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Page 50009

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. I'll ask my

2 colleagues.

3 But General Praljak.

4 THE ACCUSED PRALJAK: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I think 36

5 minutes, on the basis of 6 hours, but as Ms. Alaburic had an additional

6 20 minutes, that's an extra four minutes per Defence team. So 40 minutes

7 would be the basis, I believe. Thank you.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I will ask my colleagues

9 whether they agree that we should grant Mr. Karnavas an additional 15

10 minutes.

11 [Trial Chamber confers]

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, that's not a problem.

13 Mr. Karnavas, you will have the additional time you have requested.

14 MR. KARNAVAS: I take it I can proceed, then. May I proceed,

15 Your Honour?

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, you may.

17 WITNESS: MILIVOJ PETKOVIC [Resumed]

18 [The witness answered through interpreter]

19 Cross-examination by Mr. Karnavas:

20 Q. Good morning, General.

21 A. Good morning.

22 Q. First, I just want to ask you one particular question that came

23 up during Judge Antonetti's questioning, when he specifically was going

24 through the various accused. And in asking you a question concretely

25 about Dr. Jadranko Prlic, I noticed that when you answered, you indicated

Page 50010

1 that the executive authority -- the executive council, did not have any

2 authority over the military in any direct fashion. But I want to go back

3 and ask you the question that was originally asked by Judge Antonetti,

4 and that is: Did Dr. Jadranko Prlic, in person, did he have any control

5 over the Main Staff?

6 A. Your Honours, Jadranko Prlic did not personally have any control

7 over the Main Staff, but he did through his intermediaries.

8 Q. Did he give you any orders?

9 A. As for specific orders, no specific orders were issued by

10 Jadranko Prlic to me.

11 Q. Did he give you -- did he give you any operative orders,

12 specifically?

13 A. Jadranko Prlic didn't give operative orders to me. The operative

14 part should have gone through the authorities, through the Defence

15 Department, and then it should have been conveyed to the Main Staff.

16 Q. All right. And the supreme commander again was who?

17 A. Mr. Boban.

18 Q. Boban had the right and had the authority to give operative

19 orders?

20 A. Yes, that's correct.

21 Q. He did so?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. In fact, he did so often bypassing you or the Main Staff?

24 A. There were such situations.

25 Q. All right. And did he inform you in advance that he was going to

Page 50011

1 be issuing an order or did you learn of it thereafter?

2 A. No, there wouldn't be such information, because otherwise the

3 procedure would have been completely different.

4 Q. Very well. Now, we heard testimony from a particular witness

5 under the pseudonym of BF, and he came here and testified sometime in

6 2008. I believe it was September. And he indicated -- there was a

7 discussion concerning the 18 April 1993 meeting that took place in

8 Mostar. Do you recall that meeting?

9 A. Yes, I remember that meeting very well. It was chaired by

10 General Pellnas, Mr. Thebault, and another representative whose name I

11 can't remember. The political representative of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

12 Mr. Granic, was there, Mr. Boras, Mr. Prlic, and I attended that meeting

13 too. As for whether any other lower-ranking officials were there, I

14 can't remember. I also forgot to mention Pasalic from the 4th Corps.

15 Q. Very well. Now, as I understand it, you showed up at the meeting

16 with Dr. Jadranko Prlic. Is that correct? You arrived together?

17 A. Yes. Mr. Prlic had to pass by the Main Staff, and he said that

18 in order to avoid using two cars, I should accompany him. And we arrived

19 in front of the hospital in his car, and that is where the meeting was

20 being held.

21 Q. All right. And that's what I want to speak about. So the fact

22 that you arrived with Dr. Jadranko Prlic was not because he was in charge

23 of you or you were his subordinate, but, rather, he was merely giving you

24 a ride and you both showed up at the same time; correct?

25 A. Well, Jadranko Prlic, in that context, represented our

Page 50012

1 delegation. That's the information we received from Zagreb, information

2 as to who would be part of the delegation. And he gave me a lift so that

3 we could avoid using two cars.

4 Q. Very well.

5 A. When I say "from Zagreb," I'm thinking of Boban, who was in

6 Zagreb at the time. I wouldn't want you to take this differently.

7 Q. All right. Now, we'll move on to some other matters that I

8 wanted to discuss.

9 And we met prior to coming -- prior to your testimony; is that

10 correct? I came to visit you at the UNDU, with consultation with your

11 attorney?

12 A. Yes, that's quite right.

13 Q. Ms. Tomanovic was there, as well as Ms. Alaburic?

14 A. Yes, the two of you and my counsel and myself. There were four

15 of us.

16 Q. All right. So just to make sure that the record is correct, it

17 was Ms. Tomanovic, who is my co-counsel, and your counsel, Ms. Alaburic?

18 A. Yes, Tomanovic, yourself, Ms. Alaburic and myself. As far as

19 I can remember, the four of us. I didn't see a fifth person.

20 Q. I'm just trying to correct the record. There are no trick

21 questions here. And during that time, we presented you with some

22 transcripts of videos and asked you to look at them; correct?

23 A. Yes, that's right.

24 Q. The purpose for asking you to look at those transcripts was to

25 see whether you had any familiarity with the videos; correct?

Page 50013

1 A. Yes, that's correct. When I had a look at the transcripts, I

2 remembered the time and the context within which certain things happened.

3 Q. All right. And that's the purpose now of the following few

4 questions that I have.

5 If we could -- we'll go to the first video, which is dated 17

6 August 1992, and this is 1D02078. 1D02078. I'm just going to play the

7 first segment just for purposes of seeing whether you can recognise --

8 we're going to listen to just a couple of --

9 [Video-clip played]

10 MR. KARNAVAS: We can stop right here.

11 Apparently there's no translation. Now, for purposes of this

12 questioning, we did provide transcripts, both in English and in B/C/S, to

13 Your Honours - everyone else should have them - and also to the

14 translation booths. So I don't know why there's no translation.

15 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel give the interpreters a

16 reference, please.

17 MR. KARNAVAS: All right. My error. That would have been page 1

18 of 1D02078. I don't think it's necessary for us to re-listen to it, but

19 it's basically the first paragraph, where there's an introduction, and we

20 ended where the gentleman is describing the purpose -- you know, what he

21 proposes:

22 "I propose that we start by viewing a video-clip..."

23 And so on. That's where we stopped.

24 THE INTERPRETER: We have found it, thank you.

25 MR. KARNAVAS: All right.

Page 50014

1 Q. My question is: General, do you recognise this video-clip? And

2 if so, how?

3 A. Your Honours, yes, I recognise this video-clip. It was the

4 second time these participants appeared in this programme. I can see

5 people I know, the journalist Sagolj to the left. Mr. Pelivan is there.

6 That was the first time I saw him over the TV. I hadn't seen him live

7 before. Mr. Soljic in the white shirt, I know him. Mr. Prlic, I met

8 him. Mr. Mariofil Ljubic, and the last person is Mr. Ignac Kostroman.

9 But Mr. Pelivan and Mr. Ljubic were representatives of the Croatian

10 people at the time in the Government of the Republic of Bosnia and

11 Herzegovina.

12 Q. Do you recall when you saw this video? Was it when it was aired

13 or sometime thereafter?

14 A. I think this discussion was broadcast through the Zagreb

15 Television studio. I believe that this was broadcast from a studio in

16 Split, this particular clip was broadcast through a studio in Split. I

17 just assume that that is the case.

18 Q. Now, if we go to the second segment, and this would be on page 4

19 on the English copy, and it would be on page 7 of the B/C/S for those who

20 are helping us out in the booth. If we could show that second segment,

21 please.

22 [Video-clip played]

23 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "The HVO is a civilian authority,

24 the temporary authority of the HZ-HB. That should be clear. There is an

25 overlapping of terms. The HVO is also used for military units that work

Page 50015

1 in this area, and the same term is the term used for the temporary

2 authorities. The temporary executive authorities were selected by the

3 Presidencies -- or the War Presidents of municipalities, so in this

4 matter the legitimacy has been assured of that temporary executive

5 authority. In all its documents, it states that these are temporary

6 acts, it takes temporary decisions, it respects the laws of the

7 republics.

8 "And in the preamble of all those decisions, it refers to

9 decisions concerning the introduction of the state of war, the imminent

10 threat of war, and to the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina. All

11 the documents, all the headings, feature the Republic of Bosnia and

12 Herzegovina, and in no case should it be taken to be, and this is very

13 often stressed, that the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna means a

14 certain break-up of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In no case -- I believe that it

15 constitutes one road -- one direction towards sustaining the statehood of

16 Bosnia and Herzegovina and the materialisation of the interests of the

17 Croatian and other constituent peoples living in it in an equal manner."

18 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay, thank you.

19 Q. Now, having heard what Dr. Jadranko Prlic said back then, which

20 would have been August 17, 1992, was that your understanding as far as

21 the difference between the HVO and the HVO HZ-HB?

22 A. Yes, Your Honours, that's what I, too, said at the beginning. I

23 first wondered what the HVO one was, what the other HVO was, and then I

24 understood that the HVO was civilian authorities and then you have HVO as

25 a military authority. I also knew that the civilian authorities, and

Page 50016

1 Herceg-Bosna as a whole, was created because of the military state of

2 war, the imminent state of war, because of the state of war, as I said,

3 and it was necessary to organise for the defence of the territory of the

4 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially in places where the Croats

5 were in the majority. Those were some of the duties of the leadership of

6 the Croats.

7 It's also correct that in all briefs, memorandums, you have the

8 heading "The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina," and reference was made

9 to certain provisions of the laws of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

10 MR. KARNAVAS: All right. If we could look at the next segment,

11 and that would be on page 6 in the English version and page 9 on the

12 B/C/S version. And I want to make sure that the Trial Chamber

13 understands that I've selected --

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas.

15 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I don't want to interrupt you

17 the rhythm of your cross-examination, but perhaps it would be useful.

18 Following Mr. Prlic's intervention, there's a journalist -- the

19 journalist who returns to the issue of the legitimacy or illegality of

20 Herceg-Bosna, and Mr. Kostroman responds to that. So that could be of

21 interest. If you like, we could perhaps listen to what Mr. Kostroman has

22 to say. It might be of interest.

23 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes, and I was just about to say, Your Honours,

24 that because of time limitations, I've had to edit and edit and edit, and

25 I don't want to give the impression that we're being selective in what

Page 50017

1 we're trying to present, because we're going to be forwarding for

2 admission the entire video. But I think that would be good, and

3 that's -- I believe it's immediately following what Mr. Prlic has said.

4 So if you could play -- continue.

5 [Video-clip played]

6 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Mr. Kostroman, often also the

7 Croatian representatives in the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina say that

8 Herceg-Bosna is illegal and illegitimate.

9 "Well, the basic cause of the disagreement between existing

10 authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Croatian Defence Council and

11 the organs of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna lies precisely in

12 the lack of preparedness --"

13 MR. KARNAVAS: Apparently no one is getting any translation. I

14 had to use a time-out signal.

15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] He played

16 basket [as interpreted] in his youth, Mr. Karnavas played basketball in

17 his youth, so he wants us to stop and then proceed and stop.

18 Yes, the interpreters wanted to have the reference. It's page 5.

19 It's after what Mr. Prlic said. The journalist then puts a question.

20 The interpreters, therefore, have the document now.

21 MR. KARNAVAS: All right. We'll start again where we left off.

22 There's no sound now. There's no sound.

23 [Video-clip played]

24 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Well, the basic cause of the

25 disagreement between the existing authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Page 50018

1 and the Croatian Defence Council and the organs of the Croatian Community

2 of Herceg-Bosna lies precisely in the lack of preparedness of the

3 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its organs for this war.

4 Evidently, this war caught the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina

5 unprepared, as if it had come out of the blue, as if it had not been

6 obvious as to what was going on. And this is simply incomprehensible

7 that a week before the start of the war, the president of the state

8 should have stated that the army was the only guarantor of peace in

9 Bosnia and Herzegovina. And this is where the basic causes of all that

10 is happening should be looked for.

11 However, the Croatian Defence Council did not wait, like others

12 did in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to see what would happen, and we had been

13 preparing for this war before. And it is precisely our readiness, even

14 before the start of this war, that resulted in the free areas of the

15 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna. And the result of everything that is

16 happening now is that we are ahead of the Bosnia and Herzegovina

17 authorities."

18 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honours, did you want to pose a question or

19 should I pose the question?

20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, you've heard

21 Mr. Kostroman's claim that he supported the documents, and Mr. Prlic and

22 Mr. Kostroman didn't have any papers in front of them from which they

23 were reading, so the answers were direct, as far as I heard, because as

24 you may well imagine, I have just come to know about this document, and I

25 have the impression that Mr. Kostroman is saying the following: He's

Page 50019

1 saying that President Izetbegovic, one week prior to the declaration of a

2 state of war, said, There is an army, and he seems to be discovering the

3 moon, whereas the HVO had been preparing itself for a long time. So he

4 says that there is a distortion between the authorities of Herzegovina

5 and the HVO -- of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the HVO, which would be

6 linked to the declaration of a state of war, and this justifies, in his

7 opinion, the fact that the HVO is legitimate and legal. What do you say

8 about that?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, first, when reference

10 is made here to the fact that the president of state, Mr. Izetbegovic,

11 says that the army is the only guarantor of peace, well, at the time

12 President Izetbegovic thought that the army in question was the JNA, that

13 they would guarantee the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and

14 General Pokanjac (phoen) would also guarantee the peace, as the main

15 commander. So he believed that at the time the JNA would really

16 guarantee the peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That is the army that

17 Izetbegovic had faith in. And these are the misunderstandings that

18 occurred when trying to understand how the army would act. It was a

19 difference in understanding between Izetbegovic and the Croatian

20 authorities.

21 And finally that very same army, a few days later, the army he

22 had faith in, detained him at the Sarajevo Airport. That was the

23 problem. He believed in the JNA. The Croatian leadership said, Don't

24 believe in them, don't have faith in them. What happened in Croatian

25 Slovenia will happen here, too.

Page 50020

1 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour. I apologise to Mr. Karnavas

2 for the interruption, but a technical or a date matter.

3 I think, unless I misunderstood, which is always possible, the

4 date given for this transcript -- or this event that's being recorded is,

5 I think, in April of 1992, it was said at one point --

6 MR. KARNAVAS: 17 August.

7 MR. SCOTT: 17 August. And I believe it should be -- I would

8 suggest, based on the context and some of the things that are being said,

9 and the positions of these people, that this is 1993; is that correct?

10 MR. KARNAVAS: 1992.

11 MR. SCOTT: I believe -- well, I believe, Your Honour, and I'll

12 just put it -- it's perhaps further checking, but I believe that further

13 investigation would show that this is dated in 1993. Mr. Prlic refers to

14 being elected president the day before, and he was elected president in

15 August of 1993, at least of the republic. But I'll stand to be

16 corrected, but perhaps Mr. Karnavas can assist us further.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I assist, because I think

18 you're wrong by a whole year. This was in 1992, and all of this applies

19 to 1992 and the beginning of the organisation of the defence of parts of

20 Bosnia and Herzegovina, when Mr. Izetbegovic publicly states that the JNA

21 was the guarantor of peace and stability in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Unless I am mistaken, in the

23 document there is an indisputable material point. When the journalist

24 introduces the participants, he says that Mr. Prlic was elected on

25 Friday. Therefore, this must be -- Mr. Registrar, when I say something

Page 50021

1 of importance, as if by chance things stop working. I shall repeat

2 myself.

3 Is it okay now? Yes. I'm repeating.

4 In the transcript that we have of the interview, the journalist

5 who is present, the one who is interviewing Mr. Pelivan, et cetera, and

6 with regard to Mr. Prlic, he says that he was elected on Friday and that

7 this is his first interview or appearance. So it cannot be any other

8 date except August 1992.

9 Do you agree, General Petkovic, or not?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour Judge Antonetti,

11 it is August 1992, two days after Mr. Prlic was elected to his post.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

13 MR. KARNAVAS: And, Your Honours, for the record, there is

14 P00429, which is the appointment of Dr. Jadranko Prlic at that post. I

15 don't want to go to it now, but for the record it's there for everyone to

16 see.

17 Now, if we continue on to the next segment, which would have been

18 on page 6. This is -- we'll skip what Mr. Pelivan has to say and go to

19 page 6. And I believe I indicated that would be page 9 in the B/C/S

20 version.

21 [Video-clip played]

22 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "I think that things are clear. We

23 must make it clear also to the people who are watching television this

24 evening.

