Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 52598

 1                           Tuesday, 22 February 2011

 2                           [Petkovic Defence Closing Statement]

 3                           [Open session]

 4                           [The accused entered court]

 5                           [The Accused Pusic not present]

 6                           --- Upon commencing at 2.16 p.m.

 7             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Could you please call the case,

 8     Madam Registrar.

 9             THE REGISTRAR: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours.

10             This is case number IT-04-74-T, the Prosecutor versus

11     Jadranko Prlic et al.

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Madam Registrar.

13             Today, I'd like to greet, first and foremost, the accused, then

14     the counsel, everybody from the OTP, and all those assisting us.  I'd

15     also like to greet a new face in the public gallery which will be of

16     assistance during our session.

17             We will continue with the closing argument of General Petkovic.

18     According to the new calculation made by the Registrar, they have one

19     hour and forty minutes left.  So we gave you an extra five minutes,

20     compared to what I told you yesterday.

21             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Your Honours.

22     Good afternoon to our learned friends from the OTP, the accused, and my

23     colleagues from the Defences, as well as to all those who are with us

24     today.

25             Yesterday, analysing the final brief of the OTP, we stopped at

Page 52599

 1     paragraph 22.  At the very end of the paragraph, you can see there an

 2     assertion made by the OTP that Petkovic issued an order to arrest and

 3     isolate all able-bodied Muslims throughout HVO-controlled territory.

 4     Although we have discussed it to some extent, we can have another look at

 5     the right-hand side column, where you see the order issued by

 6     General Petkovic.

 7             I apologise.  I forgot to say that we should go into Sanction.  I

 8     hope we can resume.  Apologies for omitting that in the first place.

 9             In the right-hand-side column, we see the order by

10     General Petkovic, dated 30th June 1993.  It is quite clear that it does

11     not encompass the entire HVO-controlled territory, because it was issued

12     to only one operational zone, which is South-Eastern Herzegovina.  The

13     commander of that operational zone forwarded the order to only two

14     brigades, the 2nd and 3rd.  Therefore, the assertion made by the

15     Prosecution is incorrect.

16             The next example is paragraph 28, in which the Prosecutor asserts

17     that Praljak was present at the meeting on the 11th of May, 1993, and

18     that the meeting was also attended by Petkovic and some others.  I won't

19     go into the specific names on this occasion.  In the

20     right-hand-side column, you see an excerpt from General Praljak's

21     testimony, page 40761.  You will see there that General Praljak did not

22     say that the meeting was attended by General Petkovic.  If we recall

23     other evidence, we see that General Petkovic, on the 10th of May, 1993,

24     in the evening, left for Kiseljak in order to meet with Sefer Halilovic.

25     On the 11th of May, both of them, Sefer Halilovic and General Petkovic,

Page 52600

 1     arrived in Medjugorje.  On the 12th of May, Halilovic and Petkovic signed

 2     an agreement on the cessation of hostilities.  Therefore, the Prosecutor

 3     erroneously asserts that at the meeting referred to by General Praljak,

 4     General Petkovic was in attendance as well.

 5             The next example has to do with paragraph 104, which is legal in

 6     nature.  However, I found it necessary to refer to it briefly.  In this

 7     paragraph, the Prosecutor mentions the crime of terrorising civilians,

 8     which can be committed with a direct or indirect intention.  In the

 9     right-hand-side column, although this is a legal matter, we prepared for

10     you an excerpt from the appeals judgement in the Galic case,

11     paragraph 104; as well as the appeal judgement in the Milosevic case,

12     paragraph 37; and the first-instance judgement in the Galic case,

13     paragraph 136, with the accompanying footnote, which clearly indicates

14     that the crime of terrorising civilians can only be committed with a

15     special, specific intention or intent.

16             The following paragraph we wanted to draw your attention to is

17     paragraph 193 of the final brief of the OTP.  The Prosecutor asserts that

18     Petkovic, having testified about Operation South, wanted to paint a wrong

19     picture before the Chamber about the true nature of that operation.  We

20     wanted to direct your attention at the following:  The Prosecutor, during

21     their case, did not state a single word about Operation South, although

22     they had conducted an interview with the commander of that operation.

23     Therefore, they had all necessary knowledge about the purpose and intent

24     of that operation.  The Petkovic Defence was the only one to include that

25     operation in our case, because the events which occurred during the

Page 52601

 1     operation were of paramount importance for the withdrawal of Petkovic

 2     from the position of the chief of the Main Staff.  Therefore, it is

 3     completely unfounded to state that the Petkovic Defence wanted to do

 4     anything before the Trial Chamber concerning Operation South in order to

 5     try to paint an erroneous picture.

 6             The next issue has to do with paragraph 648, in which the

 7     Prosecutor asserts in the chief of the Main Staff, I quote:

 8             "... was superior to the HVO Command Staff."

 9             Given that the Prosecution, in their opening statement objected

10     to the way the Petkovic Defence interpreted certain legal provisions, we

11     need to look at the wording of the provision, itself, in the

12     right-hand-side column and to see what it was that the OTP omitted when

13     describing the position of the chief of the Main Staff.  The Prosecution

14     omitted the following: that the chief of the Main Staff is superior to

15     the HVO Command within the scope of general and specific powers vested in

16     him by the president of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna.  Your

17     Honours, this is not the sole example of the Prosecution interpreting

18     certain legal provisions by quoting only parts of those provisions, thus

19     displaying an incorrect interpretation of the entire legislation.  Had

20     they quoted the entire sentence, they would had to have admitted that the

21     chief of the Main Staff was not superior to all military commanders in

22     all matters, because it would go against their case against

23     General Petkovic.  In this context, at page 277 of their brief, the OTP

24     state that Petkovic was at all relevant times either the number one or

25     number two HVO military commander.  We reiterate, Your Honours, as we

Page 52602

 1     also said in our final brief, that Petkovic was the chief of the

 2     Main Staff, and that rights, duties and obligations of the chief of the

 3     Main Staff, as the chief of any other staff, are not identical to the

 4     rights and obligations of a commander.  Given that we have discussed this

 5     issue at length in our final brief, we do not find it necessary to repeat

 6     all of our theses at this point.

 7             In paragraph 162 of the final brief, the Prosecution states that

 8     Petkovic could not recall who he received his salary from.  We discussed

 9     this at length during re-examination of General Petkovic, and we'll try

10     to sum up everything that took place in that regard.

11             The Prosecution referred to Petkovic's testimony in the Kordic

12     case.  We prepared parts of the transcript in the following few pages,

13     and it is clearly stated there that Petkovic had no problem whatsoever

14     recalling who he received his salary from.  However, in the Kordic case,

15     he was limited, in terms of questions and answers.  Those limitations

16     were set by the Republic of Croatia, which also had its representatives

17     in the proceedings.  That limitation also referred to the issue of salary

18     whilst serving with the HVO.  There were no such limitations in this

19     case.  Therefore, it is unambiguous, as it was also clearly stated by

20     General Petkovic that while serving with the HVO, he received his salary

21     from the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia.  Therefore, in

22     the final brief, the Prosecution completely erroneously commented upon

23     Petkovic's testimony, in our view attempting to contaminate the entire

24     testimony and show it to be -- not to be credible.

25             We'll skip over a few pages.

Page 52603

 1             The next example has to do with paragraph 881, in which the

 2     Prosecution asserts the following, I quote:

 3             [In English] "... as Pringle so amply stated, behaviour like

 4     Petkovic ..."

 5             [Interpretation] End of quote.  When I read this part of the

 6     final brief of the Prosecution, I indeed thought that Andrew Pringle did

 7     comment on Petkovic's behaviour.  Being unable to recall it, I went back

 8     to Andrew Pringle's report.  In the footnote, we see that it is

 9     paragraph 68.  We are going to show you paragraph 68 in the

10     right-hand-side column.  In that paragraph, there is no reference to

11     General Petkovic the way the OTP stated.  Therefore, the Prosecution

12     erroneously presented the contents of paragraph 68 to the Chamber, thus

13     contaminating the evidence and rendering separate meaning to it which the

14     evidence does not possess.

15             The next example is paragraph 882, which has to do with Prozor in

16     October 1992.  Here, it is stated that Petkovic was familiar with

17     en masse forcible transfers of Muslims, as well as deportations.  With

18     regard to this example about Prozor, we wanted to draw your attention to

19     the following fact:  The OTP never charged any of the accused for the

20     crime of deportation in Prozor in October 1992.  They did not do anything

21     of the sort concerning forcible transfer that allegedly was committed in

22     October 1992 in Prozor.  Therefore, the crimes which should make part of

23     the Prosecution case with respect to JCE 1 do not form part of it, and

24     the Prosecution did not put forth any charges regarding that issue.

25             The next example is paragraph 883 pertaining to the same type of

Page 52604

 1     crime.  It has to do with Gornji Vakuf.  We have discussed this at some

 2     length in our final brief because we were limited by the word count.

 3     I can sum it up as follows:  None of the accused were accused of

 4     deportation in Gornji Vakuf in 1992.  An analysis conducted by the

 5     Petkovic Defence indicates that the Prosecutor did not prove that the

 6     civilians were forcibly transferred from Prozor in January and February

 7     1993.

 8             The next example has to do with paragraph 885 of the final brief.

 9     The Prosecution refers to a letter of the 23rd of April, 1993.

10     Apparently, it was sent by Petkovic to Mate Boban.  The letter itself had

11     to do with certain crimes committed in Central Bosnia, as reported to

12     General Petkovic by Tihomir Blaskic.  In the right-hand-side column, you

13     see the beginning of the letter.  We indicated this excerpt in order to

14     show that, indeed, it concerns Central Bosnia.  What we wanted to say is

15     the following:  The crimes committed in Central Bosnia in April 1993 do

16     not form the crime base of this case.  We also believe that this document

17     is important because it unambiguously indicates that unlawful activities

18     described in the letter were not something that had been planned or

19     wished for by HVO commanders.  Had it been the case, they would not have

20     reported about it to their superiors.

21             The next example is paragraph 887.  The Prosecutor asserts that

22     the Monitors of the European Commission and other international

23     representatives condemned Petkovic and his behaviour.  The Prosecutor

24     does not specify a single footnote or piece of evidence to corroborate

25     this.  What we wish to say about it is the following:  According to our

Page 52605

 1     analysis of all UNPROFOR documents, as well as ECMM documents and the

 2     documents of other international representatives, Petkovic was never seen

 3     or portrayed as an extremist; rather, he was shown to be a moderate

 4     person who was always in favour of an agreement.  As regards the

 5     hawk-dove system, if we take into account that simple division, Petkovic

 6     was always seen as a dove.

 7             The next example which we'll dwell on has to do with

 8     paragraph 953 of the final brief, as well as paragraph 825 and 826 and

 9     831, as well as parts of the closing arguments of Ms. West at page 52054

10     of the transcript.  All these examples have to do with the alleged role

11     Petkovic played in the destruction of Stari Most, the Old Bridge.  The

12     entire thesis of the Prosecution relies or hinges on a single document,

13     which is P6534, which is an order of the 8th November 1993.  In the

14     right-hand-side column, Your Honours, you see excerpts of that order

15     prepared in the Croatian language so that you could see that the order

16     does not contain a signature.  Therefore, the document does not have the

17     signature of General Petkovic.  This fact alone need not mean much, but

18     let us take a closer look.  I would like to remind you that this is

19     8 November 1993.

20             General Praljak, on transcript pages 41270, speaking about

21     document 4D834, said that General Petkovic had not been at Citluk on

22     8 November 1993, and that is why one order or one invitation was signed

23     by Slobodan Praljak, although it bears the name "Milivoj Petkovic," so

24     that Praljak gave evidence that on 8 November, General Petkovic was not

25     at Citluk.

Page 52606

 1             Milivoj Petkovic, on transcript pages 49643, confirmed that,

 2     indeed, on that day he was not at Citluk, but in Split, because on

 3     7 November he was to meet General Briquemont.

 4             Let us look at document 4D2026, which is General Petkovic's

 5     document.  He sent it to the UNPROFOR Command at Kiseljak.  I repeat the

 6     number, 4D2026.  General Petkovic confirms having met General Briquemont

 7     on 7 November at Divulje, which is just outside Split, so that,

 8     Your Honours, the evidence confirms that Petkovic, on 8 November 1993,

 9     was not at Citluk and did not sign the order issued on that day about

10     artillery activity.

11             What we consider very important is the fact that all this

12     evidence we have just cited was known to the Prosecution, because we've

13     seen it in this courtroom several times, but the Prosecution

14     intentionally neglected this evidence to draw General Petkovic into their

15     story as the person responsible for the destruction of the Old Bridge in

16     Mostar, as it were.  We invite you, Your Honours, to assess all this

17     evidence and conclude what the truth is.

18             The next example is paragraph 872.  It's about the meeting

19     between General Petkovic and Ratko Mladic in early July 1993.  In this

20     section of Ratko Mladic's diaries, the alleged words of Petkovic are

21     related:

22             "Push your cannons forward a bit and let my guys from Travnik

23     die.  They haven't fought, anyway."

24             In responding to submission that this excerpt from the diary be

25     admitted into evidence, we objected based on the fact that this doesn't

Page 52607

 1     make sense.  There is no logic in Petkovic firing at HVO soldiers.  And

 2     apart from that, Travnik fell a month earlier, and at Travnik there were

 3     no HVO soldiers at all.  I needn't go into this document any deeper, but

 4     we are really impressed by the quality of faith the Prosecution put into

 5     Mladic's diary.  If Mladic should stand trial before this Tribunal one

 6     day, we are curious to -- we will be curious to see how much Mladic's

 7     diaries will be trusted.

 8             The next example is from paragraph 900.  The Prosecution claim

 9     that Petkovic's statement that he never received Ivica Rajic's report of

10     23 October 1993 is not credible, and they say:

11             "This Petkovic evasion again holds no water."

12             Your Honours, in our final brief, we discuss the topic of

13     Stupni Do at length because we consider it very relevant, and we think

14     that this case is directly linked with General Petkovic's responsibility.

