081117ED

Page 34634

1 redirect. I said "ideally speaking." Of course, we don't know what's

2 going to happen.

3 [The witness takes the stand]

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, sir.

5 WITNESS: NEVEN TOMIC [Resumed]

6 [The witness answered through interpreter]

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We're delighted to see you

8 again. As you know, you're coming back into this courtroom to finish the

9 end of cross-examination and redirect. If all goes well, the Prosecutor

10 should finish today with his cross-examination, and tomorrow Mr. Karnavas

11 could have his redirect, so that by Wednesday you can return to your

12 normal life.

13 Mr. Scott, you have the floor. You may proceed.

14 MR. SCOTT: Good afternoon, Mr. President. Good afternoon, Your

15 Honours, all of you. Good afternoon to counsel and all those in and

16 around the courtroom.

17 Cross-examination by Mr. Scott: [Continued]

18 Q. And good afternoon to you, Mr. Tomic. And again as others have

19 said, welcome back.

20 Sir, just to start with some procedural -- very quickly with some

21 procedural matters and just so the record is clear, I assume we know what

22 the answers are, but can we understand, sir, that since the last time you

23 were here on the 4th of November, you have not talked to anyone about the

24 testimony you gave last time or the testimony that you might anticipate

25 giving today or tomorrow, you haven't spoken to anyone about that; is

Page 34635

1 that correct?

2 A. Correct.

3 Q. And I take it, sir, that you have not reviewed any documents or

4 any materials of any sort in connection with preparing to testify since

5 you were here last year [sic] on the 4th of November.

6 A. That's right.

7 Q. Sir, I think we need to quickly review, if we can, so -- since

8 you were here some more than ten days ago, just quickly where we were.

9 Among other things, sir, on the 4th of November I had shown to

10 you a document of a record of a meeting with President Tudjman on the 8th

11 of January, 1992, which, for the record, is Exhibit P00108. Perhaps if I

12 mention it to you, this was the meeting with President Tudjman also

13 involving Mr. Franjo Boras and the Bosnian Serb leader, Mr. Koljevic.

14 You might remember it. There was a part of the transcript which I did

15 not cover at the time and entirely my oversight, and if we could look

16 that again which I think will also serve at the same time to essentially

17 bring us back up to speed. If I can ask you -- I think all the

18 binders -- if we could have all the ushers -- thank you very much. In

19 binder -- it's Exhibit 00108. I think that will be in the first binder.

20 If I can ask you, sir, in that transcript -- and again I'll

21 remind you that in all of this so-called presidential transcript

22 material, the page numbers in both English and the Croatian language

23 versions should be the same. So if I refer you to page 9, it should be

24 page 9 in both versions. And, in fact, I will ask you, please, to go to

25 page 9. This is -- this was Mr. Koljevic continuing to talk -- excuse

Page 34636

1 me.

2 On page 9, sir, about the second paragraph beginning on that

3 page, it says:

4 "Therefore, we proposed a confederal status for Bosnia at least

5 as the first stage in which, if one views it constructively, the Croatian

6 national community and the Serbian national community could have free

7 confederal ties with Croatia and Serbia."

8 If you'll then go to the next page, page 10, just continuing that

9 same discussion, and the first paragraph on page 10 it continues:

10 "Of course, we can speak principally about Bosnia and

11 Herzegovina, although I would be glad if we, as Serbs from Bosnia and

12 Herzegovina, could mediate a bit, offer our good services if you so

13 desire and if that proves feasible. Likewise, in this broader Serbian

14 and Croatian area, it seems to us - I spoke with Radovan Karadzic about

15 this last night - we both think that this could be the beginning of an

16 overall settlement of Serbo-Croatian relations. If we don't solve these

17 relations, then, if I may say so, there is no end.

18 "Then the rest in this political crisis would be far easier."

19 And then if I could ask you, please, to go on over to page 41.

20 And again after language intervention, that is, by Mr. Koljevic, the

21 second paragraph under his name, Ms. Koljevic says:

22 "First, I think that we should follow this road politically

23 because a certain social acceptance, a climate, should be created. In

24 Bosnia, Croats and Serbs have created a very negative climate, and if we

25 were Bosnians and Herzegovinians, so it is a little discomfiting to say

Page 34637

1 whether you are a Serb or a Croat. We have to put an end to that

2 climate."

3 Now, skipping to about halfway down through the next paragraph,

4 Mr. Koljevic continues:

5 "We studied the map and those municipalities, and then we saw

6 that the same thing had been done with the Croats and with the Serbs. So

7 these enclaves, which can be established on the municipal level, they

8 should be delimited, and then we should see what can be done with the

9 transfer, what can be accomplished by agreement, and we should institute

10 fair exchanges and create an agency for the civilised transfer of

11 property and population which will be in the interest of those people.

12 The term 'homogeneity' was, as you know, vilified in Yugoslavia. Why

13 should it be something terrible for people to live with people who are

14 closest to them?"

15 And that brings us back, sir, if you go over to the top of

16 page 42, to where we were, and that's where we read when you were here

17 last. President Tudjman comes back into the conversation and says, in

18 response to what was just said:

19 "Wherever national problems so conceived emerge as they did with

20 us, that was resolved from World War I and World War II, that was brought

21 to a conclusion by exchanges."

22 Now, that's the topic we were generally talking about, if you

23 will, the demographic issues and the organisation of Bosnia and

24 Herzegovina when we finished the last time you were here. I also showed

25 to you Exhibit P08623, which you may wish to turn to. You may not have

Page 34638

1 to, but just so you know what I'm referring to. That was the statement

2 that I showed you about -- that Mr. Pogarcic had made. You may remember

3 that. And among other things, in that interview Mr. Pogarcic said that

4 as long as an ethnic group was not more than 10 per cent of the

5 population, they can function as an ornament and "can even serve as proof

6 of the will to create a multiethnic society."

7 Now, moving forward based on that, if you look back at

8 Mr. Pogarcic's article again, which is again P08623, one of the things

9 that Mr. Pogarcic says in that statement, which I didn't read to you

10 today but we looked at it the last time, he said that all three of the

11 ethnic groups, Serbs, Muslims and Croats, during the 1991 to 1995 period

12 "ethnically cleansed territories wherever they could." And do you

13 agree -- I was wondering, do you agree with that statement that all three

14 of the ethnic groups, if you will, ethnically cleansed territories

15 wherever they could?

16 A. I wouldn't agree.

17 Q. In terms of ethnic demographics, isn't it true that the

18 Herceg-Bosna HVO leadership took a number of steps throughout this period

19 1991 to 1995 to increase the number of Croats in a desired area and to

20 reduce the number of Muslims in that or those areas; isn't that correct?

21 A. No, it isn't.

22 Q. Isn't it correct, sir, that in fact there were even housing

23 projects that were established and implemented for the specific purposes

24 of increasing the Croat population in certain areas?

25 A. Those were projects that were developed following the Washington

Page 34639

1 and Dayton Accords, when some people decided that they would not be

2 returning to the areas in which they were minorities. They were provided

3 aid, in terms of building their own homes wherever they chose.

4 Q. Well, let's turn next, then, to Exhibit P08545, which will be in

5 the second binder. P08545. And, sir, this is a record of another

6 meeting in the offices of President Tudjman, on this occasion dated the

7 27th of March of 1995. And I'd like to direct your attention, please, to

8 page 14.

9 Now, some parts of this relate to another topic, but rather than

10 come back to this transcript again, I'm going to try to deal with this

11 particular document at one time, if we can.

12 MR. KARNAVAS: I just have a standing objection, as of last week,

13 that anything that goes outside the four corners of the indictment, the

14 period of the indictment, you know, that should prohibit the Prosecution

15 from going into those areas. Again, I just want to make sure that I'm

16 very, very clear, because I think the Prosecution is politicising this

17 trial and now we're prosecuting the implementation of the Dayton Accords.

18 And if that is the case, then I do think that we need to desperately have

19 a hearing about this to determine whether we should file any appropriate

20 motions as a result of the expanding of the indictment with the

21 acquiescence of the Trial Chamber.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We had this discussion last

23 week. The Prosecution explained very extensively what their position

24 was.

25 Mr. Scott, please proceed.

Page 34640

1 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour.

2 And just so the record is clear in response -- I appreciate the

3 Court's ruling, but just so the record is clear, in case it may come up

4 again: Since the last time Mr. Tomic was here -- I went through his

5 testimony to date, and I have 14 pages of excerpts of his direct

6 examination referring to the Washington Agreement and Dayton, 14 pages of

7 transcript excerpts, so Mr. Karnavas went into these topics extensively,

8 if there's any doubt about that.

9 Q. Sir, if you look on page 14, toward the bottom, where there is a

10 passage attributed to Mr. Prlic, it says:

11 "Mr. President, not to burden you with too many facts, and the

12 president of the party here has here presented 56 various facts, I think

13 the main question today is one of overall political relations. I will

14 just say a couple of sentences about that at the end. Since I am the

15 prime minister and deputy prime minister who ruled in the Federation, in

16 Sarajevo, just a couple of words about it so that we may have a rounded

17 picture of the current situation. At this moment, those free areas of

18 the Federation function as two state entities and as two completely

19 separate states within its internal structure. They are the Croatian

20 Republic of Herceg-Bosna and the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

21 Therefore, these are territories controlled by the Republic of BH Army."

22 Excuse me:

23 "Therefore, these are territories controlled by the Republic of

24 BH Army. Why do I say two states? According to all the constituent

25 elements, these are two completely different states. For instance," and

Page 34641

1 this is something we talked about extensively when you were here before,

2 "the usual customs procedure is undertaken when goods from HB,

3 Herceg-Bosna, enter that region and is the same procedure when goods

4 arrive from Germany, Austria or Canada. They are two completely separate

5 entities."

6 Now, skipping down toward the end of that full paragraph,

7 Mr. Prlic continues --

8 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, I would ask that he be allowed to

9 read the entire passage. If he's going to cherry-pick from this, I would

10 expect that he allow at least the entire passage of what Mr. Prlic is

11 saying. This is proper procedure, and it should be transferred -- the

12 burden should not be transferred on redirect, especially when you are

13 granting more time to them and you are not granting more time to me

14 within the overall time frame that you have allotted me. This is

15 fundamentally unfair.

16 MR. SCOTT: Well, to respond, Your Honour, number 1 --

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, do respond.

18 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.

19 First of all, this practice -- and Mr. Karnavas -- the Chamber

20 well knows by now this is something Mr. Karnavas says every time, and we

21 have the same discussion every time.

22 We can't read the entire documents, and Mr. Karnavas, in his

23 cross -- in his direct examination, excuse me, with this witness, with

24 the witness last week, did exactly the same thing. He takes a document

25 and he puts to the witness those parts which he wants to put to the

Page 34642

1 witness. And then he turns around and says the Prosecution should not be

2 allowed to do the same thing. Now, that's just not the case, and it's

3 not improper procedure, and there is no issue here about the time given

4 to Mr. Karnavas.

5 The Chamber's indicated already that it apparently intends to be

6 very liberal with the amount of redirect given to Mr. Karnavas, so I

7 don't think there's an issue about that at all.

8 But in any event, in any event, the procedure that I follow is

9 completely the proper one and the accepted practice.

10 MR. KARNAVAS: It's not a matter -- Mr. President --

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, one moment,

12 please, one moment.

13 The Trial Chamber dismissed your objection. Through this

14 witness, it is important for the Trial Chamber to know how he perceived

15 what Mr. Prlic may have said. So rather than waste time on knowing how

16 the question was put, whether it merits an objection, I think it's better

17 for everybody to focus on the very text. That is what matters. And it

18 is in the very interests of Dr. Prlic. He said something, but the

19 witness may as well confirm or deny or give the specification.

20 You, in your redirect, you will have the opportunity to go back

21 to the issue.

22 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, the text speaks for itself, Mr. President.

23 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Karnavas, you raised an objection. The

24 other party answered. The Chamber has told you that it has taken a

25 decision, and that's it. We are not going on to have these endless

Page 34643

1 discussions. Last Thursday morning was really an abyss of loss of time.

2 That's it. There's a decision, Mr. Karnavas, and please, Mr. Scott,

3 continue.

4 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well. I will continue to object as long as

5 the Trial Chamber allows the Prosecution to take text out of context. He

6 should be allowed to look at the entire text.

7 JUDGE TRECHSEL: You have made that point, and you can object

8 every time.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, please proceed.

10 MR. SCOTT:

11 Q. Sir, where I left off, and if you go to the end of that

12 paragraph, Mr. Prlic continues:

13 "They still do not have salaries, and salaries, yes or no, are

14 the foremost political issue here, and they will not be able to enter

15 that process. This will be extremely important later when we talk about

16 the Federation, with the problem being exceptionally complex in a

17 technical sense, I believe viewed statically, it cannot be resolved at

18 all. Mr. President, as far as the Federation is concerned, nothing has

19 been done so far in the functional sense. Not a single function of the

20 Federation has been developed."

21 And I just note for you, sir, and the courtroom, this is March

22 1995. This is a year after the signing of the Washington Agreement:

23 "Not a single function of the Federation has been developed.

24 Therefore, these are all just a few psychological effects. It exists or

25 it does not exist. However, not a single function of the Federation has

Page 34644

1 been established, developed, or implemented. Because of this, officials

2 in the Federation normally have found themselves in the situation where

3 their authority and posts are being jeopardised, and that process is the

4 way it is. They assess that within this time frame, the Croatian

5 Republic of Herceg-Bosna would grow stronger, contrary to their primary

6 aim. They have two primary aims at this moment. The first is to topple

7 the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, and the other is to assure access

8 to the sea. So these are the two basic aims."

9 Can you confirm, sir, that by November -- excuse me, by March of

10 1995, based on your involvement in these issues and the various senior

11 positions that you held at the time that you've described to the Judges,

12 that in fact by March 1995, essentially nothing substantial had been done

13 to establish the Federation, it was not functioning?

14 A. As I said before during my evidence, when the Croatian

15 representatives arrived in Sarajevo, the implementation of the Washington

16 Agreement began, as well as the attempt to build up the Federation.

17 Likewise, as I've mentioned, we drew up analyses to see how the financial

18 system would be functioning in BH-controlled territory and HVO-controlled

19 territory.

20 I, as the finance minister of the Republic and the Federation,

21 tabled a proposal to the government of package measures that were to be

22 adopted. My own ministry prepared a total of 26 regulations covering

23 that area, such as customs, taxes, budgetary law and so on and so forth.

24 However, there was obstruction --

25 Q. That is not --

Page 34645

1 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, I object to the interruption. It was

2 an open-ended question. He's entitled. He said nothing was developed.

3 He didn't say by whom. Now that he doesn't like the answer, because now

4 he's realising that it was the Muslim authorities of Sarajevo that

5 refused -- that refused to implement the Washington Accord. They totally

6 did not want a federation to exist. What they wanted was a unitary

7 state, and that's what they were trying to do. That's what the witness

8 is trying to explain and I object to the interruption. We can't have it

9 both ways, we can't have it both ways.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very good. Mr. Witness,

11 please proceed, please complete, because you were discussing the 26

12 regulations, you will explain, and the Prosecutor interrupted you. So

13 please complete what you were going to say, why the 26 regulations did

14 not see the light of day.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Those regulations were passed, but

16 the basic question was not resolved about the establishment of the

17 Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina; what army, what about the police?

18 According to the Washington Agreement, the police was set up at the

19 cantonal level, but we cannot now finance the budget of the state, and in

20 accordance with the Washington Agreement, first a law on police had to be

21 passed, a law on the army, the laws regulating the beneficiaries of the

22 budget, and pressure was exerted in this sense. And we talked about the

23 media reports in an effort to create the impression that Croats were

24 opposed to the implementation of the Washington Agreement.

25 However, no regulations defining this area that I was talking

Page 34646

1 about, the budget, the expenditures, the institutions of the Federation,

2 was passed [as interpreted], because the Bosniak side was not interested

3 in establishing the Federation before it knew what would happen with the

4 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was its only goal. And this was

5 why pressure was exerted for the funds to be channeled into the budget of

6 the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But where were they supposed to be

7 spent? And this was the basic reason why these regulations were not

8 implemented.

9 Later on, when we insisted for the establishment of the

10 Federation for -- for the governments of the Federation and the Republic

11 to be divided, the process was able to move on. Let me give you an

12 example.

13 In accordance with the Washington Agreement, it was envisaged

14 that there would be the Central Bank of the Federation of

15 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the currency, the Federation of

16 Bosnia-Herzegovina was to have its own currency. At no stage did the

17 Bosniak colleagues want to pass the law on the Central Bank of the

18 Federation, but they said, well, there is the National Bank of the State

19 of the Republic of Herzegovina and we have the BH dinar. But we focused

20 on the implementation of the Federation, and we insisted that the law on

21 the Central Bank of the Federation be passed. Of course, this document

22 never saw the light of day, and that is one of the reasons why there was

23 this continuous obstruction and this creating of the atmosphere of the

24 impression that Croats were trying to obstruct it. I'm talking about

25 people who came to Sarajevo fully intending to implement the Washington

Page 34647

1 Agreement.

2 MR. KARNAVAS: One minor correction. On page 16, line 15, the

3 gentleman indicated was not passed. As it reflects now in the

4 transcript, it says "was passed." It should say "was not passed."

