Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 45969

 1                           Monday, 26 October 2009

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The accused Pusic not present]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 2.15 p.m.

 6             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Registrar, could you please

 7     call the case.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes.

 9             Good afternoon, everyone in and around the courtroom.

10             This is case number IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor versus

11     Jadranko Prlic et al.

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Madam

13     Registrar.

14             Monday, the 26th October 2009.  I greet Mr. Prlic,

15     Mr. Ostojic [as interpreted], Mr. Praljak, I also -- Mr. Petkovic and

16     Mr. Coric, who is with us now.  I also welcome Mr. Pusic.  I hope you

17     will get better soon.  Best wishes.  I also greet counsel, Mr. Scott, and

18     all his colleagues behind him, as well as his female collaborators, and

19     all those who are helping us in and out of this court.

20             I would like to have the Registrar give us the numbers.

21             THE REGISTRAR:  Thank you, Your Honours.

22             Praljak Defence has submitted their responses to the Prosecution

23     objections to the documents tendered through Witness Sakic, Vlado.

24     This list shall be given Exhibit IC1081.  As well, some parties

25      have submitted

Page 45970

 1     lists of documents to be tendered through Witness Curcic, Dragan.  The

 2     list submitted by 3D shall be given Exhibit IC1082.  The list submitted

 3     by 4D shall be given Exhibit IC1083.  The list committed by 2D shall be

 4     given Exhibit IC1084, and the list submitted by the OTP shall be given

 5     Exhibit IC1085.

 6             Thank you, Your Honours.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Madam Registrar.

 8             Mr. Stewart.

 9             MR. STEWART:  Your Honours, good afternoon.

10             Your Honours may have noticed that the Petkovic Defence team is

11     in the front bench.  Your Honours, for purposes of today, it's actually

12     essential because there are technical facilities available on this bench

13     which are not available behind, but we submitted a request to

14     Your Honours.  I apologise.  If we have had a response, we just haven't

15     had time to pick it up in the last few minutes.  Our request was that we

16     should be able to sit in this row, with the complete agreement of our

17     helpful colleagues for the Stojic Defence, throughout the Petkovic case.

18     We believe that's more helpful for Your Honours, the witness, counsel,

19     for everybody.

20             Thank you, Your Honours.

21             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Indeed, the Chamber received

22     your request, and therefore it is accepted.  It is perfectly justified,

23     this request.

24             I will indicate to the Petkovic Defence that we are starting

25     today at a quarter past 2.00, and we'll stop around 10 to 5.00, because

Page 45971

 1     as you know, today we have the election of the new President of the

 2     Tribunal, and therefore there has been a change in the schedule at the

 3     last minute, so you have been advised that the hearing would start at a

 4     quarter past 2.00 and will finish, at the latest, at 5.00 p.m.  Around

 5     1650, we should really stop the hearing.

 6             We have an opening statement which is now going to begin, and I

 7     give the floor to the Defence of General Petkovic.

 8             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, good afternoon.

 9     Good afternoon to my learned friends from the OTP, all the other Defence

10     teams, and everyone else in the courtroom, including, of course, the

11     accused.

12             Your Honours, the Petkovic Defence has decided to begin our case

13     with an opening statement, in keeping with Rule 84, the reason being we

14     wish to apply the same standard to the Court, the Prosecutor, and all the

15     other Defence teams in a clear and concise way in order to explain our

16     Defence plan and our main theories.  The Petkovic Defence wishes that

17     these subjects be raised in a timely manner in this courtroom and for all

18     the events to be clarified that we believe to be of relevance to these

19     proceedings.  The question is, of course:  Do we make the job any easier

20     by opening like that to our learned friends from the OTP?  We do believe

21     that this is the case.  Nevertheless, we shall not let this stand in our

22     way, in terms of presenting our opening statement.

23             The situation is as follows:  All the charges in this case in a

24     way are in relation to a person wearing a military uniform.  The

25     customary understanding is that military commanders are responsible for

Page 45972

 1     any steps taken by their own soldiers.  The responsibility, in a way,

 2     rests on the shoulders of these military commanders then, unless proven

 3     otherwise.  In other words, there is a certain presumption of

 4     responsibility, at the expense of military commanders, who are also

 5     soldiers.

 6             The fundamental interest of the Petkovic Defence is for all

 7     events and relations relevant to this case to be established specifically

 8     both de jure and de facto.

 9             Our opening statement has been sent up as a Powerpoint

10     presentation.  I have just been told that the system can be switched on

11     as soon as I announce the use of Sanction.  I have no idea what that

12     means, I do have to admit, but I hope that helps us switch on the

13     Powerpoint presentation.

14             The opening statement of the Petkovic Defence, Your Honours, my

15     learned friends, will comprise five subject matters or five chapters, the

16     first being the joint criminal enterprise, and that is what we shall

17     spend the longest time dwelling on.  The next one is the time-frame.  The

18     third one is the crime base.  Number 4 is the HVO Main Staff.  And

19     number 5 on our list is Milivoj Petkovic, himself.

20             Let us now move on to the first component, which is also the

21     central component to the Petkovic Defence, joint criminal enterprise, or,

22     as defined by the OTP, a campaign of persecutions, military actions,

23     arrests, and expulsions.

24             In the indictment, the Prosecution submits in paragraph 25, I

25     read:

Page 45973

 1             "While not every member of the HVO was part of the joint criminal

 2     enterprise, the HVO was one of the essential structures and instruments

 3     of the joint criminal enterprise."

 4             Paragraph 33 goes on to state:

 5             "The Herceg-Bosna/HVO forces set about a broad campaign of

 6     persecutions, military actions, arrests, and expulsions to enforce their

 7     demands."

 8             The Prosecution also continues by saying this:

 9             "On 16 through 18th of April, 1993, Herceg-Bosna/HVO forces

10     attacked more than 30 Muslim towns and villages."

11             Paragraph 34:

12             "The Herceg-Bosna/HVO attacks, arrests, and expulsions in the

13     second half of April 1993 set in motion an extensive campaign of such

14     actions, interrupted by occasional cease-fires, which continues even

15     after the signing of another peace plan, the Washington Agreement, in

16     March 1994."

17             The Defence counters these claims made by the OTP as follows:

18     Firstly, there was no joint criminal enterprise to persecute, arrest, and

19     expel Muslims.  Secondly, the HVO never prepared for a war against the

20     Muslims.  Thirdly, the clashes between the BH Army and the HVO, on a

21     broader scale, were a consequence of the offensive plans and actions of

22     the BH Army.  Number 4, in 1993 the BH Army conquered territories and

23     expanded the area under the control of the Muslim authorities.  Number 5,

24     the military actions of the HVO were no more than reactions to the plans

25     and actions of the BH Army.  At the time, there was only one order that

Page 45974

 1     the HVO obeyed, and that was to defend themselves.

 2             Talking of the joint criminal enterprise, our Defence will be

 3     structured as follows:  There are two components to it.  Firstly, we

 4     shall try to prove that the Croats did not plan for clashes with Muslims

 5     in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  And, secondly, we shall try to explain the

 6     importance of a turning point in the relations between the Muslims and

 7     the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1993, the date being the 30th of

 8     June, 1993.

 9             Let us move on to the first point.  The Croats were not planning

10     for a conflict with Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  While dealing

11     with this, we shall be tackling seven individual components, as you can

12     probably see if you look at this introductory part of our statement.  The

13     first element.  The HVO was not planning for any clashes with Muslims in

14     Bosnia and Herzegovina.  This theory by the Defence is proven, among

15     other elements, by the following:  The Prosecution claims it was clear

16     that the clashes in Bosnia and Herzegovina would be of an ethnic national

17     character even before the first clashes broke out.  They also go on to

18     state that there was a high probability of violence against civilians.

19     The Defence counter this as follows:  The Croats believed that the war

20     against Muslims in -- had the Croats believed that the war against

21     Muslims in Bosnia-Herzegovina was inevitable, then, firstly, the HVO

22     would not have been built up as a joint army of both Croats and Muslims

23     and, secondly, the HVO would not have worked together with the BH Army,

24     fighting the JNA and the Army of Republika Srpska.  Rather, it would have

25     started clashes with the army when it was at the lowest point of its

Page 45975

 1     power.  Thirdly, the Republic of Croatia would not have supported the

 2     BH Army, nor would it have cooperated with the political leadership of

 3     the BH Muslims.  And, fourthly, the HVO would not have seen the outbreak

 4     of clashes with the BH Army on a broad scale unprepared -- entirely

 5     unprepared in April 1993.

 6             Let us look at a number of documents now showing that the HVO was

 7     really a joint army of both Croats and Muslims.

 8             The Chief of the Main Staff of the HVO, Milivoj Petkovic, sent a

 9     letter to Sefer Halilovic in February 1993.  In this letter, he

10     emphasizes, I quote -- that was in February 1993.  In this letter, he

11     emphasizes as follows:

12             "I looked forward to each new soldier, Croat or Muslim, because I

13     knew that they had a common goal.

14             "The HVO has not changed its attitude or behaviour towards the

15     BH Army to this day.

16             "We are aware that with the present balance of powers, neither

17     the HVO nor the BH Army alone could defeat the Chetniks."

18             The next document was written by the deputy chief of the Staff of

19     the Supreme Command of the BH Army, dated January 1993, conveying the

20     words of Arif Pasalic, who said that in the HVO units there were between

21     20 and 80 per cent Muslims.

