1 Monday, 8 March 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The Accused Praljak not present]
5 [The Accused Petkovic takes the stand]
6 --- Upon commencing at 2.17 p.m.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Registrar, kindly call the
9 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Good afternoon,
10 everyone in and around the courtroom.
11 This is case number IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor versus
12 Prlic et al. Thank you, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Registrar.
14 Today is Monday, the 8th of March, 2010. Let me first greet
15 General Petkovic, all the accused who are present, the Defence counsel,
16 and all the OTP members, the Prosecution, and everyone else assisting us.
17 We will continue with the Prosecution's cross-examination.
18 Today, the Prosecution should have another four hours and five minutes at
19 its disposal, according to the calculations.
20 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President. We're just double-checking
21 the time. We can check that, of course, with the Registrar and continue
22 in the meantime.
23 WITNESS: MILIVOJ PETKOVIC [Resumed]
24 [The witness answered through interpreter]
25 MR. SCOTT: Good afternoon, Your Honours, each of you. Good
1 afternoon, Counsel, all of those around the courtroom who are assisting
2 us. And good afternoon, Mr. Petkovic.
3 Cross-examination by Mr. Scott: [Continued]
4 Q. Sir, I want to spend a few minutes talking about the involvement
5 of the Croatian Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, 1993, 1994 perhaps.
6 When you testified in the Blaskic case, the representatives of
7 the Tudjman government, as we discussed last week, Mr. Rifkin and
8 Mr. Udiljak, would not let you answer questions about the relationship
9 between the HV and the HVO. But continuing on from that topic, and the
10 transcript that we looked at, which I'm sure you remember, what was the
11 Tudjman government afraid of that it didn't want you -- wouldn't allow
12 you -- wouldn't let you answer such questions in the Blaskic case?
13 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I object, because
14 this is a question that calls for speculation.
15 MR. SCOTT: Well, I don't believe so, Your Honour. I believe the
16 witness has knowledge, and it's obviously -- it's clear -- it's obviously
17 been the Prosecution's case since last week -- well, long before last
18 week, that this witness -- he may disagree, but it's our position that
19 the witness was well prepared for the Blaskic testimony, that he had
20 contact with a number of representatives, so we do believe that he was
21 very well advised.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You may put the question.
23 MR. SCOTT:
24 Q. Sir, when Mr. Rifkin and Mr. Udiljak would not allow you to
25 answer questions in the Blaskic case about the relationship between the
1 Croatian Army and the HVO, what was Tudjman afraid of -- Tudjman
2 government afraid of that it wouldn't allow you to answer those
4 A. Your Honours, I don't know what the Tudjman government was afraid
5 of. I don't know what sort of instructions Rifkin and Udiljak had. I
6 don't know which questions they had in mind when they thought there were
7 questions that they didn't want me to answer.
8 Q. But you agree that they intervened and prevented you from
9 answering such questions, didn't they?
10 A. They obtained such a position, and they intervened as other
11 lawyers intervened here. I can't say why and with regard to which
12 issues, but they fought to obtain this right.
13 Q. Sir, in the summary of your testimony -- your anticipated
14 testimony that we were provided by your counsel, and as you know, that's
15 the practice in the case, you indicated -- had you said that you arrived
16 in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the order, and I stress -- and I'm quoting from
17 the second paragraph of your summary:
18 " ... on the order of the HV commander of the southern army
19 theatre, Janko Bobetko."
20 Is that correct?
21 A. I had a decision from the Croatian Army. I agreed to go to
22 Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Janko Bobetko then appointed me to a position
23 in the forward command post -- at the forward command post in Grude.
24 Q. Well, sir, I didn't really ask you about -- a question about the
25 decision of the Croatian government. What you say, what was given to us,
1 and we were told that you would testify, is that you went to
2 Bosnia-Herzegovina, quote, "on the order of Janko Bobetko." Is that true
3 or not true? --
4 A. I went there one day earlier to Herzegovina.
5 Q. Yes or no. Did you go on the order of Janko Bobetko; yes or no?
6 A. Janko Bobetko drafted an order. I didn't go there on his order.
7 I agreed to go there.
8 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] If my colleague is reading from a
9 document that I drafted, could my colleague please read the sentence to
10 the very end.
11 MR. SCOTT:
12 Q. The point, sir, is that sometimes you say you were ordered, and
13 sometimes you say you went voluntarily. You went because you were
14 ordered by Janko Bobetko, and that's what you've said in your summary, or
15 is your summary -- or was the summary given to us not accurate?
16 A. I accepted to go, and then Janko Bobetko drafted an order when I
17 arrived in Grude. The order wasn't drafted in Croatia; it was drafted in
18 Grude, in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
19 Q. And when you arrived again, just to touch on that, and we talked
20 about this last week, when you arrived in Grude then, at that point you
21 were still a senior officer in the Croatian Army, weren't you?
22 A. No. I had a decision according to which I was no longer a member
23 of the Croatian Army.
24 Q. How could Janko Bobetko give you an order to go to Croatia, an
25 order that you were obliged to follow, if you were no longer a member of
1 the army that he was the chief of?
2 A. I don't understand the part when you say "in Croatia." Do you
3 mean in Croatia or Bosnia?
4 Q. Sir, you've told us that you arrived in the Grude -- around Grude
5 on the 14th of April, 1992. You've told us, at least in part, that you
6 arrived there on the order of Janko Bobetko, who was the head of the
7 Croatian Army. My question to you: When you -- at the time you arrived
8 in Bosnia and Herzegovina in mid-April 1992, you were still a senior
9 officer in the Croatian Army, weren't you?
10 A. No, I wasn't.
11 Q. All right. Now, this being ordered by Bobetko, that's not
12 exactly what you told the Judges in the Blaskic case, is it?
13 A. No, I said that Bobetko appointed me, he appointed Roso, and
14 everyone else, too. I provided a list of all those who had been
15 appointed by Bobetko. I provided all their names, at least as far as
16 I can remember.
17 Q. You didn't, sir, you didn't. In the Blaskic case, you never
18 mentioned Mr. Bobetko's involvement. On page 24210 of the Blaskic -- of
19 your Blaskic testimony, 24210, the only thing you talked about, and I'll
20 just quote part of it:
21 "No one sent me to the HVO. I acceded to the HVO voluntarily."
22 So -- and then skipping down, it says:
23 "So no one sent me to the HVO, or, rather, no one wrote an order
24 stating, Petkovic, you've got to go to the HVO."
25 You didn't say anything about Mr. Bobetko's involvement when you
1 testified in the Blaskic case, and again, sir, those were part of the
2 instructions you received from Tudjman and the people around him, didn't
3 you? When you go down there and testify, talk about being a volunteer,
4 but don't say anything about Bobetko having ordered you to go. Those
5 were your instructions, weren't they?
6 A. No, that's not correct. I went there on a voluntary basis.
7 Bobetko then drafted an order. You've seen that order -- or, rather,
8 your colleague, as he could have shown the order and we could have
9 discussed it, why that wasn't done, I don't know. Why did he show other
10 orders, but not that one?
11 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Counsel, Your Honours, since the
12 General has answered the question, let me just draw your attention to the
13 following: My colleague, Mr. Scott, is trying to confront two different
14 issues, to deal with two different issues. The first one is when
15 Mr. Petkovic arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina and how. The second issue
16 is how and when he joined the HVO. The general said that he arrived in
17 Bosnia and Herzegovina and that he was at the forward command post in the
18 southern battle-field in Grude. And as for joining the HVO, well, that
19 is a different issue, a different subject. So could we just be very
20 precise so that no problems arise and there shouldn't be any requests for
21 further clarifications in the course of re-examination.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.
23 MR. SCOTT:
24 Q. The reality is, sir, that --
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please try and be clear.
1 MR. SCOTT:
2 Q. The reality is, sir, that despite whether someone should or
3 should not have asked you a question -- the question differently, when
4 you appeared in the Blaskic case in this same Tribunal, you said nothing
5 about Mr. Bobetko or having received an order to go to
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I read your Blaskic transcript two or three times,
7 and Bobetko's involvement is not mentioned one time, sir; isn't that
9 A. As far as I know, Bobetko is mentioned in relation to some
10 questions when they showed me certain documents, and I confirmed
12 Q. Sir, it was only in the Kordic case a year or so later, and only
13 when pressed by the Prosecution on that -- on your second court
14 appearance at the Tribunal, that you then, in response to a Prosecution
15 question, admitted to being -- some involvement by Mr. Bobetko; isn't
16 that true?
17 A. In the first case, I answered all the questions put to me by the
18 Prosecution. It's your problem if you didn't use the documents you had
19 and if you didn't show them to me. I answered all questions put to me
20 about each and every document, and I confirmed them.
21 Q. So you were playing a game. You were being very careful in
22 answering questions very technically, but not volunteering truthful and
23 accurate information to the Judges in that case; is that what you're
24 telling us?
25 A. No, that's not correct.
1 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, what sort of a
2 question is this, and on what basis is my colleague, Mr. Scott, putting
3 this question to him? Is it the general's fault if the Prosecution in
4 some other case didn't put certain questions to him? Could Mr. Scott say
5 what constituted false testimony given by my client?
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, so that we
7 avoid wasting time, let's deal with this in the following way: Under
8 oath, you said you went to Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with the
9 Croatian Army, after the Serbian offensive had been launched. That's
10 what you said. Why didn't you say that in the Blaskic case? Why didn't
11 you say, I recognise the fact that the Croatian Army intervened in the
12 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to protect its borders, to
13 protect Dubrovnik, because the Serbs might cut Serbian territory off if
14 they had access to the sea, so we were there, and I went there following
15 an order issued by General Bobetko? Why didn't you say that? It's very
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I was answering
18 specific questions. Have a look -- or, rather, if you have a look at the
19 beginning of my testimony at court, when the Presiding Judge said, We
20 don't want to deal with that, General, let's deal with specific
21 questions, well, in that introductory part I explained or tried to
22 explain the entire situation. But the Chamber wasn't interested in that.
23 They asked me to move on to a specific issue. So that entire part that I
24 wanted to discuss, well, either there was a misunderstanding when
25 preparing for my examination, but I skipped that entire part. I didn't
1 even manage to say five sentences about that. The Trial Chamber asked me
2 to focus on specific issues they were interested in. In that
3 introductory part, I wanted to discuss the first day I arrived in the
4 HVO, the organisation, the establishment of the HVO, and then I wanted to
5 move on to specific issues. I think that this is in the transcript. You
6 can see when the Judge asked me to deal with specific issues and not to
7 deal with matters in a general way.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you say if the question
9 wasn't put to you, it's the Chamber's fault, or Mr. Kayway's [phoen]
10 fault, who was incapable of putting the right questions to you. Very
12 Mr. Scott.
13 MR. SCOTT:
14 Q. Sir, in your curriculum vitae that we'd looked at last week, and
15 I'm not necessarily going to stop again now - I'm sure I'll be corrected
16 if I'm wrong - which is P08731, for the record, you said there, quote --
17 this is your CV:
18 "On 14 April 1992, General Bobetko ordered me to go to the HVO."
19 And that's true, isn't it? You were ordered to go by
20 General Bobetko, the head of the Croatian Army?
21 A. I'm not denying the fact that General Bobetko drafted an order.
22 You have it. It's been shown five times in this case, the order to
23 establish a forward command post that I was in charge of. Other HVO
24 members were with me, and that is something that I do not deny. But I
25 decided to join the HVO.
1 Q. Well, let's talk about the forward command post for a moment.
2 Indeed, Bobetko established a forward command post of the Croatian Army
3 in Grude and made you the commander of that Croatian Army forward command
4 post when Mr. Bobetko wasn't there himself. And my next -- and you have
5 no dispute about that, as I understand what you've just said. My
6 question to you: When did the Croatian Army's forward command post, the
7 one that you and Mr. Bobetko commanded, when did that command post become
8 the HVO command or essentially, by whatever name, HVO headquarters?
9 A. Well, it immediately started performing certain tasks for the
10 HVO, and in July most of its work concerned the HVO. That was July 1992.
11 But there were quite a lot of orders regulating the status of the HVO,
13 Q. Well, between -- so between --
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, just a
15 minute. I have to be very fair to you.
16 I looked at the questions that the Chamber wanted you to address,
17 and, in fact, in the questions the role of the Croatian Army was not
18 invoked. At no point was that invoked. It wasn't part of the questions
19 you were to answer. At the very beginning of your testimony, the
20 Presiding Judge referred to the questions that you were to deal with. I
21 have just checked that. So, yes, in fact, this wasn't on the agenda.
22 There was certainly a reason for that. It's just a hypothesis, but I
23 believe that the Chamber must have "negotiated," in inverted commas, with
24 regard to your hearing, and as a result, well, the Croatian government
25 must have only agreed that you testify with regard to certain issues.
1 And if the issue of the Croatian Army's intervention was part of the
2 questions to be put to you, then they would have certainly refused for
3 you to testify, and that is why the Judges weren't curious and they
4 didn't put any questions to you, because it was part of the agreement --
5 of the contract. And proof of this is that President Jorda provides a
6 list of all the questions. He was interested mainly in Ahmici, in the
7 chain of command and the crimes committed in Ahmici. He didn't refer to
8 anything else. So I believe that that is the answer. The Chamber must
9 have seriously restricted the scope of the questions that could be put to
10 you so that the Croatian government would accept you giving testimony.
11 This is just a hypothesis I have, but if the issue of Croatian
12 intervention had been on the agenda, then you giving testimony would not
13 have been certain. This is why Mr. Kayway didn't come when the
14 cross-examination was conducted. So that's perhaps the reason. Perhaps
15 it was different in the Kordic case, but in Blaskic there were numerous
16 difficulties, and that is why this wasn't on the agenda.
17 Mr. Petkovic, what do you think about this?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Judge Antonetti, I really prepared
19 myself to deal with my arrival in the HVO and the period right up until
20 the 14th of April. That was how I had imagined my introduction. When
21 the Chamber provided me with questions, that's what I understood the
22 matter to be. When I started my testimony, the Chamber told me not to
23 move in that direction. They wanted me to deal with certain specific
24 issues. I wanted to give an introduction that would deal with my arrival
25 in the HVO and the entire period through 1992 and 1993, but the Chamber
1 quite simply said, No, we don't want to proceed in this way. And I think
2 this is in the transcript, it says, then we have misunderstood each
3 other. As to what the Croatian government discussed with them, I don't
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It's page 22442. This is what
6 President Jorda says. He's very specific, very precise:
7 "You saw, in your summons, that we want to put some questions
8 that concerns certain information, that concerns the conditions in which
9 you occupied this position, your appointment," that concerns
10 General Blaskic's appointment, "we want information on the HVO
11 organisation, on the system of communications, in particular on the chain
12 of command. In brief, we want information on the situation that concerns
13 all the units that Mr. Blaskic had under him and also that you had under
14 yourself. You participated, either with General Morillon or
15 Ambassador Thebault, in numerous meetings that had to do with
16 implementing a cease-fire. We have also asked you -- or we will also ask
17 you about your point of view on the discussions that you had with your
18 enemies at the time. We would be very interested in any information you
19 could provide us with regard to the crimes committed in Ahmici, which
20 units were concerned, which units committed the crimes, were they HVO
21 units, were they paramilitary units, were they under Colonel Blaskic's
22 command or not? And, finally, more generally, how do you perceive the
23 accused and his personality, who is one of your most direct collaborators
24 during this very complex period?"
25 These are the issues that were put before you. At no point in
1 time was the issue of the Croatian Army raised. That is quite certain.
2 Mr. Scott.
3 MR. SCOTT:
4 Q. Sir, be that as it may, the reality was whatever agreements that
5 had been in place, at page 24210, 24210, Judge Rodriguez asked you
6 specifically about how you had come to be in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and as I
7 read to you a few moments ago, your statement under oath was, and I'm
8 reading directly from the page:
9 "No one sent me to the HVO. I acceded to the HVO voluntarily."
10 And at no point in answering Judge Rodrigues's questions about
11 this topic, which he did ask about, did you mention Mr. Bobetko's
12 involvement or any order from the Croatian Army, in terms of sending you
14 MR. KARNAVAS: Sir, I think this has been asked and answered
15 already. It has been, it has been, and it has been. Now, if you listen
16 carefully to what the general has stated, he said he went there
17 voluntarily. Obviously, he needed an order to go there. Now, the fact
18 that one question wasn't asked of him by the Judge doesn't mean that he
19 was lying.
20 Now, the Judges can take his testimony as it is, but I think we
21 should move on. We're wasting enough time. The Prosecution has argued
22 that it needs more time to do cross-examination, but this is an abusive
23 time and an abuse of the process.
24 Thank you.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [No interpretation]
1 THE WITNESS: [No interpretation]
2 MS. ALABURIC: [No interpretation]
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] There was no interpretation. I
4 asked you to answer the question put to you by the Prosecutor. If you
5 don't remember it, he'll put it to you again.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could he please repeat it? I would
7 be grateful.
8 MR. SCOTT: Your Honour, the point's been made, and I do agree
9 with Mr. Karnavas on that point. And I had moved on, the topic came up
10 again, so I went back. And I've read the transcript to the Chamber, and,
11 of course, the Chamber will decide for itself.
12 Q. Sir, we were talking about the forward command post in Grude and
13 when, at some point, it converted, if you will, from being the forward
14 command post of the Croatian Army to being the headquarters of the HVO.
15 And eventually you said something about, well, by around July most of
16 what it was doing had to do with the HVO. And really, sir, that's what
17 happened, isn't it? What had been the forward command post of the
18 Croatian Army essentially converted and became the headquarters of the
19 HVO. One day, it was the Croatian Army, and the next day -- or by July,
20 it was the HVO headquarters, wasn't it?
21 A. Yes, that is right. However, 95 per cent of those there were HVO
22 members. I was the only one who had come from the Croatian Army
23 voluntarily. All the others were members of the HVO.
24 Q. Well, sir, during this same time-period, and I think we've talked
25 before, Mr. Tole came from the HV, Mr. Siljeg came from the HV, a number
1 of officers had come from the Croatian Army around this time, hadn't
3 A. Yes, that is right.
4 Q. What really happened here, sir, isn't it true, is that the HVO
5 essentially became the Croatian Army's forward command post?
6 A. Ten or eleven men performed the function of a forward command
8 Q. Well, for all practical purposes, it was the HVO became the
9 forward army of the Croatian Army, didn't it?