5 Page 16, line 15.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.

7 MR. SCOTT:

8 Q. Coming back to that part of the transcript that more directly

9 relates to the issue that we were on, in terms of demographics and some

10 of the ethnic issues, if I can ask you to go to page 18 of the record,

11 and this continues to be Mr. Prlic speaking, and the first paragraph

12 starting at page 18, Mr. Prlic says:

13 "As regards the conference, one speaks of the emotional and basic

14 ties with Herceg-Bosna. That is why this is important, I tell you, most

15 Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina do not feel emotional towards BH, our

16 integral group here, ourselves, do not feel it is our state. I know

17 this. I was at the talks on Thursday and Friday, on the other side of

18 the table. Therefore, that is the only significant and emotional charge

19 and we must bear it in mind at all times. That is why I believe that

20 what we say politically, confederation as the precondition of this," and

21 that's something we're going to hopefully get to today, as has been

22 mentioned to the Judges, the topic of the confederation, and Mr. Prlic

23 says: "That is why I believe that what we say politically, confederation

24 as the precondition of this, is that we must make it operational through

25 the appropriate decisions and test, let us say, the will of the Muslims."

Page 34648

1 Then continuing at the bottom of that page, the last line on

2 page 18:

3 "And the third issue, Mr. Markovic, as the projects we have

4 mentioned to you, it is the construction of a thousand individual housing

5 units in the areas of Capljina, Dubrava, Stolac, and the southern part of

6 Mostar which we believe will strengthen the Croatian spine in that

7 exceptionally important area."

8 And that brings me back, sir, to the question we were a few

9 moments ago. Wasn't that specifically being done to increase the

10 Croatian population and demographics in those areas, as a way of

11 maintaining Croatian control in those areas; correct?

12 A. It was a pragmatic response to the situation and the number of

13 refugees in those areas, refugees who lived in other people's apartments

14 and houses, and they had to leave those houses and apartments. And the

15 alternative solution that was offered to them was for houses to be built

16 for them there, because they did not want to go back to those places for

17 the most part in Central Bosnia from where they had left.

18 Q. Isn't it correct, sir, that the HVO authorities and many Croats

19 of Herzegovina were not eager to live again with Muslims?

20 A. Well, you cannot generalise. In the areas where fighting was

21 fierce and where there were victims in people's families, the wounds were

22 still fresh and it was difficult to act politically to make the people go

23 back to their -- to the places where they used to live immediately.

24 Q. Sir, there was a great deal of concern among the Herceg-Bosna

25 leadership, was there not, about Muslims coming back or returning to the

Page 34649

1 so-called Croat areas?

2 A. Muslims lived in Croatian areas until the war broke out between

3 Croats and Muslims. So they were there, and the basic problem was the

4 relationship of the victims, the people who suffered, and this was the

5 general problem that prevented the return of the people.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Witness, this issue that

7 is important, we see that Mr. Prlic intervenes before Mr. Tudjman, and

8 the date is after the Washington Accords.

9 The situation that you experienced, because you were minister of

10 the Federation, the ethnic groups, the Serbs, the Muslims and the Croats,

11 owing to the BiH offensive, were there areas taken by the Muslim armed

12 forces where the Croats were to remain and did not allow the return of

13 the Croats? Do you have knowledge of any situation where theoretically,

14 within the framework of the Washington Accords, there were to be

15 significant changes, by way of an example, if you know any?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, we constantly received

17 information about the attacks on the returnees in Central Bosnia, parts

18 of Jablanica. Those are people who were there as refugees, Muslims.

19 That was their reaction. So this was an atmosphere where the blood was

20 still boiling in people's veins after the conflicts that had taken place.

21 So we're talking about those areas where Croats were supposed to return,

22 in particular in Central Bosnia around Travnik, where we would receive

23 information to that effect. And I mentioned Jablanica, Doljani, those

24 areas.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good. So you cite the case of

Page 34650

1 Jablanica.

2 Mr. Scott.

3 MR. SCOTT:

4 Q. And you mentioned the -- if you will, the Muslims' reaction to

5 some of the returns in Central Bosnia. But, sir, it was the same on the

6 Croat side concerning so-called Muslim returns, wasn't it? There were

7 many people, including people, I put it to you, in the HVO leadership who

8 were opposed to the Muslims either staying or coming back to these

9 so-called Croat areas; isn't that true?

10 A. Well, I've already noted that the situation was so fresh in

11 people's memories, and there was mutual situation of this kind.

12 Q. Let me ask you to go to Exhibit P08848, which will be in the

13 second of the large binders. P08848.

14 If I can direct your attention to page 3 of this record of a

15 meeting involving, among others, Mr. Prlic and Mr. Tudjman. Mr. Prlic,

16 on page 3:

17 "With regards to the return of people, Central Bosnia, Sarajevo,

18 Posavina and that part, he asked me whether all of that would be

19 successful. I gave him that book. He said, 'We should meet again many

20 times before the perfect peace is restored.'"

21 Skipping to the next paragraph, he says:

22 "He asked me what I thought about that. I told him that the

23 Croats did not want to return to the areas with the majority of the

24 Muslim population."

25 Next page:

Page 34651

1 "I gave him my example. I did not want to bring my daughters to

2 the predominantly Muslim town, because I am afraid that they might get

3 married to the Muslim guys. This is how I look at it, as a parent."

4 Now, that's what Mr. Prlic said, and isn't that a commonly-held

5 view among the Croats of Herzegovina around this time?

6 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, this is 1998. What does this have to

7 do with the indictment? You know, I'm objecting on the grounds of

8 relevance. I would like to hear what the relevance is. Why is this

9 relevant to the indictment? We keep talking about Croats. Now we're

10 vilifying all of the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina. He talks about, you

11 know, the Herceg-Bosna leadership. Who are the leaderships? What is the

12 relevance of all of this?

13 MR. SCOTT: Well, among other things, Your Honour, it goes to

14 Mr. Prlic's state of mind and attitudes in this regard, number 1.

15 Number 2, the witness just said a few moments ago, and I thought it was

16 quite interesting and actually quite connected, because he was

17 attributing these emotions to the fresh wounds, if you will, the fresh

18 wounds after the 1993-1994 war. Well, we can see here that apparently

19 those feelings remained the same even by 1998, some years after these

20 fresh wounds, which undoubtedly were significant, but it's entirely

21 relevant and goes directly to the witness's testimony, Your Honour.

22 Sir, that was --

23 MR. KARNAVAS: May I get a ruling, please? May I get a ruling?

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In the view of the Chamber, it

25 is relevant and fully acceptable, all the more so since Mr. Prlic

Page 34652

1 continues indicating that, "I think that the visit of the Pope here is

2 important." So this also seems to be linked to the Pope's visit.

3 Witness, were you aware of that?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, aware of what?

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Of the visit of the Pope that

6 was likely to improve the situation.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I was the president of the

8 state committee for the Pope's visit to Sarajevo, and I knew about those

9 activities. And his arrival was supposed to be a political message, a

10 message of support to the Croats to stay in Bosnia, to remain there,

11 because Croats, as the smallest ethnic community, after all that they'd

12 been through, felt some fear that they would not be able to remain in

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina as a constituent people in the areas where Muslims

14 were in the majority. They did not -- didn't have schools in Croatian,

15 and children were not coming back, for the most part. People who were

16 going back were the elderly, who just went there to guard the property.

17 So I think that the lobbying for the visit of the Pope was an important

18 effort -- an important project for the people in -- for the Croatian

19 people in Bosnia and Herzegovina to remain there.

20 MR. SCOTT:

21 Q. Mr. Tomic, I come back to the original question some minutes ago

22 before the objection from Mr. Karnavas.

23 The view expressed by Mr. Prlic, when he said, "I told him that

24 the Croats did not want to return to the areas with a majority Muslim

25 population, I did not want to bring my daughters to the predominantly

Page 34653

1 Muslim town," that was a view held not only by Mr. Prlic, but by a number

2 of people in the HVO Herceg-Bosna leadership even by 1998; isn't that

3 correct?

4 A. I think that Mr. Prlic here expressed the fears of many people,

5 many Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina, when he said that. I know that this

6 is not his view, as far as his family is concerned, because as far as I

7 know, his brother was married twice, both of his wives were Muslims, so

8 family-wise there are no problems there. But there was this fear that

9 existed, and this was a way to convey those concerns. It was just an

10 example.

11 Q. It was -- if you can go to page 8 of the same document, please.

12 President Tudjman, in this conversation, Mr. Prlic at one point

13 says:

14 "My dear Jadranko," referring to him by first name:

15 "My dear Jadranko, Zubak is one line, you are another, those down

16 there are third one, and that's the problem."

17 And Mr. Jadranko Prlic says:

18 "Mr. President, I do not belong to any line. I have listened to

19 your advice."

20 And just repeating that at the end of that paragraph he says:

21 "I do not belong to any line. I have been implementing what you

22 were telling me all the time."

23 In your close association with Mr. Prlic through this time, and

24 learned when you were here before that you were I think it fair to say

25 close friends and close professional associates, if I can say

Page 34654

1 "professional," in government, et cetera, you were very close to

2 Mr. Prlic. And does this not accurately state, indeed, his actions and

3 views at the time, that this was he followed what President Tudjman told

4 him to do? Or to quote his own words: "I have been implementing what

5 you were telling me all the time"?

6 A. Mr. Prlic is pragmatic by nature, very much so, and in his

7 relations with President Tudjman, that was the stance that he took in

8 order to get the information, because all the negotiations that were

9 going on and all the information that came in came in, for the most part,

10 through Zagreb, so in this context I think that his relationship with

11 President Tudjman was a correct one.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, there's something

13 that is lacking for us Judges, at least as far as I'm concerned. It

14 seems that this conversation between Tudjman and Prlic is linked to the

15 departure of Zubak. What happened? What happened with Zubak?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Zubak founded a new party. He left

17 the HDZ and founded a new party. That was called "The New Croatian

18 Initiative."

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And why did he leave the HDZ?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Throughout this time, the HDZ

21 functioned as a movement of the Croatian people in Bosnia and

22 Herzegovina, and it was not actually set up as a party, if you look at

23 the membership, if you look at how it functioned. I gave you my example,

24 where I became a member of the Presidency of the party ex officio,

25 although I never actually became a member of that party. And then, at a

Page 34655

1 later stage, when there was a period of peace, when Bosnia and

2 Herzegovina was going through a reconstruction, of course there were

3 different views and visions as to how things should go on from there,

4 expounded by various people. And Zubak was the first to actually leave

5 the HDZ and to find a new party. Mr. Prlic did the same thing at a later

6 date, and there were others that followed. Be that as it may, new

7 parties were created in Bosnia and Herzegovina, new Croat parties.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Prlic created what, what

9 party? What party did he create?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Prlic founded a party that was

11 called "The European Movement," something like that, and it was a

12 multiethnic party. It was not a Croat ethnic party.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And given Mr. Zubak created

14 his party, Mr. -- his party, what did Mr. Tudjman have to say to that? I

15 mean, did he see all this powerlessly? I mean, how did he react to all

16 this?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I can't give you an answer to

18 that question, because I really don't know how he saw that, but I do know

19 that, in effect, every new party weakened the Croat chances in Bosnia and

20 Herzegovina because votes were dispersed, and Croats, as a small

21 community, were still bound to the HDZ as the first party that was set

22 up.

23 Two years ago, a new party, the largest so far, was founded.

24 This party is called "The HDZ 1990." So it's the same name with the

25 addition of "1990." At the local elections that were held recently, its

Page 34656

1 results were much worse than the original HDZ's.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.

3 MR. SCOTT:

4 Q. If we can turn next on this same topic, continuing on to

5 Exhibit P08489. P08489, which will be in the second binder. This is a

6 further record of a meeting involving President Tudjman and others on the

7 24th of November, 1995, actually quite close in time to one of the

8 earlier records we looked at.

9 If I can direct your attention, please, to page 6, which again

10 will pick up with Mr. Prlic talking. Page 6, a few lines down in the

11 first paragraph on that page, Mr. Prlic says:

12 "In that connection, our basic demand to the Muslim side has a

13 particular gravity, so we would ask you to try to resolve it with

14 Mr. Izetbegovic. It's about addressing the question of demarcating the

15 borders between the 'velezupe,' or cantons as we now call them, within

16 the framework of the Federation. You know what our interest is in that

17 respect. Under the Vienna agreement, these newly liberated areas are not

18 included in the Federation territory, because in any case that process

19 has to be met. It's vital also because of the next conclusion, and it's

20 about the return of refugees and displaced persons, where we find

21 ourselves, whether we like it or not, in a defensive position, bearing in

22 mind that the Muslims are staying, that the Muslims don't have any other

23 homelands to fall back on, and even at the price of far lower standards

24 of living, they will stay and fill up our areas. That's not the case

25 with the Croats, and in accordance with our national priorities we must

Page 34657

1 ensure that when it comes to demarcation, we safeguard those areas in

2 which - I wish to say this perfectly openly - we are keen to have a

3 majority Croatian population."

4 Then continuing over to the top of page 9, please, and Mr. Prlic

5 continues on this topic, the top of page 9, please. Mr. Prlic says:

6 "And the third aspect is support in the demographic sense. We

7 discussed that at Dayton, too, the minister of foreign affairs and

8 ourselves, and we must secure funds for Drvar, either on a credit basis

9 or some other way, we are securing these areas for Croatian families to

10 live there and be there. We have to secure funds for the families who

11 tomorrow should be living in Ivanjica, between Dubrovnik and Trebinje, in

12 that belt that belongs to the Federation. But there won't be any

13 Croatian people, regardless of what the borders are, we won't be able to

14 fully realise the interests that were the reason in the first place why

15 we ended up drawing these borders in this part of the territory,

16 regardless of all the arrangements that are mentioned, that we

17 anticipated over a long, probably quite a long time."

18 And you'll go then on the topic to page 14, bottom of page 14

19 where Mr. Bender comes into the conversation, and I will ask you, sir, a

20 couple of questions about this when I put these passages to you. Bender

21 says at the end of that paragraph above "president," he says:

22 "I would like to ask for a concretisation of the national

23 programme of protecting marginal territories, in addition to Dubrovnik,

24 through Num and so on, to Central Bosnia, because if we don't concretise

25 this, I'm afraid that the Croats will drain out from these areas and then

Page 34658

1 we don't need either the Federation or Bosnia and Herzegovina. I hope

2 that with plentiful help from the Republic of Croatia, we'll perform our

3 task to the satisfaction of Croats."

4 Sir, isn't it correct that throughout this time period, this

5 continued to be a major concern of the Herceg-Bosna and HVO leadership,

6 and that was the issue of the demographics in so-called Herceg-Bosna, and

7 there was a concern about the loss of Croat population and an increase in

8 Muslim population; correct?

9 A. No, this is not in reference to that. This is the period after

10 the Federation had been defined as a number of cantons. The Drvar area,

11 after the combat operations in the area, remained undefined. Did it

12 belong to the Federation or not? How would that area be organised? And

13 this was the question.

14 A large number of refugees, Croat refugees, had arrived in Drvar

15 to settle there. Aid became necessary in order to enable those people to

16 live there. We needed funds to build accommodation for them. We needed

17 a school system to be up and running. A modicum of economy, so to speak.

18 There was a lot of forestry there, timber processing and so on and so

19 forth.

20 This is not about Herceg-Bosna. This is the situation in the

21 Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina following the operations during which

22 these areas became part of the Federation. But it had not been defined

23 yet which canton they would fall under.

24 Q. Let's continue on this same record and see what President Tudjman

25 says on this topic. If I can direct your attention to page 30. Page 30,

Page 34659

1 please, and it picks up at the second line of the page, President Tudjman

2 talking:

3 "Yes, they have preserved a complete Bosnia, but one where, on

4 the demarcation line there'll be created four kilometres. But you

5 interpret what the Croatian people got. So the Croatian people also got

6 territories that they didn't have, so Grahovo, not just Kupres, but

7 Grahovo, Glamoc, Drvar and Jajce, territories, then, that are of

8 strategic interest for the Croatian state. And it's clear that here

9 we're to try, like down there at Stolac, to try through settling people

10 there, you'll create," and he goes and talks about "Mr. Susak has already

11 told you about a decision to put certain military unit in an area to

12 cover these things and secure things for the future."

13 The next paragraph, Mr. Tudjman goes on to say:

14 "Don't lose confidence. Gentlemen, we've succeeded. We've

15 succeeded in getting not just Herceg-Bosna, which is what we had, what

16 we've got - we can say that among ourselves - half of Bosnia, if we're

17 good at governing, if we govern cleverly."

