1 Thursday, 14 February 2008
2 [Open session]
3 [The witness entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 8.38 a.m.
5 [The accused entered court]
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, please call the
8 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you and good morning, Your Honour. This is
9 case number IT-03-67-T, the Prosecutor versus Vojislav Seselj.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
11 First of all, I would like to greet our witness. I'll ask him to
12 take the solemn declaration later on. I would like to greet the
13 Prosecution, and I'd like to ask the Prosecutor to introduce himself
14 because I don't know him.
15 MR. MUNDIS: Mr. President, on behalf of the Prosecution I'd like
16 to introduce both colleagues that are sitting with me today.
17 Mr. Mathias Marcussen on my left who will be leading the witness and
18 Mr. Calogero Ferrara who will be leading witnesses in subsequent
19 proceedings in this case. Thank you.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. Welcome to this -- to
21 these proceedings to both of you.
22 I would also like to greet Mr. Seselj and all those who assist us
23 for this hearing and for future hearings.
24 Before I ask the witness to take the solemn declaration, let me
25 give you the following piece of information: Next week we are supposed to
1 be sitting in the afternoon, but another courtroom is available and we'll
2 be able to sit in the morning. Therefore, on Tuesday, Wednesday, and
3 Thursday we'll be sitting in the morning. That's preferable, because
4 everybody's in a better shape in the morning. Next week, therefore, we'll
5 be working in the morning. That's what I wanted to say before we start,
6 but now I'm going to ask the witness to stand up.
7 Could you please give me your first name, last name, and date of
9 THE WITNESS: My name is Reynaud Theunens, Your Honour, and I'm
10 born on the 2nd of January, 1965 in Brussels in Belgium.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What is your profession or your
12 current occupation?
13 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I'm an intelligence analyst, military,
14 in the Office of the Prosecutor at the ICTY.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Have you testified before this
16 Tribunal as an expert witness and if that's the case tell us in which
18 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I testified in the Milosevic trial in
19 February 2004, in the Martic trial in February 2006, and in the trial
20 known as the Vukovar 3 trial, the trial of Mr. Mrksic, Sljvancanin, Radic
21 in June, July 2006.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You've already testified three
24 THE WITNESS: That's right, Your Honours.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One last question before I ask
1 you to take the solemn declaration. You stated that you were a military
2 analyst. So I suppose that before you came to work here in this Tribunal
3 you served in the military. I would like to know if that is the case and
4 in which units you served and with what rank.
5 THE WITNESS: Indeed, Your Honours. Actually, I'm still a member
6 of the Belgian armed forces. I'm seconded to the ICTY which means that I
7 am a UN servant but I still have my position in the Belgian military if I
8 would like to return there. After my service at the military academy, I
9 started my career as an officer first as a platoon commander and then as a
10 deputy and first year's command in the military academy, and after that,
11 so since 1992, I've been working as a military intelligence analyst in
12 various positions in the Belgian Ministry of Defence. And, excuse me, I
13 have the rank of in Belgian of captain commandant which is a rank between
14 captain and major, OF-3 in the [indiscernible] we use.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. We may have the
16 opportunity to return to this during the examination-in-chief and during
17 the cross-examination as well.
18 Please read the solemn declaration.
19 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
20 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. You may be seated.
22 Let me give you some information before I give the floor to the
23 Prosecution. You've already testified three times. Therefore, what I say
24 won't come as a surprise to you. You know that you will first have to
25 answer questions put to you by the representative of the OTP as part of
1 what we call the examination-in-chief. Five hours have been granted to
2 the Prosecution for that purpose. Questions will be put to you, documents
3 will be put to you as well, and you'll be answering the questions of the
5 The three Judges sitting before you may at any time interrupt and
6 ask you questions, ask you to expand on some answers or ask you to deal
7 with matters that the Prosecution was not considering, and all this in the
8 interest of justice.
9 Following the examination-in-chief, the accused Mr. Seselj who is
10 sitting on your left, the accused then will move on to the
11 cross-examination. Mr. Seselj has been granted the same amount of time as
12 the Prosecution, i.e., five hours.
13 As you know, the cross-examination is made up of leading
14 questions, and it can be quite an ordeal for a witness. Please do not be
15 surprised at the way some questions may be put to you or at the tone that
16 may be used when putting these questions to you, but the Judges will be
17 there to control the proceedings.
18 As you know, and I better say it straight away, the
19 cross-examination has for its aim to test the credibility of the witness,
20 and the second purpose of the cross-examination is to check that what the
21 witness has stated in his answers to the Prosecution or in his report is
22 accurate. So as I said, cross-examination can turn into quite an ordeal
23 for an expert witness.
24 Please try to be as accurate as possible when answering questions
25 put to you, but you are a military man, so I'm not worried about the
1 accuracy you will show when answering questions.
2 If a question is unclear to you, do not hesitate to ask for the
3 question to be rephrased even if the Judges have put that question to you,
4 because some questions may be rather complex or lengthy and may be quite
5 difficult to understand. So in that case do not hesitate to ask for the
6 question to be rephrased.
7 As you know, every hour and a half we take a break, a 20-minute
8 break. If at any time during the proceedings you feel unwell tell us
9 immediately. Then I'll interrupt the proceedings. And if at any time you
10 want to address the Judges directly, please do so if you believe that your
11 question may be useful.
12 This is by way of an introduction in order for these proceedings
13 to run as smoothly as possible in the interest of justice.
14 Let me now give the floor to the Prosecutor.
15 WITNESS: REYNAUD THEUNENS
16 Examination by Mr. Marcussen:
17 Q. Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. Theunens, you said that you were a
18 military analyst in the Office of the Prosecutor. What section do you
19 work in?
20 A. Your Honours, I work in a team which is known as the Military
21 Analysis Team, and --
22 Q. And what does that team do?
23 A. In the -- in the Military Analysis Team we have analysts who look
24 at, in simple terms, at the military aspects of information that is
25 relevant for the Office of the Prosecutor. In more concrete terms, we
1 will study military structures, command and control, weapon systems, the
2 interface between political authority and military command within the
3 armed forces both from the de jure, so as it is foreseen in the
4 legislation, as well as in the -- as well as from the de facto, i.e., how
5 it was on the ground, point of view. And myself and some of my colleagues
6 have already testified on these issues in other trials.
7 Q. Now, you -- you've described briefly that you have served in the
8 Belgian army. Could you -- could you describe in a little more detail
9 your military service.
10 A. Your Honours, as I said before, so after my studies in military
11 academy and in army school, I joined a tank battalion in Germany where I
12 carried out the normal duties one would expect from a young officer, i.e.,
13 platoon commander, and subsequently also a deputy company commander. I
14 was then called to exercise the position of what we call S1, so personnel
15 officer, and adjutant to the battalion commander. Following that I was
16 called to return to military academy to be first the deputy and then the
17 commander of the first years in the polytechnic division, the 146th
18 polytechnic promotion. And after that in September 1992, I joined the
19 Ministry of Defence, more specifically the military intelligence and
20 security service where I carried out various duties, mainly military
21 intelligence analyst.
22 Q. Could we call up Exhibit number -- Rule 65 ter number 2858.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment, please. Let me
24 address something you've just mentioned. You are a member of a service at
25 the OTP with -- together with other analysts. How many analysts are there
1 in that team, in that section?
2 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, the number has -- has decreased over
3 the past years, but I think in average we're around 12 to 14 analysts who
4 each support different cases. For some cases there are more analysts. I
5 would like to add also in this context that the report I compiled is only
6 my work, so nobody else in the team or outside of the team was involved in
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Who is the head of the analysts'
9 team? Is there someone who is the head?
10 THE WITNESS: Indeed, Your Honours. The head of the team is
11 Mr. Philip Coo.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] What is the geographic
13 representations? Are there Americans, Belgians, British? Can you tell us
14 the distribution by country among these 14 analysts?
15 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I think that the geographic
16 distribution of the team reflects the -- kind of reflects the composition
17 of the United Nations. There are indeed, I think, one or two Americans.
18 There is a Ukrainian analyst, a Philippino analyst. There are I think two
19 people from -- or three people from the United Kingdom. There is Dutch
20 analyst, there's a Belgian analyst, and so on.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One last question. In terms of
22 ranks, the head of your service, Mr. Philip Coo, what sort of rank did he
23 have in his own country and what are the ranks of your colleagues? What
24 ranks did they hold in their respective country?
25 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I'm not familiar with the ranks of all
1 my colleagues, but I know that Mr. Coo, I think, was a captain or a major
2 in the Canadian Armed Forces, whereas Ukrainian colleague was a Colonel in
3 his armed forces. For the other people I would -- I'm not so sure. I
4 think there is at least one non-commissioned officer. I also forgot to
5 add that there is a Hungarian colleague who was, I think, a Captain or a
6 Major in his armed force.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. Thank you very much.
8 MR. MARCUSSEN: Yes. I'd like to call up if we could 65 ter
9 number 2858. Your Honours, that's also in the binder you have. You'll
10 see it.
11 Q. Mr. Theunens, is this your --
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I demand that the
13 Prosecutor say each time in which binder the document is, because there
14 are three binders.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes, Mr. Marcussen.
16 Please give the number of the binder. This document apparently is in
17 binder 3, if I'm not mistaken.
18 MR. MARCUSSEN: Yes, Your Honour. I think there have been a
19 miscommunication. We have -- in binder 3 we have the CV of the expert and
20 his reports and related documents. And then we have -- in binders 1 and 2
21 we have the exhibits that we intend to use today. That might be a little
22 counter-intuitive, and I apologise for that.
23 Q. Mr. Theunens, is this your CV?
24 A. Indeed, Your Honours, this is my CV for court.
25 Q. If we could go -- if Your Honours go to the second page. If we
1 could go in e-court to the second page of the document.
2 I can see under item 5 that you have also served for some time
3 outside Belgium. Could you give us a brief explanation of what you were
5 A. Indeed, Your Honours. From December 1994 until October 1995, I
6 served in the headquarters of UNPROFOR, which later became known as UNPF
7 in Zagreb. When I arrived there, my first task consisted of updating
8 orders of battles, so the structure of the armed forces in the area, the
9 information that was held in the office on that issue, but because the
10 person in charge of that -- of the team I worked in, the military
11 information team, understood that I had actually more experience than most
12 of my colleagues, I was then tasked to work in a sub-team known as the
13 assessment team where I carried out the activities that are listed in the
14 CV. If you want, I can specify that.
15 Q. Yes, please, if you --
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection. Mr. President, we don't
17 have it all in Serbian, and your administrative employees who are supposed
18 to put it on the ELMO don't have it either. That document stops somewhere
19 halfway down the page in Serbian.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Seselj, you've raised two
21 points, and there's one thing I'd like to mention. On several occasions
22 you say "your employees," "your associates." Please note, Mr. Seselj,
23 that I don't have any employees. I don't have any associates. In this
24 Tribunal we have three organs that are completely independent, one from
25 the other. You have the Office of the Prosecutor, the Registry, and the
1 Trial Chambers. The only associates I have are the Trial Chambers'
2 assistants and legal officers. All the others are completely independent
3 from me. I can't give any instructions or orders to the Registrar or to
4 anyone else except during the proceedings. So when you use the word
5 "employees," "associates," you might give the impression to those
6 listening to us that the Judges here have -- completely command everything
7 that happens in this Tribunal. You've said that on a number of occasions.
