Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 49564

 1                           Wednesday, 17 February 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The accused Petkovic takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 2.23 p.m.

 6             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Registrar, could you please

 7     call the case.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  Good afternoon,

 9     everyone in and around the courtroom.

10             This is case number IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor versus Prlic et

11     al.  Thank you, Your Honours.

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Registrar.

13     Today is Wednesday, the 17th of February 2010.  I would like to greet

14     everyone in the courtroom, the counsel, the accused, Mr. Scott, everyone

15     from the OTP, as well as everybody else helping us in the courtroom.

16             I would also like to apologise for the delay in starting this

17     session.  It is my fault, but in a previous hearing that I was chairing

18     the Prosecutor wanted to take the floor for an administrative issue, and

19     unfortunately we finished late.  So I would like to apologise for that.

20             I believe that Mr. Kovacic has something to say, so I'll give him

21     the floor immediately.

22             MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour, for giving

23     me the floor.

24             Good afternoon to Your Honours and everybody else in the

25     courtroom.

Page 49565

 1             Your Honours, I'd like to ask the Trial Chamber to grant me an

 2     extension of the dead-line for submitting the various submissions and

 3     motions with respect to two rulings made by this Trial Chamber; first of

 4     all, in respect of the Chamber decision of the 16th of February, 2010,

 5     which -- and that is the decision concerning Defence witness under

 6     92 bis.  I'd like to remind you that the decision is 20 pages' long, and

 7     I'd also like to remind you that it was made two and a half months after

 8     all the motions were submitted, the motion response, and motion replies,

 9     and the Trial Chamber obviously needed a lot of time to get through that

10     job, which is no mean task.

11             As you know, we're a small team with small resources, and when

12     looking through it we saw some technical errors.  We noticed some.  We

13     didn't see whether they were more important or not, but we do think that

14     we'll need at least until the end of next week or, let me say, a Monday

15     week - not this Monday but the following Monday - to compile a reasonable

16     request for a re-examination of individual decisions, or parts of

17     decisions, or decisions on certain documents, or alternatively we should

18     like to lodge an appeal.

19             Now, as far as the other ruling is concerned, and it was the

20     ruling of the Trial Chamber of the 15th of February and was filed on the

21     same day, there, too -- I apologise.  I must take a moment.  I made a

22     mistake.

23             In the first motion about 92 bis witnesses, there's no question

24     of reconsideration.  We'd just like to have leave for a certification for

25     leave to appeal.  So we'd like to ask for certification to appeal.  And

Page 49566

 1     as I said, it was a 20-page-long ruling.  We, of course, understand the

 2     dispositions in it, and we have a working translation from the French, of

 3     course, as French is the official language or one of the official

 4     languages.  We did, nonetheless, wish to make sure we understood the

 5     Trial Chamber's reasoning in its entirety and fully, so perhaps the

 6     Trial Chamber could make a request that we receive a translation as soon

 7     as possible and that the dead-line starts running after we receive an

 8     English translation or, anyway, to be given a dead-line until Monday

 9     week, not this Monday but the following Monday.  So that's what I wanted

10     to say with respect to the 92 bis witnesses.

11             Now, as far as the 15th of February decision is concerned, which

12     relates to the adoption of exhibits used during General Praljak's

13     testimony, I'd first of all like to remind you that it concerns

14     255 documents in all.  The Trial Chamber, once again, needed considerable

15     time to go through all those documents, and of course we will need quite

16     a lot of time to go through them ourselves.  Up until now, we have found

17     that there are several exhibits which justify a request for

18     re-examination and reconsideration, and this relates to technical errors,

19     figures, or whether the document was on the 65 ter list or not, and

20     similar things, and also requires a lot of time to go through everything

21     and check it all.

22             And with respect to that ruling, too, we would also like to ask,

23     as I said earlier on, certification to appeal, and I'm sure you'll

24     understand that for both these motions, we require a little more time

25     than just seven days.  And, therefore, I consider that in conformity with

Page 49567

 1     Rule 127, there is good cause for us to make that request.  If you wish

 2     to hear the details, I'll be happy to give you them.  I'll tell you of

 3     the team we have and the difficulties that we're facing because one of

 4     our important members will not be available until the 3rd of March.  But,

 5     anyway, for both those motions we should like to be given more time, at

 6     least until the Monday week, especially for the 92 bis decision, and we'd

 7     like to have the seven-day dead-line start running from the day that we

 8     receive the English translation.

 9             Thank you.

10             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a point of clarification

11     before the Chamber confers.

12             The 92 bis decision or ruling is a 20-page document, and my

13     opinion is of 6 pages.  So it will be 26 pages altogether, so I don't

14     know how long it will take for this translation to be made.  But you

15     basically want two weeks once you receive the translation; is that

16     correct?

17             MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I don't wish to be

18     immodest.  I'm trying to be rational with the use of time.  My request --

19     well, I have one request and an alternative request.  The first request

20     would be a week after we have received the English translation.  If that

21     seems to be too long, then, regardless -- as I said, one week after we

22     receive the English translation.  If that seems too long to you or if the

23     English translation will take too much time, then we could live with the

24     next request if you give us time until Monday fortnight; so not the

25     coming Monday, but the Monday after that.

Page 49568

 1             Yes, I apologise, but I seem to have lost my notebook where I

 2     noted down the exact dates of that particular Monday.

 3             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Trial Chamber has

 4     unanimously deliberated and grants the Praljak Defence one week to do

 5     their submissions, their original submissions, and that is going to be

 6     starting from the time they receive the English translation.

 7             MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.  And the

 8     Monday I mean is the 1st of March.  I've just looked it up.  So thank

 9     you.

10             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

11             Another administrative issue.  I wanted to advise the

12     Stojic Defence, who drew my attention on the two lists that I have said

13     regarding the documents, in fact, three documents are not going to be

14     used.  And I'm going to give the numbers, because those documents have

15     not been admitted.  P00810 - it was actually the Stojic Defence that

16     contacted me - P01336, and P02646.  Those three documents were signed by

17     Mr. Stojic, and those documents will not be put forward to

18     General Petkovic.

19             MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Good afternoon to everybody in the

20     courtroom.

21             I'd just like to thank Your Honour.

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

23             We'll proceed, but I had a follow-up question, because I'm rather

24     slow and I think through things overnight.  And I remembered an answer

25     made by General Petkovic, and I wanted to double-check it, because it has

Page 49569

 1     legal consequences.

 2                           WITNESS:  MILIVOJ PETKOVIC [Resumed]

 3                           [The witness answered through interpreter]

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, when you left

 5     on the Friday before the 9th of May -- Sunday was the 9th of May,

 6     Saturday was the 8th, so Friday was the 7th, so when you left for Split

 7     on the 7th of May to spend the weekend there, Split was in a foreign

 8     country at the time, because this was the Republic of Croatia.  When you

 9     left your position, because you were the chief of staff of the HVO, I was

10     wondering whether, either verbally or in written form, you delegated your

11     authority to one of your second-in-command, or another officer, or did

12     you do nothing at all?

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, every time, for

14     justified reasons, I happened to be absent from the Main Staff for a day

15     or two; maybe longer sometimes.  Then, in the log-book that we had for

16     coming tasks, for future tasks, a log-book where we recorded the

17     assignments, we would make an entry with tasks and assignments that are

18     expected over those one, two, or several days, so that people knew what

19     to focus on.  And every duty officer and the duty team on duty at that

20     time knew that on such and such a day, these were the assignments;

21     number 1, number 2, number 3, and so on.  So that every team had to know

22     this, and that is standard practice in every army, including the HVO.  So

23     that was everybody's duty at all levels; brigade commander, up and down.

24             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  Thank you, General.

25     But I also had duty tasks at a very high level, and I know what it means

Page 49570

 1     to find out who is going to replace whom.  But when you said that you

 2     left it in a log-book for the person on duty, what had to be done, I was

 3     wondering, in case a need arised [as interpreted] -- in case there was a

 4     need, did anyone know who they would have to speak to?  And given that

 5     you were in the Republic of Croatia, would you be the person that would

 6     be contacted or would it be somebody else?

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the practice was that

 8     in addition to the people, there was an operative team made up of five or

 9     six people who would be at home, on duty at home, and if need be they

10     would be called up.  And in a document that Mr. Praljak had, we changed

11     all that, and we kept the whole operative team in the Main Staff at

12     headquarters.  Otherwise, in addition to the three or four people who

13     were on duty, people were on duty at home, too, and they knew that if

14     anything was needed, they would be called up, which would mean a team of

15     seven or eight men at headquarters.

16             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please listen carefully,

17     because my question is very important, and I don't waste my time asking

18     questions that are not important.  So listen carefully.

19             You are in Split.  Let's assume for a moment that we have a town

20     where there is some members of the HVO, and there's a major offensive

21     from the ABiH, and you were not expecting such an offensive.  So in a

22     matter of minutes your soldiers are out of sorts and you need immediate

23     back-up, and you are busy buying your tomatoes on a market-place and you

24     cannot be contacted.  Who will make a decision to send a message to

25     all -- or to send an order to all commanders of operative zones to

Page 49571

 1     strengthen all units that are in trouble, because you're not there,

 2     you're in Split, and you're busy buying your tomatoes, so who will send

 3     this order?

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if that kind of

 5     information is received in the Main Staff, that there is some danger in a

 6     certain part, then the team on duty has the responsibility of warning the

 7     command of the operative zone and say, Gather up the operative zone team

 8     and deal with the situation, take command of the situation.  And with

 9     that, the other people would come in that were on this what we called

10     operative duty, that is to say, duty at home.  So the team at

11     headquarters and the team at home activates all the subordinate units,

12     bring them up to strength, gather them together, and that was the

13     standard practice.  That was how these people were alerted and called in,

14     and that was how the normal chain of command functioned.

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  So I understand,

16     when you were in Split on the 7th, 8th, and 9th of May before you went

17     back, it was for the officers on duty to manage any problem.  Why was I

18     asking you this?  Well, I wanted to double-check, because the

19     Appeals Chamber, in a recent decision of the 12th of November, 2009,

20     states the following, and I'm going to quote.  It's not going to be very

21     long.  It has to do with the Dragomir Milosevic case.  So listen

22     carefully:

23             "The Appeals Chamber would like to recall that when

24     Dragomir Milosevic was sent to hospital in Belgrade, it was his chief of

25     staff, Cedomir Sladojev, who was in charge of the SRK Command in

Page 49572

 1     Sarajevo, and this person was giving the orders instead of the

 2     commander."

 3             So the Appeals Chamber concludes that even if Dragomir Milosevic

 4     had officially retained his rank and his function, the authority on the

 5     ground was dealt with by the person that was the deputy on the ground.

 6     This is why I asked the question.

 7             Ms. Alaburic, you have the floor.

 8             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours, to

 9     you, the Prosecution, you, General, and everybody else in the courtroom.

10             Judge Antonetti, Your Honour, may I just draw your attention to

11     something with respect to your -- what you last said on the previous

12     page, line 15.  General Petkovic did not say that on the 9th of May, he

13     was in Split.  General Petkovic said that on the 7th of May, he went to

14     Split, and that he returned to Mostar on the 9th of May, in the early

15     afternoon.  Just to avoid any misunderstanding on that score later on.