18 Going to the top of page 31 , President Tudjman continuing on,

19 first paragraph on that page:

20 "And, of course, in the Federation again, and on the basis of

21 past experience, you have to demand that every Croatian municipality

22 holds out and is autonomous, self-governing, or in places where Croats

23 are scattered around, in places where they can't hold out or don't want

24 to, get them to move to these territories that we're interested in so

25 that in every respect, and in respect of the population itself, they take

Page 34660

1 on a Croatian character."

2 Sir, I put my question -- the same question I put to you a few

3 moments ago, after seeing what President Tudjman says. It was a

4 continuing demographic policy of President Tudjman and the Herceg-Bosna

5 leadership to work the demographics in such a way and to move population

6 in such a way as to maintain Croatian control in certain desired areas;

7 isn't that correct?

8 A. We must go back to the Constitution of the Federation of Bosnia

9 and Herzegovina. The cantons were in charge of education, the school

10 system, the media, and so on and so forth, a number of other areas as

11 well. This is about Drvar and Bosanska Grahovo, about these two areas.

12 They are here becoming part of a canton that has a Croat ethnic majority,

13 the so-called Livno canton. Within the canton, these people had their

14 own schools with teaching in the Croatian language. They had their own

15 media and such like. It wasn't the same --

16 Q. Excuse me. It's not just about Livno. It talks about Kupres,

17 Jajce, Central Bosnia. You can't limit what President Tudjman has said

18 to those particular areas you just mentioned. In fact, Tudjman says,

19 "We've succeeded in not just getting Herceg-Bosna, but half of Bosnia if

20 we govern smartly"; correct?

21 A. So this was an expression of support to the Croatian leadership,

22 telling them to join in the effort to build Bosnia-Herzegovina. It was

23 also a message saying that a solution could be found. I'm talking about

24 a canton that was predominantly Croat and also a canton that had parity

25 with the other towns in it. The schooling was cantonal level at the

Page 34661

1 time, education was, and this was one of the important factors in terms

2 of having people return to the area.

3 Q. Sir, in the course of your testimony when you were here

4 previously, you made a number of references or comments about the Tuzla

5 municipality. Just one question on that, I believe.

6 Just to be clear, during the period April 1992 to April 1994,

7 April 1992 to April 1994, were you ever in Tuzla municipality?

8 A. No.

9 Q. And just not on Tuzla, but if I can just expand that and ask you

10 the same question, for example, about Zenica. Were you ever in Zenica

11 during the period April 1992 to April 1994?

12 A. I was passing through in 1992, October 1992.

13 Q. Is that the only time that you were passing through or in Zenica

14 during that two-year period?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. You were asked some questions about money that was flowing from

17 the Croatian Ministry of Defence to Croatia, and we saw some of that

18 documentation. And you made reference in that part of your testimony

19 that, to your knowledge or in your view, this money was coming from the

20 contributions from the Croatian Diaspora. Do you recall that part of

21 your testimony?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Now, sir, I'm going to put to you -- I'm putting to you now that

24 unless you've seen or unless you've been personally involved in some sort

25 of a very detailed and exhaustive accounting of all that money, you have

Page 34662

1 no way of saying, do you, that all the money that was flowing through the

2 Ministry of Defence came from diaspora contributions?

3 A. I had received information from Mr. Martinovic, and he was one of

4 the signatories of those accounts. It was based on that that I said that

5 the money had arrived in these accounts, and these accounts were opened

6 in banks outside Croatia. The implementation then went through the

7 Defence ministry or through a number of other channels that

8 Mr. Martinovic or Mr. Susak, as the signatories of those accounts, made

9 sure were available.

10 Q. Sir, I'll repeat my question to you. Sir, there's no way that

11 you can tell these Judges, under oath, that all the money that went to

12 Herceg-Bosna or the HVO through the Croatian Ministry of Defence came

13 from diaspora contributions, can you? You simply have no way of telling

14 the Judges that?

15 A. I told you how I learned this. I wasn't keeping track of those

16 accounts, and I wasn't the one doing the accounting.

17 Q. In connection with Mr. Prlic and the positions he held, and

18 you'll recall that the last time you were here you -- we looked at one of

19 his business cards, and in fact he had a cellphone number and a telephone

20 number and a fax number, and on that business card he described himself

21 as the president of the Croatian -- excuse me, the president of the HVO

22 HZ-HB; is that correct? Do you recall?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. And I take it, sir, that in your experience, and working closely

25 with Mr. Prlic, when he met people, when he met international officials,

Page 34663

1 for example, I suppose he did not introduce himself as the convener of

2 meetings, did he?

3 A. I don't think I understand.

4 Q. Well, did he introduce you, "Hi, President so-and-so. I'm

5 Jadranko Prlic, I'm the convener of meetings"?

6 A. I know nothing about that.

7 Q. And I suppose at these meetings he never introduced himself as,

8 quote, "the signer of documents."

9 A. I really don't understand your question.

10 Q. Sir, when you heard --

11 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, I'm going to object to this line of

12 questioning. We've heard witnesses over and over again talk about what

13 the function was of the president of the -- of an executive authority, be

14 it at a municipal level or at this level. I find these questions

15 offensive, and I think that I would expect that the Trial Chamber would

16 find them equally offensive at this point, three years into this trial.

17 I think that this is the better time -- there are better ways to use up

18 his time that the Trial Chamber has been so generous in giving him.

19 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. Karnavas.

20 Your Honour, my questions are entirely serious. Representations

21 have been made about what powers and authorities Mr. Prlic had, and

22 I think it's appropriate to know how did he hold himself out to the

23 world. And I suspect, as I'm putting the questions to the witness, he

24 didn't introduce himself as, "I convene meetings." My question is

25 entirely serious.

Page 34664

1 Q. Sir, did you ever hear of Mr. Prlic explain himself or his

2 position to international officials or others, that his position in

3 Herceg-Bosna was, quote, "to sign documents"?

4 A. Mr. Prlic was the president of the HVO HZ-HB, and that is

5 precisely how he introduced himself.

6 Q. Now, did you come to know that throughout this period of 1992 to

7 1994, that Mr. Prlic, among other things, had a number of ongoing

8 dealings with the Serb -- the Bosnian Serb authorities?

9 A. I did not know that there was permanent contact. I know that

10 some information would occasionally arrive, but I knew of no permanent,

11 ongoing contact.

12 Q. I'm not sure where the word "permanent" came from. It wasn't in

13 my question. My question was: Did you become aware that from time to

14 time, perhaps increasing over time, Mr. Prlic had dealings and

15 negotiations with the Bosnian Serb authorities? And I take it the answer

16 is, "Yes."

17 A. Yes. At a later stage, there were contacts, as far as I know.

18 Q. Let me ask you to go to Exhibit P10718, which will be in the

19 third binder. P10718. And I'm told that the translations for those who

20 might want to look in the B/C/S, that those translations were distributed

21 today that we've been able to obtain since the last time. But, in any

22 event, P10718.

23 Sir, this is a BBC article dated the 14th of June, 1993. It

24 refers to Mr. Prlic being involved in negotiating for prisoner exchange

25 with the Serb authorities. About halfway -- well, not quite halfway down

Page 34665

1 the page, Mr. Prlic is said to have said he expresses his gratitude on

2 behalf of the Croatian side to the people of the Serbian Republic for the

3 help they have extended the Croatian civilians and fighters who had to

4 leave the Travnik area due to the attack by the Muslim army.

5 And then in the next paragraph after the reporter or interviewer

6 speaks, he talks about arranging an exchange of prisoners on an

7 all-for-all basis.

8 Can you remind the Judges what it meant, in terms of when you

9 negotiated a prisoner exchange, what "all-for-all" meant, and that was in

10 contrast to what?

11 A. I'm not exactly an expert on exchanges, but I think "all-for-all"

12 means all prisoners on one side were exchanged for all prisoners on the

13 other side.

14 Q. And I take it regardless of the numbers on each side. So even

15 though it might be -- one might be turning over 10 and the other side

16 might be turning over 50, but rather than a one-for-one, that's the

17 purpose of saying "all-for-all"; is that correct?

18 A. I assume so, yes.

19 Q. Now, in this same article, it's not only actually Mr. Prlic, but

20 it makes reference to Mr. Petkovic's involvement in these matters. And

21 if you go down toward the bottom of the document, Mr. Petkovic is

22 indicated -- is reported here as talking about these -- some people that

23 have been taken prisoner, apparently. He says:

24 "After their detainment, a different treatment would not be in

25 accordance with what you have said. Therefore, they are civilians in my

Page 34666

1 eyes. They are in uniform. I hope they will be treated as civilians and

2 that they will be returned to us."

3 Did you have any knowledge of that area around this time, that in

4 June 1993 -- about any Croat soldiers who had come into the custody, if

5 you will, of the Serbs around that time, and the issue of how they should

6 be treated?

7 A. As far as I know, there were Croats from Kupres who had been

8 taken prisoner. There was a lot of pressure being exerted by the public,

9 pushing for their release. Some of them were listed as missing, as a

10 matter of fact. There was a very powerful association of parents and

11 families that kept exerting pressure, sending letters, making public

12 statements, in a bid to find their missing relatives.

13 Q. In this same topic, would you go, please, next to P10717, which

14 should be close by, the document immediately preceding the exhibit, I

15 believe. This is another BBC article dated the 26th of June, 1993,

16 referring to the topic of prisoner exchanges and again discussing

17 Mr. Prlic's involvement.

18 In the third paragraph of this document, it says that apparently

19 the Croat side had refused to release even the 90 Serbs brought to the

20 exchange from Livno, in Western Herzegovina.

21 Do you have any knowledge as to why the Croats on this occasion

22 refused to release the 90 Serbs?

23 A. I don't know anything about that.

24 Q. And the next paragraph, it refers to 500 Serbs who had been

25 released in the -- from the area of Tomislavgrad in October of 1992. Do

Page 34667

1 you know anything about the release of those Serbs in October of 1992?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Did you know, sir, that throughout this time period, Mr. Prlic,

4 as president of the HVO HZ-HB, was engaged in prisoner exchange

5 negotiations with the Serbs?

6 A. I know that Mr. Prlic had contacts with the Serbs. It was about

7 making sure those people received assistance, and this was probably done

8 under pressure from the families who were looking for their relatives,

9 all them wanting to get their relatives released.

10 Q. Can I ask you to next turn, please, to P10711. That should also

11 be close by, P10711, another BBC-reported article on the 3rd of

12 September, 1993, concerning talks between Mr. Prlic and the Bosnian Serb

13 authorities on a number of topics, including freedom of movement, passage

14 of convoys. It's in binder number 3, but it should be -- it should have

15 been close by to the 10711.

16 My particular question about that, other than the -- you don't

17 have it?

18 A. Not there.

19 MR. SCOTT: Can we have the usher's assistance, please. Binder

20 3, 10711.

21 Okay. I'm told, Your Honour, that the documents the witness

22 would have been looking would probably have been loose today, and that

23 may be the basis of the confusion.

24 Sir, if you could either find it, or if I could ask you to assist

25 us, please, by looking at the screen in front of you. You'll see the

Page 34668

1 same document. In the interests of time, sir, I really just have one

2 particular question about the document.

3 In the -- toward the bottom of the page, the last paragraph that

4 is attributed to Mr. Prlic, you'll see Mr. Prlic's name in brackets, and

5 toward the end of that paragraph he says:

6 "The Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna wants its neighbours in

7 the territory of former Bosnia-Herzegovina be people open to cooperation

8 and negotiations to ease tensions."

9 And my question to you, sir: Was it common for the HVO and

10 Herceg-Bosna leadership around this time in September of 1993 to refer to

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina as the former Bosnia-Herzegovina?

12 A. It wasn't being referred to as the former, in the sense of no

13 longer being there. The reference was to the previous Republic of

14 Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had not been agreed, in a manner of speaking

15 upon, and which was not the expression of the will of all its

16 inhabitants, and that's why the term "former" was used here; not in the

17 sense of a country no longer being around.

18 Q. What had not been agreed, according to the will of all its

19 inhabitants?

20 A. The Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the changes that ensued in

21 terms of government, in terms of the Presidency, in terms of Parliament,

22 all these were unilateral changes made by Sarajevo, and that is what the

23 term "former" refers to. It doesn't suggest that this is a country that

24 is no longer there. It means that this is a state that was developed and

25 set up and established, but not all of the peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina

Page 34669

1 were really involved in this process.

2 Q. Sir, it says here -- there's no reference to the government. It

3 says -- it's referring to territory. The territory had not changed, had

4 it, or had it? Is your position that the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina

5 had changed by 30 September 1993?

6 A. No. We're talking about Bosnia-Herzegovina, we're talking about

7 a state which is within its Avnoj borders. However, colloquially, the

8 term "former" was used, in the sense of the former authorities, a state

9 that was not established since its establishment. This is not about new

10 territory. This is always about Bosnia-Herzegovina, but it is former,

11 former meaning one still seeks a structure that would suit all of its

12 citizens.

13 Q. Well, sir, that's what you say now, but I will leave it at that.

14 MR. KARNAVAS: I object to the commentary, Your Honour. You

15 know, he can just move on with the questions. He's not here to provide

16 commentary.

17 MR. SCOTT: To hear Mr. Karnavas say that, Your Honour, is truly

18 astounding, given the amount of running commentary that he provides on a

19 regular basis, but I'll move on.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, you've got two minutes

21 before the break.

22 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.

23 Q. If I could ask you to go next to P10709, sir. It should still be

24 in the third binder, if you have that, 10709.

25 Sir, this is a BBC article dated the 5th of October, 1993, again

Page 34670

1 talking about certain meetings between Mr. Prlic and the Bosnian Serb

2 authorities. It refers to a two-day visit to Banja Luka. Mr. Prlic,

3 among other things, states that the Serbs in this area had never been at

4 war. And in the third paragraph of that document:

5 "... as the frontlines were frozen and the ceasefire was in force

6 in all theaters of war."

7 Can you confirm to the Judges, please, that as of October of

8 1993, there was no active large-scale fighting between the Croats and

9 Serbs in the area of Herzegovina, was there?

10 A. I can't say for sure, but I don't know.

11 Q. You don't know. You can't -- you have no basis at all? You

12 can't tell the Judges about the general state of affairs during that time

13 between the Serb -- Bosnian Serb armed forces and Croat armed forces?

14 Sir, isn't it correct -- let me put just it to you this way,

15 then. Isn't it correct, sir, that for many months around this time, in

16 fact, there had not been any significant armed conflict between Serbs and

17 Croats in most of the areas of Herzegovina or Central Bosnia; isn't that

18 true?

19 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] I would like to raise an objection.

20 Given the question, I think my learned friend is misleading the

21 witness. The first time around, the way my learned friend phrased it, it

22 was about Prlic, among other things, saying that the Serbs in this area,

23 meaning Banja Luka, that the Serbs -- it should obviously read "Serbs and

24 Croats" - the Serbs and Croats in this area were never fighting, and then

25 it goes on. If it goes like that, then this is about Banja Luka. And

Page 34671

1 then the questions move on to Central Bosnia, Herzegovina, and so on and

2 so forth. We had many separate wars in Bosnia, and we all know this is a

3 notorious fact.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, was it a general

5 question or did it have to do only with Banja Luka?

6 MR. SCOTT: It was a general question, Your Honour. I

7 introduced --

8 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for Mr. Scott.

9 MR. SCOTT: I introduced the topic by simply referring to the

10 first paragraph, but I believe by the time we get to the third paragraph,

11 we are speaking more generally. And that was my question to the witness.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, Witness, can you answer

13 the question, this general question? As the Prosecutor put it, in that

14 period there was no major conflict or fighting between the Croats and the

15 Serbs. What do you have to say to that?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'm not privy to any

17 detail, where was this and so on and so forth. I really can't recall.

18 As for this document, it's about the Banja Luka area. There were a large

19 number of Croats living there. My family -- rather, my father hailed

20 from Banja Luka. His family lived there. And there was no fighting, in

21 the sense of a war being waged there. I think it was in reference to

22 that particular segment. I don't know about the rest of

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina or anything sporadic going on elsewhere. It wasn't my

24 place to monitor such developments. But, again, right now I simply can't

25 remember.

Page 34673

1 make an oral request that that be part of -- that that be attached as an

2 exhibit to the motion for certification. And I can file an amended

3 version to that, if that would assist. That's it.

4 [The witness takes the stand]

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very good.

6 Mr. Scott, you have the floor.

7 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.

8 Q. Mr. Tomic, we were on and still are on Exhibit P10709, the 5

9 October 1993 article. There are still several aspects of that I would

10 like to talk to you about.

