Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 50497

 1                           Monday, 8 March 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           [The Accused Praljak not present]

 5                           [The Accused Petkovic takes the stand]

 6                           --- Upon commencing at 2.17 p.m.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Registrar, kindly call the

 8     case.

 9             THE REGISTRAR:  Good afternoon, Your Honours.  Good afternoon,

10     everyone in and around the courtroom.

11             This is case number IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor versus

12     Prlic et al.  Thank you, Your Honours.

13             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Registrar.

14             Today is Monday, the 8th of March, 2010.  Let me first greet

15     General Petkovic, all the accused who are present, the Defence counsel,

16     and all the OTP members, the Prosecution, and everyone else assisting us.

17             We will continue with the Prosecution's cross-examination.

18     Today, the Prosecution should have another four hours and five minutes at

19     its disposal, according to the calculations.

20             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Mr. President.  We're just double-checking

21     the time.  We can check that, of course, with the Registrar and continue

22     in the meantime.

23                           WITNESS:  MILIVOJ PETKOVIC [Resumed]

24                           [The witness answered through interpreter]

25             MR. SCOTT:  Good afternoon, Your Honours, each of you.  Good

Page 50498

 1     afternoon, Counsel, all of those around the courtroom who are assisting

 2     us.  And good afternoon, Mr. Petkovic.

 3                           Cross-examination by Mr. Scott:  [Continued]

 4        Q.   Sir, I want to spend a few minutes talking about the involvement

 5     of the Croatian Army in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, 1993, 1994 perhaps.

 6             When you testified in the Blaskic case, the representatives of

 7     the Tudjman government, as we discussed last week, Mr. Rifkin and

 8     Mr. Udiljak, would not let you answer questions about the relationship

 9     between the HV and the HVO.  But continuing on from that topic, and the

10     transcript that we looked at, which I'm sure you remember, what was the

11     Tudjman government afraid of that it didn't want you -- wouldn't allow

12     you -- wouldn't let you answer such questions in the Blaskic case?

13             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I object, because

14     this is a question that calls for speculation.

15             MR. SCOTT:  Well, I don't believe so, Your Honour.  I believe the

16     witness has knowledge, and it's obviously -- it's clear -- it's obviously

17     been the Prosecution's case since last week -- well, long before last

18     week, that this witness -- he may disagree, but it's our position that

19     the witness was well prepared for the Blaskic testimony, that he had

20     contact with a number of representatives, so we do believe that he was

21     very well advised.

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You may put the question.

23             MR. SCOTT:

24        Q.   Sir, when Mr. Rifkin and Mr. Udiljak would not allow you to

25     answer questions in the Blaskic case about the relationship between the

Page 50499

 1     Croatian Army and the HVO, what was Tudjman afraid of -- Tudjman

 2     government afraid of that it wouldn't allow you to answer those

 3     questions?

 4        A.   Your Honours, I don't know what the Tudjman government was afraid

 5     of.  I don't know what sort of instructions Rifkin and Udiljak had.  I

 6     don't know which questions they had in mind when they thought there were

 7     questions that they didn't want me to answer.

 8        Q.   But you agree that they intervened and prevented you from

 9     answering such questions, didn't they?

10        A.   They obtained such a position, and they intervened as other

11     lawyers intervened here.  I can't say why and with regard to which

12     issues, but they fought to obtain this right.

13        Q.   Sir, in the summary of your testimony -- your anticipated

14     testimony that we were provided by your counsel, and as you know, that's

15     the practice in the case, you indicated -- had you said that you arrived

16     in Bosnia-Herzegovina on the order, and I stress -- and I'm quoting from

17     the second paragraph of your summary:

18             " ... on the order of the HV commander of the southern army

19     theatre, Janko Bobetko."

20             Is that correct?

21        A.   I had a decision from the Croatian Army.  I agreed to go to

22     Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Janko Bobetko then appointed me to a position

23     in the forward command post -- at the forward command post in Grude.

24        Q.   Well, sir, I didn't really ask you about -- a question about the

25     decision of the Croatian government.  What you say, what was given to us,

Page 50500

 1     and we were told that you would testify, is that you went to

 2     Bosnia-Herzegovina, quote, "on the order of Janko Bobetko."  Is that true

 3     or not true?  --

 4        A.   I went there one day earlier to Herzegovina.

 5        Q.   Yes or no.  Did you go on the order of Janko Bobetko; yes or no?

 6        A.   Janko Bobetko drafted an order.  I didn't go there on his order.

 7     I agreed to go there.

 8             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] If my colleague is reading from a

 9     document that I drafted, could my colleague please read the sentence to

10     the very end.

11             MR. SCOTT:

12        Q.   The point, sir, is that sometimes you say you were ordered, and

13     sometimes you say you went voluntarily.  You went because you were

14     ordered by Janko Bobetko, and that's what you've said in your summary, or

15     is your summary -- or was the summary given to us not accurate?

16        A.   I accepted to go, and then Janko Bobetko drafted an order when I

17     arrived in Grude.  The order wasn't drafted in Croatia; it was drafted in

18     Grude, in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

19        Q.   And when you arrived again, just to touch on that, and we talked

20     about this last week, when you arrived in Grude then, at that point you

21     were still a senior officer in the Croatian Army, weren't you?

22        A.   No.  I had a decision according to which I was no longer a member

23     of the Croatian Army.

24        Q.   How could Janko Bobetko give you an order to go to Croatia, an

25     order that you were obliged to follow, if you were no longer a member of

Page 50501

 1     the army that he was the chief of?

 2        A.   I don't understand the part when you say "in Croatia."  Do you

 3     mean in Croatia or Bosnia?

 4        Q.   Sir, you've told us that you arrived in the Grude -- around Grude

 5     on the 14th of April, 1992.  You've told us, at least in part, that you

 6     arrived there on the order of Janko Bobetko, who was the head of the

 7     Croatian Army.  My question to you:  When you -- at the time you arrived

 8     in Bosnia and Herzegovina in mid-April 1992, you were still a senior

 9     officer in the Croatian Army, weren't you?

10        A.   No, I wasn't.

11        Q.   All right.  Now, this being ordered by Bobetko, that's not

12     exactly what you told the Judges in the Blaskic case, is it?

13        A.   No, I said that Bobetko appointed me, he appointed Roso, and

14     everyone else, too.  I provided a list of all those who had been

15     appointed by Bobetko.  I provided all their names, at least as far as

16     I can remember.

17        Q.   You didn't, sir, you didn't.  In the Blaskic case, you never

18     mentioned Mr. Bobetko's involvement.  On page 24210 of the Blaskic -- of

19     your Blaskic testimony, 24210, the only thing you talked about, and I'll

20     just quote part of it:

21             "No one sent me to the HVO.  I acceded to the HVO voluntarily."

22             So -- and then skipping down, it says:

23             "So no one sent me to the HVO, or, rather, no one wrote an order

24     stating, Petkovic, you've got to go to the HVO."

25             You didn't say anything about Mr. Bobetko's involvement when you

Page 50502

 1     testified in the Blaskic case, and again, sir, those were part of the

 2     instructions you received from Tudjman and the people around him, didn't

 3     you?  When you go down there and testify, talk about being a volunteer,

 4     but don't say anything about Bobetko having ordered you to go.  Those

 5     were your instructions, weren't they?

 6        A.   No, that's not correct.  I went there on a voluntary basis.

 7     Bobetko then drafted an order.  You've seen that order -- or, rather,

 8     your colleague, as he could have shown the order and we could have

 9     discussed it, why that wasn't done, I don't know.  Why did he show other

10     orders, but not that one?

11             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Counsel, Your Honours, since the

12     General has answered the question, let me just draw your attention to the

13     following:  My colleague, Mr. Scott, is trying to confront two different

14     issues, to deal with two different issues.  The first one is when

15     Mr. Petkovic arrived in Bosnia and Herzegovina and how.  The second issue

16     is how and when he joined the HVO.  The general said that he arrived in

17     Bosnia and Herzegovina and that he was at the forward command post in the

18     southern battle-field in Grude.  And as for joining the HVO, well, that

19     is a different issue, a different subject.  So could we just be very

20     precise so that no problems arise and there shouldn't be any requests for

21     further clarifications in the course of re-examination.

22             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.

23             MR. SCOTT:

24        Q.   The reality is, sir, that --

25             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please try and be clear.

Page 50503

 1             MR. SCOTT:

 2        Q.   The reality is, sir, that despite whether someone should or

 3     should not have asked you a question -- the question differently, when

 4     you appeared in the Blaskic case in this same Tribunal, you said nothing

 5     about Mr. Bobetko or having received an order to go to

 6     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I read your Blaskic transcript two or three times,

 7     and Bobetko's involvement is not mentioned one time, sir; isn't that

 8     correct?

 9        A.   As far as I know, Bobetko is mentioned in relation to some

10     questions when they showed me certain documents, and I confirmed

11     everything.

12        Q.   Sir, it was only in the Kordic case a year or so later, and only

13     when pressed by the Prosecution on that -- on your second court

14     appearance at the Tribunal, that you then, in response to a Prosecution

15     question, admitted to being -- some involvement by Mr. Bobetko; isn't

16     that true?

17        A.   In the first case, I answered all the questions put to me by the

18     Prosecution.  It's your problem if you didn't use the documents you had

19     and if you didn't show them to me.  I answered all questions put to me

20     about each and every document, and I confirmed them.

21        Q.   So you were playing a game.  You were being very careful in

22     answering questions very technically, but not volunteering truthful and

23     accurate information to the Judges in that case; is that what you're

24     telling us?

25        A.   No, that's not correct.

Page 50504

 1             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, what sort of a

 2     question is this, and on what basis is my colleague, Mr. Scott, putting

 3     this question to him?  Is it the general's fault if the Prosecution in

 4     some other case didn't put certain questions to him?  Could Mr. Scott say

 5     what constituted false testimony given by my client?

 6             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, so that we

 7     avoid wasting time, let's deal with this in the following way:  Under

 8     oath, you said you went to Bosnia and Herzegovina, together with the

 9     Croatian Army, after the Serbian offensive had been launched.  That's

10     what you said.  Why didn't you say that in the Blaskic case?  Why didn't

11     you say, I recognise the fact that the Croatian Army intervened in the

12     Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina in order to protect its borders, to

13     protect Dubrovnik, because the Serbs might cut Serbian territory off if

14     they had access to the sea, so we were there, and I went there following

15     an order issued by General Bobetko?  Why didn't you say that?  It's very

16     simple.

17             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I was answering

18     specific questions.  Have a look -- or, rather, if you have a look at the

19     beginning of my testimony at court, when the Presiding Judge said, We

20     don't want to deal with that, General, let's deal with specific

21     questions, well, in that introductory part I explained or tried to

22     explain the entire situation.  But the Chamber wasn't interested in that.

23     They asked me to move on to a specific issue.  So that entire part that I

24     wanted to discuss, well, either there was a misunderstanding when

25     preparing for my examination, but I skipped that entire part.  I didn't

Page 50505

 1     even manage to say five sentences about that.  The Trial Chamber asked me

 2     to focus on specific issues they were interested in.  In that

 3     introductory part, I wanted to discuss the first day I arrived in the

 4     HVO, the organisation, the establishment of the HVO, and then I wanted to

 5     move on to specific issues.  I think that this is in the transcript.  You

 6     can see when the Judge asked me to deal with specific issues and not to

 7     deal with matters in a general way.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So you say if the question

 9     wasn't put to you, it's the Chamber's fault, or Mr. Kayway's [phoen]

10     fault, who was incapable of putting the right questions to you.  Very

11     well.

12             Mr. Scott.

13             MR. SCOTT:

14        Q.   Sir, in your curriculum vitae that we'd looked at last week, and

15     I'm not necessarily going to stop again now - I'm sure I'll be corrected

16     if I'm wrong - which is P08731, for the record, you said there, quote --

17     this is your CV:

18             "On 14 April 1992, General Bobetko ordered me to go to the HVO."

19             And that's true, isn't it?  You were ordered to go by

20     General Bobetko, the head of the Croatian Army?

21        A.   I'm not denying the fact that General Bobetko drafted an order.

22     You have it.  It's been shown five times in this case, the order to

23     establish a forward command post that I was in charge of.  Other HVO

24     members were with me, and that is something that I do not deny.  But I

25     decided to join the HVO.

Page 50506

 1        Q.   Well, let's talk about the forward command post for a moment.

 2     Indeed, Bobetko established a forward command post of the Croatian Army

 3     in Grude and made you the commander of that Croatian Army forward command

 4     post when Mr. Bobetko wasn't there himself.  And my next -- and you have

 5     no dispute about that, as I understand what you've just said.  My

 6     question to you:  When did the Croatian Army's forward command post, the

 7     one that you and Mr. Bobetko commanded, when did that command post become

 8     the HVO command or essentially, by whatever name, HVO headquarters?

 9        A.   Well, it immediately started performing certain tasks for the

10     HVO, and in July most of its work concerned the HVO.  That was July 1992.

11     But there were quite a lot of orders regulating the status of the HVO,

12     too.

13        Q.   Well, between -- so between --

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, just a

15     minute.  I have to be very fair to you.

16             I looked at the questions that the Chamber wanted you to address,

17     and, in fact, in the questions the role of the Croatian Army was not

18     invoked.  At no point was that invoked.  It wasn't part of the questions

19     you were to answer.  At the very beginning of your testimony, the

20     Presiding Judge referred to the questions that you were to deal with.  I

21     have just checked that.  So, yes, in fact, this wasn't on the agenda.

22     There was certainly a reason for that.  It's just a hypothesis, but I

23     believe that the Chamber must have "negotiated," in inverted commas, with

24     regard to your hearing, and as a result, well, the Croatian government

25     must have only agreed that you testify with regard to certain issues.

Page 50507

 1     And if the issue of the Croatian Army's intervention was part of the

 2     questions to be put to you, then they would have certainly refused for

 3     you to testify, and that is why the Judges weren't curious and they

 4     didn't put any questions to you, because it was part of the agreement --

 5     of the contract.  And proof of this is that President Jorda provides a

 6     list of all the questions.  He was interested mainly in Ahmici, in the

 7     chain of command and the crimes committed in Ahmici.  He didn't refer to

 8     anything else.  So I believe that that is the answer.  The Chamber must

 9     have seriously restricted the scope of the questions that could be put to

10     you so that the Croatian government would accept you giving testimony.

11     This is just a hypothesis I have, but if the issue of Croatian

12     intervention had been on the agenda, then you giving testimony would not

13     have been certain.  This is why Mr. Kayway didn't come when the

14     cross-examination was conducted.  So that's perhaps the reason.  Perhaps

15     it was different in the Kordic case, but in Blaskic there were numerous

16     difficulties, and that is why this wasn't on the agenda.

17             Mr. Petkovic, what do you think about this?

18             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Judge Antonetti, I really prepared

19     myself to deal with my arrival in the HVO and the period right up until

20     the 14th of April.  That was how I had imagined my introduction.  When

21     the Chamber provided me with questions, that's what I understood the

22     matter to be.  When I started my testimony, the Chamber told me not to

23     move in that direction.  They wanted me to deal with certain specific

24     issues.  I wanted to give an introduction that would deal with my arrival

25     in the HVO and the entire period through 1992 and 1993, but the Chamber

Page 50508

 1     quite simply said, No, we don't want to proceed in this way.  And I think

 2     this is in the transcript, it says, then we have misunderstood each

 3     other.  As to what the Croatian government discussed with them, I don't

 4     know.

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] It's page 22442.  This is what

 6     President Jorda says.  He's very specific, very precise:

 7             "You saw, in your summons, that we want to put some questions

 8     that concerns certain information, that concerns the conditions in which

 9     you occupied this position, your appointment," that concerns

10     General Blaskic's appointment, "we want information on the HVO

11     organisation, on the system of communications, in particular on the chain

12     of command.  In brief, we want information on the situation that concerns

13     all the units that Mr. Blaskic had under him and also that you had under

14     yourself.  You participated, either with General Morillon or

15     Ambassador Thebault, in numerous meetings that had to do with

16     implementing a cease-fire.  We have also asked you -- or we will also ask

17     you about your point of view on the discussions that you had with your

18     enemies at the time.  We would be very interested in any information you

19     could provide us with regard to the crimes committed in Ahmici, which

20     units were concerned, which units committed the crimes, were they HVO

21     units, were they paramilitary units, were they under Colonel Blaskic's

22     command or not?  And, finally, more generally, how do you perceive the

23     accused and his personality, who is one of your most direct collaborators

24     during this very complex period?"

25             These are the issues that were put before you.  At no point in

Page 50509

 1     time was the issue of the Croatian Army raised.  That is quite certain.

 2             Mr. Scott.

 3             MR. SCOTT:

 4        Q.   Sir, be that as it may, the reality was whatever agreements that

 5     had been in place, at page 24210, 24210, Judge Rodriguez asked you

 6     specifically about how you had come to be in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and as I

 7     read to you a few moments ago, your statement under oath was, and I'm

 8     reading directly from the page:

 9             "No one sent me to the HVO.  I acceded to the HVO voluntarily."

10             And at no point in answering Judge Rodrigues's questions about

11     this topic, which he did ask about, did you mention Mr. Bobetko's

12     involvement or any order from the Croatian Army, in terms of sending you

13     there.

14             MR. KARNAVAS:  Sir, I think this has been asked and answered

15     already.  It has been, it has been, and it has been.  Now, if you listen

16     carefully to what the general has stated, he said he went there

17     voluntarily.  Obviously, he needed an order to go there.  Now, the fact

18     that one question wasn't asked of him by the Judge doesn't mean that he

19     was lying.

20             Now, the Judges can take his testimony as it is, but I think we

21     should move on.  We're wasting enough time.  The Prosecution has argued

22     that it needs more time to do cross-examination, but this is an abusive

23     time and an abuse of the process.

24             Thank you.

25             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [No interpretation]

Page 50510

 1             THE WITNESS:  [No interpretation]

 2             MS. ALABURIC: [No interpretation]

 3             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] There was no interpretation.  I

 4     asked you to answer the question put to you by the Prosecutor.  If you

 5     don't remember it, he'll put it to you again.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Could he please repeat it?  I would

 7     be grateful.

 8             MR. SCOTT:  Your Honour, the point's been made, and I do agree

 9     with Mr. Karnavas on that point.  And I had moved on, the topic came up

10     again, so I went back.  And I've read the transcript to the Chamber, and,

11     of course, the Chamber will decide for itself.

12        Q.   Sir, we were talking about the forward command post in Grude and

13     when, at some point, it converted, if you will, from being the forward

14     command post of the Croatian Army to being the headquarters of the HVO.

15     And eventually you said something about, well, by around July most of

16     what it was doing had to do with the HVO.  And really, sir, that's what

17     happened, isn't it?  What had been the forward command post of the

18     Croatian Army essentially converted and became the headquarters of the

19     HVO.  One day, it was the Croatian Army, and the next day -- or by July,

20     it was the HVO headquarters, wasn't it?

21        A.   Yes, that is right.  However, 95 per cent of those there were HVO

22     members.  I was the only one who had come from the Croatian Army

23     voluntarily.  All the others were members of the HVO.

24        Q.   Well, sir, during this same time-period, and I think we've talked

25     before, Mr. Tole came from the HV, Mr. Siljeg came from the HV, a number

Page 50511

 1     of officers had come from the Croatian Army around this time, hadn't

 2     they?

 3        A.   Yes, that is right.

 4        Q.   What really happened here, sir, isn't it true, is that the HVO

 5     essentially became the Croatian Army's forward command post?