25 "We very often have long talks, et cetera. I do not want to be a

Page 50022

1 pragmatic man. If Bosnia and Herzegovina could have been politically

2 resolved, this war would not have happened. Therefore, the self-same

3 people who were supposed to resolve the situation before the war and

4 evidently today and after this war are unable to solve it, and that is

5 why Europe and the United Nations got involved to help solve the

6 political problems in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

7 "A constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina was also drawn up,

8 which is quite clear, and the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna fully

9 respects the proposal of the Constitution. And as for those who do not

10 want to talk about it and believe that by exhaustion, procrastination, a

11 problem can be solved, I think that it cannot. We have to organise

12 everyday life. Our economic, financial, and every other system in

13 Bosnia-Herzegovina have collapsed. We all have to be clear on that with

14 exceptional efforts, with numerous victims. More than 100 people from

15 Mostar are undergoing treatment here and enabling [indiscernible] alone,

16 so many have been killed, liberating us from the occupation in a part of

17 our region. We had to organise life. Now, we have to make a road to

18 Central Bosnia, for when winter comes, those people will not be able to

19 get food.

20 "So we have to work and at the same time negotiate politically.

21 I believe that the points of departure formulated by Europe, stating that

22 there exists three national units in BH and which clearly said and

23 proposed which competencies those three national units should have, which

24 rights should be assured to peoples in those national units, must be

25 taken as points of departure for talks.

Page 50023

1 "I believe that a very important question tonight, also to which

2 we may or may not give an answer, is whether all in Bosnia and

3 Herzegovina are anxious to see the war stop. My assessment is that not

4 all are keen on the war stopping."

5 MR. KARNAVAS: Okay.

6 Q. Now, General, this road that Dr. Jadranko Prlic speaks of in

7 Central Bosnia, a road to Central Bosnia for the food to get there for

8 the winter, was that road ever built?

9 A. Yes, Your Honours, that road was built across Vran Planina, and

10 it is known as "Salvation Road," and that was the only secure link of

11 Herzegovina with Central Bosnia. That is, going from Croatia across

12 Herzegovina, one could reach the then free areas of Central Bosnia.

13 Without that road, it would have been very difficult, in some cases quite

14 impossible.

15 Q. And could you please assist us. Was it the authorities in

16 Sarajevo that built the road or someone else?

17 A. No, the construction of the road was taken upon itself by the

18 authorities of the -- of Herceg-Bosna, and I think mostly construction

19 companies from Grude did the work, and some from Siroki Brijeg, Posusje

20 joined in. This was a major initiative to build a road across one of the

21 highest mountains in the area so that vehicles carrying humanitarian aid

22 and people from Central Bosnia could cross Herzegovina and go on to

23 Croatia, and from there to Europe.

24 Q. Do you know whether the Sarajevo authorities, and when I speak of

25 that, I'm speaking of the president of the Presidency or the government

Page 50024

1 that Mr. Pelivan was the head of, whether they made any financial

2 contributions?

3 A. No, no one gave anything, and I think for a long time no one paid

4 these work organisations from Herzegovina, with the exception that the

5 HVO provided the gas and minimum daily allowances for these people. So

6 the construction was at the expense of the HVO or, rather, at the expense

7 of companies in Western Herzegovina, and the central government did not

8 make any donations for this road and learnt about its construction later,

9 in fact.

10 Q. The beneficiaries of this road, were they strictly Croat, or did

11 other peoples, and I'm speaking of Muslims, in particular, benefit from

12 the construction of that road?

13 A. Certainly, they had benefit from the construction of that road,

14 both Croats and Muslims in Central Bosnia, and this means the whole area

15 as far as Tuzla and Eastern Bosnia, because that was the only road that

16 one could take safely to reach Central Bosnia, the Tuzla region, and even

17 Sarajevo. Convoys were directed via Kiseljak and other places to go

18 there.

19 MR. KARNAVAS: All right. If we could go to the next segment,

20 and that is on page 12 of the English version and 19 on the B/C/S

21 version. It's a very short clip.

22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, do you intend to

23 come back to some of these pages later or are you moving straightaway to

24 page 12, and you will not be asking any questions on the previous pages?

25 MR. KARNAVAS: Regrettably, Your Honour, because of time

Page 50025

1 limitations, I will not. However, if the Trial Chamber wishes, after I

2 finish this segment, if the Trial Chambers wishes to go in to a

3 particular segment, we could find it. So I don't -- as I indicated, I

4 intend to admit the entire video. I just don't have the time, and I

5 didn't feel it appropriate to ask for two or three hours for this.

6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I would have a question, and

7 during my time.

8 General Petkovic, it is a shame that I discover this document

9 now. It's really a pity. I'm looking at the list of participants in

10 this interview, and I put myself in the place of the viewers or listeners

11 hearing the interview. We're in August 1992. It is Croatian Television,

12 apparently, in Split, and the TV viewers note that there is the

13 prime minister of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mr. Pelivan,

14 and they also note there is the vice-president of the Assembly of Bosnia

15 and Herzegovina, and also representatives of the Croatian Community of

16 Herceg-Bosna and its president, who has just been elected, Mr. Prlic.

17 So they might think that all the persons present represent the

18 political vision of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. But looking at

19 the document, I focused on what Mr. Pelivan was going to say, who is the

20 prime minister, who is, after all, the legal authority, quite legal

21 authority. And perhaps it would be important to hear what he says about

22 the question of the HVO, its competencies, its zone of influence,

23 et cetera.

24 Could we look at the video and listen to what Mr. Pelivan says?

25 MR. KARNAVAS: Your Honours, I take it you're referring to page 8

Page 50026

1 in the English version. Is that where it would begin, or -- is that the

2 segment, Your Honour?

3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] No. I'm referring to page 6 --

4 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well. We could go back to --

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] -- when he speaks about the

6 regional organisation, referring to economic and cultural issues. It

7 could be interesting to know what the official prime minister says.

8 MR. KARNAVAS: Very well. So this would be at page 6, Your

9 Honours, of the English version.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes.

11 [Video-clip played]

12 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "There was the question of

13 constituent units or regions, and to be quite sincere, you have

14 frequently talked about regions rather than constituent units, and one

15 has the impression that among representatives of the Croatian people,

16 this question has not been fully resolved. What is the problem with

17 these constituent units?

18 "I think that there should be no problem, if we analyse what is

19 best suited in respect of the organising of each people into constituent

20 units. In fact, we did not conduct sufficient joint talks on this topic,

21 so that in some respects things remain unclear and insufficiently

22 defined.

23 "First of all, the area of Bosnia and Herzegovina is such that it

24 requires regional organisation of both economic flows and geographic

25 areas and the cultural entities. Therefore, the regional form of

Page 50027

1 organisation should not be disregarded, being widely known in the world,

2 and one giving very important practical results. That means that we

3 should not, at the very outset of talks, negate the possibility of the

4 existence of regional organising, provided that in all areas there can

5 feature a different degree or percentage of representation of an

6 individual people in that area, and the defining category is the majority

7 share of a people in a given region.

8 "And as regards constituent units, I personally feel that

9 constituent units should be constructed so that the sum of the regions

10 makes up a whole in which the constituent units of each people is

11 constituted, which then should, at that level, organise the manner of

12 managing the overall interests of the people."

13 MR. STEWART: Excuse me, Your Honour.

14 LiveNote has gone down for a number of people in the courtroom in

15 the last couple of minutes. May I just mention that so that it could be

16 resolved as quickly as possible.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] There seems a problem with the

18 transcript. Everyone has the text in front of them. You have heard the

19 comments by Mr. Pelivan.

20 General Petkovic, what would you say regarding his vision of

21 these regional areas in which all the peoples would be represented? What

22 would be your comment regarding his remarks?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Pelivan first mentions that

24 regional organisation is absolutely legal with respect to many questions

25 important for life, in this specific case for defence as well. Also,

Page 50028

1 Mr. Pelivan points out that constituent units should be formed as a sum

2 of those regions, and I think that he's referring to the already

3 well-known Cutileiro Plan which envisaged such constituent units. And in

4 my view, Mr. Pelivan, as the representative of the government, has

5 nothing against. On the contrary, he supports regional development and

6 the formation of constituent units, but he says that there should be

7 further talks about these things so that many points can be co-ordinated.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, please continue.

9 MR. SCOTT: I'm sorry to Mr. Karnavas for intervening, and of

10 course this is not his time, but I do have to make a record here,

11 Your Honour, in light of the time issue, because I think what's happening

12 now illustrates perfectly the dilemma for various parties in the

13 courtroom, including the Prosecution.

14 And, again, my concern here is not personal to Mr. Karnavas.

15 Mr. Karnavas is simply proceeding to the current arrangement, so I'm not

16 throwing any stones whatsoever in Mr. Karnavas' direction. But the way

17 things are playing out here, as I say, is a perfect illustration of the

18 problem.

19 Now, the road to Central Bosnia, as an example, is a new topic.

20 It's a new topic, hasn't been raised before. It's been added to the

21 case. Now we're talking about Mr. Pelivan and his role in the BiH

22 government at the time; also, not previously a topic in the case.

23 Brand-new topics, among other examples. I picked those two now. There's

24 already been several others this morning.

25 Then Mr. Karnavas, rightly so, says, Well, I don't have time to

Page 50029

1 cover the entire transcript, because he's constrained by time-limits,

2 just as the other parties are and just as I am. So when he says, Well, I

3 can't have time -- don't have time to cover it, perhaps you would like to

4 cover it, Your Honour, then you cover those issues, you raise new issues

5 in the case, and then presumably I'm not going to be given any additional

6 time to deal with these new issues. Now, that's the fundamental problem

7 of the way that things are working here and the time elements.

8 To date, we've had about something like 24 hours of examination,

9 raising all sorts of issues, and I'm counting, I'm counting, and there's

10 no way the Prosecution -- I'm just going to continue to make my record.

11 There is no way the Prosecution, in six hours, can possibly begin to

12 respond to all the issues that are being raised. And when Mr. Karnavas,

13 rightly so, says, Well, I don't have time to go into this, and he has to

14 exercise his judgement, just as all the parties do, and just like I would

15 have to, in theory, exercise judgement and skip time, but then it's

16 brought back into the case by the Judge's questions, Well, let me ask it

17 for you, Mr. Karnavas, in effect. And I'm not given any time to deal

18 with that.

19 So I'm making the issue on a number of points. There are new

20 issues being raised. Mr. Karnavas can do that, according to the

21 Chamber's guide-lines, new issues being raised, not part of

22 Ms. Alaburic's direct, and there's the issue of time. And if new issues

23 are being raised and if the Chamber is going into issues, and

24 Mr. Karnavas says, Well, I don't have time to get into that, then that is

25 to the detriment of the other co-accused and to the Prosecution if we are

Page 50030

1 not provided time to also deal with that.

2 And I'll continue to make a record on this, Your Honour, because

3 I'm going to ask -- I will tell the Chamber, I'm going to ask for

4 additional time -- substantial additional time to conduct the

5 Prosecution's cross-examination.

6 And I'll continue with my -- I apologise to Mr. Karnavas for my

7 interruption. Again, it's not his time, but I'm going to continue to

8 make this record.

9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Karnavas, I will give you

10 the floor, as it was I who put the question. I discover, in a few

11 seconds -- I don't need hours. In a few seconds, I discover that the

12 prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and this name has already been

13 heard here in the documents or uttered by witnesses, that he's

14 intervening regarding the question of regional organisation. It's a

15 subject that is not new, because it has already been embarked upon. And

16 this question of regional organisation stems from the Constitution, so

17 it's not new. As it's not a new subject, I only need a few seconds to

18 put my question, that's all. And I asked the witness what he thinks of

19 Mr. Pelivan's comments on regional organisation. The witness answered

20 also in a few seconds. And you, Mr. Prosecutor, you need a lot of time.

21 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour, I do, and I think it's, with all

22 due respect, completely unfair to say what you just said. It has nothing

23 to do with whether there's a topic that's been raised in this case.

24 Surely, in the past four years -- in the past four years, virtually all

25 sorts of topics have been raised. That's not the test. And if that's

Page 50031

1 the test, then it's a test that is meaningless. The question is what's

2 gone into with a particular witness, and as Mr. Karnavas has just

3 demonstrated properly, he doesn't have time to cover every possible

4 topic, even though it may have been raised in April 2008 or November

5 2009. It hasn't been raised with this witness, and it's the time with

6 this witness that controls. And it's completely unfair to say, Well, in

7 a couple of seconds, I could do this. Well, maybe, maybe not, but we've

8 just spent at least the last 10 minutes on a new topic.

9 Now, I'm going to ask for to have the same additional 10 minutes

10 to be add to my time.

11 And I'm going to continue to make this record and I apologise if

12 that offends anyone, but this is fundamentally unfair to parties; the

13 co-accused and the Prosecution.

14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Chamber will deliberate and

15 perhaps will grant you additional time. I, personally, see no problem

16 with that.

17 Mr. Karnavas.

18 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you.

19 Just so that there are no more interruptions, or fewer, we could

20 consider this as a running objection on the part of the Prosecution, and

21 then perhaps afterwards you could just list the new areas. You know, to

22 quote Don Corleone in "The Godfather," Everybody around here knows I'm a

23 reasonable person, I just want to try to get through this as quickly as

24 possible.

25 So if we could go to page 12 in the transcript, and I believe I

Page 50032

1 indicated it was page 19 in the B/C/S. It's a short segment.

2 [Video-clip played]

3 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Their sons have been killed, and

4 we can deal with those questions in the future. Concretely, what fault

5 do you find with the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, for example,

6 for the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina?"

7 Prlic: "I do not know even know what they did over these four

8 months so that I do not know what fault I could find with them or what I

9 could approve, for indeed nothing of it was reflected on the ground. I

10 was in Mostar all the time of the war, in connection with the decisions

11 adopted at the level of the republic. I know that all information as to

12 what was happening in the area of Herceg-Bosna, in particular Mostar, was

13 accorded marginal significance.

14 "You know, for example, that the name of the Armed Forces of BH

15 was changed five times in the start; that in the first variant the

16 Yugoslav People's Army was within the composition of the Territorial

17 Defence; that the aggressor was named only after a month or a month and a

18 half after the aggression; that only on the 6th of August, the HVO was

19 actually legally proclaimed a component part of the Armed Forces of BH.

20 I really do not know what the decisions were. We did not get them

21 because of the communications blockade, so that I cannot have a position.

22 "Precisely owing to that overall blockade, we were compelled,

23 people living in that area and who had earlier held some jobs in that

24 government, to try and organise that government and for it to try and

25 restore life."

Page 50033

1 MR. KARNAVAS:

2 Q. Now, General Petkovic, earlier on you did mention, I believe it

3 was to the President's question, the fact that Izetbegovic was relying on

4 the JNA to come to the rescue of Bosnia and Herzegovina. But from what

5 Dr. Jadranko Prlic is stating, is this correct, keeping in mind the

6 time-frame?

7 A. No, obviously it was not correct. And Mr. Izetbegovic, himself,

8 realised this and felt it. I have a feeling that when he personally felt

9 the consequences, when the JNA was -- arrested and subjected him to a

10 certain kind of torture, that only then he realised what the JNA was.

11 And that is when the people, the Bosniaks, started to establish the first

12 units to resist and oppose the JNA, and that was too late. Therefore,

13 the role of army in Bosnia and Herzegovina was not realised in time. It

14 was viewed as a protector of BH. He even felt that a part of that army

15 would stay in Bosnia and Herzegovina and proclaim itself the Army of

16 Bosnia and Herzegovina, and this was completely erroneous on his part.

17 Q. Is Dr. Jadranko Prlic correct when he states that the name of the

18 Armed Forces of BiH had changed? And if so, to what extent did that play

19 a role in the psychology of the Croats living in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as

20 far as their safety and as far as their comfort with respect to being

21 protected by the state authorities of BiH?

22 A. Your Honours, there is no doubt that the Croats didn't feel

23 comfortable when Mr. Izetbegovic says, It is our army and it will protect

24 us. The Croats couldn't believe that, and they were simply afraid of

25 such positions of the leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Furthermore,

Page 50034

1 Mr. Izetbegovic decided that the army he was forming should be called

2 "The Territorial Defence." As the Territorial Defence was the defence of

3 the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and then all of this was taken away

4 from those peoples and everything was given to the Serb people and the

5 JNA, and this caused frustrations among the Croats, why a

6 territorial defence. Again, it is part -- it was part of the armed

7 forces of the former state.