15     That's why we plan to deal with this matter for a couple of minutes.  On

16     the right-hand side, we see the Croatian report of Ivica Rajic.  It is

17     shown in Croatian to enable you to see that this report, Ivica Rajic's

18     report, contains an instruction for General Petkovic from General Praljak

19     to take care of the situation in Vares.  We are showing this document

20     because it is addressed to Milivoj Petkovic at the Main Staff, and we can

21     see that the document indeed made it to the Main Staff, which is

22     confirmed by the handwritten words of General Praljak.  If we read this

23     document in Croatian, then this document proves that a document which was

24     supposed to reach Milivoj Petkovic at the Main Staff indeed arrived at

25     the Main Staff.  The Prosecution showed us no evidence that shows that

Page 52608

 1     this document was indeed forwarded from the Main Staff to Petkovic in

 2     Kiseljak.

 3             The next example refers to paragraph 933.  The Prosecution

 4     asserts that Petkovic repeatedly received information from his soldiers

 5     about the harassment and mistreatment of prisoners and detainees along

 6     the front-line.  In the footnote, there's a reference to document P6202.

 7     In the right column, there is the document, itself.  This is a document

 8     which, on the 28th of October, 1993, was sent by Stanko Bozic, the

 9     number-one man at Heliodrom, to Milivoj Petkovic.  Our conclusions are

10     the following:  One, the allegation is completely false that commanders

11     informed Petkovic about anything concerning the prisoners and their

12     labour on the front-line.  And, secondly, this document contains not a

13     single word about mistreatment or labour on the front-line:  This report

14     of Bozic's is the only report he sent to Petkovic, and we have clearly

15     pointed that out in Annex 12 to our final brief.

16             In paragraph 937, the Prosecution asserts that Petkovic had

17     information about the wounding and deaths of prisoners forced to work,

18     and that he received information about that repeatedly from the

19     representatives of the international community.  The Prosecution also

20     asserts that Petkovic had that information while he was issuing orders

21     concerning forcible labour.  In the footnotes, documents P5308 and P5967

22     are referred to.  In the right column, you can see the dates of these

23     documents.  One is from late September, and the other from October 1993.

24     Our conclusions are the following:  The Prosecution failed to prove that

25     Petkovic had information about killed and wounded detainees in July and

Page 52609

 1     August 1993, when he issued three orders in relation to the labour of the

 2     detainees and prisoners.  Thus, Petkovic spoke the truth, because he

 3     spoke about his knowledge at the moment he issued these orders and not

 4     later.

 5             The next example is about paragraph 962.  Here, the Prosecution

 6     refers to the topic of shelling and sniping, and they say that Petkovic

 7     had information about that.  The date of 23 September 1993 is mentioned

 8     as the day when Pasalic complained to UNPROFOR.  About this, we wish to

 9     conclude that this shows that before September 1993, there were no

10     complaints about shelling by the HVO or about sniping of HVO members.

11             The following example is paragraph 964, in which the Prosecution

12     asserts that Petkovic personally denied humanitarian convoys free

13     passage.  About this paragraph, we -- or rather there were several

14     footnotes to this paragraph which you see on the left, and on the right

15     you can see the list of documents with the dates of issuance.  We have no

16     time now, Your Honours, but I believe there is even no need to go into

17     each and every of these documents, but we wish to draw your attention to

18     two documents which are extremely important to our minds.

19             The first such document is P3923.  It's a letter sent by Tadic to

20     Jadranko Prlic on 3 August 1993, in which Darinko Tadic complaints that

21     he didn't get an approval from General Petkovic for the passage of a

22     convoy from Bosnia to Split and back.  So this is a letter dated

23     3 August 1993.

24             Let's take a look at the following document, P3895.  This is an

25     order by General Petkovic issued one day earlier on 2 August 1993 and

Page 52610

 1     sent to all HVO units.  It is said here very clearly and unambiguously

 2     that pursuant to the Makarska Agreement, as well as the

 3     Sarajevo Airport Agreement, all HVO units shall enable the unobstructed

 4     passage of convoys of humanitarian aid.

 5             Therefore, there is no evidence showing that General Petkovic

 6     obstructed the passage of any convoy carrying humanitarian aid.

 7             The following example is about the chapter in the Prosecution

 8     final brief in which it is asserted that Petkovic had at his disposal

 9     various means to discipline HVO members, and in Annex G there is also an

10     overview of documents about the possibility of disciplining, which partly

11     relates to General Petkovic.  Your Honours, we invite you to scrutinise

12     these documents from Annex G very carefully, because we will all easily

13     establish that the Prosecution failed to mention a single law or

14     regulation which would enable Petkovic to punish or exert control as

15     asserted by the Prosecution.  And, furthermore, the following clearly

16     follows from Annex G:  If Petkovic really knew the name of the

17     perpetrator and the crime committed, then certain measures were taken.

18     If, however, the perpetrator was unidentified, Petkovic issued general

19     instructions that appropriate investigative measures and sanctions shall

20     be taken.  In that context, my learned friend Mr. Scott, on transcript

21     pages 51935 and the following, referred to document P1598, which you can

22     see in the right column.  It is obvious from this document that

23     General Petkovic issued an order that an investigation shall be launched

24     against a member of the Main Staff, an officer in the Main Staff of the

25     HVO, concerning the misuse of a stamp.  We would like to stress that this

Page 52611

 1     is about a person who worked in the Main Staff; that is, a person who was

 2     immediately subordinate to General Petkovic.  He knew about this

 3     misconduct and immediately took measures he considered appropriate, but

 4     the Prosecution shows no evidence that any other officer or any other

 5     employee in the Main Staff committed a crime against a Muslim about which

 6     Petkovic knew but failed to do anything about it.

 7             The following examples from paragraph 876, 930, 931, and 957, and

 8     962 refer to an interesting standard for mens rea systematically used by

 9     the Prosecution in their final brief not only with regard to

10     General Petkovic but also the other accused.  For example, I quote:

11             "It is impossible that Petkovic was not aware ..."

12             Or:

13             "Petkovic could not have been aware ..."

14             Or:

15             "He would have had to try very hard not to be aware of it."

16             Your Honours, I think we all agree that these are not legal

17     standards for mens rea, as recognised by this Tribunal, and we really

18     fail to understand what the Prosecution really want to achieve with such

19     language when it comes to the mens rea of the accused.

20             The next paragraph is 973.  This is a very important paragraph

21     for General Petkovic.  Here, the Prosecution asserts that Petkovic, among

22     other things, ordered murder, as charged in Counts 2 and 3, and they go

23     on to explain in the footnote -- that is, in paragraph 1308, that these

24     orders were about prisoners of war who were killed during forcible

25     labour, forced labour.  With regard to this, we wish to say the

Page 52612

 1     following:  Firstly, the Prosecution failed to prove that based on

 2     Milivoj Petkovic's order, the crime of forced labour of prisoners of war

 3     was committed.  In addition, the Prosecutor failed to prove that pursuant

 4     to any of Milivoj Petkovic's orders about forced labour, any detainee was

 5     killed.  Therefore, Milivoj Petkovic can certainly not be held

 6     responsible for the alleged orders to kill prisoners of war during forced

 7     labour.

 8             The same topic was discussed by my learned friend Ms. West, and

 9     she said that, one, Petkovic's order, dated 8 August 1993, was executed,

10     or, rather, that pursuant to that order, a crime was committed, and the

11     crime was forced labour by prisoners of war.  Let's look at the

12     right-hand side of the page.  First of all, the order number is 4020,

13     dated 8 August 1993.  We see that it was sent to the Posusje Brigade, and

14     everybody else was copied.  Let's look at the content of the order.  The

15     first sentence reads:

16             "Order to fortify the achieved lines immediately."

17             That's the first sentence in the order, and that's an order, of

18     course.  The second sentence reads:

19             "Prisoners and detained Muslims may be used for fortifying

20     lines."

21             The second sentence is a permission to use prisoners and detained

22     Muslims.  And then the third sentence reads, and it is an instruction:

23             "To file a request to use prisoners."

24             An elementary school investigative analysis of this order, in our

25     view, Your Honours, show that this is not an order for prisoners of war

Page 52613

 1     to be used for forced labour.  However, it is a permission to use

 2     prisoners of war, amongst others, who are sent to work.

 3             Let's see what happened next.  Document P4030, this is a request

 4     issued by the Posusje Brigade Command.  He is requesting to use

 5     detainees.  I would like to emphasise that a reference here is made to

 6     Muslim detainees who will be performing certain tasks.

 7             And the following document is P4068, 4068.  Your Honours, the

 8     document is presented here in both versions, in Croatian and English.  We

 9     would like to draw your attention to an error in translation.  It is very

10     clear in the Croatian text that a hundred detainees were taken over,

11     detainees; whereas in the English translation, a reference is made to a

12     hundred prisoners.  If this document had been translated properly, it

13     would arise from it that a hundred detainees had been taken over, and not

14     a hundred prisoners of war.  And the following fact is also important in

15     the analysis of this document:  There is no single piece of evidence

16     about the type of work that these hundred individuals were engaged in,

17     irrespective of their status, whether they were detainees or prisoners of

18     war.  It is also important to say that there is no single piece of

19     evidence proving that those people worked voluntarily or that they had

20     been forced to perform those tasks.  In other words, were they volunteers

21     or were they forced to do labour?

22             Why do we mention voluntary labour?  Because of a witness who was

23     detained in the prison in Vitina.  The witness was protected, so the

24     documents should not be broadcast.

25             Let's look at P10210.  On page 3, Witness EI said, inter alia,

Page 52614

 1     and I quote:

 2             [In English] "Every morning, one of the guards would come to the

 3     hangar and look for volunteers to go work for them.  Some prisoners

 4     volunteered as they were promised better food and also as the hangar was

 5     made from tin, the temperature was sometimes 40 degrees inside, so it was

 6     better to be outside even if it was to work."

 7             [Interpretation] The witness also testified about work which

 8     could not be considered inadmissible, and he also mentioned the types of

 9     work which could be considered inadmissible.  In this context,

10     Your Honours, we would like to point to the practice of this Tribunal,

11     which we believe is best illustrated by the first-instance judgement in

12     the Naletilic case, paragraph 259.  In that paragraph, it is stated, and

13     I quote:

14             [In English] "As a result of the foregoing, the Chamber will have

15     to determine, on a case-by-case basis, whether the forms of labour

16     alleged in the indictment were indeed undertaken voluntarily or whether

17     the detainees were compelled to do so."

18             [Interpretation] Your Honours, we are familiar with the practice

19     of this Tribunal, and we know that some circumstances make voluntary

20     labour look different because of the circumstances.  However, there is an

21     undisputed fact that the Trial Chamber has to take all of the

22     circumstances of each case into account.  In this case, we have not dealt

23     with that.

24             Let's conclude about all that has been said so far.  Petkovic's

25     order was not an order for the unlawful labour of prisoners of war.  It

Page 52615

 1     is, however, permission that certain work could be done by using

 2     prisoners and detainees.  There is no evidence that any prisoner of war

 3     had to do any unlawful labour.  There's also no evidence that detainees

 4     were forced to work.

 5             With regard to the topic of unlawful labour, there are two other

 6     Petkovic's orders.  Since the Prosecution agrees with the Petkovic

 7     Defence that nothing was done in order to execute those two orders, we

 8     are not going to waste any time on them.  I would just like to draw your

 9     attention to our final brief, where the topic was covered at great

10     length.

11             And now we come to the topic of the siege of Mostar.  Maybe some

12     day Ms. West and I will co-author a paper on the topic because we spent

13     so much time discussing it.  On transcript page 52069, my learned friend

14     Ms. West said, in a nutshell, that Muslim civilians could not leave

15     East Mostar.  Your Honours, we don't have any more time, nor do we think

16     that it is necessary to deal with main routes and alternative routes that

17     led from East Mostar towards Jablanica and further on towards

18     Central Bosnia.  However, in this case there is no dispute about the

19     following thing:  First of all, there's no single piece of evidence that

20     any of the civilians was killed or wounded while leaving East Mostar and

21     going towards Jablanica.  There is no single piece of evidence showing

22     that the HVO opened either artillery or any type of fire to prevent any

23     individual or group of civilians who wanted to leave East Mostar and go

24     in the direction of Jablanica.  As we look at the evidence on file, we

25     can see that there is no proof that anybody was either killed or wounded.

Page 52616

 1     The most important thing for this topic is the issue whether that

 2     communication was at all possible and whether that communication was

 3     en masse.  As we go on, we will be using exclusively Prosecutor's

 4     evidence to show that the communication was indeed possible, that the

 5     communication was en masse, and that the communication was basically

 6     hindered by the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

 7             The first document that we would like to show you is a protected

 8     document, and that's why I'm not going to talk about the contents.  I'm

 9     just going to give you the number of the document, P9181.  And this

10     document, at the end of the chapter that we are showing to you, it says:

11             [In English] "The movement remains limited due to the danger of

12     the journey and the fact that BiH ..."

13             "[Interpretation] I would like to repeat the number, P9851, 9851.

14     I'm not going to repeat the entire sentence.  I'll continue:

15             [In English] "... and the fact that the BiH Army permission must

16     be obtained to leave, such permission reportedly being difficult to

17     obtain."

18             [Interpretation] The following evidence that we would like to

19     draw your attention to is Witness BB's testimony, transcript page 25335.

20     The witness said as follows, I quote:

21             [In English] "We were very well aware of the --"

22             MR. SCOTT:  Sorry, Your Honour.  We can't have this quoted in

23     open session.

24             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone for the Prosecutor.

25             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] Very well, Your Honours, we can go


Page 52617

 1     into private session.

 2             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Registrar.

 3                           [Private session]

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)

Page 52618

 1   (redacted)

 2   (redacted)

 3   (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted)

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15                           [Open session]

16             THE REGISTRAR:  We are in open session, Your Honours.

17             MS. ALABURIC: [Interpretation] And now continuing on the same

18     topic, let's look at 4D719.  This is a report about the situation in the

19     area north of East Mostar.  We have seen the document a lot of times in

20     this courtroom.  Let's look at it once again.  The 4th Command of the

21     BiH Army controlled that area and established, I quote:

22             "... a great problem for the command of the operational group is

23     transport of civilian population and others marching in the direction of

24     north and south.  That is why it is necessary for civil authorities to

25     take over the transport of civilians.  There are huge problems with the


Page 52619

 1     transport of wounded people and other things required by the town.  There

 2     is a need to repair the armoured transporter for this purpose and its

 3     usage in night-time."

 4             And just one more document about that topic.  This is an excerpt

 5     from Esad Sejtanic's book.  This is on page 184, and I quote -- I will

 6     just read the last sentence.  You see the entire chapter:

 7             "By repressive measures, regrettably, we prevented the outflow of

 8     the population and reduced any movement of population to the minimum."