10 A. The HVO co-operated with the Croatian Army, and it had a unified
11 front stretching from the Republic of Croatia to the Republic of Bosnia
12 and Herzegovina. That was what it was.
13 Q. Sir, we've talked in the course of your testimony and in the
14 course of this case about joint armies or a joint command, and I put it
15 to you: The HVO was far more a joint army with the Croatian Army than it
16 ever was with the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992 and 1994,
17 wasn't it?
18 A. I wouldn't agree with you there, because the Croatian Army, in
19 July, went entirely towards Dubrovnik and we remained in Bosnia and
20 Herzegovina until the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
21 Q. Wherever you were physically located, sir, you were effectively a
22 joint if not the same army, weren't you?
23 A. No, we were not. We were the HVO, and they were the Croatian
24 Army. They had their part of the front, and we had our part of the
25 front, and we co-operated along this unified front-line between Croatia
1 and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2 Q. Sir, I put to you that if you -- if it's your position, based on
3 everything we know, that the HVO and the Croatian Army were not the same
4 army, according to your criteria, then for sure the HVO and the Army of
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina were certainly not the same army or a joint army, was
7 A. The law passed in Bosnia and Herzegovina treats the HVO and the
8 Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a joint army, and the Croatian law does
9 not treat the HVO and the HV as a joint army.
10 Q. We're not going to argue about the law, sir, because the lawyers
11 will argue about the law later. But I put to you that your legal
12 analysis is simply and completely wrong.
13 But let me put it to you this way on the facts: Let's talk about
14 the facts. You and the BH Army, the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, were
15 very busy trying to kill and destroy each other, and I don't think that
16 was the case ever between the HVO and the Croatian Army, was it?
17 A. It is not right. We were not endeavouring to kill each other.
18 We collaborated extraordinarily well for a long period of time, for
19 longer than with the Croatian Army.
20 Q. Well, I put to you, sir, that you were co-operating with the
21 Croatian Army continuously from 1991 to 1994 and thereafter, didn't you?
22 A. We had a single front. They held their men on the borders, and
23 we happened to be next to them. So these two lines were linked and was
24 transformed into a common front-line between Croatia and Bosnia and
1 Q. Sir, you testified in the Kordic case, under oath, at page 26686,
2 that you didn't know how the payments -- your income or the funds or --
3 paid to you or HVO soldiers:
4 "Your Honours, I don't know who made the payments or how."
5 And once again, sir, that wasn't true when you answered that
6 question under oath in Kordic, was it?
7 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, could two pages of
8 the transcript from the Kordic case which refer to payments be shown to
9 this witness, and that we could ask him for his opinion then, because
10 colleague Scott is continuing to misrepresent answers of the witness in
11 previous proceedings? He doesn't allow the witness to see exactly what
12 was said, and in this way he's not contributing to the quest for peace.
13 Could the witness be shown his answer to questions from the Prosecutor
14 about payment, that there was no repetition by Judge Rodrigues six or
15 seven times for him to answer questions about payments? So if we could
16 do that, then the witness will certainly tell us exactly what he said.
17 MR. SCOTT: Let's go to exhibit --
18 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I apologise. If I may, I think it
19 is absolutely inappropriate to ask the witness about his testimony 10
20 years ago and to expect him to give an answer based exclusively on his
21 memory, so could we show him exactly what was said for that portion also
22 to be interpreted in the witness's language?
23 JUDGE TRECHSEL: A point on the transcript. On page 17, line 9,
24 this corresponds to the translation as I've heard it, Ms. Alaburic is
25 referred to as speaking of "contributing to the quest for peace." I
1 wonder whether you actually said that and wanted to say that, because I
2 would rather have expected you of speaking of truth than peace.
3 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, my intention was to
4 speak for the quest for the truth. If I misspoke, I apologise. And
5 thank you for noticing it.
6 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Thank you. It happens to all of us. You don't
7 have to apologise.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, I'm looking at the
9 page 26896 [as interpreted] in the Kordic case. I don't have the exact
10 reference to the questions regarding payments. 26886.
11 MR. SCOTT: Excuse me, Your Honour. I may have misspoke or
12 someone misheard. It is page 26866.
13 Q. Sir, you should have a binder available to you that's called "HV
14 in BiH."
15 If that can be -- if the witness doesn't already have it, if that
16 could be provided to the witness, please. I'll refer the courtroom,
17 please, to binder -- excuse me, a binder titled "Table - HV in BiH."
18 If you'll turn, please, in that to P00910, there's a table on the
19 front of that binder -- there's a table that's been provided on the front
20 of that binder. There's also the documents behind the table.
21 For reference to -- to assist everyone, it is line or item
22 number 14 on the table, and it's been tabbed in the binder as number 14.
23 There should be a sticky, so to speak, on the document number 14.
24 Sir --
25 A. May I just ask something?
1 JUDGE PRANDLER: It is my fault, of course. Which binder should
2 we find that on?
3 MR. SCOTT: It is a binder that is -- probably has red tabs on
4 the top, and it says on the outside "Table - HV in BiH." Tab 14, on the
5 top -- there should be red tabs on the top. You find number -- if
6 everyone finds number 14, that will be the same as P00910.
7 Q. Sir, this is a request for funding that was going to Mr. Susak on
8 the 15th of December, 1992.
9 A. Do I have the translation?
10 Q. Yes, you do.
11 A. Yes, I see it now. I have it.
12 Q. If you'll look, sir -- even though the document -- the last page
13 of the Croatian version is what is actually in the untranslated document.
14 Although this document was to requesting funding from the State of
15 Croatia to Mr. Susak, was prepared for Mr. Stojic's signature; that, in
16 fact, was your signature, wasn't it?
17 A. Yes, I signed this document.
18 Q. If you can go to item number 19 in the table, or I will give you
19 the exhibit number, also again tab 19 -- I'm trying to assist because the
20 exhibit numbers were not in numerical order for various reasons. But if
21 you can look at the red tabs, will you find number 18 in the same
22 binder -- excuse me, number 19. My apologies. And, sir, this is a
23 document from Mr. Berislav Pusic, dated the 6th of May, 1993, going to
24 the Croatian Army in Dubrovnik. The second sentence:
25 "It is necessary to have there a person from the HV Dubrovnik so
1 that it would be easier to recognise the bodies of your dead soldiers."
2 There was going to be a body exchange, as sad as that might be.
3 If there was going to be a body exchange in a -- soldiers killed in
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and what this -- what Mr. Pusic is referring to is
5 that someone from the HV needs to come, it would be easier for them to
6 identify the bodies of HV soldiers; correct?
7 A. No. You didn't read it correctly, Mr. Prosecutor. It's an
8 exchange of Chetniks, that is, Serb -- Serbian Army and the Croatian Army
9 from the southern part of Croatia. As far as I know, Serbs and Croats in
10 the south, that is, the Republic of Croatia and Republika Srpska, could
11 not agree on an exchange of their dead, and then through the Observer
12 Mission they proposed a neutral ground, and that is Herceg-Bosna. And it
13 says "in exchange with dead Chetniks," and not an exchange of killed
14 Croatian soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina who were within the HVO, as you
15 endeavoured to put it. So this is an exchange of Serb soldiers and Croat
16 soldiers who were killed in the south of Croatia.
17 Q. For the record, sir, this is Exhibit P02214. Can you tell us how
18 Mr. Pusic then, for the HVO, came to be involved in an exchange between
19 the Croatian Army and the Serb or VRS Army?
20 A. This was all done by the Observer Mission of the
21 European Community that was stationed in Dubrovnik at the time and the
22 Observer Mission which was in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They were
23 negotiating this. Why Pusic is there, I really have no idea. But, in
24 any event, it is an exchange between the Army of Republika Srpska and the
25 Army of the Republic of Croatia.
1 Q. Sir, you testified in the Kordic case that in 1993 or in 1994,
2 there were no Croatian Army units or elements in Central Bosnia. That
3 was at page 26825 to 27. And, again, that wasn't true, was it?
4 A. No, I don't remember a single soldier of the Croatian Army
5 fighting in 1993 and 1994, as you put it, in Central Bosnia, yes.
6 Q. All right. Well, we'll see what some of the other documents seem
7 to show.
8 In fact, sir, there were a number -- there were a number of the
9 elements of the HVO -- the Croatian Army, excuse me. There were a number
10 of elements of the Croatian Army that were active in Bosnia and
11 Herzegovina during 1993, weren't there?
12 A. I am talking about Central Bosnia. Certain elements of the
13 Croatian Army may have been in Herzegovina, but we're talking about
14 Central Bosnia, as that is what you asked me about. That is the zone of
15 responsibility of Colonel Blaskic.
16 Q. Sir, when General Bobetko established another forward command
17 post at Gornji Vakuf, General Bobetko and the Croatian Army called that
18 Central Bosnia. And there were Croatian Army elements there, weren't
19 there, in 1992 and 1993?
20 A. I'm talking about 1993. That is how I understood your question,
21 1993 and 1994. In 1992, there were certain volunteers.
22 Q. And there were Croatian volunteers in 1993.
23 A. No, they were volunteers. In 1993, there were no elements of the
24 Croatian Army.
25 JUDGE PRANDLER: You are overlapping each other, and I would like
1 to ask both you of really to slow down a bit. I would ask also,
2 actually, our President and everybody to slow down, because sometimes it
3 is impossible to follow the declarations and questions and the answers.
4 Thank you.
5 MR. SCOTT:
6 Q. Sir, I'm going to refer you to -- I'm going to be working largely
7 from the table, but I'll give you the numbers.
8 If we go to line number 16, which, for the record, is exhibit --
9 involves Exhibit P01332, P01332, line 16 - again in the binders it should
10 have been marked with a red "16" - this is a document from Mr. Susak, and
11 Mr. Susak talks about -- or, excuse me. The document talks about the
12 payment of wartime allowances owed to soldiers of the HV 101st Brigade
13 ordered by Susak and Praljak to the Southern Front, deployed by
14 Commander Janko Bobetko. And the date of that communication is the 27th
15 of January, 1993; not 1992, 1993. And you knew, sir, and you know now
16 that there were elements of the Croatian Army continuously in
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina throughout 1993, weren't there?
18 A. I don't know where all these people were. They could have been
19 south of Bregava, in the direction of Cavtat, or in the direction of
21 Q. Let's go to item number --
22 A. And then they are entitled to this allowance.
23 Q. Let's go to item number 28, which is P04061, P04061, in line 28.
24 From Tole to the president of Croatia and the defence minister of
25 Croatia, that is, Mr. Tudjman and Mr. Susak:
1 "TG-2 will be under the command of the Southern Front. We ask
2 you to help us in the following:
3 "To send the 1st Battalion, if possible, from the 5th Guards
4 Brigade who want to come to this theatre with complete equipment and
5 weapons. To resolve the key problem," which is what the document is
6 about, and it says: "To resolve the key problem around Gornji Vakuf."
7 And that's the truth, isn't it? Croatian Army elements were
8 active in the area of Gornji Vakuf continuously in the second half of
10 A. [No interpretation]
11 MR. SCOTT: I'm not getting translation. There's no translation,
12 Your Honours.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] These were volunteers, and as you
14 heard from General Praljak in his testimony, these were people with
15 volunteer status. They were referred to in a document during
16 General Praljak's testimony. There were about 230 of them, if I remember
17 that document correctly. And it was submitted by General Praljak, and he
18 was in Gornji Vakuf at the time, so he knows best.
19 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, Your Honours. We
20 have two questions here. When colleague Scott uses the term "elements of
21 the Croatian Army," and the general answers with the words "men from the
22 Croatian Army." When General Scott [as interpreted] uses the term
23 "elements," is he implying men?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And the size of the elements?
25 MR. SCOTT:
1 Q. Well, sir, I don't want to be involved in the situation you told
2 us about in Blaskic case, where you were playing word games about this.
3 You know what "elements" means, it's a commonly-used military term, and
4 you know full well what it means. And whether they volunteered or not,
5 and we'll put that to the side for a moment, whether they volunteered or
6 not, these people were coming to Bosnia and Herzegovina as a unit -- as
7 an element of the Croatian Army. They were part of the -- in some
8 instances, they were part of the 5th Guards; in some instances, they were
9 part of the 7th Guards; they were part of the 101st Guards, and you know
10 that, don't you?
11 A. Those were volunteers who had been born in the territory of
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, who decided amongst themselves to come, and they
13 figured in the numbers they came. As for this group, I point you to the
14 document in which 230 such people are mentioned.
15 Q. Let's go to line 40 in the table, which is Exhibit P05804,
16 P05804, item tab 40. Tying a couple of issues or topics together, this
17 appears to be an approval by Mr. Jelic of the Croatian Army to take 45
18 prisoners to the Heliodrom. Do you see that? Mr. Jelic doesn't say that
19 they were being taken by individuals or volunteers. He says they were
20 being taken by the Croatian Army; isn't that correct?
21 A. I don't know where that Croatian Army could have been at this
22 point in time on the 11th of October, 1993.
23 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, could we draw
24 attention to the full stop after the letter H and after the letter V,
25 which could indicate that this could be the name of a unit.
1 General, could you help us?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Hrvoje Vukcic could be the name of
3 the unit.
4 MR. SCOTT: Well, first of all, I object to the procedure. It's
5 not for counsel to get up and tell the witness what the answer should be,
6 and I strongly object to that. It should not be allowed. And I take it
7 that its withdrawn.
8 Q. Sir, you know what that means, and you know there were Croatian
9 Army elements in that region at that time, but I don't want to spend -- I
10 don't want to get us too bogged down in this, but -- because there's over
11 50 documents, there's 40 some documents in this. We don't have time to
12 go through them, unfortunately. I wish we did.
13 But look at line 41, Exhibit P07423, a report by Mr. Skender --
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, regardless of this,
15 do you recognise that the document that comes under tab 40,
16 Exhibit P5804, does not illustrate your theory on the presence of the
17 Croatian Army, because in the text, after the H and V, there is a full
18 stop. And the unity [as interpreted] was Hrvoje Vukcic, so it doesn't
19 stand for the Croatian Army. So do you recognise that you made a
21 MR. SCOTT: With great respect, Your Honour, no. I think it's up
22 to interpretation. "HV" is HV, and that's what it says.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But "HV" is written without a full
25 MR. SCOTT: It might be in most instances, sir, but there's no
1 point in us arguing about it.
2 Q. If you would go, please, and follow my instructions, go to tab
3 41, P07423, Mr. Skender reports:
4 "HV unit, 7th Guards Brigade, 1st Battalion, was engaged in
5 fighting against MOS," Muslim armed forces or defence forces, "in the
6 Uskoplje battle-field, Gornji Vakuf, in an attempt to protect Croatian
7 Army in HR-HB. This unit was carrying out offensive and defensive
9 The 7th Guard Brigade is an element of the Croatian Army, isn't
10 it, sir?
11 A. The 7th Guards Brigade, yes, but members who volunteer are
12 something quite different from the 7th Guards Brigade.
13 Q. They're still the 7th Guards, sir, aren't they? They may or may
14 not have volunteered, but when they go, they may say, just like you --
15 you said, General Bobetko, I'm willing to go, you can order me to go, I'm
16 willing. But when you went to Croatia, you were still a member of the
17 Croatian Army, weren't you? It didn't matter whether you volunteered,
18 sir. You went under Bobetko's order, subject to your superior, as a
19 member of the Croatian Army, and whether they volunteered or not, they
20 were still members of the Croatian Army, weren't they?
21 A. Yes, but they were born there, and they had every right to leave
22 the Croatian Army and go --
23 Q. You say they were, sir. Did you see their birth certificates of
24 each one who went?
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic,
1 General Petkovic, the document that we have in front of us, and that
2 could have been presented to Colonel Skender when he was there, it
3 indicates that the elements of the Croatian Army were engaged against the
4 BiH Army, and then the Colonel Skender sent that document, which is
5 indicated in the left part of the document, to the Croatian Army. Do you
6 see that?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can see that, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So when we read this document,
9 we could perhaps start thinking that there was a military operation
10 involving units of the Croatian Army on the 31st of December, 1993. What
11 do you say to that?
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, one could interpret that, but
13 it was about the 70 members of the Guards Brigade, and those were all
14 people who hailed from the territory of Herzegovina or, rather, Bosnia
15 and Herzegovina, who had decided to go to Bosnia and Herzegovina even at
16 the cost of perhaps losing their status in the Croatian Army.
17 At this moment, we still had 10.000 of our own men who were born
18 in Bosnia-Herzegovina and are still members of the Croatian Army, and we
19 are still waiting for them to come back, and they're coming in batches,
20 50, 70, 100. Look at the officer here. He was in command of a small
21 group, and that group had about 70 men from the 7th Guards Brigade. And
22 I believe that Mr. Mandic was in -- its commander and he hailed from
23 Siroki Brijeg. He was its first commander, and the second commander was
24 Branko Preradovic, or I'm not sure about his name.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So what you're
1 saying is that for you, those were volunteers because they were all born
2 in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, they hailed from those
4 territories and they went there. And in the Croatian Army, you can see
5 where the 7th Brigade and other brigades were engaged with the main body
6 of their troops at that time.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
8 Mr. Scott, you have the floor.
9 MR. SCOTT:
10 Q. My question was pending to you, sir, at the time, and I'll repeat
11 it: You don't know that these people were all born in Bosnia and
12 Herzegovina, do you? That might be the party line, but you've never seen
13 all their birth certificates, have you?
14 A. I didn't see their birth certificates, because nobody carries
15 birth certificates into combat. But we knew where they hailed from, and
16 we knew that they went home when they returned to Bosnia-Herzegovina.
17 Q. So you say, sir, so you say.
18 If we can go to tab 42 in the table, which is P07475. P07475,
19 tab 42. This is part of a presidential transcript on the 4th of January,
20 1994. I'll direct your attention and the courtroom's attention to
21 page 14 -- starting on page 13, perhaps. Mr. Bobetko and Mr. Susak, and
22 perhaps others, but at least those two, are meeting with
23 President Tudjman. At the bottom of page 13, Mr. Bobetko is giving a
24 report. Carrying over to the top of page 14:
25 "And it is all organised, but this shift, 7th Zagorska Guards
1 Brigade, a part of it has not shift changed yet. It should be done these
2 days. They are holding Gornji Vakuf, 200 of them, and they are very good
3 at it. I said to Petkovic today, that now, today, a new mobilisation
4 should commence, and I ordered that this 8th Light, holding positions at
5 another location, Ogulin, as a reserve be transferred down there for
6 manoeuvre or that we go up there towards this part in the direction of
8 And that's accurate, isn't it? Mr. Bobetko had talked to you on
9 the 4th of January, 1994, about rotating the 7th Guards out of
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina, didn't he?