8 And, finally, that is when Mr. Boban decided that the Croats, of

9 whom he's the commander, could not be called in any other way except "the

10 Croatian Defence Council," and let the others call themselves as they

11 wish. And he reproached Izetbegovic, why he opted for this term

12 "Territorial Defence," because the association of the people was

13 something bad. And two months later, he changed the name from

14 Territorial Defence to the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

15 MR. KARNAVAS: Now, if we go to page 20, that clip on page 20,

16 the next clip, and this is the last one for this. And this should be 31

17 in the B/C/S.

18 [Video-clip played]

19 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Do not think I'm being malicious,

20 but please, Mr. Prlic, as the president of the HVO, do you know that

21 credits for armaments are being sought abroad?"

22 "No, but the Presidency of Herceg-Bosna --"

23 There is too much interference and static.

24 "No, but the Presidency of Herceg-Bosna has sent a request, a

25 conclusion that we'll submit to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina to

Page 50035

1 request a third of the resources for Herceg-Bosna. Otherwise, it does

2 not want to be responsible for those resources and leaves itself leeway

3 to take appropriate and countermeasures. Also, I think that foreign

4 borrowing should be resorted to both for the needs of the defence, of the

5 feeding the population, and for reviving economic flows. I think that it

6 is time something was done, because so far, to be frank, we have been

7 speaking about the Republic of Herceg-Bosna.

8 "Up to now in the defence actions of the Croatian Defence

9 Council, the republic has only had a negative role. Let me be quite

10 frank. Practically not a single combatant of the Croatian Defence

11 Council got even a single tea bag from the republic. The people

12 themselves provided all this for their combatants and the combatants

13 themselves provided this, but we're ready to talk based on the principles

14 I've just spoken about."

15 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I apologise. I

16 didn't compare the translations, but I know that something that Dr. Prlic

17 said was wrongly translated in lines 14 and 15. Dr. Prlic said, Let us

18 speak about the republic and Herceg-Bosna, which means the Republic of

19 Bosnia and Herzegovina and Herceg-Bosna. This way, it turns out that it

20 was only Herceg-Bosna that was discussed, which was formed a year later.

21 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you for that clarification.

22 Q. Going back to the question, itself, about credits for armaments,

23 do you know whether Izetbegovic or the Sarajevo authorities actually

24 obtained any credits for armaments or cash -- or financing for armaments

25 from abroad?

Page 50036

1 A. Your Honours, I don't know about any credits, nor could I have

2 known at that time that the Government of Bosnia-Herzegovina raised any

3 credits. But I did know that donations were coming in to them from

4 various sources, especially from the Islamic world.

5 Q. And can you tell us, at least, what Dr. Jadranko Prlic is saying

6 here is that Herceg-Bosna should also be receiving some of those

7 resources because, after all, they are defending part of

8 Bosnia-Herzegovina, do you know whether the HVO received any of the

9 assistance, monetary assistance or armament assistance, that the Sarajevo

10 authorities were receiving from the various Islamic countries or

11 elsewhere?

12 A. Your Honours, no. From the resources collected up at the level

13 of Bosnia-Herzegovina and its Presidency, I don't know who, on behalf of

14 the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, collected those resources. None of that was

15 siphoned down to assist the Croatian Defence Council. And Jadranko Prlic

16 is right there when he says that, and he says not a single tea bag was

17 sent for any soldier.

18 MR. KARNAVAS: That concludes my questions for this video.

19 If we could go on to the next video, unless there are any

20 questions; follow-up, that is.

21 1D02070. 1D02070, if we could just look at that. We may just

22 look at part of it. It's a short clip. The first couple pages, I wanted

23 to get your opinion on something.

24 [Video-clip played]

25 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Croatia is again helping Bosnia

Page 50037

1 and Herzegovina. In Makarska, Croatia arranged a meeting of the two

2 governments and representatives of the Croatian Community of

3 Herceg-Bosna. The aim of the meeting was an agreement on free delivery

4 of humanitarian aid throughout BH. Here is what the participants of the

5 meeting told our colleague Ivo Sipek [phoen]: After a day of

6 co-ordinating the work, the prime minister of the Republic of Croatia,

7 Mate Ganic, earlier this evening, as the host and the witness, signed the

8 agreement on the passage of humanitarian convoys. The deputy

9 prime minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Hadzo Efendic, and the president of

10 the Croatian Defence Council in the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna,

11 Jadranko Prlic, signed it, determined to implement it.

12 "Their signatures are witnessed by the International Committee of

13 the Red Cross, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and UNPROFOR should

14 quickly easy the troubles of Croats [indiscernible] -- within the

15 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Croatia is the initiator, host, and

16 witness. Croatia provided its good services, having gained experience

17 during the entire war.

18 "From its beginning until now, all humanitarian convoys travel

19 from Zagreb to Knin and Topusko and everywhere else in complete freedom,

20 because as far as respective international humanitarian law is concerned,

21 the Croatian position is that it must be respected in full without any

22 reservations.

23 "This was actually the reason we invited both sides to come here

24 and to reach this agreement. This position is fully supported by all

25 international humanitarian organisations."

Page 50038

1 MR. KARNAVAS: We'll stop here. The rest can be read, what we

2 provided, even though I'm skipping what Dr. Jadranko Prlic indicated.

3 For purposes of admission of this particular video, I want to ask

4 you a couple of questions, General.

5 Q. Are you familiar with this particular meeting, this video, and

6 the contents thereof?

7 A. Yes, yes, I do know about the meeting. It was a meeting in

8 Makarska at the beginning of July 1993.

9 Q. And the purpose of the meeting, if you might tell us?

10 A. This was about humanitarian aid and assistance, and the passage

11 of humanitarian convoys and distributing it. I think this is an abridged

12 version, it didn't encompass everything. As far as I heard, they

13 discussed the quantities of humanitarian aid, what was intended for the

14 Croats, what was intended for the Bosniaks. So this is just a brief

15 excerpt. I don't think this was in the studio. This was the report of

16 somebody who was in Makarska.

17 Q. All right. And do you know whether this agreement was adhered to

18 by all sides?

19 A. As far as I know, there were no problems, no problems that

20 couldn't be solved in providing humanitarian assistance. Now, the

21 meeting was announced as being -- as a meeting to resolve the very great

22 problems that existed. I don't think that was the case. I don't think

23 there were any major problems. I think that somebody, through

24 humanitarian aid, wanted to politicise the whole issue, because

25 humanitarian convoys went into Makarska and they continued to go forward.

Page 50039

1 So we were surprised why a meeting was being held to discuss humanitarian

2 convoys and assistance, because the UNHCR and everybody else, UNPROFOR,

3 had their plans to provide assistance according to their plans.

4 MR. KARNAVAS: All right. If we could go on to the next video,

5 which is 1D02230. 1D02230, and it's dated 21 September 1993. I'm just

6 going to initially show the very first part and see whether you have any

7 recollection of this one, for foundational purposes, before I go into any

8 other segments.

9 [Video-clip played]

10 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "The latest declaration from

11 Geneva, signed by the president of the Republic of Croatia,

12 Dr. Franjo Tudjman, and the Muslim leader, Alija Izetbegovic, is just

13 another piece of paper, or is it something else, the question is now.

14 There is a saying that, Who has been bitten by snakes fears lizards as

15 well, and the Croatian people have truly signed numerous pieces of paper

16 with Izetbegovic thus far, so doubts are to be expected. After every

17 signature, we have the same situation; massacre. After so many

18 casualties, everything is too late."

19 MR. KARNAVAS: All right.

20 Q. Now, do you recall seeing this video-clipping? And if so, when?

21 A. Well, this footage was broadcast several days after the

22 declaration between Mr. Tudjman and Mr. Izetbegovic was signed, and

23 I think it was signed on the 14th of September, 1993. So this footage

24 was shown in a -- within a programme some seven or eight days later,

25 because there was a lot of talk about the declaration. So it was

Page 50040

1 interesting to see what the participants at the meeting thought about the

2 declaration, itself.

3 Q. All right. And you recall seeing it at the time?

4 A. Yes, I do. Well, let me tell you, these programmes that were

5 broadcast in this way, with representatives taking part from executive

6 and political power in Herceg-Bosna, people liked to see programmes like

7 that because you could see what your representative thought, because

8 Mr. Prlic and others couldn't go to 10 different places in one day. So

9 this was a good opportunity to convey the necessary information. And the

10 importance of the declaration between Tudjman and Izetbegovic was such

11 that a lot of attention was paid to the declaration.

12 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you.

13 And incidentally, Your Honours, the general is referring to

14 P05051. That's an exhibit already, the declaration, itself.

15 So if we go to the first segment, and that would be on page 2 in

16 the English version, and I believe it's page 2 in the B/C/S version.

17 [Video-clip played]

18 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Greetings from Neum.

19 Marhaba [phoen] was never president, nor will it ever be in Neum. A bit

20 of humour at the beginning.

21 "So the basic question tonight is: What after the signing of the

22 declaration? As we said in the introduction, this was the most important

23 topic discussed between the special envoy of the president of the

24 Republic of Croatia, the foreign minister, and the vice-president of the

25 government, Dr. Mate Granic, and the leadership of the Croatian Community

Page 50041

1 of Herceg-Bosna as a "trojka" together with several additional ministers.

2 "Mr. Prlic, can you tell us at the beginning, and please answer

3 this question that has been asked frequently yesterday, why are Croats

4 discussing the implementation of the declaration, while the Muslims, it

5 was reported, on the eve of the Central News, especially yesterday, are

6 attacking Croatian areas and citizens on all fronts?

7 "The Croatian side shall implement every document signed

8 authorised representatives of the Croatian people, and this has never

9 been an issue. It is obvious that in implementing this declaration, the

10 level of implementation should also depend on the level of willingness of

11 the other side to implement this document. It is, nevertheless,

12 necessary to point out at the beginning that we will never do anything to

13 the detriment of the Croatian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina through

14 implementing any document. So we are prepared to implement it fully, we

15 are prepared to make the first step in every area, and I made this very

16 clear yesterday. But the second step will not be made until the other

17 side does the same."

18 MR. KARNAVAS:

19 Q. And can you tell what is Dr. Jadranko Prlic speaking about at

20 this particular point in time?

21 A. Dr. Prlic is obviously speaking about the way in which the

22 declaration should be effected, the declaration signed seven or eight

23 days previously, and he says that the HVO will implement the declaration,

24 but we'll also see what the other side is doing about it, that is to say,

25 the Bosniak side.

Page 50042

1 Q. All right. Now, prior to the question -- or prior to the answer,

2 I should say, the question was prefaced with some information concerning

3 attacks and ongoing conflict with the Muslims. Do you recall what was

4 happening on the ground at that time?

5 A. Your Honours, I'd like to remind you that in this courtroom --

6 well, the declaration was signed on the 14th, and we, in this courtroom,

7 on several occasions introduced the document from the 4th Corps commander

8 dated the 15th of September, preparing a broad-scale operation of taking

9 control of Mostar. And I'd like to add to that that on the 15th, I think

10 it was, the declaration was signed between the Serbs and the Muslims, and

11 in one of the items it says that it was their joint interest to have an

12 exit to the sea, so that on the 15th, that is to say, just one day after

13 the declaration, we have an order from the BH Army, and we saw Pasalic's

14 order and the sector commander's order, we saw it two or three times in

15 this courtroom - I don't know what the numbers of those documents

16 were - and the operations were launched to take control of Mostar. And

17 I think that that is why Journalist Bowen was brought in to give the news

18 first that the BH Army had taken Mostar.

19 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you. And before we go to the next segment,

20 my colleague, Ms. Tomanovic, tells me that the declaration that the

21 general just spoke of was 3D00451. That's the Karadzic-Izetbegovic

22 declaration.

23 Q. Is that correct? You're shaking your head, General. That means

24 yes?

25 A. [In English] Yes.

Page 50043

1 Q. All right. If we go on to the next --

2 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Mr. Karnavas, sorry. Just to avoid

3 confusion, without looking at that particular document, just on date, is

4 this -- we are talking about 1993?

5 MR. KARNAVAS: Yes.

6 MR. SCOTT: Thank you very much.

7 MR. KARNAVAS: We're into 1993 at this point.

8 And if we go to the next segment, which is on page 3 in the

9 English version, page 4 in the B/C/S. It's a very short segment.

10 [Video-clip played]

11 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Let's continue our discussion with

12 our guest. Mr. Prlic, briefly, how do you interpret these activities of

13 the Muslims in attacking all areas, all locations, as was said at the

14 meeting yesterday, on the Croatian Defence Council?"

15 "This is a well known and classical pattern of behaviour for the

16 Muslim side which is practically buying time in situations they think it

17 is possible for them to achieve their goals in the field. Objectively,

18 those percentages of territory that were set as a precondition for the

19 Muslim side to sign, they want to realise in the field as soon as

20 possible, and primarily on those areas inhabited by Croats and the

21 Croatian Defence Council. However, neither the declaration nor any other

22 document that regulates international war law and International

23 Humanitarian Law does not prevent anyone from defending themselves, and

24 we must be ready to defend all the territories within the lines where we

25 are located now. We must seek political solutions, but also, as was said

Page 50044

1 at the beginning of this programme, we must be prepared to respond and

2 guard our territories. We must, first of all, be realistic when

3 considering anything. There are certain issues the cause of which a

4 positive effect might be created in the public, and this also has to be

5 taken into account. This is part of special warfare and the entire

6 package of war activities. But let me emphasise again we must be

7 realistic.

8 "The Muslim Army in Central Bosnia and Herzegovina is an enemy

9 army, as far as the Croatian Defence Council is concerned, and all talks,

10 agreements, and negotiations are exactly that, only negotiations. This

11 actually suits the position of the Croatian Defence Council and the

12 government, since it is in line with the latest decision. Seven or eight

13 months ago, we sent a letter to the Mission of the European Communities,

14 the Monitoring Mission of the EC, stating that we're ready to negotiate

15 with the Serbian and Muslim governments - this was eight months ago - on

16 all open questions and the functioning of these infrastructure systems,

17 education, et cetera. And I can reiterate this today: That we're open

18 and ready to talk, because we believe that even in the throws of the

19 fiercest hostilities, it's always necessary to talk with the enemy."

20 MR. KARNAVAS:

21 Q. Now, General, here Dr. Jadranko Prlic characterises the Muslim

22 Army in Central Bosnia - he restricts his answer to that - as an enemy

23 army. Would you agree or disagree with that statement? And if so,

24 please explain.

25 MS. TOMANOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, but the general

Page 50045

1 received a slightly different interpretation to Mr. Karnavas' question.

2 It wasn't quite as Mr. Karnavas put it. So to avoid a misunderstanding

3 in the answer, I'll repeat and say that Mr. Karnavas said that

4 Dr. Jadranko Prlic characterises the Muslim Army in Central Bosnia, he's

5 asked about, and he was limiting this just to Central Bosnia.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, Your Honours, let me answer

7 that question and observation.

8 We're dealing with the end of September 1993, the 21st of

9 September, in actual fact, when they were holding this discussion, and

10 that's the time, as we saw yesterday when we looked at the maps, what

11 happened to towns in Central Bosnia at that time, and the HVO and the

12 BH Army, and the problems involved. Jadranko Prlic knows that at the end

13 of September, the Muslims had taken control of Travnik, expelled the

14 Croats; took control of Fojnica, expelled the Croats; took Bugojno,

15 expelled the Croats; and took 99 per cent of Konjic municipality,

16 expelling the Croats. Jadranko Prlic knows this full well, so he can

17 have no other attitude towards an army that expelled over 100.000 Croats

18 than the position he takes.

19 Similarly, I believe that Jadranko Prlic also had in mind the

20 fact that this was a time of the Neretva 93 operation which was fierce

21 and moving towards the town of Mostar, that is to say, Mostar

22 municipality, and moving down towards the coast, the sea. So

23 Jadranko Prlic was fully informed about everything that was taking place

24 in Central Bosnia at the time. He had the Office of Refugees informing

25 him and everybody else informing him about the plight of the 100.000

Page 50046

1 Croats who were seeking salvation in different ways and means, so he knew

2 that we had been expelled from many towns. How, then -- how else can we

3 describe an army that did this to us but to say that it was an enemy

4 army?

5 MR. KARNAVAS: All right.

6 Now, if we go to page 6, the next segment, and in the Croatian

7 version it would be -- I'll find it in a second here. It's rather long.

8 It's on page 8. My apologies for not being --

9 [Video-clip played]

10 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "We often read in here that Muslim

11 politics and policies are crazy. This is just an illustration of our

12 arrogance when we speak of this. These are not crazy politics at all.

13 It's a very well-thought-out politics. Almost every step has been

14 planned, and political, military, and propaganda activities have all been

15 co-ordinated as a whole. If we analyse the activities from the beginning

16 of the war, then we can very easily come to that conclusion.