 9             I conclude, Your Honours, the Prosecutor's documents and

10     documents issued by the BiH Army and its members fully confirm the fact

11     that people could leave East Mostar en masse, that the population used

12     the routes available to them, but the Muslim authorities -- or, rather,

13     the BiH Army prevented the departure of civilians en masse.  I am not

14     talking about the lawfulness of such procedures on the part of the

15     BiH Army, but I believe that it is very important in these proceedings to

16     put the siege of Mostar in context.

17             And now we are at the very end of our analysis of the

18     Prosecutor's final brief.

19             In paragraph 308 [as interpreted], the Prosecutor asks for a

20     sentence of 40 years, and the Prosecutor bases that request on the

21     following.  The paragraph is 1308.  Firstly, if we look at the speech,

22     that was never uttered, and then he bases the request on the order of

23     30th June 1993 about the isolation of the Muslim soldiers of the HVO and

24     military conscripts of the BiH Army who were also reserve force of the

25     BiH Army, and, as we said -- and as we showed, the decision was

Page 52620

 1     legitimate and was issued for security reasons.  A request for such a

 2     sentence, the Prosecutor bases on the assertion that Valentin Coric

 3     [as interpreted]ordered that POWs be used for forced labour, although

 4     there is not a single piece of evidence in existence to show that any POW

 5     performed any forced labour pursuant to Petkovic's order.  Their request

 6     further relies on the assertion that Mr. Petkovic, having issued orders

 7     in July and August 1993, knew of the wounding and killing of people who

 8     had to do the labour, although documents confirm that, first, such

 9     knowledge was gained by Petkovic as late as September and October 1993

10     for the first time.  Finally, their request is based on the assertion

11     that Petkovic participated in an orchestrated cover-up of the crime in

12     Stupni Do.  The Prosecutor knows well that Petkovic, as deputy chief of

13     the Main Staff or deputy commander of the Main Staff, had no commanding

14     authority and could not independently take any action.  He could only

15     work according to orders and instructions of his superiors.

16             As of 9 November 1993, Ante Roso was at the helm of the

17     Main Staff.  We did not put forth a single piece of evidence in this

18     courtroom which would have to do with Ante Roso, the chief of the

19     Main Staff, and his opinion or position vis-a-vis the crimes committed in

20     Stupni Do.

21             This is what we wanted to tell you about the Prosecution final

22     brief, in its part which directly affects General Petkovic.  We will now

23     go back to General Petkovic, himself, wishing to show you what was the

24     level of Petkovic's knowledge, his mens rea and actus reus in the

25     relevant period of time.

Page 52621

 1             Let us look at document P279.  I apologise for the mistake.  We

 2     have the wrong year recorded.  The document is actually from 1992.  This

 3     is the speech that was not delivered, which the Prosecution stipulates as

 4     the only item which would connect Petkovic with anti-Muslim activities

 5     and the like.  We once more wish to state that this speech was supposed

 6     to have been delivered, but was not, at the meeting with municipal

 7     representatives specified in paragraph 2.  We also wanted to draw your

 8     attention to the fact that in this speech that was not delivered, it was

 9     recorded that still certain parts of the municipalities of Mostar and

10     Stolac were not liberated because parts of those municipalities were at

11     that point in time still under the control of the Serb forces.

12     Therefore, the topic of liberation and introduction of Croatian rule in

13     all municipalities referred to in the meeting was actually excluding the

14     parts of Mostar and Stolac that had not been liberated.  As for the

15     interpretation of this speech that was never held, you can take our word

16     for it or you can take the word of the Prosecution for it.

17             However, we suggest that we view this document in the context of

18     other documents by General Petkovic to see what the true meaning of the

19     document is.  The true meaning is also visible if we look at 4D830, which

20     is also P907.  That is Petkovic's report for the period of 1992.  In its

21     conclusions, it unambiguously states that HVO controls 90 per cent of the

22     territory envisaged as the Croatian entity.  HVO, therefore, has no need

23     for any offensive operations, and it is stated that the HVO is fully

24     capable to defend the liberated areas.  Furthermore, it states that HVO

25     controls 70 per cent of the free territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  A

Page 52622

 1     logical conclusion is that the remaining 30 per cent is controlled by the

 2     Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Therefore, it is beyond dispute that the

 3     free territory was seen to comprise both the territory held by the HVO

 4     and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Finally, the sentence that is of

 5     utmost importance is this:

 6             "The Croatian people, having organised their own armed forces,

 7     managed to defend not only themselves, but also the majority of Muslims."

 8             In our view, it unambiguously confirms that it was not the

 9     intention of either the HVO or the author of this report to undertake any

10     anti-Muslim activities.  The goal was to defend both Croats and Muslims,

11     and that was the task of the HVO.  It is also confirmed by the next few

12     documents, which we'll only touch upon.

13             Document 4D397, the 20th of June, 1992.  Petkovic sent a letter

14     to the HVO in Konjic and Gornji Vakuf.  Inter alia, he says:

15             "On behalf of Croats and Muslims, I beg you to overcome this

16     situation.  As the members of the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina, you

17     are bound to do that."

18             The next example is P633, an order of the 23rd of October, 1992,

19     to the HVO in Tomislavgrad.  Petkovic states:

20             "Find and talk to those with the greatest responsibility and

21     influence."

22             The next document is 4D399 of the 16th of November, 1992, an

23     order to Zeljko Siljeg, commander of an operational zone.  Petkovic

24     states:

25             "Get in touch urgently with the Command of the BH Army in

Page 52623

 1     Gornji Vakuf to overcome mistrust ..."

 2             The next document is 4D389, an order of the 16th of December,

 3     1992, which Petkovic sent to Zeljko Siljeg and Tihomir Blaskic:

 4             "In executing this order, achieve full co-ordination with

 5     Bosnian Army units."

 6             The next document, P1115, January 13, 1993.  Petkovic issued this

 7     order to the HVO in several municipalities.  He states:

 8             "Where possible, set up joint teams with the Muslim side to solve

 9     the past or current conflicts."

10             The next document, P1190, January 18, 1993, Petkovic's letter to

11     the HVO in Central Bosnia.  He states:

12             "Please avoid conflicts of any kind, because we and the Muslims

13     do not want our dispute to escalate again."

14             Document 4D433 of January 20, 1993.  Petkovic issued an order to

15     the HVO in Konjic:

16             "Establish contact with the BH Army in Konjic ..."

17             The next document, 4D19, dated January 27, 1993.  Petkovic

18     states:

19             "Resolve all disputes through negotiations ..."

20             February 9, 1993, document 4D75, Petkovic's letter to Halilovic:

21             "I looked forward to each new soldier, Croatian or Muslim,

22     because I knew that they had a common goal."

23             March 23, 1993, document P1709, a joint order by Petkovic and

24     Pasalic:

25             "Resolve all disagreements by joint agreements with mutual

Page 52624

 1     understanding and readiness by both sides to make concessions."

 2             April 18, 1993, Petkovic to all operational zones.  It is

 3     document P1959.  Petkovic states:

 4             "Establish communication with the BH Army Command ..."

 5             Mostar, May 9, 1993.  Let us recall the testimony of

 6     General Petkovic at transcript page 49541, among others.  As soon as

 7     Petkovic had learned of the conflict, he advised Mate Boban to get in

 8     touch with Alija Izetbegovic.  He tried to contact Sefer Halilovic

 9     personally.  We see the result of that the next day, May 10, 1993.

10     Mate Boban and Alija Izetbegovic issue an order on a cease-fire.  That is

11     document 4D456 and 4D457.

12             May 10, 1993, to May 12, 1993.  Petkovic was with Sefer Halilovic

13     throughout that period of time.  Their meeting resulted in an agreement,

14     which is P2344.

15             June 1, 1993, document P2599, Petkovic's order to all operational

16     zones:

17             "... negotiate with the Muslim side ..."

18             June 9, 1993, the fall of Travnik.  Petkovic explains his

19     reaction upon having learned of the fall.  It is page 49456 of the

20     transcript.  Petkovic asked to meet Halilovic.

21             The next document, 4D1355, General Petkovic's interview to the

22     daily "Vecernji List" in August 1994.  General Petkovic explains how he

23     had come to Bosnia-Herzegovina with the intention of staying for about a

24     month, but he remained longer.  What is of importance to us is the

25     following:  General Petkovic, in 1994, said that the results of fighting

Page 52625

 1     the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina were not very favourable for the HVO, but

 2     the reason was probably in that the HVO had not prepared for a war with

 3     the Muslim side.  This is the truth, Your Honours.  This is Petkovic's

 4     truth.  It may not be an absolute, objective truth, but it is the truth

 5     of General Petkovic.

 6             We are coming to the end of General Petkovic's closing arguments.

 7     We pondered on what we should tell you by way of conclusion to indicate

 8     what was the most important thing for General Petkovic at the time.

 9     Therefore, we decided to show you a number of documents which would

10     indicate that the HVO was a legal armed force and that it was a part of

11     the armed forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as well as that all HVO

12     fighters in Bosnia and Herzegovina as it exists today honours their

13     service in the HVO, much as they do to all former members of the Army of

14     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  This shows that the HVO was not a criminal armed

15     force put together in order to implement a criminal enterprise.  It

16     fought for Bosnia-Herzegovina, much as the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina

17     did.  All rights that the fighters of the army are entitled to are also

18     extended to HVO fighters.  We showed you those documents in our Annex 1

19     of the final brief.  Perhaps we can have another look at them.

20             Document P2002, agreement between Halilovic and Petkovic.  The

21     date is April 20, 1993.  In item 1, it is stated:

22             "The B and H Army and the HVO are legitimate military forces of

23     the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and are accorded equal treatment."

24             Document P2078 of April 24, 1993, a joint statement by

25     Izetbegovic, Boban and Tudjman.  Inter alia, mention is made on the

Page 52626

 1     agreement on the legal status of both the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina and

 2     the HVO.

 3             The next document is P2091, annex to the aforementioned joint

 4     statement signed by Halilovic and Petkovic.  It is stated:

 5             "The Army of B and H and the HVO will keep their individual

 6     identities and establishment of the command."

 7             "They will form the joint command ...," in item 2.

 8             Document 4D1234, the Washington Agreement, in which both sides

 9     are mentioned which were to establish a joint military command, that is

10     to say, the HVO and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

11             Document 4D826, Law on Armed Forces of the BH Federation, dated

12     1996.  It is stated that:

13             "The Army of the Federation is composed of the formations of the

14     Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Croatian Defence Council ..."

15             Your Honours, have a look at the second paragraph of this

16     document.  In this document from 1996, it is stated:

17             [In English] "Peacetime forces are constituted of (civilian)

18     persons in the service of the Federation, conscripts and professional

19     troops."

20             [Interpretation] We wish to draw your attention to the language

21     "conscripts," the word "conscripts."  As we have extensively argued, we

22     consider this to be a crucial notion in this trial.  As shown in this

23     document in 1996, conscripts of the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina were

24     considered members of the armed forces.

25             The following document is 2D628, the Law on the Rights of

Page 52627

 1     Defenders and Members of their Families from 2004.  It shows that the

 2     same rights are enjoyed by members of the BH Army and HVO members.

 3             Document 2D1183 is the Law on the Special Rights of Recipients of

 4     War Decorations from 2005.  We can see that extends to both members of

 5     the BH Army and members of the Croatian Defence Council.

 6             And the last document we're about to show is 2D1181, a decree on

 7     old-age pensions under favourable conditions from 2007.  We see that it

 8     applies both to members of the BH Army and members of the HVO in the same

 9     way.

10             Your Honours, we will finish by the break.  We only have a few

11     final remarks.

12             Milivoj Petkovic and his Defence have never claimed that he is

13     infallible, neither as a man nor as a professional soldier.  Maybe today,

14     based on all the information we have today, Milivoj Petkovic would have

15     taken some other decisions in his life and in his military career.  It is

16     certain, however, that Petkovic came to Bosnia-Herzegovina in good faith

17     to defend, as a professional soldier, first and foremost, his homeland,

18     Croatia, which was attacked -- being attacked from the territory of BiH,

19     but also to help the Croatian and Muslim peoples to defend themselves in

20     Bosnia-Herzegovina.

21             He participated in the creation and development of the Croatian

22     Defence Council, as an army of both the Croatian and the Muslim peoples

23     in Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Petkovic honestly believed that the Croatian

24     Defence Council was one of the armed forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  All

25     BH legislation confirmed that today -- confirms that today.

Page 52628

 1             Neither Milivoj Petkovic nor his colleagues planned to wage war

 2     on the BH Army, nor did they prepare for that war.  Maybe that is why the

 3     BH Army was so successful in taking territory controlled by the

 4     Herceg-Bosna authorities from April 1993 on.

 5             Your Honours, we saw from numerous documents that Petkovic was

 6     not a man of war.  Remember his words from the clip that we showed to you

 7     in our opening statement, Your Honours.  I quote:

 8             "It is better to talk for two years than to wage war for one

 9     day."

10             This is Milivoj Petkovic.

11             General Petkovic gave testimony before you, Your Honours.  It

12     wasn't easy for him.  It takes strength to do that.  General Petkovic

13     wanted to show you that all his acts were guided by military logic and

14     that were justified from the military point of view.  They may not have

15     been the best, but surely they weren't criminal and most certainly not

16     directed against the civilian Muslim population.

17             We invite you, Your Honours, to assess the facts based on a

18     comprehensive analysis of all evidence and the correct determination of

19     the context of Petkovic's actions or omissions.  We especially invite you

20     to establish precisely what the legal obligations of the chief of the

21     Main Staff of the HVO were under the legislation of Herceg-Bosna pursuant

22     to the decisions of the supreme commander.

23             Milivoj Petkovic was chief of Main Staff, and his position must

24     not be confused with the position of a military commander.  We believe,

25     Your Honours, that in that case, you will find out that Milivoj Petkovic

Page 52629

 1     hasn't committed any one crime, that the Prosecution failed to prove that

 2     he ordered or instigated or aided or abetted anybody in the commission of

 3     crimes or that he was -- or that he is in any other way criminally

 4     responsible for crimes committed.  An acquitting verdict will then be the

 5     only correct decision.

 6             This is the end of the Petkovic Defence final arguments.

 7             I wish to thank you, Your Honours, for the good co-operation

 8     during these five years.  I would also like to thank my learned friends

 9     from the Prosecution, who showed much understanding for our applications

10     to be awarded additional time.  And we also considered that the

11     Prosecution must be given a chance to do a good job, because if they do,

12     that will place the Petkovic Defence in a favourable position as well.

13             I would like to thank our colleagues from the other Defences for

14     their co-operation.  I would like to thank the Registry and all persons

15     who assisted us, and especially to the interpreters, with special

16     emphasis on the French booth.

