090908IT

Page 44516

1 recall that you directed that a written motion should be filed in

2 relation to disclosure under Rule 68. We're on the verge of filing that

3 motion, Your Honour, but we're just running into slight difficulty on the

4 word limit, and the application is to have the word limit extended from

5 the normal 3.000 to 3.500 words. We want to go into enough detail about

6 the sort of material we're looking for to make it a helpful and

7 manageable motion. So, Your Honour, our application is very simple on

8 behalf those two Defences.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let me consult with my fellow

10 Judges. Obviously we all agree. The Trial Chamber agrees, and you can

11 use 3.500 words, if you wish.

12 MR. STEWART: Thank you, Your Honour.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Stringer.

14 MR. STRINGER: Good afternoon, Mr. President, Your Honours,

15 counsel, and everyone else in and around the courtroom.

16 WITNESS: SLOBODAN PRALJAK [Resumed]

17 [Witness answered through interpreter]

18 Cross-examination by Mr. Stringer: [Continued]

19 Q. Good afternoon, General.

20 A. Good afternoon, Mr. Stringer.

21 Q. And, General, before I begin or continue with the

22 cross-examination --

23 MR. STRINGER: Mr. President, I just wanted to take the floor to

24 make one clarification for the record from yesterday. When we were

25 talking about the TV ORF video which was one of the video-clips we looked

Page 44517

1 at on the bridge, and it's the clip that there appears to have been some

2 sort of a splice or alteration. And in the course of the discussion I

3 note some comments were made, and I don't know, maybe it's just my own

4 sensitivity, but I don't know whether there was an impression created

5 that that video that appears to have been spliced originates from the

6 Office of the Prosecutor. And I just wanted to make it clear from the

7 record that the TV ORF video based on the testimony of Professor Jankovic

8 when he testified on the 30th of June last year, testified that he was

9 provided with the TV ORF video along with the TV Mostar video, that he

10 used those to prepare his report and that he received those from the

11 Praljak Defence. And so just for the record, I wanted it to be clear

12 that those are -- at least the TV ORF video does not originate from the

13 Office of the Prosecutor.

14 Q. General, when we --

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. Mr. Stringer, this goes

16 without saying, what you just said. Of course the video had been

17 disclosed by the Praljak Defence to Professor Jankovic, and we had

18 understood that the OTP had nothing to do with this video in the first

19 place, had nothing to do with making this video in the first place. It

20 was really obvious for us. It went without saying, but you wanted to say

21 this on the transcript so much the better.

22 MR. STRINGER: Thank you, Mr. President.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, Mr. Stringer,

24 Mr. Jankovic and I did not have at our disposal the tape in its entirety

25 as you showed it yesterday. It wasn't broadcast that way. We only had

Page 44518

1 the video that was broadcast; whereas, this one here is a broader

2 version, the one we saw yesterday. It's longer.

3 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, just for the record,

4 to make it quite clear, Dr. Jankovic, the expert witness, very precisely

5 in his report and in testifying here explained the origins and source of

6 the two videotapes that he used. They were videotapes as they were

7 broadcast on the two mentioned television networks and nothing more than

8 that. I didn't hear what was said very well. We didn't say that the

9 Prosecutor acquired it. We explained what the source was and where the

10 videotapes had come from, so there's no misunderstanding or dispute

11 there.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The only problem left comes

13 from what Mr. Praljak just told us. He told us that yesterday when he

14 was watching the video with everyone else, he noted that the entire

15 sequence we saw yesterday is not the same sequence as the one that he

16 himself, that his counsel and Professor Jankovic had seen. According to

17 him, this video is longer.

18 The Trial Chamber will reflect on this, think about it.

19 I wanted to put something on the transcript yesterday. I forgot

20 to do it, so I'll do it now.

21 I must say that I saw -- if someone saw the same thing please

22 tell us, but we saw this waterfall. We saw a cloud of smoke or dust,

23 then we saw a white stone falling from the bridge into the Neretva, and

24 there was a splash right after that, and then for several minutes after

25 that we saw the cloud that was clearing up with time, but the bridge was

Page 44519

1 still standing for a good number of minutes after we saw the first

2 waterfall. Then we saw an image where the bridge collapsed into the

3 river. That's what we saw. And I believe we all saw the same thing. If

4 someone didn't see that, please say so, but this is what we saw

5 yesterday.

6 Now, given what Mr. Praljak just told us, we have a new problem:

7 The time spent between the waterfall, the cloud of dust or smoke, and the

8 collapse, it seems to be different. He's telling us that we saw a

9 different video than the one that he, his counsel, and his expert saw

10 when they were drafting the report of Professor Jankovic.

11 MR. STRINGER: Mr. President, just for the record, I think the

12 video you're referring to now, the one in which the bridge is still

13 standing, is -- is from Exhibit P01040, 1040. And just for the record,

14 1040 - because this came up yesterday as well - 1040 is a compilation.

15 It's a long video, and so the part that we're focussed on now on this

16 part is just one part of it. The video has lots of different things on

17 it, but I think that the President's just now made reference to

18 Exhibit P1040.

19 I don't know we can resolve this any more today, Mr. President.

20 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Kovacic.

22 MR. KOVACIC: I remember that the Prosecution informed the

23 Chamber and the others in the courtroom what was the source of that video

24 shooting the Prosecutor showed us yesterday, which is P1040. We don't

25 know the source. The Prosecutor is practically testifying about that.

Page 44520

1 For the Defence, the Defence brought an expert to testify about that.

2 Now we have the Prosecution testimony. We don't know the source of that

3 video and whether that is the same one or it is not the same one as it

4 was presented by witness expert.

5 I think that the Prosecution should show where that video is

6 coming from, because even in the e-court it has a wrong date. It is,

7 what, 11 months -- it is 11 months before actually the bridge fall, and

8 this is at least something which nobody dispute, the date of the fall of

9 the bridge. So I would kindly request the Prosecution to give us the

10 source. We can --

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Stringer, this P -- the

12 video P01040, could you tell us what its source is?

13 MR. STRINGER: Mr. President, I can't give you the source at this

14 moment. I know that it was disclosed to the Defence on the 19th of

15 January, 2005. I'm pretty confident that it was among the exhibits that

16 we used in our cross-examination of Professor Jankovic, and if that's the

17 case, the source would have been indicated on the list that would have

18 been in the binder that went out to all the parties before we began our

19 cross-examination, because we generally include the source of all the

20 cross-examination exhibits. So I think that with a little bit of

21 diligence any of us could determine the source based upon what's been

22 provided in the past, but certainly we'll look at -- into it and see if

23 we can remind everybody what the source is.

24 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour, I'm really sorry, but maybe it's

25 better to clear these things completely.

Page 44521

1 As my dear colleague said, and I agree with that, a video under

2 this number was presented to [indiscernible] Professor Jankovic who was

3 here in the courtroom. So we do have his answers, his responses to that

4 question on the record. So there is no need to discuss that. We agree

5 whatever the expert said. We are fine. But another thing, the

6 Prosecution, my dear colleague, just said that this material was

7 disclosed long ago to the Defence, and yes, indeed, we agree with that;

8 but the problem of the source remain, because as the Prosecutor said,

9 this video is compilation of many other images from Mostar and area. It

10 is compilation, and I stress that word, this is compilation. We don't

11 know who did it, how, when, et cetera.

12 Now, what I am interested is to know exactly where this part of

13 this big compilation, the part about the bridge which we saw yesterday,

14 1040, a part of evidence 1040, where this particular shot came from. Who

15 is the author, when?

16 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Kovacic, if you look at the transcript, on

17 1st of July, 2008, at page 30170, line 50 -- 15 or something, I find that

18 Ms. West told the Chamber that this exhibit was tendered into evidence by

19 Witness Denis Saric.

20 Now, do you challenge that? I think you could have looked it up

21 and find it. I have the fearing that we are a bit losing time right now.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, that's another tape.

23 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour, I don't think that we are talking

24 about the same, the evidence. The cite is witness Delalic.

25 JUDGE TRECHSEL: But the number here is 01040.

Page 44522

1 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour, I cannot claim now. It could be

2 some -- it could be some mistake, but I'm also looking in history at that

3 document --

4 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Well, may I suggest that before we lose time on

5 such discussions in the courtroom, time which is very scarce, this be

6 prepared beforehand and then a precise motion be made in this respect. I

7 don't think it is helpful just raising questions of, I don't know, and

8 this and that when there is some material in our transcript, and it seems

9 not to really have been looked at and properly examined before. I think

10 we should let Mr. Stringer start now with the --

11 MR. STRINGER: But I --

12 MR. KOVACIC: I apologise, Your Honour. It's not that I'm

13 challenging the transcript. What is in the transcript is in the

14 transcript, certainly. I merely wanted to correct you that in the --

15 what you said, at least what is written in the transcript now is that it

16 was Witness Denis Saric, Saric. There was no such witness. According to

17 the history in the e-court, the witness was Delalic, Enes Delalic. So

18 I --

19 MR. STRINGER: Mr. President, if I --

20 MR. KOVACIC: So I referred to this confusion. And I'm now not

21 going into assume, rightly said, I'm now not going to improvise, but

22 Delalic brought another video which we also saw yesterday or day before

23 yesterday.

24 MR. STRINGER: Mr. President, please --

25 MR. KOVACIC: But anyway, my point is only that we should know

Page 44523

1 the source. The Prosecutor is using it. He should say, This is shot by

2 this and this man on this and that day and have to document that on some

3 way. Thank you.

4 MR. STRINGER: Mr. President. Mr. President --

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Stringer.

6 MR. STRINGER: Denis Saric is a 92 bis witness. All right? So

7 there is a witness Denis Saric. He's the source of the tape and that's

8 what Ms. West referred to. We can line all this up for Mr. Kovacic, and

9 we'll provide him with all of the details after the next break. That's

10 my proposal, rather than taking more court time on this now.

11 MR. KOVACIC: I'm sorry. I just wanted to say that it is in --

12 all my discussion is based on what I can see from e-court document. In

13 description of e-court, it is not as the Prosecutor said. It is Delalic,

14 and it is another day. So if there is any mistake, I cannot be blamed

15 for that. Sorry. Thank you so much.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Kovacic, the Trial Chamber

17 admitted a document, P1040. The Legal Officer told me that this document

18 had been admitted when witness Delalic was heard. When witness Delalic

19 came to testify, we played the video and the Trial Chamber admitted

20 Exhibit P1040.

21 It seems now that this video was actually shot by witness

22 Denis Saric, a 92 bis witness. He is the person who gave this video to

23 the OTP.

24 Now you have it. It's a bit complex, but I believe it's clear

25 now. It's clear, because now you have all the elements.

Page 44524

1 MR. KOVACIC: With all due respect, Your Honour, I think that

2 somebody -- there is some mistake. Saric took --

3 MR. STRINGER: Excuse me, Mr. President, I object to further

4 interventions.

5 MR. KOVACIC: -- the video which was shown by the Prosecutor

6 before 1040, one we were looking at yesterday, the one where nothing is

7 seen. So there must be some error or some confusion. I don't know what

8 is it. I cannot tell you now. Somebody should -- should investigate,

9 but this is simply not correct. This is --

10 MR. STRINGER: Well, Mr. President, the last time I spoke I said

11 that we would look into it and provide Mr. Kovacic with the information

12 he requires over the break. We're just beating a dead horse. Let's just

13 move on to the cross-examination. We'll provide him the information he

14 wants --

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Stringer, rest assured you

16 will be able to finish your cross-examination. Please prepare all the

17 information for Mr. Kovacic and hand it over to him and we'll come back

18 to this, I'm sure, at one point in time. As you know, the Trial Chamber

19 is still waiting for the conclusions of the witness, expert witness.

20 Mr. Stringer, you have the floor.

21 MR. STRINGER: Thank you, Mr. President.

22 Q. General, yesterday I believe we were leaving off with -- or

23 discussing P09817. I had pretty much completed my questions to you about

24 that document. This was from 29 October 1993, and I won't re-read the

25 document, and we all recall what you said about it, it relates to some

Page 44525

1 coordination issues between the HVO and the VRS in the Vares area.

2 Related to this, I believe, is the next document, which I would

3 like to ask you about, P06219.

4 Now, this one, General, is -- it's dated the same day. It

5 appears to be dated the same day, 29 October. And now this is Rajic

6 reporting to a number of different individuals and bodies, Mr. Stojic,

7 yourself, General Petkovic, and here we see that Rajic is reporting that:

8 "The XY side is not implementing any part of the agreement

9 between General Petkovic and General Milovanovic."

10 And then moving to the next paragraph Rajic says:

11 "It is necessary to urgently establish contact between Mr. Stojic

12 and Mr. Kovacevic in order to get this going so that assistance can be

13 provided to Vares."

14 General, first of all, do you know what is the agreement between

15 General Petkovic and General Milovanovic that is refer to here by

16 Colonel Rajic?

17 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone for the

18 witness, please.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know what Mr. Petkovic

20 agreed with Mr. Milovanovic because I wasn't present at the meeting, and

21 I don't remember that we discussed it later on when Petkovic returned,

22 but most probably it was some form of, as you say, co-operation or some

23 form of payment for assistance for treatment, something of that nature,

24 and for the procurement, perhaps, of some weapons or ammunition to defend

25 Vares.

Page 44526

1 MR. STRINGER:

2 Q. Do you know who General Milovanovic is?

3 A. No, I don't.

4 Q. And here the reference to urgently establishing contact, or he

5 says:

6 "It is necessary to urgently establish contact between Mr. Stojic

7 and Mr. Kovacevic ..."

8 Do you know who Mr. Kovacevic is that's referred to here?

9 A. I don't know.

10 Q. Do you know whether Mr. Stojic had meetings with any of his

11 counterparts on the VRS side in respect of co-operation issues?