11 A. No. General Bobetko didn't speak to me. He had requested me.
12 And there is also information that the 7th Brigade and the Light Assault
13 Brigade was never in Gornji Vakuf. You have the minutes of a meeting
14 which took place on the 7th of January with a list of all the units that
15 were there, and those units were not there. This is just a story, and I
16 claim that these two never arrived at Vakuf. These two units were still
17 in Croatia at the time.
18 Q. Let's look at Exhibit P07884, which is -- excuse me, table --
19 tab 14 or item 43, P07884. This is a report, sir, from the 8th Light
20 Assault Brigade in the Croatian Army. It's a Croatian Army document
21 confirming, in fact, the rotation in mid-February 1994, and it begins by
23 "Pursuant to the verbal order of the chief of the Croatian Army
24 Main Staff of 13 February 1994, and concerning the hand-over of the area
25 of responsibility of the 8th Light Assault Brigade to HVO Defence units
1 on the 15th of February, a commission was formed..." et cetera.
2 And the document goes on to record the transfer.
3 A. Yes, but this is not Gornji Vakuf. This is from the border of
4 the Republic of Croatia towards Buna, towards Buna. This is not
5 Gornji Vakuf. I'm telling you that the Light Assault never arrived in
6 Vakuf. Half of it was in Matkovic, and the other half was in the
7 direction of Dubrava Plateau. And if you look at all the --
8 Q. Where is Buna?
9 A. South of Mostar.
10 Q. So the HV -- so putting aside anything else for the moment, this
11 confirms that an HV unit and the HVO were rotating responsibilities in
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina just south of Mostar, weren't they?
13 A. This refers to the area south of Mostar, but not to Gornji Vakuf,
14 as you said at the beginning.
15 Q. And we now know where Buna is and where the rotation is taking
17 Sir, isn't it correct that -- give me a moment, please.
18 Mr. Davor Marijan, who testified in this case, also testified as a
19 Defence expert in the Tuta Stela case, and in that case Mr. Marijan
20 identified the 5th Guards Brigade -- the Croatian Army 5th Guards Brigade
21 as the most involved HV unit in BiH in 1993. He said that the 7th Guards
22 Brigade was the second-most involved HV unit. The 1st Guards Brigade,
23 known as the Tigers or Tigrovi, were also actively involved. The 2nd
24 Guards Brigade, known as Thunders or Gromovi, were actively involved, and
25 he identified all those units as being in Bosnia and Herzegovina during
1 1993. Are you saying that's not true?
2 A. I can't accept what he said. Some elements were there, but not
3 more than 50, 60, or 70 men from each of these brigades, and they were
4 only people from Herzegovina, or, in other words, volunteers in the
5 Croatian Army.
6 Q. If you'll go to Exhibit P03667, which may be a loose exhibit,
7 Your Honours, but it's P0 -- it's not in the table, it's not in the
8 binder we've been looking at in the last few minutes, at least I don't
9 think so, but it's P03667.
10 Sir, this is a report from Mr. Kapular, commander of a Croatian
11 Army unit, dated the 23rd of July, 1993, in which Mr. Kapular is
12 reporting to the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia
13 concerning an action on the Southern Front involving the
14 5th Guards Brigade; isn't that true?
15 A. Yes. We're talking about volunteers from the 5th Brigade who
16 participated in the Operation South in the month of July 1993 south of
18 Q. And the Chamber has seen this document before, but in that
19 paragraph numbered 2 on the second page of the English version, but it's
20 under heading 2, I'll remind you that Mr. Kapular says, essentially,
21 nobody is fooled by calling it the Southern Front; everybody knows what
22 the Southern Front really means. And that meant, in this instance,
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, didn't it?
24 A. The Southern Front was the Republic of Croatia and the area
25 behind the borders towards Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that group was engaged
1 in the Southern Front because that was south of Mostar, which was exactly
2 in the area bordering on Croatia.
3 Q. Well, by some definition, sir, we can all agree that's some
4 distance from -- some kilometres from Mostar, there is the Croatian
5 border. I think we can all agree on that. But these people were
6 acting -- in the 5th Guards were acting inside the borders of
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, wasn't it?
8 A. I'm saying the area around the borders in Bosnia-Herzegovina and
9 parts of the Republic of Croatia together were considered the
10 Southern Front. This was a unified Southern Front.
11 Q. On the 15th of July, 1993, sir, you were still the head of the
12 HVO Main Staff, and you knew at that time, didn't you, that by that time,
13 by the middle of 1993, if not sooner, Herceg-Bosna and the HVO government
14 and military leadership knew that without the support and involvement of
15 the Croatian Army, it was going to be very difficult for the HVO to
16 establish its objectives, didn't they?
17 A. It would have been difficult even for the Republic of Croatia,
18 because the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina wanted to take part of the
19 Republic of Croatia also, the sea -- the coastal area. Yes, it was very
20 difficult to defend the southern part of the Republic of Herceg-Bosna and
21 the Republic of Croatia.
22 Q. I'd like to -- I'd like some assistance, please, and I'd like you
23 to listen specifically to my question and answer my question and not some
24 other question.
25 The leadership -- the governmental and military leadership of
1 Herceg-Bosna and the HVO knew, by the middle of 1993, that it would be
2 very difficult for them to establish their objectives without the active
3 support and involvement of the Croatian Army, didn't they?
4 A. The objectives were to defend the area and not allow a
5 breakthrough to the south.
6 Q. That wasn't my question, sir. I didn't ask you what the
7 objectives were. Please answer my question. Don't answer another
8 question. Answer my question, Mr. Petkovic. The leadership knew --
9 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Karnavas.
10 MR. KARNAVAS: I think if we look at the question, and everybody
11 should just calm down a little bit - I'll be the first one to admit I get
12 a little excited at times - but I think if you look at the question,
13 Your Honours, it's extremely difficult. It's almost like -- well, I
14 won't use the example that is always used, you know, When did you stop
15 beating your wife, sort of question, but it's as posed -- now, if we go
16 step by step, I understand there's some time limitations, but I think the
17 Prosecution is overreaching at this stage and is assuming facts that are
18 not in evidence, is speculating. So step by step, and I'm sure, you
19 know, the gentleman is quite capable. I'm rather impressed, in fact.
20 JUDGE TRECHSEL: I would like to put it in, perhaps, a bit simpler way.
21 Reaching their objectives, is what you say, but which objectives?
22 So far, we get the impression from the Bench -- I get the impression that
23 you have one idea of what the objectives were, and the accused, the
24 witness, has always denied this. So probably it's difficult to put this
25 question in a way which does not lead back to the lower grassroot
1 question of what were the objectives.
2 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour. Thank you, Mr. Karnavas.
3 Sorry if I've created confusion.
4 My point is I don't want to argue with the witness now about what
5 the objectives are. He said, at least for these purposes, that they were
6 the defence of the territory of Herceg-Bosna. Now, whether I agree with
7 that or not, for the purpose of this question, I accept that, for the
8 purposes of this question. So my question remains.
9 Q. The HVO, Herceg-Bosna leadership, the political, the
10 governmental, and military leadership, knew that by mid-1993 they would
11 have great difficulties if, in fact, it would not be impossible to
12 achieve their objectives, however you define them at the moment, without
13 the active support and involvement -- in fact, on-the-ground involvement
14 of the Croatian Army; correct?
15 A. No.
16 MR. KARNAVAS: What objectives? What are we talking about? Is
17 it -- excuse me. Is it the objective to mount a proper defence against
18 the Serbs? That's one. Is it to co-operate with the ABiH in certain
19 areas where there is co-operation against the Serbs? Is it the situation
20 in Central Bosnia? There is a host of things. Now, if the Prosecution
21 could say, I put it to you that these were the objectives, he could say,
22 Yes, or, No. And then even if he gets annoyed, he would say, Well I
23 still put it you, an X, Y, and Z. I think that's the way it's normally
24 done. And then he could follow up with whatever information he may have,
25 once he has locked the witness into his position, to demonstrate so that
1 we can all see, ha, ha, ha, now we know what he means by "objectives."
2 But thus far, I think it's rather vague and it's improper. And I think
3 some of my other colleagues would like to chime in, but I don't think
4 that this is a proper way of cross-examining, at least on this particular
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, when you speak about
7 objectives, I believe - maybe I'm mistaken - that you're talking about
8 the objectives of the joint criminal enterprise. Is that what you have
9 in mind when you are putting this question to the witness?
10 MR. SCOTT: No, Your Honour. I was trying to avoid all these
11 issues by just accepting, for these purposes, what the witness, himself,
12 said the objectives was. But apparently that doesn't seem to be working,
13 so I'm going to go on to another question. I thought it was rather
14 clear, but I'm not going to take the time to pursue it further.
15 Q. This action that Mr. Dzanko was involved in that you've described
16 as Operation Jug, you've told us during your direct examination that you
17 said -- excuse me. On the 15th of July, 1993, you met with Mr. Boban in
18 the evening, and that was when, according to you, you told Mr. Boban that
19 you wanted him to find a replacement for you, that you would give him
20 something like 10 days to find a replacement. You recall that testimony,
21 don't you?
22 A. Yes, that's exactly what I said.
23 Q. And at the time, sir, you knew full well that Operation Jug, as
24 it was ultimately planned and carried out, was an HV-led operation,
25 wasn't it, a Croatian Army-led operation?
1 A. No, it was not. There were volunteers and there were two HVO
2 brigades under the command of Luka Dzanko. I don't know what his status
3 was at the time.
4 Q. Sir, you know full well that Mr. Dzanko was a senior Croatian
5 Army officer and that the HV 5th Guards Brigade -- the 5th Guards Brigade
6 that we've been talking about this afternoon was substantially involved
7 in this operation, supplemented by some elements from the HVO. And, in
8 fact, you wrote a report on this with Mr. Dzanko, didn't you?
9 A. Let me just correct you. You can't say some elements of the HVO.
10 There were two HVO brigades which were four times bigger than the whole
11 body of volunteers from the 5th Brigade. The 1st and the 3rd Brigades
12 which were much bigger than the group of 350 volunteers from the
13 5th Brigade who arrived there.
14 Q. Let's go to Exhibit P03466, P03466. I believe it's in binder 1,
15 I've been told, but we're still checking. Perhaps we can also -- if it's
16 pulled up in e-court, we can work -- it's loose. I'm told now, and I
17 apologise to the courtroom, that it's a loose exhibit, P03466. He's got
19 Sir, this is a report that you and, I believe, Mr. Dzanko
20 authored together, indeed, dated on the 15th of July, 1993, and you
21 report this event, this action. You talk about "our forces" on the
22 second -- at least in the second page of the English version, but you'll
23 find it, "our forces," in the Croatian version. And you see that it
24 talks about 400 men from the HV 5th Guards Brigade for the attack. And
25 Mr. Dzanko is listed, I might indicate here, on this document, since you
1 questioned it a moment ago, deputy commander of the Split Military
2 District, Brigadier Luka Dzanko. And you knew full well -- sir, when you
3 sat there on the 15th of July, 1993, and drafted this report with
4 Mr. Dzanko, you knew full well he was a senior officer in the Croatian
5 Army, didn't you?
6 A. I knew that he was an officer of the Croatian Army. And, second
7 of all, do you know where this document was drafted? This document was
8 not drafted at the HVO. The HVO did not have such a code. Luka Dzanko
9 sent this document on his own from Ploce to General Bobetko, and that's
10 the whole truth. The HVO is not represented by this code. You saw what
11 the HVO used and how it used it. Look at the stamp. This is not the
12 stamp --
13 Q. You're wasting time, sir, and you know it. This is a document
14 that you and Mr. Dzanko prepared together about this action, and you're
15 avoiding the question and the answer that's obvious, and that is:
16 Mr. Dzanko was a Croatian Army commander in command of this unit which
17 was substantially carried out by elements of the 5th Guards Brigade; yes
18 or no? If you don't agree, sir, just say, No, and we'll move on.
19 A. Yes, yes, correct. Yes, he was the deputy commander of the Split
20 Military District. He was the second in command in the
21 Military District of Split.
22 Q. And, sir, in fact, your knowledge of what happened in
23 Operation Jug and the fact that this was -- and I put it to you that it
24 was a Croatian Army operation, under Croatian Army command, that very
25 event was one of those that President Tudjman and the people that met
1 with him on the 13th of April, 1999, that we looked at last week, were
2 concerned about, that you knew that this was an HV operation, and that if
3 you went to testify in The Hague, that was something that might come out,
4 wasn't it?
5 Can we go to Sanction slide --
6 A. No, no.
7 Q. If we can go to slide number 25, which is an excerpt from page 39
8 of Exhibit P08192. Mr. President, this is the same presidential
9 transcript that we looked at last Thursday. Mr. Cosic, who we identified
10 as the deputy defence minister of Croatia:
11 "Mr. President, in August 1993, after the 5th Brigade suffered
12 that defeat, and so on, we sat in the cellar, General Petkovic,
13 General Djuric and Luka Dzanko, and a letter was written ..."
14 And I put to you, sir, that 3466 is the letter that you prepared
15 with Mr. Dzanko. And it goes on to say:
16 "He came in about 1993. He was engaged there from the HVO. He
17 used to be in the former JNA."
18 And then they realised that they were talking about the wrong
19 person, but then goes on to say:
20 "So General Matic and General Petkovic, Mr. Boban was there, and
21 General Petkovic knows too much, so I think the risk is too great for us
22 to put him into an uncertain environment which is not friendly."
23 Sir, the very thing that these men were concerned about your
24 knowledge of was the Operation Jug and your knowledge that, in reality,
25 it was a Croatian Army operation, wasn't it?
1 A. No, why would -- Jug be a Croatian Army -- why would
2 Operation Jug be an operation of the Croatian Army? Nobody but Cosic
3 mentions Operation Jug, and your colleague could have asked me anything
4 he wanted, and I knew a lot more about other things as well.
5 Q. You may have, and again I know you want to blame the people
6 asking the questions, but Mr. Cosic, who is the deputy defence minister
7 of Croatia, what Mr. Cosic says is "After the 5th Brigade suffered that
8 defeat ..."
9 And I assume that the assistant minister of defence of Croatia
10 knows the elements and units of the Croatian Army, sir.
11 A. Of course he knew. Kapular sent a report to the Ministry of
12 Defence. The unit commander sent a report to the Ministry of Defence of
13 the Republic of Croatia.
14 Q. Sir, in this case you've sat here under oath in this Prlic case,
15 you've been sitting here for three and a half years, you know the
16 involvement of the Croatian Army in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an issue in
17 this case, you know that full well, and you sat in front of these Judges,
18 under oath, and talked about Operation Jug, and you never once informed
19 them that this, in reality, was a Croatian Army operation, commanded by a
20 Croatian Army officer. You sit here -- sat here and misled these Judges
21 and allowed them to believe something that wasn't true, didn't you?
22 A. This is not my intention. I did say that two HVO brigades
23 participated in that and that their strength was much bigger than the HV
24 movement, because there were some 4.000 members of the HVO that
1 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Just for the record, I would like
2 to say that Mr. Scott misinterprets what has been happening in this
3 courtroom, and I am saying this with full responsibility, because the
4 Petkovic Defence has very clearly stated that the commander of the
5 Operation Jug was Luka Dzanko. That was not in dispute, and it was also
6 not in dispute that he was a Croatian Army officer. And it was also not
7 in dispute that volunteers from the 5th Guards Brigade of the Croatian
8 Army participated in that operation.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] All that is in the transcript.
10 Mr. Scott, it's perhaps time for our break now. Now, the
11 Registrar has calculated the time you have used. You've used up 5 hours
12 and 12 minutes, so you have another 3 hours and 40 minutes available.
13 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We'll have our 20-minute break
16 --- Recess taken at 3.45 p.m.
17 --- On resuming at 4.09 p.m.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We will resume.
19 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.
20 I want to turn now to the topic of some dealings or relationship
21 between the HVO and the VRS, the Bosnian Serb armed forces.
22 Q. Sir, I'm putting now slide 51 -- Sanction slide 51 on the screen.
23 You testified in the Blaskic case, at page 24123:
24 "General --"
25 The question was asked:
1 "General, did you and the HVO participate with the Serbs against
2 the Muslim -- or the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?"
3 Petkovic answer:
4 "No, we never acted together with them."
5 And, sir, I'm going to ask you once again, as you've heard me ask
6 you several times now: That testimony that you gave in the Blaskic case
7 is not true or correct, is it?
8 A. No, we never took joint action with the Serbs. But as for
9 weapons and equipment, to the extent that it was possible, we obtained
10 such weapons and equipment from them.
11 JUDGE PRANDLER: I'm sorry to interrupt you, both of you. I
12 believe that there was an important mistake in the question asked by
13 Mr. Scott. The question was asked, and I quote:
14 "General, did you and the HVO participate with the Serbs against
15 the Muslims -- or the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?"
16 I believe that the question was, if I'm not mistaken:
17 "General, did you and the HV participate ..."
18 Was it your intention to ask --
19 MR. SCOTT: I'm sorry, Your Honour, it is "HVO."
20 JUDGE PRANDLER: Yes, okay.
21 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Judge Prandler.
22 Q. Well, sir, you say today that, in fact, you participated with
23 them or dealt with them in some ways in terms of obtaining arms and all
24 that, but once again, sir, you very clearly -- when you testified in the
25 Blaskic case, you very clearly attempted to create the impression, before
1 those Judges, that there was no co-operation or dealings -- no
2 co-operation between the HVO and the VRS at all, didn't you? I agree
3 you've changed your position, I'm putting that to you. But the
4 impression you tried to create in the Blaskic case was, very
5 categorically, there was no involvement, no dealings, no co-operation.
6 That's what you wanted to tell those Judges, isn't it?
7 A. No. The question had to do with Vlasic -- in co-operating with
8 the Serbs on Vlasic. A document was shown. The Serbs allege that this
9 was done for propaganda reasons, and that's what the testimony had to do
10 with. As far as I can remember, I believe I said that we and the Muslims
11 obtained weapons -- or, rather, ammunition from them. The specific
12 question put to me concerned Vlasic.