17             Thank you.

18             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Scott.

19             MR. SCOTT:  Excuse me.

20             Your Honour, I know it's about time for the break, but at some

21     point today, and I just want to alert the Chamber or raise it with the

22     Chamber at the least inconvenient moment and without obstructing the

23     Coric closing that will begin in a few minutes, I can only assume --

24     Mr. Stringer and I and the Prosecution team can only assume at some point

25     the Chamber will want to hear thoughts in terms of connection -- requests

Page 52630

 1     for rebuttal before we actually get up against that time, so that

 2     everyone, including, of course, most importantly the Chamber, can plan

 3     accordingly.

 4             Based on what the Prosecution has heard so far, we do expect to

 5     request a substantial amount of rebuttal.  I don't know when the Chamber

 6     will want to take that up.  We're prepared to address it today, but we

 7     just raise it and put it in the Chamber's hands so that that can be

 8     addressed at the appropriate moment, but presumably not -- not at the

 9     last minute, so to speak.

10             Thank you.

11                           [Trial Chamber confers]

12             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Trial Chamber has taken

13     note of the Prosecutor's intervention.  The Bench thinks that we are yet

14     to hear the closing arguments of the Coric Defence and the Pusic Defence,

15     and, therefore, it is only after that we will move on to that stage of

16     the trial when it's the Prosecution's turn for their response.  Then we

17     will deal with your position, and not at this moment, while we will

18     entertain only the closing argument of the Defences.

19             We'll have a 20 minutes' break now, after which I will give the

20     floor to the Coric Defence counsel.

21                           --- Recess taken at 3.45 p.m.

22                           --- On resuming at 4.08 p.m.

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We continue with the trial.

24             I give the floor to the Coric Defence.

25                           [Coric Defence Closing Statement]


Page 52631

 1             MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] Good afternoon,

 2     Your Honours.  Good afternoon to everybody in and around the courtroom.

 3             At the beginning of the closing arguments on behalf of the

 4     Valentin Coric team, I would like to extend my thanks to everybody who,

 5     with their committed efforts, have contributed to our bringing this trial

 6     to an end, to the Judges, and all employees of the Chamber, my learned

 7     friends from the Prosecution, and all Prosecution staff, my colleagues

 8     from the Defence and all members of their teams, the Registry, the

 9     technical personnel, the security guards, and especially our interpreters

10     deserve all our thanks, because without them, our voice would remain

11     unheard.  I would like to use this opportunity to thank all those who I

12     may have forgotten to mention.

13             After several years of trial and after analysing the statements

14     of hundreds of witnesses contained in over 50.000 pages of the

15     transcripts and over 10.000 documents, two weeks ago we were able to hear

16     the Prosecution's final and best arguments.  We listened to the

17     Prosecution closing arguments patiently.  For all of us who have seen all

18     evidence in this trial and heard all witnesses, both the Prosecution as

19     well as Defence witnesses, it was difficult to listen to the Prosecution

20     closing arguments patiently.  It was just as difficult as it was to read

21     the Prosecution final brief.  It was difficult, Your Honours, because

22     both the Prosecution final brief and their closing arguments were

23     intended to divert the attention of the Trial Chamber from the evidence

24     led, but instead wanted to focus the attention of the Trial Chamber to

25     insinuations instead of concrete facts.

Page 52632

 1             Your Honours, at the end of their closing arguments, the

 2     Prosecution mentioned the victims of various conflicts throughout human

 3     history, including the victims of the Holocaust.  Every victim, even if

 4     it's one single person, deserves justice.  And the Valentin Coric Defence

 5     deeply and honestly sympathises with each victim, but not one of the

 6     victims mentioned, not even the victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, cannot

 7     be compared with the Holocaust for one important reason.  Terrible as

 8     their fate may have been, and as much as we all may sympathise with them,

 9     all these victims were members of warring parties, whereas the victims of

10     the Holocaust were not.  They were systematically exterminated only

11     because they were Jews.

12             After the closing arguments of the Prosecution, I was thinking

13     how I should start my closing arguments, and then something occurred to

14     me that I had heard some time ago from a more experienced and wiser

15     colleague.  She said to me, When a common man reads the contents of an

16     indictment in the media, for that common man, the accused is already

17     guilty, he is as good as convicted.

18             Talking about the judgement of the public, there is no principle

19     that nobody is guilty until his guilt is proved beyond reasonable doubt.

20     Why am I saying that?  Because during the closing arguments of the

21     Prosecution, we heard the indictment once more.  But, Your Honours, we

22     are -- we do not stand trial before the public or a lay jury.  These

23     accused are being tried by professional Judges who, based on the analysis

24     of all evidence, will individually and, together with all other Judges,

25     will decide whether this Prosecution was able to prove the allegations in

Page 52633

 1     the indictment beyond reasonable doubt.

 2             At the end of his closing arguments, my learned friend Mr. Scott,

 3     in the manner of a true knight of international justice, appealed to the

 4     Court to listen to the voices of the victims.  Your Honours,

 5     international justice includes satisfaction for the victims, but not in

 6     line with the Machiavelli's principle of achieving your goal at any cost.

 7     International justice was -- protecting the rights of the victims,

 8     includes establishing the truth and protecting the rights of the accused.

 9     International justice means that this Prosecution must prove the

10     defendant Valentin Coric guilty beyond reasonable doubt.

11             The Prosecution wishes to present itself as knights of

12     international justice.  With all due respect for my learned friends from

13     the Prosecution, Your Honours, in the case of Valentin Coric, this

14     Prosecution has not acted in the least knightly.  In their closing

15     arguments, the Prosecution asserted that some Defences, in their final

16     briefs, used linguistic gymnastics and a selective presentation of

17     evidence.  Your Honours, in the case of Valentin Coric, the Prosecution

18     did all that and more.  It ignored the statements of their own witnesses

19     when it didn't suit them.  The same documents were interpreted in

20     different ways, depending on which one of the accused it pertained to.

21     They fabricated facts that were not to be found in the documents.  This

22     is not the way one acts who struggles for international justice and the

23     rights of victims.  That is the way one acts if he or she wants victory

24     at all costs.  The Coric Defence, during its closing arguments, will

25     show, by presenting several examples, that these are not merely hollow

Page 52634

 1     words.

 2             In their final brief, in paragraphs 982, 993, 1039, and in their

 3     closing arguments, the Prosecution, in order to show that my client was

 4     committed to the project of some Greater Croatia, quoted part of a

 5     publication that says that people were selected for the military police

 6     who were faithful to the Croatian idea and the homeland.  The document

 7     I'm referring to is P8550.  Whenever the Prosecution, in their final

 8     brief, tried to prove this thesis, it relies on this very document, one

 9     document only.  The Prosecution does so because no other proof can be

10     found in over 10.000 documents that have been presented in this trial,

11     and they were unable to find anything else even in the statements of

12     hundreds of witnesses.

13             The Prosecution ignores the answer of a protected witness, who is

14     questioned what this Croatian idea is that is mentioned in this

15     publication, although no other witness has testified about that.  The

16     transcript pages are 51316 through 51318.  And the witness said that in

17     1992, when the war started in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the homeland he was

18     fighting for was Bosnia-Herzegovina.  He added that the Croatian idea for

19     the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina meant that they should be one of three

20     equal and constituent peoples.  The witness said that was the way he

21     understood it and that it cannot be understood differently.  Your

22     Honours, it doesn't really matter how the Prosecutor or the Defence

23     interpret documents pertaining to that period.  What matters is the fact

24     how the witnesses interpret those documents and how they interpreted them

25     at the time.

Page 52635

 1             My learned friend Mr. Stringer said that it is not as clear as to

 2     how many Muslims would have been partisan to that idea which, according

 3     to the Prosecutor, was a condition for a job with the military police.

 4     My learned friend Mr. Stringer has probably failed to acknowledge that in

 5     this case, there is ample evidence about the fact how many Muslims there

 6     were in various units of the military police during the relevant period

 7     of the indictment.  The Prosecutor has failed to acknowledge that

 8     Witness Andabak, on transcript pages 50949 through 50950, said that in

 9     the battalion that he commanded, there were 30 per cent Muslims, which,

10     in numerical terms, meant a hundred men.  The commander of the

11     2nd Light Assault Battalion was Muslim.

12             Another witness, on transcript page 51318, said that in another

13     military police unit, at first there were between 30 and 40 Muslims and

14     some dozen Serbs, and later on that there were over 50 Muslims and

15     anything between 10 and 15 Serbs.

16             Witness Desnica, a Defence witness, in his statement, 5D5109,

17     paragraph 9, was recorded as having said that Muslims and Croats alike

18     attended military training or police training.

19             I would like to draw the Trial Chamber's attention to documents

20     P2970 and P4850.  Your Honours, all of those proves that Muslims in the

21     military police understood the terms "Croatian idea" and "homeland" in

22     the same way as the protected witness mentioned before, and not in the

23     way interpreted by the Prosecutor.  This also shows that Valentin Coric

24     shared the opinion of the protected witness.  Otherwise, he would not

25     have put forth a Muslim as the commander of a light assault battalion.

Page 52636

 1     This is, Your Honour, the first example to show that the Prosecutor, when

 2     he doesn't really have any proof for his arguments, instead of proof

 3     which exists, offers to the Trial Chamber their own unproven and

 4     unfounded interpretations of the documents.

 5             In their final brief and in their closing arguments, in

 6     paragraph 982 and 986, the Prosecution for the first time tried to extend

 7     the alleged criminal responsibility of Mr. Coric by referring to his

 8     appointment to the duty as a minister of the interior in November 1993,

 9     as well as all of his other appointments within the Croatian Republic of

10     Herceg-Bosna throughout 1994 and 1995.  It is inappropriate and too late

11     for the Prosecution to offer arguments that did not exist in the

12     indictment, arguments which were not presented during trial.  It is too

13     late to do it now.  Both the indictment and the pre-trial brief limited

14     the scope of Coric's alleged criminal responsibility to a period up to

15     November 1993, and during that period they limited his responsibility as

16     the chief of the Administration of Military Police, and you can find this

17     in paragraphs 12 and 17.5 of the indictment.

18             The Prosecution ignores the fact that as the minister of the

19     interior, Coric demanded the return of the civilian police from the

20     front-line.  He wanted them to return in order to be able to fight crime.

21     This is corroborated by document P6837.  The Prosecutor also ignores the

22     fact that Coric continued performing certain duties in

23     Bosnia and Herzegovina even after the war, or, rather, after the Dayton

24     Accords.  He was a cantonal minister of the interior as well as the

25     deputy minister for civilian affairs in Sarajevo.  This is corroborated

Page 52637

 1     by document P9053.  These appointments demonstrate that Mr. Coric was a

 2     professional and not somebody who was rewarded for crimes against

 3     non-Croats.

 4             In their final brief, the Prosecution refers to several meetings

 5     attended by Mr. Coric or at which his name was mentioned.  The

 6     Prosecution requests from the Trial Chamber to arrive at a conclusion,

 7     based on those meetings, that Coric was a part of some alleged criminal

 8     plan.  In paragraphs 982 and 986 of the Prosecution's final brief, the

 9     Prosecution claims that Coric was rewarded for his leading role in the

10     so-called Herceg-Bosna project, and that his appointment as the

11     Ministry of the Interior minister was approved by Tudjman, Boban and

12     Prlic.

13             As far as the leading role of Coric is concerned, I would like to

14     point out that there are documents on file which show that he attended no

15     more than four meetings of the HVO government.  As you can see from the

16     documents P4111, P4275, P5799 and 2D8454, the only reason why Coric was

17     present at those four meetings was his duty to report about joint

18     operations by the military and civilian police in their fight against

19     crime, operations that were undertaken and which were planned.  It arises

20     clearly from the minutes of those meetings that the participants in the

21     meetings, instead of discussing any kind of Herceg-Bosna criminal

22     project, they actually discussed the need for further empowerment of the

23     civilian and military police forces and creation of such an operative

24     plan according to which the civilian and military police forces would

25     work together with a view to fighting and stopping crime.  The four

Page 52638

 1     meetings which were held with a view to fight crime as efficiently as

 2     possible, and if at those four meetings Mr. Coric had contributed to any

 3     kind of project, such a project cannot be defined as illegal or criminal.

 4     His appointment as the minister of the interior, which was based on his

 5     role played at the HVO meetings concerning his efforts to prevent crimes,

 6     certainly makes a lot of sense.  The Prosecutor's negative conclusion,

 7     which arises from the same meetings, does not have any logical basis and

 8     doesn't make sense.

 9             As concerns the meeting illustrated by document P6581, it should

10     be emphasised that it is clear from the minutes of the meeting that

11     Tudjman was hardly aware of Valentin Coric's existence.  At that meeting,

12     Mr. Prlic stated that Coric was currently the head of the military police

13     and that he enjoyed a lot of trust among the troops.  In this case, we

14     did not see any proof that would either confirm or disprove the alleged

15     statement by Mr. Prlic concerning the trust of the army.

16             The Prosecutor also refers to document P2099, quoted in

17     paragraph 984 of their final brief.  The Prosecutor claims that Coric

18     also enjoyed support by Ivan Jarnjak.  It also stems from the transcript

19     that Tudjman again didn't know who Valentin Coric was or at least didn't

20     know too well, and that Jarnjak's support was based only on the fact that

21     that gentleman, during that meeting, said that him and Coric used to bump

22     into each other in their karate club.  It clearly arises from the

23     documents that Coric did not attend any of the two meetings and that

24     there is no single piece of evidence that would lead to a conclusion that

25     he was ever familiar with the contents of those meetings.

Page 52639

 1             In their final brief, the Prosecutor on several occasions, for

 2     example, in paragraphs 11, 236 and 1003, refers to a meeting which was

 3     attended by Mr. Coric and General Praljak.  The document number is P1788.

 4     During their closing argument, the Praljak Defence already objected to

 5     the authenticity and credibility of the handwritten notes.  They

 6     challenged their authenticity, and we're not going to go over the same

 7     arguments again.  In that part, we would like to join General Praljak's

 8     Defence.  Moreover, there is no link between Coric's presence at that

 9     meeting and his participation with regard to the words uttered at that

10     meeting by Mr. Praljak.  At that meeting, Coric answered questions about

11     the new organisation and the numerical strength of the military police.

12     And with this regard, he stated that the military police would adhere to

13     their former ways until a new agreement is reached.  Valentin Coric's

14     words were not part of a political speech.  They also did not present an

15     expression of any criminal intent.