8 I don't know if you have something in mind when you use that sort of
9 language, but I wanted to make that very clear. The Judges only work with
10 the senior legal officer and the legal officers of the Chamber. The
11 Judges have no power over anyone else. And when it comes to giving grades
12 to their own assistants, the Judges only give advice. They don't have the
13 final say on that matter. I wanted that thing to be extremely clear.
14 Second point: Yes, you're right. We don't have a B/C/S version
15 of the witness's CV. If there's a problem in that respect, the best way
16 to proceed is probably to put the CV on the ELMO, to ask the witness to
17 read out the relevant passage, and then the interpreters will translate
18 the relevant passage in Mr. Seselj's language.
19 MR. MARCUSSEN: We seem, Your Honours, to have a technical problem
20 with the CV that we have in B/C/S, but maybe Mr. Theunens could simply
21 explain what his functions were. I'm not sure it's essential that -- that
22 we -- we necessarily look at the CV for the explanation of his tasks. And
23 I will ensure that we get a copy of the CV to the accused in his language
24 very quickly. It's being printed, I'm informed, right now and the accused
25 can be given a copy.
1 Let's -- if we just wait for a second, I think it's being
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, since we have time to
4 spare while the document is being delivered, I hope you will allow me to
5 explain what I thought when I said "your employees." Maybe it's a problem
6 with interpretation.
7 When I say "employees," I mean all the administrative personnel
8 cooperating with the Trial Chamber in conducting proceedings. Assistants,
9 associates, employees or whatever it is called in your environment, but it
10 is absolutely inconceivable to me that you may think that I have ulterior
11 motives in saying that. I'm not trying to insult any of the administrative
12 personnel here. When I say that they're your associates, I don't think
13 that I'm insulting you either. I didn't mean they're your private
14 associates. When I address you, I address the whole Trial Chamber and the
15 Court as such.
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you for this explanation.
17 MR. MARCUSSEN:
18 Q. Thank you, Mr. Theunens. Now that we have sorted out this issue,
19 would you please continue with your explanation of your -- your duties
20 while your serving with the UNTAES -- sorry, UNPROFOR.
21 A. Your Honours, my duties while serving with UNPROFOR can be
22 summarised in three -- under three headings. First of all, we would
23 follow, analyse, and assess the military developments and to a certain
24 extent also political developments in the zone of operation of UNPROFOR
25 and its subordinate forces, i.e., the peacekeeping force in Croatia,
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and FYROM, former Yugoslavia Republic of Macedonia.
2 We would then participate and provide oral or written briefings - I mean,
3 that would be done by myself or colleagues - daily briefings to the
4 operations section within the UNPROFOR command, also daily briefings to
5 the force command and the senior, if I can express myself that way,
6 civilian leadership of the mission. And then we would also prepare
7 written documents both for internal use, I mean within the UNPF, UNPROFOR
8 headquarters, as well as for external use. Sometimes there would be
9 questions from the Security Council or from other UN organisation
10 officers, I apologise, who would then go to the civilian component, i.e.,
11 the special representative of the Secretary-General or to the force
12 commander who would then forward -- if it was a matter that was within our
13 competence would then forward the question to us.
14 And my tasks also included liaison within the headquarters between
15 military and civilian agencies, mainly civil affairs and political
16 affairs, and we would also, when possible, go out in the field to have
17 meetings with our counterparts in the sectors, I mean as UNPROFOR is
18 organised, or the battalions and to see for ourselves what the
19 developments were.
20 And to summarise, mainly whereas the people in the operations
21 department would follow the developments, we would use that information to
22 try to prepare predictions, i.e., an outlook how could the situation
23 develop and what would be the implications for the overall situation in
24 the area in general but also in relation to the peacekeeping forces.
25 Q. And then from -- in 1996, 1997, you served with UNTAES in Vukovar,
1 Croatia. What were your functions there?
2 A. Indeed, Your Honours. The United Nations Transitional
3 Administration for Eastern Slavonia was a much smaller mission than
4 UNPROFOR. Its zone of responsibility was limited to the area known as
5 Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem, and I basically carried out the same
6 tasks as I did in the UNPROFOR UNPF headquarters with a slight change in
8 Q. And then again in 1998, 1999, you served for a while in the
9 region. Could you elaborate a little on that function.
10 A. Indeed, Your Honours. From December 1998 till April 1999, I
11 served as the chief of the Belgian National Intelligence Cell in the SFOR,
12 so the Stabilisation Force headquarters in Sarajevo, which was essentially
13 a national assignment. So I was not part of that force. And my duties,
14 in addition to managing the team or leading the team or the cell, as well
15 as following and analysing the developments in the zone of interest, also
16 consisted of intelligence liaison between various governmental and
17 non-governmental agencies.
18 Q. If we could go back to page 1 of the CV, please. You -- I can see
19 that from September 1997 to July 1998 you attended a staff course. What
20 level was that?
21 A. Your Honours, that is the senior officer candidate course, and
22 it's a course at -- for the ground force at brigade level. So basically
23 you are trained to operate in a brigade staff.
24 Q. And lastly about your CV, you have an Licentiaat. What level of
25 degree is that translated into in English?
1 A. Your Honours, in the framework of the Bologna Agreement which
2 regularises university degrees within Europe, the degree of Licentiaat, or
3 Licencie in French, from the military academy is equalised to a master's
5 MR. MARCUSSEN: Your Honours, I'd like to tender Mr. Theunens' CV.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment. I have a question
7 with respect to your CV. I see that from April 1997 to June 1997 you
8 attended for about three months a training programme in Washington, DC,
9 and here we see Defence Intelligence Agency. What is that? What was this
10 training all about? Can you give us some information about this, please.
11 THE WITNESS: Indeed, Your Honours. So the training consists of
12 two components. The first component is a study of the US intelligence
13 community, which covers a number of agencies, both civilian as well as
14 military, so we learned about legislation that guided or directed the
15 activities of these organisations and their interaction. The second
16 component of the course is an analysis course on the strategic level, so
17 where the students are trained in techniques of strategic analysis.
18 I would like to add that the course -- or the students were people
19 from all over the world. They were -- there was an Albanian officer.
20 There were people from Thailand, from other countries in Asia, from Latin
21 America, from Europe, and as well as US civilians.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And who were the trainers? Was
23 it the CIA? Was it another body? Were these people from other
24 governmental agencies? Who were the people directing the training?
25 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, the course was organised by the
1 defence intelligence agency which is, as the name says, is the main
2 intelligence agency within the armed forces in the United States. The
3 trainers or the teachers were people from various backgrounds. There were
4 university professors. There were people from the various organisations
5 which are part of US intelligence community. So there was for example a
6 speaker of the CIA. There would also -- which I didn't mention we would
7 also visit newspapers and political parties so we would have briefings
8 from, at least, journalists from the two main newspapers in Washington,
9 DC. We would visit the Republican party, the democratic party and get a
10 briefing there. So it was very varied, if I can express myself that way.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. Can we have a number,
12 Mr. Registrar.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Exhibit number P191.
14 MR. MARCUSSEN: And now I'd like to call up 65 ter number 2854.
15 And this should be in binder 3. It should be in the same binder as the
16 CV, the second tab there.
17 Q. Mr. Theunens --
18 MR. MARCUSSEN: Your Honours, it's the thin -- it's the thin of
19 the three binders that you received, if there's any ...
20 Q. Mr. Theunens, the document you can see on the screen, is that your
21 expert report?
22 MR. MARCUSSEN: Sorry, I think we have on the screen the addendum,
23 which is 58 -- 2854B -- A, sorry, but what we should have is -- we should
24 simply have 2854.
25 Q. Mr. Theunens, now I think we've got the right document up. Is
1 this -- is this the report that you have prepared?
2 A. Indeed, Your Honours, it is. It's the table of contents now on
3 the monitor.
4 Q. Now, in preparing this report, what was your -- what were you
5 asked to give an opinion on?
6 A. Your Honours, I received the following question from the senior
7 attorney -- senior trial attorney, I apologise, who was at the time in
8 charge of the trial, of the case, the question was to look at the role of
9 SRS/SCP volunteers in the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, more
10 specifically in relation to the areas that are included in the indictment.
11 And also, secondly to study or to analyse the relationship between these
12 volunteers and Mr. Vojislav Seselj or the organisations he was allegedly
13 in control of.
14 Q. In preparing your analysis, which structures did you look at?
15 A. Your Honours, when I received that question which was quite
16 general, I first started to collect information in order to improve my
17 understanding of the question, and I realised very soon that one could not
18 consider the topic in isolation, i.e., that these volunteers were part of
19 a bigger thing, and therefore I thought it would be useful to include in
20 the report also information on the SFRY armed forces. I also included
21 information on the situation in Serbia in relation to armed forces. And I
22 also realised very soon that it was important to make a distinction
23 between the de jure aspects, i.e., the situation as it was described in
24 the legislation and the doctrine, as well as between what I would call the
25 de facto situation. And I mean by that the way how this legislation and
1 doctrine was implemented during the conflict, focused, of course, on the
2 activities of these volunteers and the other forces. They operated in
3 cooperation, subordination, or other relations with -- during that
5 Q. Did your analysis also -- did your report also include an analysis
6 of -- could we call it the structure of the opposing forces in Croatia and
8 A. No, Your Honours. This report is solely focused on SRS/SCP
9 volunteers, as well as, as I mentioned, the forces with whom they operated
10 together in various relations which are explained in the report, and I can
11 be there more specific. It's the SFRY armed forces consisting of JNA and
12 TO, and then what I would call local Serb TO or police forces that were
13 created in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as well as the TO of the
14 Republic of Serbia.
15 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Theunens, you told us that you were asked to
16 investigate into the role of the SRS in the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia
17 and Herzegovina, more specifically the relation to the areas that are
18 included in the indictment and also to analyse the relationship between
19 these volunteers and Mr. Seselj. My question would be if you analysis
20 also intends to analyse the relation between the SRS volunteers and the
22 THE WITNESS: Indeed, Your Honours. Just for the transcript, I
23 was asked to investigate in the role of SRS volunteers, not SRS as a
24 party, and obviously the relationship between the SRS volunteers and the
25 JNA in the various areas is an essential component of my report.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I have a question. It is a
2 direct follow-up of the question asked by my fellow Judge, and this is my
3 question: You testified in the Milosevic case. You know that Mr. Seselj
4 also testified in the Milosevic case. I was not able to check whether you
5 testified before him or after him. As far as you remember, could you tell
6 us when you testified in the Milosevic case?
7 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I testified in -- if I'm not wrong, in
8 January 2004, during the Prosecution phase of the Milosevic trial, whereas
9 Mr. Seselj testified during Defence phase, which was later. So he
10 testified after me.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So he testified
12 after you. Have you -- do you know of his testimony, and do you know of
13 his opinion on the links between the SRS and the JNA?