22             The third document, the "Herzegovina Soldier," which was a

23     newspaper published by the 4th Corps of the BH Army, containing an

24     interview of an HVO company commander in Capljina, comprising Muslims as

25     well.  He said that all of his soldiers were wearing lilies from the very

Page 45976

 1     beginning, and as far as that was concerned, they had no problems in the

 2     HVO.

 3             Your Honours, we could move on and show you dozens of other

 4     documents on this same topic, which is exactly what we plan to continue

 5     doing throughout our Defence case.  Nevertheless, we believe that for the

 6     present purposes, this is quite sufficient for you to get an idea of our

 7     theory, the main theory that we have expounded, for the duration of this

 8     case so far.

 9             Also, during this trial we have seen a great many documents about

10     the fact that the HVO and the BH Army were allies in their struggle

11     against a common enemy.  Allow me at this point in time to point out a

12     number of those, the ones that we believe to be exceptionally relevant.

13             Milivoj Petkovic, in June 1992, addresses the HVO municipal

14     staffs in Konjic and Gornji Vakuf, the HVO municipal staffs in Konjic and

15     Gornji Vakuf, and I'm talking about 1992.  Among other things, it

16     reads -- there were some clashes between the Croats and the Muslims, and

17     Petkovic says, I quote:

18             "Sit down immediately all together at the same table and clear up

19     the situation that you are now facing.  I expect you have not forgotten

20     that the TO and the HVO are both integral parts of the armed forces of

21     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Instead of strengthening your mutual bonds in your

22     struggle against our common enemy, who is at the door-step of your

23     municipality, you are preparing to use arms against each other.

24             In the name of both Croats and Muslims, I beg you to try and

25     overcome this situation, and as members of the BH armed forces, you are

Page 45977

 1     bound to do just that."

 2             In this same context, another document that is highly relevant is

 3     a press release by Mate Boban on the 3rd of July, 1992.  Mate Boban says

 4     that a provisional executive authority was established in the

 5     successfully-defended liberated areas of the BH by setting up the HZ-HB

 6     Presidency.  Nevertheless, he goes on to state that this in no way

 7     challenges the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and

 8     Herzegovina.

 9             In the second paragraph of this press release which you can see

10     on your screens, it reads, I quote:

11             "The Croatian Defence Council was set up as an armed force of

12     their own against the occupied and aggressor in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

13     As soon as it was set up, the Presidency and Government of Bosnia and

14     Herzegovina were informed that this force regarded itself as a part of

15     the united defence forces under the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

16     but that a joint command of the armed forces for the entire area of the

17     independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina needed to be established."

18             The third document shows that the brigade of -- Bregava Brigade

19     of BH Army requested the 1st Brigade of the HVO a zone of responsibility

20     and a location for their own unit.

21             This is followed by the next document in order by

22     Alija Izetbegovic to lift the blockade of Sarajevo, dated October 1992.

23     This was also dispatched to the BH Army and the HVO.

24             Next one up, order to defend by Milivoj Petkovic, dated November

25     1992, dispatched also to the Mostar Brigade of the BH Army.  Likewise, an

Page 45978

 1     order by Tihomir Blaskic for the defence of Central Bosnia, showing that

 2     the tasks were defined in order to be carried out jointly with the

 3     BH Army.  The same thing is shown by Miljenko Lasic's order for active

 4     defence of the South-Eastern Herzegovina Operation Zone, dated February

 5     1993.  He, too, defined certain tasks that also applied to brigades from

 6     the BH Army.

 7             Your Honours, there are numerous other documents on a real and

 8     sincere cooperation between the BH Army and the HVO.  In certain areas of

 9     Bosnia-Herzegovina, the cooperation, indeed, continued throughout 1993.

10     The honourable Chamber has seen ample evidence to this effect, and we

11     will not be dwelling on that in particular.

12             The third component within this is about the HVO as a

13     component -- a component element of the BH armed forces.  We have spoken

14     a lot about that as well during this trial, Your Honours.  Let us try and

15     remind ourselves of some key elements:  The agreement on friendship and

16     cooperation signed in 1992 by Izetbegovic and Tudjman, in July 1992.

17     Paragraph 6 reads:

18             "The armed component of the HVO is an integral part of the united

19     armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

20             The Decree on the Armed Forces of BH was soon amended, and the

21     HVO was now considered to be a component of the army.

22             Alija Izetbegovic, in the "Oslobodjenje," liberation daily, in

23     October 1992, announced an imminent establishment of a -- the imminent

24     establishment of a joint command of the BH Army forces and the HVO.

25             Halilovic and Petkovic, in their agreement dated the 20th of

Page 45979

 1     April, 1993, defined both the BH Army and the HVO as legal and legitimate

 2     armed forces of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and should be equally

 3     treated as such.  Soon after, there was a joint statement that was issued

 4     on the 25th of April, 1993.  Izetbegovic, Boban, and Tudjman also

 5     asserted and called on the military units of the BH Army and the HVO to

 6     start setting up a joint command.  They also pointed out that both armies

 7     were equally legitimate.  On that same day, in a military supplement to

 8     the joint statement, Halilovic and Petkovic agreed that the BH Army and

 9     the HVO would keep their separate identities and command.  It also says

10     that they would be setting up a joint command to control military

11     operations throughout the military districts in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

12             In June 1993, at a meeting of the BH Presidency, the following

13     was said:

14             "We recognise the HVO as a constituent part of the armed forces."

15             The Washington Agreement states very much the same thing,

16     Your Honours.  The Army of the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina would be

17     made up of two components, the HVO and the BH Army.  It also says that

18     the bodies of command, at the moment the agreement was concluded, would

19     continue to operate and that a joint command would soon be established.

20     There are quite a number of other documents to this effect, Your Honour.

21     We shall not be placing an extra burden on the Trial Chamber by repeating

22     this, because we believe this to be a proven fact in this trial.

23             Number 4 is in relation to the Republic of Croatia and the

24     support lent by the Republic of Croatia to both the Muslims and the

25     Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The Petkovic Defence theory in relation to

Page 45980

 1     the Republic of Croatia is as follows:  First, the Republic of Croatia

 2     was not an occupying power in Bosnia-Herzegovina; secondly, the Republic

 3     of Croatia did not have effective control over what went on on the ground

 4     in Bosnia-Herzegovina; thirdly, the Republic of Croatia was helping both

 5     the HVO and the BH Army in the following ways:  A, by supplying weapons,

 6     ammunition and other military equipment; B, by training men; C, by

 7     allowing HV soldiers and officers of both Croat and Muslim ethnicities to

 8     join the HVO and the BH Army in an effort to defend Bosnia-Herzegovina,

 9     without thereby altering in any way their soldiers' or officers' status

10     in the Croatian Army; D, logistics centres of the BH Army, training

11     centres for BH Army soldiers, in the territory belonging to the Republic

12     of Croatia; E, providing shelter and care for refugees from

13     Bosnia-Herzegovina, irrespective of their ethnicity; F, medical care for

14     wounded and sick, irrespective of their ethnicity; G, various forms of

15     financial aid, and other forms of aid as well.

16             Your Honours, the Petkovic Defence has no intention of dwelling

17     on this segment, although it is very important to this case, simply

18     because we believe that what has been put forward by the Praljak, Stojic

19     and Prlic Defence so far fully support this theory.  We believe there is

20     no need for the Petkovic Defence to go any further into this and bring

21     new evidence to support these claims.

22             Number 5 within the same framework is entitled "The HVO did not

23     prepare for war against Muslims."  At this point in time, we shall be

24     pointing out two statements to that effect, the first being from a

25     Milivoj Petkovic interview published by the Zagreb-based daily,

Page 45981

 1     "Vecernji List," in August 1994.  General Petkovic says:

 2             "We did not prepare for war against the Muslims."

 3             Kresimir Zubak, in a Croatian TV show, said, I quote:

 4             "At the moment we were signing the Vance-Owen Plan, the HVO was

 5     in control of 88 per cent of the territory that was supposed, under the

 6     Vance-Owen Plan, to be annexed by the Croatian provinces.  Nevertheless,

 7     following an aggression by the Muslim forces, the control of that

 8     territory was reduced to 50 per cent, showing that the Croats had not

 9     expected the MOS, the Muslim armed forces, to act in this way.  In this

10     sense, we were unprepared."

11             Furthermore, Your Honours, the Prosecution in this case claims

12     that the clashes between the HVO and the BH Army in April 1993 occurred

13     as a result of the criminal plans and criminal actions taken by the

14     Croats.  Our theory, Your Honours, is as follows:  The BH Army, who was

15     planning, in the spring of 1993, to launch broad offensive actions

16     against the HVO and gain control over some strategically-important

17     locations, both for the country's economy and in more narrow strategic

18     sense, and this is what gave rise to the wide-ranging conflict in 1993.

19     We shall try to prove this theory by citing further documents and witness

20     and bringing witnesses.  At this point in time, we would merely like to

21     point out a number of documents that we believe to be crucial.