16             The Defence would like to remind the Trial Chamber that

17     General Praljak, in his testimony, in answering questions by the

18     honourable Judge Antonetti, said that he had never engaged in any

19     political talks with Coric, nor was he ever familiar with Coric's

20     political views.  You can find those words on page T-41499 of the

21     transcript.

22             In paragraph 364 of their final brief, the Prosecutor claims that

23     Jadranko Prlic, in his statement, document P9078, provided to the

24     investigator of this Tribunal, referred to Coric as a clerical fascist.

25     In that way, he ranked him among the group of people close to Tudjman and

Page 52640

 1     thus responsible for the war crimes committed by the HVO.  Your Honours,

 2     this is simply not true.  There is no place in that statement where

 3     Jadranko Prlic referred to Valentin Coric as a clerical fascist.

 4     Everything you can find in the document is the fact that Prlic and Coric

 5     did have some misgivings and disagreements.

 6             Your Honours, none of the aforementioned documents shows that

 7     Valentin Coric had any kind of opinion, any kind of a political view,

 8     which would be in favour of the secession of the HZ-HB from Bosnia and

 9     Herzegovina and the creation of some sort of a Greater Croatia.

10             My learned friend Mr. Stringer, at the beginning of his closing

11     argument, referred to the judgements in the Kvocka and Krajisnik cases

12     and claimed that Coric's Defence had erroneously said that Mr. Coric

13     could not be convicted for his participation in a joint criminal

14     enterprise if his command responsibility was not simultaneously

15     established pursuant to Article 7(3) of the Statute.  Although it is true

16     that these two legal forms of responsibility, pursuant to Article 7(3)

17     and for JCE 7(1) [as interpreted] are different, like in any other case,

18     that responsibility for the JCE pursuant to Article 7(1) must be

19     established using concrete facts in the case; in other words, before the

20     Trial Chamber.

21             In the Kvocka case quoted by the Prosecutor, the accused were

22     charged not only with ordering crimes to be committed, and orders being

23     given to their subordinates, but also participating in those same crimes.

24     In the Krajisnik case, there were also concrete facts which led to the

25     judgement the way it was handed down.  However, let's come back to the

Page 52641

 1     Prosecutor's case against Valentin Coric, because this is precisely what

 2     the Trial Chamber has to take into account, and you will see why we are

 3     claiming here that a responsibility, through Mr. Coric's participation in

 4     the joint criminal enterprise, cannot be proven if at the same time

 5     Coric's command role over the military police was not proven.

 6             In the appeal judgement in the Kvocka case quoted by the

 7     Prosecutor, paragraph 28 reads:

 8             [In English] "If the Prosecution relies on the theory of joint

 9     criminal enterprise, then the Prosecutor must plead the purpose of the

10     enterprise, the identity of the participants, and the nature of the

11     accused's participation in the enterprise."

12             [Interpretation] In paragraph 33 of the same judgement, the

13     Appeals Chamber elaborates that statement and says:

14             [In English] "The Trial Chamber can only convict the accused of

15     crimes which are charged in the indictment."

16             [Interpretation] Why, in their final brief, the Prosecutor did

17     not invoke the part of the indictment with relation to Mr. Coric, in

18     relation to Mr. Coric?  Your Honours, if we look at the indictment,

19     paragraphs 12 and 17.5(A) to (N), in the pre-trial brief, the same

20     paragraphs, the nature and way of participation in the JCE that

21     Valentin Coric is charged with, we actually see that the Prosecution

22     asserted that Coric, based on military -- based on command responsibility

23     in the military police, participated in the JCE.  That is why we assert

24     that the problem with ascertaining Coric's command line intertwines with

25     the issue of ascertaining his participation in the JCE.  In the second

Page 52642

 1     amended indictment, in the part which has to do with Mr. Coric, it only

 2     states that he had de jure and de facto command and control over HVO

 3     military police.  The Prosecutor could now conclude that he should have

 4     presented a better or different case against Mr. Coric.  However, they're

 5     stuck with what they had said previously.

 6             In predominating jurisprudence, where the Prosecution need not

 7     prove that there was a superior-subordinate relation between the accused

 8     and physical perpetrators or indirect perpetrators, they have to prove

 9     that the accused held at least some kind of authority position that could

10     have incited another to commit a crime following an order by the accused.

11     This thesis is further corroborated by the judgement in the Milutinovic

12     case in paragraph 87.

13             In our final brief, paragraphs 67 to 72, we presented a detailed

14     analysis about who it is exactly that the Prosecution asserts were

15     Coric's subordinates, and in the pages following that we explained in

16     detail whether Mr. Coric had a command role.  And this is the topic I am

17     going to cover in the next part of my presentation.

18             The Prosecution and Petkovic Defence, in their final brief, offer

19     several different theories about who, when, and how, commanded the

20     military police.  Let me cite a few examples.

21             In paragraph 988, the Prosecution asserts that Coric commanded

22     the military police, administratively and operationally.  In

23     paragraph 683, the Prosecution submits that Praljak's subordinates,

24     including the military police, respected his superior authority.  In

25     paragraph 684, the Prosecution submits that Praljak had command

Page 52643

 1     responsibility over the military police, which had been re-subordinated

 2     to him by Boban and Stojic for combat operations.  In paragraph 686, the

 3     Prosecution submits that Praljak commanded the entire spectrum of work of

 4     the military police, not only their participation in combat operations.

 5             Petkovic's Defence, in paragraphs 96 and 97 of their final brief,

 6     state that the chief of the Main Staff commanded the military police only

 7     when it was re-subordinated to him.  In paragraph 99, the

 8     Petkovic Defence state that the commander of the

 9     Military Police Battalion in the operational zone was subordinated to the

10     operational zone commander, in terms of regular military police tasks,

11     and to the Military Police Administration when professional activities

12     were in question.  In paragraph 103, the Petkovic Defence state that the

13     regular military police tasks were not within the remit of the chief of

14     the Main Staff, and that it was because of that, those military

15     commanders were subordinated to the head of the Department of Defence, in

16     terms of regular military policing tasks.  In paragraph 106, the

17     Petkovic Defence submit that in relation to the military police units

18     within operational zones and brigades, there was a double chain of

19     command leading up to the military commander and the chief of the SIS or

20     to the Military Police Administration.

21             In several paragraphs of Defence 4D, such as paragraphs 99, 100,

22     106 and 204, they assert that the military police administration

23     commanded the military police.

24             Your Honours, different theories, which actually represent a

25     Plan A, a Plan B, or a Plan C, and so on, indicate that the party

Page 52644

 1     offering so many different theories actually lacks any evidence to prove

 2     beyond a reasonable doubt any of them.

 3             The Coric Defence, as is well known in this courtroom, throughout

 4     the five years of this trial and in its final brief, defended only one

 5     thesis.  The Coric Defence need not bother to construe different theories

 6     depending on which turn the case takes because we based our arguments on

 7     the evidence presented; not only documentary evidence, but also based on

 8     witness testimony.  Our thesis, which is what I'm going to remind the

 9     Chamber about in the continuation of my closing argument, were confirmed

10     not only by the witnesses of the Defence 5D, but also by Prosecution

11     witnesses as well as the witnesses of the Defences of Mr. Petkovic and

12     Mr. Praljak.

13             Your Honours, concerning commanding over the military police, the

14     Coric Defence submits that the evidence in this case indicate the

15     following:  The units of the military police were organised in five

16     battalions, four of which had their respective operational zone, and only

17     one did not have a standing territorial deployment.  This is confirmed by

18     documents P936, P128, P957, and it was also confirmed by the following

19     witnesses:  Witness Andabak, at transcript pages 50906 to 50908, 50912,

20     50915, 50917 to 50918, and 50920; CC, a Prosecution witness, at

21     transcript pages 10452, 10453, and 10458; EA, another Prosecution

22     witness, at transcript pages 24875 to 24880, and 24884 to 24886; OTP

23     Witness C at transcript pages 22520, 22521, and 22524 to 22527; as well

24     as NO, a witness of Defence 5D in his statement which was admitted in

25     this case as 5D5110 in its fourth paragraph.

Page 52645

 1           The single battalion, without a standing territorial deployment,

 2    could be sent to a specific operational zone following Mr. Coric's order.

 3    In order to be able to do that, he had to receive an order from the

 4    Main Staff which had previously been approached by the operational zone

 5    commander to do so.  This is confirmed by documents 5D4040, 5D4030, 5D4039,

 6    5D440, and P5478.  It was also confirmed by several witnesses, such as

 7    Witness Andabak, a Defence witness of Defence team 5D, at pages 50911 and

 8    50912; an OTP Witness C at transcript pages 22524 to 22527; EA, another

 9    OTP witness, at transcript pages 24879 to 24881.  That situation was

10    changed towards late July, but I will address that issue at a later stage.

11            In their daily tasks, the military police battalions were commanded

12     by operational zone commanders.  This is confirmed by documents 5D5095,

13     5D4374, 5D4375, P2534, P4063, 3D2584, 3D1785, 5D2195, 5D4380, 5D1054,

14     P2548, P2640, P3135, 5D4392, 5D3052, 5D3046, P1913, P1972, 5D3044, 5D3019,

15     P5731, P3593, P5411, 3D798, P781, 5D2102, P4251, P1238, P2836, and P1359.

16            Since I don't have sufficient time to do so, I am unable to list

17     all such documents here.  However, this issue was also confirmed by the

18     following witnesses:  OTP Witness EA at transcript page 24876 to 24877;

19     OTP Witness CC at transcript page 10458 to 22527 and 22451 to 22453 --

20     sorry, I apologise to the interpreters. I seem to have skipped a line. OTP

21     Witness C at transcript pages 22524-22527 and 22451-22453. I apologise to

22     the interpreters, and will go back two lines because I forgot to read out

23     one witness. OTP Witness CC at transcript page 10458, Defence Witness, 5D,

24     NO at transcript pages 51181 to 51182, Defence Witness, 4D, Petkovic at

25     transcript pages 50249 to 50254 and 50260 to 50261; Defence Witness, 4D,

Page 52646

 1     Pavlovic at transcript pages 46905 to 46907; Defence Witness, 5D, Andabak

 2     at transcript pages 50906, 50907, 50917, 50918, 50934, 50935, 50939 to

 3     50942, 50950, and 50951; Defence Witness, 5D, Vidovic at transcript

 4     page 51512.  There were also certain situations in which a commander --

 5     the commander of an operational zone re-subordinated individual companies

 6     or parts thereof to the commanders of his own brigades or to the

 7     battalions contained in those brigades.  This is confirmed by documents

 8     5D2102, and P02846.  It was also confirmed by Defence Witness, 5D,

 9     Andabak at transcript pages 50934 and 50935.

10             Your Honours, daily tasks of the military police include all

11     those affairs which are part of the scope of work of the military police.

12     It is confirmed by documents 5781, P635, P4063, P1238, P1359, P2836,

13     P4251, P2534, 3D2584, 3D1785, 5D2102, 5D5095, 5D4374, and 5D4375.

14             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's correction:  The first document

15     in this sequence is P781.

16             MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] It was also confirmed by

17     the following witnesses:  Defence Witness, 4D, Pavlovic at transcript

18     page 46905; Prosecution Witness C at transcript page 22325;

19     Defence Witness, 5D, Andabak at transcript pages 50917 and 50918; and

20     Defence Witness, 4D, Petkovic at transcript pages 50232 to 50260.

21             I will enumerate but a few of those daily tasks of the military

22     police:  Securing facilities, bringing in deserters, control of entry and

23     exit in an area of responsibility, detection of crime, internal security

24     of military prisons, and taking part in providing security for POWs.  It

25     is confirmed by documents P1148, P143, and P837.  It was also confirmed

Page 52647

 1     by the following witnesses:  Defence Witness, 4D, Petkovic at transcript

 2     pages 50232 to 50236, and 50349 to 50261 [as interpreted]; OTP Witness EA

 3     at transcript page 24878 and 24879.

 4             Your Honours, the daily tasks of the military police are regular

 5     tasks that the military police carries out anywhere in the world.  The

 6     Coric Defence, therefore, simply fails to understand about which

 7     professional activities the Petkovic Defence speaks in paragraph 99 of

 8     their final brief.  Apart from the active military police about which I

 9     have just spoken, there was also the brigade military police.  The

10     brigade military police was organised in platoons, and every brigade had

11     one such platoon in their structure.  The brigade military police was in

12     all matters subordinated to the brigade commanders, just as any other

13     unit belonging to that brigade.  The brigade commanders commanded the

14     brigade platoons.  The brigade commanders selected personnel for these

15     platoons as well as appointed and -- appointed members of these platoons.

16     Brigade commanders were supposed to launch, and they did launch,

17     disciplinary proceedings against members of the brigade platoons of the

18     military police.  This is confirmed by documents P4262, 5D538, P1099,

19     P4413, P990, P2595, 5D5106, 5D5107.  This was also confirmed by

20     witnesses:  The 5D Witness, Andabak, on transcript pages 50913 through

21     50928; the 4D Defence, Petkovic, on transcript pages 50226 through 50229;

22     Prosecution Witness CC on transcript pages 10449 and 10458; Prosecution

23     Witness C on transcript pages 22525 through 22527; and the 3D and

24     4D Witness Tokic on transcript page 45507.

25             Military commanders commanded the units of the military police,

Page 52648

 1     no matter if we're talking about the brigade or the active military

 2     police in combat operations.  This was confirmed by the following

 3     Prosecution witnesses:  Witness CC on transcript page 10458; Witness EA

 4     on transcript pages 24876 and 24877, as well as 24879 through 24880; then

 5     there is Prosecution Witness C on transcript pages 22520 and 22540

 6     through 22541; the next is the 3D Witness Skender on transcript page

 7     45241; the 4D Witness Pavlovic on transcript pages 46894 through 46895,

 8     and 46905; the 3D Witness General Praljak on transcript page 42692; the

 9     4D Witness Petkovic on transcript pages 49791 through 49795; the

10     5D Witness Andabak on transcript pages 50933 through 50934; then the

11     5D Witness NO in his statement which was admitted as 5D5110 in paragraphs

12     4 and 5.