16                           Examination by Ms. Alaburic:  [Continued]

17        Q.   Now, General, today we're going to deal with the 30th of June,

18     1993.  To start off with, tell us this, please:  If you told us that in

19     June 1993 the BH Army took control of Travnik and Kakanj, and if we know

20     that on the 30th of June it took control of the area north of

21     East Mostar, towards Jablanica, on the left bank of the Neretva River,

22     then where is the difference between taking control of Travnik and

23     Kakanj, for example, and taking control of this area north of

24     Eastern Mostar?

25        A.   Your Honour, as far as the area that the BH Army took control of,

Page 49573

 1     there's no difference.  But there is a difference in the grouping of

 2     forces carrying out that assignment, because in April it was the BH Army

 3     forces that took Kakanj and Travnik, whereas in Mostar our own Muslims,

 4     Muslims within the HVO, committed a treacherous act, and then they went

 5     on to take control of the territory.

 6             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Can I correct the transcript.  In

 7     line 24, it says that the general spoke about April, but we're talking

 8     about taking control of Kakanj and Travnik in June 1993.

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't remember saying "April."

10     I think I said "June."

11             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I was just correcting the

12     transcript.

13             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I'm sorry.  Talking about dates, I have to come

14     back to something which happened a bit earlier.

15             Mr. Petkovic, on the morning of the 9th May, where did you awake?

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On the 9th of May, in the morning,

17     I woke up in Mr. Stojic's apartment.

18             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  And where was that; in Mostar?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, in Citluk, where his parents

20     lived.

21             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  So you left Split on the -- sometime when?

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I arrived at the Stojic family's

23     house in the evening hours of the 8th.

24             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you.

25             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

Page 49574

 1        Q.   Another additional question.  Which route did you take with

 2     Mr. Stojic on the 9th of May?

 3        A.   We left for the Operative Zone in North-West Herzegovina.  It was

 4     our intention to arrive at Prozor, at Colonel Siljeg's command post.

 5        Q.   Let us return to the 30th of June.  If I understood you

 6     correctly, the difference between this event and the previous events is

 7     the fact that the ABiH had taken the area north of East Mostar in

 8     co-operation with the Muslim soldiers of the HVO.  Is that what you said?

 9        A.   Yes, exactly.

10        Q.   Tell us, General, before that was there a single incident in

11     which the Muslim soldiers of the HVO turned their weapons on their

12     Croatian colleagues in the HVO?

13        A.   No, there have been no such incidents.  But some of them simply

14     left the HVO after the 9th of May, but did not engage in any combat

15     activities against HVO soldiers.

16        Q.   What was your reaction and that of the other HVO commanders once

17     you understood that part of the area was lost due to this act committed

18     by the Muslim HVO soldiers?

19        A.   Well, we were afraid that this would trigger a chain reaction

20     throughout the HVO units that had a significant share of Muslim soldiers

21     in their ranks, so we were a little short of panic.

22        Q.   In South-East Herzegovina, what was the average number of Muslims

23     in the 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Brigades of the HVO?

24        A.   The average share was about 30 to 35 per cent in these three

25     brigades.  It changed, of course, with -- or, rather, depending on

Page 49575

 1     whether they grew stronger or weaker.

 2        Q.   Was this relevant for you, as chief of Main Staff, with regard to

 3     security?

 4        A.   Yes, of course it was relevant.

 5        Q.   How was it relevant?

 6        A.   There was the risk that the entire area to the east and south of

 7     Mostar, even including the western part of Mostar, might be lost for the

 8     HVO in that manner, because the worst thing that could happen to an army

 9     is a rebellion in its own ranks.

10        Q.   Let us look at the following set of documents, the first one

11     being P3019.  This is your order dated the 30th of June, and you sent it

12     to the Operative Zone of South-East Herzegovina.  What has been the focus

13     of our interest and will remain so is item 8 of this order, where you say

14     that:

15             "In the units where there are soldiers of Muslim ethnicity, these

16     are to be isolated and disarmed."

17             And you also say:

18             "In places where there is a Muslim population, all able-bodied

19     Muslim men should be isolated."

20             And it goes on to say that:

21             "Women and children should be left in their houses and

22     apartments."

23             I correct the document reference.  It is document P3019.

24             Tell us, General, is this your order?

25        A.   Yes, it is.

Page 49576

 1        Q.   On this 30th of June, in the morning, when you learned what was

 2     going on in the area north-east of Mostar, and when you learned of the

 3     treason of the Muslim HVO soldiers, did you speak to anybody about that?

 4        A.   I first stayed for about two hours in the Command of the

 5     OZ South-East Herzegovina to try to establish with them who was where at

 6     that given moment, so it took us about two hours, from 7.00 to 9.00,

 7     because we wanted to get -- to have a real picture of what was going on.

 8     Once we were sure how things really worked, I received a phone call from

 9     Mr. Boban.  At 9.00, once the information had been collected, I returned

10     to the Main Staff, and I spoke to Mr. Boban.  I presented the information

11     that was presented to me at the OZ to him.  I listened to everybody who

12     was able to give any information, and I also used a map.

13        Q.   General, can you reproduce your conversation with Boban as

14     faithfully as possible?  What exactly did he tell you?

15        A.   Once he heard what I had to say, he said that it did differ from

16     what he had heard before.  I suppose that, among others, he also spoke to

17     the mayor of Mostar, so that information may be different from that

18     information which the army had.  He asked me, General, you were

19     convincing us that you can rely on your soldiers of Muslim ethnicity.

20     Any warnings to the effect that this was risky was rejected by you --

21     were rejected?  And he asked me what I was planning to do with my

22     Muslims, as he put it, and I said, Well, we'll wait a bit longer, and

23     then we'll assess the situation and see how it develops.  At that moment,

24     he said to me, You know, General, from this moment on, you must start

25     disarming all these people you have in your units, if it isn't too late

Page 49577

 1     already.  Do you have any idea what's happening south of Mostar?  As far

 2     as I can tell and judging what happened, we will not only lose the entire

 3     area south of Mostar, and also put Croatia in jeopardy, because you know

 4     that it is their wish to reach the coast, because they want to take not

 5     only Neum, they also want the port of Ploce.

 6        Q.   Did you understand that to mean or that to be an order of your

 7     supreme commander, or did you take that to be a piece of advice from a

 8     co-worker?

 9        A.   No, the conversation continued, and we tried to find the best

10     ways and means of disarming the soldiers of Muslim ethnicity, and

11     everybody else who could be a threat for the HVO should be isolated.  To

12     me, that was an order which I included in my order in this item that has

13     two components.  Around 11.00 or 12.00, I started drafting that order,

14     once I received information from the OZ, because I wanted them to provide

15     information about the positions that we could take.

16        Q.   When your supreme commander issued you this order to disarm

17     soldiers of Muslim ethnicity, did you consider that to be a legal or an

18     illegal order?

19        A.   That was a legal order, and it would be such in any army in the

20     whole world.  You must take care of a rebellion in your ranks in

21     whichever way you think appropriate, and disarming is one such way.

22        Q.   From the aspect of security, the security of the HVO, did you

23     consider this order of your commander-in-chief justified?

24        A.   Yes, fully.

25        Q.   When you spoke to the supreme commander, did you mention the

Page 49578

 1     number of Muslim soldiers of the HVO and able-bodied Muslim men that

 2     would be affected by this isolation campaign?

 3        A.   Yes.  He asked me about the number of Muslim soldiers who had

 4     defected to the ABiH and how many were left in our units.  He also wanted

 5     to know how many collaborators, or, that is, able-bodied men that were

 6     left who could join the ranks of the ABiH.  Knowing the approximate

 7     number of men, and taking into consideration that you certainly cannot

 8     disarm each and every one, the estimate we came up with was 2.500 to

 9     3.000 men.

10        Q.   In your conversation with the supreme commander of the HVO, did

11     you mention the facilities of where these isolated Muslim HVO soldiers

12     and able-bodied Muslim men could find accommodation?

13        A.   Yes.  He said that the HVO had facilities that can put up this

14     number of men and that it was up to the army to disarm these men in the

15     safest manner, and everybody else was somebody -- oh, sorry, everything

16     else was for someone else to take care of.

17        Q.   General, how did you feel when you wrote this order?

18        A.   I felt cheated and double-crossed, because we were accepting a

19     large number of Muslim men into the HVO.  On the other hand, whenever

20     anything happened outside of Mostar, where there were the most Muslims in

21     the ranks of the HVO, I tried to make it clear to my counterparts in the

22     ABiH that we can function this way and do everything with this

23     composition of our forces.  And I tried to convince my colleague,

24     Mr. Halilovic, that this was the right way and that we should both go

25     about our work in this manner.

Page 49579

 1             In such a situation, it wasn't easy to accept the fact that you

 2     were backing up the policy of accepting people in the HVO and then they

 3     turned against you.

 4        Q.   You're saying it wasn't easy, General.  But how do you feel?

 5     That's what I wanted to hear from you.

 6        A.   Well, I felt shattered, completely shattered.  Everything I had

 7     hoped for was simply falling apart, and I simply couldn't -- I couldn't

 8     come by.  And it wasn't easy to pass such a decision, and I feared that

 9     there could have been losses due to fighting in the process of disarming.

10     However, that didn't happen, fortunately.

11        Q.   When you were drafting this order to isolate able-bodied Muslim

12     men, how did you treat those people?  At that moment, what was their

13     status to you, as an HVO man?

14        A.   Able-bodied Muslim men, to my mind at that moment, were only --

15     could only be members of the ABiH.

16        Q.   Did you, personally, consider those able-bodied Muslim men

17     prisoners of war?

18        A.   Yes, they would come under that category.

19        Q.   Tell us, please, General, at the point that you isolate Muslim

20     soldiers from the HVO, regardless of the reasons for that, in your

21     opinion, does that soldier retain the status of HVO soldier?

22        A.   Yes, fully.  There's no difference between him and somebody else

23     whom we detained because he refused to take up his position.  So, yes, he

24     does retain his status as an HVO soldier.

25        Q.   In this order, General, we see that the you say that the women

Page 49580

 1     and children should be left in their homes and not touched.  What was

 2     your position on the protection of civilians, General?

 3        A.   My position was that this category was not a threat to security

 4     in any way, and, therefore, that it was quite understandable and

 5     reasonable that they should be left to remain in their houses, where they

 6     lived, regardless of what people called total national defence.  But as

 7     far as I was concerned, this category, women, children and the elderly,

 8     did not present a threat; that is to say, all those who weren't

 9     able-bodied men.

10        Q.   At the end of this document, General, we see that your order was

11     sent to the South-East Herzegovina Operations Zone and that the command

12     of that operations zone sent it on to the 2nd and 3rd HVO Brigades.  He

13     forwarded it to them.  Now, to the best of your knowledge, General,

14     Miljenko Lasic, did he forward your order to the 1st HVO Brigade as well?

15        A.   I did not look at my order, the one that reached Miljenko Lasic,

16     so I didn't know what he did at that time, but I did know that the

17     1st Brigade started acting upon the order.  So if it didn't receive the

18     order in this form, quite obviously it did receive it in another form, in

19     another way.

20             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, it is not my

21     intention to pursue questions on this document, so if you would like to

22     ask the general anything on it, perhaps this is the opportune moment.  If

23     not, we can move on.

24             General, let's look at the next document, which is 4D480.

25        Q.   Tell us, General, is that one of your documents?

Page 49581

 1        A.   Yes, it is.

 2        Q.   Tell us, General, did you personally send a document with these

 3     contents to somebody else, or did you just send it to the

 4     Defence Department?

 5        A.   This document went to the Defence Department, and I think late in

 6     the afternoon the same contents and the same document was sent out I

 7     don't know whether to all operative zones or just to Central Bosnia,

 8     because they called to see what was happening with relation to the events

 9     in Mostar, so we -- and they asked that the same document be sent to

10     them.