 6        A.   Ten or eleven men performed the function of a forward command

 7     post.

 8        Q.   Well, for all practical purposes, it was the HVO became the

 9     forward army of the Croatian Army, didn't it?

10        A.   The HVO co-operated with the Croatian Army, and it had a unified

11     front stretching from the Republic of Croatia to the Republic of Bosnia

12     and Herzegovina.  That was what it was.

13        Q.   Sir, we've talked in the course of your testimony and in the

14     course of this case about joint armies or a joint command, and I put it

15     to you:  The HVO was far more a joint army with the Croatian Army than it

16     ever was with the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992 and 1994,

17     wasn't it?

18        A.   I wouldn't agree with you there, because the Croatian Army, in

19     July, went entirely towards Dubrovnik and we remained in Bosnia and

20     Herzegovina until the end of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

21        Q.   Wherever you were physically located, sir, you were effectively a

22     joint if not the same army, weren't you?

23        A.   No, we were not.  We were the HVO, and they were the Croatian

24     Army.  They had their part of the front, and we had our part of the

25     front, and we co-operated along this unified front-line between Croatia

Page 50512

 1     and Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 2        Q.   Sir, I put to you that if you -- if it's your position, based on

 3     everything we know, that the HVO and the Croatian Army were not the same

 4     army, according to your criteria, then for sure the HVO and the Army of

 5     Bosnia-Herzegovina were certainly not the same army or a joint army, was

 6     it?

 7        A.   The law passed in Bosnia and Herzegovina treats the HVO and the

 8     Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a joint army, and the Croatian law does

 9     not treat the HVO and the HV as a joint army.

10        Q.   We're not going to argue about the law, sir, because the lawyers

11     will argue about the law later.  But I put to you that your legal

12     analysis is simply and completely wrong.

13             But let me put it to you this way on the facts:  Let's talk about

14     the facts.  You and the BH Army, the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, were

15     very busy trying to kill and destroy each other, and I don't think that

16     was the case ever between the HVO and the Croatian Army, was it?

17        A.   It is not right.  We were not endeavouring to kill each other.

18     We collaborated extraordinarily well for a long period of time, for

19     longer than with the Croatian Army.

20        Q.   Well, I put to you, sir, that you were co-operating with the

21     Croatian Army continuously from 1991 to 1994 and thereafter, didn't you?

22        A.   We had a single front.  They held their men on the borders, and

23     we happened to be next to them.  So these two lines were linked and was

24     transformed into a common front-line between Croatia and Bosnia and

25     Herzegovina.

Page 50513

 1        Q.   Sir, you testified in the Kordic case, under oath, at page 26686,

 2     that you didn't know how the payments -- your income or the funds or --

 3     paid to you or HVO soldiers:

 4             "Your Honours, I don't know who made the payments or how."

 5             And once again, sir, that wasn't true when you answered that

 6     question under oath in Kordic, was it?

 7             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, could two pages of

 8     the transcript from the Kordic case which refer to payments be shown to

 9     this witness, and that we could ask him for his opinion then, because

10     colleague Scott is continuing to misrepresent answers of the witness in

11     previous proceedings?  He doesn't allow the witness to see exactly what

12     was said, and in this way he's not contributing to the quest for peace.

13     Could the witness be shown his answer to questions from the Prosecutor

14     about payment, that there was no repetition by Judge Rodrigues six or

15     seven times for him to answer questions about payments?  So if we could

16     do that, then the witness will certainly tell us exactly what he said.

17             MR. SCOTT:  Let's go to exhibit --

18             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I apologise.  If I may, I think it

19     is absolutely inappropriate to ask the witness about his testimony 10

20     years ago and to expect him to give an answer based exclusively on his

21     memory, so could we show him exactly what was said for that portion also

22     to be interpreted in the witness's language?

23             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  A point on the transcript.  On page 17, line 9,

24     this corresponds to the translation as I've heard it, Ms. Alaburic is

25     referred to as speaking of "contributing to the quest for peace."  I

Page 50514

 1     wonder whether you actually said that and wanted to say that, because I

 2     would rather have expected you of speaking of truth than peace.

 3             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, my intention was to

 4     speak for the quest for the truth.  If I misspoke, I apologise.  And

 5     thank you for noticing it.

 6             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Thank you.  It happens to all of us.  You don't

 7     have to apologise.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, I'm looking at the

 9     page 26896 [as interpreted] in the Kordic case.  I don't have the exact

10     reference to the questions regarding payments.  26886.

11             MR. SCOTT:  Excuse me, Your Honour.  I may have misspoke or

12     someone misheard.  It is page 26866.

13        Q.   Sir, you should have a binder available to you that's called "HV

14     in BiH."

15             If that can be -- if the witness doesn't already have it, if that

16     could be provided to the witness, please.  I'll refer the courtroom,

17     please, to binder -- excuse me, a binder titled "Table - HV in BiH."

18             If you'll turn, please, in that to P00910, there's a table on the

19     front of that binder -- there's a table that's been provided on the front

20     of that binder.  There's also the documents behind the table.

21             For reference to -- to assist everyone, it is line or item

22     number 14 on the table, and it's been tabbed in the binder as number 14.

23     There should be a sticky, so to speak, on the document number 14.

24             Sir --

25        A.   May I just ask something?

Page 50515

 1             JUDGE PRANDLER:  It is my fault, of course.  Which binder should

 2     we find that on?

 3             MR. SCOTT:  It is a binder that is -- probably has red tabs on

 4     the top, and it says on the outside "Table - HV in BiH."  Tab 14, on the

 5     top -- there should be red tabs on the top.  You find number -- if

 6     everyone finds number 14, that will be the same as P00910.

 7        Q.   Sir, this is a request for funding that was going to Mr. Susak on

 8     the 15th of December, 1992.

 9        A.   Do I have the translation?

10        Q.   Yes, you do.

11        A.   Yes, I see it now.  I have it.

12        Q.   If you'll look, sir -- even though the document -- the last page

13     of the Croatian version is what is actually in the untranslated document.

14     Although this document was to requesting funding from the State of

15     Croatia to Mr. Susak, was prepared for Mr. Stojic's signature; that, in

16     fact, was your signature, wasn't it?

17        A.   Yes, I signed this document.

18        Q.   If you can go to item number 19 in the table, or I will give you

19     the exhibit number, also again tab 19 -- I'm trying to assist because the

20     exhibit numbers were not in numerical order for various reasons.  But if

21     you can look at the red tabs, will you find number 18 in the same

22     binder -- excuse me, number 19.  My apologies.  And, sir, this is a

23     document from Mr. Berislav Pusic, dated the 6th of May, 1993, going to

24     the Croatian Army in Dubrovnik.  The second sentence:

25             "It is necessary to have there a person from the HV Dubrovnik so

Page 50516

 1     that it would be easier to recognise the bodies of your dead soldiers."

 2             There was going to be a body exchange, as sad as that might be.

 3     If there was going to be a body exchange in a -- soldiers killed in

 4     Bosnia-Herzegovina, and what this -- what Mr. Pusic is referring to is

 5     that someone from the HV needs to come, it would be easier for them to

 6     identify the bodies of HV soldiers; correct?

 7        A.   No.  You didn't read it correctly, Mr. Prosecutor.  It's an

 8     exchange of Chetniks, that is, Serb -- Serbian Army and the Croatian Army

 9     from the southern part of Croatia.  As far as I know, Serbs and Croats in

10     the south, that is, the Republic of Croatia and Republika Srpska, could

11     not agree on an exchange of their dead, and then through the Observer

12     Mission they proposed a neutral ground, and that is Herceg-Bosna.  And it

13     says "in exchange with dead Chetniks," and not an exchange of killed

14     Croatian soldiers in Bosnia-Herzegovina who were within the HVO, as you

15     endeavoured to put it.  So this is an exchange of Serb soldiers and Croat

16     soldiers who were killed in the south of Croatia.

17        Q.   For the record, sir, this is Exhibit P02214.  Can you tell us how

18     Mr. Pusic then, for the HVO, came to be involved in an exchange between

19     the Croatian Army and the Serb or VRS Army?

20        A.   This was all done by the Observer Mission of the

21     European Community that was stationed in Dubrovnik at the time and the

22     Observer Mission which was in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  They were

23     negotiating this.  Why Pusic is there, I really have no idea.  But, in

24     any event, it is an exchange between the Army of Republika Srpska and the

25     Army of the Republic of Croatia.

Page 50517

 1        Q.   Sir, you testified in the Kordic case that in 1993 or in 1994,

 2     there were no Croatian Army units or elements in Central Bosnia.  That

 3     was at page 26825 to 27.  And, again, that wasn't true, was it?

 4        A.   No, I don't remember a single soldier of the Croatian Army

 5     fighting in 1993 and 1994, as you put it, in Central Bosnia, yes.

 6        Q.   All right.  Well, we'll see what some of the other documents seem

 7     to show.

 8             In fact, sir, there were a number -- there were a number of the

 9     elements of the HVO -- the Croatian Army, excuse me.  There were a number

10     of elements of the Croatian Army that were active in Bosnia and

11     Herzegovina during 1993, weren't there?

12        A.   I am talking about Central Bosnia.  Certain elements of the

13     Croatian Army may have been in Herzegovina, but we're talking about

14     Central Bosnia, as that is what you asked me about.  That is the zone of

15     responsibility of Colonel Blaskic.

16        Q.   Sir, when General Bobetko established another forward command

17     post at Gornji Vakuf, General Bobetko and the Croatian Army called that

18     Central Bosnia.  And there were Croatian Army elements there, weren't

19     there, in 1992 and 1993?

20        A.   I'm talking about 1993.  That is how I understood your question,

21     1993 and 1994.  In 1992, there were certain volunteers.

22        Q.   And there were Croatian volunteers in 1993.

23        A.   No, they were volunteers.  In 1993, there were no elements of the

24     Croatian Army.

25             JUDGE PRANDLER:  You are overlapping each other, and I would like

Page 50518

 1     to ask both you of really to slow down a bit.  I would ask also,

 2     actually, our President and everybody to slow down, because sometimes it

 3     is impossible to follow the declarations and questions and the answers.

 4     Thank you.

 5             MR. SCOTT:

 6        Q.   Sir, I'm going to refer you to -- I'm going to be working largely

 7     from the table, but I'll give you the numbers.

 8             If we go to line number 16, which, for the record, is exhibit --

 9     involves Exhibit P01332, P01332, line 16 - again in the binders it should

10     have been marked with a red "16" - this is a document from Mr. Susak, and

11     Mr. Susak talks about -- or, excuse me.  The document talks about the

12     payment of wartime allowances owed to soldiers of the HV 101st Brigade

13     ordered by Susak and Praljak to the Southern Front, deployed by

14     Commander Janko Bobetko.  And the date of that communication is the 27th

15     of January, 1993; not 1992, 1993.  And you knew, sir, and you know now

16     that there were elements of the Croatian Army continuously in

17     Bosnia-Herzegovina throughout 1993, weren't there?

18        A.   I don't know where all these people were.  They could have been

19     south of Bregava, in the direction of Cavtat, or in the direction of

20     Dubrovnik.

21        Q.   Let's go to item number --

22        A.   And then they are entitled to this allowance.

23        Q.   Let's go to item number 28, which is P04061, P04061, in line 28.

24     From Tole to the president of Croatia and the defence minister of

25     Croatia, that is, Mr. Tudjman and Mr. Susak:

Page 50519

 1             "TG-2 will be under the command of the Southern Front.  We ask

 2     you to help us in the following:

 3             "To send the 1st Battalion, if possible, from the 5th Guards

 4     Brigade who want to come to this theatre with complete equipment and

 5     weapons.  To resolve the key problem," which is what the document is

 6     about, and it says:  "To resolve the key problem around Gornji Vakuf."

 7             And that's the truth, isn't it?  Croatian Army elements were

 8     active in the area of Gornji Vakuf continuously in the second half of

 9     1993.

10        A.   [No interpretation]

11             MR. SCOTT:  I'm not getting translation.  There's no translation,

12     Your Honours.

13             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] These were volunteers, and as you

14     heard from General Praljak in his testimony, these were people with

15     volunteer status.  They were referred to in a document during

16     General Praljak's testimony.  There were about 230 of them, if I remember

17     that document correctly.  And it was submitted by General Praljak, and he

18     was in Gornji Vakuf at the time, so he knows best.

19             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I apologise, Your Honours.  We

20     have two questions here.  When colleague Scott uses the term "elements of

21     the Croatian Army," and the general answers with the words "men from the

22     Croatian Army."  When General Scott [as interpreted] uses the term

23     "elements," is he implying men?

24             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] And the size of the elements?

25             MR. SCOTT:

Page 50520

 1        Q.   Well, sir, I don't want to be involved in the situation you told

 2     us about in Blaskic case, where you were playing word games about this.

 3     You know what "elements" means, it's a commonly-used military term, and

 4     you know full well what it means.  And whether they volunteered or not,

 5     and we'll put that to the side for a moment, whether they volunteered or

 6     not, these people were coming to Bosnia and Herzegovina as a unit -- as

 7     an element of the Croatian Army.  They were part of the -- in some

 8     instances, they were part of the 5th Guards; in some instances, they were

 9     part of the 7th Guards; they were part of the 101st Guards, and you know

10     that, don't you?

11        A.   Those were volunteers who had been born in the territory of

12     Bosnia-Herzegovina, who decided amongst themselves to come, and they

13     figured in the numbers they came.  As for this group, I point you to the

14     document in which 230 such people are mentioned.

15        Q.   Let's go to line 40 in the table, which is Exhibit P05804,

16     P05804, item tab 40.  Tying a couple of issues or topics together, this

17     appears to be an approval by Mr. Jelic of the Croatian Army to take 45

18     prisoners to the Heliodrom.  Do you see that?  Mr. Jelic doesn't say that

19     they were being taken by individuals or volunteers.  He says they were

20     being taken by the Croatian Army; isn't that correct?

21        A.   I don't know where that Croatian Army could have been at this

22     point in time on the 11th of October, 1993.

23             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, could we draw

24     attention to the full stop after the letter H and after the letter V,

25     which could indicate that this could be the name of a unit.

Page 50521

 1             General, could you help us?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Hrvoje Vukcic could be the name of

 3     the unit.

 4             MR. SCOTT:  Well, first of all, I object to the procedure.  It's

 5     not for counsel to get up and tell the witness what the answer should be,

 6     and I strongly object to that.  It should not be allowed.  And I take it

 7     that its withdrawn.

 8        Q.   Sir, you know what that means, and you know there were Croatian

 9     Army elements in that region at that time, but I don't want to spend -- I

10     don't want to get us too bogged down in this, but -- because there's over

11     50 documents, there's 40 some documents in this.  We don't have time to

12     go through them, unfortunately.  I wish we did.

13             But look at line 41, Exhibit P07423, a report by Mr. Skender --

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, regardless of this,

15     do you recognise that the document that comes under tab 40,

16     Exhibit P5804, does not illustrate your theory on the presence of the

17     Croatian Army, because in the text, after the H and V, there is a full

18     stop.  And the unity [as interpreted] was Hrvoje Vukcic, so it doesn't

19     stand for the Croatian Army.  So do you recognise that you made a

20     mistake?

21             MR. SCOTT:  With great respect, Your Honour, no.  I think it's up

22     to interpretation.  "HV" is HV, and that's what it says.

23             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But "HV" is written without a full

24     stop.

25             MR. SCOTT:  It might be in most instances, sir, but there's no

Page 50522

 1     point in us arguing about it.

 2        Q.   If you would go, please, and follow my instructions, go to tab

 3     41, P07423, Mr. Skender reports:

 4             "HV unit, 7th Guards Brigade, 1st Battalion, was engaged in

 5     fighting against MOS," Muslim armed forces or defence forces, "in the

 6     Uskoplje battle-field, Gornji Vakuf, in an attempt to protect Croatian

 7     Army in HR-HB.  This unit was carrying out offensive and defensive

 8     tasks."

 9             The 7th Guard Brigade is an element of the Croatian Army, isn't

10     it, sir?

11        A.   The 7th Guards Brigade, yes, but members who volunteer are

12     something quite different from the 7th Guards Brigade.

13        Q.   They're still the 7th Guards, sir, aren't they?  They may or may

14     not have volunteered, but when they go, they may say, just like you --

15     you said, General Bobetko, I'm willing to go, you can order me to go, I'm

16     willing.  But when you went to Croatia, you were still a member of the

17     Croatian Army, weren't you?  It didn't matter whether you volunteered,

18     sir.  You went under Bobetko's order, subject to your superior, as a

19     member of the Croatian Army, and whether they volunteered or not, they

20     were still members of the Croatian Army, weren't they?

21        A.   Yes, but they were born there, and they had every right to leave

22     the Croatian Army and go --

23        Q.   You say they were, sir.  Did you see their birth certificates of

24     each one who went?

25             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic,

Page 50523

 1     General Petkovic, the document that we have in front of us, and that

 2     could have been presented to Colonel Skender when he was there, it

 3     indicates that the elements of the Croatian Army were engaged against the

 4     BiH Army, and then the Colonel Skender sent that document, which is

 5     indicated in the left part of the document, to the Croatian Army.  Do you

 6     see that?

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I can see that, Your Honour.

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So when we read this document,

 9     we could perhaps start thinking that there was a military operation

10     involving units of the Croatian Army on the 31st of December, 1993.  What

11     do you say to that?

12             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, one could interpret that, but

13     it was about the 70 members of the Guards Brigade, and those were all

14     people who hailed from the territory of Herzegovina or, rather, Bosnia

15     and Herzegovina, who had decided to go to Bosnia and Herzegovina even at

16     the cost of perhaps losing their status in the Croatian Army.

17             At this moment, we still had 10.000 of our own men who were born

18     in Bosnia-Herzegovina and are still members of the Croatian Army, and we

19     are still waiting for them to come back, and they're coming in batches,

20     50, 70, 100.  Look at the officer here.  He was in command of a small

21     group, and that group had about 70 men from the 7th Guards Brigade.  And

22     I believe that Mr. Mandic was in -- its commander and he hailed from

23     Siroki Brijeg.  He was its first commander, and the second commander was

24     Branko Preradovic, or I'm not sure about his name.

25             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  So what you're

Page 50524

 1     saying is that for you, those were volunteers because they were all born

 2     in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, they hailed from those

 4     territories and they went there.  And in the Croatian Army, you can see

 5     where the 7th Brigade and other brigades were engaged with the main body

 6     of their troops at that time.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

 8             Mr. Scott, you have the floor.

 9             MR. SCOTT:

10        Q.   My question was pending to you, sir, at the time, and I'll repeat

11     it:  You don't know that these people were all born in Bosnia and

12     Herzegovina, do you?  That might be the party line, but you've never seen

13     all their birth certificates, have you?

14        A.   I didn't see their birth certificates, because nobody carries

15     birth certificates into combat.  But we knew where they hailed from, and

16     we knew that they went home when they returned to Bosnia-Herzegovina.