22             In January 1993, there was a plan by the BH Army to cut across

23     some roads, thereby creating Croatian enclaves in Central Bosnia.  This

24     is demonstrated by the report of the chief of security, Administration of

25     the Staff of the BH Supreme Commander.  You can see which specific roads

Page 45982

 1     are mentioned there and what corridor was to be sealed off.  I would like

 2     to merely draw your attention to one of those, which was the one that was

 3     most commented on in this case, and that was the sealing of the

 4     Busovaca-Kiseljak road.  The army was planning to do this back in April,

 5     and they soon put this into effect, which is demonstrated by the

 6     following document appearing on our screens right now, which is a report

 7     by the HVO to the government, but concerning the situation in Central

 8     Bosnia, dated the 27th of January, 1993.  It reads, I quote:

 9             "The Busovaca-Kiseljak road is cut off in the region of the

10     Kacuni village."

11             We would like to point out, Your Honours, that the BiH Army

12     conducted and pursued a very deliberate policy by removing non-Muslims

13     who occupied -- or, rather, Muslims who occupied high positions and

14     wanted cooperation with the Croats.  The document that points to that

15     fact is an order by Sefer Halilovic, dated 28 January 1993.  In the

16     introductory part of the order, it says that a small number of staff from

17     the BiH Army, the MUP, and the government completed placed themselves at

18     the service of the Greater Croatian policy, and names are mentioned.

19     Dr. Rusmir Hadzihuseinovic, Hadzihuseinovic, we will make note of that

20     and correct that later, he was the president of the municipality of

21     Konjic.  The next one was Jasmin Guska, the chief of the MUP in Konjic,

22     Mr. Tufo, Refo, the chief of the MUP in Hadzici, and Midhat Cerovac, the

23     commander of the BiH Brigade in Konjic.  Three of the four aforementioned

24     persons hailed from Konjic.  Sefer Halilovic's order to Arif Pasalic

25     reads as follows, and I'll paraphrase:  Remove all those who are within

Page 45983

 1     your authority and prepare decisions that need to be taken by somebody

 2     else, including the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

 3     That order demonstrates clearly that the BH Army had plans for Konjic to

 4     remove Muslims who were willing to cooperate with the Croats.  Let's see

 5     what happened soon thereafter.

 6             Soon thereafter, Rusmir Hadzihuseinovic was removed from his

 7     position, and Mr. Safet Cibo took over the overall power in Konjic and

 8     Jablanica.  The Presidency of the ABiH appointed him on the 13th of

 9     March, 1993, as the president of the War Presidency of Jablanica and

10     Konjic.

11             Sefer Halilovic, on the 20th of March, 1993, appointed Safet Cibo

12     and deployed him to the 4th Corps of the BiH Army within who's are of

13     responsibility were Konjic and Jablanica.  And, thirdly, the regional

14     board of the SDA issued a decision about adopting Safet Cibo as a member

15     of the Regional Committee of Herzegovina.  That party promotion also

16     happened on the 20th of March 1993.

17             Let's look at what happened three days after the reshuffle in

18     Konjic.

19             On the 23rd of March, 1993, the BiH Army attacked the HVO in

20     Konjic.  A report by the BiH Army reads, and I quote:

21             "150 members of the HVO captured, the town blocked, the life in

22     town paralysed, and we continue with further arrests."

23             Your Honours, we are going to demonstrate that the conflict was

24     partly appeased.  However, in the first part of April a new attack was

25     launched by the BH Army against Konjic.  Everything that we are going to

Page 45984

 1     show you will predominantly be excerpts from the BiH Army documents.  A

 2     combat report by the BiH Army dated 23rd March 1993 reads as follows:

 3             "On the 14th of April, 1993, the Neretvica Brigade gained control

 4     of the Buscak feature, where it seized an 82-millimetre MB and some

 5     infantry units, and the HVO barracks ..."

 6             We would like to draw attention to the fact, Your Honour, that

 7     this incident happened three days before the conflict in Sovici.  In the

 8     same arm -- report of the BH Army, it says:

 9             "I believe that tomorrow is the decisive day.  The actions to

10     liberate the town will start tomorrow.  It is already under heavy fire

11     from the aforementioned elevations.  This time there will be no stopping.

12     We will go on 'till final victory."

13             Let's see what the HVO is reporting on the same day from Konjic.

14     The HVO from Konjic reports as follows:

15             "Konjic was attacked by forces that had arrived from Bradina and

16     Igman.  We are trying our best to neutralise those activities.  They are

17     putting pressure from Jablanica on the territory of Klis.  We are trying

18     to do our best in Jablanica to link up all those forces."

19             This is one of the crucial sentences, Your Honours:

20             "We are going to try and prove that the HVO did not attack

21     Jablanica in order to conquer Jablanica, but rather that the attack was

22     within the context of broader and wider conflicts in the territory of

23     Jablanica and Konjic."

24             Further on in the same document, the HVO says:

25             "Help, start while we are still alive."

Page 45985

 1             This document is actually a cry from Konjic on the 15th of April,

 2     1993.  And again I emphasise this is a conflict which took place two days

 3     before the conflict in Sovici.

 4             There are a number of other BiH Army documents which show how

 5     this operation to conquer the Konjic area developed.  Let us point out

 6     just the most relevant ones.

 7             A combat report dated 17 April 1993, which says, and I quote:

 8             "We will try to have the work in Prozor completed as soon as

 9     possible and then start with all brigades counter-attack in two

10     directions.  The first axis will be Konjic-Jablanica-Mostar, and the

11     second axis will be Konjic-Prozor-Rama."

12             That is why Konjic has been the source of the essence of the

13     army -- of the conflict between the army and the HVO, and it has been so

14     for all Defence teams.  The Stojic Defence had a witness to that effect

15     and produced a number of documents.  Unfortunately, so far we have not

16     managed to penetrate the Trial Chamber's attention with this theory

17     because on a number of cases -- in most of the cases you said that it was

18     a tu quoque defence.  We would like to say that this is the central part

19     of our defence case, this is not a case of tu quoque.  We are trying to

20     point out what were the causes of the conflicts in mid-April which were

21     relevant for the further developments on the ground.  We are going to try

22     and show you why the BH Army was concentrated and focused on Konjic

23     predominantly, and why an action could develop further from Konjic

24     southwards towards Mostar and Prozor.

25             The next document shows the situation in Kakanj in June 1993.  I

Page 45986

 1     would like to say that documents that we currently have on the screen are

 2     under seal, so maybe the documents should not be broadcast out of the

 3     courtroom, and that will be enough to protect them.  I'm not going to

 4     mention the number of the document.

 5             In the month of June, the BiH Army conquered Kakanj as well as

 6     Travnik, and this is demonstrated by the documents that you can now see

 7     on the screen.

 8             On the 30th of June, 1993, the BiH Army conquered the territory

 9     of Bijelo Polje and the territory north of East Mostar in the direction

10     of Jablanica.  In July 1993, the BiH Army also conquered the territory

11     south of East Mostar in the direction of Blagaj and Buna.  In the month

12     of July 1993, the BiH Army conquered the entire territory of Konjic, save

13     for just one enclave there.  In the month of July 1993, the BiH Army

14     conquered Fojnica.  In the month of July 1993, the BiH Army conquered

15     Bugojno.  In the month of July, the BiH Army conquered Doljani.  In the

16     month of November 1993, the BiH Army conquered Vares.

17             We will dwell upon Vares a little bit longer because, Your

18     Honours, we would like to show you how the operation to conquer Vares was

19     an operation that had been planned for a long time.  It was a

20     well-planned military action.

21             The first document shows that already in the month of August

22     1993, there was a plan to conquer Vares and that the deputy commander of

23     the Staff of the Supreme Command of the BH Army informed the Command of

24     the 3rd Corps that they were agreeable with the proposals about offensive

25     actions that were to be undertaken in the areas which are described in

Page 45987

 1     the document.  The second document is an order to launch an attack

 2     against Vares, which was issued by Rasim Delic on the 1st of November,

 3     1993.  And the third document is also a document of the BiH Army.  This

 4     is an analysis of the Vares operation, drafted on the 10th of November,

 5     1993, which shows that the action had been planned, well organised, and

 6     well executed.

 7             Now, if all of that, Your Honours, is depicted as an image, this

 8     is how it would look.  Please focus on the blue area in the central part

 9     of Central Bosnia, and you will see how that blue area is reduced, and

10     the green area that was under the control of the Muslim authorities

11     becomes bigger.  The first situation is in January 1993.  You can see the

12     attacks launched with the BiH Army in order to cut off the corridor

13     between Busovaca and Kiseljak.

14             The next map shows the situation in the months of March and April

15     1993.  The corridor has been cut off.  In the month of June, you can see

16     the attacks against Travnik, Novi Travnik, Fojnica, and you can see that

17     the attacks were also taking place around other places.  In the month of

18     July, the area in blue is already drastically reduced.  We have already

19     told you which places fell in July.  In the month of September 1993, the

20     blue area is further reduced.  And then in October, the area under the

21     control of the Croatian government is further reduced.  And then in the

22     month of November, certain blue enclaves have stopped existing.

23             And the last map that we would like to draw your attention to is

24     the summary of the situation as it was in November 1993.  You have a list

25     of towns that were under the control of the BH Army and the number of

Page 45988

 1     Croats who had fled those towns.

 2             The following maps show the territory of Mostar.  The first map

 3     shows the situation in Mostar on the 30th of June, 1993.  You can see how

 4     at that moment the town -- the eastern part of town of Mostar looked

 5     like.  The following map shows the situation after the 30th of June.  We

 6     said that that was the day when the BiH Army conquered the area north and

 7     south of Mostar.  This map that you have before you at the moment depicts

 8     the situation in the broader or general region.  East Mostar is still an

 9     enclave of sorts, and in the territory of Jablanica and Konjic there are

10     still two Croatian enclaves in existence.

11             The following map shows the situation after the 30th of June.

12     The BiH Army now has control over the territories north and south of the

13     town of East Mostar.  The town of East Mostar at that point had

14     communications in the direction of north and south, the length of which

15     is about 50 kilometres.  We will dwell upon that a little bit later.  I'm

16     not going to go into great detail now.  And now the same situation in the

17     general territory of Jablanica and Konjic, that's how it looked like.

