Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 40781

 1                           Wednesday, 27 May 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The Accused Prlic and Coric not present]

 5                           [The witness takes the stand]

 6                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, could you please

 8     call the case.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning

10     everyone in and around the courtroom.  This is case number IT-04-74-T,

11     the Prosecutor versus Prlic et al.  Thank you, Your Honours.

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, registrar.  This is

13     Wednesday, May 27, 2009, and I welcome Mr. Praljak.  I also greet

14     Mr. Pusic, Mr. Petkovic, and Mr. Stojic, as well as the counsels for

15     Defence.  I greet Mr. Stringer and all his associates, as well as

16     everyone helping us in the courtroom.

17             Before giving the floor to Mrs. Pinter for the rest of the

18     questions, I personally have a request to make.  This request -- I have

19     to make a request for the Defence of General Praljak.  As you know, I

20     told you that I would be putting questions to General Praljak, and while

21     I was drafting these questions I noted one thing.  Brigadier

22     Miljenko Lasic, before May 9, sent a series of orders.  The Praljak

23     Defence filed these orders under 3D01015, 1016, 1013, 1014, and so forth.

24     There were also orders as of 9 -- May 9 that have different numbers,

25     3D01006, 008, 009, and so on.

Page 40782

 1             Now, here's my problem:  It seems that when Mr. Lasic was sending

 2     his orders, he used two systems to record these orders.  The ones before

 3     May 9 were filed under numbers 03-0398, 399, 400, 401, and so forth, but

 4     that was the case before May 9.  Then after May 9 there's a new series of

 5     numbers, 01-2903, 2904, et cetera.

 6             I don't need an answer now, but I would like to know whether the

 7     Praljak Defence actually had in its hands all the documents filed as of

 8     01-29 -- 2000 and some numbers, and all documents as of May 9 -- no,

 9     before May 9 who were filed under number 03- and some numbers.

10             Now, why am I asking this question?  I would like to know whether

11     before May 9 in the operational zone commanded by Lasic there were any

12     documents that would be addressing some kind of preparation or not.  I

13     don't know what kind of documents you have.  I know I have complained

14     about this a number of times.  The Judges have no control on the

15     documents presented by the parties.  It's only during the trial that the

16     Judges note that there are these kind of documents missing.  So I would

17     like to know whether there are -- whether the other documents are in your

18     hands.  It would be extremely interesting to know what happened on May

19     1st, May 2nd, May 3rd, whether Mr. Lasic actually sent any orders on

20     these dates or even before that date.  I believe this would be extremely

21     interesting, but I don't have this.  Maybe you have it.  If you do, I'm

22     sure you'll use them, and if you don't use them, well, too bad.  I can't

23     demand that you use them unless we actually call Mr. Lasic, but this is

24     not on the agenda as of now.

25             So please think about all this and give me an answer later on.

Page 40783

 1     But I would like to add, Mrs. Pinter, that I did note something that was

 2     a bit strange, and I'd like to tell you about it.  Regarding the orders

 3     of May 9, there are a number of them.  Most of them are filed under

 4     01-0293 and so on, but at the same date exactly is filed under number

 5     01-2742.  It's very strange.  It's certainly out of series.  So it seems

 6     that there's a problem.  So please look into this.

 7             Mrs. Pinter, you have the floor.

 8             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  I'll look

 9     and see.  We attached the documents we had, and I'll give you an answer

10     to your question tomorrow.  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning to

11     everyone else in the courtroom.

12                           WITNESS:  SLOBODAN PRALJAK [Resumed]

13                           [Witness answered though interpreter]

14                           Examination by Ms. Pinter: [Continued]

15        Q.   [Interpretation] And good morning to you too, General.

16        A.   Good morning.

17        Q.   To start off with, I have prepared a document, which is already

18     an exhibit.  It is 3D00931.  As I say, the document has already been

19     admitted into evidence and is an exhibit.  General, you are well

20     acquainted with this document.  Let's say what it's about.  Let's start

21     with the date so we can have it on record.  What's the date of the

22     document?

23        A.   The 29th of August, 1993.

24        Q.   And they are conclusions and tasks from a meeting of senior

25     officers of the Main Staff and corps commanders held in Zenica on the

Page 40784

 1     21st and 22nd of August, 1993.  I think that it is important to look at

 2     the individuals who were present from the Main Staff and from the corps.

 3     Do you have any personal contacts with those individuals, or do you only

 4     know about this through the documents?

 5        A.   At that time I only knew them through the documents.

 6        Q.   Can you tell us -- when, it says what their posts were.

 7     Rasim Delic was the commander of the BH Army, was he not?

 8        A.   Well, everything is written down in the document we needn't waste

 9     time on it.

10        Q.   But these people are important to me so we know who these people

11     are so their names are stated, but anyway I'd like to ask you to look at

12     points 2 and 3 of the conclusions of this meeting.

13        A.   I'd like to start with point 1 where they say that the war was

14     imposed by the extremist parts of the HVO and that that was a stab in the

15     back for them and that this HVO attack was more brutal than the war waged

16     by the Chetniks.

17             Well, if at that time the command of the BH Army thought along

18     those lines, then we can observe only two things.  There are only two

19     conclusions to make.  First that he's lying and that something like that

20     can be uttered only by somebody who is indoctrinated, an indoctrinated

21     former officer of the Yugoslav People's Army, in fact, who was

22     brought up in the spirit of the general concept that the Croats were

23     Ustashas.  And third, he's justifying himself and saying that the HVO had

24     a vital influence on slowing down their struggle.

25             Now, of course this question was raised here too.  I don't know

Page 40785

 1     how they were doing in their struggle against the Army of Republika

 2     Srpska and what operations, what major operations they launched in order

 3     to stop the Army of Republika Srpska from occupying 70 percent of the

 4     territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the remaining portion was, in fact,

 5     stopped by the HVO.  Why didn't they lift the siege of Sarajevo with an

 6     army of 250.000 men and so on and so forth.

 7             However, there's more here, and it's set out in the following

 8     points.  For example, in point 3 he says that a classical ideological

 9     idiosyncrasy is one that they are -- is the fact that they are fighting

10     both Fascism, Serbian, Montenegrin and Croatian.  And Their Honours were

11     able to see thousands of documents here of the relationship between the

12     Croatian state and the HVO, and, of course, Rasim Delic who is preparing

13     an offensive that we're going to discuss in due course, as far as he's

14     concerned, we're fascists of the same order of those people from the Army

15     of Republika Srpska who committed all those things, and it is something

16     that this Tribunal is well aware of.

17             Now, point 6 --

18        Q.   Before we go to point 6, I'd like to go back to point 3 because

19     did says:  "The war for territories will continue, even if peace on the

20     basis ..." et cetera.

21        A.   Yes that has been underlined for me but I have skipped it.  It's

22     an important sentence, and we'll see once again from the books that we're

23     going to deal with that the BH Army was not listening to its commander

24     and says quite literally we are going to fight for territories, and even

25     if there is peace on the basis of the Geneva agreements, the war will

Page 40786

 1     continue.  And as you will be able to see in the continuation of the

 2     offensive led by Sefer Halilovic, they did not advance towards

 3     Srebrenica, or Zepa or Banja Luka, and they did not liberate Sarajevo,

 4     but this continuation of the effort to win over territories was an attack

 5     on the HVO with a -- the will to defeat it and the intention to defeat

 6     it, and Their Honours saw the agreement yesterday between

 7     Alija Izetbegovic and the Serb side about -- well, it was dated September

 8     1993, the agreement, and it was about demarcation and separation of

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina after which a referendum could be held.

10             And in this portion where they say that there will be a Muslim

11     majority, that part can then be cut off.  And then it's clear here from

12     what follows, very clear, in fact, that they will use all their forces to

13     defeat the HVO, and then the portion that was not occupied by the Serbs,

14     they would make their own state there, set up their own state there which

15     would dominate.  The Croats would be defeated and pushed back to Neum and

16     the western borders, and then they can be cut off and regardless of what

17     was happening in Geneva and so on.

18        Q.   General, just a minute, please.  In 1993, did the HVO win over

19     territory, any territory, from -- in comparison to what it had in 1992 in

20     October?

21        A.   Well, Mrs. Pinter, we can't repeat this whole trial and all these

22     proceedings.  We've shown maps many times showing what territories the

23     HVO lost to the BH Army aggression.  So we must keep that in our heads

24     when we move on, because I can't repeat the whole trial again.  So can we

25     go on to point 6?  And in point 6 they speak of the loss of free

Page 40787

 1     territory along the Drina River valley, the territory of Trnovo

 2     municipality, Bijelasnica, and so on; and it says this isn't the result

 3     of the aggressors' strength but that it is due rather to treason,

 4     cowardice and so on and so forth.  Of course, they won't prepare to win

 5     over these territories again but as I've said and claim at this Tribunal

 6     that it was a political and military cooperation to defeat the HVO and to

 7     deal with the agreement with the Serbs in September 1993.

 8             Now, in point 7 he says that discipline -- that there was a lack

 9     of discipline --

10             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I'm sorry.  Excuse me, Mr. Praljak.  I think

11     you're not very clear.  You said or I read in the translation there was a

12     political and military mission -- mission.  At first it was said

13     cooperation or something.  I'm sorry.  Okay.  Continue.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Now, in point 8 they speak about

15     problems with supplies, that they have war booty.  I don't know where

16     they could have got war booty from the Serbs.  You obtain war booty when

17     you are the victor.  You cannot take over war booty and gain war booty

18    by losing territories and towns.  But anyway, it says that ammunition

19     should be purchased through aggressors' territory.

20             So, Your Honours the -- Croatia and the HZ HB through which

21     without -- without stop they were receiving weapons is aggressors'

22     territory they say here, and they say that they will buy and procure this

23     from friends and foes, from war profiteers and traders and so on and so

24     forth.  Then in point 11 they talk about the collection of financial

25     resources and they say that a large -- large sums of money have been

Page 40788

 1     collected and most of that money was in Zagreb.  So the means to buy

 2     weapons and bring them in is to be found then on the fascist aggressors'

 3     territory, according to this, of Croatia and the HZ HB, because here when

 4     he said fascist, fascist aggression, he is referring to the Croats.  So

 5     the Serbs, Montenegrins, and Croats, and he doesn't differentiate between

 6     the Croats of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croats of Croatia.

 7             Anyway, in point 10 he goes on to say that they should launch

 8     even better propaganda and popularise their concepts and goals.

 9             Then we go on to number 11, which says again how this group of BH

10     Army officers feels, because everybody, every single one of them occupied

11     high functions in the Yugoslav People's Army previously.

12             Your Honours, it was lodged in their heads what the JNA was in

13     Yugoslavia.  It was a corporate institution which had far greater

14     influence on the policies pursued in the country than the policy of

15     Yugoslavia called influence of JNA.  And they say here the state power

16     and authority was only partially placed in -- worked for the war.  And

17     then down below it says that there were destructive acts to the detriment

18     of the BI -- BH state, and he mentions separatist forces and especially

19     the HVO and so on and so forth.  And this was the prevailing criticism.

20     Anybody who cooperated with the HVO, Konjic, Mostar, and so on, were

21     proclaimed to be traitors because they had placed themselves in the

22     service of the HVO.  But the fact that they needed to have 10.000 wounded

23     transported and hundreds of thousands of refugees put up and

24     accommodated, and the fact that we had to supply them constantly with

25     weapons and ammunition, that seems to be just beside the point.  The fact

Page 40789

 1     that they were being supplied with fuel in order to carry on their fight,

 2     that seems to be left out.  And the fact that they have a complete basis

 3     in the HZ HB and HVO and in Croatia, these people don't seem to

 4     be interested in any of that.  So that's it.

 5             And then in point 9, he's -- if we look at point 9, for example,

 6     he says that the Zulfikar units and the Black Swans, Silver Fox, the

 7     Akrepi, and so on, will be placed in special command and deployment and

 8     they would all take part in Operation Neretva 93.

 9             There you have it, Mrs. Pinter and Your Honours.  That's what I

10     wanted to say about this text.

11        Q.   Thank you, General.  We have prepared a number of books by

12     persons who participated in the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  First

13     is 3D035 --

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Regarding this document which

15     I'm discovering, and it's an important document because it's a summary of

16     the BH Army which met in August 1993, and here we have all the eminent

17     military leaders of the BH Army.  So obviously this is an essential

18     document.

19             As you told us, there's military items that are discussed in this

20     document, and also more political aspects.  There's an obvious political

21     issue discussed involving the HVO.  It's in the conclusions, paragraph 1.

22             Here they say that the Gar [as interpreted] was imposed by an

23     extreme element of the HVO.  According to them, it's the BH Army stabbing

24     them in the back.

25             Now, it seems that Mr. Delic and the others are actually making a

Page 40790

 1     distinction in the HVO between the extreme element on the one hand and

 2     another element that is not extremist.  I believe we have to keep this in

 3     mind in order to really understand things.  But what exactly are your

 4     observations on this, on the fact that Mr. Delic seems to make a

 5     difference when he talks about the HVO between these two elements?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have a very simple comment

 7     personally, Your Honours.  Those units which the HVO relinquished to be

 8     under the command of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of such, if

 9     you remember the map which has already been exhibited in this court, of

10     such units there were 17.  So 17 HVO brigades more or less were under the

11     command the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Two in Tuzla, Usora,

12     Sarajevo, Bihac, et cetera.  Let me not enumerate them all.  For them

13     those were good HVO.  The extremist portion of the HVO was one.  I was in

14     their eyes an extremist because I wanted relations based on equality, on

15     a footing of equality totally.

16             My idea was to wage a joint struggle with Delic and that Delic

17     was equal counterpart to Praljak, and Praljak to Delic, and the Muslims

18     were equal to Croats and Croats were equal to Muslims.  That was my

19     concept -- concept, and I'm speaking in my personal name.  I did not want

20     to recognise then and today or tomorrow that anyone in Bosnia and

21     Herzegovina, in the civil sense or in the constituent nation sense, was

22     more equal than I was; and I assert that that is what the Muslims wanted

23     to be.  That is how they saw the state, and that is why they said that

24     they would continue that war until the country was completely liberated

25     and why did they not strike against the Serbs then.  There was my

Page 40791

 1     question, and I want to put it again.  They say that Neretva is their

 2     first major operation, Neretva 1993.

 3             So, Your Honours, when you ask me about this, the Serbs started

 4     bombing Sarajevo in April 1992, and they captured it all, and they did

 5     not have a single major military success in the war up to that moment

 6     against the Army of Republika Srpska, and they turned against the Croats,

 7     and it was easy then to pin some things on them like they were fascists,

 8     they were aggressors, they were equal to the Serbs, if not worse, even

 9     worse, they were worse in their eyes.  Well, if you saw the quantity of

10     weapons that I had spent to that army I, the aggressor in their eyes, the

11     fascist in their book, how many arms, what a large quantity of arms, I

12     had spent on them, then I have to say that this is a really

13     unconscionable, vulgar, wanton ideological lie.

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] [Previous translation

15     continues] ... question and that's all I have on this document.  The

16     conclusion on paragraph 3, they first say that peace is being looked

17     after, sought after in Geneva but saying that war still continues against

18     both types of Fascism, the Serbian type and the Croatian type.  Either

19     individually against each of them, and they he adds -- there's something

20     added, or against the joint forces of both aggressors.