17        Q.   So you say, sir, so you say.

18             If we can go to tab 42 in the table, which is P07475.  P07475,

19     tab 42.  This is part of a presidential transcript on the 4th of January,

20     1994.  I'll direct your attention and the courtroom's attention to

21     page 14 -- starting on page 13, perhaps.  Mr. Bobetko and Mr. Susak, and

22     perhaps others, but at least those two, are meeting with

23     President Tudjman.  At the bottom of page 13, Mr. Bobetko is giving a

24     report.  Carrying over to the top of page 14:

25             "And it is all organised, but this shift, 7th Zagorska Guards

Page 50525

 1     Brigade, a part of it has not shift changed yet.  It should be done these

 2     days.  They are holding Gornji Vakuf, 200 of them, and they are very good

 3     at it.  I said to Petkovic today, that now, today, a new mobilisation

 4     should commence, and I ordered that this 8th Light, holding positions at

 5     another location, Ogulin, as a reserve be transferred down there for

 6     manoeuvre or that we go up there towards this part in the direction of

 7     Travnik."

 8             And that's accurate, isn't it?  Mr. Bobetko had talked to you on

 9     the 4th of January, 1994, about rotating the 7th Guards out of

10     Bosnia-Herzegovina, didn't he?

11        A.   No.  General Bobetko didn't speak to me.  He had requested me.

12     And there is also information that the 7th Brigade and the Light Assault

13     Brigade was never in Gornji Vakuf.  You have the minutes of a meeting

14     which took place on the 7th of January with a list of all the units that

15     were there, and those units were not there.  This is just a story, and I

16     claim that these two never arrived at Vakuf.  These two units were still

17     in Croatia at the time.

18        Q.   Let's look at Exhibit P07884, which is -- excuse me, table --

19     tab 14 or item 43, P07884.  This is a report, sir, from the 8th Light

20     Assault Brigade in the Croatian Army.  It's a Croatian Army document

21     confirming, in fact, the rotation in mid-February 1994, and it begins by

22     saying:

23             "Pursuant to the verbal order of the chief of the Croatian Army

24     Main Staff of 13 February 1994, and concerning the hand-over of the area

25     of responsibility of the 8th Light Assault Brigade to HVO Defence units

Page 50526

 1     on the 15th of February, a commission was formed..." et cetera.

 2             And the document goes on to record the transfer.

 3        A.   Yes, but this is not Gornji Vakuf.  This is from the border of

 4     the Republic of Croatia towards Buna, towards Buna.  This is not

 5     Gornji Vakuf.  I'm telling you that the Light Assault never arrived in

 6     Vakuf.  Half of it was in Matkovic, and the other half was in the

 7     direction of Dubrava Plateau.  And if you look at all the --

 8        Q.   Where is Buna?

 9        A.   South of Mostar.

10        Q.   So the HV -- so putting aside anything else for the moment, this

11     confirms that an HV unit and the HVO were rotating responsibilities in

12     Bosnia-Herzegovina just south of Mostar, weren't they?

13        A.   This refers to the area south of Mostar, but not to Gornji Vakuf,

14     as you said at the beginning.

15        Q.   And we now know where Buna is and where the rotation is taking

16     place.

17             Sir, isn't it correct that -- give me a moment, please.

18     Mr. Davor Marijan, who testified in this case, also testified as a

19     Defence expert in the Tuta Stela case, and in that case Mr. Marijan

20     identified the 5th Guards Brigade -- the Croatian Army 5th Guards Brigade

21     as the most involved HV unit in BiH in 1993.  He said that the 7th Guards

22     Brigade was the second-most involved HV unit.  The 1st Guards Brigade,

23     known as the Tigers or Tigrovi, were also actively involved.  The 2nd

24     Guards Brigade, known as Thunders or Gromovi, were actively involved, and

25     he identified all those units as being in Bosnia and Herzegovina during

Page 50527

 1     1993.  Are you saying that's not true?

 2        A.   I can't accept what he said.  Some elements were there, but not

 3     more than 50, 60, or 70 men from each of these brigades, and they were

 4     only people from Herzegovina, or, in other words, volunteers in the

 5     Croatian Army.

 6        Q.   If you'll go to Exhibit P03667, which may be a loose exhibit,

 7     Your Honours, but it's P0 -- it's not in the table, it's not in the

 8     binder we've been looking at in the last few minutes, at least I don't

 9     think so, but it's P03667.

10             Sir, this is a report from Mr. Kapular, commander of a Croatian

11     Army unit, dated the 23rd of July, 1993, in which Mr. Kapular is

12     reporting to the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia

13     concerning an action on the Southern Front involving the

14     5th Guards Brigade; isn't that true?

15        A.   Yes.  We're talking about volunteers from the 5th Brigade who

16     participated in the Operation South in the month of July 1993 south of

17     Mostar.

18        Q.   And the Chamber has seen this document before, but in that

19     paragraph numbered 2 on the second page of the English version, but it's

20     under heading 2, I'll remind you that Mr. Kapular says, essentially,

21     nobody is fooled by calling it the Southern Front; everybody knows what

22     the Southern Front really means.  And that meant, in this instance,

23     Bosnia-Herzegovina, didn't it?

24        A.   The Southern Front was the Republic of Croatia and the area

25     behind the borders towards Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that group was engaged

Page 50528

 1     in the Southern Front because that was south of Mostar, which was exactly

 2     in the area bordering on Croatia.

 3        Q.   Well, by some definition, sir, we can all agree that's some

 4     distance from -- some kilometres from Mostar, there is the Croatian

 5     border.  I think we can all agree on that.  But these people were

 6     acting -- in the 5th Guards were acting inside the borders of

 7     Bosnia-Herzegovina, wasn't it?

 8        A.   I'm saying the area around the borders in Bosnia-Herzegovina and

 9     parts of the Republic of Croatia together were considered the

10     Southern Front.  This was a unified Southern Front.

11        Q.   On the 15th of July, 1993, sir, you were still the head of the

12     HVO Main Staff, and you knew at that time, didn't you, that by that time,

13     by the middle of 1993, if not sooner, Herceg-Bosna and the HVO government

14     and military leadership knew that without the support and involvement of

15     the Croatian Army, it was going to be very difficult for the HVO to

16     establish its objectives, didn't they?

17        A.   It would have been difficult even for the Republic of Croatia,

18     because the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina wanted to take part of the

19     Republic of Croatia also, the sea -- the coastal area.  Yes, it was very

20     difficult to defend the southern part of the Republic of Herceg-Bosna and

21     the Republic of Croatia.

22        Q.   I'd like to -- I'd like some assistance, please, and I'd like you

23     to listen specifically to my question and answer my question and not some

24     other question.

25             The leadership -- the governmental and military leadership of

Page 50529

 1     Herceg-Bosna and the HVO knew, by the middle of 1993, that it would be

 2     very difficult for them to establish their objectives without the active

 3     support and involvement of the Croatian Army, didn't they?

 4        A.   The objectives were to defend the area and not allow a

 5     breakthrough to the south.

 6        Q.   That wasn't my question, sir.  I didn't ask you what the

 7     objectives were.  Please answer my question.  Don't answer another

 8     question.  Answer my question, Mr. Petkovic.  The leadership knew --

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for Mr. Karnavas.

10             MR. KARNAVAS:  I think if we look at the question, and everybody

11     should just calm down a little bit - I'll be the first one to admit I get

12     a little excited at times - but I think if you look at the question,

13     Your Honours, it's extremely difficult.  It's almost like -- well, I

14     won't use the example that is always used, you know, When did you stop

15     beating your wife, sort of question, but it's as posed -- now, if we go

16     step by step, I understand there's some time limitations, but I think the

17     Prosecution is overreaching at this stage and is assuming facts that are

18     not in evidence, is speculating.  So step by step, and I'm sure, you

19     know, the gentleman is quite capable.  I'm rather impressed, in fact.

20     JUDGE TRECHSEL:  I would like to put it in, perhaps, a bit simpler way.

21             Reaching their objectives, is what you say, but which objectives?

22     So far, we get the impression from the Bench -- I get the impression that

23     you have one idea of what the objectives were, and the accused, the

24     witness, has always denied this.  So probably it's difficult to put this

25     question in a way which does not lead back to the lower grassroot

Page 50530

 1     question of what were the objectives.

 2             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Your Honour.  Thank you, Mr. Karnavas.

 3     Sorry if I've created confusion.

 4             My point is I don't want to argue with the witness now about what

 5     the objectives are.  He said, at least for these purposes, that they were

 6     the defence of the territory of Herceg-Bosna.  Now, whether I agree with

 7     that or not, for the purpose of this question, I accept that, for the

 8     purposes of this question.  So my question remains.

 9        Q.   The HVO, Herceg-Bosna leadership, the political, the

10     governmental, and military leadership, knew that by mid-1993 they would

11     have great difficulties if, in fact, it would not be impossible to

12     achieve their objectives, however you define them at the moment, without

13     the active support and involvement -- in fact, on-the-ground involvement

14     of the Croatian Army; correct?

15        A.   No.

16             MR. KARNAVAS:  What objectives?  What are we talking about?  Is

17     it -- excuse me.  Is it the objective to mount a proper defence against

18     the Serbs?  That's one.  Is it to co-operate with the ABiH in certain

19     areas where there is co-operation against the Serbs?  Is it the situation

20     in Central Bosnia?  There is a host of things.  Now, if the Prosecution

21     could say, I put it to you that these were the objectives, he could say,

22     Yes, or, No.  And then even if he gets annoyed, he would say, Well I

23     still put it you, an X, Y, and Z.  I think that's the way it's normally

24     done.  And then he could follow up with whatever information he may have,

25     once he has locked the witness into his position, to demonstrate so that

Page 50531

 1     we can all see, ha, ha, ha, now we know what he means by "objectives."

 2     But thus far, I think it's rather vague and it's improper.  And I think

 3     some of my other colleagues would like to chime in, but I don't think

 4     that this is a proper way of cross-examining, at least on this particular

 5     issue.

 6             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, when you speak about

 7     objectives, I believe - maybe I'm mistaken - that you're talking about

 8     the objectives of the joint criminal enterprise.  Is that what you have

 9     in mind when you are putting this question to the witness?

10             MR. SCOTT:  No, Your Honour.  I was trying to avoid all these

11     issues by just accepting, for these purposes, what the witness, himself,

12     said the objectives was.  But apparently that doesn't seem to be working,

13     so I'm going to go on to another question.  I thought it was rather

14     clear, but I'm not going to take the time to pursue it further.

15        Q.   This action that Mr. Dzanko was involved in that you've described

16     as Operation Jug, you've told us during your direct examination that you

17     said -- excuse me.  On the 15th of July, 1993, you met with Mr. Boban in

18     the evening, and that was when, according to you, you told Mr. Boban that

19     you wanted him to find a replacement for you, that you would give him

20     something like 10 days to find a replacement.  You recall that testimony,

21     don't you?

22        A.   Yes, that's exactly what I said.

23        Q.   And at the time, sir, you knew full well that Operation Jug, as

24     it was ultimately planned and carried out, was an HV-led operation,

25     wasn't it, a Croatian Army-led operation?

Page 50532

 1        A.   No, it was not.  There were volunteers and there were two HVO

 2     brigades under the command of Luka Dzanko.  I don't know what his status

 3     was at the time.

 4        Q.   Sir, you know full well that Mr. Dzanko was a senior Croatian

 5     Army officer and that the HV 5th Guards Brigade -- the 5th Guards Brigade

 6     that we've been talking about this afternoon was substantially involved

 7     in this operation, supplemented by some elements from the HVO.  And, in

 8     fact, you wrote a report on this with Mr. Dzanko, didn't you?

 9        A.   Let me just correct you.  You can't say some elements of the HVO.

10     There were two HVO brigades which were four times bigger than the whole

11     body of volunteers from the 5th Brigade.  The 1st and the 3rd Brigades

12     which were much bigger than the group of 350 volunteers from the

13     5th Brigade who arrived there.

14        Q.   Let's go to Exhibit P03466, P03466.  I believe it's in binder 1,

15     I've been told, but we're still checking.  Perhaps we can also -- if it's

16     pulled up in e-court, we can work -- it's loose.  I'm told now, and I

17     apologise to the courtroom, that it's a loose exhibit, P03466.  He's got

18     it.

19             Sir, this is a report that you and, I believe, Mr. Dzanko

20     authored together, indeed, dated on the 15th of July, 1993, and you

21     report this event, this action.  You talk about "our forces" on the

22     second -- at least in the second page of the English version, but you'll

23     find it, "our forces," in the Croatian version.  And you see that it

24     talks about 400 men from the HV 5th Guards Brigade for the attack.  And

25     Mr. Dzanko is listed, I might indicate here, on this document, since you

Page 50533

 1     questioned it a moment ago, deputy commander of the Split Military

 2     District, Brigadier Luka Dzanko.  And you knew full well -- sir, when you

 3     sat there on the 15th of July, 1993, and drafted this report with

 4     Mr. Dzanko, you knew full well he was a senior officer in the Croatian

 5     Army, didn't you?

 6        A.   I knew that he was an officer of the Croatian Army.  And, second

 7     of all, do you know where this document was drafted?  This document was

 8     not drafted at the HVO.  The HVO did not have such a code.  Luka Dzanko

 9     sent this document on his own from Ploce to General Bobetko, and that's

10     the whole truth.  The HVO is not represented by this code.  You saw what

11     the HVO used and how it used it.  Look at the stamp.  This is not the

12     stamp --

13        Q.   You're wasting time, sir, and you know it.  This is a document

14     that you and Mr. Dzanko prepared together about this action, and you're

15     avoiding the question and the answer that's obvious, and that is:

16     Mr. Dzanko was a Croatian Army commander in command of this unit which

17     was substantially carried out by elements of the 5th Guards Brigade; yes

18     or no?  If you don't agree, sir, just say, No, and we'll move on.

19        A.   Yes, yes, correct.  Yes, he was the deputy commander of the Split

20     Military District.  He was the second in command in the

21     Military District of Split.

22        Q.   And, sir, in fact, your knowledge of what happened in

23     Operation Jug and the fact that this was -- and I put it to you that it

24     was a Croatian Army operation, under Croatian Army command, that very

25     event was one of those that President Tudjman and the people that met

Page 50534

 1     with him on the 13th of April, 1999, that we looked at last week, were

 2     concerned about, that you knew that this was an HV operation, and that if

 3     you went to testify in The Hague, that was something that might come out,

 4     wasn't it?

 5             Can we go to Sanction slide --

 6        A.   No, no.

 7        Q.   If we can go to slide number 25, which is an excerpt from page 39

 8     of Exhibit P08192.  Mr. President, this is the same presidential

 9     transcript that we looked at last Thursday.  Mr. Cosic, who we identified

10     as the deputy defence minister of Croatia:

11             "Mr. President, in August 1993, after the 5th Brigade suffered

12     that defeat, and so on, we sat in the cellar, General Petkovic,

13     General Djuric and Luka Dzanko, and a letter was written ..."

14             And I put to you, sir, that 3466 is the letter that you prepared

15     with Mr. Dzanko.  And it goes on to say:

16             "He came in about 1993.  He was engaged there from the HVO.  He

17     used to be in the former JNA."

18             And then they realised that they were talking about the wrong

19     person, but then goes on to say:

20             "So General Matic and General Petkovic, Mr. Boban was there, and

21     General Petkovic knows too much, so I think the risk is too great for us

22     to put him into an uncertain environment which is not friendly."

23             Sir, the very thing that these men were concerned about your

24     knowledge of was the Operation Jug and your knowledge that, in reality,

25     it was a Croatian Army operation, wasn't it?

Page 50535

 1        A.   No, why would -- Jug be a Croatian Army -- why would

 2     Operation Jug be an operation of the Croatian Army?  Nobody but Cosic

 3     mentions Operation Jug, and your colleague could have asked me anything

 4     he wanted, and I knew a lot more about other things as well.

 5        Q.   You may have, and again I know you want to blame the people

 6     asking the questions, but Mr. Cosic, who is the deputy defence minister

 7     of Croatia, what Mr. Cosic says is "After the 5th Brigade suffered that

 8     defeat ..."

 9             And I assume that the assistant minister of defence of Croatia

10     knows the elements and units of the Croatian Army, sir.

11        A.   Of course he knew.  Kapular sent a report to the Ministry of

12     Defence.  The unit commander sent a report to the Ministry of Defence of

13     the Republic of Croatia.

14        Q.   Sir, in this case you've sat here under oath in this Prlic case,

15     you've been sitting here for three and a half years, you know the

16     involvement of the Croatian Army in Bosnia and Herzegovina is an issue in

17     this case, you know that full well, and you sat in front of these Judges,

18     under oath, and talked about Operation Jug, and you never once informed

19     them that this, in reality, was a Croatian Army operation, commanded by a

20     Croatian Army officer.  You sit here -- sat here and misled these Judges

21     and allowed them to believe something that wasn't true, didn't you?

22        A.   This is not my intention.  I did say that two HVO brigades

23     participated in that and that their strength was much bigger than the HV

24     movement, because there were some 4.000 members of the HVO that

25     participated.

Page 50536

 1             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Just for the record, I would like

 2     to say that Mr. Scott misinterprets what has been happening in this

 3     courtroom, and I am saying this with full responsibility, because the

 4     Petkovic Defence has very clearly stated that the commander of the

 5     Operation Jug was Luka Dzanko.  That was not in dispute, and it was also

 6     not in dispute that he was a Croatian Army officer.  And it was also not

 7     in dispute that volunteers from the 5th Guards Brigade of the Croatian

 8     Army participated in that operation.

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] All that is in the transcript.

10             Mr. Scott, it's perhaps time for our break now.  Now, the

11     Registrar has calculated the time you have used.  You've used up 5 hours

12     and 12 minutes, so you have another 3 hours and 40 minutes available.

13             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Mr. President.

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We'll have our 20-minute break

15     now.

16                           --- Recess taken at 3.45 p.m.

17                           --- On resuming at 4.09 p.m.

18             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We will resume.

19             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Mr. President.

20             I want to turn now to the topic of some dealings or relationship

21     between the HVO and the VRS, the Bosnian Serb armed forces.

22        Q.   Sir, I'm putting now slide 51 -- Sanction slide 51 on the screen.

23     You testified in the Blaskic case, at page 24123:

24             "General --"

25             The question was asked:

Page 50537

 1             "General, did you and the HVO participate with the Serbs against

 2     the Muslim -- or the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?"

 3             Petkovic answer:

 4             "No, we never acted together with them."

 5             And, sir, I'm going to ask you once again, as you've heard me ask

 6     you several times now:  That testimony that you gave in the Blaskic case

 7     is not true or correct, is it?

 8        A.   No, we never took joint action with the Serbs.  But as for

 9     weapons and equipment, to the extent that it was possible, we obtained

10     such weapons and equipment from them.

11             JUDGE PRANDLER:  I'm sorry to interrupt you, both of you.  I

12     believe that there was an important mistake in the question asked by

13     Mr. Scott.  The question was asked, and I quote:

14             "General, did you and the HVO participate with the Serbs against

15     the Muslims -- or the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina?"

16             I believe that the question was, if I'm not mistaken:

17             "General, did you and the HV participate ..."

18             Was it your intention to ask --

19             MR. SCOTT:  I'm sorry, Your Honour, it is "HVO."

20             JUDGE PRANDLER:  Yes, okay.

21             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Judge Prandler.

22        Q.   Well, sir, you say today that, in fact, you participated with

23     them or dealt with them in some ways in terms of obtaining arms and all

24     that, but once again, sir, you very clearly -- when you testified in the

25     Blaskic case, you very clearly attempted to create the impression, before

Page 50538

 1     those Judges, that there was no co-operation or dealings -- no

 2     co-operation between the HVO and the VRS at all, didn't you?  I agree

 3     you've changed your position, I'm putting that to you.  But the

 4     impression you tried to create in the Blaskic case was, very

 5     categorically, there was no involvement, no dealings, no co-operation.