11        Q.   From this document - we've already looked at it in this

12     courtroom, but, anyway - in the penultimate paragraph we see that you say

13     that in all the units, measures had been taken to remove Muslims from the

14     HVO.

15             Now, my question to you is this:  Did you inform the supreme

16     commander of your order and of the measures of isolation to be taken for

17     Muslim soldiers in the HVO?

18        A.   Yes, I did inform him on that same day, because we had further

19     contacts by night-time, and I told him that I had taken these measures

20     and that probably the very next day they would start acting upon them.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Now, let's look at the next document, which is P3175,

22     General.  3175 is the document number, and it's under seal.  It's a

23     report from the European Monitors, a daily report, with

24     Nedjeljko Obradovic's statements and reports for the 4th of July, and he

25     speaks about the isolation of Muslim soldiers within the HVO because of a

Page 49582

 1     possible threat from inside, and he also speaks about the isolation or,

 2     rather, arrest of Muslim men aged between 18 and 60.

 3             Now, my question to you, General, is:  Did the HVO in any way

 4     hide from the internationals that they had undertaken to isolate Muslim

 5     soldiers in the HVO and Muslims who were able-bodied men?

 6        A.   No, we never kept that secret.  They came to see Obradovic, he

 7     received them, and I can see that he told them about the situation and

 8     all the measures that had been taken.  And this covers two pages in that

 9     particular report.

10        Q.   Now let's look at the next document, General.  P3427 is the

11     number.  Once again, it is under seal.  It is another European Monitors'

12     report, dated the 13th of July, 1993, and they are conveying the

13     statement made by Kresimir Zubak.

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, this document

15     is of international nature, and it relates to a talk Colonel Obradovic

16     had with the person who will later write the report, or maybe with

17     someone else.  We don't know.  Whatever the case, he says on July 4th,

18     and it's an important date, on July 4th the HVO started an operation to

19     remove the Muslim men from the forces; i.e., about 25 per cent of the

20     troops were removed from the HVO forces.  And it is written here, black

21     and white, that these people were arrested, and that they were between 18

22     and 60.  So nothing is hidden here.

23             Now, when Colonel Obradovic stated this, did he say this with

24     your authorisation or with Mate Boban's authorisation?

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we talked to the

Page 49583

 1     commanders and said that it would be a good thing to supply information

 2     to the internationals, whether it be the Observer Mission, the Monitors,

 3     UNPROFOR or whoever, because they were there on assignment and they asked

 4     us to help them carry out their assignment.  So they had to come and

 5     visit our units, and you couldn't say, Colonel Obradovic is not going to

 6     say anything, or, You go and see Petkovic or somebody else and they'll

 7     tell you all about it.  So we did allow them, at their request, to be

 8     given basic information without entering into any political or other

 9     explanations.

10             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  Among the 11.000

11     documents we have been presented with, we saw some documents where the

12     HVO sometimes made public announcements.  So why is it that in this very

13     specific case on June 30th, in the morning, it wasn't envisaged to send

14     out a press release stating, for example, that:  "The HVO this morning,

15     between 6.00 and 7.00 a.m., disarmed a number of soldiers from HVO units

16     for security reasons, given the events unfolding in the Republic of

17     Bosnia-Herzegovina," something all these lines?  I mean, I'm improvising

18     here, but something of that flavour.  Why wasn't it done?  Then it would

19     have been perfectly transparent.

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, now whether in the

21     form that you have presented here, but, anyway, on the 30th of June, in

22     the course of the day, a statement was issued, and we've seen it here

23     several times in the courtroom.  And this was the statement issued by the

24     authorities of the HVO, and it was made public, it was a public

25     statement.  And we looked at that document here in the courtroom a number

Page 49584

 1     of times.  So there was a statement on the 30th about everything that had

 2     happened.

 3             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I think that Ms. Alaburic will

 4     give us the number of the press release.

 5             Please proceed, Ms. Alaburic.

 6             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, yes, we will

 7     certainly find the number of that press release.  We've seen it many

 8     times in the courtroom, and I'm sure you'll remember it once we see it.

 9     But let's move on.

10        Q.   The next document, General, is P3427, once again the

11     Observer Mission, and we were talking about Kresimir Zubak, who says that

12     it was necessary to arrest the Muslim fighters within the HVO because

13     they led a rebellion.  And then in continuation, he says that the HVO

14     will try and exchange them or do something else with them.

15             Anyway, General, to the best of your knowledge, did the

16     leadership of Herceg-Bosna do its best to see that the problem of

17     isolating soldiers and able-bodied men be solved in co-operation with the

18     international community?

19        A.   Yes, that is right, they did try and resolve the problem with the

20     internationals, and they contacted them straight away so that no level

21     was left out and nothing was kept secret from any level; quite the

22     contrary, assistance was sought, especially humanitarian aid and

23     assistance and so forth.

24        Q.   Now, the next three documents that we have prepared we're going

25     to have to deal with very briefly because our time is running out.

Page 49585

 1             Anyway, General, they show that you did have knowledge about the

 2     BH Army plans to take control of the area south of Jablanica, in the

 3     direction of Mostar, and further on towards the sea.  And the documents

 4     are 4D948 and 4D702.  You're familiar with those documents General, so

 5     tell us now, please:  Did you really have knowledge of those BH Army

 6     plans, and did you take them seriously and consider the possible axes of

 7     attack by the BH Army?

 8        A.   Well, our knowledge was that we followed the developments in the

 9     BH Army and its offensive in Central Bosnia and in the Konjic-Jablanica

10     areas, and we expected a further attack or movements on the part of the

11     BH Army towards Mostar.  And that is why we attempted to take certain

12     measures to prevent that, so these are measures out of caution.

13             Now, this other document is a letter to UNPROFOR representatives,

14     where I wrote to Mr. Walgren, who was commander-in-chief of all the UN

15     peace forces for ex-Yugoslavia, and to General Philippe Morillon.  I

16     wrote to them about what had happened on the 30th, but I also say that

17     several days before that, in talking to them, I informed them that we

18     envisage that something could happen.  But I never thought that it would

19     happen in this shape or form, to be quite honest.

20             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, before we continue

21     with General Petkovic's testimony, let me just say that the document we

22     just mentioned is a statement with respect to the events of the 30th of

23     June, is document P3038.  3038 is the number of the statement, press

24     release.

25        Q.   Now, General, I'm going to show you a series of documents, seven

Page 49586

 1     in all, and after that I'm going to ask you a question related to those

 2     documents.

 3             The first document is 4D469.  It is an official note from

 4     Ivica Kraljevic, dated March 1993, in which he notes that pressure was

 5     being exerted on Muslims in HVO and MUP units to leave those same units.

 6     And if they failed to do so, then those Muslims are being threatened with

 7     a physical liquidation or the burning of their houses.

 8             The next document, 2D288, is a document from the

 9     Security Administration of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of BH,

10     Fikret Muslimovic, who, in mid-April 1993, is making the following

11     assessments:  He says that:

12             "It is realistic to expect further escalation in relations, and

13     an all-out confrontation between the BH Army and the HVO."

14             And then he goes on to state and he says:

15             "It is essential that all the Muslims should be pacified as much

16     as possible, Muslims who are in the HVO, and to prevail and see that they

17     leave the HVO and go to the BH Army."

18             Now, the next document, 4D33, is a document once again from the

19     security organ of a brigade within the 4th Corps of the BH Army.  Once

20     again, the date is mid-April 1993.  And among other things, it says, and

21     I quote, that:

22             "All Muslims, members of the HVO, should be called to take the

23     side of their people," to stand on the side of their nation.

24             JUDGE PRANDLER:  I'm sorry, it is only a technical question.  Did

25     you mention the next document, 4D33, because I do not see it here, but it

Page 49587

 1     may be my fault.  So then if you could clarify which document you are

 2     talking about.

 3             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I'm referring to 4D33, which

 4     should be in your binder, and I'm adhering to the order in the binders.

 5        Q.   The next document is 4D34.  The same author, the chief of

 6     security in the 4th Corps brigade two days later on the 18th of April.

 7     He also proposes security measures, and among other, I quote:

 8             "... to establish co-operation with our fighters in the HVO and

 9     tell them of the seriousness of the situation."

10             Now, the next document is 4D35; a brigade of the 4th Corps, on

11     the 18th of April, 1993.  The commander is Bajro Pizovic, and among other

12     things, he says that:

13             "The Organ for Morale," IPD, "and Religious Affairs should devise

14     a plan for information to the Muslim soldiers who are in the units of

15     Capljina and Stolac."

16             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Excuse me, Ms. Alaburic.  I was of the opinion

17     that we were dealing with the events of 30 June.  Is that still the case?

18             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Yes, we are dealing with the

19     events of the 30th of June, but I'm trying to show you the defence and

20     security reasons for which the measure was taken to isolate the Muslims

21     from the HVO.  And what I wish to show you on this occasion is that a

22     series of BH Army documents talk about the systemic way in which the

23     BH Army acted towards the Muslims in the HVO, to have them tie in with

24     the HVO Muslims, and I want to show you and prove that what actually

25     happened on the 30th of June, 1993, is a consequence of the long-term

Page 49588

 1     plan that Bosnia-Herzegovina had and systemic work to try and win over

 2     the Muslims from the HVO to the side of the BH Army.

 3             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Right, thank you.  I fully understand that.  I

 4     was just impressed by the fact that it is two and a half months,

 5     practically, before the main event.

 6             Thank you.  Excuse me for interrupting.

 7             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we showed a document

 8     for 1992 because we wanted to show that this was a plan of the ABiH which

 9     was being systematically implemented for months, and I only focused on a

10     few documents I consider most important.

11        Q.   We're done with this document, General.  The next one is 4D473.

12     It is also issued by Bajro Pizovic and dated the 18th of April, 1993.  He

13     communicates with the commander of the 1st HVO Brigade, and he says, I

14     quote:

15             "You know very well that a large number of Muslim soldiers are in

16     your formations, and they are Muslims and belong to this people, so it

17     wouldn't be good if the organisation and establishment of your units were

18     to be disrupted."

19             And the next document is 4D36.  It's a report of the commander of

20     the 4th Corps, Mr. Arif Pasalic, in which he, on the 2nd of May, 1993,

21     among others, reports that:

22             "We linked up with our men in the HVO."

23             And then he said that the men from the Capljina HVO have the task

24     of taking Tasovcici village and the bridge in Capljina in order to

25     prevent troops from coming in from the direction of Metkovic; also, that

Page 49589

 1     they had assigned the task to seize the town of Stolac with "our people

 2     in the HVO."

 3             Now, General, we have seen reports of the SIS and other bodies

 4     that controlled the security situation due to the large number of Muslim

 5     soldiers in the HVO.  Did you at the Main Staff have information about

 6     such plans of the ABiH and their efforts to link up with the Muslim

 7     soldiers in the HVO?

 8        A.   We did have some information, but at that time, when these

 9     drastic things were going on, we didn't have such information --

10     information about that.  Many activities in the brigades showed that this

11     was a matter that was being dealt with.  We did have reports that some

12     soldiers hid their weapons and reported them stolen, or that they

13     reported they had run out of ammunition, although there was no fighting

14     in that area for days.  We hoped that all these would stop some day, but

15     there was more and more of that.  And what's worse, all this originated

16     from the very top of the ABiH; that is, Sarajevo.

17        Q.   Up until the 30th of June, 1993, did you, personally, or any

18     other HVO commander, launch any action against HVO soldiers of Muslim

19     ethnicity?