13 Q. And it was only again, sir, in the Kordic case when, again, once
14 you were pressed and when documents were put in front of you, that you
15 then agreed for the first time that there was trading and dealing between
16 the HVO and the VRS, in terms of acquiring weapons and ammunition,
17 starting with at least the beginning of July 1993; isn't that the case?
18 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, given that last
19 Thursday my colleague Scott falsely alleged that the Judge Robinson put a
20 question on six or seven occasions, I would appreciate it if he could lay
21 a factual basis for the question just put.
22 MR. SCOTT: Well, first of all, Your Honour, I disagree that I
23 gave any false information about Judge Robinson's repeated questions to
24 the witness before he finally got an answer. Whether I said seven or
25 eight, there were numerous questions, and I'm happy to let the Chamber
1 review the transcript and count them for themselves. But I'm absolutely
2 confident it was only after repeated questions by Judge Robinson that the
3 question was finally answered.
4 Q. Sir, how often were you -- was the HVO and Serbs involved in
5 these dealings, and how often were you involved in approving these
6 transactions between the Serbs and the HVO?
7 A. Up until -- or while the ABiH had us surrounded and wanted to
8 defeat us, during that period of time the only way of obtaining
9 ammunition was to try and buy it from Republika Srpska.
10 Q. And how often were you directly involved in those negotiations or
11 directing other HVO agents who were involved?
12 A. I couldn't say how often, but I issued instructions saying that
13 such equipment could be obtained because that was the only way that the
14 Croats could survive in Central Bosnia and defend themselves from the
15 ABiH army. It was also impossible to get from Herzegovina to
16 Central Bosnia. Not a single route was open for that purpose.
17 Q. And you dealt, sir, with -- you were -- in fact, sir, you were
18 the principal negotiator, ultimately, on behalf of the HVO, weren't you?
19 A. I wouldn't say so.
20 Q. And you were actually dealing directly at times with Mr. Mladic
21 from the Serb army or the VRS, weren't you, Ratko Mladic, this Tribunal
22 is well familiar with? You and Mr. Mladic frequently dealt with each
23 other to arrange these transactions, didn't you? And I'm going to tell
24 you, sir, if it will help you -- I'm going to show you a number of
25 documents that will indicate exactly that. So if you want to deny your
1 involvement with Mr. Mladic, I suppose you can do so.
2 A. Whenever the UNPROFOR commander called me when I arrived in --
3 Q. We're not going to waste time talking about that. My apologies
4 to the interpreters. I do apologise to the interpreters, but time is
5 precious. I asked you nothing about UNPROFOR, sir. You frequently dealt
6 directly with Ratko Mladic, didn't you; yes, no?
7 A. I wouldn't say that I had frequent contact with him. I attended
8 meetings, if necessary. I had time to reach agreements at those meetings
9 that were organised by UNPROFOR.
10 Q. Sir, you know full well that you had numerous dealings with
11 Mr. Mladic, and it had nothing to do with UNPROFOR; that you were
12 communicating with him to arrange transactions between the HVO and the
13 VRS. And you know that, sir, and you're being dishonest with this
14 Chamber to represent otherwise, don't you?
15 A. No. Others had contact with him, but I had enough time, for
16 example, at meetings at the Sarajevo Airport, to say, I need such and
17 such equipment. If possible, could it please be provided.
18 Q. And is it your position, sir -- is it your testimony, under oath,
19 that the co-operation between the HVO and the VRS was limited only to
20 arms trading?
21 A. On the whole, to arms trading and to the possibility of using the
22 road to Vares -- or, rather, towards Kiseljak.
23 Q. In fact, sir, isn't it the case that most of what we've heard in
24 this trial about any real armed conflict between the HVO and the Serbs in
25 the area of Herzegovina, between late 1992 and at least until March 1994,
1 that was all really phony, wasn't it? And I use the word "phony"
2 specifically. It was false, it wasn't real. It was all kind of a
3 put-on -- a put-up job, so to speak, that you would like this Chamber to
4 believe you were engaged actively in a war with the Serbs during that
5 period, but you weren't, were you?
6 A. No. We were actively engaged in a war against the Serbs, and
7 that was more the case than for our associates up until then, the
9 Q. I put it to you, sir, that between December of 1992 and March of
10 1994 in the area of Herzegovina, there was not a single significant armed
11 conflict between the Serbs -- between the VRS and the HVO; isn't that true?
12 A. That's not true. Our lines were actively engaged. We had dead
13 men, wounded men. The artillery and tanks and the infantry were active.
14 Q. You say that, sir, but you're not telling us anything. I'm not
15 talking about the fact that there were two lines looking across each
16 other across some distance. I'm talking about active military
17 operations, offensive operations. Please identify for me a VRS offensive
18 operation carried out in Herzegovina against the HVO during 1993.
19 A. Yes, in 1993 there were several operations in the direction of
20 Nevesinje. There were several operations from Bugojno to Kupres, in the
21 direction of Kupres. And there were some operations in the area of
22 Vlasic, in the Travnik area, and incessantly in the valley of the River
23 of Usora and Komusina village.
24 Q. Give me the dates of those events and how long they lasted, and
25 the size of the units that were involved, because I put to you, sure,
1 there may have been some local skirmishes here and a skirmish there, an
2 artillery shell here and there, but there were no sustained major HVO-VRS
3 actions during 1993 in Herzegovina, were there?
4 A. I don't know which actions you're referring to. Do you want
5 operations that involve depth of 100 or 200 kilometres? We were waiting
6 for allies -- our allies to invite us to join in operations against the
7 Serbs, large-scale operations against them. We did what we could. That
8 concerned tactical depth, moving the lines, defensive lines --
9 Q. Again, you're avoiding my question, and you know it. And, again,
10 don't blame -- you always blame it on somebody else; it's the Court's
11 fault, it's the questioner's fault, it's the Muslim's fault, it's
12 Izetbegovic's fault. It's always somebody else's fault, sir. You didn't
13 answer my question. Tell these Judges right here, under oath, one
14 significant large-scale offensive operation between the HVO and the VRS
15 in the region of Herzegovina in 1993. Tell them.
16 A. Yes, there were large-scale operations in the area of
17 Tomislavgrad-Livno at the beginning of 1993, in Bugojno, Kupres. There
18 were operations in the Valley of Usora and in the Valley of Kamusina,
19 where we managed to drive back the Serbian forces in a significant way.
20 Q. Let's go to the testimony of Mr. -- again, the Defence expert
21 Davor Marijan, who testified in this case and in the Naletilic case.
22 Slide -- Sanction slide 52, at page 15601-03. My question to
23 Mr. Marijan in that case:
24 "Sir, any violence, of course, is too much, and there were
25 certainly skirmishes and artillery shells fired from time to time, but
1 isn't it true, sir, that in 1993 in the Prozor-Mostar-Stolac region,
2 fighting between Serbs and Croats was not a significant factor in what
3 was happening there?"
4 Answer, under oath: "That is true."
5 And you know that to be true, don't you, sir?
6 A. Well, look. If a soldier who spent a short period in the HVO --
7 well, if he knows more than the Chief of Staff of the HVO, well, then he
8 really is an expert.
9 Q. Well, he was called as an expert, sir, twice, not by me. He was
10 called by two different Defence teams as an expert, so apparently someone
11 thought he had some expertise.
12 Sir, if you could go to slide -- if we could have Sanction slide
13 number 53, let's look at what was being said on this topic by
14 President Tudjman during this -- in President Tudjman's office during
15 this period. I'll put these to you, and then I'll ask you a couple of
17 The 2nd of September, 1993, Exhibit P04740, pages 9 and 10:
18 "Tudjman: ... we can't allow accusations of direct military
19 involvement of Croatia in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on the other hand,
20 all state organs in all areas naturally have to provide help to that
21 Croatian republic, not only to survive but to prosper and be a support
22 for the Croatian state.
23 "In view of this situation, we have to suppress relations with
24 Belgrade ... it is a fact," and he's making this statement on the 2nd of
25 September, 1993, "it is a fact, though, that for five or six months now
1 there has been no fighting between the Croats and Serbs in Bosnia and
3 On the 15th of September, 1993, Exhibit P05080, pages 18 to 20,
4 Mr. Praljak is speaking:
5 "Another thing is, the relations between the Croats and the Serbs
6 have improved, especially on the military plane, because our whole units
7 depend on co-operation with the Serbs ... therefore, Zepce, Kiseljak and
8 thus Vitez, the battalion below Konjic and Vares, it will now be
9 difficult for us to provide them with supplies.
10 "Tudjman: But the fighting against the Muslims should stop.
11 "Praljak: It will stop, but this is going to be different --" or
12 "difficult," I think, and I would submit -- and we can look at the
13 transcript, but I believe that should be "difficult":
14 "A year ago, we thought we could not hold talks with the Serbs at
15 all. We reached some agreement with the Serbs, and now we should start a
16 war against them in order to ease the tension with the Muslims, and it
17 will probably take time to turn things around, psychologically.
18 "Susak: Their side, we should say something to the media. We
19 cannot simply neglect the Serbs now. The point of this agreement is a
20 cease-fire. It is not unification and war against the Serbs. We must
21 inform the public in a subtle manner that we are not establishing a union
22 with the Muslims to fight the Serbs ..."
23 The 12th of January, 1994, P07570, pages 55 and 56:
24 "Tudjman: Jadranko, take steps to open Croatian offices in
25 Banja Luka:
1 "Pranjic: We discussed this and they agree, but someone has to
2 carry this out. We must be sufficiently prompt and flexible as regards
3 this matter ...
4 "Tudjman: We must act in both directions, both towards the
5 Muslims and the Serbs, to get out of this infernal situation.
6 "Jadranko Prlic: Everything can be agreed upon with the Serbs,
7 Mr. President - joint military activity and a military alliance and
8 everything else. There is no operational matter ..."
9 Now, I'm going to stop there for a moment, sir. You know, based
10 on what Mr. Davor Marijan has testified at this Tribunal under oath, by
11 the comments by the Croatian government leadership, that that's the state
12 of -- that was the state of affairs, wasn't it, in 1993, or at least much
13 of it -- most of it? There was no fighting between the VRS and the HVO,
14 and any allegations to the contrary are deceiving this Chamber, aren't
16 A. No, that's not correct. In June, the Croats were totally cut off
17 in Central Bosnia by the Muslims, and they couldn't establish contact
18 with the Serbs and fight with them. That's what the period is about
19 here. So as of June, the Muslim aggression against the HVO blocked the
20 entire HVO system. They had surrounded them, broken it up into small
21 areas in Central Bosnia, and the concern was quite simply to defend
22 oneself. In such conditions, you cannot attack the Serbs.
23 Q. Well, exactly, sir, exactly. You weren't fighting the Serbs
24 during this time-period at all.
25 Let's go -- in fact, sir, you know -- you know, and the Croatian
1 leadership knew, that in reality the war between the Croats and the
2 Muslims was much worse than the war between the Croats and the Serbs,
3 wasn't it?
4 A. Because the Muslim aggression was more intense than the Serbian
5 one. They had surrounded us wherever that was possible for them, and we
6 had no contact -- our enclaves didn't have any contact between
7 themselves. And under such conditions, you can only fight those
8 surrounding you. Those surrounding us were the Muslims or the ABiH.
9 I think that we have demonstrated what was going on in June. The HVO was
10 completely isolated and had no way out.
11 Q. Thirteen of February, 1994 -- I'm sorry. If I wait for
12 translation, Mr. Petkovic just continues on, and I don't have time to
13 allow that. I apologise.
14 13th of February, 1994, P07856, Mile Akmadzic, a witness in this
16 "I would only remind you that yesterday Karadzic said to
17 me - I think you were there too - that Karadzic said that he offered
18 everything to the Croats, that every Croatian village could join the
19 Serbian republic, with full autonomy and the right to secede at a later
20 stage if they didn't want to live with the Muslims."
21 At page 10:
22 "Tudjman: Is it true that we have 3.000 killed in the resistance
23 against the Serbian aggression and 5.000 against the Muslims?
24 Granic, the foreign minister:
25 "2500 and 5500; right?
1 "Boban: a little less. I cannot remember the figures now, but
2 we do have precise figures.
3 "President: So how many did we have with the Serbs?"
4 The interjection is:
6 Going over to the next page:
7 "2500. With the Muslims? (Comment: About 5.000.)
8 "Tudjman: We can go with that figure. 2500 killed."
9 And what's being talked about here between the Serbs and the
10 Croats, and 5500 between the Croats and the Muslims, so more than two
11 times the number with the Serbs, and that's what you know to be the case,
12 isn't it? I mean, as much as you want to talk about the fighting with
13 the Serbs, which was non-existence in most of 1993, it was the war with
14 the Muslims that was much more serious, wasn't it, sir? More than twice
15 as many casualties?
16 A. Because they had driven us out of all parts of Central Bosnia.
17 They have taken all our places that we inhabited --
18 Q. Your not answering my question.
19 A. [Overlapping speakers] [No interpretation]
20 Q. Sorry, you didn't ask --
21 A. [Overlapping speakers] [No interpretation]
22 MR. SCOTT: Your Honours, Your Honours, Your Honours, please ask
23 the witness to answer my question.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Listen to the Prosecution's
25 question very carefully. The Prosecution is putting extremely important
1 questions to you, and answer the question precisely.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will.
3 Your Honours --
4 MR. SCOTT:
5 Q. Sir, I didn't ask you why, I simply said -- my question was more
6 than twice as many casualties -- my apologies. With the Muslims was --
7 my apologies. That was much more serious, wasn't it, sir, more than
8 twice as many casualties? And that can be answered, Yes, or, No. I
9 didn't ask for an explanation. Yes or no?
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, the
11 Prosecution has asked you some very important questions that one should
12 focus on, and the Prosecution has referred to expert testimony, too, and
13 other bases. So there was no conflict between the Croats and the Serbs,
14 according to the Prosecution. That has been stated quite clearly. And
15 you're reminded of a question put to a Defence expert witness. The
16 Defence witness said, No, there was nothing going on. And then in the
17 course of questions put to you, two figures have appeared that are
18 problematic for me, 2.500 were killed as a result of the conflict with
19 the Serbs and 5.000 as a result of the conflict with the Muslims. So I'm
20 trying to see things clearly here.
21 The 2.500 men killed, which year did that concern? Was that
22 before 1993? Because if there was no fighting then there aren't any dead
23 or wounded. But if 2.500 men were killed, that means there was fighting.
24 So I no longer understand anything. The figure of 2.500 referred to by
25 President Tudjman, he, himself, referred to that figure, what exactly
1 does that figure concern?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this is the number of
3 Croats killed in the fighting against the Serbs up until the 15th of
4 June, 1993, so mid-June 1993. As for the other part, it has to do with
5 the ABiH all-out offensive. The fact that Central Bosnia was completely
6 cut off. The HVO forces were completely surrounded from Konjic, Vitez,
7 Busovaca, Kiseljak. The Croatian enclaves was also involved, and then at
8 one point did they have contact with the Serbs and that was at Kiseljak.
9 There was an incessant offensive by the armija. They wanted to
10 deal with this, so in fighting against the armija, the ABiH that kept
11 attacking us, we suffered terrible losses because we can't defend
12 ourselves in an enclave if we're surrounded and attacked. So that was
13 the problem, and not the inverted thesis of the Prosecution. You
14 understand the Muslims had left the Serbs, attacked us from April, and
15 especially June 1993, and they inflicted terrible losses on us. So we
16 suffered the losses as a result of the ABiH attacks in all areas where we
17 had to defend ourselves, because we had been totally surrounded.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, you haven't
19 really answered my question, but you answered part of it. You said that
20 the figure concerns mid-June 1993, so I have understood that. But as for
21 the 2.500 men killed, how many of them were killed as a result of the
22 conflict between the Croats and the Serbs? Because according to the
23 Prosecution, there was no conflict. If there's no conflict, no one's
24 killed, no one's wounded. If we have dead and wounded, this must be the
25 result of something. So where were these Croats killed and wounded by
1 the Serbs, where and when? That's what the Prosecution wants to know,
2 and you're not answering the question.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the Croats, in
4 fighting the Serbs, suffered the most significant losses at the end of
5 1992, at the beginning of 1993, up until the beginning of June 1993.
6 This was the fighting with the Serbs in which Croats were killed. Five
7 and a half thousand killed Croats in the fighting against the Muslims,
8 well, that occurred mostly in April 1993, and especially in June, July,
9 and August, and up until the end of 1993 or up until mid-1994, when we
10 had to face a terrible attack launched by the ABiH. So we had two and a
11 half thousand men who were killed in fighting against Serbs,
12 Your Honours; whereas five and a half thousand killed in the fighting
13 against Muslims.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, I have some
15 difficulty in following you.
16 You are saying that there was fighting with the Serbs and men
17 were killed. That's line 11, page 53. And I was expecting you to tell
18 me where. But then you go back to the subject of the ABiH. If men were
19 killed, if Croat soldiers were killed by the Serbs -- if Croats were
20 killed by the Serbs, rather, which municipality did this take place in?
21 Where did this happen?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, well, it was
23 throughout the territory where the Croats had organised defence against
24 the Serbs, starting with the Neretva Valley, Kupres, Bugojno, Travnik, in
25 the area of Usora, the area of Bosanska Posavina, then a small part of
1 Orasje, the area where our brigades were in the Tuzla area, so throughout
2 the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina where the HVO was facing the VRS.
3 And there were 2.500 men who were killed in the clashes with the
4 Serbs. Is that an insignificant number, doesn't this show that there was
5 fighting with the VRS? Five and a half thousand men were killed in the
6 fighting against the Muslims. Most of them were killed in April 1993.
7 And then up until the end of the Washington Agreement, when the Croats
8 from Central Bosnia quite simply disappeared. On a daily basis, there
9 were 30 to 50 people killed in Vitez, Busovaca, and Kiseljak. And in
10 Travnik and Kakanj, well, I won't even mention the figures there. So
11 these people were killed in five municipalities in fighting against the
12 Muslims. Konjic, Travnik, Vitez, Busovaca and Kiseljak are the areas
13 concerned, the municipalities concerned, and a smaller number of people
14 were killed in the Vares area. So five and a half thousand people were
15 killed as a result of the fact that we were surrounded by Muslims, and we
16 didn't break out of that encirclement until the Washington Agreement was
17 signed. So in Konjic, in Central Bosnia, we were completely surrounded.
