100126IT

Page 48896

1 General Praljak was aware of my leaving for training.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you're saying that

3 General Praljak knew that you were going to go on training. Well, that,

4 at least, is very clear. Thank you for your answers, which are very

5 clear. During the night, a few questions came to mind, and I felt I had

6 the duty to put these questions to you.

7 Mr. Kruger, you have the floor.

8 MR. KRUGER: Good morning, Your Honours, and good morning to

9 everybody in and around the courtroom.

10 Cross-examination by Mr. Kruger: [Continued]

11 Q. Mr. Jasak, good morning to you, too.

12 Now, sir, last night we tried to look at a video and we had some

13 technical problems, so let's start this morning by looking --

14 A. [No interpretation]

15 Q. Thank you. Let's start by looking at the video of a very small

16 part of the meeting between General Petkovic and Commander

17 Sefer Halilovic, and this is the meeting which you said last night that

18 you were not present at. And this takes place early in May 1993.

19 If we could just play the video. Sorry, for the record, it's

20 Exhibit P02187, and we are looking at a segment from 5 minutes and 27

21 seconds.

22 [Video-clip played]

23 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "This should be a conversation

24 between us, the representatives of the army and the representatives of

25 the HVO. You may be present, but this talk is more an internal talk. At

Page 48897

1 this gathering imposing as to the number of participants as well as to

2 the number of functions of the people present here, we want at last a

3 final answer. Are we allies or are we enemies? If we are, indeed,

4 allies, then we have to know that and behave accordingly. And if we are

5 enemies, then we have to know that as well and behave accordingly. But

6 we will not disarm people in Central Bosnia and in Mostar, arrest them,

7 drag people out of their homes, and do all those things that are being

8 done while we are holding talks and establishing joint commands. And

9 while establishing joint commands, we won't have convoys with

10 humanitarian aid and other convoys.

11 It is known to the gentlemen to which convoys I'm referring,

12 standing still in Central Bosnia and Herzegovina, standing where they

13 shouldn't be, there where they should not stand, while at the same time

14 in Gorazde and in Eastern Bosnia and in Srebrenica and in North-Eastern

15 Bosnia, people are dying of hunger, dying because they do not have arms.

16 And you may not hold a convoy as you did two days ago, arrest five

17 clerics, seize 200.000 weapons, and so on.

18 MR. KRUGER: Thank you.

19 Q. Now, sir, at this stage when this meeting took place, and it's

20 late in May, if I'm not mistaken, it's not the 4th of May -- this takes

21 place sometime after the 9th of May; would you agree?

22 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, objection to this

23 question. How should the witness know when this was recorded?

24 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I think the witness can say that, that he does

25 not know.

Page 48898

1 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honour, I don't think so.

2 It is not fair towards the witness. We know how this film has been

3 marked. It has been marked as something that was taken on the 4th of May

4 in Jablanica. We've seen it a lot of times in this courtroom. There are

5 no dilemmas here, and I don't know what the foundation may be for this

6 question to be connected with the 9th of May.

7 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I personally don't

8 believe that the Prosecutor tried to confuse the witness intentionally.

9 However, we have information about the evidence, and it has been said

10 about this film that we've already seen that this meeting took place on

11 the 4th of May. So if my learned friend is putting the film to the

12 witness, he has to start from the fair facts or otherwise he's trying to

13 set a trap for the witness, which I sincerely doubt that he is doing.

14 MR. KRUGER: Your Honour, I won't belabour the exact date of the

15 meeting.

16 Q. What I will ask, sir, is: In May 1993, it's correct that the

17 ABiH and the HVO were still allies against the Serbs; is that correct?

18 A. I don't know when this film was recorded. However, in May 1993

19 the BiH Army and the HVO were allies against the VRS.

20 Q. And, sir, my next question is, then: If we assume -- if we

21 accept that this meeting took place in May 1993, can you tell the Court

22 what has the HVO done which would cause Mr. Halilovic to ask this

23 question, Are we friends or are we allies? Do you know?

24 MR. KARNAVAS: I object to the form of the question. First of

25 all, we don't know whether Halilovic is telling the truth and whether

Page 48899

1 he's just saying this for the purposes of the camera and those who are

2 there to witness the events. So I think it assumes a fact, first of all,

3 which certainly has not been proved. And also the gentleman indicated --

4 in fact, it was Mr. Kruger who started by saying, I know you were not

5 there. So if he wasn't there, how can he then begin to pose questions

6 about the meeting to which he wasn't present at?

7 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would like to add

8 something to that.

9 My learned friend says, before putting the question, We're not

10 going to dwell upon dates. I would like to remind you that this is

11 P2187, and on page 1 of the English transcript it says that the date is 4

12 May 1993. The question is whether the Prosecutor doubts his own

13 evidence. Does the Prosecutor want to confuse us by claiming that

14 something, in this particular case this piece of evidence, was recorded

15 on the 4th of May, 1993, and then they change their mind and say, Maybe

16 not? How can we prepare our case on that? We start from the point that

17 what the Prosecutor has given us is probably true, but when the

18 Prosecutor doubts his own evidence, I really don't know what we are all

19 doing in this courtroom.

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Kruger, this video so far

21 is dated the 4th of May, 1993. If you agree that it is on the 4th of

22 May, 1993, you then settle the issue, knowing that, of course, the

23 witness cannot answer.

24 MR. KRUGER: Witness, indeed, I accept that it's the 4th of May.

25 The mistake is entirely mine. I was listening to the clip, and just one

Page 48900

1 part of the clip certainly triggered my mind and set it off at a tangent.

2 Your Honour, but as to the objection by Ms. Alaburic,

3 Your Honour, I simply can't agree -- or, sorry, by Mr. Karnavas. The

4 witness was an intelligence analyst, and certainly this is a question

5 which he's entitled -- or fully entitled to answer. He was receiving

6 intelligence reports, and certainly he would know from his intelligence

7 notes if there was anything which could justify a question such as this

8 by Mr. Halilovic on the 4th of May.

9 And further, Your Honour, if there's also an objection as to the

10 foundation for asking this question, then certainly most of the testimony

11 that he was giving -- that he gave last week is also evidence that should

12 then not have been heard, because certainly there was then no foundation

13 for that evidence as well.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Put your questions. I will

15 have a question after that.

16 MR. KRUGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

17 Q. Now, sir, you have heard that Mr. Halilovic says or asks to

18 Mr. Petkovic, General Petkovic, Are we friends or are we enemies? Now,

19 sir, can you tell the Court, do you know of anything which may have

20 justified General Halilovic asking such a question of General Petkovic at

21 this time?

22 A. As far as I know about the date 4th of May, and it was my

23 colleague Dinko Zebic who told me about that meeting, that meeting was

24 very skillfully used by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a propaganda

25 tool. Nobody was allowed to visit Croatian villages, most of which had

Page 48901

1 been burned by that time. This means that the media and the journalists

2 were used to dispatch something that was nothing short of a propaganda

3 material.

4 Q. Now, sir, you still haven't answered the question. Were you

5 aware of anything which may have caused General Halilovic to ask this

6 question? And if I may ask you, sir, please do not look at

7 General Petkovic for approval. I see you constantly looking at

8 General Petkovic and looking for approval, and then General Petkovic nods

9 to you. Please don't do that.

10 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I really object to

11 this remark by my learned friend Kruger, and I must admit that I don't

12 see what is happening behind my back, but I'm absolutely certain that

13 General Petkovic is not giving any signs to the witness, nor that this

14 witness needs to look at anybody in order to be given a signal as to how

15 to answer. So I'm saying this remark as the Prosecutor's attempt to

16 discredit the witness.

17 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, just one sentence, if

18 I may.

19 In our circles in Croatia, our legal circles in Croatia, we call

20 it poisoning the record. You just throw something and then it is

21 recorded, and when the Appeals Chamber reads it, they base their

22 judgement on that. This is a lie which has nothing whatsoever to do with

23 the reality. I've been watching the witness for four days now, and the

24 witness, when he answers, does, indeed, look all over the courtroom, but

25 that's not to say that he is asking approval from either General Petkovic

Page 48902

1 or anybody else. This should not be allowed because it doesn't hold

2 water, and I'm sure that if this, indeed, was the case, you would have

3 noticed that as well.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, the Prosecutor put a

5 very specific question to you. Please answer that question now.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I've already answered,

7 and I said that that meeting was nothing short of propaganda by

8 General Halilovic. That's how I heard it from my colleague Dinko Zebic.

9 That meeting followed after major conflicts when most of the Croatian

10 villages had already been burned, people had been killed or expelled or

11 were fully encircled. That is the time-frame, and that was around

12 Konjic, and that was nothing but propaganda.

13 MR. KRUGER: Let's have a look at a next clip from this same

14 video.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment. Before we look at

16 the next video-clip: Sir, this is a video we've seen already, and it

17 doesn't come as a surprise for us Judges. There is, however, a third

18 component here, which is a new one; i.e., the Spaniards. The Spaniards

19 are neutral, and under their aegis a meeting is organised between

20 General Halilovic and General Petkovic. And we realise that

21 General Halilovic puts the question, which is a fundamental question, Are

22 we allies or enemies? This is a topic which you addressed last week,

23 since you said that they were neighbours and a neighbour is a friend.

24 Therefore, there was a foundation to the question.

25 Since you brought this up last week, and General Halilovic turns

Page 48903

1 to his counterpart and says, Are we allies or enemies, and he did this in

2 the presence of the Spaniards, which means, in my view, that on the 4th

3 of May there is the HVO and the ABiH that are united, and the issue of a

4 joint command is definitely on the agenda, since it was raised at the

5 meeting. If they were enemies in the classic sense of the term, I would

6 find it difficult to imagine that a high-ranking Spanish officer would

7 convene a meeting between enemies. He would thus run the risk of people

8 bringing out their weapons at the meeting and people getting killed. I

9 assume that the Spaniard did take a number of precautions. He would have

10 not run the risk of convening a meeting between enemies. This is

11 something which I certainly take into account.

12 You did not attend this meeting, but as Mr. Kruger said, since

13 you were an analyst, you might have had some information about it, about

14 the reason behind the question. We have no specific answer from

15 General Petkovic, because as we can see, the question of the humanitarian

16 aid will be raised, the fact that there were blockades, and so on. Maybe

17 that was the reason, but maybe there were other reasons. In other words,

18 all the incidents that occurred before that, and what I think of as

19 Hamzici and Trusina and other villages. Perhaps General Halilovic, who

20 together with General Petkovic had been involved in the negotiations in

21 Geneva, perhaps he wants to fulfill his role to the full, maybe, also.

22 According to you, if General Halilovic puts this question, it is

23 due to skirmishes that occurred before. The mere fact that they share a

24 common enemy, i.e., the Serbs, that doesn't preclude the fact that there

25 might be skirmishes between the two. And since you were a VOS analyst,

Page 48904

1 you might be able to answer this question, or, as you say, it's just a

2 question of propaganda.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, if we're dealing with

4 the 4th of May, that date, this is just a segment. I received

5 information from my colleague that the whole event was made use of as

6 promotion, as a propaganda, and that the goal was to resolve the problems

7 of the Croatian villages in the area and the captured. And from the 18th

8 of April, we have an agreement between Boban and Izetbegovic. We have an

9 agreement on the 20th between General Petkovic and Halilovic. But we

10 also have, after that, orders issued by the BH Army for attack, and we

11 also have information from the Intelligence Service, from around the 23rd

12 of April, I believe, that the Croatian villages which were in the area

13 were either set fire to and the population expelled or that they were

14 under siege. So that was the situation that came before. But at that

15 meeting, to the best of my knowledge, they were supposed to agree to tour

16 those villages. And according to my information, I don't think that was

17 ever done. So this means that it was just used as propaganda by the

18 BH Army, that particular meeting. I don't know the details of it, of

19 course. I'm just speaking about the meeting based on the information

20 that I had received.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So according to you, what

22 Halilovic is saying is that he is speaking as part of a propaganda.

23 Mr. Kruger, please proceed.

24 MR. KRUGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

25 Q. Just to follow up on this, sir: In April, therefore, you were

Page 48905

1 aware of certain conflicts which had taken place between the ABiH and the

2 HVO?

3 A. We had information about what happened in April, yes.

4 Q. And even before that? Did you have information about conflicts

5 in January and in October the previous year?

6 A. Everything that happened until the 23rd of March, 1993, was dealt

7 with on a daily basis. So the more serious conflicts began on the 23rd

8 of March, 1993, in the Konjic area.

9 Q. And to your knowledge, had the HVO done anything to cause those

10 conflicts or contributed to causing those conflicts?

11 A. To the best of my knowledge, the HVO did not do anything to cause

12 those conflicts.

13 Q. Sir, I'm not going to show you the second clip. The second clip

14 dealt only with, once again, General Halilovic saying to Mr. Petkovic

15 that, Mostar will never be only Croat. All that I'll ask you about that

16 is: Were you aware that the ABiH and the Muslims in Herceg-Bosna were

17 not supportive of the idea of a Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna?

18 A. I don't understand the question. The BH Army and the Muslims in

19 Herceg-Bosna, that they did not support the idea of Herceg-Bosna? What?

20 Is that what you asked?

21 Q. Did the Muslims and -- or let's say the Muslims within the

22 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, who lived within that area, are you

23 aware that they were not supportive of the idea of the establishment of

24 that Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna?

25 A. The Muslims who lived on this territory under the control of the

Page 48906

1 Croatian Defence Council were on a footing of equality with the Croats in

2 the Croatian Defence Council, so automatically they supported the idea.

3 Otherwise, they didn't have to be in the Croatian Defence Council.

4 Nobody forced them.

5 Q. Sir, let's move on. Let's look at Exhibit P01911, and this is in

6 binder 2. It's Exhibit P01911.

7 Now, sir, this document is a document from the ECMM, and it's

8 dated the 16th of April, 1993, and it's a political and military analysis

9 about the present Jablanica crisis.

10 Now, the first thing that I'd like to refer you to is paragraph 2

11 or section 2, which is titled "Regional Importance," and there it says,

12 first paragraph:

13 "The region immediately north of Bugojno, Gornji Vakuf, Prozor,

14 Jablanica, Konjic Road is predominantly Muslim, yet under the

15 Vance-Owen Plan is due to fall under the control of Provinces 8 and 10.

16 The HVO signed the plan and have expressed a strong desire to implement

17 the plan."