21             So here he seems to say that according to him, Croats and the

22     Serbs may or might actually have joined forces.  So what do you have to

23     say about the responsibility of joining forces with Serbs that he is

24     alluding to?

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Never did the HVO, never ever while

Page 40792

 1     I was there, and even when I was not formally the commander of the HVO,

 2     General Petkovic is here to also say, we never ever concluded any joint

 3     agreement about concerted action with the Serbs.  But this gentleman,

 4     somewhat later did sign a military contract with the Serbs as part of

 5     that political agreement.  Fifteen days after this meeting you saw the

 6     document yesterday.  They signed a political and military alliance with

 7     the Serbs.  They established a telephone lines with them, and they

 8     stopped fighting against the Serbs completely.  They stopped all

 9     operations against the Serbs.  You will see in the books that I will be

10     showing that that was so.

11             As for us, at least while I was working there, we cooperated with

12     the Serbs in the area of Vares.  A, we paid and very dearly for them to

13     treat our wounded combatants because it was not feasible in any way other

14     way because Vares did not have a hospital.  It was completely cut off,

15     isolated so that no treatment of any gravely wounded persons was

16     possible.

17             Sometimes we would purchase from them, you could also hear this

18     from a witness who appeared here, and we paid exorbitantly for that also,

19     some ammunition, and the use of a tank or two, but only then when the

20     Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina attacked the area.  The forces in Vares,

21     had they not been attacked, well, nothing would have happened.  And you

22     saw their orders for attack, and I will be showing them again in this

23     Tribunal, I believe.

24             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  Mrs. Pinter.

25             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

Page 40793

 1        Q.   General, the book that we are going to talk about is 3D03543.

 2     This is a book by Fikret Muslimovic.  Please be so kind as to tell

 3     Their Honours what references are made in this book to all this that we

 4     have been discussing?

 5             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Ms. Pinter, I must remind you, you must indicate

 6     in which binder we must look for these documents.  You have given a

 7     number, but we have a thousand documents here with numbers.  Please.

 8     Thank you.

 9             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] This is in the binder which is

10     called "Books."  And I believe that it is the last document in your

11     binder.  It is entitled "Books."

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mrs. Pinter, could you tell us

13     beforehand which is the binder we need to look at so we can find it,

14     because with this witness, Mr. Praljak, we have as many documents as in

15     other trials that lasted for a very long time in which fewer documents

16     were presented than in this case.  So it's just to point out to you how

17     difficult this can be.  So if you can help us, this is of course very

18     useful.

19             We now have the binder in question.  Thank you.

20             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I know that your task

21     is extremely difficult, but believe me, my task has not been easy either

22     to organise them.  But as I'm never sure which document will need to be

23     called up and opened, so we prepared a bit more than we actually needed

24     perhaps.

25        Q.   General.

Page 40794

 1        A.   Why do I claim that these two books by Muslimovic and

 2     Sefer Halilovic and parts of other books, some or books, will be

 3     relevant?  It is necessary to know in this process the other side, to

 4     familiarise oneself with the other side, to know what it is doing, what

 5     its intentions and conclusions are.  The best way to show this is from

 6     the works of authorship in which they exactly explain events, accurately

 7     recount them, because in the long run this is contained in their

 8     documents which we could not obtain.

 9             Mr. Muslimovic, a general, was the chief of security in the

10     4th Corps of the Yugoslav People's Army.  After that, he transferred to

11     the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and discharged that same duty in the

12     Main Staff of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  And he wrote a book,

13     and I will be very concise in seeking to explain what its pages contain,

14     about how Sarajevo looks, what the relationship was like between

15     Mr. Sefer Halilovic and Mr. Izetbegovic, how was control conducted in

16     Sarajevo, what their mutual relations were like, and what their political

17     intentions were and what their military actions were.

18             That is simply necessary, just like this previous document was

19     for us to be able to understand what I'm assert because Sarajevo was

20     being killed from Serbian areas, and also because intentions existed to

21     that effect.  There were totally unscrupulous lies about what the Army of

22     Bosnia and Herzegovina was doing to the HVO, and we shall see that

23     plainly in this book, and that is why this book is important, and I

24     should like to ask you to start with page 79.

25        Q.   Just a minute.  It is 3D41-0428 in Croatian.  In English it is

Page 40795

 1     3D41-0106.

 2        A.   What I do know and the testimony which I'm giving is from what I

 3     do know, is that May 1991, in a place called Polog when a tank brigade of

 4     the Yugoslav People's Army was intercepted there which was on route to

 5     Kupres, and that is what the gentleman writes here, because at that time

 6     he was a member of the Yugoslav People's Army and was flying over that

 7     area.  So he says here that already then the JNA and the Serbian

 8     Democratic Party had reached an agreement that if connections were

 9     severed between Sarajevo and Belgrade, Nikola Koljevic could pass on

10     orders for combat use.  And Nikola Koljevic was a leading member of the

11     Serbian Democratic Party, and before the war I knew him as a professor

12     and an excellent expert and Shakespeare and we often met in Sarajevo's

13     different festivals.

14             THE INTERPRETER:  Would the witness kindly slow down.

15             THE WITNESS:  Pardon.  Pardon.

16             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   General, could you please indicate at that you -- when you stop

18     quoting, because it causes problems for the record.

19        A.   Well, I'm not quoting now.

20        Q.   Thank you.

21        A.   So he's now talking about how Milan Zorc was sent into retirement

22     because he wouldn't obey the order for the people who stopped the tank

23     column to be fired on.  Well, definitely a fair person would not say

24     people from Herzegovina but Croats, but he finds it hard to say so.

25             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreters note the witness is kindly asked

Page 40796

 1     to slow down.

 2             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] That's 3D40-0107 to 3D40-0109, and

 3     in the Croatian version that would be 3D41-0429 and 0430.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Again here he says the people of

 5     Herzegovina.  He refuses to say Croats, but anyway, in Polog.  But what

 6     is interesting here and I would like you to put the map on the screen and

 7     then we'll look at it.

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  Counsel should please switch on her microphone.

 9             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] The map is 3D03544.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, Your Honours, here he says

11     the same thing that I have been saying all over again.  He is in the

12     Yugoslav People's Army, of course, a high-ranking official, a security

13     chief in one of the corps -- corps, and he says that this brigade left

14     for Kupres in order to support the armed aggression against the Republic

15     of Croatia.  And of course that Chetniks in the Republic of Croatia had

16     to be protected.  And I will now draw in the movements of other units.

17             I would like to note that on the 10th of April -- rather, 7th,

18     8th, 9th of April, 1992, this brigade attacked the HVO in Kupres, and the

19     HVO suffered great casualties.  A lot of troops were wounded.  And then

20     the brigade launched another attack on Livno that followed the so-called

21     Boban-Karadzic agreement, or the purported agreement between the two of

22     them, but it was stopped in this corridor.

23             And now, Your Honours, I will -- he says here that the movements

24     of units are going -- or, rather, the disposition of units along the line

25     from Knin to Zadar and Split --

Page 40797

 1             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation]

 2        Q.   Just a moment.

 3        A.   I'll switch it on.  You don't need to.  I'll switch it on.  Yes,

 4     yes, it's okay.

 5             Do we see Knin here?  No, we don't need to.  We don't see it

 6     here, but I'll put Knin here.  I'll mark it with number 1.  Well, Sibenik

 7     is somewhere here, so that's the attack and that's the attack.

 8             And then he goes on to say -- and Bosnian Krajina, Bugojno Kljuc,

 9     Jajce, and Bosanski Petrovac are the units are moving.  Bugojno, well, I

10     really can barely see.

11        Q.   Perhaps you could zoom in the middle part.

12        A.   Well, I can't see.  Just a moment.  Don't touch it.  I'll just

13     take this.

14        Q.   General, perhaps you will find it easier to do it on this map.

15        A.   Well, no.  Let's do it like this.  Bugojno, Jajce, Kljuc.  We'll

16     manage to find it somehow.  Bosanski Petrovac is down here.  I'll find it

17     in a moment.  Here it is.  Well, somewhere here.

18             So this Kupres plateau.  This brigade went there, 1.  The brigade

19     goes to the Kupres plateau.  2 is Bugojno, 3 is Jajce, 4 is Kljuc, 5 is

20     Bosanski Petrovac.

21             So according to the knowledge of a JNA officer, this is how the

22     forces were deployed in this area.  But now, please, we have the

23     conclusion.  So the miserable nature of this conclusion is simply

24     terrifying as are so many things.  He says that the movement of this

25     brigade that the Croats were standing in front of, and it went through

Page 40798

 1     thanks to Mr. Izetbegovic, because he was obeyed.  So he said that it

 2     served the functions of the measures of protecting -- protective measures

 3     that Milosevic took in relation to the agreement that he concluded only a

 4     month and a half ago in Karadjordjevo with Tudjman, and then he said that

 5     Milosevic and Tudjman mistrusted each other, and Milosevic tried to have

 6     this brigade deployed there as a collateral.

 7             Well, it would be the highest degree of cynicism had it been any

 8     more intelligent than it actually is, but it is actually so stupid.  It

 9     is sheer I idiocy to write something like that.

10             Croatia is under attack.  Chetniks, he talks about Chetniks.  The

11     forces are deployed.  Everything is under attack, and all this serves the

12     function of an agreement between Franjo Tudjman -- well, Dubrovnik is on

13     fire.  Tudjman and Milosevic, about the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

14     Then this is the perennial question:  Can anyone show me what is being

15     divided given that the Serbs had already taken everything?  They're

16     already on the Neretva around Mostar.  Here they are.  All of this

17     belongs to them.  They're attacking Dubrovnik.  They're attacking here.

18     They're attacking there.  Everything up there is already there.  So what

19     was there to carve up?  But, of course, this doesn't bother this kind of

20     a mind, this kind of a brain to say, yes, well, Your Honour,

21     Judge Antonetti made a deal with Praljak and now he's beating Praljak up

22     and he's throttling him, but it is somehow -- it somehow serves the

23     function of Praljak, and they'll divide something up.

24             Well, I don't want to talk about it really because I'm not really

25     all that upset by the dirty propaganda, but I'm really upset by

Page 40799

 1     stupidity, which of course unfortunately the thing that really makes you

 2     mad is when this stupidity gains the strength of a myth, this mythical

 3     event that later on played a major role in the developments.

 4             He goes on to say that there were previous incidents in Knin,

 5     Plitvice, in Slavonia, in Split, a number of clashes that we've already

 6     spoken about that preceded this so-called agreement.  And then he goes on

 7     to say that the Bosniaks, of course, supported the Croats against this

 8     kind of disruption, and that is true, yes.  And he goes on to say, of

 9     course, that a few days before the 10th Motorised Brigade, there was a

10     drill or an exercise of the Yugoslav People's Army where of course

11     Enver Hadzihasanovic himself took part, and he went on to command the

12     3rd Corps.  He describes the exercise and what units participated in it

13     and what the objective of the exercise was.

14             And then he goes on to speak about the relations, how

15     General Andjelic, for instance, did not obey General Spirovski, who

16     wanted to fire on the people, and then he goes on to say that from the

17     northern camp barracks he actually flew, Muslimovic took a helicopter to

18     have a look at the situation.

19             So he is serving in the JNA, Yugoslav People's Army, and it never

20     occurs to him to leave its ranks at the time.  So that's it.

21             Could we now please move to page 187, and let me just sign the

22     map.  The 27th, 05, 2009.

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Registrar could we have an IC

24     number for this map, please.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honours.  The marked version of

Page 40800

 1     document 3D02544 shall be given -- sorry, 3D03544 shall be given

 2     Exhibit IC1021.  Thank you, Your Honours.

 3             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Just a moment, general, let me give you the number.  The number

 5     in Croatian is 3D41-0433, and in English it's 3D41-0110.

 6        A.   General Muslimovic here talks about Sefer's wrong approach to the

 7     special units and the military police units, and he refers to some

 8     decisions that obviously he had in his archives or that existed in the

 9     Sarajevo archives that we have not been able to get at.

10             He talks about the mistakes he makes, and in the end he says that

11     Sefer -- or, rather, that only Sefer had any influence over Mido Aljic,

12     who when he took over the military police battalion, removed as a triage

13     all those who were not Bosniaks, and he didn't even admit Bosniaks who

14     came from mixed marriages.

15             And then he goes on to say that Sefer, throughout the war, which

16     of course was true, set up of a -- a political party, accused

17     Mr. Izetbegovic, and he says, well, he accused Delic and myself, that

18     they, too, are responsible for Croats and Muslims being expelled from the

19     ranks of the Yugoslav People's Army.

20             At page 190 --

21             MR. STRINGER:  Excuse me, could we just get a clarification of

22     the last statement by the general?  What I heard was that the general

23     said that -- what's written here is that according to Halilovic,

24     Izetbegovic and the others were responsible for Serbs and Croats being

25     sent away from the Yugoslav People's Army, and I do not know that that is

Page 40801

 1     what the text actually says or is referring to here; so I wonder if the

 2     general could clarify which army these Croats and Serbs were allegedly

 3     sent away from.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Here, Mr. Muslimovic says that

 5     Sefer, who in fact took on people such as this man Mido Aljic, who

 6     cleansed his ranks of all non-Bosniaks, including the Bosniaks who come

 7     from mixed marriages, and that Sefer Halilovic allowed that and did that.

 8     And then he says afterwards when Sefer established his political party,

 9     he accused Delic, who later became the commander of the BH Army, and

10     Muslimovic, that they are expelled Serbs and Croats from our ranks, and

11     that means from the BH Army.

12             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   There was a problem in the record because it turns out that you

14     were a participant in all that from the record.

15        A.   No, no.  So page 190.

16        Q.   3D40-0110, Croatian, 3D41-0435 and 0436.

17        A.   Here Mr. Muslimovic says --

18        Q.   General, 3D40-0110 that's the English, not the Croatian.

19        A.   He speaks about May, June, July, and August 1992, and Sefer's

20     actions regarding the arbitrary appointment of some people such as

21     Kerim Lucarevic, whom he presented as the commander of the republican

22     military police and the commander of the -- or head of the military

23     security service.  At that time Mr. Izetbegovic had already issued an

24     order appointing Muslimovic the chief of the military security service,

25     and he was supposed to be in charge of the military police.  I'm talking

Page 40802

 1     about Muslimovic now.  Of course Sefer didn't like it, and he wanted his

 2     own man to be in charge there.  And then it goes on to say at the end

 3     that there were complaints in Sarajevo about various teams of the BH

 4     Army, especially the special units of Juka Prazina.  And then he goes on

 5     to say that Muslimovic should be in charge of preventing that but that

 6     they were unable to do so because he had limited -- because Juka, of

 7     course, didn't want to obey anyone's orders, anybody in the chain of

 8     command, and he says that it was risky to even criticise Juka and his

 9     brigade.

10             And then this man Juka received some -- well, at any rate, in the

11     face of Muslimovic's opposition Izetbegovic appointed Juka as some kind

12     of a special -- special units that were supposed to carry out command

13     operations somewhere.

14        Q.   I have to give the page number.

15        A.   It's 191, 2, 3 and so on.

16        Q.   It is 3D41-0436 in the Croatian version, and 37, 38.  And in the

17     English it is from 3D41-0111 to 3D41-0114.

18        A.   I'll just say something briefly.  It's quite clear that Sefer is

19     appointing the special -- his special units and enabling Juka, Caco, and

20     all the rest of them to be able to act outside the establishment of the

21     BH Army, that he's giving him scope to do that, and that nobody could do

22     anything about it.