12 A. I don't know. I assume so, but I don't know.

13 Q. All right. And -- well, let's stay with this issue. I've got

14 one more document on this topic, and the next exhibit is P06364. And

15 this is just now a few days later, now the 2nd of November, 1993, and

16 this is Rajic reporting to Mr. Stojic in the Ministry of Defence on the

17 equipment received from the XY side and per request, and this then

18 contains a list of the various MTS that according to Rajic has been

19 received from the XY side.

20 General, you just said that you assumed that Stojic had meetings

21 with counterparts in the VRS. Based on Mr. Stojic's role in procuring

22 MTS, is that a topic that Mr. Stojic would have been dealing with with

23 the VRS people?

24 A. Mr. Stringer, I said probably, and probably that was the topic.

25 So I can confirm only that, that I sought and approved talks in order to

Page 44527

1 be able to obtain some materiel and equipment for this area to be

2 defended against the BH Army attacks, but I didn't know whether they

3 really met, how they paid, where they met, whether they met at all. It

4 would be too much to ask from me. Well, I'm talking about myself. I

5 asked for those talks to be conducted.

6 Q. All right. Then that would suggest, General, that in efforts to

7 obtain MTS from the Serb side, the VRS, Mr. Stojic's role would have been

8 in sort of a logistics and possibly the financial aspects of that?

9 A. You could conclude that.

10 Q. General, the next exhibit -- oh.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I would like to come back to

12 this document. First of all, in November, specifically November 2nd, did

13 you know in your capacity as commander of the HVO that the Serb side was

14 supplying military equipment, namely weapons, and two tanks, there are

15 two tanks, one is clearly not in running order, is obsolete. Did you

16 know this?

17 A. [Indiscernible]

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Good. So you did know it. So

19 let us try to step back now. And here I'm not speaking to you in your

20 capacity as General, I'm speaking to you as a person who was at one point

21 a deputy minister of defence in the Croat Republic and who understands

22 the issues at hand. How do you explain this politically speaking, in

23 political terms, at that time?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was difficult for one very

25 simple reason, and that is that you cannot, as commander of an army,

Page 44528

1 leave the wounded people untreated, and you cannot allow anybody who is

2 attacking you to take some territory, expel the people, if you have any

3 means at your disposal to obtain at a very high price the necessary

4 materiel and equipment that might prevent it. So I still maintain what I

5 said before. They started that before, and I approved it. I wasn't

6 aware of the quantities, however. So from the political point of view it

7 was very complicated, but at that time I was the commander of the Main

8 Staff, and the United Nations did not label the Army of Republika Srpska

9 as a criminal organisation, a crime syndicate which would prevent me from

10 obtaining from them weapons in order to defend myself, to defend an area

11 that was under attack and to help the HVO that was defending it. I could

12 have gone to anywhere else in Europe to do so.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I would like to ask a slightly

14 more complicated question. We have a document which contains a list of

15 the equipment. At first glance this is costly, tanks, mortars, and so

16 on. This costs money. You have said that as far as payment is concerned

17 it may be the Department of Defence that will implement payment even

18 though we know, because we heard several witnesses speak to this, we know

19 that there was a prepared annual budget at the time for Herceg-Bosna, so

20 that this was something that had to be factored into the budget.

21 This is not what I intend to address with my question. If the XY

22 side, the Serbs, are to supply or were to supply this equipment, does

23 this mean that in terms of Republika Srpska, at this highest level,

24 Karadzic, Mladic, were informed of this, or was this done behind their

25 back by corrupt military officers who, behind the backs of the

Page 44529

1 politicians, were engaging in this type of arms trafficking?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I cannot answer that

3 question. I know that -- well, I remember well that the prices were

4 extremely, enormously high and that as far as I know, at least 80 per

5 cent of the costs for the treatment and procurement was paid by the

6 people from the Vares municipality. They collected the money in all

7 kinds of ways, from abroad and so on. And I think that we had a witness

8 who testified here and who explained how and to whom they took the money

9 and who was aware of it on the Republika Srpska Army side, and how high

10 it went. I really don't have any facts that I could share with you now.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I understood, if I am not

12 mistaken, that you said that during this period, July, August, September,

13 October, you had remained on the front because there was a front that was

14 200 kilometres long, fighting was taking place, and you were truly in the

15 front line facing the enemy.

16 I understood through what you have said and I drew the conclusion

17 that at times you were squaring off or facing off with the Serbs and

18 sometimes with the Muslims because the front was fairly long. I can

19 concluded -- I can conclude that during this period from July to October

20 at times there was some fighting with the Serb side.

21 Can you confirm that during this period there was fighting with

22 Serbs?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So we find ourselves in the

25 very extraordinary situation, and it may be the first time that has been

Page 44530

1 seen in the history of war where the belligerent parties are passing,

2 either directly or indirectly, weapons. For example, tanks. We have two

3 tanks, one of which is in operating order. What does that mean? The

4 tank is taken, it's put in position, and one shoots at the Serbs. In

5 other words, one is shooting at those who procured the tank or who ceded

6 the tank. Is that possible, or is that completely unthinkable,

7 inconceivable?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. First of all, it all started

9 in October, not before that. When the BH Army launched its offensive on

10 Vares, that's when it started. That's when the co-operation started as

11 an effort in the defence, this effort to procure the weapons. As they

12 were isolated and the tanks, one of them was out of order, the other one

13 was functioning, they could defend the territory only against the BH

14 Army.

15 Well, I couldn't have used it in any way to fight the Serbs, that

16 specific tank. Other tanks were used, but not that one.

17 The situation, Your Honours, was very complicated if you take

18 into account the fact that in the Bihac area the Muslim army of Fikret

19 Abdic fought at the BH Army. Unfortunately, every part of Bosnia and

20 Herzegovina had its own specificities and peculiarities and those

21 problems had to be solved at the level -- at the local level, and

22 globally there were always attempts to reach peace between the BH Army

23 and the HVO in areas where the BH Army was attacking, because more than

24 ten full-strength HVO brigades were fighting at the very same time

25 together with the BH Army against the Republika Srpska Army under the

Page 44531

1 BH Army command. I drew all that on the map when we had the former

2 member of the BH Presidency, Mr. Kljujic, here. I can list them for you:

3 Sarajevo, Tuzla, Usora, Posavina, Bihac, and so on.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Stringer.

5 MR. STRINGER: Thank you, Mr. President.

6 Q. Just one follow-up question on that, General. During the time

7 that you were commander of the HVO Main Staff, or at any time were you

8 aware that General Mladic with the VRS had to personally approve the

9 movement of HVO personnel through VRS-held territory?

10 A. No, I don't have any such information. On several occasions

11 approval was granted for the movement of those HVO troops and the people

12 who lost the fight, such as, for instance, in Travnik, and they were

13 retreating through the territory controlled by the VRS, the Republika

14 Srpska Army. And then after Bugojno, a good part of the people and of

15 the troops again had to flee in the face of the aggression by the BH Army

16 through -- or, rather, they fled to the Serbs, sort to speak. And then

17 some talks were held and so on.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] [No interpretation] The

19 document that we see on weapons shows -- the document on weapons shows

20 that there is co-operation. Some may wonder why bother insisting or

21 dwelling on this question, but when one knows all of the case, one may

22 wonder when the Ivica Rajic conducts the operation in Stupni Do, and they

23 require the authorisation of the Serb side to go through the territory.

24 At that time, authorisation is given to go through the territory because

25 there already is a form of co-operation as concerns weapons, and Ivica

Page 44532

1 Rajic who knows a lot about this, as the document is from him, when he

2 asks the Serb side to get authorisation to go through the territory to

3 reach Stupni Do, the Serb side -- the Serb side says, "Yes. Go ahead."

4 What do you think of this?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is true that Ivica Rajic

6 travelling from Kiseljak to Vares had to pass through the territory

7 controlled by the VRS, as far as I know, but this co-operation was not

8 co-operation like you would have among friends. Everything was paid for.

9 So it was a market thing. Well, even -- it was higher than the market

10 price, in fact. And secondly, it was in the interest of the Serb side

11 for the Croats in Vares to fight their enemy, because -- and that's why

12 they assisted by letting the HVO soldiers through to die there, because

13 once Vares fell, they were the next in line for an attack. So it was a

14 very logical, pragmatic military situation. So you always have to give

15 another side to fight your enemy, and the BH Army was their enemy. It

16 was quite clear as it was to us, but unfortunately you had two interested

17 parties here, the HVO. It was in my interest as the commander for Vares

18 not to fall, and the Serbs had the same interest. They didn't want me to

19 lose this position. I didn't want to lose the position, because people

20 would have to flee, and they had a different interest. If Vares fell,

21 then the BH Army Corps would attack them. They were the first in line

22 for an attack.

23 MR. STRINGER:

24 Q. General, I want to move on to the next topic here. We have not

25 talked about the use of the Muslim prisoners for forced labour, and I

Page 44533

1 want to take you to Exhibit P06937. It should be the next document in

2 your binder. And I know, General, that you claim -- you said this on the

3 23rd of June here. You claim that this document does not bear your

4 signature and that it is a false document, at least to the extent it

5 indicates that you approved of the taking away of these 40 prisoners from

6 the Heliodrom on the 8th of November, 1993.

7 Do I correctly understand your testimony on that, General?

8 A. Yes, Mr. Stringer. This is a clear-cut forgery. I never ever

9 approved the taking out of prisoners --

10 Q. So you --

11 A. -- anywhere, prisoners that were taken to do some work then.

12 Q. So you're saying you did not approve someone else to put your

13 signature on this document for you?

14 A. No, sir. I claim that this is a clear cut forgery that was

15 produced for I don't know what reason. On the 8th of November, they were

16 taken out and I was not there at all, and I claim that this was a

17 forgery, that somebody simply forged the signature, took it from

18 somewhere. General Slobodan Praljak, well, there's always something

19 typewritten. This is a forgery. This was copied from another document

20 with another stamp. Well, I don't know.

21 Q. General, can we agree that this document bears two stamps? The

22 first stamp, the upper stamp, being the stamp of the military police next

23 to the name of Mijo Jelic, and then the stamp underneath that is the

24 stamp of the HVO Main Staff; correct?

25 A. That's correct.

Page 44534

1 Q. So that if this was forged, General, you claim it was forged by

2 someone in your own Main Staff?

3 A. Well, sir, it's impossible to forge my signature in the

4 Main Staff. I don't know who forged it. I simply know that

5 unfortunately earlier on regarding the trial and the Tribunal lots of

6 services were trying to fabricate documents that actually had not existed

7 at the time of the events --

8 Q. General --

9 A. -- but were produced later on and I don't want to speculate now

10 who it was.

11 Q. So you're suggesting that the document may have been prepared

12 sometime after the 8th of November, 1993. Is that what you're telling

13 us?

14 A. No, sir. I don't want to say when this document was drafted. I

15 simply want to say that this document or any document of a similar kind

16 was never signed by me, ever. And secondly, on the 8th of November,

17 which is the time in question, I was not in Citluk. I was not in the

18 Main Staff. As other evidence will show, I came later, and I don't know

19 in what period this was done. I'm talking only about my signature, when

20 these elements that concern me, were added to this document.

21 Q. Okay. General, now, to stay with this specific order, I want to

22 take you to the next exhibit, P02642, 2642. And, General, this is a

23 log-book referencing orders for the release of POWs to work, and I'd like

24 to direct your attention, General, to item 407 in this log-book, which in

25 your version is on the page ending with the number 7502. Page 17 of the

Page 44535

1 English, item 407.

2 So, General, we can go back and look at the previous document,

3 the order itself, and the order bears the file number 02-717/93, and

4 indeed, General, what we see in this log-book now is a specific reference

5 to this order among lots of other orders that are contained in this book.

6 So, General, the fact is that whoever allegedly forged this order

7 on taking the prisoners to work would also have had to somehow modify or

8 forge the HVO's own logbooks setting out all the orders for prisoners to

9 work; isn't that true?

10 A. No. No. This is -- I don't know when this log-book was created.

11 It's the log-book of the military police administration, and it is quite

12 probable that somebody brought this order of this kind here and then just

13 made the entry, the appropriate entry, but this has nothing to do with

14 it. On that day, I was not in the Main Staff at the relevant time, and

15 in the 422 or 500 -- well, on the 8th -- on the 8th when I was not there,

16 somebody planted this one on me. No, Mr. Stringer.

17 Q. All right. And whoever did that had access to the Main Staff's

18 stamp that they used to affix the stamp onto the order itself. So,

19 General, for us to believe your story, we have to believe that this

20 happened from inside the Main Staff on or about the 8th of November,

21 1993; isn't that true?

22 A. No, that's not true. When something is forged -- well, I kept

23 asking myself why there's this number 2 and not 1 on this stamp. We

24 discussed it. Well, it's easy to copy the stamp, and it's easy to copy

25 my signature. Somebody simply took the Main Staff stamp with number 2

Page 44536

1 from some other document. I really don't know what that means. I don't

2 it, but I was not at that time there, and I did not sign any such

3 approvals ever.

4 MR. STRINGER: Mr. President, I've finished my questions on this

5 one.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, I told you I would

7 have a few questions on the maps. Before we begin with the maps --

8 MR. STRINGER: I apologise, Mr. President. I've finished with

9 this couple of documents. I still got a little more cross-examination

10 left. I apologise. I didn't know if the Trial Chamber had any questions

11 on this --

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Sorry. I thought you were

13 finished. Please then go ahead, and I shall return to this later on.