18             A conclusion about the first cluster topic that concerned the

19     joint criminal enterprise is as follows:

20             A general conclusion would be this:  The HVO combat activities in

21     mid-April 1993 were not the beginning of the realisation of the so-called

22     criminal plan of the persecutions, arrests, and expulsions of Muslims, as

23     the Prosecutor claims, but rather the reaction to the plans and

24     activities of the BiH Army.  This is corroborated by two separate events.

25     There could be more of them, but for the time being the two rules

Page 45989

 1     suffice.  The first one is this:  The HVO did not conduct combats in

 2     Sovici in April 1993 in order to conquer Jablanica, as asserted by the

 3     Prosecution.  Those combat activities were part of the conflict in the

 4     territory of Konjic and Jablanica, and the HVO's intention was to help

 5     its units and Croats in Konjic who were under the attack by the BiH Army.

 6     And the second event is Vares.

 7             We would like to demonstrate that the BiH Army did not conquer

 8     Vares in November 1993 because of the alleged provocation on the part of

 9     the HVO in Stupni Do.  The word "alleged" refers only to the word

10     "provocation."  Rather, the conquest of Vares was previously planned and

11     well executed, an operation by the BiH Army.

12             The Petkovic Defence believes that without understanding the

13     plans and activities of the BiH Army and the political leadership of

14     Bosnian Muslims, it is not possible to estimate the actions of the HVO

15     and the leadership of the HZ-HB.  Therefore, the Petkovic Defence will

16     mostly deal with plans, combat activities, reports, and other documents

17     issued by the BiH Army, as well as documents about the BiH Army.

18             And I repeat once again, because I believe it is very important,

19     it is not a tu quoque defence.  Not for a single moment do we believe

20     that any crime can be justified by another crime.  However, we believe

21     that one needs to understand the context, and that in the context of

22     joint criminal enterprise it has to be said clearly whether something was

23     a consequence of a joint criminal plan or a consequence of some other

24     event.

25             Our second topic is about the 30th of June, 1993, which is a date

Page 45990

 1     that the Petkovic Defence will be focusing on most of all throughout our

 2     Defence case.

 3             Your Honours, we wish to show that the HVO was expecting

 4     offensive actions by the BH Army in the surroundings of Mostar.  Two

 5     documents will suffice for that purpose so far.

 6             In early June 1993, Milivoj Petkovic said to the commander of the

 7     operations zone:

 8             "On account of the situation occurring as a result of the Muslim

 9     aggression and in an effort to control and occupy the Neretva Valley, I

10     hereby order:  Urgently assess and organise the required number of units

11     to stop a potential Muslim breakthrough along the following axis:

12     Jablanica-Bijelo Polje-Mostar."

13             What this document shows, Your Honours, is that the HVO

14     Main Staff had information on BH Army plans to take the area between

15     Jablanica, Bijelo Polje, and Mostar.

16             On the 30th of June, 1993, Milivoj Petkovic sent a letter to

17     Mr. Wallgren and Mr. Morillon, saying, and I'm about to quote two

18     sections of this letter:

19             "I would like to remind you that when meeting

20     General Mr. Morillon in Medjugorje on the 26th of June, 1993, our side

21     warned him about the possibility that the Muslim side was organising a

22     frontal assault against the town of Mostar and HVO positions and its

23     surroundings.

24             "It was very easy to foresee these developments as a logical

25     consequence of offensive activities by the Muslim forces started in

Page 45991

 1     Central Bosnia and continued throughout Northern Herzegovina.  The Mostar

 2     River Valley -- the Mostar Valley and the whole Neretva Valley are only a

 3     continuation of the same geo-strategic whole, and the Muslim leadership

 4     wanted to take that area in order to ensure they had access to the sea,

 5     the sea coast."

 6             Therefore, Your Honours, the HVO Main Staff knew about these

 7     plans by the BH Army.  Nevertheless, no one was even vaguely suspecting

 8     that these plans might be carried out in cooperation with HVO soldiers of

 9     Muslim ethnicity.

10             This was an event without precedent, or that's what we believe;

11     HVO soldiers of Muslim ethnicity betrayed the HVO.  A lot of evidence has

12     been produced to show this.  I will be pointing out a number of documents

13     also originating from the international community, the recording of the

14     conversation between Sefer Halilovic and Arif Pasalic.  Arif Pasalic on

15     the 30th of June, Sefer Halilovic, congratulates the other man on his

16     success, and we also believe this to be exceptionally important; this

17     speech given by Arif Pasalic on War Radio on the 30th of June, 1993,

18     which says:

19             "People, citizens of Mostar, you have to understand that this is

20     judgement day.  You have to start fighting.  I am hereby calling on every

21     citizen able to bear a rifle or carry a rock to kill these Ustasha

22     criminals, because there is no life for us with these Ustasha here,

23     except for life with Muslims, honest Croats, and loyal Serbs side by

24     side."

25             HVO soldiers of Muslim ethnicity, Your Honours, were entangled

Page 45992

 1     with the BH Army.  We shall be pointing out a number of documents more or

 2     less exhibits already and known to all in this courtroom.

 3             In the official transcript of the crime squad of the military

 4     police, dated the 30th of March, 1993, we see that there is pressure

 5     being exerted on Muslims who are members of the HVO and MUP units to

 6     leave those units.

 7             The next document, chief of the Security Administration of the

 8     BH Army Supreme Command Staff, the date being the 16th of April, 1993.

 9     He says:

10             "It is realistic to expect the tensions to mount further, and

11     what is required is to have a general mobilisation of all Muslims within

12     the HVO."

13             The chief of security of the 42nd Mountain Brigade of the BH Army

14     claims in another document that one must call upon all Muslims who are

15     members of the HVO to place themselves on the side of their own people.

16     This same person, on the 18th of April, in a different document, claims

17     that:

18             "Cooperation must be established with our soldiers in the HVO,

19     and we must point out the seriousness of the situation to them."

20             Next, the commander of that same BH Army unit talks about the

21     plan to inform Muslim soldiers who are in HVO units in Mostar, Capljina,

22     and Stolac about developments.  Just as meaningful is the letter written

23     by the commander of the 42nd Mountain Brigade of the BH Army that he sent

24     to the Command of the HVO Knez Domagoj Brigade.  He says:

25             "I mention, and this is very well known to you, that a large

Page 45993

 1     number of Muslim soldiers are in your units, and they are Muslims and,

 2     hence, belong to this people, so it would not be good if a certain

 3     organisation and formation of your units, as defined, were to be

 4     disrupted."

 5             Your Honours, this is a direct threat by using the fact there

 6     were many Muslims in HVO units.

 7             Another important document is the one by Arif Pasalic dated the

 8     2nd of May, 1993, stating that:

 9             "An effort was carried out to link up with our men in the HVO."

10             It also says that the men from the Capljina HVO had the task of

11     taking Tasovcici village and the bridge in Capljina in order to prevent

12     troops being brought in from the Metkovic area.  Furthermore, it states

13     that there had been an agreement to seize the town of Stolac with "our

14     people in the HVO."

15             On this subject, Your Honours, we could provide many further

16     documents, as we shall be doing in due course.  Nevertheless, these

17     should suffice at present to arrive at the following conclusion:  The

18     security of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna was at risk.  A state

19     of emergency had been declared because of two things: the danger of

20     new betrayals by HVO soldiers of Muslim ethnicity and; (b), the danger

21     that the BH units from Central Bosnia would invade the Mostar region and;

22     (c), the danger of losing control over West Mostar, Stolac, Capljina, and

23     the whole of South-Eastern Herzegovina, all the way up to the Adriatic

24     coast.  In order to protect the security of the HZ HVO, the Muslim

25     soldiers of the HVO were disarmed in some of the HVO units.

Page 45994

 1             The most important document on that particular subject is a

 2     document that we've seen many times in this courtroom already, and the

 3     first time was when it was raised by the Petkovic Defence.  This is an

 4     order by General Petkovic dated the 30th of June, 1993.  Paragraph 8:

 5             "All Muslim soldiers, who are still active in some units, should

 6     be disarmed and isolated.

 7             "In places with a Muslim population within the area of

 8     responsibility, [indiscernible], should be isolated.  Women and children

 9     should be left in their houses."

10             Paragraph 10 reads:

11             "A close cooperation and activity coordination should be

12     established with all forces in your zone (anti-terrorist groups, the

13     police and the military police outside your structure)."

14             In relation to this document, Your Honours, we shall be pointing

15     out for the very first time an important element, the fact that both the

16     police and the military police were involved in the operation to disarm

17     and isolate Muslim soldiers who were members of the HVO, which is a fact

18     well known to you.  But the theory that we shall be putting forward for

19     the very first time is this:  The Main Staff was not superior to the

20     police or the military police.

21             If you have a situation where, in a single action, we see

22     cooperating in a synchronised way the army, based on an order by the

23     Main Staff, the police and the military police, who were not subordinated

24     to the Chief of the Main Staff, the only logical conclusion that one can

25     draw, based on this, is that the order could have been possibly issued

Page 45995

 1     only by the supreme commander, himself, to disarm and isolate these

 2     Muslim soldiers.  Therefore, we shall be trying to prove at least the

 3     following four circumstances, Your Honours:  Firstly, there were

 4     legitimate security reasons to isolate Muslim soldiers of the HVO;

 5     secondly, the isolation or detention of these Muslim soldiers of the HVO

 6     was legal; thirdly, this is an order by the Chief of the Main Staff that

 7     follows up on an order of the supreme commander; and, fourthly, HVO

 8     soldiers would not lose their status as HVO soldiers simply because they

 9     were now detained or isolated.