20        A.   No, no such action was taken against HVO soldiers of Muslim

21     ethnicity, except for measures that applied to everybody who failed to

22     show up at the front-line, was facing sanctions, irrespective of their

23     ethnicity.  So there was no specific action targeted at HVO soldiers of

24     Muslim ethnicity.

25        Q.   If you remember, we analysed some reports from the 2nd and

Page 49590

 1     3rd Brigades with Witness Radmilo Jasak about how Muslim HVO soldiers

 2     were to be treated.  What was the position of the brigade commanders?

 3     Did they want to keep the soldiers of Muslim ethnicity in their units?

 4        A.   The commanders certainly wanted them to stay, but whoever asked

 5     to be discharged from the HVO would be issued a regular document about

 6     the end of his service in the HVO, once he had returned his weapons and

 7     other equipment that was issued to him, and after that he was supposed to

 8     report to the Defence Secretariat, but they -- and then they could go to

 9     the ABiH, or somebody may have remained passive or joined their families

10     in Croatia or whoever.  But whoever applied for that would be invited to

11     an interview, where he would be asked about his reasons, but they would

12     be let go.  And they would also be able to return if they wanted to.

13        Q.   You said that you agreed with General Praljak's assessment that

14     on that 30th of June, an all-out war broke out between the HVO and the

15     ABiH in this part of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Tell us now, in a situation of

16     all-out war, were you the right man in the right place at the right time,

17     as chief of the HVO Main Staff?

18        A.   That is for somebody else to say.  All-out war may require

19     somebody else who is much fiercer, much more determined, energetic, who

20     wouldn't have a soft side for some things, somebody who would -- whose

21     moves would be more energetic and the like.  But it isn't for me to

22     assess myself; it's for others to do.

23             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we're done with this

24     chapter.  If you have no questions, I can continue.  It seems that there

25     are no questions.

Page 49591

 1             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I must disappoint.  Excuse me.

 2             Mr. Petkovic, I'm not sure whether you can answer these

 3     questions, but I would like to have a bit more concrete picture of some

 4     of these events, of what actually happened.  I would like to have a film

 5     in my head so that I can really imagine the scenes.

 6             The first moment is:  How did the rebellion of the Muslims start?

 7     Did they wake up in barracks, and shot their neighbours who were still in

 8     bed?  Apparently, at some places they were out at 3.00 in the night, and

 9     then were they -- were they already assembled and organised in

10     previously-prepared Muslim units, or did they meet ad hoc, did they sneak

11     out?  Do you have any idea of what actually specifically happened?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, north of Mostar, the

13     area that we're speaking about, starting from the barracks and all of

14     Bijelo Polje, up until the front-line facing the VRS, in providing

15     logistics to these positions there may have been a 50:50 ratio.  There

16     was a battalion which was predominantly Muslim and another which was

17     predominantly Croat.  They were battalions established based on the local

18     principle, so they were made up of locals.

19             According to the statements of the persons who experienced that

20     personally, they said that people were forced to give up their weapons at

21     gunpoint.  And the barracks is an interesting example.  I believe that

22     there were four or five sentries, and one guard would walk the line and

23     reach the neighbouring sentry point, and that's how the entire barracks

24     actually fell or was taken.

25             At the level of the brigade, the HVO was totally surprised, and

Page 49592

 1     some 80 or 90 HVO soldiers, too, crossed the Neretva River and get away.

 2     The only part of Bijelo Polje where they were unsuccessful was a place

 3     that we call "the nun's house."  The command of the battalion was there,

 4     and the majority there were Croats.  Some were able to escape and pass on

 5     the information about the events, and that was the first information that

 6     we received.

 7             We only learned later that two or three hours after the beginning

 8     of the events, the command of the OZ was informed.  The command of the

 9     brigade was blocked, the communications centre, and the barracks where

10     the Muslims were the majority.  Only the battalion next to the nun's

11     house still had communication with us, and that's where we got our

12     information from.

13             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I'm sorry.  I'm trying to mike in.  You signed

14     so that it would make a break and I would not have to interrupt you,

15     because this is a bit lengthy, and I may want to come back to something

16     that is a bit further up already in the transcript.

17             You said that some battalions were predominantly manned by Muslim

18     soldiers.  Would the commander of such a battalion and staff also be

19     predominantly Muslim?

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that was the 1st Battalion or

21     the 2nd, because the battalions were manned with the inhabitants of a

22     certain area.  So if a certain area was predominantly Muslim, then the

23     soldiers in that battalion would be mostly Muslims, and fewer would be

24     Croats.  But they worked together all the time.

25             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you.  What I did not quite understand and

Page 49593

 1     has not -- perhaps it's also a problem of translation, without me wanting

 2     to criticise the interpreters:  On page 28, at lines 17 to 20, you talked

 3     about the barracks as being, I quote:

 4             "... an interesting example.  I believe that there were four or

 5     five sentries, and one guard would walk the line and reach the

 6     neighbouring sentry point, and that's how the entire barracks actually

 7     fell or was taken."

 8             Quite frankly, this is not very -- I cannot imagine this.  I see

 9     these sentries walking, and I have memories of my own military past, but

10     never the barracks were taken then.  Perhaps you could be more specific,

11     if you know, of course.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, certainly.  This may not have

13     been interpreted the best way.

14             The barracks had four or five guards' posts manned by one guard

15     or sentry each, and the guards were never only Muslim or only Croats.

16     And if I'm the guard at one such post, another guard would be 300 metres

17     away from me or so, and we would walk our lines and we would meet now and

18     then.  So measures were taken that especially at the entrance to the

19     barracks, the guard would be disarmed in order to let the ABiH enter, and

20     then they would go on to the other rooms and other buildings in the

21     barracks where the people slept.  And the hallways and corridors, there

22     were the weapons, and these weapons were removed.  So whoever woke up and

23     understood what was going on tried to escape, because they didn't have

24     weapons.  Half of them swam across the Neretva with no clothes and

25     managed to reach the other bank.

Page 49594

 1             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you very much.  That was the kind of

 2     account that I had in mind, and this I find absolutely helpful.

 3             The next question is a similar one, and it concerns the disarming

 4     of the Muslims.  Have you been present at any such occasion when Muslim

 5     soldiers in an HVO unit were disarmed?  I'm sure this did not happen in

 6     the same way.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Your Honours, I didn't go out

 8     to any area to see how this was done.

 9             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  So you do not have information on that.

10             And the last question now is perhaps of a bit more theoretical

11     nature.  You have told us that you have disarmed Muslims who had been in

12     HVO units, and that you had isolated them, but you also said that they

13     continued to be soldiers of the HVO, and -- POW and members of the HVO at

14     the same time, and this puzzles me to some extent.  Did they still get

15     money, as soldiers, from the HVO, or is it perhaps again a problem that

16     -- or a situation where some misunderstanding has arisen?

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, it's a

18     misunderstanding.  I said that disarmed HVO soldiers were not prisoners

19     of war.  They were still considered soldiers of the Croatian

20     Defence Council, the HVO.  Prisoners of war were that category which

21     belonged to the BH Army, those who actually were members of the BH Army,

22     with everything that that entailed.  They were POWs, and those who were

23     without weapons but were potential candidates for the BH Army, which

24     meant conscripts and so on.  No HVO soldier could be a prisoner of war.

25             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  That would have been my reaction, too.

Page 49595

 1             Now, the soldiers that still were HVO soldiers, we are talking of

 2     such soldiers who were also isolated?

 3             I see that you nod.  You must say, Yes, so that it's in the

 4     transcript, but you don't have to say more than that.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, they were isolated,

 6     isolated HVO soldiers, yes.

 7             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you.  Then the next question would be

 8     whether, according to you, this isolation could be equated to a

 9     deprivation of liberty.

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, "isolation" should not be

11     taken in the classical sense of deprivation of liberty.  It should have

12     been temporarily removing these people to see what had done -- who had

13     done what and who was responsible for what, and then who should be

14     prosecuted further.  And if not, if they weren't culpable, then they

15     should be released.

16             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  You have just used the term "released."  And to

17     be released, one must before be somewhat detained.  You have also been

18     very careful in saying that they should not be taken as being deprived of

19     their liberty, in the classical sense.  Simply, it is not clear to me

20     what you want to tell us in this respect.  Do you want to tell us that

21     they were not detained and then, presumably, not released, technically,

22     but just said goodbye, to go home, and perhaps -- if you know, it would

23     be helpful if you could describe what the situation of these isolated HVO

24     soldiers was, practically.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Those HVO members who were isolated

Page 49596

 1     were supposed to be in one place, under supervision, and certain measures

 2     should be taken to find the organisers from amongst them, to find who the

 3     organisers were, who the leaders were in these individual groups, and to

 4     see what each person's behaviour and conduct was, what they had done.

 5     And then on the basis of that, to take certain measures if the

 6     individuals were deemed culpable.

 7             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  That could apply to detention on remand, someone

 8     under an investigation.  There is a certain suspicion, and then

 9     questioning and other methods perhaps are applied to see whether the

10     suspicion is sufficiently serious to continue with the proceeding.  Would

11     you agree to that?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, for the most part, yes.

13             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Then we're still back with the question:  What

14     does it mean, they were "under supervision"?

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, it was a group of people who,

16     at a given point in time, represented a threat to security.

17             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Excuse me.  This goes not in the direction I am

18     curious.  I would like to know:  Were they in a hotel, where they could

19     go in and out as they pleased, or were they in a school, perhaps, where

20     the door locked, basically, and one or several guards in front of it, or

21     any other situation?  Always, if you know.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, they couldn't go out, they

23     couldn't leave, except to go to hospital or things of that nature.  They

24     were in the facility, in the building, under supervision.

25             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you.

Page 49597

 1             Excuse me, Ms. Alaburic.  I've been a bit lengthy, but I was

 2     really interested in this.

 3             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, we'll break, because it's

 4     almost 4.00.  We'll break for 20 minutes.

 5                           --- Recess taken at 3.53 p.m.

 6                           --- On resuming at 4.15 p.m.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The court is back in session.

 8             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I've been told that we have

 9     44 minutes left, and I'd like to ask you, if we need extra time to

10     complete what we intended to tell you, Your Honours, that you should

11     allow us these few extra minutes.  But I will make the request when I see

12     we are drawing to the end of the testimony.  We will be finished today,

13     and I assume that my colleagues from the Prosecution and the Defence will

14     be satisfied if my time is extended, because then their time will be,

15     too, and it won't upset the plan, Your Honours that we move on tomorrow

16     with Judge Antonetti's questions and examination.

17        Q.   Now, General, we're not going to deal with any more documents

18     because we don't have that much time --

19             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I actually prepared myself to

20     start immediately, so you're actually causing a problem here.

21             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] There won't be a problem,

22     Your Honours.  After the break, we can move on with your questions, with

23     your examination of General Petkovic, but I assume that if we might need

24     an extra 10 or 15 minutes, that you will allow us that time.

25        Q.   Anyway, General, we're not going to deal with documents

Page 49598

 1     anymore --

 2             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] If you need additional time,

 3     you will ask, and then the Trial Chamber will decide.

 4             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

 5        Q.   General, Operation South, let's explain that to Their Honours in

 6     the briefest possible terms.  When did you learn about the plan to launch

 7     an operation which came to be known as Operation South?

 8        A.   On the 4th of July -- or, rather, the 5th of July, 1993,

 9     Your Honours.

10        Q.   And who told you about the plan?

11        A.   Mr. Boban called me and told me to prepare an operation like

12     that.

13        Q.   What was your response to that?

14        A.   My response was that the HVO wasn't capable of undertaking any

15     operation and that it would be madness to do so.

16        Q.   And what did he say to that?

17        A.   Quite simply, that he would find a team capable of carrying it

18     out.  And he was busy to come up with such a team.