11 We were talking about whether there had been conflict around this

12 time between the Croats and Serbs, but perhaps we can come back to that

13 in a few minutes. But also in that same -- the last paragraph that we

14 were talking about before, the one that I referred you to that says: "As

15 the frontlines were frozen ...," it then goes on to say and attributes to

16 Mr. Prlic a statement about the economic cooperation between the two

17 states, referring to the Serbian Republic, that is, the Republic of

18 Srpska, and the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna.

19 Was it your experience around this time -- well, let me ask you,

20 Mr. Tomic, is that the terminology you used in the fall of 1993, to refer

21 to Herceg-Bosna as a state and the RS as a state?

22 A. No state prerogatives were used in the Herceg-Bosna nomenclature,

23 and this is just a journalistic description.

24 Q. Sir, going to the last paragraph of this very same article, it

25 says that Mr. Prlic said: "... Now the Republic has all the features and

Page 34674

1 powers of a state."

2 Do you disagree with Jadranko Prlic?

3 A. I'm sorry, I didn't understand what you're referring to. What

4 section?

5 Q. The last paragraph, if you will, of the same article that we've

6 been looking at for the last few minutes:

7 "Speaking about the development of the Croatian Republic of

8 Herceg-Bosna, Prlic said that now it was a republic with all the features

9 and powers of a state."

10 Now, do you agree with that or do you disagree with

11 Mr. Jadranko Prlic's assessment?

12 A. You cannot say that it had the characteristics of a state. At no

13 time did Herceg-Bosna have this element.

14 Q. In the preceding paragraph, the statement is attributed to

15 Mr. Prlic that says:

16 "As we were not --" and he's referring, obviously, to the --

17 well, from the context of this article, to the Serbs, and he says:

18 "'As we were not able to live together, we should continue to

19 live as neighbours,' Prlic said."

20 I put it to you, sir, that statement by Mr. Prlic sounds

21 amazingly similar to the statement by Mr. Koljevic in the presidential

22 record we looked at earlier. "We can live together, but not on top of

23 each other." That was also Mr. Prlic's view, wasn't it?

24 A. I can't say what was said here. I know, from my contacts with

25 Mr. Prlic, what his thoughts were on this matter, so this is not in the

Page 34675

1 context of what Mr. Koljevic was saying. This was about a visit to Banja

2 Luka and the efforts to help the Croats who remained in Banja Luka, the

3 costs of medical treatment and various other problems that they

4 encountered. So this part is given from the point of view of the

5 journalist. He's the one describing the situation. But knowing what

6 Mr. Prlic's positions were, what his thoughts were on this matter, to me

7 this is contradictory to what his thoughts were.

8 Q. Well, sir, you've said something similar to that a number of

9 times now this afternoon, and I want to come at it this way: I put it to

10 you, sir, are you suggesting that with a given audience on a given day,

11 Mr. Prlic would say one thing and on a different day Mr. Prlic would say

12 something different?

13 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, I object to the form of the question.

14 Is the Prosecutor now claiming that these are his actual words and that

15 the journalist accurately described what was said, if indeed anything was

16 said? We don't have a tape-recording, we have nothing to verify this. I

17 object to the way the question is formed.

18 Now, if he wishes to rephrase it and to say that Dr. Prlic would

19 say one thing on one occasion and another thing on another occasion,

20 that's fine. But to now claim that these are his held positions, I

21 object to that.

22 MR. SCOTT: Well, two responses, Your Honour.

23 Number 1, there's no reason, at face value, not to take the

24 article at face value. We simply cannot assume that it is not correct,

25 number 1.

Page 34676

1 Number 2, number 2, I'm happy to put the question as suggested by

2 Mr. Karnavas.

3 Q. Sir, in your experience, and again as a close friend and

4 colleague of Dr. Prlic, is it your experience that depending on the

5 circumstances and depending on the audience, Mr. Prlic might say one

6 thing on one day and something completely different to a different

7 audience under a different circumstance on another day?

8 A. I have to say once again I know his views of those issues, and in

9 this text, this is a Tanjug text that is carried by the BBC. It's

10 originally from a Belgrade agency. We saw a number of cases where

11 reports were written and quotes were made that may have been or may not

12 have been actually the quotes of what was being said.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What you said had not escaped

14 me. We don't exactly know who is with the Tanjug agency and what is part

15 of the BBC. We don't know if it's Tanjug that ascribes these words to

16 Mr. Prlic or if it's the BBC that is doing the commentary. But just in

17 terms of press, a press agency, when it hears something, it quotes it

18 between -- puts it between inverted commas, and here there's no -- this

19 last sentence, there's no inverted commas or hyphens, so we can assume

20 that it's either the journalist who is making this conclusion or the BBC.

21 What do you think of that? You, in your previous duties, were

22 used to dealing with the press. What is your view on the matter?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] To be quite specific, when it comes

24 to this text, this is a text produced by the Tanjug news agency from

25 Belgrade. They published it, and then it was carried by the -- by BBC.

Page 34677

1 In my line of work in Bosnia-Herzegovina over the past 15 years,

2 I cannot believe what they're saying in situations of this kind. You saw

3 the text published in "Oslobodjenje" that was tendered in the course of

4 my testimony where some statements were made and some accusations levied

5 against me, and I know that this was not true, but this was a report

6 published by a newspaper that supported one option, and Tanjug supported

7 the option to turn the Republika Srpska into a state. And they used

8 every opportunity to say that Republika Srpska is and should be a state,

9 and regardless of everything else, that was their main goal. And this is

10 why I'm so skeptical about this quote really being attributable to

11 Mr. Prlic.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.

13 MR. SCOTT:

14 Q. Sorry, I asked you --

15 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

16 MR. SCOTT:

17 Q. -- few moments ago. We won't come back to it just now, but I

18 mention it so that it is in the context of the question I'm going to put

19 to you, about the absence of substantial armed conflict between the Serbs

20 and the Croats in Herzegovina and most of Central Bosnia through this

21 period, at least the second half of 1993. I just put a marker on that,

22 and I'll come back to it in a moment.

23 Now, is it correct that in accomplishing the Croat goals in the

24 second half of 1993, Mr. Prlic and others in the HVO leadership felt that

25 a military victory over the Muslims was essential, that basically there

Page 34678

1 was no way forward at this time, at least not a good one, for the Croats

2 unless a clear military victory could be achieved over the Muslims?

3 A. I was not aware of this position on the part of Mr. Prlic. I

4 knew that he always said that the conflict should cease as soon as

5 possible, and because the Croats were the smallest community, in the long

6 run they stood no chance in any such conflict, prolonged conflict. This

7 was the way that I saw his position.

8 Q. And you also understood, did you not, that the position of

9 Mr. Prlic and others in the HVO leadership were that Croats should be

10 moved or concentrated from some parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina to others,

11 which could be made or would remain, based on those movements, Croat

12 areas?

13 A. We never considered this as a position of the HVO. The position

14 was that Croats must be helped and that those who leave their homes must

15 be provided with adequate accommodation, alternative housing.

16 Q. Let's go to Exhibit P06454. P06454 would be in the second

17 binder.

18 This is a record of a presidential meeting in the offices of

19 President Tudjman on the 5th of November, 1993, and I'd like you to first

20 please turn to page number 30, top of the page, simply if you will to set

21 the scene that we have Mr. Prlic speaking. At the top of page 30,

22 Jadranko Prlic says:

23 "I think that this meeting is extremely important. The

24 highest-ranking officials of the Republic of Croatia and the Croatian

25 Republic of Herceg-Bosna are here, and this is an opportunity for open

Page 34679

1 dialogue on the overall situation that we are in ..."

2 Now, if I can ask you, please, to go to page 36. Toward of the

3 top of that page, and I'll represent to you this is still -- the record

4 will show -- the transcript will show this is still Mr. Prlic speaking.

5 Mr. Prlic:

6 "I think that at this moment a military victory is necessary to

7 restore both the situation and the state of mind. I think that it is

8 clear --" excuse me, "I think that is clear and does not need to be

9 explained at all. Whether it is Mostar, whether it is Vakuf or this

10 action that is being planned up there to connect Kiseljak with Busovaca.

11 "We must move closer to rounding off territories. As a

12 government, last spring we defined both the proposals and the

13 conclusions, even with regard to moving certain brigades from some areas,

14 which would include moving the population from those areas and

15 concentrating it in certain directions that we think could become and

16 remain Croatian areas.

17 "We would like this solely in the pragmatic sense. I know that

18 the efforts are directed towards every Croat remaining and living where

19 he is now.

20 "But there is pragmatism, there is a concentration of forces,

21 there is everything else. You, as a soldier, know that quite well."

22 Could you please go on to page 38. The bottom of page 38,

23 Mr. Prlic continues:

24 "As for relations with the other two sides, I am in Velika

25 Kladusa tomorrow, God willing, for talks with these two sides. We must

Page 34680

1 play a game with the Serbs because of these enclaves, because that is the

2 only way to keep them alive at all, and to enable them the military

3 strength to protest themselves against the Muslims."

4 Let me pause there. What Mr. Prlic is talking about here, isn't

5 it correct, sir, is the necessity of Bosnian Croats to move across

6 Serb-held territory; isn't that correct?

7 A. I've already stated that the HVO did not discuss this, the

8 relocation of brigades and so on. This was not a topic that was

9 discussed by the HVO.

10 Q. Let me restate my question, sir. Perhaps it was mistranslated or

11 perhaps I misspoke.

12 The reference when Mr. Prlic says: "We must play a game with the

13 Serbs because of these enclaves, because that is the only way to keep

14 them alive at all," he's talking about the necessity of the HVO and

15 Herceg-Bosna authorities and forces to move across Serb-controlled

16 territory; correct?

17 A. I don't know what it entailed, I really don't.

18 Q. "And as for the Muslims, obviously a game will have to be played

19 on two cards, playing different people on one and on the other a card,

20 and probably yourself," referring to President Tudjman, "or some

21 high-ranking official from Croatia will be the one who will unify, who

22 will coordinate that gang."

23 Now, playing two cards with the Muslims, isn't that a little bit

24 like saying one thing one day and saying something different another day?

25 A. I don't know what this is about, because I was not part of it and

Page 34681

1 I couldn't really explain this.

2 Q. Sir, I'm going to challenge you on that. You were a senior

3 member of this government for a period of time. You sat in virtually

4 every meeting of the HVO HZB [sic] during this period. You were a close

5 friend and colleague of Mr. Prlic. I put it to you, sir, you could

6 not -- you cannot tell these Judges that you did not know the policy of

7 the HVO on these matters at that time. Can you, sir?

8 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, I'm going to object, and it goes back

9 to my fundamental objection at the beginning.

10 He's asked to comment about a conversation that is taking place

11 where the gentleman was not present. Based on that, unless he's being

12 given an opportunity to read the entire transcript, how is he expected to

13 comment, in light of what he said, he wasn't there and he doesn't know?

14 So that's the fundamental problem that we have here.

15 I understand that the Trial Chamber doesn't wish for the

16 gentleman to take up valuable court time in reading that, but if we want

17 to be fair to the gentleman, then I suggest that either you instruct the

18 Prosecutor to withdraw the question or rephrase it in a manner in which

19 he can answer. But how can he comment about a meeting at which he wasn't

20 present? He's asked to look at a line here and a line there. None of us

21 would be able to do that, even the members of the Bench.

22 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour. Mr. Karnavas has unfairly

23 stated my question.

24 It is not uncommon practice, and I'm sure Mr. Karnavas and I dare

25 say every lawyer in this courtroom has done this in this trial, you cite

Page 34682

1 a few examples, you a cite particular example on this occasion. I then

2 worked from the specific to the general, and I challenge Mr. Tomic, given

3 his position, given his close hands-on involvement in these matters

4 throughout this time period, I challenge him that it is not credible for

5 him to say not whether he knew this particular conversation, but the

6 policies of the HVO touching on these topics during this time, and I

7 challenge him that is not a credible situation.

8 Q. Now, sir, you knew what the position of the HVO HZ-HB was, didn't

9 you, because you sat in on the meetings, you voted on decisions, you

10 provided the financing? You did all those things, sir, and you cannot

11 sit here and tell these Judges that you did not know what the

12 [indiscernible] of the HVO was during this time.

13 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Could you please reframe from hitting the

14 podium, because this becomes reinforced for the mic.

15 MR. SCOTT: My apologies, Your Honour.

16 Q. Sir, my question -- my apologies for thumping the podium.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] With the objection, I lost the

18 thread. Could you repeat your question to the witness.

19 Let me say that we have a transcript that starts following what

20 happened at [indiscernible]. This is page 1, where Tudjman explains why

21 there's this meeting, and then we don't have pages 2 to 30. And then

22 Mr. Prlic speaking for a few pages, and then it continues, because there

23 are 113 pages, and the document that we have before us is very

24 fragmentary. But speaking from memory, I know that we've already seen

25 this document on various occasions. The Judges are fully informed of the

Page 34683

1 tenor of this document.

2 Before Mr. Scott repeats the question, I just have a minor

3 technical question for you.

4 We have seen several meetings held by Mr. Tudjman that last hours

5 on end. There are dozens of pages. Here we have 100 pages. Is this

6 common practice with you, to have such lengthy meetings?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It all depended on the topic. I

8 attended a couple of meetings that were not that long, but ...

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Because earlier on we saw a

10 document. I can't remember the number of it, but it was the first

11 meeting with Mr. Susak, starting at 10.00 in the morning and ending at

12 4.00 in the afternoon. The second meeting with Tudjman, starting at 6.00

13 in the afternoon, and Tudjman said, "Well, you didn't have anything to

14 eat." So the 6.00 meeting must have lasted into the night, so obviously

15 nobody had a bite to eat. So for participants, it would take the whole

16 day. And this is not the only example. We've seen several documents

17 showing that the meetings would last for hours on end. So it was just a

18 theoretical question, was it useful, or was it customary for you to speak

19 for a long time?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, as far as we could see from

21 the transcript, this was an occasion where everybody wanted to say

22 something. That is why it took such a long time. I did not attend many

23 of those meetings. Just one of them lasted a little while longer, but

24 the rest were acceptable.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Scott, put the

Page 34684

1 question again, because we lost track of it.

2 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour.

3 I must say, Your Honour, it's difficult to conduct -- we're kind

4 of back to some old ways of trying to conduct an examination, and then

5 literally right in the middle of a question, I'm waiting for an answer,

6 and then things go off in another direction, with all respect to the

7 Chamber. I try to lay a foundation, I put the question, and then we move

8 off on to something else.

9 Q. Sir, I come back to the question I put to you some time ago that

10 was hanging at the time of the other questions put by the President.

11 Sir, I put to you that you knew full well what the policy of the HVO

12 HZ-HB was during this time period throughout 1993. You sat in on these

13 meetings and you were a close associate and, I dare say, confidant of

14 Mr. Prlic. You attended some of these presidential meetings yourself in

15 Zagreb that we have records of. You knew full well, sir, the policy of

16 the HVO, and you knew that policy was as stated, among other things, in

17 this record that I've just referred you to. Correct?

18 A. No, that is not correct. I've already said that the HVO had, as

19 its primary task, the defence and protection of the Croats in the areas

20 that were part of the HZ-HB. That was the concept. That's what I have

21 explained a number of times here in court.

22 I also want to add that at official sessions of the HVO, there

23 was always the same concept. No other concept was ever presented. Of

24 course, peace talks affected the debate, as did the situation on the

25 battlefield. A large number of refugees, things that had to be dealt

Page 34685

1 with on a daily basis, but the policy of the HVO was clear.

2 Q. Sir, you've said that repeatedly, but now I come back to the

3 question I put to you a few minutes ago. Are you then suggesting, sir,

4 that -- you say this is what you heard Mr. Prlic say, but I put to you,

5 again, if that's your position, we've now seen a number of instances

6 where Mr. Prlic, I put to you, had said something quite different.

7 I think Mr. Prlic expressed one thing to you and held -- in fact, held on

8 other occasions expressed another view. Is that how the Chamber should

9 understand your testimony?

10 A. I cannot offer a judgement on the basis of what I see here. I

11 know that there was a series of situations where pragmatic solutions had

12 to be found in order to resolve this basic political issue that I was

13 talking about. How are we to look at it today, after so many years have

14 passed, I really cannot conclude that.

15 Q. Sir, you used the word "pragmatic." Let's go back to page 36,

16 and the Chamber well knows and the lawyers in the courtroom know that

17 these records are transcripts of recordings, of a recording system that

18 was operated in the offices of President Tudjman, and on this day

19 Mr. Prlic is recorded as saying, on page 36:

20 "We must move closer to rounding off territories. As a

21 government, last spring," that would be the spring of 1993, "we defined

22 both the proposals and the conclusions, even with regard to moving

23 certain brigades from some areas, which would include moving the

24 population from those areas and concentrating it in certain directions

25 that we think could become and remain Croatian areas. We would like this

Page 34686

1 solely in the pragmatic sense."

2 Skipping down again: "This is pragmatism."

3 And that's exactly the sort of pragmatic solution that you said

4 just a few moments ago just now was necessary; correct?