10             Further along these lines, Your Honours, I would like to remind

11     you that a military expert brought by the OTP, Mr. Pringle, at page 24265

12     of the transcript, 24265, when prompted by me -- I asked him whether

13     based on such documents as he had been discussing, would it be fair to

14     conclude that the Muslim soldiers in the HVO were posing as sort of a

15     security threat, he answered:

16             "Yes, I can understand that they would."

17             The next thing we are trying to prove, Your Honours, is about

18     isolating Muslim conscripts in a part of the Croatian Community of

19     Herceg-Bosna.  We are trying to prove that these were reserve soldiers --

20     the reserve component of the BH Army.  We shall be pursuing this

21     throughout our Defence case a great deal, and we certainly hope that you,

22     too, will be contributing questions, asking our witnesses questions in a

23     bid to define more precisely the status of these reservists.

24             Let us look at a number of documents for the time being.

25             The commander of the 44th Mountain Brigade of the BH Army, in his

Page 45996

 1     report, says:

 2             "Civilians from the village of Doljani are being evacuated at the

 3     moment, conscripts will remain."

 4             Based on this document, Your Honours, it transpires beyond a

 5     shadow of the doubt that the BH Army, themselves, were not considering

 6     these conscripts to be civilians.  The Petkovic Defence is entirely in

 7     agreement with this.

 8             The next document on our screens are the proposed measures to

 9     organise an all-people's liberation war, dated May 1993.  We are using

10     this document to show that all citizens were to form a patriotic front to

11     defend the country.

12             The next document by the chief of staff of the 4th Corps talks

13     about the mobilisation of local able-bodied population, and the

14     mobilisation rate was almost 100 per cent.

15             Allow me to remind you of the testimony of Witness BB, transcript

16     page 17215.  She said:

17             [In English] "At the time, draft-age Muslim men [sic] regarded by

18     the Bosnian Croatians as a threat to national security because they were

19     perceived as being potential combatants for the Army of Bosnia and

20     Herzegovina."

21             [Interpretation] We believe this evidence to be important, Your

22     Honours, also in order to establish the mens rea of the accused at a

23     moment when these Muslim conscripts were isolated.

24             Finally, although this is a point of law, we believe it

25     necessary, within this context, to point out that the Geneva Conventions

Page 45997

 1     contained this, too.  This is footnote number 2:

 2             "Grounds for internment or assigned notes:

 3             [In English] "The fact that a man is of military age should not

 4     necessarily be considered as justifying the application of these measures

 5     unless there is --"

 6             JUDGE PRANDLER:  Ms. Alaburic, I'm sorry to interrupt you, but

 7     the previous quotation, I believe there is some problem there, in it.

 8     From page 23, it says in English:

 9             "Muslim men regarded by the Bosnian populations as a threat to

10     national security because they were perceived as being potential

11     combatants for the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina."

12             Now, I really don't understand this.  Did the Bosnian population

13     regard the Muslim men as a threat to national security?  It is somehow,

14     in a way, a contradiction in adjecto, and of course they were potential

15     combatants - and this I agree with as being a kind of important issue -

16     but are you sure that this quotation was well quoted in your text or

17     would you confirm that?  It is my question.  Thank you.

18             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I'd hope that I'm

19     following.  I wasn't focusing on the text.  I think your reaction is

20     about page 27 of the transcript, a portion of page 27.  I think you're

21     talking about what I quoted from the testimony of Witness BB.  I would

22     like to draw your attention to the fact that the word "were" is missing.

23     The word "were" is missing.  The entire sentence would be, and I'll say

24     it again:

25             [In English] "At the time, draft-age Muslim men were regarded by

Page 45998

 1     the Bosnian Croatians as a threat to national security because they were

 2     perceived as being potential combatants for the Army of Bosnia and

 3     Herzegovina."

 4             JUDGE PRANDLER:  Thank you very much, Ms. Alaburic.

 5             As a matter of fact, probably, Dr. Prlic would have liked also to

 6     point out that what I read here in the transcript, it was "Muslim

 7     population regarded them" so-and-so.  Of course, now you've said

 8     "Bosnian Croats," which is, of course, quite another issue here.  So

 9     thank you for the clarification.

10             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, you're able to

11     follow our Powerpoint presentation, and we have prepared the opening

12     statement for you in Powerpoint.  You can see for yourself, if you look

13     at the page in the Powerpoint presentation, that the quote is there.

14     It's an extract from the testimony of Witness BB.  I do apologise for not

15     realising there was an error in the transcript in a more timely fashion.

16             The last thing I mentioned was this footnote from the comment

17     following Article 42 of the 4th Geneva Convention.  I repeat in English:

18             [In English] "The fact that a man is of military age should not

19     necessarily be considered as justifying the application of these

20     measures, unless there is a danger of him being able to join the enemy

21     armed forces."

22             [Interpretation] The sixth component within this subject matter,

23     Your Honours, is this:  We shall try to show that these isolation

24     measures were not being taken in secrecy.  The internationals were

25     informed in a timely manner of these steps to disarm and isolate being

Page 45999

 1     taken by the Herceg-Bosna authorities, including the involvement of the

 2     army.  The documents are classified, and I will not be quoting them.  I

 3     would just like to say this by way of conclusion:

 4             In paragraph 37, the Prosecutor claims:

 5             "In early July, the Herceg-Bosna HVO forces, supported by and

 6     involving the government and armed forces of the Republic of Croatia,

 7     launched a massive campaign to attack, arrest, and cleanse Bosnian

 8     Muslims from areas claimed to be part of Herceg-Bosna, including the

 9     municipalities of Mostar, Prozor, Stolac, Capljina and Ljubuski."

10             The Defence counters this in the following way:  Firstly, in

11     early July 1993, HVO soldiers of Muslim ethnicity were disarmed and

12     isolated for justified security reasons.  Secondly, all able-bodied men

13     are potential fighters and members of the armed forces; therefore, the

14     Muslim conscripts were isolated as prisoners of war.  Thirdly, the HVO

15     military police and civilian police did not arrest any civilians in early

16     July 1993.  Fourthly, the decision to take these isolation measures was

17     passed suddenly on the day of the betrayal by the HVO soldiers of Muslim

18     ethnicity, and there was absolutely no plan to launch an organised

19     campaign against the Muslim population.  These are the key theories of

20     the Petkovic Defence in relation to the joint criminal enterprise.

21             Now a couple of words about the time-frame and the way we shall

22     be going about the different periods involved.

23             The first period covers Milivoj Petkovic's time as Chief of the

24     Main Staff.  We shall be dealing with the period between mid-April 1993

25     and 24 July 1993, which amounts to a total of three months and nine days,

Page 46000

 1     the reason being as follows:  The charges prior to this period are in

 2     relation to Prozor in October 1992.  We believe that this has been proven

 3     to be a local incident.  We believe that the evidence that exists sheds

 4     sufficient light on all the circumstances surrounding this event.  The

 5     next incident is Gornji Vakuf in January 1993.  We believe that this

 6     trial so far has shown that Milivoj Petkovic was not involved in the

 7     planning, organising, and commanding the HVO combat activities.  We also

 8     believe that General Praljak, including our joint witness, Zrinko Tokic,

 9     has shed sufficient light on any circumstances regarding this event.  Of

10     course, General Petkovic will be testifying about what was going on at

11     the Geneva Peace Conference at the time which he, too, attended.

12             The next period covers Milivoj Petkovic's time as deputy

13     commander or deputy Chief of the Main Staff.  The period runs from the

14     24th of July, 1993, to April 1994, which is the last period of time

15     covered by the charges in the indictment.  The deputy commander is not a

16     part of the chain of command.  Therefore, we will not be covering all the

17     developments throughout that period, but rather just those in which

18     Milivoj Petkovic was personally involved, and we'll also be covering

19     documents that Milivoj Petkovic personally produced.

20             Following the relevant period, Milivoj Petkovic again became

21     Chief of the Main Staff.  We shall not be dealing with that especially

22     because it is not covered by the time relevant to the indictment.  We

23     will be mentioning the fact in order to be able to properly determine the

24     place and role of Milivoj Petkovic in the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

25             Milivoj Petkovic was dismissed from his office as Chief of the

Page 46001

 1     Main Staff of the HVO soon after a total war broke out between the

 2     BH Army and the HVO in a part of the BH territory.  He again assumed this

 3     role and took up this office when the clashes with the Muslims stopped.

 4     When he was General Praljak's deputy, his task was to contribute to talks

 5     and agreements to stop the clashes.  General Petkovic sincerely believed

 6     that the war could not be stopped in any other way but for the warring

 7     parties to sit down at a table together and reach a solution that was

 8     acceptable to all.  It was precisely because of this view that

 9     General Petkovic was constantly being given the task of being involved in

10     talks and negotiations with the internationals, members of the BH Army,

11     and the VRS.

12             The third part of our Defence case will deal with some specific

13     localities from so-called crime-base.  Since my time is slowly coming to

14     an end, I'm going to use just a few minutes to draw your attention to the

15     key theories of our defence.  We are going to be dealing with Sovici and

16     Doljani, and we will try and show you --

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Wait a second, Ms. Alaburic.

18     My colleague thinks it would be just time to have a break, since you are

19     going to start on a third part.  I don't know how much time you still

20     have left, but I think you probably used already an hour, so you probably

21     have about half an hour left.  But let's not do sums now.  Perhaps we

22     could break now, and we will better prepare and assess what is yet to

23     come.