14 THE WITNESS: Indeed, Your Honours. I am familiar with
15 Mr. Seselj's testimony in the Milosevic case, and I'm also familiar with
16 contemporaneous statements of Mr. Seselj on the relationship between
17 SRS/SCP volunteers and the JNA, and I have attempted to include them in
18 part 2 of the report, in section 3 which deals specifically with the
19 SRS/SCP volunteers.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So you're telling me
21 that in this report that we have there are some parts of the report that
22 incorporated what was said during the Milosevic trial, said by Mr. Seselj.
23 THE WITNESS: I apologise, Your Honour. I may have misexpressed
24 myself. The report only includes what I would call contemporaneous
25 statements of Mr. Seselj, i.e., statements he made at the time of the
1 events or shortly after.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So I'll come back to
3 my question then. Your report as we have it here never took into account
4 what Mr. Milosevic or Mr. Seselj might have said regarding these
5 volunteers, the role played by the JNA, and the role played by the other
6 paramilitary units or the role of the TOs of a number of municipalities.
7 This was not incorporated into this report.
8 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, maybe I have to clarify something
9 about the methodology applied. The footnotes that are included in the
10 report only reflect a fraction of the material I reviewed. The footnotes
11 reflect the material I considered relevant for the subject matter I was
12 requested to analyse.
13 While preparing the report, and I'm not sure any more whether
14 Mr. Seselj testified in the Seselj trial before the report was filed or
15 afterwards, but he certainly testified before the --
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Seselj testified in the
17 Milosevic case, not the Seselj case.
18 THE WITNESS: Okay. I apologise. In the Milosevic trial. I'm
19 sorry. What I meant to say is that he certainly testified in the
20 Milosevic trial prior to the filing of the addendum, which means I was
21 familiar with his testimony in the Milosevic trial. I was also familiar
22 with, for example, Mr. Milosevic's cross-examination of my -- during my
23 testimony in the Milosevic trial, and that is -- and maybe we'll come back
24 later to that when we explain the methodology that was applied. That --
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So in the addendum
1 you took into account a number of data that had emerged during the
2 Milosevic case.
3 THE WITNESS: I will try to explain it better. The fact that
4 there is no explicit reference to the testimony or -- in the addendum or
5 in any other part of the report does not mean that I didn't take it into
6 account. It is information like any other information I consulted while
7 preparing the report, and the report then is a reflection of that
8 process --
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. I'm asking all these
10 questions through evidence that had already been admitted by this Chamber,
11 which is the entire testimony of Mr. Seselj in the Milosevic case, and
12 there was 15 hearings involved, more than 60 hours of testimony.
13 I sum up in two -- and this is what seems to transpire from the
14 question and answers that we have in this testimony: First, at the time,
15 Mr. Milosevic did not have any military authority over the JNA. This is
16 at least the version that seems to emerge from their Q and As.
17 Secondly, the generals of the JNA were in control of all military
18 action. That's the first thing.
19 Second thing which seems to emerge from this document, the Serbian
20 volunteers of the Serbian Radical Party were under the authority of the
21 military command either of the JNA or -- or for those -- for others,
22 Republika Srpska. That's all we have coming out of this testimony.
23 So were these two elements integrated into your own report or
24 maybe in the addendum? This is what I would like to know. Or did you
25 just stick to your report which had been written before the testimony of
1 Mr. Seselj in the Milosevic case?
2 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I was familiar with Mr. Milosevic's
3 view on his relation with the JNA, as well as what the generals -- the
4 powers that the generals allegedly had according to Mr. Milosevic, at the
5 latest in January 2004 when he cross-examined me in the Milosevic case.
6 Now, the documents I have consulted, as well as other sources, but
7 the report itself is only based on documents, do not support these views
8 in relation to Mr. Milosevic. For Mr. Seselj's views are concerned on the
9 relation between SRS volunteers and the JNA during the conflict, he made
10 certain statements already at the time of the events, that his volunteers
11 after September 1991 were always subordinated to the JNA and that the JNA
12 "was our army." These statements are included, or the main ones are
13 included in part 2 of the report, section 2, and in the English version
14 that starts on page 24. So where I provide an overview of quotations from
15 statements by Mr. Seselj.
16 In the report I have also included military documents, orders from
17 military commanders in the various areas, situation reports, which show
18 that indeed most often SRS/SCP volunteers, while participating in the
19 conflict in Croatia are subordinated to the JNA. Vukovar is a very good
20 example. However, there are also documents from senior JNA officers, as
21 well as later for Bosnia-Herzegovina from VRS, so armed forces of the
22 entity known as the Republika Srpska, and these documents include orders
23 and reports where these VRS officers state that they have no control over
24 SRS/SCP volunteers.
25 So in summary I would like to say -- or in conclusion I would like
1 to say that indeed the statements are included with the comment that the
2 statements Mr. Seselj made during the Milosevic trial were actually
3 nothing new when compared to earlier statements and that the documents
4 from -- military documents from people on the ground do not always support
5 these statements.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you for your
7 answer. I think that you have given us the scene and the backdrop, and
8 we'll be able to understand the rest of the proceeding.
9 JUDGE LATTANZI: [Interpretation] I have a question. If I
10 understood you well, you've also analysed the relationship between
11 Seselj's volunteers and the army of Republika Srpska. I would like to
12 know whether you also analysed the relationship between Seselj's
13 volunteers and the broader institution, which was the -- the Serbian armed
14 forces. Was there a higher command that was -- if I understood you well,
15 there was a superior command at the Serbian army level. Is that it?
16 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I'm not sure whether I understand your
17 question well, but I will try to summarise which forces were acting where
18 and what relationship were.
19 The events --
20 JUDGE LATTANZI: [Interpretation] I apologise. In your report I
21 understood that there was an entity, the Serbian armed forces. This
22 entity was made up of the JNA and of the TO. So in this whole
23 construction or device I have not really understood, and I'm sure we'll
24 understand it later on during the examination, but I would like you to
25 know that I have this problem that I would like solved. I don't really
1 understand the role that it plays in this whole contraption. You have the
2 JNA and the TO. On top you have the armed forces, and I don't understand
3 how the volunteers fit in to this whole structure. Not just Seselj's
4 volunteers but all volunteers.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just to maybe make my -- the
6 question a bit more specific, but you seem to be having a difficult time.
7 My fellow Judge, if I'm not mistaken, is talking about the Serbian
8 armed forces, the question of the Serbian armed forces, which is a very
9 broad concept. Within this entity there would be JNA, on the one hand,
10 and the TO. But in this concept of the armed -- Serbian armed forces,
11 where do the volunteers fit in? That's the whole question. This is our
12 question. This is the essence of the question: These volunteers, are
13 they 100 per cent integrated into the JNA or into the TOs or -- and then
14 if that's the case, they are part and parcel of the Serbian armed forces;
15 or were these volunteers another entity, a de facto entity or de jure,
16 maybe, we'll see. It all depends on the documents. We'll see according
17 to the documents. So it would be in addition to the JNA and the TO, like
18 in a parallel structure. Above, under, where does it fit? That's the
19 whole question that we have.
20 THE WITNESS: Indeed, Your Honours. I understand the question. I
21 would just like to make a small correction. When we talk about the JNA
22 and the TO, according to the 1974 constitution and the 1982 All People's
23 Defence law, these were the two components of the SFRY Armed forces, so
24 the armed forces of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The
25 constitution and All People's Defence Law also stipulate that under
1 certain circumstances the armed forces, JNA or TO, can be replenished with
2 volunteers. Now, these volunteers are then people without military
3 obligations who, for whatever reason, want to participate in the defence
4 effort. When I say "certain conditions," I meant by that the three states
5 defined in the legislation: The state of war, the state of imminent
6 threat of war, or a state of emergency.
7 Now, the law also says, the All People's Defence Law, that the TO
8 will include of armed formations which are not part of the JNA. It is
9 also stated that anyone who takes part in the defence of the country in
10 case of an aggression will be considered a member of the armed forces.
11 Now, what is important in the context of the report is that in the
12 course of 1991, political parties in Serbia, the same way it happened in
13 Croatia or Bosnia-Herzegovina, but that's not the subject matter of the
14 report, but certain political parties in Serbia start to recruit,
15 organise, dispatch, participate in the training of volunteers, and these
16 volunteers are then sent in groups to the area of conflict.
17 Two important aspects, it is that -- those are that we talk about
18 volunteer groups who are being sent. Some of these groups, as is shown in
19 part 2 of the report, try to act as separate formations, whereas other
20 groups become subordinated to the JNA. But I think that the distinction
21 between individual volunteers and groups is very important in the context
22 of the report.
23 A second important aspect is that we see these volunteers appear
24 in the conflict areas before the legal conditions as they were defined in
25 the '74 constitution and the 1982 All People's Defence Law have been
1 fulfilled. It is only on the 3rd of October, 1991, that the SFRY
2 Presidency, and I will try to quote the text as it is in the document:
3 "...establishes the existence of a state of imminent threat of war." But
4 even before that condition was fulfilled, we saw that there were
5 volunteers on the ground.
6 Another important aspect which should clarify the role of
7 political parties is that based on the documents I reviewed, many of these
8 volunteers who were recruited by political parties were actually
9 conscripts. So they should have, if the law had been applied, they should
10 have joined the armed forces, because -- i.e., the JNA or the TO, because
11 there had been mobilisations, call-up and so on; but as I tried to explain
12 in the second part of the report, for various reasons these people, i.e.,
13 these conscripts said, "Well, look, I don't want to serve in the JNA. I
14 want to serve in the volunteer group or of party X, Y, or Z." In this
15 report I take then a closer look at the volunteers that were recruited,
16 dispatched, by the SRS/SCP through the organisations it controlled.
17 I hope that that clarifies the matter for you, Your Honours.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes. It clarifies this. I'm
19 trying to sum it up maybe so that it can be on the transcript.
20 You just said that according to the law enforced, there are three
21 states that could solve this problem of the volunteers, of the
22 conscripts: State of emergency, state of imminent war, or state of war.
23 And you're saying that according to what you studied, the text which was
24 applied was only applied on October 3rd, 1991. That was when there was
25 imminent threat of war. That's when there was the proclamation, and
1 that's the founding text. And you're saying before October 3rd, 1991,
2 volunteers were already on the field. And so in your mind, and I'm sure
3 we'll come back to this, you're making a difference between individual
4 volunteers, so individuals who volunteer on their own accord to go and
5 join either the JNA or the TO, and other volunteers that are grouped. And
6 these groups of volunteers, they join the JNA or the TO but through their
7 political party.
8 Is this it? Is this what you said? Did I sum it up?
9 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honours, that is correct. And if you
10 allow me just to be complete --
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'm not an expert, but I'm
12 trying to understand.
13 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, just to be complete, I would like to
14 add that between August 1991 and December 1991, the government of the
15 Republic of Serbia, the Federal Secretariat for People's Defence, as well
16 as the SFRY Presidency, adopt decrees or decisions in order to what I
17 qualified in my report as regularise the situation on the ground. And we
18 see, for example, that on the 18th of August, 1991, the government of the
19 Republic of Serbia adopts a decree for the registration of volunteers in
20 the TO, so the Territorial Defence of the Republic of Serbia.