19        Q.   Who was at the head of the team?

20        A.   At the head of the team was Brigadier Luka Dzanko.

21        Q.   Tell us, please, General, did you in any way -- were you in any

22     way involved in the planning of that action?

23        A.   No, in no way was I involved in the planning of that operation.

24        Q.   Were you ever in the command of that operation which was in

25     Krivodol?

Page 49599

 1        A.   No, I never joined that command, nor was I ever there.

 2        Q.   Tell us, please, General, before the beginning of the operation,

 3     itself, was a meeting held at Mate Boban's?

 4        A.   Yes, Boban called all the participants of the operation to attend

 5     a meeting which was held concerning the operation, itself --

 6        Q.   Can you give us the date?

 7        A.   The date was the 13th, because the operation was supposed to

 8     start on the morning of the 13th, but there was a delay, and he called in

 9     the command to see what had caused the delay.  So on the 13th of July was

10     when it was supposed to have started, 1993.  Right?  I'm mixing up my

11     dates now.

12        Q.   Tell us, please, General, did you attend the meeting at

13     Mate Boban's?

14        A.   Yes, I did attend the meeting, and I sat to one side, listening

15     to the others to hear what they were going to do.

16        Q.   Tell us, please, General, why couldn't the operation start on the

17     13th?

18        A.   Because that morning the BH Army infiltrated a large number of

19     sabotage terrorist units in the Dubrava Plateau area, and so there was a

20     lot of disturbance and a lot of fighting and a lot of casualties in the

21     Dubravska Plateau area.

22        Q.   Tell us, please, General, this operation, does it have anything

23     to do with your departure from the post of the number 1 man of the

24     Main Staff, the chief of the Main Staff?

25        A.   Yes, it did.  I considered that the supreme commander should have

Page 49600

 1     believed me and not have taken the decision to bring in a whole command

 2     team, made up of some 15 or 16 men, and to launch the operation of his

 3     own bat.

 4        Q.   And did you ask the supreme commander to relieve you of your

 5     duties as chief of the Main Staff?

 6        A.   Yes.  On the 15th, in the evening, I talked to him, and I told

 7     him that I would give him 10 days to find a replacement for me and that

 8     that was proper procedure.

 9        Q.   Tell us, please, General, why did you remain in the HVO?  Why

10     didn't you leave?  Why didn't you go home to Croatia?

11        A.   Well, I felt the need to stay with the people that I'd spent so

12     much time with, and I also learnt that General Praljak would be replacing

13     me.

14        Q.   Did you know General Praljak, General, from before?

15        A.   Not -- well, not before the 17th or 18th of April of 1992.

16     That's when we first met, when I arrived in the HVO.

17        Q.   Tell us, please, General, knowing General Praljak, was it your

18     assessment that he was a man you could co-operate with in the Main Staff

19     of the HVO?

20        A.   Yes, I did think that, because General Praljak didn't come to

21     take up some position or anything like that, but to help the people, and

22     it was easier to work that way.

23             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Very well, General.

24             Your Honours, if any of you has any questions about this topic,

25     Operation South, pose them, but we'll move on.

Page 49601

 1             The re-subordination of the military and civilian police is the

 2     next area I'd like to deal with, and for that let's look at document

 3     P3770.  We're still dealing with the second binder.  It's an order from

 4     the chief of the Military Police Administration, in which it says

 5     pursuant to the order from the head of the Defence Department, part of

 6     the military police should be re-subordinated to the 3rd Brigade HVO

 7     Command.

 8             Now, does this order, General, show what should have been done

 9     when a military police unit is re-subordinated to a commander?

10        A.   Yes, this is standard procedure, because we're dealing with the

11     deployment of the military police in combat operations.

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Coric.

13             THE ACCUSED CORIC: [Interpretation] I'd like to say straight away

14     that for the umpteenth time we're repeating the fact that Defence counsel

15     is testifying, in fact, and is just asking for confirmation.  Ten seconds

16     ago, she said, General, isn't it true that the head of the

17     Defence Department was supposed to issue an order to the chief of the

18     military police, and then so on and so on.  I think that they are

19     statements on her part, so let's have that manner of conduct changed in

20     this courtroom.

21             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Coric -- Ms. Alaburic,

22     given that you're touching on a sensitive issue, which is the military

23     police and the relationship with the chief of staff, it's a very

24     sensitive issue given the various interventions of Mr. Coric, I would ask

25     you to touch upon this issue in a most neutral possible way, because as

Page 49602

 1     Mr. Coric rightly said so, if, in the question, you are already issuing a

 2     position, one could have problems.  So please be very careful when asking

 3     those questions.  General Petkovic will talk about it; I may ask

 4     questions as well; and when Mr. Coric will have some of his witnesses

 5     testifying, I'm quite sure that we will come back on this issue.  So

 6     please be very cautious when you are putting those questions.  Don't

 7     forget that you are doing an examination-in-chief here.

 8             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  If I may just add a technical remark.

 9             I think the correct way would be if Mr. Coric would ask counsel

10     to make such intervention, because it's really something that is the role

11     of counsel, rather than the accused.  I understand that you become

12     impatient.  That's perfectly correct.  And we have granted the accused

13     the right, personally, to ask questions, but as you are, in fact,

14     excellently assisted by competent counsel, this is the kind of thing

15     normally counsel should do.

16             THE ACCUSED CORIC: [Interpretation] Yes, thank you for those

17     compliments addressed to my counsel.  So on her behalf, I thank you, and

18     I thank Ms. Alaburic, too.  But I will always get up when things are

19     repeated that should not be repeated in this courtroom, regardless of

20     your warning.  I do respect you, Your Honour.  However, when it's too

21     much, it's too much.  Thank you.

22             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I don't need to

23     comment.  I'd just like to remind you that my question was whether this

24     document shows what should be done if a military police unit were

25     re-subordinated to an HVO commander.  That was my question.

Page 49603

 1             THE ACCUSED CORIC: [Interpretation] No, that wasn't your

 2     question.  That was not your question, what your question was like.  Look

 3     at the transcript.  You made an observation.  You didn't ask a question.

 4     Have a look at the transcript again.

 5             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, with your

 6     permission, I'll move on.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In a criminal trial, I also

 8     take on board psychological factors.  It is important for the good course

 9     of justice that everything happens as smoothly as possible, and when an

10     accused wants to take the floor, he has to be listened to, and one

11     shouldn't always hide behind applying rules.  Rules may actually

12     sometimes be counterproductive, and therefore you are presenting a

13     document to the witness.  Why don't you just read this document and say,

14     This is a document with such and such a date and such and such signatory;

15     what does this document say?  And the witness will say, Well, this

16     document talks about re-subordination, and so on and so forth.  And you

17     say, Very well, so what does that mean in military terms?  And that's how

18     we can proceed, and in that case no one can argue about anything.

19             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, as you have said

20     this, I really now ask you to take a look at the transcript.  And what

21     does Mr. Coric's counsel do?  She reads out at least half the document

22     before she asks a question.  Your Honours, I really don't think that we

23     should go into this any further.  I am extremely considerate to what I am

24     saying and toward every other accused, but I appeal to every other -- to

25     all accused to be as patient as General Petkovic for us to deal with all

Page 49604

 1     the documents that pertain to him.  I do think that this reaction is

 2     unfounded.

 3             So if you allow me to continue my examination, I will do so,

 4     about the civilian police.

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Coric.

 6             MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] As I have been mentioned,

 7     I would like to say that Ms. Alaburic has forgotten the fact that I

 8     haven't yet examined anybody in chief, I have only conducted

 9     cross-examination, and in a cross-examination leading questions are

10     allowed.  Once we start examining in chief, Ms. Alaburic will be in a

11     position to say how I phrase my questions.

12             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I may respond.

13             I haven't mentioned examination-in-chief or cross-examination.  I

14     have only referred to the technique of examining a witness; namely, that

15     half a document is read out before a question is put to the witness.  So

16     we all know that.  No need to waste more time on that.

17        Q.   General, let's speak about the civilian police, how the civilian

18     police re-subordinated to a military commander.

19             Please take a look at document 3D2408.  This is an order --

20        A.   I can see it.  I can give -- I can comment.  Your Honours, this

21     is an order of the chief of the Department of Interior.  He makes use of

22     his authority, and due to the worsening situation in Mostar he orders the

23     civilian police to go to Mostar and be subordinated to the OZ of

24     South-East Herzegovina.  And this is a normal procedure on the part of

25     the head of the Department of the Interior.

Page 49605

 1        Q.   Who can decide that a unit of the civilian police should be used

 2     in combat and, for that purpose, re-subordinated to a military commander?

 3        A.   It's the head of the Department of the Interior.

 4        Q.   Let us now look at document P3027.  General, I must describe the

 5     document for the sake of the transcript.

 6             This is an order of the head of the Department of the Interior,

 7     dated the 30th of June, 1993.  The previous order was not described, so

 8     the time reference is lacking from the transcript.  That previous

 9     document is dated the 9th of May, 1993.  That's a reason why documents

10     must be described.

11             Now, General, this one is an order to form a joint police unit.

12     Can you comment on this, General?

13        A.   Your Honours, the head of the Department of the Interior,

14     Mr. Kvesic, issued an order on the 30th of June to establish a joint

15     police unit and re-subordinate it to the commander of the military

16     police.

17        Q.   The head of the Department of the Interior, General, did he have

18     the right to take such decisions?

19        A.   Yes, he was, because they were his units.

20        Q.   Let us look at document P6027.  It is an order issued jointly by

21     the minister of the interior and the minister of defence on the 23rd of

22     October, 1993.  Tell us, General, what kind of order is this?

23        A.   This is about the head of the Department of the Interior and the

24     head of the Department of Defence issued a joint command to the effect

25     that for the reinforcement of the HZ-H -- HR-HB forces, the entire

Page 49606

 1     reserve police is to be reassigned to the armed forces, whereas the

 2     regular units of the police that are on the front-line should be relieved

 3     of their duties on the front-line, and that is a regular procedure.

 4        Q.   And now the following document in this set, which is P5573.  It's

 5     a letter sent by the head of the Department of the Interior, dated the

 6     1st of October, 1993, in which in paragraph 5 we can read:

 7             "The exclusive right to form these units and make decisions

 8     regarding their size, commanding personnel and combat engagement,

 9     observing the principles of subordination and command, no one else has

10     the right to render decisions regarding the establishment or combat

11     engagement of police, particularly at a local level."

12             General, is this position of the head of the Department of

13     Defence [as interpreted] a correct rendering of the rules governing the

14     use of police units?

15        A.   Yes, it is, and the head of the Department of the Interior is the

16     only one who has the right to take such decision.

17             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] It has been entered wrongly in the

18     transcript.  On page 43, line 6, the department reads "the Department of

19     Defence," whereas we are speaking about the Department of the Interior.

20             THE WITNESS:  Yes, the head of the Department of the Interior is

21     in charge of civilian police.

22             THE INTERPRETER:  Please speak a bit slower and make a pause

23     between question and answer.

24             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] General, we will now deal with the

25     issue of Stupni Do.  Unless there are questions about the

Page 49607

 1     re-subordination of civilian and military police, I would like to pass on

 2     to Stupni Do.

 3        Q.   General, we have prepared a number of documents, but we will be

 4     showing only some.  But the Trial Chamber has a good overview of the

 5     events at Stupni Do.

 6             Tell us, General, why did you go to Kiseljak in October 1993?

 7        A.   I went there on the occasion of the pulling out of the wounded

 8     HVO personnel from that area, and we had to use helicopters to complete

 9     that task.