17 "All negotiations and stalling were just a means of buying time.

18 The Muslim side, headed by Alija Izetbegovic, has used the international

19 recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina entirely for its own purposes. All

20 embassies and consular offices, diplomatic representative offices, are

21 manned by people of Muslim ethnicity, who promote the Muslim idea and the

22 interests of the Muslim people. Of course, whether these are truly the

23 interests of the Muslim people is debatable.

24 "There is also the issue of their leader, Alija Izetbegovic.

25 I can say that it was also Croatian politics that, to a large degree,

Page 50047

1 created Alija Izetbegovic, who didn't have support, nor does he today, in

2 the Tuzla region, where relations between Croats and Muslims are, so to

3 speak, bearable in the Zazine region. But I do believe that extremism

4 will become more widespread in these regions, because the longer the war

5 lasts, the extreme viewpoints and behaviour also become stronger.

6 "I think that one of the great mistakes made by Croatian politics

7 was leaving Alija Izetbegovic in the position of president of the

8 Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He took advantage of this position and

9 strengthened it in the field. He managed to combine what only seemed to

10 be two opposite fractions in the Muslim people. One of my qualifications

11 was that the Muslim nation was a fundamentalist core which was negligent

12 [as interpreted] at the beginning, 1 or 2 per cent of the population.

13 The majority were the so-called moderate Muslims with a European

14 orientation, and a smaller group of Jugo-unitarians.

15 The core of this group was composed of former Yugoslav officers.

16 Through the efforts of the BH Army, these two groups merged, the

17 fundamentalists and the Ju go-unitarian stream, and the modern European

18 people of the Muslim people objectively had no space to survive. It

19 became smaller and smaller. Most of the people from this group left

20 Bosnia and Herzegovina, and some later sociological research will

21 probably give a better assessment than I am able to do in these few

22 minutes.

23 "But to go back to your question, it is not a question of whether

24 it's a crazy policy and politics or not. It can be called so if we

25 observe it in the long term. But short term, it will give certain

Page 50048

1 results. However, it is in the interests of the world, and I want you to

2 understand why these declarations are being signed in the first place.

3 Regardless of how difficult it is to talk about these times, yesterday 20

4 soldiers were killed in Mostar and 73 wounded. It is very difficult to

5 talk about officials of the Croatian people, of some future co-operation,

6 calming of relations, and the situation. However, we must understand one

7 thing. It is in the interests of the world that this Muslim republic

8 within the future union of Bosnia and Herzegovina have a European

9 orientation, thus be a secular state similar to Turkey, and show the

10 world that it is possible to have one more such state, apart from Turkey.

11 It is considered that this Muslim republic would be what the world wants

12 to see, and if this is to be so, this path must lead through Croatia.

13 "So these are some strategic interests. There are a million

14 things that intertwine, and many are frequently parallel, yet manage to

15 collide. But in creating strategic policy, all this must be taken into

16 account, and still that what I have been talking about must not lose its

17 basic importance; the defence of the Croatian people, regardless of where

18 they live in Bosnia and Herzegovina."

19 MR. KARNAVAS: All right.

20 Q. Now, General, this is September 1993. By this point, is it not a

21 fact that there is talk of having three republics? That's the plan that

22 the internationals are pushing for Bosnia-Herzegovina, three republics

23 within a Bosnia-Herzegovina; correct?

24 A. Yes, that's correct, three republics as part of a union of the

25 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. And finally maps were drawn up to

Page 50049

1 depict what this should look like. The representatives of the three

2 peoples just had to accept this. And after all those negotiations and

3 discussions, the war should have come to an end, but obviously that

4 didn't happen.

5 What Mr. Prlic has said, well, Mr. Izetbegovic thought that the

6 union of Bosnia and Herzegovina given to the Bosnian side could be

7 extended through war, because territory taken through military means were

8 included in the map that related to the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan. What

9 Alija took was given to him in that plan. And in addition, the Stolac

10 area that was given to the HVO was taken and given to him. So his

11 appetites increased, quite certainly. He wanted the whole of Central

12 Bosnia for himself, and he wanted access to the sea. And perhaps he

13 would just give the Croats Western Herzegovina.

14 Q. All right. And the assessment that Dr. Jadranko Prlic makes of

15 Alija Izetbegovic, that is -- or his side, that they're stalling, that's

16 a fact, that they were stalling precisely because of what you indicated;

17 they were trying to get as much territory -- occupy as much territory?

18 Therefore, at the negotiating table, that would be their point of

19 departure, to keep and control what they had? Isn't that a fact?

20 A. Yes, that's correct. I'll give you an example.

21 Mr. Izetbegovic sent Delic, a new commander, on the 10th of June

22 to speak to me about Travnik. He knew that Travnik, in 24 hours, would

23 fall. But let's accept that that's correct, too. Izetbegovic, on the

24 15th of June, wrote to me and Delic and said, Put an end to the war, but

25 he had already launched an action in the direction of Kakanj. So what

Page 50050

1 are we discussing, then? Some papers had to be drafted to cover up, but

2 in the field instructions were being followed. And after seven or eight

3 towns taken by him in Central Bosnia, well, naturally he didn't say,

4 That's enough, we'll stop there. He continued; Busovaca, Vitez, Kiseljak

5 had to be dealt with, and the entire territory of Central Bosnia would

6 remain in the hands of the Bosniaks.

7 MR. KARNAVAS: Mr. President, usually this is our time for a

8 break. I have two or three -- three, actually, small segments, but I --

9 perhaps we could take the break now and get to those segments, or I can

10 continue. I'm up to your -- I'm up to whatever you decide. I'm at your

11 disposal.

12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I was waiting for the end of

13 the interpretation.

14 The Registrar has told me that you have used up the time

15 allocated to you, but you have just said that you have two or three

16 additional clips to show, and this would mean that you'd be asking for

17 additional time. How much additional time would you need?

18 MR. KARNAVAS: Well, by the looks of it, Your Honours, and maybe

19 I miscalculated, I don't think more than 15 minutes. There are just

20 two -- three clips. One is a little bit longer than the others. I've

21 timed them. The timing of them is less than five minutes altogether, but

22 then there are questions. So we could take the break now, and if you

23 decide to give me more time --

24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, but just a minute. I will

25 ask my colleagues whether they agree to grant you 15 additional minutes.

Page 50054

1 As far as the Stojic Defence is concerned, the Chamber -- 40 and

2 30, that's 70, not 100. So one hour and ten minutes, an hour and ten

3 minutes.

4 As far as the Stojic Defence is concerned, the Chamber hereby

5 allocates to the Stojic Defence one hour and ten minutes in total, an

6 hour and ten minutes.

7 For the Praljak Defence, the Chamber hereby allocates an hour and

8 20 minutes to that Defence team.

9 With regard to the Coric Defence, the Chamber hereby allocates

10 that Defence team an hour and ten minutes in total.

11 This is a unanimous decision, but I personally would like to say

12 the following: I fully agree with the decision made by the various

13 Defence teams, part of which had to do with the consequences of Judges

14 putting questions. With regard to that particular issue, I would like to

15 point out that the questions that I put to General Petkovic were almost

16 identical to the ones -- almost identical to the ones that I put to

17 General Praljak. And unless I am mistaken, I didn't have the impression

18 that any new subjects had been dealt with in my questions. But whatever

19 the case may be, I am inclined to grant additional time for the Defence

20 teams that believe that they require such time.

21 Mr. Karnavas, so you have your 15 minutes.

22 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you, Mr. President.

23 If we could go on to the next segment. That would be on page 9

24 in the English version, on page 12 in the B/C/S version. So 9 in the

25 English version, for our friends both in the English and the French

Page 50055

1 booths, and 12 -- page 12 in the B/C/S version. It's a small clip.

2 [Video-clip played]

3 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Mr. Prlic, let's return to what

4 was said at the meeting yesterday. It said that the humanitarian convoy,

5 regardless of everything else, have to pass through. Could you comment

6 on that?"

7 "Many questions are asked about that that shouldn't even be

8 commented on. Either we're filling in time or having meetings, certain

9 subjects are imposed just to exact pressure on the Croatian side. The

10 English would say, It's out of the question, we don't want to discuss

11 such matters. Neum shows the objective position that Croatia and the

12 Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna are facing, so if we are speaking about

13 that, it shows what our objective position is and the pressure exerted on

14 us from the world.

15 "The humanitarian convoy -- humanitarian convoys were never a

16 problem. Their passage through Herceg-Bosna was never a problem, never.

17 It's an artificial dilemma that has been created around this issue.

18 There was never a problem concerning this, not in positional behaviour.

19 "In any case, who built roads in these mountains of Herzegovina,

20 if not the Croatian Defence Council? And they have been the only means

21 of communication and entrance for humanitarian aid and commercial goods,

22 ammunition, arms, and everything else into the territory of Bosnia and

23 Herzegovina. These roads served as an exit way for over 60.000 refugees

24 from all of Bosnia and Herzegovina, so this doesn't exist as an issue at

25 all.

Page 50056

1 "Who was it, then, who used this issue of humanitarian convoys

2 for political purposes, and why, if what I'm implying is correct? As to

3 whether there were individual cases, yes, probably so. We even

4 investigated some; for instance, one that was on Sky News and concerned

5 the convoy of four petrol tanks that left from Metkovic and arrived at

6 our border. The military police wanted to make a routine inspection that

7 was arranged in the procedure, in accordance with the procedure.

8 However, UNPROFOR didn't want to allow the tanks to be inspected. They

9 just ordered them back. And as a result, a problem was created.

10 "For us, this doesn't amount to a problem. Nothing will be

11 allowed to travel through the territory of Herceg-Bosna without having

12 undergone the normal and previously-arranged inspection of goods.

13 "This very clear principle was also accepted by UNPROFOR and the

14 High Commissioner for Refugees, and regarding this yesterday they

15 emphasised, you heard during the meetings, the representatives -- if

16 UNHCR said that there were no problems regarding the passage of

17 humanitarian convoys. The objective problems now are the intense war

18 activities on all fronts, and especially in Central Bosnia and the area

19 of Mostar."

20 MR. KARNAVAS:

21 Q. General, my question is: Here Dr. Jadranko Prlic is talking

22 about one particular instance concerning the inspection of tanks, and he

23 gives the impression that there had been an agreement with the

24 internationals, in particular UNPROFOR and the High Commission for

25 Refugees, that such inspections would be legitimate and appropriate; is

Page 50057

1 that a fact?

2 A. Your Honours, yes, that is correct, and it was agreed at the

3 level where you agree about the passage of convoys. There was a goods or

4 transport list that was compiled. I think that's what it's called. So

5 you have such a list, a freight list. It says, such and such goods are

6 going to be transported. Then you would inspect it, and they would be

7 let through. That was it. No one asked for the goods to be unloaded and

8 to be viewed. They just had a look at the freight list. It would say,

9 You have authority to pass through, and that's how things happened. That

10 was the only means of control, as far as I know, that had been agreed on,

11 and that was at the border. I think this is a quite normal procedure.

12 You show the freight list, the bill of lading, the list of goods, and

13 that would be it.

14 Q. All right. And you spoke of a border, and we see here

15 "Metkovic." Some of us do know where Metkovic is, but which border are

16 you and, in particular, Dr. Jadranko Prlic speaking about ?

17 A. The border of the Republic of Croatia and the Republic of Bosnia

18 and Herzegovina, because if oil was being transported, it would be from

19 Ploce, and the UNHCR had its warehouse in Metkovic, in Croatia, and moved

20 from there to Bosnia and Herzegovina through the Valley of Neretva. This

21 is the route they used. So the warehouses were in the territory of the

22 Republic of Croatia, warehouses for oil and food, and control was --

23 well, it was controlled at the border with the Republic of Bosnia and

24 Herzegovina. I think that the name of the border crossing is Doljani.

25 Q. All right. And Ploce is in Croatia?

Page 50058

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, a technical

2 question. I'm not intervening, I'm not interrupting Mr. Karnavas'

3 questions, but it's a technical question.

4 You speak about these lorries being inspected, and you say this

5 was done at the border. When I was listening to you, I thought about

6 what I did 20, 30 years ago, because as a prosecutor I was responsible

7 for the motorway in Northern France, where many vehicles and lorries

8 passed through, lorries from Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and so on

9 and so forth, so I was familiar with all these problems, I dealt with all

10 these problems. And when listening to you, I wondered whether you wanted

11 to say that when a lorry arrived at the border, there was a customs

12 inspection, and then there could be a stamp that shows that the contents

13 were inspected, and after that has been done the lorry can circulate, it

14 can't be controlled, but when you see that it has already been inspected,

15 the goods aren't checked. But perhaps in your system that you are

16 describing, there was a control at the border, but there was no customs

17 immunity for the vehicles when circulating, so the HVO could have another

18 look at the goods being transported at certain check-points, control

19 points. Is that what you are telling us, in fact?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the Customs didn't

21 inspect humanitarian goods, especially if it was under the UNHCR, if the

22 UNHCR had organised this, and other organisations responsible for such

23 things. So such goods weren't inspected by Customs.

24 In Metkovic, in the UNHCR base, there was an HVO representative.

25 Such an agreement had been reached, and this representative would

Page 50059

1 supervise the loading of goods. At the border, you'd only show a piece

2 of paper on which it said "Four lorries," such and such a number of

3 tonnes of flour, and so on and so forth. No one had the look at the

4 contents of the lorry. You just had that so-called bill of lading.

5 I think that's the term. You'd see that it was loaded in Metkovic and

6 that it should now have free passage. Nothing else was controlled. The

7 Customs didn't do anything else because they didn't have the right to

8 impose duty on goods of a humanitarian kind. Customs service was

9 concerned with commercial goods. And this procedure took no more than

10 five minutes.

11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So you're saying

12 that in Metkovic, all the lorries had a letter list which described the

13 goods being transported, and when the HVO inspected the lorry or, rather,

14 controlled the lorry, in fact, they just had a look at this letter, this

15 document?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

18 Mr. Karnavas, I apologise, but I have now understood what the

19 witness was saying.

20 MR. KARNAVAS: Thank you.

21 Q. Now, I had asked the question, but it was not recorded for some

22 reason. Ploce. Ploce is in Croatia, it's a deep-water port, in fact;

23 correct?

24 A. Yes, yes, Ploce is a town and a port in the Republic of Croatia,

25 and it has an oil base, it has a certain capacity, and it was used for

Page 50060

1 transporting oil there, and oil would then be transported from that place

2 to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

3 Q. And Neum, which is a little bit further up and in the territory

4 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, also is a port town, we could call it that, but

5 it's not a deep-water -- it does not have the capacity that Ploce has;

6 correct?

7 A. Neum is in Bosnia and Herzegovina. However, Neum was never a

8 commercial port. It was a port for small boats that the local people

9 used.

10 MR. KARNAVAS: All right. If we can go to the next segment.

11 That would be on page 24 in the English version, and it's page 36 on the

12 B/C/S version. So it's page 24, English; 36, B/C/S. Again, it's just a

13 short clip.

14 [Video-clip played]

15 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Thank you. Let's move on with

16 other questions.

17 "Are you aware of the cry for help from the Croats from Zenica?

18 This is a question from Stipo Viskovic from Switzerland, and it's a

19 question for Mr. Prlic.

20 "We are fully aware of this. We are well informed. And to the

21 extent that this is possible, of course, it is difficult to have all the

22 relevant information from Zenica which is objectively under a blockade.

23 "The position of Croats is very difficult, especially the

24 position of those who have been captured. Mr. Jukic spoke of this a bit

25 earlier. Six months prior to these intense conflicts in Central Bosnia,

Page 50061

1 we anticipated these developments, especially after the arrest of the

2 brigade commander and the beginning of the conflict in Zenica and the

3 situation in Cagljas, et cetera. We asked for a corridor to be opened to

4 save the brigade and the inhabitants of the area, because it was easy to

5 anticipate what would happen next. However, none of the international

6 organisations, UNPROFOR, the UNHCR, for example, wanted to support us in

7 this, so they are giving no support today either."

8 MR. KARNAVAS:

9 Q. Now, General, first of all, Dr. Prlic is talking about an arrest

10 of a brigade commander. Are you aware of this incident? And if so,

11 could you please tell us who the brigade commander was?

12 A. Yes, Your Honours, I'm aware of this. It was Mr. Zivko Totic,

13 the commander of the Zenica Brigade. He was arrested on the 15th of

14 April, 1993, together with four members of his escort.

15 Q. Do you recall about what time that would have been? What's the

16 time-frame? We know that this video here is in September 21, 1993, so

17 can you give us a time-frame?