18 We had to face an ABiH attack, and at that point in time it wasn't
19 possible for us to engage in combat against the Serbs because the Muslims
20 had also left the Serbs and focused on us. They had inflicted
21 significant losses on us. We lost twice as many men in fighting against
22 the Muslims as we did in fighting against the Serbs.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.
24 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Your Honour.
25 Your Honour, I submit that, unfortunately, you never did get your
1 question answered. There's no question there was fighting between the
2 Muslims and Croats. No one denies that, and no one denies the number of
3 killed. That wasn't the point about any of this. It was the fighting
4 with the Serbs, and we still don't know the dates and where that
6 I would remind the courtroom that although Mr. Petkovic talks
7 about this being some figure that he pulls out of air as being mid-June
8 1993, the conversation involving Mr. Tudjman, the defence minister,
9 Boban, and others was in February 1994.
10 Sir -- and let me also say, Your Honour, lest the Prosecution
11 position be mis-characterised either by Mr. Petkovic or somebody else, we
12 have never said that -- and the statement -- the quote that I put, if we
13 can go back to paragraph -- excuse me, slide 52 in Sanction -- because I
14 can't really improve on this, and this was my question at the time, and I
15 want it to be clear:
16 "No one has ever said that there weren't some isolating fighting
17 in places."
18 And that's the question I put to Mr. Marijan:
19 "Any violence, of course, is too much, and there were certainly
20 skirmishes, there were certainly artillery shells fired from time to
21 time, but isn't it true, sir, that in 1993, in the Prozor-Mostar-Stolac
22 region, fighting between Serbs and Croats is not a significant factor in
23 what was happening there?
24 "That is true."
25 Q. And I put it to you, sir, that nothing you've told us so far
1 contradicts Mr. Marijan. And, in fact, sir, you knew, didn't you, that
2 by June of 1993, you considered the Serbs to be allies, you, yourselves?
3 A. That is not correct. We never considered them allies. From the
4 month of April, we were exposed to a total aggression by the Muslim
5 forces, and in view of such an aggression and a total encirclement, we
6 could not fight on two fronts. We resisted in the places where we were
7 most at risk, and that is Central Bosnia.
8 Q. Sir, I ask you to go to Exhibit P02931, and again, I apologise to
9 the interpreters, but I can't cut Mr. Petkovic off any other way. And
10 unless the Chamber would graciously grant me more time, I have to control
11 the use of the time.
12 If you could turn, please, sir, in the binder marked "Exhibits
13 for Cross - Tables," "Serb-Croat Co-operation" is the first one in the
14 binder. And in this particular binder, there are blue and yellow tabs on
15 the top.
16 And on this particular -- there is -- once again, Your Honours,
17 there is a table, and for the courtroom --
18 THE INTERPRETER: Would you repeat the exhibit number, please,
19 Mr. Scott?
20 MR. SCOTT: Yes, I will. P02931. It is item or line number 15
21 in the table. It is also tabbed on the top in blue as number 15.
22 Q. Sir, this is a document from you, dated the 24th of June, 1993,
23 to Mr. Siljeg and others. And on that day, you say, sir, item 3:
24 "I forbid any support to former allies."
25 Number 4:
1 "Provide support to the new allies."
2 The new allies, sir, were the Serbs, weren't they? --
3 A. The Muslims were attacking us and bringing pressure to bear --
4 Q. I'm not asking you that, sir. The allies were the Serbs, and
5 these are your words and said that the new allies -- and those are
6 referring to Serbs.
7 MR. SCOTT: I'm sorry, Your Honour, but I cannot allow
8 Mr. Petkovic to continue to ramble on in an unresponsive manner.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, the
10 Prosecutor has asked you a very specific question. In point 4, it is
12 "Provide support to the new allies."
13 And he's asking you whether those allies are the Serbs. And you
14 tell him, Yes, or, No. There's no point in wasting time.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, at this point in time, when
16 the Muslims had attacked us, the Serbs were the allies.
17 MR. SCOTT:
18 Q. And despite that, sir, if we can go to Sanction slide 54, despite
19 that, sir, when you came and testified in the Blaskic case at page 24129,
20 you were asked this question:
21 "Tell me, General, in addition to these particular orders
22 (related to Bosnian Serb (VRS) documents" which you had denied earlier,
23 "how many other occasions did you and members of the HVO --" it's in
25 "How many other occasions did you and members of the HVO
1 co-operate in combat operations with the VRS?"
2 Petkovic answer, under oath:
3 "Not once. We did not co-operate once."
4 And yet, sir, we've just seen a document in which that was what
5 you told the Blaskic Judges, that's what you told Judge Jorda and the
6 others under oath. And yet we've just seen a document in which you say
7 that as of June 1993, the HVO and the VRS were allies. And that's the
8 truth of the matter, isn't it? That's the truth now, not what you told
9 the Blaskic Trial Chamber?
10 A. No, the truth is what I said, because we were attacked, we were
11 being persecuted, and the Serbs were helping us out.
12 Q. It doesn't matter who attacked who, sir. It doesn't matter who
13 you were attacked who. You were allies with the Serbs, and you know it.
14 MR. KARNAVAS: Excuse me, General.
15 Your Honours, I think -- I think there needs to be a little bit
16 of patience exercised by the Prosecutor. Now, I understand the
17 frustration. The problem is context, and I believe the general wants to
18 speak of context before putting -- giving the answer. I do think, under
19 these procedures, because we're reminded often by members of the Bench, a
20 variety of them that we're not in the American system where, Yes, or, No,
21 is always the answer, whereas somebody can and does give an explanation.
22 So if -- if I may give some advice, it might be better if the general
23 were given an opportunity to give an explanation as to the answer.
24 If, for instance, the answer is -- the question is, Who is your
25 allies at this point, well, without giving the context of it, I think
1 it's very important. And I can look at any number of conflicts ongoing
2 what areas, whether it's Iraq, whether it's Afghanistan, whether it's
3 Israel, whether it's -- you name it. Today's enemy may be tomorrow's
4 friend because of the situation that is happening at that particular
5 moment, and the general is trying to answer the best that he can.
6 Now, it's unfair, I submit -- to take a transcript from a
7 previous case and read the answer when, in fact, the lawyer or the
8 Prosecutor in that case may have been pursuing a different angle at the
9 time. So I think it would be better to allow the Prosecutor to have
10 extra time, thus allowing the accused to give context, whereas opposed to
11 not allowing him to give context and really restricting him to, Yes, or,
12 No. That would be my proposal.
13 MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I may, if I may
14 add something. I agree what has been said by my learned friend, it's a
15 question of context. But in this particular case, an exhibit has been
16 shown parallel to this one, P2931, where there is reference to one
17 particular location. And here in this extract from General Petkovic's
18 testimony in Blaskic, the reference to a different location, to a
19 different region. And now the Prosecutor is generalising these things,
20 and General Petkovic is answering. Simply, they are not -- they are
21 talking at cross-purposes. They're not talking about the same thing.
22 The Prosecutor is raising details to the level of a general conclusion,
23 and we can see from the document that the reference is to a particular
24 location, just as in the Blaskic case the reference is to a particular
1 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, may I be allowed to
2 add some argument regarding the fundamental difference between this
3 document and the extract from the Blaskic testimony?
4 In the Blaskic case, there is reference to co-operation and
5 combat operations --
6 MR. SCOTT: [Overlapping speakers] I object. This is what we do
7 every time. Counsel gets up and is testifying and stating her case in
8 front of the witness, and we do this all the time.
9 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, Your Honours, I
10 really wish to say this. And if I may be allowed a re-examination, I
11 will show you how Colleague Scott has systematically erroneously
12 presented the context of certain statements, and this is one such
14 In this document, there's reference to co-operation in military
15 operations with the Army of Republika Srpska, which is one issue, and the
16 document sent to a different operational zone, the North-Western
17 Herzegovina, there is mention of specific villages and there's no mention
18 of combat co-operation with the VRS, and there's no reason for us to
19 confuse these two things. And if Colleague Scott is helped by mixing up
20 things, then that is a sad business.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, Mr. Scott, I
22 would like to remind you that there was a general question in the Blaskic
23 case between -- the co-operation between the HVO and the VRS, and it was
24 not linked to Ahmici. The question was a very general one, as we can see
25 on the screen. And you have answered: "Not once," that, We did not
1 co-operate once. That is what you said. And now we have a document in
2 which there's not the word "co-operation," but the word "support," but
3 let's not play with words, which appears to contradict your testimony
4 under solemn declaration. What is your comment? There's no need for
5 counsel, because you are responsible. It is up to you to respond.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I was shown a
7 document on the activity of the Serbs from Vlasic which was not in order.
8 The Serbs from Vlasic did not act upon the request of the HVO, and in the
9 document it says, Use it for propaganda purposes. In this document,
10 Travnik has fallen, so has Kakanj, and they're advancing towards Bugojno.
11 So tell me, if the Muslims have taken Travnik, Kakanj, and are marching
12 towards Bugojno, how can they be any allies of mine; whereas the Serbs
13 are taking in Croats who are fleeing to the area under the control of the
14 VRS? Then who is my ally? These are taking in Croats that are fleeing
15 from the Muslims, and these others are attacking us. Who has mobilised
16 the Muslims against the Croats in Kakanj and Travnik in June? And,
17 again, these are areas in the direction of Bugojno.
18 What could one do in such a situation? The Muslims won't stop
19 their operations, and the Serbs take in civilians and a part of the
20 military that is fleeing to their territory. And that is the truth that
21 we need to talk about, and not about allies or non-allies. Allies should
22 not have attacked me in Travnik and Kakanj, and taken over those towns,
23 and then gone on to Bugojno, and the previous enemies are taking in
24 civilians and a part of the military that is fleeing. And then who is an
25 ally and who is not?
1 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I do apologise, but
2 now I have had a chance to look at the transcript page 24129 from the
3 Blaskic case. And the Prosecution of this Tribunal has shown you this
4 answer as if it consisted of two sentences; but the answer, in fact,
5 consists of six lines, and the continuation of this answer would show you
6 the context in which this answer was given. And I consider this to be
7 another example that the Prosecution of this Tribunal is not
8 authentically representing the testimony of General Petkovic in the
9 previous cases.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please proceed.
11 MR. SCOTT:
12 Q. Thank you for your answers, Mr. Petkovic, because you have
13 confirmed, in fact, that the Serbs were your allies at exactly the time
14 that I told you that they were. So I'm glad that we've finally come to
15 agreement on something.
16 Sir, your question -- the answer you gave in Blaskic to a general
17 question, I persist, and when we have time, when we don't have a witness
18 in the room, we can spend hours debating the transcript, and I'm happy to
19 do so. The general -- as President Antonetti put to you, there was a
20 general question put to you. You answered it categorically, sir, and you
21 knew exactly what you were saying:
22 "Not once. We did not co-operate once."
23 And that, sir, answer was just fundamentally false. And we have
24 before us now, in this binder, as represented in this table -- and we
25 don't have time, unfortunately, sir. Again, I wish we did. Forty-six
1 documents, and the number could be double or triple that, between the
2 10th of March, 1993 -- the 10th of March, 1993, and the 17th of January,
3 1994, documenting extensive co-operation, combats co-operation, between
4 the HVO and the VRS, many of which directly involving you, sir.
5 Line 5, Petkovic to Rajic. Line 6, Petkovic to Kiseljak HVO.
6 Line 8, Rajic to Petkovic. Line 9, Petkovic to Rajic. Line 10, Rajic to
7 Petkovic. Line 11, Blaskic to Petkovic. Line 12, Rajic to Petkovic,
8 et cetera, et cetera.
9 You told the Blaskic Judges, "Not once, we didn't co-operate
10 once." And you lied under oath, didn't you, sir?
11 A. No, I didn't. I know what it was referring to and I was respond
12 to what it was referring to. When we took over ammunition, when they
13 gave us ammunition, I accepted it.
14 Q. Sir, you weren't talking about ammunition. You were talking
15 about combat operations, artillery support.
16 Look at line 25 in the table as one example -- sorry, my
17 apologies. Let's start with line 21, just to get the characters, line
18 21, Exhibit P09963. You're talking about an agreement which was agreed
19 between two chief commanders of the two sides, General Petkovic and
20 General Mladic, and between Mr. Bruno Stojic and two chief political
21 leaders from your side.
22 JUDGE TRECHSEL: Sorry. Mr. Scott, the number of the document
23 has not been recorded, and it would help us to find it if we had it.
24 Thank you.
25 MR. SCOTT: Of course, Your Honours. P09963, line 21, and it's
1 also flagged as number 21 in the blue tabs on the top of the binder.
2 Q. I'm going to also refer you to, sir, because I don't have time to
3 cover all these individually, but to line 25, P09965, same format. It
4 will be marked as tab 25 in the binder:
5 "On July -- on July 1993," and there may be a day missing, "At
6 their invitation I contacted the XY side." You know, don't you, sir,
7 that the XY side was a term frequently used by the HVO to refer to the
8 Serbs, don't you?
9 There's no translation, apparently.
10 Hello? Are you getting translation now? Is there translation
11 now? All right, thank you.
12 Referring to P09965:
13 "On July 1993, at their invitation, I contacted the XY side."
14 Sir, you know, don't you, that "the XY side" was a term
15 frequently used by the HVO to refer to the Serbs and the VRS; correct?
16 We can see it in this table many, many times, and it's very clear, sir,
17 who's being talked about, isn't it?
18 A. Yes, correct.
19 Q. "That major-general --" item 1:
20 "That Major-General Petkovic should meet with General
21 Ratko Mladic at Hotel Plaza in Herceg-Bosna on 7 July 1993."
22 Skipping to item number 4 toward the end:
23 "At this moment, we would need from them heavy artillery,
24 Howitzers, which should be positioned deep in the territory of the
25 municipality of Kiseljak for artillery support of Fojnica."
1 Line 32 in the table Exhibit P03677, Glasnovic to Siljeg:
2 "I made contact with the third side via hotline. They agreed to
3 help us, and they can start shooting immediately. Therefore, it is
4 necessary that you determine the targets to be hit, and our side should
5 do the same."
6 Sir, if we had the time, we'd go through all 46 documents, but we
7 don't. You know full well that the HVO and VRS during this time-period
8 were engaged in extensive co-operation, not only trading arms and
9 ammunition, oil, and other materials, but actively engaged in combat
10 operations together against the Muslims, providing the -- providing the
11 HVO with artillery support on request, et cetera; isn't that the case?
12 A. We purchased all that from them and we paid for it, and that is
13 the truth, and at very high prices.
14 Q. You paid for what?
15 A. For the ammunition, artillery, and the treatment of men. We paid
16 for all this.
17 Q. When you gave them the grid references and said, Open fire on
18 this ABiH target, how much did you pay the Serbs for that?
19 A. I don't know about that, about that particular case. I know that
20 we did order grenades and mines, and we paid for them.
21 Q. Sir, you're doing it again, sir, and you know full well. You're
22 trying to waste time. I put to you the question very clearly, unless
23 there was a problem in translation: Combat operations, not buying
24 weapons, not buying grenades, not buying rifles, not buying tanks, combat
25 operations, including active artillery support opening fire on Muslim
1 positions, that's what my question is, and you know it, sir. That's the
2 truth of the matter, isn't it, that that's what happened extensively
3 throughout 1993?
4 A. It may have happened, but not in the way you are saying.
5 Q. And now, sir, you told the Blaskic Judges, under oath, that it
6 didn't happen once, We did not co-operate once. That's what you said,
7 sir, and that was not true, was it?
8 A. No, I didn't know about this document. I was shown a document
9 from Vlasic which I denied, but this document is one I see for the first
10 time now.
11 Q. So, once again, the fact that you gave false testimony in the
12 Blaskic case is somebody's else's fault, sir; is that what these Judges
13 should understand?
14 I don't need any comment from Mr. Kovacic.
15 A. No. What I knew, I testified truthfully. But things I hadn't
16 seen were things I couldn't testify about in any way.
17 Q. So you didn't remember these 46 documents, and if I showed you 46
18 more, you'd say you didn't remember those either; is that correct, sir?
19 A. Every document addressed to me, I remember, but correspondence in
20 a different zone is something I cannot be familiar with because it is not
21 directed to me.
22 Q. In fact, sir, not only did you engage in artillery -- did the VRS
23 provide you with artillery support, but in the case of action against the
24 town of Zepce, which was being held by the ABiH at that time, and we'll
25 come to the date in just a moment, you and the Serbs actually carried out
1 joint combat operations to take that town, didn't you, in March of 1993?
2 A. No.
3 Q. Look at line 1 of the table, Exhibit P01643 --
4 A. In March 1993, there was nothing.
5 Q. Item 1, P01643. Lozancic to Stojic and Boban:
6 "The political situation in the municipalities in Zepce are
7 growing more complex. Please discuss our position urgently at the
8 highest level. It is necessary to initiate talks with the third party as
9 a possibility of a solution for us in Usora."
10 Go to table line 7, Exhibit P02805:
11 "Zepce. The Serbs are fully observing the cease-fire on all
12 lines toward us. They are continuously fighting in parts where the
13 Muslims are. Serbs, headed by Colonel Arsic, commander of the OG Doboj,
14 are offering full co-operation and joint fight against the 'balijas' in
15 these parts."
16 Table line 24 -- line 24, the 1st of July, 1993, P10884:
17 "At around 1300 hours yesterday, the town of Zepce fell into the
18 hands of the Ustasha and Chetniks. Before the town fell, they called the
19 commander of our 319th Mountain Brigade to negotiate, and he agreed."
20 The HVO and the VRS together conquered the town of Zepce in July
21 1993, didn't they?
22 A. No. Zepce was continuously under the control of the HVO. Zepce
23 was never lost by the HVO, and it was constantly under the control of the
24 HVO, the entire municipality of Zepce. Had it not been like that, then
25 there would have been no Croats in Zepce at all.
1 Q. So I want to ask you to go to the next -- to another table in the
2 same binder. You'll find a table that is titled on top "HVO-Serb
3 Co-operation in Vares." It's behind a green tab divider, if you will.
4 But you'll find the table titled "HVO-Serb Co-operation in Vares," in the
5 same binder, and again these have the yellow tabs on top.