18 Sir, you are aware of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan?

19 A. Yes, I know that a Vance-Owen Peace Plan existed.

20 Q. And you don't disagree with what is stated here, that these

21 provinces would fall within Provinces 8 and 10, which would fall under --

22 that these provinces would fall under -- that these municipalities would

23 fall under Provinces 8 and 10; you don't disagree with that, do you?

24 A. As far as I can see here, what it says, at least in the Croatian

25 version, that this is a document dated the 17th of April, and as far as I

Page 48907

1 know, the overall Vance-Owen Plan, the complete plan, was signed by

2 Alija Izetbegovic and Mate Boban with all the attachments and supplements

3 much before this. I think it was in March, the 25th of March, I think,

4 1993. So I don't see that the problem here was that there was a strong

5 intention on the HVO and BH Army to -- I don't see that there was any

6 problem in them implementing it. If the leaders of the two nations

7 signed it, I don't see the problem.

8 Q. Sir, you haven't answered the question. Is it correct that these

9 provinces fell within -- or these municipalities mentioned here fell

10 within Provinces 8 and 10?

11 A. I think they were municipalities under Provinces 8 and 10,

12 Jablanica, Konjic, and so on.

13 Q. And Provinces 8 and 10 are provinces assigned to the Croats; is

14 that correct?

15 A. Well, Provinces 8 and 10, well, yes, they're parts of

16 Bosnia-Herzegovina, so they belong to everyone.

17 Q. Sir, Provinces 8 and 10 were assigned to the Croats under the

18 Vance-Owen Peace Plan? That's the question, and you don't disagree with

19 that; that's correct, isn't it?

20 A. Well, I agree that they were regions where Croats lived and that

21 they were in the majority there.

22 Q. Sir, your answer doesn't make sense. We're talking about Konjic,

23 Jablanica, Gornji Vakuf. Those are definitely provinces or

24 municipalities which are predominantly Muslim, yet these municipalities

25 have been assigned, under the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, to Provinces 8 and

Page 48908

1 10. That's correct, isn't it?

2 A. Absolutely, they were assigned, these Provinces 8 and 10, but

3 there were other municipalities, too, not only those two in those

4 provinces. So the provinces, if you look at them in their entirety, the

5 Croats were the most numerous populous there, according to the 1991

6 census, that is to say, in those provinces. One province had its

7 headquarters in Mostar, and the other one in Travnik, according to the

8 Vance-Owen Plan, if I remember correctly.

9 Q. And, sir, the next part of the report says:

10 "To the HVO, 'implementation' means 'taking control of,' with an

11 emphasis on 'ownership' of the provinces rather than 'responsibility' for

12 them."

13 Is that correct, to your knowledge?

14 A. I don't know what "ownership" is meant here. In private

15 ownership, you know who the owner is, regardless of the province.

16 Q. Sir, on the next page, just prior to section 3 on political

17 activity, it says, and now we're referring to this region -- Jablanica

18 region:

19 "Indeed, the region is not just important, it is strategically

20 vital both for military and economic reasons, not just in the history of

21 Herceg-Bosna, but for its future prosperity and security."

22 Is that a correct statement?

23 A. Just allow me a moment to read this. Political activities, is

24 that what you're referring to in point 3.

25 Q. No, it's -- sir, it's just prior to political activity, the last

Page 48909

1 paragraph of the section dealing with regional importance. It's that

2 last section. Is it correct that Jablanica --

3 A. "This region is not only important, but it is strategically vital

4 both for military and economic reasons."

5 But which region?

6 Q. This report deals with Jablanica, sir. This is the Jablanica

7 region, sir.

8 A. Well, Jablanica is vital for the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina, not

9 only for this particular region.

10 Q. Let's have a look at the political activity in paragraph 3 and

11 what the ECMM is observing, or how they view the events. It says, the

12 first paragraph:

13 "The clashes that have occurred in the past months have generally

14 followed provocation, and it is the experience of ECMM and some UNPROFOR

15 units that the provocation is usually HVO inspired."

16 Now, sir, if the internationals are saying this, do you know or

17 do you have any idea on what basis or what has led them to believe that

18 the HVO is actually the one provoking?

19 A. I don't know. Meetings like the one held by Sefer Halilovic,

20 that is to say, propaganda on the part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, probably

21 that. I don't know what else. That they had very strong propaganda.

22 Q. Didn't the HVO also have strong propaganda?

23 A. No, absolutely not.

24 Q. Let's look at the --

25 MR. KOVACIC: Your Honour, I think that this deserves objection.

Page 48910

1 [Interpretation] My dear colleague asked us to focus on

2 paragraph 1 of point 3 of this document, and he put it to the witness --

3 he claimed that the ECMM was claiming and saying that the HVO, as it has

4 been recorded in the transcript, and I'll quote, that the HVO is actually

5 the one provoking. So the assertion is -- that was the assertion. And

6 then the witness is responding.

7 I'd like to draw your attention that that's not what the document

8 says. The document says as follows:

9 "The ECMM and some UNPROFOR units, that the provocation is

10 usually HVO inspired."

11 So obviously the author of this report does not have information

12 about who was doing the provoking, but he started out from the assumption

13 that the incidents or clashes or whatever took place because of -- caused

14 by confrontation.

15 THE INTERPRETER: Sorry. "Caused by provocation," interpreter's

16 correction.

17 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] And then he writes the general

18 observation that usually -- they are usually. So the ECMM is not saying

19 who did the provocation, but they say, We think that it was usually

20 inspired by the HVO. And on that basis, the Prosecutor is categorically

21 stating that it was, indeed, the HVO who did the provoking and that

22 that's what the document says. Once again, that is improper questioning,

23 and he's trying to mislead the witness. The witness has been provided

24 with the document, and he could have said, There's the extract, take a

25 moment to read it, and may we have your comments.

Page 48911

1 MR. KARNAVAS: My comments and my fear go beyond this, because

2 I'm watching also the expression of the Bench, and at least one of the

3 members of the Bench is showing faces of incredulity at some of the

4 answers, which leads me to believe that at least one member of the Bench

5 believes everything that he reads in these reports as being true,

6 accurate, and complete.

7 Now, we have seen a great deal of propaganda on everyone's side.

8 In particular, we have seen where, for instance, even today's

9 vice-president of the United States was going around saying that, In

10 Bosnia, we only have Bosnians who are Catholic, Orthodox, or Muslim,

11 based on what he had been told by Silajdzic. And also we have documents

12 that Alihodzic was saying the same things. And my concern is that now

13 we're using this particular document to somehow validate what's in it.

14 Now, I understand the technique. If Mr. Kruger wishes to show

15 that this is what the ECMM is saying, especially when it gets to the word

16 "usually," as was pointed out by Mr. Kovacic, then -- and if the

17 gentleman then says, I don't know what you're talking about, it is up to

18 Mr. Kruger then to demonstrate concretely, with correct and accurate

19 facts, how it is that this ECMM report, or whoever he or she may be, has

20 actually come up to this conclusion.

21 In other words, we're using this and we're using vital time in

22 this courtroom in order to somehow bolster the credibility of this

23 particular report, and this is utterly improper, at least in an

24 adversarial system which to this date this Tribunal still abides by.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, you're a Defence

Page 48912

1 witness, and the Prosecutor is asking you a question based on a document

2 coming from a body of the international community; namely, the observers

3 from the European Union. According to them, and it is relayed by the

4 Prosecutor, the document seems to say - but I'm very cautious, I will not

5 be categorical on that - the document states that the HVO is provoking,

6 and it quotes a few examples such as the flag. You remember that the

7 flag has caused some incidents afterwards.

8 So what I'm interested in is the conclusion in the last

9 paragraph. It states that the ECMM concludes that the provocation of the

10 HVO is intense. This is what the document states. They may be right,

11 they may be wrong, they may not have all the information required, but

12 what I would like to know is: According to you, how did you see the

13 situation? What do you say about that?

14 And to clarify my question, it is obvious that this report is

15 only dealing with the activities of the HVO, while they could also have

16 looked into what was doing the ABiH, but they're not mentioning anything

17 about that because perhaps on the other side the same thing was

18 happening. But in this report, we're only dealing with the HVO. And, of

19 course, this could give the relative value of this document. I would

20 rather have a document that looks at the entirety of the situation, with

21 all of its components, Serbs, Muslims, Croats, rather than a document

22 looking only at one side of the story.

23 So given that you were an analyst, what is your take on this

24 document?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have already said,

Page 48913

1 looking at the parts I read, because this is the first time that I'm

2 seeing this document, it seems to me that this is the consequence of

3 strong propaganda on the part of the BH Army, and that it was a follow-up

4 to something that others attacked, and then they retaliated and took

5 control of the area.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

7 JUDGE PRANDLER: I would like to ask also a question, and

8 although our faces are sometimes watched, but I would like to ask the

9 witness about the following matter. And actually it is Chapter 7 of the

10 report, "The Present Analysis."

11 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] No interpretation, Your Honours.

12 JUDGE PRANDLER: So then I will repeat again.

13 So I started saying that although sometimes our faces are

14 watched, but nevertheless I make an attempt to ask a question from the

15 witness, and it is about the last part of that report, chapter or part 7,

16 "Present Analysis." And here it is being said that the -- in the third

17 paragraph:

18 "At the time of writing, the HVO are making their most serious

19 attempt to isolate Jablanica before seizing it."

20 And here I would like to ask the witness if, according to his

21 knowledge as an analyst in VOS, how did he actually see the situation

22 there as far as the HVO attempts, according to the report of the ECMM,

23 that what kind of efforts have been made by the HVO, if any, to isolate

24 Jablanica before its seizing? So it is my question.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it says here that the

Page 48914

1 document is dated the 17th of April, that's what it says on the document,

2 1993. At that time, we know what we have in the Konjic-Jablanica region.

3 We also know that large-scale activities on the part of the BH Army were

4 underway for the first time on the 20th [as interpreted] of March, 1993,

5 and then, following on from that, on the 13th of April, 1993, and that

6 the ratio of forces -- the balance of forces at that time in the region

7 was over 10:1 to the advantage of the BH Army. That's what we know for

8 sure. We know that that's how things stood and that almost all the

9 villages were under a blockade.

10 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, just to correct the

11 transcript, the witness gave us the date. He said the 23rd of March,

12 whereas the record says "the 20th of March." So "the first time on the

13 23rd of March 1993" is what we should read.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, when I see a document

15 coming from an international body, I do not always give it 100 per cent

16 credibility or value: A judge in a criminal court of law looks at the

17 various documents, compares documents, so I will not draw any conclusions

18 from this document.

19 Now, I look at the second paragraph in that chapter "Political

20 Activity." Please look at this paragraph, second paragraph. In the

21 first paragraph of this chapter, the observers say that the HVO is

22 provoking. In the second paragraph -- and I don't understand why we

23 changed that. Please go back to point 3, Registrar. I don't understand

24 why we have moved. Let's go back to "Political Activities," please.

25 There we go, Chapter 3, "Political Activity."

Page 48915

1 Look at the way it's drafted. In the first paragraph, we talk

2 about the clashes, and as a conclusion we say that it's provocation from

3 the HVO. And then in the second paragraph, it says:

4 "There is always a good story attached to any clash ..."

5 And then it states that the Croatian media are talking about

6 Mujahedin extremists, but, in fact, when this is written they do not know

7 that Mujahedin extremists have committed crimes. It is not mentioned, it

8 is just quoted as a proof or as a token of propaganda from the HVO,

9 whereas in fact it is a fact, and this is why I'm very cautious when

10 looking at those documents because documents have to be compared with

11 everything else, and we should not only base any conclusions on one

12 specific document.

13 So as an analyst, I was wondering whether you knew that in part

14 of the BiH there were Mujahedins who were causing problems. Were you

15 aware of this, yes or no? Because according to European Observers, all

16 this is false and has never existed, this is provocation, this is

17 propaganda.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They knew that there were

19 Mujahedin. We knew that there were Mujahedin in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

20 And as far as this paragraph is concerned, let me try and explain.

21 That was a very specific period. How come there is nothing else

22 in the reports by the international community, UNPROFOR, and whoever was

23 there, can be explained by this. After the 13th of April, UNPROFOR was

24 forbidden to visit the Croatian enclaves in the territory of Konjic. The

25 BiH Army did not allow them to enter those areas on the 13th of April and

Page 48916

1 later on, including the 4th of May, when that meeting took place. They

2 could not reach those areas or enter those areas, and I believe that

3 that's why the report looks the way it does.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you're saying that after the

5 13th of April, UNPROFOR was banned from visiting any Croatian enclaves.

6 If they did not go to those locations, they didn't have a clear view of

7 the situation, which might explain these documents from the international

8 community. Is that what you are wanting to tell us?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Absolutely, this is exactly what I

10 meant to say. Conclusions were reached based on the information provided

11 by the ABiH. They, themselves, could not inspect the area themselves.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

13 Mr. Kruger, perhaps we've made some progress.

14 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I would like to, with your permission, add a

15 question.

16 Mr. Jasak, would you look at the last paragraph on that page, and

17 the last paragraph of the chapter "Military Activity." Here the report

18 says, and I quote:

19 "The Muslims are not entirely blameless and have their own

20 extremists, though for the most part made, not born. Observation and

21 regular contact with the HVO suggests the presence of a hidden agenda."

22 How do you interpret this? What does the term "hidden agenda"

23 refer to?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise, Your Honour. I did

25 not find where you were reading from. Could somebody tell me in

Page 48917

1 Croatian? Could somebody refer me to the page in Croatian?

2 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I can say that this

3 is page 3, last paragraph, above the title "Military Activities."

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.

5 JUDGE TRECHSEL: [Interpretation] Correct.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I don't know what

7 "hidden agenda" means here in this report.

8 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you. It's a pity, because I don't know

9 either. It can refer to the plans you have spoken of of the Muslims, but

10 it can also refer to the HVO. I thought perhaps you had an idea. Thank

11 you.