23        Q.   Who is Caco?

24        A.   One of the commanders of the so-called special brigades in

25     Sarajevo.  Later on, some of them were killed, some committed suicide,

Page 40803

 1     and others were accused of war crimes.

 2             He goes on to speak of the fact that all of them wanted to be in

 3     these special units and says on page 194, and this is important, that in

 4     1992, in Sarajevo, many citizens were afraid of the military police, and

 5     so given an atmosphere of this kind and a situation in which there was a

 6     lot of looting in Sarajevo, and you will see that.  Later on, Sefer set

 7     up military police units that were called the Mechanised Brigade in

 8     Sarajevo.  Now, what the mechanised brigades in Sarajevo could be

 9     actually and do, that is something that only Sefer Halilovic can know.

10     But I suppose he thought it was a resounding name, and at the time he

11     says that Izetbegovic had already tried to solve the problem of the

12     conduct of the military police in Sarajevo but that Sefer was doing his

13     job now.

14             MR. STRINGER:  Excuse me for the interruption I object to this

15     testimony on the grounds of relevancy, Mr. President.  This goes way

16     beyond the scope of anything that is relevant.

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, can you tell us

18     what the relevance of all this is?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The relevance, Your Honours, is

20     clear.  It's vital.  The relevance of presenting things like this is of

21     course not essential to explain some crime that might be committed by one

22     or two men in the HZ HB area.  However, in order to understand the

23     indictment which speaks about a joint criminal enterprise, which is then

24     based and one of the grounds for claiming that is that we blackmailed the

25     BH Army, that the BH Army was the sole legitimate and legal military

Page 40804

 1     force in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that it was a good army, a humane army, and

 2     so on; and that it wasn't the BH Army which attacked the HVO but the

 3     other way round, that the HVO attacked the BH Army, and that Sefer was

 4     obeying Izetbegovic.

 5             For these proceedings, for this trial, it is very important to

 6     establish why agreements fell true -- fell through and what the

 7     relationship between Sefer Halilovic and the BH Army was and the

 8     president of the Presidency of BH and all the other concerned.  And

 9     you'll be able to say in due course what Muslimovic, and we have

10     Muslimovic here -- well, Judge Antonetti would often ask and would say to

11     me, "Why didn't you, Praljak, when you got down there come into contact

12     with Sarajevo," and things like that.

13             Now, this book tells it us that in Sarajevo what was prevalent

14     was terrorist groups, looting and thieving from the citizens of Sarajevo,

15     and this is what the chief of security of the Main Staff of the BH Army

16     is writing about, and he -- that they're all bands and criminals and that

17     they couldn't put a stop to it in 1993.  The book also says that

18     Izetbegovic is talking to Caco.  And when this man took 150 people as

19     hostages off the Sarajevo streets, probably he had no other options.

20             Anyway, the question was also raised about the political

21     leadership of the HZ HB.  Why didn't you go to Sarajevo?  Why didn't you

22     come into contact with them and so on and so forth.  Now here we'll be

23     able to see what Sarajevo, in fact, was in the political sense, in the

24     military sense, and in terms of organisation with respect to all the

25     looting and thieving, who was stabbing whom in the back and who was in

Page 40805

 1     charge and in control of that city and of Bosnia-Herzegovina; and that is

 2     why, Your Honours, this is exceptionally important for this trial because

 3     it gives answers to the questions that you put several times, like why

 4     didn't you move towards Sarajevo?  Why didn't the ministers arrive and so

 5     on and so forth.  Well, this is to paint you a picture of what Sarajevo

 6     was like and the relationships that prevailed between the army and

 7     politics and the possibility of controlling bands of brigands in the city

 8     of Sarajevo, so with that in mind, please allow me to continue.

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, if you continue, please

10     try and focus on essential points so that you don't waste your time.  You

11     know, this is to your detriment.  This is taking a lot of time.

12             MS. TOMANOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise for taking the floor,

13     but I have to correct the transcript in one of its vital parts.  On page

14     23, line 13, the general said that it is claimed here that the BH Army

15     was the sole legitimate and legal military force.  In the transcript sole

16     has been left out.

17             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Go ahead, General.

19        A.   I'm moving on to page 195 now and 195.

20             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] 3D41-114 to 3D41-116 for the

21     Croatian 3D41-0440 to 3D41-0442.

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Could counsel kindly read the numbers out

23     slowly in future.  Thank you.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Now, Juka Prazina was the God in

25     Sarajevo.  He would receive who he wanted, Radio Sarajevo would play

Page 40806

 1     songs for him, doing what he was saying.

 2             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Is that the same Juka Prazina that came --

 4        A.   Yes, yes, of course, we didn't know of his conduct when he

 5     clashed up there with his own men and arrived in the territory, but,

 6     Mrs. Pinter, you have documents and we've done -- we've dealt with

 7     Juka Prazina.  We had a lot of problems, but we dealt with him.  Anyway,

 8     Juka was threatening Muslimovic saying that he was a member of KOS,

 9     K-O-S, however, it is also important to note here that when this meeting

10     took place, it says here that there was -- well, that everybody was doing

11     what they wanted, what they liked in Sarajevo again, that there was

12     looting and thieving and general unrest and Juka reacts and -- to

13     Muslimovic, and there was always shooting.  Now I'd like to move and

14     pages 202, 203, and 204.

15        Q.   3D41-0443, and 3D41-0444, and 3D41-0445.  And the English,

16     3D41-0116, 3D41 -0117.

17        A.   Here it is.  In a report on the work of the military police the

18     following was noted:  That goods were being taken, technical goods, gold,

19     jewellery, foreign exchange, foreign currency, and so on, that the

20     citizens of Sarajevo were being abused, sworn at, that storehouses and

21     warehouses were broken into and that the goods -- and goods taken, and of

22     course the citizens are wondering who was in control of the military

23     police and whether the BiH leadership was conscious of the fact that the

24     citizens found all this evil worse to take, the evil done by individuals

25     and groups from the TO, because it still wasn't the BH Army.  It was

Page 40807

 1     still the Territorial Defence, the TO, and so on and so forth, that they

 2     found this harder to take than being attacked by the Serbs.

 3             And then he goes on to say that people were releasing others from

 4     prison whenever they felt like it, and that they were on the threshold of

 5     a totalitarian state and that the military police -- or, rather, the

 6     police had -- had concentrated within it all powers, constitutional and

 7     others, legislative and executive powers, and that this was a motive for

 8     defence.  And it was the Serbs in Sarajevo that were particularly in

 9     jeopardy.

10             So we can now move on to the next page, 216.

11             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation]  3D41-0446 --

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Praljak, you just

13     mentioned about the evil deeds done in Sarajevo, Mr. Prazina

14     and -- et al. and others.  And earlier the Prosecutor told us that this

15     was not relevant and you gave us your own point of view, but while I was

16     hearing -- listening to you, I would like to place this in parallel with

17     what happened in Mostar from April to July, because there, according to a

18     report from the Ministry of Interior, allegedly there was allegedly 54,

19     and I repeat, 54 Muslims were kidnapped and then killed by soldiers who

20     were belonging to HVO units, but we have no other detailed information on

21     this.

22             I believe that we will come back to this document, because it's

23     an exhibit.  But you were saying this is what was happening in Sarajevo.

24     Well, obviously it seems that the same was going on in Mostar.  What can

25     you say about this?

Page 40808

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What I say to that is this,

 2     Your Honour:  There was a similar situation -- well, similar.  Far less

 3     so.  Far less marked.  Our control was far more successful -- well, under

 4     those conditions it's impossible and I'm fully conscious of the fact that

 5     Mr. Izetbegovic didn't like to see this happening in Sarajevo.  There's

 6     no doubt about that.

 7             However, in Mostar, in 1992, when I was down there, we did

 8     manage -- of course there was some looting, and this happened in 1993 and

 9     the chaos there of that vast defensive of theirs and so on when

10     individuals committed acts that should be prosecuted in any court and by

11     any court; but, Your Honours, it was more important for me to keep 7.000

12     Muslims safe who were on the western side at the time, west side.  So I

13     was completely conscious of the fact that when you take the military

14     police to fight, then a certain number of -- that the number of criminals

15     would increase.  However, we did, and I do claim this and repeat, we did

16     manage on the west bank, during that time, to keep 7.000 Muslims and

17     several thousand Serbs.  And the stormings at night that were discussed

18     here and where people were expelled, and I can say neither yes nor no to

19     that because I didn't see it happen.  I didn't investigate them.  I

20     didn't take legal proceedings against them.  I didn't say it didn't

21     happen.  I have no reason to doubt that, but I'm just saying that in

22     Sarajevo up until 1993, the situation was such that those people

23     controlled the situation.  Juka, afterwards, had a conflict, an armed

24     conflict, with his own people, some other units of the same type, which

25     we did not know about.  For a time he was in Travnik, and I appointed him

Page 40809

 1     in a document over there as fighting around Komar and Turbe.  After that

 2     he disappeared and reappeared in Mostar.  I came across his up down

 3     there, and with great effort, we managed to send that unit packing.

 4             Mr. Juka Prazina was expelled in a way from that territory and

 5     was later continued -- killed somewhere in Germany on the motorway or

 6     somewhere.

 7             Anyway, it's only a case of how much effort was invested in

 8     controlling the situation and how successful those efforts were, and I

 9     claim that the HVO did that far better, they were far more successful

10     than was the situation in Sarajevo.  But of course it wasn't an ideal

11     situation.  You can't achieve the ideal even in a civil society.

12             But anyway, Your Honours, this is once again at the very

13     foundations of this trial, because we have to quite simply establish the

14     links between wishes and aspirations and actions and energy and the power

15     to implement something given the situation that it was.  So that is the

16     basis for this and the basis for what I'm here for.  And it's the

17     question that I have been asking myself throughout the year, whether I,

18     vis-a-vis my own men, with my energy throughout the whole time, whether I

19     worked and did -- worked as an animal, as a moral animal, I mean, to

20     establish law and order, to punish people, to take legal proceedings

21     against people, and whether that power is limitless.  And if it's not

22     limitless, that I'm guilty.  Well, I'm not going to agree with anything

23     like that.  Of course it's up to you Judges to decide, but ...

24             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mrs. Pinter.

25             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation]

Page 40810

 1        Q.   Thank you, General.  You asked for page 216.

 2        A.   Yes, and 217, 18, and 19.  I'm go through that very quickly.

 3        Q.   For the record, it is 3D41-0446 to 0449, and the English version,

 4     3D41-0118 to 3D41-0120.  Go ahead, please.

 5        A.   The title is again "Sefer protected criminal groups in Sarajevo,"

 6     and he says exactly how the lists were made, how these groups that were

 7     all over town had to be dealt with, and he also states here from the very

 8     beginning of the war, the first three months, I shall quote:

 9             "The criminals have looted almost all the shops, kiosks,

10     storehouses and other business premises, and they placed the looted goods

11     in hidden places.  They started also to loot abandoned flats whereby they

12     took out everything that is valuable, especially jewellery, money, radio

13     sets, TV sets, and then groups of looters brutally treated the citizens

14     whom they found in their flats."

15             So the conclusion, the conclusion is quite realistic, that there

16     is no building in Sarajevo that had not been looted to a greater or

17     lesser extent and that there is not a single citizen who had not suffered

18     more or less damage in these criminal activities and so on and so on, and

19     that is the end of the quotation.

20             And he goes on to explain all this and states that there were

21     protests against that in the MUP and elsewhere.  And on page 219, he said

22     that he brought the plan to Sefer, and it was supposed to be a secret

23     plan, but then he saw Sefer reading that plan with the people against

24     whom the plan was directed in -- that's on page 219.

25        Q.   And that is 3D41- just a minute, General, I have to wait for the

Page 40811

 1     transcript.  That is 41-0449 up to 3D41-0450.  The English page is 3 --

 2     3D41-0120.

 3             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  A technical observation, Ms. Pinter.  This goes

 4     page after page, and it's really easy if one knows the page number which

 5     is indicated also in the translation simply for us to take the next page.

 6     I don't think that it is necessary that you go every time into reading

 7     out these long numbers.  Its -- I always found it before you had actually

 8     read the number.  So maybe we can save some time on that.

 9             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] I agree, Your Honours.  We wouldn't

10     quote the pages, but if we are going to do the IC list, we have to list

11     the book pages on the IC list, so that has to be on record.  We are short

12     of time.  We are aware of that, but this is the method that we have to

13     employ in order to be able to present this list to you.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So in page 248, he -- he,

15     Muslimovic, speaks about the problem of KOS [as interpreted], which was

16     there within the framework of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, of

17     course, and who actually accepted to be subordinated to the Main Staff

18     command.

19             Well, that is a problem, because the leaders of the KOS,

20     Your Honours, really at that time --

21             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] There's an error on the

22     transcript.  You said HOS, and on line 22, page 3, it says KOS, which is

23     different.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No.  H-O-S, HOS, our Croatian armed

25     forces.  Initially there was a group of people which within the framework

Page 40812

 1     of its party, which was the Croatian Party of Rights, set up military

 2     units both in Croatia and in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  In Croatia, that

 3     was as soon as the state authority had stabilised to a certain extent

 4     after a major strike in 1991.  They, as the military component, were

 5     eliminated, and the political component changed and still is in existence

 6     today.  But it is an incomprehensible, Your Honours.  The idea of the

 7     HOS, H-O-S, which resided in great measure at that time in the concepts

 8     of Ante Pavelic was that Croatia was a state up to the Drina River,

 9     including Bosnia-Herzegovina, in other words.

10             Now, how did the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina embrace, accept such

11     an army with such a political idea remains incomprehensible, but that's

12     the way it was.  And that is also noted here by this gentleman, except

13     that he also places Ante Starcevic next to Ante Pavelic which only shows

14     his total ignorance of political history of Croatia and the historical

15     political life in Croatia.  But what remains is what he reiterates here

16     namely that propaganda is being employed in order to identify them with

17     the Ustasha troops.

18             Now as Milosevic had agreed with on a division of

19     Bosnia-Herzegovina with Tudjman who is a new Ustasha, according to

20     Mr. Muslimovic, who does not favour the old Ustashas, the HOS members,

21     because now they were in favour of an integral Bosnia-Herzegovina in a

22     confederal union with Croatia.  But this officer of the Yugoslav People's

23     Army and KOS high official, of course, did not favour either the new or

24     the old Ustashas.  And look here.  He stresses in this conversation that

25     the conflicts between the HVO and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Page 40813

 1     actually speak of a possible collusion between the personnel of Croatian

 2     extraction in the government of the Bosnia and Herzegovina, and

 3     especially with extremists of the HVO.

 4             THE INTERPRETER:  Would the witness please slow down.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is all happening --

 6             JUDGE PRANDLER:  Really, I do not know what to tell you.  Several

 7     times we have asked you to slow down.  The poor interpreters are asking

 8     you to slow down.  I don't understand why this could not be followed by

 9     you.  Please, be so kind and slow down and also to pause when it is

10     important and to wait.  Even sometimes, of course, others are also doing

11     the same mistake, frankly even from the Bench, but I would like to ask

12     everyone really to make sure that the interpreters' work is being helped.

13     Thank you.

14             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour, Judge.

15     This is done automatically, because one's speech follows one's thoughts,

16     so you know -- and one's controls are relaxed in the process.  That's

17     why.  And I apologise.  But this was at the beginning of November, 1992,

18     on these pages that I'm dealing with.