 6     That's what you wanted to tell those Judges, isn't it?

 7        A.   No.  The question had to do with Vlasic -- in co-operating with

 8     the Serbs on Vlasic.  A document was shown.  The Serbs allege that this

 9     was done for propaganda reasons, and that's what the testimony had to do

10     with.  As far as I can remember, I believe I said that we and the Muslims

11     obtained weapons -- or, rather, ammunition from them.  The specific

12     question put to me concerned Vlasic.

13        Q.   And it was only again, sir, in the Kordic case when, again, once

14     you were pressed and when documents were put in front of you, that you

15     then agreed for the first time that there was trading and dealing between

16     the HVO and the VRS, in terms of acquiring weapons and ammunition,

17     starting with at least the beginning of July 1993; isn't that the case?

18             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, given that last

19     Thursday my colleague Scott falsely alleged that the Judge Robinson put a

20     question on six or seven occasions, I would appreciate it if he could lay

21     a factual basis for the question just put.

22             MR. SCOTT:  Well, first of all, Your Honour, I disagree that I

23     gave any false information about Judge Robinson's repeated questions to

24     the witness before he finally got an answer.  Whether I said seven or

25     eight, there were numerous questions, and I'm happy to let the Chamber

Page 50539

 1     review the transcript and count them for themselves.  But I'm absolutely

 2     confident it was only after repeated questions by Judge Robinson that the

 3     question was finally answered.

 4        Q.   Sir, how often were you -- was the HVO and Serbs involved in

 5     these dealings, and how often were you involved in approving these

 6     transactions between the Serbs and the HVO?

 7        A.   Up until -- or while the ABiH had us surrounded and wanted to

 8     defeat us, during that period of time the only way of obtaining

 9     ammunition was to try and buy it from Republika Srpska.

10        Q.   And how often were you directly involved in those negotiations or

11     directing other HVO agents who were involved?

12        A.   I couldn't say how often, but I issued instructions saying that

13     such equipment could be obtained because that was the only way that the

14     Croats could survive in Central Bosnia and defend themselves from the

15     ABiH army.  It was also impossible to get from Herzegovina to

16     Central Bosnia.  Not a single route was open for that purpose.

17        Q.   And you dealt, sir, with -- you were -- in fact, sir, you were

18     the principal negotiator, ultimately, on behalf of the HVO, weren't you?

19        A.   I wouldn't say so.

20        Q.   And you were actually dealing directly at times with Mr. Mladic

21     from the Serb army or the VRS, weren't you, Ratko Mladic, this Tribunal

22     is well familiar with?  You and Mr. Mladic frequently dealt with each

23     other to arrange these transactions, didn't you?  And I'm going to tell

24     you, sir, if it will help you -- I'm going to show you a number of

25     documents that will indicate exactly that.  So if you want to deny your

Page 50540

 1     involvement with Mr. Mladic, I suppose you can do so.

 2        A.   Whenever the UNPROFOR commander called me when I arrived in --

 3        Q.   We're not going to waste time talking about that.  My apologies

 4     to the interpreters.  I do apologise to the interpreters, but time is

 5     precious.  I asked you nothing about UNPROFOR, sir.  You frequently dealt

 6     directly with Ratko Mladic, didn't you; yes, no?

 7        A.   I wouldn't say that I had frequent contact with him.  I attended

 8     meetings, if necessary.  I had time to reach agreements at those meetings

 9     that were organised by UNPROFOR.

10        Q.   Sir, you know full well that you had numerous dealings with

11     Mr. Mladic, and it had nothing to do with UNPROFOR; that you were

12     communicating with him to arrange transactions between the HVO and the

13     VRS.  And you know that, sir, and you're being dishonest with this

14     Chamber to represent otherwise, don't you?

15        A.   No.  Others had contact with him, but I had enough time, for

16     example, at meetings at the Sarajevo Airport, to say, I need such and

17     such equipment.  If possible, could it please be provided.

18        Q.   And is it your position, sir -- is it your testimony, under oath,

19     that the co-operation between the HVO and the VRS was limited only to

20     arms trading?

21        A.   On the whole, to arms trading and to the possibility of using the

22     road to Vares -- or, rather, towards Kiseljak.

23        Q.   In fact, sir, isn't it the case that most of what we've heard in

24     this trial about any real armed conflict between the HVO and the Serbs in

25     the area of Herzegovina, between late 1992 and at least until March 1994,

Page 50541

 1     that was all really phony, wasn't it?  And I use the word "phony"

 2     specifically.  It was false, it wasn't real.  It was all kind of a

 3     put-on -- a put-up job, so to speak, that you would like this Chamber to

 4     believe you were engaged actively in a war with the Serbs during that

 5     period, but you weren't, were you?

 6        A.   No.  We were actively engaged in a war against the Serbs, and

 7     that was more the case than for our associates up until then, the

 8     Muslims.

 9     Q.   I put it to you, sir, that between December of 1992 and March of

10     1994 in the area of Herzegovina, there was not a single significant armed

11   conflict between the Serbs -- between the VRS and the HVO; isn't that true?

12        A.   That's not true.  Our lines were actively engaged.  We had dead

13     men, wounded men.  The artillery and tanks and the infantry were active.

14        Q.   You say that, sir, but you're not telling us anything.  I'm not

15     talking about the fact that there were two lines looking across each

16     other across some distance.  I'm talking about active military

17     operations, offensive operations.  Please identify for me a VRS offensive

18     operation carried out in Herzegovina against the HVO during 1993.

19        A.   Yes, in 1993 there were several operations in the direction of

20     Nevesinje.  There were several operations from Bugojno to Kupres, in the

21     direction of Kupres.  And there were some operations in the area of

22     Vlasic, in the Travnik area, and incessantly in the valley of the River

23     of Usora and Komusina village.

24        Q.   Give me the dates of those events and how long they lasted, and

25     the size of the units that were involved, because I put to you, sure,

Page 50542

 1     there may have been some local skirmishes here and a skirmish there, an

 2     artillery shell here and there, but there were no sustained major HVO-VRS

 3     actions during 1993 in Herzegovina, were there?

 4        A.   I don't know which actions you're referring to.  Do you want

 5     operations that involve depth of 100 or 200 kilometres?  We were waiting

 6     for allies -- our allies to invite us to join in operations against the

 7     Serbs, large-scale operations against them.  We did what we could.  That

 8     concerned tactical depth, moving the lines, defensive lines --

 9        Q.   Again, you're avoiding my question, and you know it.  And, again,

10     don't blame -- you always blame it on somebody else; it's the Court's

11     fault, it's the questioner's fault, it's the Muslim's fault, it's

12     Izetbegovic's fault.  It's always somebody else's fault, sir.  You didn't

13     answer my question.  Tell these Judges right here, under oath, one

14     significant large-scale offensive operation between the HVO and the VRS

15     in the region of Herzegovina in 1993.  Tell them.

16        A.   Yes, there were large-scale operations in the area of

17     Tomislavgrad-Livno at the beginning of 1993, in Bugojno, Kupres.  There

18     were operations in the Valley of Usora and in the Valley of Kamusina,

19     where we managed to drive back the Serbian forces in a significant way.

20        Q.   Let's go to the testimony of Mr. -- again, the Defence expert

21     Davor Marijan, who testified in this case and in the Naletilic case.

22             Slide -- Sanction slide 52, at page 15601-03.  My question to

23     Mr. Marijan in that case:

24             "Sir, any violence, of course, is too much, and there were

25     certainly skirmishes and artillery shells fired from time to time, but

Page 50543

 1     isn't it true, sir, that in 1993 in the Prozor-Mostar-Stolac region,

 2     fighting between Serbs and Croats was not a significant factor in what

 3     was happening there?"

 4             Answer, under oath:  "That is true."

 5             And you know that to be true, don't you, sir?

 6        A.   Well, look.  If a soldier who spent a short period in the HVO --

 7     well, if he knows more than the Chief of Staff of the HVO, well, then he

 8     really is an expert.

 9        Q.   Well, he was called as an expert, sir, twice, not by me.  He was

10     called by two different Defence teams as an expert, so apparently someone

11     thought he had some expertise.

12             Sir, if you could go to slide -- if we could have Sanction slide

13     number 53, let's look at what was being said on this topic by

14     President Tudjman during this -- in President Tudjman's office during

15     this period.  I'll put these to you, and then I'll ask you a couple of

16     questions.

17             The 2nd of September, 1993, Exhibit P04740, pages 9 and 10:

18             "Tudjman:  ... we can't allow accusations of direct military

19     involvement of Croatia in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and on the other hand,

20     all state organs in all areas naturally have to provide help to that

21     Croatian republic, not only to survive but to prosper and be a support

22     for the Croatian state.

23             "In view of this situation, we have to suppress relations with

24     Belgrade ... it is a fact," and he's making this statement on the 2nd of

25     September, 1993, "it is a fact, though, that for five or six months now

Page 50544

 1     there has been no fighting between the Croats and Serbs in Bosnia and

 2     Herzegovina."

 3             On the 15th of September, 1993, Exhibit P05080, pages 18 to 20,

 4     Mr. Praljak is speaking:

 5             "Another thing is, the relations between the Croats and the Serbs

 6     have improved, especially on the military plane, because our whole units

 7     depend on co-operation with the Serbs ... therefore, Zepce, Kiseljak and

 8     thus Vitez, the battalion below Konjic and Vares, it will now be

 9     difficult for us to provide them with supplies.

10             "Tudjman:  But the fighting against the Muslims should stop.

11             "Praljak:  It will stop, but this is going to be different --" or

12     "difficult," I think, and I would submit -- and we can look at the

13     transcript, but I believe that should be "difficult":

14             "A year ago, we thought we could not hold talks with the Serbs at

15     all.  We reached some agreement with the Serbs, and now we should start a

16     war against them in order to ease the tension with the Muslims, and it

17     will probably take time to turn things around, psychologically.

18             "Susak:  Their side, we should say something to the media.  We

19     cannot simply neglect the Serbs now.  The point of this agreement is a

20     cease-fire.  It is not unification and war against the Serbs.  We must

21     inform the public in a subtle manner that we are not establishing a union

22     with the Muslims to fight the Serbs ..."

23             The 12th of January, 1994, P07570, pages 55 and 56:

24             "Tudjman:  Jadranko, take steps to open Croatian offices in

25     Banja Luka:

Page 50545

 1             "Pranjic:  We discussed this and they agree, but someone has to

 2     carry this out.  We must be sufficiently prompt and flexible as regards

 3     this matter ...

 4             "Tudjman:  We must act in both directions, both towards the

 5     Muslims and the Serbs, to get out of this infernal situation.

 6             "Jadranko Prlic:  Everything can be agreed upon with the Serbs,

 7     Mr. President - joint military activity and a military alliance and

 8     everything else.  There is no operational matter ..."

 9             Now, I'm going to stop there for a moment, sir.  You know, based

10     on what Mr. Davor Marijan has testified at this Tribunal under oath, by

11     the comments by the Croatian government leadership, that that's the state

12     of -- that was the state of affairs, wasn't it, in 1993, or at least much

13     of it -- most of it?  There was no fighting between the VRS and the HVO,

14     and any allegations to the contrary are deceiving this Chamber, aren't

15     they?

16        A.   No, that's not correct.  In June, the Croats were totally cut off

17     in Central Bosnia by the Muslims, and they couldn't establish contact

18     with the Serbs and fight with them.  That's what the period is about

19     here.  So as of June, the Muslim aggression against the HVO blocked the

20     entire HVO system.  They had surrounded them, broken it up into small

21     areas in Central Bosnia, and the concern was quite simply to defend

22     oneself.  In such conditions, you cannot attack the Serbs.

23        Q.   Well, exactly, sir, exactly.  You weren't fighting the Serbs

24     during this time-period at all.

25             Let's go -- in fact, sir, you know -- you know, and the Croatian

Page 50546

 1     leadership knew, that in reality the war between the Croats and the

 2     Muslims was much worse than the war between the Croats and the Serbs,

 3     wasn't it?

 4        A.   Because the Muslim aggression was more intense than the Serbian

 5     one.  They had surrounded us wherever that was possible for them, and we

 6     had no contact -- our enclaves didn't have any contact between

 7     themselves.  And under such conditions, you can only fight those

 8     surrounding you.  Those surrounding us were the Muslims or the ABiH.

 9     I think that we have demonstrated what was going on in June.  The HVO was

10     completely isolated and had no way out.

11        Q.   Thirteen of February, 1994 -- I'm sorry.  If I wait for

12     translation, Mr. Petkovic just continues on, and I don't have time to

13     allow that.  I apologise.

14             13th of February, 1994, P07856, Mile Akmadzic, a witness in this

15     case:

16             "I would only remind you that yesterday Karadzic said to

17     me - I think you were there too - that Karadzic said that he offered

18     everything to the Croats, that every Croatian village could join the

19     Serbian republic, with full autonomy and the right to secede at a later

20     stage if they didn't want to live with the Muslims."

21             At page 10:

22             "Tudjman:  Is it true that we have 3.000 killed in the resistance

23     against the Serbian aggression and 5.000 against the Muslims?

24             Granic, the foreign minister:

25             "2500 and 5500; right?

Page 50547

 1             "Boban:  a little less.  I cannot remember the figures now, but

 2     we do have precise figures.

 3             "President:  So how many did we have with the Serbs?"

 4             The interjection is:

 5             "2500."

 6             Going over to the next page:

 7             "2500.  With the Muslims?  (Comment:  About 5.000.)

 8             "Tudjman:  We can go with that figure.  2500 killed."

 9             And what's being talked about here between the Serbs and the

10     Croats, and 5500 between the Croats and the Muslims, so more than two

11     times the number with the Serbs, and that's what you know to be the case,

12     isn't it?  I mean, as much as you want to talk about the fighting with

13     the Serbs, which was non-existence in most of 1993, it was the war with

14     the Muslims that was much more serious, wasn't it, sir?  More than twice

15     as many casualties?

16        A.   Because they had driven us out of all parts of Central Bosnia.

17     They have taken all our places that we inhabited --

18        Q.   Your not answering my question.

19        A.   [Overlapping speakers] [No interpretation]

20        Q.   Sorry, you didn't ask --

21        A.   [Overlapping speakers] [No interpretation]

22             MR. SCOTT:  Your Honours, Your Honours, Your Honours, please ask

23     the witness to answer my question.

24             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Listen to the Prosecution's

25     question very carefully.  The Prosecution is putting extremely important

Page 50548

 1     questions to you, and answer the question precisely.

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will.

 3             Your Honours --

 4             MR. SCOTT:

 5        Q.   Sir, I didn't ask you why, I simply said -- my question was more

 6     than twice as many casualties -- my apologies.  With the Muslims was --

 7     my apologies.  That was much more serious, wasn't it, sir, more than

 8     twice as many casualties?  And that can be answered, Yes, or, No.  I

 9     didn't ask for an explanation.  Yes or no?

10             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, the

11     Prosecution has asked you some very important questions that one should

12     focus on, and the Prosecution has referred to expert testimony, too, and

13     other bases.  So there was no conflict between the Croats and the Serbs,

14     according to the Prosecution.  That has been stated quite clearly.  And

15     you're reminded of a question put to a Defence expert witness.  The

16     Defence witness said, No, there was nothing going on.  And then in the

17     course of questions put to you, two figures have appeared that are

18     problematic for me, 2.500 were killed as a result of the conflict with

19     the Serbs and 5.000 as a result of the conflict with the Muslims.  So I'm

20     trying to see things clearly here.

21             The 2.500 men killed, which year did that concern?  Was that

22     before 1993?  Because if there was no fighting then there aren't any dead

23     or wounded.  But if 2.500 men were killed, that means there was fighting.

24     So I no longer understand anything.  The figure of 2.500 referred to by

25     President Tudjman, he, himself, referred to that figure, what exactly

Page 50549

 1     does that figure concern?

 2             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this is the number of

 3     Croats killed in the fighting against the Serbs up until the 15th of

 4     June, 1993, so mid-June 1993.  As for the other part, it has to do with

 5     the ABiH all-out offensive.  The fact that Central Bosnia was completely

 6     cut off.  The HVO forces were completely surrounded from Konjic, Vitez,

 7     Busovaca, Kiseljak.  The Croatian enclaves was also involved, and then at

 8     one point did they have contact with the Serbs and that was at Kiseljak.

 9             There was an incessant offensive by the armija.  They wanted to

10     deal with this, so in fighting against the armija, the ABiH that kept

11     attacking us, we suffered terrible losses because we can't defend

12     ourselves in an enclave if we're surrounded and attacked.  So that was

13     the problem, and not the inverted thesis of the Prosecution.  You

14     understand the Muslims had left the Serbs, attacked us from April, and

15     especially June 1993, and they inflicted terrible losses on us.  So we

16     suffered the losses as a result of the ABiH attacks in all areas where we

17     had to defend ourselves, because we had been totally surrounded.

18             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, you haven't

19     really answered my question, but you answered part of it.  You said that

20     the figure concerns mid-June 1993, so I have understood that.  But as for

21     the 2.500 men killed, how many of them were killed as a result of the

22     conflict between the Croats and the Serbs?  Because according to the

23     Prosecution, there was no conflict.  If there's no conflict, no one's

24     killed, no one's wounded.  If we have dead and wounded, this must be the

25     result of something.  So where were these Croats killed and wounded by

Page 50550

 1     the Serbs, where and when?  That's what the Prosecution wants to know,

 2     and you're not answering the question.

 3             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the Croats, in

 4     fighting the Serbs, suffered the most significant losses at the end of

 5     1992, at the beginning of 1993, up until the beginning of June 1993.

 6     This was the fighting with the Serbs in which Croats were killed.  Five

 7     and a half thousand killed Croats in the fighting against the Muslims,

 8     well, that occurred mostly in April 1993, and especially in June, July,

 9     and August, and up until the end of 1993 or up until mid-1994, when we

10     had to face a terrible attack launched by the ABiH.  So we had two and a

11     half thousand men who were killed in fighting against Serbs,

12     Your Honours; whereas five and a half thousand killed in the fighting

13     against Muslims.

14             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, I have some

15     difficulty in following you.

16             You are saying that there was fighting with the Serbs and men

17     were killed.  That's line 11, page 53.  And I was expecting you to tell

18     me where.  But then you go back to the subject of the ABiH.  If men were

19     killed, if Croat soldiers were killed by the Serbs -- if Croats were

20     killed by the Serbs, rather, which municipality did this take place in?

21     Where did this happen?

22             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, well, it was

23     throughout the territory where the Croats had organised defence against

24     the Serbs, starting with the Neretva Valley, Kupres, Bugojno, Travnik, in

25     the area of Usora, the area of Bosanska Posavina, then a small part of

Page 50551

 1     Orasje, the area where our brigades were in the Tuzla area, so throughout

 2     the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina where the HVO was facing the VRS.

 3             And there were 2.500 men who were killed in the clashes with the

 4     Serbs.  Is that an insignificant number, doesn't this show that there was

 5     fighting with the VRS?  Five and a half thousand men were killed in the

 6     fighting against the Muslims.  Most of them were killed in April 1993.

