Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 49918

 1                           Wednesday, 24 February 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The accused Petkovic takes the stand]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

 6             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Could the Registrar please call

 7     the case.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  Good morning,

 9     everyone in and around the courtroom.

10             This is case number IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor versus Prlic

11     et al.  Thank you, Your Honours.

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar.

13             Today, this Wednesday.  I'd first like to greet Mr. Petkovic, the

14     other accused, the Defence, representatives of the OTP, my colleagues,

15     and everyone else assisting us.

16             The Chamber has two oral decisions it would like to render.

17             Oral decision on the Petkovic Defence's request and the

18     Prosecution's request to have additional time for the cross-examination

19     of the witness Miroslav Desnica.

20             In a request dated the 4th of February, 2010, the Petkovic

21     Defence requested to be granted 15 minutes to conduct its

22     cross-examination of the witness Miroslav Desnica, who will be appearing

23     pursuant to Rule 92 ter of the Rules, scheduled for the 2nd of March,

24     2010.  This hearing is scheduled for the 2nd of March, 2010.

25             The Coric Defence responded to the request on the 15th of

Page 49919

 1     February, 2010.  The Chamber granted the Petkovic Defence leave to reply

 2     in an oral decision of the 16th of February.  This response was filed on

 3     the 17th of February, 2010.

 4             In addition, in a request dated the 1st of February, 2010, the

 5     Prosecution requested to be granted one hour to examine the witness

 6     Miroslav Desnica.  The Coric and Praljak Defence responded to the request

 7     on the 4th of February, 2010.  The Prosecution asked leave -- requested

 8     leave to respond and filed its response on the 4th of February, 2010.

 9             The witness Miroslav Desnica, called by the Coric Defence, is to

10     appear pursuant to 92 ter of the Rules on the 2nd of March, 2010.  The

11     Coric Defence informed the Chamber and the parties of its intention of

12     conducting an examination-in-chief, the length of which would be 30

13     minutes.

14             In view of the submissions filed by the parties, the Chamber

15     hereby grants the Petkovic Defence's request to have 15 additional

16     minutes for its cross-examination, to the extent that this request is not

17     a disproportionate one and is in accordance with the practice of the

18     Chamber with regard to allocating time for the cross-examination of a

19     witness who is appearing pursuant to Rule 92 ter.

20             The Chamber hereby decides, for the very same reasons, to grant

21     the Prosecution request and to grant it one hour for the conduct of its

22     cross-examination.

23             The Prlic Defence, the Stojic, Praljak, and Pusic Defence have

24     not filed any requests in particular, but will have 30 minutes at their

25     disposal which are to be divided amongst themselves in case they should

Page 49920

 1     wish to conduct their cross-examination.

 2             Second oral decision concerning Witness Andabak.

 3             Witness Janko Andabak, called by the Coric Defence, is to appear

 4     as a viva voce witness from the 2nd to the 4th of March, 2010.  The Coric

 5     Defence has informed the Chamber and the parties of its intention to use

 6     two hours for the examination-in-chief of this witness and for any

 7     re-examination they might wish to conduct.

 8             In a request dated the 1st of February, 2010, the Petkovic

 9     Defence requested leave to be granted an hour, which means that they

10     would be granted 45 additional minutes in relation to the time they would

11     allocated in accordance with Guide-line 5.  They have requested this

12     additional time for the examination of the witness Andabak.  The Coric

13     Defence responded on the 5th of February, 2010, to this request.  The

14     Chamber authorised the Petkovic Defence to file a response, which was

15     done on the 12th of February, 2010.

16             Then on the 2nd of February, 2010, the Praljak Defence filed a

17     request and asked the Chamber for 20 additional minutes to conduct its

18     cross-examination of this witness.  And, finally, in a brief of the 10th

19     of February, 2010, the Stojic Defence requested that the Chamber grant it

20     20 additional minutes to conduct its cross-examination of the witness.

21     In addition, it requested that this additional time be allocated to the

22     total time granted to it by the Chamber -- be deducted from the total

23     time.

24             Concerning the 65 ter summary of the witness Andabak, the Chamber

25     believes that the requests for additional time filed by the

Page 49921

 1     Praljak Defence and the Stojic Defence have a good basis and are not

 2     disproportionate.  The Chamber hereby decides that they be, therefore,

 3     granted 20 additional minutes for each team in order to cross-examine the

 4     witness.  The Chamber also takes notes of the Stojic Defence request to

 5     have the additional time of 20 minutes added to its total time.

 6             As far as the Petkovic Defence team is concerned, the Chamber

 7     believes that an hour for its cross-examination is disproportionate,

 8     given the elements in the 65 ter summary for the witness Janko Andabak.

 9     The Chamber believes that 20 additional minutes is sufficient for counsel

10     to protect its client's interests.

11             As a result, time will be allocated as follows:  The

12     Coric Defence will have two hours for its examination-in-chief and for

13     re-examination, if any.  The Stojic Defence, the Praljak and Petkovic

14     Defence, will have 32 minutes respectively for their cross-examination.

15     Given that there are no particular requests from the Prlic and

16     Pusic Defence teams, they will have 12 minutes respectively for any

17     cross-examination they may have.  And, finally, the Prosecution will

18     have, pursuant to Guide-line 5, two hours for its cross-examination.

19                           WITNESS:  MILIVOJ PETKOVIC [Resumed]

20                           [The witness answered through interpreter]

21                           Questioned by the Court: [Continued]

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, with regard

23     to the questions I will be putting to you concerning the list of exhibits

24     dealt with on the first day and given the time taken yesterday that was

25     spent on clarifying the oral decision that was handed down, in light of

Page 49922

 1     all those elements, I'll put questions to you with regard to two

 2     elements, the video of the bridge and I'll put questions to you on the

 3     document on a meeting that was held in Zagreb.  Then I will put questions

 4     to you on the basis of documents from your own Defence team and will only

 5     be referring to 4D documents.  That means to your documents.  I will then

 6     conclude today.  That is my intention.  I won't be putting any questions

 7     to you tomorrow.  Tomorrow, the D1 Defence team will conduct its

 8     cross-examination.

 9             Mr. Registrar, let's now see the video on the Old Bridge.  Please

10     view it carefully, General Petkovic.

11                           [Video-clip played]

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We can stop there.

13             General Petkovic, I've seen this video ten times, at least.  As I

14     did, you must have come to the conclusion that shots were fired.  You can

15     see the bridge being hit, and you can see that when the shell -- or when

16     a shell hits the bridge, there's a sort of red bubble -- red effect that

17     is produced, a red ball.  Whereas you were in the JNA, in the unit that

18     had artillery and missiles, shells, at one point in time, perhaps you

19     could tell me what this red ball is when the shell hits the bridge.

20        A.   Your Honour, when any shell hits a target, the red ball means

21     that there was an explosion, because the explosive in the shell is being

22     activated at the point of impact.  So it's a red ball effect, which

23     means, as I said, that the explosive in the shell has been activated, and

24     it's when the detonator sets off the explosion and the fill.  So if you

25     were to set alight an explosive yourself, when it explodes you have this

Page 49923

 1     red ball flash effect.

 2             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  That's a very

 3     precise answer.

 4             MR. KOVACIC:  Excuse me, Your Honour, but it would be maybe

 5     useful to have the number of that video in the transcript.  I think you

 6     mentioned it, but it was not in the transcript.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, we'll have a number.  It's

 8     Exhibit IC00574.

 9             General Petkovic, one can also see the third hit -- when the

10     third shell hits the bridge, the red ball is on the other side of the

11     bridge.  How do you explain this?  If you like, we can have a look at the

12     video one more time.  Would you like us to do that?

13        A.   No, there's no need.  I've seen it.  The red ball or red ball

14     effect is the tracer that you can see, so it's a projectile that was

15     fired from the opposite side of the bridge, so not from the southern

16     side.  It came somewhere from the north, that is to say, from the other

17     side of the bridge.  If we divide it into north and south, it came from

18     the south [as interpreted] side, which means that there was something

19     else which fired this one or more projectiles targeting the bridge, but

20     from the opposite side of the bridge, from the other side.

21             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  Listen to me

22     carefully now, General Petkovic.

23             On the other side, when it comes from the north, who was present

24     on the other side in the north?  Who could have fired on the bridge from

25     that side?

Page 49924

 1        A.   Your Honours, the question now is of locality, location.  The

 2     Neretva River, the bridge, north towards Tito's Bridge and that whole

 3     area were held by the BH Army forces.  So from the bridge, the Old Bridge

 4     itself, right up until I think it was called Tito's Bridge and the

 5     barracks, that was held by -- well, along the Neretva River on both

 6     sides.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Given the importance of what

 8     you have just said, namely, that -- yes?

 9             MR. KOVACIC:  I'm awfully sorry to interrupt, but I think that

10     the transcript, on lines from 12 to 18, does not really reflect what the

11     witness said.  The witness explicitly mentioned projectile coming from

12     the north side.  It is -- I don't think it is reflected here.  I would

13     kindly ask the Court to repeat this question.

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  In the French

15     interpretation, my understanding was that the projectile came from the

16     north.  I'll put my question to you again, because it's important in the

17     video we saw.

18             But before I put the question again, I will first ask the

19     Registrar to show it again so that everyone can see this very clearly and

20     so that the Prosecution can see this very clearly.

21                           [Video-clip played]

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Stop.

23             We have just seen a shell that hit the bridge on the other side,

24     and we saw a tyre fall on the other side of the bridge.

25             General Petkovic, the shell that we have all just seen came from

Page 49925

 1     which direction?

 2        A.   Your Honours, that shell came from the north, from the northern

 3     side of the bridge.

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  And my last

 5     question:  Which forces were present to the north of the bridge?

 6        A.   To the north of the bridge, including both banks of the

 7     Neretva River, right up to Tito's Bridge, roughly, or even more

 8     northerly, the area of South Camp and Rastan, this area of Rastan was

 9     held by the BH Army, that area.  So both sides of the Neretva, including

10     North Camp, the area of North Camp.  That's where members of the BH Army

11     were.

12             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I apologise, but

13     let's clear something up, an imprecision.

14             The general, first of all, said "South Camp and Rastani," and

15     then later he said "North Camp."  So just to avoid misunderstanding.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honours, that is

17     North Camp.  Yes, South Camp is elsewhere.  So we're dealing with

18     North Camp, and the BH Army took control of North Camp in June, which

19     means that this entire area from north camp was held by the BH army right

20     up to the Old Bridge, and further on along the Neretva River.  But from

21     the bridge to the north, that's North Camp and the entire area up to the

22     bridge.

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'll move on to the last

24     document, P07475.  You must have it.  It's the record of the meeting that

25     was held on the 4th of January, 1994, in the Presidential Palace from

Page 49926

 1     10.50 to 11.40.  It's necessary to be extremely precise.  And this

 2     meeting was attended by Mr. Tudjman, Mr. Susak, and Mr. Bobetko.

 3             General Petkovic, have you had the time to read this document,

 4     have a look at this document?

 5        A.   Yes, Your Honour, I have looked through this document in its

 6     entirety.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  Could the Registrar

 8     put page 12 of the English version on the screen, and the identical page

 9     in the B/C/S version.

10        A.   Your Honours, might I be allowed to say something about this

11     document, briefly?

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, go ahead.

13             I have page 12 in your version.  What did you want to say,

14     General Petkovic?

15        A.   I thought you would be asking me first how this meeting came

16     about in the first place.

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] This meeting -- or, rather,

18     this is a record of the meeting.  It's a Prosecution exhibit, as you are

19     well aware.  The presidential transcripts have been translated by using a

20     recording that we don't have, we no longer have.  The Judges never had

21     it.  We have an English version and a B/C/S version of these transcripts,

22     so that's the document.  This is not the first transcript, because a

23     number of them have been admitted.

24             Are there any comments you would like to make about this?

25        A.   Well, Your Honours, what I want to say is this:  This

Page 49927

 1     conversation took place after Geneva on the 21st, and then on the 22nd

 2     and 23rd of December, 1993, in Brussels a meeting was held linked to an

 3     agreement about a union of three republics in Bosnia-Herzegovina, at

 4     which a framework was set.  And according to that, 33 per cent would have

 5     been Muslims, 17.5 would have been the Croats, and 49.2 per cent would

 6     have been given to the Serbs.

 7             Now, this meeting on the 4th of January, 1994, between Tudjman,

 8     Susak and Bobetko, was prompted by that situation and what had happened

 9     prior to that in Brussels.  So it is discussions about an international

10     plan for the setup of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which defined the size of the

11     territory, but also essentially -- if you look at the draft plan, it

12     actually defines the different areas and regions that had previously been

13     defined by the Vance-Owen Peace Plan.  So there were certain deviations

14     to that plan, where he accepted a part occupied by the army, and he added

15     another part, if I can put it this way, to the Muslim side, because the

16     HVO -- where the HVO had previously had control, which was the whole of

17     Stolac municipality and a large portion of the Neretva River Valley, and

18     so that's what they were discussing here in Zagreb at this meeting.

19             Similarly, in the document we also see mention of the request to

20     come out to the sea, to the coast, an exit to the sea.  And on the basis

21     of that, the Republic of Croatia and the leadership of Croatia, these

22     three men, were discussing the fact that that part was threatened, and

23     the border, meaning the border of the Republic of Croatia, with the

24     intentions of these others to reach the sea; not to Neum, but another

25     location, which was Klek.  So that was what was discussed.

Page 49928

 1             And also another thing that was discussed was a very difficult

 2     situation in which the Croatian Defence Council found itself in the

 3     Central Bosnia area, and the danger of Vitez, Busovaca, Kiseljak, and the

 4     other areas to be wiped out completely, as far as the Croatian Defence

 5     Council was concerned.  That means that the BH Army should take control

 6     of that area, too, and in that way the Croatian Defence Council and the

 7     Croats, themselves, quite simply wouldn't have 17 and a half per cent,

 8     they wouldn't even have 5 per cent.  And the South Mostar area was

 9     questionable, too, because you had 100.000 BH Army forces joining up, and

10     from Central Bosnia they could be deployed along the Neretva River

11     towards the Republic of Croatia in their intention to reach the coast, to

12     reach the sea, have an outlet to the sea.

13             So that is the substance of these talks, and they were looking

14     into ways and means of dealing with the situation, what they could advise

15     the Croatian leadership in Bosnia-Herzegovina, what they should tell them

16     to do, and what would be the best option given the circumstances.  And

17     here we see that there are three options, three variants, put on the

18     table, and then the worst-case scenario was if they jeopardise the

19     Croatian borders down south, then Croatia will respond openly and

20     actively and stop that kind of breakthrough.

21             And then they looked into this northern part in relation to the

22     area that should be the Republic of Herceg-Bosna, which is the area of

23     Travnik, Vitez, Busovaca, Kiseljak, and so forth, and how to assist the

24     Croats and the HVO in that part to prevent it falling into the hands of

25     the BH Army, because it was under siege and that's where the most -- the

Page 49929

 1     heaviest fighting took place, including the beginning of 1994, when the

 2     fighting was fiercest.  So it was in that context that the situation in

 3     the area was being reviewed.

 4             So that, in my opinion, was the substance of the talks and

 5     negotiations held, which is evidenced in this transcript between these

 6     three individuals.