12 Mr. Kruger.

13 MR. KRUGER: Thank you, Your Honours.

14 Q. Sir, Their Honours have dealt with most of the questions that I

15 did want to ask you. Just before stepping off this document, if we

16 look -- and this is the third section, "Political Activity," and it's the

17 third paragraph of that section. It says:

18 "Furthermore, the HVO have emphasised Muslim aggression."

19 Now, sir, my question to you is: If I listen to you, you're also

20 emphasising in your testimony Muslim aggression, but do you allow at all

21 that it's possible that the Muslims were actually reacting to prior

22 actions of the HVO? Isn't that possible?

23 A. I don't know what the Muslims could be reacting to. And here

24 that document was issued on the 17th of April, 1993. We know what the

25 situation was at the time. I don't know who, in their right mind, could

Page 48918

1 launch any activities against somebody who is tenfold stronger than them.

2 Q. And to quickly return to the propaganda issue, did I understand

3 you correctly that you said that the HVO was not involved in propaganda?

4 A. The HVO had its Information Service. However, the HVO never

5 launched any such propaganda [realtime transcript read in error

6 "proper today"] activities, nothing similar to what was done by the BiH

7 Army. And they used the same procedures later on when they launched

8 attacks. They pretended that they had come under attack by the enemy,

9 which made them defend themselves, and then they took a large part of the

10 territory.

11 MR. KOVACIC: Page 27, line 3, it is recorded:

12 "However, the HVO never launched any such proper today

13 activities."

14 The witness said, "The HVO never launched any propaganda

15 activities." I think that it was obvious.

16 MR. KRUGER:

17 Q. Now, sir, let's explore a bit whether the HVO wasn't, indeed,

18 doing anything which could have caused concern on the side of the

19 Muslims. And for the first document, let's look at, and this is still

20 binder 2, P0 -- sorry, P10926. It's about the eighth document from the

21 end, 10926.

22 Now, sir, this document purports to be an order from

23 Mr. Mate Boban, dated the 10th of June, 1992, and it says:

24 "Pursuant to the statutory decision on the provisional

25 establishment of the executive authority and administration on the

Page 48919

1 territory of the HZ-HB of 15 May 1992, I hereby order:

2 "1. The establishment of the executive authority of the HVO in

3 the Konjic municipality ..."

4 Now, sir, were you aware that the HVO wished to establish its

5 executive authority in the Konjic municipality?

6 A. I was not aware of that. I don't know what that was about. At

7 the time, I was the commander of a battalion in Mostar. I was not

8 politically active.

9 MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I

10 apologise. We have not seen this document before. This must be an

11 excerpt from a book or a compilation of documents. I believe it would be

12 fair from the Prosecution to explain the origin of the document. Thank

13 you.

14 MR. KRUGER: Your Honour, when we tender the document or if we

15 tender the document, we'll fully explain the origins and why we believe

16 it can be admitted. But for cross-examination purposes, Your Honour,

17 I think I'm fully entitled to put the document to the witness for a

18 reaction.

19 MS. TOMANOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise. I really have to

20 react to this response by the Prosecutor.

21 If Ms. Alaburic is going to prepare her re-examination, she needs

22 to be familiar with the source of the document in order to test its

23 probative value in her additional questions. This is the way I'm

24 thinking, and I don't think that it is appropriate to answer an objection

25 of this sort with such an answer.

Page 48920

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Kruger, tell us where this

2 document comes from.

3 MR. KRUGER: Your Honour, the full origins of the document are

4 recorded in e-court, and it does, indeed, come from a book. And the page

5 numbers of the book are also recorded there. It's in the book

6 "Aggression on Bosnia and Genocide of Bosniaks" by Dr. Smail Cekic, 1991

7 to 1993, and it's pages 317 and 379, with reference to Annex 20.

8 Q. Now, sir, this document clearly mentions the municipality, so

9 isn't it so that the HVO wished to establish executive authority in all

10 the municipalities which were being claimed for the Croatian Community of

11 Herceg-Bosna? Do you know about that?

12 A. Your Honour, as I've already said, as far as this document is

13 concerned, at that time I was the commander of a battalion in Mostar. I

14 don't know anything about the functioning of the civilian authorities. I

15 don't know that there were any conflicts during that period of time. Any

16 conflicts in the territory of Konjic up to the 23rd of March were daily

17 affairs, and they were solved on a daily basis and never posed any

18 problems. The problems arose only after that period: As far as I can

19 see, this document was issued in 1992.

20 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Maybe the witness should give us

21 the year together with the date that he mentioned.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 23rd of March, 1993, that's when

23 the conflicts started, and this document apparently was issued in 1992.

24 MR. KRUGER:

25 Q. Let's move on to another document, then, three documents earlier

Page 48921

1 in your binder, document P10919. 10919.

2 Now, sir, this is a press release of the War Presidency of the

3 Konjic Municipality, signed by Mr. Zejnil Delalic, who was the

4 co-ordinator of the BH Army and War Presidency of Konjic Municipality.

5 And in this public announcement from July 1992, he says:

6 "Regarding the announcement of the Konjic HVO of 5 July 1992,

7 filed under" reference number, "we are making the following announcement:

8 "The Konjic HVO has surfaced as a self-proclaimed organisation

9 allegedly in charge of supplying a complete range of products from

10 Croatia.

11 "This is not correct. Our municipality gets all its food and

12 medical supplies, and oil and oil products, by buying them from bartering

13 through the Economic Staff and business operators in Konjic military, or

14 receiving them as a gift from domestic or international humanitarian aid

15 organisations. The HVO does not take part in that.

16 "On the contrary, the Konjic HVO interferes and obstructs the

17 flow of these products obtained with great difficulty ..."

18 Sir, do you know anything about the Muslims in Konjic viewing the

19 HVO as being interfering and obstructive? And this was -- and this was

20 1992 that we're talking to July -- June 1992.

21 A. I don't know that the HVO blocked anything. I've already told

22 you that at that time I was the commander of a battalion in Mostar, and I

23 know that we had excellent co-operation in the territory of Mostar when

24 it came to the liberation of the city from the VRS. At the time, I was

25 the commander of a battalion in Mostar. Therefore, I know nothing about

Page 48922

1 this document.

2 Q. So, sir, from what you've said with regard to this document and

3 the previous one that I showed you, you don't know whether what is stated

4 in those documents is true or not; is that correct?

5 A. I was not even aware of the existence of the document, nor did I

6 hear anything about any such things happening, so I can't really tell you

7 anything. I've not -- I've never heard of anything that is referred to

8 in this document.

9 Q. But it is entirely possible -- because you don't know, it's

10 possible that it's actually true, what's being stated in these documents,

11 isn't it?

12 A. I can't tell you that. When a document of this sort is written,

13 I don't know what the purpose of it may be. At the time, as I've already

14 told you, I was in Mostar, I was the commander of a battalion, and I had

15 excellent co-operation with the BiH Army.

16 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, this sort of questioning, I suggest,

17 is really -- unfairly confuses the witness, because witnesses come to

18 answer questions and say what they know. They don't come to be asked to

19 agree to simple propositions of logic, such as if they don't know

20 anything about anything, then they can't say anything about that. So

21 this is really a waste of time and confusing for a witness.

22 MR. KRUGER: Your Honour, if I may briefly respond to that.

23 I would submit it's entirely appropriate, this line of

24 questioning, because the whole point is the witness has expressed very

25 categorical views on the ABiH being the aggressor and the HVO having done

Page 48923

1 nothing to -- or not having been responsible for provocations or for the

2 conflict. And the reason for putting this to the witness is simply to

3 ascertain whether the witness really knew what he was talking about, and

4 that's why I'm putting these documents to the witness. And if he knows

5 nothing about them, then it makes a point.

6 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, he said that. That's the point. At

7 page 31, line 3:

8 "I wasn't aware of the existence of the document, nor did I hear

9 about any such things happening, so I can't really tell you anything."

10 So end of story there. Now, if Mr. Kruger then wishes to

11 challenge that and suggest that he does know something, or put something

12 to him to say that he does know something, that's an entirely legitimate

13 line of cross-examination, but not to go on, I submit, into these

14 propositions of logic. It's really just argument, then, and that's not

15 what witnesses come here for.

16 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, Your Honours -- my

17 apologies.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please. Mr. Kruger, you put

19 your question, which was a very specific question, and you were entitled

20 to do so. The witness answered your question and said that he could not

21 answer your question because at the time he was not involved in this

22 region, he was not there, and so on. On two occasions, you addressed the

23 issue again, and on two occasions he answered likewise. You can waste

24 your time and put the question a third time again, and he will answer in

25 the same fashion.

Page 48924

1 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, with your

2 permission, I was just going to say something along the same lines as

3 you, Your Honour Judge Antonetti.

4 The witness said it clearly as to what he was able to know at the

5 moment when he was the commander of a battalion in Mostar and what he was

6 in a position to know after the month of October and further on when he

7 was with the VOS and the Main Staff. I don't think that these two should

8 be mixed and disqualify the answer pertaining to the time when he was a

9 member of the VOS, because he was somewhere else before that.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please proceed.

11 MR. KRUGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

12 Q. Well, sir, let's move, then, into October 1992, and let's have a

13 look at document P00581. And this is still binder 2. This is the third

14 document in your binder, sir.

15 Now, sir, this document is a document that's already in evidence,

16 Your Honours, from 15 October 1992, and it's by Zdravko Sagolj, the

17 Herceg Stjepan Brigade commander, and it's to the Konjic Military Police,

18 Jablanica Military Police, Klis Military Police, and a few other military

19 police organisations. It says :

20 "This is to inform you that as of 17 October 1992, all persons in

21 the territory of Konjic and Jablanica that are in possession of a pass

22 allowing them freedom of movement throughout the territory of the

23 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna and the Republic of Croatia shall have

24 their passes authenticated with the Herceg Stjepan Brigade's stamp.

25 "All persons in possession of passes that have been authenticated

Page 48925

1 with any other stamp than that of Herceg Stjepan Brigade shall be

2 invalid, and holder of any such pass shall not be permitted to enter and

3 tour this territory."

4 Now, just for the record, I note that the original document does

5 refer in this instance to "teritorija."

6 So, sir, were you aware of this order stating that only

7 Herceg Stjepan Brigade stamps would be valid for travel passes?

8 A. This is an order. I was not familiar with this. This had

9 nothing to do with military intelligence, because this referred to the

10 members of this brigade. It seems that the intention was not to allow

11 anybody else to deal with the members of his brigade, or maybe something

12 else. I really don't know. I've not seen this document before. In any

13 case, this was not a military intelligence document. It is possible that

14 he informs all the military police units that his men did not enough

15 duty, he is inquiring whether anybody else had let them go. I really

16 don't know.

17 Q. Now, sir, but even though you haven't seen the document before,

18 then, do you agree that on the face of it, this document says, in

19 essence, that travel passes which would be issued by the RBiH and its

20 authorities would not be valid? Isn't that what it implies?

21 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Objection, Your Honour.

22 Objection, Your Honour, to the question. If the document had been read

23 through, the reason would be obvious, the reason for the issuance of this

24 document.

25 MR. KRUGER:

Page 48926

1 Q. Sir, can you answer? In essence, this would mean that travel

2 documents issued by the authorities -- the legal authorities of the RBiH

3 in Konjic and Jablanica would not be valid under certain circumstances?

4 A. I can't agree with that, absolutely not, because I can see a

5 reference being made here to the area of Herceg-Bosna and the Republic of

6 Croatia. The reason why this was issued was the abuse of stamps.

7 Somebody must have stolen a stamp or something to that effect. But a

8 local commander cannot put out of effect an existing agreement on

9 co-operation between the Republic of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina,

10 which clearly demonstrates that the BiH Army and the HVO were both legal

11 and legitimate. I don't see how a local commander could have an

12 effect -- an influence on a pre-existing agreement. I don't see how he

13 can allow somebody to move or not move around the territory of

14 Herceg-Bosna. I don't know what the authorities of such a man would be,

15 vis-à-vis everybody else, unless it is only vis-à-vis his own troops.

16 Q. Sir, just before the break, perhaps: At that stage, October

17 1992, is it correct that all the municipalities which were identified to

18 be part of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna actually formed part of

19 the sovereign territory of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

20 A. All municipalities of Bosnia-Herzegovina are part of the

21 sovereign territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is very clear.

22 Q. And according to this order, somebody from Konjic or from

23 Jablanica who had a valid travel document issued by the authorities of

24 the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, according to this, they cannot

25 travel into the areas being claimed for the Croatian Community of

Page 48927

1 Herceg-Bosna; that pass would not be valid, isn't that what this says?

2 A. Yes, absolutely, I said that this was a local commander, and

3 already at the time agreements existed on friendship and co-operation

4 between Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Republic of Croatia. And I know that

5 at that time people were travelling from Konjic and Mostar, people coming

6 in, so I don't know of any such possibility that a commander of a local

7 brigade could have any such influence.

8 MR. KRUGER: All right, let's step off this topic.

9 Your Honours, is it time for the break or we still have a few

10 moments?

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well, it's time for the

12 break, a 20-minute break.

13 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

14 --- On resuming at 10.54 a.m.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The court is back in session.

16 Mr. Kruger, please proceed.

17 MR. KRUGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

18 Q. Mr. Jasak, just before -- and continuing, it occurred to me that

19 you went to the academy in Zagreb, the Military Academy, in 1993, and you

20 remained there until 1994. Do you know, is that the same academy where

21 General Petkovic at one stage was involved either as an instructor or had

22 some role there?

23 A. I attended the Command Staff School, and General Petkovic

24 appeared [as interpreted] as a lecturer there.

25 Q. During the time when you were doing your --

Page 48928

1 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I apologise. The

2 witness said General Petkovic was not a lecturer there.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] General Petkovic did not appear

4 during my schooling there as a lecturer.

5 MR. KRUGER: Thank you for that clarification.

6 Q. During your period subsequently after the Command Staff School,

7 from 1994 onwards, did you have anything to do with General Petkovic?

8 Were you ever in the same units or working in the same sectors?

9 A. After I had completed my schooling, yes, during a certain period

10 of time. I think it was 1996 until 2000, thereabouts.

11 Q. Yes. And what was the relationship between you and

12 General Petkovic at that time, the professional relationship?

13 A. General Petkovic was my commander.

14 Q. Your immediate commander, and in which -- where were you working

15 at that stage?