6 And, again, we don't have the time to go through this, but based
7 on -- in detail, I mean. And based on what I just showed you a moment
8 ago, I put to you, sir, another 23 documented instances between the 9th
9 of September, 1993, and the 12th of November, just a short -- relatively
10 short period of time, 23 instances of extensive HVO-VRS co-operation in
11 the area around Vares and Kiseljak. And you know that to be the case,
12 don't you, sir? A number of these entries are directly to you: Line 1,
13 P04907 Emil Harah to Petkovic; line 13, P05898, Rajic to Stojic, and
14 Petkovic; line 10, Rajic to Prlic, Praljak, Stojic, and Petkovic; line
15 12, Rajic to Stojic, Praljak, and Petkovic, et cetera, et cetera, sir.
16 And you know full well that you and the VRS were co-operating extensively
17 in the Vares area in the fall of 1993, weren't you?
18 A. This is just a proposal for us to establish contact in the month
19 of September, and then in November we were expelled from Vares onto the
20 territory that was under the control of the VRS. We see something that
21 somebody proposed, and we should then see what actually happened to see
22 the difference between the two.
23 Q. Line 7, P09812, 24th of October, 1993, at the time of Stupni Do;
24 24 October 1993, a report from the Ban Jelacic Brigade to Rajic:
25 "Support in artillery by XY carried out."
1 Now, that's not a proposal, sir. That's a report that the
2 artillery support by the XY side, who you know to be the Serbs, was, in
3 fact, carried out, wasn't it? --
4 A. This is a document from the OG, and it never reached the
5 Main Staff, so nobody knew whether things had been done or not.
6 Q. Sir, are you saying that all these documents -- none of these
7 documents on here, including the ones either from you or to you, you
8 didn't know about, they didn't reach you?
9 A. Only documents sent to me and received by the Main Staff are --
10 could be known by me. As for the others within the OG, as their internal
11 communication, there was no way for us to know about it.
12 Q. Sir, Mr. Rajic -- Mr. Rajic was communicating to you on a very
13 frequent and regular basis, and he was reporting this information to you
14 over and over again. He was your man in the Vares-Kiseljak area, wasn't
15 he, and he was constantly arranging deals with the Serbs, buying arms and
16 equipment, buying artillery support? Mr. Rajic was your man in Kiseljak
17 and Vares, wasn't he, and he was keeping you informed on all these
19 A. Ivica Rajic was in charge of the defence of the area, and he was
20 duty-bound to put up resistance against the Muslim aggression by hook or
21 by crook.
22 Q. And he was duty-bound to keep you informed, wasn't he, sir? I
23 know you want to talk about everything except answering my question. I
24 know that, sir. But he was also duty-bound to keep you informed, to
25 report to you, as one of his superior officers, wasn't he?
1 A. We can look at all of the reports that he sent to me. I don't
3 Q. Let's look at P -- line 3, P05898. Mr. Dusko Kovacevic or
4 Kovacevic, whichever it is, and my apologies, that gentleman was the
5 RS -- the Republika Srpska minister of defence, wasn't he?
6 A. Yes, correct.
7 Q. Mr. Rajic reports to you on the 15th of October, 1993:
8 "Today I met Mr. Dusko Kovacevic," and my apologies again,
9 "briefly. Everything is in order and proceeding according to plan, but
10 General Milivoj Petkovic has not arrived yet. Please, do what you can to
11 speed up his arrival, because things might get worse for us if more time
12 is allowed to pass."
13 You were -- you knew and you were on your way to Central Bosnia
14 and to the Kiseljak area by mid-October 1993, a short number of days
15 before the atrocities at Stupni Do, and you knew that that action
16 ultimately would involve the co-operation of the VRS, didn't you?
17 A. No, no co-operation with the VRS.
18 Q. Well, you've told us that so many times before, and we've seen
19 the contrary. And Mr. Rajic reports to you:
20 "Everything is in order and proceeding according to plan ..."
21 There was a plan between you, Mr. Rajic, the HVO, and the VRS
22 about everything that was going to happen in the Kiseljak-Vares area in
23 the next 10 days, wasn't there, including what happened in Vares and
24 Stupni Do?
25 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours --
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This has nothing whatsoever to do
2 with Vares.
3 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I have to object. Could my
4 learned friend explain the factual basis? Otherwise, we'll be in the
5 dark about what happened next, and the witness cannot answer. If my
6 learned friend is saying that the action in Stupni Do was planned 10 or
7 15 days before and that this document refers to what happened in
8 Stupni Do, then he should be directing -- the insinuations and
9 suggestions by -- on the part of my learned friend are inappropriate for
10 this trial, I should think.
11 MR. SCOTT:
12 Q. If you go next, sir --
13 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Scott, your microphone is not on.
14 MR. SCOTT: My apologies.
15 Q. If you go next, sir, to table line 4 -- my apologies. Table line
16 2, which is Exhibit P09823, this is from Mr. Rajic's journal entry for
17 the same day, 15th of October, 1993, meeting Kovacic:
18 "Petkovic must urgently -- everything has been arranged.
19 Everything is happening according to the plan. Just get in touch with
20 Mladic. This is a big task, and it has to succeed 100 per cent. We are
21 getting into extremely favourable situation here, and next to follow is a
22 definite solution for the Krivaja Valley. This has to be solved
23 immediately and before winter. Borders should be established and normal
24 life resumed.
25 "Petkovic will command deployment of our and their troops. These
1 are the words of the supreme commander."
2 And that was the plan that was being put in place, isn't it, sir?
3 A. No. These were Ivica Rajic's assumptions and requests. Nobody
4 was in command of the Serbs -- Serb forces, and the least so Petkovic.
5 Q. Let me ask you go next to table -- to the table line 19, to
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, when we look
8 at this document, Rajic says, and he mentions you in the first line,
9 "that there is a plan," that is quite clear - we are looking at the
10 document - "that you are going to be in command of the deployment of our
11 troops and theirs."
12 "And theirs." And he adds:
13 "These are the words of the supreme commander."
14 So he's obviously referring to Mate Boban. So unless Mr. Rajic
15 is a fool, who is writing anything, which may be the case - we don't
16 know, but that is what is written here, and it was written on the 15th of
17 October. And a Judge, who reads this, asks himself, first of all,
18 whether there was, indeed, a plan, and whether there was an agreement
19 between the VRS and the HVO. So you are still claiming that you were not
20 "au currant" with this?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour Judge Antonetti, those
22 were Rajic's attempts to defend the area of Kiseljak, and he tried to
23 link up Petkovic and Kovacevic, if needed, in order to agree the things
24 that had to be taken, and he continues to say the condition for the
25 passage of the convoy is 30.000 litres of petrol. And he says that
1 Ivica Rajic is trying to agree with the Serbs to receive the material
2 that the HVO could send to Kiseljak, and that is the long and the short
3 of it, nothing else. And this is also the price that we were supposed to
4 pay if the convoy was to be organised from Herzegovina in order to avoid
5 the charges imposed by the Serbs for such an expensive ammunition. That
6 was that, and I was supposed to arrive and agree on the details. So this
7 is about the convoy, the convoy with the ammunition that we should have
8 sent from Herzegovina to avoid paying the Serbs through the nose, and we
9 would have paid the passage of that convoy in kind; in petrol, as he
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Listening to you, I was looking
12 at the B/C/S document. This didn't strike me at first, but I see that
13 all this is written in a small notebook, written by hand, very nice
14 handwriting. And apparently it is Mr. Rajic who kept this personal
15 diary, who describes, day by day, everything that was going on. And I
16 assume that this notebook was either communicated by Mr. Rajic when he
17 negotiated a deal with the Prosecutor, or perhaps it was found in the
18 archives, so I don't know. But this document, which appears, and I
19 stress "appears" to have been written by Rajic in realtime, and he noted
20 everything that was going on in this notebook, you've seen this notebook?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Your Honours. It was his
22 notebook. There was no way for me to see his notebook. He's just
23 describing his plans, and he says what he thinks that should be done. He
24 needed the ammunition. The ammunition provided by the Serbs is very
25 expensive. He want to do make the Serbs allow us to bring over our own
1 ammunition because it would have been much cheaper than for us paying
2 them in German marks or American dollars. And here he mentions the
3 quantity of the petrol that should have been paid for a convoy that would
4 have been sent from Herzegovina and that would have arrived in Kiseljak,
5 carrying the ammunition that he needed in order to defend Kiseljak from
6 the attacks by the BiH Army.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
8 Mr. Scott.
9 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I apologise. The
10 document bears different dates, and certain pages do not contain any
11 dates at all. Maybe Mr. Scott could explain the nature of this document.
12 Have the pages been chosen randomly, or what kind of document this is.
13 As you can see, a reference is made to a meeting on the 15th of October.
14 There is no date on the right-hand-side page. And then the following
15 page refers to December 1993, and so on and so forth. It is very
16 difficult for me to get the bearings in the document.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, you have information
18 about Mr. Rajic's notebook, I'm sure.
19 MR. SCOTT: To get the details, Your Honour, and to be accurate,
20 I'd have to double-check that. But to answer the more immediate question
21 that Ms. Alaburic just raised, it's a matter of translation, Your Honour.
22 If you go back to the previous page in the B/C/S version, you will see
23 clearly the date, "15/10/1993." It should be on the screen now. So
24 there's no mystery about that.
25 If we could turn next, please, to item number 19 in the same
1 table, which is P06478, P06478, line 19 of the table. This is a special
2 report from the Security Administration of the Republic of
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I simply want to direct your attention to the
4 second full paragraph of the document on page 2 of the English version:
5 "There is reliable information that this action," and referring
6 to Stupni Do, "above," the Stupni Do massacre, "there is reliable
7 information that this action was under preparation as of the 16th of
8 October this year and that it was supposed to include villages of
9 Mijakovici, Dragovici, and Stupni Do. Information which was collected
10 from captured members of the BH Army by the HVO leaders," making a
11 reference to Rajic, "made the HVO units staff to reduce this action only
12 to Stupni Do."
13 Q. And, in fact, sir, you do know -- and as this document confirms
14 and you do know that, as indicated in several documents we've now looked
15 at, the action involving Stupni Do was planned around the 15th of
16 September -- excuse me, the 15th and 16th of October, 1993, wasn't it ?
17 A. No, not correct. The villages of Kopljari, Ljesovina, and other
18 features and facilities in the direction of Stupni Do were being attacked
19 on the 15th and the 16th, so this is upside-down. Kopljari is a Croatian
20 village, and so were the others.
21 Q. Nothing you've said, sir, is to the contrary of this having been
22 planned on those days. You know, you just go on and start talking, and
23 you don't answer the question. Nothing you said is contrary to the fact
24 that I put to you -- what I put to you, and that is the action of
25 Stupni Do was planned on the 15th and 16th of October, 1993, regardless
1 of what was taking place somewhere else; isn't that true, sir?
2 MR. KARNAVAS: Again, Your Honour, I want to object at this
4 Look at the question, look at the answer. General Petkovic
5 answered the question and then gave an explanation. Then look at the
6 following question, and if I were in another courtroom in my
7 jurisdiction, I would argue that -- I would object as being
8 argumentative, this is, and also it misstates the answer. So on two
10 So if you look at the following question, it is simply unfair,
11 and I think that at some point the Bench has an obligation to at least
12 point out to the Prosecutor that he can be as vigorous as he wishes, but
13 he needs to be fair to the witness. I invite you to look at the series,
14 question, answer, question. It is simply not fair, and I shouldn't have
15 to be objecting.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, I believe that all
17 the questions you have put were intended to have General Petkovic admit
18 that the operation was prepared as of the 15th of October. That is the
20 MR. SCOTT: Yes, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
22 General Petkovic, regardless of all these procedural issues, the
23 Prosecutor is telling you that the operation was planned as of the 15th
24 of October. What is your comment?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this is not true. On
1 the 15th of October and around that date, the BiH Army launched an attack
2 against Vares. It took the Croatian village of Kopljari, the Ljesnica
3 feature, and some other features around Vares, and that's what happened.
4 Therefore, the BiH Army launched an attack on Vares, took those features,
5 and that, in turn, created a situation in Vares after which the commander
6 turned to his superior for assistance because he didn't know how to
7 control the situation from then on.
8 There's no dispute that the HVO had lost some of its positions
9 and that this position was less favourable from then on. There was no
10 mention of Stupni Do, so that had nothing whatsoever to do with
11 Stupni Do.
12 We saw, in the case of Rajic, what happened with the Croatian
13 village of Kopljari and other features in the direction of Vares.
14 Croatian villages were falling, Croatian positions were falling, and
15 Vares is under threat. Nobody mentioned Stupni Do until the moment Rajic
16 actually went to Stupni Do.
17 MR. SCOTT: Mr. President, we're about to get into Vares and
18 Stupni Do in a more significant way, and I know it is a few minutes
19 early, but now might be the best time to take the break. But, of course,
20 I'll proceed however the Chamber guides me.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. As you wish, let us
22 now have a 20-minute break.
23 --- Recess taken at 5.32 p.m.
24 --- On resuming at 5.54 p.m.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I believe that the Stojic
1 Defence has something to say or ask.
2 MR. KHAN: Mr. President, Your Honours, thank you so much. In
3 fact, I'd asked for five minutes at the end of the day, but it's a very
4 short matter.
5 We are responding tomorrow to request certification or, in the
6 alternative, leave to appeal against Your Honour's decision dated the
7 15th of February, 2010, which related to the Praljak motion.
8 Your Honour, the word limit for this is ordinarily 3.000 words. As we
9 are combining both an application for reconsideration and, in the
10 alternative, a request for a certification to appeal, we would humbly ask
11 the Trial Chamber to grant a dispensation and file a document of not more
12 than 3.500 words. We will endeavour to make it as pithy and short as
13 possible, but at the moment, because of some authorities that need to be
14 included, and instead of filing two separate documents, we deem it more
15 efficient to file one document that Your Honours can consider, and that's
16 the basis of the application. Your Honour, I thought it simpler, given
17 the proximity of the dead-line tomorrow, to raise this in court.
18 I'm grateful.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Khan, to understand well,
20 your request is linked to the request of the Praljak Defence, that is,
21 for a certification to appeal following a decision by the Chamber
22 rendered in connection with 92 bis; is that right?
23 MR. KHAN: Indeed, Mr. President, in relation to the documents --
24 the order of the 15th of February, 2010, for the admission of elements.
25 [Defence counsel confer]
1 MR. KHAN: Indeed, Your Honours, my learned friend tells me, not
2 92 bis. It was the documents that were the subject of the decision of
3 the 15th of December -- 15th of February, 2010. I think there was one
4 order of the Trial Chamber on that date.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I see, yes. I shall consult my
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] After having heard the
9 explanations by Mr. Khan, representing the interests of Mr. Stojic,
10 agrees that his submissions consist of 3.500 words instead of 3.000.
11 MR. KHAN: I'm most grateful. Thank you.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Scott.
13 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Mr. President.
14 Q. Mr. Petkovic, continuing on further into the topic of Vares and
15 Stupni Do, I'd like to assist the Judges, if we can, to talk a moment
16 about your relationship with Mr. Rajic.
17 You and Mr. Rajic had extensive dealings with each other in 1993,
18 and I think you told us the other day, if my memory serves, that you had
19 probably travelled to Kiseljak in 1993 at least -- and perhaps at least,
20 as I heard you and understood, maybe substantially more, but at least 20
21 times; is that correct?
22 A. Yes, more or less.
23 Q. In fact, during this time-period, it would be fair to say,
24 wouldn't it, that between you and Mr. Rajic, there was not only a
25 superior-subordinate relationship, but the two of you were actually
1 friendly, on good terms, you socialised together when you were in
2 Kiseljak? You had a friendly relationship with each other for a
3 substantial period of time, didn't you?
4 A. I was on friendly terms with everybody, including Rajic.
5 Friendly in the order, too.
6 Q. In fact, sir, by the time that we get to October 1993, Mr. Rajic
7 had really had a bit of a checkered career with the HVO, he'd been in
8 trouble and removed on previous occasions, and in fact, sir, you were
9 something of Mr. Rajic's protector, weren't you?
10 A. No, not true.
11 Q. You protected Mr. Rajic. You intervened on his behalf on a
12 number of occasions, and probably kept him in better standing with the
13 HVO than he would have had it not been for you; isn't that true?
14 A. No, not true. Rajic enjoyed the same status as everybody else,
15 and he didn't enjoy my protection if he didn't do things properly.
16 Q. Well, I want to -- I want to put the Prosecution case to you very
17 clearly, sir. I put it to you that you and Mr. Rajic were close friends,
18 you socialised frequently when you were in Kiseljak, you were close to
19 Mr. Rajic. You co-operated extensively with him, among other things, in
20 your dealings with the Serbs, and that you protected Mr. Rajic on a
21 number of occasions, and that's the nature of your relations going into
22 Stupni Do, wasn't it?
23 A. No, not true.
24 Q. Is it your testimony, sir, that you did not become aware of the
25 HVO attack on Stupni Do on the 23rd of October, 1993? You did not learn
1 of it on the day of the 23rd; is that your testimony?
2 A. No, I didn't learn then. I learned late in the evening after the
3 meeting with the Main Staff of the HVO and my conversation with
4 Zarko Tole, I believe.
5 Q. Well, let's look at Exhibit P06032.
6 MR. SCOTT: And, Your Honour, we're now changing to another set
7 of binders. I apologise for the volume of materials, but we're now
8 changing to what is called binder 2, but actually, in fairness, there are
9 two parts of binder 2. There's binder 2, number 1, which includes the
10 exhibits which were marked on the back of the binder, on the spine of the
11 binder, P00150 to P02142, and binder number 2 of the set includes
12 Exhibits P02182 to 5D04271. So we're going now to P06026, which is in
13 binder 2 of the set.
14 While everyone is orienting themselves to that, it's a document
15 that we've seen many times in the courtroom, so I think we can go
16 forward, I hope.
17 Q. This is the report from Mr. Rajic to Dario Kordic,
18 Milivoj Petkovic, Tihomir Blaskic, and Mr. Mario Bradara on the 23rd of
19 October, 1993. And you're saying to us again, sir, that you claim not to
20 have received this on the 23rd of October, 1993; is that right?