 7             And now we can go on to other questions, if you have any.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  You have given us

 9     the background to this document, so I can focus on the questions that I

10     have in mind.

11             You have page 12 on the screen, and Bobetko says the following:

12             "I have contacts with Petkovic.  He was away, and I told him that

13     there has to be a person responsible within the Command.  That's the very

14     principle of war-making.  Orders are given to those capable of carrying

15     them out, and they have to be consolidated within the Command.  One may

16     be absent, but not all of them, day and night."

17             When I read this sentence, my impression was that General Bobetko

18     had difficulty in reaching you, and apparently he was not the only one.

19     How do you explain that it was hardly ever possible to get in touch with

20     you?

21        A.   Your Honours, this was the period around the new year, when I had

22     some serious health problems.  I had to go -- I don't know how you call

23     it.  We called it "hot shots."  These were cocktail shots of various

24     vitamins, B-6, B-12, for people with problems with their spine, and I had

25     to have those shots daily.  And I was keeping my back warm, I had massage

Page 49930

 1     and what is known as galvanisation of both shoulders, so over a period of

 2     some ten days, as long as this treatment lasted, I was absent from my

 3     command post.  And General Bobetko had probably tried to reach me during

 4     that period, and he failed to reach me.  That is the only problem.

 5     Otherwise, it was normal, if General Roso was absent, I would be at the

 6     command post or nearby.  The only problem was that he called me and he

 7     couldn't reach me because I was absent.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I would like to ask the

 9     Registrar to show us page 10 of the English version.

10             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I may, I'm

11     reading the English text of this transcript now.  Could we go back to

12     page 12, please.  And I can see that it wasn't correctly translated.  The

13     word "the same" is missing.

14             "I have contacts with Petkovic.  He was also away now, and I told

15     him ...," et cetera.

16             The word "also" is missing, which significantly changes the

17     meaning.  In the Croatian text, it is clear that Bobetko tried to reach

18     General Roso, but that he also tried to reach Petkovic and he couldn't

19     find him either.  So from the English translation, that doesn't emerge

20     and it is not correct.

21             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Page 10, please.  Page 10,

22     please.  That's it.

23             General Petkovic, you see, in the middle of page 10, there's

24     Mr. Susak who says:

25             "We are having dinner with Galbraith on Wednesday."

Page 49931

 1             But just before that, there's Mr. Tudjman, who says the

 2     following, and I quote:

 3             "Who told him to ask for a visa for him to be able to travel, so

 4     that we may cleanse our image in the eyes of the world, though I keep

 5     repeating, and I will continue repeating, and again in this letter to

 6     Izetbegovic, that Boban is a product of the Serb aggression."

 7             And Tudjman then, after Susak's comment, says the following:

 8             "Then you repeat this directly, Boban might be held partly

 9     politically responsible, and here is what happened to him.  They knocked

10     the bridge down, but that is the war, and he emerged as part of the

11     resistance to the Serb aggression, and therefore we wished him -- to have

12     him so as to be able to reach an agreement with the Muslims."

13             So have you seen this sentence where Tudjman talks about Boban

14     and says that Boban is a product of the Serb aggression?  What would be

15     your comment?

16        A.   Your Honours, President Tudjman is trying to say that had it not

17     been for the Serb aggression, Mate Boban would certainly not be in the

18     post he was.  He was the organiser of the rallying of the Croats and the

19     organiser of the resistance against the Serb aggression, the aggression

20     in April 1992 and onwards.

21             So here Galbraith and many others are bringing pressure to bear

22     on President Tudjman, saying that Mate Boban's time is over and that

23     certain measures should be taken for Mate Boban to leave that position

24     and for someone else to be found to replace him.  And towards the end,

25     President Tudjman says, We want him to be able to reach an agreement with

Page 49932

 1     the Muslims.  What he means is, We want to remove Mate Boban or for him

 2     to leave so that an agreement could be reached with the Muslims, if

 3     Mate Boban is the one who is to blame.  Therefore, after this meeting,

 4     shortly after this meeting, at the beginning of February Mate Boban will

 5     officially be removed from his position and replaced by someone else.

 6             So these reflections were under pressure of Galbraith, who is

 7     asking for Mr. Boban to withdraw and for someone else to be found for

 8     this position.  That is the substance of this discussion between them.

 9     And this, in fact, happened.  I don't remember the exact date when

10     Mr. Boban left and Zubak came in his place.

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I have two other questions with

12     this document.

13             Page 14, please.  I wish to see page 14 in the English and B/C/S

14     version on the screen, please.  Here we have it.

15             Third line, I'm going to read, and then you're going to tell me

16     what you think.  Line 3:

17             "I said to Petkovic today," and this is Bobetko speaking, "that

18     now, today, a new mobilisation should commence, and I ordered that this

19     8th Light holding positions at Ogulin as a reserve be transferred down

20     there for manoeuvre or that we go up there towards this part in the

21     direction of Travnik."

22             General Petkovic, that is what Bobetko is saying.  And when I

23     read this, I could come to the following conclusion, for as you know, the

24     Rules make it my obligation, as well as the jurisprudence of this

25     Tribunal, to establish the truth.  That is my moral obligation that is

Page 49933

 1     imposed upon me.  And when I read this text, I could conclude that

 2     General Bobetko is calling on you and asking you for a new mobilisation,

 3     and I seem to understand that the 8th Light is holding positions at

 4     Ogulin and there appears to be the possibility of moving them towards

 5     Travnik.  Does the 8th Light come from the Croatian Army?  If so, that

 6     means that you are associated with a movement of troops involving the

 7     Croatian Army.  I may be wrong.  What is your comment?

 8        A.   Your Honours, if General Bobetko says, I told Petkovic today, and

 9     we saw that he couldn't find Petkovic, so there's some contradiction

10     here.  Furthermore, I will say, without insulting General Bobetko, as

11     he's an elderly gentleman, that this is a nice story that he served on

12     President Tudjman.  The 8th Light Brigade never came to Vakuf, nor was

13     that brigade of the Croatian Army moved towards Gornji Vakuf.  And I can

14     prove this by showing a document.  When there is reference to the forces,

15     you will not be able to find the 8th Light Brigade anywhere.

16             I'm sorry I have to say this here, but these are stories in the

17     presence of President Tudjman, and that they are unfounded.  And I

18     repeat, the 8th Light Brigade never, never came to the territory of

19     Gornji Vakuf, and I will refer to a document where you will see not that

20     there is no 8th Light Brigade, there's none at all.

21             Now, why such a story is served on President Tudjman, I wasn't

22     present at the meeting, so I couldn't have -- I couldn't say, You can't

23     say these things, because I wasn't there.

24             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, I take note

25     that for you, the 8th Light Brigade was not, as one might conclude from

Page 49934

 1     the document, in Travnik, and it was not present in the

 2     Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that this, a fable, a story, for

 3     President Tudjman.  I take note of this.

 4             I come to my last question on this document.  Page 19, please.

 5     It will be a purely technical question regarding aerosol bombs.

 6             We have page 19.  It's Bobetko who's speaking.  He says the

 7     following:

 8             "One cluster bomb was fished out from the seas at Lopud.  It came

 9     down the Neretva River.  We have been investigating who was the person

10     who let it float down the river.  It had a 36-hour Swiss mechanism.  We

11     gave them this bomb, but we don't know where it came from.  Did they

12     capture it, or did someone throw it into the water?"

13             For me, this is absolutely unclear.

14             This cluster bomb, was it given to the HVO or the Croat Army?

15     And where is Lopud; is it in Croatia or in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

16        A.   Your Honour, Lopud is a small island close to Dubrovnik in the

17     south of Croatia.

18             This is not a cluster bomb.  It is an anti-navy bomb, a floating

19     bomb or a diving one that is put into the sea and waits for an enemy ship

20     to come across it.  Those are bombs that are dropped into the sea.  I

21     don't know how it came to the Neretva River.  The Croatian Army -- or,

22     rather, the JNA did not leave such bombs.  Whether, upon leaving the port

23     of Ploce, the JNA may have left some of those bombs in front of the port

24     of Ploce, and they may have floated towards Dubrovnik, which is about

25     150 kilometres, the sea current may have carried it, and the former units

Page 49935

 1     for mine-laying of the JNA was based in Ploce.  There was no base on the

 2     Neretva for such naval bombs to be found there.  These are naval bombs

 3     whereby one prevents the possible movement of enemy vessels.  They float

 4     in the sea and may be encountered by an enemy ship.  And one knows what

 5     happens then.  And one such bomb reached as far as Dubrovnik.

 6             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  Thank you for this

 7     answer.

 8             General Petkovic, I'm going now to refer to all the documents --

 9             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  If I may, I would like to ask two questions.

10     One relates to what you have said a while ago.  It is page 14, line 25,

11     and the next line.  You said:

12             "... shortly after this meeting, at the beginning of February,

13     Mate Boban will officially be removed from his position."

14             And my question is:  Who will remove him, or who did remove him,

15     and how was that done?

16        A.   Your Honour Judge Trechsel, in Livno, I think it was, a meeting

17     of the Presidency of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna and all the

18     other political factors of Herceg-Bosna attended a meeting, and they made

19     the decision to relief Mate Boban of his duties.  So it was in February.

20     I don't know the exact date.  I'm not sure.  There was a session of the

21     Presidency of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, and all other

22     relevant political factors in Herceg-Bosna attended, and they decide to

23     relieve Mate Boban of his duties.  And Mr. Zubak was appointed in his

24     place.

25             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you.  And the second question relates to

Page 49936

 1     the document we have just seen and to something Mr. Bobetko said just

 2     after the passage the President has quoted on page 14.  He says, and I

 3     quote:

 4             "Secondly, we got some arms so that we can control the entire

 5     Neretva Valley north of the Neretva with two or three multiple

 6     rocket-launchers, thence this is what we can guarantee completely, that

 7     not a single bird would escape us."

 8             This looks as if General Bobetko were saying it is easy, with two

 9     or three multi-rocket-launchers, to control the access to the north from

10     Mostar and lock in the Muslims of Eastern Mostar.  I may misunderstood

11     even this.  I would like you to comment on it.

12             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, before the answer,

13     let me say that the text refers to the area north of the Neretva and not

14     north of Mostar.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let me just see which page this is.

16             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  It's page 14 in the English version.

17             Ms. Alaburic, could you explain?  I was of the opinion that the

18     Neretva was a river that came from the north to Mostar.  And, of course,

19     north-east of the Neretva was HVO territory, but north-west, as I seem to

20     remember, would have been the territory where the Defences always say it

21     was no problem to get to and from Mostar.

22             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, unfortunately I'm not

23     an expert for the area.  But the situation isn't that simple, because

24     part of the Neretva Valley is completely in the Republic of Croatia.  The

25     continuation of the Neretva Valley is under the control of the Croatian

Page 49937

 1     forces on both sides of the river, on the left and the right side, and

 2     then to the north of Mostar, the right bank is under the Croatian forces

 3     and the left bank under the Muslim forces.  And then the positions get

 4     mixed up and both have the left and right bank.  It's not that easy.

 5             I just want to do say that Mostar, as a town, isn't mentioned at

 6     all.  So I just want to avoid confusion about the territory concerned.

 7             If I was mistaken, could someone correct me?

 8             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can answer that question.

 9             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  You have confused me a bit, and that is your

10     role.  I don't really understand whether you want to interpret

11     General Bobetko or whether you just want to say that his statement is

12     equivocal.

13             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, my role is to help

14     you to fully understand the situation, at least to the extent that I can

15     understand the situation, and I really would like you to take my efforts

16     in that sense.

17             I wanted to avoid any confusion, because you referred to the

18     passage that starts with the words "Other," but then it was almost a

19     quote when you mentioned the territory to the north of Mostar.  All I

20     wanted to say is that the words Bobetko used were "to the north of the

21     Neretva."

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If I may --

23             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Yes, Ms. Alaburic, if you have listened

24     carefully, I have read exactly these words.  Then I have asked

25     Mr. Petkovic about what they actually mean, and I would like him to

Page 49938

 1     answer.

 2        A.   Your Honours, General Bobetko -- well, if we have a look at the

 3     bottom part, General Bobetko says that he will secure reserve forces.  He

 4     mentions Marinovic and 700 men, and they would have fire support.  And he

 5     says they can be on the one of the axis or second axis or third axis

 6     according to need.  General Bobetko will bring into the territory of the

 7     lower part of the Neretva forces 700-men strong.  They will be provided

 8     with fire support, and they will control any breakthrough to the south of

 9     Mostar towards the border with Croatia.  So that's why these intervention

10     forces were brought to the territory of the Valley of Neretva, but in the

11     territory of the Republic of Croatia, or, rather, he planned to bring

12     these forces in.  I can't say whether that was done, but he's thinking of

13     moving 700 men to the lower part of the Neretva, which is in the Republic

14     of Croatia.  He would reinforce them with two or three VBRs, and to the

15     south of Mostar they can put up resistance if an attempt is made to break

16     through to Croatia.  That's what he had in mind, and that's what the

17     reference to two or three VBRs means.  And Gojko is supposed to bring in

18     a group, too.  So these are all forces that were to be used to secure

19     Klek, Neum, Ploce, to secure these territories.  And when he says "to the

20     south," he means to the south of the Croatian border.  The Neretva flows

21     through Croatia, and to the north of it you have the area that is to the

22     south of Mostar.  So if you head south from Mostar in the direction of

23     Croatia, he would be ready to intervene with those forces and to support

24     them with the artillery that he had secured.

25             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I'd just like to correct the

Page 49939

 1     transcript.

 2             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Yes.

 3             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] In line 13 and 12, the term

 4     "south" is used.  The general said, when Bobetko says "to the north," he

 5     means to the north of the border, so it should say "north" and not

 6     "south."

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Bobetko was expecting the ABiH from

 8     the Dubrava Plateau to enter the territory of Croatia, and that is why he

 9     was planning to use reserve forces that he would deploy in the Metkovic,

10     Ploce, Opuzen area, and in such a case he would prevent the breakthrough

11     of Muslim forces from the plateau -- of the Dubrava Plateau.  And he used

12     two or three VBRs for this purpose, multiple rocket-launchers.  We can

13     see the mortars he has referred to, et cetera.  So he's giving

14     Nojko [phoen] support, fire support, and he won't allow the ABiH to enter

15     the Republic of Croatia from Blagoje and the Dubrava Plateau.  So that

16     was his intention, and he formed these intervention forces for such a

17     case.

18             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you for this clarification.  I was,

19     indeed, misled, it seems, by the text, and you have set this clear.

20     Thank you.

21             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, I'm going to

22     put some questions to you on the basis of documents.  Before I do so:  I

23     carefully read the submissions filed by your counsel on the 15th of

24     February, 2006.  This is your pre-trial brief.  I read through it.  It

25     consists of more than 35 pages.  I read through it carefully in order to

Page 49940

 1     understand what the Petkovic Defence's view was.  I also read with great

 2     interest the entire file provided to us by Ms. Alaburic with regard to

 3     the opening statement.  I congratulate her, because it's very well

 4     drafted and composed.  It was very easy for me to check up certain

 5     things.  On that basis, I have selected a series of documents, and I will

 6     put some questions to you on the basis of those documents.

 7             The first one is 4D1700.  It should be the first document in your

 8     binder.  I'm waiting to see the document before I put the question to

 9     you, out of courtesy towards the other accused who don't have the binder.