16 A. At the time, I was working in the Ston Military District, and

17 General Petkovic was the commander of the Ston Military District, and I

18 was head of the Department for Personnel and Legal Affairs.

19 Q. Thank you. Now, sir, let's continue, and let's have a look at

20 document P01139. This is two documents further on in the binder from

21 where you are now. P01139. This document is already in evidence.

22 This is a document from 15 January. It's an order signed by

23 General Petkovic, and it is to the HVO and the BiH. Now, sir, this

24 order, if we just read the preamble, it says:

25 "Pursuant to the decision of the HZ-HB HVO ..."

Page 48929

1 Before continuing, can you confirm or did you know what the HZ-HB

2 HVO was?

3 A. Yes, I do. The HVO is the Croatian Defence Council, and the

4 HZ-HB is the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna.

5 Q. Yes. And if there's reference to the Croatian Community of HVO

6 decision, would that be the body of which Mr. Prlic was the president?

7 A. I don't know where your question is going, because from the

8 memorandum -- or, rather, from the heading we can see it says "Republic

9 of Bosnia-Herzegovina," from the header, and then "the Croatian Community

10 of Herceg-Bosna," and then "the Croatian Defence Council." That's the

11 hierarchy.

12 Q. Okay. Sir, let's move --

13 A. And then it goes on to say "HVO Main Headquarters" or

14 "Main Staff."

15 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Sorry. Witness, this was a very easy question.

16 Did you know that Mr. Prlic was the president of this entity or not?

17 It's a yes-or-no question, no comment called for.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I didn't understand the question to

19 be that, because at the time the president of the Croatian Defence

20 Council was Mr. Prlic, I think.

21 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Well, that's the answer, then. The question

22 is -- yes, I know.

23 THE WITNESS: The civilian part.

24 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, would you look at

25 the question, and you'll see that the question wasn't put that way. And

Page 48930

1 it's line 25, the question was "the Croatian Community of HVO," and that

2 is why the witness did not understand what the question referred to,

3 because the body that Mr. Prlic headed which was the HVO HZ-HB.

4 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I didn't look at the literal formulation of the

5 question, which I agree to you is puzzling, but I was looking at the

6 document and what is set out on page 37, line 20. And that entity, I

7 thought, was what the question referred to.

8 Mr. Kruger.

9 MR. KRUGER: Thank you, Your Honour. That was indeed so and

10 thank you for eliciting the answer or a response.

11 Q. Now, sir, if we go on, it's pursuant to the decision, then, of

12 the body of which Mr. Prlic was the head. And the order of the chief of

13 the Defence Department, you agree that that is Mr. Stojic being referred

14 to?

15 A. Yes, I agree.

16 Q. " ... and pursuant to the Geneva Agreements on the structure of

17 Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as the jurisdiction of the Armed Forces

18 Command in the provinces, I hereby order:"

19 And then it says:

20 "All units of the HVO Armed Forces and of the BH Army in

21 Provinces 3, 8, 10," those are Croatian provinces, "be placed under the

22 command of the HVO Main Headquarters, that is, under the command of the

23 Central Bosnia, North-Western and South-Eastern Herzegovina Operative

24 Zone."

25 And if we continue to number 4, it says:

Page 48931

1 "Members and units of the HVO Armed Forces and the BH Army who do

2 not submit to the commands in items 1 and 2 herein leave the province

3 where they do not belong; otherwise, they will be treated as paramilitary

4 units and disarmed."

5 Now, sir, my question to you is: You'll agree that this order

6 relates to the implementation of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan; you don't

7 disagree with that?

8 A. This order relates to the provinces contained in the

9 Vance-Owen Plan, yes.

10 Q. And from paragraph 1, what this, in effect, says, if we look at

11 those provinces, those provinces would include Konjic, for instance, and

12 it says the units in Konjic municipality are to be placed under the

13 command of the HVO Main Headquarters. And, furthermore, if those units

14 in Konjic do not do this, and it says -- who do not submit to the

15 commands, they must leave the province where they do not belong;

16 otherwise, they will be treated as paramilitary units and disarmed.

17 Now, sir, doesn't this mean that the ABiH in Konjic municipality,

18 that majority of the soldiers - I think you mentioned the number of

19 14.000 - according to this, they must submit themselves to the command of

20 the HVO, isn't that what this says, and if they don't, they have to

21 leave?

22 A. As far as I know, this order never came into force. It was never

23 acted upon and implemented.

24 Q. But, sir, this order -- that's not the question, whether it was

25 implemented or acted upon. Does this mean that those soldiers -- ABiH

Page 48932

1 soldiers in Konjic had to either submit to the HVO command or leave?

2 A. If the order was not implemented, then they didn't have to be

3 submitted to anybody.

4 Q. We're not talking about the implementation yet. I'm talking

5 about the practical implication. Does this order say, as it stands here,

6 or imply, as it stands here, that those soldiers in Konjic, Muslim

7 soldiers, ABiH, had to submit to the HVO or leave?

8 A. If it didn't come into force, then they didn't have to become

9 submitted.

10 Q. Sir, if you look at paragraph 8, it says:

11 "This order shall be carried out by 20 January 1993."

12 Now, this order, if you place yourself in the shoes of the

13 Muslims in Konjic, for instance, the ABiH in Konjic, certainly you would

14 be very concerned about what the HVO is requiring of you; isn't that so?

15 A. I have no knowledge that this was sent to Konjic at all. That

16 does not follow from this. It doesn't follow that it was sent to Konjic.

17 But I say again I have no knowledge that this -- that any of the things

18 contained in this order were ever carried out. And if we go back to this

19 period, then there was another order at that time linked to the

20 Vance-Owen Plan. Perhaps I could try and explain that general period.

21 It was an order from the minister of defence of

22 Bosnia-Herzegovina - his name was Bozo Rajic - and it related to all

23 three components, and initially it meant a truce, a cessation of all

24 hostilities. That's what it called for, and it had similar contents to

25 this. So it meant the temporary de-blockade of Sarajevo and the

Page 48933

1 withdrawal from areas where the Serbs were in the majority, where the

2 Croats were in the majority, where the Muslims were in the majority, and

3 so on. So this was something that was resorted to for that particular

4 time so that they knew who was in command of what forces in the

5 provinces, and then later on so that they could discuss overall

6 demobilisation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. So the aim of that was an

7 immediate cessation of conflicts, and the Croats saw the Vance-Owen Plan

8 as a definite end to the war.

9 Q. Now, sir, you say the Croats saw the Vance-Owen Plan as a

10 definite end to the war, but certainly as an intelligence analyst you

11 must have been aware that the Muslim side was not in favour of this

12 Vance-Owen Peace Plan and they didn't agree with it. Isn't that so?

13 A. Upon returning from Geneva, when our people working on that came

14 back, the knowledge wasn't like that, because in January already it was

15 agreed with Alija Izetbegovic that he would accept the Vance-Owen Plan

16 and that he would sign it -- well, it was to have taken place in January,

17 but there was some technicality involved. And I remember that I was

18 personally given an assignment from General Petkovic to collect

19 information about heavy artillery deployment for the entire HVO for that

20 period and also the distribution of the minefields for the requirements

21 of the negotiations in Geneva, and I was in charge of that personally. I

22 drew those maps and so on. So that means that the goal was to locate

23 where the artillery was located in order to prevent it from firing, and

24 to draw up maps and exchange them on the layout of the minefields.

25 Q. Okay. Let me put this to you: that the interpretation that the

Page 48934

1 Bosnian Croats had of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan was not shared by the

2 Muslims, the interpretation. They didn't agree with your interpretation.

3 What would you say to that?

4 A. I don't know how they interpreted it. All I do know is that the

5 Vance-Owen Plan was signed in its entirety in March 1993, and that, in

6 principle, they had agreed on all the points as early on as January 1993.

7 So if something was signed and a document existed, and you had a map,

8 then I think that's it, that's the end of the story.

9 As far as interpretations go, it is only the international

10 community that can interpret things, because it was under its auspices

11 that it was carried through.

12 Q. Sir, let's move on from this, and let's move to March 1993. And

13 I refer you to document 4D00454. This is the second-last document in

14 your binder. This document is already in evidence.

15 Now, sir, the document you have before you is dated the 20th of

16 March, 1993, and it's a protocol of the joint meeting of representatives

17 of the RBiH Army, commands and representatives of RBiH Ministry of

18 Interior, and the meeting was held on 20 March. The subject of this

19 meeting, we see just below "Protocol," it says -- at least "subject," you

20 will see just below the "Protocol," "Subject" is:

21 "The assessment of military-safety situation in the area of

22 Hadzici, Jablanica, Konjic municipalities with regard to the Croatian

23 Defence Council."

24 And then it starts off with saying:

25 "Upon analysis of the military-safety situation in the free

Page 48935

1 territories of the indicated municipalities, significant deterioration of

2 the relations between HVO and legal government authorities of the RBiH

3 and the Army of RBiH in the recent period, and particularly since

4 continued negotiations in New York began, was established. The reasons

5 thereof lie in the establishment by force of parallel authorities by HVO,

6 which is manifested through:"

7 And then various instances of manifestation of this attempt to

8 establish parallel authorities is listed.

9 Now, sir, I put it to you that the HVO was, indeed, trying to

10 establish parallel authorities in various municipalities, including

11 Konjic and Jablanica.

12 A. I don't have any knowledge of any establishment of parallel

13 authority in the Konjic-Jablanica area.

14 Q. And the legal authorities in Konjic and Jablanica, the

15 authorities of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, they were

16 concerned about the actions of the HVO? Do you allow for that, that this

17 could be a reason why later on, a month later, Mr. Halilovic asks

18 Mr. Petkovic, Are we still friends, or Are we allies or enemies?

19 A. I don't want to do any guess-work here. When you mention legal

20 organs, legal authorities, absolutely the HVO was a legal, and I think

21 we've established that already in the previous days, so I don't see how

22 the problem of legality crops up here.

23 Q. But those authorities were being interfered with or worked

24 against by the HVO. The HVO was usurping their power, isn't that so, and

25 their authority?

Page 48936

1 MR. KARNAVAS: Could we have an example of how, in Jablanica, for

2 instance, when you had the doctor who was appointed by Izetbegovic to

3 take over that region, how is it that -- and in what concrete fashion did

4 the HVO in Jablanica or Konjic actually took over authority? And if he

5 can prove that and show that, then he can pose that question. That's the

6 predicate, as opposed to just hypothesising in the air, like a feather in

7 a storm.

8 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I might remind

9 you that the topic of civilian authorities were not covered in the

10 examination-in-chief, and, therefore, I think that Mr. Kruger should

11 refrain from posing leading questions.

12 MR. KRUGER: Your Honour, if I may respond to that.

13 The summary makes it very clear that the witness testifies that

14 the position in Konjic Municipality is that it was the ABiH which

15 precipitated the conflict, they were responsible for it. These questions

16 go directly to that topic, because they are designed to indicate that

17 this simply is not so, and the HVO, be it the military or the civilian

18 authorities, had a very big role in provoking that conflict. And that's

19 why this falls squarely within the ambit of cross-examination,

20 Your Honour, I submit.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Once again, these are

22 objections that are wasting our time.

23 You have heard the Prosecutor. He's talking about provocations

24 from the HVO, and do you agree or don't you agree with that?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I don't agree about these HVO

Page 48937

1 provocations.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, he doesn't agree, so

3 please proceed.

4 MR. KRUGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

5 Q. Now, sir, let's move to the actual attack in Konjic, the ABiH

6 attack, on the 23rd of March, 1993. Now, your testimony, as I understand

7 it, is that on the 23rd of March, it's 1993, it's the ABiH which launched

8 this attack, and it was entirely unprovoked by any actions from the HVO

9 side. Is that your testimony?

10 A. That's right.

11 Q. Let's have a look at document P01747. 1747.

12 Now, sir, this document is an --

13 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Would that document be protected? It says

14 "Confidential" on the first page, and it's a SpaBat document, I think.

15 MR. KRUGER: Your Honour, this is one of those documents where we

16 are allowed to talk about it, as long as we don't broadcast it, an image

17 of the document.

18 JUDGE TRECHSEL: It's good to know that. Thank you.

19 MR. KRUGER: Thank you, Your Honour, and thank you for alerting

20 me to that. I missed that.

21 Q. Now, sir, this document is an UNPROFOR report from UNPROFOR

22 Kiseljak to UNPROFOR Headquarters Zagreb, and it's a weekly information

23 summary for the period 22 to 28 March. And we only have the translation

24 of the portions that I'm going to put to you, and the first part I'm

25 putting to you -- want to show you is paragraph 4(b), which is on page 3

Page 48938

1 of 8 in the English version. And 4 is the report for the BritBat Sector.

2 4(b) relates to Gornji Vakuf, and it says:

3 "The relationship between the Muslims and the Croats appears to

4 have deteriorated during the past seven days. On 21 March, according to

5 BritBat reports, the HVO to the east of Prozor attacked the Muslim

6 village of Here. Following this attack, concentration of soldiers from

7 both sides were noted in the surrounding villages."

8 Sir, are you aware or is that correct that on the 21st of March

9 the HVO attacked the village of Here?

10 A. I don't know about this.

11 Q. But, sir, as an analyst, certainly if this is true, then

12 certainly this may or would have an impact on how the ABiH viewed their

13 security in neighbouring areas; isn't that so?

14 A. I've said a number of times that the HVO had less men, and in

15 case of any attacks it was clear what would happen, what the outcome

16 would have been. So I don't have any knowledge to the effect that the

17 HVO attacked anywhere.

18 Q. Sir, the fact that you don't know about this is just because you

19 weren't privy to all information regarding the HVO activities, even

20 though you were in the Main Staff; isn't that so?

21 A. I said that I was informed of the enemy activities in these

22 parts, and so, according to the reports we had, there were no conflicts,

23 which means that the HVO did not cause the conflicts, provoke the

24 conflicts.

25 Q. Sir, I put it to you that if we look at the ABiH attack in

Page 48939

1 Konjic, we simply cannot evaluate that attack on the 23rd of March, 1993,

2 without taking into account this attack by the HVO in Prozor two days

3 earlier.

4 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Counsel.

5 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, let us just be more

6 precise. It wasn't about the attack in Prozor that was referred to, but

7 the village of Here.