19             Mr. Muslimovic -- Muslimovic says that at that time he stressed

20     out that the conflicts between the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina -- with

21     the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina were perhaps the result of a conjunction

22     between personnel of Croatian nationality.  This expression "personnel of

23     Croatian nationality," or ethnic Croats, this is a typically KOS

24     expression, and they were actually engaged in some shady deals, and

25     especially the personnel of the Bosnian army and police are engaged in

Page 40814

 1     some shady deals with the police.  So he says, I mentioned that there

 2     were some personnel of Croatian nationality who were engaging in some

 3     group meetings and were meeting that was very suspicious because they

 4     were meeting this -- this is the typical thought of an idiot coming from

 5     KOS.  He said they intensively socialise with Catholic priests.  Can you

 6     comprehend this, Your Honours?  So in the heads of those people, at that

 7     time, the chief of the military security of the Army of

 8     Bosnia-Herzegovina was a person who found it suspicious if a Croat should

 9     meet with a Catholic priest.

10             This, Your Honours, is the cause which made them launch the war.

11     It was in their heads, in the heads of the former officers of the

12     Yugoslav People's Army who were Muslims.  This is the cause of the war,

13     because if they find it's suspicious that a French officer should meet

14     with any -- with a priest of any religion in France, then here we can say

15     good-bye to all reason and all sincerity.  It is only a matter of time

16     when he will actually attack you.

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We will have the break, but I

18     would like some clarifications about this page 248.  The author of this

19     document seems to establish a distinction between the Croats, and he puts

20     them in two categories, the former Ustashas.  In this category, he

21     includes the people from HOS, H-O-S, and the new Ustashas.  In this

22     category he includes Mr. Tudjman.

23             Based on this distinction, he relies on the "division" of

24     Bosnia-Herzegovina put forward by Tudjman and Milosevic to say, is seems

25     this is what page 248 states, that they, the Serbs, and the author of

Page 40815

 1     this book are in agreement with the new Ustashas, more so than with the

 2     former Ustashas.  This is what he says.  But where I find it difficult to

 3     understand what is in the mind of the author is that the latter also

 4     mentions the extremists.  In his view, Mr. Praljak, who are these

 5     extremists, the people that are opposed to the division, including the

 6     HOS, or does he mean Tudjman and the others, or does he mean the former

 7     Ustashas and the new Ustashas?  It's rather confusing.  Maybe you have a

 8     view on this.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have an opinion on

10     that to the Serbs who were attacking Croatia, but I've already said that.

11             Franjo Tudjman was a Ustasha.  Although Franjo Tudjman had been a

12     partisan for two years, he was a general of the Yugoslav People's Army.

13     And he had lived in Belgrade as well.  He founded the Partisan soccer

14     club, one the two major soccer clubs in Belgrade.  In Yugoslavia, it was

15     the Yugoslav People's Army Soccer Club.  But when he featured as the

16     first time as an historian and that happened to many other people when he

17     spoke out a bit more liberally, a bit more freely about the departing

18     from Josip Broz Tito's doctrine they would be locked up in gaol.  The

19     first one was Djilas who is a world-renowned name.  He was in prison for

20     nine years.  And then before that, he was one of the two or three top men

21     in the Communist regime after the Second World War.  This also happened

22     to Franjo Tudjman, to Bobetko, and to many others.

23             So there existed a synonym identical meanings between Croat and

24     Ustasha.  My parents, both of them, were partisans, Your Honours, and

25     I've said this.  But the moment I departed from that particular line, I

Page 40816

 1     was an Ustasha.  That is one fact.  And for an officer of the KOS in the

 2     Yugoslav People's Army to say that you were a Croat was tantamount to

 3     saying that you were a Ustasha.

 4             Secondly, what you're trying to have me clarify is if you would

 5     say a green cosine is singing, you cannot say that, or a green tangent is

 6     singing.  This is the way they wrote in that state.  They would say

 7     something of that kind.  All the priests were, of course, suspicious and

 8     to meet with a priest was in itself suspicious ipso facto.

 9             I was at school at that time, and I didn't know what God was,

10     what church was in this early period, Your Honours, but once -- but we

11     were not able to celebrate Christmas.  Once our teacher asked who had

12     gone to the Christmas mass, and then several pupils rose and they were

13     punished.

14             So I also had some moral dilemmas even at that early age, even

15     though I didn't know what the church was, what religion was, but I could

16     see that people, my fellow pupils were getting punished then, so I had

17     these dilemmas.  So one had to know these previous facts.  If you did not

18     agree with Muslimovic you were a Ustasha.  Never mind if you're French.

19     If you did not agree with his views, you were are an Ustasha, that's it.

20             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  We'll have our

21     20-minute break.

22                           --- Recess taken at 10.36 a.m.

23                           --- On resuming at 11.02 a.m.

24             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The court is back in session.

25     For a few short moments, we will move into private session.

Page 40817

 1                           [Private session]

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

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 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

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14   (redacted)

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23   (redacted)

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25   (redacted)

Page 40818











11 Pages 40818-40819 redacted. Private session.















Page 40820

 1   (redacted)

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 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19                           [Open session]

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're back in open session.

21             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In open session, let me remind

22     the Defence once again that we would like you to quote the page numbers

23     slowly.  The interpreters don't have the documents before them, so when

24     you refer to a document, the interpreters don't know which document it is

25     exactly and who's speaking.  So please give us the page numbers so that

Page 40821

 1     we're able to follow with the transcript.

 2             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  I have to

 3     say that the Defence, before the beginning of its case, on the 4th of May

 4     provided the interpreters with all the electronic versions of all the

 5     books that it would be using and the interpretation booths have them, and

 6     that was the deal between the Defence team and the interpreters, but I

 7     will try to speak as slowly as possible.

 8        Q.   General, which page are we going to use?

 9        A.   305, 306.

10        Q.   Just a moment.  That's 3D41-0451 in Croatian, and 3D41-0452 in

11     the English version -- or, rather, in the Croatian version.  The English

12     version is 3D41-0121, 121, through 3D41-0122.

13        A.   Well, this is a meeting between Mr. Fikret Muslimovic, a Muslim,

14     with Mr. Izetbegovic in late May 1993.  It was a Muslim religious feast,

15     Kurban Bajram.  It's the most important Muslim religious feast.  And in

16     fact, there is again the problem that Mr. Izetbegovic has on the military

17     plan again with Chetniks and extremists of the HVO presenting the problem

18     that Izetbegovic has a big problem with the bad situation in the Supreme

19     Command Staff, and then he tells Mr. Izetbegovic that it's not really

20  possible to liberate Bosnia and Herzegovina as they wanted from the Serbs,

21  or rather, the Republika Srpska army and the HVO extremists.  For him, those

22  units and the police force are under the control of Milosevic and Tudjman.

23  The policies -- their policies and aspirations are the same in his eyes. And

24     then he tells Mr. Izetbegovic that Milosevic's and Tudjman's aspirations

25     about the war can be opposed only in such a way that huge losses are

Page 40822

 1     inflicted on them.

 2             And then he says that it will not be possible to get full

 3     military victory.  The bitter and difficult circumstance would have to be

 4     accepted, that the followers of Tudjman and Milosevic, i.e., Croats and

 5     Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, whose intention it is to destroy the state

 6     and the Bosniaks, that they would have to admit them to the institutions

 7     of the government and that they would have to exercise power together

 8     with them, those Croats and Serbs.  And this is a difficult and bitter

 9     circumstance.  In other words, the Islamic declaration will not be

10     implemented in full.  They would have to accept the fact that there are

11     two other nations living side by side with them.

12             And then he goes on to say -- well, Mr. Izetbegovic says that

13     peace should be achieved because time is not an ally of the BH Army.  And

14     then the situation would develop well, because the nationalist and

15     fascist forces of evil - and that's Tudjman's and Milosevic's forces -

16     would suffer a defeat on -- at the hands of the democrats and civilised

17     people such as Mr. Muslimovic, until recently, a member of the

18     Yugoslav People's Army and a high-ranking official in the KOS, K-O-S.

19             So that would be it.  He is a civilised and democratic force, and

20     Franjo Tudjman is a fascist anti-democrat, and he's anti-civilisation,

21     and he -- and so are all the Croats who are his followers.

22             I want to clear all this up, Your Honours, because this is an

23     answer to the question why all the efforts and why all the cease-fires

24     signed by Mr. Petkovic and all the agreements in Geneva and New York, and

25     so on and all the efforts to set up a joint command, actually why all

Page 40823

 1     this fell through, why the efforts that I spoke about - I spoke about my

 2     contribution - why all this was in vain, why those efforts stood no

 3     chance, because here are the people that this was supposed to be done

 4     with.

 5             Could we please move to page 308.

 6        Q.   3D41-0123.  That's the English version.  3D41-0453.

 7        A.   In that short section there, Mr. Muslimovic says that he was very

 8     often present when Sefer Halilovic would meet -- would see Izetbegovic on

 9     television, and he would comment, and I quote:

10              "Look at the fool.  There he is, the fool.  I don't know what to

11     do with this old man.  I keep telling him one thing, and he keeps doing

12     another," and things like that.

13             Muslimovic, of course --

14        Q.   End of quotation now, is it?

15        A.   Yes, end of quotation.

16             Muslimovic wondered why Sefer was using language like that and

17     that that was not in order, that he ought to be supporting

18     Mr. Izetbegovic; and Muslimovic conveyed this to the president, but

19     he was afraid of Sefer because he say, "The man could eliminate me."  He

20     doesn't say, "Remove me from my post," but says, "eliminate."  So that's

21     all I have to say about that.

22             Now I'd like to have pages 321, 322, 323, and -- so 320 through

23     323.

24        Q.   In Croatian it is 3D41-0454, and for the English -- or rather,

25     0454 to 0457, and in the English it is 3D41-0123 and onwards until 0127.

Page 40824

 1        A.   Here Mr. Fikret Muslimovic speaks about a RBH Presidency meeting

 2     held on the 8th of June, 1993, when, in fact, at the head of the BH Army

 3     by presidential decision, Delic was brought in to head the armed forces,

 4     and Sefer then became the Chief of Staff.  In other words, he wasn't --

 5     no longer the number one man but became the number two man.

 6             This shocked Izetbegovic [as interpreted], of course, and

 7     completely upset him to the end of his life, because quite obviously he

 8     saw himself as a historical figure of the first order in

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

10             However, after all the vivid descriptions of how doors were being

11     slammed and how the secretaries behaved and so on and so forth, and all

12     those juicy details, the fact remains that Sefer called a meeting of the

13     commanders, of his own commanders, so that they could vote about whether

14     to accept the decision taken by the Presidency of the Republic of

15     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And at the meeting he presented the fact that the

16     appointment of Rasim Delic was a trick and tantamount to treason and that

17     the Presidency decision was a scandalous one, that it was taken along the

18     lines of the Chetnik policy pursued in Belgrade and Pale, and that this

19     was a threat to Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And then it goes on to say that this

20     was a clash between him and Izetbegovic with respect to the general

21     concept of defence strategy, and that Izetbegovic didn't know about any

22     of that and that he was destroying the very concept, and then goes on to

23     say that by appointing Delic as commander, staff commander, commander of

24     the Supreme Command Staff, and I quote:  "That the Chetnik course was

25     victorious in the Presidency of RBH."

Page 40825

 1        Q.   General, I apologise, but for the record I have to stop the page

 2     there.  Was it Alija Izetbegovic who was shocked or was it

 3     Sefer Halilovic who was shocked?

 4        A.   No, Sefer Halilovic.

 5        Q.   Because it says in the transcript that Izetbegovic was shocked.

 6        A.   No.  It was Sefer Halilovic who was shocked.  And then he called

 7     a meeting at which it was voted on whether the supreme commander decision

 8     was to be accepted or whether there would be a coup d'etat because what

 9     he was doing here was a coup d'etat.  He was successful in the first

10     round of the voting, and then in the second round, many commanders

11     supported Sefer Halilovic as it says here.  Many people changed their

12     minds.  And so, of course, it was all very dramatic and contrary to any

13     logical organisation and this is considered to be a putsch on the part of

14     the army which Mr. Muslimovic at the end of this excerpt that I had

15     translated says that lack of obedience towards the political leadership

16     of the country can take on the character of a coup d'etat.

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Is there not a contradiction in

18     what you are saying?  We understood over the last few days that according

19     to you, Halilovic was a KOS agent, K-O-S.  That is what I understood.

20     And now there's a change.  He's being replaced by Delic, and you said

21     earlier that this seemed to be a victory for the Chetniks.

22             Does this mean that Mr. Delic, like Halilovic, is part of the

23     same group?  What difference is there between the two?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours -- Judge Antonetti,

25     Your Honour, apart from the fact that I presented whereby Mr. Halilovic

Page 40826

 1     was -- and he was questioned by the BH Army and he recognises in the

 2     document that was made public, that is to say that he worked for the

 3     K-O-S, KOS, I did not draw any conclusions, I personally; because I'm

 4     very wary of making conclusions on the basis of very scant information.

 5             Halilovic first began setting up the Patriotic League, and then

 6     those who came later considered this to be KOS.  I'm just speaking about

 7     the total unrest and unruliness that existed.  Now, who worked for whom,

 8     I can't claim that for sure.  I think that you either misunderstood me

 9     because of the interpretation or whatever.  All I know is that those of

10     us down there, I, Petkovic, and so on -- well, what is quite clear is

11     that all the efforts, all the signed agreements, the peace processes, and

12     all the effort invested fell through.  It came to nothing.  And here we

13     have the answer as to why this all failed.  Here we have an answer, and

14     it is that with people that think this way and behave in this way and

15     speak about Croats and Franjo Tudjman in the way they do are, A, those

16     who attack the HVO and, therefore, caused the war and used the -- used

17     Croatia as its backyard, and I explained why we allowed them to do that

18     despite our information about the attacks, and nothing more than that.

19     That's all I'm saying.

20             We were not able to establish a joint -- a joint struggle with

21     those people.  It was they who attacked us.  There was no Tudjman-Boban

22     agreements, no agreements of any kind, and then we'll see how the

23     situation evolved.  But here we have their plan.  One of them thinks they

24     can take control of the territory.  The other says ha ha, we're not able

25     to do that, and it's very painful for us to have to divide up power with

Page 40827

 1     those Croats and Serbs.  We thought we would be the only ones, the

 2     absolute majority.  That's what they say here and that's what we knew

 3     about.

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mrs. Pinter.

 5             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

 6        Q.   General, are we going on to page 321?

 7        A.   No, no.  I've gone through that.  There's no need to dwell on

 8     that.

 9             So other commanders, too, who took the floor after Sefer also say

10     that the Presidency decision is unacceptable and that the Chetnik course

11     and stream had been victorious through that decision.  The atmosphere was

12     a very ugly one, and he says according to six people who took the floor,

13     six more commanders, high-ranking commanders from the BH Army took the

14     floor after them, and from what they said one could conclude that the

15     Presidency decision should not be accepted and adopted and that the

16     Supreme Command Staff must stand up to it and oppose it.  Well, that's

17     tantamount to a state coup.  All right.  Opinions change so that never

18     actually happened, and we'll see all this on page 324.