21 A. No, sir, it was sent to me in Mostar, and I was not in Mostar.
22 Q. What you said on the 17th of February, sir, at pages -- at
23 transcript page 49613-614, in answering a similar question:
24 "No, Your Honours, this information couldn't have reached me
25 because Paket radio doesn't recognise my name and surname. It only
1 recognises the station to which it is sent, which was Mostar in this
3 That was your testimony on the 17th of February, wasn't it?
4 A. Yes, that's correct.
5 Q. Now, Witness EA testified, and I'm at -- making reference to --
6 and I'm proceeding cautiously because it's a protected witness, but I
7 don't think, in this respect, there will be any inadvertent disclosure, I
8 hope. At transcript page 24729, Witness EA explained this:
9 "From an operative point of view, whoever received this message
10 at the Main Staff, and knows that General Petkovic is not there and the
11 message is for him, and this person knows that General Petkovic is
12 somewhere else, then he is duty-bound to forward this message to
13 General Petkovic. If they acted differently, then they were doing the
14 wrong thing."
15 And that's an accurate statement of the process and what should
16 have happened, isn't it, sir?
17 A. No, that is not the exact procedure. The procedure was exactly
18 what was done. When Petkovic was absent, it was General Praljak who
19 would be informed, and that would have been the procedure and not what
20 your witness told you that it was.
21 Q. That's not what you said last week, sir. You confirmed to us
22 last Wednesday, and I covered this with you very specifically and
23 obviously, in part, for this purpose, you testified that the procedure
24 was you travelled to Kiseljak and Vitez often. I asked you:
25 "Q. Did you travel to Vitez and Kiseljak and other places?
1 "A. Yes, I did.
2 "Q. And when you weren't physically in Mostar, how would you be
4 Answer, Well, the duty people would know where I was. In fact, I
5 didn't even have to tell them an address. If they knew I was in
6 Kiseljak, they knew where I was. Your testimony was very close to that.
7 I'm not quoting in verbatim from memory, but I think that's a fair
8 summary. And that's the case, sir, isn't it? You knew -- you'd been to
9 Kiseljak many times, at least 20 times in 1993. Your headquarters staff,
10 the duty officer would have known that. And if a fax came -- or a Paket
11 came in for you, they would have known exactly where to send it, wouldn't
12 they? They knew you were in Kiseljak, at the headquarters, Mr. Rajic's
13 headquarters. And we've seen even today all these documents and
14 communications about co-operation with the Serbs, frequent communication
15 back and forth between Herzegovina and Mr. Rajic in Kiseljak, and your
16 people -- your people, sir, in Mostar knew exactly how to reach you in
17 Kiseljak, didn't they?
18 A. Yes, when I was at the head of the Main Staff, at this time there
19 was a commander in Mostar, that's when the commander was there. There
20 was no need for me to receive this. Praljak did. It's not addressed to
21 him, but you can see his handwriting down here that shows that he
22 received it. But he's not a part of those to whom it was addressed.
23 There was no need for me to be sought after if the commander received the
25 Q. Exactly, sir. Exactly, sir. You say -- my apologies,
2 You say, sir, that, I didn't receive it because I wasn't in
3 Mostar, and they wouldn't have known -- essentially, what you say is they
4 wouldn't have known where to send it, but you know that's not true, sir.
5 The headquarters staff knew exactly where you were, didn't they? And
6 they didn't have to know where Mr. Praljak was, but it was forwarded to
7 Mr. Praljak. They knew how to find him and they knew how to forward it
8 to him, didn't they?
9 A. No, that's not correct. General Praljak was in the Main Staff,
10 and when this arrived, and it was addressed to Petkovic in Mostar, it was
11 forwarded to General Praljak. That was the end of the procedure, and
12 there was no need to send it to Petkovic if it had been received by the
14 Q. Well, of course there was a need, sir, because that's who your --
15 that's who Rajic addressed it to. It wasn't addressed to Praljak. It
16 was addressed to you and Mr. Kordic and Mr. Blaskic. Of course there was
17 a reason to make sure you got it, and you did receive it, didn't you?
18 You want to tell this Chamber you didn't receive it, but your
19 headquarters staff knew exactly where you were, the same place you had
20 been so many times before, in Kiseljak, with Rajic, and just like they
21 knew how to send it on to Mr. -- excuse me, Mr. Praljak, wherever he was,
22 they knew exactly how to send it on to you, where you were, didn't they?
23 A. No. General Praljak was in his office. The document arrived.
24 It was addressed to Petkovic, as if Petkovic were in Mostar. It was
25 forwarded to Praljak, and it was no longer necessary for anyone to look
1 for Petkovic once the commander had received this document. And that is
2 why the procedure as of that moment proceeded from Praljak and not from
3 General Petkovic.
4 Q. Let's go to Exhibit P06026 in the second binder. It should be
5 very close by, numerically, 6026.
6 So this, in fact, is a version of the document that obviously
7 Mr. Praljak had received, because as you said a moment ago, Mr. Praljak
8 scribbled some information on the bottom of the page about taking --
9 gaining control and dealing with the situation in Vares, without mercy
10 towards anyone. You see that, don't you, at the bottom of the document?
11 A. Yes, I can see it in the document.
12 Q. And you received that document, didn't you, in Kiseljak?
13 A. No, no, no. This document can't be returned in this form.
14 There's a document that's typed, there's a new document. You've seen it
15 here, so show me that one.
16 Q. Sir, you received a typed version, a Paket version of that
17 document, and we've seen it in the courtroom before, and you received
18 that in Kiseljak, didn't you?
19 A. Only what it says at the bottom: "Petkovic, deal with the
20 situation," sent to the following addresses, but I didn't receive the
21 other text.
22 Q. P06028, the same binder, P06028, a Paket version of the document
23 from Mr. Praljak, addressed to you and others, Mr. Rajic, Mr. Kordic,
24 Mr. Blaskic. And you received that, didn't you?
25 A. Yes, I received this, but not the part that is handwritten at the
1 top. So that's why I'm trying to tell you what I actually received.
2 Q. You received this on the 23rd of October, 1993, didn't you?
3 A. That's correct.
4 Q. So what you want this Chamber to believe is, even though the
5 previous Paket communication was directed to you, even though your
6 headquarters staff clearly knew exactly where you were, you didn't
7 receive the first report from Mr. Rajic, but on the very same day, a
8 short time later, you received -- you did, in fact, receive this Paket
9 from Herzegovina to you in Kiseljak; is that correct?
10 A. Yes, that's correct. There was no need for it to be sent to me
11 if the commander was there and he received it. The commander then
12 reacted to the document. The document arrived around midnight in
14 Q. You keep saying there was no need, but when someone addresses a
15 document to a person, I put to you, there is a need for it to be
16 delivered to that person. Mr. Rajic says, Mr. Petkovic, Mr. Kordic,
17 Mr. Blaskic. And under the military chain of command, it wasn't up to
18 the duty officer in Mostar to decide who it should be forwarded to. I
19 assume that what a military duty officer does is, when he receives an
20 order, he makes sure that that document gets to the person to whom it's
21 addressed, doesn't he, in addition to anyone else?
22 A. No, not in this case. It's taken to the most responsible person
23 in the Main Staff, and that was the commander who received the document.
24 If he received the document, then it's not necessary to send it to
25 lower-ranking officers.
1 Q. Mr. Vinko Lucic is a person you worked with closely in Kiseljak
2 when you were there on these various occasions; correct?
3 A. Yes, he was a liaison officer with UNPROFOR -- for UNPROFOR.
4 Q. In fact, in addition to Mr. Rajic, himself, Mr. Lucic was, once
5 again, your man in Kiseljak, wasn't he?
6 A. No, they weren't my men. They were part of the HVO. My men,
7 well, that just refers to my family. These were people who are part of
8 the HVO.
9 Q. Sir, these were men -- both Rajic and Lucic were men that you
10 interacted with frequently either you were in Kiseljak or in your
11 communications with Kiseljak. I don't know what term you would use in
12 your language, perhaps. They were your right-hand men, they were your
13 lieutenants, they were your preferred people for doing business with in
14 Kiseljak, weren't they, Mr. Rajic and Mr. Lucic?
15 A. No, they weren't my favourite men. Lucic had to communicate with
16 UNPROFOR and relay everything that UNPROFOR had for me or that I had for
17 UNPROFOR. Rajic was the commander who was responsible in that area, and
18 it was natural that if I went to Kiseljak or Sarajevo, when I arrived
19 there, I would be with those people until I left.
20 Q. Sir, Lucic was a responsible officer, in your experience,
21 reliable? Did he ever let you down?
22 A. Lucic communicated in an appropriate manner with UNPROFOR. That
23 was his main task, and he was constantly in contact with UNPROFOR.
24 Q. I repeat my question: He was a responsible officer, in your
25 experience, reliable? Did he ever let you down?
1 A. If he carried out all the tasks that he had to carry out, then he
2 didn't let me down. Why should he let me down if he carried out the
4 Q. Did he ever let you -- you said "if," sir, my question is a
5 factual one. Based on your experience, the 20-plus times you were in
6 Kiseljak, all your interactions with Mr. Lucic, which were considerable,
7 did he ever let you down or did you find him to be a reliable officer?
8 It's a very simple question.
9 A. Yes, he was a reliable officer. He performed his tasks well.
10 Q. Judge Antonetti asked you this on the 17th of February, because
11 by the time we get to October, Ahmici has already happened. You know,
12 sir, that was a terrible experience for many reasons for the HVO. It's a
13 worldwide scandal reported in the international press. One of the
14 reasons, in fact, for the creation of this Tribunal. And when you saw
15 Stupni Do happening, you thought, This is going to be Ahmici all over
16 again, didn't you? --
17 A. I don't know what you mean exactly.
18 Q. It was "deja vu," some might say, all over again, wasn't it, sir?
19 It was going to be just like Ahmici. We're going to have the
20 internationals all over us, the international media is going to be saying
21 what terrible things the HVO was doing, another atrocity. You knew that
22 this was going to be -- you were afraid that this was going to be Ahmici
23 all over again, weren't you?
24 A. Why would I have been afraid of that? I had contact with
25 UNPROFOR, and I allowed UNPROFOR to enter Stupni Do and take the steps
1 that they thought were the most appropriate ones.
2 Q. Well, we'll get to that, sir, about access and what you did or
3 didn't do. What you really did, sir, is that you immediately, even on
4 the 23rd, as soon as you heard this information, which I put it to you
5 you did know on the 23rd, you immediately began what we might call damage
6 control, didn't you? Maybe if I act fast enough, maybe if I talk to the
7 right people, maybe if we do the right things, we can put a lid on it
8 now. It won't be like Ahmici. We can put a lid on it and keep this from
9 blowing up. That's what you thought, and that's what you tried to do,
10 isn't it?
11 A. No, no, that's not true, it's not true. The international forces
12 entered that area. They closed the area off, and then no one could
13 prevent them doing what they wanted to do.
14 Q. Sir, UNPROFOR was not able to enter into Stupni Do for some time,
15 and, in fact, at one point General Tole issued an order to surround the
16 UNPROFOR vehicles with anti-armour weapons and prevent them from moving,
17 didn't he?
18 A. Yes, I heard about that, and I reacted to prevent that. You have
19 that document.
20 Q. You testified that by the 7th of November, you requested
21 information from the internationals, but isn't it true, sir, that on the
22 24th of October, the very day after the attack, UNPROFOR was already
23 asking your office in Kiseljak what had happened? It wasn't you looking
24 for information from UNPROFOR. It was UNPROFOR looking for information
25 from you, wasn't it?
1 A. No. On the 25th of October, General Ramsay, who was a brigadier
2 at the time, called me, and I spent a long time with him in discussions
3 so that he could provide me with the information he had, if he had any.
4 Q. Let's go to Exhibit P06053, P06053. This is an UNPROFOR report
5 from the 24th of October, 1993. Looking to the third page of the English
6 version, it's under a heading, if you might be able to find it -- item
7 numbered 9 under "Actions Taken":
8 "NordBat II has been tasked to get to Stupni Do to carry out full
9 reci [phoen] and search for signs of a massacre, and to check other
10 Muslim areas and to check allegation of systematic looting by the BiH."
11 Look at both sides:
12 Item 10:
13 "Informed Lucic, HVO, CO, of our concerns. Answer attached."
15 "Send letter of protest to Boban and Petkovic, seeking their
16 intention to prevent attacks on civilians."
17 Item 11:
18 "As at the 24th of October at 1730 hours, NordBat II still being
19 blocked from access to Stupni Do. Letters received from Lucic, HVO LO,"
20 liaison officer, "and Petkovic, HVO commander, which are
21 self-explanatory, are enclosed. Verbal assurances have now been received
22 from HVO LO," liaison officer, "of NordBat II freedom to enter all
23 villages in the area."
24 If we can go -- with that in mind, sir, if we can go to
25 Exhibit 6 -- excuse me, P06049. It should be, again, close by, P06049:
1 Let's look at the response from Mr. Lucic that is reported in the
2 UNPROFOR document we just looked at.
3 Mr. Lucic says, on the 24th of October, 1993:
4 "Regarding your request for assistance in connection with the
5 investigation of alleged massacre over Muslim population in Vares
6 municipality, I informed it was true that a large conflict occurred,"
7 et cetera.
8 "Any checked information --" look toward the bottom, about the
9 middle of the page:
10 "Any checked information about any attacking enemies of HVO
11 Vares --" my apologies:
12 "I do not have any checked information about any attacking
13 activities of HVO Vares, so I doubt about the information from the Muslim
14 side concerning the massacre in Stupni Do village.
15 "In the annex, I deliver you an order issued by General Petkovic
16 regarding the situation in Vares municipality. General Petkovic is
17 personally interested for the performance of the investigation of ethnic
18 cleansing of the villages in Vares municipality.
19 "You have our full support."
20 Now, Mr. Lucic sent this communication to UNPROFOR on the 24th of
21 October, at your direction, didn't he?
22 A. No, not according to my instructions, but he spoke then about it,
23 and it was as a result of the fact that they didn't have the information,
24 so he then wrote a letter to UNPROFOR on the 24th, and then I was asked
25 to go and speak to General Ramsay on the 25th. So no one had the right
2 Q. Sir, you were -- Mr. Lucic is not providing -- is not asking them
3 for information. He's providing information, and he says:
4 "I delivered you an order issued by General Petkovic regarding
5 the situation."
6 Mr. Lucic acted on your instructions in doing this, didn't he?
7 How did he get the copy of the order issued by you if he wasn't acting
8 co-operatively with you?
9 A. No. Here the problem is we don't have reliable information. We
10 informed UNPROFOR that we had no information. There was just hearsay.
11 Q. Again, sir, you're not answering my question. I didn't say -- I
12 didn't ask you one thing about whether you had reliable information or
13 not. My question was -- please listen, sir. Please listen very
14 carefully to the translation. My question was: Mr. Lucic prepared and
15 sent this communication to UNPROFOR on your instructions and in
16 co-operation with you, didn't he?
17 A. Yes, obviously he sent a message to UNPROFOR so that we could
18 contact them and obtain reliable information. That happened on the
19 following day, on the 25th, at a meeting between myself and --
20 Q. Sir, I put it to you, you already had information. You had the
21 report from Mr. -- you had the report from Mr. Rajic, which I again
22 assert to you that you had received, and you had Mr. Praljak's order that
23 you admitted receiving also on the 23rd. It wasn't you that needed
24 information, it was UNPROFOR looking for information, and you and
25 Mr. Lucic sent this, as you just confirmed; correct?
1 A. We said that we had no verified information. You can see that
2 the text says we haven't got any verified information. I received an
3 order from General Praljak that evening, and you can see that, it's
4 obvious, but we had no verified information.
5 Q. Let's go to P06022, P06022. And that's the attachment to
6 Mr. Lucic's report he refers to. In the annex:
7 "I deliver you an order issued by General Petkovic.
8 General Petkovic, dated the 23rd of October, the day of the
9 attack, the 23rd of October, Petkovic to the HVO Vares commander:
10 "1. To control the situation in Vares, you have the
11 authorisations to remove the following people from their present
13 Anto Pejcinovic, Zvonko Duznovic, Ivica Gavran.
14 "2. Investigate the responsibility for the situation in Croatian
15 and Muslim villages where, in accordance with our incomplete findings,
16 ethnic cleansing of the population occurred.
17 "3. This decision is to be implemented obediently."
18 According to Mr. Lucic, sir, you had issued this order already on
19 the 23rd of October, 1993, the same day as the attack; correct? And
20 that's true, isn't it?
21 A. After receiving the information from General Praljak, the
22 situation in Vares is to be resolved.
23 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter notes that the witness is very
24 faint and cannot be heard very well.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was very late in the night.
1 That's when the order arrived at Kiseljak.
2 MR. SCOTT:
3 Q. You're being asked, sir, to keep your voice up a bit, if you can.
4 The interpreters are having some difficulty hearing you.
5 Sir, how did you -- what was the source of your information that
6 it was Pejcinovic, Duznovic and Gavran who should be removed?
7 A. I received the information from the commander. The situation was
8 to be dealt with. They were to be shown no mercy. The information
9 arrived from Colonel Blaskic.
10 Q. You're telling us that, on the one hand, you're not receiving
11 communications, but, on the other hand, the communications are getting
12 all the way to Mr. Praljak in Herzegovina and back to you, that you're
13 getting information from Mr. Blaskic in Vitez, that's somehow getting to
14 Vitez and back to you. You were sitting in Kiseljak, sir, with an
15 operable Paket machine and other communication, I put to you. It's
16 simply illogical, sir, that you were not receiving these communications
17 addressed to you. Again, I go back to what I said 20 minutes ago: Your
18 headquarters staff knew where you were, they knew how to reach you, and
19 you were getting all these communications, weren't you?
20 A. No, that message wasn't returned to me. I received an order to
21 deal with the situation in Vares and to bring in the people who were
22 responsible. We found out --
23 Q. Excuse me, sir. My apologies to the interpreters, but we have to
24 move on.
25 Sir, you've told -- you received the issue -- the order from
1 Praljak, you know, Show no mercy, get things in control. Mr. Praljak's
2 order doesn't mention any individuals by name. He just says, Go and gain
3 control. No individuals, no names, no one identified. The next thing we
4 know is we have a document from you, dated the same day as the attack, 23
5 of October, identifying these three men. Now, you say you received that
6 information from Mr. Blaskic; is that what you're telling us?