8 MR. KRUGER: I'll reformulate.

9 Q. Sir, the attack of the ABiH in Konjic on the 23rd of March, 1993,

10 we cannot evaluate or judge what happened there without taking into

11 account the HVO attack in the village of Here, which is in the

12 municipality of Prozor, two days earlier; isn't that so?

13 A. I don't have knowledge of this attack in Here on the 21st of

14 March, but perhaps the attack in Konjic on the 23rd -- perhaps we can

15 view that through a different context, in a different context, where a

16 little while before that, both for the military and civilian authorities,

17 Safet Cibo was appointed for Konjic, Jablanica, and Prozor, and he

18 addressed the population over Radio Konjic, and then Croats could not

19 have any access to Konjic anymore. So propaganda again.

20 Q. Let's look at paragraph 5(b) of this report, which is a report

21 from SpaBat Sector, and paragraph 5(b) relates to Konjic. It says:

22 "According to Slobodan Bobic (HVO vice-defence minister), on

23 March 24th, Muslim elements killed two Croats, wounded eight more, and

24 arrested a further 22 of the HVO."

25 And it goes on:

Page 48940

1 "The situation abated somewhat when Bruno Stojic and

2 Brigadier Petkovic visited the area and organised the release of the

3 detainees. The comment is this activity was a consequence rather than a

4 cause of the tension which has been increasing in the Konjic-Jablanica

5 area during the past week. The heightened state of tension was

6 demonstrated by the significant increase in the number of check-points in

7 town as well as an increase in the manning of these check-points."

8 Sir, it seems that the internationals viewed that the events in

9 Konjic, that attack on the 23rd and then -- which was then stopped by

10 Petkovic and Stojic a day later, it seems that that attack was not --

11 should not be viewed only in the context of Konjic, you can't view it in

12 isolation. You need to look at the broader context. That activity was a

13 consequence rather than a cause of the tension; isn't that so? Konjic

14 you can't view in isolation; you have to view it in the broader context

15 of the region. What happened in Jablanica and Prozor would also impact.

16 A. If we look at 5(b), referring to Konjic, you will see that an

17 additional 22 HVO members were arrested, which means that prior to that

18 there were 150 HVO members arrested, as had been admitted by the ABiH,

19 and that the attack was going on across the area. On the 23rd, an

20 agreement was signed by the HVO and the ABiH in order to put a stop to

21 that conflict. And as I've already said it, after that the scale of the

22 conflict was first reduced and then the scale -- the conflict was

23 stopped, but a big contribution towards that was a very bad weather.

24 You can see that the report is not comprehensive and that the

25 number of 150 is not mentioned. We see that there is a reference to the

Page 48941

1 21st, but whereas the 23rd the report is not comprehensive, which may be

2 due to the fact that it was not easy to come by information at the time.

3 Q. Let's move on to the next month, April. Now, sir, with regard to

4 the events in April in the municipality of Jablanica, your testimony was:

5 "To the best of my knowledge, the HVO had never planned that."

6 And that was on the 19th of January at transcript reference 48654

7 [realtime transcript read in error "48694"], line 20. Sir, by that do

8 you mean that the HVO did not attack in Jablanica in April 1993?

9 A. Absolutely, the HVO didn't launch any attacks on the town of

10 Jablanica. What the HVO did was to try and help the Croats who were

11 completely encircled there. That was an active defence.

12 Q. You are aware of the ultimatum -- the April ultimatum by the HVO

13 to the ABiH in April, issued on the 5th of April, to expire on the 15th

14 of April? Are you aware of that ultimatum?

15 A. I'm not aware of any ultimatum.

16 Q. Let's look at paragraph 18 -- Exhibit P01808. It's just the next

17 document in your binder. Exhibit P01808. This is in evidence.

18 Sir, this is a media report published in "Borba" on the 5th of

19 April, 1993, and we've provided in your binder an enlarged version of it

20 to make it easier for you to read. You'll see that there's a photograph

21 on the top right-hand side of the picture, and just beneath that

22 photograph there's an article entitled "HVO Ultimativno Trazi." You see

23 that?

24 A. Yes, I do.

25 Q. This article says -- it's about the HVO ultimatum: "HVO ultimatum

Page 48942

1 demands pullout of Muslim troops from three provinces:

2 "Zagreb. The Croatian Defence Council yesterday called for the

3 pullout of Muslim troops from the provinces assigned to the Croats under

4 a UN peace plan, thus heightening the tensions between the nominal

5 allies.

6 "The HVO command set April 15 as the dead-line for

7 Alija Izetbegovic to sign a joint document which calls for a pullout of

8 troops and the creation of a joint command, thus confirming that there

9 are no disagreements between Croats and Muslims."

10 Sir, do you have no knowledge of this?

11 A. I have no knowledge of the ultimatum. However, another reference

12 is made to provinces. That was in April, and as far as I know the

13 Vance-Owen Plan was signed in March and included the proposals by both

14 the Croatian and Muslim sides. I don't see where the problem lies. I

15 don't know about any ultimatums.

16 Q. Sir, let's read the next paragraph:

17 "'If Izetbegovic does not sign the agreement by 15 April, the HVO

18 will unilaterally establish its authority in Provinces 3, 8 and 10,' says

19 a communique from the HVO General Staff in Mostar."

20 That's a reference to the Main Staff where you were working.

21 They issued this communique. Did you know about that?

22 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, for the fifth time,

23 perhaps, I will have the following objection to a similar question. We

24 have already spoken at great length about the text in "Borba" and in

25 Reuters, and we had Veso Vegar as a witness in this courtroom, and I

Page 48943

1 believe that it was established in this court that no information was

2 issued by the Main Staff of the HVO. Could that please be borne in mind,

3 rather to use a newspaper text from the Belgrade-based "Borba," and ask

4 the witness about something that he could not have any knowledge about

5 and that has been proven in this courtroom as not being the truth?

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Kruger, the Defence is

7 saying that the Main Staff never issued any press releases and that one

8 needs to be wary of this article published in Belgrade.

9 MR. KRUGER: Thank you for that, Your Honour.

10 MR. STEWART: Your Honours, a small correction, but it makes life

11 easier later, but the -- I was trying to find the reference at page 49,

12 line 20 of today's transcript to the 19th of January, given as 48694.

13 It's actually 48654. It's probably worth noting, because later we'll

14 look for it and it's not there.

15 MR. KRUGER: Thank you for that, Your Honour. It is, indeed, as

16 Mr. Stewart spoke. I misspoke on that, and I apologise.

17 MR. KOVACIC: Maybe not to forget later, the previous discussion

18 of my dear colleague Mr. Stewart is recorded as Mr. Kruger is speaking,

19 so later we would forget who is speaking what.

20 MR. STEWART: I suppose I should also point out that --

21 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the counsel, please.

22 MR. STEWART: I should also point out that if the corrected

23 references that I've just given don't then appear correctly on the

24 transcript now, nothing is achieved. And a few lines back, it's given as

25 "4655." What did I say, "48654," I think is what I said. Mr. Kruger can

Page 48944

1 confirm that. Thank you.

2 JUDGE TRECHSEL: It's wrong again. You said "48654," not "46,"

3 I think.

4 MR. STEWART: Yes, thank you.

5 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the counsel, please.

6 MR. STEWART: Now I've got it, thank you.

7 Yes, thank you, Your Honour. I did -- as I sat down, same old

8 problem. Once it happens once, it carries on happening, doesn't it?

9 That's a rule.

10 MR. KRUGER:

11 Q. Sir, you were in the Main Staff during April 1993. Was there any

12 talk that you were aware of in the Main Staff about an ultimatum and a

13 dead-line of 15 April?

14 A. I was not aware of any ultimatums.

15 Q. Let's have a look at the next document in the binder, which is

16 P01872. And we won't dwell upon this document. We'll just quickly look

17 at it. It's an order from Miljenko Lasic of the 14th of April, 1993.

18 It's an HVO order. It says:

19 "In view of carrying out the combat mission in the

20 Prozor-Jablanica area, I order:"

21 And then follows what he orders.

22 Now, sir, you'd agree that this is very clearly a combat -- an

23 order preparing the HVO for combat missions? You don't disagree with

24 that?

25 A. If we look at the date, which is the 14th of April, and

Page 48945

1 Miljenko Lasic's order, we will see that that was a reaction to the

2 activities previously undertaken by the BiH Army. This is what I have

3 already been talking about. That was when artillery support was

4 requested for Boksevica and for the areas penetrated by their sabotage

5 forces. If we look at the artillery of the Operations Zone South-East

6 Herzegovina and North-West Herzegovina, in my view, the only logical

7 explanation would be that that was that artillery support. It was not

8 previously planned. It was a reaction to something that had happened,

9 and an order was then issued to that effect.

10 Q. Sir, you've given a long explanation, but you still haven't

11 answered the question. You don't disagree that this is clearly an order

12 for combat missions by the HVO, regarding combat missions for the HVO?

13 A. I absolutely agree, and I would say that this was a combat

14 mission, of course.

15 Q. Let's go three documents further in your binder, and this is

16 document P01915, P01915.

17 Now, this is an interim report two days later. It's dated the

18 16th of April, 1993, and it's by Colonel Zeljko Siljeg. And if we note

19 the addressees, it's to the Department of Defence in Mostar and to the

20 Main Staff of the HVO.

21 Now, if we go to paragraph 7 and paragraph 8 of this report, it

22 says:

23 "Co-ordinating with Tuta is done through the Posusje unit of

24 Sovicka."

25 And 8:

Page 48946

1 "Beginning of today's operation on selected targets, next to the

2 village of Slatina at 7.00 and on the village of Sovici from 9.00."

3 Now, sir, my question to you is: This appears to be very close

4 to an attack order. Isn't this an attack order regarding the village of

5 Sovici?

6 A. This is not a combat or, rather, an attack order. I need to read

7 the whole document, but I can tell you that this is a report from a

8 commander who had his zone of responsibility, and he submitted a report.

9 For me to be able to comment upon this document, I have to read the

10 entire report to be able to tell you what's herein. So this is not an

11 order. This a report, reporting about the situation on the ground.

12 Q. And according to what you see there in this report, what is being

13 reported is that Sovici is going to be attacked at 9.00?

14 A. Here it says "Selectively on military targets." That's how I

15 read it.

16 Q. Have a look at paragraph 13, the very last item of the document.

17 It says:

18 "We continue to work according to plan."

19 Now, sir, do you allow that there was actually a plan being

20 implemented in this area by the HVO?

21 A. Here it says, looking at bullet point 1:

22 "In the command of the Rama Brigade, we are establishing a

23 forward command post."

24 This a plan to establish a forward command post in order to be

25 able to resist attacks which were mounting in the area. When you want to

Page 48947

1 establish a forward command post, it takes some time. In other words,

2 this is a plan to establish a forward command post in the area.

3 Q. Doesn't this refer to all the previous points in this document, 1

4 to 12, and it says, We have reported to you and it's all according to the

5 plan? Isn't that what this says?

6 A. This is a report by a commander. What exactly did he have in

7 mind? There's no way for me to know. But I believe that he was talking

8 about his plan to establish a forward command post as a reaction to what

9 had happened previously in the area. We see the date 16 April, and we

10 know that the intense activities started on the 13th of April. In my

11 view, as an analyst, I would say that I am right in interpreting the

12 commander's words, but what he really meant is a different story.

13 Q. Now, sir, as an analyst, you see that this report was addressed

14 to, inter alia, Mr. Stojic, and it was addressed to the chief of the

15 Main Staff, General Petkovic. Now, certainly Colonel Siljeg, when he

16 wrote this, it's safe to assume that when he refers to "the plan" or

17 "this plan," that Mr. Stojic and General Petkovic would know what he was

18 talking about. As an analyst, would you agree with that?

19 A. As an analyst, looking back at that time, I can say that

20 Mr. Stojic and everybody else got very much involved with a view to

21 pacifying the situation. It was common knowledge that there was a lot

22 going on, and you can see that something was done in order to prevent

23 further attacks against the units of the HVO which were deployed in the

24 area -- in the enclaves around Konjic.

25 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Your Honour, with your permission, I

Page 48948

1 allowed the witness to provide his answer, but I have to object. The

2 document doesn't say that it was ever sent to Mr. Stojic. It was sent to

3 the Defence Department. We have had documents which expressly refer to

4 Mr. Stojic. This is not one of them. And I just wanted to be very

5 precise in that respect. Thank you.

6 MR. KRUGER: I'll move on, Your Honour. Thank you.

7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Sir, this is an important

8 document in light of the indictment; namely, as regards Sovici and

9 Doljani. The case put by the Prosecution is that the HVO attacked,

10 together with Tuta's unit, and with a number of consequences.

11 I'm looking at this document as it stands in front of us. There

12 is something at the end which mentions a plan. In your language,

13 "planu," "po planu." A Judge that only reads this document can infer

14 that an offensive is being launched, but this would not take into account

15 what happened on the 13th, 14th, and 15th of April. And you addressed

16 this very briefly, and we've seen documents relating to that.

17 Since you were a member of the Main Staff at the time, since you

18 were an analyst, as far as you remember - it is very difficult to

19 remember everything after such a long time when so much happened, it's

20 difficult perhaps to jolt your memory - but at the time, as far as you

21 remember, did the HVO react after there had been an attack by the ABiH or

22 did the HVO launch an attack, which is not the same thing?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The HVO absolutely reacted to an

24 attack.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In this document, if I analyse

Page 48949

1 it without taking into account what happened on the 13th, 14th, and 15th

2 of April, for which we have a great number of documents, there's a small

3 technical point of detail which caught my attention, and that has to do

4 with the radio connections and the fact that it was important to install

5 a mobile repeater coming from Tomislavgrad. Do you see what I mean?

6 It's mentioned here. After the list of artillery pieces, 1, 2, 3, and

7 then there is a need to install that; i.e., it is important to have four

8 Motorolas.

9 If there is such a plan as put forward by the Prosecution, I

10 wonder why this hadn't been planned beforehand, to install the entire

11 communications system. This is clearly done in a hurry and there's

12 nothing there, so it has to be brought in from Tomislavgrad. Either they

13 are totally incompetent, which could well be the case, or this small

14 technical detail indicates that the HVO was faced with an offensive and

15 they had to prepare for a counter-offensive by installing an adequate

16 communications system which wasn't working properly.