19             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation]

20        Q.   3D41-0458 of the Croatian, and it's Nika Pinter speaking not

21     Mr. Stringer, and in English it is 3D41-0127 of the English.  41-0127.

22        A.   Izetbegovic knew that this was a very sensitive question, this

23     hand-over and takeover of duty, because he knew how Sefer behaved.  So he

24     waited to see whether the commission, which was supposed to see to this

25     takeover, and then it says that there were two rounds of discussion here

Page 40828

 1     and that the six people present went back on their positions.  They

 2     changed their positions.  And once they had done that, the changeover or

 3     takeover of duty was successful.  So I have nothing further to say now on

 4     that page and would like to go on to page 329 to 332.

 5        Q.   The Croatian text is 3D41-0460 to 3D41-0463, and for the English

 6     it is 3D41-0127, 127, 3D41-0127 to 3D41-0130.

 7        A.   What we've already said several times, Sefer Halilovic was not a

 8     citizen of Bosnia-Herzegovina, not a BH national, but he was a citizen, a

 9     national of Serbia, Yugoslavia, from the Sandzak region.  And it says

10     here how many people from Sandzak came into Bosnia-Herzegovina and

11     Sarajevo to fight on the side of the BH Army, and that was an extremely

12     high number, and all of them were received and taken in, although they

13     were foreign nationals.  Sefer, in particular, had great respect for the

14     people from his own region, and this led to additional divisions and

15     rifts within the BH Army.

16             Then Mr. Muslimovic goes on to say that Sefer was the greatest

17     mistake Izetbegovic had made in terms of cadres and that he just sat in

18     his office and that he kept saying that UNPROFOR -- that the presence of

19     UNPROFOR on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina was detrimental and that

20     they should be removed and that the Bosniaks would, of course, then see

21     eye-to-eye with the Serbs and Croats very quickly after that.

22             Now, why does the author think this?  Well, when they said that

23     they would reach an agreement, then it means that he would be victorious,

24     and we'll see this later on.

25             Secondly, he criticises Sefer's assessments to the effect that

Page 40829

 1     the BH Army was a superior to the aggressor forces, and the aggressor

 2     forces were the Army of Republika Srpska and the HVO, in his view, and

 3     that the BH Army was ready for large-scale offensives, which I saw

 4     nowhere else except vis-a-vis the HVO.  And then he goes on to say that

 5     Sefer meddled in politics and the policies pursued and that he stood up

 6     to Izetbegovic's policy and the signing of some peace agreements because

 7     he said he could repel the aggressor forces from the east and from the

 8     west, meaning the Serbs and the Croats.  And he strongly criticised

 9     Izetbegovic because of his efforts to stop the war.  He spoke about the

10     fight for freedom, and Izetbegovic spoke about the concept of putting an

11     end to the war.

12             And furthermore, he goes on to say that Sefer, in fact, hated

13     Izetbegovic and anybody who stood up to him and opposed him.

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Praljak, I was

15     listening to you and looking at this text on Sefer Halilovic, who came

16     from Sandzak, who was a Serb, who was of Serb origin.

17             We know that in the BH Army there were Croats, Siber Merdan, and

18     others.  Now, yourself, didn't you ever think about joining the BH Army

19     just like other Croats did?  And if you didn't, could you tell us why?

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, I have an ID from the

21     BH Army, so in formal terms I was.

22             Why would I join the BH Army with people like that?  The Croatian

23     people are a constituent and sovereign people, and they're saving Bosnia

24     and Herzegovina while Mr. Izetbegovic is walking around Sarajevo two days

25 prior to the attack.  He's first talking about Ravno and he says it's not his

Page 40830

 1     war.  He couldn't care less about the aggression against Croatia.  He's

 2     not doing anything.

 3             So you want me to wait for somebody to kill my family down there

 4     and then I join them and they very reluctantly even recognise that I

 5     belong to a people, a nation.  No, Your Honour.

 6             I wasn't on a footing of equality with Sefer Halilovic.  I

 7     wouldn't enter into an association with Sefer Halilovic even to talk to

 8     him except with a human being but somebody that had to have some

 9     knowledge.

10             Anyway, we organised ourselves first, the -- we never questioned

11     the community of Croats and Muslims in the BH Army except for Siber and

12     other people.  There were very few individuals as opposed to the HVO

13     which in certain units had as many as 60 percent Muslims on a footing of

14     complete equality.  Why didn't they join the HVO?  Why would you join the

15     Germans as a French and not have the Germans join up with you?  So

16     equality means equal rights for everyone.  I'm not anybody's servant.

17     I'm not Sefer Halilovic's servant or a servant to his ideas.  I at least

18     wasn't, and nobody could force me to be that then or today.  I want to

19     have equal rights in Europe together with the French.  With the exception

20     of God, I would like to be on equal rights with everybody else, on the

21     footing of equality.

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You gave us your answer.  Thank

23     you.

24             Mrs. Pinter.

25             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation]

Page 40831

 1        Q.   General, are we still on the subject of manipulation or are we

 2     going to move on?

 3        A.   We are done with that.  We can move on to page 326.

 4             JUDGE PRANDLER:  I'm sorry to interrupt you again, Mr. Praljak.

 5     I listened to the question of the President and to your answer.  Frankly,

 6     for me the answer is very, very clear and should be formulated in one

 7     sentence, that actually Sefer Halilovic was a -- a kind of Muslim from

 8     Sandzak; and the Sandzak, as we know, there had always been a great

 9     number of Muslims.  So, therefore, he was in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and

10     he joined, of course, to the army.  Thank you.

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour

12     Judge Prandler.  The fact that he hailed from Sandzak didn't bother me at

13     all.  The fact was that according to the agreements and the decisions

14     that we had, we were two equal armies.  Two equal nations had created two

15     equal armies, and we offered to cooperate in our joint defence.  And that

16     was the situation that you have to abide by if you want to defend the

17     joint state, if you want to shape the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina as

18     a common state.  You cannot just hand it over into the hands -- I mean,

19     its fate into hands of people who arm themselves, who write the Islamic

20     declaration, who treat us in this way.  No.  No serious politician or

21     military man would have done that.

22             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation]

23        Q.   I have to ask you where Sandzak is, to show us, for -- because of

24     Judge Prandler's question.  In which state is it?

25        A.   It is in Serbia.  It is there.

Page 40832

 1        Q.   So Sefer Halilovic was not born in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 2        A.   No.

 3        Q.   Thank you.

 4             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I'm sorry.  I'm sorry, Mr. Praljak.  Could you

 5     try to express in words the area of Sandzak, because when you say

 6     "there," that's all that we find in the transcript.  It's not very

 7     informative.  Please.  Thank you.

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is on the east border of Bosnia

 9     and Herzegovina towards the Republic of Serbia.  There is a province

10     which is called Sandzak.  It is on the western borders of Serbia towards

11     Bosnia and Herzegovina, or looking from Bosnia and Herzegovina on the

12     eastern border of Bosnia and Herzegovina towards Serbia, in Serbia.

13             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, to lift an ambiguity,

14     could you tell us whether Mr. Halilovic was born in Sandzak?  Can you

15     tell us if he stayed in Serbia would he have been a Serbian citizen?

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, a citizen of Serbia.  But

17     today, as far as I know, and I believe myself to be well informed, all

18     Muslims who lived in the territory of Yugoslavia today call themselves

19     Bosniaks save for those who remained Muslims and actually acquired the

20     nationality of another nation.

21             So in Croatia you have Muslims who are Croats who profess the

22     Islamic faith, and you have those whose religion is Islamic, and they

23     call themselves Bosniaks.  There are about 60.000 of them in Croatia and

24     as part of national minorities, they have a representative in the

25     Croatian Sabor, in the Croatian Assembly, which is a directly elected

Page 40833

 1     representative, not a part of the party's slates.

 2             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So to be very clear,

 3     Sefer Halilovic is born of parents that were of Muslim faith.  So he was

 4     a Muslim, but he could have acquired a Serbian citizenship because he is

 5     born in a Serbian region; is that it?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  Yes, that's right,

 7     Judge Antonetti.  He could have been a citizen of Serbia and declared

 8     himself to be a Bosniak, because Sandzak they also declared themselves to

 9     be Bosniaks by ethnicity.  I know that you do not have this in France

10     because there a national is the same as a citizen, but here you can have

11     a national of the Republic of Croatia, who is a Czech or a Hungarian, or

12     a national of the Republic of Serbia, who is a Bosniak or a Serb, et

13     cetera.

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  Mrs. Pinter.

15             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

16        Q.   General, I had stopped you, interrupted you, and we were at page

17     336 when I interrupted you.

18        A.   Yes.  Here again it is stated that Sefer used to say that

19     Izetbegovic was a traitor of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Bosniak people;

20     and that in the view of Sefer Halilovic, Izetbegovic should have

21     resigned.  For Izetbegovic, Sefer wrote that he was a graveyard digger.

22     That without Bosnia-Herzegovina, that he dug that and so on and so forth.

23     So he meddled.  He meddled in all sorts of things.  He wanted to be the

24     political and military boss of Bosnia.  He wanted to conquered it with

25     his forces, and he had territorial ambitions in a word.  Let's go to page

Page 40834

 1     342 now, please.

 2        Q.   3D41-0467.  That's the Croatian, and English, 3D41-0131.

 3        A.   To continue, here he says that Sefer did not even like any

 4     Bosniaks if he thought them some competition to himself, and he thought

 5     so about his war colleagues and comrades in arms, Vehbija Karic, Suljevic

 6     and others.  How they didn't know anything.  They were ignorant.  They

 7     were a burden to him, et cetera; so this was not only Izetbegovic that he

 8     had a such view of but also his own high officers in his own army staff,

 9     and he told these kinds of stories about them as well.  So this was a

10     state of total disarray.  Let us go to 344 and 345.

11        Q.   In English it is still the same page in Croatian 3D41-01 -- 0468

12     and 3D41-0131 for the record, Your Honours, in English.

13        A.   So Muslimovic testifies that there was a major difference between

14     Halilovic and Sefer in the intellectual education and moral and every

15     other respect, which of course is true.  And we will all agree with that.

16     I had an encounter with Sefer Halilovic.  After the war in a TV duel and

17     I can testify and it lasted about an hour or so.  I can testify to the

18     intellectual levels of Sefer Halilovic.  Furthermore, he reiterated how

19     many times Sefer had told him that Izetbegovic was not up to the task,

20     and he quoted how many times in 1992 and the second half of 1993 he had

21     heard Sefer say that Izetbegovic is an old fool saying stupid things.

22     Let us go to 346 now, please.

23        Q.   3D41-0470 - that's in Croatian - to 3D41-0472.  And in English

24     3D41-0132 to 3D41-0133.

25        A.   So Sefer, after his replacement or the replacement, sought to

Page 40835

 1     soil, besmirch Delic, Izetbegovic and others as much as possible.  And he

 2     goes on to say that he employed the media, that he wanted to be a

 3     political and military leader of the Bosniaks, that he printed posters

 4     with his image on them, and also badges with his image on them.  And I

 5     had the opportunity to see those posters myself.  The great warrior

 6     smiling down on people in his poster in the pose of a victor.  And then

 7     he goes on to say all the sorts of things that he did to Mr. Ahmet Tabak

 8     in order to force him to state how Izetbegovic, Cengic, and Alispahic

 9     were criminals, that they were stealing money, that they were war

10     profiteers, and then he describes this incident, this torture.

11             Then the gentleman goes on to describe how Sefer actually incited

12     conflicts in Sarajevo and how he helped Caco and Celo, which are the

13     nicknames of commanders of brigades in Sarajevo who were obedient to no

14     one.

15             MR. STRINGER:  Excuse me.  Prosecution renews its objection to

16     this book and this testimony on relevancy grounds.  I don't see how this

17     bears any connection to either the crimes charged in the indictment or

18     the joint criminal enterprise that's alleged in the indictment as well.

19             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] This can be associated because

20     Ramiz Delalic, "Celo" is referred to here, who was later involved in the

21     action at Grabovica, which is in the area of Herceg-Bosna and is to the

22     north of Mostar and which is in the area where there were conflicts

23     between the ABH and the HVO.  Of course this is only an appendix to all

24     the reasons already adduced previously by General Praljak.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is stated in the indictment, for

Page 40836

 1     instance, that the document of the 15th of January, 1993, which was

 2     generated in agreement with Izetbegovic was an ultimatum of the HVO which

 3     actually brought about conflicts and set in motion an avalanche of

 4     attacks by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Is it not clear from this

 5     text now who in the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina actually revoked

 6     Izetbegovic, cancelled the document that he had approved, that he had

 7     produced in Zagreb together with the co-chairmen of the peace conference?

 8     Is it not clear from this book what Sefer and the rest thought -- think

 9     about peace and the agreements of peace?  Is that not one of the main

10     counts of the indictment that the HVO, namely by that ultimatum injured

11     or hurt or -- them or caused the war with the Bosniaks?  If that is not

12     so, I don't know what I'm talking about.

13             So please bear with me, Your Honours.  Let me finish this part

14     which I'm still working on.

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Praljak, yes, finish,

16     but finish briefly, please.  We understood what you're trying to

17     demonstrate you seem to say that Halilovic has his own agenda.  Maybe he

18     was even playing a double game.  And he took part in the Geneva

19     conference because he signed a document with Mr. Petkovic.  The document

20     was -- has already been admitted into evidence, and you believe this is

21     important to understand what exactly happened on the field.  Fine, but

22     then, on the other hand, I'm sure you understood Mr. Stringer.  He was

23     speaking about the crimes and your responsibility when it comes to these

24     crimes, or alleged crimes; so please keep that in mind.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm not losing sight of that,

Page 40837

 1     Your Honours.  I know what I did and what I signed and cannot be --

 2     there's no way that my association with any crime can be proved in any

 3  way whatsoever except by idle stories, constructions.  One of those

 4  constructions is the 15th of January.  And we lost and wasted hours and

 5  hours of time on that, but nobody said why that fell through and who was

 6  behind it.  But just these two documents were taken as such.  Let me,

 7  therefore, say very briefly it is here on pages 334, 350 --

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  Could the witness please slow down.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So the 352 --

10             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Mr. Praljak, I'm a bit amazed.  You come here as

11     a soldier.  Of the one the first duties of a soldier is discipline, and

12     normally it applies to all ranks, and discipline implies self-control,

13     and I'm surprised that you seem not to be able to control the speed --

14     the speed of your speech and have to be admonished once per hour about

15     after -- this is the fourth week that you're doing it.  So if you want to

16     show that you have some discipline and self-control, this is the way you

17     could very usefully do so.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour Judge Trechsel --

19             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I'm sorry, I'm not -- I was not asking you a

20     question.  I was telling you how you should behave usefully in your own

21     interest as a witness, and that's all.  That needs no comment from you.

22             Please, Ms. Pinter, continue.

23             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no, I do not agree with the

25     concept of how a military should behave.  A soldier has discipline, but

Page 40838

 1     the mind works in different ways.  Judge Trechsel has the right to

 2     present his view on the army or how a drill soldier looks like.  I'm not

 3     a drill soldier.  I'm a human being, a man; and I'm doing my best, my

 4     level best, but the concept of a such a drilled Prussian soldier,

 5     Prussian idiot, is something that I will not accept, even if it does come

 6     from His Honour Judge Trechsel.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, I'm sure you

 8     misunderstood my fellow Judge, and I would like to take the floor on this

 9     point.  My fellow Judge reminded you that on several occasions the

10     Trial Chamber asked you to slow down.  You've understood this and you

11     have apologised for speaking too fast.  My fellow Judge added that a

12     military man because that's -- I mean, you were a general.  We have to

13     keep this in mind.  So normally a military man is self-disciplined.  It's

14     part and parcel of a military man, and it's a essential quality for

15     anyone in the military.  This is what he wanted to point out.  If a Judge

16     is, therefore, asking you to slow down, you must obey.  That's all there

17     was to it.