5 A. As for this paragraph, I said that I was a member of the Cabinet

6 in spring, not in October when this was going on, but I was in spring.

7 And I know that the government never discussed any programme for the

8 relocation of the brigades or of the population.

9 Now, as to why Mr. Prlic said that, in what circumstances, this

10 is the question that he can answer. I know that at the sessions that I

11 attended, no such positions were taken.

12 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I allowed the witness

13 to answer. I didn't want to object. But as you have said, we don't have

14 all the pages of the minutes here in front of us, and we don't know the

15 context of this debate. Is this a reference to some specific effect, an

16 emergency situation that had to be dealt with, and hence the reaction

17 that is ascribed to Prlic, or is this about the policy in general? We

18 can't say that, on the basis of the minutes that we have. Well, at least

19 we have the date for the minutes, and we could compare it with the events

20 in the field that we talked about here.

21 My learned friend from the Prosecution knows the dates, and he

22 knows the answers that he might expect, but this is out of context here,

23 and the connotation it gets might be completely wrong.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, on page 36 Mr. Prlic

25 said the following. He said: "I believe that a military victory is

Page 34687

1 necessary." We've been working at it for nearly three years, so we know

2 a lot of things. We've heard many witnesses, seen many documents. We

3 know that there was an offensive by the ABiH in Central Bosnia. We know

4 that, unfortunately so, unfortunately for the Croats, they're going to

5 have positions, be it in only in Vares, where there are close to 15.000

6 Croats, 5 to 15 Croats, they're going to leave Vares. It seems as though

7 the military situation was a very worrying one, and here we have Prlic

8 saying, "I believe that a military victory is necessary."

9 As far as you know, back then in November was the HVO able to

10 prevail in front of the ABiH, or did they need help from the Republic of

11 Croatia? And curiously, oddly enough, I was looking at the document, I

12 was expecting an answer from Tudjman to this question raised by

13 Mr. Prlic, but as a matter of fact, following his intervention, we have

14 Mr. Sancevic speaking.

15 This being said, you were no longer a minister in November. We

16 know that. But from what you know, back then, militarily speaking, was

17 the HVO able to win victory or not? This seems to be called upon by

18 Mr. Prlic.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If you'd asked any Croat at the

20 time, they would all have told you the same thing. A victory was

21 required to regain hope, to stop the flood of refugees, to simply allow

22 people to stay in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was against this backdrop

23 that the discussion occurred.

24 I really can't say at this point whether the HVO had the military

25 might to achieve that or not, because that was not my area, nor indeed

Page 34688

1 can I judge that sort of issue. I simply don't have sufficient

2 information.

3 I do know one thing, and it's simply enough. Every day, you are

4 being told that people are leaving this town or that town. Under the

5 circumstances, this was something that appeared to us almost as a

6 mission, it being a good idea to improve the atmosphere that prevailed

7 among the Croats and stop the migrations.

8 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if I may place a

9 remark on the record. Otherwise, this will head in a different

10 direction.

11 When the witness started answering your question, he said,

12 "I think that all Croats would agree with that," and he also said, "at

13 the time," and he said a victory was required to consolidate. You heard

14 what he said. And what the transcript says, "a victory was required,"

15 which might mean the overall victory, but he said something entirely

16 different. And I think this should be clarified with the witness.

17 Otherwise -- well, my learned friend is suggesting that maybe I was

18 premature in this.

19 Well, yes, it seems that the key word was not translated. The

20 witness, at the beginning of his answer, said at the time -- any Croat at

21 the time probably would have said the same thing, that a victory was

22 required. A victory, a victory, in the sense of something being

23 required.

24 [In English] Only one victory is needed, this is what the witness

25 said, only one victory is needed.

Page 34689

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What did you say, exactly,

2 Mr. Tomic? Do you remember?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] A victory, a victory, not in the

4 sense of a final victory. A victory somewhere along the frontline, quite

5 simply in order to regain the confidence and for people to stop thinking

6 about leaving. There was panic now, and everyone was preparing to leave

7 their respective areas, especially those in the border areas with the

8 BH Army close by.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] If I understand properly, in

10 November 1993, as you see it, the morale among the Croats was rather low.

11 They had lost confidence because there was an influx of refugees, there

12 were specific events; is that what you're saying?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What about yourself, were you

15 confident or not?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was a concern that it

17 wouldn't be possible to control the numbers of refugees, in the sense of

18 being able to put them up in the sense of getting sufficient supplies for

19 them.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a question that's just

21 crossed my mind, and then I'll ask Mr. Scott to proceed.

22 In November, Vares was totally evacuated from the Croat

23 population. We've seen documents in which there is mention of the need

24 to put up and send these people everywhere. We've seen several documents

25 to this effect. As far as you know, the Croat -- were the Croat

Page 34690

1 intelligence services aware that there was a major-scale offensive by the

2 ABiH? And in the affirmative, why did they fail to intervene in a

3 transparent and visible way? It may be that you don't know. If you

4 don't know, I'll put the question to the military members that are

5 scheduled to come for other Defence teams, so I could put that question

6 then. But at your level, given the level of disarray, the fact that

7 Croats were leaving in the thousands, why did the Republic of Croatia

8 fail to intervene militarily in a visible and official way?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I simply don't have sufficient

10 information to answer that question.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, we'll ask the question

12 of military people.

13 Mr. Scott.

14 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour.

15 Your Honour, before I begin questioning again and my time with

16 the witness, there's been a number of comments now for some minutes that

17 I've not had a chance to respond to.

18 On the issue of the transcript, Your Honour, and this is not

19 questioning -- this does not go to questioning the witness, you know,

20 we've had this same conversation any number of times. Let me just make a

21 couple of things again clear.

22 The Prosecution's position has been, since Day 1, and it's still

23 the same today, that when the transcripts were admitted, they should have

24 been admitted in toto, partly for these very reasons, so there wouldn't

25 be argument about what's on one page and what's on the previous page.

Page 34691

1 That's been our position all along, it's still our position, and in fact

2 in terms of the recent position by Mr. Karnavas on adding additional

3 material, on much of it I don't think the Prosecution will object,

4 because it's always been our position that the entire transcript should

5 be admitted. Now, having -- which prevents anyone from taking anything

6 out of context.

7 Now, having said that, number 2, as we've said many times,

8 Your Honour, that there's simply no way that we can cover -- read every

9 transcript in full with every witness who comes into this courtroom or

10 that we can put all 120 pages of every transcript in your binders. You

11 have four binders now. How would you like to have ten? How would each

12 of you like to have ten on the Bench, ten binders? These are

13 necessities, this is the way it is, it's the way we've practiced in the

14 last three years, and it is not helpful for anyone to stand up and say,

15 "Well, we've got to read the whole thing, we should have the whole

16 transcript." We just cannot do it, Your Honour, under these

17 circumstances, I put. And the Defence has done exactly the same thing.

18 They've used parts of the transcripts that they wanted to use. The

19 Chamber wants to set days aside which we'll sit and we'll read from

20 page 1 to page 110 of every transcript, but I think the point is made,

21 Your Honour.

22 Now, returning to the witness:

23 Q. Sir, isn't it correct that throughout this time Mr. Prlic -- the

24 topic generally we're talking about is Mr. Prlic's dealings with the

25 Serbs in negotiations during this time period, and you knew, didn't you,

Page 34692

1 that he was engaged in ongoing discussions with the Serbs, especially in

2 the fall of 1993, on a wide range of topics and he was reporting that to

3 the HVO HZ-HB, wasn't he?

4 A. Yes, I did know about some of his contacts with the Serb side.

5 Q. And, in fact, you knew that he was at one point negotiating

6 agreements with something called the Autonomous Province of Western

7 Bosnia, associated with someone named Fikret Abdic, and also with the

8 Serb Republic or RS, involving Mr. Karadzic; correct?

9 A. I wasn't up to date on that.

10 Q. Can I ask you, please, to Exhibit P10707 in binder number 3,

11 P10707.

12 Sir, while you have that and -- this is an article reported by

13 the BBC again on the 9th of November, 1993. Given some of the things

14 that were mentioned earlier, I note that the source of this article

15 originally apparently was the Croatian TV Satellite Service in Croatia

16 given at 1830 Greenwich Mean Time on the 7th of November, 1993.

17 Now, Mr. Prlic, in this discussion -- or in this article, there

18 is discussions about his meetings involved with these individuals and the

19 entities that they represented, including Mr. Lukic, the prime minister

20 of the RS, and there's also reference to his giving his support to a

21 joint statement issued by Fikret Abdic and the president of the Croatian

22 Republic of Herceg-Bosna, Mate Boban, and the declaration signed in

23 Belgrade by Abdic and Karadzic. Now, were you familiar with all those

24 negotiations and signed documents in November 1993?

25 A. I heard about that in the media.

Page 34693

1 Q. Well, did you recall Mr. Prlic reporting back during the meetings

2 around this time about these negotiations, about his dealings with the

3 Serbs and about the dealings with Mr. Abdic's authorities, so-called?

4 A. I wasn't a member of the government at the time. Therefore, I

5 can't remember whether this was, in fact, the case or not.

6 Q. Wasn't it true, sir, that throughout this time period again,

7 Mr. Prlic was in regular and frequent communication with the Bosnian Serb

8 leadership, including travel to the various locations to meet with them,

9 by use of the telephone, by use of the fax? Mr. Prlic was having

10 extensive dealings with the Bosnian Serb leadership, wasn't he?

11 A. I don't know to what extent this was an ongoing contact. I know

12 about the visit to Banja Luka, I know about what the media said, but I

13 have no idea about whether the nature of this was ongoing or not.

14 Q. And did you know that he was involved, again, with negotiating

15 prisoner exchanges with the Serbs?

16 A. I did mention a while ago, when we talked about that report, that

17 there was a lot of pressure being exerted by families, by people from

18 Kupres who were in captivity. There was a lot of pressure for them to be

19 released.

20 Q. If I can ask you, sir, to go to Exhibit P06581, P06581, in binder

21 number 2. Binder number 2, 06581. This is a record of another

22 presidential meeting in Zagreb on the 10th of November, 1993.

23 And, Usher, if you can assist us by taking the witness to page 3.

24 At the top of that page, President Tudjman starts by saying:

25 "Did you have a meeting by Karadzic?"

Page 34694

1 Mate Boban:

2 "No. Tomorrow is the government meeting."

3 Then going on to Jadranko Prlic:

4 "It was like this. I went up there. There was some

5 complications in crossing," et cetera, et cetera. "When I arrived in

6 Banja Luka in the evening, there was change and some talks, and we sent

7 that fax" - and given some issues raised about communications, I

8 underline the word "fax" - "Which said that it was today on Thursday."

9 Going on down:

10 "The told me they received it on Sunday, that Komarcia [phoen],

11 Komarica," excuse me, my apologies for pronunciation, "wrote that part by

12 hand, that things to be further clarified over the phone. On Sunday

13 evening, I was down there in Kladusa, down there according to their

14 statements," et cetera.

15 Now, if you go to page 7, please, page 7, again Jadranko Prlic:

16 "As regards these Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina, that exchange

17 was going on with them. We agreed on that, you know that, and they have

18 delivered their part."

19 And then he goes on talking about the Croats to Banja Luka:

20 "This is work obligation and they cannot be prevented in that.

21 They pick apples, and that's better than their going to the army. There,

22 those are some of the essential things."

23 Now, sir, I'm wondering, based on some of the answers you've

24 given us in the last few minutes, is it your position or is it your

25 understanding, based on seeing this, that Mr. Prlic reported more

Page 34695

1 information about his dealings to President Tudjman in Zagreb than he

2 reported to the HVO government in Mostar?

3 A. I can't conclude that based on this. For as long as I was a

4 government member, we had information on what Mr. Prlic knew, and for a

5 while after that I was no longer a member of the government and I really

6 can't comment in relation to that.

7 Q. Sir, I'm going to end this section, if you will, by going back to

8 the question I put to you some minutes ago now, and based on having seen

9 and been through a number of additional documents.

10 Isn't it correct, sir, that by February 1994, there had been no

11 substantial armed clashes between the Bosnian Serbs and the Croats for at

12 least the preceding seven months?

13 A. I really can't say exactly, in relation to that period, about

14 these military operations, as I pointed out before. I know, for example,

15 when there were clashes at Usora, but what the extent of those clashes

16 was or the exact timing, I really can't say. It wasn't my duty to keep

17 track of those clashes. I do know, however, that at Usora there was

18 information relating to an attempt to put a stop to the Serbs'

19 breakthrough, but I really can't put up a timeline for you that you could

20 rely on.

21 Q. And did you also know around February, the first part of 1994,

22 that Mr. Prlic was negotiating with the Serbs to -- Bosnian Serbs to

23 connect the power transmission lines of both the Croats and the Serbs?

24 A. I really can't say, in relation to this period.

25 Q. Can you look, please, at P10705.

Page 34696

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, I'm still on this

2 meeting. We'll, of course, have the opportunity to return with other

3 witnesses to this document, but it's an important document, because this

4 meeting is held on the 10th of November, 1993, and plainly we discover

5 two things; that Mr. Tudjman knew absolutely nothing about the Stupni Do

6 matter, asking who this rage [as interpreted] is and then the destruction

7 of the old bridge. It's the same position by Tudjman, who inquires and

8 who asks questions.

9 Now, in your view, was Mr. Tudjman well informed of what was

10 happening in Herzegovina?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I think he did have

12 sufficient information available to him. I don't know about the quality

13 of his information, but --

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you're assuming that he had

15 the information, but you can't say anything further?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I really can't say, because that

17 wasn't --

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very good.

19 Mr. Scott.

20 MR. SCOTT:

21 Q. Sir, looking, please, at P10705, an article again from the BBC

22 Monitoring Service, 15 February 1994, this reports Mr. Prlic's

23 involvement in negotiating an agreement to connect the power transmission

24 lines. And because of the time factor, what I particularly want to

25 direct your attention to is the third paragraph, where it is stated in

Page 34697

1 this article -- actually, the information is attributed to the Bosnian

2 Serb leader, Lukic:

3 "There have been no clashes between Bosnian Serbs and Croats

4 already for all of seven months, which is an example of how clashes can

5 be avoided in war, Lukic stressed."

6 And I put to you one final time, Mr. Tomic: Don't you know and

7 isn't it a fact that this statement by Mr. Lukic is correct, that as of

8 February 1994, there had not been any substantial clashes between the

9 Bosnian Serbs and the Croats for the previous seven months?

10 A. I've answered that question a number of times already. I don't

11 have the timeline, and I can't confirm that. I know that there were

12 clashes at Usora, but I cannot define a timeline for you exactly as to

13 how and when this went on. I do know that this was a place where for a

14 long time there were clashes between us and the Serb forces.

15 Q. All right. Sir, changing topics, unless there's any follow-up

16 questions from the Judges on that last document or two, changing topics,

17 sir, to -- going back to some things we touched on earlier last time, but

18 I want to tie back in to some other questions I want to put to you,

19 please.

20 Sir, you may recall that we looked at a number of documents the

21 last time, including one of the records of the Livno meeting from the 9th

22 of February, 1992. And I suggest we don't need to look at it, but for

23 the record, in particular, P00117, which you saw last time and which

24 I think the Judges have seen a number of times. Sir, the language of the

25 referendum that the people in attendance of that meeting voted for, the

Page 34698

1 formulation they wanted was -- it said the following:

2 "Are you in favour of a sovereign and independent Bosnia and

3 Herzegovina, a joint state of the constituted and sovereign Croatian,

4 Muslim and Serbian peoples in their own ethnic areas (cantons)?"

5 That was the formulation that the HDZ central board meeting in

6 Livno on the 9th of February, 1992, that's what they wanted; correct?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And that continued to be, sir, was it not, the position of the

9 HVO and Herceg-Bosna authorities throughout this time period, 1992, 1993,

10 into 1994, was an organisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina on the basis of

11 separate ethnic areas, so the Croats would have their area, the Serbs

12 would have their area, and the Muslims would have their area? Wasn't

13 that the desired model?

14 A. We can't define these as pure ethnic areas with Serbs, Muslims,

15 or Croats alone in them. We were discussing majority areas populated

16 predominantly by one, the other, or the third ethnic group.

17 Q. Three ethnic areas, not necessarily pure, but three ethnic areas,

18 that was the desired structure; correct?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Can I ask you, please, to go to Exhibit P00498. P00498, which

21 will be in the first binder.

22 Sir, this is another record of a presidential meeting in Zagreb

23 on the 17th of September, 1992. I'd like to direct your attention,

24 please, to page 26.

25 On page 26, Mr. Prlic states to those assembled:

Page 34699

1 "I want to say that we are holding firm on the lines of defence

2 of the Croatian territories in Herceg-Bosna. I have exact information

3 here about the Bosnian Posavina which has formally not yet been

4 associated into Herceg-Bosna. We're going abroad tomorrow, and we shall

5 solve these questions too. At this moment, due to a shortage of

6 technical means, we are not ready for offensive operations, especially in

7 regard to Kupres," et cetera. "Otherwise, we are holding firm on the

8 line which is over 500 kilometres long."