14 MR. STRINGER:

15 Q. General, I just wanted to pass back a bit to an issue we

16 discussed a bit at an earlier part in your cross-examination, although I

17 think I failed to get our record clear enough on it, so I want to come

18 back, and this relates to the Convicts Battalion and its status in

19 respect of the HVO, and so I want to take you back to the chart that you

20 made when you testified in the Naletilic case, Exhibit P09324, and also

21 the transcript of your testimony in that case, which we've marked as an

22 exhibit here as P10980.

23 So this is in Sanction so that we can put it up, the transcript

24 on, on everybody's screens.

25 General, I just want to read from two pages of your testimony in

Page 44537

1 the Naletilic case when you were talking about this chart and making your

2 markings on, and this is at page 9573 of the Naletilic transcript. I'm

3 going to begin on line 21 where Mr. Seric begins taking. Mr. Seric was

4 the lawyer at the time for Vinko Martinovic and he says:

5 "Mr. President, since the title says that this is the diagram of

6 the HVO structure from 1993, and we have the witness's precise answer

7 when that was, I think it would be fair to him to also put the date next

8 to this box, the date when he assumed his duty."

9 And then Mr. Scott said:

10 "I agree with that. "

11 And then the Presiding Judge, Judge Liu, agreed. So then

12 Mr. Scott asked you, General, the following, this is line 4 of the next

13 page:

14 "All right, sir. Thank you. That's exactly why I'm asking you

15 to look at this chart, to avoid confusion, because in the box it says

16 'supreme commander.' But that may have been misinterpreted to be chief

17 commander, or whatever you -- Chief of the Main Staff. So when in this

18 chart it says 'supreme commander,' as of the date you've now written, the

19 27th of July, 1993, who was that?"

20 And, General, your answer is:

21 "Mr. Mate Boban."

22 And then we see you write that on the chart. And we can see

23 you're writing on the chart as we're looking at the exhibit now.

24 And then you're asked by Mr. Scott:

25 "And as of July 27, 1993, what was the -- whatever term you want,

Page 44538

1 minister or secretary of the Defence Department?"

2 And your answer:

3 "Mr. Bruno Stojic."

4 Mr. Scott asked you to please write that on the chart, which you

5 do. Then Mr. Scott says:

6 "Now, can you tell us, please, looking at this chart, can you

7 tell us where the Convicts Battalion fits on this chart?"

8 And the transcript tells us that you indicate, you point.

9 Mr. Scott says:

10 "Can you mark that, please? Why don't you put K -- well, you can

11 put whatever you like. I suggest you might put KB."

12 And then you marked on the chart.

13 Now, I'm going to stop there. Mr. Scott goes on to ask you about

14 Mladen Naletilic and where he would appear on the chart, and I'm not

15 interested in that today, General. I just want you to confirm for us,

16 please, that when you wrote KB on the chart here, P09324, you were making

17 reference to the Convicts Battalion as of the 27th of July, 1993.

18 A. The -- the time that I was asked that, at that time the

19 Convicts Battalion, at that time -- well, it's how I said it. That's how

20 it was.

21 Q. All right. Thank you. Now, General, I'm ready to move to the

22 last exhibit of this cross-examination.

23 JUDGE TRECHSEL: May I -- sorry, I think the record is not

24 entirely clear. The answer was not quite clear.

25 The question, I think, refers to the 27th of July, 1993, and the

Page 44539

1 answer says:

2 "At the time, well, it's -- the time that I was asked that." And

3 the time that the witness was asked that was the time of the hearing in

4 the Tuta-Stela case. So I want you to be precise. Mr. Praljak, you

5 affirm that the organisation as indicated on document P09324 was that

6 which prevailed on 27th of July, 1993.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Judge Trechsel, Your Honour. I

8 wouldn't put it that way. It's -- well, I came in to testify about

9 something quite different, and then somebody put this. Now, when I look

10 at the special purpose units, they're placed in the same box as the

11 professional units. Now, professional units, of course, were units under

12 the command of the Main Staff, but not all of them. So this kind of

13 examination with suggestions and so on, I'm not going to go back on my

14 words, but I'm not going to testify and say that I had time -- or,

15 rather, if I had time to draw a diagram of what the whole set-up looked

16 like from the main command and staff, no, I'm not going to do that or say

17 that.

18 What I was asked was: Is Mate Boban the supreme commander. Yes,

19 he is. And was Mr. Bruno Stojic the head of the Defence Department at

20 the time? Yes. Where was the ATG? It was in the Special Purpose area,

21 and I wasn't asked anything more than that. So that's it.

22 Whether the certain units -- Special Purpose Units were separate

23 and who commanded them and who commanded the professional units, there

24 weren't questions of that kind and so everything remains masked.

25 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I would rather like to unmask, Mr. Praljak.

Page 44540

1 When you said Naletilic -- no, not the -- the Kinder Battalion -- the

2 Convicts Battalion belonged to those special units, you were referring to

3 a specific moment in time, namely the 27th of July, 1993? Yes or no?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] To the best of my knowledge, at the

5 time I was convinced that had it existed and that it belonged somewhere.

6 Now, as I had and didn't want to have anything to do about with that man

7 or anything he was in charge of after that time, then I can say in quite

8 precise terms that he wasn't under my command. Now, who's command he was

9 under --

10 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Once again, Mr. Praljak, would you be so kind as

11 to answer my question? I have not asked you whether he was under your

12 command. Maybe I must understand you as saying that you simply do not

13 remember what you were saying then and what you meant when you were

14 answering the question of Mr. Scott in Tuta-Stela with regard to this

15 Kinder Battalion. Is that what I must understand? You don't know any

16 more whether you were saying that this was the situation on the 27th of

17 July.

18 MR. STINGER: Excuse me, Judge, I apologise for interrupting, but

19 again you said Kinder Battalion --

20 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Ah, I'm sorry, thank you, yes.

21 MR. STRINGER: And that's a different unit that needs to be

22 distinguished.

23 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Ah, yes. Convict. Convict. I find it

24 difficult to put the K at the head of convict.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Praljak, I was

Page 44541

1 listening to Mr. -- my fellow Judge, Mr. Stringer, and my -- and your

2 answers, but I was also looking at the very professional questions put to

3 you by Mr. Scott during that -- during his examination. Very

4 professional. He was asking you very specific question, and you were to

5 answer him, and you answer him. And on this document that we all have

6 here on the screen, you know, he asked you to mark a number things, which

7 you do. But then on page 9574, line 24 I note the following: Mr. Scott,

8 in a very professional fashion, is asking you questions on Mladen

9 Naletilic.

10 You were a witness in the Naletilic case, and he is asking you

11 where Naletilic fits in on this organisational chart. That's the

12 question he is putting to you at the time.

13 Theoretically, since you already answered all his questions, you

14 were probably going to put Naletilic some place in the organisational

15 chart, but this is your answer. You're saying, Mladen Naletilic, Tuta,

16 was not the commander of the Convicts Battalion, and I don't really know

17 where he fits in in this organisational chart. In a nutshell, that's

18 your answer. So we have a very specific question put by Mr. Scott on

19 Naletilic, and we have a very specific answer from you. According to

20 you, Tuta was not the commander, and since he was not commanding the

21 battalion, he cannot be placed in this organisational chart.

22 Do you remember this answer that you had put to -- that you had

23 given Mr. Scott? I mean, it's noted on the transcript, but I want to

24 make sure that you remember what you said at the time.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's quite certainly what my

Page 44542

1 answer was, Your Honours. However, if I was to answer that question

2 today, I would say that according to my information, that most probably

3 that's where it was.

4 Now, this Convicts Battalion, when it took part in the liberation

5 of Mostar, Tuta -- Tuta wasn't the commander. I don't want to justify

6 myself or say that there was even a single little lie, but maybe I wasn't

7 precise enough. Of course, with the best intentions in mind. What I

8 remember, or, rather, I knew at the time that he wasn't the commander of

9 what was then called the Convicts Battalion, although they called

10 themselves the Tutic's men, the Convicts, whatever, and some other names

11 they used.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So at the time

13 either you were telling the truth or you were lying, but you were under

14 oath. So I assume you were telling the truth.

15 If Naletilic had been the commander of the KB, would you have

16 marked under KB something? You know, maybe a circle with "Tuta" written

17 in it or something. If he had been the commander of the KB, would you

18 have marked the document in that fashion?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I wasn't lying then, and I'm not

20 lying now, not at all. I would have written in that the

21 Convicts Battalion existed and most probably Tuta was in command. I

22 would also sign and say that it wasn't under the Main Staff. That is

23 what I would sign up to.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You answer Mr. Scott by saying

25 that the commander was not Naletilic. He maybe should have asked you who

Page 44543

1 was the commander then if it wasn't Naletilic.

2 I'm putting it to you now. Who was the commander of the Convicts

3 Battalion at the time?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Now, the time 1992 when the

5 Convicts Battalion was under the command of Andabak, that's when I said

6 Tuta wasn't the commander. I sort of reduced the time.

7 I don't know who was the commander at the time, and this was a

8 year later. So I seem to join two facts. When Andabak was the commander

9 of the Convicts Battalion, when I agreed on the operation at Orlovac with

10 him, and I seemed to have put the two things together. And I also made a

11 mistake. I exaggerated to Mr. Scott when I said that I came on the 27th.

12 I came on the 24th. 1993, that is.

13 Now, there are always possible mistakes can make but not lies.

14 Lies do not exist. They is imprecisions in the time periods and time

15 frames and time perhaps.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So this organisational chart

17 that we have here on the screen which is marked by you, well, we

18 shouldn't read the September -- we shouldn't read 27/07, we should read

19 the 24/07. The supreme commander is Mate Boban and then there's

20 Bruno Stojic, and then you take your post as the HVO -- chief of the HVO

21 Main Staff, and regarding the Convicts Battalion, you have no idea who

22 the commander was. You know that in 1992 it was Andabak but on July 24th

23 you have no idea who the person might be. Is that it?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right. That's quite right.

25 Yes. So it should be corrected to read the 24th and everything else is

Page 44544

1 as you have put it.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Stringer.

3 MR. STRINGER:

4 Q. General, again as I indicated, for purposes of this discussion

5 I'm not interested in who the commander of the Convicts Battalion was or

6 who you think it was or whether you know who it was.

7 Can we agree to this, General: That on the -- on Friday, the 5th

8 of April, 2002, when you were sitting at that very spot in this

9 courtroom, testifying under oath, that you wrote KB in this place on this

10 chart? Can we agree to that?

11 A. I agree with that. I agree that I put that in at the time that

12 you stated.

13 Q. All right. All right. Thank you.

14 MR. STRINGER: I'm ready to move to my final document,

15 Mr. President.

16 Q. General, on the 14th of July of this year you were being asked

17 questions about the presence of members of the Croatian Army within the

18 ranks of the HVO, and I was asking you about the southern front, and we

19 were looking at a document, P03667, which is not in the binder. It's the

20 one that had a reference to parents protesting their children being sent

21 to the southern front, and on page 43015 of the transcript you said,

22 line 2:

23 "It says here that there were spontaneous rallies and protests,

24 but I repeat, nobody came to the HVO to fight without being a volunteer.

25 As I've already said several times and I've shown you in the documents,

Page 44545

1 they could possibly refuse an order of that kind without any military

2 consequences."

3 Now, General, I want you to look at P11033, because I'm going to

4 challenge that assertion that you made in your testimony with this

5 document, and you will recall earlier on your cross-examination that we

6 were looking at various documents from Brigadier Kapular of the

7 Croatian Army.

8 General, this is the 27th of November, 1993. So this is shortly

9 after you resigned the position as commander of the HVO.

10 After a long list of names of members of the

11 4th Motorised Brigade, Commander Kapular, this document says, they bear

12 responsibility for refusing to obey the order on marching of the unit to

13 the southern front on the 2nd October 1993 and 11th November 1993 as

14 members of the 4th Motorised Brigade. It goes on to say that all of

15 these people are going to have disciplinary measure of a 20 per cent

16 salary reduction over three months based on their refusal to obey the

17 order. And it goes on to discuss some additional people for whom

18 disciplinary measures are not imposed.

19 And then the document continues on with a section, this is page 3

20 of the English, of a statement of reasons, and in the fourth paragraph

21 under the statement of reasons Kapular writes:

22 "One of the basic duties of the guardsmen is to perform all tasks

23 without questioning them, scrupulously, independently, efficaciously and

24 professionally, as well as to be ready for personal sacrifices and

25 professional risks, so I consider that in the concrete case there was no

Page 44546

1 place for subjective attitude towards the order that was the subject

2 matter of the disciplinary violations ..."

3 So, General, what that tells us is that on these two relevant

4 dates, the 2nd of October, 1993, and the 11th of November, these members

5 of the 4th Motorised Brigade, or at some point shortly before, these

6 members, these HV soldiers, received an order to go to the southern

7 front; correct?

8 A. Of the HV, not the HVO.

9 Q. Well, the fact is, General, that the -- "southern front" was the

10 terminology used within the HV in order to send its personnel down into

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina so that it could regulate their status as HV members

12 who were part of the HVO. Isn't that true?

13 A. Not the way you're saying it. The southern front was the

14 southern front of the Croatian Army, and it included territory from Split

15 to the south, Prevlaka and Dubrovnik. And it's also correct that the

16 volunteers, through -- being sent through the southern front secured what

17 I was talking about; however, in this document, in no way is there any

18 mention as to why and how and where those people were sent.

19 Q. Let me --

20 A. Please. It doesn't say that anywhere.

21 Q. Well, I'm going to put to you that what this tells us is that we

22 have these individuals who were, in fact, ordered to go down to fight

23 with the HVO in Bosnia-Herzegovina. They refused to do so, and that

24 despite what you've said in your testimony, they did suffer consequences

25 as a result of that refusal. Isn't that really how it was?