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.  I

19     apologise, and I'll really trying, but before I became an active-duty

20     serviceman, I was a director for 25 years, which means that you have to

21     be dramatic, thespian; and you know, Your Honours, that it's a different

22     kind of formation of a thought of speech, so I'm really trying; but

23     please understand me, this is my second nature coming out, my important

24     part of myself.

25             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well, but we are not --

Page 40839

 1     we're not talking to someone who was a director, who was a director.

 2     This is not the director we're speaking to.  We're talking to the general

 3     here.

 4             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

 5        Q.   So the page numbers are 3D41-0473.

 6             THE INTERPRETER:  The counsel is kindly asked to slow down when

 7     reading numbers.

 8             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   To 3D41-0477 in Croatian and 3D41-40 -- -0134 through 3D41-0137.

10        A.   Well, I have this and another portion.  This is a brief

11     description of the role of Sefer Halilovic in supporting some of the

12     commands who are listed here, and the brigades so that they ended up

13     subordinate to him and no one else, and how those units blocked any kind

14     of action which probably Mr. Izetbegovic tried to carry out in order to

15     introduce some kind of order into the town of Sarajevo; and there was a

16     great deal of disorder and chaos there, and it's a well-known fact.

17     People know that.  And we have some details that are recounted here from

18     the fact that Sefer ordered that anyone who wants to pose them should be

19     fired at into the body and there were conflicts between the MUP forces

20     and the police with Caco and Celo's followers, and people in Sarajevo

21     know that.  This problem was solved as you will see a little bit later.

22     Let us move on to page 358.  That's the last portion of this book that I

23     want to use.

24        Q.   3D41-0477.

25        A.   And the next page.

Page 40840

 1        Q.   To 3D41-0482.  In English that's 3D41-0137 through to the end.

 2        A.   Well, this is about the arrest of the members of the

 3     10th Brigade.  And the command of the military security in the Army of

 4     Bosnia-Herzegovina has to send a letter to some commanders warning them

 5     that they are no longer a part of the military organisation, that they

 6     are out of -- out of control, that they're no longer controlled by any

 7     military or political factors.

 8             And then he goes on to say that Mr. Izetbegovic gave a positive

 9     assessment to the perseverance on Muslimovic's part to solve the problem

10     with Caco.  He speaks about how those people stole gasoline, took people

11     away to dig trenches, and so on.

12             And then he goes on to say that Celo's and Caco's men, and those

13     are two brigade commanders that are at issue here, arrested some 20

14     members of the civilian police, the military police, and officers of the

15     BH Army.  They beat some of them up.  And when -- attempts were made to

16     solve this and President Izetbegovic was involved in that too.  He spoke

17     to some of Caco's men.  Caco is one of those commanders, and Caco's men,

18     of course, issued an ultimatum for the release of some of his men or they

19     would shell the Presidency building.

20             President Izetbegovic vacillated.  He couldn't make a final

21     decision.  And then President Izetbegovic received some people from

22     Caco's brigade, and these talks were very hard for him.  The negotiations

23     were very hard.  The president had to replace Muslimovic and another

24     well-known commander, Hajrulahovic, Talijan, at the request of Caco's

25     men.  And it goes on to say that that night Caco set up combat lines

Page 40841

 1     along the streets of Sarajevo.  And then on the 3rd of July, 1993, he

 2     corralled some 200 people, rounded up some 200 people in the streets,

 3     including Admir Delic, General Delic's son, and President Izetbegovic was

 4     forced to decide to release from the Pecara prison the people who had

 5     been arrested, the people who belonged to Commander Caco.

 6             The situation then calmed down.

 7             I have nothing more to say about that because this book speaks

 8     for itself, and it is quite clear.  It's a clear image of the other side,

 9     the side that the HVO was supposed to create, a joint state, a joint

10     army, arm them.  And that's what we were doing actually.

11             Thank you very much.  Let us move on.

12        Q.   Our next --

13             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] On the document we've just

14     seen, I'd like to put you a question.  I'll will address later on your

15     relationship with Mate Boban.  We will see this in detail later, but as a

16     military commander, whether it be Mr. Halilovic, you, yourself,

17     Mr. Petkovic, General Mladic, we can mention a number of names, but as a

18     military commander, I want to ask you this:  Is a military commander

19     placed under the command of the acting president?

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, absolutely.  A

21     military commander may --

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So your answered by saying yes.

23     How can you explain on the basis of the documents we've seen a few

24     moments ago that relate to Halilovic that's being replaced by Delic, and

25     that a coup d'etat is being prepared?  Izetbegovic is not respected.  How

Page 40842

 1     can you explain this situation?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, the explanation, Your Honour,

 3     is very simple.  As Mr. Izetbegovic had not prepared for the war and the

 4     people of Sarajevo, the people who -- in the street, Caco's, Celo's men

 5     and those who belonged to others, were the first to grab hold of weapons,

 6     and they saved Sarajevo.  They were the first to fight the Republika

 7     Srpska army.  They manned the position.  They fought.  They got killed.

 8     And that is now they grew in stature.  And it takes a year and a half.

 9     It took one year and a half.  It was only in the fall of 1993 that

10     Mr. Izetbegovic managed to arrest all these people and introduce order

11     into Sarajevo.

12             So from what I know, there is not a shred of doubt that the

13     inclination of President Izetbegovic was to resolve the situation.  But

14     if he arrested Caco and Caco has a brigade composed of his pals, there

15     was no structure.  They would simply leave the positions and Serbs would

16     enter Sarajevo.  His hands were tied.  He had to bide his time for his

17     organisation, for his army to grow in strength so that he could finally

18     grapple with the criminal elements.  He did not have a state and then

19     created an army.  Izetbegovic and the Presidency survived because Caco's

20     men and Celo's men and Juka's men went out onto the positions, and those

21     were street urchins so to speak, and they have had their own ideas of

22     morality.  Those were people who had their share of -- and that is why

23     this happened.  The armies that defend the state, it's difficult.  It

24     takes time to turn them into a proper army because they say, Well, this

25     is my rifle.  I defended this patch.  Who are you?  And you say, I am the

Page 40843

 1     president of the state, and he just waves you off.  What kind of a

 2     president are you?  You can't pay his salary, you didn't recruit him, and

 3     you cannot punish him, you cannot discipline him.  If you discipline him,

 4     there goes your town.  You lose your town.

 5             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  In the

 6     binder --

 7             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I would like to add a question to the initial

 8     question of the President, namely whether generals are submitted to the

 9     president of the state.  This you answered positively.  You said yes, and

10     I think it's even more obvious if the president of the entity, I'm

11     avoiding now the word "state," of the entity is also the supreme

12     commander of the military.

13             How can you reconcile this with what you also said today, and I

14     think previously, that you accept no authority between yourself and God.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Ah, you misunderstand me,

16     Your Honour Judge Trechsel.  I am highly disciplined in this sense, but

17     if a policy or any supreme commander issued orders or decisions to me

18     that I couldn't accept as a human being, then I do not oppose it by

19     staging a coup d'etat.  I leave the organisation.

20             So I did have some disagreements about the organisation of the

21     overall life in Herceg-Bosna with Mr. Boban, some disagreements, but it

22     never occurred to me to do what Sefer Halilovic was doing.  I at that

23     time, because the Muslim offensive ended and I was sure that we had

24     managed to defend ourselves in this lull, I calmly asked to be relieved

25     of my duty.  And this is a completely different situation from what we

Page 40844

 1     have here.

 2             So in any organisation, let's say the judiciously at one point

 3     you cannot accept something.  You say, All right.  I don't want to be

 4     part of it.  So I'm speaking about the moral sentiment to the extent at

 5     which I am prepared to participate or to be a member of something, and

 6     for as long as I am, I am very disciplined and I always abide by all the

 7     rules.

 8             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you.  That's not exactly what I had meant,

 9     but I leave it at that.  Thank you.  I did not want to compare you to

10     Mr. Halilovic at all.  Thank you.

11             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.  In the

12     binder "Central Bosnia," there is a single document that I need, and by

13     your leave I would like to call it up in e-court so that you don't have

14     to change binders because we will go back to the -- to the book so it's

15     3D02873.  It was submitted to everyone so just that you don't change your

16     binders you can look at it on the screen.  Now I would like to ask

17     General Praljak -- we're waiting for it to come up in e-court and then I

18     would like to ask him to look at it.

19        Q.   General, it's the chief of VOS, Ivica Zeko.  He was in Central

20     Bosnia, operational zone Central Bosnia.

21        A.   Yes.

22        Q.   I think the date is important here?

23        A.   Yes, it's the 9th of May, 1993, and at that time, and I didn't

24     take it from the book, in the presence of General Morillon and others,

25     the demilitarisation was signed of Srebrenica, Zepa, Gorazde, and other

Page 40845

 1     zones.  So Sefer Halilovic, who was opposed to UNPROFOR's presence in

 2     Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sefer Halilovic said, yes, okay, fine, the units

 3     that we are defend -- that are defending our territory in Eastern Bosnia

 4     we will now transfer them for the final clash with the Ustasha and then

 5     we will have all routes open to Croatia.

 6        Q.   Could we now please have 02648.  It's Sefer Halilovic's book, "A

 7     Cunning Strategy."

 8             General, what parts would you like us to read.

 9        A.   Pages 7 and 8, and it will take us a short time to go through the

10     book.

11        Q.   3D33-0962, Croatian, and that's 3D40-0818, and 3D40-0819 .

12        A.   Well, it's the 7th of July, 1993.  That's when Mr. Sefer

13     Halilovic's removal from office was in the offing, and again a -- a

14     meeting was arranged with Mr. Petkovic in Kiseljak, in the UNPROFOR base,

15     yet another one, and it says here --

16             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I'm sorry to interrupt.  This book is not in the

17     binder books.  It may be somewhere else, but it is not in this binder

18     which is entitled "Books."  And it is also not on the list of documents

19     at the first page of the -- of this binder, at least not under the number

20     that we were given.

21             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] I may have misspoken.  It's 3D02648,

22     and it is listed --

23             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Yes.

24             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] -- on the front page.

25             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Now I've found it.  The number given was 2 --

Page 40846

 1     well, it is okay now, but it was another number first.  Thank you.

 2             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation]

 3        Q.   Thank you, General.  Please about ahead.

 4        A.   Well, this is Sefer Halilovic's book that he wrote probably

 5     compos mentis, and there is no reason I should expect that particularly

 6     because I know all those details.  So Sefer Halilovic is supposed to

 7     attend this meeting with Petkovic, but President Izetbegovic tells him no

 8     you don't have to hurry that meeting is unimportant, and in the morning

 9     we have other things to do.

10             So you can see that Mr. Izetbegovic did not consider the meetings

11     with Mr. Petkovic and others to be of any great importance, because he

12     was preparing to get rid of Sefer Halilovic.

13             At page 8, he says that he had an unpleasant conversation with

14     General Morillon and that Ganic was there, too, and that they asked --

15     demanded from Morillon that the embargo be lifted, and Sefer, in fact,

16     was very brusque with Morillon.  He said remove this trash that is

17     UNPROFOR and how yourself off [as interpreted] where you came from, and

18     we, the BH Army, will reach a deal with the Ustasha and Chetniks about

19     whom Bosnia belongs to.  So apart from the language that this man uses,

20     and he even reports it in the book, it is really astonishing this immense

21     arrogant stupidity.  He has 70 percent of the territory that was taken

22     away from him by Serbs, and he claims that he has 250.000 men under arms,

23     and he says that he will defeat them.  The only thing that is needed is

24     for UNPROFOR to go away.  You really have to listen to it and wonder.

25             Now we can move to pages 14, 15, and 16.

Page 40847

 1        Q.   3D33-0964 is the page number, and 3D0965, 66, and for the English

 2     it is 3D40-820, 3D40-821.  Go ahead, please.

 3        A.   Well, this first bit is quite clear.  I have nothing to add.

 4     It's the proposal by the BH Presidency about the new appointments, about

 5     dismissals, Sefer Halilovic and Rasim Delic, and just a comment by

 6     Sefer Halilovic when he saw that Alija Izetbegovic had signed this on the

 7     2nd of June, 1993, his first thought was that it had been prepared for a

 8     long time and that this it was heinous or treacherous.  That's what

 9     heinous means.  And says that the differences between him and the

10     president were great, that they were two worlds not only with respect to

11     defence and -- defence concepts but on many other issues too.  And

12     Sefer Halilovic testifies himself what Muslimovic had previously said

13     about him and what we saw in the previous document.

14             And now may I look at pages 18, 19, 20, and 21 to 23, please.

15        Q.   That is 3D33-0967 to 3D33-0972, and in the English it is 3D40-822

16     to 3D40-826.

17        A.   This is a very important text because it's first-hand testimony

18     about how the talks were conducted on this famous problem of

19     Bosnia-Herzegovina's division, and he speaks about the meeting with

20     President Izetbegovic and Ganic, and he refers to him as a Yugoslav

21     because Ganic was also from Sandzak; and he was also a national of the

22     then Yugoslavia and would be a national of the state of Serb today.

23             And then another observation made here is that

24     Mr. Sefer Halilovic was a member of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

25     and it's up to Your Honours and the lawyers to explain the fact of how in

Page 40848

 1     an elected body, a body elected at the elections and confirmed in that

 2     way, that is to say the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, how there can

 3     be some appointment or you take someone by the ear and say, You're now

 4     going to be a member of the Presidency.

 5             Well, would things like that, when it comes to things like that,

 6     and when in Croatia a body was to be established that would be more

 7     expeditious, then a national security council was set up.  And it never

 8     entered anybody's head that you now, Bobetko, Praljak, are a member of

 9     the Presidency because Croatia had a Presidency too.  But it's not up to

10     me to say although I can't understand how you can appoint and nominate

11     someone, for example, the president of France or something, the

12     Presidency, or whatever.

13             And then he goes on to say that -- well, he's wondering whether

14     the people of Sandzak would accept the decision for him to move to

15     Eastern Herzegovina so that the Serbs can come and settle in Sandzak

16     then.  Obviously Ganic, who is from Sandzak himself, would like that

17     because that would round off his majority in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  And he

18     comes out in favour of what is being discussed there.  Of course, Sefer

19     does not agree, and he says that he's a soldier.  And they say, All

20     right.  We know that you understand all this.  And then they say, Only a

21     fool will not change his opinion.

22             Then Sefer goes on to explain why he doesn't agree, but he also

23     observes that Alija said to Ganic later on, "Did I tell you that --

24     didn't I tell you that you shouldn't discuss this matter with Sefer?"

25     And then Sefer keeps sticking by his guns and says it must remain intact.

Page 40849

 1     It is indivisible, and so on and so forth.

 2             And with respect to this same topic, there was a conversation in

 3     the plane on our way back to Geneva, on the way back to Geneva, and that

 4     was in January.  So they set out from Sarajevo on the 1st of January,

 5     1993, and now he describes how much pride there was involved, who would

 6     get -- be allowed to get into the private jet, who would take the regular

 7     flight to Geneva, and so on and so forth.  So there was a lot of vanity

 8     and pride afoot there.

 9             And there was irony here, bring that Ustasha in.  That was stated

10     with irony.