17 I don't know exactly what your knowledge of military affairs are.

18 I know that you went to military school, I know that you're an officer,

19 but I don't know if you're currently involved in a number of operations

20 conducted by NATO, with the participation of the Croatian forces. I

21 don't know. But when there is a plan, in technical terms, are the

22 communications systems not a priority when such a plan exists?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, absolutely,

24 communications are a priority, and you can see that there was no plan in

25 place. If there had been a plan, then we, as the military intelligence,

Page 48950

1 would have had to provide elements for such a plan, and I know that we

2 have never provided such elements. And you can see here that this was

3 organised as a reaction to something and that we were taken by surprise.

4 A repeater was then brought in and set up in order to establish

5 communication among the different elements of the artillery.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You have just mentioned a

7 detail which is important. This could be drowned in what you are saying.

8 You are saying that if there was a plan, the VOS would have been

9 involved beforehand, upstream, not at the last minute. As far as you

10 remember, while you worked as an analyst, do you have any memory of a

11 plan that would have been prepared beforehand?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The only plan that had been

13 prepared and that I'm aware of at the level of the Main Staff was

14 Operation Tempest in the month of November, 1992, against the VRS, and

15 the Military Intelligence was a part of that.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you are saying that this

17 famous Bura Operation which we have heard a great deal about, well, that

18 you were involved in that.

19 To conclude, if a large-scale operation in Sovici-Doljani had

20 been prepared, you should have been involved, and you are saying this

21 under oath. You are saying that you were not involved, We were not

22 involved, so there's no plan?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Absolutely, I was not involved,

24 there was no plan in place.

25 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Just for the record, on page 59,

Page 48951

1 line 2, the witness said "Operation Bura." We have spoken about

2 Operation Bura on a number of occasions. Maybe we should stick to the

3 Croatian word rather than attempt to translate it into English.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Kruger.

5 MR. KRUGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

6 Q. Mr. Jasak, let's then look at another document, P01936. It's the

7 very next document in your binder, P01936, and this is another interim

8 report by Colonel Siljeg on the 17th of April, 1993, addressed to the

9 Main Staff of the Croatian Defence Council in Mostar and the Operative

10 Zone North-West Herzegovina, Tomislavgrad:

11 "Interim report for the situation at 0900 hours."

12 And then he says:

13 "This morning at 6.00, we began to implement the plan."

14 So, sir, there was a plan?

15 A. A plan? Well, it might just be the word used, "plan," plan to

16 help people under siege in the Konjic region, used that way. But there

17 wasn't a written plan as something that is elaborated for anything like

18 that. It's just a plan to assist those people who are in jeopardy.

19 Q. But you're just speculating on that, because you don't really

20 know, do you?

21 A. I know that at the level of the Main Staff, there was no plan.

22 So the word "plan," well, you can say -- we used to say, We're working

23 according to plan, but there was no actual plan.

24 Q. Okay, sir. Now, sir, just further on how the ABiH was viewing or

25 interpreting what they saw coming from the HVO side, let's look at

Page 48952

1 document P11078.

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a second.

3 Witness, the word "plan" is important, because there are two

4 versions, there are two cases. The Prosecutor argues that there was a

5 plan, and you are saying that there was no plan, and Judges will have to

6 rule on this.

7 I see in the B/C/S version the word "plana" or "plan," and I see

8 that it's a report from the 17th of April to the Main Staff and it's

9 coming from Mr. Siljeg. So it's coming from -- it's going to the top.

10 And Colonel Siljeg is reporting to the Main Staff, so going upstream,

11 probably saying to General Petkovic that, We started at 6.00 a.m. and we

12 began to implement the plan. And he points out that the operations are

13 going to go towards the villages of the Prozor municipality, and he gives

14 a list. This is what is puzzling, because you say that you had maps, you

15 had other documents, and you would jot down everything that was

16 happening. So if you are -- if what you're saying is true, in theory,

17 this report sent to General Petkovic would be sent to the VOS or to the

18 officer in charge, and on your map you are going to put arrows like

19 "Gorica," "Paros," "Parcani," and so on, stating that some actions will

20 be taken there.

21 So as far as you can recollect, were you given this document on

22 the 17th of April?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This document -- well, I don't

24 remember this document, I don't remember having been given it. We

25 received from this zone -- from VOS, V-O-S, down our chain of

Page 48953

1 information, but this obviously went down the chain of command, whereas

2 from VOS, of the operations zone we would receive, on a regular basis,

3 information and reports.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'm not trying to speculate,

5 but from a military point of view, 13th, 14th, and 15th of April, the

6 ABiH is launching an attack. The HVO shows some resistance and launches

7 a counter-attack. Colonel Siljeg, from his forward command post because

8 he is apparently in Prozor, is in touch via radio communication with

9 General Petkovic, and minute after minute he keeps him posted. And on

10 the 16th of April, either by radio communication or by telephone, they

11 set up the counter-offensive. And on the 16th of April, Colonel Siljeg

12 says to him, Tomorrow morning at 6.00 a.m., I will launch my attack on

13 all those small villages, and we are going to take part, and that is

14 Parcani, Visnjani, and so on and so forth. General Petkovic says, That's

15 well and good. Go ahead. And on the 17th of April at 9.00 a.m., which

16 means three hours later, he reports that according to the plan, this is

17 what happened.

18 From a military point of view, could this be a proper sequence of

19 events?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I'm looking at the

21 axis of action, Slatina mentioned here. As far as I'm concerned, it

22 would only -- the only logical thing would be to alleviate the Boksevica

23 and Neretva River Valley area [as interpreted], where the HVO were in a

24 very difficult position, so to reinforce them. That is the only logical

25 thing, that it went along that way. So in conformity with the assistance

Page 48954

1 they had asked for previously both from the Operations Zone South-East

2 Herzegovina and North-West Herzegovina, and where proposals were made

3 about the pressure from the north, all I can see here is a request to

4 help the area out because the units were far -- had far less manpower --

5 the HVO had far less manpower and, as such, they found it difficult to

6 survive and to maintain the areas they controlled. So this is by way of

7 alleviating the situation in those areas.

8 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, a correction to the

9 transcript. In line 8, it was recorded as being the Neretva River Valley

10 area. The witness said "Neretvica."

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Neretvica.

12 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Because they are two different

13 rivers; right?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So according to

16 you, this plan, what was its purpose? Was it to lift some pressure off,

17 because the ABiH was putting pressure on the Neretvica region and

18 attacking those villages would lift some pressure off this region? Is

19 that what the plan was all about? Is that what you're trying to say

20 here?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't think there was any plan.

22 It was just assistance, reaction to the existing situation, and that they

23 wanted to lift the burden over the units in the Konjic and Jablanica area

24 that were in a difficult position.

25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Please proceed.

Page 48955

1 MR. KRUGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

2 Q. Witness, I'm going to skip a few documents. I'm going to refer

3 you to Exhibit P01949. 1949. This exhibit is already in evidence.

4 Now, sir, this is still the same period, and this is the 18th of

5 April, and it's an order for further action by

6 Brigadier Milivoj Petkovic, and it's addressed to, inter alia, Prozor,

7 Siljeg, and it says:

8 "1. Urgently reinforce the troops that are carrying out offensive

9 operations towards Klis."

10 So, sir, from this it's correct that the HVO was actually in an

11 attack mode, this time in Klis?

12 A. It says here:

13 "Urgently reinforce the forces carrying out offensive operations

14 towards Klis."

15 So that's precisely what I was saying, towards Neretvica. So

16 obviously the forces who -- which wanted to assist the area did not

17 succeed and that they needed to be reinforced to lift the burden off

18 Klis.

19 Q. But, sir, the question is: From 1 it's clear that the HVO is

20 carrying out offensive operations, it's attacking towards Klis. Isn't

21 that exactly what it says here?

22 A. This part of the order being mentioned and what we have on the

23 ground, you should view this integrally, comprehensively, and we can call

24 it exclusively "active defence." So there are some elements of attack,

25 but exclusively to gain a better defence position and not to take control

Page 48956

1 of something, so that the defence could be put into a better position so

2 as to be able to resist enemy attacks.

3 Q. Paragraph 2:

4 "You should assess whether you have forces available for attack

5 on Here, Kute, and Scipe."

6 That's clearly contemplating attack?

7 A. If you look at this here, Here, Kute, Scipe, it's an area

8 north-west of the Neretvica Valley, along the Neretvica Valley. Now,

9 from where the attacks came along the Neretvica Valley and further on

10 towards the municipalities of Prozor and Vakuf. Now, they are Muslim

11 villages from which units arrived which attack this area. So here,

12 too -- now, Slatina is the lower side, southerly. This is northerly. So

13 they wanted to lift the burden of this entire siege. So in geographic

14 terms, it's one area which belongs to different municipalities, but it's

15 one general region.

16 Q. Now, sir, paragraph 4:

17 "Zeljko, I hope you understand the order."

18 Do you have any idea what General Petkovic means when he says

19 this? Is he giving a coded message to Zeljko Siljeg?

20 A. I don't know what coded thing this could be, except to be

21 understood just how important the area was. So unless assistance is

22 given, there wouldn't be any more HVO units there. It would have been

23 completely militarily routed. I don't know what else this could mean.

24 Q. Sir, before completing this topic, let's have one more look at

25 the ECMM report which we looked at earlier today. This is P02430.

Page 48957

1 JUDGE PRANDLER: I would like to ask the witness about the

2 following in connection with the number 4 question, which says that:

3 "Zeljko, I hope you understand the order."

4 And in this connection, I would like to ask Mr. Jasak about the

5 following: If in number 1 and 2 there are references to reinforce the

6 troops that are carrying out offensive operations, then:

7 "You should assess whether you have forces available for attack

8 on Here, Kute, and Scipe."

9 Then would you find any contradiction with number 3,

10 paragraph number 3 of the order, which says that:

11 "In accordance with the order to cease the hostilities, I will

12 meet with Halilovic tomorrow and UNPROFOR will have the role of a

13 mediator"?

14 So my question is that although in numbers 1 and 2 there are a

15 clear reference as far as the offensive operations, in number 3 there is

16 information that there will be talks about a cease-fire, in that context

17 what is your position on this order? And then probably you can

18 reconsider your previous answer about paragraph number 4, if it is coded

19 or not. Thank you.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I tried to analyse

21 this as a soldier.

22 We have units that are under siege, in an encirclement. The only

23 way to try, from various axes, to attack -- the only way in which we can

24 lift the burden off these units, we had information that the BH Army was

25 attacking -- was on the attack, regardless of the fact that on the 18th

Page 48958

1 an agreement was signed, and we could see from their orders that they had

2 no intention of respecting it. So here I think that General Petkovic has

3 attempted, by issuing this order, to act and to ensure that his meeting

4 with General Halilovic does not result in a complete military routing of

5 the HVO, because then they would have nothing to discuss. That's how I

6 understand this.

7 JUDGE PRANDLER: Thank you.

8 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Are you saying, Mr. Jasak, that this is an order

9 to implement a cease-fire?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right. After this, the

11 24th [as interpreted] in Zenica, they agreed on a cease-fire;

12 Generals Petkovic and Halilovic, that is.

13 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But the operations continued.

15 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you.

16 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, might I correct the

17 transcript. In line 19, what was recorded is the witness having said

18 "the 24th in Zenica." The witness said "the 20th of April," "the 20th of

19 April."

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Colonel, the document we have

22 is an important exhibit from the Prosecution, and it may be used in their

23 final submission as to what happened. Therefore, we have to look at this

24 document in detail. There are four paragraphs, and they have to be

25 linked to each other when read.

Page 48959

1 It seems that there is some sort of a code here. When

2 General Petkovic is sending this document to Colonel Siljeg, it is

3 encrypted, so it's confidential.

4 Point 1, it's obvious it's a surprise attack. We are not aware

5 of all the situation and we don't know what was the position of the HVO

6 and the ABiH in Klis, but you say that the situation was difficult.

7 As for point 2, as for Here, Kute and Scipe, it is obviously not

8 an attack. They have to first assess whether they have the forces

9 available. So this document is mainly targeting Klis.

10 Then we move to points 3 and 4, and here you have to really read

11 it carefully. At first glance, I see that in an official military

12 document, General Petkovic calls Siljeg by his first name, Zeljko. I

13 don't know whether he's saying the formal "you" or the informal "you,"

14 but it's: "I hope you understand the order." But is this referring to

15 number 1 or to number 3? If it's referring to 1, it's very clear, they

16 have to do their utmost for this operation. But if it's linked to

17 number 3, then we are buying into the case of the Prosecution, which

18 could be the following: In Bosnia-Herzegovina during this period, there

19 was some hostilities and there was some cease-fires. Here,

20 General Petkovic knows that. The following day, he will meet with

21 Halilovic, and that UNPROFOR is going to play its role. And as a result

22 of this meeting, there will be a cease-fire. It's obvious. And he is

23 trying to explain to Zeljko that since there's going to be a cease-fire,

24 they have to win immediately. So in military terms, it could mean that

25 you have to win this position immediately, and he's basically saying to

Page 48960

1 him, I hope you understand, because as early as the 19th of April, the

2 following day, UNPROFOR will blow the whistle and will say that it's the

3 end of the game. So he's pre-empting this.

4 So according to you, is point 4 to be read with a link to

5 number 3 or to number 1, if you have any knowledge as a military analyst?

6 If you don't know anything, you can say so and we can move on.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think it refers to point 1. I

8 don't know in what context. It could relate to the rest, but the most --

9 essential point is that we can see here the forces acting towards Klis,

10 so if they are not being effective, they need to be reinforced. And to

11 lift the burden, it says in point 2, You should assess whether you have

12 forces available. I think that's what that refers to. And point 3 would

13 simply be that they should try and see that the villages -- these

14 villages don't fall until some agreement is reached, well, in military

15 terms. That's my interpretation of that.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Colonel, please look at me

17 rather than looking either to your left or to your right.

18 The situation in Klis, what happened? Did the BiH attack? What

19 really happened in Klis, because I'm not aware of anything.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In Klis, they were under siege.