 7     And then up until the end of the Washington Agreement, when the Croats

 8     from Central Bosnia quite simply disappeared.  On a daily basis, there

 9     were 30 to 50 people killed in Vitez, Busovaca, and Kiseljak.  And in

10     Travnik and Kakanj, well, I won't even mention the figures there.  So

11     these people were killed in five municipalities in fighting against the

12     Muslims.  Konjic, Travnik, Vitez, Busovaca and Kiseljak are the areas

13     concerned, the municipalities concerned, and a smaller number of people

14     were killed in the Vares area.  So five and a half thousand people were

15     killed as a result of the fact that we were surrounded by Muslims, and we

16     didn't break out of that encirclement until the Washington Agreement was

17     signed.  So in Konjic, in Central Bosnia, we were completely surrounded.

18     We had to face an ABiH attack, and at that point in time it wasn't

19     possible for us to engage in combat against the Serbs because the Muslims

20     had also left the Serbs and focused on us.  They had inflicted

21     significant losses on us.  We lost twice as many men in fighting against

22     the Muslims as we did in fighting against the Serbs.

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.

24             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Your Honour.

25             Your Honour, I submit that, unfortunately, you never did get your

Page 50552

 1     question answered.  There's no question there was fighting between the

 2     Muslims and Croats.  No one denies that, and no one denies the number of

 3     killed.  That wasn't the point about any of this.  It was the fighting

 4     with the Serbs, and we still don't know the dates and where that

 5     occurred.

 6             I would remind the courtroom that although Mr. Petkovic talks

 7     about this being some figure that he pulls out of air as being mid-June

 8     1993, the conversation involving Mr. Tudjman, the defence minister,

 9     Boban, and others was in February 1994.

10             Sir -- and let me also say, Your Honour, lest the Prosecution

11     position be mis-characterised either by Mr. Petkovic or somebody else, we

12     have never said that -- and the statement -- the quote that I put, if we

13     can go back to paragraph -- excuse me, slide 52 in Sanction -- because I

14     can't really improve on this, and this was my question at the time, and I

15     want it to be clear:

16             "No one has ever said that there weren't some isolating fighting

17     in places."

18             And that's the question I put to Mr. Marijan:

19             "Any violence, of course, is too much, and there were certainly

20     skirmishes, there were certainly artillery shells fired from time to

21     time, but isn't it true, sir, that in 1993, in the Prozor-Mostar-Stolac

22     region, fighting between Serbs and Croats is not a significant factor in

23     what was happening there?

24             "That is true."

25        Q.   And I put it to you, sir, that nothing you've told us so far

Page 50553

 1     contradicts Mr. Marijan.  And, in fact, sir, you knew, didn't you, that

 2     by June of 1993, you considered the Serbs to be allies, you, yourselves?

 3        A.   That is not correct.  We never considered them allies.  From the

 4     month of April, we were exposed to a total aggression by the Muslim

 5     forces, and in view of such an aggression and a total encirclement, we

 6     could not fight on two fronts.  We resisted in the places where we were

 7     most at risk, and that is Central Bosnia.

 8        Q.   Sir, I ask you to go to Exhibit P02931, and again, I apologise to

 9     the interpreters, but I can't cut Mr. Petkovic off any other way.  And

10     unless the Chamber would graciously grant me more time, I have to control

11     the use of the time.

12             If you could turn, please, sir, in the binder marked "Exhibits

13     for Cross - Tables," "Serb-Croat Co-operation" is the first one in the

14     binder.  And in this particular binder, there are blue and yellow tabs on

15     the top.

16             And on this particular -- there is -- once again, Your Honours,

17     there is a table, and for the courtroom --

18             THE INTERPRETER:  Would you repeat the exhibit number, please,

19     Mr. Scott?

20             MR. SCOTT:  Yes, I will.  P02931.  It is item or line number 15

21     in the table.  It is also tabbed on the top in blue as number 15.

22        Q.   Sir, this is a document from you, dated the 24th of June, 1993,

23     to Mr. Siljeg and others.  And on that day, you say, sir, item 3:

24             "I forbid any support to former allies."

25             Number 4:

Page 50554

 1             "Provide support to the new allies."

 2             The new allies, sir, were the Serbs, weren't they?  --

 3        A.   The Muslims were attacking us and bringing pressure to bear --

 4        Q.   I'm not asking you that, sir.  The allies were the Serbs, and

 5     these are your words and said that the new allies -- and those are

 6     referring to Serbs.

 7             MR. SCOTT:  I'm sorry, Your Honour, but I cannot allow

 8     Mr. Petkovic to continue to ramble on in an unresponsive manner.

 9             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, the

10     Prosecutor has asked you a very specific question.  In point 4, it is

11     indicated:

12             "Provide support to the new allies."

13             And he's asking you whether those allies are the Serbs.  And you

14     tell him, Yes, or, No.  There's no point in wasting time.

15             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, at this point in time, when

16     the Muslims had attacked us, the Serbs were the allies.

17             MR. SCOTT:

18        Q.   And despite that, sir, if we can go to Sanction slide 54, despite

19     that, sir, when you came and testified in the Blaskic case at page 24129,

20     you were asked this question:

21             "Tell me, General, in addition to these particular orders

22     (related to Bosnian Serb (VRS) documents" which you had denied earlier,

23     "how many other occasions did you and members of the HVO --" it's in

24     Sanction:

25             "How many other occasions did you and members of the HVO

Page 50555

 1     co-operate in combat operations with the VRS?"

 2             Petkovic answer, under oath:

 3             "Not once.  We did not co-operate once."

 4             And yet, sir, we've just seen a document in which that was what

 5     you told the Blaskic Judges, that's what you told Judge Jorda and the

 6     others under oath.  And yet we've just seen a document in which you say

 7     that as of June 1993, the HVO and the VRS were allies.  And that's the

 8     truth of the matter, isn't it?  That's the truth now, not what you told

 9     the Blaskic Trial Chamber?

10        A.   No, the truth is what I said, because we were attacked, we were

11     being persecuted, and the Serbs were helping us out.

12        Q.   It doesn't matter who attacked who, sir.  It doesn't matter who

13     you were attacked who.  You were allies with the Serbs, and you know it.

14             MR. KARNAVAS:  Excuse me, General.

15             Your Honours, I think -- I think there needs to be a little bit

16     of patience exercised by the Prosecutor.  Now, I understand the

17     frustration.  The problem is context, and I believe the general wants to

18     speak of context before putting -- giving the answer.  I do think, under

19     these procedures, because we're reminded often by members of the Bench, a

20     variety of them that we're not in the American system where, Yes, or, No,

21     is always the answer, whereas somebody can and does give an explanation.

22     So if -- if I may give some advice, it might be better if the general

23     were given an opportunity to give an explanation as to the answer.

24             If, for instance, the answer is -- the question is, Who is your

25     allies at this point, well, without giving the context of it, I think

Page 50556

 1     it's very important.  And I can look at any number of conflicts ongoing

 2     what areas, whether it's Iraq, whether it's Afghanistan, whether it's

 3     Israel, whether it's -- you name it.  Today's enemy may be tomorrow's

 4     friend because of the situation that is happening at that particular

 5     moment, and the general is trying to answer the best that he can.

 6             Now, it's unfair, I submit -- to take a transcript from a

 7     previous case and read the answer when, in fact, the lawyer or the

 8     Prosecutor in that case may have been pursuing a different angle at the

 9     time.  So I think it would be better to allow the Prosecutor to have

10     extra time, thus allowing the accused to give context, whereas opposed to

11     not allowing him to give context and really restricting him to, Yes, or,

12     No.  That would be my proposal.

13             MR. KOVACIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if I may, if I may

14     add something.  I agree what has been said by my learned friend, it's a

15     question of context.  But in this particular case, an exhibit has been

16     shown parallel to this one, P2931, where there is reference to one

17     particular location.  And here in this extract from General Petkovic's

18     testimony in Blaskic, the reference to a different location, to a

19     different region.  And now the Prosecutor is generalising these things,

20     and General Petkovic is answering.  Simply, they are not -- they are

21     talking at cross-purposes.  They're not talking about the same thing.

22     The Prosecutor is raising details to the level of a general conclusion,

23     and we can see from the document that the reference is to a particular

24     location, just as in the Blaskic case the reference is to a particular

25     location.

Page 50557

 1             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, may I be allowed to

 2     add some argument regarding the fundamental difference between this

 3     document and the extract from the Blaskic testimony?

 4             In the Blaskic case, there is reference to co-operation and

 5     combat operations --

 6             MR. SCOTT: [Overlapping speakers] I object.  This is what we do

 7     every time.  Counsel gets up and is testifying and stating her case in

 8     front of the witness, and we do this all the time.

 9             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, Your Honours, I

10     really wish to say this.  And if I may be allowed a re-examination, I

11     will show you how Colleague Scott has systematically erroneously

12     presented the context of certain statements, and this is one such

13     example.

14             In this document, there's reference to co-operation in military

15     operations with the Army of Republika Srpska, which is one issue, and the

16     document sent to a different operational zone, the North-Western

17     Herzegovina, there is mention of specific villages and there's no mention

18     of combat co-operation with the VRS, and there's no reason for us to

19     confuse these two things.  And if Colleague Scott is helped by mixing up

20     things, then that is a sad business.

21             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, Mr. Scott, I

22     would like to remind you that there was a general question in the Blaskic

23     case between -- the co-operation between the HVO and the VRS, and it was

24     not linked to Ahmici.  The question was a very general one, as we can see

25     on the screen.  And you have answered:  "Not once," that, We did not

Page 50558

 1     co-operate once.  That is what you said.  And now we have a document in

 2     which there's not the word "co-operation," but the word "support," but

 3     let's not play with words, which appears to contradict your testimony

 4     under solemn declaration.  What is your comment?  There's no need for

 5     counsel, because you are responsible.  It is up to you to respond.

 6             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I was shown a

 7     document on the activity of the Serbs from Vlasic which was not in order.

 8     The Serbs from Vlasic did not act upon the request of the HVO, and in the

 9     document it says, Use it for propaganda purposes.  In this document,

10     Travnik has fallen, so has Kakanj, and they're advancing towards Bugojno.

11     So tell me, if the Muslims have taken Travnik, Kakanj, and are marching

12     towards Bugojno, how can they be any allies of mine; whereas the Serbs

13     are taking in Croats who are fleeing to the area under the control of the

14     VRS?  Then who is my ally?  These are taking in Croats that are fleeing

15     from the Muslims, and these others are attacking us.  Who has mobilised

16     the Muslims against the Croats in Kakanj and Travnik in June?  And,

17     again, these are areas in the direction of Bugojno.

18             What could one do in such a situation?  The Muslims won't stop

19     their operations, and the Serbs take in civilians and a part of the

20     military that is fleeing to their territory.  And that is the truth that

21     we need to talk about, and not about allies or non-allies.  Allies should

22     not have attacked me in Travnik and Kakanj, and taken over those towns,

23     and then gone on to Bugojno, and the previous enemies are taking in

24     civilians and a part of the military that is fleeing.  And then who is an

25     ally and who is not?

Page 50559

 1             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I do apologise, but

 2     now I have had a chance to look at the transcript page 24129 from the

 3     Blaskic case.  And the Prosecution of this Tribunal has shown you this

 4     answer as if it consisted of two sentences; but the answer, in fact,

 5     consists of six lines, and the continuation of this answer would show you

 6     the context in which this answer was given.  And I consider this to be

 7     another example that the Prosecution of this Tribunal is not

 8     authentically representing the testimony of General Petkovic in the

 9     previous cases.

10             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Please proceed.

11             MR. SCOTT:

12        Q.   Thank you for your answers, Mr. Petkovic, because you have

13     confirmed, in fact, that the Serbs were your allies at exactly the time

14     that I told you that they were.  So I'm glad that we've finally come to

15     agreement on something.

16             Sir, your question -- the answer you gave in Blaskic to a general

17     question, I persist, and when we have time, when we don't have a witness

18     in the room, we can spend hours debating the transcript, and I'm happy to

19     do so.  The general -- as President Antonetti put to you, there was a

20     general question put to you.  You answered it categorically, sir, and you

21     knew exactly what you were saying:

22             "Not once.  We did not co-operate once."

23             And that, sir, answer was just fundamentally false.  And we have

24     before us now, in this binder, as represented in this table -- and we

25     don't have time, unfortunately, sir.  Again, I wish we did.  Forty-six

Page 50560

 1     documents, and the number could be double or triple that, between the

 2     10th of March, 1993 -- the 10th of March, 1993, and the 17th of January,

 3     1994, documenting extensive co-operation, combats co-operation, between

 4     the HVO and the VRS, many of which directly involving you, sir.

 5             Line 5, Petkovic to Rajic.  Line 6, Petkovic to Kiseljak HVO.

 6     Line 8, Rajic to Petkovic.  Line 9, Petkovic to Rajic.  Line 10, Rajic to

 7     Petkovic.  Line 11, Blaskic to Petkovic.  Line 12, Rajic to Petkovic,

 8     et cetera, et cetera.

 9             You told the Blaskic Judges, "Not once, we didn't co-operate

10     once."  And you lied under oath, didn't you, sir?

11        A.   No, I didn't.  I know what it was referring to and I was respond

12     to what it was referring to.  When we took over ammunition, when they

13     gave us ammunition, I accepted it.

14        Q.   Sir, you weren't talking about ammunition.  You were talking

15     about combat operations, artillery support.

16             Look at line 25 in the table as one example -- sorry, my

17     apologies.  Let's start with line 21, just to get the characters, line

18     21, Exhibit P09963.  You're talking about an agreement which was agreed

19     between two chief commanders of the two sides, General Petkovic and

20     General Mladic, and between Mr. Bruno Stojic and two chief political

21     leaders from your side.

22             JUDGE TRECHSEL:  Sorry.  Mr. Scott, the number of the document

23     has not been recorded, and it would help us to find it if we had it.

24     Thank you.

25             MR. SCOTT:  Of course, Your Honours.  P09963, line 21, and it's

Page 50561

 1     also flagged as number 21 in the blue tabs on the top of the binder.

 2        Q.   I'm going to also refer you to, sir, because I don't have time to

 3     cover all these individually, but to line 25, P09965, same format.  It

 4     will be marked as tab 25 in the binder:

 5             "On July -- on July 1993," and there may be a day missing, "At

 6     their invitation I contacted the XY side."  You know, don't you, sir,

 7     that the XY side was a term frequently used by the HVO to refer to the

 8     Serbs, don't you?

 9             There's no translation, apparently.

10             Hello?  Are you getting translation now?  Is there translation

11     now?  All right, thank you.

12             Referring to P09965:

13             "On July 1993, at their invitation, I contacted the XY side."

14             Sir, you know, don't you, that "the XY side" was a term

15     frequently used by the HVO to refer to the Serbs and the VRS; correct?

16     We can see it in this table many, many times, and it's very clear, sir,

17     who's being talked about, isn't it?

18        A.   Yes, correct.

19        Q.   "That major-general --" item 1:

20             "That Major-General Petkovic should meet with General

21     Ratko Mladic at Hotel Plaza in Herceg-Bosna on 7 July 1993."

22             Skipping to item number 4 toward the end:

23             "At this moment, we would need from them heavy artillery,

24     Howitzers, which should be positioned deep in the territory of the

25     municipality of Kiseljak for artillery support of Fojnica."

Page 50562

 1             Line 32 in the table Exhibit P03677, Glasnovic to Siljeg:

 2             "I made contact with the third side via hotline.  They agreed to

 3     help us, and they can start shooting immediately.  Therefore, it is

 4     necessary that you determine the targets to be hit, and our side should

 5     do the same."

 6             Sir, if we had the time, we'd go through all 46 documents, but we

 7     don't.  You know full well that the HVO and VRS during this time-period

 8     were engaged in extensive co-operation, not only trading arms and

 9     ammunition, oil, and other materials, but actively engaged in combat

10     operations together against the Muslims, providing the -- providing the

11     HVO with artillery support on request, et cetera; isn't that the case?

12        A.   We purchased all that from them and we paid for it, and that is

13     the truth, and at very high prices.

14        Q.   You paid for what?

15        A.   For the ammunition, artillery, and the treatment of men.  We paid

16     for all this.

17        Q.   When you gave them the grid references and said, Open fire on

18     this ABiH target, how much did you pay the Serbs for that?

19        A.   I don't know about that, about that particular case.  I know that

20     we did order grenades and mines, and we paid for them.

21        Q.   Sir, you're doing it again, sir, and you know full well.  You're

22     trying to waste time.  I put to you the question very clearly, unless

23     there was a problem in translation:  Combat operations, not buying

24     weapons, not buying grenades, not buying rifles, not buying tanks, combat

25     operations, including active artillery support opening fire on Muslim

Page 50563

 1     positions, that's what my question is, and you know it, sir.  That's the

 2     truth of the matter, isn't it, that that's what happened extensively

 3     throughout 1993?

 4        A.   It may have happened, but not in the way you are saying.

 5        Q.   And now, sir, you told the Blaskic Judges, under oath, that it

 6     didn't happen once, We did not co-operate once.  That's what you said,

 7     sir, and that was not true, was it?

 8        A.   No, I didn't know about this document.  I was shown a document

 9     from Vlasic which I denied, but this document is one I see for the first

10     time now.

11        Q.   So, once again, the fact that you gave false testimony in the

12     Blaskic case is somebody's else's fault, sir; is that what these Judges

13     should understand?

14             I don't need any comment from Mr. Kovacic.

15        A.   No.  What I knew, I testified truthfully.  But things I hadn't

16     seen were things I couldn't testify about in any way.

17        Q.   So you didn't remember these 46 documents, and if I showed you 46

18     more, you'd say you didn't remember those either; is that correct, sir?

19        A.   Every document addressed to me, I remember, but correspondence in

20     a different zone is something I cannot be familiar with because it is not

21     directed to me.

22        Q.   In fact, sir, not only did you engage in artillery -- did the VRS

23     provide you with artillery support, but in the case of action against the

24     town of Zepce, which was being held by the ABiH at that time, and we'll

25     come to the date in just a moment, you and the Serbs actually carried out

Page 50564

 1     joint combat operations to take that town, didn't you, in March of 1993?

 2        A.   No.

 3        Q.   Look at line 1 of the table, Exhibit P01643 --

 4        A.   In March 1993, there was nothing.

 5        Q.   Item 1, P01643.  Lozancic to Stojic and Boban:

 6             "The political situation in the municipalities in Zepce are

 7     growing more complex.  Please discuss our position urgently at the

 8     highest level.  It is necessary to initiate talks with the third party as

 9     a possibility of a solution for us in Usora."

10             Go to table line 7, Exhibit P02805:

11             "Zepce.  The Serbs are fully observing the cease-fire on all

12     lines toward us.  They are continuously fighting in parts where the

13     Muslims are.  Serbs, headed by Colonel Arsic, commander of the OG Doboj,

14     are offering full co-operation and joint fight against the 'balijas' in

15     these parts."

16             Table line 24 -- line 24, the 1st of July, 1993, P10884:

17             "At around 1300 hours yesterday, the town of Zepce fell into the

18     hands of the Ustasha and Chetniks.  Before the town fell, they called the

19     commander of our 319th Mountain Brigade to negotiate, and he agreed."

20             The HVO and the VRS together conquered the town of Zepce in July

21     1993, didn't they?

22        A.   No.  Zepce was continuously under the control of the HVO.  Zepce

23     was never lost by the HVO, and it was constantly under the control of the

24     HVO, the entire municipality of Zepce.  Had it not been like that, then

25     there would have been no Croats in Zepce at all.

Page 50565

 1        Q.   So I want to ask you to go to the next -- to another table in the

 2     same binder.  You'll find a table that is titled on top "HVO-Serb

 3     Co-operation in Vares."  It's behind a green tab divider, if you will.

 4     But you'll find the table titled "HVO-Serb Co-operation in Vares," in the

 5     same binder, and again these have the yellow tabs on top.