11             Sefer was opposed to this.  Who was Jasmin Jaganjac in order to

12     be able to get into that plane?

13             Anyway, this describes an unruly atmosphere that shouldn't have

14     been present.

15             Now, he -- Sefer says he was taking his interpreter and

16     body-guard, I suppose, to safeguard him from some evil Swiss.  I beg your

17     pardon, Your Honour Judge Trechsel, I have to make a joke now and again.

18             And at the end of page 21 there, let's see Sefer Halilovic's line

19     of thinking.  He left the hotel, got into a taxi.  He says that they both

20     used hands and sign language instead of speaking English, and that they

21     were looking for the Bosnian delegation and then he understood that the

22     Bosnian delegation was Karadzic and that the Bosnian delegation was Boban

23     too.  And the Yugoslav delegation was taking part as well there, that is

24     to say Cosic, Milosevic, Bulatovic, and he says the United Nations palace

25     was full of Chetniks and Ustashas, and very -- it was all we could do to

Page 40850

 1     find the real Bosnia and Herzegovinian delegation.

 2             And let me repeat once again, Your Honours.  Those people felt

 3     themselves to be a nation.  Sefer Halilovic saw himself and everybody he

 4     commanded as a supernation, the Aryans.  These are Chetniks, Ustashas

 5     that have to be expelled and killed -- or killed, and he was above all

 6     that.  He was a nation above, a people above, and he's going with that

 7     view to negotiations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 8             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] I think it's time for the break.

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It is time to have a break.

10     It's 12.30.  We shall have a 20-minute break.

11                           --- Recess taken at 12.30 p.m.

12                           --- On resuming at 12.51 p.m.

13             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mrs. Pinter.

14             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

15        Q.   General, we completed the pages about Jasmin Jaganjac and the

16     events described on page 22.  Would you continue, please.

17        A.   Well, Sefer, in the breaks in the negotiations in Germany, he

18     left for Germany and Turkey -- the pause in the negotiations he left for

19     Germany and Turkey.  He didn't agree with Jasmin Jaganjac role, and there

20     was the dilemma of it would either be him or Jaganjac.  And quite

21     obviously Jaganjac left the negotiations, and from that we can see that

22     the four months of Jaganjac's work and my own work to set up a joint

23     command was futile.  We wasted a lot of time and effort and talks and

24     nothing came of it.

25             It's important to mention here that the talks between

Page 40851

 1     Mr. Izetbegovic, who in fact recounted his talks with Mr. Arafat, the PLO

 2     head, and Mr. Arafat told him, said:

 3             "Mr. Izetbegovic, I was offered a portion of the land too -- a

 4     portion of land, too, and there is no Palestine state to this day."

 5             And he advised Alija Izetbegovic to take a part and not to call

 6     for the maximum demand of having an entire Bosnia-Herzegovina but to take

 7     what he could.

 8             And then he says to Sefer, who is against this, that he's

 9     harbouring a delusion and that a part of Bosnia should be taken which

10     will allow the people to come back, people who had been expelled to

11     Croatia, to come to that portion of land, because otherwise they might be

12     left with nothing.  Sefer is benevolent and says well, nobody who

13     respects the Bosnian state is withheld any rights.  The general term used

14     is the "Bosnian state," and that term is used today, but in fact it's

15     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  And after he presented his views, Izetbegovic

16     said that he needed a part of the land which would be big enough to take

17     2 million inhabitants.  Some will come in, others will leave.  So that

18     would be the best solution.

19             So that's as far as the thesis goes of who always has this idea

20     of the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina in their minds.  The only question

21     is how much who would get.

22             Now we can move on to page 24 and 25, and I'd just like -- well,

23     and pages 26 and 27.  You can give us the proper numbers.

24        Q.   Very well.  The Croatian text is on 3D33-00973 to 3D33-0977, and

25     for the English it is 3D40-80827 -- 0827 -- 3D40-0827 to 3D40-0829.

Page 40852

 1             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  May I still go back to the page 1 -- no,

 2     3D40-0826.  It was the one which was before us last.

 3             I also read here Sefer quoting himself as saying:

 4             "We do not want everything.  We want to live in equality with all

 5     those who have always lived in Bosnian, without depriving of their rights

 6     anyone who respects the Bosnian state."

 7             How do you interpret this, Witness?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.  I can see it.  So the

 9     words "we do not" already puts Mr. Sefer in a position of saying how he

10     respects or does not respect the Bosnian state.

11             As for me, in respect of the way that Sefer Halilovic conceives

12     of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that he is the one to determine who or what

13     respects it or not is not something that I could agree to, but this could

14     be tolerated were it not for his other statements, if we did not

15     comprehensively look at everything that he says.

16             So I interpret this to sound like this:  If you are loyal to

17     Sefer Halilovic and his views of Bosnia-Herzegovina, then it is all

18     right.  But if you would by any chance have any idea that would be

19     discrepant to his, then you would not be respectful of that state.  Then

20     he would either put you deep six you or he would banish you to Croatia.

21             That's it.  I do not consider this statement of Sefer's any

22     different from all of his other statements to the effect how the Chetniks

23     and Ustasha should be defeated.

24             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you, Mr. Praljak.

25             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation]

Page 40853

 1        Q.   Please, General, let us revert to our basic page.

 2        A.   Yes.  Very briefly in respect of all these pages, Sefer was

 3     already shown the draft document of the Presidency about replacements,

 4     dismissals, et cetera; and he was harshly protesting here saying that he

 5     was also a member of the Presidency and had the right to -- saying that

 6     the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina only speaks about the chief of

 7     Main Staff, that they were violating the law, that this was a decision

 8     that was counter-constitutional and in contravention of the law.

 9             Mr. Izetbegovic says that this is his problem and that Sefer is

10     meddling too much in matters.

11             Sefer also states his opinion of people -- of the people who were

12     appointed generals.  He speaks badly about Delic, bad-mouths other people

13     as well saying that Delic did not fight and so on and so forth.

14             So everything.  What Selimovic placed in his book is confirmed in

15     this one as well by Sefer Halilovic too, name that Muslimovic and Delic

16     cannot be generals, that they were guilty of violations, that all of

17     Muslimovic's activities were in the very least very disputable because

18     all the time he spent all the time in the basement of the Presidency.  So

19     this reflects a general wholesale political and military disorganisation,

20     disarray, and nothing more.

21             Can we move on?  Page 54 -- pages 54 and 55.

22        Q.   It's 3D33-0978 to 3D33-0978 --  9 and in the English 3D40-830,

23     and 3D40-0831.

24        A.   Here Sefer is talking about misunderstandings with Izetbegovic

25     the president of the Presidency ever since 1991 when he had hopes that

Page 40854

 1     Bosnia and Herzegovina would get ready for war which was imminent, which

 2     was on the horizon; and he speaks how he had organised the

 3     Patriotic League organisation as it was called at the time.  He refers to

 4     how Karadzic was threatening that if the referendum on the independence

 5     of Bosnia and Herzegovina should be successful and this is what Karadzic

 6     said in parliament, he said that the Muslims would disappear and

 7     President Izetbegovic sent this message to the citizens that there will

 8     be no war in Bosnia and Herzegovina because it takes two to quarrel and

 9     obviously the Muslims did not want to engage in any quarrel, so according

10     to his logic, because they didn't want to quarrel, nobody would attack

11     you.

12             Well, one really needed to be able to say something like that.

13     Sefer was saying that as we will all know Mr. Izetbegovic maintain his

14     neutral position also when Dubrovnik was being destroyed and during the

15     JNA's attack on Slovenia and Croatia, and when in 1991 in September he

16     said after the massacre and the attack in the village of Ravno that

17     it was not their war, the Muslims' war, I guess.  Also, Sefer

18     refers to the fact -- to his intention to mobilise 250.000 people.  He

19     gives statements to the effect that he had 250.000 or so people in the

20     ABiH army.  He said that New Year's Eve in 1992, the newspaper

21     "Oslobodjenje," he says that Alija -- Alija will not attack Bosnia and --

22     that the army will not attack Bosnia and Herzegovina and that in

23     Brussels, in the paper "Le Soir," Izetbegovic actually claimed that the

24     people were actually awakening from a couchemar, seeing what was going to

25     be happening.  And on the 17th of March, 1992, in an interview to a

Page 40855

 1     Croatian paper, he said that the army had changed, that it was now

 2     different in terms of quality, in terms of psychology.  That's its

 3     intentions and objectives were different and that an army would not

 4     occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina and undertake a coup d'etat.

 5             In "Oslobodjenje," there was published, and we will all were

 6     familiar with that.  I knew it for a fact that he had said, Izetbegovic:

 7             "Go for a walk.  Look around you.  See that everything is

 8     peaceful.  Don't be taken in by rumours.  The situation is under control.

 9     So you can peacefully walk around town."

10             Several days after that, Sarajevo came under extremely heavy

11     shelling that was the situation.

12             Can we see 56, 57, 58 and 59 now, please.

13        Q.   3D33-09780, 0980.  3D33-0980 to 3D33-0983.  The English is

14     3D40-0832 to 3D40-0833.

15             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I'm sorry I have a somewhat technical

16     observation to you, Mr. Praljak.  It is not clear to someone who listens

17     always whether you are telling something out of your own head or whether

18     you are taking it from the paper that is in front of us.  For instance,

19     you have spoken about 250.000 or so people.  I do not find this figure on

20     pages 54 and 55 which are before us.

21             I'm not going to tell you what you should say, but I am asking

22     you to make it clear when you are saying things from your head or when

23     you are just referring to what is in the book that you are using.

24             Can you agree to that?  Thank you.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour Judge Trechsel.

Page 40856

 1     Here I invoke documents that I have already shown this Court, documents

 2     of the Patriotic League, namely, where Mr. Halilovic speaks about already

 3     having 250.000 men, and in another document where he very clearly says

 4     that the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina has more than 250.000 men.

 5     These are documents that have been shown here.  I am speaking here -- I'm

 6     saying here that Halilovic claims in this book everything that I in

 7     different periods claimed likewise before this Tribunal, both in respect

 8     of Ravno, both in respect of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is attacking

 9     Croatia --

10             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I was not inviting you to comment on the

11     substance.  I just would like you to tell us when you are departing from

12     what is in this text.  You may appreciate that we are not -- have present

13     in our mind the thousands of documents that have already been shown to

14     us.  Thank you.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.  Here Halilovic says what is

16     also my contention and which has been reiterated time and again, namely

17     that apart from Vojvodina, namely this eastern part, i.e., the western

18     part of Serbia, Croatia was attacked at Vukovar, that operations were

19     launched against Croatia from Bosnia and Herzegovina and that Izetbegovic

20     claimed that at that time while the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina

21     together with the renegade Serbs in Croatia was doing what it was doing,

22     that the presence of the JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina was necessary and

23     that it would be the fundamental military force of Bosnia and

24     Herzegovina.

25        It also says that Izetbegovic asked Croatians in Polog to let go those

Page 40857

 1     tanks, the tank brigade towards Kupres, and it was, in fact, let go to

 2     come at his insistence.  Then it refers to the existence of the Ram plan

 3     and the academy memorandum and how everything was clear, how the

 4     intention was to destroy and to create a Greater Serbia, but

 5     Judge Trechsel, you see that part of this plan was also to destroy the

 6     Bosnian state and the Bosniaks.  He does not mention the Croats here.

 7     After this perhaps acceptable sentence he says the Bosnian state.  He

 8     does not say Bosnian and Herzegovina, but he does -- he says the Bosnian

 9     state, which is not the same.

10             Furthermore, he says that the unambiguous conclusion is that the

11     very dangerous war is being prepared, dangerous to the Bosnian people and

12     the Bosnian state.  I must say that there does not exist a Bosnia or a

13     Bosnian nation.  These are very dangerous political thesis.  This is how

14     the Yugoslav people exists as a form of the implementation of the

15     dictatorship and negation of nations, and Sefer is using the same

16     expressions, the same words, everything that was being said in Belgrade

17     after World War II; so Sefer says this is Bosna, Bosnian, not

18     Bosnia-Herzegovina, and in Bosnian there lived -- lives the Bosnian

19     nation.  No.  In Bosnia does not live the Bosnian nation.  In Bosnia live

20     Croats, Bosniaks, Serbs, Jews, the Roma; and there is no Bosnian nation

21     or Bosnia people.

22             These are these basic planks, thesis, that this is about at that

23     I'm contesting.  These theses are in his mind, unitaries -- a unitarian

24     state in which Sefer rules.  So if you are not Bosnian nation member

25     but -- and you happen to say that you are a Croat, he has all the

Page 40858

 1     argumentation, just as it was in Yugoslavia, to lock you up for two or

 2     three years of gaol.

 3             Furthermore, he states that according to what Mr. Izetbegovic

 4     told the paper "Oslobodjenje" that the JNA shall be radically

 5     transformed, that it shall become the Bosnian army, and then he actually

 6     corrects himself as he's quoting, he says the armed forces.

 7             Your Honours, the Bosnian army and the armed forces of Bosnia and

 8     Herzegovina in our conditions, our conditions who -- of us who passed

 9     through this unitarianisation [as interpreted] of the country these are

10     crucial differences.  Is this Bosnia and the Bosnian nation?  Or is this

11     Bosnia and Herzegovina that can have its own armed forces?  These are

12     incredibly important differentiations, distinctions, and so on and so

13     forth.  I shall not now belabour the point why the arms were not taken --

14     why arms were not taken from the barracks of the JNA.  That is evident.

15     Let us now move on to pages 60, 61, and 62.

16             MS. PINTER: [Interpretation]

17        Q.   3D33-0984, 3D33-0985, 3D33 -0986.  English, 3D40-0834.

18        A.   Here he speaks about how within the MUP the protagonists of the

19     special war were hiding.  This is the thesis about which His Honour

20     Judge Antonetti asked me several times, and I said that there were

21     hundreds of provocateurs there of those who provoke conflict, in fact.

22     Those who were the promoters of and agents of special warfare.

23             Now Sefer wonders how could have Juka Prazina, the well-known

24     criminal, Sarajevo criminal, how could he have become the commander of

25     the reserve force of the Special Police?  Muslimovic on his part says

Page 40859

 1     that Sefer Halilovic had made that possible so that one doesn't know here

 2     who is responsible for what.

 3             Then he goes on to say that Juka, when it was decided that he

 4     should not be the chief of the police, that he was promoted and the

 5     Presidency of the state appointed him commander of the special forces of

 6     the MUP units.  He wonders here, Your Honours, in particular, Your Honour

 7     Judge Trechsel, how could have Milorad Ekmecic, Slavko Leovac,

 8     Vojo Milijas, Nenad Kecmanovic, or the brother of Nikola Koljevic have

 9     left Sarajevo unhindered?  Milorad Ekmecic, these are all Serbs by the

10     way.  That's one thing.  Secondly, Milorad Ekmecic is a very well known

11     historian, a professor of history, a Serb.  Nenad Kecmanovic was, in

12     fact, even -- and a brother of Nikola Koljevic.

13             According to Sefer, these people, apart from being Serbs, were in

14     no units, you but according to Sefer Halilovic, they were supposed to be

15     locked up because they were Serbs and also probably also blackmail.

16     Koljevic was to be blackmailed with his brother who would have been

17     locked up.

18             That is the sense of this sentence.

19             Who made it possible for them to depart Sarajevo?  Free people,

20     citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina, university professors.