21 In September 1991, the -- the General Staff of the SFRY armed
22 forces issues an instruction for the acceptance of volunteers into the
23 JNA. And on the 10th of December, 1991, the SFRY Presidency adopts the
24 presidential order number 10 for the engagement of volunteers during the
25 state of imminent threat of war.
1 Based on my review of the documents, only the last reference I
2 mentioned, so the 10th of December SFRY Presidency order, makes a
3 reference to volunteer formations. So this is the first time that we see
4 the term "formations" or "group" being used in a legal document in the
5 context of volunteers.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. One last question
7 and then I will give the floor to the Prosecutor. This term "volunteers,"
8 it's a bit surprising for those who are used to, you know, Western armies
9 and the way they operate, the UK, Belgium, France, Denmark, Sweden, the
10 US, and so on. This concept of volunteer does not exist in other -- in
11 all these countries I mentioned. Did you look into this to see whether
12 maybe it's not a concept that would come from the Communist state, you
13 know, in Communism? So I have in mind, you know, Mao Zedong's books on
14 People's war, the fact when there's a conflict everybody must join, become
15 a soldier. So why didn't your report look into this?
16 THE WITNESS: Indeed, Your Honours. You see the terminology, the
17 use of terms like volunteer more in the concept of, for example, guerrilla
18 warfare as you mentioned with Mao Zedong or with Che Guevara and I
19 consulted the works of these two individuals in relation to guerrilla
20 warfare, but actually the laws that existed in Yugoslavia were, in my view
21 in conclusion, sufficient to deal with the issue because the report starts
22 in part 1 with reference to the concept of All People's Defence, or which
23 is ONO in Serbian, which is sometimes translated -- so All People's
24 Defence, ONO, which is sometimes translated as total national defence.
25 And this concept as is explained in the report was published first in
1 1969, and basically it means that the whole population participates in the
2 defence effort.
3 Okay. JNA are the federal armed forces. Then in the republics a
4 Territorial Defence would be established, but, in addition, there would
5 also be Civil Defence which is dealing essentially with civilian matters;
6 for example, these are activities after natural or other disasters or war
7 damage. There is also, when you consult the All People's Defence Law, a
8 monitoring and warning system. So I considered guerrilla warfare, as
9 such, was less relevant in the conflict -- excuse me, in the context of
10 the report than the concept of All People's Defence or total national
11 defence. Whereas, and I can give you the reference, in Article 119 of the
12 1982 All People's Defence Law, which is 65 ter number 19, the concept of
13 volunteers is legally defined. And I apologise for being so extensive.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you for this explanation
15 which makes things much clearer.
16 Mr. Marcussen.
17 MR. MARCUSSEN: Thank you.
18 Q. Maybe now that we are at your conclusions, just to cover one last
19 point that we would also come back to, but what is your conclusion on
20 the -- on the reporting structure or the contacts between these volunteer
21 units of the SRS and SCP that were sent on the ground and the accused and
22 the leadership of this organisation?
23 A. Your Honours, in part 2 of the report there is a section on the
24 SRS War Staff, and I deal with the various aspects of the relations
25 between the SRS War Staff and the SRS/SCP volunteers starting with
1 recruitment and training, and this actually starts on page 32 in the
2 English version, and it goes to page 58, if I'm not wrong. So I start
3 with training. Then I talk about the role in dispatching or the sending
4 of these volunteers, i.e., the deployment. I talk about equipment,
5 military equipment including weapons. I also talk about payment. And
6 then there is paragraph, a title -- or subtitle "Relationships," starting
7 on page 47, where I give examples -- at least one example of what I
8 described as the exchange of operational information from volunteers on
9 the ground to the SRS War Staff.
10 There is on page 51, for example, 65 ter number 486 where I quote
11 from a report Srecko Radovanovic, who is described as the deputy commander
12 for the defence of the villages of Sodolovci, Koprivna, and Petrova
13 Slatina, so this is page 51, part 2 in the English version, and he sends a
14 report on -- containing detailed operational information on the situation
15 in the zone of operations where he and his volunteers are active.
16 There are also other examples, but --
17 MR. MARCUSSEN: Your Honours, we will --
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, what you're saying is
19 very interesting. You're saying that the volunteers would send reports to
20 the SRS War Staff. That's all very well. And you've mentioned two
21 occasions when a report was prepared and sent.
22 While I was listening to you, I was making the connection with
23 what's currently happening in Iraq. You have US soldiers sending text
24 messages or calling their friends or family in the United States to tell
25 them what they are doing. In today's world with today's communications,
1 that type of information can readily be sent and received, but these
2 reports you mentioned, did they -- were they made after a specific order,
3 an order that had been issued for these reports to be prepared? And in
4 other words, was there a double chain of command?
5 Let me give an example. Let's assume that a US soldier in Iraq
6 sends some information to a friend who is a member of the Republican or
7 Democratic Party. It does not mean that that party has sent him an order
8 to do so.
9 So that's my point. You mention these reports in your own report,
10 but did this report come after an order, a document, that had given
11 specific -- specific instructions to these volunteers?
12 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, in relation to the Iraq situation, I
13 would like to clarify that if a member of armed forces sends operational
14 information to people outside the chain of command on matters they are
15 dealing with operations, that would actually be a violation of security,
16 because operational matters are in general classified, and they are sent
17 through classified reports via secure communication means through the --
18 to the authority that has a need to know.
19 On page 50, part 2, English version of the report, I have a
20 subtitle 4: "Fact-finding Missions by members of the SRS 'War Staff' to
21 the conflict zone." This is followed on page 51 by a discussion of 65 ter
22 number 459 where, and I'm reading from the report: "Zoran Rankic," whose
23 function is described as "Deputy Staff Commander," states in his report
24 that he was -- he went "... by the order of the Staff and the President,
25 Vojislav Seselj, with the task of visiting the units in the field and
1 relaying an order to withdraw in order to regroup the forces."
2 And this report is dated the 2nd of September, 1991.
3 So here we have a clear reference to an order by the War Staff and
4 more specifically by Mr. Seselj.
5 The earlier document I refer to, 65 ter number 486, we would have
6 to look at the entire document to see what the basis was for Radovanovic's
7 report. I didn't quote the entire Radovanovic report in my report. I
8 only included the sections that I considered relevant in this context.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection. Mr. President, I think
11 the expert witness should show these documents, because he has at his
12 disposal all the documents he's quoting from. I think it's very important
13 when he mentions a document that he also show it.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, but I believe we'll come
15 back to the issue of these documents later.
16 MR. MARCUSSEN: Indeed, Your Honours. That was actually just what
17 I was about to say. Both of the reports that are mentioned are in the
18 binders that you have, and it was my intention to cover these. And as I
19 can see the break is approaching, I have prepared for Your Honours and for
20 the accused an outline of my examination of this witness, and maybe that
21 would be helpful to indicate the areas that I will be covering, and it
22 would also have references to the relevant exhibit numbers. And of course
23 we have a translation into B/C/S of the accused, but I'm not providing one
24 to Your Honours.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We will review the
1 document during the break. Mr. Seselj will read the document as well.
2 It's almost time to take the break, so we'll have a 20-minute
3 break, and we'll resume in 20 minutes.
4 --- Recess taken at 9.56 a.m.
5 --- On resuming at 10.21 a.m.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. The hearing is
7 resumed. Just a technical information for next week. We will start at
8 9.00 and not at 8.30. So we'll start at -- we start at 8.30 when we have
9 to sit also in the afternoon, but next week we will not have any sittings
10 in the afternoon, so we can start at 9.00 next week.
11 Very well. Now I give the floor to the Prosecution.
12 MR. MARCUSSEN: Thank you, Mr. President.
13 Q. I hope it will not be too much of an anticlimax, but I'd like to
14 go back to discuss the preparation of the report a bit more in detail.
15 Mr. Theunens, we have talked about the scope of your analysis.
16 What I'd like to move on to now is the sources that you consulted. You've
17 already touched upon some of the types of documents you -- you looked at,
18 but could you give us a brief overview of the material that you have
19 consulted in preparing the report.
20 A. Your Honours, the materials I consulted in preparation of the
21 report broadly covered the following categories: I looked at SFRY
22 legislation; SFRY armed forces doctrinal regulations as well as manuals;
23 then military documents by JNA, TO, VRS consisting of reports and orders.
24 I also included documents and reports by organs of Ministry of Interior.
25 For example, for what the entity known as Republika Srpska is concerned.
1 I also consulted open sources, i.e., documents which are available to the
2 public, more specifically the party magazine of the Serbian Radical Party,
3 Velika Srbija. Sometimes other media other reports. And just to -- to
4 finalise, I only included documentary evidence in this report.
5 Q. Did you also have access to documents originating from the
7 A. Yes indeed, Your Honours. I forgot to mention that. The section
8 on the SRS War Staff is largely based on documents that were issued or
9 directed to the SRS War Staff.
10 Q. Could you describe the process by which these sources -- no.
11 Excuse me. Maybe I should, just before I move into the list, clarify.
12 The material that's included in the report, is that all the material that
13 you looked at for your analysis? You have answered this maybe already,
14 but just for clarity.
15 A. Indeed, Your Honours. As I mentioned earlier this morning, I
16 looked at a much wider range of information including also testimony,
17 witness statements, and other material which is available in the Office of
18 the Prosecutor. I also consulted the internet for certain searches. But
19 the document itself only -- is only based on documentary evidence.
20 Q. Were any limits put on your access to the evidence in the
21 possession of the Office of the Prosecutor?
22 A. No, there were not, Your Honours.
23 Q. Now could you please describe the process by which these sources
24 were transformed into your report.
25 A. Your Honours, the methodology I applied while compiling the report
1 is the same one I applied when working as an intelligence analyst and is
2 commonly known as the intelligence cycle. The intelligence cycle consists
3 of four phases. The first phase is direction; secondly, collection;
4 thirdly, processing; and fourthly, dissemination.
5 In the context of this report, the processing phase, the
6 processing phase, yes, indeed, is the most important one, and it covers
7 four steps which -- or five steps, excuse me, which I can explain if
9 Q. Maybe if you could just give us a brief description of these
10 stages so we understand how you -- what methodology you applied in your
12 A. You mean for the intelligence cycle or for the processing --
13 Q. For your processing of the documents you have selected for your
15 A. Okay. The processing phase starts with collation of the
16 information. So the direction I received from the general tasking, i.e.,
17 a report on the role of the SRS/SCP volunteers and so on, as we explained
18 before. Then I started to collect information. During the collation
19 step, actually in the processing phase, you organise the information in a
20 way and you record it in a way that it's easily accessible. Secondly, in
21 the processing phase the evaluation is carried out. Evaluation covers the
22 assessment of the reliability of the source and the credibility of the
24 Next, after the evaluation, we're going to analyse the
25 information. We're going to -- during the analysis step, we are going to
1 review the information in order to identify significant facts. Once we
2 have done that, we're going to interpret these facts. What do these facts
3 mean? In particular, in comparison to the earlier knowledge we have.