10     We have the text in B/C/S, and in English, too.

11             As you can see, it is a document that was drafted by

12     Colonel Blaskic.  It's an order which you approved of, because we have

13     that reference, "I approve."  I'm interested in the first word, where

14     Colonel Blaskic speaks about the area of Central Bosnia, and he says that

15     the enemy has conducted offensive operations.

16             To be very careful and to fully understand the idea of offensive

17     and defensive operations, tell me, what does General Blaskic mean when he

18     says that the ABiH is conducting offensive operations?

19        A.   Your Honours, the ABiH wasn't conducting operations of any kind.

20     The Army of Republika Srpska was.  The entire front part refers to -- the

21     entire first part refers to units from the Army of -- let me just check

22     this.  There are three and a half pages in the Croatian version where

23     General Blaskic describes the intention of the Army of Republika Srpska.

24     After taking Jajce, they arrived in Travnik, and they wanted to continue

25     to take the entire area of Central Bosnia.  So Blaskic is talking about

Page 49941

 1     potential offensives launched by the Army of Republika Srpska in the

 2     Central Bosnian area, which is being defended in a joint manner with the

 3     ABiH.

 4             So all these units which you see referred to on pages 1, 2, and 3

 5     are units that belonged to the Army of Republika Srpska, units that were

 6     deployed in the vicinity of the central area of, let's say, the free

 7     Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  The

 9     Republika Srpska Army was conducting offensive operations.  As far as you

10     know, did the ABiH, in 1992 and 1993, conduct offensive operations?

11        A.   Your Honours, as far as this document is concerned, we will later

12     see that Blaskic was planning to prevent an attack launched by the

13     Serbian forces by acting in a joint manner with the ABiH.  We're talking

14     about the month of March 1993.

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let's have a look at five --

16     let's have a look at page 10, please.  I didn't have the intention of

17     putting this question to you, but as your answer concerned the VRS, I

18     want to go into the ABiH.  So let's have a look at page 10.  Bobovac --

19     5.10 is the item.  "The Bobovac Brigade," is what I'm interested in.

20             You can see that the task is mentioned.  A co-ordinated action is

21     to be conducted together with the ABiH.  Active operations are to be

22     conducted.  Does this mean that at the time the ABiH and the HVO

23     conducted offensive operations against the VRS.

24        A.   Your Honours, in this item of the order, Blaskic issued such an

25     order to his brigade.  The brigade was to defend the area facing the VRS.

Page 49942

 1     The ABiH were in the vicinity, too.  And he was requesting [realtime

 2     transcript read in error "requested"] that they not remain in the

 3     trenches, but that they also engage in certain actions and inflict losses

 4     on the VRS.  And perhaps they would also manage to liberate part of the

 5     occupied territory.  That's the terminology -- the JNA terminology that

 6     was used.  Conduct active operations when you're engaged in defence.

 7             So the Bobovac Brigade and the unit from the ABiH, the

 8     Vares Brigade and the ABiH, jointly organised defence and prevented enemy

 9     forces from breaking through, enemy forces from the VRS.

10             MR. KOVACIC:  Your Honour --

11             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] So at the time the HVO and the ABiH

12     were acting together.

13             MR. KOVACIC:  I would like to intervene regarding the transcript.

14     On line 18, the sentence is -- the response is recorded as "and he was

15     requested."  It is about Blaskic, "like somebody else requested."

16     General Petkovic clearly said Blaskic requested.  It's not that he was

17     requested, but he requested orders.  Thank you.

18             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'll conclude with this

19     document.

20             In your mind, is there a difference between an offensive action

21     and an active action or active operation, or is it the same thing?

22        A.   Your Honours, this entire order is an order for defence.  It

23     means that the forces are to defend the territory.  That's the main task.

24     But each unit is given the possibility of taking more active -- a more

25     active stance with regard to the enemy, to take part of the territory,

Page 49943

 1     and to move the front-line.  So this is a defensive order.  It's not a --

 2     this is a defensive order, not an offensive order.  An offensive order

 3     would say which axis it should follow, what should be taken, how soon,

 4     and so on and so forth.  So the title is "Order for Defence," but this

 5     defence can't be envisaged in a static manner.  If there is an

 6     opportunity, one can take action.

 7             MR. KOVACIC:  Sorry.  Mr. Scott, if I may, until we have a page

 8     on the screen, but whatever.

 9             Your Honour, I did intervene, and it is again repeated, something

10     which is not said.  I kindly ask you to ask a direct question to the

11     general, whether the text -- whether he said that Blaskic was requested

12     or whether the testimony is that Blaskic requested the others.  I mean,

13     in spite of intervention, it is again the same.

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.

15             MR. SCOTT:  One moment, Your Honour.  Let me check something

16     before I -- yes, Your Honour.  If we could get a date for this document.

17     As the Chamber knows well by now, dates are incredibly important, and we

18     have no idea if this is 1991, 1992, 1994, or 1995.  Thank you.

19             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I may answer.

20             MR. SCOTT:  Excuse me, Your Honour.  No, excuse me, excuse me.

21     Let's let the witness answer.  We don't need Ms. Alaburic testifying.

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, you're quite right.

23             General Petkovic, in your opinion, this order, what is the date

24     of the order?

25        A.   It was drafted in March 1993.  I can't tell you the exact date.

Page 49944

 1     It's not mentioned.

 2             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] March 1993?

 3        A.   Yes, March 1993.

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  To understand what

 5     you have been saying, to fully understand what you're saying, because

 6     it's not the first time we've heard this, when we have "Order" marked in

 7     a document, a defence order, order for defence, within the document there

 8     may be a reference made to active operations or to offensive operations,

 9     but they would come under the heading of defence, they would be labelled

10     as "Defence."  Is that how we are to understand this in military terms?

11     I'm not a military man, so I would like you to clarify this for me.

12        A.   Your Honours, when an order is issued for defence, an order like

13     the one we have here, its main purpose is for defence, the Serbian forces

14     mustn't break through the defence line.  But Blaskic assigns or gives

15     each brigade the possibility of taking action.  If they have the

16     opportunity, if they have the forces, then they can engage in active

17     operations.  So that means that they can go forward from this line.  It

18     wouldn't be significant breakthroughs.  Perhaps it would involve an area

19     of 300 or 500 metres.  But when you speak about offensive operations,

20     then what one has in mind is really an attack.  So under defence, the JNA

21     meant "defence," but also active operations, active operations which

22     involved in smaller areas.  It means you don't allow the enemy to attack

23     you.  Take action in the direction of the enemy, inflict losses, disrupt

24     the enemy's deployment, and then your defence will be more secure.  So

25     the active operations within defence, but "offensive action" means that

Page 49945

 1     you plan to carry out an attack, you really plan to carry out an attack.

 2             And let me repeat Mr. Kovacic's comment.  Blaskic, through his

 3     order, asked every brigade -- each and every brigade to be active along

 4     the lines it held.

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  Could the counsel

 6     refrain from intervening - I would be extremely grateful - unless there

 7     is a monumental error in the transcript.  If there's an error in the

 8     French version, I'm aware of it.

 9             So, General Petkovic, let us look at the document 4D410.

10             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I have still a question on the previous

11     document.  As I don't have it before me, I cannot look for indicia

12     myself.

13             Mr. Petkovic, can you tell the Chamber, was this order actually

14     issued, or is it an order that was prepared but did not eventually go to

15     the subordinate units, as one often has?

16        A.   Judge Trechsel, Your Honour, this order went down to every

17     brigade, and it was on the basis of this order that every brigade had to

18     draft its own order for further action.

19             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you.

20             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, the document

21     4D410, which is a decree of law issued by Mr. Izetbegovic personally on

22     the 6th of August, 1992.  Look at Article 1.  Mr. Izetbegovic says, in

23     November 1992, that the armed forces of the republic comprise the ABiH

24     and, according to my understanding, the HVO is a component of the army.

25     How would you interpreter this article as it is worded and coming from

Page 49946

 1     Mr. Izetbegovic?

 2        A.   Mr. Izetbegovic here was playing a game, himself, but we take it

 3     at face value here.  What he said is that the armed forces of the

 4     republic were comprised of the army, the BH Army, so that was an armed

 5     force hereinafter called "the army."  But then he went on to say that the

 6     a constituent part of the BH Army shall comprise the Croatian Defence

 7     Council.  So that was how it was, as interpreted by Izetbegovic here.

 8     Somebody obviously prepared this document from his legal office.  So the

 9     HVO was part of the BH Army, and the BH Army was part of the forces.  So

10     the logical conclusion is that the HVO was a component part of the

11     Armed Forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you say that for

13     Mr. Izetbegovic, the HVO was a part of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia

14     and Herzegovina.  You are confirming what is written in this article.

15             MR. SCOTT:  That's not entirely correct, Your Honour.  That's not

16     what's written, because what's written is "such units which place

17     themselves under the command of the BiH government."  I don't think we

18     can take one part of the sentence without taking the other part of the

19     sentence.  So he is not confirming what is written, because you have not

20     read the entire sentence.

21             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, could you

22     read, in your own language, Article 1?  Read it slowly, please, so that

23     the interpreters into English can translate it properly for Mr. Scott.

24             Go ahead, please.

25        A.   "The armed forces of the republic are made up of the Army of the

Page 49947

 1     Republic (hereinafter the Army).

 2             "A constituent part of the army shall comprise --" or, rather,

 3     "the Croatian Defence Council shall constitute part of the army as well

 4     as other armed components which place themselves under the single command

 5     of the army.

 6             "During a state of war, in addition to the Army, the armed forces

 7     shall be comprised of the police, units providing physical security to

 8     enterprises and other legal entities, units of the Customs Service and

 9     other frontier organs which are subordinated to the single command of the

10     armed forces which are re-subordinated."

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So Article 1, as you have read

12     it and as it has been interpreted into English and French, says that the

13     HVO is a part of the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but the

14     HVO is placed under the single command of the ABiH; is that right?

15        A.   Precisely, Your Honour.  We were part of the BH Army, and thereby

16     we were a component part of the armed forces, and we were under the

17     single command of the BH Army or, rather, the Armed Forces of

18     Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that supreme single command was the Presidency of

19     the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

20             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  And the unified

21     supreme command depended on the Presidency of the Republic of

22     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  You have added this.

23             We are now going to look at the next document, 4D433.  It's a

24     document.  I wait for it to appear on the screen.  There it is.

25             It's a document of the 20th of January, 1993.  The dates are

Page 49948

 1     important, as Mr. Scott and Mr. Stewart have reminded us on several

 2     occasions.  We'll always need to indicate the date, and I'm trying to do

 3     that.  This is a document that you sent to Mr. Sagolj in person in

 4     Konjic, and this document relates to the situation.  And you're asking

 5     him to establish contact with the ABiH.

 6             Do you remember this document, and what was the purpose of your

 7     request addressed to Sagolj?  What is the context of all this, bearing in

 8     mind there's reference also to Zuka's men?

 9        A.   Your Honour, the context of all this is the following: that in

10     the Konjic area, there should be talks between the HVO commander and

11     members of the BH Army, the Army of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,

12     to prevent any tensions in the area in Konjic municipality, because we're

13     warning them that the Chetniks are also planning to enter Konjic and take

14     control of it.  So they have to discuss the situation, reach an

15     agreement, and do away with any tension.  And bear in mind that there was

16     this threat from the Chetniks storming Konjic and taking control of it.

17             Now, Juka is an additional piece of information here, something

18     that we learnt about, that after the conflict with Juka and these others,

19     that he fled to the area of Konjic.  And to ensure peace in the area, I

20     ask him to relocate Juka's men from the territory to prevent them from

21     being a cause for tension between them and the BH Army and the HVO,

22     because the army -- BH Army incarcerated Juka, whereas the others

23     considered him a hero and celebrated him.  So that was the problem -- and

24     released him from prison.

25             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you for the explanation

Page 49949

 1     for this text.

 2             As we are talking about January, all the more reason to look at a

 3     map.  We are going to look at 4D560, which we're going to see on the

 4     screen now.

 5             Here we are.  Let us turn it around.  That's it.

 6             We see this map now, which is the situation as it was in January

 7     1993.  Your counsel has said that you, yourself, drew this map and

 8     painted the colours indicating the positions of the Serbs, the ABiH, and

 9     the HVO, and that is the precise situation as it was in 1993 that was to

10     have been conveyed to those in Geneva.

11             This is not the first time we are seeing this map.  I have looked

12     at it at great length from all possible angles.  I would like you, in

13     military terms, but quite quickly so that we don't spend hours on it,

14     that you explain to me the military position of the HVO as we see it in

15     blue.  I note that in blue there are enclaves at Zepce, Vares, Travnik,

16     Vitez, Busovaca, Kiseljak, and then the other part, Jablanica, Livno,

17     Tomislavgrad.  So I see the positions of the HVO, and I also see the VRS

18     and the ABiH.

19             Could you please explain for us, from your point of view, what

20     was the military situation, and was it critical or not?

21        A.   Your Honours, I'll start off with Vakuf in January 1993, and that

22     is denoted as a place of conflict.  There was, indeed, a conflict, and it

23     was stopped by the end of the month.  You saw my order from Geneva, and

24     that's when the conflict in Vakuf municipality was halted.

25             Now, what is important is the arrow between Busovaca and Fojnica,

Page 49950

 1     or, rather, Kiseljak.  This arrow shows that from the 25th to the 29th of

 2     January, 1993, the BH Army cut across the Croatian enclaves which are in

 3     blue, it split it in two.  So from that time on, we had a separate

 4     enclave in Fojnica, Kiseljak, and Kresevo, that was one, and can I add --

 5     and the other enclave which was separated was Busovaca, Vitez, and

 6     part -- a part belonging to Zenica municipality, Novi Travnik and

 7     Travnik.  So the Central Bosnian part, where the Croats were a compact

 8     entity, in January, that is to say, from the 25th to the 9th of January,

 9     the BH Army cut across this enclave, making two enclaves of the Croatian

10     Defence Council, and they remained that way until after the

11     Dayton Accords.

12             May I have a pen so that I can write in "Enclave 1" and

13     "Enclave 2"?  [Marks]

14             So this one enclave was split into two.  We have one which was

15     made up of Fojnica, Kiseljak and Kresevo, and number 2, the second

16     enclave, made up of Busovaca, Vitez, Travnik, and Novi Travnik

17     municipalities.  And this area here [marks] -- so there's no more blue in

18     this area.  This was the area controlled by the BH Army along a line

19     from -- ranging from seven to ten kilometres, and so that was the

20     separation line of the Croatian Defence Council and the Croatian people

21     living there.

22             And that's how the situation remained until after the

23     Dayton Accords.  The HVO was never able to establish contact after this

24     so that people could go freely from Kiseljak to Busovaca, or vice versa.

25             By this action, the BH Army scored a considerable advantage,

Page 49951

 1     because it separated the Croats in this area, and there was no

 2     possibility for Vitez, Busovaca, if the need arose, could help,

 3     militarily, Kiseljak, Fojnica, and Kresevo.

 4             Now, the other areas, Kakanj, Vares, and so on, stayed the same

 5     as they had been previously.  They were no longer able to communicate

 6     with any Croat -- Croatian enclave.  Everybody was cut off in his own

 7     region.