21     Nenad Kecmanovic, a professor at the university, Lecic as well.  I don't

22     know about the others.

23             This is a very sinister thesis, you know, when you read it in

24     this way.  Imagine if you read somewhere that Praljak had wandered

25     somewhere and written had how could Muslims have left Sarajevo?  How

Page 40860

 1     could they have allowed some wounded men to leave?  How could they have

 2     allowed some Serbs to leave when they could have told him, No we're going

 3     to hold you here and then you see what you're going to do.

 4             Furthermore, he goes on to say that Alija Delimustafic, at a

 5     government session verified the decision that had been agreed with

 6     Aleksandar Vasiljevic, who was the chief of the overall KOS of the

 7     Yugoslav People's Army and how the army had protected all the TV relays

 8     and occupied them all in this way.

 9             This is, Your Honours, the answer to the question why no

10     communication with Sarajevo was possible, why no signals could pass, why

11     the city was completely blocked in terms of information and communication

12     apart from the radio ham operators, of course, and certain long radio

13     waves, probably.  And they could do this because they had special

14     communications and devices able to send out signals across the mountains.

15             And then he says that Delimustafic had agreed with

16     Petar Gracanin, who was the minister of the interior of the federal

17     Yugoslav government and with Vasiljevic who was the chief of KOS, KOS,

18     agreed upon the arrival of approximately 100 inspectors from the federal

19     SUP, SUP, who were of course members of KOS as well who completely

20     paralyzed the work in Defence preparations.

21             And I would like to mention in this regard if you recall the

22     moment when Franjo Tudjman at a meeting with Filipovic said when he was

23     offering up secession from Yugoslavia and military cooperation and an

24     integral Bosnia-Herzegovina without any agreements with Tudjman and when

25     he says to Mr. Filipovic this is what I propose, but I don't believe that

Page 40861

 1     Mr. Izetbegovic is going to accept that because he is surrounded by KOS

 2     people.  And here we have it.  Here's confirmation of that, confirmation

 3     of a fact like that.

 4             Then he goes on to speak about money.  I don't think we need to

 5     spend any more time on this page.  It's just confirmation of the facts

 6     and the matters that I set forth and matters dealt with in the documents

 7     and which testify to how the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was forged and

 8     also how the war and the conflict and the attack by the BH Army against

 9     the HVO had instructors and helpers, agents, aiders and abettors, and how

10     many midwives there were to produce that particular baby.

11             Now may I have pages 70 and 71.

12        Q.   The Croatian text is 3D33-0987 and 3D33-0988.  The English

13     version is 3D40-0836.  Go ahead, please, General.

14        A.   He says here that Fikret Muslimovic was the chief of HOS in the

15     4th Corps, and that as a Communist he was in charge of Muslim nationalism

16     at that time.  And then he goes on to recount a meeting that took place

17     in the summer of 1991 where Muslimovic stood up to Izetbegovic.  He

18     referred to him as a fundamentalist, as somebody who was trying to break

19     up Yugoslavia, and then with his Serbs in the JNA that he would never be

20     Alija's soldier.  And here you can see that somebody who worked for KOS

21     you can see how strong the organisation was, in fact, because this shows

22     it all.  And he says Ivan Stambolic, who was one of the top officials,

23     top leaders in Yugoslavia, he says the weaker Tito became, the stronger

24     and more sovereign the war minister became and that it was -- or the

25     defence minister became and that through KOS he had complete control over

Page 40862

 1     the Yugoslav People's Army, its cadres, policy, and all the rest of it.

 2             And then it goes on to say that KOS did not only hold its pause

 3     over the JNA, but it had its pause over security and Serbia and says that

 4     Stambolic writes this in his work called "The Path to Wilderness" on

 5     pages 185 and 187.

 6             So KOS was an all-powerful organisation within Yugoslavia,

 7     especially after Tito's death in 1980.

 8             May I now have page number 79, please.

 9        Q.   3D33-0993, and the English version is 3D40-0839.

10        A.   Once again I'm going back to the sentence uttered by

11     Sefer Halilovic that Judge Trechsel mentioned.  He referred to it.

12     Mr. Sefer Halilovic, how was it that Mr. Sefer Halilovic allowed those to

13     be -- that he allowed people who were loyal to the state to remain there

14     and weren't Bosniaks.  Let's see what he says here.  He says the SDS and

15     the HDZ, the behaviour of the leadership of the HDS and -- HDZ and SDS,

16     and especially the Chetniks and Ustasha units in the war from 1992 to

17     1995 are best evidence of persistence in the agreement to divide up

18     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  So there you have it, Judge Trechsel.

19             The man just needed six or seven pages to forget what he wrote 15

20     pages earlier on.  And 15 pages on, he says that the HDZ in

21     Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is to say Mate Boban, Prlic, and the rest; and

22     in the army, Petkovic and Praljak, they are Ustashas, Ustashas who had

23     reached an agreement on the division of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

24             And then he goes on to lie blatantly and says, "We never fought

25     among ourselves."  And quotes the example of Stolac and Mostar where we

Page 40863

 1     just happened to be.

 2             Well, first of all, the Chetniks marched in and we withdrew, and

 3     then the Ustashas marched in and the Chetniks withdrew, and that's how

 4     peace came about.  And we gained Splitska Banovina to Podvelezje, this

 5     illiterate captain of the Yugoslav People's Army doesn't know that a

 6     Banovina -- the Banovina is in not in the area of Podvelezje and then he

 7     says in that Stolac, Kiseljak, Konjic, and Vares they came across

 8     Ustashas socialising and trading.  Well, where are the Chetniks in

 9     Kiseljak?  That's something we don't know, but I assume he knows

10     something about that.

11             Then he goes on to speak about something that -- well, now that

12     you have -- well, you saw the statements made by Muslims about the

13     fighting in Stolac and in Mostar and so on, and if you add up all the

14     wounded and dead, the casualties in the fighting against the JNA, the

15     number of Croats who were killed, and the number of Muslims who were

16     killed, too, then your stomach turns when you read sentences like this

17     from a third-rate wheeler-dealer here who not only insults Croats, but he

18     also insults many of the reports written about the people expelled and so

19     on.  He's just insulting to everyone.  That's just it, but I'm going to

20     move on.

21             He goes on to say that the SDA and the official policy of the

22     state is being waged by Mustafa efendi Ceric, the one-time imam of the

23     mosque in Zagreb.  And furthermore, he says that Bosnian today looks just

24     the way KOS, the KOS, wanted it to look like, that is to say divided up

25     according to ethnic lines and boundaries and the Bosniak question has

Page 40864

 1     been reduced to the Islamic problem in Europe and he says that Muslimovic

 2     together with Zijad Ljevakovic played a key role in re-educating

 3     the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina based on exclusively party lines, a party

 4     army or, rather, that it became ideologized [as interpreted] in the

 5     religious sense strengthened by the Mujahedin or reinforced by the

 6     Mujahedin.

 7             And we can move on.  Page 97 and 98.

 8        Q.   General, could you comment on what you have just said?  May we

 9     have your comments to that?

10        A.   Well, I don't know what you want me to comment.  I think that we

11     presented all the documents that are relevant.  We've tendered them.  I

12     think they speak for themselves.  They're crystal clear, and if somebody

13     is able to speak in this way about that fighting over there, especially

14     in Stolac and so on, and this is something that General Petkovic led and

15     I led it in Mostar, although towards the end I was in Stolac myself; and

16     if you remember all the dead and wounded and if you remember all those

17     who had been expelled across the Neretva River, then, well, I can say

18     this quite calmly, that it's something that only a fool could utter, an

19     insulting fool, and that's what it is.  But I'm in a court of law.  I'm

20     in a courtroom, so I have to stick to that but that's my cool opinion and

21     I think I managed to convey it with a cool head.  You can't even make a

22     chicken coop with a man like that let alone a joint army, not even a

23     chicken coop.

24        Q.   When you were speaking about Stolac and Mostar, what year did you

25     mean?

Page 40865

 1        A.   1992, of course.

 2        Q.   All right.  Fine.  Now we go on to page 97, which is number

 3     3D33-0996 up until 3D33-0997.  And for the English it is 3D40-0841.

 4        A.   Well, just briefly.  Here he says how much money was collected

 5     for the Muslims through special accounts, who had access to the money and

 6     could sign for it, and that it was an informal group from the Party of

 7     Democratic Action, but for the most part made up of people who in 1983,

 8     as the Young Muslims Movement were convicted and sentenced to terms of

 9     imprisonment.  Izetbegovic, Cengic, Sabic.  They were in prison.

10             It goes on to say that that group were in fact working in Zagreb

11     and were referred to as the Zagreb group and that they were organising

12     volunteers coming in from the Islamic countries, and so on and so forth.

13     I don't think we need comment on that any further.

14             May we move on now.  We're going to skip the next portion.  We

15     have dealt with that with other documents.  We have orders about that

16     operation and so on.

17             May we have page 121 and 122 now, please.

18        Q.   It is 3D33-1010 to 3D33-1011.  And in the English it is

19     3D40-0853.

20        A.   He says here that a military organisation has been set up

21     throughout the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that an army has been

22     established made up of five corps and that he managed to liberate 58

23     percent of the country.  And he says that there he counts free liberated

24     territory under HVO control until 1992.

25             Well, man's lying.  He's just lying, pure and simple.  There's no

Page 40866

 1     question of 58 percent of the country being liberated, but I suppose he's

 2     allowed to do that and say that.

 3             And then he says when we in the Main Staff of the HVO and

 4     Croatian army saw that there was nothing -- that nothing would come of

 5     the Milosevic-Tudjman agreement, that they then clashed with the army and

 6     that the Ustasha units entered Prozor, but never mind.  The Main Staff of

 7     the HVO and the Croatian army understood, under quotations, that Tudjman

 8     was a fool and why would he sign something like that and we took matters

 9     into our own hands and then we had nothing else left to us as but as

10     Ustashas to attack Rama.  Well there you have it, Your Honour

11     Judge Trechsel.  I don't know whether this portion has been translated,

12     whether you have the translation of it, but he claims here that the

13     Bosnian patriots had an army numbering five corps with about 250.000 men,

14     and I quote, I'm quoting this now:

15             "The Bosnian patriots during that same time had an army of five

16     corps strong with about 250.000 fighters, and it was successful in

17     tackling the criminals on two fronts.  And he goes on to say that there

18     have never been any such examples in history that with 250.000 men he was

19     able to tackle this other force."  And then he goes on to enumerate which

20     corps of the Yugoslav People's Army had how many tanks, armoured APCs and

21     men. He talks of the Knin and Rijeka Corps that were, of course, in part

22     transferred to Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Then he goes on to say that the

23     forces of the extremist part of the HDZ were organised in three brigades

24     numbering about 6.000 men and several smaller units amounting to the

25     strength of a company or battalion.

Page 40867

 1             Now, I understand none of this anymore, because in that entire

 2     area with all those Ustashas he says there were 6.000 of them and yet he

 3     has an army of 250.000 men, and they're being attacked by the Ustashas

 4     with just 6.000 men; and he's having to fight on two fronts.  I don't

 5     understand any of that.  It's all nebulous and incomprehensible apart

 6     from the fact that it is quite clear that an agreement with people of

 7     that kind and everything that the Prosecution said about it being a clash

 8     with -- that -- that HVO caused the clash with the BH Army and that the

 9     HDZ policy was a nationalistic policy which I assume then supported the

10     HVO to carry all this out, well, there's not a single shred of evidence,

11     no arguments to say that we wanted to cut off part of Bosnia-Herzegovina

12     and that was the Croatian policy.  That's why I claim that both these

13     books are highly relevant for this incomprehensible -- well, to me it's

14     incomprehensible -- the incomprehensible way in which the indictment has

15     been constructed.

16             And I'd just like to look at page 165 and 166, and I'll conclude

17     with that because I don't need to deal with any more of his documents if

18     we could just look at those two pages now.

19             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We'll see these pages tomorrow,

20     because with you and your counsel, I need to take stock of how much time

21     you have.

22             As you know, the Trial Chamber has granted you 55 hours.  There

23     is no question as far as the Trial Chamber is concerned to give you any

24     extra time.  This would be an unbalanced situation vis-a-vis the other

25     accused who have not had any extra time.

Page 40868

 1             Before you testified yourself, you had one hour and 30 minutes,

 2     you then had 53 hours and 30 left.  Since you are testifying, sitting

 3     where you are opposite me, you have had approximately 32 hours to be

 4     precise, 31 hours and 52 minutes.  We are not going to be too picky about

 5     these seconds.

 6             Now, if I subtract these 23 hours 30 and the time you've had, as

 7     of tomorrow you would have 21 hours and 30 minutes left.

 8             For you to be able to finish and to be able to hear your

 9     witnesses out of these 55 hours, you wanted 36 for yourself.  You have

10     had 32.  You would, therefore, have four hours left to finish.

11             I have had a look at the two remaining binders, and in light of

12     all the documents contained in these, I doubt very much that you will be

13     able to finish in 4 hours.  The Chamber is not against the fact that you

14     go beyond your 36 hours, but that would be part and parcel of the overall

15     time you have, i.e., 51 hours and 30 minutes.

16             Based on that, there are a number of witnesses which you are

17     going to call to testify.  We don't know which ones are coming, which

18     ones are not.  This has not been confirmed, but this is not our problem.

19     We have no preference either way.  It's for you to tell us who should

20     come and testify in support of your defence, but you should not overlook

21     the fact that the Prosecutor will have exactly the same time as you have

22     had to cross-examine you.  If you have 36 hours, the Prosecution will

23     have 36 hours.  If you have 40 hours, the Prosecution will have 40 hours.

24     So that is something you need to remember.

25             After that, I'm fairly certain that your counsel will ask for

Page 40869

 1     redirect, and this extra time has to be included in these 21 hours and 30

 2     minutes, so all this needs to be clear for you, and I'm giving you a

 3     piece of advice.

 4             So all of this unfolds in the best possible way, make sure that

 5     you liaise with your counsel.  Make sure which documents you wish to

 6     adduce, and even if you don't know what the Prosecutor is going to say

 7     and which issues he is going to address, you must already think ahead and

 8     prepare for the redirect.  You will not have any extra time and not have

 9     more than those 55 hours that you have been given.  We don't have

10     unlimited time.  Therefore, it is something you need to be aware of.

11             From the Trial Chamber's point of view, there's no problem.  If

12     after 36 hours you would like to have 38, 39, or 40 hours, that's for you

13     to work out; but if you have 40 hours, then the Prosecutor will

14     automatically have 40 hours also.

15             So look into this.  The Trial Chamber is totally prepared to

16     facilitate your defence like it does in all cases, but it is not prepared

17     to give you any extra time.  So it's for you to work this out.

18             You have stressed these books you have shown to us.  There are

19     the binders that address the issue of the Main Staff that may be

20     interesting, but let me remind you we've heard nothing about the capture

21     of Mostar, the snipers, the Mostar bridge, and so on.  So you can adduce

22     these elements any way, I just needed to let you know.  I needed these

23     few minutes to share this what you.  We shall resume

24     Mr. Sefer Halilovic's book tomorrow, because we have all afternoon and

25     half the night to leaf through these tens of thousands of pages you are

Page 40870

 1     showing us.

 2             It is just about a quarter to 2.00.  I wish you all a very

 3     pleasant afternoon, and we shall reconvene tomorrow at 9.00.

 4                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.44 p.m.,

 5                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 28th day of May,

 6                           2009, at 9.00 a.m.