24             So a 20 minutes' break.

25                           --- Recess taken at 3.31 p.m.

Page 46002

 1                           --- On resuming at 3.58 p.m.

 2             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic, I'm told by the

 3     Registrar that you have still 30 minutes.

 4             Yes.

 5             MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your

 6     Honours.

 7             I would like to address the Trial Chamber about a technical issue

 8     for a couple of minutes.  Could we please move into private session.

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Registrar, closed session,

10     please.

11                           [Private session]

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23                           [Open session]

24             THE REGISTRAR:  We are in open session, Your Honours.

25             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

Page 46003

 1             As far as the crime base is concerned, the Petkovic Defence will

 2     be dealing with certain localities, including Sovici and Doljani.  The

 3     Petkovic Defence case is as follows:  Firstly, the conflict in Sovici was

 4     part of the conflict in the general area of Jablanica and Konjic.  The

 5     HVO did not intend to conquer Jablanica.  It was never a plan.  The

 6     Convicts Battalion participated in the combat in Sovici, and it was not

 7     subordinated to the Main HVO Staff.  This is a very important part of the

 8     Petkovic Defence, or at least we deem it important.  The inhabitants of

 9     Sovici and Doljani agreed with Sefer Halilovic for those whose houses had

10     been destroyed to be driven to Jablanica.  The HVO merely ensured

11     vehicles for the realisation of that agreement.  The vehicles did not

12     arrive in Jablanica, as had been agreed.  Due to obstacles on the road,

13     they were rerouted to Gornji Vakuf so that the inhabitants of Sovici and

14     Doljani arrived in Jablanica only a few weeks later.

15             The second locality is Mostar.  Your Honours, we're going to try

16     to prove the following:  On the 9th of May, 1993, when the conflicts

17     broke out between the HVO and the BiH Army, General Petkovic was not in

18     Mostar at the moment when the combat started.  He arrived in Mostar as

19     soon as he learned about the conflict in Mostar in the early afternoon

20     hours on that same day, and the first thing he tried to do, after he was

21     briefed about the events, was to get in touch with Arif Pasalic and

22     Sefer Halilovic and in order to stop the conflict.

23             The following day, on the 10th of May, 1993, Alija Izetbegovic

24     and Mate Boban ordered a break in the conflict.  On the following day,

25     11th of May, 1993, Generals Halilovic and Petkovic met in Kiseljak and

Page 46004

 1     agreed cooperation.

 2             On the 12th of May, 1993, Halilovic and Petkovic signed the

 3     cease-fire agreement.  From that moment on until the end of June 1993,

 4     General Petkovic participated in many rounds of negotiations with the

 5     representatives of the BiH Army and the Army of Republika Srpska.  He

 6     also participated in the organisation and presence of the representatives

 7     of the international community.  All those contacts and negotiations

 8     happened in the territories of Kiseljak, Sarajevo, Medjugorje, and

 9     Jablanica.

10             Your Honours, from day to day, based on the evidence provided to

11     us by the Prosecution, we'll try to show you what General Petkovic did

12     and where he was.

13             On the 30th of June, 1993, as we have already said, the Muslim

14     HVO soldiers committed the treason which was the beginning of an all-out

15     war between Muslims and Croats in that area.

16             The Petkovic Defence will also deal with the artillery actions in

17     Mostar.  We are going to try to show that during the relevant period, the

18     artillery was under the command of the commander of the operative zone,

19     that only military facilities were legitimate targets, and that the

20     proportionality principle was always taken into account.

21             Your Honours, we are also going to try to prove that there was no

22     siege of Mostar, and we will dedicate a lot of attention to that subject.

23     Therefore, on this occasion we would like to point to a number of

24     documents that confirm that.

25             The first document is information about combat activities that

Page 46005

 1     was prepared by the Staff of the Supreme Command of the BH Army on the

 2     1st of July.  This describes the territory north of East Mostar which was

 3     conquered by the BiH Army, and it includes the following statement, and I

 4     quote:

 5             "According to the report of the Command of the 4th Corps, the

 6     forces of that corps linked up yesterday with the forces of the

 7     6th Corps, which will have a positive influence on the further course of

 8     combat."

 9             Your Honours, if we know that the seat of the 4th Corps was in

10     Mostar and that the 6th Corps covered the territories of Jablanica and

11     Konjic, we can conclude from this sentence that the forces of the BiH

12     Army linked up from Jablanica and from Mostar.

13             The following document, which is already in evidence, is an

14     excerpt for Esad Sejtanic's book.  He says that again a number of

15     inhabitants wanted to go to Jablanica and further on to Bosnia from

16     Mostar.  This document also proves that there was a possibility of

17     communication between East Mostar and Jablanica and further afield in

18     Bosnia.

19             The following document is an order by Arif Pasalic from the month

20     of September 1993.  It arises from the description of the area of

21     responsibility that in the direction of north and in the direction of

22     south from well-defined points, there were the forces of the BiH Army

23     that, on the eastern side, there are, and I quote, "Chetniks," and that

24     in the west there were, and I again quote, "Ustasha."  This document

25     again shows that the BiH Army in East Mostar was not encircled or under

Page 46006

 1     siege.  And the following document, issued by the chief of staff of the

 2     4th Corps, dated from October 1993, proves the same.  Let's look at the

 3     statement, which says:

 4             "A great problem for the Command of Operational Group is the

 5     transport of civilian population and others who are marching in the

 6     direction of north and south."

 7             Therefore, communication in the direction of north and south did

 8     exist.

 9             And one more quote from the same document:

10             "There is a big problem to supply the unit with bread because

11     fuel wood has to be transported to Mostar and bread has to be transported

12     from Mostar to Bijelo Polje.  At the same time, there is a bakery in

13     Vrapcici that could start operating and needs only some minor repairs."

14             This means the communication between East Mostar and

15     Bijelo Polje, including the settlement of Vrapcici, was completely

16     unhindered.  Our conclusion is this:  East Mostar was never under siege.

17             The third locality is Ljubuski.  In a short statement about this

18     topic, we are going to try and show the following:  The HVO soldiers of

19     Muslim ethnicity were not disarmed and isolated in early July 1993, which

20     points to the fact that at the beginning of July 1993, the action to

21     isolate and disarm was carried out only in those units which were at

22     the -- most threatened at that moment.  We are going to show you how and

23     why HVO soldiers of Muslim ethnicity in Ljubuski were disarmed and

24     isolated in August 1993.  We are also going to show how one-third of the

25     population of Muslim ethnicity stayed in Ljubuski, and also that the

Page 46007

 1     destruction of a mosque in Gradiska was condemned by the citizens of

 2     Ljubuski.

 3             The fourth locality is Stolac.  We're going to try to show you,

 4     Your Honours, that Stolac was liberated by the Croat and the Muslim

 5     forces in June 1992, and I believe that the Trial Chamber already knows

 6     that.  We are going to try and show that on the 20th of April, 1993, it

 7     was not Muslim intellectuals that were arrested, as the Prosecution

 8     claims, but rather that it was the members of the Command of the BiH

 9     brigade Bregava who were arrested.  We are also going to bring a witness

10     who was the commander of a military unit where HVO soldiers of Muslim

11     ethnicity were disarmed and isolated, as well as able-bodied men of

12     Muslim ethnicity.  He will describe how the action transpired and how

13     people were disarmed.  We are also going to show that in this territory,

14     in mid-July 1993, there was the military action called Jug in order to

15     take back the control of the area south of Mostar.

16             General Milivoj Petkovic believed that the HVO was not well

17     prepared to engage in such a military action, and that's why he was

18     excluded from the Command over that action.  That operation was not

19     successful.  It was carried out on the 15th of July, and nine days later

20     General Petkovic was removed from the Command of the Main Staff of the

21     HVO.

22             The fifth locality is Vares.  We will dwell upon that in order to

23     try and prove the following:  Milivoj Petkovic did not come to Kiseljak

24     because of the situation in the territory of Vares.  Further on,

25     Ivica Rajic, together with the local HVO commanders, inspected the area

Page 46008

 1     and then decided about the military action on his own.  We're also going

 2     to try and prove that Ivica Rajic did not inform either his immediate

 3     superior, Tihomir Blaskic, or the commander of the Main Staff,

 4     Slobodan Praljak, about the activities in Stupni Do, and he never

 5     informed General Petkovic about it either.  We are also going to try to

 6     prove, Your Honours, that Petkovic, in Kiseljak, did not receive any

 7     reports from Ivica Rajic directly and that he did not receive a single

 8     report from him about the operation in Stupni Do.  Milivoj Petkovic left

 9     Kiseljak prior to Ivica Rajic's return from Vares.  The military

10     prosecutor was involved in the investigation of facts about the crimes

11     committed in Stupni Do.

12             We're also going to try to prove, Your Honours, and explain that

13     the president of the HZ-HB, Mate Boban, decided to publish information

14     about the removal of Ivica Rajic, but his decision was actually to keep

15     Ivica Rajic under a different name in the same position.

16     General Petkovic was aware of that decision, and General Petkovic

17     communicated with Ivica Rajic under his new name, Viktor Andric, after

18     that.  The operation to conquer Vares, as I've already said, was planned

19     in the summer of 1993, and the fall of Vares was not the result of an HVO

20     attack on the village of Stupni Do.