 8             And there's another piece of information that I failed to tell

 9     you for the Konjic area.  The arrow there indicates the arrival of units

10     who were not from Konjic proper.  They were the Black Swans, and we

11     mentioned Zuka's men previously, part of the Lasta or Swallows, part of

12     the Special Police of the MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina which were pulling

13     out of Sarajevo and coming into the Konjic area, and there was some other

14     smaller units as well which were infiltrating into Konjic.  And that is

15     why I am cautioning my commander to talk to the BH Army so that the

16     influx of these forces should not lead to greater tension in Fojnica

17     municipality and Konjic, Konjic municipality.

18             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  As you have marked

19     this map, yourself, let us give an IC number to this map.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour.

21             The marked portion of document 4D00560 shall be given Exhibit

22     number IC01181.  Thank you, Your Honours.

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  After the break, we

24     will see document 4D100.  So the Registrar can prepare the document.

25     That will be the next document after the break of 20 minutes now.

Page 49952

 1                           --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.

 2                           --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

 3             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Can I have the next document,

 4     which I think is already on the screen, 4D100.

 5             Here we are.  It's an interview that you gave on the 16th of

 6     February, 1993.  The date is February, and you're answering questions put

 7     by the reporter.

 8             First of all, will you please look at the second paragraph, when

 9     the reporter says:

10             "Mr. Petkovic, it is impossible to find you at HVO headquarters

11     in Mostar."

12             So everyone is looking for you, and they can't find you,

13     including reporters.  And then you answer:

14             "I am in the field most of the time ..."

15             What would be your comment?

16        A.   Your Honours, this was the time of active negotiations in Geneva,

17     and it was the duty, after the first half of the meeting, for me to meet

18     with my commanders with respect to the orders issued and the

19     documentation.  I had to personally go and take a look at it, examine it,

20     and then briefly to convey what had happened in those first days of

21     negotiations and talks, those that I was able to reach.

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'd like us to look at page 3

23     in the English version.  In my document, there are no page numbers, but

24     it is a question being put in connection with Halilovic regarding

25     extremist Muslims.  There's no page number.

Page 49953

 1             Here we are.  We see it, the box, in English, "10.000 Muslim

 2     extremists."  And the Registrar is doing a miracle, and I'm sure he's

 3     going to be able to find the text in your own language.

 4             General Petkovic, the reporter is asking you whether

 5     Sefer Halilovic is behind the Muslim extremists who are provoking

 6     clashes, and you answer at length.  We are not in the tu quoque, we are

 7     in a military context where we have belligerence, the HVO and the ABiH,

 8     and in the ABiH there are certain individuals.  So the question put to

 9     you by the reporter is being answered by you.

10             Would you, today, give the same answer as you did then?

11        A.   Yes, Your Honours, I would give the same answer.  The journalist

12     asked the question, and the journalist said that it was 10.000

13     extremists.  But I said that it was impossible to have 10.000 extremists,

14     that it was a regular army, and that the situation we looked at a moment

15     ago on the map, when Busovaca was cut off from Kiseljak, that's the area

16     it applied to where the BH Army attacked the Croatian Defence Council,

17     separated the two enclaves, Busovaca from Kiseljak, creating two

18     enclaves.  And that's what my answer was.  I claim that it was not 10.000

19     extremists, but that it was 10.000 regular soldiers who had been given

20     the assignment to attack the HVO and cut across Busovaca and Kiseljak,

21     and they succeeded in doing that.

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We're going to look at the last

23     page of the interview, when the journalist asks you a question about

24     Mladic and Karadzic.

25             Last page, please.  Here it is.  I have it in the English

Page 49954

 1     version.

 2             The journalist speaks about the negotiations in Geneva and asks

 3     you whether you had any meetings or contacts with the criminals Mladic

 4     and Karadzic.  When the journalist qualifies them as criminals, what was

 5     your reply to the journalist's question?

 6        A.   Well, my reply to the journalist was this: that according to the

 7     Geneva negotiations -- well, at the Geneva negotiations there were no

 8     bilateral talks; that I worked in the military -- well, we all worked in

 9     plenary sessions, sitting down at the same table, the Muslims, the

10     Croats, the Serbs, and Mr. Satish Nambiar with his team, who conducted

11     the negotiations and talks.  And the journalist was interested in whether

12     during our talks we had individual one-on-one talks.  But I said, no, we

13     didn't, that we all discussed matters together sitting down at a single

14     negotiating table.

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] In order to assess the weight

16     to be attached to the question and the reply, this interview was in a

17     publication issued in Zagreb, was it, in Bosnia and Herzegovina?  Where

18     was this magazine or newspaper published?

19        A.   Your Honours, this is the Zagreb "Vecernji List" paper, but this

20     edition was the edition for Bosnia and Herzegovina.  So the

21     "Vecernji List" had a publication for Croatia and an additional

22     publication which was intended for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'm not aware of that

24     newspaper.  Is it a totally independent newspaper in relation to the

25     authorities of Croatia, or was it under the control of Croatian

Page 49955

 1     authorities?

 2        A.   As far as I know, it was an independent paper, but I don't know

 3     whether they were within the RPH.  But as a newspaper, yes, it was

 4     independent with respect to the Croatian authorities.

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] This means that the journalist

 6     was quite free to ask you any questions he wanted, and quite independent

 7     in doing so?

 8        A.   Yes, Your Honours.  This journalist originated from Herzegovina,

 9     and he was a correspondent of the "Vecernji List," working for the

10     "Vecernji List," but covering Herzegovina.

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Could the Registrar --

12             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Sorry.  I have two questions with regard to this

13     document.

14             The first question is:  Did you have a chance to re-read the text

15     before it was published?

16        A.   No, Your Honour.

17             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you.  And then in the text that figures in

18     the box, you say, on the ABiH, that they are digging bunkers in every

19     village.  Digging bunkers, according to you, is it an activity which

20     points to attack, rather, or rather to defence, or neither?

21        A.   Your Honours, when I toured the area, I was surprised why they

22     were digging bunkers around each village.  Well, the army didn't have any

23     work to do, so to engage them they said, Let's dig the bunkers.  So I

24     think that's the simplest answer why bunkers were being built, and

25     probably some other plans too.  Every village wanted to protect itself

Page 49956

 1     because it didn't know who was going to attack it from where.  So there

 2     was general hysteria in that sense.

 3             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you very much.

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The two following documents

 5     relate to Safet Cibo, 4D450 and 4D452.  4D452.

 6             You have the text in your own language.  This is 450.  SDA.

 7     Mr. Cibo is going to be appointed at the same time by Halilovic and by

 8     the SDA, which is a political party, as a member of the regional

 9     committee for Herzegovina, and also he's going to be appointed by

10     Halilovic for a military post 3252.  And this is to show what?  What did

11     you wish to demonstrate with this type of document?

12        A.   Your Honours, if we look at the previous document, we'll see that

13     he was appointed to the post of president of the Wartime Presidency of

14     Konjic municipality and Jablanica, so that was the post he occupied.

15             Now, with this document, Sefer Halilovic is putting him at a high

16     place in the Command of the 4th Corps of the BH Army.  That is to say, he

17     was given a military function as well.  And then the regional board of

18     the party, incorporating Mostar, Jablanica, Konjic, is co-opting him into

19     the party, so that to all intents and purposes he held all functions --

20     military and political functions in the area.  And I think that that was

21     the only man in Bosnia-Herzegovina who had functions of this type.

22             And this "3252" is the VES from the JNA which denotes that he was

23     a physician, a doctor, according to military terminology.  Those are the

24     figures and code for physicians, although he was assistant for morale and

25     religious affairs.  And he might have also been a commander, too, a

Page 49957

 1     shadow commander.

 2             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you're telling us that

 3     Mr. Cibo had a double hat, a military one and a political one, at the

 4     same time.  To the best of your knowledge, within the HVO were there

 5     people who also wore such two hats, who were at the same time military

 6     figures and politicians, like Cibo?

 7        A.   As far as I know, they did not.  In the HVO, somebody could have

 8     a rank, could hold a rank, but need not have had a military function,

 9     because politicians could have been rewarded for their acts by some rank.

10     But that they had a political function in the army, I don't know of any

11     such case in the HVO.  He is also the representative of executive power

12     and authority here, which is his third function.

13             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.  We'll have a look

14     at the document from the 4th Corps, 4D438.

15             There it is.  In the B/C/S version, it's not very legible.  The

16     English version is a lot more legible.  It has to do with the 4th Corps.

17     The date is the 24th of March, 1993.  We learn that 150 members of the

18     HVO were captured, that a town is blocked, that life in the town is

19     paralysed, and that they're continuing with arrests.

20             In your opinion, what does this document mean?

21        A.   Your Honours, the 23rd of March was when the all-out attack of

22     the ABiH started from the area of Konjic.  It was launched against two

23     battalions of the HVO in the municipality of Konjic, and this report from

24     the commander, Commander Cerovac, is a report on what he and his brigade

25     had managed to achieve up until then.  And he's reporting to his superior

Page 49958

 1     command, his 4th Corps, about that.  So this is a report on his offensive

 2     operations against the HVO.

 3             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  We will have a look

 4     at 4D125, which is a document that you signed together with Mr. Pasalic,

 5     which is why it is a document of interest, in relation to the other

 6     documents that we have already seen that concerned the army and whether

 7     it was a joint army or not.  There is your signature, and there is also

 8     Mr. Pasalic's signature on the document.  The heading of the document is

 9     "The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina."  Then it says "The

10     Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, Croatian Defence Council."  And it

11     also says "The HVO" and "The 4th Corps Command."  So that is what a

12     reasonable Judge can read in this document.

13             If I have a look at item number 1, there is a joint order, HVO

14     and BH Army order, and it says that all action should immediately cease.

15             General Petkovic, it's a Defence document, not a Prosecution

16     document.  It was found in the archives of Croatia.  What is the meaning

17     of this document, in your opinion?

18        A.   Your Honours, this document was drafted after eight or ten hours

19     of combat in Konjic on that day.  In the afternoon, I called Mr. Pasalic

20     and asked him about what was going on in the territory of Konjic.  I

21     asked him whether we could put an end to that, whether he had the will

22     and the force to put an end to the fighting in Konjic.  He responded to

23     my request.  He came to the Main Staff to see me -- to the headquarters.

24     We drafted this joint order and sent it to Konjic, to the HVO and to the

25     ABiH, and we asked them to do what is stated here in this order.  But we

Page 49959

 1     also told them that the situation in the battle-field of the Tuzla

 2     battle-field was difficult.  It's in the direction of Zepa, Srebrenica,

 3     and so on.  We asked them to put an end to the fighting, because at that

 4     point in time -- well, a witness appeared, Mr. Mlakar [phoen] here.  He

 5     had received equipment from the HVO and was waiting for an end to the

 6     combat so that he could move the equipment to Tuzla through Jablanica and

 7     Konjic.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, this document

 9     bears a number that you gave it and that he gave it.  Does this number,

10     01/508/93 mean that this document emanates from you, who was number 1 in

11     the HVO staff?  So it's the 508th document emanating from 01; yes or no.

12        A.   Yes, it's 01-508 is a number from my protocol, and to the right

13     you have the number from the 4th Corps protocol.

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  You anticipated my

15     following question.  To the right, apparently, Mr. Pasalic wrote down the

16     number "01 ," that means him as commander of the 4th Corps, "2.192," so

17     he must work more than you, four times more than you, because there are

18     2.192 documents, whereas you only had 508 documents.  Apparently, he was

19     a lot more active than you were.  And then we have "/93."  What did he

20     do?  How is it that he provided this number?  That doesn't have a seal or

21     stamp, as you can see, and he was in your office.  Did he phone his

22     office to be provided with this number?  How was this done, if you can

23     remember?  I can't answer such questions because my memory doesn't allow

24     me to do so.

25        A.   Your Honours, this was drafted in my office.  He phoned his corps

Page 49960

 1     command and asked which the following number was.  They told him what it

 2     was, and he then made a note of this number on the document.  The

 3     official in charge of protocol told him that the following number was

 4     2192, so he made a note of the number, "01-2192," and that's how it was

 5     sent later on.

 6             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Could you tell me the exact

 7     date -- well, in fact, it says the 23rd of March, 1993.  Is that correct?

 8     Because in the English version, there is no date, but in the B/C/S

 9     version there is a date.  You see, it's always necessary to have a look

10     at a document in the original version.  You can see that the English

11     translation doesn't bear the date.

12        A.   Yes, the 23rd of March is the date in the original signed by

13     Pasalic and myself.

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  So,

15     General Petkovic, listen to me carefully.  If -- as a Judge reads who

16     this document, who sees that it refers to the Republic of Bosnia and

17     Herzegovina, it refers to the HVO and to the 4th Corps, who sees that a

18     joint order is being drafted, if I read this, as such a Judge, can I draw

19     the conclusion that on a given date, the 23rd of March, 1993, the HVO and

20     the ABiH were part of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia and

21     Herzegovina, or if I drew such a conclusion, would that conclusion be

22     erroneous?

23        A.   The conclusion is correct.  We were members of the very same

24     army, and that's why we issued an identical order, the same type of

25     order.  And let me add, under item 1 we say that we don't want to disrupt

Page 49961

 1     the joint combat of the HVO and the ABiH, so there is joint combat.  We

 2     have a common enemy, and it's necessary to put an end to the situation

 3     that had developed between the HVO and the ABiH.

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let's have a look at 4D469.

 5     The date is the 30th of March.  I'm following the chronology.  Sometimes

 6     I move from one subject to another, but I'm doing it in chronological

 7     order.

 8             It's a report from the HVO Crime Department.  Ivica Kraljevic

 9     signed the document.  I won't deal with the substance of the document,

10     but at the time were you aware of the fact that there was a crime

11     department?

12        A.   A crime department.

13             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes.  And what was its main

14     role?  What was its main task?

15        A.   Yes, it was a crime department within the military police.

16             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Within the military police.

17     This department that was in charge of investigations, was it responsible,

18     as far as you know, to investigate crimes committed by HVO soldiers, or

19     was it only responsible for investigating crimes committed by members of

20     the ABiH, ABiH soldiers?

21        A.   Your Honours, they investigated each and every case that occurred

22     in the territory, not only crimes.  There were also cases of theft.

23     There was fighting.  Certain units would flee.  There were accidents, and

24     HVO soldiers guilty of murder.  So they investigated all these matters.

25     They weren't only concerned with crimes, as you say.  Their scope of

Page 49962

 1     activity was very broad.

 2             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  We'll have a look

 3     at a map that you drafted in April, 4D561, because now we're dealing with

 4     the month of April.

 5             We saw the January map a while ago, and now we have a map

 6     relating to April.  With regard to January -- well, now it's April.  And

 7     with regard to January, what sort of significant changes occurred, in

 8     military terms, in the area that we can see in the map?

 9             MS. ALABURIC: [No interpretation]

10             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, I'll start again

11     and check whether we are receiving interpretation.  Yes, there is

12     interpretation into English.  I'll check to see whether I can hear the

13     B/C/S.  Yes, I do, on channel 6.

14             General Petkovic, it's a map dated March-April 1993.  A while

15     ago, we saw the map from January.  In what way had the military situation

16     changed in relation to the January map?