Page 44547

1 A. No, it's not. I don't see any possibility of a commander of the

2 5th Guards Brigade, Ivan Kapular, to issue an order to people from the

3 4th Guards Brigade and to punish the members of the 4th Guards Brigade.

4 And I simply don't see that anywhere. It doesn't say anywhere that they

5 left and how can he be in control and command the 4th Guards Brigade

6 which is in Split whereas he's in Vinkovci 3, 4, 500 kilometres away.

7 Q. Well, General, the fact is that the southern front was HVO in BiH

8 and that these individuals were ordered to go, not volunteers; correct?

9 A. That is not correct. It is incorrect, and you can't see that and

10 say that from any of the documents here. Why they didn't carry something

11 out, you can't see that from this document. And I claim that nobody was

12 punished because they were all volunteers. So nobody suffered any

13 consequences.

14 MR. STRINGER: Mr. President. This completes our

15 cross-examination. Thank you.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Let's have a break.

17 We will reconvene in 20 minutes.

18 --- Recess taken at 3.36 p.m.

19 --- On resuming at 4.02 p.m.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Stringer.

21 MR. STRINGER: Mr. President, over the break we've prepared a

22 cheat sheet or just something that we think sets out the history in terms

23 of that videotape that was being discussed at the beginning, and so if we

24 could distribute this around. We gave one to your court officer, but

25 then since then we had one correction to make on something, so we can do

Page 44552

1 TV, and it reached this place through some different channels, and those

2 channels are rather problematic.

3 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you. Thank you. You've absolutely

4 answered my question.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. General Praljak, as

6 of next week you will no longer be a witness. Your testimony will be

7 over. Normally it should be over Thursday after Mr. Kovacic puts some

8 redirect to you. However, I have a few questions for you, and after that

9 I'll no longer have the opportunity to put these questions to you, so

10 I'll do it now. I want to put questions to you on maps. We'll come back

11 to this in a minute, but I have a technical question first.

12 Questioned by the Court:

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'm using this opportunity to

14 put this question to you right now. I read very carefully the report you

15 made by the expert that you share with Mr. Petkovic, Mr. Gorjanc - excuse

16 me for not pronouncing his name correctly - and we'll be hearing this

17 expert witness during the Petkovic case but it's an expert that you share

18 with the Petkovic Defence.

19 I was looking at all the documents used to back this expert's

20 report. There's three whole volumes of documents, and I found a document

21 that was -- brought a question to me. It's 3D2591. I believe that it's

22 been downloaded -- or uploaded, so we can probably see it on the screen.

23 3D2591, please.

24 We have it here on the screen. It's an interim report coming

25 from the Electronic Operations Centre of the HVO Main Staff, and it's

Page 44553

1 dated September 21, 1993, which is a time where you were commander of the

2 HVO.

3 When you were commander of the HVO, were you aware of the

4 existence of this department that was tapping conversations or tapping

5 radio conversations or telephone conversations?

6 Here obviously are these radio conversations that are tapped.

7 Were you aware of this?

8 A. I did know, Judge Antonetti, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Here -- I won't go

10 into details -- but here it's a conversation between Zuka and Alija

11 Izetbegovic that was tapped. However, what -- Izetbegovic's words are

12 not tapped because they don't have the transmission frequency used by

13 Izetbegovic. So -- however, they were able to record Zuka's words.

14 Therefore, you're telling us that the HVO was able, technically,

15 to eavesdrop on conversations.

16 At your command level were you able to use all this to get

17 information on what the enemy was about to do, BiH Army, for example, or

18 possibly the VRS?

19 A. There were possibilities for a certain number of intercepts of

20 conversations, not all of them. Some were protected, unfortunately or by

21 chance. The BH Army, because it had more money, it had better devices

22 for communication, more than the HVO, and the document that I showed was

23 introduced with permission from the HVO. Jasmin Jaganjac has a whole set

24 of documents to that effect, but we did have certain -- a certain amount

25 of success in intercepting certain conversations and, of course, that

Page 44554

1 information from VOS, V-O-S, and Mr. Keza who was head of VOS attached to

2 the Main Staff, I would receive -- I received information, and I can say

3 that that information was relatively -- relatively good and correct.

4 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Your Honour, please.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you for your answer.

6 I would now like to turn to the maps. The last document that was

7 shown by the Prosecutor, P11033 fully warrants the need to have before us

8 maps showing the position of different military units. In the documents

9 that were established in Vinkovci by Kapular, we have seen that soldiers

10 from the 4th Motorised Brigade are unwilling to go to the south front of

11 the Croatian republic. What is this, a flank? Precisely. Maybe with

12 the aid of maps we will be able to see later on what exactly this means.

13 During cross-examination we saw several documents such that I

14 believed it would be useful to have maps to better understand.

15 Notwithstanding this, re-reading the indictment and the pre-trial brief,

16 there are many references to military positions. Just to give one

17 example, in paragraph 18 of the pre-trial brief it is stated that in

18 September 1991, Croatia was at war with the nationalist Serb forces, and

19 this begs the question as to where the belligerent parties were

20 positioned.

21 In paragraph 28, the Prosecutor talks about the first bouts of

22 fighting in Travnik and Prozor. So here again, it would be very

23 worthwhile to know exactly where the forces were positioned.

24 In paragraph 33 of said brief, the Prosecutor says that in April

25 there was a deadline set for April 15th, that thereafter military

Page 44555

1 operations were conducted, and from April 16th to April 18th of 1993

2 there were 30 attacks launched against towns and villages, and OTP says

3 that in Ahmici on April 30th, Sovici, Doljani on April 17th, Parcani,

4 Lizoperci and Toscanica - and I do apologise for my pronunciation - from

5 April 17th to 19th. Altogether, 30 towns and villages that were

6 attacked. So it would be very useful to see this on a map.

7 The Prosecutor in paragraph 35 says that on May 9th and 10th the

8 HVO and Herceg-Bosna forces attacked Bosnian monuments in Mostar, and the

9 OTP goes on to say that as early as June of 1993, Herceg-Bosna forces and

10 HVO forces started -- or laid siege to Mostar East and that the siege

11 lasted until April 1994. This would be indicated in paragraph 34.

12 In paragraph 36, OTP then goes on to say that following an attack

13 of the BiH against an HVO camp in a northern part of Mostar, and here we

14 discover that such attacks take place as is written by the Prosecutor, so

15 here again, it would be very useful to see where the BiH was positioned

16 at the time of this attack. Maybe we will get an answer to this question

17 later on.

18 In paragraph 37 OTP states that in early July Herceg-Bosna's

19 forces, either with the support and the participation of the government

20 and the armed forces of the republic, the Croatian republic, launched a

21 large scale campaign that was aimed at attacking, arresting, and

22 detaining Bosnian Muslims. That's paragraph 37.

23 Then OTP continues in paragraph 38, and here I'm quoting

24 directly:

25 "The HVO and Herceg-Bosna operations were taking place according

Page 44556

1 to the following lines. Muslim were is arrested, then attacks are

2 launched against the towns and villages. This is the modus operandi."

3 All of this is in paragraph 38.

4 Reading this and based on all the exhibits we have seen so far, I

5 raise the question, the following question: For our better

6 understanding, it would be useful to have maps in order to visualise all

7 of the events I just referred to. This is why I have asked you to

8 prepare maps for us that would show us the positioning of the JNA in

9 1991, 1992, and 1993, to see exactly where the JNA positions were.

10 Secondly, to see when there is a conflict between the JNA and the

11 Croatian republic where the fighting takes place. You have many times

12 referred to Dubrovnik, so it would be very interesting and worthwhile to

13 see what took place. And I would like to see again on the basis of your

14 maps how over time from 1992, in October in Prozor, where was HVO and

15 where was the BH Army. And then up until January through April, June,

16 and November, what was respect -- what were the respective positions of

17 HVO and the BH Army.

18 So I'm saying starting with ELMO, what were the respective

19 positions? I cannot contest or challenge the fact that the VRS was

20 present or the BH Army was there or the HVO was there. All of this will

21 be thoroughly checked and counter-checked with other -- or against other

22 exhibits. I'm just asking you to the best of your knowledge to give us

23 the respective positions of the armed forces and presence.

24 If you're able to do this quickly this should expedite matters.

25 We need to put ELMO en route, and then you can just simply say to us,

Page 44557

1 This is map number 1, this is map number 2. Identify your maps. I'm

2 just asking you to assist us in visualising things. I am asking the

3 registrar to start ELMO so we can visualise the map.

4 General, please explain what is this map.

5 A. This map depicts the attack by the Yugoslav People's Army and the

6 Army of Republika Srpska which was in its initial stages of development

7 at the time, and here on Mostar, the south of Croatia up to this area --

8 well, we didn't go further when we did this map. So the JNA and the

9 reservists took the eastern bank of the Neretva River, Stolac, and all

10 the dominant heights around Mostar, and they wanted to attack further on.

11 They attacked Livno, Kupres, and on the 10th of April they managed to

12 take it.

13 They attacked on -- they attacked Livno on the 23rd of April, and

14 the attack was repelled. And on the 15th of May they managed to expel

15 all the population from East Mostar. They tore down all the bridges

16 apart from the Old Bridge after that. And that was the situation in this

17 area at that point in time. So that's map number 1.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. Please move to map 2.

19 A. This map shows -- I'm receiving an echo. Is somebody's

20 microphone on or ...

21 This map shows the joint action by the Croatian Defence Council

22 and BH Army from the 10th of April, 1992, to the 7th of June, 1992.

23 Therefore, the blue is the HVO, the green is the BH Army, the red is the

24 Yugoslav People's Army of Republika Srpska.

25 Up until that time, the Army of Republika Srpska had taken

Page 44558

1 control of 70 per cent of the territory in this area here, and facing

2 the -- the Army of Republika Srpska are the HVO units. Here you have the

3 BH Army units.

4 I have too much volume here, an echo. My voice is coming back to

5 me, an echo. I can hear myself speak.

6 MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] There's something wrong with the

7 B/C/S channel, because we have a lot of interruption on the channel, a

8 lot of noise, and it's unpleasant to listen to.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'm sorry. There must be a

10 technical problem. This is for registrar.

11 Please, General, try to carry on.

12 A. In this area here, this area was defended by the BH Army.

13 Sarajevo was defended by the BH Army with the proviso that this area

14 here, facing Kiseljak, was the HVO in relation to the Army of Republika

15 Srpska. This area here around Tuzla mostly was defended by the joint

16 units of the BH Army and HVO according to their positions.

17 The area -- I think this is Gradacac or Zepa. Anyway, this area

18 was defended by the BH Army, and so was this area here.

19 The Serbs were on the attack towards Posavina over here. We'll

20 see that on the next map. And here I omitted Bihac. And you'll see all

21 this on the next map.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Map 3, please.

23 A. Map number 3, once again the blue is the HVO. I don't want to

24 repeat this. It is the joint activities of the HVO and the BH Army from

25 June to the 29th of October, 1992.

Page 44559

1 Bihac was defended by far more significant BH Army forces. That

2 is to say, there were more BH Army units and soldiers, but there were

3 also the HVO. The Serbian army was launching a fierce attack on Posavina

4 in order to gain a corridor for supplies. These two enclaves are under a

5 siege, have been encircled.

6 The HVO, together with the help of a weak BH Army at that time,

7 managed to liberate the eastern and then western part of Mostar, too, the

8 whole of Stolac and the Neretva River valley.

9 Here towards Konjic you had the BH Army, then some small forces

10 of the HVO, then the BH Army defending this area here -- or, rather, the

11 HVO forces under the command of the BH Army.

12 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Praljak, just to make sure, it seems to me

13 that the -- I have difficulties in seeing the difference -- the only

14 difference between those two maps is that in number 3 we have Bihac that

15 was omitted in number 2 and we have these red flashes. Is that correct,

16 that's the only difference?

17 A. I'm afraid I can't work like this. I can't hear myself speak,

18 Judge Trechsel. Could this be put right? Could the technician put this

19 right?

20 There is an essential difference between these two maps because

21 strong attacks on Jajce are going on, and the Army of Republika Srpska is

22 launching fierce attacks and taking control of this area defended by the

23 HVO.

24 And we also have a difference here in map number 3. During that

25 period of time we liberated -- well, the HVO, with the help of the BH

Page 44560

1 Army and the Muslims who were in the HVO, we managed to liberate this

2 entire area, Mostar, Stolac, and the Neretva River valley.

3 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.

4 A. This map is similar to the previous map. Number? Yes. It's

5 number 4, map number 4.

6 Jajce had fallen. There was no more Jajce. And the Army of

7 Republika Srpska took control of Bosanski Brod and the other places, and

8 only a small enclave was left to the end of the war which the HVO managed

9 to keep. So the fall of Jajce, the fall of Bosanska Posavina except for

10 that small enclave there, and that was on the 29th of October, 1992.

11 This was the situation then.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Regarding map number 4, October

13 29th, 1992, this is an important date. We can make a connection between

14 this and the events that took place in Prozor. I see, however that, the

15 VRS is indicated in red and it is facing off with the HVO and the BH Army

16 acting jointly. So they have a common front line opposing them to the

17 VRS. That is correct?

18 A. Correct, Judge Antonetti. And in Bihac, and in Sarajevo are

19 units there, and as has been marked in here. They held the front jointly

20 facing the VRS.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Now, a very quick question.

22 Let us look at the map. If the HVO were to withdraw from its positions,

23 would this mean that the VRS would be able to take the Bihac in a pincer

24 movement and occupy all of the territory?

25 A. Correct. Completely correct.

Page 44561

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very good. Please move to the

2 next map.