4 And then lastly, in the integration step of the processing phase
5 we integrate. We include the new information within the existing
6 information, and we amend or we review our conclusions or assessments if
8 Now, just to finalise, the intelligence cycle is mainly applied
9 for predictive work. I mean, an intelligence analyst is generally
10 requested to explain future developments, whereas I had to explain events
11 that have already happened, but that, in my view, does not affect the
12 methodology that is applied.
13 Q. Is there any difference in the nature of --
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a minute. I have listened
15 to you, because what you're saying is quite interesting regarding
16 intelligence analysis. You did use a method, you know, to analyse
17 something that already happened, whereas usually this is used for -- for
18 the future. If I've understood well, there are five phases, but I missed
19 one. You've got assessment, analysis, interpretation, and integration.
20 Where's the fifth phase?
21 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, the fifth phase is actually the first
22 one is collation. It's more -- it means that you record the information
23 and you organise it. It can consist of the establishment of databases.
24 It can also consist of just putting the documents in binders by topic.
25 It's just to facilitate the further use of that information. So it's not
1 really a thought process. It's more like a logistical kind of aspect.
2 So --
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Just a minute. You said that
4 you had -- first there's direction, collection, processing, and
5 dissemination. That's what you said; right? Those are the four steps.
6 And then you said that in processing there are five steps, and I'm missing
7 one -- these are the steps I'm interested in. In processing there are
8 five steps. What are they exactly?
9 THE WITNESS: So in processing, Your Honours, the five steps are
10 collation, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. This technique is
12 used worldwide in all intelligence departments, or is it a Belgian
13 technique? Does it come from the US?
14 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I wouldn't be able to -- to answer the
15 question in relation to all services in the world, but it's -- at least it
16 is applied in the services I'm familiar with. And in addition, I have
17 also noticed that, for example, when you search on the internet you use
18 intelligence cycle. I find the web site of Notre Dame university in the
19 United States which actually had the processing phase -- excuse me, the
20 processing, yeah, phase explained and also in relation to the evaluation
21 of sources for its students, and it was even a teaching course in
22 university in order to assist students in assessing the reliability of
23 sources and accredibility with the information.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much for this
25 additional information.
1 MR. MARCUSSEN:
2 Q. Mr. Theunens, after you finished your report have you had an
3 opportunity to review the report?
4 A. Indeed, Your Honours. The report was finished in March 2006, so
5 at a later stage an addendum was prepared, and also more recently we
6 discovered that there were some typographical or other minor errors in the
7 report and a corrigendum was therefore prepared.
8 Q. Now, dealing first with the addendum. First, for the record, the
9 addendum is -- we don't need to call it up on the screen, but it's 65 ter
10 number 2854A, and it's included in the binder after the main report.
11 And, Mr. Theunens, why did you prepare the addendum?
12 A. I prepared the addendum because after the finalisation of the
13 report in March 2006, additional documents became available which I
14 considered relevant in the context report, and therefore they were
15 included in the addendum.
16 Q. And to -- did the documents that have become available, did they
17 change any of your conclusions?
18 A. No, they didn't, Your Honours. They were in line with -- or they
19 confirmed or supported the conclusions drawn in the initial report.
20 Q. And then you mentioned that you had discovered some minor
21 typographical errors and an addendum was filed -- sorry, a corrigendum was
22 filed. The 65 ter number for the corrigendum is 2854B.
23 Mr. Theunens, last night did you become aware that there were some
24 minor mistakes in that version?
25 A. Indeed, Your Honours. So --
1 Q. Sorry. That's right.
2 MR. MARCUSSEN: For Your Honours we have -- in e-court we have
3 replaced the addendum, and I'd like to hand you -- what shall we call it?
4 A corrected version of the correction. And I have also a copy for the
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection. Mr. President, I think
7 you should take certain steps towards the Prosecution because this expert
8 report was ready in March 2006, as the witness tells us. He even wrote an
9 addendum to this report, then several days ago he submitted corrections,
10 then last night he established there were still some mistakes remaining.
11 That means that the report is actually not ready. It's not complete. You
12 should return it to him to submit it in a complete form. Maybe there will
13 be more corrections today, tomorrow. Who can guarantee there will not be
14 many more corrections to follow?
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, there are a few
16 corrections that I have just seen. They are minor corrections, and maybe
17 the Prosecutor can review them very quickly. We all have the document.
18 Page 10, paragraph 31, and so forth and so on. I mean this does not deal
19 with the substance of the report anyway. For example, he wants to change
20 quorum to vote, responsibility with authority. So, Mr. Prosecutor, could
21 you please quickly review these corrections with the witness?
22 MR. MARCUSSEN: If I may just clarify one thing. The document
23 that has just been handed out is a corrected version of the corrigendum.
24 There are no new changes per se being made. It's simply that the main
25 error was that there's a reference in the first version to page 76 of the
1 report. It should have been 67. It's really minor little details that
2 the expert discovered, and frankly in the context of a document that's 400
3 pages long I would submit that these are inevitable things that happen and
4 only speaks to the thoroughness with which the expert has worked in
5 preparing this, and there is no prejudice to the accused.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
7 Witness, when you reviewed this report, obviously you noted that
8 there were a few typing errors and there were words that you wanted to
9 substitute with others, but the substance of the report is untouched.
10 THE WITNESS: That is correct, Your Honours.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
12 MR. MARCUSSEN: Your Honours, at the end of the testimony of
13 Mr. Theunens, I will ask that the report with the addendum and the
14 correction be admitted into evidence. I will also be asking that all the
15 documents, all the exhibits that are referred to in the report be admitted
16 as underlying documents. This is just for your information. I'll deal
17 with that at the end of the testimony of the witness.
18 So what you have received in the binders and the exhibits that --
19 I will be tendering along the way as we move through the witness evidence
20 is part of what we would seek admitted.
21 Q. Mr. Theunens, would you please explain to us which are the key
22 laws that regulate the armed forces in -- that regulated the armed forces
23 and [indiscernible].
24 A. Your Honours, the key legislation regulating or defining the SFRY
25 armed forces are the 1974 constitution as well as the 1982 All People's
1 Defence Law and its amendments that were issued later. So this law
2 defined the armed forces. They regulate the use of the armed forces as
3 well as command and control in the armed forces. In -- in addition
4 there's also the 1985 Law on the Service in the Armed Forces which
5 regulates the service in the armed forces.
6 MR. MARCUSSEN: And, Your Honours, we have included the
7 constitution of former Yugoslavia or excerpts of it in your binder and
8 also the All People's Defence Law. They are 65 ter numbers 10 and 65 ter
9 number 19.
10 If we could call up 65 ter number 10 first.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Marcussen, at Exhibit 10 we
12 only have a few articles of the constitution. We don't have the full
14 MR. MARCUSSEN: That's correct, Your Honour. Your Honour, we have
15 attempted to include only the most relevant parts of some of the bigger
16 documents that we're seeking to tender. In e-court we have the full -- we
17 have the full version of the documents as exhibits. It's simply for
18 logistical reasons that we have not wanted to burden you with too many
19 binders. Excuse me.
20 And, Your Honours, I was not intending to go into the substance of
21 this particular document. I called this document up just so that it can
22 be seen that this is from the Official Gazettes of the former Yugoslavia.
23 And without going into the actual document I was going to request that
24 this document be tendered into evidence.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Can we have a number for the
1 constitution, please?
2 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. That will be Exhibit number
4 MR. MARCUSSEN: And I'd like to do the same with the All People's
5 Defence Law. So that would be 65 ter number 19. Maybe if Your Honours
6 just want to consult the B/C/S version to see that it's from the gazettes
7 and then I'd like to tender it into evidence without calling it up.
8 Q. Mr. Theunens -- I'm sorry?
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Can we have a number for Exhibit
11 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit number P193.
12 MR. MARCUSSEN:
13 Q. Mr. Theunens, what was the mission of the armed forces of the
14 former Yugoslavia?
15 A. The mission of the armed forces -- of the SFRY armed forces as
16 defined in the constitution and the All People's Defence Law was to defend
17 or to protect the territorial integrity, the sovereignty, the
18 independence, and the social order in the SFRY armed forces, and this is
19 explained in Article 92 of the 1982 All People's Defence Law.
20 Q. Thank you. Now, Mr. Theunens, I'd like to move on to the topic of
21 command and control. Did the armed forces of the former Yugoslavia apply
22 this concept?
23 A. Indeed, Your Honours, and there are two components in -- in this
24 topic. First of all, command and control over the armed forces, as well
25 as command and control within the armed forces.
1 Q. And if -- we will get into that in a little bit, but maybe first
2 could you explain what the core principles of command and control in the
3 Yugoslav Army was? It's explained in part 1 of your report at pages 28
4 through 90 -- sorry, 28 through 31, and in the B/C/S version it's pages 29
5 through 32. I'm not -- don't call this up, but could you just explain
6 what the principles were.
7 A. First, the Article 112 of the 1982 All People's Defence Law
8 defines the three principles which are single command; secondly, unity in
9 command; and thirdly, the obligation to implement decisions, commands, and
10 orders of a superior.
11 Q. Is -- are these principles similar to what is applied in, for
12 example, in the Belgian army?
13 A. Indeed, Your Honours. I -- without exaggerating I think I can say
14 that these principles are universal in relation to the application or
15 implementation of command and control by armed forces.
16 Q. And why do armed forces have these principles? What's the
18 A. Because they are considered essential in order to implement the
19 mission the armed forces have been given by, in general, the political
21 Q. Now, I would like to call up --
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We are dealing with the issue of
23 command and control, and I'm thinking here of the Serbian Radical Party.
24 Please have a look at Article 94 of the law. I'd like everyone to turn to
25 Article 94 of that law. And mention here is made of the League of
1 Communists of Yugoslavia that is entrusted with special, specific
2 responsibility. And when we look at this article, Witness, we see that a
3 political organisation played a role in the operation of the army.
4 Article 94.
5 MR. MARCUSSEN: In the English version I can see -- in e-court the
6 English version it should be page 62, I think.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'm not working with the e-court
8 system. I'm working on the basis of hard-copy documents. I find it too
9 risky to work with the e-court system, but now it's displayed.
10 So we can all see this page on screen, and we can see that this
11 political party that at the time was the only political party, we can see
12 that type of responsibility was entrusted to the League of Communists.
13 Witness, was your attention drawn to the role played by the
14 League of Communists, and when the League of Communists stopped existing
15 and was replaced by other political parties weren't these parties,
16 according to Article 94, weren't these new parties supposed to exercise
17 some form of command and control?