 6             And, again, we don't have the time to go through this, but based

 7     on -- in detail, I mean.  And based on what I just showed you a moment

 8     ago, I put to you, sir, another 23 documented instances between the 9th

 9     of September, 1993, and the 12th of November, just a short -- relatively

10     short period of time, 23 instances of extensive HVO-VRS co-operation in

11     the area around Vares and Kiseljak.  And you know that to be the case,

12     don't you, sir?  A number of these entries are directly to you:  Line 1,

13     P04907 Emil Harah to Petkovic; line 13, P05898, Rajic to Stojic, and

14     Petkovic; line 10, Rajic to Prlic, Praljak, Stojic, and Petkovic; line

15     12, Rajic to Stojic, Praljak, and Petkovic, et cetera, et cetera, sir.

16     And you know full well that you and the VRS were co-operating extensively

17     in the Vares area in the fall of 1993, weren't you?

18        A.   This is just a proposal for us to establish contact in the month

19     of September, and then in November we were expelled from Vares onto the

20     territory that was under the control of the VRS.  We see something that

21     somebody proposed, and we should then see what actually happened to see

22     the difference between the two.

23        Q.   Line 7, P09812, 24th of October, 1993, at the time of Stupni Do;

24     24 October 1993, a report from the Ban Jelacic Brigade to Rajic:

25             "Support in artillery by XY carried out."

Page 50566

 1             Now, that's not a proposal, sir.  That's a report that the

 2     artillery support by the XY side, who you know to be the Serbs, was, in

 3     fact, carried out, wasn't it?  --

 4        A.   This is a document from the OG, and it never reached the

 5     Main Staff, so nobody knew whether things had been done or not.

 6        Q.   Sir, are you saying that all these documents -- none of these

 7     documents on here, including the ones either from you or to you, you

 8     didn't know about, they didn't reach you?

 9        A.   Only documents sent to me and received by the Main Staff are --

10     could be known by me.  As for the others within the OG, as their internal

11     communication, there was no way for us to know about it.

12        Q.   Sir, Mr. Rajic -- Mr. Rajic was communicating to you on a very

13     frequent and regular basis, and he was reporting this information to you

14     over and over again.  He was your man in the Vares-Kiseljak area, wasn't

15     he, and he was constantly arranging deals with the Serbs, buying arms and

16     equipment, buying artillery support?  Mr. Rajic was your man in Kiseljak

17     and Vares, wasn't he, and he was keeping you informed on all these

18     matters?

19        A.   Ivica Rajic was in charge of the defence of the area, and he was

20     duty-bound to put up resistance against the Muslim aggression by hook or

21     by crook.

22        Q.   And he was duty-bound to keep you informed, wasn't he, sir?  I

23     know you want to talk about everything except answering my question.  I

24     know that, sir.  But he was also duty-bound to keep you informed, to

25     report to you, as one of his superior officers, wasn't he?

Page 50567

 1        A.   We can look at all of the reports that he sent to me.  I don't

 2     mind.

 3        Q.   Let's look at P -- line 3, P05898.  Mr. Dusko Kovacevic or

 4     Kovacevic, whichever it is, and my apologies, that gentleman was the

 5     RS -- the Republika Srpska minister of defence, wasn't he?

 6        A.   Yes, correct.

 7        Q.   Mr. Rajic reports to you on the 15th of October, 1993:

 8             "Today I met Mr. Dusko Kovacevic," and my apologies again,

 9     "briefly.  Everything is in order and proceeding according to plan, but

10     General Milivoj Petkovic has not arrived yet.  Please, do what you can to

11     speed up his arrival, because things might get worse for us if more time

12     is allowed to pass."

13             You were -- you knew and you were on your way to Central Bosnia

14     and to the Kiseljak area by mid-October 1993, a short number of days

15     before the atrocities at Stupni Do, and you knew that that action

16     ultimately would involve the co-operation of the VRS, didn't you?

17        A.   No, no co-operation with the VRS.

18        Q.   Well, you've told us that so many times before, and we've seen

19     the contrary.  And Mr. Rajic reports to you:

20             "Everything is in order and proceeding according to plan ..."

21             There was a plan between you, Mr. Rajic, the HVO, and the VRS

22     about everything that was going to happen in the Kiseljak-Vares area in

23     the next 10 days, wasn't there, including what happened in Vares and

24     Stupni Do?

25             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours --

Page 50568

 1             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This has nothing whatsoever to do

 2     with Vares.

 3             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] I have to object.  Could my

 4     learned friend explain the factual basis?  Otherwise, we'll be in the

 5     dark about what happened next, and the witness cannot answer.  If my

 6     learned friend is saying that the action in Stupni Do was planned 10 or

 7     15 days before and that this document refers to what happened in

 8     Stupni Do, then he should be directing -- the insinuations and

 9     suggestions by -- on the part of my learned friend are inappropriate for

10     this trial, I should think.

11             MR. SCOTT:

12        Q.   If you go next, sir --

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Mr. Scott, your microphone is not on.

14             MR. SCOTT:  My apologies.

15        Q.   If you go next, sir, to table line 4 -- my apologies.  Table line

16     2, which is Exhibit P09823, this is from Mr. Rajic's journal entry for

17     the same day, 15th of October, 1993, meeting Kovacic:

18             "Petkovic must urgently -- everything has been arranged.

19     Everything is happening according to the plan.  Just get in touch with

20     Mladic.  This is a big task, and it has to succeed 100 per cent.  We are

21     getting into extremely favourable situation here, and next to follow is a

22     definite solution for the Krivaja Valley.  This has to be solved

23     immediately and before winter.  Borders should be established and normal

24     life resumed.

25             "Petkovic will command deployment of our and their troops.  These

Page 50569

 1     are the words of the supreme commander."

 2             And that was the plan that was being put in place, isn't it, sir?

 3        A.   No.  These were Ivica Rajic's assumptions and requests.  Nobody

 4     was in command of the Serbs -- Serb forces, and the least so Petkovic.

 5        Q.   Let me ask you go next to table -- to the table line 19, to

 6     P06478.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, when we look

 8     at this document, Rajic says, and he mentions you in the first line,

 9     "that there is a plan," that is quite clear - we are looking at the

10     document - "that you are going to be in command of the deployment of our

11     troops and theirs."

12             "And theirs."  And he adds:

13             "These are the words of the supreme commander."

14             So he's obviously referring to Mate Boban.  So unless Mr. Rajic

15     is a fool, who is writing anything, which may be the case - we don't

16     know, but that is what is written here, and it was written on the 15th of

17     October.  And a Judge, who reads this, asks himself, first of all,

18     whether there was, indeed, a plan, and whether there was an agreement

19     between the VRS and the HVO.  So you are still claiming that you were not

20     "au currant" with this?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour Judge Antonetti, those

22     were Rajic's attempts to defend the area of Kiseljak, and he tried to

23     link up Petkovic and Kovacevic, if needed, in order to agree the things

24     that had to be taken, and he continues to say the condition for the

25     passage of the convoy is 30.000 litres of petrol.  And he says that

Page 50570

 1     Ivica Rajic is trying to agree with the Serbs to receive the material

 2     that the HVO could send to Kiseljak, and that is the long and the short

 3     of it, nothing else.  And this is also the price that we were supposed to

 4     pay if the convoy was to be organised from Herzegovina in order to avoid

 5     the charges imposed by the Serbs for such an expensive ammunition.  That

 6     was that, and I was supposed to arrive and agree on the details.  So this

 7     is about the convoy, the convoy with the ammunition that we should have

 8     sent from Herzegovina to avoid paying the Serbs through the nose, and we

 9     would have paid the passage of that convoy in kind; in petrol, as he

10     said.

11             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Listening to you, I was looking

12     at the B/C/S document.  This didn't strike me at first, but I see that

13     all this is written in a small notebook, written by hand, very nice

14     handwriting.  And apparently it is Mr. Rajic who kept this personal

15     diary, who describes, day by day, everything that was going on.  And I

16     assume that this notebook was either communicated by Mr. Rajic when he

17     negotiated a deal with the Prosecutor, or perhaps it was found in the

18     archives, so I don't know.  But this document, which appears, and I

19     stress "appears" to have been written by Rajic in realtime, and he noted

20     everything that was going on in this notebook, you've seen this notebook?

21             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, Your Honours.  It was his

22     notebook.  There was no way for me to see his notebook.  He's just

23     describing his plans, and he says what he thinks that should be done.  He

24     needed the ammunition.  The ammunition provided by the Serbs is very

25     expensive.  He want to do make the Serbs allow us to bring over our own

Page 50571

 1     ammunition because it would have been much cheaper than for us paying

 2     them in German marks or American dollars.  And here he mentions the

 3     quantity of the petrol that should have been paid for a convoy that would

 4     have been sent from Herzegovina and that would have arrived in Kiseljak,

 5     carrying the ammunition that he needed in order to defend Kiseljak from

 6     the attacks by the BiH Army.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

 8             Mr. Scott.

 9             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I apologise.  The

10     document bears different dates, and certain pages do not contain any

11     dates at all.  Maybe Mr. Scott could explain the nature of this document.

12     Have the pages been chosen randomly, or what kind of document this is.

13     As you can see, a reference is made to a meeting on the 15th of October.

14     There is no date on the right-hand-side page.  And then the following

15     page refers to December 1993, and so on and so forth.  It is very

16     difficult for me to get the bearings in the document.

17             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, you have information

18     about Mr. Rajic's notebook, I'm sure.

19             MR. SCOTT:  To get the details, Your Honour, and to be accurate,

20     I'd have to double-check that.  But to answer the more immediate question

21     that Ms. Alaburic just raised, it's a matter of translation, Your Honour.

22     If you go back to the previous page in the B/C/S version, you will see

23     clearly the date, "15/10/1993."  It should be on the screen now.  So

24     there's no mystery about that.

25             If we could turn next, please, to item number 19 in the same

Page 50572

 1     table, which is P06478, P06478, line 19 of the table.  This is a special

 2     report from the Security Administration of the Republic of

 3     Bosnia-Herzegovina, and I simply want to direct your attention to the

 4     second full paragraph of the document on page 2 of the English version:

 5             "There is reliable information that this action," and referring

 6     to Stupni Do, "above," the Stupni Do massacre, "there is reliable

 7     information that this action was under preparation as of the 16th of

 8     October this year and that it was supposed to include villages of

 9     Mijakovici, Dragovici, and Stupni Do.  Information which was collected

10     from captured members of the BH Army by the HVO leaders," making a

11     reference to Rajic, "made the HVO units staff to reduce this action only

12     to Stupni Do."

13        Q.   And, in fact, sir, you do know -- and as this document confirms

14     and you do know that, as indicated in several documents we've now looked

15     at, the action involving Stupni Do was planned around the 15th of

16     September -- excuse me, the 15th and 16th of October, 1993, wasn't it ?

17        A.   No, not correct.  The villages of Kopljari, Ljesovina, and other

18     features and facilities in the direction of Stupni Do were being attacked

19     on the 15th and the 16th, so this is upside-down.  Kopljari is a Croatian

20     village, and so were the others.

21        Q.   Nothing you've said, sir, is to the contrary of this having been

22     planned on those days.  You know, you just go on and start talking, and

23     you don't answer the question.  Nothing you said is contrary to the fact

24     that I put to you -- what I put to you, and that is the action of

25     Stupni Do was planned on the 15th and 16th of October, 1993, regardless

Page 50573

 1     of what was taking place somewhere else; isn't that true, sir?

 2             MR. KARNAVAS:  Again, Your Honour, I want to object at this

 3     point.

 4             Look at the question, look at the answer.  General Petkovic

 5     answered the question and then gave an explanation.  Then look at the

 6     following question, and if I were in another courtroom in my

 7     jurisdiction, I would argue that -- I would object as being

 8     argumentative, this is, and also it misstates the answer.  So on two

 9     grounds.

10             So if you look at the following question, it is simply unfair,

11     and I think that at some point the Bench has an obligation to at least

12     point out to the Prosecutor that he can be as vigorous as he wishes, but

13     he needs to be fair to the witness.  I invite you to look at the series,

14     question, answer, question.  It is simply not fair, and I shouldn't have

15     to be objecting.

16             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott, I believe that all

17     the questions you have put were intended to have General Petkovic admit

18     that the operation was prepared as of the 15th of October.  That is the

19     question?

20             MR. SCOTT:  Yes, Your Honour.

21             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

22             General Petkovic, regardless of all these procedural issues, the

23     Prosecutor is telling you that the operation was planned as of the 15th

24     of October.  What is your comment?

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, this is not true.  On

Page 50574

 1     the 15th of October and around that date, the BiH Army launched an attack

 2     against Vares.  It took the Croatian village of Kopljari, the Ljesnica

 3     feature, and some other features around Vares, and that's what happened.

 4     Therefore, the BiH Army launched an attack on Vares, took those features,

 5     and that, in turn, created a situation in Vares after which the commander

 6     turned to his superior for assistance because he didn't know how to

 7     control the situation from then on.

 8             There's no dispute that the HVO had lost some of its positions

 9     and that this position was less favourable from then on.  There was no

10     mention of Stupni Do, so that had nothing whatsoever to do with

11     Stupni Do.

12             We saw, in the case of Rajic, what happened with the Croatian

13     village of Kopljari and other features in the direction of Vares.

14     Croatian villages were falling, Croatian positions were falling, and

15     Vares is under threat.  Nobody mentioned Stupni Do until the moment Rajic

16     actually went to Stupni Do.

17             MR. SCOTT:  Mr. President, we're about to get into Vares and

18     Stupni Do in a more significant way, and I know it is a few minutes

19     early, but now might be the best time to take the break.  But, of course,

20     I'll proceed however the Chamber guides me.

21             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  As you wish, let us

22     now have a 20-minute break.

23                           --- Recess taken at 5.32 p.m.

24                           --- On resuming at 5.54 p.m.

25             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I believe that the Stojic

Page 50575

 1     Defence has something to say or ask.

 2             MR. KHAN:  Mr. President, Your Honours, thank you so much.  In

 3     fact, I'd asked for five minutes at the end of the day, but it's a very

 4     short matter.

 5             We are responding tomorrow to request certification or, in the

 6     alternative, leave to appeal against Your Honour's decision dated the

 7     15th of February, 2010, which related to the Praljak motion.

 8     Your Honour, the word limit for this is ordinarily 3.000 words.  As we

 9     are combining both an application for reconsideration and, in the

10     alternative, a request for a certification to appeal, we would humbly ask

11     the Trial Chamber to grant a dispensation and file a document of not more

12     than 3.500 words.  We will endeavour to make it as pithy and short as

13     possible, but at the moment, because of some authorities that need to be

14     included, and instead of filing two separate documents, we deem it more

15     efficient to file one document that Your Honours can consider, and that's

16     the basis of the application.  Your Honour, I thought it simpler, given

17     the proximity of the dead-line tomorrow, to raise this in court.

18             I'm grateful.

19             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Khan, to understand well,

20     your request is linked to the request of the Praljak Defence, that is,

21     for a certification to appeal following a decision by the Chamber

22     rendered in connection with 92 bis; is that right?

23             MR. KHAN:  Indeed, Mr. President, in relation to the documents --

24     the order of the 15th of February, 2010, for the admission of elements.

25                           [Defence counsel confer]

Page 50576

 1             MR. KHAN:  Indeed, Your Honours, my learned friend tells me, not

 2     92 bis.  It was the documents that were the subject of the decision of

 3     the 15th of December -- 15th of February, 2010.  I think there was one

 4     order of the Trial Chamber on that date.

 5     JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I see, yes.  I shall consult my

 6     colleagues.

 7                           [Trial Chamber confers]

 8             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] After having heard the

 9     explanations by Mr. Khan, representing the interests of Mr. Stojic,

10     agrees that his submissions consist of 3.500 words instead of 3.000.

11             MR. KHAN:  I'm most grateful.  Thank you.

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  Mr. Scott.

13             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Mr. President.

14        Q.   Mr. Petkovic, continuing on further into the topic of Vares and

15     Stupni Do, I'd like to assist the Judges, if we can, to talk a moment

16     about your relationship with Mr. Rajic.

17             You and Mr. Rajic had extensive dealings with each other in 1993,

18     and I think you told us the other day, if my memory serves, that you had

19     probably travelled to Kiseljak in 1993 at least -- and perhaps at least,

20     as I heard you and understood, maybe substantially more, but at least 20

21     times; is that correct?

22        A.   Yes, more or less.

23        Q.   In fact, during this time-period, it would be fair to say,

24     wouldn't it, that between you and Mr. Rajic, there was not only a

25     superior-subordinate relationship, but the two of you were actually

Page 50577

 1     friendly, on good terms, you socialised together when you were in

 2     Kiseljak?  You had a friendly relationship with each other for a

 3     substantial period of time, didn't you?

 4        A.   I was on friendly terms with everybody, including Rajic. 

 5     Friendly in the order, too.

 6        Q.   In fact, sir, by the time that we get to October 1993, Mr. Rajic

 7     had really had a bit of a checkered career with the HVO, he'd been in

 8     trouble and removed on previous occasions, and in fact, sir, you were

 9     something of Mr. Rajic's protector, weren't you?

10        A.   No, not true.

11        Q.   You protected Mr. Rajic.  You intervened on his behalf on a

12     number of occasions, and probably kept him in better standing with the

13     HVO than he would have had it not been for you; isn't that true?

14        A.   No, not true.  Rajic enjoyed the same status as everybody else,

15     and he didn't enjoy my protection if he didn't do things properly.

16        Q.   Well, I want to -- I want to put the Prosecution case to you very

17     clearly, sir.  I put it to you that you and Mr. Rajic were close friends,

18     you socialised frequently when you were in Kiseljak, you were close to

19     Mr. Rajic.  You co-operated extensively with him, among other things, in

20     your dealings with the Serbs, and that you protected Mr. Rajic on a

21     number of occasions, and that's the nature of your relations going into

22     Stupni Do, wasn't it?

23        A.   No, not true.

24        Q.   Is it your testimony, sir, that you did not become aware of the

25     HVO attack on Stupni Do on the 23rd of October, 1993?  You did not learn

Page 50578

 1     of it on the day of the 23rd; is that your testimony?

 2        A.   No, I didn't learn then.  I learned late in the evening after the

 3     meeting with the Main Staff of the HVO and my conversation with

 4     Zarko Tole, I believe.

 5        Q.   Well, let's look at Exhibit P06032.

 6             MR. SCOTT:  And, Your Honour, we're now changing to another set

 7     of binders.  I apologise for the volume of materials, but we're now

 8     changing to what is called binder 2, but actually, in fairness, there are

 9     two parts of binder 2.  There's binder 2, number 1, which includes the

10     exhibits which were marked on the back of the binder, on the spine of the

11     binder, P00150 to P02142, and binder number 2 of the set includes

12     Exhibits P02182 to 5D04271.  So we're going now to P06026, which is in

13     binder 2 of the set.

14             While everyone is orienting themselves to that, it's a document

15     that we've seen many times in the courtroom, so I think we can go

16     forward, I hope.

17        Q.   This is the report from Mr. Rajic to Dario Kordic,

18     Milivoj Petkovic, Tihomir Blaskic, and Mr. Mario Bradara on the 23rd of

19     October, 1993.  And you're saying to us again, sir, that you claim not to

20     have received this on the 23rd of October, 1993; is that right?