10        Q.   When did you arrive at Kiseljak?

11        A.   I believe it was on the 17th of October, 1993.

12        Q.   How long were you supposed to stay there?

13        A.   Until the 22nd of October, 1993, when I submitted a request to be

14     returned from there by helicopter.

15             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Excuse me.  I am looking at the schedule of

16     Petkovic movements that we have, and I cannot help noticing that this

17     does not coincide.  I see that you have also noticed.  So I just have

18     drawn your attention to it, and I leave it to you to continue.

19             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, for the time being I

20     skipped the topic of the labour of detained persons, because I think due

21     to a shortage of -- the shortage of time, Stupni Do has precedence.  But

22     if you will grant me additional time --

23             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I'm sorry.  You may have completely

24     misunderstood me.  I was just pointing out that according to this paper

25     that you have presented us, Mr. Petkovic was in Kiseljak from 17 to 26 of

Page 49608

 1     October, and you have just said, Mr. Petkovic, that you returned on the

 2     22nd.  Which of the two indications is the one that we should base

 3     ourselves on?

 4             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honours.  If I may just

 5     ask for a little bit of patience.

 6             General Petkovic said that he was supposed to stay until the

 7     22nd.  He didn't say that he really did stay until the 22nd.

 8             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Okay, thank you.

 9             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   Let's take a look at the following document, General, 4D844.  Is

11     this the document that you mentioned a short while ago about a flight

12     that you requested to be scheduled for the 22nd?

13        A.   Yes.  I requested to be returned to Herzegovina on the 22nd, and

14     this is it.

15        Q.   Let's take a look at the following document, P6144.  This

16     document says that you and Mr. Lucic, as well as Mr. Bandic, stayed at

17     Kiseljak because it was impossible to fly to Split due to adverse

18     weather?

19        A.   Yes.  There was -- we had bad weather, and the helicopters

20     couldn't take off at Kiseljak to fly to Split.

21        Q.   Now, tell us, General, how long did you really stay at Kiseljak?

22        A.   I stayed until the 22nd of -- sorry, 26th of October, 1993, until

23     9.30 a.m., when I left for Herzegovina.

24        Q.   And with who did you return to Herzegovina?

25        A.   Ivan Bandic, Vinko Lucic, and the driver of Colonel Blaskic.  I

Page 49609

 1     can't remember his name now.

 2        Q.   General, tell us, when did Ivica Rajic, with some HVO units, set

 3     off from Kiseljak to Vares?

 4        A.   Ivica Rajic left in the night between the 21st and the 22nd of

 5     October, 1993.

 6        Q.   Let's see the plans of the ABiH with regard to Vares.  Please

 7     take a look at document 4D523.  It's a document authored by

 8     Stjepan Siber, dated the 22nd of October, 1993, in which he replies to

 9     the Command of the 3rd Corps.

10             I correct the document reference, which is 4D523, 4D523.

11             And he says, among others -- he was asked about offensive actions

12     in the wider Vares area, and Siber says:

13             "We agree with your proposals with regard to the offensive

14     activities in the area of Vares, the villages of Dragovici and Mijakovici

15     are mentioned, as well as the Plijes facility or building.

16             Tell us, General, in October 1993, while you were at Kiseljak,

17     did you receive information about the ABiH taking these locations

18     mentioned in Siber's letter?

19        A.   Yes, some of the places were mentioned.  I can see that the

20     village of Kopljari is missing, but Plijes, Dreznica, Borovica, they were

21     taken; and Dragovici and Mijakovici are also mentioned.

22        Q.   Look at the following document, General, 4D520.  This is an order

23     by Commander Abdulah Ahmic, dated the 23rd of October, 1993, in which he

24     states that combat activities are intensifying, especially in the

25     Stupni Do area, and he goes on to mention help and the unblocking of

Page 49610

 1     Stupni Do.  And he's also mentioned the Breza MUP intervention unit which

 2     shall be kept ready to engage in combat along the axis, et cetera.

 3             General, tell us, was there an ABiH unit in the village of

 4     Stupni Do?

 5        A.   Yes, there was one.

 6        Q.   As far as you know, is the statement in this order true, that on

 7     the 23rd of October, combat activities intensified, especially in the

 8     Stupni Do area?

 9        A.   Yes, that is true.

10        Q.   Take a look at the following document, 4D519.  This is an

11     analysis of the performance or the execution of tasks involved in the

12     Vares operation.  It's a document of the 6th Corps of the ABiH.  It's a

13     lengthy document, it has about 16 pages.  Did you read this analysis,

14     General?

15        A.   Yes, I read it fully, and it describes who did what in the

16     operation of taking Vares.

17        Q.   Tell us, what you read in this analysis, does it correspond to

18     the information you have about the events in the Vares municipality?

19        A.   Yes.  Vares was taken, and everything -- all descriptions of that

20     process matches my information that I had at the time.

21        Q.   According to this analysis, was the operation of taking Vares

22     planned?

23        A.   The operation of taking Vares was planned in August 1993, a month

24     and a half after the fall of Kakanj.  So Vares was meant to be the next

25     municipality with a majority Croat population that was to be taken by the

Page 49611

 1     ABiH.

 2        Q.   This analysis speaks about the taking of the Kopljari village,

 3     then Plijes, then Lijesnica.  The places mentioned, were they taken

 4     before Ivica Rajic set off for Vares?

 5        A.   Yes, they were taken before, and that's why panic broke out in

 6     the Command of the Bobovac Brigade, and they requested help from the

 7     operations group at Kiseljak.

 8        Q.   Tell us, please, General, did you agree to the fact that

 9     Ivica Rajic, with a number of HVO soldiers, should move to Vares?

10        A.   Yes, I did agree with that.

11        Q.   At the time in Kiseljak, did you agree with Ivica Rajic, what

12     kind of combat activities would be undertaken in the Vares municipality

13     area?

14        A.   It was agreed that Ivica Rajic should try and deal with the part

15     of the defence where the BH Army had managed to break through, from the

16     village of Kopljari, towards Mijakovici, along that axis, the western

17     part of the municipality, and to see what the problem of command was

18     there and why a commander was being asking to be relieved of his duties,

19     and to look into the possibility of taking control of that area again or

20     to set up a new line there.

21             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Now, Your Honours, may we go into

22     private session for a few moments, please.

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Private session, please.

24                           [Private session]

25    (redacted)

Page 49612

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17                           [Open session]

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're back in open session.  Thank

19     you.

20             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   My question to you, General, is this:  This statement made by the

22     witness, is it correct?

23        A.   Yes, it's completely correct, and that's how he acted.

24        Q.   Now let's look at the next document, which is P9954.  It is

25     information from Ivica Rajic, dated the 22nd of October, 1993, sent to

Page 49613

 1     you, General Petkovic, about the fact that he had arrived in Vares.  And

 2     my question to you is this:  Did you receive that information?

 3        A.   Yes, I did receive the information telling me he had arrived in

 4     Vares.

 5        Q.   Apart from this information, did you -- directly from Ivica Rajic

 6     in Vares, did you receive any other piece of information in written form,

 7     regardless of what the title of that was, while you were in Kiseljak

 8     until the 26th of October?

 9        A.   No, no written information reached me from Ivica Rajic in

10     Kiseljak.

11        Q.   Can you explain to us the reason for that.  Because we have seen

12     some documents in the courtroom that were addressed to you, among others.

13        A.   I think that Ivica Rajic realised that on the 22nd I had left

14     Kiseljak, because I said goodbye to him before I left, and I said, I'm

15     going to Herzegovina, and he believed that I had gone to Herzegovina,

16     regardless of the fact that I sent some documents from Kiseljak.  He

17     didn't pay attention to that.

18        Q.   Now let's look at the next document, which is P6026.  And it's

19     information from Ivica Rajic, dated the 23rd of October, 1993, and it is

20     addressed, among others, to you, and it is addressed to the chief of

21     staff of the HVO Mostar, Milivoj Petkovic.

22             Tell us, please, General, could this piece of information reach

23     you -- have reached you while you were in Kiseljak?

24        A.   No, Your Honours, this piece of information couldn't have reached

25     me, because Paket radio doesn't recognise my name and surname.  It only

Page 49614

 1     recognises the station to which it is sent, which was Mostar in this

 2     case.

 3        Q.   Right.  Now let's look at the next document, which is P6028, and

 4     that's a document signed by Slobodan Praljak, dated the 23rd of October,

 5     about how the problems in Vares should be solved.

 6             Tell us, General, did you receive written communication of this

 7     type in Kiseljak on that day?

 8        A.   Yes, this did reach me late at night in Kiseljak.

 9        Q.   Tell us, please, General, what did you think?  The calming of the

10     situation in Vares, did that refer to the Muslims or the Croats?  How did

11     you understand this?

12        A.   No, this did not refer to the Muslims.  It referred to people in

13     the command and those around the command and headquarters who clashed

14     with the command.

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21        A.   No --

22             MR. SCOTT:  Excuse me.  Your Honour, out of an abundance of

23     caution, I think we should go into private session, because the nature --

24     in fact, I'd like to go into private session now, before I say anything

25     further.

Page 49615

 1             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very good.  Let's go into

 2     private session, and we'll see whether we have to lift confidentiality or

 3     not later on.

 4                           [Private session]

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 49616











11 Pages 49616-49630 redacted. Private session.















Page 49631

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21                           [Open session]

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, for the record, we are back in open

23     session.  Thank you.

24             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.  We're obviously on

25     sensitive ground here.

Page 49632

 1        Q.   Now, General, military commanders in Herceg-Bosna, did they have

 2     the task and responsibility of investigating crimes and undertaking

 3     prosecutions and criminal -- filing criminal reports?  Was that their

 4     main task?

 5             MR. SCOTT:  Excuse me, Your Honour.  I'm going to have to, at

 6     this point, add my voice to that of others.

 7             I think there's a very easy way to proceed here, and I know -- I

 8     know Ms. Alaburic is concerned about time, but the general is a

 9     professional soldier and an educated man.  I'm sure if she could just

10     ask, Can you explain the procedures by which these things were done, he

11     could give us an answer in his own words, without being led by a series

12     of "yes" or "no" questions.  I think clearly he can be asked, Can you

13     explain to us the disciplinary procedures that a commander would have

14     available to him in these circumstances?  And he can give us a narrative

15     response.

16             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, we have said

17     everything there is to say about disciplinary procedures.  And from what

18     we have said so far, you clearly know that the chief of the Main Staff

19     did not have the authority and that officers and non-commissioned

20     officers could not have been punished by a term of imprisonment.  I'm

21     just responding to Mr. Scott's comments.

22             Now, Your Honours, if you consider my question to be leading, I

23     will reformulate it and ask it in the following way:

24        Q.   General, which organs in Herceg-Bosna were in charge of

25     investigating crimes and prosecuting the perpetrators thereof?

Page 49633

 1        A.   They were the security services and the crime organs, criminal

 2     investigation organs, either attached to the military police or the

 3     civilian police.

 4        Q.   Now, what organs were these?  What were they called?

 5        A.   The Security and Information Service, with its organs.

 6        Q.   Give us the abbreviation of that.

 7        A.   SIS.  And the crime departments attached to the military police

 8     units and the units attached to the civilian police force, or, rather,

 9     the Ministry of the Interior.

10        Q.   General, repeat that again, because the translation is wrong.

11        A.   SIS, the Security and Information Service, is the first; and

12     second is the crime Department attached to the military police battalions

13     and the crime departments attached to the Ministry of the -- the

14     Department of the Interior.

15        Q.   Now, these crime departments, are they part of the military or

16     civilian police or not?