18 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, when looking at that article obviously
19 I viewed at the entire All People's Defence Law in the framework of the
20 preparation of my report, but this specific article in my view is part
21 of -- has to be seen in context of the overall situation in the SFRY as it
22 was not only in 1982 but as it was still in 1991, and actually until April
23 1992 when the SFRY ceases to exist and is formally replaced FRY, Federal
24 Republic of Yugoslavia, and where the JNA is replaced by the VJ, the
25 Yugoslav Army.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, sir, but what I was driving
2 at is that in the mind-set that prevailed in the former Yugoslavia, the
3 political party, and here it was -- there was just one political party,
4 but a political party would play a role in the armed forces in -- when the
5 former Yugoslavia was dismantled, the League of Communists did not play a
6 part any more, but what I would like to know is whether other political
7 parties like the Serbian Radical Party, whether these parties did not wish
8 to continue, to continue operating in the same way as had been the case
10 THE WITNESS: Indeed, Your Honours, my reply will include several
11 aspects. The importance of -- of Communist doctrine was already clear
12 from the structure from the SFRY armed forces. That means that on -- from
13 battalion level upwards you would have within the command officers for
14 morale and political guidance who would obviously promote the values that
15 were considered important in the framework of the political situation SFRY
16 within the units.
17 I think it's also important to highlight the importance of the
18 slogan of "Brotherhood and unity" which dominated the whole situation in
19 the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and was also very important
20 within the armed forces.
21 Now, the situation you are referring to is the situation that
22 starts to exist from, let's say, the end of the '80s or early '90s
23 onwards, and it is a transition phase. There are still political and
24 moral guidance officers in the commands and that's also something, I
25 think, that is visible through, for example, the book of army
1 General Kadijevic which is quoted in the report, how on one hand senior
2 JNA officers still believe in Yugoslavia and in Communism, whereas, on the
3 other hand, there are political parties, nationalistic political parties,
4 who start to criticise the JNA because they say JNA is -- is Communist and
5 so on and so on, and we want to have our own army. We don't want to have
6 Communism any more, and they try to infiltrate the armed forces, or
7 actually as could be linked to the establishment of volunteer groups, try
8 to create -- some call them party armies or at least volunteer groups that
9 are mainly motivated by a nationalistic or an ethnic ideology instead of
10 the JNA, which was driven or -- by a Communist ideology but also by the
11 slogan of "Brotherhood and unity," which is also visible from the various
12 legal --
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You looked into the operation of
14 the JNA at length. Can you tell me if like in other socialist or
15 Communist armies there were political commissioners in the JNA?
16 THE WITNESS: As I mentioned, Your Honours, within -- at least --
17 or starting at the battalion level upwards, within the command of the unit
18 whereby the command consists of the commander and his assistants from
19 brigade level onwards we would have a staff and assistant commanders,
20 well, there would be an assistant for morale and political guidance. And
21 even in Western armies we would have morale officers but they would not be
22 part of the command but they would look at troop morale. The officers for
23 morale and political guidance has a clear role. You could compare him to
24 the political commissioners as you call them, but they are there to ensure
25 that -- yeah, Communist doctrine or call it socialist doctrine is being
1 implemented. And it's actually also visible through the principle of one
2 of the three principles of command and control, the principle of unified
3 command and control. Throughout the chain of command from the highest
4 level to the lowest level, to put it in simple terms, everybody works in
5 the same direction, and this direction is determined to a large extent by
6 the -- by the political doctrine or the political ideology that exists in
7 the country at that stage.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You've stated that in the
9 brigades there would be someone in charge of morale and political
10 guidance. I'd like you to tell me the following: Before all the problems
11 started, before the country was dismantled, in the JNA was there a link
12 between this officer, this particular officer, and the League of
13 Communists outside of the chain of command?
14 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, the documents I have reviewed while
15 preparing this report have not indicated that such a link, a formal link,
16 existed. I can imagine that there would be seminars or courses or similar
17 things whereby morale officers would be regularly updated on political
18 ideology, but I have not come --
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Of course you understand why I'm
20 asking this question, because if there was such a link before, then we
21 might think that with the SRS volunteers integrated within the JNA that
22 there would be a similar link between them and their political party based
23 on the way things were organised before and that link between the League
24 of Communists and the relevant officers within the JNA.
25 THE WITNESS: Maybe to clarify, Your Honours, there may have been
1 a formal link in the sense of exchange of information or -- between the --
2 the political guidance and morale officer on one hand and the League of
3 Communists on the other hand, but I have seen no indication whatsoever
4 that this link would interfere with the chain of command. However, the
5 links that may have existed between certain JNA officers or officers in
6 the TO and the Serbian Radical Party, if they existed and where they
7 existed, those would be de facto links which were obviously not foreseen
8 by the doctrine.
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. Thank you very much.
10 JUDGE LATTANZI: [Interpretation] I have one question. These
11 officers who were in charge of morale, they were not taking part in
12 military operations, did they, in the field?
13 THE WITNESS: It is correct that they would not command --
14 normally not command -- or de jure not command forces in the field, but
15 they would -- they would certainly participate in the planning process of
16 operations as any other member of the command, because their -- their
17 input and their views would be -- could be relevant for the commander when
18 he receives a task from his superior which he has to implement, and their
19 input could be useful like the input of any other member of the command.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One last question to follow up
21 on this question put by my fellow Judge.
22 These officers in charge of morale and political guidance, you
23 said they would take part in planning and maybe debriefing of operations.
24 They took part in meetings at the command.
25 I'd like to know the following about them: Before 1982, 1985, do
1 you know how they were appointed to their position? Were they appointed
2 to their position by the League of Communists or by the military
3 authority? You may not be able to answer that question because it's a
4 very technical question indeed.
5 THE WITNESS: Yes, indeed, Your Honours, I cannot answer the
6 question because I have not looked into that specific matter. But just to
7 summarise, when preparing the report and coming across documents prepared
8 by these -- such officers, I have never seen an indication that these
9 officers would interfere or would participate in the chain of command
10 except for providing guidance to the command or assisting him or had
11 another operational role.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
13 MR. MARCUSSEN: Maybe the next exhibit will be on point. I'd like
14 to call up 65 number 24. And go to e-court page number 104 in the English
15 and e-court page 60 in the B/C/S. It is in your binders. It would be the
16 second page of -- of the document that you have on the list under tab 24.
17 Q. Mr. Theunens, do you have a copy of the exhibit in front of you?
18 A. Yes, I have.
19 Q. It's coming up in e-court, but as we all have it on paper, could
20 you explain what this is? Well, first of all, maybe where it comes from.
22 A. Your Honours, the chart is an excerpt from a manual that was used
23 within military academies in the SFRY armed forces called the "Command and
24 Control." It dates from 1983. And the chart shows a -- what I would call
25 generic command structure above the level of battalion.
1 When you take a closer look at the chart you see the commander and
2 his command consisting on the left-hand side of the staff whereby the
3 staff is directed or managed by the chief of staff. You have a number of
4 staff sections. And then we move -- when we move to the right we see a
5 number of organs, three of them, which were also known as assistant
6 commanders. We have the organ for political guidance with an assistant
7 commander, the security organ, as well as logistics organs. So the heads
8 of these three organs would be assistant commanders where the chief of
9 staff he would be the only deputy commander.
10 Q. And what role would these different organs play in the planning
11 process in the army?
12 A. Well, all of these organs participate not only in the planning
13 of -- of operations but in the daily or the continuous work of the
15 Q. So --
16 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] There's something that strikes
17 me when I look at this organisational chart. The military court, military
18 prosecutor, investigating judge, military investigating judge, they're all
19 under this -- they all come under this organ for political guidance, in
20 charge also of morale, and they don't come under the security organ or the
21 chief of staff. Why is that?
22 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, the dotted line actually means that
23 there exists a relationship or there are contacts but it doesn't imply a
24 subordination. I have some information on the military courts and the
25 military prosecutor in part 1 of the report when I refer to the 1977 laws
1 on these two organs.
2 It is correct that security organs, one of their tasks would be to
3 investigate serious crimes against the armed forces. During the conflict
4 security organs were also involved in the investigation of serious crimes
5 including violations of the laws and customs of war, and they would,
6 together with the military police, enjoy particular relations with the
7 military prosecutor and the military court.
8 When reviewing these documents on these reports on crimes, I did
9 not come across information on -- on any role for the morale or political
10 guidance organs in the investigation of these -- of these crimes.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] But why is it on a dotted line
13 THE WITNESS: Because, Your Honours, because it shows a
14 relationship which is not a command relationship. It can be an exchange
15 of information. It can be consultation. Bodies can exchange information
16 or can have contact --
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You're saying it's not command,
18 but the title is "General structure of command."
19 THE WITNESS: That is correct, Your Honours, but "Command" is here
20 used as a noun. It's not the verb "to command." It's the name of a
21 structure, the command. So the staff and the organs are identified, and
22 then also with the dotted line in this particular situation there is a
23 link to bodies which are relevant in the context of describing the
24 command. But, for example, there is no link between the commander and the
25 military court.
1 So the dotted line means contact, exchange of information or
2 another form of contact, but not subordination in this context.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you very much.
4 MR. MARCUSSEN:
5 Q. Mr. Theunens, just to clarify something, I'm sure it's obvious but
6 you said the role of the security organs was to investigate crimes against
7 the armed forces. Is it also the role to investigate crimes by the armed
9 A. Indeed, Your Honours, that is correct. And in part 1 of the
10 report I -- the section number -- the section on laws of armed conflict, I
11 discussed that aspect. Page 55. Sorry, page 55 in the English version,
12 to be complete.
13 Q. Mr. Theunens, was my understanding correct of what you said before
14 that these different units within the command, so artillery, security, and
15 these different units would provide input to the commander in the
16 preparation of plans of, for example, a combat operation?
17 A. That is correct, Your Honours. In -- command and control is not
18 static kind of thing. It's a process whereby the commander has to
19 continuously gather information. At the same time, obviously, the
20 information is observed. Decisions are made on a continuous basis and
21 orders are issued. The commander himself cannot do all these tasks and he
22 needs assistants for that and though assistants are described in this
23 chart. For example, when the commander receives from his superior a
24 particular order to carry out an attack which involves the use of -- or an
25 important role for artillery, well, the commander will direct himself via
1 the chief of staff to his expert for artillery in order to assist with the
2 planning of the use of artillery for that specific operation.
3 Q. I'd like now to go to Exhibit 65 ter number 540. 540. Oh, sorry,
4 could I ask for an exhibit number, maybe, for 65 ter number 24 before I
5 move on.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, absolutely.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit number P194.
8 MR. MARCUSSEN:
9 Q. Mr. Theunens, you have a copy of this -- and now it's also on the
10 screen. This is an example of an order. What I'd like you to explain,
11 comment on, is how we can see -- if we can see the work of these different
12 sub-organs of the command appearing in this document, and for that I
13 would -- first of all, there's data on the enemy here. Where would that
14 come from?
15 A. Your Honours, the data on the enemy can come from -- from several
16 sources. It will come first and foremost from the own forces in -- that
17 are fighting in that area. I say first and foremost because I'm
18 influenced by this specific -- specific context of this order. It has to
19 do with Vukovar. But it will come from the own forces who are fighting
20 the -- in a particular area and who have information on the situation
21 there, in particular on the enemy.