13             Your Honours, throughout the period covered by the indictment

14     while Valentin Coric was chief of the MP Administration, the military

15     police, in its daily tasks as well as in combat operations, was commanded

16     by military commanders in their respective zones of responsibility.  That

17     was confirmed by 5D Witness Andabak on transcript pages 50909 and the

18     following.  Why was that the case, Your Honours?  Any operative zone

19     commander and, within that operative zone, any brigade commander had

20     their respective zone of responsibility.  The zone of responsibility has

21     a certain depth and width, and includes not only the front-line, but also

22     a stretch of territory behind it.  The depth is determined based on the

23     security assessment of the area commander, and it can go up to 10 or 15

24     kilometres.  In one operative zone, where the zone of responsibility of

25     the commander of a brigade ends, the zone of responsibility of the

Page 52649

 1     commander of another brigade begins.  That is confirmed by documents

 2     P4819 and P3135.  It was also confirmed by witnesses:  The 3D and

 3     4D Witness Tokic on transcript page 45343; and the 5D Witness Andabak on

 4     transcript pages 50943.

 5             The commander of a zone was the person who knew best what was

 6     happening in his zone.  He knew where enemy positions were.  He knew what

 7     the security situation was like.  He knew what the points of entry and

 8     points of exit into or from his zone of responsibility were and where he

 9     will set up check-points.  He was the one who knew which forces he had at

10     his disposal.  The following witnesses confirmed that:  The

11     5D Witness Andabak on transcript pages 50943 and the following;

12     Defence Witness Skender, that is, 3D Witness Skender, on transcript pages

13     45310 and 45283; then 5D Witness Vidovic on transcript page 51453; the

14     3D and 4D Witness Tokic on transcript pages 45336 through 45547; then

15     there is 2D Witness Bandic on transcript page 38105.  That is why,

16     Your Honours, this commander was the one who decided daily which part of

17     his forces, including the military police, would do what.

18             At daily briefings which had to be attended and, indeed, were

19     attended by the commanders of the military police, among others, assigned

20     tasks and received reports.  That was confirmed by 5D Witness Andabak on

21     transcript pages 50932 through 50934, then 50940 and 51146.  That

22     commander received written reports from all his units, including the

23     military police.  That is confirmed by documents P970, 5D4385, P4063,

24     P2836, P1359, P377, P458.  There have also been witnesses who confirmed

25     that:  Prosecution Witness C on transcript page 22323; 5D Witness Andabak

Page 52650

 1     on transcript pages 50931 through 50959; and 5D Witness NO in his

 2     statement which was admitted into evidence as 5D5110.  It is the fifth

 3     paragraph of that statement.

 4             What is the role of the commander in his zone of responsibility?

 5     We can tell by reviewing document P3135.  Colonel Obradovic states in

 6     this document that he issues that order pursuant to the unlimited

 7     authority that he received by civilian and military structures in keeping

 8     with the widening of his zone of responsibility.

 9             The following situation also proves that the commanders of

10     operative zones had effective control over the military police in their

11     zones.  There are several orders issued by Valentin Coric to military

12     police in the case file, and these orders do not relate to professional

13     structures, staffing, or familiarising with legislation.  In such orders

14     that relate to military police tasks, Valentin Coric in the preamble

15     invokes the Main Staff or some other high-ranking body.  Why does he do

16     that if they are his subordinates?  Why doesn't he simply say, Do it, as

17     he does in case of instructions?  The only logical conclusion is the

18     following:  Because these military policemen cannot carry out the order

19     unless they are allowed to do so by the commander of the operative zone

20     who commands them on a daily basis.  And the superior of that operative

21     zone commander is the Main Staff, so if Valentin Coric invokes an order

22     of the Main Staff, the commander of the operative zone will not be able

23     to prevent the implementation of that order.  This confirmed by documents

24     5D4282, P2020, P875, and P864.  This thesis of the Coric Defence is

25     confirmed by the order on check-points, which is co-signed by

Page 52651

 1     General Praljak, the head of the Department of Defence, and

 2     Valentin Coric.  I'm referring to document P875.  The same document also

 3     has an alternative number, and that is P876.

 4             During his testimony, Mr. Praljak said that he co-signed that

 5     order for it to have more weight.  Your Honours, this order was issued to

 6     the military police.  This is recorded on transcript page 40539.

 7             There is a sentence in the structure of the military police that

 8     is used both by the Prosecution, in their brief, and also by the

 9     Petkovic Defence.  It says that the Military Police Administration is in

10     charge of and commands military police units.  At first glance, this

11     sentence may be in contradiction with what I've just said, and I'm sure

12     that Your Honours remember that this caused much debate during this

13     trial.  Probably this situation would remain unresolved to this day if --

14     hadn't we heard witnesses in this case, and the witnesses, loudly and

15     clearly, under oath and without second thought, said to this

16     Trial Chamber that the military police, in its daily tasks as well as in

17     combat operations, was commanded by military commanders, rather than the

18     Military Police Administration.  This is confirmed by many documents, of

19     which I have mentioned only a few.

20             The witnesses confirmed that the Military Police Administration

21     was responsible for staffing, the provision of MP equipment, training,

22     and disciplinary proceedings against military police members.  This is

23     confirmed by 5D Witness Andabak on transcript pages 50906 and the

24     following.  This was also confirmed by NO in his statement which was

25     admitted into evidence as 5D5110.

Page 52652

 1             Who commands the military police, and how, and what kind of role

 2     the Military Police Administration has in this context is best

 3     illustrated by Judge Trechsel's question to Defence Witness Skender and

 4     the answer this witness provided.  Judge Trechsel said:

 5             "I don't think it is -- this is possible.  We need to clarify

 6     this.  If there are two commanders who can give orders, that both are

 7     entitled to do this, this would appear rather disorderly.  Could you not

 8     clarify this for us, please, in administrative terms?  The military

 9     policemen were still part of the Military Police Administration, whereas

10     as far as their work on the ground, while they are part of the brigade,

11     it is only the brigade commander who tells them what they must do on the

12     battle-field?"

13             [In English]

14             "A.  Yes, that's right.

15             "Q.  I think this had made things clear, and we have been able to

16     iron out some of these differences we had.  Thank you."

17             [Interpretation] End quote.

18             And now I will just briefly say something about one part of

19     administrative authorities, those that the Military Police Administration

20     had vis-a-vis military police units.

21             The chief of the Military Police Administration, de jure, was in

22     a position to appoint company commanders and lower-ranking officers in

23     the units of active military police.  When it comes to the battalion

24     commanders, he only -- he could only propose appointments.  This is

25     illustrated, for example, by document P143.

Page 52653

 1             The candidate for battalion commander in any operative zone was

 2     pre-selected by a commission.  For example, a commission for deciding on

 3     the candidates for the commander of the 1st Battalion, one of the members

 4     was a representative of the Main Staff, whereas the commander of the

 5     operative zone was a member of a commission appointing commanders for

 6     other active battalions.  This was confirmed by Witness Andabak on

 7     page T-50914 as well as document P960.  However, the fact that some

 8     commanders may have been selected unbeknownst to Valentin Coric, and the

 9     examples for that are documents P3409 and P4494.

10             The example of Mijo Jelic is the best illustration of the extent

11     to which the Administration of the Military Police de facto participated

12     in the staffing policy.  Mijo Jelic, Your Honour, was the commander of

13     the 1st Light Assault Battalion on the 2nd of July, 1993.  On that day,

14     pursuant to Miljenko Lasic's order, and he was the commander of the

15     South-East Herzegovina Operative Zone, he was appointed as the commander

16     of one sector in the city of Mostar.  Nobody consulted Valentin Coric

17     prior to that.  Nobody even formally informed him about that.  This is

18     proven by document P3117.

19             On the 6th of August, 1993, the chief of the Main Staff appointed

20     Mijo Jelic as the commander of the defence of the city of Mostar.  Nobody

21     consulted Valentin Coric.  Nobody sought his opinion yet again.  This is

22     proven by document P3983.

23             It is true, Your Honours, that at that point Mijo Jelic was a

24     military policeman.  However, when it comes to his destiny,

25     Valentin Coric could have as big a say as he could have if at that point

Page 52654

 1     in time Mijo Jelic was, for example, a postman.

 2             Let me give you another example as to what kind of authority

 3     Valentin Coric had, or better said, didn't have over the military police.

 4     Valentin Coric wanted to discipline a member of the military police.

 5     However, General Praljak prevented him from doing that.  General Praljak

 6     said that he was the one who had operative command over that particular

 7     military policeman.  You will see proof of that in documents P3068 and

 8     5D4394.

 9             The Prosecution and the Petkovic and Praljak Defence teams claim

10     that it was only from the 28th of July, 1993, pursuant to Valentin Coric,

11     seen in document P3778, the military police was engaged and

12     re-subordinated to military commanders.  In pleading their case, these

13     Defence teams go even further and say that the military police were

14     subordinated to them for a very brief period of time and for very

15     specific tasks.

16             Your Honours, I have just listed the names of all the witnesses

17     who confirmed that throughout all that time, the commanders of the

18     military police were military commanders, both when they were engaged in

19     combat as well as when they were performing their daily duties.

20             Your Honours, no order on re-subordination had to exist in order

21     for military commanders to be in command, and there is a simple reason

22     why such an order did not have to exist.  The military police were

23     already re-subordinated to military commanders by their organisation.

24     Document P3778 is not a document testifying to re-subordination.  This is

25     what it is:  Before this order was issued, Valentin Coric, pursuant to an

Page 52655

 1     order of the Main Staff, had to move the military police from one zone to

 2     another, because they had their own permanent territorial deployment.

 3     Likewise, he sent the 1st Battalion, pursuant to the Main Staff orders,

 4     wherever the Main Staff wanted to send the battalion.  This order which

 5     Valentin Coric did not issue of his own will, but rather pursuant to an

 6     order that he had already received from the Main Staff, completely throws

 7     out Valentin Coric from the story.  From that moment, military commander,

 8     headed by the Main Staff, deployed military police units wherever they

 9     wanted and whenever they wanted.  This is confirmed by the fact that all

10     witnesses which I have already mentioned, in addition to Praljak and

11     Petkovic, confirmed that the de facto system of command over the military

12     police functioned equally throughout all that time in all of the

13     operative zones.

14             The following examples that show that military commanders

15     commanded over the military police, these are the examples for the orders

16     of military commanders for the daily tasks of the military police:

17     P3039, P3135, P2030, P2548, P1359, P2836 - I apologise, Your Honours.

18     Could you please bear with me for a moment - P2640, P1913, 5D2195,

19     5D4040, 5D3044, 5D3046, 5D3048, 5D3052, 5D3019, 5D1054, 5D4392, 5D4030,

20     5D5095, 5D4374, 5D4380.

21             And now the example showing that even before the order by

22     Mr. Valentin Coric was issued, commanded over military police in combat:

23     3D1785, 5D2102, 5D4387, 5D4385, 5D4382, 5D4375, 5D4376, 5D4377.

24             And now examples of orders issued by the Main Staff to the

25     military police via the Military Police Administration for their daily

Page 52656

 1     tasks:  P323, P708, 5D4282.  There was no single order that went straight

 2     from the Main Staff via the Military Police Administration for combat

 3     activities.

 4             And now examples of orders issued by the Main Staff, sent

 5     directly to the military police without the involvement of the

 6     Military Police Administration for daily tasks:  P638, P377, P2534,

 7     P1344, P933, P458.

 8             And now examples of the Main Staff orders sent directly to the

 9     military police for combat operations, without the involvement of the

10     Military Police Administration:  P1888, P3117, P3128.

11             Your Honours, this may be a good time for our next break, I

12     believe.

13             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.  I was waiting for

14     the last digit to enter the transcript.  There are a lot of numbers.

15             It is, indeed, time to take our last break of 20 minutes.

16                           --- Recess taken at 5.31 p.m.

17                           --- On resuming at 5.50 p.m.

18             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We continue.

19             You have the floor.

20             MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.

21             Another part of the Prosecutor's case, argued in their final

22     brief in paragraph 1058, as well as in their closing argument, as well as

23     in the Petkovic final brief in paragraph 95, is the fact that

24     Valentin Coric received combat reports.  Your Honours, we assert that

25     Valentin Coric did not receive a single combat report.  We also claim

Page 52657

 1     that he did not issue a single combat order.  A combat report has to

 2     contain the following:  Information about the enemy, including the

 3     enemy's activities; deployment and future intentions; information about

 4     one's own forces, including activities in the course of the previous day;

 5     the technical deployment problems and how they were dealt with; losses;

 6     requirements with regard to the materiel and technical equipment; as well

 7     as other requirements.  All this information has to be very precise.

 8     This is proven by documents 5D4385 and P1915.

 9             A combat order or an order for combat has to contain the

10     following:  Information about the enemy; information about the enemy

11     forces; information about their technical equipment and deployment;

12     deployment of one's own forces and their precise combat tasks; the

13     description of signals and communications; the plan of movements; the

14     designation of command posts and strategic points; the designation of

15     artillery support; instructions and tasks which concern the security

16     organs and intelligence organs; instructions and tasks for the engineers

17     as well as the logistics men.  This is proven by documents P3246, 5D4387,

18     P1933, P1932, P4719, P4777, P3117, and 4D1700.  There is no evidence in

19     the case file proving that Valentin Coric ever received such reports or

20     ever issued such orders.

21             In paragraph 998, the Prosecutor claims that Valentin Coric

22     personally carried out the inspection of the front-line in Mostar, and

23     that after that he was the one who ordered that reinforcements should

24     arrive, and how they would be deployed.  Of the nine documents invoked by

25     the Prosecutor, in that only one has something to do with the specific


Page 52658

 1     situation.  This is document P5657.

 2             And now could we go into private session for a couple of minutes,

 3     please.

 4             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Madam Registrar.

 5                           [Private session]

 6   (redacted)

 7   (redacted)

 8   (redacted)

 9   (redacted)

10   (redacted)

11   (redacted)

12   (redacted)

13   (redacted)

14   (redacted)

15   (redacted)

16   (redacted)

17   (redacted)

18   (redacted)

19   (redacted)

20   (redacted)

21   (redacted)

22   (redacted)

23   (redacted)

24   (redacted)

25   (redacted)


Page 52659

 1                           [Open session]

 2             THE REGISTRAR:  We're in open session, Your Honours.

 3             MS. TOMASEGOVIC TOMIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, the

 4     Prosecution claims that Valentin Coric received, personally, to his

 5     attention all the reports that were issued by every single military

 6     policeman of the HVO.  The Coric Defence has described at great length in

 7     their final brief the system of reporting within the military police.

 8     Therefore, we will not belabour the point now.  I will just briefly say

 9     that evidence on file and testimonies of witnesses demonstrate that when

10     it came to regular reporting, in case of active battalions, only summary

11     reports could reach Valentin Coric via the operative duty service.