3 A. Map number 5 shows the ratio in 1993. At the time there was a

4 conflict in Uskoplje the 11th to the 23rd of January and a BH Army

5 attack, Busovaca-Kiseljak. This problem was dealt with. There was a

6 truce in Uskoplje. However, the BH Army managed to cut across this area

7 here where the HVO was linked up, and so part of Busovaca was cut off

8 from part of Kiseljak. The other lines were held as if nothing was going

9 on.

10 As far as the Tuzla region is concerned, the BH Army and the HVO.

11 Then here you had the HVO, then down here above Mostar the HVO, then the

12 BH Army towards Konjic, and towards Tomislavgrad and Livno you had the

13 HVO. In the area here of Bugojno, joint forces.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Another quick question. In

15 January, according to your maps, and here I'm asking the question -- I'm

16 putting the question to you, two military actions are underway. One is

17 in Gornji Vakuf, the other one in Busovaca, Kiseljak. These are the two

18 military operations took place in January. This is what you have

19 indicated on your map.

20 A. Yes.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] According to you, the actions

22 in Gornji Vakuf were carried out by the BH Army, and Kiseljak and

23 Busovaca is also carried out by the BH Army? Is that correct?

24 A. Correct. The BH Army and Uskoplje placed the HVO in an illogical

25 position but unfortunately they didn't want to come up to the positions

Page 44562

1 facing the Army of Republika Srpska which were located over here.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let us move to the next map.

3 MR. STRINGER: I apologise for the interruption. At some point

4 the Prosecution wants to make some sort of a response. I don't what. We

5 heard about Gornji Vakuf at length on direct. We heard about Gornji

6 Vakuf by other Defence, I believe. We did it on cross, and here we are

7 now providing a forum again to cover this territory, for the General to

8 make assertions at a point when we've pretty much finished examining the

9 witness. And so again, it's -- it's troubling from that point of view,

10 and perhaps at the end of all of the maps if the Prosecution could at

11 least have an opportunity to make some remarks.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very good. I see no problem

13 with that. Let's move on to map 6.

14 A. Map number 6 shows the distribution of forces of the BH Army and

15 the HVO in April 1993. The BH Army attacks Konjic on the 13th of April,

16 1993. It attacks Vitez on the 15th of April, 1993. In Zenica we have

17 some disarming. The BH Army is disarming the HVO and expelling the

18 people.

19 The conflict in Sovici and Doljani was on the 17th of April, and

20 in that same month of April we have a preparatory attack by the BH Army

21 on Mostar.

22 The green lines still facing the VRS are being held by the BH

23 Army and the HVO, and we have this small portion that they're holding at

24 Stolac, the unit that was called the Bregava Unit.

25 And then we see up here in Bihac, Orasje, and Sarajevo the

Page 44563

1 positions there.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Next map.

3 A. Map number 7 relates to May 1993. On the 9th of May the BH Army

4 attacks in the town of Mostar, and from the 1st to the 30th of June

5 there's an all-out general attack by the BH Army in Konjic. And three

6 small enclaves remain. We can't draw them in here, but we spoke about

7 them.

8 I took part in pulling out of Kostajnica. And that was the

9 situation, but nothing changed. The HVO and the BH Army still

10 co-operated both in Stolac, in the defence against the VRS. This area is

11 held by the HVO. This was held jointly by the HVO and the BH Army

12 precisely as the blue and green lines indicate.

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Map number 8.

14 A. Map number 8, number 1. From the 4th to the 10th of June, 1993,

15 the BH Army attacks at the HVO in Travnik, takes control of Travnik, and

16 the soldiers and civilians fled across Serb portions. And we had a

17 chance to see what this looked like on the tapes. The army was disarmed

18 and negotiations were held. Between the 13th and the 15th of June, 1993,

19 the BH Army attacked Kakanj and took control of it. And then from the

20 1st to the 30th of June it continued to attack Konjic, and the people,

21 the population withdrew, except for small enclaves. So that was the

22 situation. Travnik was taken control of, Kakanj, and the action

23 continued, the operations continued along the other lines. The HVO and

24 the BH Army still acted together.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Map number 9.

Page 44564

1 A. Shows exactly what the situation was on the 30th of June, 1993.

2 The BH Army had taken control of Travnik. That was on the 10th of June.

3 Kakanj the 15th of June. This was crossed out. Kakanj's crossed out

4 here. The BH Army then in Mostar does what we needn't talk about any

5 more. That is to say, the HVO soldiers who were Muslims, of Muslim

6 ethnicity, disarmed the Croatian soldiers, and in Stolac, in an ambush,

7 killed 26 men, established a new line here -- actually, the HVO set up a

8 new line facing the BH Army and the VRS.

9 As I was saying, the BH Army took control of positions north and

10 south of Mostar. South of Mostar up to Blagaj and northwards right up to

11 Konjic, and now the BH Army was taking over the positions facing the VRS,

12 the red line. The HVO, from Blagaj -- takes positions from Blagaj in

13 Mostar along the Bulevar, Antic Street and so on and further on as the

14 map shows, the BH Army and the HVO. We'll see this better on map number

15 10.

16 This is July 1993, that is to say the point in time when I

17 arrived. We had an attack on Fojnica and the BH Army attacked and took

18 control of Fojnica. The BH Army also attacked and took control of

19 Bugojno. The BH Army attacked Gornji Vakuf and ended it's operation in

20 Konjic, and the line in Mostar remains as you can see here through Cabuna

21 and Vram Planina. The VRS facing the BH Army, the BH Army facing the

22 HVO, the attack in Konjic, the attack in Fojnica, the attack on Bugojno

23 and the attack on Vakuf and that's when the offensive began.

24 As to the other positions in Bihac we still have the BHO -- the

25 HVO and the BH Army together in the whole Tuzla region, the HVO with its

Page 44565

1 brigades was together with the BH Army as it was in Sarajevo fighting the

2 VRS.

3 Do you want me to go on?

4 This is the 30th of July. It is map number 11. The situation in

5 the area under BH Army control and the HVO's control, on the 30th of July

6 1993. Vitez and Busovaca remain, Kiseljak and Kresevo, Vares, Zepce,

7 Usora, and small enclaves around Konjic. All the rest that is has been

8 crossed out, Bugojno, et cetera, Konjic, Kakanj, Fojnica, Zenica,

9 Travnik, all that is in BH Army hands already, because it was

10 implementing its plan to extend its territory.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, turning to map 11

12 coloured in blue and in green, green is the BH Army, and red is for the

13 HVO. On this map we see that there's a part under control by the HVO,

14 which is essentially below, and then there are HVO enclaves in zones that

15 are under BH Army control, it being clear that everybody, all the forces

16 are encircled by the VRS indicated in red; is that correct?

17 A. That's right, Your Honour Judge Antonetti.

18 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Praljak, I am looking at this map, and I

19 note that you have identified areas monochrome, and the legend speaks of

20 areas under control of ABiH and HVO. Now, during cross-examination the

21 question has come up quite a number of times about areas under the

22 control of the HVO, and you have consistently persisted rather strongly

23 and said there were no areas under the control of the HVO, but only a

24 very small strip along the front line.

25 Now, this appears -- there appears to be a contradiction which I

Page 44566

1 think you would wish to straighten out.

2 A. Judge Trechsel, Your Honour, this is a map which shows what the

3 BH Army controlled, the Muslim representatives and the Croatian

4 representatives. When I say under HVO control, I'm not -- I don't mean

5 the army. I mean the power and authority there.

6 The HVO was facing the VRS lines, Tomislavgrad, et cetera. Here

7 south of the Mostar towards the Croatian border and within the frame of

8 the BH Army here in these areas around Tuzla, Orasje, and so on. There

9 are two terms, HVO control as an institution and so on. That's one term,

10 and that's what I'm using here. Everything else that's not green and

11 blue is controlled by the army -- well, it's not the Army of Republika

12 Srpska, it's the authority that that represented.

13 JUDGE TRECHSEL: This is still a bit puzzling, because as far as

14 Bosnia and Herzegovina, let's say the Muslims, are concerned, we only see

15 here ABiH, and A stands for army. So are you saying that when you paint

16 it green that is an area controlled by the Muslim Army, and when you

17 paint blue that is not controlled by the HVO army but by some other HVO

18 authorities?

19 I watched you and it looked as if you had given an answer. I

20 don't -- I'm not quite sure. Have you given an answer to this midway

21 or -- and if so, what was it, because it's not transcribed.

22 A. Judge Trechsel, Your Honour, Sarajevo was controlled by the

23 authorities in Sarajevo, the Presidency. Now, the BH Army and the VRS

24 come into contact along the lines of contact. When it's green this means

25 the authorities controlled by the Muslims. Here the authorities, along

Page 44567

1 with all the agreements, are the Croats. The army is at the point where

2 the green and blue come into contact and where the blue and red come into

3 contact and where the green and red come into contact, green being the BH

4 Army, blue being the HVO, and red being the VRS. So let's not mix these

5 armies up, and let's not confuse them with the civilian authorities, the

6 civilian authorities protected by their armies at the borders.

7 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Well, you put "ABiH" here, and that does lead to

8 confusion. I don't think that I am to blame for having raised this.

9 Thank you.

10 JUDGE PRANDLER: Would I like to ask you, Mr. Praljak, about the

11 following, that the -- up to now I haven't seen very well where the

12 Posavina region was situated, and here you have under XI, XIa, you have

13 several enclaves here in the first part number 5, Usora, I'm not sure if

14 Usora was in the Posavina region or not, but then Usora is not mentioned

15 in the second part of that clarification, that is under XIa; and,

16 therefore, of course, I see the Sava and Bosanski Brod, but of course, it

17 is far away from the regions which you, yourself, refer to. So I am a

18 bit at a loss as far as the situation with that particular part,

19 Posavina, which was also which -- from which we have had as well

20 witnesses. So I would like you to point out where those -- I saw your

21 hand that it is probably -- that very small blue region which is rather

22 difficult to read, that part. That is only that one which remained from

23 Posavina according to you, is it?

24 A. Correct.

25 JUDGE PRANDLER: I mean under HVO control.

Page 44568

1 A. That's correct, Your Honour Judge Prandler. That remained under

2 HVO control. And why didn't I put an enclave here? Because it is

3 adjacent to the Republic of Croatia, and you could go there. You could

4 take that route. But I'm afraid that there is a bit of confusion here.

5 This part that is being defended together which the HVO and the BH Army,

6 it's also called Posavina. So this is Posavina -- well, you can see that

7 the corridor was forged here, and here from Brcko and the rest, this is

8 Posavina that is being defended by the HVO and the BH Army, and there are

9 HVO brigades which are under the command of the BH Army.

10 JUDGE PRANDLER: Yes. Thank you very much. Thank you.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. General Praljak,

12 next map, please.

13 A. Map number 12, well, as you can see, the situation in Bihac

14 remains the same. In Posavina the Posavina on the Croatian side the

15 situation remained the same until the end of the war. And this is the

16 situation as of the 8th of November, 1993.

17 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note: Could the witness please

18 speak into the microphone.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Where the BH Army took Travnik,

20 Kakanj, Fojnica, Bugojno, and, in the end, Vares as we were able to see

21 in late October 1993. And the enclaves of Busovaca and Vitez remained,

22 and the area around Kiseljak. Zepce was still there as was this area

23 here from the south of Mostar. And in the BH -- the VRS actually is

24 holding the lines against the BH Army and against the HVO. Here it is

25 attacking. Here the HVO is holding the lines against BH Army, and here

Page 44569

1 in the Tuzla region, the joint forces, to the greater extent of the

2 BH Army and the lesser extent the HVO is holding the lines against VRS

3 and also in Bihac and in Sarajevo where we have one brigade each.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] This is the situation on

5 November 8, 1993.

6 Next map.

7 A. Well, this is then map number 13. That is how I'm going to mark

8 it. Map number 13 is the same thing that we have seen before, but now

9 things are a little bit more precisely marked here. So it's a bit

10 clearer in military terms, but it's a little bit difficult to discern it.

11 So the Republika Srpska Army and what the BH Army and the HVO managed to

12 defend.

13 And now if we may --

14 MR. STRINGER: Excuse me, Mr. President. Just for the record, it

15 looks like beginning with 13, we don't have English translations, at

16 least not of 13, and we're going to object to anything that does not have

17 translation.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Praljak, could you read in

19 your own language what is on this map so that the interpreters can

20 translate what is on the map.

21 A. Yes, I can, Your Honours. I didn't ask for translation. That's

22 the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina in April and May 1992. Red,

23 that's the areas controlled by the VRS. Green is the territory

24 controlled by the BH Army.

25 Judge Trechsel, I'm saying this colloquially so please don't.

Page 44570

1 And the territory controlled by the HVO is marked with blue. That's the

2 usual way of marking things.

3 We move on to map number 14. We do have the translation.

4 That's situation -- well, we've looked at this map. It's the

5 deployment of the JNA, its armies and corps. The 1st Army, 2nd Army,

6 7th Army, the Naval District, that's the VPO. And that's the armed

7 forces of the SFRY, the territorial deployment within Yugoslavia.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Praljak, this is map

9 number 13 or is it map 14? I can't remember.

10 A. Fourteen.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Map 14. Very well. This is a

12 map where the JNA was fully deployed in all the former Yugoslavia in 1985

13 with the different army corps called 9A, 5A, 7A and 2A, and 2K, and so

14 forth; is that it?

15 A. That's correct. A is army, K is corps, and VPO that's the naval

16 district.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. That is map number

18 14.

19 A. Now we move on to map number 15. In 1987, Your Honours. This is

20 very important. The Yugoslav People's Army changes its entire

21 territorial structure and deployment in line with what it would be

22 required to do in order to accomplish the Serbian objectives, and that is

23 a new military district is formed, the naval district remains the same.