7 A. I'm saying that Blaskic had information, and the Main Staff also
8 had information. And previously I said - you've forgotten that - that
9 information about the matter arrived from Zarko Tole, information about
10 the people concerned. So when we checked the order, who it concerned,
11 which people were concerned, well, that was the situation.
12 Q. Well, Mr. Tole, again, was another person who knew how to reach
13 you in Kiseljak; is that correct?
14 A. Well, Tole was in the Main Staff. He knew where I was, and he
15 knew how to use the phone to call me.
16 Q. Of course he did, just like your duty officer at the Main Staff
17 knew how to reach you as well?
18 A. Yes, he did, but it wasn't necessary for him to return a document
19 to me. Someone else had it, someone else who was more senior than myself
20 was to receive it, and he received it.
21 Q. Sir, you sent these communications -- you and Mr. Lucic sent the
22 two documents that are marked as P06049, Mr. Lucic's letter or
23 communication, and your order, which is P06022. You fired those off to
24 UNPROFOR for the exact reasons that I put to you 15 or 20 minutes ago,
25 and that is: If we act quickly, if we get some information out to
1 UNPROFOR, if we tell them we're already taking actions, we can keep
2 this -- we can maybe keep a lid on this situation, and then we won't have
3 another Ahmici on our hands. That's what you were thinking, isn't it?
4 A. No, that's not true, that's not true. Have a look at item 2. We
5 didn't know what had happened in Ahmici. We just assumed. Why wouldn't
6 we have written down what you can find in that report under item 2?
7 Q. Sir, you knew Ahmici was a crime and if we have time --
8 A. [Overlapping speakers] [No interpretation]
9 Q. If we have time, we'll get -- you knew Ahmici was a crime.
10 You've said that before. You know it was a crime. The HVO committed it.
11 It was the military police. And you've conceded all that, so there's no
12 question about Ahmici being a crime. But you knew that it created huge
13 problems for the HVO. This happens in April 1993, and now you find
14 yourself sitting in Kiseljak, getting these reports of another atrocity
15 in Stupni Do, and you think -- you're thinking, This is going to be
16 Ahmici all over again. That's what you were thinking, and you were
17 trying to put a lid on it, some people might say; isn't that true?
18 A. No. No, we did not wish to conceal it from anyone. We didn't
19 wish to conceal it from anyone, nor did we conceal it, in fact.
20 Q. Despite the fact that Mr. Rajic and Mr. Tole kept UNPROFOR out of
21 Stupni Do for some time; isn't that the case?
22 A. I don't know when UNPROFOR made the request. But when Mr. Ramsay
23 explained the situation to me, UNPROFOR entered Stupni Do the next day.
24 Q. P06104, P06104, a communication from the head of the Main Staff.
25 Perhaps Mr. Praljak:
1 "We have received a confirmation of the Croatian TV saying they
2 have footage of the massacre in Stupni Do, which they had received
3 through exchange with foreign agencies."
4 On the 25th of October, 1993, you were losing control, weren't
5 you, sir? Events were spinning out of your control. Now the television
6 station has footage of the massacre; correct?
7 A. No, I don't know whether the TV station had footage on the
8 massacre. I don't know which TV team entered Stupni Do on the 25th with
9 UNPROFOR. This is just guess-work that HTV had footage, and HTV was not
10 in Stupni Do, and I don't know whether they had any footage from anyone.
11 Q. Well, it's not guess-work. It's not guess-work, sir.
12 Mr. Praljak or someone, the head of the Main Staff, said, We have
13 received confirmation that they have footage. It's no guess-work at all,
14 sir, so you're just flat wrong on that.
15 Now, if you go to Exhibit P09968, P0 -- excuse me, P0 - I may
16 have said too many zeros, P09968, this is a further document from you,
17 sir, on the 7th of November, 1993, to Operative Group 2, Kiseljak. That
18 was Mr. Rajic, wasn't it?
19 A. Yes, correct.
20 Q. Now, by now we're the 7th of November, and Stupni Do happens at
21 least on the first day, the 23rd of October, and now it's the 7th of
22 November. And let me direct your attention to item number 7:
23 "UN is to be given freedom of movement, but you should record
24 their every move. Do not allow them to move outside of the road."
25 When you say "freedom of movement," sir, that you gave them
1 freedom of movement some days later, that's your idea of freedom of
2 movement, keep them on the road; correct?
3 A. UNPROFOR has roads along which they go. UNPROFOR may not
4 approach HVO positions outside the road in the area of Kiseljak.
5 Q. Let's go back to your meeting at UNPROFOR on the 25th of October,
6 P06144, P06144. This is when you and Mr. Lucic, and also Mr. Bandic, the
7 Mr. Bandic that we've heard so much about, went to meet with UNPROFOR
8 with Mr. Ramsay on the 25th of October.
9 Item number 2:
10 "General Petkovic knew about the possible massacre of civilians
11 at Stupni Do."
12 "He stressed that two HVO officers had been arrested and others
14 He was clearly embarrassed, according to them:
15 "HVO will investigate --"
16 A couple of lines down:
17 "HVO will investigate, and disciplinary will follow as
19 Can you tell us, sir, the two HVO officers that you said had been
20 arrested as of the 25th of October, who were they?
21 A. Let me just add that you left out that I got the information from
22 Radio Sarajevo, which is very important. And the two officers were
23 Duznovic and Gavran.
24 Q. And where did you get that information? Who told you that they
25 had been arrested?
1 A. Because the order said that they should be arrested.
2 Q. What order?
3 A. The order dated the 23rd. Duznovic and this other man - what's
4 his name? Gavran are mentioned.
5 Q. Sir, Mr. Duznovic and Mr. Gavran were not members of the HVO
6 military. They were essentially part of the HVO political government in
7 Vares, and they had nothing to do with Stupni Do, did they? Neither of
8 those men stepped foot in Stupni Do on the 23rd or 24th of November,
9 1993, did they?
10 A. No, they were not members of the government. Pejcinovic was.
11 They were in the military -- Duznovic was in the military, and the other
12 one was in the MUP, the police. So one of them was in the SIS, I think
13 Duznovic, and the other one, Gavran, was in the police.
14 Q. Neither of those men had anything to do with Stupni Do. They
15 weren't in Stupni Do, they didn't carry out any of the execution, they
16 didn't burn any of the houses down. You know full well those men had
17 nothing to do with Stupni Do. You know it now, and you knew it on the
18 25th of October, 1993, didn't you?
19 A. The information about them was such that they were the people who
20 needed to be temporarily detained at that point in time.
21 Q. And who was suspended -- and then it goes on to say "And others
22 suspended," so who were they?
23 A. The Commander Harak, who abandoned his place, and Mr. Bozic took
24 over from him. He was suspended and temporarily relieved of duty.
25 Q. And who else? It says "others." Besides Mr. Harah [sic], who
1 else was suspended?
2 A. There were other reports, but I can't remember now. Two or three
3 officers from the Bobovac Brigade Command. I know of Harak, and there
4 were some others who asked to be relieved of their duties --
5 Q. Sir, your communication, what you told Ramsay on the 25th of
6 October, again, this was just your effort to feed UNPROFOR some
7 information, again, to create the impression that you were trying to do
8 something about the situation, but you knew full well that Duznovic and
9 Gavran, among others, had nothing to do with Stupni Do. But you had to
10 tell UNPROFOR something, didn't you?
11 A. I had information about Stupni Do from Radio Sarajevo, and that
12 was my main motive to go to Mr. Ramsay to discuss this. And these were
13 the people against whom we took certain measures. Why doesn't the
14 brigade commander have nothing to do with Stupni Do? He asked to be
15 relieved, and he was temporarily relieved.
16 Q. I was talking about Mr. Gavran and Mr. Duznovic, sir. That's one
17 of the names I gave you just a moment ago.
18 Who in the HVO military and governmental leadership, by the
19 time -- by this time, by the 25th of October, by the time of your other
20 communication to UNPROFOR on the 7th of November, the one we looked at a
21 few minutes ago -- or about UNPROFOR to Mr. Rajic, excuse me. By that
22 time, who had you talked to in the top echelons of the HVO military and
23 governmental leadership?
24 A. I talked to Mr. Praljak, I talked to Mr. Tole, and I talked to
25 Mr. Boban, as far as I can remember now.
1 Q. And it was following this meeting with Mr. Ramsay that you and
2 Mr. Lucic and the intelligence officer and your travel companion to
3 Central Bosnia, Mr. Bandic, went back to the offices in Kiseljak,
4 Mr. Rajic's -- the same place where Mr. Rajic was, and left the note and
5 the instructions for Mr. Rajic; correct?
6 A. No, that is not correct. I left a document for Rajic in
7 connection with what was happening in Stupni Do, if that's what you
8 meant, and another document for the Bobovac Brigade, or, rather, it is
9 one and the same document addressed to both of them.
10 Q. Sir, you knew, didn't you, around this time that the Vares Croats
11 felt that essentially they had been sold out, the HVO in Herceg-Bosna
12 leadership had taken the position that, you know, Vares is never going to
13 remain part of Herceg-Bosna, it's too far to the east, it's too
14 attenuated, we haven't even included it on our Vance-Owen maps, it's not
15 even a Croat province anymore, and they felt abandoned by the HVO and
16 that this was all a measure to get these Croats to move out from Vares
17 and move to Herzegovina; that was the ultimate plan, wasn't it?
18 A. No, that is not correct. Kiseljak wasn't on the Vance-Owen map,
19 either, and it still remained; nor was Kresevo.
20 Q. The Chamber had -- and we're not going to take the time, but the
21 Chamber will recall -- I'm not going to mention names because it may
22 relate to a protected witness, but a communication, P05068, which sets
23 out the position of the Vares Croats, and I take -- and I again put to
24 you, sir, that you knew that the Vares Croats felt that events had been
25 manipulated, that they had been sold out, and this was all orchestrated
1 by the HVO. You knew that was being said at the time or soon thereafter,
2 didn't you?
3 A. No, that is not true. Whoever lost any territory would shout
4 that they had been sold out. This was general -- this was a general
5 attitude among Croats and Muslims. Vares was not sold out to anyone.
6 Q. Let's go next to P06533, P06533. I believe we have a slide,
7 Sanction slide 27. P06533 is an UNPROFOR report from Mr. Andreev to
8 Mr. Thornberry, dated the 8th of November, 1993, about Stupni Do. And in
9 terms of what is being said, among other things, item number 4:
10 "... the likely answer is that the Kiseljak troops, outsiders to
11 Vares, were needed to commit the massacre at Stupni Do."
12 Number 8:
13 "The HVO leader ship's intention appears to have been to force
14 the Croat population of Vares into fleeing for fear of retaliation for
15 Stupni Do. If so, this massacre was a war crime, made more horrible by
16 its cold-blooded political and strategic motivation."
17 And I put it to you, sir, Mr. Andreev hit it about right, didn't
19 A. No, I don't accept what he wrote. Those are his assessments and
20 his games.
21 Q. Sir, you knew that the HVO soldiers, the troops, the units that
22 were going to Vares around the 23rd of October, you know that these units
23 had been notorious bad actors in the past, hadn't they? The Maturice and
24 the Apostoli were problem units. They had been involved in a number of
25 incidents of misbehaviour before that, hadn't they?
1 JUDGE PRANDLER: Excuse me. Mr. Scott, I would like only to ask
2 Mr. Petkovic about the following: It happened to me that I knew
3 Mr. Andreev from the United Nations work and from New York, so when you
4 said that, No, I do not accept what he wrote, and then you continued,
5 "Those are his assessments and his games," end of quotation, I would like
6 to ask you if you have anything -- a kind of opinion or concrete events
7 which you base your position on him, as far as when you say that those
8 are his assessments and his games, and what do you mean by "games"?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Mr. Viktor Andreev was
10 informed by me and others regarding the position of Croats in Travnik,
11 Kakanj, Fojnica, and he never reacted in this way. But he said, as did
12 others, that many Croats had left. So you cannot accept, when he says
13 with respect to such events which had happened before Vares, that the
14 Croats had left, and he didn't take any steps. We asked him to go to
15 Catici. There was a thermal power-plant in Kakanj. There were 200-odd
16 Croats there, and Mr. Viktor Andreev did not want to go to Catici to see
17 what was happening to those Croats.
18 Therefore, I have the right to conclude that Mr. Andreev has a
19 double standard. And, after all, I did meet with that gentleman several
20 times during talks in Sarajevo and Kiseljak when these things happened.
21 And when a man says on one occasion that the Croats had left, and in a
22 second -- on a second event that the Croats had been expelled, these are
23 not small towns, these are not minor events that were happening, then I
24 have the right to say, of this man, that he has double standards.
25 MS. TOMANOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise. I need to correct
1 the transcript. I think it is important. On page 103, line 22, the
2 general said that Mr. Victor Andreev said that the Croats had left, and
3 for Muslims, he always said that he had been expelled or forced out.
4 I think the General can confirm that that is what he said.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, quite so. And this is evident
6 in all their documents. That is what they resort to. The Croats had
7 left, and when it comes to Muslims, then they had been expelled. And it
8 is very hard to say of such people that they are right. I had contacts
9 with them, and I know very well what they were doing, and it wasn't
10 correct for them to behave in that way, you see. Because for more than
11 100.000 Croats from Central Bosnia, to say of them that they had left,
12 and as for Muslims somewhere else, that they had been expelled, I think
13 that is not appropriate, even if his name is Mr. Viktor Andreev, or his
14 right-hand man, Mr. Benabou. We had encounters with these people, and I
15 know and we saw what they wrote in their reports and what they said.
16 JUDGE PRANDLER: Thank you for your answer.
17 Mr. Scott.
18 MR. SCOTT: Thank you, Judge Prandler.
19 Q. Sir, I'm just going to show you one document on this particular
20 topic at the moment, P11213. It should be in the second -- again the
21 second of the -- same binder we have been working in, P11213. This is a
22 report --
23 A. Is it to the back, towards the back?
24 Q. Sir, they're in numerical order, so wherever you would find
25 P11213. Yes, toward the back.
1 This is dated the 28th of April, 1993. It's an order from you.
2 Among other -- number 1:
3 "Is Ivica Rajic still in the area of Kiseljak municipality?"
4 Number 2:
5 "Prohibit setting fire to facilities owned by Muslims and
6 severely punish persons who do that. Submit to me immediately any
7 information on perpetrators.
8 "Everything should be put under control, including treatment of
9 civilians. In case setting fire to facilities continues, HVO of the
10 Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna shall distance itself from Kiseljak.
11 "3. Prepare and submit immediately a report regarding events in
12 the villages of Kazagici, Gomionica and Svinjarevo."
13 Sir, you knew at the time that in April of 1993 in the Kiseljak
14 villages, there had been a number of HVO war crimes committed against
15 Muslims by the HVO units in the Kiseljak area, didn't you? --
16 A. No, that is not true that in the area of Kiseljak some of these
17 villages belonged, I think, to Busovaca and another group to Kiseljak,
18 and I'm asking for information whether this is true; that is, the
19 information I received at a meeting with Mr. Halilovic and Thebault on
20 the 24th in Vitez.
21 Q. Sir, you knew -- if you didn't know on the 28th of April, you
22 knew very soon that there were a number of HVO crimes that had been
23 committed in these villages, if you suggest in Busovaca and Kiseljak
24 municipalities; and you know, from your testimony in the Kordic and
25 Blaskic cases, that some of these crimes are the very crimes that were
1 established in those cases, that Mr. Kordic and Mr. Blaskic were
2 convicted of HVO crimes in these areas at these times, weren't they?
3 A. Yes, they were accused of these crimes. But at this time I'm
4 trying to check whether the information is correct or not or, rather,
5 what is going on in those villages.
6 Q. And by the time you reach October 1993, sir, you had repeated
7 information that these -- some of these units, the Maturice, the
8 Apostoli, had repeatedly engaged in misconduct, if not war crimes, and
9 yet it was exactly those troops and those units that you sent in to
10 Stupni Do, didn't you? --
11 A. No, you're not right; and you're not connecting to the dates when
12 Maturice was formed. You spoke to your Witness EA, and he explained when
13 Maturice was formed. At this time, there was no Maturice, and it was the
14 battalion --
15 Q. I know when it was formed, and existed before October 1993
16 because it was the Maturice that went into Stupni Do. I know when they
17 were formed. And you know full well that by October 1993, before you
18 sent these units into Stupni Do and Vares, you knew that both these
19 units, among others, were highly problematic, they'd engaged in
20 anti-Muslim conduct throughout this period, some of them were driving
21 around Kiseljak with cut-off Muslim heads on their cars, and you knew all
22 that, didn't you?
23 MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Objection, Your Honour. Objection
24 to the assertion contained in this question, and that is that the general
25 has sent any kind of units to Stupni Do. My objection is based on the
1 testimony of witnesses of the Prosecution, who clearly said when and who
2 had made the decision for the attack on Stupni Do. So I appeal to my
3 learned friend to abide by the testimony of his own witnesses.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I respond?
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, answer the
6 question of the Prosecutor, and then we'll adjourn.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, not a single report on
8 the behaviour of Maturice in the sense the Prosecutor is saying do not
9 exist. The Maturice was formed in May, and the letter by Witness EA
10 speaks about extraordinary people, individuals who acted
11 correctly, and nowhere is there any report that in Kiseljak and Kresevo
12 they had committed anything. So there is no information about Maturice
13 which were praised by Witness EA as exemplary fighters, and
14 there's no mention of anything bad that they had done.
15 As for this document, the Command of the 4th Battalion was
16 replaced, that is the so-called Fojnica Battalion and Mr. Tuka. And this
17 was the time when, after this, Ivica Rajic took up his duties in
18 Kiseljak. On the 28th of April, Ivica Rajic had still not taken over in
19 Kiseljak. It was then that he came from Tomislavgrad to Kiseljak, and
20 that is why I'm asking whether he's there, whether he has returned from
21 Tomislavgrad to Kiseljak.
22 As for Maturice, there is no information that the Prosecutor is
23 referring to -- of the kind the Prosecutor is referring to.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
25 It is two minutes past 7.00. We have exceeded our time by almost
1 three minutes. The Prosecutor will have exactly two hours to complete
2 his cross-examination.
3 As you know, we will be meeting in the morning, so we'll meet
4 again at 9.00 tomorrow morning.
5 Thank you.
6 [The Accused Petkovic stands down]
7 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.03 p.m.,
8 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 9th day of March,
9 2010, at 9.00 a.m.