17        A.   Your Honours, the situation changed in the following manner:

18     Under 1, in the territory of the municipality of Konjic, there was an

19     ABiH attack against the HVO, and conflict engulfed the entire area of the

20     Konjic municipality.  And then there was a minor incident that occurred

21     in the territory of Vakuf.  It was soon placed under control.  It didn't

22     spread.  And then, thirdly, there was a conflict between the HVO and the

23     ABiH which occurred on the Zenica-Vitez axis.  That would be number 3.

24     So that conflict was the conflict that is considered to be an initial

25     conflict in Central Bosnia.  So those were the events in April 1993.

Page 49963

 1             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  In military

 2     terms -- well, I can see "Vitez," and you say that there was a conflict

 3     in Vitez.  When I have a look at the map, the Zenica area and the part

 4     below it, below Novi Travnik, would you say that the ABiH wanted

 5     territorial continuity which would establish a new pocket, a

 6     Busovaca-Travnik pocket?  In military terms, was that the strategic

 7     objective that the ABiH was pursuing at the time?

 8        A.   That was the strategic objective.  The entire area of the

 9     Lasva Valley, the Lepenica Valley, or the territory from Travnik to

10     Kiseljak and Kresevo, was to be split into a number of small entities.

11     They were to be separated from each other [marks].  The HVO was to be

12     reduced to minor forces, unable to help each other, and then gradually,

13     one by one, the HVO was to be defeated, the population was to be

14     expelled, and in this way a larger area would have been created for the

15     ABiH or, rather, Bosniak area -- a so-called Bosniak area would be

16     created.  That is what happened when Travnik was taken.  The HVO no

17     longer had a presence there.  They were only in Vitez and Busovaca and in

18     this enclave here.  So it was a real military objective.  They were

19     thinking, in military terms, separate them, reduce them to a number of

20     small entities, and then gradually, one by one, liquidate them, or,

21     rather, take over -- take the troops, or arrest the troops, or expel

22     them.  And when you expel them, expel the population together with them.

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  We'll give the

24     document an IC number, since the witness has marked some numbers there.

25             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour.

Page 49964

 1             The marked portion of document 4D00561 shall be given

 2     Exhibit IC01182.  Thank you, Your Honours.

 3             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] 4D83 is the following document

 4     I would like to have a look at.  It's dated the 15th of April.  It's from

 5     the ABiH.  Esad Ramic is reporting to the 4th Corps.  It's a combat

 6     report.  We'll see it up on the screen, and it is important for perhaps

 7     an understanding of the ultimatum.  I said "perhaps."  I'm not certain of

 8     anything.

 9             So we have a document of the ABiH in which, as you can see, at

10     the very beginning they say that in the early morning the Herceg Stjepan

11     Brigade had attacked the ABiH at Klis.  According to this document, it is

12     you who attacked.  Can you explain?

13        A.   Mr. Ramic obviously forgot about the 13th and not the 14th.  He

14     also forgot about reports in the media that we had attacked them first,

15     for them not to attack us.  This is a trick that occurred also on the

16     30th of June, when Pasalic said, They attacked us, and then we responded

17     and took everything around Bijelo Polje.

18             The Herceg Stjepan Brigade, Your Honours, which has no contact

19     with other HVO forces and was in an -- absolutely incapable of

20     undertaking [realtime transcript read in error "understanding"] any

21     military action in the municipality of Konjic because the balance of

22     forces was absolutely unfavorable for the HVO, and they couldn't attack

23     anyone, because in five or ten days they would have been liquidated and

24     disarmed.

25             Esad Ramic explained this to his commander, who knows what

Page 49965

 1     happened.  They attacked us, and then we responded and disarmed them one

 2     by one, village by village, until 50 villages were disarmed and the HVO

 3     had disappeared from the territory of the municipality of Konjic.

 4             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have to make a

 5     correction in line 8.  Instead of "understanding," the word should be

 6     "undertaking."

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, if I

 8     understand you correctly, there's an error in this document, and that is

 9     that it wasn't the 14th of April, as indicated, but the 13th of April.

10     This document was drafted on the 15th of April, as we can see, and will

11     be registered on the 17th of April in the 4th Corps.

12             So you appear to be saying that Mr. Ramic is presenting a

13     military version which is not totally correct?

14        A.   Your Honours, Mr. Ramic -- or maybe we don't have the document.

15     What happened on the 13th of April is not described here, because he

16     begins with the 15th of April, and he says that, On the 14th of April, in

17     the morning hours, we had captured the village of Buscak, but, in fact,

18     the ABiH had attacked that village on the 13th.  Now, whether there is a

19     report dated prior to this, we haven't managed to find it.  There must be

20     one, because these are daily combat reports.

21             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We see the next document, which

22     has the same date, 4D453.  I'm waiting for it to appear on the screen.

23             Here we are.  It is an HVO document dated the 15th of April,

24     because it was received at 12.38 in the headquarters, so one can assume

25     that it is, indeed, from the 15th of April.  And it relates to Bradina,

Page 49966

 1     Igman, Konjic, et cetera.

 2             According to you, what does this document indicate?

 3        A.   Your Honours, this document by a brigade commander says that

 4     Konjic and the rest of Konjic municipality were attacked -- or, rather,

 5     the HVO in this area was attacked by units of the ABiH.  And now if we

 6     compare the two, we will see that the reports are for the 15th of April

 7     in both cases.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let us move on to the 16th of

 9     April with the next document.  And so thanks to this document, we can

10     follow.  It is 4D33, and it is a document of the 4th Corps.

11             It's a document of the 4th Corps drafted by the security chief,

12     Maric, relating to the events of the night between the 15th and 16th of

13     April.  And apparently he refers to Sevici [phoen].  In the English

14     version, it says "Sevici."  I assume it should be "Sovici."

15             General Petkovic, what is the situation as described by this

16     document?

17        A.   Your Honours, let me just correct.  The place is Sevac Njive on

18     the Dubrava Plateau, and it is 50 or more kilometres, as the crow flies,

19     from Sovici.  This is quite a different area, the Dubrava Plateau area.

20     And the Bregava Brigade is there; that is, the 42nd Brigade of

21     Bosnia-Herzegovina, known as the Bregava Brigade.

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  So we are

23     50 kilometres from Sovici.  What is the military situation at this stage,

24     as you knew it, because as the document says, there is an action by the

25     HVO, with the assistance of the Croatian Army, it appears.  That is what

Page 49967

 1     is written here.  What would you say?

 2        A.   I'm trying to find the reference to the Croatian Army.  Could you

 3     assist me?  In what line is it?

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Look at the second paragraph,

 5     second paragraph.

 6        A.   In the second paragraph, it says:

 7             "In order to achieve its ultimate aim, that is, the

 8     Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, the HVO has engaged all its forces.

 9     With the comprehensive assistance from the Croatian Army, they're

10     attempting to achieve their ultimate goal."

11             Now I see it.  I don't know what the Croatian Army was doing at

12     the Dubrava Plateau.  Obviously, it wasn't present there.  The Croatian

13     Army is far further to the south, close to the borders of Croatia, and

14     not at the Dubrava Plateau.  And you will see, from these dates on, that

15     it keeps saying "HV-HVO."  These were instructions from the ABiH that in

16     every report they have to say "HV-HVO," and even add to that the extreme

17     section of the HVO.  So in all these reports, you will see reference to

18     "HV-HVO."

19             At the Dubrava Plateau at this time, there were no Croatian Army

20     units.  The Croatian Army was along the border of the Republic of Croatia

21     in the direction of Dubrovnik.

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  The next document

23     is of the 17th of April.  It is document 4D -- wait a moment.  I

24     apologise.  4D599, 599.  It's a bit complicated with all these numbers.

25     It is a document of the 4th Corps, and it is again by Mr. Ramic.

Page 49968

 1             There it is.  You have the document.  And from the beginning, it

 2     refers to combats against the HVO in the Konjic area.  And then he

 3     reviews all the positions of the HVO, Stari Grad, Zlatar, Spiljani,

 4     Polje Bijela, et cetera.  According to you, what does this document mean,

 5     in military terms?

 6        A.   Your Honour, from the military perspective, this document says

 7     that there are seven locations where the HVO was, were simultaneously

 8     attacked by the ABiH, and these are all locations immediately next to the

 9     town of Konjic.  The old town is a part belonging to Konjic.  Zlatar is

10     on a hill above Konjic.  Polje Bijela is also in this area.  Babin Nos is

11     where the famous check-point was that is mentioned in UNPROFOR.  And the

12     village of Radisine is also Konjic municipality, but several kilometres

13     from Konjic in the direction of Jablanica.  But all this is Konjic

14     municipality and the urban area, itself, the urban area of Konjic and the

15     surrounding localities.  As far as I remember, there's only one that may

16     be seven or eight kilometres further away.

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let us look at the end of the

18     document, which may be of some interest.  Let us look at the end of the

19     document, please, when Mr. Ramic speaks of a Serb and Croat aggression

20     against the sovereignty of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  At the

21     very end.  According to my reading, there were 60 trucks of men, MTS,

22     artillery action from Borak on Muslim villages, and for him there is no

23     doubt there is an open aggression of Serbs and Croats.

24             What is your comment?  He even speaks of co-operation between the

25     HVO and the Chetniks.

Page 49969

 1        A.   That is Mr. Ramic's position.  By this attack against the entire

 2     territory of the town of Konjic and its municipality, the HVO had to

 3     withdraw to the so-called pocket that we have mentioned, and the only

 4     contact that the HVO had were the Serb forces on the front-line up there.

 5     And Mr. Ramic, instead of explaining why the Croats were attacked at

 6     these locations, he finds the excuse that it is now the Serbs and Croats

 7     who are attacking Konjic.  Actually, from this day on, not a single Croat

 8     or HVO soldier was no longer in Konjic or in these locations.  From this

 9     day on, the so-called pocket was formed in the municipality of Konjic

10     with about 1500 civilians and about 300 soldiers of the HVO, and nothing

11     more than that.  And such a force of 300 men cannot attack anyone.  On

12     this day, they were pushed into this pocket.

13             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  Let's see the next

14     document, 4D430.

15             Let me check with the screen.  It is a document addressed to the

16     4th Corps.  It is an interim combat report regarding the 17th of April.

17     You have the document in your own language.

18             And according to what I see at the beginning of the paragraph,

19     there was a request by the HVO for subordination to the HVO of an ABiH

20     unit, and if not, they have to surrender their weapons.  And this was

21     refused.  That is what it says here.

22             What would be your comment, because this affects what we have

23     already heard about the allegation by the Prosecutor that as of the 15th

24     of April, there was an ultimatum.  I won't go into the details.  You are

25     familiar with them as well as I am.  So this document could go in that

Page 49970

 1     direction.  What would you say to it?

 2        A.   I don't know who this Colonel Beglerovic is.  And that a

 3     battalion from Dreznica is supposed to subordinate itself to the HVO, I

 4     don't know anything about that, when four or five days before that you

 5     saw that Witness Peric said that there was a joint contact on the

 6     Bijela Bridge between the 2nd Brigade and the Dreznica Battalion, so I

 7     don't know what this is about.  I don't even know who this colonel is,

 8     obviously from the ABiH, that he apparently attended a meeting in

 9     Bijelo Polje.

10             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic --

11        A.   You don't have anyone's order, or Lasic's order, or anyone else's

12     order to do anything.  I don't know what this is about between these two

13     units.  I just know that contact was established between them three or

14     four days prior to this date, on the 12th or the 13th.

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I need to conclude, from what

16     you have said, that you are denying emphatically that there was a request

17     for subordination from the ABiH.

18             MR. SCOTT:  Excuse me, Your Honour.  That's not what he said at

19     all.  He said he doesn't know anything about it.  I don't think that's --

20     I think that's a completely incorrect mis-characterisation of the

21     testimony.  He said he didn't know.

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said --

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, when I ask

24     you a question, after 30 years of professional experience, I think over

25     what I'm saying.  My question was the following, and I'll repeat it:  In

Page 49971

 1     view of the reply that you gave, should one conclude from it that you are

 2     denying that there was a request for subordination of an ABiH unit to the

 3     HVO?  That is my question to you.

 4        A.   Yes, Your Honour, I am denying that, and I'm rejecting such a

 5     possibility.  Colonel Beglerovic apparently is walking freely in

 6     Bijelo Polje, without any fear, and I don't see why the HVO would ask

 7     Dreznica to give them weapons.  This did not happen in the territory of

 8     Mostar and the entire Mostar region.

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, I see a

10     document and I read a sentence.  I then ask you whether you agree with

11     what the document states.  You say, No, and then I try to understand what

12     your final position is.  And you have just explained your final position

13     very clearly.

14             This colonel would move around freely, in your opinion, and the

15     issue of subordination of an ABiH unit was never raised, it was never an

16     issue.  That's your position.  Perhaps it's true, perhaps it isn't.  When

17     deliberating, we'll examine this document, together with other documents,

18     and the Judges will then draw a conclusion.  But for the moment, I just

19     take note of your position.  I don't have a point of view with regard to

20     it.  It is your position, and you have expressed it under oath.

21             4D34 is the next document I would like to have a look at.

22             I'm looking at the document, dated the 18th of April.  It's on

23     the screen, dated the 18th of April.  The 42nd Mountain Brigade, the

24     ABiH.  So it's the other side.  Suggestions are made.  It appears there

25     are certain security measures that are being proposed, and so on and so

Page 49972

 1     forth.  It says that co-operation should be established with the Dubrava

 2     and Stolac inhabitants, and this should be done through the civilian

 3     authorities.

 4             As this is a document that emanates from your own Defence, this

 5     document, in your opinion, has what sort of objective?  What is the

 6     purpose of this document, in your opinion?

 7        A.   Your Honours, this document was written by the head of security,

 8     and it's up to him to see what should be done.  He makes his proposals to

 9     the commander.  The object of this document is to establish full contact

10     between communications and issuing of assignments to Muslim soldiers in

11     the HVO, the population in the broader area of the Dubrava Plateau.  So

12     this whole system, Muslim soldiers in the HVO and civilians, should be

13     tied up into one single system, and the Bregava Brigade would head that

14     system.

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Am I to take it that, according

16     to what you say, this document has its -- wants the ABiH -- or says that

17     the ABiH wants the HVO to be included in certain activities, and this

18     document proves that this is the case, apparently; yes or no?

19        A.   Your Honours, this document says that the BH Army organs should

20     contact the Muslims in the Croatian Defence Council, and establish full

21     co-operation with them, and agree at what point in time, if that point

22     arrives, they should cross over and join the BH Army.  That's the purpose

23     of this.  Negotiations with the Muslims in the HVO.  They're telling

24     them, Stay there, but when we're ready, you cross over to the BH Army.

25             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  Another document,

Page 49973

 1     the 18th of April.  4D35 is the number of the document, and it is a

 2     document from Pizovic, the 42nd Mountain Brigade.  It's a three-page

 3     document.  This document, it seems, has to do with the situation --

 4     relates to the situation.  There's combat, ongoing combat.  There's some

 5     very precise items in the document.

 6             In your opinion, what does this document prove?  What does it

 7     prove?