21 The BH Army was attacking parts of the HVO in the Neretvica River Valley.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So the HVO is

23 surrounded in Klis; correct?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The HVO was encircled mostly

25 throughout the area of the Konjic municipality. There were enclaves that

Page 48961

1 existed, and it was in a very disadvantageous position, the HVO, and so,

2 in my view, all this was planned to make it be in a better position to

3 avoid failure, militarily.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

5 Mr. Kruger, please proceed.

6 MR. KRUGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

7 Q. I'm not going to show you any further documents from this binder.

8 I'll just ask you one final question to wrap up.

9 Sir, from your testimony on various documents that I've shown

10 you, your testimony has essentially been that where the international

11 observers have come to the conclusion, probably based on their

12 intelligence or the intelligence available to them, that the HVO was

13 actually principally the party provoking conflict in the Konjic-Jablanica

14 area in 1993, are they wrong when they come to those conclusions?

15 A. I'm not claiming that they are setting out untruthful data, but

16 quite simply that information after the 13th of April, 1993, that

17 information could not have arrived, because they couldn't enter Croatian

18 enclaves. That was not permitted. They weren't able to see the

19 consequences of the actions of the BH Army.

20 MR. KRUGER: Thank you.

21 Your Honour, I propose stepping on to topics in binder 3, but

22 perhaps this may be a time for the break.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You are right, it's probably

24 better to have a break before we move to binder number 3.

25 We'll have a 20-minute break.

Page 48962

1 --- Recess taken at 12.29 p.m.

2 --- On resuming at 12.51 p.m.

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The court is back in session.

4 Mr. Kruger, you have two hours and eight minutes left.

5 MR. KRUGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

6 Q. Now, Mr. Jasak, I'd now like to turn to Mostar, and the first

7 thing I'd like to refer you to or ask you about is: On the 20th of

8 January last week, you testified, and I'll get the -- try and get the

9 reference right this time, at transcript reference 48681, and from line

10 10 this is the question:

11 "Mr. Jasak, in this courtroom we saw evidence that the vast

12 majority of these people were of Muslim ethnicity."

13 Now, this is talking about the people who were detained at Velez

14 Stadium on the 9th of May, 1993, and then taken to Heliodrom:

15 "Could you explain to us why there was such a disproportionately

16 large number of Muslims among these people, compared to the composition

17 of the population at that point in time?"

18 And, sorry, sir, I'm not referring to a document, so you needn't

19 look for a document. I'm reading from your own testimony.

20 Your answer to this question was:

21 "Well, I'll try. In my opinion, the only possible explanation is

22 that a large number of Croats had already moved out of that part of town.

23 They had taken their children to continue their schooling elsewhere. And

24 a large part of the inhabitants of Mostar came from the surrounding

25 municipalities, and they may have gone away for the weekend. Also, when

Page 48963

1 people heard shells falling, they left the town in their own vehicles."

2 Sir, from this response of yours, are you telling the Court that

3 the ethnicity of those arrested in Mostar on the 9th of May, 1993, was

4 totally coincidental?

5 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, an objection to the

6 use of the verb "arrest."

7 MR. KRUGER:

8 Q. Sir, are you telling the Court that the ethnicity of all those

9 people detained in Mostar on the 9th of May, 1993, was totally

10 coincidental?

11 A. I don't have any other explanation, save for what I have already

12 said in the course of my testimony. That's my opinion.

13 Q. Is it correct that 10 days later, General Petkovic was

14 negotiating about the release of these Muslims who were held at the

15 Heliodrom?

16 A. As far as the VOS is concerned, the VOS was not involved in any

17 negotiations at all. But I know that there were talks about releasing

18 all detainees kept both by the BiH Army and the HVO. It would have been

19 an exchange, all for all. That was all I know.

20 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I deliberately

21 allowed the witness to answer. I would just like to remind everybody

22 that under the indictment, people who were detained at the Heliodrom on

23 the 9th of May were released within approximately eight days. So their

24 release could not have been negotiated after 10 days because they had

25 already been released.

Page 48964

1 MR. KRUGER:

2 Q. Sir, let's move on. Have a look at the very last document in

3 your binder, and that is a Defence exhibit that was shown to you last

4 week. It's Exhibit 4D01344.

5 JUDGE PRANDLER: I'm sorry, Mr. Kruger, but I believe at least in

6 my binder, the last one is 1242.

7 MR. KRUGER: My apologies, Your Honour. We're moving to binder

8 3. That's --

9 JUDGE PRANDLER: I see.

10 MR. KRUGER: My apology for not making that clear. Binder 3, the

11 very last document is 4D01344.

12 Q. And, sir, you remember this document? This the document showing

13 an agreement between General Mladic and General Halilovic, brokered by

14 Philippe Morillon on the 8th of May, 1993, the cease-fire agreement. You

15 recall this?

16 A. I do.

17 Q. Now, just to refresh your memory, you were shown the document and

18 you were asked to interpret what the document showed regarding the

19 Muslims, and this is on the 20th of January, 2010; transcript reference

20 48675 -- sorry, 48676 from line 5. You said:

21 "I would interpret this document in the following way: that the

22 Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina no longer intended to fight the Army of

23 Republika Srpska and that they were turning to the creation of their own

24 living environment, at the detriment of their hitherto ally, that is to

25 say, the Croats."

Page 48965

1 You remember saying that?

2 A. Yes, I do remember.

3 Q. And you also stated that you had information that since January,

4 the Muslims and the Serbs were negotiating with each other or talking to

5 each other; is that correct?

6 A. Correct.

7 Q. You told General Petkovic about this?

8 A. VOS, well, about the knowledge that there were talks, we came to

9 that information and we sent it on further. The VOS, I mean.

10 Q. And this agreement on the 8th of May, 1993, was information on

11 this also forwarded to General Petkovic by VOS?

12 A. This was common knowledge, because it concerned UNPROFOR

13 representatives and it was generally known that they were negotiating.

14 But apart from this, some other talks were held that we knew about at

15 that time, too.

16 Q. Now, sir, you are aware of the fact that shortly after this,

17 General Petkovic and General Mladic, they also met under the auspices of

18 General Morillon, and Muslims were not present at that occasion? You

19 were aware that?

20 A. I don't know of that meeting.

21 Q. If I tell you that on the 16th of May, 1993, there was, indeed,

22 such a meeting, would that change your assessment that it's inappropriate

23 for the Serbs and the Muslims to meet, with no Croats being present?

24 A. Well, it wouldn't change it, because after these meetings there

25 were some other meetings, and they were talks about demilitarisation, for

Page 48966

1 instance, of the enclaves in Eastern Bosnia, and the BH Army units would

2 pull out of Central Bosnia, because it was about demilitarisation of

3 Sarajevo as well, where a large number of soldiers would pull out to the

4 area of Central Bosnia. And that's what prompted us to see this

5 agreement as problematic because it would have large forces from

6 North Herzegovina, and this went along the lines of having an area void

7 of Croats or the BH Army.

8 Q. Sir, if you look at the document, you'll see that there's no

9 signature that appears. Do you know whether this agreement was, in

10 actual fact, signed?

11 A. We know that the talks were held, and this was indicative, as far

12 as we were concerned, for assessing co-operation between the BH Army and

13 the Army of Republika Srpska, that is, and for later activities which

14 stemmed from that. And we had information and knowledge that they were

15 working against the Croatian Defence Council, so this was confirmation.

16 Q. And so you did see this document at that stage; is that what

17 you're saying?

18 A. No, I'm not saying I saw the document, but that we knew about the

19 talks.

20 Q. This document here, do you know whether this is the whole

21 agreement that was concluded or not?

22 A. I don't know whether it was the whole agreement that was

23 concluded.

24 Q. And, sir, if I show you a different part or even the rest of this

25 agreement, or the documents which form this exhibit or which form the

Page 48967

1 totality of the agreement, then you would have to reassess this document

2 in the context of all those documents; isn't that correct?

3 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Mr. Kruger, I find that a difficult question.

4 How can the witness say something? He doesn't know what the other

5 documents are. All he can answer is, Perhaps. And I can answer for him.

6 MR. KRUGER: Indeed, Your Honour. I will show him the document,

7 rather.

8 Q. Sir, let's look at the totality of this document. And if you

9 turn to just the previous document in your binder, this is

10 Exhibit P11192, P11192.

11 MR. KRUGER: And, Your Honour, for the record, if I may point out

12 that the English version of the document which forms this exhibit

13 consisted of a number of pages in English and then one page in B/C/S.

14 And if we look at the translation, this was drawn from the EDS, and it

15 contains the document that was shown to the witness as 4D01344, but that

16 entire document on EDS consists of a number of pages of B/C/S and then

17 one page of English. For convenience, we have switched that single page

18 of English and single page of B/C/S so that one can look at the entire

19 English version and the entire B/C/S version without having to flip

20 between the two versions.

21 Q. Sir, looking at this document, the first page, if you just look

22 at the English version perhaps for a moment, the first page is an

23 agreement which is signed by various persons. Now, you may not be able

24 to read the English, but I put it to you that that is actually the signed

25 version of the document that we were discussing just before this,

Page 48968

1 4D01344. This is the cease-fire agreement:

2 "Cease all armed attacks or any hostile acts within the whole

3 territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina."

4 That's the 8th of May, 1993.

5 But, sir, if we turn the page and we look at the next page, we

6 see that this is actually part -- or was concluded at the same time as

7 the agreement on the demilitarisation of Srebrenica and Zepa concluded

8 between General Ratko Mladic and General Sefer Halilovic on 8 May, 1993.

9 And if we actually look at section 1, the demilitarised zone is:

10 "To demilitarise the areas of Srebrenica and Zepa."

11 Now, sir, in that area of Srebrenica and Zepa, the HVO was not

12 really involved in that area as a party to that conflict; is that

13 correct?

14 A. That's right, yes.

15 Q. And, therefore, if you look at General Mladic and

16 General Halilovic meeting to actually deal with the conflict in

17 Srebrenica and Zepa, this actually is of little concern to the HVO. They

18 had no reason for being present at that meeting; isn't that correct?

19 A. I mentioned that within the context of later on, wherein it came

20 to the demilitarisation of Sarajevo, where the HVO did have interest. So

21 I'm talking about the overall activities about which we had knowledge

22 that they were ongoing. So we knew that this was going on in

23 Eastern Bosnia, these enclaves, and that according to an agreement, they

24 would be able to move to an area of their desire on the basis of an

25 egress.

Page 48969

1 Also, that the demilitarisation of Sarajevo would move and

2 transfer the army to where they wanted to go. So as far as we were

3 concerned, that was indicative; that is to say, that the BH Army was

4 giving up the eastern part, but at all cost wished to do in Central

5 Bosnia something that was not good for the HVO.

6 Q. But, sir, your response last week was:

7 "I would interpret this document ..."

8 And that's only the first page of the document. If you look at

9 the further pages of the document, that certainly must change your

10 categorical assessment that the ABiH no longer -- was actually abandoning

11 the HVO. We don't see that from this agreement, do we?

12 A. If we take this agreement and what I've just mentioned, the fact

13 that I knew about Sarajevo, and if we look at the activities that took

14 place afterwards and where the artillery did open fire at HVO units, then

15 I think that what I said yesterday is absolutely fine and stands, because

16 I answered yesterday based on our knowledge, the information we had, that

17 something was being discussed, and the topics.

18 So now that you've shown me this document that I've never seen

19 before, that it's about Eastern Bosnia, I mentioned that before you had

20 put this document to me. So a large number of soldiers were to be pulled

21 out to the area of Central Bosnia, so we saw that as a danger for the

22 disappearance of the HVO.

23 Q. Now, sir, if you look at the final page of the document, it's a

24 joint statement issued by General Mladic and General Halilovic, signed --

25 or witnessed by General Morillon. And, of course, it informs in the

Page 48970

1 first paragraph about the agreement, but if we look at paragraph 3,

2 that's what I'd like to ask you about:

3 "We are informing the domestic and international public that we

4 shall be making further efforts," et cetera.

5 Now, sir, this appears to be a press release. Is it correct that

6 this meeting between General Mladic and General Halilovic, that wasn't a

7 secret thing? It was being conducted openly and in full view also of the

8 HVO; isn't that correct?

9 A. I don't know what excerpt you're referring to. I haven't been

10 able to locate that passage.

11 Q. The last page of the document, it's a joint statement, and the

12 third paragraph of that one, it says:

13 "We are informing the domestic and international public ..."

14 So the question is: This meeting between Mladic and Halilovic,

15 it wasn't being conducted in secret? It was an open affair. Everybody

16 knew about it, the HVO as well. It wasn't hidden?

17 A. Well, I said it was generally known and under the auspices of the

18 international community, but the meetings and agreements reached apart

19 from this, according to our information, indicated what I have told you

20 about, because if military-able men were pulled out of this general area

21 to Central Bosnia, then as far as we were concerned, it was a problem, we

22 had a problem, and that was the result of this meeting -- of this

23 agreement. So we are now assessing what the consequences were, that's

24 what we did, and we saw a danger there.

25 Q. Now, sir, let's just quickly turn to something else, then,

Page 48971

1 regarding the 9 May events in Mostar. That involved --

2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment. Colonel, I have a

3 follow-up question in connection with this document which we have seen

4 already.

5 There is an agreement between Mladic and Halilovic, under the

6 auspices of the international community. As the document states, it

7 applies to the entire Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and I emphasise

8 the entire country of Bosnia-Herzegovina, including Mostar. What can

9 emerge from this? The document states that there is a cease-fire at

10 12.00 on the 9th of May. We see that this document considers two

11 specific situations. One is Srebrenica; the other one is Zepa. But

12 Sarajevo, strangely enough, is not mentioned. I don't know whether, on

13 the 9th of May, at one minute past 12.00, no shots were fired anymore in

14 Sarajevo. I don't know. I will check this out later.

15 There are two possibilities. The first one is that you, the HVO,

16 you are aware of this agreement. And you answered Mr. Kruger's question

17 by saying, We knew about it. In that case, a new situation emerges. You

18 were side by side with the ABiH, and behind your back the ABiH signs a

19 pact with the VRS. Therefore, you risk having to confront two enemies,

20 the Serbs and the Muslims. As your intelligence service operates

21 extremely well, you realise that this agreement is going to enter into

22 force at 12.00, and that is why the HVO attacks the Main Staff of the

23 4th Corps in Mostar. That is one possibility.