12     Summaries compiled by the duty operations officers, who included into

13     those summary reports whatever events they deemed important.  This was

14     confirmed by Witnesses Andabak, a Defence witness, on transcript

15     page 50931; Prosecution Witness C on transcript page 22560.  This is also

16     corroborated by documents P420, P423, and P6722.  Only in very rare

17     cases, only in very exceptional situations, were reports sent straight to

18     Valentin Coric.

19             As far as the brigade military police were concerned, the brigade

20     military police never sent their reports to the Military Police

21     Administration or to the military police battalions.  The brigade

22     military police sent their reports to brigades.  This, for example, was

23     confirmed by Witness Andabak on transcript page 50929.  Another example

24     to corroborate that is document P4110.

25             How come that only the reports of the 5th Battalion of the

Page 52660

 1     Military Police mention the activities of the brigade military police in

 2     their area is a special subject which was dealt with by the Coric Defence

 3     in their closing brief, so we will not belabour the point again.

 4             The Petkovic Defence, in paragraph 106 of their final brief,

 5     assert that with regard to the military police, there existed a double

 6     chain of command, as well as that there were problems in commanding the

 7     military police.  They invoke two documents and a number of transcript

 8     pages from the testimony of General Praljak.  On those pages, there is no

 9     mention made about this assertion by the Petkovic Defence.  Witness NO

10     was shown these two documents, and he stated that no military commander

11     ever mentioned to him any double command chain with regards to the

12     military police.  No one ever mentioned to him any problems which would

13     have to do with commanding the military police.  We'd like to stress that

14     that witness, according to his own testimony, personally knew basically

15     all military commanders of the HVO.  It was recorded at transcript

16     pages 51326 and 51328.  Besides, in Mr. Petkovic's report for six

17     months -- for a period of six months in 1993, an entire spectrum of

18     problems is outlined, but not a single one has to do with the military

19     police.  It is document P3642.

20             Your Honours, I'd like to draw your attention to document P4792.

21     In that document, the chief of the Main Staff ordered the commander of

22     the North-Western Herzegovina Operational Zone, Mr. Siljeg, not to let

23     through UNPROFOR vehicles, UN vehicles, and UNHCR vehicles through the

24     check-points, but that it should be done in a way so as to suggest that

25     it was done by the MPs manning the check-points of their own accord.

Page 52661

 1     Your Honours, the Coric Defence submits that this is the best example to

 2     illustrate how and why fairy-tales were constructed about the double

 3     command chain and the recalcitrance of the military police.

 4             At the beginning, I said that I will use the many examples to

 5     show, inter alia, how the Prosecutor ignored their own witnesses and

 6     testimonies when it was not to their advantage.  They did so precisely in

 7     this case when they were trying to show that Valentin Coric and the

 8     Military Police Administration commanded the units of the military

 9     police.  Leaving aside the fact that the Prosecutor ignored a number of

10     Defence witnesses and their testimonies, even though some of them

11     appeared as Defence witnesses, contradicting the thesis put forth by the

12     representative Defences, Your Honours, the Prosecutors in this case

13     ignored their own witnesses, C, CC, and EA.

14             In spite of all statements by Prosecution witnesses, as well as

15     Defence witnesses, the Prosecution puts forth their thesis that Coric

16     commanded the military police by trying to show that through three

17     witnesses, Witness E and the accused Petkovic and Praljak.  It is only

18     good fortune for the Prosecution that the accused testified.  Otherwise,

19     after an investigation which took a number of years, and five years of

20     proceedings in this courtroom, and after a few hundred witnesses, the

21     only witness who could address that thesis would have been Witness E.

22             First, I'd like to deal briefly with the credibility of

23     Witness E.

24             Without any hesitation, the Prosecution declared the

25     Coric Defence Witness NO a war criminal, and all that about a man who has

Page 52662

 1     never been charged, let alone sentenced, for a war crime.  On the other

 2     hand, without any hesitation, in order to corroborate their thesis, they

 3     relied (redacted)

 4   (redacted)

 5   (redacted).  I'd like to remind Your Honours that

 6     there are exhibits confirming that in this case, which are 2D511, 2D512,

 7     and 2D513.

 8             Having analysed the testimony of the accused Petkovic and

 9     Praljak, which was used in order to prove the Prosecution thesis against

10     my client, the Prosecution, in their final brief, said the following;

11     paragraph 3:

12             [In English] "This is especially true of the testimony of the

13     accused Praljak and Petkovic, who lied repeatedly when they were not

14     evading questions on important issues.  Their self-serving testimony is

15     entitled to little weight."

16             [Interpretation] Paragraph 836:

17             [In English] "Praljak lied under oath."

18             [Interpretation] Paragraph 839:

19             [In English] "Praljak repeatedly lied to the Trial Chamber during

20     weeks of his sworn testimony, both in direct and cross-examination.  When

21     he was not lying, he was evading giving direct answers to questions."

22             [Interpretation] Paragraph 840:

23             [In English] "Later in his testimony, Praljak distinguished

24     between vital truth and factual truth.  It is not clear which of these

25     varieties of truth Praljak employed while testifying."

Page 52663

 1             [Interpretation] Paragraph 862:

 2             [In English] "Petkovic had great difficulty giving direct,

 3     truthful and candid answers during his testimony."

 4             [Interpretation] Paragraph 900:

 5             [In English] "This Petkovic evasion again holds no water."

 6             [Interpretation] Paragraph 935:

 7             [In English] "Petkovic assurances cannot be believed."

 8             [Interpretation] Similar or same qualifications the Prosecutor

 9     repeats in paragraphs 650, footnote 1502, paragraph 746, 837, 838, 864,

10     867, 870, 873, 902, 905, 908, 909, 936, and 939.

11             Although in all these paragraphs the Prosecutor qualified the two

12     accused as notorious liars, they did not think twice before using their

13     testimony to confirm their thesis against my client, Valentin Coric, and

14     all that despite the fact that the testimony in question is contradictory

15     with the testimony of other Prosecution witnesses as well as Defence

16     witnesses of the same accused, Petkovic and Praljak.  This, Your Honours,

17     is a very good example showing that the Prosecution, depending on who the

18     target is, offers different interpretations of testimony, assigning them

19     different probative value.

20             Your Honours, there is a possibility that a witness, though not

21     credible, sometimes may say something truthful.  However, in order to be

22     trusted, what he said needs to be confirmed by someone credible, someone

23     that this Court can trust.  However, if that witness speaks differently

24     from all the other witnesses who the Court can believe, and if such

25     testimony assists the person in question to be personally exculpated,

Page 52664

 1     such a person cannot and must not be believed.

 2             The Prosecution, in their final brief, say that Valentin Coric

 3     hid behind his desk, pretending to be a clerk, a bureaucrat.  Your

 4     Honours, Valentin Coric did not hide then and is not hiding now.  At the

 5     time, Valentin Coric was prevented from taking part in the appointment of

 6     military policemen.  He was prevented from instituting disciplinary

 7     procedures.

 8             I'd like to remind Your Honours that Valentin Coric requested the

 9     Main Staff to withdraw military policemen from the front-line.  Proof of

10     that is document P5471 and General Praljak's testimony, who stated that

11     it was his decision not to meet that particular request by Coric.  It was

12     recorded on transcript pages 40988, 40989, 42523 to 42527.

13             Your Honours, had Valentin Coric been the commander of the

14     military police, he would have withdrawn those men.  He would not have

15     needed any -- Praljak's permission, nor would Mr. Praljak have been able

16     to decide on that.  Valentin Coric's Defence is not shying away.  Our

17     assertions are confirmed by evidence and credible witnesses.

18             I'd like to move on to another topic now.

19             The Prosecution, in paragraph 1036 of their final brief, assert

20     that Valentin Coric was informed on the 30th of January, 1993, of the

21     misconduct of the military police in Prozor.  In doing so, the

22     Prosecution invokes document P1362, in which the brigade commander of

23     Rama, by the name of Zutic, states that no order was implemented unless

24     the military police had its own interest in doing so.  By the same token,

25     mention is made of a problematic military policeman whose nickname was

Page 52665

 1     Banja Luka.

 2             Your Honours, first I'd like to draw your attention to an order

 3     of that same brigade commander, Mr. Zutic, dated the 27th of January,

 4     1993, that is to say, three days prior, in which he states, by sending it

 5     to the military police:

 6             "I order that at military police check-points in the area of our

 7     municipality, the personnel staffing the check-points from the military

 8     police should be informed of the following:

 9             "1.  No Muslim can traverse the area of this municipality;

10             "2.  Buses travelling through the area of the municipality should

11     be controlled more carefully, and any Muslim found on board such buses

12     should be removed;

13             "3.  Goods and cargo Muslims are trying to transfer through our

14     municipality should be seized."

15             This order is in force immediately, and the personnel at all

16     check-points should be acquainted with it.  Your Honours, this is

17     document P1327.  It is clear what the order in question is.  The

18     Coric Defence asserts that the military police conducted themselves in a

19     legal fashion by not implementing this order.

20             Your Honours, I'd like to remind you that in document P1362,

21     referred to by the Prosecutor, the brigade commander mentioned the

22     military policeman by the nickname of Banja Luka as a problematic person.

23     In paragraph 1036, the Prosecution again asserts that this Banja Luka

24     person was a military policeman.  Your Honours, not only that he was

25     never a military policeman, he was even declared unfit to serve the army,

Page 52666

 1     as can be seen in the criminal report submitted against him, which is

 2     document P4836.

 3             In paragraph 1037 of their final brief, the OTP assert that

 4     Miroslav Bralo was released from detention, although a criminal report

 5     was submitted against him for murder, with a view to including him in

 6     combat operations.  The Coric Defence would like to

 7     retray [as interpreted] that the military police submitted a criminal

 8     report against that person for the murder of a Muslim, and following that

 9     report he was detained in the military prison Kaonik.  It is clearly

10     illustrated by P1405.  The Kaonik Military Prison was not under the

11     competence of neither the military police nor the Military Police

12     Administration, and they had no say over who could be released from

13     detention.  The Kaonik Military Prison was under the authority of the

14     Central Bosnia Operational Zone, as indicated by document P1478.

15             In paragraph 1017 of their final brief, the Prosecution assert

16     that Coric, on 25 October 1992, was informed by Siljeg, commander of the

17     North-West Herzegovina Operational Zone, about criminal misconduct of the

18     military police.  In paragraph 1018, they continue the story by saying

19     that four days later, which would be the 29th of October, a meeting was

20     held in Ljubuski, attended by Coric, and that it was there where he was

21     informed of that criminal conduct.  Your Honours, first of all, that

22     meeting, which is in document P1350, was not held four days later.  It

23     was three months later, in January 1993.  In that document, there is no

24     mention of either Siljeg or any criminal conduct by the military police.

25     Quite the contrary, the military police was praised by those in

Page 52667

 1     attendance.  The problems discussed there concerning crime were the

 2     technical issues the Crime Service was facing, which had nothing to do

 3     with criminal acts.  In other words, to assert that some criminal conduct

 4     by the military police was discussed at the meeting is a simple

 5     fabrication.

 6             Let me return to Mr. Siljeg's report.  Let me first refer to the

 7     document the Prosecution cites, and that is P648.  This document doesn't

 8     deal with any sort of command conduct by the military police, which is

 9     seen from the reply to that document, which is 3D424.  Instead, the

10     document is about vehicles that the military police had taken from

11     thieves and which it was returning to the rightful owners.  This was

12     confirmed by Witnesses Andabak and Praljak, and everything is explained

13     in detail in paragraph 617 of our final brief.

14             Now I would like to say a few words about the commander of the

15     North-West Herzegovina Operative Zone, whom the Prosecution cites several

16     times in their attempts to try to prove that the military police was

17     involved in illegal conduct.  This operative zone commander, Mr. Siljeg,

18     is the same one the Prosecution points out in paragraph 880 of his final

19     brief as an example of a commander who uses abusive language when

20     referring to Muslims.  This man, Your Honours, is the same one who,

21     although he knows perfectly well that at that point in time he had

22     prisoners in Prozor, lied to the Health Section of the Department of

23     Defence that he doesn't have any, and he goes on to say, You have no

24     right to issue orders to me.  That can be seen in document P6203.  That's

25     the same man, Your Honours, who was tasked by the commander of the

Page 52668

 1     Main Staff not to let UNPROFOR, UN, and UNHCR vehicles pass and to

 2     misrepresent it as arbitrary conduct of the military police.  That's

 3     document P4792.  That man is the very same commander who, in the

 4     document, gives instructions to conceal dead bodies, which can be seen in

 5     document P1308.  It's the same man who accuses the military police of

 6     stealing tanker-trucks from the convoy, although he knew that these

 7     tanker-trucks were in his possession.  A longer story about this incident

 8     can be found in our closing -- in our final brief in paragraph 748.  This

 9     is the same man, Your Honours, who follows orders to tidy up his

10     prisoners before the Red Cross arrived.  That's P4188.  This,

11     Your Honours, is the credible evidence that the Prosecution puts forward

12     against the military police and Valentin Coric.  But with who does this

13     gentleman -- this commander have problems, Your Honours?  He doesn't have

14     a problem with Franjic, for example.  He doesn't complain of him.  Well,

15     that's hardly surprising because that man, Franjic, is his own man, an

16     earlier brigade commander turned military policeman, and when he was

17     supposed to be arrested, the same Siljeg accepts him again as the brigade

18     commander.  The entire chronology is described in detail in our final

19     brief in paragraphs 612 and 617.

20             I will tell you who was a problem for Mr. Siljeg.  Your Honours,

21     it was Mr. Andabak who was a problem for him, the commander of the

22     military police battalion that covered his operative zone.  And who is

23     Mr. Andabak?  Mr. Zdenko Andabak continued his military career after the

24     war in the Armed Forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Mr. Andabak became

25     colonel of those armed forces, and he was commander of the

Page 52669

 1     Combat Simulation Centre under the Training and Doctrine Command.

 2     Mr. Andabak stated that on transcript pages 50904 and 50905, as well as

 3     in document 5D5084.  Mr. Andabak couldn't have become an officer in the

 4     Armed Forces of Bosnia-Herzegovina if there had been a shadow of doubt

 5     that he had ever committed a crime, especially a war crime against

 6     Muslims.

 7             I'm going to move on to another topic now.

 8             In their final brief, the Prosecution asserts that Valentin Coric

 9     commanded the Convicts Battalion and that Valentin Coric and the military

10     police tolerated the criminal activities of the Convicts Battalion and

11     its members.  Under the Rules of Procedure and Evidence and the

12     jurisprudence of the Tribunal, it is impermissible for the Prosecution to

13     put forward a new thesis for the first time now, after five years into

14     the trial, in their final brief, and only now mention a new subordinate

15     over whom Valentin Coric allegedly had authority.  The jurisprudence of

16     the Tribunal stipulates that all matters of substance shall be described

17     in the indictment in detail, including all allegedly subordinate persons

18     for whose acts the accused is -- was or is allegedly responsible under

19     Article 7(3), in order for the accused to be informed what he can defend

20     himself against.  That is corroborated by various legal authorities who

21     we cite in paragraph 6 and paragraphs 67 through 72 of our final brief.