9 Sir, in your experience, and this was true at the HVO HZ-HB

10 meetings, was it not, Mr. Prlic was quite well informed on the military

11 situation, and in fact in this situation he could provide quite specific

12 information to President Tudjman, couldn't he?

13 "Due to a shortage of technical means, we are not ready for

14 offensive operations. Otherwise, we are holding firm on the line which

15 is over 500 kilometres long."

16 Now, you told us the last time that -- let me just put something

17 further and I'll come back to you.

18 You told us the last time you were here, sir, when I asked you

19 about Mr. Prlic's management style, you said he was a man who dotted his

20 "i"s and crossed his "t"s. Do you remember that?

21 A. I don't think that these are my words.

22 Q. I asked you that question, sir, and I believe the record will

23 show that you said, yes, Mr. Prlic was a talented administrator, paid

24 attention to detail. And I believe I put to you, and if we had the time

25 I would put to you the transcript page, I put it to you he was the kind

Page 34700

1 of person who crossed his "t"s and dotted his "i"s, and I believe, sir,

2 that you agreed. But in any event, you would agree, would you not, that

3 Mr. Prlic in fact was well informed about the military situation in

4 Herceg-Bosna?

5 A. Well, I don't recall this phrase, whether I used this phrase.

6 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Well, this is an attempt to confuse

7 the witness. This phrase, to dot the "i"s and cross the "t"s, this is

8 not something that was said by the witness, but this was -- this was

9 quite properly translated in this way, however. But now this is an

10 effort to confuse the witness, because the phrase that is used in

11 Croatian is not something that is inherent in our language. The

12 witness's words were translated in an appropriate manner into English,

13 but now when they are back-translated, they are confusing the witness.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What do you mean to say?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What I wanted to say is that the

16 quote, as it was given back to me by the Prosecutor, this was not

17 something that I said. This was not the phrase that I used, because I

18 don't say to dot the "i"s in my language. And now whether this is a

19 conclusion of my discussion of my position, it's a completely different

20 thing.

21 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, if I could, the question was posed by

22 Mr. Scott in that fashion. I know for a fact that he -- that he -- but

23 obviously it might have been -- something was lost in translation. But

24 I can verify that Mr. Scott did, in fact -- asked the question whether he

25 was the sort of person that crossed his "t"s and dotted his "i"s. Now,

Page 34701

1 whether -- and as I recall the answer, Mr. Tomic did say that he did

2 cross his "t"s, something to that effect, and I can find the passage. I

3 read it yesterday, in fact. But, again, something must have been lost in

4 translation. But the problem is, I think, is that the witness objects to

5 a question being formulated by the Prosecutor, then being turned out --

6 then the Prosecutor claiming that this is the witness's words. I think

7 that's where the confusion may lie. I'm not ascribing any, you know, ill

8 intention on either side.

9 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Well, thank you, thank you, Mr. Karnavas. I

10 know, indeed, Mr. Scott and the Defence, Mr. Kovacic, this is a dispute

11 of words with no relevance at all. You can very well ask Mr. Scott,

12 well, do you want to ask without using this image?

13 MR. SCOTT: Well, before I do that, Your Honour, before I do

14 that, there has been so much about -- discussion about -- and I do

15 appreciate and thank Mr. Karnavas for his candour in indicating that I

16 did, in fact, put the question. In the record at 34105-106, the question

17 was put -- and, Mr. Tomic, just so you can put your own mind at ease, you

18 may want to listen to this as well.

19 Question: "All right. Well, my question to you is focusing more

20 on Mr. Prlic than the premises of the -- the premises or the operation of

21 the office. Would you say, in your experience, that Mr. Prlic is a

22 very -- in fact a very competent, in fact very talented administrator?"

23 Answer: "Yes."

24 Question: "Would it be fair so say that Mr. Prlic is the type of

25 person who we might say -- and, forgive me, I don't know if it will -- I

Page 34702

1 don't know if you have it in your language, but we might say the type of

2 person who dots his 'i's and dots his 't's?"

3 Answer: "Yes, that's what he always tries to do, to dot his 'i's

4 and crosses his 't's."

5 Witness's own words.

6 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Karnavas, it is not the witness's own words;

7 it is the translation, and we have many times made the experience that a

8 good translator will translate one figure of speech to a corresponding

9 but not literally identical figure of speech in another language, and

10 another interpreter will then maybe translate back by using the figure of

11 speech which he translates, and then it's uncomprehensible. So I really

12 think go on and let's forget about the "i"s and the "t"s.

13 MR. SCOTT: Well, Judge Trechsel, I'm sorry, but, you know, this

14 is the trial record, what it says, whatever we have. Is there anyone who

15 doubts the content or the concept of what was put to the witness and what

16 the answer was? He was a talented administrator who paid attention to

17 detail.

18 Q. Can we agree on that, sir?

19 MS. TOMANOVIC: [Interpretation] I would just like to confirm what

20 Judge Trechsel has just said.

21 This is the first time, two minutes ago, that this phrase, in the

22 English language, was translated literally into Croatian, to dot the "i"s

23 and cross the "t"s, and the witness has not yet heard it yet in

24 courtroom. This was the first time that he heard it. I think that we

25 really have to cut this whole debate short.

Page 34703

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We spent ten minutes.

2 Witness, the question was very simple. Was Mr. Prlic informed of

3 the military situation? That's it.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think that a certain volume of

5 information was available through the joint meetings that we had. But as

6 for the operations themselves, the planning, as far as I know, he did not

7 have any information about those.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.

9 MR. SCOTT: I appreciate, Your Honours, the assistance of so

10 many, and I will move on without belabouring the point further. I hope

11 the point is clear, regardless of the particular metaphor that one might

12 use.

13 Q. Sir, let me direct your attention on to page 28 of that same

14 document. Excuse me a moment.

15 Sir, continuing on, on page 28 Mr. Prlic gives essentially a

16 rundown of the various positions of the three parties, actually:

17 "The Serbs want an association of states in Bosnia and

18 Herzegovina. That practically means no state regarding Bosnia and

19 Herzegovina. What would exist at the centre would be financed, and any

20 state based on this is no state. That is the Serbs' option. The

21 Muslims' option is what the previous speakers suggested, said, but

22 essentially and personally, it is a civic and unitary Bosnia and

23 Herzegovina. That is what we all personally think."

24 Then he goes down below and he talks about the Croat position:

25 "The Croats, at least the soldiers in the Croatian Defence

Page 34704

1 Council and the people who are involved, the organs of authority, have a

2 clear political aim. It has been clear to me ever since I became

3 involved in this and since I have been in this post, that is, the

4 constituting of Bosnia and Herzegovina through three national units.

5 Now, sir, that's fully consistent with the language of the Livno

6 formulation, if you will, that I put to you a few moments ago, correct,

7 three national units?

8 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, he does -- Mr. Prlic does say "with

9 the principles of the European Community." That's in the text, keeping

10 in mind that it is the European Community that is driving the negotiating

11 formulas. And this is a critical aspect of what he's saying. So if

12 we're going to pose that question, perhaps it should be added, "Did

13 Dr. Prlic promote the initiatives of the internationals, especially the

14 International Community, with respect to how Bosnia and Herzegovina

15 should internally be formulated?"

16 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, this is argument and commentary. This

17 is exactly --

18 JUDGE TRECHSEL: It is, Mr. Scott -- this is a place where it is

19 really easy to put in the full quotation, and that's what Mr. Karnavas --

20 so I would say let's not quarrel.

21 MR. SCOTT: I'm happy to read it entirely, Your Honour. Everyone

22 in the courtroom has it. I'm sorry, no, there is no misleading anyone in

23 the courtroom about it. But, you know -- well:

24 "Since I became involved in this and since I have been in this

25 post, this aim is the forming and ordering of Bosnia-Herzegovina in

Page 34705

1 accordance with the principles of the European Community, that is, the

2 constituting of Bosnia-Herzegovina through three national units."

3 Now, having read the entire thing, it's still my position what

4 Mr. Karnavas says is argument and commentary in front of the witness, and

5 that is my position. He says that, but that's his position. And I'm not

6 suggesting that the Prosecution agrees with that, or the witness, for

7 that matter. We don't know. So there's no reason for it.

8 Q. Now, sir, my question to you was specifically: That was what

9 follows dead on, the formulation as expressed by the HDZ central board

10 gathered in Livno on the 9th of February, 1992, the organisation of

11 Bosnia and Herzegovina in three separate ethnic units or, as said here,

12 three national units; correct?

13 A. I have to add to this, that I have already --

14 Q. No, sir.

15 A. No, not fully, not fully.

16 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honours. How many times, again, in

17 the last two and a half years and during the Prosecution case did

18 Mr. Karnavas say, "Answer the question, yes or no," and I think I'm

19 entitled to the same process as was afforded to the Defence.

20 Q. My first -- I'll give you -- I'll let you clarify, sir, I'll let

21 you add, but my question --

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please try and answer as the

23 question was put to you, even if you don't like it, but that's it,

24 because in the case of the redirect the Prosecutor is entitled to put a

25 leading question that answers "yes" or "no," "I don't agree," or "I don't

Page 34706

1 know," and then according to your answer, depending on your answer, the

2 Prosecutor may supplement if need be.

3 Mr. Scott, you may resume.

4 MR. SCOTT:

5 Q. Sir, this is the third time -- at least the third time I've asked

6 you this question. The formulation put forward here by Mr. Prlic on the

7 17th of September, 1992, some nine months after the meeting in Livno in

8 February, that -- those formulations are, for all practical purposes, the

9 same, aren't they? Three national units, each people in their own

10 separate ethnic areas (cantons), three national units; correct? It's the

11 same basic structure, yes or no?

12 A. No, because here it is through and not in separate units

13 inhabited by only one people. And in the minutes, it goes on to say that

14 the only criterion will not be the ethnic composition of the population.

15 We should also take into account geographic elements, transportation. So

16 we're not talking about -- the goal is not ethnically-pure units, so this

17 is the context where I differ.

18 Q. Sir, we already had this discussion. You corrected me, yourself,

19 or you suggested earlier that the Livno question was similar, that it

20 didn't necessarily mean pure ethnic areas but three primarily, you said a

21 few minutes ago -- again, if we have to take the time to go back in the

22 transcript, what the Livno question was calling for was majority ethnic

23 areas. Now, that's exactly the qualification you gave 20 or 30 minutes

24 ago, and that's the same qualification you can make now, if you want.

25 Nobody in the courtroom said "ethnically pure," but the structure was

Page 34707

1 three national units, correct? Or do you not believe what Mr. Prlic says

2 on the 17th of September, 1992?

3 A. Yes, what was said here was, but the entirety of what was said

4 was the policy pursued by the HVO HZ-HB.

5 Q. Going on to page 29 -- Your Honour, I think we may be coming up

6 on a break, but perhaps I can finish with this document, if the Court

7 will allow.

8 Sir, if you can on to page 29, just a few more items, or one or

9 two more items from this, this is Mr. Prlic continuing, and toward the

10 bottom part, not exactly the bottom, but toward the bottom of that page,

11 you'll find this passage at the end of one of the paragraphs:

12 "There is still no political agreement regarding the relations

13 between the Croats and the Muslims. These relations," and again we're

14 talking September 1992. "These relations are becoming ever more tense

15 and certain conflicts are looming. Personally, I think it would be

16 impossible to avoid conflicts entirely."

17 And he goes on about trying to send some letters, et cetera.

18 Now, isn't that a position not only held by Mr. Prlic at that

19 time, but didn't you and others in the HVO leadership hold similar views?

20 You knew, based upon the positions being taken around this time, that

21 essentially a conflict between the Croats and the Muslims was virtually

22 inevitable, didn't you?

23 A. This is not about the military conflict, the way I see it. At

24 that time in our day-to-day work, we saw the reactions and we encountered

25 conflicts when it came to the implementation of the regulations on the

Page 34708

1 ground. In all the segments, finance, justice, et cetera, there were

2 tensions, and that caused problems. And this is the way I see it, in

3 that context.

4 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, if you'd like to take the break.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fifteen-minute break.

6 --- Recess taken at 5.34 p.m.

7 --- On resuming at 5.56 p.m.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The court is back in session.

9 Mr. Registrar, how much does the Prosecutor have left?

10 Mr. Scott, you may proceed.

11 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.

12 Q. Sir, I'd like you to next, please, look at Exhibit P10701 in the

13 third binder. P10701.

14 And while you're looking at that, sir, this is again a BBC

15 Monitoring Service publication dated the 26th of April, 1993. My

16 question to you is this: In about the middle of that -- there's only

17 about two paragraphs. In the second paragraph, it says:

18 "The president of the HVO of the Croatian Community of

19 Herceg-Bosna, Jadranko Prlic, spoke about the latest clashes between the

20 HVO and Muslim forces at today's press conference (one of the regular HVO

21 press conferences held in Mostar every day)."

22 Were you familiar with the general practice of the HVO

23 authorities to, in fact -- can you confirm that there was something like

24 a daily press conference?

25 A. As far as I know, they were not held on a daily basis.

Page 34709

1 Q. Approximately how often?

2 A. Well, I couldn't tell you exactly, but I know that the HVO HZ-HB

3 did not hold those conferences all that often. After our sessions, there

4 were press releases.

5 Q. And who were the principal spokespersons for the HVO HZ-HB at

6 these press conference -- press conferences?

7 A. I've already said that you couldn't even say "principal

8 spokespersons," because there were not many of those press conferences.

9 I really don't know.

10 Q. Sir, I'm going to put to you that they were, in fact, much more

11 regular than you apparently indicate. Apart from Mr. Prlic, who else

12 would speak at these conferences?

13 A. I don't know. I really couldn't tell you.

14 Q. Would you look, please, at P10706. This is a BBC article dated

15 the 6th of May, 1993, based on a story coming out of the Croatian TV

16 Satellite Service in Zagreb about the launch of Croatian Radio

17 Herceg-Bosna, says it was marked in Mostar today, the 4th of May:

18 "In the presence of the president of Herceg-Bosna, HVO,

19 Jadranko Prlic and several other HVO officials, radio director Zlatko

20 Prienda stressed that all transmitters, which would enable Croatian Radio

21 of Herceg-Bosna to be heard throughout Bosnia would be erected in the

22 next few weeks."

23 Again, sir, wasn't it the case that at press releases, press

24 conferences, statements to the media such as this, Mr. Prlic was very

25 often the person involved in making such statements; correct?

Page 34710

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. And can you tell us, do you recall that it was indeed around this

3 time, early May 1993, when further steps were taken to establish and

4 operate something called the Croatian Radio of Herceg-Bosna?

5 A. Yes, the Croatian Radio of Herceg-Bosna was established by a

6 decision of the HVO HZ-HB in order to broadcast information throughout

7 the HZ-HB, in light of the fact that up until that time there were mostly

8 local radio stations active there.

9 Q. Sir, you recall, do you not, that around -- we talked about this,

10 the meeting -- the HVO HZ-HB meeting on the 3rd of April, 1993, and you

11 agree, do you not, that around the 3rd of April, 1993, Herceg-Bosna, the

12 HVO authorities, issued what became was -- or became known as an

13 ultimatum to armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina to either subordinate

14 themselves to the HVO or to leave those areas, so-called Croat areas, by

15 the 15th of April, 1993. Correct?

16 A. Yes. It was within the framework of the implementation of the

17 Vance-Owen Plan.

18 Q. But you knew, did you not, that there were a number of documents

19 and conditions in connection with President Izetbegovic's signature of

20 that document which had not yet been resolved; correct?

21 A. Yes. That was in the correspondence between Mr. Prlic and

22 Mr. Izetbegovic.

23 Q. And in fact, though, and if we can look -- if I can direct your

24 attention to P10675, P10675 in the third binder, please. And while

25 you're looking at that, sir, I'll just tell you and I'll say for the

Page 34711

1 purposes of the record, this is a collection of four articles, one dated

2 the 4th of April, 1993, from Reuters News, a second one from Financial

3 Times, dated 20 April 1993, one from the Christian Science Monitor dated

4 7 April 1993, and one from Agence France-Presse on the 16th of April,

5 1993, all reporting on what's described in, I believe, each of the

6 articles as the HVO ultimatum with the deadline 15th of April, 1993.

7 Let me direct your particular attention, please, because of the

8 time limitations that we have. If you can go to the Christian Science

9 Monitor article, which is, I believe, sir, the third article in your

10 binder -- in that bundle, please, excuse me.

11 Toward the end of that -- well, about two-thirds through the

12 overall article, at the bottom of the English version on the first page,

13 for those reading in English, it says:

14 "Mr. Prlic concedes, nonetheless, that the HVO ultimatum could

15 lead to bloodshed. 'We expect everything. We don't want this struggle,

16 we don't have any reason for this struggle,' he says."