 8        A.   Your Honours, this document, in the Dubrava Plateau area within

 9     the frameworks of the 42nd Brigade, emanates from an order by the

10     4th Corps commander.  I don't have it in front of me now.  But he issued

11     orders to the entire corps, and, among others, to brigades in Konjic

12     municipality.  And the commander of the 42nd Brigade knows what is

13     happening in Konjic municipality, what activities are being launched by

14     the BH Army, and he raises combat readiness for his own unit, probably

15     expecting to be given an assignment from the corps commander for him to

16     try to act militarily vis-à-vis the HVO units.  And that is why he

17     undertakes certain steps, when we read about the 2nd Battalion and the

18     3rd Battalion and so on, to extend his forces along the Dubrava Plateau,

19     thereby creating initial positions which will prove advantageous to him.

20             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We'll have a look at the

21     following document.  The same date is concerned, and it yet again

22     emanates from Pizovic.  4D473 is the number of the document.  It is

23     addressed to the commander of the Knez Domagoj Brigade.

24             I re-read this document this morning in order to prepare for the

25     questions I was going to put to you.  I've been preparing for this for

Page 49974

 1     about two years.  However, this morning I re-read the document again, and

 2     when I did that, I had the impression that Mr. Pizovic was telling the

 3     HVO that he wanted to co-operate, that it wasn't a matter of encroaching

 4     on zones of responsibility, and so on and so forth.  It says that the

 5     ABiH had no ill intentions, that there were many Muslim soldiers who were

 6     part of the HVO.

 7             So how would you interpret this document?

 8        A.   Your Honour, this document is a reflection of the situation in

 9     which the Bregava Brigade and the 1st Brigade are trying to explain --

10     the 1st Brigade to explain to the Bregava Brigade, Yes, you can move

11     around the Dubrava Plateau, but you must announce your movements

12     beforehand so that we know where you're going and why you're going;

13     nothing more than that.

14             Now, Mr. Pizovic is replying and saying that he doesn't have any

15     special intentions, and he feels quite strong here.  He feels he was

16     given a zone from -- or by Mico Lasic, which he was holding, but that he

17     felt the need to move around.  And nobody is questioning that need of his

18     to move around, but it is a military rule, Your Honour, that you can't go

19     into another brigade's area without announcing your arrival.  If you

20     announce your arrival, you're free to move around.  But Mr. Pizovic is

21     not doing that.  He's moving around as he sees fit.  But if you read

22     documents from the security organs, Mr. Pizovic, in actual fact, is

23     abusing that and is coming into contact with the HVO soldiers, Muslim HVO

24     soldiers, and he is also coming into contact with the population as well

25     and preparing them.

Page 49975

 1             And at the end of this document, Mr. Pizovic says to

 2     Colonel Obradovic, Now for you to come to Gubavica, you're going to have

 3     to announce your arrival, when you intend to come and when you intend to

 4     arrive.  So there Mr. Pizovic is saying to Mr. Obradovic, If you want to

 5     come to Gubavica, you have to give me prior notice, telling me of your

 6     arrival.  So it's just a question of having both brigades respect the

 7     regime in the area of another's brigade, that they should announce what

 8     they intend to do and that then there would be no problems.

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  The 22nd of April

10     is the same date.  4D90 is the number, a report from Mr. Ramic.  We've

11     already seen this in other documents, and it's addressed to the commander

12     of the 4th Corps.  I'll check to see that you all have this document.

13             You now have it in the B/C/S version, and the English version

14     will be appearing on the screen.  So there is a summary of the situation.

15     It speaks about the liberation of the village of Radesine.  There are

16     other locations mentioned, Turije, Zabrdje, and so on and so forth.

17             In your opinion, what does this document mean?

18        A.   Your Honour, this is the continuation of attack by the BH Army

19     against the HVO, and an attack on Croatian settlements in Konjic

20     municipality.  We showed you the document in this courtroom, and it was

21     the -- and it concerned 24 villages which the BH Army had taken control

22     of.  Mention is made here of those three villages, Turije, Zabrdje, and

23     Zaslivlje, and that they should not be taken control of until the village

24     of Radesine has been liberated, which is seven or eight kilometres away

25     from Konjic.  So they wanted to take control of Radesine first, and then

Page 49976

 1     they would go back to Turije, Zabrdje and Zaslivlje, because apart from

 2     these three villages, looking at this date, there was no Croatian village

 3     in the vicinity of the town of Konjic which the BH Army had not already

 4     taken control of.  All that remained was these three villages and the

 5     village of Radesine.  All the other villages were too close to

 6     Kostajnica.  But around the town of Konjic, itself, these were the three

 7     remaining villages, including Radesine, and Radesine would be done with

 8     within a day or two, and then Turija, Zabrdje, and Zaslivlje would never

 9     fall into the hands of the BH Army.

10             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, have a look

11     at the last paragraph.  In technical terms, I have the impression that

12     the ABiH was in a position to intercept conversations of the Serbian

13     forces.  Is that true?  Was it true, as far as you know?

14        A.   Well, of course the BH Army was equipped with devices enabling it

15     to tap in to the Serbs and the HVO, and anybody else, for that matter.

16             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  And you, the HVO,

17     were you in a position to listen to the ABiH and the VRS, to intercept

18     their conversations?

19        A.   Yes, Your Honour, we were also able to intercept them, just as

20     they intercepted us.  Well, we had the same devices, the same equipment,

21     both the BH Army and the HVO.  The Serbs had stronger equipment than we

22     did.  And part of those communications, at a tactical level, was

23     something that we were able to intercept.

24             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Praljak.

25             THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honour

Page 49977

 1     Judge Antonetti, I think that when you say "intercept conversations,"

 2     that that's too broad.  Which conversations can be tapped into and which

 3     can't?  Because this way it appears that we knew too much about them and

 4     they knew too much about us.  There was several types of communication

 5     and conversations, and I'm sure General Petkovic knows what could be done

 6     and what could not be done, what could be intercepted and what couldn't.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, following

 8     General Praljak's technical intervention, when you listened to the ABiH

 9     and the VRS, what were you doing, exactly?  How were you doing this?

10        A.   Your Honours, we intercepted only radio communication.  And in

11     military terms, this is called "the tactical depth," which means not

12     further than seven or eight kilometres in depth.  Our equipment was not

13     able to intercept conversations further away.  So you had this device

14     that chooses its frequencies.  When it comes across a certain frequency,

15     it taps in to that conversation.  If it's interesting, it listens to the

16     conversation to the end, then records it, and then processes it further.

17     So the tactical level.  We intercepted for as much as the tactical level

18     was concerned, which was seven to eight kilometres in depth, not further

19     than that.  We weren't able to tap in to conversations further than that.

20     Those were the devices we had that could be used for that depth.  For

21     other depths, you would use other devices, or telephone communication

22     devices, et cetera.

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  So you were able to

24     engage in tactical interception of conversations.

25             Let's have a look at document 4D1344.  It's the 8th of May.

Page 49978

 1             The date is the 8th of May.  As you know, that's the day prior to

 2     the 9th of May.  It's a document signed by Mladic and Halilovic, and it

 3     confirms the desire to re-establish peace.  And as of noon on the 9th of

 4     May, there's to be a cease-fire.  All of this was done in the presence of

 5     General Morillon.  You, the HVO, were not associated in this matter --

 6     involved in the matter.

 7             How do you interpret this document?  Is there a link that can be

 8     made between the ABiH attack that you supported on the 9th of May in

 9     Mostar -- is there a link or not, or is it just a coincidence?

10        A.   Your Honour, I learned about this document on the 11th of May,

11     when I went to talk to Halilovic and General Morillon in Kiseljak.

12     Before the beginning of our meeting, General Morillon started first and

13     said that two days previously an agreement had been reached between

14     Mladic and Halilovic, with his presence -- in his presence, and that they

15     dealt with problems with forces in the eastern part of

16     Bosnia-Herzegovina, so that I knew -- or, rather, they told me that an

17     agreement had been reached then between Mladic and Halilovic.  I was just

18     angry when I told Halilovic -- I told Halilovic, when he interrupted our

19     stay in Jablanica and Konjic on the 5th, in the evening, he said he had

20     other things to attend to, he could have freely -- frankly told me that

21     he had negotiations with Mladic.  But on the 11th of May, they told me

22     quite openly, General Morillon and Halilovic, that is, that this meeting

23     had taken place because of the problems, as they said, between the two

24     armies in eastern -- the eastern part of Bosnia-Herzegovina, so that I

25     had been completely informed of their meeting and that they discussed

Page 49979

 1     matters.

 2             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

 3        A.   Now, as for the 9th of May, I don't want to speculate or make any

 4     conclusions.  I learnt about it three days later, three days after the

 5     agreement, that they had met and signed the agreement.  Nobody hid it

 6     from me.  And that was the practice, for General Morillon to ask for

 7     meetings, both bilateral and tripartite ones, depending on the problem

 8     that had to be discussed.

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  You say that you

10     learned about this on the 11th of May, but the agreement took place on

11     the 8th of May.  At no point in time did General Morillon phone you and

12     tell you, General Petkovic, there's going to be an agreement on a

13     cease-fire between Mladic and Halilovic; we're putting this into place,

14     and it will take place on the 9th of May -- it will come into force on

15     the 9th of May, at noon, and I encourage you to reach the same agreement

16     with Halilovic and Mladic?  Didn't he phone you to tell you something of

17     that nature?

18        A.   No, Your Honour, he didn't, he didn't phone me.  But before the

19     talks between myself and Halilovic, he said, quite frankly, Halilovic and

20     Mladic reached an agreement in my presence.

21             Now, after this agreement, on the 12th, I and Halilovic reached

22     an agreement, and then General Morillon said, Now it would be a good idea

23     if I had a third agreement.  And on the 16th of May, he convened a

24     meeting.  And we did, in fact, meet, Mladic and I, and signed the

25     agreement, so that at that moment from the 8th to the 16th of May, he had

Page 49980

 1     three bilateral agreements signed, because that's what his position was,

 2     and we complied.

 3             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, you

 4     participated in all those meetings that were held in Geneva.  Wouldn't it

 5     have been more interesting -- I don't know, it's just a hypothesis I am

 6     putting forth.  Wouldn't it have been more interesting for there to have

 7     been an agreement between Halilovic, Mladic and Petkovic, between these

 8     three signatories?  Wouldn't that have been better?

 9        A.   Your Honour, certainly it would have been better.  However,

10     General Morillon at that moment felt that it would be better, in view of

11     the overall situation -- and the HVO could not influence the events in

12     Eastern Bosnia towards the border with Serbia.  That's where there were

13     only the Bosnian Serb forces and the BH Army forces - although it does

14     say in the agreement that there would be a cease-fire throughout

15     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  But, anyway, General Morillon, in talking to them,

16     in consulting them, he wanted to try and calm the situation down, and

17     that is why he convened this bilateral meeting, just as he accepted to

18     chair the meeting between myself and Halilovic on the 11th.  And we

19     signed the agreement on the 12th of May and didn't consider it necessary

20     to include Mladic in that.  But subsequently he asked, when we already

21     had two agreements in the bag, that we could have a third.

22             And I flew to Sarajevo in his helicopter for the meeting with

23     Mladic, and I've already told you the outcome of that.  So he didn't hide

24     this from any of the three of us.  He wanted to have an agreement with

25     all three.

Page 49981

 1             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  The following

 2     document we've already seen, 4D457.  4D457.

 3             There's Mr. Izetbegovic's signature, which you can recognise.  It

 4     emanates from the president of the Presidency.

 5        A.   Yes, I do recognise it.

 6             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] This document says that ABiH

 7     units are in conflict with HVO units, and they must respect a cease-fire

 8     on the 10th of May, 1993, at 1800 hours.  So you are referred to in the

 9     document, because you have been ordered to immediately meet Halilovic in

10     order to establish the details of this order and how it should be

11     implemented, and also in order to return the relationship between the

12     units of the ABiH and the HVO to normal.

13             So in your opinion, what is the meaning of this document?

14        A.   Your Honours, this is a document which came into being after the

15     19th of May, on the basis of talks held at about 7.00 or 8.00 in the

16     evening on the 9th of May between Mr. Izetbegovic and Mr. Mate Boban,

17     when they agreed that on the 10th of May, they would issue a command --

18     that each of them would issue a command -- one was in Sarajevo and one

19     was in Grude, so they couldn't have issued a joint command.  But the next

20     one is an order from Boban which is identical to this particular order,

21     because we spent three hours harmonising and dovetailing it to make it as

22     similar as possible, both from Mr. Izetbegovic and from Mr. Boban.  And

23     it demands that conflicts in Mostar cease, that there should be a

24     cease-fire in Mostar.

25             And let me also add that on the basis of this, that meeting of

Page 49982

 1     mine on the 11th of May, which started in Kiseljak, continued on the 12th

 2     of May in Medjugorje and went on for three or four days with Halilovic in

 3     the Mostar and Medjugorje area.

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The following document is under

 5     seal.  I don't know why.  4D -- it shouldn't be broadcast to the outside.

 6     4D00456.  The same date, the 10th of May.  It's from Mate Boban.  And as

 7     you have just said, the two documents are almost identical if you compare

 8     them.

 9             What does this document state, General Petkovic?  In your

10     opinion, why is this document of interest?

11        A.   Judge Antonetti, Your Honour, it's the same document as

12     Mr. Izetbegovic's document, that is to say, for conflicts to cease

13     between the BH Army and the HVO in Mostar, and that I and Halilovic

14     should meet and draw up an agreement to fully bring about a cease-fire

15     and to resolve the situation.

16             Now, this document, if you're interested, let me tell you that I

17     and Mr. Boban were in Grude.  We were on the phone with Mr. Izetbegovic,

18     and we started with point 1 and then dovetailed it, fine-tuned it;

19     point 1, item 1, item 2, item 3, and so on.  And if you look at the two

20     documents, they're almost identical.  The heading is a little different,

21     because we introduced the agreement reached in Zagreb on the 25th of

22     April.  But, anyway, this document is the result of a three-hour

23     telephone conversation, because one man was in Sarajevo, the other was in

24     Grude.

25             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, is there a

Page 49983

 1     reason for which this document was drafted one second before 1800 hours,

 2     because you can see the hour is 1759 hours.  Is that quite accidental, or

 3     was there a desire to issue this document just a second before

 4     1800 hours?

 5        A.   Your Honours, no, this document was completed sometime around

 6     1.00 or 2.00 p.m.  This was obviously faxed to someone, and then this is

 7     the date when it was faxed.  Now, I took part in the compiling of this

 8     document, and I had communication with Sarajevo, and I know that by 2.00

 9     in the afternoon the two copies had been dovetailed and fine-tuned, and

10     then it was processed further.  So at this time, the 10th of May,

11     somebody sent the document to someone at 1759, so it doesn't matter --

12     there's no significance in this one-second difference between 1800 hours

13     and 1759.

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Let us see now document

15     4D00307.  It's a document by you, and it is 10 days later, that is, the

16     20th of May, 1993.  And it is addressed to General Wahlgren and

17     General Morillon, and it regards the Medjugorje Agreement and its

18     implementation.

19             Why did you send this document to Zagreb and to Morillon?

20        A.   Your Honour, after the agreement and Boban's order, and my

21     agreement with Halilovic, General Wahlgren, who was the commander of all

22     the forces for the former Yugoslavia, and therefore General Morillon's

23     superior, he joined in at this stage, and he wanted General Morillon and

24     UNPROFOR to assist as much as possible.  And that is why I felt it

25     necessary to inform General Wahlgren, who had got involved in the events

Page 49984

 1     in this area and who had an interest in dealing with the situation as

 2     soon as possible, and of course to General Morillon, as he was a

 3     co-signatory of the joint document.  And I'm saying here what the HVO had

 4     done.  I said that it had released all the civilians in the barracks.  I

 5     didn't say "all captured civilians," but "all civilians."  And I indicate

 6     everything else that the HVO has done.