21        A.   No, sir, it was sent to me in Mostar, and I was not in Mostar.

22        Q.   What you said on the 17th of February, sir, at pages -- at

23     transcript page 49613-614, in answering a similar question:

24             "No, Your Honours, this information couldn't have reached me

25     because Paket radio doesn't recognise my name and surname.  It only

Page 50579

 1     recognises the station to which it is sent, which was Mostar in this

 2     case."

 3             That was your testimony on the 17th of February, wasn't it?

 4        A.   Yes, that's correct.

 5        Q.   Now, Witness EA testified, and I'm at -- making reference to --

 6     and I'm proceeding cautiously because it's a protected witness, but I

 7     don't think, in this respect, there will be any inadvertent disclosure, I

 8     hope.  At transcript page 24729, Witness EA explained this:

 9             "From an operative point of view, whoever received this message

10     at the Main Staff, and knows that General Petkovic is not there and the

11     message is for him, and this person knows that General Petkovic is

12     somewhere else, then he is duty-bound to forward this message to

13     General Petkovic.  If they acted differently, then they were doing the

14     wrong thing."

15             And that's an accurate statement of the process and what should

16     have happened, isn't it, sir?

17        A.   No, that is not the exact procedure.  The procedure was exactly

18     what was done.  When Petkovic was absent, it was General Praljak who

19     would be informed, and that would have been the procedure and not what

20     your witness told you that it was.

21        Q.   That's not what you said last week, sir.  You confirmed to us

22     last Wednesday, and I covered this with you very specifically and

23     obviously, in part, for this purpose, you testified that the procedure

24     was you travelled to Kiseljak and Vitez often.  I asked you:

25             "Q.  Did you travel to Vitez and Kiseljak and other places?

Page 50580

 1             "A.  Yes, I did.

 2             "Q.  And when you weren't physically in Mostar, how would you be

 3     reached?"

 4             Answer, Well, the duty people would know where I was.  In fact, I

 5     didn't even have to tell them an address.  If they knew I was in

 6     Kiseljak, they knew where I was.  Your testimony was very close to that.

 7     I'm not quoting in verbatim from memory, but I think that's a fair

 8     summary.  And that's the case, sir, isn't it?  You knew -- you'd been to

 9     Kiseljak many times, at least 20 times in 1993.  Your headquarters staff,

10     the duty officer would have known that.  And if a fax came -- or a Paket

11     came in for you, they would have known exactly where to send it, wouldn't

12     they?  They knew you were in Kiseljak, at the headquarters, Mr. Rajic's

13     headquarters.  And we've seen even today all these documents and

14     communications about co-operation with the Serbs, frequent communication

15     back and forth between Herzegovina and Mr. Rajic in Kiseljak, and your

16     people -- your people, sir, in Mostar knew exactly how to reach you in

17     Kiseljak, didn't they?

18        A.   Yes, when I was at the head of the Main Staff, at this time there

19     was a commander in Mostar, that's when the commander was there.  There

20     was no need for me to receive this.  Praljak did.  It's not addressed to

21     him, but you can see his handwriting down here that shows that he

22     received it.  But he's not a part of those to whom it was addressed.

23     There was no need for me to be sought after if the commander received the

24     document.

25        Q.   Exactly, sir.  Exactly, sir.  You say -- my apologies,

Page 50581

 1     interpreters.

 2             You say, sir, that, I didn't receive it because I wasn't in

 3     Mostar, and they wouldn't have known -- essentially, what you say is they

 4     wouldn't have known where to send it, but you know that's not true, sir.

 5     The headquarters staff knew exactly where you were, didn't they?  And

 6     they didn't have to know where Mr. Praljak was, but it was forwarded to

 7     Mr. Praljak.  They knew how to find him and they knew how to forward it

 8     to him, didn't they?

 9        A.   No, that's not correct.  General Praljak was in the Main Staff,

10     and when this arrived, and it was addressed to Petkovic in Mostar, it was

11     forwarded to General Praljak.  That was the end of the procedure, and

12     there was no need to send it to Petkovic if it had been received by the

13     commander.

14        Q.   Well, of course there was a need, sir, because that's who your --

15     that's who Rajic addressed it to.  It wasn't addressed to Praljak.  It

16     was addressed to you and Mr. Kordic and Mr. Blaskic.  Of course there was

17     a reason to make sure you got it, and you did receive it, didn't you?

18     You want to tell this Chamber you didn't receive it, but your

19     headquarters staff knew exactly where you were, the same place you had

20     been so many times before, in Kiseljak, with Rajic, and just like they

21     knew how to send it on to Mr. -- excuse me, Mr. Praljak, wherever he was,

22     they knew exactly how to send it on to you, where you were, didn't they?

23        A.   No.  General Praljak was in his office.  The document arrived.

24     It was addressed to Petkovic, as if Petkovic were in Mostar.  It was

25     forwarded to Praljak, and it was no longer necessary for anyone to look

Page 50582

 1     for Petkovic once the commander had received this document.  And that is

 2     why the procedure as of that moment proceeded from Praljak and not from

 3     General Petkovic.

 4        Q.   Let's go to Exhibit P06026 in the second binder.  It should be

 5     very close by, numerically, 6026.

 6             So this, in fact, is a version of the document that obviously

 7     Mr. Praljak had received, because as you said a moment ago, Mr. Praljak

 8     scribbled some information on the bottom of the page about taking --

 9     gaining control and dealing with the situation in Vares, without mercy

10     towards anyone.  You see that, don't you, at the bottom of the document?

11        A.   Yes, I can see it in the document.

12        Q.   And you received that document, didn't you, in Kiseljak?

13        A.   No, no, no.  This document can't be returned in this form.

14     There's a document that's typed, there's a new document.  You've seen it

15     here, so show me that one.

16        Q.   Sir, you received a typed version, a Paket version of that

17     document, and we've seen it in the courtroom before, and you received

18     that in Kiseljak, didn't you?

19        A.   Only what it says at the bottom:  "Petkovic, deal with the

20     situation," sent to the following addresses, but I didn't receive the

21     other text.

22        Q.   P06028, the same binder, P06028, a Paket version of the document

23     from Mr. Praljak, addressed to you and others, Mr. Rajic, Mr. Kordic,

24     Mr. Blaskic.  And you received that, didn't you?

25        A.   Yes, I received this, but not the part that is handwritten at the

Page 50583

 1     top.  So that's why I'm trying to tell you what I actually received.

 2        Q.   You received this on the 23rd of October, 1993, didn't you?

 3        A.   That's correct.

 4        Q.   So what you want this Chamber to believe is, even though the

 5     previous Paket communication was directed to you, even though your

 6     headquarters staff clearly knew exactly where you were, you didn't

 7     receive the first report from Mr. Rajic, but on the very same day, a

 8     short time later, you received -- you did, in fact, receive this Paket

 9     from Herzegovina to you in Kiseljak; is that correct?

10        A.   Yes, that's correct.  There was no need for it to be sent to me

11     if the commander was there and he received it.  The commander then

12     reacted to the document.  The document arrived around midnight in

13     Kiseljak.

14        Q.   You keep saying there was no need, but when someone addresses a

15     document to a person, I put to you, there is a need for it to be

16     delivered to that person.  Mr. Rajic says, Mr. Petkovic, Mr. Kordic,

17     Mr. Blaskic.  And under the military chain of command, it wasn't up to

18     the duty officer in Mostar to decide who it should be forwarded to.  I

19     assume that what a military duty officer does is, when he receives an

20     order, he makes sure that that document gets to the person to whom it's

21     addressed, doesn't he, in addition to anyone else?

22        A.   No, not in this case.  It's taken to the most responsible person

23     in the Main Staff, and that was the commander who received the document.

24     If he received the document, then it's not necessary to send it to

25     lower-ranking officers.

Page 50584

 1        Q.   Mr. Vinko Lucic is a person you worked with closely in Kiseljak

 2     when you were there on these various occasions; correct?

 3        A.   Yes, he was a liaison officer with UNPROFOR -- for UNPROFOR.

 4        Q.   In fact, in addition to Mr. Rajic, himself, Mr. Lucic was, once

 5     again, your man in Kiseljak, wasn't he?

 6        A.   No, they weren't my men.  They were part of the HVO.  My men,

 7     well, that just refers to my family.  These were people who are part of

 8     the HVO.

 9        Q.   Sir, these were men -- both Rajic and Lucic were men that you

10     interacted with frequently either you were in Kiseljak or in your

11     communications with Kiseljak.  I don't know what term you would use in

12     your language, perhaps.  They were your right-hand men, they were your

13     lieutenants, they were your preferred people for doing business with in

14     Kiseljak, weren't they, Mr. Rajic and Mr. Lucic?

15        A.   No, they weren't my favourite men.  Lucic had to communicate with

16     UNPROFOR and relay everything that UNPROFOR had for me or that I had for

17     UNPROFOR.  Rajic was the commander who was responsible in that area, and

18     it was natural that if I went to Kiseljak or Sarajevo, when I arrived

19     there, I would be with those people until I left.

20        Q.   Sir, Lucic was a responsible officer, in your experience,

21     reliable?  Did he ever let you down?

22        A.   Lucic communicated in an appropriate manner with UNPROFOR.  That

23     was his main task, and he was constantly in contact with UNPROFOR.

24        Q.   I repeat my question:  He was a responsible officer, in your

25     experience, reliable?  Did he ever let you down?

Page 50585

 1        A.   If he carried out all the tasks that he had to carry out, then he

 2     didn't let me down.  Why should he let me down if he carried out the

 3     tasks?

 4        Q.   Did he ever let you -- you said "if," sir, my question is a

 5     factual one.  Based on your experience, the 20-plus times you were in

 6     Kiseljak, all your interactions with Mr. Lucic, which were considerable,

 7     did he ever let you down or did you find him to be a reliable officer?

 8     It's a very simple question.

 9        A.   Yes, he was a reliable officer.  He performed his tasks well.

10        Q.   Judge Antonetti asked you this on the 17th of February, because

11     by the time we get to October, Ahmici has already happened.  You know,

12     sir, that was a terrible experience for many reasons for the HVO.  It's a

13     worldwide scandal reported in the international press.  One of the

14     reasons, in fact, for the creation of this Tribunal.  And when you saw

15     Stupni Do happening, you thought, This is going to be Ahmici all over

16     again, didn't you?  --

17        A.   I don't know what you mean exactly.

18        Q.   It was "deja vu," some might say, all over again, wasn't it, sir?

19     It was going to be just like Ahmici.  We're going to have the

20     internationals all over us, the international media is going to be saying

21     what terrible things the HVO was doing, another atrocity.  You knew that

22     this was going to be -- you were afraid that this was going to be Ahmici

23     all over again, weren't you?

24        A.   Why would I have been afraid of that?  I had contact with

25     UNPROFOR, and I allowed UNPROFOR to enter Stupni Do and take the steps

Page 50586

 1     that they thought were the most appropriate ones.

 2        Q.   Well, we'll get to that, sir, about access and what you did or

 3     didn't do.  What you really did, sir, is that you immediately, even on

 4     the 23rd, as soon as you heard this information, which I put it to you

 5     you did know on the 23rd, you immediately began what we might call damage

 6     control, didn't you?  Maybe if I act fast enough, maybe if I talk to the

 7     right people, maybe if we do the right things, we can put a lid on it

 8     now.  It won't be like Ahmici.  We can put a lid on it and keep this from

 9     blowing up.  That's what you thought, and that's what you tried to do,

10     isn't it?

11        A.   No, no, that's not true, it's not true.  The international forces

12     entered that area.  They closed the area off, and then no one could

13     prevent them doing what they wanted to do.

14        Q.   Sir, UNPROFOR was not able to enter into Stupni Do for some time,

15     and, in fact, at one point General Tole issued an order to surround the

16     UNPROFOR vehicles with anti-armour weapons and prevent them from moving,

17     didn't he?

18        A.   Yes, I heard about that, and I reacted to prevent that.  You have

19     that document.

20        Q.   You testified that by the 7th of November, you requested

21     information from the internationals, but isn't it true, sir, that on the

22     24th of October, the very day after the attack, UNPROFOR was already

23     asking your office in Kiseljak what had happened?  It wasn't you looking

24     for information from UNPROFOR.  It was UNPROFOR looking for information

25     from you, wasn't it?

Page 50587

 1        A.   No.  On the 25th of October, General Ramsay, who was a brigadier

 2     at the time, called me, and I spent a long time with him in discussions

 3     so that he could provide me with the information he had, if he had any.

 4        Q.   Let's go to Exhibit P06053, P06053.  This is an UNPROFOR report

 5     from the 24th of October, 1993.  Looking to the third page of the English

 6     version, it's under a heading, if you might be able to find it -- item

 7     numbered 9 under "Actions Taken":

 8             "NordBat II has been tasked to get to Stupni Do to carry out full

 9     reci [phoen] and search for signs of a massacre, and to check other

10     Muslim areas and to check allegation of systematic looting by the BiH."

11             Look at both sides:

12             Item 10:

13             "Informed Lucic, HVO, CO, of our concerns.  Answer attached."

14             G3:

15             "Send letter of protest to Boban and Petkovic, seeking their

16     intention to prevent attacks on civilians."

17             Item 11:

18             "As at the 24th of October at 1730 hours, NordBat II still being

19     blocked from access to Stupni Do.  Letters received from Lucic, HVO LO,"

20     liaison officer, "and Petkovic, HVO commander, which are

21     self-explanatory, are enclosed.  Verbal assurances have now been received

22     from HVO LO," liaison officer, "of NordBat II freedom to enter all

23     villages in the area."

24             If we can go -- with that in mind, sir, if we can go to

25     Exhibit 6 -- excuse me, P06049.  It should be, again, close by, P06049:

Page 50588

 1     Let's look at the response from Mr. Lucic that is reported in the

 2     UNPROFOR document we just looked at.

 3             Mr. Lucic says, on the 24th of October, 1993:

 4             "Regarding your request for assistance in connection with the

 5     investigation of alleged massacre over Muslim population in Vares

 6     municipality, I informed it was true that a large conflict occurred,"

 7     et cetera.

 8             "Any checked information --" look toward the bottom, about the

 9     middle of the page:

10             "Any checked information about any attacking enemies of HVO

11     Vares --" my apologies:

12             "I do not have any checked information about any attacking

13     activities of HVO Vares, so I doubt about the information from the Muslim

14     side concerning the massacre in Stupni Do village.

15             "In the annex, I deliver you an order issued by General Petkovic

16     regarding the situation in Vares municipality.  General Petkovic is

17     personally interested for the performance of the investigation of ethnic

18     cleansing of the villages in Vares municipality.

19             "You have our full support."

20             Now, Mr. Lucic sent this communication to UNPROFOR on the 24th of

21     October, at your direction, didn't he?

22        A.   No, not according to my instructions, but he spoke then about it,

23     and it was as a result of the fact that they didn't have the information,

24     so he then wrote a letter to UNPROFOR on the 24th, and then I was asked

25     to go and speak to General Ramsay on the 25th.  So no one had the right

Page 50589

 1     information.

 2        Q.   Sir, you were -- Mr. Lucic is not providing -- is not asking them

 3     for information.  He's providing information, and he says:

 4             "I delivered you an order issued by General Petkovic regarding

 5     the situation."

 6             Mr. Lucic acted on your instructions in doing this, didn't he?

 7     How did he get the copy of the order issued by you if he wasn't acting

 8     co-operatively with you?

 9        A.   No.  Here the problem is we don't have reliable information.  We

10     informed UNPROFOR that we had no information.  There was just hearsay.

11        Q.   Again, sir, you're not answering my question.  I didn't say -- I

12     didn't ask you one thing about whether you had reliable information or

13     not.  My question was -- please listen, sir.  Please listen very

14     carefully to the translation.  My question was:  Mr. Lucic prepared and

15     sent this communication to UNPROFOR on your instructions and in

16     co-operation with you, didn't he?

17        A.   Yes, obviously he sent a message to UNPROFOR so that we could

18     contact them and obtain reliable information.  That happened on the

19     following day, on the 25th, at a meeting between myself and --

20        Q.   Sir, I put it to you, you already had information.  You had the

21     report from Mr. -- you had the report from Mr. Rajic, which I again

22     assert to you that you had received, and you had Mr. Praljak's order that

23     you admitted receiving also on the 23rd.  It wasn't you that needed

24     information, it was UNPROFOR looking for information, and you and

25     Mr. Lucic sent this, as you just confirmed; correct?

Page 50590

 1        A.   We said that we had no verified information.  You can see that

 2     the text says we haven't got any verified information.  I received an

 3     order from General Praljak that evening, and you can see that, it's

 4     obvious, but we had no verified information.

 5        Q.   Let's go to P06022, P06022.  And that's the attachment to

 6     Mr. Lucic's report he refers to.  In the annex:

 7             "I deliver you an order issued by General Petkovic.

 8             General Petkovic, dated the 23rd of October, the day of the

 9     attack, the 23rd of October, Petkovic to the HVO Vares commander:

10             "1.  To control the situation in Vares, you have the

11     authorisations to remove the following people from their present

12     functions:

13             Anto Pejcinovic, Zvonko Duznovic, Ivica Gavran.

14             "2.  Investigate the responsibility for the situation in Croatian

15     and Muslim villages where, in accordance with our incomplete findings,

16     ethnic cleansing of the population occurred.

17             "3.  This decision is to be implemented obediently."

18             According to Mr. Lucic, sir, you had issued this order already on

19     the 23rd of October, 1993, the same day as the attack; correct?  And

20     that's true, isn't it?

21        A.   After receiving the information from General Praljak, the

22     situation in Vares is to be resolved.

23             THE INTERPRETER:  The interpreter notes that the witness is very

24     faint and cannot be heard very well.

25             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was very late in the night.

Page 50591

 1     That's when the order arrived at Kiseljak.

 2             MR. SCOTT:

 3        Q.   You're being asked, sir, to keep your voice up a bit, if you can.

 4     The interpreters are having some difficulty hearing you.

 5             Sir, how did you -- what was the source of your information that

 6     it was Pejcinovic, Duznovic and Gavran who should be removed?

 7        A.   I received the information from the commander.  The situation was

 8     to be dealt with.  They were to be shown no mercy.  The information

 9     arrived from Colonel Blaskic.

10        Q.   You're telling us that, on the one hand, you're not receiving

11     communications, but, on the other hand, the communications are getting

12     all the way to Mr. Praljak in Herzegovina and back to you, that you're

13     getting information from Mr. Blaskic in Vitez, that's somehow getting to

14     Vitez and back to you.  You were sitting in Kiseljak, sir, with an

15     operable Paket machine and other communication, I put to you.  It's

16     simply illogical, sir, that you were not receiving these communications

17     addressed to you.  Again, I go back to what I said 20 minutes ago:  Your

18     headquarters staff knew where you were, they knew how to reach you, and

19     you were getting all these communications, weren't you?

20        A.   No, that message wasn't returned to me.  I received an order to

21     deal with the situation in Vares and to bring in the people who were

22     responsible.  We found out --

23        Q.   Excuse me, sir.  My apologies to the interpreters, but we have to

24     move on.

25             Sir, you've told -- you received the issue -- the order from

Page 50592

 1     Praljak, you know, Show no mercy, get things in control.  Mr. Praljak's

 2     order doesn't mention any individuals by name.  He just says, Go and gain

 3     control.  No individuals, no names, no one identified.  The next thing we

 4     know is we have a document from you, dated the same day as the attack, 23

 5     of October, identifying these three men.  Now, you say you received that

 6     information from Mr. Blaskic; is that what you're telling us?