17 Would you agree with that statement, in terms of further

18 confirming that there was, indeed, this ultimatum, and would you

19 confirm -- would you confirm and agree with Mr. Prlic, that it was known,

20 given the circumstances, that quote, anything -- something to the effect

21 of, excuse me, anything could happen?

22 A. First of all, I don't think that this was an ultimatum. That's

23 not how I see it. I consider this to be a step in the direction of the

24 implementation of the Vance-Owen Plan. And this was not Prlic, the

25 president of the HVO, as indicated in this text, but as the

Page 34712

1 prime minister, as he was designated at the time.

2 The situation was difficult already at that time, and it was

3 expected that the signatories of the agreement would make an effort to

4 implement this, and the statement made by the Defence minister that

5 followed later, Mr. Rajic, must also be seen in this context. So I don't

6 think that this was an ultimatum with an ultimate goal of causing a

7 conflict. This was more -- I just wanted to say that this was mostly an

8 expression of the desire to implement this agreement as soon as possible

9 and to move over to another stage in the activities in Bosnia and

10 Herzegovina.

11 Q. Well, you may not want to use the term "ultimatum," sir, but you

12 would agree, would you not, that it was the statement of a position with

13 a deadline, the deadline being the 15th of April, 1993; correct?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And if we go back to the first article before we need to move on,

16 the Reuters article, the fifth paragraph on that page in that article

17 says:

18 "The HVO set an April 15 deadline for Bosnian President

19 Alija Izetbegovic to sign a joint communique ratifying the withdrawals,

20 creating a common high command and certifying there were no Muslim-Croat

21 territorial disputes."

22 And skipping a paragraph, it says:

23 "If Izetbegovic fails to sign this agreement by April 15th, the

24 HVO will unilaterally enforce its jurisdiction in Cantons 3, 8 and 10,

25 the statement from the HVO headquarters in the southwest Croat stronghold

Page 34713

1 of Mostar warned."

2 Now, those are both true and accurate statements, aren't they?

3 A. I don't know about the latter statement.

4 Q. Let's go on, sir, to the so-called Medjugorje Agreement which you

5 spent some time discussing with Mr. Karnavas.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment, we just saw that

7 there were three press releases, and my eye was caught by the AFP release

8 in Zagreb. Usually, the AFP is a very precise news agency. I find here

9 that the HVO had a spokesperson, Mr. Veso Vegar, and allegedly this

10 person said, and this is being quoted by the AFP agency, that this is

11 resolutely an ultimatum. "We can't wait indefinitely until the peace

12 plan is implemented."

13 So the HVO spokesperson says here that this is an ultimatum, and

14 you said it wasn't. Well, did you know this Mr. Veso Vegar?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I did. However, Mr. Veso

16 Vegar was not a spokesperson for the HVO HZ-HB. He was a spokesperson of

17 the military component.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So he was a spokesperson for

19 the military component. I see.

20 Please proceed, Mr. Scott.

21 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.

22 Q. Just one question further on that. When you say this spokesman

23 for the military component, Mr. Vegar was the spokesperson for the HVO

24 Main Staff; correct?

25 A. I know he wasn't with the HVO HZ-HB. We had a service that was

Page 34714

1 run by another person.

2 Q. Well, perhaps you'll answer my question, sir. You were there in

3 Mostar throughout this time period. You were one of the central figures

4 in the Herceg-Bosna government. You knew Mr. Vegar, and you knew, sir,

5 did you not, that he was the spokesperson for the HVO Main Staff? It's a

6 very simple question.

7 A. Yes.

8 MR. SCOTT: Now, unless there's additional questions, Your

9 Honours, I'll move on to the next topic. Thank you.

10 Q. Sir, you started -- I made reference just a few moments ago to

11 the Medjugorje Agreement, and let's just try to clarify a few things.

12 There's a reference to "Medjugorje Agreement," but isn't it correct, sir,

13 that at least on the political or governmental side, at best, there were

14 some conceptual discussions at the meeting on the 18th of May, 1993,

15 which never, and I emphasise the word "never," resulted in a signed

16 written agreement?

17 A. I'm not familiar with any details regarding that.

18 Q. Well, sir, you -- excuse me, sir. You testified about this at

19 length in response to questions from Mr. Karnavas. Now, you knew then

20 but you don't know now, or how do you explain the fact that you could

21 talk about it when you were here ten days ago, but now you don't know

22 anything about it?

23 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honours, if perhaps the question was

24 rephrased. I mean, how is one to interpret what are the conceptual

25 discussions?

Page 34715

1 MR. SCOTT:

2 Q. Sir --

3 MR. KARNAVAS: What is exactly -- I mean, if you could be more

4 concrete, perhaps the gentleman might be able to be of assistance.

5 MR. SCOTT: I'll try, thank you, Mr. Karnavas.

6 Q. My question was simply, I think, rather simple, and was

7 ultimately this, sir: Isn't it correct, at least on the political or

8 governmental side, there was never a signed written agreement? I put it

9 to you, sir, that there was one meeting on the 18th of May. Certain

10 discussions were had, and concept. There was never any signed written

11 agreement; yes or no? There either was or there wasn't. There's nothing

12 in between.

13 A. If there is something that is called the Medjugorje Agreement,

14 then probably there was an agreement like that. I inferred this based on

15 the correspondence between Mr. Prlic and Mr. Izetbegovic.

16 Mr. Izetbegovic invokes the --

17 Q. Has anyone ever shown you a document that says this is the

18 Medjugorje Agreement with the signatures of the parties? Not "probably,

19 there probably was one." Did you ever see one?

20 A. I've never seen a document like that. And the same applies to a

21 million other documents or agreements that were there and that we were

22 being informed about.

23 Q. And, sir, you would agree, would you not, just on these things

24 generally, that what was being discussed, the establishment of

25 governments and structures, there were many loose ends, if you will, and

Page 34716

1 again I guess I'm not sure how that will translate, unresolved items

2 remaining after the meeting on the 18th of May, 1993; correct?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. I believe you testified that one of the things you were critical

5 about was that you were critical of Mr. Izetbegovic and the Muslims for

6 wanting to start work at the provincial level first, instead of

7 concerning the central government. But I put it to you, sir, wasn't that

8 exactly the same position as Mate Boban, that Mr. Boban wanted to start

9 with the provincial governments, just as Mr. Izetbegovic did? Do you

10 remember that?

11 A. What context?

12 Q. Of any discussions to go forward with anything -- the concepts

13 discussed on the 18th of May, 1993.

14 A. One thing that wasn't questioned was the establishment of

15 authorities in the cantons. What was questioned was the resolution of

16 the previous issue, which was the establishment of state authorities, who

17 will bankroll the army, who will bankroll the police, and how the

18 breakdown in terms of authority between the cantons and the central

19 government. And this is the one issue that was not resolved.

20 As for establishing the cantons themselves, all this meant was

21 destruction of the HZ-HB, but not the establishment of the state of

22 Bosnia-Herzegovina under the Vance-Owen Plan, and that is why this

23 activity had to be coordinated and a government had to be set up which

24 the cantons would then communicate with in terms of defining their

25 respective authorities down to the minutest detail. It wasn't just about

Page 34717

1 setting up cantons.

2 Q. Exactly, sir, and none of those things are resolved at one

3 meeting on the 18th of May, 1993, were they, and they never were resolved

4 because there never was an agreement; correct?

5 A. You have this meeting with several people in it. You can't

6 expect them to deal with a question such as establishing a state. That

7 is why you need a government. They have to communicate with other

8 levels, other authorities, and that brings the whole thing to a

9 conclusion. You can't just expect an agreement to define all the details

10 that need defining.

11 The Washington Agreement or the Dayton Accords were not

12 successful in this, either, on their own. It wasn't until later on when

13 the government started operating that amendments were made to both the

14 Washington Agreement and the Dayton Accords.

15 Q. Sir, for exactly the reasons you just stated, for exactly those

16 reasons, there were so many things left unresolved, so many issues still

17 to resolve, based on one meeting, one day's meeting. Wasn't it a bit

18 premature for Jadranko Prlic to start sending letters describing himself

19 as the president of this so-called new government?

20 A. It wasn't premature. Mr. Izetbegovic himself, when he replied,

21 behaved this way. His name was nominated, he was put forward. Some

22 personnel decisions at a later stage in Washington had also been

23 pre-agreed, as it were.

24 Q. Sir, we don't have time to go through all the documents. I put

25 to you again, as you agreed just a few minutes ago, there was a

Page 34718

1 discussion and concept on one day, on the 18th of May, 1993, which never

2 resulted in any actual agreement, including any position held by

3 Mr. Prlic; correct?

4 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, I'm going to -- I object. This has

5 been asked and it's been answered. The gentleman did indicate that

6 Izetbegovic had responded to correspondence to Dr. Jadranko Prlic based

7 exactly on this particular agreement and nominations that he was asking

8 for, the sort of positions or ministries that Izetbegovic wished to have,

9 and there was correspondence to that. So I think we can move on. This

10 horse has been beaten to death.

11 MR. SCOTT: Well, I disagree with Mr. Karnavas, Your Honour. He

12 may think it's beaten to death, but I don't have to accept his position

13 on the matter.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Do put your question, because

15 there were exchanges of letters between Mr. Prlic and Mr. Izetbegovic on

16 this subject. Well, the Prosecution has a specific point of view. Put

17 it forward.

18 MR. SCOTT: I agree with that, Mr. President. I'd agree that

19 there was correspondence. We saw that.

20 Q. And if you can look, please, sir, at 1D 01597. It will be in the

21 fourth binder, excuse me, so-called Defence binder. 1D 01597.

22 Sir, if you have that document, 1D 01597, this is one of the

23 letters that I think Mr. Karnavas showed you dated the 23rd of May, 1993.

24 Now, just on some of the items we've just been talking about, if you look

25 at the very beginning of Mr. Prlic's letter, Mr. Prlic starts out, in

Page 34719

1 fact, by saying:

2 "Although I have only been verbally informed of the decisions

3 made at the meeting in Medjugorje ..."

4 Sir, doesn't what Mr. Prlic say there only a few days later, on

5 the 23rd of May, after the 18th of May, doesn't that in fact suggest to

6 you that there was no agreement or there was no written agreement,

7 because even Mr. Prlic himself says, "I've only been verbally informed"?

8 MR. KARNAVAS: I object to the form of the question. How can he

9 answer this question?

10 MR. SCOTT: A very simple question.

11 MR. KARNAVAS: Yeah, but look at the question, Your Honour. I

12 mean, how does he come up with this, that there was no agreement based on

13 that he was verbally informed? One can be verbally informed of an

14 agreement or informed in written form.

15 MR. SCOTT:

16 Q. Excuse me. "Although I have only been verbally informed," does

17 that not suggest, sir, that Mr. Prlic had not, by that time, seen a

18 written -- a signed, written agreement?

19 MR. KARNAVAS: [Indiscernible] crazy.

20 MR. SCOTT:

21 Q. Sir?

22 A. Yes, that's right, he didn't see that.

23 Q. Now, then in the -- down below in about the third paragraph, he

24 says:

25 "I have prepared new facilities for the government offices, since

Page 34720

1 I am of the opinion that it cannot operate in existing conditions in

2 occupied Sarajevo."

3 So, Mr. Prlic presumes to move this new government out of

4 Sarajevo.

5 The next -- skipping one paragraph:

6 "If I don't receive responses from the representatives of the

7 nations in the established time frame (Mr. Mate Boban has expressed

8 interest in the ministries of international trade)," et cetera, "I will

9 be forced to inform you to that effect."

10 Sir, isn't this one more instance that the Chamber has heard,

11 these Judges have heard a number of -- and seen a number of instances of

12 the HVO jumping the gun, getting way ahead of itself on where things

13 actually stood at the time?

14 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, before he answers that question, he

15 should be given the opportunity to look at 1D 01600, which is Izetbegovic

16 responding to Dr. Jadranko Prlic. You have to read both of them

17 together. And having given the witness the opportunity to read both of

18 them together, then he can pose that question.

19 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me. Perhaps I can conduct my examination and

20 Mr. Karnavas can conduct his examination.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, you're entitled to. The

22 Trial Chamber is aware of all the documents, because it has reviewed them

23 all. But you could have asked the question differently. You could have

24 asked the witness whether he had already seen these documents.

25 MR. SCOTT: Well, that wasn't my question, Your Honours. That's

Page 34721

1 why I didn't put it.

2 Q. My question was, sir: Isn't this another instance of the HVO, we

3 would say, and again whatever the Croatian translation might be, jumping

4 the gun, acting prematurely on things where there was no -- in fact no

5 agreement yet reached, in fact, and there never was?

6 A. No. I believe that this was merely an active approach to the

7 implementation of that agreement. It also expressed a desire to see the

8 Vance-Owen Plan implemented, as well as to stop the clashes.

9 Q. If you'll go, sir, to Exhibit P02613, P02613, in the second --

10 no, sorry, first binder. P02613. This is a record of another meeting in

11 the offices of President Tudjman on the 2nd of June, 1993, and on this

12 particular occasion, according to this record, President Tudjman, Defence

13 Minister Susak and perhaps others were meeting with perhaps, among

14 others, Lord David Owen. And I would like to direct your attention,

15 please, in particular to -- excuse me a moment, my apologies -- starting

16 at page 10. Starting at page 10, Mr. Owen says:

17 "We analysed the confederal solution which actually divides

18 Bosnia into three parts. However, in this way we haven't managed to find

19 a way to establish a viable Muslim state. You would in fact create some

20 kind of Palestine. They would never accept it and they would continue to

21 fight."

22 Then going over to the top of the next page, Tudjman says:

23 "Who would never accept it, Europe or Lord Owen?"

24 "The Muslims, the Muslims would never accept it."

25 And then toward -- at the end of that page, jumping down, he

Page 34722

1 says:

2 "But, whenever I analyse the tripartite division of BH, I think

3 it does not give enough to the Muslims. I think your people would want

4 to take more than they should or what the rest of the world would allow

5 them," next page, "that's one thing. It's enough to look at how Boban

6 interprets the provinces of Travnik and Mostar. He speaks about them as

7 if they were his, and that's how he started to behave. They were not

8 his. These are the provinces in which he will probably have certainly a

9 majority in the province of Mostar and probably a majority in the

10 province of Travnik."

11 And then going on to page 13, in the middle of the page, Owen

12 says:

13 "I wouldn't want to give up on the idea to preserve BH, but I'm

14 certainly prepared to consider a possibility, if that is not possible, to

15 establish a viable Muslim state."

16 Tudjman: "As far as we are concerned, we too can influence the

17 Croats, but not slowly. We can influence the Croats to accept this

18 confederal. So to apply the Vance-Owen Plan with regard to the Croats

19 along those lines, such as Provinces 3, 8 and 10, this is roughly what in

20 1939 became part of the banovina of Croatia."

21 Now, sir, when we go back, again I wanted to read a broader part

22 so that I wouldn't be accused of reading too little, but didn't -- isn't

23 Owen at the top of page 12 telling Tudjman, once again, "You've

24 jumped --" you know, "Boban, you've jumped the gun. You've acted like

25 this is something that's already happened when in fact it hasn't

Page 34723

1 happened"? Isn't that, sir, the case with the way you've described the

2 so-called Medjugorje Agreement?

3 Sir?

4 A. Yes, but this is not about the provinces. This is about the

5 establishment of state authority in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This is the

6 Vance-Owen Plan. It's not merely about the cantons. It's about the

7 overall authority being established.

8 Q. I'm sorry, I've intervened with you very, very little today, but

9 I'm putting the language to you specifically at the top of page 12. Now,

10 please, please assist me to this extent. Look exactly at the language,

11 what Owen says:

12 "It is enough to look at how Boban interprets the provinces of

13 Travnik and Mostar. He speaks about them as if they were his, and that's

14 how he started to behave."

15 That's my question. And that's, in fact, what happened, isn't

16 it? I mean, isn't that what happened in January 1993, in April 1993, in

17 May 1993? Sir, the HVO was always jumping the gun and doing what they

18 want to do, but there's no agreement to that effect; isn't that the case?

19 A. I don't think that is the case. This is based on the

20 Vance-Owen Plan, and the plan was confirmed. Therefore, this is nothing

21 more than an active role in terms of the implementation of the

22 Vance-Owen Plan. I declare that at the time the Muslim side was not

23 interested in its full implementation, simply because they didn't know

24 what the fate would be of the Bosnia-Herzegovina in its entirety.

25 Q. I put it to you, sir, that when you say that the Muslim side was

Page 34724

1 not interested in its full implementation, what you should say, sir, and

2 I put to you is the correct position, is that the Muslims did not agree

3 with the implementation as conceived by the HVO. Isn't that the correct

4 statement?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Let's go to Exhibit P10698, P10698 in the binder number 3. Sir,

7 this is an article -- a Reuters article dated the 28th of October, 1992.