24 The 5th Military District is set up, but it's important that the 1st

25 Military District now encompasses the area that corresponds to the

Page 44571

1 borders of Greater Serbia. So as early as in 1987, the foundations were

2 laid for all that and it was all organised in order for this

3 developmental plan that this area from Karlobag to Karlovac and

4 Virovitica can be taken as part of this military district.

5 Can I go on?

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you're saying that on map

7 number 15, the JNA modified or changed its entire structure.

8 Now, on this map we have 1.VO written, and you also indicated the

9 borders of Greater Serbia, and you're telling us that this was a plan, a

10 plan to attack Croatia; is that it?

11 A. Not only on Croatia. Bosnia and Herzegovina is also here. So is

12 Montenegro and --

13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

14 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could all the microphones

15 that are not in use please be switched off.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Map number 16 shows the aggression

17 of Serbia, Montenegro, and Bosnia and Herzegovina on Croatia. When I say

18 Bosnia and Herzegovina, I mean the forces that were deployed there. I

19 mean the Yugoslav People's Army is actually attacking. I don't have

20 anything to add. Everything is accurate here so the 3rd Corps, the 2nd

21 Corps, the 31st Corps, and this is the plan how from Serbia and from

22 Bosnia and Herzegovina. So in all those directions, and of course with

23 the use of the navy, the destroyers. They destroyed Split and Dubrovnik

24 as the aggression on Croatia was launched in 1991.

25 This is map number 17. It's the same thing, but here I marked

Page 44572

1 two things. It was of particular importance for the Yugoslav People's

2 Army to take Kupres and then to reach Split via Livno and also to go down

3 the Neretva valley in this area to be able to destroy Dubrovnik, to cut

4 it off and then to move in the other direction in order to conquer all of

5 Dalmatia.

6 In 1991, this marks the beginning of the implementation of the

7 plan.

8 Map number 18, that's the operative development of the armed

9 forces of the SFRY in 1992. You can see here that after their defeat or

10 after their retreat of the Yugoslav People's Army from Slovenia, the 31st

11 Corps was moved here. The 14th Corps was moved here. And the 13th Corps

12 was moved to Montenegro where it then proceeded to move to

13 Eastern Herzegovina carrying out attacks here.

14 The 10th Corps, after taking the Knin area and then left it to

15 the local forces, moved to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The 9th Corps, again,

16 after taking the Zadar hinterland and Sibenik hinterland moves to

17 Bosnia-Herzegovina and launches its operation against the Republic of

18 Croatia in 1992, and by that time, they already started attacking

19 Bosnia and Herzegovina.

20 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] This is 1992. Could you please

22 tell us which month in 1992? You're telling us that the 14th Corps is

23 returning as well as the 31st, the 13th, and the 10th, but which month

24 was that, in May? in April? When did this happen?

25 A. Well, these are the developments up until March 1992. In March

Page 44573

1 1992, everything was already in place for the final strike on

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina. You will see that on the next map. That's map

3 number 19.

4 Here you have a quite specific date. It's situation in March

5 1992. And here you can see the positions of the 13th and 9th and the

6 10th Corps. They moved first from Slovenia, well, from Slovenia the 13th

7 and the other two from Croatia, and here you see the disposition of the

8 corps within Bosnia-Herzegovina or on the border with the Republic of

9 Croatia and you can see it is designated quite clearly, the number of

10 volunteers and the number of soldiers in each corps. Well, I didn't

11 translate -- have that translated. Well, soldiers are soldiers, and

12 volunteers are those who volunteered.

13 JUDGE PRANDLER: Mr. Praljak, when we see here the Dobrovojacka,

14 that is the volunteers in each of those brigades or corps, et cetera,

15 mentioned here under 10, 5, 17, 9 and 4, I believe. And of course there

16 are that one even more, that is 13 and the 2nd square mentioned here, so

17 then what I would like to ask you is that the volunteers were to come

18 from the territory concerned that they were deployed, or they were

19 volunteers, let's say, from Montenegro or from -- from Macedonia or

20 Serbia itself. So were there volunteers from over the rest of the

21 republics, or they were mainly based on the Territorial Defence units.

22 That is my question. Thank you.

23 A. Your Honour Judge Prandler, these are the units of the

24 Yugoslav People's Army marked as such. The volunteers came from all over

25 the place, from Montenegro, from Serbia. Serbs naturally from

Page 44574

1 Bosnia-Herzegovina. They came from Croatia. Simply put, Serbs who felt

2 that they wanted to participate in the implementation of the political

3 goals, they volunteered to join the army and their numbers grew.

4 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could all the microphones

5 that are not in use please be switched off.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I proceed?

7 JUDGE PRANDLER: Yes, thank you.

8 A. Map number 20. Your Honours, this is just --

9 MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] General, I'm sorry. I would like to

10 ask you to read out the 3D numbers that you have marked on each map.

11 Each map is in e-court and it's marked.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, but I think Madam Nika that we

13 can add it later on so that I don't waste my time.

14 MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] Well it would be easier for people

15 to follow.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, you can see quite clearly

17 which map is which.

18 Your Honours, this is what was happening between January and

19 April 1992. Bosnia and Herzegovina was suddenly chock full of

20 Yugoslav People's Army units. You can see the military districts here

21 and you can see what belonged to which military district. All the corps

22 are listed here. I think it's quite clear and there's no need to

23 elaborate any further.

24 May I proceed?

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Next map.

Page 44575

1 A. Your Honours, on the next maps, the maps that follow, the map

2 number 21, well, it specifies the overall strength of the JNA and the VRS

3 in the period between January and April 1992, and you can see how in 1992

4 and 1993 the strength increased. So here when you say personnel, that

5 means soldiers, tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and armoured fighting

6 vehicles, and artillery, cannon. Well, these are the figures. I didn't

7 have this translated because I thought -- because it seemed to me that --

8 well, that's map number 22.

9 That's the 10th Corps. It's deployed in Western Bosnia. It's

10 under the command of Major General Spiro Ninkovic. You can see the

11 strength, soldiers, volunteers. This is all 1992.

12 The 4th Corps is located in Sarajevo. It's under the command of

13 Major General Vojislav Djurdjevac, the number of soldiers, the number of

14 volunteers and you can see the composition of the units.

15 There is also map 23. For the 5th Corps in Banja Luka, for the

16 9th Corps at Kupres.

17 Map 24 is 17th Corps located in Tuzla. Major-General

18 Sava Jankovic. The number of men, the brigades, et cetera.

19 So there we have it as regards that territory. At the beginning

20 of 1992, what the disposition of forces was of the Yugoslav People's Army

21 and the volunteers in Bosnia-Herzegovina, who the commanders were.

22 THE INTERPRETER: Could all the microphones be switched off,

23 please, which are not in use. Thank you.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] How they were armed and so on.

25 I don't understand were there is such a lot of interference and

Page 44576

1 background noise. It seems to be better now.

2 Unfortunately this copy, well, it's not a good copy but it's map

3 number 25.

4 I've already shown this on a clearer map. It is 1993,

5 Operation Neretva 93, in fact. I have nothing more to say about that.

6 Everything's been said.

7 Now, this is the -- from October to November 1993. The number of

8 the map is 26. The situation in the Mostar area is what this map

9 depicts. It's turned round the wrong way.

10 Map 26. Could you all take up map 26 and take a look at it.

11 It's 3D03724. And in red is the BH Army this time, an attack in the

12 Mostar area, Bijelo Polje, and so on and so forth. The axis of attack by

13 the MOS. Unfortunately, you can't see those arrows on this copy, and I

14 can't do anything about that, but it's quite clear, as far as I'm

15 concerned, in the copy I have. It's a bad photocopy, but it says where

16 the attacks were. Well, I don't really know. I can provide you with the

17 original maps or provide the Judges with the original maps perhaps.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Place the map on the ELMO,

19 please, because no one can see it. Put it under the ELMO. The

20 October/November map.

21 That's the Neretva operation. It's not that one but the next

22 one.

23 A. Yes, that's right. That's it.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] If you would please explain the

25 numbering system, 1, 2, 3, 4, all the way through 10. Say the number of

Page 44577

1 the map.

2 A. The number of the map is map number 26. Here we have it, 26, and

3 that shows the situation as it was in Central Bosnia and moving south in

4 October and November of 1993. And the BH Army attacks are marked in

5 numbers -- or, rather, the Muslim forces. That's number 1. Number 1

6 shows that.

7 Why is this happening now? 1, Mostar, Hum, Rodoc. 1, here it

8 is; 2, Bijelo Polje, Rastani; 3, Dreznica, Vrdi; 4, Neretvica, Hudotsko,

9 Slatina; number 5, Hare, Uzdol, Prozor, Rama; number 6, Voljevac, Crni

10 Vrh; number 7, Bugojno, Gornji Vakuf; number 8, Voljica, Raduski Kamen;

11 number 9 is the attack on Vitez; and number 10, the attack on Travnik and

12 Nova Bila. Novi Travnik and Nova Bila. That is map 26.

13 And the same thing on map 27, which is 3D -- no, we haven't got

14 3D here. It's map 27. Also October and November, but showing the axis

15 of attack. Red the MOS. The armed forces of the BH republic are in

16 blue. The main roads are in yellow. The diversions on the roads are

17 marked with these circles here.

18 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Excuse me, Mr. Praljak. You were somewhere out

19 of the reach of the ELMO right now. If you could show again and taking

20 the map up a bit. We didn't see where you went with your pencil.

21 A. The red.

22 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Exactly. Exactly. No, you must move the map a

23 bit, because this is exactly what we cannot see. I'm sorry.

24 A. Judge Trechsel, Your Honour, I'm in a hurry. I don't know why

25 I'm hurrying for goodness sake. I don't know. I just seem to speed up

Page 44578

1 for no reason at all and then this is what happens.

2 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I understand that, Mr. Praljak, and I'm trying

3 to assist you by pointing out something which you do not see. So do not

4 take it wrong. There's no reproach for once in what I say.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, if you would please

6 indicate the legend, the caption. What does it mean?

7 A. The red arrows on the map indicate the axes of attack of the

8 Muslim armed forces, MOS, and at the time, well, it was no longer the BH

9 Army. We began calling them the Muslim forces.

10 The blue denotes the defence lines of the armed forces of the

11 Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

12 The yellow on the map denotes the main roads so that you can see

13 where the main roads were. And let's start with the south. From the

14 coast Ploce, the roads that all the convoys of humanitarian aid passed

15 through, Mostar --

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic.

17 General Petkovic, you have the floor.

18 THE ACCUSED PETKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, a technical

19 problem. Perhaps General Praljak is a little tired, but you can't have

20 two markings for the BH Army forces, one more MOS and the other for the

21 BH Army. The blue is the HVO, and somebody placed the letters RH HB. So

22 the blue refers to the HVO in this particular case.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Thank you, Mr. Petkovic.

24 That is right. The blue is the HVO. I don't know why I read it out

25 differently.

Page 44579

1 And on that map, you can see quite precisely where the BH Army

2 was attacking the HVO. There were two enclaves remaining. This is one.

3 This is another below Zenica. So the Novi Travnik enclave and the

4 Kiseljak enclave.

5 Here we have the BH Army and the HVO. The HVO is blue. And we

6 were attacked from all sides. The red circle here with this cross, the

7 red circle with the cross was the slaughter in Uzdol near Prozor that

8 occurred, the massacre.

9 And here these two Xs are the diversions alone the roads,

10 especially at Stolac where crimes had been committed in the rear. We saw

11 those dead people in the barracks in Grabovina and the previous 26 people

12 who were killed and brought there.

13 And this map is a precise map showing the situation in October

14 and November with the BH Army attack on two enclaves in Central Bosnia

15 that had been broken up, and in Vares -- no. This is Zepce. Vares is

16 over here. So Vares was being taken control of, and the whole of the

17 southern part of the territory is being attacked, is under attack towards

18 Mostar. Konjic has been completely taken control of. And that's the

19 situation in October and November, and that was map 27.

20 We've seen this next one. Now we can move on to what

21 Your Honour's interested in, which is where -- we're going to call this

22 map 28. So this is map 28, and it comes with a translation. It's a plan

23 of attack on the Republic of Croatia after the withdrawal of the JNA from

24 Slovenia, but here we can also see the plan of attack on Dubrovnik, the

25 south, Ploce, Split, Sibenik, Zadar, and so on.

Page 44580

1 MR. STRINGER: Excuse me, Mr. President. I don't have that map.

2 I only have one left, this one.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, the Prosecutor does

4 not have that map.

5 MS. PINTER: [Interpretation] Your Honours, these are the maps

6 which the General marked following your request, and the Registrar had

7 them printed, and we put them into six groups. We didn't print out the

8 maps, we just sorted them and put them together. So perhaps the

9 Prosecutor doesn't have that particular one, but it does have a 3D

10 number, which means it should be on e-court.

11 MR. STRINGER: I do have it now. Thank you.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please continue.

13 A. This is map 28. The axes of attack by the aggressor, that is to

14 say the Yugoslav People's Army, and that's what the arrows show. The

15 interrupted blue -- dotted blue line is the line along which the

16 aggressor retreated, not being able to take control of Croatia. The red

17 arrows indicate the different types of obstructions set up by an

18 organised defence throughout the territory of the Republic of Croatia and

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And another important thing is these red circles

20 which denote the garrisons which the JNA were -- had in Croatia and were

21 blocked by the Croatian forces.

22 At the request of the international community, Your Honours, in

23 1991, Croatia, the Croatian Army, the Croatian armed forces, were forced

24 to deblock the JNA barracks in the Republic of Croatia, and all the

25 weaponry went to Bosnia-Herzegovina pursuant to demands from the

Page 44581

1 international community, which I'm -- if I might be allowed to add was a

2 completely incomprehensible act for anybody to knows the situation on the

3 ground. Anybody who knew what was happening knew what these actions

4 would lead to.