18 A. Your Honours, I said the arrest of Zivko Totic and his escort

19 occurred on the 15th of April, 1993, but the imprisonment of members of

20 the HVO brigade, there were two in Zenica, started from the 16th and

21 continued for a few days. At the same time, during that period some of

22 the Croats who were in suburbs of Zenica, closer to the Lasva or Busovaca

23 Valley, they were expelled mostly to Busovaca and Vitez. However, some

24 of them remained. No one knew who was taking care of them, or how, and

25 assistance was requested from the UNHCR and other international

Page 50062

1 organisations, assistance to determine what the situation was. Although

2 they didn't have the possibility of living under normal conditions, they

3 should be moved to Busovaca, where the others were, or a guarantee should

4 be provided for them so that it would be possible for them to live there,

5 because in Zenica, in the -- from the 16th and 17th, the system in Zenica

6 had broken down. There was no one you could rely on there.

7 Q. All right. Now, Dr. Jadranko Prlic speaks of a corridor, and I

8 want to tie this in with the notion that we've heard from the Prosecution

9 and we see in the indictment, that there was this allegation of reverse

10 ethnic cleansing, the Croats wanting to cleanse certain areas where

11 Croats are, get them out, expel them, if you will, in order to have them

12 re-populate; in other words, making Central Bosnian -- turning them into

13 Herzegovinians, if that is possible. But that's -- my question goes to

14 whether there was such a policy, whether Dr. Jadranko Prlic is talking

15 about a corridor for those purposes, for the reverse ethnic cleansing,

16 Croats cleansing themselves.

17 A. No. No, Your Honours, whether the inhabitants -- the Croatian

18 inhabitants of Central Bosnia, well, you would know that they would never

19 leave their areas unless they were forced to by such a force. The Croats

20 from Central Bosnia were very much tied to the areas in which they lived.

21 Therefore, Jadranko was trying to find a way to move Croats to the

22 closest safe place, to move them there from the Zenica area, and settling

23 Croats in Herzegovina wasn't necessary. Herzegovina was mostly Croatian,

24 and those people really didn't want to leave their areas because they

25 were never really tied to Herzegovina. It's interesting that a few

Page 50063

1 people from Central Bosnia, even in peacetime, tried to go and live in

2 Herzegovina.

3 No, they didn't really move in the direction of Herzegovina, and

4 they weren't delighted with the atmosphere in Herzegovina, so to speak,

5 so they didn't want to go there. They preferred going abroad. It's not

6 that they didn't like Herzegovina, but that place was a place where the

7 atmosphere was quite different to the atmosphere in the areas that they

8 inhabited.

9 Q. All right. And since we're speaking about Zenica, this is the

10 place, is it not, where the Mujahedin were more or less headquartered out

11 of or at least concentrated to a great extent?

12 A. Your Honours, Zenica was the headquarters of the 3rd Corps of the

13 ABiH. It was the greatest base, with the greatest number of soldiers.

14 And the Mujahedin who gathered in Central Bosnia, well, their centre was

15 also in Zenica, but they would select certain places on the periphery of

16 Zenica because they wanted to remain isolated. They didn't want others

17 to have access to them. So Zenica was their destination.

18 Q. And isn't it a fact, General, you having lived through that

19 period, that the Mujahedin instilled fear with some of their tactics and

20 approaches, such as beheadings?

21 A. Your Honours, yes, and such acts had an influence on the security

22 of those people. Naturally, they were fearful, and they asked for

23 protection, you know. But when someone cuts off your arm, you don't have

24 protection, you don't know who will protect you, and our brigades had

25 been practically cut off in those areas -- had been practically

Page 50064

1 imprisoned.

2 MR. KARNAVAS: We'll go to the next and the very last segment.

3 It's very, very short. It's page 25 in the English version. So it would

4 be the following in the English version, and I believe it's 37 in the

5 B/C/S. It's a very short segment.

6 [Video-clip played]

7 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Let's go on to the next question.

8 What will happen to the Croats in Tuzla? A viewer from Trbovlje has this

9 question for Mr. Prlic.

10 "From the very beginning, our principles have been clear. Once

11 the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna was established on a legal system,

12 that it made it what it was. The Croats in Tuzla will have all the

13 rights the Muslims will have in the Croatian Republic of Herceg-Bosna,

14 and it is through mutual agreements of the two republics, Croatian and

15 Muslim, that as of tomorrow we will attempt to protect the full rights of

16 the Croatian people in that area that will remain outside the Croatian

17 Republic of Herceg-Bosna."

18 MR. KARNAVAS:

19 Q. Now, General, Jadranko Prlic here is speaking about what was

20 envisaged, to have three different republics in Bosnia-Herzegovina;

21 correct?

22 A. Yes, correct, Your Honours. This was the concept of three

23 republics within the framework of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was known

24 as the union of republics of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

25 Q. And essentially here what he is saying, and, in fact, mirrors

Page 50067

1 colleagues, whether they agree.

2 Yes, Mr. Scott.

3 MR. SCOTT: Your Honours, just to say the Prosecution has no

4 objection. Thank you.

5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Prosecution agrees that

6 Ms. Alaburic can discuss it with General Petkovic. Everyone is in

7 agreement, my colleagues too, so you can discuss this document in a

8 moment.

9 After D1, normally it's D2. I don't know whether they wish to

10 begin now.

11 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Yes. Thank you, Your Honour. We

12 would, indeed, like to begin.

13 Could the usher please come to my friend Mr. Khan to take over

14 the binders for this examination.

15 Cross-examination by Ms. Nozica:

16 Q. Good day, Mr. Petkovic.

17 A. Good day.

18 MS. NOZICA: [No interpretation]

19 [In English] Sorry, sorry, it's the same binder. One for

20 Ms. Alaburic, please.

21 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Petkovic, I will follow this binder in

22 order. As I didn't get as much time as I hoped, so I will have to leave

23 out some things, but I hope that we will finish during the day.

24 I would like to start with a topic that my colleague Mr. Karnavas

25 had asked you about. That is the meeting on the 18th of April that was

Page 50068

1 chaired by Mr. Pellnas, and he spoke about this on page 49521, lines 3 to

2 14. And for that purpose, I wish to show you the first document, P2016.

3 And what I wish to refer to is page 4 in the Croatian and page 3 in the

4 English version.

5 I will tell you, just briefly, that it is stated here that on the

6 18th of April, a meeting was held, attended by Mr. Granic, the meeting

7 that we have referred to several times, and that, as it is stated on the

8 second page, the first meeting of the warring parties in Mostar was

9 interrupted by the defence minister of the HVO, who said that an attack

10 by the army had started in Central Bosnia of a large scope, and then the

11 meeting was postponed.

12 Mr. Petkovic, do you remember this meeting, and did Mr. Stojic

13 interrupt the meeting, as is stated here?

14 A. Your Honour, of course I remember this meeting. It has been

15 referred to with Mr. Prlic's counsel, the meeting of Mr. Pellnas and

16 Mr. Thebault, Petkovic, Prlic, Granic, Boras. It is not true that Stojic

17 interrupted the meeting. The meeting had already been completed, and

18 myself and General Pellnas were looking at the room from the entrance.

19 We were in the left part of the room. And with the help of an

20 interpreter of the military observers, myself and the general discussed

21 how we would continue work over Mostar and that he would try and let me

22 know when exactly General Halilovic would arrive for these talks. I

23 asked that he come, and Mr. Granic promised that he would contact

24 Sarajevo for General Halilovic to come. The second group was to the

25 right. I don't know what they were talking about.

Page 50069

1 And that is when Mr. Stojic walked into the room and asked first,

2 Where is Petkovic? And then he saw Mr. Granic, and he had a piece of

3 paper in his hand. It was a report from Central Bosnia. And it was

4 normal that he said, Mr. Granic, do you know what is now happening in

5 Central Bosnia? Has anyone here mentioned what's going on in Central

6 Bosnia? And that was Mr. Stojic's conversation with Mr. Granic. The

7 latter, of course, said that he didn't know what was happening.

8 Mr. Stojic then read out this document which had come from Central

9 Bosnia. It was a report. And the question was put whether anything

10 would be done to improve the situation in Central Bosnia. And that was

11 all the conversation conducted in connection with Mr. Stojic's arrival at

12 that meeting.

13 There were no threats whatsoever by Mr. Stojic addressed at

14 anyone. I did not notice that Mr. Granic felt afraid or in any other way

15 affected, because after all, Mr. Stojic showed that document to me, too,

16 I saw what it was about, and after that he left the hospital where the

17 meeting was being held and he went to his office. And I stayed on for a

18 while with General Pellnas and Mr. Thebault. For us, it was rather

19 outside the hospital than inside when we discussed what we would be

20 doing, especially when General Morillon and General Halilovic arrived.

21 Let me just add, I didn't even notice straight away that

22 Mr. Stojic had entered, because I was with General Pellnas. Had he

23 shouted out, then certainly my attention would have been drawn towards

24 Mr. Stojic and the group he had approached.

25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Petkovic. I should just like to say that on

Page 50070

1 page 61, 13, 62, third row, it says "Granic" instead of "Ganic." We are

2 talking about Mr. Ganic, so as to avoid any error.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I really apologise. I think each

4 time I first said "Granic," and then "Ganic," but it is Ganic, the

5 vice-president of the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina. I have some

6 problems with my teeth, so the R is a bit difficult to pronounce.

7 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Let us forget the R when we are

8 talking about Mr. Ganic, but let us proceed.

9 Q. But tell me, Mr. Petkovic, did Mr. Stojic have a pistol on him

10 when he came in?

11 A. Oh, no, Mr. Stojic, I never noticed him wearing a pistol. As far

12 as I knew, he had a pistol in the front of his car, and it was his driver

13 who was responsible for the pistol. I think we called him "Buca." Now,

14 I don't know whether that was his name, or surname, or a nickname. Buca

15 had two pistols and one in the car. I never saw a pistol on Stojic.

16 Q. Mr. Ganic. After this meeting, did Mr. Ganic come again -- after

17 this day when Mr. Stojic came, did Mr. Ganic come either to the premises

18 of the Defence Department or the Main Staff headquarters, after this

19 meeting?

20 A. Your Honours, Mr. Ganic dropped in with Mr. Halilovic briefly to

21 the Defence Department or the Main Staff. When coming to Mostar,

22 General Morillon asked whether it would be a good idea for Halilovic to

23 come and for us to be the hosts, and we said, Yes, and we spent a brief

24 time there. And then Messrs. Ganic and Halilovic, together with

25 General Morillon, went on to General Pasalic and stayed with him for a

Page 50071

1 little longer. So they returned to Medjugorje without me, and my

2 assessment is that they spent more than two hours talking to Mr. Pasalic.

3 Q. Mr. Petkovic, I'm asking you this because one of the witnesses in

4 the courtroom here said that Mr. Ganic, after the alleged incursion of

5 Mr. Stojic, was so frightened that he needed special security to reach

6 Zenica. Is that true?

7 A. That is not true. Mr. Ganic travelled to Zenica in the same

8 convoy as myself. I and Mr. Ganic, at the UNPROFOR base in Medjugorje,

9 got onto the vehicles of the Spanish Battalion, travelled with them to

10 Kiseljak. Then we moved to the vehicle of the Canadian Battalion,

11 because that was their zone towards Zenica, and then via Visoko-Kakanj,

12 we reached Zenica. And the whole evening, he attended the meeting that

13 all of us attended, and Mr. Zubak accompanied him. And he was very

14 active at that meeting.

15 Q. Mr. Petkovic, we'll move on to another topic.

16 So the next document is P1901. I shall briefly tell you that

17 during Witness 4D-AA, page 49263, line 23 of the transcript, a witness

18 for your Defence, when shown this document from Bruno Stojic, commented

19 on it. And then we'll look at the next document as well. The next

20 document is 2D3080. And then I'll ask you a question. This is

21 information sent to the Administration of SIS of the HZ-HB on the 25th of

22 April, 1993 -- I'm sorry, March, signed by the commander of SIS,

23 reporting on problems connected with the HOS units in Livno.

24 What is particularly important is that it says that this HOS unit

25 was attached to the Petar Kresimir HVO Brigade and had become a component

Page 50072

1 part of this brigade and was carrying out orders of this brigade, but

2 that in this HOS unit certain tension and disagreements had arisen. And

3 then on page 2, it is said that due to the newly-developed -- new

4 developments, the head of the Defence Department, Mr. Stojic and

5 yourself, are advised to call Stanko Brgoca [phoen], the commander of

6 this brigade, Mato Sukan [phoen], for an interview to deal with the

7 situation.

8 Could you tell us, linked to the previous command of Mr. Stojic,

9 dated the 16th of April, asking for this HOS brigade to be disbanded, do

10 you remember what happened to this brigade, this HOS brigade?

11 A. Your Honours, it was not a brigade, first of all. They were

12 called a battalion.

13 Q. A unit, a unit. Yes, I'm sorry, a unit.

14 A. Some of those men joined the Petar Kresimir Brigade,

15 Petar Kresimir IV Brigade, and a smaller group of those men left Livno

16 and went to Zagreb, as far as I can remember, the unit that was in Livno.

17 However -- but regardless of that, problems arose among them again, and

18 that is that their headquarters in Zagreb, Mr. Paraga, also tried to

19 settle things among those men who had now joined the HVO, and I think

20 this was done behind everybody's back. So he found some men that he was

21 in touch with, and this was causing problems to the brigade commander in

22 Livno. And we asked that this problem be dealt with, and we had a

23 man - I don't know whether he's mentioned here. I can't remember his

24 name. I think he was in Tomislavgrad; I'm not sure - who managed to deal

25 with HOS in a special way, somehow to put some order there, that they had

Page 50073

1 to fit into the brigade system, and that they couldn't do anything on

2 their own initiative. And this gentleman helped a part of those troops

3 so as not to be arrested and leaving for Zagreb. They were from this

4 area, but they had Croatian citizenship. And that is how this problem

5 was dealt with in Livno.

6 However, something happened that we learnt about much later.

7 I think they tricked us by saying that they were joining the brigade;

8 whereas, in fact, they believed that they continued to be HOS. And even

9 though they removed HOS insignia, perhaps they carried them in their

10 pockets.

11 Q. If I understood you correctly, that means that this order, issued

12 by Mr. Stojic, P1901, came after these problems, but the situation was

13 resolved peacefully ultimately; nobody was arrested or anything else.

14 Have I understood you correctly?

15 A. Yes, there was this great problem with them, but they tried to

16 resolve it in a peaceful way by negotiating with them and, first of all,

17 asking that they become included in the system that was already set up in

18 the area, and that they couldn't play their own game and do what they

19 wanted. I don't know how many there were, but, anyway, the brigade that

20 had three and a half thousand men could not tolerate a group of not more

21 than 30 or 40 combatants doing what they liked.

22 Q. Thank you very much, Mr. Petkovic, for that exhaustive

23 explanation and the information you've given us, but we'll have to be

24 briefer to save time.

25 Now look at 4D, please, 3418, the next document.

Page 50074

1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, I've just

2 seen this document. The 16th of April, 1993, is the date. You know that

3 there is the Prosecution claim according to which there was an ultimatum,

4 and as of the 15th of April all units were to be either subordinated to

5 the HVO or to the ABiH. When I see this document, I put the following

6 question to myself: I want to know whether this document can support the

7 Prosecution claim or not, the claim that as of the 15th of April, the HVO

8 wanted to be the only master in Regions 3, 8, and 10, and as a result it

9 instructs everyone to either join the HVO or to be disarmed.

10 So can this document be linked to the HVO's desire to remain

11 alone in Regions 3, 8, and 10, or is this just a coincidence because it

12 concerned this unit that could present certain problems, and as a result

13 the decision was taken to definitively separate from --

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour Judge Antonetti, the

15 HOS units, even if they -- well, they weren't tied in amongst themselves

16 properly, and each of their groups, numbering 15 to 20 men, would control

17 the area they were in according to their own volition. So at the end of

18 1992 and the beginning of 1993, in Tomislavgrad and Livno, and anywhere

19 elsewhere they happened to congregate, they never formed a single unit

20 with 400 or 500 people rallied together so that you realise that it was a

21 unit. No. They were small groups, 15, 20 men, and each of them had

22 their own plan, and they would always be active in some settlement. They

23 sold weapons, they engaged in crime, they caused excessive situations,

24 and things like that. They were engaged in smuggling and so on. There

25 were very few of them that were willing to go up to the front-line and

Page 50075

1 hold the line. No, they had their own agenda, their own plan, which was

2 to topple the system that existed, and to make as much nuisance of

3 themselves as possible, and to try to impose themselves on others. They

4 thought nothing of opening fire, or kidnapping somebody, or engaging in

5 things like that. So I would call them a sort of wild group of men. And

6 I encountered them in April 1992 for the first time in Tomislavgrad, when

7 I had to go there to help put some reason into a group like that and to

8 work under one command.