17        A.   The one are parts of the civilian police, and the others are part

18     of the military police.

19             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Now, Your Honours, since we've

20     entered into a realm of topics that was not the subject of my

21     examination-in-chief, and my time is short, I now tender a request, along

22     with your interventions, regardless of how long they last, to give me

23     time to the end of today's session, because -- and that might mean half

24     an hour to 40 minutes' additional time, so until the end of business

25     today.  May I have that additional time, please?

Page 49634

 1             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So based on the original six

 2     hours, you want 20 to 40 additional minutes -- 30 to 40 additional

 3     minutes.  So in that case, the Prosecutor will also have 6 hours and

 4     40 minutes or 6 hours and 30 minutes.  I'll ask my colleagues.

 5                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 6             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Alaburic, if you want an

 7     additional 40 minutes, you have them, given that you have actually a

 8     credit.  So it will be taken off your credit, out of the 55 hours that

 9     you had.  So there is no problem.

10             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Certainly, Your Honour.  Thank

11     you.  I'd just like to add that not only the Prosecution will have

12     additional time, but the Defence teams, too, just to avoid any

13     misunderstanding.

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just talk for yourself.  Don't

15     deal with the others.  I think I'm going to spend another sleepless

16     night.

17             In the meantime, we'll have a 20-minute break.

18                           --- Recess taken at 5.44 p.m.

19                           --- On resuming at 6.04 p.m.

20             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The court is back in session.

21             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   General, just two more questions.

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a minute.  I have a

24     question for the Petkovic Defence.

25             When is it going to file its motion for admission of exhibits

Page 49635

 1     according to Guide-Line 9?

 2             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, we're working on it,

 3     and we'd like to file it on the last day of General Petkovic's testimony.

 4     I sincerely hope that we'll manage to do that, but if not, we will file a

 5     request to give us about 10 days after the completion of

 6     General Petkovic's testimony and certainly not longer than 10 days after

 7     the completion of our case.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

 9             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   General, just two additional questions, staying with this topic

11     of criminal prosecution.

12             Tell us, in a situation in which a military commander knows that

13     a soldier of his, and knows the first and last name of a soldier,

14     committed a crime, is the military commander duty-bound to file a

15     criminal report to the military prosecutor?

16        A.   The military commander is duty-bound to file a criminal report

17     with the military prosecutor, yes.

18        Q.   Now let's take another situation.  A crime has been committed.

19     The perpetrator or perpetrators are unknown, and it is not known whether

20     it is, in fact, a crime that has been committed.  Who is going to be

21     responsible for gathering up the information and then possibly file a

22     criminal report with the military prosecutor?

23        A.   Well, there are two services, the SIS, Security and Information

24     Service, or the military police, so two possibilities.

25        Q.   Okay, General.  Now let's return to that Stupni Do of ours and

Page 49636

 1     look at P9895, please.

 2             Tell us, please, General, have you ever seen this document

 3     before?  When I say "before," I mean, of course, before these

 4     proceedings, so any time before this trial.

 5        A.   Do you mean what it says here, "Orders"?

 6        Q.   I mean document P9895.  It is one word handwritten.

 7        A.   I have two 9895 documents.  Do you mean where is says, "Ivica,"

 8     the text beginning with "Ivica"?

 9        Q.   The third page of this document.

10        A.   Very well.  But everything is under document P9895.  No, I never

11     saw this document before this trial.

12        Q.   Now, in this courtroom, General, it was stated that you dictated

13     these words to Mr. Lucic.  Did you dictate anything to anybody, General?

14        A.   No, I had no need to dictate anything.  I'm not incapable of

15     writing four sentences.  I'm not lazy, so I would have written them

16     myself.

17        Q.   General, in later communication with Mr. Rajic, did you ever hear

18     any comment of his about this document, or did you hear him question this

19     document at all, ask any questions about it?

20        A.   No, Ivica Rajic never mentioned this document.  Ivica Rajic acted

21     as he had been ordered to do and speed up the process of reporting.  He

22     didn't refer to any document, in fact.

23        Q.   Now, General, on the 26th of October, 1993, in the evening, did

24     you happen to talk to Mr. Rajic over the phone?

25        A.   No.  Mr. Praljak explained here in the courtroom that upon my

Page 49637

 1     arrival in Kiseljak, I talked to him, and then I carried on my journey to

 2     Split.  So Rajic couldn't communicate with me, nor did he need to do so.

 3        Q.   Did you inform General Praljak, who was your superior officer,

 4     about everything you learned about the events at Stupni Do?

 5        A.   Yes, we spoke about everything, and I informed him of everything

 6     I could and what I knew based on the information that were arriving at

 7     the Main Staff.

 8        Q.   Let's take a look at the following document, 4D834.

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, the

10     handwritten document that we have, P9895, sent to "Ivica," bearing the

11     name "Petkovic," when reading it any reasonable trier of fact could infer

12     from this --

13             MS. TOMANOVIC: [Interpretation] We're not receiving

14     interpretation.

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, every time I'm putting an

16     important question, there is no interpretation.  This is really strange.

17     Let me repeat.

18             Can you hear me, General Petkovic?

19             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.

20             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  You all have this

21     document on the screen, and I was saying that any reasonable trier of

22     fact, seeing this document, could infer - could, I say - could infer from

23     it that a person called Petkovic is telling Ivica that the order for an

24     investigation is merely a formality, that he must be cautious, and so

25     forth and so on.  So in a nutshell, it means, Don't worry, Ivica.  This

Page 49638

 1     document is in the hands of the Prosecutor, because there's an ERN

 2     number, so I don't know where you found it.  Someplace in the archives,

 3     probably.  But if you gave absolutely no instruction whatsoever, why

 4     would this document have been introduced, and why; to your detriment, to

 5     harm you?

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, Your Honours, I do not know

 7     why this document was introduced.  Firstly, we are not duty-bound to give

 8     the details about the investigations about (redacted)

 9     (redacted)

10     (redacted), and there were three versions of this document.

11             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I ask to pass into

12     private session.

13             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let's move into private

14     session.  Madam Registrar, could we move to private session.

15                           [Private session]

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 49639











11 Pages 49639-49642 redacted. Private session.















Page 49643

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10                           [Open session]

11             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're back in open session.

12             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

13        Q.   On this 8th of November, 1993, where were you?

14        A.   I was not at the command in Citluk, I was in Split, because on

15     the 7th I had a meeting with General Briquemont in Split, and

16     General Praljak testified to that effect.  General Praljak received his

17     order on the 8th to take up another position, and he wanted all

18     documents -- all relevant documents, and then Ivica Rajic submitted the

19     first part of a report.

20        Q.   And the second part?

21        A.   The second part arrived, I believe, around the 15th of November,

22     so that the entire report has two parts.  This was an amendment.

23             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I failed to correct

24     the transcript on page 74, line 25.  The general spoke about an

25     investigation conducted by Ivica Rajic, whereas the transcript reads that

Page 49644

 1     it was an investigation about Rajic.  So just to avoid misunderstandings.

 2        Q.   General, I'll produce only some SIS documents so that we may see

 3     whether SIS was up to date with regard to the Stupni Do investigation.

 4             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Excuse me.  If I come back to an answer a short

 5     while ago, I seem to see that -- oh, no, I'm sorry.  I'm sorry, there was

 6     an error in -- I thought I had heard something different.  I withdraw.

 7     I'm sorry.

 8             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, Counsel, please.

 9             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   P6828, it's information from Marijan Biskic.  He sent it to the

11     then defence minister, Perica Jukic.  We've already looked at this

12     document and it's an exhibit.  Remind us, General, if you can, how come

13     Marijan Biskic, the SIS sector in the military police, is writing from

14     the Main Staff of the HVO?  How come we have this heading?

15        A.   Mr. Marijan Biskic arrived on the 9th of November.  He came to

16     the HVO then.  Mr. Biskic still hadn't received an office to work in, nor

17     had he relocated to Mostar.  Mr. Biskic was, in fact, in Posusje for most

18     of the time, and probably as he was writing this document in Posusje, he

19     put "Main Staff, HVO, SIS," and "Military Police Sector."  And I think a

20     document arrived on which it said -- because the person didn't know, but

21     it had these 12 or 13 people who came to the HVO, so somebody outside the

22     HVO had already written these positions, and the document does not

23     correspond to the actual situation in which Mr. Biskic was at the time.

24     But, anyway, he used the right stamp, the one he had at his disposal, for

25     his use.

Page 49645

 1        Q.   Now let's look at the next document, General, which is P6964,

 2     which is a piece of information from the head of SIS.  And mention is

 3     made in this document of the following names:  Dominik Ilijasevic, Como;

 4     Ante Ljoljo; Marinko Juricic; and so on.  Tell us, General, are those the

 5     names of the people who are mentioned in other documents as being

 6     responsible for the crimes in Stupni Do?

 7        A.   Yes, that's right, those are the individuals who were in

 8     Stupni Do and who were in command of certain groups in the attack on

 9     Stupni Do.

10        Q.   Now let's look at the next document.  4D499 [realtime transcript

11     read in error "4D4999"] is the number.  It's a letter from the command or

12     assistant commander for SIS, of the Kiseljak Brigade for SIS.

13             Let me correct the number of the document.  It is 4D499.

14             It's a document sent to the District Military Prosecutor's Office

15     in Travnik, telling them that documents are been supplied linked to the

16     investigation at Stupni Do.

17             Now, my question to you, General, is this:  Did you know that the

18     Military Prosecutor's Office in Travnik was included in the Stupni Do

19     investigation?

20        A.   Yes, I knew that two days after my order.  The military

21     prosecutor became involved ex officio.

22        Q.   General, look at document 4D500 now, please.  Is that the

23     document you mentioned a moment ago?

24        A.   Yes, that is that document.  It is the document from the Military

25     Prosecutor's Office, and the date is the 28th of October, 1993, linked to

Page 49646

 1     the events in Vares municipality or, rather, Stupni Do.

 2        Q.   Now look at a document that comes before this document.  It is

 3     4D506.  It comes before 4D500.  Can you tell us, General, what this

 4     document is?

 5        A.   This is a document from Mr. Perica Jukic, the then defence

 6     minister of the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna, where he is seeking

 7     assistance from UNPROFOR in Kiseljak.  He's asking UNPROFOR to send us

 8     the information that they have linked to the investigations -- their

 9     investigations in Stupni Do.

10        Q.   Now look at the next document, please, which is P6291.  It is a

11     report on the information in Vares which, on the 31st of October, 1993,

12     Ivica Rajic sent to the president of the HZ-HB, that is to say, to

13     Mate Boban.  Tell us, General, at the time did you have any knowledge

14     about the direct communication between the supreme commander and

15     Ivica Rajic?

16        A.   We knew about this communication, but we didn't know about this

17     document straight away.  We didn't know that Ivica Rajic had compiled a

18     report linked to Stupni Do and addressed to Mr. Boban.

19        Q.   Now look at the next document, which is P10255.  It is a public

20     statement on relieving Ivica Rajic as commander of Operative Group 2.

21     Tell us whether Ivica Rajic was truly relieved of that duty or not.

22        A.   Ivica Rajic was not relieved of that duty, and the information

23     was put out by the information media.

24        Q.   Tell us what else important happened with respect to Ivica Rajic

25     giving notice to this position.