 7             And I draw your attention to the last part of this.  It says that

 8     the forces of the ABiH have still not withdrawn from the Konjic sector,

 9     so UNPROFOR cannot patrol the Vrci village, Seonica-Podhum road, as

10     envisaged by the agreement, because the UNPROFOR said that the same day

11     it entered Mostar, it would enter the Konjic area as well, and they were

12     not able to enter, as we see on the 20th of May.  And my request is if

13     General Morillon could do something along those lines in agreement with

14     the other party.

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I shall pass on to document

16     948, which may clear up some events connected to the 30th of June.

17     4D948.  This is a document by you; hence, the interest of this document.

18     It's an order addressed to the South-East Operational Zone of

19     Herzegovina, as you can see.  And the preamble indicates that the

20     situation is such that there is a Muslim aggression, and their efforts

21     are to control and occupy the Neretva Valley.  And that is why you issue

22     an order indicating a series of measures.  And in point 2, you say that

23     you need to regroup forces in Bijelo Polje to prevent Muslim forces from

24     attacking.

25             In military terms, how is one to understand this document.

Page 49985

 1        A.   Your Honour Judge Antonetti, this document was drafted after

 2     intensive combat for Travnik had already been conducted and after the HVO

 3     was practically facing defeat in Travnik.  This document was then drafted

 4     because the HVO was about to be defeated in Konjic, too, and throughout

 5     that area.  This was also done after it came to light that the ABiH was

 6     sending some of its forces in the direction Mostar and as far as

 7     Dreznica.  At that time, there was no fighting that would be of concern

 8     in Bijelo Polje, Mostar, and in that area.  But I believed that those

 9     Muslim forces might at one point in time have been in a position of

10     attacking the HVO, so I warned the commander of the operative zone in

11     South-Eastern Herzegovina that he should find a way -- if we [as

12     interpreted] attacked from the axis of Jablanica-Bijelo Polje-Mostar, he

13     should find a way to have forces that could deal with it.  So it was a

14     warning -- an order in which a warning was given.  But at that point in

15     time, there was no fighting in the area.  It was just an order, the

16     purpose of which was to warn, given the situation that prevailed a little

17     further to the north of Bijelo Polje and further to the north from

18     Mostar.

19             MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I apologise, but

20     I think there's a critical error in the transcript.  In line 22 on

21     page 67, it says here that General Petkovic said "if we attack from the

22     axis Jablanica-Bijelo Polje-Mostar."  He said "if we were to be attacked

23     from the axis Jablanica-Bijelo Polje-Mostar," rather than the HVO

24     attacking.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Quite correct, Your Honour.  I said

Page 49986

 1     if the army were to attack HVO units in the area of Bijelo Polje, but

 2     from the direction of Jablanica-Dreznica towards Bijelo Polje.  Of

 3     course, I asked the 3rd Brigade also to be on the alert, and also to the

 4     2nd Brigade.

 5             But I am saying, once again, there's no fighting at this point in

 6     time in Bijelo Polje or Mostar.  This is a warning order, in view of what

 7     was happening to the north of this area.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You anticipated the question

 9     that I was going to put to you, but it should be in the transcript.

10             In this order, there is mention of raising the level of combat;

11     that is, to prepare for a potential event.  And I see, in point 8, when

12     you are asking for the fortification of lines, et cetera, so this

13     document is not an attack document.  Is it mobilising everyone?  "In the

14     event that ...," is that how we should read this document?

15        A.   Your Honour, yes.  Resources are being mobilised, in the event

16     they are attacked, and that is why it says that some other positions in

17     depth should be prepared, that is, 300 or 400 metres behind, and, Should

18     you be pushed back from that position, you continue the struggle from the

19     next position, which is a normal military procedure.

20             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, when there is

21     an order for an attack, in the order must there be mention of the time of

22     the attack?  Should there also be an indication of a system of

23     communication?  Should there also be other technical instructions so that

24     one can consider such an order to be an order for an attack?

25        A.   Quite so, Your Honour Judge Antonetti.  In an order for an

Page 49987

 1     attack, you have to indicate the exact date of the attack, the time of

 2     the attack, when you will launch it, will it be 4.00 a.m. or 5.00 a.m.,

 3     and you must also envisage the dynamics of the attack, how it will

 4     evolve.  And also in the assault units, the assault units have to be

 5     brought there at least 24 hours before the attack, that is, close to the

 6     line from which you will attack, and they must be on full combat alert,

 7     because it doesn't mean that if you say that you're going to launch the

 8     attack at 4.00 a.m., that you may not change your mind and say you will

 9     start it earlier.  But you have to give the date, the time, also the time

10     when the artillery will provide support by firing at the front end, also

11     the direction of the attack, the dynamics of the attack, and the ultimate

12     target of the attack.

13             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Should one also envisage a

14     reserve force?

15        A.   Absolutely so, Your Honours.  You don't launch an attack only

16     with the front-line forces.  There's the first echelon, then the second

17     echelon, and then there are also forces protecting the wings, and there

18     are also forces that may be infiltrated behind enemy lines to disorganise

19     him so that the front can -- front-lines can more successfully carry out

20     their task.

21             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Before the break:  In such an

22     order, should not one also envisage the weapons, a medical corps, food;

23     should not all these things be mentioned in the order?

24        A.   Your Honour, such an order is comprehensive.  First, you indicate

25     information about the enemy, his deployment.  Then you give assignments

Page 49988

 1     to your own forces.  Then, thirdly, the decision, what it is you wish to

 2     achieve.  And, fourthly, then you give assignments to each of your units.

 3     And then after, if you have tank support, you give tasks to the

 4     artillery, what its role is, when it will start to provide support.  It

 5     must have its own plan of action.  I'm surprised you didn't ask me any

 6     question about the Toplica diaries.  Then regarding the engineers, the

 7     communications, the logistics, the medical corps, security, et cetera.

 8     An order has more than 20 points covering everything.

 9             I hope that in the cross-examination of my counsel, we will show

10     such an order, and then we shall see.

11             Therefore, an order on an attack has a large number of points,

12     and it must cover everything, in terms of time and space.

13             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, very well.  I have focused

14     on a few principal points.  I could add also:  Should there be a

15     code-name?  But I didn't enter into the very minute technical details.

16             Anyway, after the break we'll look at document 4D702.  And before

17     the end of the day, that will be my last question, I will have a dozen or

18     so documents, depending on the speed of your answers.

19             So we'll meet again in 20 minutes.

20                           --- Recess taken at 12.34 p.m.

21                           --- On resuming at 12.57 p.m.

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The hearing is resumed.

23             A small correction of date.  As this morning we received planning

24     for the Coric Defence, Mr. Andabak will come from the 8th to the 11th of

25     March.  Therefore, the oral decision that we rendered this morning should

Page 49989

 1     take into account these dates, that is, the 8th to the 11th of March.

 2             General Petkovic, 4D702.  It's not on the screen yet.

 3             Here it is.  It's a document that you sent on the 30th of June -

 4     this is an important date - to Mr. Wahlgren and Morillon, and you refer

 5     to the issue of Muslims.  What I am interested in is on page 2 of the

 6     English version, where it appears that according to what you say, you

 7     informed General Morillon, on the 26th of June already, of the

 8     possibility that the Muslims may organise an attack -- an assault on the

 9     town of Mostar.  Do you see that?  The 26th of June, you told him this

10     orally.

11             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise.

13             On the 26th of June, 1993, General Morillon arrived in

14     Medjugorje, and he called us to come and discuss certain issues with him.

15     And I, among others, warned General Morillon of the possible danger in

16     Mostar, in view of all the events taking place in Central Bosnia and

17     Northern Herzegovina.  This is a period when Travnik had fully fallen, as

18     had Kakanj, on the 26th of June, except for a small area in Klis, Turije,

19     and Zabrdje.  We didn't have our forces at all in the territory of Konjic

20     municipality, and the forces of the ABiH were approaching Mostar

21     gradually.  I warned him of this danger, and suggesting that a meeting

22     could be organised with Halilovic, or for him simply to warn them of

23     this, to bear this in mind.  This was on the 26th of June, when he

24     visited Medjugorje.  And we had quite a lengthy conversation at the time.

25     And then I wrote a letter to Mr. Wahlgren as well, counting on him to

Page 49990

 1     talk to Mr. Izetbegovic and others, if possible, to prevent an attack by

 2     the ABiH on Mostar and the areas around it.

 3             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  I take note to what

 4     you have said.

 5             Therefore, this letter that you sent on the 30th of June, was its

 6     aim to explain to the international community what the situation was.

 7        A.   Absolutely so, Your Honour.  This was sent to them for them to

 8     learn about the situation.  And also on the 15th of June, when we signed

 9     the tripartite agreement, we took upon ourselves the obligation that,

10     through our officer -- liaison officer, we would immediately inform the

11     operative headquarters of UNPROFOR in Kiseljak on anything happening by

12     the opposing side.  This was a major move by the ABiH, and I personally

13     wrote this letter to General Wahlgren and to General Morillon.

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'm looking at the time.  We

15     have another 45 minutes.  Let us look at all the remaining maps.

16             Yes.

17             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Mr. Petkovic, I have a small question on this

18     letter.

19             You write about the, I quote, "so-called Army of Bosnia and

20     Herzegovina (BiH)."  Why do you say "so-called"?

21        A.   Your Honour Judge Trechsel, after everything that had happened, I

22     asked myself, Is that, indeed, the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or is

23     it not, and whether I belonged to such an army or not.

24             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you.

25             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar,

Page 49991

 1     4D502 [as interpreted].  It is a map that you headed "The situation in

 2     June 1993," and it is going to appear on the screen.

 3             Here it is.  Could you, in brief and in military terms, describe

 4     the situation, because you were the one who prepared this map.

 5        A.   Yes, Your Honour Judge Antonetti.  With this map, I wanted to

 6     show all the things that were happening in June 1993.

 7             So let me start with the beginning of June, Travnik, and part of

 8     the municipality of Novi Travnik.  The ABiH attacked units of the HVO,

 9     and by the 12th of June, the ABiH fully controlled Travnik.  Thousands of

10     Croats were expelled.  Kakanj, the red line is missing around Kakanj,

11     which is meant to indicate that on the 15th of June, Kakanj also fell;

12     that is, the ABiH took control of Kakanj, and 10.000 to 12.000 Croats

13     were expelled and sought refuge in the municipality of Vares.

14             Similarly, in June the ABiH attacked Vakuf.  In June, also, there

15     were the first attacks by the ABiH on Fojnica, but they didn't succeed in

16     gaining control of Fojnica.  And June was one of the worst months for all

17     the other Croatian enclaves in Bosnia and Herzegovina, starting with

18     Kiseljak, where symbolically I have these two circles, Kresevo, Busovaca,

19     Vitez, this whole series of markings for fierce fighting.

20             June was one of the most difficult months for the HVO in

21     Central Bosnia.  I think that was the final decision of the leadership of

22     the ABiH and Mr. Izetbegovic to settle accounts with the HVO in

23     Central Bosnia.

24             MR. STEWART:  Your Honour, could we just correct the transcript.

25     At page 73, line 10, this exhibit is given as "4D502," and it is 4D561 --

Page 49992

 1     I'm told 562.  I did have in mind it was 561, but there were probably two

 2     versions of it, then.  It's 562, apparently, is the actual one up on the

 3     screen.  Thank you.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And I would like to say that this

 5     means that Travnik, where there were HVO units and ABiH units, shows that

 6     Travnik was in the hands of the ABiH at the time, and there were no

 7     longer any Croats in the territory of the municipality of Travnik.  This

 8     also concerns parts of the municipality of Novi Travnik, which is near

 9     the line with the Army of Republika Srpska.  The Croats were expelled

10     from that area.  The ABiH took control of Travnik, of part of

11     Novi Travnik municipality, and they took full control of the Kakanj area

12     too.  So this is how I would depict it, symbolically.

13             Our enclave, our HVO enclave, moved in this direction [marks],

14     and this is the enclave -- they didn't take Fojnica at the time, so it

15     was -- the HVO was still present there in June.  And Konjic can't even be

16     seen here, apart from a small part in Klis.  We've seen that, but Konjic

17     isn't here.  These were the first attacks on Vakuf, and it was a

18     preparation for a subsequent attack in July that was launched against

19     Bugojno.

20             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, could we have an

21     IC number.

22             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, the marked portion of document

23     4D00562 shall be given Exhibit IC01183.  Thank you, Your Honours.

24             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  We will move on to

25     the Mostar map before the 30th of June.  4D621.

Page 49993

 1             We have the map there.  General Petkovic, we have Mostar here.

 2     Could you comment on the map that you have, that you, yourself, made?

 3        A.   Your Honour, this was prior to the 30th of June.  It's the

 4     situation when the HVO and the ABiH were together at a joint line facing

 5     the VRS, and that line extended, well, from the 4th Battalion -- from

 6     their 4th Battalion - I'll draw it here below this point [marks] - the

 7     2nd HVO Brigade is defending this line [indicates], they continue to

 8     Mostar, above Mostar.  The 1st Brigade of the ABiH comes to the line with

 9     its three battalions.  Then the HVO 3rd Brigade is at the line facing the

10     Serbs here [indicates], and then we reach Blagaj.  There's an independent

11     battalion of the ABiH here.  It's called Sargan, and they continue to

12     hold the line facing the Army of Republika Srpska, the VRS.  That is the

13     joint line that we held before the 30th of June together with the ABiH.

14     The HVO and the ABiH held that line.

15             If you take this red line here [marks], you could say it's the

16     line of the VRS.  I will mark it in this way so that you can see that it

17     is the line of the VRS [marks].

18             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'll ask the Registrar to

19     provide a number for the document, and then I have a question for you.

20             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honour, the marked version of document

21     4D00621 shall be given Exhibit IC01184.  Thank you, Your Honours.

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, you said that

23     there was the 1st ABiH Brigade, the 2nd HVO Brigade, the 3rd HVO Brigade

24     deployed at certain positions, et cetera.  What I would like to know is:

25     at the time could a Muslim or Croat civilian move around freely from the

Page 49994

 1     north to the south, and in the opposite direction too?  Could they do

 2     this in the areas that we can see in green and in blue?

 3        A.   Your Honour Judge Antonetti, green -- the green colour and the

 4     blue are symbolical.  You're supposed to be able to see the entire area.

 5     The army was at the lines that I have already shown.  The army wasn't in

 6     the depth.  Everyone who needed to move from Mostar towards Bijelo Polje

 7     and further on could do so, or from Mostar to the south in the direction

 8     of Blagaj.  They could also move in that direction.  It was a joint line,

 9     the forces were joint forces, and I see no reason for this not to be

10     possible.

11             Similarly, the HVO could freely enter the barracks, the

12     Northern Camp that is here where I have stated that it's the 1st Brigade.

13     They could enter that area.  They could go over Tito's Bridge and enter

14     the Northern Camp.  It wasn't a problem.  So if it was necessary for

15     someone to go in one direction or another in this area, it was possible

16     for that person to do so quite freely.  If the authorities allowed this,

17     organised groups of people could move around.  Otherwise, that wouldn't

18     be the case.  I mean the authorities in Eastern Mostar.