9 So that was the way they acted and behaved. They were little

10 groups that went into action far from the front-lines in little

11 settlements. And wherever they came, they caused a lot of problems,

12 especially as their leadership -- as their leader had gained certain

13 positions in the Croatian Party of Rights at the time, and that party had

14 lost a lot of sympathisers, so they wanted them, by hook or by crook, to

15 impose themselves in the region in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, nobody

16 had gained much advantage from them. It wasn't a large unit with 400 or

17 500 men. You would have little groups of 20 or 15 men, and they ran amok

18 mostly. So what date was it that you said, the 15th, the 16th? And it

19 had nothing to do with that. Everybody who accepted that remained.

20 But let me say they left as a HOS because they pledged to be part

21 of the HVO, but through their connections in Zagreb, nonetheless, they

22 managed to remain HOS in one way or another.

23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So in your opinion,

24 the date was just a coincidence.

25 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Your Honours, without any intention

Page 50076

1 to testify, but the witness did talk about this in 2D3080, the next

2 document in line, and it says there that that particular unit, after the

3 disbanding of HOS, did join up the HVO brigade which was named the

4 Petar Kresimir Brigade, and it became just one of the brigade's units.

5 So it wasn't -- even if there was an ultimatum to be re-subordinated,

6 there was no need, because it was already part of the HVO.

7 Q. Isn't that right, Mr. Petkovic?

8 A. Yes, and that's the report of the 25th of March, 1993, that says

9 that about Livno.

10 Q. Just a brief question related to the H-O-S, HOS. You've told us

11 about all the problems you had with them, but did they wear uniforms that

12 were inappropriate and that caused you problems, for which you had to

13 intervene on a number of occasions?

14 A. Yes, Your Honours. They wore black uniforms, and in their office

15 or offices they had Ante Pavelic's photograph up on the wall, and things

16 like that. So, as such, at the time they couldn't be considered

17 combatants either for Bosnia-Herzegovina or anything else, for that

18 matter. The main photograph that they each had in their office was

19 Ante Pavelic's. That was what they liked to do, and also to wear black

20 uniforms.

21 Q. Let's move on to another area now.

22 I have given the number of the document. It is 4D00348. You've

23 found the document, have you not, Mr. Petkovic?

24 Now, this is a report from Mr. Miro Andric. It's signed. We see

25 that it's a report for the period between the 13th of January to the 22nd

Page 50077

1 of January. And in the beginning, Mr. Miro Andric says that:

2 "Following a verbal order from the head of the Defence

3 Department, Mr. Bruno Stojic, on the 12th of January, 1993," he says, "I

4 went to carry out a mission in Prozor, with the objective of calming the

5 situation down in Gornji Vakuf municipality."

6 It is not my intention to look at the entire document.

7 Mr. Miro Andric was in the Main Staff, was he not? And during the

8 examination-in-chief, you explained what his position there was, and I'd

9 just like to ask you now if you remember, where were you on the 12th of

10 January? Could you tell us, or repeat it if you've already told us? And

11 why was it necessary for Mr. Miro Andric to go to Gornji Vakuf at this

12 particular point in time in the first time?

13 A. Your Honours, we're dealing with the 12th of January, when he

14 left -- or, rather, when he received an order. He probably set out then.

15 And I and Mr. Boban were still in Geneva. And on the evening of the

16 12th, we were on our way back to Croatia, and then I continued on my

17 journey to Herceg-Bosna. And Mr. Stojic sent Andric to Prozor to join up

18 with Colonel Siljeg and our negotiating team there, which was discussing

19 matters with the BH Army through the mediation of BritBat in

20 Gornji Vakuf.

21 Q. Mr. Petkovic, when you returned, did you hear anything about the

22 fact the fact that the BH Army delegation had been expanded and that's

23 why somebody had needed to go to the negotiations of Mostar?

24 A. A delegation arrived -- well, at first it was a local Vakuf

25 delegation which was later joined by - well, I don't know the exact

Page 50078

1 number - three or four, and we have the names in the documents, a

2 delegation of the 3rd Corps from Zenica, which means that a 3rd Corps

3 delegation from Zenica also joined in. And I think they referred to

4 themselves as the state delegation.

5 Anyway, on the Bosniak side and the BH Army side, there was this

6 local delegation led by the commander of the local brigade and some

7 others, and then at a certain moment a delegation from the 3rd Corps of

8 the BH Army arrived and joined in, too, from the superior institution, so

9 to speak.

10 Q. Mr. Petkovic, you say that you weren't there and that Mr. Boban

11 wasn't there either; in Mostar, that is. Now, was that the reason why

12 Mr. Andric went, because of this expanded delegation that arrived at the

13 negotiations?

14 A. I assume that was why he was sent there, to strengthen our

15 delegation or, rather, so that we should have a representative outside

16 the local people who attended. So Colonel Siljeg arrived, and as we can

17 see, Colonel Andric arrived, too, so that we had a two-level delegation,

18 a local one and one of a higher level.

19 Q. All right, fine. I'm now going to go on to another area, and for

20 that would you look at document 2093, please, P2093.

21 You have testified about this document, how the order came into

22 being, and that was on page 49530 of the transcript, lines 1 to 3. You

23 mentioned those negotiations. Now, we have before us an order, and you

24 were supposed to sign it, but somebody signed in your stead. And it

25 relates to a cease-fire and a cessation to hostilities agreement, and the

Page 50079

1 resolution of the problem between the HVO and the BH Army, which was

2 signed in Zagreb by Mr. Izetbegovic and Boban, as well as

3 General Petkovic and Halilovic, along with the signature of Mr. Tudjman

4 and Lord Owen.

5 Now, what I'm interested in is this, Mr. Petkovic: We see here

6 that there's a signature there, Mr. Stojic's signature, whether a

7 facsimile or his signature. But tell me, anyway, we see that the

8 document was issued at 8.00 a.m., so could you explain to Their Honours

9 how it came about that another person signed for you and that Mr. Stojic

10 signed a document of this kind?

11 A. The situation was similar to the previous situation. At this

12 point in time, Mr. Boban and I were still in Zagreb. An agreement had

13 been signed, and we've seen it in this courtroom a number of times. And

14 from Zagreb, they demanded that orders be issued straight away on the

15 basis of the agreement; that is to say, that they shouldn't wait for

16 Halilovic and me to arrive in Mostar and Sarajevo. But Zagreb called up

17 and said that, in the spirit of the agreement that had been reached

18 before our arrival, orders should be issued straight away in the

19 meantime. And Bruno Stojic in that case did so, and he signed on behalf

20 of the Defence department, and Zeljko Akrap signed on behalf of the

21 Main Staff. So the demand that came in was, The agreement has been

22 signed, follow it on and tell both commands and headquarters to issue

23 orders for a cease-fire. So that's how this order came to be written

24 while Mr. Boban and I were still in Zagreb and were on our way back. We

25 came back in the afternoon. The first available flight from Zagreb to

Page 50080

1 Split was at 1.00 or 2.00 p.m., and then from there we would go to Mostar

2 and Herzegovina.

3 Q. Mr. Petkovic, do you happen to remember whether you contacted

4 Mr. Stojic and gave him instructions of this kind? Can you remember?

5 A. Well, to be quite frank, I can't remember who that was. Was it

6 Mr. Boban or did I call him up? Anyway, the position was that the orders

7 should be signed straight away and that on that very day the orders

8 should be carried out; that is to say, that a stop should be put to the

9 conflicts and a cease-fire enforced.

10 Q. All right. Now let's look at another document of similar

11 content. It's 2D3081, and it is another order issued by

12 Mr. Sefer Halilovic this time.

13 What I want you to focus on is the fact that he sent this order

14 to the HVO Main Staff as well. Does that, Mr. Petkovic, indicate, and

15 with the previous order we saw that it was received by the Supreme

16 Command Staff of the Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina. This one

17 was sent to the Main Staff of the HVO, so I'm going to ask you this: And

18 Judge Antonetti asked you something like that, too. Was it a single army

19 and just the two components of one and the same army, because these

20 orders were being exchanged in this way?

21 A. Well, it was an agreement, and an attachment to the agreement was

22 also signed which states that the HVO and the BH Army were the armed

23 forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that is why it was

24 requested that orders be issued straight away. Here I see that Halilovic

25 signed it personally, which means that we signed our order 12 hours

Page 50081

1 before Halilovic signed his, which means from Zagreb we phoned up Mostar,

2 told them to issue the order.

3 And Mr. Halilovic first of all flew in to Sarajevo, and then he

4 proceeded to issue that order, so he lagged behind us at least 10 hours.

5 And I know it was sometime around 1.00 or 2.00 that he flew to Sarajevo

6 in an UNPROFOR plane, whereas we used the regular flight to Split and

7 continued on from there to Mostar. But, anyway, the orders were issued

8 as we had agreed. Who issued them first, well, we can see that. It

9 would have been better had he phoned up from Zagreb, called Divjak or

10 Siljeg or somebody else, and given them instructions.

11 Q. [Previous translation continued] ... 49151, line 24 -- I'll

12 repeat this. I don't know whether you heard me. I said -- it's not in

13 the transcript. I said that Witness 4D-AA has testified here, and on

14 pages 49151 and 49.000 -- or up to 49155, on those pages he was asked

15 about certain military issues by Judge Antonetti, about Vitezovi, about

16 whose control it was under, what happened with the battalion. You have

17 testified about this at length. You said quite a few witnesses mentioned

18 under whose command it was. So my question is: Have a look at P2673,

19 and then -- D2673 should be after this. Have you found it? First I'll

20 ask you to confirm this again.

21 The Vitezovi Battalion, during this period - we're speaking about

22 the beginning of 1993 up until the 8th of June, 1993 - where was it

23 based, and under whose command was it?

24 A. The Vitezovi Battalion, Your Honours, at that time was in the

25 territory of Central Bosnia. In particular, it was in the town of Vitez,

Page 50082

1 or, rather, the municipality of Vitez. So that's in Vitez town. It was

2 a battalion from the Main Staff, but it was attached to

3 Commander Blaskic, the commander of the operative zone in Central Bosnia,

4 and at that time it was still active in that role in the territory of

5 Central Bosnia.

6 Q. Here we can see an amendment on the mobilisation deployment here,

7 mobilisation development. Item 2, it says the Vitezovi Battalion and

8 Tvrtko II battalion, and then the code is mentioned for the unit. It

9 says -- I'm sorry, let's start at the beginning. It says:

10 "Put an end to the mobilisation development," and then it

11 mentions the Vitezovi Battalion. Although this was signed by Mr. Stojic,

12 do you remember, were you involved in this entire problem, and why did

13 this occur?

14 A. Your Honours, the Vitezovi Battalion was -- it wasn't very

15 strong. The number of troops was reduced. At the beginning -- it didn't

16 have many men at the beginning, but in all the fighting in Central Bosnia

17 it was used -- well, if someone lost their position, they were sent in to

18 take back the position. Many of them were wounded, they had many dead,

19 so, in fact, the battalion could only exist as a battalion on paper. It

20 could only be a battalion on paper. So there was a decision according to

21 which -- as it wasn't being reinforced, people didn't want to report for

22 service in that battalion because they saw that those people were really

23 being used wherever others failed and lost the lines. So, as a result,

24 they avoided going to that battalion, so a decision was taken to

25 terminate the Vitezovi Battalion.

Page 50083

1 On the 8th of June, such a decision was adopted according to

2 which the Vitezovi Battalion should be terminated. And, similarly, the

3 Tvrtko II Battalion was to be dismantled. And as far as Tvrtko II is

4 concerned, they refused to sign -- its officers refused to sign the

5 contract, but they wanted to be professionals without a contract. So

6 that was the reason.

7 Q. Let's have a look at the following document that comes, 2D002,

8 which should confirm what you have just been saying. But there is one

9 particular item I am interested in. I will draw your attention to that.

10 Mr. Petkovic, this document, for certain technical reasons, does

11 not bear a signature. It is from the Croatian Defence Council, from the

12 command of the operative zone. It was forwarded to you and to

13 Mr. Stojic. It should have been signed by Mr. Blaskic.

14 Please assist us and tell us whether you can remember this

15 document. Have you ever received it -- did you ever receive it, and was

16 it sent by Mr. Blaskic?

17 Here he says -- immediately after receiving the previous document

18 on mobilisation development, he says that he saw officers and commanders

19 from the Vitezovi Battalion who were unhappy because of certain

20 terminology used, for insulting terminology used. It also says because

21 of -- in the order according to which the independent Vitezovi Battalion

22 is to be terminated, and this confirms that they actually received this.

23 So here in this document, it says --

24 MR. SCOTT: Could we get the number again? We seem to be having

25 trouble.

Page 50084

1 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] 2D3082. It's the next document.

2 That's fine.

3 Q. Sir, what is most important with regard to the commander they

4 were under is that it says:

5 "I have to point out that the Vitezovi Battalion really carried

6 out all military tasks assigned to it and that it was a guarantor of the

7 professionalism, especially in certain combat activities. It bolsters

8 morale and provides security for all fighters at the lines."

9 Here, Mr. Petkovic, it says what you have just been saying,

10 yourself, that up to then 780 or more were killed, 2.017 were wounded.

11 A. Let me correct you. That doesn't have to do with the battalion.

12 It has to do with the military zone as a whole, whereas the battalion,

13 you've skipped something. It had 80 soldiers, and now it only has 40

14 today. That's what it says.

15 Q. Yes, yes. General Petkovic, go three lines back.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. Very well. That's what you said. I just want to go through

18 this. It says in the operative zone, we have had such and such a number

19 of dead and wounded. And then further down, it says, I -- you, the chief

20 of Defence, and you, the chief of the Main Staff, I have the following

21 request from you, temporarily dismiss the order for reforming the

22 Vitezovi Battalion and the Tvrtko Battalion. If possible, pay the

23 remaining salaries. If possible, the Health Department should pay a cash

24 advance to the staff of the Novi Bila Hospital.

25 Mr. Petkovic, can you confirm that you also received this

Page 50085

1 document from Mr. Blaskic at the time?

2 A. Yes, it was addressed to me, and the heading, Your Honours, and

3 after a decision according to which the Vitezovi Battalion was to be

4 dismantled, this was Colonel Blaskic's reaction. He had immense praise

5 for this battalion and for the important role it played in the defence of

6 Central Bosnia, and a request was made not to dismantle the battalion.

7 It was to continue existing, in spite of the fact that it had very few

8 troops.

9 Q. Mr. Petkovic, in this request of his, did he explicitly state

10 that the Vitezovi Battalion carried out all the military tasks assigned

11 to it?

12 A. Yes, that is correct, that's what he says. Let me remind the

13 Chamber that when I testified in the Blaskic case and was faced with such

14 questions, I said that it was only in the Croatian newspapers that I

15 discovered that the battalion was so bad. But, in fact, the situation

16 was quite the contrary. So someone deliberately wanted to conduct a

17 smear campaign against the battalion. I said that whenever I heard

18 negative things about the battalion, it was from the newspapers, but I

19 hadn't heard such things from the commander. So that was my testimony,

20 and I stand by that testimony.

21 Q. So, General Petkovic, in the course of your testimony, you also

22 said that the Vitezovi Battalion was under the direct command of

23 Mr. Tihomir Blaskic as of January 1993, under his exclusive command?

24 A. Yes, that's what I said. And there is an order -- there is a

25 document to that effect, and that then doesn't have to do with military

Page 50086

1 tasks. It has to do with all elements that relate to command. And

2 Colonel Blaskic knows what that means.

3 Q. General Petkovic, I now have another three documents for you.

4 I'll tell you what it is about. These are reports on -- work reports for

5 1992, a letter from Mr. Stojic asking for a report on the basis of the

6 decision of the HVO OHZB --

7 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Counsel.

8 Your Honours, I haven't been doing this regularly, and taking

9 Mr. Karnavas counsel on board to have a -- some sort of a standing point

10 on this, but I do think it's maybe timely to raise it again just to keep

11 the Chamber advised of my intentions.

12 The Vitezovi is a classic example of something that is actually

13 brand new. It has nothing to do with Ms. Alaburic's direct examination,

14 and again is another topic on which I'll be seeking substantial

15 additional time, as among a number of others. This is one additional

16 example of a brand-new topic raised on so-called cross-examination.