Page 49647

 1        A.   Well, I think that it was Mr. Boban's relationship and attitude

 2     towards Kiseljak and Kresevo.  The Kiseljak and Kresevo municipalities

 3     held it against Mr. Boban, because in all the negotiations that were

 4     conducted on the organisation of Herceg-Bosna, allegedly, they reproached

 5     him for not defending their interests, and never put them in those

 6     cantons where there was a Croat majority, but they -- that he allowed

 7     them to go -- he allowed Kiseljak and Kresevo to become component parts

 8     of provinces with a Croat majority.  And that was one of the major

 9     complaints by people from Kiseljak.  They even threatened that they would

10     rather go with someone else than into the Sarajevo district, and that is

11     why Mate Boban was particularly well disposed towards the Kresevo and

12     Kiseljak municipalities and their leaders, and that's why they had free

13     communication at all times.

14        Q.   But, General, you didn't tell us what important thing happened in

15     respect of Ivica Rajic's de-missioning [sic].  Was he still called

16     "Ivica Rajic"?

17        A.   No, he changed his name to Viktor Andric a month or so after this

18     date.

19        Q.   Tell us, General, Mate Boban, did he know of this name change?

20        A.   He must have known.  He certainly did know, because two days

21     later he received a document from Kiseljak where Rajic signed himself as

22     "Viktor Andric."

23        Q.   Now let's look at P7387, the next document I'd like to deal with.

24             MR. SCOTT:  Excuse me, Your Honour.  I'm not sure, but before we

25     leave the page, on line -- page 83, line -- approximately around line 20,

Page 49648

 1     22, it doesn't seem to make sense, the answer there.  On the one hand, it

 2     says that Mr. Boban would not put Kiseljak and Kresevo in a Croat

 3     majority province, but then turns around to say exactly the opposite.  I

 4     don't know if it's just -- if it was -- someone misspoke or what, but it

 5     doesn't seem to make any sense.  Perhaps counsel could clarify that.

 6             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   General, the end of the sentence, where it says that they had

 8     free communication throughout, what the did you mean when you said that?

 9        A.   Kiseljak municipality and the leadership of Kiseljak

10     municipality, and Kresevo municipality - they considered themselves to be

11     Croatian municipalities - criticised Mr. Boban for not including them

12     into the Croatian provinces, if I can put it that way.  And then from

13     this kind of relationship with them, well, he simply -- he tried to do a

14     service to the Kiseljak people and people in the Kresevo municipality and

15     was constantly in communication with them, promising them that their

16     situation would be improved, that after a certain amount of time that

17     district would be reorganised and so on.

18        Q.   General, if I understand what you're saying, you mean direct

19     communication between Mate Boban with people from Kiseljak.

20        A.   Yes, that's the communication I meant.  Nobody from

21     Central Bosnia had such direct communication with Mate Boban as the

22     military and civilian authorities from Kiseljak enjoyed, and then the

23     people from Kresevo joined in.

24             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Still on this point, because I also have a

25     question before you go to the next document.

Page 49649

 1             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Yes, go ahead, Your Honour.

 2             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Mr. Petkovic, unless -- and I'm speaking under

 3     the control of Mr. Stewart.  Unless I have misread or misunderstood, you

 4     have told us that (redacted) or

 5     something.  No -- anyway, he changed it, we know.  Now, could you tell us

 6     what the procedures are, in the applicable law in the Republic of Bosnia

 7     and Herzegovina, for changing one's name?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I think that by law,

 9     even today in Croatia and Bosnia, you can go and request a name change,

10     and you can stipulate your reasons.  But in this case and at that point

11     in time, (redacted) didn't go that far, although later on he did collect

12     up the necessary documents for (redacted).  And later on, some other

13     name, (redacted) or whatever.

14             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  And was it, to your knowledge, (redacted) --

15     are we in closed session, actually?  We are not.  We'll need some

16     redaction.  I'm sorry.

17             Was it the person, itself, who decided on the new name that he

18     would bear henceforth, or were any authorities involved by suggestion,

19     assistance?

20             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] For instance, I could request a

21     change of my name now, my first and last name.  I might choose to be

22     called by some other name.  Every person has the right and possibility of

23     asking for a name change, a change in name and surname, at least as far

24     as I know the law and regulations.  I think every person is entitled to a

25     name change if they so desire.

Page 49650

 1             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  That is actually not the answer to the question

 2     that I had intended to put.  I don't know whether Ivica Rajic even went

 3     to someplace to ask for his name to be changed or whether he simply

 4     spread the word, From now on I shall be known under the new name.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, as far as I know and

 6     as far as I was able to learn later from Ivica Rajic's dealings, there

 7     was mention of his having -- him having false documents, documents with

 8     two names, one in the name of Viktor Andric and the other in the name of

 9     Kovac.  I think he took another name again.  Now, how he came to have

10     official documents in these two names, I really don't know.

11             JUDGE PRANDLER:  I'm sorry.

12             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I take it that you would say that no one

13     suggested the name change, let alone a specific name.  There's two

14     questions, actually.  Was it suggested to him that it would be a good

15     idea to change his name?

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, not as far as I know, nobody

17     made that suggestion.  He made the decision himself.  He decided to

18     change his name, and then sent out an information saying that from that

19     day forward, he would be Viktor Andric.  And he had a document where it

20     said "Viktor Andric."

21             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you.

22             JUDGE PRANDLER:  Sorry.  It is only a very question of detail

23     that -- of course, I do agree with General Petkovic, that most probably

24     the former Yugoslavia, like in Hungary, the changes in names, first name

25     and family name, it is rather often happening, and there is no major

Page 49651

 1     problem with this one.

 2             I would also add that "Kovac" is a very nice name, too.  It is a

 3     Hungarian family name.  Thank you.

 4             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation]

 5        Q.   General, let's repeat.  Did Mate Boban know about this name

 6     change undertaken by Ivica Rajic?

 7        A.   Well, one can assume that he did know, because just a few days

 8     after this name change, a letter was sent to Mate Boban with the new name

 9     and surname, and I don't think anybody would dare do that unless this

10     person knew about it.

11        Q.   Let's look at P7387 now, the next document.  It's a letter which

12     Viktor Andric, on the 29th of December, 1993, sends to Mate Boban.

13             Now, General, from the contents of the letter, would you say that

14     Mate Boban knew who this man, Viktor Andric, was writing the letter, the

15     writer of the letter?

16        A.   He most certainly did know, yes.

17        Q.   Now let's look at the next document.  It is P7386.  Once again,

18     Viktor Andric writing to Mate Boban on the 29th of December.

19             General, from the contents of that letter, could Mate Boban have

20     known for sure who this person, Viktor Andric, was sending him this

21     epistle?

22        A.   Yes, the entire correspondence was in the name of Viktor Andric

23     from that time on.

24        Q.   Now, we're not going to show the other documents, they're already

25     an exhibit, but tell us, if the person called Viktor Andric, did he have

Page 49652

 1     communication with the minister, Lukic [as interpreted]?

 2        A.   Yes, he did, with the minister and with the Main Staff.

 3             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I'd just like to correct the name

 4     in line 17.  It's not Lukic, but Jukic with a J.

 5        Q.   Now, tell us, General, did you know about this name change,

 6     Ivica Rajic's name change?

 7        A.   Yes, I did learn of it.

 8        Q.   Did you communicate with him, as with Ivica Rajic?

 9        A.   Yes, I did, that's right.

10             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if we could move

11     into private session for a minute.

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Closed session.

13             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Witness EA --

14                           [Private session]

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 49653

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4                           [Open session]

 5             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, we're back in open session.

 6             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I'm done with the

 7     Stupni Do chapter.  Unless you have additional questions, I would like to

 8     go through some of the topics that we had envisaged for the

 9     examination-in-chief very briefly.

10        Q.   The so-called ultimatum from April 1993, according to all

11     documents that you saw and to the best of your knowledge, did the HVO

12     Main Staff have anything to do with that so-called ultimatum?

13        A.   No, nothing whatsoever, nor did anybody relate to the Main Staff

14     that there was an ultimatum of any kind.

15        Q.   Prozor, in October 1992, how do you see the conflict between the

16     HVO and the ABiH in Prozor in 1992?

17        A.   That was not a conflict.  We see that as an incident which was

18     over after a day and a half.

19        Q.   What did you do during the conflict in Prozor?  What were you

20     preoccupied with?

21        A.   A few days before that, I started organisational preparations for

22     the Bura operation in the Neretva Valley, and pulled out some materiel

23     from the OZ South-East Herzegovina, among them three Howitzers, and

24     deployed them to the Neretva Valley.

25        Q.   Gornji Vakuf, January 1993.  Did you instruct your deputy,

Page 49654

 1     Mr. Miro Andric, to go to Gornji Vakuf?

 2        A.   No, I was in no position to do so.  I was still in Geneva, and I

 3     didn't do so from Geneva.

 4        Q.   Did you, while Miro Andric was in Gornji Vakuf --

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, my apologies.

 6     You said that you were in Geneva.  I'm interested as to who was in charge

 7     of command.  How long were you in Geneva for, from which day until which

 8     day, because Geneva is not the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, nor is it

 9     Croatia, so from which day until which day did you stay in Geneva?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, my first trip there

11     was on the 1st of January, and the conference started on the 2nd.  I

12     stayed until the 6th of January, and in the afternoon of that day I

13     returned to Herceg-Bosna.  My second trip there was along the following

14     lines:  On the 10th, in the morning, I was already at the conference, and

15     on the 12th of January I returned to Zagreb and then continued my voyage

16     to Herzegovina.  My third travel there in January 1993 was on the 22nd,

17     in the evening.  And on the 23rd, in the morning, the working part of

18     this third conference began.  And I returned on the 26th of January,

19     1993, in the afternoon hours.

20             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And did you go back to Geneva

21     in February, March, April, June?

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Your Honours.  My next trip to

23     Geneva was in late November 1993.

24             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you were in Geneva from the

25     1st -- or the 6th of January -- from the 10th to the 12th of January, 22,

Page 49655

 1     23, and 26th of January.  So when you were there, who was in charge of

 2     the command of the Main Staff?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] For the first stay, there was

 4     Colonel Akrap who stayed there in my stead:  On the 7th, Colonel Andric

 5     was appointed to the Main Staff.  On the 23rd and later,

 6     Vukonik [phoen] Andric was on sick leave because he had injured himself,

 7     so that this duty was again taken over by Colonel Zeljko Akrap.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And from the 10th to the 12th

 9     of January?

10             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] From the 10th to the 12th of

11     January, it was Mr. Miro Andric.

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We have two minutes before the

13     end of this session.

14             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, until the end of

15     today's examination or until the end of my examination-in-chief?

16             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We have two minutes left.  But

17     in fact you have used 6 hours and 23 minutes, so in fact you have

18     7 minutes left.

19             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] If you grant me 40, it will be 17

20     minutes.

21        Q.   General, I asked you whether you gave --

22             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Ms. Alaburic, I don't think that's a very

23     respectful way of speaking to the Chamber.  We have granted you until the

24     end of today, actually.  And it would be correct to say that you request

25     that we give you some more.  And you simply say, Okay, if you give me 40,

Page 49656

 1     then it's 13 more.  It's a bit loose.  I would suggest that we end the

 2     day, because it's been very heavy, and the speed you are keeping is

 3     understandable but extremely tiring for us.  So I would suggest that you

 4     start to continue tomorrow morning.

 5             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I agree fully, and I

 6     apologise if I wasn't precise enough and if I wasn't respectful enough.

 7     I do apologise if my remark was inappropriate.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You will proceed tomorrow.  I'm

 9     sure that General Petkovic is also tired, because it's tiring to answer

10     all those questions.  And I've been sitting here since 9.00 this morning

11     without a break.

12             So we will all come back here tomorrow at a quarter past 2.00.

13                           [The accused stands down]

14                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.00 p.m.,

15                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 18th day of

16                           February, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.