24 The second possibility is that the ABiH and the Serbs agree to

25 stop. Then the ABiH knows that as far as Mostar is concerned, the Serbs

Page 48972

1 will not fire any shots at them. They know that at 12.00 sharp, there

2 will be no more shots fired by the Serbs on Mostar. But the ABiH has a

3 bit of a problem, because the international community, via

4 General Morillon, are involved in this, and there is no question of

5 deceiving him. The ABiH then, in light of the timing, attacks in the

6 morning, since the cease-fire should only enter into force at 12.00, and

7 they attack at 5.00 or 6.00 in the morning. Like that, General Morillon

8 cannot turn around and say, You've deceived me.

9 This document can be construed in different ways. What I would

10 like to know is this: The VOS, with its telephone tapping systems, via

11 its liaison officers which the HVO had and who were working with

12 UNPROFOR, knew that this agreement was going to be signed and that this

13 was going to enter into force on the 9th of May, 1993. What I would like

14 to know is whether you knew about this for sure, or were these only

15 rumours and, in fact, you know nothing about it?

16 Let me add, if you knew about it, in light of the new political

17 situation which was about to emerge after this agreement, Mr. Mate Boban

18 must have certainly received the information, who would have then got

19 together with Izetbegovic, Tudjman, and Morillon, Vance-Owen --

20 Cyril Vance and Lord Owen, and so on. We haven't seen a single document

21 from Mate Boban concerning this agreement. There might be such a

22 document, but we don't have an exhibit to that effect. Had you known

23 about this, the information should have reached Mate Boban, and in that

24 case something must have existed. When you say that you knew, are you

25 saying this because these were rumours, or are you saying it because you

Page 48973

1 knew it and you knew for sure that this was the case?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We knew for certain that that would

3 happen.

4 And I'd also like to mention the part relating to Sarajevo. So

5 that would be a lesser problem for us, because there was no HVO in

6 Eastern Bosnia. But when you discuss the demilitarisation of Sarajevo,

7 without an HVO representative in Sarajevo, then that is a problem and was

8 a problem for us. And that kind of thing would be contained in our

9 reports.

10 So a couple of days after this, I think that in one of our

11 reports the demilitarisation of Sarajevo is expressly mentioned, and the

12 talks held on that topic. So as far as we were concerned, it was a

13 problem for us, the arrival of a large number of soldiers, which we

14 expected, as a result of these agreements into Central Bosnia.

15 MR. STEWART: Your Honour, may I just inquire about something? I

16 don't wish to disrupt the course of the evidence, but at page 79, I've

17 got line 23, but it may be line 20, Your Honour said:

18 "I don't know whether on the 9th of May, at one minute past

19 12.00, no shots were fired anymore in Sarajevo. I don't know. I will

20 check this out later."

21 May I just invite Your Honour, with respect, to confirm that what

22 Your Honour has in mind is to check out in the evidence in this case. I

23 have, actually, no recollection, I must say, whether any such point is in

24 the evidence in this case, but I take it that is what Your Honour means,

25 that that search will be in the evidence before this Trial Chamber.

Page 48974

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, of course I will check as

2 part of what we have in this file. But as far as I know, we don't have

3 anything, but you never know. Maybe one document would have gone astray.

4 But this is obvious what you're saying.

5 To go back to what the witness was saying, you say that you knew

6 that -- know that within the HVO, that if this agreement was implemented,

7 there would be the following consequences; namely, the arrival of new

8 troops from the Serb side, and perhaps also from the ABiH, and this could

9 lead to some consequences. Is that what you said?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that from the area where

11 demilitarisation was underway in Eastern Bosnia. So according to our

12 knowledge, we had knowledge and information to the effect that the

13 BH Army and the Army of Republika Srpska had reached an agreement to

14 enable the units to leave those protected areas and go where they wanted

15 to go, and it was our assessment that that would be Central Bosnia. So

16 if a large number of forces from Eastern Bosnia and Sarajevo comes into

17 Central Bosnia, it would present a major problem for the HVO.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. I understand what

19 you are saying. But does that mean that from a military point of view,

20 the HVO could say, Well, we're going to make sure that this plan fails by

21 launching an attack on the 9th of May, in the morning? Could this not be

22 construed as a military answer to this plan with a cease-fire between the

23 Serbs and the ABiH? From the military point of view, don't you think

24 that an attack would make sure that everything that was planned would

25 fail?

Page 48975

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was absolutely no planning of

2 an attack, no planned attack at all. And I said earlier on that had

3 there been anything, that the VOS would have taken part in the planning

4 of such a thing.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'm listening to you, and you

6 say, We knew. But does that mean that Mate Boban knew, that Mr. Prlic

7 knew, that Mr. Stojic knew?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, they could have known. We

9 can assume that.

10 MR. KARNAVAS: At this point, Your Honour, I do object, because

11 so far the gentleman has not mentioned Mr. Prlic and we haven't seen a

12 single, solitary document that shows that anything came from VOS to

13 Mr. Prlic. So I do object to hypothesising and speculating as to what

14 Mr. Prlic might have known. If the Court wishes to pose a direct

15 question, whether he sent any information directly to Mr. Prlic, the

16 Court can do so. But to then speculate and throw names out there, I do

17 object to that.

18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Before the counsel intervened,

19 you said that they were in a position to know. What did you mean when

20 you said that they were in a position to know?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, from the last paragraph, when

22 it says "by this we informed the international community," I assume that

23 they could have known.

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] But you don't know whether they

25 got to know this, do you?

Page 48976

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I don't know whether they

2 arrived at that information and knowledge, except for the part where I

3 said that --

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One last question. As far as

5 you can recollect --

6 MR. STEWART: As far as I can see from the transcript, the

7 witness didn't finish his answer before the next question came from

8 Your Honour. That's what I heard on the English translation and what I

9 see on the transcript.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, indeed, I was listening to

11 the French version and I didn't check on the English version.

12 You didn't finish and I interrupted you. Go ahead. Could you

13 please repeat what you just said?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can, Your Honour, because

15 what I said is this: The information about co-operation between the

16 BH Army and the Army of Republika Srpska was contained in our reports,

17 those which were written in May, but after the 9th of May, after the 9th

18 of May, so this was an important portion related to Sarajevo. So that

19 was our focus, because it was talks -- a matter of talks without the

20 presence of the Croats or, rather, the HVO Sarajevo.

21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] This will be my last question.

22 I did not have time to look at all the documents, and I will do this, of

23 course, later on. But as far as you can recollect or as far as you know,

24 on the 9th, on the 10th, and 11th of May, do you know whether the Serb

25 artillery opened fire towards Mostar East or Mostar West? Did they

Page 48977

1 start -- did they open fire or did they stop doing that?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] According to what I know, fire was

3 opened on the HVO position -- positions.

4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

5 Mr. Kruger, please proceed.

6 MR. KRUGER: Thank you, Your Honour.

7 Q. Sir, just to finish, perhaps, on this agreement of the 8th of

8 May, 1993, between Mladic and Halilovic, sir, is it correct that this

9 agreement, it didn't stop the conflict between the Serbs and the Muslims?

10 Is that correct?

11 A. Obviously, even after this, there were activities. I don't know

12 whether the activities stopped at the moment when this was signed. We

13 know only too well that there were conflicts after this.

14 Q. So let's turn to something else regarding Mostar, the events of

15 the 9th of May, 1993. It's correct that on that day, there was a

16 large-scale HVO involvement in those events; you agree with that?

17 A. According to what I know, I've already told you what I know.

18 There was fighting around that time around the president's office, which

19 means in the area west of the agreed line of separation which existed at

20 the time, which points to the fact that the fighting didn't take place

21 east of that, which means that the HVO defended itself, because near the

22 president's office there was a parish office and the local priest was

23 also taken away in an unknown direction, and it was only in the evening

24 they will learn as to where he had been taken to. There were a lot of

25 refugees who were around North Camp who had been expelled to the right

Page 48978

1 bank. Fire was opened on the Tihomir Misic Barracks, Bijela Brijeg was

2 also shelled, and this is the long and the short of what I know.

3 Q. Okay. Now, from the long and the short of what you know, you can

4 perhaps answer the question: There was, indeed, large-scale HVO

5 involvement on the 9th of May in Mostar?

6 A. The HVO was involved in defence.

7 Q. And, sir, it's also so that on that day, the HVO displaced

8 thousands of Muslim inhabitants to Velez, and from there to Heliodrom?

9 You don't disagree with that?

10 A. I can't talk about numbers, and I believe that this was not a

11 resettlement. I believe that those people were moved from the territory

12 affected by combat, and I really wouldn't be able to confirm that they

13 were only Muslims.

14 Q. But they were moved by the HVO; that's correct, isn't it? That

15 you should know.

16 A. I don't know who displaced them. Maybe they, themselves, decided

17 to flee from the war. Maybe somebody told them where to go. I really

18 wouldn't be able to tell you how all that came about.

19 Q. And do you know that the people who were so displaced were taken

20 to Heliodrom and held there for many days by the HVO?

21 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honour, the problem is the word "displaced,"

22 and I think if we look at the previous answers, there seems to be -- this

23 is a term of art which the gentleman may be aware of. I don't want to be

24 giving any answers away, but perhaps a clearer choice of words might

25 assist in this exchange, because "displacement" does have a particular

Page 48979

1 connotation, and I believe that's what the gentleman was referring to in

2 his previous answer. Now we're bringing "displacement" into Heliodrom.

3 Before he was saying "arrest," then he said "detention," now it's

4 "displacement." He should pick one and stick with the term.

5 MR. KRUGER: Sir, with respect, I think that everybody in the

6 courtroom know what's being referred to, and the witness, being in

7 Mostar, certainly knows about large numbers of Muslims [realtime

8 transcript read in error "prisoners"] being taken to Heliodrom and being

9 held there for various days.

10 Q. And I'm simply asking: You know about that, sir, don't you?

11 A. I've already told you that on the evening news I learned about

12 all that.

13 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, with your permission,

14 there seems to be a mistake in the way how Mr. Kruger's question was

15 recorded on line 11. It says here "prisoners taken to Heliodrom," and I

16 don't think that Mr. Kruger used the term "prisoners."

17 MR. KRUGER: I think that's entirely correct. I think that I did

18 refer to persons, or maybe it was Muslims, but the question remains.

19 Q. Sir, let's move on. You, yourself, also confirmed in testimony

20 last week that the HVO attacked the ABiH in the Vranica building. You

21 agree with that still?

22 A. I did not say that the HVO had launched an attack. There was

23 fighting for the Vranica building, and it was a reaction to previous

24 events.

25 Q. So let me read your testimony to you, and this comes from the

Page 48980

1 transcript of the 19th of January, 2010, and the transcript reference is

2 page 48674 from line 5. The question was:

3 "Now my question, Mr. Jasak: Is it correct when it is asserted

4 that the HVO attacked BH Army positions in the Vranica building?

5 "A. To the best of my knowledge, this information is correct."

6 So, sir, are you now saying that you were wrong when you said

7 that?

8 A. Within a context. The entire city of Mostar came under attack,

9 according to what I know. Fighting was taking place all over the city.

10 The HVO opened fire on the ABiH, but in order to defend themselves, not

11 in order to attack, to choose any part of the BiH Army as targets. That

12 was part of defence. There was combat, but as part of defence.

13 MR. STEWART: Excuse me, it's actually the 20th of January. The

14 page number is right this time, but the date is wrong.

15 MR. KRUGER: I stand corrected. The 20th of January. Thank you.

16 Q. Now, sir, why I'm asking you all of this is just to come to this

17 point, and I think this is the last thing that I'll touch upon before the

18 time runs out: On the 19th of January, last week, you were asked -- and

19 I'll give the transcript reference first. The transcript is T-48663 from

20 line 24. Ms. Alaburic asked you:

21 "Let me ask you for your opinion, if you believe you know enough

22 about what was going on at the time. Any continuation of these BH Army

23 activities --"

24 Just for context, we're referring here -- this was -- what was

25 being talked about was the ABiH actions on the 25th of April, 1993, and

Page 48981

1 it was alleged that they broke a cease-fire agreement:

2 "Any continuation of these BH Army activities, which in itself

3 flew in the face of the cease-fire that was agreed, do you think anything

4 like that could have been possible or would have been without the consent

5 of the high-ranking commanders in the BH Army?"

6 And to this, your response was:

7 "Nothing like this could have happened unbeknownst to

8 high-ranking commanders in the BH Army. Maybe something like this could

9 have gone on for a single day, but if anyone had failed to carry out an

10 order actually signed by President Izetbegovic, this person would then

11 have been removed, meaning even President Izetbegovic, himself, would

12 have known about this, as well as their supreme military command."

13 Sir, my question is: Given the large-scale involvement of HVO

14 military in Mostar on the 9th of May, and in taking a number of Muslims

15 to Velez Stadium, and taking them from there to Heliodrom and holding

16 them there for many days, are you prepared to make the same categorical

17 assertion with regard to the knowledge of the HVO's military leaders,

18 that they would have known?

19 A. This is an entirely different matter. On the 25th of April,

20 nothing [as interpreted] happened. And on the 18th of April, there was

21 an agreement between Boban and Izetbegovic. On the 20th, there was an

22 agreement between Generals Petkovic and Halilovic, which means that if

23 things had been done after the 10th of May, I would be able to agree. If

24 an agreement had been signed about Mostar between Izetbegovic and Boban

25 on the 10th of May, and if we remember that that was on the 18th, and

Page 48982

1 then seven days after that, on the 25th, so if this had been signed on

2 the 10th and if the fighting had taken place on the 17th, then I would

3 totally agree with what you are saying.

4 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, a correction. Line

5 21, it says that the witness said "on the 25th of April, nothing

6 happened," whereas the witness said "on the 25th of April, there was an

7 attack." And then he explained how this transpired seven days after the

8 cease-fire was signed. So instead of "nothing," we should have the word

9 "attack."

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

11 We have reached the end of our session. We will meet again at

12 9.00 tomorrow, and I would like to point out to the Prosecutor that there

13 is still an hour and 35 minutes left. Thank you very much.

14 [The witness stands down]

15 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,

16 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 27th day of

17 January, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.