17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Nozica, just a minute.

18 A minute ago, Mr. Karnavas, when putting questions, put questions

19 that could have to do with the joint criminal enterprise. He put

20 questions about the interview that Mr. Prlic was in -- was involved in.

21 I see a link there. But when you address the issue of the Vitezovi

22 Battalion, well, what is the link? What are you trying to demonstrate?

23 What are you trying to establish? Because if we don't understand, well,

24 the Prosecution has an objection that they have made, and then the Judges

25 may wonder why you are putting such and such a question. I didn't ask

Page 50087

1 any questions about the Vitezovi Battalion that General Petkovic defends.

2 Ms. Alaburic, similarly, did not address this issue. So why are you

3 going into the subject?

4 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Your Honour, why? Well, your

5 questions for Witness 4D-AA had to do with this subject. And as I have

6 the right, in the course of my cross-examination, to put questions of

7 interest for the Stojic Defence, if the witness has direct knowledge of

8 this, and Mr. Petkovic does, as a result I wanted to confirm the

9 allegations that Mr. Petkovic made in the Blaskic trial. This has been

10 referred to on a number of occasions, so this is a subject of importance,

11 in the light of your questions, too, because you referred to a document

12 that also relates to Mr. Bruno Stojic. It was the appeal judgement in

13 the Blaskic case. So that's why I've put this question to the witness,

14 who can answer it directly. He can say whether he knows anything about

15 this, whether he has any direct knowledge of this matter.

16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Continue. For the

17 moment, I don't see where you're going, but a light will certainly be

18 shed.

19 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour, light will be

20 subsequently shed, but I have now dealt with this matter.

21 I spoke about providing reports, biannual reports from the

22 Main Staff. I won't show you the documents, Mr. Petkovic. I don't have

23 the time. I'll just briefly put the questions to you.

24 Q. When you drafted reports from the Main Staff, was the integral

25 text, without any amendments, sent through the Defence Department to the

Page 50088

1 HVO HZ-HB? And, as such, was it an integral part of the HVO HZ-HB

2 report?

3 A. Your Honours, my report was a special report, a particular

4 report. It wasn't amended in any way. First it became an integral part

5 of the Defence Department report, and thus also an integral part of the

6 report of the authorities of the HZ-HB. But in no way was it amended.

7 Nothing was changed.

8 Q. Mr. Petkovic, that's what it says about the reports. For the

9 sake of the transcript, I'll just say that the document concerned is

10 P126 [as interpreted] and document P4699. It says that reports from the

11 Main Staff and from the Logistics Base, because of the level of

12 confidentiality, will be in the Office of the President of the HZ-HB.

13 And in the second report of the president of the HVO. So that confirms

14 that the integral text of the report was presented to the HZ-HB or,

15 rather, to the Presidency. Is that correct?

16 A. Yes. I said that in the Defence Department each ministry -- in

17 the Defence Department, each office had its reports. All the offices

18 were in unity. The headquarters was also treated as an office of the

19 Defence Department. But my report had to be drafted so as it didn't

20 require any amendments, and it was in that state that it was conveyed to

21 the Defence Department. It was part of the report of the Defence

22 Department. No one amended it. And, as such, it was forwarded to the

23 government or to the executive authorities of the HVO.

24 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] I'd like to correct the transcript.

25 On page 80, line 20, it's not "P126," it's P128.

Page 50089

1 Q. Let's now move on to another subject. Mr. Petkovic, you said

2 that the chief of the Main Staff, on the basis of the decision on the

3 organisation of the Defence Department - this is document P -- we don't

4 have to show it -- P586 - you said that he was responsible to the supreme

5 commander with regard to issues of supreme command; organisation,

6 strategic operative plans, and the use of the armed forces. Is that

7 correct?

8 A. Yes, that's what it says there in that document with regard to

9 issues that the supreme commander refers to me as the chief of staff

10 involved in certain areas of responsibility.

11 Q. In the very same decision, the chief of staff is responsible to

12 the head of the Defence Department for all administrative affairs, for

13 budgetary issues, and for issues that relate to materiel expenditure, and

14 to issues that relate to the organisation of the armed forces; is that

15 correct?

16 A. Yes, that is correct. That's what we also said in my testimony.

17 Q. So according to the regulations -- according to the rules that

18 were in force in the HZ-HB, the head of the Defence Department - I'm

19 talking about Bruno Stojic - couldn't issue operative orders to the units

20 of the HVO?

21 A. Your Honours, he couldn't if he didn't refer to Article 30 of the

22 Decree on the Armed Forces of the HZ-HB. In certain situations, under

23 certain conditions, that article makes it possible to command in the

24 operative sense. The law provided that that was also possible if

25 authority was transferred to him. So Article 30 allowed the head of the

Page 50094

1 Ms. Nozica, please continue.

2 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.

3 I just want to inform you that according to my calculations, I

4 have another 24 minutes for the cross-examination. And from Mr. Pusic's

5 Defence, I have been granted half of their time, which is another 18

6 minutes. So I think that will bring me to the end of this session during

7 which I'll be able to complete my cross-examination.

8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So as Mr. Pusic has granted you

9 their time, we will finished as planned, at quarter to 2:00, so let's go

10 on and not waste any more time.

11 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12 Q. Mr. Petkovic, could you give me a yes-or-no answer now. When you

13 were the chief of staff of the Main Staff, and when you were doing other

14 work in the Main Staff, did Mr. Stojic ever issue to you an operative

15 order for the use of armed forces?

16 A. I said, Your Honours, except for those two cases that I have

17 mentioned, that I do not remember any direct order to me. This one -- I

18 remember Praljak's, but this one, I do not.

19 Q. I will remind you that Mr. Praljak testified regarding this

20 issue, and he provided an answer.

21 My second question: Did Mr. Stojic ever issue an order to you

22 whereby he would cease or stop your order for the use of armed forces?

23 Please give me a yes-or-no answer.

24 A. I don't remember. I don't remember him giving me such an order.

25 Q. Mr. Petkovic, did you ever see any order whereby Mr. Boban

Page 50095

1 transfers his authority, under Article 30, as you have said, an order by

2 Mr. Boban where he is transferring his competencies from Article 30 to

3 Bruno Stojic? Did you ever see such an order?

4 A. Your Honours, I don't know whether these need to be transferred

5 or not. In the heading of those three orders, I did see Mr. Stojic

6 referring to Article 30, so to be quite frank, I don't know whether he

7 was given such authority or not. But there are three documents by

8 Mr. Stojic in which he refers to Article 30.

9 Q. Mr. Petkovic, were they orders for the operative use of armed

10 forces?

11 A. No.

12 Q. Then we can move on. That is what I am interested in.

13 Specifically with the use of armed forces, you spoke at length about the

14 competencies of Mr. Stojic, and the Court is aware of that.

15 Let us move on to the next topic, the method of appointment of

16 unit commands. Could you explain to Their Honours how such appointments

17 were made? Who made the proposals, if any? Was the Main Staff involved

18 before Mr. Stojic made such appointments, that is, the appointments that

19 he was authorised to make?

20 A. The legal regulations, Your Honours, stipulate that the chief of

21 staff of the Main Staff may make a proposal which the head of the Defence

22 Department accepts, and then he appoints people, or upon the proposal of

23 the chief of staff. There were, however, individual cases when the

24 Main Staff did sign. I, for instance, did sign, saying that I agree with

25 the proposal coming from our brigades.

Page 50096

1 Q. Mr. Petkovic, does that mean that proposals for appointments came

2 from the units, from the brigades?

3 A. Yes, the brigades did provide names of people proposed for

4 certain positions, because neither the Main Staff nor does the Defence

5 Department have a list of available people. It was the units on the

6 ground who would make the proposals, and then, in principle, such

7 proposals were adopted and appointments formalised.

8 Q. Let us now look at a document just to confirm this procedure,

9 document P616. This is a proposal for the appointment of an officer in

10 the Krajl Tomislav Brigade, made by Mr. Siljeg, both to the Defence

11 Department and the Main Staff. Were the proposals usually made in this

12 way?

13 A. Yes. Those were the proposals coming from the units in the

14 operative zone.

15 Q. Mr. Petkovic, did such proposals come also for people to be

16 relieved of their duties, that is, proposals from a unit to the Defence

17 Department and the Main Staff, or to one or the other?

18 A. In principle, yes. Such proposals were also made from the lower

19 level up, proposals for people to be relieved of duty.

20 Q. Let us now look at document P2523. This is a proposal for a

21 dismissal by Mr. Siljeg, and at the bottom I see your signature. Is that

22 what you were referring to, that this would go to the Main Staff, and by

23 your signature you confirm your approval?

24 A. Yes, exactly.

25 Q. During your testimony, you spoke about certain dismissals and the

Page 50097

1 need that you felt to initiate certain dismissals, so I would like to ask

2 you to have a look at document 4D1038. This is a proposal for a

3 dismissal. You have signed it. And it's being sent to the Operative

4 Zone of South-Eastern Herzegovina. And you say:

5 "Urgently make a proposal to the Main Staff for the dismissal

6 from the present post in the command. Please propose how this position

7 should be filled in and with who."

8 Do you remember such a situation?

9 A. Yes, I do remember. This was a situation in connection with the

10 situation in Mostar, and I spoke to the commander of the operative zone.

11 And when the conclusion was reached, that for various reasons some people

12 need to be dismissed. And he's asked to investigate who are the people

13 who are not fulfilling conditions.

14 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters kindly ask Mr. Khan to switch

15 off his microphone. We're hearing the typing. I'm sorry.

16 MR. KHAN: Your Honours, the interpreters perhaps can't see my

17 microphone, but I can assure them it's off.

18 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Okay. Document P1631.

19 Q. This is an exhibit. I believe you can clarify it. It is an

20 order by Mr. Stojic to dismiss Marko Zelenika on the 9th of March, 1993.

21 Could we please look at the document that follows. This is

22 3D2339. This is a report of SIS, dated the 9th of April, 1993. It's a

23 statement by the mentioned person, Marko Zelenika, and in this statement

24 he says that he performed various duties in the HVO. That is the first

25 sentence after the word "Statement." That he was the commander of the

Page 50098

1 Mijat Tomic Battalion in Jablanica, that he performed that duty until the

2 1st of March, 1993, when he took sick leave. And after medical treatment

3 in Jablanica and Split, he returned to Jablanica. And he goes on to say

4 in the text that upon his return, he was interviewed in the Civilian

5 Staff, and on that occasion he declared that he would prefer to extend

6 his sick leave in order to fully recover. He says that the someone else

7 was put in his place, that is, Marinko Mikulic.

8 Mr. Petkovic, can you confirm that this situation of

9 Mr. Zelenika's sickness was the reason for him being relieved of duty?

10 A. Yes. The gentleman says that he was sick and undergoing

11 treatment, and that, as such, he cannot hold a command position, so that

12 some other solution has to be found for him.

13 Q. Very well, thank you. Mr. Petkovic, is it correct to say that

14 battalions, brigades, and operative zones, in their commands, had

15 assistants for SIS, IPD, logistics, and the medical corps?

16 A. Yes, they were a component part of the uniformed [as interpreted]

17 service of security, and of course they did have this segment.

18 Q. Precisely on account of what you have just said, that they were a

19 unified part of the SIS and IPD administrations, I have to ask you

20 whether these assistants in the units were in the chain of command of the

21 commander of those units, and were they given assignments from them, and

22 were they accountable to them?

23 A. In certain instances, yes, and in other cases they were

24 accountable to the superior SIS body, up until the assistant head of

25 security. So some of the work was under the command of the commanders,

Page 50099

1 and a part of the work, according to their own vertical chain of command,

2 right up to the assistant commander of the SIS Administration.

3 Q. Mr. Petkovic, did you ever see -- you, yourself, did you ever see

4 any order which the head of the Defence Department or the assistant for

5 security for IPD issued to units, commanders, or directly to assistants

6 for these activities?

7 A. Your Honours, it would be a good idea if we had the documents of

8 SIS, to the extent that it is available, but we don't have it.

9 Q. Please, my time is limited, Mr. Petkovic. I do have quite a

10 number of commands of the SIS. I'm just asking you whether you saw them.

11 A. I could not see them, because the Main Staff does not have SIS,

12 so it doesn't go through the Main Staff, from the SIS Administration to

13 the brigade, or to any other lower level.

14 Q. Let me remind you that a witness for your Defence, a

15 Mr. Zrinko Tokic, brigade commander, on page 45458, lines 10 to 14, said,

16 without any reservation, that these are assistants for IPD, SIS, Health

17 and Logistics, were in the chain of command of the commander. Now, how

18 this is according to the documents, we shall look now.

19 Look at document 2D3083. This is an order - I assume you're

20 familiar with it - dated the 9th of October, as it is one of your

21 documents. I put them in chronological order to see what orders they

22 received from units commanders, from assistants for SIS and IPD. And

23 here you're sending an order to Mr. Lasic to secure facilities, and you

24 say, in paragraph 5, that:

25 "The formation that provides security, SIS, and the command of

Page 50100

1 Sector Mostar must perform the control of the security of this facility

2 and similar facilities as well."

3 Does it follow from this order that you are issuing an order to

4 the SIS commander here?

5 A. Now, is this SIS the SIS of the brigade or the SIS Centre? But,

6 anyway, SIS was supposed to check out the level of security of the

7 hydroelectric power-station in this area, Salakovac.

8 Q. From your answer, Mr. Petkovic, it follows that it could refer to

9 the SIS Centre as well, not only the assistant in the unit?

10 A. What I'm saying is that I cannot claim which instance of SIS this

11 is, whether it was the commander of the operative zone or Sector Mostar,

12 Mr. Lasic, or somebody else. So all I could do was to contact Lasic, and

13 it was up to him, in turn, to involve and contact the SIS officials.

14 Q. Very well. Let's look at P3135, which is the next order now,

15 please. It's an order from Mr. Obradovic, and it is dated the 3rd of

16 July. And as we can see at the bottom, it was also addressed to the

17 chief of SIS. And in point 1, it refers to theft, the theft of property,

18 and that proceedings should be taken through this command. In item 3, it

19 talks about brutal behaviour, and once again that proceedings be taken

20 through this command. In item 6, it says that the commanders, in their

21 area of responsibility, must not allow any searches or people being taken

22 away except by the military police and SIS in the brigade.

23 From this, we can see that Mr. Obradovic is sending the SIS

24 Command of the 1st Brigade an order linked to violent behaviour, theft,

25 searches, and detention, and demands that all steps taken against

Page 50101

1 perpetrators of these types of acts be done through the command. And I'm

2 sure you've seen this document before. Does it confirm, Mr. Petkovic,

3 what the tasks were as issued by the commander to the SIS and the

4 military police in the brigade?

5 A. Your Honours, it is true that in the overall setup of SIS --

6 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers kindly slow down, speak one

7 at a time. And lead counsel's microphone is picking up the typing noise.

8 Thank you.

9 MR. KARNAVAS: Excuse me, General, because we've lost some

10 translation here, and I'll do Judge Prandler's work.

11 If we could have a pause, if we could have a pause. If we could

12 speak a little slower. If for whatever reason there seems to be some

13 typing being picked up, perhaps -- it's transferring from me, perhaps

14 it's transferring from my desk, but we shall all endeavour to assist our

15 good translators. Thank you.

16 JUDGE TRECHSEL: If I may add a word, it would be helpful to the

17 translators, Ms. Nozica, if you would turn off the microphone when you do

18 not speak, because the typing on the desk is transferred via the

19 microphone pretty loud to the ears of the translators -- interpreters,

20 sorry.

21 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Your Honours, it's rather difficult

22 for me to keep remembering to switch my microphone on -- off.

23 Q. Now, Mr. Petkovic, could you give us your answer? You started

24 answering and saying that it was correct, that the SIS in the brigades

25 existed, as far as I understood you, in the units, and that those were,

Page 50102

1 indeed, the tasks which the commanders could issue SIS. Am I right in

2 saying that?

3 A. Yes, you are right. There was part of a united single SIS within

4 the brigade, and within the brigade the SIS was operating for the needs

5 and requirements of that particular brigade. Therefore, that is the

6 united, single SIS system that existed within the HVO, and now we see it

7 working at the level of the brigade, doing its job in the field of the

8 brigade's remit, which is quite normal. And then once it has carried out

9 its assignments, it will inform the superior SIS officers, right up to

10 the level of the SIS Administration, because he is duty-bound to do that.