 7        A.   I'm saying that Blaskic had information, and the Main Staff also

 8     had information.  And previously I said - you've forgotten that - that

 9     information about the matter arrived from Zarko Tole, information about

10     the people concerned.  So when we checked the order, who it concerned,

11     which people were concerned, well, that was the situation.

12        Q.   Well, Mr. Tole, again, was another person who knew how to reach

13     you in Kiseljak; is that correct?

14        A.   Well, Tole was in the Main Staff.  He knew where I was, and he

15     knew how to use the phone to call me.

16        Q.   Of course he did, just like your duty officer at the Main Staff

17     knew how to reach you as well?

18        A.   Yes, he did, but it wasn't necessary for him to return a document

19     to me.  Someone else had it, someone else who was more senior than myself

20     was to receive it, and he received it.

21        Q.   Sir, you sent these communications -- you and Mr. Lucic sent the

22     two documents that are marked as P06049, Mr. Lucic's letter or

23     communication, and your order, which is P06022.  You fired those off to

24     UNPROFOR for the exact reasons that I put to you 15 or 20 minutes ago,

25     and that is:  If we act quickly, if we get some information out to

Page 50593

 1     UNPROFOR, if we tell them we're already taking actions, we can keep

 2     this -- we can maybe keep a lid on this situation, and then we won't have

 3     another Ahmici on our hands.  That's what you were thinking, isn't it?

 4        A.   No, that's not true, that's not true.  Have a look at item 2.  We

 5     didn't know what had happened in Ahmici.  We just assumed.  Why wouldn't

 6     we have written down what you can find in that report under item 2?

 7        Q.   Sir, you knew Ahmici was a crime and if we have time --

 8        A.   [Overlapping speakers] [No interpretation]

 9        Q.   If we have time, we'll get -- you knew Ahmici was a crime.

10     You've said that before.  You know it was a crime.  The HVO committed it.

11     It was the military police.  And you've conceded all that, so there's no

12     question about Ahmici being a crime.  But you knew that it created huge

13     problems for the HVO.  This happens in April 1993, and now you find

14     yourself sitting in Kiseljak, getting these reports of another atrocity

15     in Stupni Do, and you think -- you're thinking, This is going to be

16     Ahmici all over again.  That's what you were thinking, and you were

17     trying to put a lid on it, some people might say; isn't that true?

18        A.   No.  No, we did not wish to conceal it from anyone.  We didn't

19     wish to conceal it from anyone, nor did we conceal it, in fact.

20        Q.   Despite the fact that Mr. Rajic and Mr. Tole kept UNPROFOR out of

21     Stupni Do for some time; isn't that the case?

22        A.   I don't know when UNPROFOR made the request.  But when Mr. Ramsay

23     explained the situation to me, UNPROFOR entered Stupni Do the next day.

24        Q.   P06104, P06104, a communication from the head of the Main Staff.

25     Perhaps Mr. Praljak:

Page 50594

 1             "We have received a confirmation of the Croatian TV saying they

 2     have footage of the massacre in Stupni Do, which they had received

 3     through exchange with foreign agencies."

 4             On the 25th of October, 1993, you were losing control, weren't

 5     you, sir?  Events were spinning out of your control.  Now the television

 6     station has footage of the massacre; correct?

 7        A.   No, I don't know whether the TV station had footage on the

 8     massacre.  I don't know which TV team entered Stupni Do on the 25th with

 9     UNPROFOR.  This is just guess-work that HTV had footage, and HTV was not

10     in Stupni Do, and I don't know whether they had any footage from anyone.

11        Q.   Well, it's not guess-work.  It's not guess-work, sir.

12     Mr. Praljak or someone, the head of the Main Staff, said, We have

13     received confirmation that they have footage.  It's no guess-work at all,

14     sir, so you're just flat wrong on that.

15             Now, if you go to Exhibit P09968, P0 -- excuse me, P0 - I may

16     have said too many zeros, P09968, this is a further document from you,

17     sir, on the 7th of November, 1993, to Operative Group 2, Kiseljak.  That

18     was Mr. Rajic, wasn't it?

19        A.   Yes, correct.

20        Q.   Now, by now we're the 7th of November, and Stupni Do happens at

21     least on the first day, the 23rd of October, and now it's the 7th of

22     November.  And let me direct your attention to item number 7:

23             "UN is to be given freedom of movement, but you should record

24     their every move.  Do not allow them to move outside of the road."

25             When you say "freedom of movement," sir, that you gave them

Page 50595

 1     freedom of movement some days later, that's your idea of freedom of

 2     movement, keep them on the road; correct?

 3        A.   UNPROFOR has roads along which they go.  UNPROFOR may not

 4     approach HVO positions outside the road in the area of Kiseljak.

 5        Q.   Let's go back to your meeting at UNPROFOR on the 25th of October,

 6     P06144, P06144.  This is when you and Mr. Lucic, and also Mr. Bandic, the

 7     Mr. Bandic that we've heard so much about, went to meet with UNPROFOR

 8     with Mr. Ramsay on the 25th of October.

 9             Item number 2:

10             "General Petkovic knew about the possible massacre of civilians

11     at Stupni Do."

12             "He stressed that two HVO officers had been arrested and others

13     suspended."

14             He was clearly embarrassed, according to them:

15             "HVO will investigate --"

16             A couple of lines down:

17             "HVO will investigate, and disciplinary will follow as

18     necessary."

19             Can you tell us, sir, the two HVO officers that you said had been

20     arrested as of the 25th of October, who were they?

21        A.   Let me just add that you left out that I got the information from

22     Radio Sarajevo, which is very important.  And the two officers were

23     Duznovic and Gavran.

24        Q.   And where did you get that information?  Who told you that they

25     had been arrested?

Page 50596

 1        A.   Because the order said that they should be arrested.

 2        Q.   What order?

 3        A.   The order dated the 23rd.  Duznovic and this other man - what's

 4     his name?  Gavran are mentioned.

 5        Q.   Sir, Mr. Duznovic and Mr. Gavran were not members of the HVO

 6     military.  They were essentially part of the HVO political government in

 7     Vares, and they had nothing to do with Stupni Do, did they?  Neither of

 8     those men stepped foot in Stupni Do on the 23rd or 24th of November,

 9     1993, did they?

10        A.   No, they were not members of the government.  Pejcinovic was.

11     They were in the military -- Duznovic was in the military, and the other

12     one was in the MUP, the police.  So one of them was in the SIS, I think

13     Duznovic, and the other one, Gavran, was in the police.

14        Q.   Neither of those men had anything to do with Stupni Do.  They

15     weren't in Stupni Do, they didn't carry out any of the execution, they

16     didn't burn any of the houses down.  You know full well those men had

17     nothing to do with Stupni Do.  You know it now, and you knew it on the

18     25th of October, 1993, didn't you?

19        A.   The information about them was such that they were the people who

20     needed to be temporarily detained at that point in time.

21        Q.   And who was suspended -- and then it goes on to say "And others

22     suspended," so who were they?

23        A.   The Commander Harak, who abandoned his place, and Mr. Bozic took

24     over from him.  He was suspended and temporarily relieved of duty.

25        Q.   And who else?  It says "others."  Besides Mr. Harah [sic], who

Page 50597

 1     else was suspended?

 2        A.   There were other reports, but I can't remember now.  Two or three

 3     officers from the Bobovac Brigade Command.  I know of Harak, and there

 4     were some others who asked to be relieved of their duties --

 5        Q.   Sir, your communication, what you told Ramsay on the 25th of

 6     October, again, this was just your effort to feed UNPROFOR some

 7     information, again, to create the impression that you were trying to do

 8     something about the situation, but you knew full well that Duznovic and

 9     Gavran, among others, had nothing to do with Stupni Do.  But you had to

10     tell UNPROFOR something, didn't you?

11        A.   I had information about Stupni Do from Radio Sarajevo, and that

12     was my main motive to go to Mr. Ramsay to discuss this.  And these were

13     the people against whom we took certain measures.  Why doesn't the

14     brigade commander have nothing to do with Stupni Do?  He asked to be

15     relieved, and he was temporarily relieved.

16        Q.   I was talking about Mr. Gavran and Mr. Duznovic, sir.  That's one

17     of the names I gave you just a moment ago.

18             Who in the HVO military and governmental leadership, by the

19     time -- by this time, by the 25th of October, by the time of your other

20     communication to UNPROFOR on the 7th of November, the one we looked at a

21     few minutes ago -- or about UNPROFOR to Mr. Rajic, excuse me.  By that

22     time, who had you talked to in the top echelons of the HVO military and

23     governmental leadership?

24        A.   I talked to Mr. Praljak, I talked to Mr. Tole, and I talked to

25     Mr. Boban, as far as I can remember now.

Page 50598

 1        Q.   And it was following this meeting with Mr. Ramsay that you and

 2     Mr. Lucic and the intelligence officer and your travel companion to

 3     Central Bosnia, Mr. Bandic, went back to the offices in Kiseljak,

 4     Mr. Rajic's -- the same place where Mr. Rajic was, and left the note and

 5     the instructions for Mr. Rajic; correct?

 6        A.   No, that is not correct.  I left a document for Rajic in

 7     connection with what was happening in Stupni Do, if that's what you

 8     meant, and another document for the Bobovac Brigade, or, rather, it is

 9     one and the same document addressed to both of them.

10        Q.   Sir, you knew, didn't you, around this time that the Vares Croats

11     felt that essentially they had been sold out, the HVO in Herceg-Bosna

12     leadership had taken the position that, you know, Vares is never going to

13     remain part of Herceg-Bosna, it's too far to the east, it's too

14     attenuated, we haven't even included it on our Vance-Owen maps, it's not

15     even a Croat province anymore, and they felt abandoned by the HVO and

16     that this was all a measure to get these Croats to move out from Vares

17     and move to Herzegovina; that was the ultimate plan, wasn't it?

18        A.   No, that is not correct.  Kiseljak wasn't on the Vance-Owen map,

19     either, and it still remained; nor was Kresevo.

20        Q.   The Chamber had -- and we're not going to take the time, but the

21     Chamber will recall -- I'm not going to mention names because it may

22     relate to a protected witness, but a communication, P05068, which sets

23     out the position of the Vares Croats, and I take -- and I again put to

24     you, sir, that you knew that the Vares Croats felt that events had been

25     manipulated, that they had been sold out, and this was all orchestrated

Page 50599

 1     by the HVO.  You knew that was being said at the time or soon thereafter,

 2     didn't you?

 3        A.   No, that is not true.  Whoever lost any territory would shout

 4     that they had been sold out.  This was general -- this was a general

 5     attitude among Croats and Muslims.  Vares was not sold out to anyone.

 6        Q.   Let's go next to P06533, P06533.  I believe we have a slide,

 7     Sanction slide 27.  P06533 is an UNPROFOR report from Mr. Andreev to

 8     Mr. Thornberry, dated the 8th of November, 1993, about Stupni Do.  And in

 9     terms of what is being said, among other things, item number 4:

10             "... the likely answer is that the Kiseljak troops, outsiders to

11     Vares, were needed to commit the massacre at Stupni Do."

12             Number 8:

13             "The HVO leader ship's intention appears to have been to force

14     the Croat population of Vares into fleeing for fear of retaliation for

15     Stupni Do.  If so, this massacre was a war crime, made more horrible by

16     its cold-blooded political and strategic motivation."

17             And I put it to you, sir, Mr. Andreev hit it about right, didn't

18     he?

19        A.   No, I don't accept what he wrote.  Those are his assessments and

20     his games.

21        Q.   Sir, you knew that the HVO soldiers, the troops, the units that

22     were going to Vares around the 23rd of October, you know that these units

23     had been notorious bad actors in the past, hadn't they?  The Maturice and

24     the Apostoli were problem units.  They had been involved in a number of

25     incidents of misbehaviour before that, hadn't they?

Page 50600

 1             JUDGE PRANDLER:  Excuse me.  Mr. Scott, I would like only to ask

 2     Mr. Petkovic about the following:  It happened to me that I knew

 3     Mr. Andreev from the United Nations work and from New York, so when you

 4     said that, No, I do not accept what he wrote, and then you continued,

 5     "Those are his assessments and his games," end of quotation, I would like

 6     to ask you if you have anything -- a kind of opinion or concrete events

 7     which you base your position on him, as far as when you say that those

 8     are his assessments and his games, and what do you mean by "games"?

 9             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Mr. Viktor Andreev was

10     informed by me and others regarding the position of Croats in Travnik,

11     Kakanj, Fojnica, and he never reacted in this way.  But he said, as did

12     others, that many Croats had left.  So you cannot accept, when he says

13     with respect to such events which had happened before Vares, that the

14     Croats had left, and he didn't take any steps.  We asked him to go to

15     Catici.  There was a thermal power-plant in Kakanj.  There were 200-odd

16     Croats there, and Mr. Viktor Andreev did not want to go to Catici to see

17     what was happening to those Croats.

18             Therefore, I have the right to conclude that Mr. Andreev has a

19     double standard.  And, after all, I did meet with that gentleman several

20     times during talks in Sarajevo and Kiseljak when these things happened.

21     And when a man says on one occasion that the Croats had left, and in a

22     second -- on a second event that the Croats had been expelled, these are

23     not small towns, these are not minor events that were happening, then I

24     have the right to say, of this man, that he has double standards.

25             MS. TOMANOVIC: [Interpretation] I apologise.  I need to correct

Page 50601

 1     the transcript.  I think it is important.  On page 103, line 22, the

 2     general said that Mr. Victor Andreev said that the Croats had left, and

 3     for Muslims, he always said that he had been expelled or forced out.

 4     I think the General can confirm that that is what he said.

 5             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, quite so.  And this is evident

 6     in all their documents.  That is what they resort to.  The Croats had

 7     left, and when it comes to Muslims, then they had been expelled.  And it

 8     is very hard to say of such people that they are right.  I had contacts

 9     with them, and I know very well what they were doing, and it wasn't

10     correct for them to behave in that way, you see.  Because for more than

11     100.000 Croats from Central Bosnia, to say of them that they had left,

12     and as for Muslims somewhere else, that they had been expelled, I think

13     that is not appropriate, even if his name is Mr. Viktor Andreev, or his

14     right-hand man, Mr. Benabou.  We had encounters with these people, and I

15     know and we saw what they wrote in their reports and what they said.

16             JUDGE PRANDLER:  Thank you for your answer.

17             Mr. Scott.

18             MR. SCOTT:  Thank you, Judge Prandler.

19        Q.   Sir, I'm just going to show you one document on this particular

20     topic at the moment, P11213.  It should be in the second -- again the

21     second of the -- same binder we have been working in, P11213.  This is a

22     report --

23        A.   Is it to the back, towards the back?

24        Q.   Sir, they're in numerical order, so wherever you would find

25     P11213.  Yes, toward the back.

Page 50602

 1             This is dated the 28th of April, 1993.  It's an order from you.

 2     Among other -- number 1:

 3             "Is Ivica Rajic still in the area of Kiseljak municipality?"

 4             Number 2:

 5             "Prohibit setting fire to facilities owned by Muslims and

 6     severely punish persons who do that.  Submit to me immediately any

 7     information on perpetrators.

 8             "Everything should be put under control, including treatment of

 9     civilians.  In case setting fire to facilities continues, HVO of the

10     Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna shall distance itself from Kiseljak.

11             "3.  Prepare and submit immediately a report regarding events in

12     the villages of Kazagici, Gomionica and Svinjarevo."

13             Sir, you knew at the time that in April of 1993 in the Kiseljak

14     villages, there had been a number of HVO war crimes committed against

15     Muslims by the HVO units in the Kiseljak area, didn't you?  --

16        A.   No, that is not true that in the area of Kiseljak some of these

17     villages belonged, I think, to Busovaca and another group to Kiseljak,

18     and I'm asking for information whether this is true; that is, the

19     information I received at a meeting with Mr. Halilovic and Thebault on

20     the 24th in Vitez.

21        Q.   Sir, you knew -- if you didn't know on the 28th of April, you

22     knew very soon that there were a number of HVO crimes that had been

23     committed in these villages, if you suggest in Busovaca and Kiseljak

24     municipalities; and you know, from your testimony in the Kordic and

25     Blaskic cases, that some of these crimes are the very crimes that were

Page 50603

 1     established in those cases, that Mr. Kordic and Mr. Blaskic were

 2     convicted of HVO crimes in these areas at these times, weren't they?

 3        A.   Yes, they were accused of these crimes.  But at this time I'm

 4     trying to check whether the information is correct or not or, rather,

 5     what is going on in those villages.

 6        Q.   And by the time you reach October 1993, sir, you had repeated

 7     information that these -- some of these units, the Maturice, the

 8     Apostoli, had repeatedly engaged in misconduct, if not war crimes, and

 9     yet it was exactly those troops and those units that you sent in to

10     Stupni Do, didn't you?  --

11        A.   No, you're not right; and you're not connecting to the dates when

12     Maturice was formed.  You spoke to your Witness EA, and he explained when

13     Maturice was formed.  At this time, there was no Maturice, and it was the

14     battalion --

15        Q.   I know when it was formed, and existed before October 1993

16     because it was the Maturice that went into Stupni Do.  I know when they

17     were formed.  And you know full well that by October 1993, before you

18     sent these units into Stupni Do and Vares, you knew that both these

19     units, among others, were highly problematic, they'd engaged in

20     anti-Muslim conduct throughout this period, some of them were driving

21     around Kiseljak with cut-off Muslim heads on their cars, and you knew all

22     that, didn't you?

23             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Objection, Your Honour.  Objection

24     to the assertion contained in this question, and that is that the general

25     has sent any kind of units to Stupni Do.  My objection is based on the

Page 50604

 1     testimony of witnesses of the Prosecution, who clearly said when and who

 2     had made the decision for the attack on Stupni Do.  So I appeal to my

 3     learned friend to abide by the testimony of his own witnesses.

 4             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I respond?

 5             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] General Petkovic, answer the

 6     question of the Prosecutor, and then we'll adjourn.

 7             THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, not a single report on

 8     the behaviour of Maturice in the sense the Prosecutor is saying do not

 9     exist.  The Maturice was formed in May, and the letter by Witness EA

10     speaks about extraordinary people, individuals who acted

11     correctly, and nowhere is there any report that in Kiseljak and Kresevo

12     they had committed anything.  So there is no information about Maturice

13     which were praised by Witness EA as exemplary fighters, and

14     there's no mention of anything bad that they had done.

15             As for this document, the Command of the 4th Battalion was

16     replaced, that is the so-called Fojnica Battalion and Mr. Tuka.  And this

17     was the time when, after this, Ivica Rajic took up his duties in

18     Kiseljak.  On the 28th of April, Ivica Rajic had still not taken over in

19     Kiseljak.  It was then that he came from Tomislavgrad to Kiseljak, and

20     that is why I'm asking whether he's there, whether he has returned from

21     Tomislavgrad to Kiseljak.

22             As for Maturice, there is no information that the Prosecutor is

23     referring to -- of the kind the Prosecutor is referring to.

24             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

25             It is two minutes past 7.00.  We have exceeded our time by almost

Page 50605

 1     three minutes.  The Prosecutor will have exactly two hours to complete

 2     his cross-examination.

 3             As you know, we will be meeting in the morning, so we'll meet

 4     again at 9.00 tomorrow morning.

 5             Thank you.

 6                           [The Accused Petkovic stands down]

 7                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.03 p.m.,

 8                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 9th day of March,

 9                           2010, at 9.00 a.m.