5 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Just a moment, Mr. Praljak. I would like to

6 clarify an issue of -- on map number 28, which is a very nicely -- I must

7 say it's a really nicely done map.

8 There are two types of legends here. In the one that is inserted

9 in the map, it says: "Possible directions of attacks of the aggressor's

10 forces according to estimations and available data." And on the

11 right-hand side, under number 11, it says: "Plan of the attack to

12 Croatia."

13 Now, these are clearly, I think, two different things, and I

14 would like to know which is the one that we should rely on.

15 A. Two things at two different times, Judge Trechsel. So according

16 to available information, and I consulted the book by the General, the

17 JNA Army general, and showed which -- what their preparations were and

18 what they intended to do. Now, on the basis of the information we had,

19 we forecast what the attack would look like on the Republic of Croatia,

20 and that's what actually happened. It actually took place. So both.

21 You have both things here, the attack that was forecast, the deployment

22 of JNA forces and so on, and then everything came into being. Everything

23 happened as is indicated on this map.

24 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you. That is a third eventuality, namely

25 description of something that actually happened. It is not a plan but a

Page 44582

1 historical presentation of what happened, and that is, I understand, what

2 we should take it as.

3 A. Correct.

4 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.

5 A. Map 29 shows what we managed to do, and it describes the

6 situation. It describes what the BH Army -- or, rather, the VRS managed

7 to do. Martic's army, if you want to call it that, the army set up by

8 the Serbs within the Republic of Croatia. They did not succeed in

9 implementing their plan, but they did manage to take control of this area

10 here. It says the Zone of Rebellion. That's what we called it. The

11 rebel Serbs led by the JNA took control of Vukovar, Baranja,

12 Western Slavonia, that is. They took control of Eastern Slavonia but did

13 not manage to move to the Hungarian border. They took control of

14 everything below Zagreb, Sisak, and then the hinterland of the Adriatic,

15 Sibenik and Split, and the south of Croatia below of Dubrovnik, and to

16 the south and north above Dubrovnik. But they did not manage to take

17 control of the town of Dubrovnik itself and didn't manage to break

18 through to Peljesac or the Neretva River valley, either towards the south

19 and Ploce or the west towards Split.

20 And as far as Bosnia-Herzegovina is concerned, it says very

21 rightly here the HVO, precisely along this line here that I've drawn, set

22 up a defence and managed to stop the JNA's -- the JNA from moving

23 forward, and this happened towards the north of Metkovici. So within --

24 a few kilometres within the BH Army borders there was some Croatian Army,

25 but the HVO managed to stop everybody here. Of course we could draw in

Page 44583

1 the same for Posavina, but this is the situation as it was in 1992 in the

2 south.

3 So up until this line at the very borders, the HVO managed to

4 stop the breakthrough. Later on they would move towards Dubrovnik and

5 liberate that portion, and everything north of that was held by the HVO.

6 Of course, later on it was joined by the BH Army, or rather, there were a

7 great many Muslims within the HVO who took part in all this.

8 May I continue?

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Next map.

10 A. Map number 30. It's the situation in this area in 1992 and 1993,

11 and I claim, Your Honours, again as I have explained, on the 10th of

12 April, 1992, a single unit from the 4th Guards Brigade came here into

13 three villages, Tepcici, Slipcici, and another one near Citluk to stop

14 and -- put a stop to an advance of the JNA. A total of 159 soldiers.

15 They came together with me on the same day, because that area was

16 completely empty, and I couldn't man it with anyone. There simply were

17 not enough people.

18 In 1992, that HV unit was in this area from the 10th of April,

19 1992, until the end of June 1992, and it took part in the operation to

20 liberate South Mostar. After that, it returned to the Republic of

21 Croatia. It was the 4th Battalion of the 4th Guards Brigade stationed in

22 Split under the command of a young officer, General Krsticevic. He went

23 on to command a brigade and was one of its most notable commanders.

24 Here where it's marked with number 2, the Croatian Army was

25 stationed along the Croatian borders. And here between numbers 3 and 4

Page 44584

1 and down towards Dubrovnik, it was all the Croatian Army. Of course, it

2 was after the signing of the agreement on co-operation in the border

3 areas between Dr. Franjo Tudjman, President Tudjman, and

4 President Izetbegovic, and the HVO held TG2, what His Honour

5 Judge Trechsel asked me. It's the Tactical Group 2 which manned

6 positions from the area south of Stolac towards the Croatian border,

7 defending Neum, among other things. And here we from the HVO and the

8 Croatian Army quarreled over who actually had to hold this line, because

9 this is not a defence line of anything in Bosnia and Herzegovina. This

10 is the defence line of Croatia facing the attacks by Republika Srpska.

11 And the Croatian Army did man those positions after a while, but

12 then the international community complained, and the HVO went on to man

13 those lines again, although it is still not clear to me. I would not

14 have complied with it because the Croatian Army in some areas, maybe a

15 kilometre or two, because of the lay of the land and in light of the laws

16 of war, moved into Bosnia-Herzegovina territory towards Dubrovnik. But

17 it was never a part of any conquests. It was just in accordance with the

18 rule that you have to and you can stop an attacker in the tactical depth.

19 And the border facing Dubrovnik was such that you can actually

20 fire on the town from a pistol. So if you want to repel the artillery so

21 that they can no longer target this town, and it is in -- at the

22 territory of another state which is not under the control of the

23 government, because from the beginning of the war, the government in

24 Sarajevo did not have any representatives, any idea how to defend it.

25 This was people organising themselves, and after all, I, myself, in an

Page 44585

1 effort to defend the basic things in life, your mother, your son, your

2 child, friends, and so on.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please get back to what's at

4 hand, because you're straying. Please move to the next map.

5 A. I do apologise. Number 31. Map number 31. That's 3D03741.

6 Again, this is the plan of -- for the attack of the JNA and the

7 VRS to the south -- attack on the south of Croatia from the territory of

8 Bosnia and Herzegovina. Here you have the translation.

9 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I think the number is 31 rather than 51 as you

10 wrote.

11 A. 31, yes.

12 MR. STRINGER: Mr. President, is it time for the break? I

13 thought it was about 5.30.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We still have five minutes to

15 go.

16 General, please write down 31, because, indeed, we have 51.

17 A. Thirty-one. So these are the axes of attack by the JNA and the

18 VRS, the attack on Livno towards Split, taking of Kupres, and then from

19 Mostar, they're moving towards Makarska. They're linking up their

20 forces, and we don't have to add anything to it. It's crystal clear as

21 it is.

22 Here we have two maps, 32. Map number 32. This is the map from

23 1995, operations between the 8th of October, 1995, until the 11th of

24 October, 1995. HVO, HV, BH Army in operations -- operations --

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General, this is not covered by

Page 44586

1 the indictment. What is the point of talking of a situation taking place

2 in 1995? What is the military purpose of giving us this information?

3 A. From a military point of view, this is what is important: We

4 have to see when the Croatian Army -- when, and what occasions and to

5 what extent actually had a presence in Bosnia-Herzegovina. On the

6 previous map I showed you that it was in the south of Croatia -- or,

7 rather, the Dubrovnik area, A, B, only the unit of 159 people, from the

8 10th of April until the end of June around Citluk, and the next time

9 there is a regular presence by the HV was in 1995 when Bihac was

10 liberated and when the Croatian troops, the HVO, the HV, and the BH Army

11 together advanced towards Banja Luka. These are two maps. These

12 operations were under the command of General Gotovina. This is southern

13 movement, and you can't really see it here. I wrote Jajce. Jajce was

14 liberated, Sipovo, Kljuc and so on.

15 This was after an agreement that was signed - this is important -

16 by Dr. Franjo Tudjman and Alija Izetbegovic about military co-operation.

17 So in 1995, I am --

18 MR. STRINGER: Objection, Mr. President. It is outside the scope

19 of the indictment, and the General's not even qualified to talk about

20 this. He's not even in his position in 1995.

21 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, Your Honour, if I may -- if I may --

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just one minute. Let me

23 respond to what he said, to what Mr. Stringer said. I can answer any

24 question that I like. That is my answer.

25 General, I asked you a question: Is this useful? You said, Yes,

Page 44587

1 because it shows in 1995 HVO and -- and HV led a joint operations under

2 the command of General Gotovina. We know that. You've said it now we

3 can move on to something else. Mr. Karnavas, what did you want to add?

4 MR. KARNAVAS: I just wanted to add that for contextual purposes

5 I believe this is relevant testimony, and I don't want to take up any

6 more time; but I do think for contextual purposes it's relevant, but

7 since the Trial Chamber has already ruled on the matter, there's no need

8 for me to elaborate.

9 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if you allow me just

10 one sentence. In our cross-examination of General Praljak, we tried to

11 show that only 23 per cent of the war period was the time when the BH

12 Army and the HVO were in conflict, and this document from 1995 covers the

13 77 per cent of the time when Muslims and Croats actually co-operated in

14 the defence against the common enemy. I think it is important in order

15 to be able to determine the intentions of the Croats and the Croatian

16 leadership.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Praljak, you told us

18 that in 1995 there was a joint action between HVO and HV. We have the

19 map. Very well. We take this into account. Mrs. Alaburic said that

20 according to her, and she's probably right, she said that most of the

21 time it wasn't HVO or ABiH but HVO and HV versus VRS, so forth and so on.

22 Well, everything is noted down anyway. Move to the next map, please, and

23 then we'll have a break.

24 A. Just two maps, two minutes, Your Honours. I am saying and the

25 next map number 33 shows it, I'm not going to say anything. Had

Page 44588

1 Mr. Izetbegovic in 1992 signed a military -- signed a military agreement

2 that he did eventually sign in 1995, the Army of Republika Srpska would

3 have been defeated much faster and there would have been no conflict

4 between the BH Army and the HVO. There would not have been any

5 aggression on the part of the BH Army against the HVO.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please write a number on the

7 previous map.

8 A. Thirty-three.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thirty-three.

10 A. This is the last one.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] This one is 34, and then we

12 have the break.

13 A. Last map, 34.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Tell us about map 34, please.

15 A. The HV, HVO, BH Army together defeated the Army of Republika

16 Srpska and came as close as Banja Luka, and then Christopher, Holbrooke

17 and Galbraith put a ban. They didn't want the Republika Srpska Army to

18 be defeated. We stopped and then --

19 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's remark: The witness should speak

20 slower.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General -- General Praljak,

22 please tell us the month and year of this map depicting the Banja Luka

23 operation. No, it's on the map already, obviously. Fall 1995, is that

24 it? No more maps?

25 A. I don't have any more maps.

Page 44589

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So let's break for 20 minutes.

2 --- Recess taken at 5.46 p.m.

3 --- On resuming at 6.08 p.m.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We are back in session.

5 Mr. Kovacic, you have the floor. I believe you have something to say

6 regarding the numbering of the maps.

7 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I don't

8 want us to move on. The last answer by Mr. Praljak was not recorded

9 because he was talking too fast. The interpreters were unable to catch

10 it. That was the part where he said that the HV and the HVO and the BH

11 Army together defeated the Army of Republika Srpska and reached as far as

12 Banja Luka, and then Christopher, Holbrooke, and Galbraith prohibited

13 them from proceeding any further. So that's all we have in record in --

14 on lines 15 through 18 at page 74. The last thing that is recorded is

15 they didn't want the BH -- the Republika Srpska Army to be defeated, and

16 then he said, "Well, we stopped," and you can see that there's something

17 missing here. So perhaps General Praljak might complete his answer. And

18 I apologise. As for the numbers for the maps that you mentioned, we will

19 provide the Trial Chamber tomorrow with a table where we will list all

20 the numbers that were used by General Praljak to mark the maps, collated

21 with the numbers -- 3D numbers, the e-court numbers, so that we can be

22 sure that we're all on the same page.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Stringer, the

24 Trial Chamber consider it fair for you to be able to put questions to

25 Mr. Praljak on these maps if you believe that, according to you, some of

Page 44590

1 these maps can be challenged.

2 MR. STRINGER: Yes, Mr. President. Thank you. Mr. President, at

3 some point, I think it was last week although I can't remember exactly

4 when, I was given the first 12 maps that we went through, and the rest of

5 them I -- I didn't have, and I had looked at these a little bit, although

6 again I was doing my own cross at the time, and I asked somebody else to

7 look at them for me.

8 I had not looked at or considered the maps 13 through the last

9 one, whatever it was, until we saw it today, and I -- there will be some

10 questions, not a lot, but I do have some questions, Mr. President, and I

11 think that it would be best and most efficient if I could put those

12 questions to the General on Thursday when we reconvene, say for probably

13 15 or 20 minutes at the most.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] That's no problem as far as I'm

15 concern. Let me consult with my fellow Judges. No, it seems that we all

16 agree. We agree. So you will put your questions on Thursday.

17 Ms. Alaburic and Ms. Nozica, you had questions to put, some

18 cross-examination questions to put to Mr. Praljak. Well, you can go at

19 it right away. Mrs. Alaburic?

20 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, the way I understand

21 our agreement with Ms. Nozica, she is supposed to start first.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

23 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Well, we

24 stuck to the order that is usual for the cross-examination of

25 General Praljak.

Page 44598

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Ms. Nozica.