11 So he'll do the work for the brigade, and then he's -- he will inform the

12 brigade and his superiors up the chain of command, which is the SIS

13 Administration.

14 Q. Mr. Petkovic, will the assistant commander for SIS in the brigade

15 inform the assistant commander of SIS in the operative zone?

16 A. I think that they had the duty to inform him, but directly to

17 send the SIS Centre information first, or the SIS Administration,

18 perhaps, too, and first. So within the SIS system, they were duty-bound

19 to inform the SIS Administration. That's what it says in their rules and

20 regulations, the rules and regulations of the Security and Information

21 Service, which we have looked at in this courtroom and discussed.

22 Q. Now, the orders for their work, as we have seen on the basis of

23 the one we looked at, did they receive it from the commander under whose

24 command they were, and do they report to him about their work?

25 A. Yes, they are given their assignment both to the commander and

Page 50103

1 the superior level. That's what it says in the regulations, and they are

2 duty-bound to adhere to them.

3 Q. Very well, thank you. May we have shorter answers, please.

4 And look at P3614 next, please. P3614 is the number, yes. It's

5 a request from you, dated the 21st of July, and what you're requesting is

6 that in view of the situation in the area of responsibility of the 2nd

7 HVO Brigade, you are sending this request to Mr. Lasic to send reports of

8 commanders which are of interest to the commanders of the 2nd Brigade.

9 And then it says: "NS, the Intelligence and SIS section." So you asked

10 for reports from all these individuals linked to certain events; is that

11 right?

12 A. Well, Madam, I asked for a complete report into everybody,

13 including the commander, including the intelligence personnel and SIS,

14 and some people knew, some people did not, about what was happening in

15 the brigade.

16 Q. Can we now look at 2D3025 next, please. This is an order from

17 Commander Marijan Bradara, brigade command, and it is the

18 Josip Jelacic Brigade, and he is issuing an order to the chief of SIS

19 Brigade and the chief of the 3rd Battalion of Kresevo. And this is what

20 he says, establish the facts straight away, and the reason why the

21 defence line was not taken up.

22 In item 3, it says that persons who fail or obstruct the

23 implementation of the order should be sanctioned.

24 2D35 -- 2D3025 is the document number. I think I've read it out

25 correctly. 2D3025 is the document I'd like to have us look at next.

Page 50104

1 Have you found it, Mr. Petkovic? You have.

2 A. Yes, I'm looking at.

3 Q. Now, if we look at number 4, it says that the command of the 3rd

4 Battalion, the Kresevo Battalion, he draws their attention to cases of

5 this kind, and the commander is asking, under item 5, that the persons

6 this order is addressed to shall be held personally responsible "to me."

7 Now, with this type of command or order, issued by the brigade

8 commander to the chief of SIS and chief of the SIS within the 3rd

9 Battalion, are those the tasks and assignments that come within their

10 remit?

11 A. Yes. Well, the brigade commander can't issue an order to the

12 chief of SIS Administration. All he can do is to issue orders to those

13 in his brigade, and those are the SIS organs working in that particular

14 brigade. But that does not mean that this is some third type of SIS.

15 It's just one single SIS, this one installed in the brigade and working

16 for the requirements of the brigade and battalion.

17 Q. Yes, that's precisely why I'm asking you this, Mr. Petkovic, to

18 see what SIS does. That's why I'm asking you. And we'll take a look at

19 another document -- or, rather, two documents.

20 Look at P6791 next, please. This is your order, dated the 22nd

21 of November, 1993, and you speak about the increase of crime, which

22 upsets military discipline. And you demand that an analysis of the

23 crimes committed be undertaken. And under 4, you say:

24 "To engage the SIS organs to deal with these tasks and give them

25 priority."

Page 50105

1 And you refer to Tomislavgrad, Vitez, and so on, and those

2 military districts. Is that correct, it's addressed to Tomislavgrad,

3 Mostar, and Vitez?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. So you are addressing them to make things clear, and they are

6 going to involve their assistants, each in his own unit; right?

7 A. As this deals with crimes in a broad area, they're going to

8 involve their own assistants, the SIS Centre's and sub-centres in their

9 area, so they're going to mobilise the entire SIS apparatus in the

10 region. It does not exclude the involvement of the SIS Centre or asking

11 assistance from the SIS Centre, because you know that in a brigade you

12 only have so many SIS workers.

13 Q. All right. Now, when it comes to reporting, let's look at the

14 next document, which is 4D977. This a report addressed to the Main Staff

15 from Kiseljak. The date is the 7th of June, and the assistant chief for

16 the SIS Brigade, Zeljko Bosnjak, directly informs the Main Staff -- I'm

17 sure you're familiar with this document, as it's a 4D document. And in

18 connection to the letter from the Main Staff, that because of combat in

19 the Kiseljak area, it wouldn't be opportune to discuss the problem of

20 crime at that moment. And then he goes on to say that this will be done

21 when the situation on the ground changes. Right? This document shows

22 that you, in the Main Staff, receive reports from the SIS in the brigade?

23 A. The gentleman is saying that my order to undertake certain action

24 should not be done at the present time, but should be deferred until

25 later. Now, whether he's going to report back to me or not is another

Page 50106

1 question. The order came from me -- or, rather, the Main Staff for them

2 to carry out certain actions to prevent crime. Now, the SIS that was

3 supposed to be in charge of that is writing back to me and saying that it

4 would be a better thing to defer that until later.

5 Now, we should look at his report to see what was actually done.

6 Obviously, a report is due to the chief of the Main Staff.

7 Q. Mr. Petkovic, would you now look at the next document -- or,

8 rather, before we go on to our next document, let's see how orders are

9 issued, when it came to the Medical Corps, SIS, IPD, and so on. And it

10 was a question that Judge Antonetti asked.

11 All I'm going to ask you now is whether what you have just

12 said -- what you have just told us about SIS, that is to say, that the

13 orders by the assistant commanders are received in the same way both for

14 IPD and Logistics and for the Medical Corps, from the commander within

15 their composition --

16 A. Yes, it's the same system that applies to the whole of the HVO,

17 from top to bottom. A single system was established both for the Medical

18 Corps, Logistics, and -- what was the other thing you mentioned?

19 Q. Mr. Petkovic, I asked you whether they also receive orders from

20 the IPD, or did the IPD commander receive reports from the unit commander

21 who issues orders to them?

22 A. Yes, that's absolutely correct. They will receive orders from

23 their assistants, but it doesn't mean that they will not contact with

24 their superior officers and that they are duty-bound to inform the IPD

25 service or whatever up the chain of command; whether it be SIS, IPD,

Page 50107

1 or -- what was the thing you mentioned? Logistics, I believe.

2 Q. Mr. Petkovic, in the operative zone -- or, rather, we have

3 established that there is an assistant for SIS, IPD, Health, and

4 Logistics in the operative zone; is that right?

5 A. Yes, that is right.

6 Q. Now, these assistants, assistants to the commander of the

7 operative zone, for their work, did they report to the commander of the

8 operative zone about their work?

9 A. Yes, they had to do that, because they were his assistants, so

10 they had to report back to him.

11 Q. Now, the commander of the operative zone, was he duty-bound to

12 send reports to the Main Staff which would be relevant and important to

13 the planning of certain operations or to be able to assess the situation

14 in a certain area on questions of security, morale, logistics, and so on?

15 A. Yes, that's absolutely right. The commander must inform the

16 Main Staff on all issues, and this would include the morale of the

17 troops, logistics, and the problems that he might have with the Medical

18 Corps. But he will simultaneously inform the highest levels of

19 Logistics, SIS, IPD, and so on, because future work will depend on that.

20 Q. Mr. Petkovic, I can't refrain from asking you why it would depend

21 on them.

22 A. Madam counsel, because it is the roof, the upper-most

23 organisation, the blanket organisation in the Ministry of Defence, and

24 they don't just hold press conferences. They are there as the umbrella

25 to explain the policies of Herceg-Bosna and to provide guide-lines and

Page 50108

1 instructions about how the organs -- their organs will be working lower

2 down the chain, because somebody has to give guide-lines and

3 instructions. And the commander has responsibility at a lower level,

4 lower than the top man in the Defence Department and later the Ministry

5 of Defence. So that was their task. They have to be in contact with all

6 the forces right down to the lower level, which is a battalion.

7 Q. Yes, I agree with you, Mr. Petkovic. And Mr. Bandic, who

8 testified here, agreed with you, too, and he explained that it was the

9 role of the administration to provide professional advice along the lines

10 of what you've just told us.

11 Let's now go on to 4D1700.

12 A. Let me just add, when you're talking about Mr. Bandic, Mr. Bandic

13 was in an advisory capacity, but he was also an operative, because

14 operative centres or sub-centres of SIS belonged to him and he led them

15 as an operative.

16 Q. Mr. Petkovic, thank you. We'll soon get to Mr. Bandic.

17 Let's just have a look at two or three documents, orders that

18 Judge Antonetti asked about. Have a look at 4D1700.

19 Have you found it? I assume so.

20 Judge Antonetti asked questions about it yesterday. Please have

21 a look at page 12 in the Croatian version, page 13 in the English

22 version.

23 In this order, signed by Mr. Blaskic, you said it was from March

24 1993. It says in item 8(a), (b), (c), it says that orders are being

25 issued concerning IPD and SIS issues. Am I correct?

Page 50109

1 A. Yes, that's correct. Those are the bodies that exist at those

2 levels, and that is the way in which they have to function. And those

3 bodies, those organs, will have to show the success they've had in those

4 operative zones to their highest organs, because the IPD at the level of

5 defence has to know what's going on down below. So they will go into the

6 field to work, these bodies.

7 Q. I'm showing these orders to you. I know it's logical,

8 General Petkovic, but Judge Antonetti asked you whether, in the course of

9 Praljak's questions, whether it meant that the assistant commander had to

10 ask for instructions when issuing certain orders, or could he receive

11 such orders directly from his commander? That's the only reason for

12 which I'm putting this question to you.

13 Let's have a look at 4D475, which deals with the same subject.

14 Let's have a look at item 7 in the document. It's on page 8. That's

15 where we'll start. Item 7 in the English version is on page 7.

16 Similarly, this is an order that is being sent to the IPD. It's

17 an order that's replete for active defence, dated the 23rd of February,

18 1993. It's an order issued to the IPD. In item 7, item 7(3), an order

19 is issued to security. And then the last bullet says:

20 "SIS offices, as professional organs of the command, directly

21 participate in the organisation and the implementation of security

22 measures in their unit, and they provide assistance for other members of

23 the armed forces."

24 Isn't that what it says, Mr. Petkovic?

25 A. Yes, that's correct. SIS workers have to assist all those below

Page 50110

1 them. SIS in the operative zone will provide assistance for the SIS

2 lower down, and the [indiscernible] organisation, at its meetings, must

3 prepare all SIS officials, workers for the armed forces. The IPD also

4 has its plans where it prepares its men at lower levels with regard to

5 how to act and under what conditions. We had seen work plans for the

6 IPD, that they should visit units, they should prepare their employees.

7 They don't have to prepare instructions and orders every day. They'll

8 prepare them, they'll provide them with instructions, they will give them

9 guide-lines and tell them what is essential for them to do in their work

10 down there.

11 Q. Mr. Petkovic, that wasn't my question. You have repeated that,

12 and you keep repeating that on numerous occasions. I'm showing you

13 documents that show that with regard to orders for defence -- with regard

14 to any orders, the commander who issues the order simultaneously is

15 assigning tasks in that order to his subordinate assistants for SIS and

16 IPD, to assistants for logistics. Am I correct, does this order show

17 that?

18 A. Yes, those are his assistants, they are his assistants, and he

19 issues orders to them. He probably asked for his assistants to be

20 prepared by people who are more professional than his own people. With

21 regard to such an operation and such a command, well, it's necessary for

22 the highest-level organs to be included. They know a lot more than the

23 others. And then the commander will deal with matters in the field.

24 Whether an area of 70 kilometres is concerned isn't just a matter for the

25 commander of an operative zone.

Page 50111

1 Q. Let's have a look at P4778. It's an order dated the 3rd of

2 September, 1993. And, similarly, item 10 says:

3 "Motivate each and every soldier to the maximum."

4 It gives orders for logistics, and this order also contains an

5 order for the Medical Corps. So it has to do with logistical support and

6 obtaining two medical vehicles.

7 Did Commander Siljeg, in this order dated the 3rd of September,

8 include tasks that should be carried out by assistants for IPD and by the

9 assistant for the Medical Corps?

10 A. Yes. Colonel Siljeg knew what the situation was in his brigade,

11 particularly if this has to do with Rama or Livno. He knows how the

12 Medical Corps functions. He's aware of that.

13 Q. Very well. Mr. Petkovic, since you said that when such

14 operations are involved, these assistants will certainly ask for

15 assistance from the administrations of the SIS and the IPD -- I'll go

16 back to an order that I have already shown to you. It's your order, the

17 number of which is P6791. It's an order that relates to dealing with

18 criminal activity.

19 The following document, this is your document, but let's see

20 where the SIS assistants went, after your order, to consult. It's

21 document P6822. I believe it should be visible in the e-court system,

22 P6822. Have a look at that.

23 On the basis of this order of yours, Mr. Lasic refers to your

24 order, in fact, and he says that there has been an increase in crime

25 which affects one's reputation. And he says, Send in SIS officials of

Page 50112

1 the first subordinated units to a meeting that will be held with the

2 command of the Mostar Military District. It was sent to Sector North,

3 Sector South, to the Mostar Defence Sector. So can you see that

4 Mr. Lasic, when carrying out his order, sends SIS assistants to a meeting

5 in the Mostar Military District; is that correct?

6 A. Yes, they were sent to the Mostar Military District, but we don't

7 know whether he found a professional person from the SIS who would

8 prepare his workers. This was just an invitation to a meeting. It would

9 be logical for someone in the Centre for SIS in Mostar to go to the

10 meeting and prepare all the workers from subordinate units for the tasks.

11 Q. Mr. Petkovic, I apologise, I have just one more document to deal

12 with, so I have to hurry. Does this document say that the invitation is

13 addressed to the SIS Administration too? Just tell me that.

14 A. No, it doesn't, but we don't know how preparations were made.

15 Q. So you are making calculations, then?

16 A. No, no.

17 THE INTERPRETER: The speakers are kindly asked to slow down and

18 not to overlap.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm just talking about professional

20 preparations, and nothing else.

21 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Let's just have a look at another document that has to do with

23 Mr. Bandic. It is a document which is an order of yours. You're

24 probably familiar with it. We'll see it in the e-court system, but let's

25 conclude with this. It's document P6137. It's the order that has to do

Page 50113

1 with Stupni Do. It's an order that you issued.

2 A. Let me just have a look.

3 Q. P6137. It's in e-court system. I just have two questions about

4 this order.

5 Mr. Petkovic, is this order against an unidentified perpetrator,

6 in fact? When you issued the order, was the perpetrator's identity

7 known?

8 A. No. That's why we were looking for the perpetrator.

9 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I object to the question,

10 Your Honour, but I don't have time to go into that.

11 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] My colleague will have time in her

12 re-examination, the course of her re-examination. I'd like to remind the

13 Trial Chamber of this.

14 Q. I assume you're familiar with this. In the course of your

15 testimony, you said that you drafted this order together with

16 Mr. Ivan Bandic. Mr. Ivan Bandic was heard in this court on the 17th of

17 March, 2009. And on page 38094, line 21, I showed this order to

18 Mr. Bandic. And on page 38095, line 1, he answered my question and said

19 that he had never seen this order prior to coming to testify here.

20 Mr. Petkovic, when Mr. Bandic was examined, your Defence team had

21 the opportunity of cross-examining him on two occasions. I have just one

22 question. Did your Defence team show Mr. Bandic -- demonstrate to

23 Mr. Bandic that he was not telling the truth, because he said that it was

24 the first time he had seen -- the first time he saw the order was when he

25 came to testify here? Do you remember whether you contested this claim

Page 50114

1 of his or not? Just tell me that.

2 A. I don't remember any such statement made by him, but I know that

3 he advised me as to how to phrase certain questions.

4 MS. NOZICA: [Interpretation] Perhaps we failed to put certain

5 questions to him. A question obviously failed to challenge that part of

6 his testimony, because there's a significance difference between saying

7 that it's the first time that he saw this and between what you said in

8 the course of your testimony, but I have no more time.

9 Thank you very much, Witness. Thank you.

10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.

11 We'll stop there, because the Tolimir case will be starting in

12 the afternoon.

13 Thank you, and we will resume on Monday at 2.15.

14 [The accused stands down]

15 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.47 p.m.,

16 to be reconvened on Monday, the 1st day of March,

17 2010, at 2.15 p.m.