22 Now it will come from -- it can come from the higher echelons. So
23 this is a brigade level order. Guards Motorised Brigade was subordinate
24 to the 1st Military District, so the 1st Military District has
25 intelligence on the situation. They included in their order to the
1 subordinate commands. This information will be reviewed by the
2 intelligence officer who is a member of the staff. He may have other
3 sources. He may have established a network of his own sources. The
4 information can also come from neighbouring units and so on.
5 Q. And if we flip over to page 4, which I think in e-court --
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Before we move to page 4 there's
7 one detail from page 3 on description of the enemy, on the fourth
8 paragraph. I see that it is said that women and children were trained
9 with the sniper guns. Have you seen that? Sniper rifles. On page 3.
10 THE WITNESS: Indeed, Your Honours. It's the third page in
11 English, page 3. So this is -- intelligence is -- can be based on facts
12 that have been observed and which have been reported by different sources.
13 It can also include an assessment. Here it appears to be something that
14 has been observed and that has been considered relevant to include in the
16 Now, we cannot determine which source provided this information,
17 what the reliability was of the source or the credibility of this
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] But isn't there a risk that
20 there could be misinformation, false information, or information planted,
21 false information planted in this kind of report?
22 THE WITNESS: This risk exists, Your Honour, but within the
23 military there were -- excuse me, disciplinary measures could be taken in
24 case of misinforming the superiors, and that refers in first instance to
25 the commander when he sends incorrect reports to his superiors.
1 Now, as I said, the first data on the enemy is intelligence.
2 Intelligence can be wrong.
3 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, if I may, let me go into
4 military technical details. When a unit learns suddenly that the enemy
5 may use a sniper, snipers to shoot at them, but then these snipers could
6 very well be women and children. Does this have any consequences,
7 military consequences, regarding civilians?
8 THE WITNESS: Well, I mean from the purely military point of view
9 it would mean that -- the message would mean that one has to be extra
10 careful when seeing women and children. Now, if these women and children
11 are armed and participate in the conflict, they could be considered
13 MR. MARCUSSEN:
14 Q. Then on page 4, which is on page 2 of the B/C/S, we have what I
15 believe is the order "I have decided." And then on the next page -- the
16 next pages there are different tasks given to the units. And then when we
17 come to page 7, and if we see from 7, we have intelligence; 8, we have
18 security -- sorry, on page 8 we have security and engineering, on page 9
19 we have logistic support, on page 10 we have a section on command and
21 So this is -- is this the practical implementation of the input
22 from these different organs that you talked about before in the command?
23 A. Indeed, Your Honours. This is the end result of the planning
24 process, and it's -- yeah, this is then the written order.
25 Q. And then at the end there's a section on reports at various
1 different points in time. Now -- and the order is, in this case, signed
2 and stamped.
3 Is -- is this kind of a document -- is that a standard order,
4 standard military order of the kind that you have been looking at?
5 A. Indeed, Your Honours. Orders are prepared in militaries I'm
6 familiar with in accordance with a template, and it is in the interests of
7 everyone to always use this standardised template because it facilitates
8 not only the drafting but also the implementation of the order.
9 The fact that reports have to be submitted is directly linked to
10 the fact that in accordance to not only SFRY armed forces doctrine but
11 also doctrine of other armed forces, the commander has to be aware of the
12 situation in his zone of responsibility. Sometimes it's called situation
13 awareness. And one of the source -- or -- for this situational awareness
14 are the reports sent by the subordinates and more specifically reports on
15 the implementation of the order which is part of one of the functions of
16 command and control, the inspection function.
17 Q. And now that we are on this exhibit, you have referred to this
18 document in your report in what context?
19 A. Your Honours, I used this -- this order in my report in the second
20 part on the report when discussing the operations in Slavonia, Baranja,
21 Western Srem and more specifically in Vukovar because it is an order by
22 the Guards Motorised Brigade for an attack, an order for blockade, an
23 attack, in Vukovar dated the 1st of October.
24 I also used this order because it mentions the Petrova Gora TO
1 Q. And so this order is also an example of -- it illustrates the
2 command and control relationship between the JNA and the Territorial
4 A. Indeed, Your Honours. On -- in paragraph 5, unit tasks, we see
5 the acronym JOD, Jurisni Odred, which is Assault Detachment. In part 1 of
6 the report I explain what Assault Detachments, Operational Groups,
7 Tactical Groups are, but basically these are ad hoc formations which are
8 established to carry out a specific task in a specific context at a
9 specific time. And one of the advantages of these ad hoc units is that
10 they facilitate command and control, because when you look at 5.1, Jurisni
11 Odred should be number one. It mentions units of the Guards Brigade, the
12 1st Motorised Battalion. It also mentions at the end with guidance from
13 Petrova Gora Odred TO. So with guys from the Petrova Gora TO detachment.
14 It also mentions Military Police Battalion, elements which have
15 all been subordinated to these various forces I mentioned under the
16 command of the 1st Assault Detachment.
17 MR. MARCUSSEN: Your Honours, I'd like to tender this exhibit as
18 well. So that is Exhibit ...
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit P195.
21 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One technical question. We're
22 talking about the Petrova Gora TO. In this order does it state very
23 clearly that in this offensive operation the TO is fully subordinated to
24 the army? Is that what this document tells us?
25 THE WITNESS: Indeed, Your Honours. And with "army" we mean the
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Another technical question. I
3 found it striking that the order is drawn up by a lieutenant colonel. Is
4 it customary for an officer of such a high rank to draft an order himself
5 unless we are talking about a large-scale operation and the order was
6 drafted at very high level?
7 THE WITNESS: Indeed, Your Honours. JNA orders -- the JNA orders
8 I have come across, at the bottom of the order on the right side the
9 commander signs because he is responsible. The commander rarely drafts an
10 order himself. So this as it concerns a brigade operation, it's in
11 principle the chief of the operations department of the brigade staff or a
12 member of that department who will draft the order and then it will be
13 typed by somebody else. And we don't see the B/C/S on the monitor but
14 normally the B/C/S will have just the initials without mentioning who
15 drafted it or who typed it, but the initials are sufficient to see who
16 drafted it and who typed it.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] But here in B/C/S, in the B/C/S
18 version, we have Lieutenant Colonel Lukic mentioned and we have the name
19 of the person who typed the document. It's also an officer.
20 Very well. Yes, you're right. Usually we find initials in these
21 documents and here we have the names.
22 MR. MARCUSSEN:
23 Q. Now I'd like to move now from the principles and the
24 implementation to the structures through which they were implemented.
25 Mr. Theunens, what was the highest body of command and control in
1 the armed forces of former Yugoslavia?
2 A. The SFRY Presidency and more specifically the president of the
3 Presidency was the Supreme Commander of the armed forces.
4 MR. MARCUSSEN: Your Honours, if you want to follow on paper, in
5 page 20 -- page 20 of the English version of the expert report, and that
6 would be on page 21 in the B/C/S version, you have an illustration of
7 this. In e-court it is Exhibit 2854, e-court page 43 in English and
8 e-court page 41 in B/C/S.
9 Q. Mr. Theunens, could you explain what this diagram should
11 A. Your Honours, this diagram illustrates the command structure
12 during one of the three states, state of emergency, state of imminent
13 threat of war, or state of war, whereby the SFRY Presidency with its eight
14 members would constitute the Supreme Command presided by the president of
15 the Presidency, and the Supreme Command would be assisted by a Supreme
16 Command Staff which consisted of the federal secretary for
17 People's Defence, the Federal Secretariat for People's Defence, as well as
18 the General Staff of the SFRY armed forces which was led by the Chief of
19 the General Staff of the SFRY armed forces.
20 Q. Who were the members of the Presidency?
21 A. Well, each -- each of the six constituent republics had a
22 representative, as well as the autonomous provinces, the two autonomous
23 provinces or regions, and the president of the Presidency would be elected
24 among these eight members for one year.
25 Q. Were -- so the Presidency did not -- was not composed of the
1 presidents of the different republics. Is that a correct understanding?
2 A. That is correct. For example, yeah -- sorry, you want me to give
3 the names or --
4 Q. If you could also do that. First I just want to confirm whether
5 they were the presidents of the republics. You've answered that.
6 A. No. The members of the Presidency had been appointed or elected
7 by the republics. They obviously maintained relations with their
8 republics, but they were not the presidents of their republic.
9 For example, Borisav Jovic, who I quoted from, was during the
10 first half of 1991 the president of the Presidency. He was at the same
11 time the representative of Serbia, but he -- he was not the President of
12 Serbia because Slobodan Milosevic was the president of Serbia.
13 In Croatia the situation was similar, as in any republic, but
14 there I can give the names. Stipe Mesic was representative of Croatia in
15 the SFRY Presidency, but Franjo Tudjman was the president of Croatia at
16 that time.
17 And the same applies to the other republics.
18 Q. And so for Serbia, for example?
19 A. As I said. So Borisav Jovic was the representative of the
20 Republic of Serbia, but Slobodan Milosevic was the president of the
21 Republic of Serbia.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, we are starting to deal
23 with the very significant issues, and we should dwell on them a little
24 longer. We have the constitution from 1974, and reading this constitution
25 we understand that the Presidency is the supreme command and control organ
1 or body. That's what we can read in the documents we have before us.
2 At the time in 1991, you gave us the name of the president of the
3 Presidency. It was Jovic. And you said -- as an example that the
4 Croatian representative within the Presidency was Mesic. You added that
5 at the time the President of Serbia was Milosevic. Now I'm looking at the
6 text here of the document, and in terms of command and control,
7 Mr. Milosevic was not the first in line. It was the Presidency that was
8 in charge of command and control. Is that correct?
9 THE WITNESS: Indeed, Your Honours, but now we enter in the area
10 of de jure versus de facto situation.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I'm -- myself, I'm in the de
12 jure area. De facto is something else.
13 I'm looking at the texts, and if you look at the texts you see
14 that command and control is the Presidency, is in the hands of the
15 Presidency. Is that correct?
16 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. And actually, that article you
17 quote from is Article 313, which refers clearly to the situation that
18 existed when Tito was still alive. Article 328 of the 1974 constitution
19 clarifies that it is the president of the SFRY Presidency who, on behalf
20 of the SFRY Presidency, is in charge of command over the armed forces of
21 the SFRY. And that is what the law says.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Talking about the command and
23 control de facto, if there is de facto command and control structure,
24 isn't -- can't we talk about a constitutional coup? Because if according
25 to the constitution command and control has to be in the hands of the
1 Presidency but actually others are in charge of command and control, then
2 we are faced with a problem. What do you think? You are the expert after
4 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, section 1 of part 2 of the report
5 clearly tries to depict and describe the problem that exists, because we
6 can see that there are serious problems with the functioning of the SFRY
7 Presidency. The sources I consulted for this section are mainly -- are
8 two books. One book by Borisav Jovic, so the Serbian representative in
9 the Presidency and the outgoing chairman, as well as the book of
10 Veljko Kadijevic, who was at that time the federal secretary for all
11 people -- for People's Defence. And indeed when reading these books, and
12 I've tried to include the most significant aspects in my report, one can
13 see that there is indeed a problem with the functioning and the authority
14 of the de jure Supreme Command body, i.e., the SFRY Presidency and, more
15 specifically, the president of that Presidency.