2 Further Cross-examination by Ms. Alaburic:

3 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon to you, Your Honour, and

4 everybody else in the courtroom. Let me start off by saying good

5 afternoon, Mr. Praljak, officially, and now I have been given permission

6 to ask you a number of questions linked to a document that was shown you

7 by me learned friend Mr. Stringer and the number is P10960, and that's

8 the number under which you were shown Professor Jankovic's report or

9 analysis. Now, I have a few questions for you in that regard. To the

10 best of your knowledge, was Professor Jankovic on the territory of

11 Herceg-Bosnia in 1992?

12 THE INTERPRETER: Could all the other microphones be switched

13 off, please? Thank you.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] With a great degree of certainty I

15 can say that he was not.

16 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Tell us, please, General, Professor Jankovic, was he in

18 Herceg-Bosna in 1993?

19 A. With a great deal of certainty, I state that he was not. I am

20 completely unaware of any such fact, and I think that I would have had to

21 know about it. No, he was not on the territory of Herceg-Bosna.

22 Professor Jankovic was not.

23 Q. Tell us now, please, did Professor Jankovic ever see or

24 physically touch any pieces or weapons that he analysed in the report we

25 had in front of us?

Page 44599

1 A. Certainly not. His knowledge comes from his work as a professor,

2 not by having an insight into the actual state of the artillery pieces in

3 the HVO.

4 Q. General Praljak, are you telling us that Professor Jankovic,

5 then, did not in fact know what artillery pieces they had in

6 Herceg-Bosnia, but he made his conclusions on the basis of some

7 theoretical premises, looking at the type of weapon, the date of

8 manufacture and so on?

9 A. Yes, that's quite certain. He was judging on the basis of

10 what -- the subject he taught but certainly he didn't see -- have an

11 insight into the weaponry that the HVO had in 1992 and 1993, and in the

12 Croatian Army he dealt with scholarly work concerning the manufacture of

13 weapons, the training of crews, and so on.

14 Q. Tell us, General, to the best of your knowledge, Professor

15 Jankovic was he in possession of any documents perhaps linked to these

16 piece -- artillery pieces, firing tables, corrections made and

17 adjustments made to the firing and firing tables or concrete documents

18 related to concrete artillery pieces on the territory of Herceg-Bosna?

19 A. He certainly didn't ask me for any such documents, and it is also

20 quite certain that I didn't have those documents in my possession, so I

21 can say with a great deal of certainty that he did not have access to

22 those documents. He did not have them before him in writing up his

23 report, because his expertise was not compiled on the basis of an insight

24 into the fact, in the present tense, when it was actually happening on

25 the ground.

Page 44600

1 Q. Tell us, please, General, Professor Jankovic, did he have a list

2 of soldiers and officers who were deployed in the HVO on artillery

3 positions?

4 A. I absolutely exclude that possibility.

5 Q. Does your answer imply that Professor Jankovic, in fact, didn't

6 know at all what specific men were involved, who was in the artillery of

7 the HVO, what these people's training was, what training they had

8 undergone, and so on?

9 A. He certainly couldn't have known any of that, no.

10 Q. Tell us, please, General, just one more question in this

11 connection. To the best of your knowledge, did Professor Jankovic talk

12 to any soldier or officer, who in 1992 and 1993 or 1993, was deployed in

13 the artillery of the HVO?

14 A. I don't know of any such case.

15 Q. Thank you. Very well. Now, staying with this topic, the

16 artillery, I have several questions just to see what your understanding

17 is of certain rules of warfare as an HVO commander in the second half of

18 1993.

19 Tell us, please, General, do you happen to know that it was

20 prohibited to attack or bomb a town, village, or settlement which was not

21 defended, that is, that all attacks on undefended localities were

22 prohibited.

23 A. Yes. I know that perfectly well.

24 Q. I'm now going to ask you another question that you would say

25 argumentum a contrario. Do you know that an attack is allowed on

Page 44601

1 defended places?

2 A. Yes, I'm perfectly well aware of that.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The question, Mrs. Alaburic is

4 a little bit complicated. She is asking whether you know that you cannot

5 attack a village, an undefended village. It's very interesting question,

6 and it's merit is that it has been asked, but does this mean in your mind

7 that the army that is about to attack or not to attack knows in advance

8 it is defended or undefended? Do you need to know whether or not the

9 village is defended or not. If one of the belligerent parties doesn't

10 know whether or not a village is defended, can it preventively, after

11 having taken all the necessary precautions to make sure that there are no

12 civilians present, launch a first military operation to conquer the

13 village?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Judge Antonetti. You cannot

15 take control of a village that -- or attack a village that is not

16 defended. So before you enter a village or pass through a village, for

17 that matter, you do two things: First of all, you collect intelligence,

18 military intelligence; second -- secondly, you reconnoiter. You

19 reconnoiter from some vantage points to ascertain whether along a certain

20 axis there are -- there is an enemy. And thirdly, there is forced

21 reconnaissance work. You send reconnaissance men, one, two, or three,

22 and they advance until they are fired at.

23 Now, there's a rule that holds true in cases of that kind. You

24 can't learn where the enemy is unless you lose some reconnaissance men.

25 So usually these reconnaissance men come across an ambush, and they're

Page 44602

1 killed, these scouts, but it's important to send these scouts out to see

2 the positions of the enemy, and I did this in the Konjic operation

3 together with the BH Army, for instance.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You know -- and I'm going to

5 refer to the case of Vietnam. In some villages there were apparently

6 some civilians, but in fact, troops were hidden under floor boards or in

7 galleries, underground galleries. In that case, the US Army would send

8 scouts, as you just said, but they wouldn't leave it like that. As soon

9 as they saw a hole, they threw a grenade in it.

10 Is this part of the soldier's manual, who, when he knows that in

11 a village there are civilians, must check to see if some enemy soldiers

12 are hidden?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Only through forcible

14 reconnaissance, that is to say passing through the village. You send

15 somebody through the village, and if he's not shot at, then most probably

16 there's nobody in the village. They can, of course, search a certain

17 number of houses.

18 Now, the Vietnam War was a specific one. There was a lot of

19 digging and so on when the French were there. That wasn't the case in

20 our parts.

21 So you send two or three scouts to reconnoiter the area, to

22 reconnoiter a village to see the lie of the land, so to speak. And to be

23 quite frank, those scouts were very often killed.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mrs. Alaburic.

25 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

Page 44603

1 Q. Tell us, please, General, in your opinion, in an attack on a

2 defended locality, is it absolutely forbidden, consciously, to attack

3 civilian targets, or is that allowed?

4 A. No, it is not allowed to attack civilian targets unless they are

5 in the service of any military activities by the enemy side.

6 Q. Just a moment. I'll take that a step further. Tell us, please,

7 General, to the best of your knowledge, at a point when a civilian

8 facility is used for military purposes, then that civilian facility

9 becomes a military target; right?

10 A. Absolutely. There's no dilemma on that score. That's how things

11 stand.

12 MR. STRINGER: Sorry for the intervention. Mr. President, this

13 is nothing but legal principles that the Trial Chamber doesn't need to be

14 instructed on by a witness, and there's nothing in these questions that

15 relates to the context of any of the conflicts or crimes that are alleged

16 in the indictment. It's pure law, and the Trial Chamber is the master of

17 the applicable law and doesn't need instruction as it's getting in this

18 way.

19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You are right from a strictly

20 legal standpoint, the Trial Chamber has not instructions to receive, to

21 know what the applicable rules of law are. But we have seen a document

22 from Colonel Blaskic that incorporates the order from Mr. Boban on the

23 Geneva Conventions and so on. So one might raise the question as to what

24 is the knowledge of the HVO commander on the rules of law and the

25 international conventions especially insofar as in any worthy army there

Page 44604

1 is a minimum amount that is taught to officers and soldiers as to

2 compliance with rules of war, whether it's the treatment of prisoners or

3 other. So perhaps General Praljak is not, himself, a legal scholar, that

4 is what he said himself, but he does have a minimum of knowledge as to

5 what is allowed and what is not. So I fail to see where the problem

6 lies.

7 Mrs. Alaburic, you have the floor.

8 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I am

9 really asking General Praljak these questions in his position as

10 commander. At what point should you launch an attack on a defended

11 locality, whether it is more important to safeguard civilians and

12 civilian facilities or to achieve a military objective. So in view of

13 these concepts and evaluation of interests from the aspects of military

14 interest, is the topic of my re-direct to General Praljak.

15 Now, the fact that these questions have certain legal

16 repercussions and consequences at this point in time, I --

17 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Excuse me for interrupting. The way you have

18 now formulated the question is really asking what the law is, and that

19 the Prosecution is correct in saying that's not the purpose of direct or

20 cross.

21 I have a feeling that you want to demonstrate something else,

22 namely to what extent the witness was knowledgeable of that law. That is

23 a different aspect, and that is correct, but you should then put your

24 question in a way which makes it clear that you do not want to have him

25 tell the Chamber what the law is, but you want him to demonstrate how

Page 44605

1 much he knew about it.

2 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, most probably you're

3 right, and most probably, I fail to formulate my question properly, and

4 if so, I apologise for that.

5 Q. Now, General, I'm asking you questions as a military commander

6 about attacks on a defended locality, and it's up to you to weigh up all

7 the relevant factors and decide whether you're going to go ahead or not.

8 Now, your last answer, as far as I remember, was to say that

9 never, under no circumstances, is it permitted to target civilian

10 targets, but then you said that if civilian targets are used in -- for

11 military purposes, then they become military targets.

12 MR. STRINGER: Excuse me, General. I apologise again for the

13 interruption. It was my understanding that this -- the scope of this

14 examination relates to the Jankovic report, which relates itself to HVO

15 artillery, use of artillery. So perhaps for the record, if counsel could

16 specify that we're talking about artillery operations on civilian targets

17 versus infantry operations, which is something different and which would

18 be outside the scope, I think, of the cross-examination.

19 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, for the moment I'm

20 talking about attacks on a defended locality, and the next step would be

21 to take a look at what civilians are exposed to in an infantry attack

22 compared to an artillery attack and what the possible differences are in

23 the conduct of an army during an infantry operation and an artillery

24 operation.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mrs. Alaburic, the problem is

Page 44606

1 as follows: You said, "I will be asking questions based on the Jankovic

2 report." This report addresses the issue of the bridge. I thought you

3 were going to ask questions about whether a bridge can be a military

4 target. Now you are moving to another sphere, field, that of villages

5 with civilian population. The Jankovic report does not cover this. Why

6 are you deviating from the original topic? And the OTP is raising that

7 in his own arguments. He did not raise this.

8 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, there are two

9 reports written by Professor Jankovic. One relates to the Old Bridge,

10 and that is not the topic of my re-direct.

11 The other one, the other report, is the one which the

12 Praljak Defence never tendered officially, and through an oral decision

13 of yours, you allowed the Prosecution to use it. And I'd just like to

14 remind you that the Petkovic Defence objected and said that it was a new

15 piece of evidence. However, you decided that questions can be asked

16 based on that new document. And now my questions relate exclusively to

17 that second report by Professor Jankovic, which was never tabled as an

18 expert report, and according to General Praljak, it should not have been

19 examined in this courtroom, but since your ruling allowed this --

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I understand.

21 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. General Praljak, a question linked to that second report now, and

23 that is the question of proportionality during an artillery or any other

24 kind of attack, for that matter, on a defended locality.

25 General, please tell us, do you know that under the principle of

Page 44607

1 proportionality possible civilian casualties and damage to civilian

2 facilities in any attack on an undefended locality must be significantly

3 smaller than the military effects achieved by an attack on the undefended

4 locality? Have you ever heard of the greater importance that is given to

5 the achieving of a military effect then on the -- which must be then much

6 greater than the civilian casualties, or is it the first time that you

7 hear it?

8 A. Ms. Alaburic, 30 years before the war started, out of curiosity,

9 I studied wars from Napoleon on. I studied all the relevant books, and I

10 focused precisely on this issue: What is the proportion? And I could

11 speak about this for hours with all the facts that I have in my head; how

12 in every war that follows the number of civilian casualties increases:

13 The Vietnam war, the Iraq war, the Israel and Palestine conflict. This

14 has been the subject of my interest for years. I know that, and I

15 presented many of the facts to the Judges already. So I claim that I

16 knew that. I was perfectly well aware of that and this is one of the

17 most difficult military conundrums ever since it was first introduced

18 because you have this principle of proportionality under the law, and

19 that is why we applied this rule very restrictively, absolutely

20 restrictively.

21 So the Old Bridge was a military target, and when they attacked

22 and -- on around the 20th of September when they launched this

23 large-scale offensive, we, in the HVO - and I can claim on the basis of

24 everything that I read in the books - we were the only side that would

25 not have destroyed the bridge.

Page 44608

1 Well, all the armies destroy bridges as they retreat. They burn

2 the bridges behind them.

3 Q. If I can just sum up your answer. So you are aware of this

4 proportionality test, and you applied it as the commander of the HVO; is

5 that so? Could you please just very briefly answer?

6 A. Yes, and we applied it restrictively, madam. So 20 military

7 facilities were in the centre of Mostar. They were military targets,

8 command posts, headquarters.

9 Q. Yes. We'll go through all that with our witnesses, but one last

10 question, General Praljak. Is it your position that at the time when the

11 BH Army started using the Old Bridge for military purposes did the

12 Old Bridge become a legitimate military target at that time?

13 A. Yes, absolutely, like Monte Cassino and any other facility. It

14 was a military target, but we -- I did not allow it.

15 Q. Thank you very much, General Praljak.

16 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your Honours,

17 for the time that you've accorded me.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One last question. You said as

19 using the maps that the Serbs had destroyed all bridges except for the

20 Old Bridge. Why didn't they destroy the Old Bridge?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Hey, the man that they sent to

22 activate the explosives inside the bridge, he -- he died. We killed him.

23 The HVO killed him. And number two, the speed with which we were able to

24 take the bridgehead off further down from the Old Bridge to the east, and

25 my order to protect the Old Bridge against the mortar shells, that's what