19             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Try and be concise, because I

20     have other maps and I would like to conclude.

21             4D622 is the following map.  It's the situation in Mostar after

22     the 30th of June, 1992.

23             Could you comment on this map, since we can see the markings

24     "VRS," "ABiH," "HVO"?  What does this map mean?

25        A.   Your Honour, in relation to the previous map, this map means that

Page 49995

 1     between Eastern Mostar, Bijelo Polje, Dreznica, and Jablanica, there are

 2     no HVO units.  That entire area is now under the control of members of

 3     the ABiH.  The HVO has been driven out to the western bank of the

 4     Neretva River.  The VRS remained at the positions that it had previously

 5     occupied.

 6             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  So you're saying

 7     that one should conclude that the HVO had been driven back and that the

 8     ABiH had control over the entire area depicted in green.  My question:

 9     Could a civilian from East Mostar go to the north or to the south through

10     territory that was under ABiH control?

11        A.   That's correct, Judge Antonetti.  A civilian could move through

12     that territory, because in that territory there was no longer an HVO

13     presence.  No one was there, apart from the ABiH.  The ABiH regulated

14     movement and decided how many people could pass through that area.

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  We'll move on to

16     the map on Mostar, Jablanica and Konjic.  It's 4D1216.  We'll see it in a

17     minute.  It depicts the situation up until the 30th of June, and then

18     there's the situation on the 30th of June.

19             There it is, we have the map.  Could you comment on this map,

20     which, according to you, depicts the situation in the area prior to the

21     30th of June, or up until the 30th, of June, as you like?

22        A.   The positions of the VRS is identical to the positions it had a

23     few months earlier.  These are the positions occupied by the VRS.  If you

24     start from the south, this line here [indicates] is a line that was under

25     the control of an ABiH battalion, it faced the Serbs.  This blue line

Page 49996

 1     here [indicates] was held by the 3rd Brigade of the HVO.  I don't know

 2     why this pencil -- this pen isn't working.  This is the line that was

 3     held by the 1st Mostar Brigade.

 4             Could you please provide --

 5             THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] If the pen doesn't work, we

 6     can't see what he is showing.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I hope that it will work now.  I'll

 8     try to sign -- no, it's not working.

 9             It's probably all right now.

10             It's not working, but I can explain the situation.

11             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Perhaps the map could be put on the ELMO, and

12     another --

13             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We could place it on the ELMO.

14     Wait, I'll give you my map.  Put it on the ELMO.

15             THE WITNESS:  Your Honour Judge Antonetti, I'll mark the Serbian

16     line first, the line held by the Serbs [marks].  These are the positions

17     of the VRS, as I have already said.  They didn't change for a very long

18     time, and they held these positions here.

19             Now I will mark the positions and the lines under the control of

20     HVO units [marks].  So this double line represents the line occupied by

21     the HVO units, the 2nd Brigade of the HVO.

22             And now I'll show the position of the 3rd Brigade [marks].  To

23     the north, near Konjic, there's a small enclave.  I'd like to correct

24     this, because a witness quite rightly observed something.  This enclave

25     borders on these positions here [marks], borders on the village of

Page 49997

 1     Prevlje, borders on the position of the VRS.  So this shows the situation

 2     correctly now.

 3             Together with the HVO, lines were held by members of the ABiH in

 4     areas where their units had been deployed.  So I want to show you that

 5     situation too.  This the Blagaj area [marks].  This is the Mostar area,

 6     it's the slopes above Mostar, which is where the 1st Brigade was located

 7     together with its three battalions [marks].  This part here was under the

 8     control of the 4th Battalion of the 1st Mostar Brigade.  We also called

 9     it the Dreznica Battalion.

10             MR. STEWART:  Your Honour, could I say that, as has often

11     happened in the past, at the moment we're not getting, as we go along,

12     any clear link between the transcript and the map that we're going to be

13     able to follow in the future, because the words "here" and "there" are

14     perfectly comprehensible right now, as we're watching Mr. Petkovic do it,

15     but they won't be when we're later looking at the transcript.

16             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'll mark this again once I've

17     completed the line [marks].  This area that I have just marked was under

18     the control of units the Municipality Defence Staff of Jablanica.

19             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] If you mark it with a letter or

20     a number, that will help us find the place in the transcript that is

21     concerned, the relevant place in the transcript.

22        A.   Your Honour, I'll start from the south.  Number 1 is Blagaj

23     [marks], the battalion of the ABiH in Blagaj.  Number 2 [marks], in the

24     area of Mostar, the line towards the Serbs is held by the 1st Mostar

25     Brigade.  Number 3 [marks], the front-line towards the Serbs, is held by

Page 49998

 1     the 4th Battalion of the 1st Mostar Brigade, or the Dreznica Battalion.

 2     Number 4 [marks] is being held by the Municipal Defence Staff of

 3     Jablanica of the ABiH.  And number 5 [marks], I've put number 5 in two

 4     places.  That is the front towards the Serbs held by the 7th Brigade of

 5     the ABiH.

 6             So all the numbers I have indicated refer to the Army of the

 7     Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that is the joint front-line held

 8     up until the 30th of June by members of the Army of the Republic of

 9     Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Defence Council in the area north

10     of Konjic, across the territory of Jablanica municipality and the

11     territory of Mostar municipality.

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  Could you sign the

13     map, please.

14        A.   [Marks]

15             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, take the map,

16     please, and give it a number.

17             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, the marked version of document

18     4D01216 shall be given Exhibit IC01185.  Thank you, Your Honours.

19             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The next map that will be

20     placed under the ELMO is 4D1207 -- 1217, I'm sorry.  And using the ELMO,

21     we'll be saving some time.

22             So we're still in the same geographic area on the 30th of June.

23     Could you explain the situation exactly as it was on the 30th of June?

24        A.   On the 30th of June, Your Honours, after the Army of Bosnia and

25     Herzegovina captured HVO positions north of Mostar and certain positions

Page 49999

 1     south of Mostar, the situation was as follows:  The Army of

 2     Republika Srpska held the same positions [marks].  I have marked in red

 3     the positions of the Army of Republika Srpska.  I shall now mark the

 4     positions towards the Serbs held by the Army of the Republic of Bosnia

 5     and Herzegovina [marks].  This line tells us that facing the Army of

 6     Republika Srpska, after the 30th of June, in the area from Konjic, across

 7     Jablanica municipality, up to Mostar, Eastern Mostar, and Blagaj, there

 8     are no units of the HVO; that is, HVO units in this area have no contact

 9     with the Army of Republika Srpska, and they organised a new front-line on

10     the west bank of the Neretva.

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Could you sign the map, please.

12        A.   [Marks]

13             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, can we have a

14     number for this map.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This colour --

16             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Mr. Petkovic.  Mr. Petkovic, just a question of

17     detail.

18             In an earlier map -- can you take the ELMO -- the map a bit down

19     on the ELMO?  No, that's up.  Down, yes.

20             The enclave of the HVO shown north of the white spot, you have

21     indicated that there was a mistake, because it was actually up to the

22     line of the Serbs.  Would that still be true?  So I think it would be

23     correct if you also put in this correction.  Thank you.

24        A.   Yes, Your Honour, thank you [marks].  Let me just strengthen the

25     red line to mark it more visible [marks].  Thank you for your

Page 50000

 1     indications.

 2             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, a number.

 3             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour.

 4             The marked portion of document 4D01217 shall be given

 5     Exhibit IC01186.  Thank you, Your Honours.

 6             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

 7             There are two other maps, the situation in July 1993.  Under the

 8     ELMO, please.  The document -- I don't have the number now.  4D -- I

 9     can't remember the number.  563, 563.  4D563, yes.

10             General Petkovic, will you please comment on this map showing the

11     situation in July?

12        A.   Your Honours, I can.  [Marks].  The Army of Bosnia and

13     Herzegovina, in June, captured Travnik.  And in July, the HVO did not

14     return to Travnik, so the HVO has been expelled, the military as well as

15     the civilians, and it is in the hands of the ABiH.  [Marks].  The same

16     applies to the municipality of Kakanj.

17             I will sign as soon as I explain.

18             Kakanj and the municipality of Fojnica are fully under the

19     control of the ABiH.  And the little blue enclaves that remain, I can

20     mark them with numbers, if you wish.  They are the remaining Croat

21     enclaves.

22             And I forgot to add that Konjic, too, with the exception of a

23     very small area which I will mark in blue [marks], is all that remains of

24     the Croatian enclave, just symbolically.  So you see it is next to

25     Konjic.  This is the situation as it was in July 1993.

Page 50001

 1             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please sign, and we will have a

 2     number.

 3        A.   [Marks].  But I wish to point out that 90 per cent of Bugojno had

 4     already fell.  But if necessary, we can mark that on the next map,

 5     because on the 2nd of August Bugojno was left without any Croats.  They

 6     were expelled.

 7             THE REGISTRAR:  Your Honours, the marked portion of document

 8     4D00563 shall be given Exhibit IC01187.  Thank you, Your Honours.

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We have September, and then we

10     also have November, and that will be the end of it.  Yes, the number is

11     564, 4D564.

12        A.   Your Honour, the situation was as follows at the time indicated

13     [marks].  I have marked all the places in Central Bosnia and Herzegovina

14     from which, militarily, the HVO was defeated and the Croat inhabitants

15     expelled from these areas.  But in the area of Konjic, I have to put a

16     little dot to indicate an enclave [marks].

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar.

18             THE REGISTRAR:  Yes, Your Honour.

19             The document just marked by the witness, which is 4D00564, shall

20     be given Exhibit IC01188.  Thank you, Your Honours.

21             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And the last map, it is 4D567.

22        A.   Your Honours, on this map we have a presentation of everything.

23     I have nothing to add.  All the places have been crossed out, Bugojno,

24     Novi Travnik, Travnik, part of Zenica, Vares, Fojnica, Konjic, other

25     places from which the Croats were expelled and no HVO forces are there.

Page 50002

 1     The HVO has been defeated by the ABiH.  And the little dot remains in

 2     Konjic.  And we see the number of inhabitants who were in those places,

 3     but were expelled by the Army of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 4     This is the situation in November [marks].

 5             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Could the general tell us which

 6     inhabitants he's referring to.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Croat inhabitants, Croat

 8     inhabitants who were expelled from all these places here, and that is the

 9     situation in November 1993.  These two enclaves in Central Bosnia remain

10     as such.

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The numbers appearing on the

12     map are numbers indicating the Croats who were expelled from the areas.

13     For example, for Travnik, according to you, there were 25.000; Vares,

14     9.000; et cetera.  Is that right?

15        A.   Yes, Your Honours.  Those are roughly accurate data.  They are

16     not smaller than this.  There may be more.  I don't know how many Croats

17     from other areas may have come to Vares and were then expelled.  The

18     Croats from Kakanj were no longer in Vares.  They went further on and

19     they disappeared from this area.  Konjic had about as many Croats who

20     came from other areas, but they left the whole region.  They were

21     expelled from this region.  So UNPROFOR says that the Croats left, and

22     for the Bosnians, they say that they were expelled.  Then there were

23     local Croats plus those who came from Serb-controlled areas.  There were

24     25.000 in Travnik, and now there's not a single one left.  Unfortunately,

25     even now there are none, with the exception of a few hundred.

Page 50003

 1             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] A number, please.

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  Document 4D00567 just marked by the witness shall

 3     be given Exhibit IC01189.  Thank you.

 4             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  A very small question, and you don't need the

 5     map.

 6             Mr. Petkovic, how did these figures come about?  Are these your

 7     estimates, are they in some other official document?  Could you tell us,

 8     please?

 9        A.   Your Honours, Judge Trechsel, these documents and these figures

10     were kept in our Office for Refugees and Displaced Persons, and an

11     analytical team attached to Mr. Boban's office monitored the expulsion of

12     Croats and kept records on the total number of Croats expelled, those who

13     had lived there, those who had earlier on fled from the Serbs and settled

14     there, and then they were expelled together with the locals from that

15     area.

16             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you.

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, thank you for

18     having answered my questions.  I intended to use two days.

19     Unfortunately, it has extended to three days.  There were rulings to be

20     handed down, objections, and so on, so I was a bit longer than I had

21     planned.  Thank you for answering my questions.  I asked you about your

22     positions, specifying things with the help of some documents on some

23     occasions.  That is what I wanted to tell you.

24             Before closing, a small precision regarding

25     Witness Miroslav Desnica, who will be testifying on the 8th of March,

Page 50004

 1     2010, and not on the 2nd of March.

 2             Mr. Prlic.

 3             THE ACCUSED PRLIC:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 4             On the last break, a few of us heard for the party.  Since we

 5     are, for obvious and understandable reason, are not invited, others who

 6     have spent the last four years are, allow me to convey on this, the only

 7     way, our best wishes for your 80th birthday, which was actually

 8     yesterday, as I heard.  So happy birthday, Mr. Prandler, and take care.

 9             JUDGE PRANDLER:  I'm very much in a situation that it is

10     difficult for me to answer to you, besides thanking you for your very

11     kind words.  I am really sorry that you are not invited, but it is the

12     rules of the game, and I cannot alter those rules, of course.  But I wish

13     everyone here in the courtroom all the best, and thanking them for their

14     co-operation and their spirit of friendly relations, if at all it exists

15     in a courtroom.  So thank you, and I really thank, actually, Mr. Prlic

16     for his nice words.

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Praljak.

18             THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have

19     something quite different to raise.

20             It will be probably my turn tomorrow, so I appeal that in view of

21     the hundreds of millions of dollars that are being spent, and that a pen

22     isn't working, and when a film is being shown, it will and will not, and

23     then we give in and you give in, so if we had acted in this way in

24     wartime conditions, there would have been an additional 100.000 dead.

25             Yesterday, I mentioned the word "professionalism," which means,

Page 50005

 1     (a), to know your job, and, two, to do it honestly for the salary you

 2     receive, so let them act in that way.

 3             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, make sure that

 4     tomorrow that the pen is working.

 5             Mr. Kovacic.

 6             MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I apologise for

 7     standing at the last moment.  But we tried to deal with it directly in

 8     communication with the Detention Unit by e-mail, but we received no

 9     reply.  So if you could ask from the Registry to make it possible, when

10     the accused return to the Detention Unit, for General Praljak to take two

11     bulbs, because he needs those bulbs to be able to read the documents

12     overnight.  We brought those electric bulbs.  The guards said we could,

13     and now, according to the Rules, we cannot send them to him.  So could

14     the Registrar intervene so that we give those electric bulbs to

15     General Praljak.  Of course, the guards would assist us here, but the

16     guards in the Detention Unit do not allow it.

17             Thank you very much.

18             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Would the Registrar please

19     forward this request so that I don't have to go and buy some bulbs

20     myself.  It will be done, Mr. Registrar.

21             Tomorrow, we will have the cross-examination by the other Defence

22     counsel.  I wish you all a good evening, good afternoon, and we meet

23     again tomorrow at 9:00 a.m.

24                           [The accused stands down]

25                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.49 p.m.,

Page 50006

 1                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 25th day of

 2                           February, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.