8 And we've gone back a bit in time, but for a reason. This is again

9 starting with a discussion about Lord Owen and Cyrus Vance. About

10 halfway down the first page, you'll see a paragraph, I believe, that

11 says:

12 "But Jadranko Prlic, president of the republic declared by Croats

13 in the area of Bosnia they control, told Reuters that the only way to

14 achieve a stable solution was to have three national units, whose parts

15 need not be physically connected."

16 Now, sir, again, doesn't this take us back to and can we agree

17 again that the position of the HVO and the Herceg-Bosna authorities, as

18 seen in Livno, as seen in other documents that we've looked at when you

19 were here before and again today, that the basic position was and

20 remained the establishment of separate ethnic areas? Correct?

21 A. I must say that there is this question that had been going on

22 since Livno. It was not about ethnically-pure areas. There was some

23 options, such as the cantons, on the one hand, or a unit, on the other,

24 that physically --

25 Q. [Previous translation continues]... specific. I'm talking about

Page 34725

1 this article and the statement attributed to Jadranko Prlic, not what

2 your own thoughts were at the time. Did Jadranko Prlic say then and

3 continue to say throughout this period that the solution was three

4 national units? Nobody said that they were 100 per cent pure ethnic,

5 anything about that. You continually say that. You said it about five

6 times today. The idea was three ethnic units, and that's what Mr. Prlic

7 told Reuters in October 1992, and that continued to be the HVO position,

8 didn't it? Yes?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. If you look at Exhibit P10532, P10532 in the third binder. This

11 is a BBC article dated the 9th of August, 1993, apparently based on an

12 interview with someone named Miomir Zuzul. You knew Mr. Zuzul, didn't

13 you, and he was -- in his position at the time in August of 1993?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And if you look at the third paragraph of Mr. -- well, excuse me,

16 the article and the statements attributed to Mr. Zuzul, can you recall,

17 sir, that it was around this time, by August 1993 and the fall of 1993,

18 that there began to be discussion of another model, since the Muslims had

19 not agreed to three separate areas, of something that became known or

20 would ultimately become known as a Croat-Muslim federation?

21 A. I wasn't up to date on those activities at the time.

22 Q. Well, if you look at the third paragraph, it says:

23 "Asked why the Muslim idea of unification of Muslim and Croat

24 republics into a Bosnian and Herzegovinian union is not acceptable, Zuzul

25 said, 'it could hardly work,' and that it would be to the benefit of the

Page 34726

1 third side, that is, of Serbia."

2 Do you remember -- do you recall that view being expressed, not

3 only by Mr. Zuzul but in general by the Croat side, in August and

4 following, 1993, that the idea of a joint Croat-Muslim unit, if you will,

5 was not feasible, it could hardly work?

6 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, you have to look at the entire paragraph,

7 Your Honours, and the witness should also look at the very last line,

8 because it would drive the Serbs, you know, into the hands of the Federal

9 Republic of Yugoslavia, that's why, because then that would mean, you

10 know, the carve-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That's what it's talking

11 about.

12 JUDGE TRECHSEL: You're commenting now.

13 MR. KARNAVAS: You're right. I apologise for that.

14 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.

15 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honours, I'm going to -- there have been

16 relatively few interventions, but I'm going to object to that. I mean,

17 that's Mr. Karnavas testifying. He can state an objection, but it's not

18 for him to argue what he thinks the document says, or means, or what it

19 should mean.

20 Q. Sir, my question to you remains. I'll just simply read it back

21 to you. Do you recall that view being expressed not only by Mr. Zuzul

22 but generally on the Croat side in August and following, 1993, that the

23 idea of a joint Croat-Muslim unit, if you will, was not feasible or,

24 Mr. Zuzul's words, "it could hardly work"?

25 A. I wasn't up to date or up to speed on that, on the community

Page 34727

1 being created at the time.

2 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I do apologise for

3 this intervention, but I believe there is a misunderstanding that has

4 just occurred.

5 My learned friend Mr. Scott asked a question about a joint

6 Croat-Muslim unit, whereas Mr. Zuzul is talking about the unity of the

7 two republics, the Muslim and the Croat. Therefore, there is no talk

8 here of a single Croat-Muslim unit. Thank you.

9 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

10 MR. SCOTT: Sorry, Counsel. In the paragraph it says -- in the

11 third paragraph, it says:

12 "Asked why the Muslim idea of unification," making one, "of

13 Muslim and Croat republics into a Bosnia-Herzegovina union," being one,

14 "is not acceptable." I do believe that was the question put to Mr. Zuzul

15 and to which Mr. Zuzul says "It could hardly work."

16 Q. Sir, coming back to your previous answer, and -- sir, how can you

17 say -- how can you, as a member of this government, the finance minister

18 or the head of the finance department, and once again a very close

19 colleague and confidant of Mr. Prlic, someone who the HVO HZ-HB minutes

20 would indicate was heavily involved in these matters, how can you say you

21 wouldn't know what the position of the HVO was at the time on these

22 matters which had to be, had to be, sir, of great importance to you and

23 the leadership?

24 A. I know what the position of the HVO was. You asked me about the

25 position of Mr. Zuzul and other Croatian or Croat officials. I thought

Page 34728

1 you were referring to other officials from the Republic of Croatia.

2 Q. Well, excuse me, sir, if that was the cause of confusion. I'm

3 talking about the HVO Herceg-Bosna leadership, those who were in the

4 government that you sat on in Mostar throughout 1993. Wasn't that the

5 position of the HVO government?

6 A. Our position was Bosnia and Herzegovina, through three units or

7 through cantons with ethnic majority populations, and from the beginning

8 until the end this was the position in the HVO HZ-HB.

9 Q. Didn't you --

10 A. Now, variants --

11 Q. Sorry, go ahead, go ahead.

12 A. It's okay, it's fine.

13 Q. Sir, during this time, and we're now moving into the fall of

14 1993, isn't it correct, sir, and I just want to put this general

15 proposition to you and I'll try to do it as clearly as I can - please

16 listen to my question - in the fall of 1993, did not those on the Croat

17 side, and for these purposes I'm including both Zagreb and the HVO

18 Herceg-Bosna leadership, I'm including both when I say "the Croat side,"

19 isn't it true that during the fall of 1993 the Croat side saw, if you

20 will, moving away from them, that the negotiations and political

21 discussions at the time were moving away from anything allowing or

22 setting up a Croat unit to something that ultimately became known as the

23 Federation? That's the direction things were going in the fall of 1993;

24 correct?

25 A. Well, things were going towards the establishment of the

Page 34729

1 Croat-Muslim federation in accordance with the Washington Agreement.

2 That was the result of the political negotiations.

3 Q. But before that fully happened, sir, isn't it correct that both

4 Tudjman and Milosevic tried to get the idea of partition, if you will,

5 back on track, that it was time to return to that concept that the real

6 solution was a partition of Bosnia, and both Tudjman and Milosevic, in

7 the second half of 1993, were once again calling for that position;

8 correct?

9 A. I did not witness that, and I don't know what to say about that.

10 Q. Sir, you didn't witness it, and I suspect you didn't witness a

11 lot of things that Mr. Karnavas asked you about. I'm putting to you, as

12 your state of knowledge and events, that was the case, wasn't it? You

13 became aware, in the political dialogue that was going on in the second

14 half of 1993 and as some of the concepts on the table, if you will, were

15 changing, you knew, didn't you, surely, President Tudjman taking such a

16 position, Slobodan Milosevic, that the idea was to return to a partition

17 of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and you knew that, didn't you?

18 A. Through speculations in the media, but I never did get a definite

19 answer or position vis-a-vis this question.

20 Q. Well, let's go to Exhibit P10700 in the third binder, P10700, a 2

21 November 1993 article by a news agency that Mr. President says is a

22 highly reliable one, Agence France-Presse:

23 "Zagreb, November 2, AFP: Croatian President Franjo Tudjman

24 called Tuesday for resumption of the stalled Geneva peace talks on

25 Bosnia-Herzegovina with the participation of Britain, France, Germany,

Page 34730

1 Russia, Turkey and the United States."

2 The fourth paragraph:

3 "The Croatian leader's proposal amounted to a rejection of

4 suggestions by international mediators Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg

5 for a broader attempt to link all outstanding conflicts in the former

6 Yugoslavia in a new global effort.

7 "The Geneva talks, brokered by the United Nations and the

8 European Community, and involving the warring Bosnian parties as well as

9 leaders from Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro, broke down in September

10 after the Muslim-led Bosnian parliament rejected proposals to divide the

11 country into ethnic Croat, Muslim and Serbian mini-states.

12 "Tudjman said the conference, broadened to include 'countries

13 likely to effectively influence' the peace process, should keep the

14 earlier partition proposal as its starting point."

15 Now, you knew that's what was going on at the time; correct, sir?

16 MR. KARNAVAS: Again, I'm going to object, Your Honour. The

17 first two paragraphs that were read, they are interpretations of whoever

18 wrote this as to what was going on at the time. What they don't have

19 are, for instance, the discussions that we saw in the presidential

20 transcripts concerning Redman, the US's position of --

21 MR. SCOTT: This is commentary, Your Honour.

22 MR. KARNAVAS: Well that's why --

23 MR. SCOTT: I'm sorry to interrupt.

24 MR. KARNAVAS: That's why I'm objecting, because right now the

25 Prosecutor is pointing to two particular paragraphs that are the opinion

Page 34731

1 of some unknown individual that I don't get to cross-examine here, I

2 don't get to confront. This is nonsense.

3 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, all sides have used press articles

4 exactly like I'm doing now, putting these questions to the witness, and

5 what Mr. Karnavas has just done again is stand up and give the answer for

6 the witness, who hasn't had a chance.

7 MR. KARNAVAS: He's given his answer.

8 MR. SCOTT: It's his commentary, his argument.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You're right. You're right,

10 Mr. Scott.

11 Mr. Karnavas, you could have done that during the redirect.

12 MR. KARNAVAS: Do what, Your Honour, do what? That's the

13 problem. You allow these sorts of -- going off into this area, and then

14 you limit me my time. It's not enough to say, "You can do -- spend as

15 much time as you want on redirect," if I only have 95 hours when I'd

16 asked for 150 and say, "Use it on redirect." Frankly, I don't see how it

17 is that the Trial Chamber can just sit there when he's reading two

18 paragraphs that are commentary. This is an analysis by somebody who

19 wrote this article. How can he then say these are facts? That's my

20 objection, the way he's trying to twist this article into believing that

21 somehow this is Tudjman's position. Why not give all the information to

22 the witness? That's my objection. And to say I can cover it on

23 redirect, I need five or ten hours on redirect to cover everything.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, please proceed.

25 MR. SCOTT:

Page 34732

1 Q. My question to you, and I'll just read it to you again - please

2 listen to my question:

3 "Tudjman said the conference broadened to include countries

4 likely to effectively influence the peace process, should keep the

5 earlier partition proposal at its starting point."

6 Now, keep that in mind. A few moments ago I believe you

7 agreed -- you ultimately did agree, after I asked you several times, that

8 there was discussion around this time and it was being reported in the

9 media that indeed Tudjman and Milosevic had taken this position. Now,

10 that's correct --

11 MR. KARNAVAS: He didn't agree to that. I object again. This is

12 a mischaracterisation of the evidence. He never agreed to that.

13 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, can we go back a minute? Give me a

14 moment, Your Honour, and I'll go back in the transcript.

15 MR. KARNAVAS: And while he's at it, why not put something in

16 front of the gentleman --

17 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Could you -- could you please moderate your tone

18 a bit?

19 MR. KARNAVAS: I apologise. We need --

20 JUDGE TRECHSEL: It's all to your credit that you're engaged,

21 Mr. Karnavas, but the Chamber really doesn't need shouting at.

22 MR. KARNAVAS: I apologise.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.

24 MR. SCOTT: While we're looking for that:

25 Q. Really, again, I've just quoted the language to you, I've read it

Page 34733

1 to you now twice. You and others in the HVO leadership, the people that

2 you met with practically every week at the government meeting, you were

3 aware of President Tudjman and Milosevic indicating -- stating taking

4 this position in the fall of 1993; correct? Whether you agree with this

5 document or not, I put it to you, as Mr. Karnavas said, put something

6 physical in front of you that might assist you, that might refresh your

7 memory, whether you agree with it or not, can you tell these Judges you

8 knew that was the position being put forward by Tudjman and Milosevic

9 during this time period, didn't you?

10 A. As I said a little while ago, I learnt about that through the

11 speculations in the media. That's where I read about it. I did not have

12 any direct knowledge of that, any documents, any information to that

13 effect.

14 Q. Do you recall, sir, around this time the German government

15 withdrawing its earlier support of the Tudjman government because, in

16 fact, for the very reason that Tudjman had gotten too close to Milosevic

17 on this issue?

18 A. I don't know about that.

19 Q. Would you go, please, to Exhibit P10702. P10702.

20 MR. KARNAVAS: Again, I'm going to object to this sort of

21 cross-examination. Where is something from the German government,

22 something official? We're using the press now. This is a profound way

23 of proving a case by an international organ.

24 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. Karnavas. Anything can be used as

25 evidence, Your Honour. It can be a bloody shirt, it can be a piece of

Page 34734

1 anything I've put in front of the witness, and the witness can clearly

2 say. If he says he doesn't know or he doesn't agree, he can say so, and

3 for that matter I don't have to put a single document in front of him;

4 I can simply ask him the questions. So Mr. Karnavas is just dead wrong,

5 and I wish he would stop being obstructionist.

6 Q. Now, sir, this is another article by Agence France-Presse, and

7 started on November 2nd, 1993, Zagreb, November 2nd, AFP:

8 "Germany, one of Croatia's staunchest supporters in the Yugoslav

9 conflict, can no longer 'identify' with Zagreb because of the latter's

10 increasing alliance with Serbia, a German Deputy said here Tuesday,"

11 referring to a man named Hans Stercken.

12 In the middle of the page:

13 "Stercken, who arrived in Zagreb last Saturday for talks with top

14 Croatian officials, also criticised Croatia President Franjo Tudjman for

15 'trusting too much' his Serbian counterpart Slobodan Milosevic."

16 Now, do you remember around this time, sir, in November 1993, a

17 very important -- a very important government that was generally

18 supportive of Croatia withdrawing its support because of the

19 Tudjman-Milosevic partition initiative? Surely you were reading the

20 newspapers, surely you were watching television, surely you were

21 participating in these government meetings.

22 A. At that time, I was not in the government. And in the media that

23 I was able to follow at the time, I could not find any statements to that

24 effect. This document from the France Press Agency, well, this is the

25 first time that I see it.

Page 34735

1 Q. Sir, you keep saying you weren't in the government at this time.

2 When did you stop being the head of the finance department of

3 Herceg-Bosna?

4 A. Well, when the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna was established,

5 I ceased being a member of the government.

6 Q. Sir, that didn't happen overnight, did it? It's just like we

7 were talking about earlier today. It takes time to do these things, and

8 the new government wasn't put in place until late November of 1993; isn't

9 that the case? If you need to, we can go to presidential transcript,

10 where President Tudjman picked the new government, if that will help you.

11 You continued to be a member of the government until at least late

12 November 1993, sir, and even after that, you were the deputy minister of

13 finance, weren't you?

14 A. Yes, I became the deputy minister of finance.

15 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, of course I'm in the Chamber's hands,

16 but I'm about to start a new topic and I do note that it's a couple of

17 minutes before 7.00.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You have one hour fifteen

19 minutes left when we resume tomorrow.

20 Well, I have a fear because -- with all the objections. I was

21 expecting you to finish now. If Mr. Karnavas requires four hours, well,

22 the witness will have to return.

23 MR. KARNAVAS: Based on the latitude that is being given to the

24 Prosecution and the continuing -- the continuing observations by the

25 Trial Chamber that I can just handle everything on redirect, at this

Page 34736

1 point in time I'm making an oral application for additional time beyond

2 that which has been allotted to me for my case. In other words, I'm

3 asking for another 10 hours to be added to the 95 hours that I was given.

4 I expect some consideration of this, because it would seem that the Trial

5 Chamber is under the impression that I can handle all of these things on

6 redirect, especially if we're going to be going into areas dealing with

7 the implementation of the -- not just the Washington Agreement, but also

8 the Dayton Peace Accords.

9 I argued last week and I asked for a hearing at one point. We

10 were promised a hearing. General Praljak indicated that a hearing was

11 promised to us. We have yet to have that hearing.

12 At what point -- where are the contours of this particular

13 indictment? They keep growing over and over again. We are entitled to

14 know what it is that we need to defend against, and now we have allowed

15 the Prosecution to go into the implementation process of the Dayton Peace

16 Accords. In other words, we now have to defend that process from 1995

17 all the way to 2008.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very good. Your request is in

19 the transcript.

20 It's 7.00 p.m. Witness, you'll return for the hearing tomorrow

21 that will resume at 2.15.

22 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.00 p.m.,

23 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 18th day of November, 2008,

24 at 2.15 p.m.