21             The fourth topic, Your Honour, concerns the Main Staff of the

22     HVO; first of all, are tasks, authorities, and responsibilities of the

23     HVO Main Staff and the Chief of the HVO Main Staff.  We want to show you,

24     Your Honours, that the HVO was not the occupying power in the territory

25     of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Also, that the Chief of the HVO Main Staff was

Page 46009

 1     not the occupation commander or military governor.  Tasks, authorities,

 2     and responsibilities of the Chief of the Main Staff were precisely

 3     defined by the rules.  For example, the Decree on the Armed Forces

 4     defines that the Main Staff performs staff and other professional

 5     tasks -- staff and other professional tasks.

 6             And the following important document, the decision on the basic

 7     principles of the organisation of the Defence, it is stated for which

 8     tasks the Chief of the Main Staff is responsible to the supreme commander

 9     or the president of the HZ-HB.  The same decision also defines, and I

10     quote:

11             "In the part of principle and other authorities, the Chief of the

12     Main Staff is superior to the commander of the HVO."

13             I have quoted this provision because it shows clearly that the

14     Main Staff, when it comes to these issues, was the superior body to the

15     commanders of the HVO, which means that in other issues it is not

16     superior to the HVO commanders.

17             There are also some other regulations which are mentioned in here

18     that you can see on the screen, but in conclusion we would like to say

19     the following:  First of all, the HVO Main Staff performed staff and

20     other specialised services for the supreme commander.  Second, the chief

21     of the HVO Main Staff is in the chain of command in relation to operative

22     commanding and the use of the armed forces in concrete military actions

23     and operations.  Thirdly, the chief of the HVO Main Staff exercised

24     superior authority over the commanders of the operative zones or, rather,

25     military districts, brigades, and other military units within the scope

Page 46010

 1     of general and specific powers vested in him by the president of the

 2     HZ-HB, as the supreme commander of the armed forces.

 3             And as we have already seen, we are talking about the issues of

 4     operative command and the use of armed forces in concrete military

 5     actions and operations.  Therefore, Your Honours, we believe that when it

 6     comes to deciding about whether the chief of the HVO Main Staff was

 7     obliged or duty-bound to do something in keeping with his command

 8     responsibility, it is necessary to establish whether the issue is within

 9     the scope of general and specific powers vested in him by the president

10     of the HZ-HB as the supreme commander, or, rather, whether the matter

11     in -- are other issues in which the Chief of the Main Staff is not

12     superior to military commanders and soldiers.

13             Under item 4.2 of our presentation of -- or, rather, our

14     introductory speech, we have listed a few areas in which the Chief of the

15     Main Staff was not authorised to issue decisions.  I'm going to point out

16     only the one that I deem to be the most important under number 15, the

17     most important in this case, and that is:

18             "To decide on establishing, managing, and supervision over

19     custody facilities, prisons, collective centres, prisoner of war centres,

20     and other detention centres."

21             Your Honours, we do not intend to dwell upon this topic during

22     our defence case because we believe there is ample evidence already in

23     the file that showed that not a single commission -- not a single

24     supervisory body or a commission for the disbanding of detention centre,

25     there were no members from the Main Staff, and especially not the head of

Page 46011

 1     the Main Staff.

 2             When it comes to the issue of what falls under the authority of

 3     what organ within the Herceg-Bosna, including the Main Staff, we believe

 4     that we will be able to reply to that if we read programmes and reports

 5     on the work of those bodies.  Like in every other social group, including

 6     Herceg-Bosna, such programmes and reports testify best who was supposed

 7     to do what and who was responsible for what.

 8             And the fifth and final point of our introductory presentation is

 9     the person of Milivoj Petkovic, himself.

10             Your Honour, Milivoj Petkovic is a professional soldier, a former

11     officer of the JNA.  Before the beginning of the 1990s, he was rather

12     happy with his work in the JNA and Yugoslavia, as his homeland, until the

13     moment the JNA was transformed completely and became an army of just one

14     people and that was prepared to wage war against other peoples.

15             In July 1991, he interrupted his employment in the JNA and joined

16     the Croatian Army.  First, he was the commander of the defence of

17     Sibenik.  Sibenik is a town on the Adriatic coast of Croatia.  And then

18     the chief of the operations and training in the Operative Zone Split.  In

19     April 1992, Milivoj Petkovic arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina upon the

20     order issued by Janko Bobetko, the HV [as interpreted] commander of the

21     southern front.

22             How long did General Petkovic believe he was going to stay in

23     Bosnia-Herzegovina?  The answer is to be found in an interview that he

24     gave to "Vecernji List," published on the 2nd of August, 1994, at the

25     very end of his term of office in the Main Staff and just before his

Page 46012

 1     return to Croatia.  He said, I quote:

 2             "I thought that it would be for a month until the problem in

 3     Kupres and Livno was resolved."

 4             Nevertheless, Milivoj Petkovic did not remain a mere month, as he

 5     had planned.  He stayed a lot longer.  Having been relieved of his duty

 6     in the Croatian Army, Petkovic, of his own free will, stayed on in

 7     Bosnia-Herzegovina and accepted the position of chief of the HVO

 8     Main Staff, in the belief that Croats and Muslims would jointly liberate

 9     and defend the country from their common enemy.

10             Your Honours, General Petkovic knew that the

11     internationally-recognised borders of countries could not be altered by

12     force.  He also knew that the Republic of Croatia would never raise the

13     issue of changing the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina simply because of

14     the danger that the Serb population in Croatia would use the same or

15     similar principles to have the AVNOJ, A-V-N-O-J, borders of Croatia,

16     changed.  This can be backed by a note that Tihomir Blaskic wrote down

17     regarding the negotiations between the BH Army and the HVO on the 21st of

18     April, 1993.

19             Petkovic responded to Halilovic about Croatia's Banovina and the

20     Greater Croatia by saying:

21             "Well, you, of all people, ought to be reasonable enough to know

22     that Croatia can never aim at annexing parts of BH territory, because in

23     that case it would end up without some of its own territory.

24     Nevertheless, you are simply looking for reasons to disagree."

25             My conclusion:  Croatia is not to plan on annexing any parts of

Page 46013

 1     Bosnia-Herzegovina populated mostly by Croats, because it might thereby

 2     legitimate the claims of some Serbs living in Croatia to have their areas

 3     separated from the Republic of Croatia and annexed by Serbia.  This view,

 4     as far as the Petkovic Defence is concerned, ends all talk of

 5     Franjo Tudjman's alleged plans to cede parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina

 6     annexed by Croatia.  We believe this quote clearly shows that no

 7     reasonable, pragmatic, realistic person could claim or believe otherwise.

 8             Likewise, as far as General Petkovic's activity was concerned, we

 9     would like to demonstrate that Petkovic, throughout his time in

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina, was in charge of cooperation with UNPROFOR and

11     representatives of the international community.  He attended

12     international conferences and was involved in talks between the warring

13     sides.  Obviously, he also met representatives of the VRS.  He sincerely

14     believed that it was only through negotiations and talks that problems

15     and clashes could be resolved.

16             This is not a position that the Petkovic Defence has come up with

17     for the purposes of this trial, and this is clearly demonstrated by the

18     following document, an extract from Petkovic's interview to the

19     "Vecernji List" daily, dated February 1993.  This is a brief extract, and

20     you will see General Petkovic saying the following:

21             "I believe that weapons should be completely removed from

22     Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a whole, or as I propose, for all heavy weapons to

23     be melted down in the Zenica ironworks.  Therefore, the solution lies in

24     a complete de-militarisation of this state."

25             We would also like to point out another extract from the media,

Page 46014

 1     another interview given by Milivoj Petkovic to the Serbian Television in

 2     Sarajevo, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, dated the 16th of April, 1993, and this

 3     occurred during the talks at the Sarajevo Airport, the talks with

 4     representatives of the Republika Srpska.  The talks were organised and

 5     attended by members of UNPROFOR.  The video is six minutes' long, and I

 6     would like to pay close attention, please, to what exactly

 7     General Petkovic said and how he phrased his thoughts on the war in

 8     Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 9                           [Video-clip played]

10             THE INTERPRETER:  [Voiceover] "Well, listen, why would I sign

11     something if I wasn't an optimist, because I said in the last month and a

12     half there were no considerable actions --"

13             MS. ALABURIC:  Okay, we will start from the beginning.

14                           [Video-clip played]

15             THE INTERPRETER:  [Voiceover] "Well, listen, why would I sign

16     something if I wasn't an optimist to begin with, because I said in the

17     last month and a half, there were no considerable actions.  There was

18     stronger fighting around Livno.  However, that has also quieted down now.

19     Here, in the Neretva Valley, sometimes a shell would fall.

20             "Q.  And around Brcko?

21             "Petkovic:  Well, no, around Brcko, these past two or three days

22     the battles were a little stronger.  I don't have any real insight into

23     what is going on up there except what I hear through the public media.

24             "Q.  Following this agreement, will you order the fighting in

25     Brcko to stop as well, I mean, will you order your own units?

Page 46015

 1             "Petkovic:  Yes, our units, but that's what I'm saying.  There

 2     aren't any particularly large HV [as interpreted] units in Brcko.  We are

 3     to the left of Brcko, in Posavina, and they are currently peaceful during

 4     these days.  There is no significant action in that area, and this

 5     agreement of mine with Halilovic has not been implemented in practice at

 6     all.  For this reason, that signature cannot be applied in Brcko as well.

 7     Everybody would sign but no one would do anything in practical terms, and

 8     I hope that I still will succeed to maintain the cease-fire because even

 9     by this time there has not been significant action in these areas.  There

10     were provocations, but there hash not been considerable action.