22     The indictment identifies as his subordinates only the military police of

23     the HVO, and thus informs the accused Coric of his potential

24     responsibility under Article 7(3).  We can read that in paragraph 12.

25     Thus, this change in the Prosecution case at the very end of the trial

Page 52670

 1     infringes upon the principle of a fair trial and the rights of the

 2     accused and must be refused by the Trial Chamber.

 3             In paragraph 1028, the Prosecution, citing a single document, for

 4     the first time in this trial asserts that Valentin Coric had authority

 5     over the Convicts Battalion and that he issued an order to them.

 6     Your Honours, the document which the Prosecution cites is P1517, and it

 7     is an order issued by Valentin Coric, but that order wasn't issued to the

 8     Convicts Battalion, but to the military police, although mention is made

 9     of the Convicts Battalion in the order.  It can also be seen from the

10     document that Valentin Coric here doesn't act on his own, but rather was

11     ordered to issue this order.

12             The Prosecution tried to corroborate their assertion that

13     Valentin Coric tolerated the crimes of the Convicts Battalion without

14     reacting to them.  They used several documents to that end.  They cite

15     document P5477, which was sent to head of the Department of Defence.  The

16     same document, only sent to or addressed to the chief of Main Staff, is

17     Exhibit 2D974.  In this document, Mr. Vidovic from the Crime Service of

18     the Military Police warns the then chief of Main Staff of all problems

19     that they are facing due to crime and neglect of discipline in military

20     units, including the problems these units are creating at the Heliodrom,

21     and especially points out the situation in which the detained members of

22     the Convicts Battalion were released following Tuta's orders.  In the

23     original document, as well as in the English translation, Vidovic calls

24     these criminals heroes, but the word "heroes" is in inverted commas.  In

25     their final brief, paragraph 1034, the Prosecution, quoting from this

Page 52671

 1     document, leaves out the inverted commas, and thus totally changes the

 2     meaning of what Vidovic wrote and meant.  This, Your Honour, is yet

 3     another example of misquoting evidence by the Prosecution.

 4             Based on that document, the Prosecution construes another thesis;

 5     namely, that Vidovic, although he's a member of the military police,

 6     contacts the Main Staff because he knows that he cannot expect help from

 7     Coric.  The Prosecution here prefers to construe something like that

 8     rather than to accept the only logical conclusion to which anybody -- at

 9     which anybody reasonable will arrive.  Your Honours, it is clear and

10     logical that Vidovic contacted the Main Staff, because to Vidovic's

11     understanding, the Main Staff was superior to the armed forces and, due

12     to that fact, had the power and the authority to discipline Tuta, the

13     commander of the Convicts Battalion.  This was confirmed by Vidovic,

14     himself, when he gave evidence before this Court so recorded on

15     transcript pages 51644 and the following.

16             The Prosecution construes the following from this, without any

17     foundation: that Coric was the one who released criminals from prison to

18     enable them to take part in combat operations.  It is obvious from the

19     document which I have just quoted or which I have just cited that those

20     mentioned above were released pursuant to Tuta's rather than Coric's

21     orders, and that the military police informed the Main Staff about that.

22     Document P5891 contains another example in which Lasic, operative zone

23     commander, orders the release of another group of soldiers from

24     detention, and these soldiers were remanded in custody for a crime -- on

25     criminal charges.  Your Honours, there is not a single order issued by

Page 52672

 1     Valentin Coric along the same lines, namely, that criminals should be

 2     released.

 3             The Prosecution also, citing document P3928 in paragraph 1031,

 4     assert that it follows from one sentence of that document that the

 5     Convicts Battalion, pursuant to Coric's orders, enjoyed immunity from

 6     criminal prosecution.  That is simply untrue, Your Honours, because the

 7     sentence in question can be interpreted either way.  That is why it is

 8     irrelevant why this sentence is interpreted by either the Prosecution or

 9     the Defence.  It is relevant how credible witnesses of that time

10     interpret it.

11             Witness Vidovic, in his evidence, explained that the criminal

12     offences of members of various criminal groups were registered, not in

13     order to tolerate their crimes, but in order to prepare a comprehensive

14     police and judicial operation against these criminals.  Various HVO

15     bodies took part in these preparations, and this operation was eventually

16     carried out.  This was confirmed by Witness Bandic and by Witness NO.

17     The Coric Defence has dealt with this in detail at paragraph 286 of its

18     final brief, and there is no need for me to repeat what has already been

19     mentioned there.

20             About the allegations in paragraph 1033 of the Prosecution final

21     brief about a particular incident, I would like to draw the attention of

22     the Trial Chamber to documents 5D2097, 5D2095, and P6893, as well as to

23     the evidence given by Witness Vidovic on transcript pages 51495 through

24     51497.  It follows from these documents that not only were criminal

25     reports filed, but also an on-site investigation was conducted.  We see

Page 52673

 1     that both the military police and the civilian police took part in the

 2     investigation, that the prosecutor was informed and so was the

 3     investigative judge.  The Coric Defence asserts, and I will go into more

 4     detail later, that as of the moment when the Court and the

 5     Prosecutor's Office are informed of the case, the police no longer has

 6     any authority over the case.  Instead, it's the investigative judge who

 7     has authority.

 8             To corroborate their thesis that Coric tolerated the crimes of

 9     ethnic cleansing, the Prosecution several times, both in their closing

10     arguments and in their final brief, cite document P2802.  In that report

11     of the military police for 15 June 1993, under the heading "Crime," we

12     can read the following:  During the previous day, not one criminal

13     offence was recorded, not one incident; only the ethnic cleansing of the

14     town of persons of Muslim ethnicity has been recorded.  From this

15     sentence, the Prosecution somehow drew the conclusion that it proved that

16     the military police considers ethnic cleansing not to be a crime.  The

17     Defence asserts that the Prosecution's conclusion is completely wrong and

18     unfounded, and that is confirmed by documents P2769, P2574 and P2749.

19     It's about this same case that is described in the document cited by the

20     Prosecution.  It can be seen from these documents that the military

21     police in this particular case went out on the ground upon receiving a

22     report that Stela and his soldiers were harassing Muslim civilians.  It

23     is also obvious that these criminals said that they had been ordered by

24     their superior, Tuta.  It can also be seen that the military police was

25     looking for one of them.  It is obvious that the situation was verging on

Page 52674

 1     armed conflict between the military police and the criminals.

 2     Your Honours, it is also obvious that the military police immediately

 3     reported to the Main Staff about the entire incident.

 4             Your Honours, it is clear that at that moment, the military

 5     police did whatever they could at that moment.  The situation threatened

 6     to turn into an armed conflict between two military formations, of which

 7     one was acting on the orders of their superior, who was a criminal, and

 8     the orders were of a criminal nature.  Everything was happening in the

 9     city among the civilians, and the only thing the military police could do

10     at the moment was to inform the Main Staff.  They could only hope for

11     some assistance from their joint superior.  That's why they addressed

12     him.

13             The Defence here would like to draw the Trial Chamber's attention

14     that in one of the documents, it says that the military police was

15     powerless, because instead of being engaged in proper policing, they had

16     to man the lines.  Your Honours, it is precisely because of this type of

17     situation that Coric wanted the police to be withdrawn from the

18     front-lines.

19             The Prosecution offered a very ironical comment when they said

20     that light assault battalions normally do not engage in criminal

21     investigations.  It is true, Your Honours, that they don't, they don't

22     engage in criminal investigations.  However, imagine a situation when you

23     have only a few crime investigations [as interpreted] armed with nothing

24     but pistols.  They cannot encounter dangerous groups, they cannot arrest

25     anybody.  It is a notorious fact that in such cases, crime inspectors

Page 52675

 1     need the support of intervention police, and in this particular case, the

 2     intervention police would have been light assault battalions or units.

 3             Your Honours, would the military police have undertaken

 4     everything that they did, would they have issued several reports about

 5     this incident, if that incident had been something completely normal for

 6     them and if it had been something completely desirable?  I'm sure that

 7     they wouldn't.  Likewise, they would not have included the incident under

 8     "Crime" in document P2802 had they not considered the incident to be a

 9     crime.  Every other interpretation, Your Honours, is nothing but an

10     attempt to engage in some linguistic gymnastics, resorting to an

11     awkwardly-worded sentence in order to prove one's thesis, although all

12     other evidence point to a completely different and an only logical

13     conclusion.  And I'd also like to say that despite the Prosecution's

14     claim, it is not true that the document bears the stamp of the military

15     police.  The document bears the stamp of the 3rd Battalion of the

16     Military Police, precisely the unit to which the document was sent.

17             Your Honours, even the Prosecutor, in paragraph 293 of their

18     final brief, claims that the military police often reported about

19     infringements and crimes committed by Tuta's units.  We claim that on the

20     case file there's a series of documents which show that police

21     investigations were undertaken against those people and that criminal

22     reports were filed.  Due to the time restrictions, we're not in a

23     position to cite all of them.  Therefore, we are pointing to just a few

24     of them:  P6727, P6893, 5D4168, 5D4169, 5D5022.

25             In paragraphs 1046 through 1055 of their final brief, in the part

Page 52676

 1     that concerns Valentin Coric, the Prosecutor claims that Coric commanded

 2     the military police as well as supported the military police engagement

 3     in combat, although he knew only too well that that would have a negative

 4     impact on the policing, especially in crime prevention and fight against

 5     crime.  However, quite contrary to that thesis, the Prosecution, in the

 6     same final brief in paragraphs 565 and 752, which concern the accused

 7     Stojic and Praljak, asserts that Coric tried to intervene quite

 8     legitimately in order to withdraw the military police from the front-line

 9     in order for them to be able to fight crime.  In paragraph 742 and 748 of

10     their final brief, the Prosecution admitted that General Praljak was the

11     one who obstructed Coric's request and that General Praljak was the one

12     who kept the military police on the front-lines.  Your Honours, this is

13     yet another example how the Prosecutor uses the same facts and interprets

14     them in different ways, depending on the goal that they wish to achieve.

15             The Defence asserts that Valentin Coric, within the limitations

16     of his powers and abilities, did everything that he possibly could to

17     actively fight crime of all types.  And just like the Prosecution asserts

18     in paragraphs 565 and 752, this is why he sent the request for the

19     military police to be withdrawn from the front-lines in order to be able

20     to do their normal policing.  This is recorded in Exhibit P5471.

21             The Prosecutor's expert Tomljanovic confirmed

22     that the military police had manpower issues and that these issues

23     reflected negatively on their crime/combat capabilities, especially in

24     1993, when military policemen were engaged in combat.  This was recorded

25     on transcript pages 6347 and 6348.

Page 52677

 1             Moreover, in their final brief, the Prosecutor claims that the

 2     Prosecutor Witness Biskic had a different position than Coric with regard

 3     to the engagement of military police in combat, implying that the witness

 4     did not agree with Coric's actions, and that Biskic was actually the one

 5     who finally withdrew the military police from the front-lines once Coric

 6     had left the position.  Contrary to the allegations by the Prosecution,

 7     in his testimony before this Trial Chamber, Witness Biskic didn't

 8     criticise Coric.  Actually, he absolutely supported his position, and he

 9     totally agreed with the intentions and positions that arise from document

10     P5471, and that was recorded on transcript pages 15279 and the following.

11             Contrary to the Prosecutor's allegations, Biskic actually

12     testified that he wasn't the one who was in a position to withdraw the

13     military police from the front-lines.  Actually, it was done by

14     General Praljak's successor, at his request.  That was General Roso, who

15     was also the new chief of the Main Staff in December 1993.  This was

16     recorded on transcript page 15282.  Therefore, again in this case the

17     Prosecutor maintains a position contrary to the positions of his own

18     witnesses, one of whom is an expert witness.  He erroneously interprets

19     the testimonies of their own witnesses.  He ignores parts of testimony

20     which doesn't support his thesis, and all that with an objective to

21     confirm their construct at all costs, although that construct is not

22     founded in any of the evidence on file.

23             The testimony of Biskic was corroborated by

24     Defence Witness Vidovic.  He said that behind document P5471 was a

25     sincere desire for the military police to withdraw from the battle-field

Page 52678

 1     in order to be able to fight crime, and that was recorded on transcript

 2     page 51518.

 3             Defence Witness, 1D, the late Mr. Buntic confirmed that the issue

 4     of the military police engagement in combat was discussed at HVO

 5     sessions, and that was recorded on transcript pages 30566 and the

 6     following.

 7             Once all the evidence is reviewed, it's very difficult to

 8     understand how the Prosecutor, based on document P5471, which is

 9     Valentin Coric's request for the military police to be withdrawn from the

10     front-lines, can draw a conclusion that that corroborates a criminal

11     behaviour.  Your Honour, Coric's intentions presented in that request

12     were honourable and sincere, which is corroborated by the fact that he,

13     in his capacity as the minister of the interior, already in

14     November 1993, immediately after having taken up the position, sent

15     another one, an almost identical request.  However, at that time the

16     request concerned the civil police.  Proof of that is document P6837.

17     The only possible and logical and viable conclusion which can be drawn

18     from this action of my client is that that was a benevolent and

19     appropriate step in the fight against crime.

20             Your Honours, I am about to embark on a somewhat lengthier and

21     bigger topic.  So since I only have five minutes left, I would like to

22     conclude today and resume tomorrow.

23             JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.

24             Madam Registrar is going to give me the account of the time that

25     you have left.  I believe that you have another two and a half hours, but


Page 52679

 1     Madam Registrar is going to give me the exact time.

 2             Tomorrow, we resume at 2.15, and on Thursday we're supposed to

 3     sit in the morning at 9.00.  So tomorrow, we shall continue with the

 4     Coric Defence arguments, and after that we will hear from

 5     Pusic's Defence.

 6             And I would like to wish everybody a good evening.  Until

 7     tomorrow.

 8                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.54 p.m.,

 9                           to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 23rd day of

10                           February, 2011, at 2.15 p.m.