11             "Q.  Give us just one more brief comment.  The conflict between

12     the Muslims and your units, does it look like it's going to end and what

13     can, in fact, be done for it to end?

14             "Petkovic:  It will be necessary to implement the agreement that

15     we have signed.  In Mostar, to withdraw the soldiers into barracks.  In

16     the area of Konjic, a line of separation has been established, and now we

17     should withdraw the units of one side to one side, the units of the other

18     side to the other, and insert UNPROFOR to patrol between them, at least

19     for a period of time.

20             "Q.  Tell us.  According to your opinion, is the Muslim side more

21     to blame for the conflict in that area?

22             "Petkovic:  You know what, we were with the Muslims from the

23     beginning.  However, that changed.  As they grew in size, so their

24     relationship towards us changed.  The stronger they were, the more they

25     wanted to make decisions about many things, and that's why these

Page 46016

 1     conflicts erupted.  However, these conflicts erupted due to other reasons

 2     as well.  They were not incidents.  It was already a real war, and a war

 3     must be planned.

 4             "Q.  What is your comment regarding the Serbian side and the

 5     Croatian side?  They easily meet and agree.  Will Alija Izetbegovic

 6     finally have to sit down with the Serb side and talk?

 7             "Petkovic:  Well, we do get together easily or not, in any case.

 8     Whenever Morillon invited us, we accepted the invitation, attend it with

 9     the strongest delegation possible.  However, they have not been coming in

10     this way thus far.  This is my eighth trip to Sarajevo.  Thus far, I have

11     never met Halilovic here at this place.  I don't know why.  Everyone has

12     their reasons; right?

13             "Q.  Is there anything else you would like to comment on that I

14     haven't asked you yet?

15             "Petkovic:  Well, I think that it is time to stop the war in

16     these areas.  It is better to spend a year or two politically negotiating

17     than to wage a war for five months or even for one day.

18             "Q.  Do you share my opinion that a final agreement about the

19     fate of the three peoples in Bosnia-Herzegovina should be reached between

20     the three warring sides instead of - how should I put it? - politics that

21     are created for us by the international community from outside?

22             "Petkovic:  Well, listen, if the people living here could agree,

23     the agreement would be far more firm and stronger.  That is

24     understandable.  It is like that at home, too.  When you agree with

25     someone who is yours, the agreement is stronger than when someone tells

Page 46017

 1     you that you must agree in a certain way.  Fine, maybe as part of these

 2     negotiations, which the world is leading, there could be more mutual

 3     contacts, but, you know, it is easy to agree to some things, and then

 4     back here it is a bit more difficult to carry things out, right.  But I'm

 5     afraid that one day an agreement will have to be reached because of the

 6     people.

 7             "Q.  Is that day near?

 8             "Petkovic:  Listen, I would like that to happen as soon as

 9     possible.  You see what is happening in all this, the suffering, the

10     destruction, the burning, people leaving certain territories.  Therefore,

11     every day of war brings with it more victims, more destruction, and more

12     people get hurt.  And what is a country without people?  And there is

13     enough room here in Bosnia for an even larger number of people to live

14     than have lived here thus far.

15             "Q.  Is it true that the Muslim side really wants to - how should

16     I say? - appropriate Mostar?

17             "Petkovic:  Well, listen, it is obvious that they want to

18     appropriate Mostar.  They say that Mostar belongs to them.  We don't say

19     that Mostar belongs to us, not just us.  Mostar belongs to the people of

20     Mostar.  I think that that is the most sensible definition and that this

21     is the one we should stick with.  If we stick to this, then there will be

22     no conflict.  But they accuse us of wanting to take Mostar for ourselves,

23     you see, but how could we take it exclusively for ourselves when they are

24     here as well.  You can't just take it for yourself.  If I share something

25     with you, then I cannot take it for myself, which means that I'm actually

Page 46018

 1     sharing it with someone.

 2             "Q.  Okay, thank you very much."

 3             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this is what

 4     General Petkovic said:

 5             "Two years of political negotiations is better than a single day

 6     of war and suffering."

 7             Finally, Your Honours, we wish to point out that we really

 8     believe that human victim, any suffering, any destruction as a result of

 9     war is inexcusable.  Any victim who simply belongs to another ethnicity

10     is not justified.  That is why the Petkovic Defence would not wish for

11     any part of our case to be understood as a denial of a crime -- ignoring

12     a crime or trying to excuse a crime.  The Petkovic Defence fully

13     sympathizes with all of the victims and their families, particularly the

14     Bosniaks, who were the victims of crimes committed by individuals

15     belonging to the Croatian ethnic group.

16             Your Honours, this concludes the opening statement of the

17     Petkovic Defence.  I thank you for allowing me to present it.  Thank you.

18             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  The Chamber is

19     going to read out two oral decisions.

20             Oral decision concerning requests to reconsider the Petkovic

21     Defence to add to the 65 ter list.

22             First decision.  By a motion of 22 October 2009, the Petkovic

23     Defence filed a new request for adding documents, 4D01470, 4D01471, and

24     4D01472, on its 65 ter list.  This adding of these documents had been

25     rejected by a decision of the Chamber on the 21st of October, 2009, in

Page 46019

 1     particular because the translations of these documents did not correspond

 2     to the original documents which had been downloaded on the e-court

 3     system.

 4             Preliminarily, the Chamber finds that this requested motion is

 5     de facto a request for a reconsideration of the decision of the 21st of

 6     October, 2009.  The Chamber notes, first of all, that the English version

 7     of document 4D01472, which was put on e-court, does not have any

 8     translation with it of Articles 73 to 91.  It is, therefore, not in a

 9     position to appreciate, prima facie, the reliability and the probative

10     value of this document and part of articles whose addition has been

11     requested on list 65 ter.  Consequently, the Chamber rejects the request

12     for reconsideration for adding 4D01472 on the 65 ter list of the Petkovic

13     Defence.

14             For Exhibits 4D01470 and 4D471 [as interpreted], the Chamber

15     considers that the new English versions, which have been downloaded in

16     the e-court system, correspond to the original of these exhibits.  The

17     Chamber considers exceptionally that the corrections made by the Petkovic

18     Defence enables, in the interests of justice, to reconsider the decision

19     of the 21st of October, 2009, and considers that 4D70 [as interpreted]

20     and 4D01472 [as interpreted], have now the guarantees, prima facie, of

21     reliability and probative value which are sufficient to accept their

22     injunction on the 65 ter list of the Petkovic Defence.

23             The second oral decision.

24             MR. STEWART:  Before Your Honours go on to the second one, it may

25     be convenient just to correct, because it's not Your Honour, it's the

Page 46020

 1     transcript.

 2             At page 50, line 10, the reference to 1472 should be to 1471,

 3     because Your Honours are admitting those two, and 1472 is the one that

 4     you have rejected.  So forgive me for interrupting.  It seemed convenient

 5     to deal with it straight away.

 6             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, you're quite right.  The

 7     two documents which are now admitted are 4D01470 and 4D01471.  Therefore,

 8     these two exhibits can be put on the 65 ter list, can be added.

 9             Second oral decision.  By motion of 26 October 2009, the Petkovic

10     Defence requested the Chamber to reconsider its decision of the 21st of

11     October, 2009, by which it rejected adding on the 65 ter Exhibit P02231,

12     which gave no prima facie guarantees of sufficient reliability.  Indeed,

13     the Chamber considered that this exhibit, which came from the assistant

14     of the commander of the 3rd Brigade of the HVO, was handwritten,

15     practically illegible, and had neither stamp, nor signature, nor official

16     heading.  The Chamber considers that in its request, the Petkovic Defence

17     only completed its initial request to add the document on the 65 ter list

18     and has not shown that the reasoning of the decision contained an error

19     or that any specific circumstances which it hadn't presented in its

20     initial request would justify its reconsideration.  The Chamber decides,

21     therefore, to reject the request of the Petkovic Defence.

22             Very well.  So as a conclusion, there are two exhibits which are

23     added and three which are still rejected.

24             MR. STEWART:  Your Honour, two accepted and two rejected, is it

25     not, Your Honour?

Page 46021

 1             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We have two which are accepted

 2     and three rejected.

 3             MR. STEWART:  Sorry, rejected is 1472 and P2231, Your Honours?

 4     Accepted, 1471 and 1472, and rejected --

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] No, you're right.  Yes, indeed.

 6     Excuse me, you're right.  There are two which are accepted, which are

 7     01470 and 471, and two which are still rejected, 4D01472 and P02231.

 8             MR. STEWART:  Yes, thank you, Your Honour.  That's clear, thank

 9     you.

10             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

11             Ms. Alaburic, is the witness here, because perhaps he can make

12     the solemn declaration.  In five minutes, he could make the solemn

13     declaration, take the oath.  Or will he take the oath tomorrow?

14             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I believe that the

15     witness is here.  I personally don't mind.  We can bring him in today,

16     but I think it would be better if we did it tomorrow.  But as I say, I

17     don't mind if we --

18             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Until tomorrow.  Let's do that

19     tomorrow.  The Chamber has decided he will take the oath tomorrow.

20             As you know, we are starting the session tomorrow at 9.00, so

21     we'll see one another tomorrow at 9.00.  Mr. Coric, I repeat to you that

22     if you want to get up, to get up, if you want to get up to get out, the

23     important is that he can attend the session within the limitation of his

24     physical capabilities.

25             This is what I had to say, so see you tomorrow at 9.00 a.m.

Page 46022

 1     thank you.

 2                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.43 p.m.,

 3                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 27th day of

 4                           October, 2009, at 9.00 a.m.