16 MR. MARCUSSEN: Your Honour, maybe it will assist actually the
17 next exhibit is the book by Kadijevic. It is 65 ter number 1758. And if
18 Your Honours would turn to page 20 of that exhibit, it is one, two,
19 three -- it's five pages into the excerpt that we have included in your
20 binder. And for the accused, it's just a few pages in, two or three.
21 Q. In the first paragraph -- well, Mr. Theunens, I think -- do you
22 have this in front of you? Yes, you have.
23 A. I have it indeed.
24 Q. Have you quoted -- have you particularly looked at this part book
25 in your report?
1 A. Indeed, Your Honours.
2 Q. And what does that -- what is this showing about the question
3 we're just talking about now, the situation in the Presidency?
4 A. It shows that specifically for Kadijevic, that he as the chief of
5 the staff of the Supreme Command does not recognise Stipe Mesic as his
6 Supreme Commander.
7 Now, I think it's useful to also consider other sources, for
8 example, the book by Jovic and to see how Jovic describes these events to
9 get a completer picture.
10 Q. And we will move to that in a little bit because that's the next
11 exhibit, but in the e-court -- well, the events that are being described
12 here by Kadijevic, when did they take place?
13 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel please speak into the microphone.
14 MR. MARCUSSEN:
15 Q. When did the -- about what time is this crisis happening?
16 A. This crisis is happening concretely mid-May. On the 15th of May,
17 Mesic should have been -- or -- yeah, elected as chairman of the SFRY
18 Presidency, but he failed to be elected by his -- by most of the
20 MR. MARCUSSEN: Your Honours, I would seek to tender Exhibit 1758
21 at this stage.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, Exhibit number P196.
23 JUDGE HARHOFF: To be sure, Mr. Theunens, which year were we
24 talking about?
25 THE WITNESS: 15th of May, 1991. I apologise.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Marcussen, you're asking for
2 Exhibit 1758 to be tendered into evidence. Are you asking for -- for just
3 the pages we have here to be tendered, i.e., page 2, 3, 20, 38, 39, 40,
4 41, and so on and so forth, or are you asking for the entire book to be
6 MR. MARCUSSEN: This particular book is, I think, so significant
7 that I would suggest that the Chamber may want to have the whole book.
8 Otherwise, I would -- I can also propose to do excerpts, but I think there
9 are a few pages that we need then to add just for context, but it's not a
10 lot, like four or five pages, if Your Honours prefer that.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection. Mr. President, I propose
12 that the entire book be admitted into evidence because I will make
13 extensive use of it both in the cross-examination of this witness and in
14 some other situation -- situations. As the OTP has had the entire book
15 translated and has tendered it, I move that it be admitted in its
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Has the book been fully
18 translated into English or into French? Has the book been translated into
19 one of the working languages of the Tribunal?
20 MR. MARCUSSEN: I'm afraid it has only been translated into
21 English, the whole book.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You're asking for the book to be
23 tendered into evidence, and Mr. Seselj also wants the entire book to be
25 MR. MARCUSSEN: I think in light of what has been said by
1 Mr. Seselj -- I'm happy to go just with the excerpts, but I'm in your --
2 in your ...
3 [Trial Chamber confers]
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The Trial Chamber has decided
5 that the entire book will be admitted into evidence. We'll ask then the
6 Prosecution to provide the additional pages.
7 Can we have a number, Mr. Registrar, for the entire book?
8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit number P196.
9 JUDGE HARHOFF: How many pages are we talking about?
10 MR. MARCUSSEN: [Interpretation] About 150.
11 THE WITNESS: I'm just checking because I don't know by heart, but
12 by the ERN you are -- almost 150.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] So it's page -- 150-page book,
14 roughly. Is that -- is that the case?
15 MR. MARCUSSEN: Yes. That's the translation. Yes, about that
17 Q. Mr. Theunens, you also referred to the diary of Mr. Jovic as
18 relevant context for this particular topic. That diary, we have excerpts
19 in -- we have excerpts in the binder you have under the next tab. The 65
20 ter number is 2093.
21 Mr. Theunens, could you explain what it is that the diary show
22 about this particular issue, the crisis in the Presidency? What -- what
23 happened when there was this rejection of Mr. Mesic?
24 A. Your Honours, this is the published diary of Borisav Jovic, so the
25 president of the Republic of Serbia and the outgoing chairman of the
1 Presidency, and he gives his view on the crisis and he states, for
2 example, that Mesic could not be elected. What is also interesting
3 particularly in the context of your earlier questions, Your Honour, when
4 you read the book and analyse its contents it shows that parallel meetings
5 are ongoing. And I reviewed in particular the situation during -- between
6 May 1991 and end of 1991, and I came to a total count of approximately 27
7 meetings whereby Jovic, Milosevic meet with Kadijevic and/or with
8 Blagoje Adzic. Blagoje Adzic is the Chief of the General Staff of the
9 SFRY armed forces, and he was during the second half of 1991 also often
10 the acting federal secretary for People's Defence because Kadijevic was
11 regularly absent for health reasons.
12 MR. MARCUSSEN: Your Honours, I --
13 Q. Mr. Theunens, did you prepare an overview of -- or a table
14 indicating the meetings, the 27 meetings that you just mentioned?
15 A. Yes, I did, Your Honours.
16 MR. MARCUSSEN: And, Your Honours, that table I will hand you a
17 copy of, and a copy to the accused, of course. And that -- the witness
18 should, in all fairness, also have a copy.
19 Q. Mr. Theunens, could you explain what it is we see in this table?
20 In the first row there are a number of dates, and the crosses indicate
22 A. The dates come from Jovic's diary, and the crosses refer to
23 meetings where the people for whom a cross is mentioned in the column, or
24 is included in the column, are present at this meeting.
25 For example, on the 9th of May there is, according to Jovic, or
1 according to what Jovic writes in his book a meeting between Jovic,
2 Kadijevic, and Milosevic.
3 On the 10th of July there is a meeting between Jovic and
4 Kadijevic. On the 5th of September, for example, further down, there's a
5 meeting between Jovic, Kadijevic, Adzic, and Milosevic.
6 These meetings are interesting or relevant in the context of this
7 report for the -- for the subject matter that is being discussed, and as
8 I've tried to summarise in my report, during some of these meetings
9 instructions are given by Jovic and Milosevic to Kadijevic on the use of
10 the armed forces.
11 For example, on the 5th of July, 1991, and this is discussed on
12 page 6 -- English page 6 in the second part of my report. I forgot to
13 mention the 27th of June, as well as other dates that can be found back in
14 my report.
15 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Witness, nothing escapes me.
16 You said on page 67, line 6 and 7, that Kadijevic was not there for health
17 reasons, was absent for health reasons. And in the chart that we now
18 have, in this table we now have I see that Kadijevic is supposed to attend
19 all meetings from May 9 to December 25, 1991. And I see that Adzic
20 attends on May 15th, June 24, and then as of August also, but with
21 interruptions on September 24, October 2nd, October 22nd. So the chart is
22 wrong. The table is wrong. It's false. If Mr. Kadijevic is ill, he
23 can't attend. So why is there a cross as if he was there?
24 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, when you look at the dates there
25 are -- obviously there are gaps. So the people mentioned in the table are
1 not meeting on a daily basis. Now, I don't have an exact record of
2 Kadijevic's absences, but all I can say is that according to the entries
3 in Jovic's book, the crosses show that these people met at that day.
4 I can imagine, for example, but it's maybe too speculative, that
5 Kadijevic is absent, say, on the 3rd and the 4th of October, but he can
6 well meet on the 2nd and on the 5th. And that Adzic is --
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. But the consequence
8 of this is that Kadijevic attended all meetings, all 27 meetings.
9 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, there may have been many more
10 meetings. These are meetings which Jovic mentions in his book. They are
11 not necessarily official Presidency meetings. Most likely they are not
12 official Presidency meetings because otherwise Milosevic would not attend.
13 So these can be informal gatherings. These can be meetings that
14 one of the four people mentioned in the table has called. But the only
15 relevance of the table is to show that on date X, according to Jovic these
16 people met and discussed certain issues.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
18 MR. MARCUSSEN:
19 Q. Mr. Theunens, you -- in your book you specifically discuss the
20 meeting on the 5th of July, 1991. Could you please explain to the Court
21 the significance of this meeting for your analysis?
22 A. Indeed, Your Honours. The meeting for the 5th of July which is
23 mentioned in Jovic's book, during that meeting Jovic and Milosevic, so the
24 Serbian representative in the Presidency and outgoing chairman, as well as
25 the president of the Republic of Serbia, they make a request to Kadijevic,
1 federal secretary for People's Defence and chief of staff of the staff of
2 the Supreme Command, on the deployment and operational role of the JNA.
3 And more specifically, they request to concentrate the main forces of the
4 JNA along a line, which we may see on a map. Anyway, in the west Karlovac
5 to Plitvice, in the east Baranja to Vinkovci, and the Sava in the south
6 and Neretva, in order to concentrate the JNA along the areas or along a
7 line that delineates the areas that are considered Serb by Jovic and
9 Q. Now, you explained earlier the legal framework for command and
10 control in the armed forces. Is instructions from Milosevic consistent
11 with that framework?
12 A. No, it is not, Your Honours.
13 Q. Is it -- sorry, I just lost my place.
14 MR. MARCUSSEN: Your Honours, I think as the break is coming up we
15 should -- before we go to the break, I would like to tender the excerpts
16 of Exhibit 2093, so that is Jovic's diary, into evidence.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] And the chart. And the chart,
18 and that table too.
19 MR. MARCUSSEN: And the table has been uploaded into e-court. It
20 already has 65 ter number 7174.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar --
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection, Mr. President. I
24 consider that Borisav Jovic's book as relevant evidence cannot be admitted
25 along with this expert report. The Prosecution must call Borisav Jovic
1 himself as a Prosecution witness and tender his book through his
2 testimony. Jovic's book was created after his conflict with
3 Slobodan Milosevic and caused his expulsion from all offices in the
4 Socialist Party. So it can be a matter of mutual political showdown.
5 Jovic would have to be brought to testify to this rather than have this
6 witness explain the contents of the book as if it were taken for granted
7 that everything in the book was true.
8 [Trial Chamber confers]
9 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. The Chamber has
12 deliberated and dismisses this objection and is admitting not the entire
13 book by Jovic but only the excerpts that were commented by the witness.
14 Mr. Registrar, we need two numbers, one for the table with the 27
15 meetings and another one for the excerpts that we find under number 2093
16 in the 65 ter list.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours. The -- the table with the 27
18 meetings will be Exhibit number P197, and the excerpts of the diary will
19 be Exhibit number P198.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. We will now break.
21 We will resume in 20 minutes.
22 --- Recess taken at 11.51 a.m.
23 --- On resuming at 12.11 p.m.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. The hearing's
25 resumed. We will continue until 1.15 p.m., but at 1.05, I will ask the
1 witness to leave the courtroom because I think the Prosecutor needs ten
2 minutes in private session. So we'll stop the examination-in-chief at
3 1.05 p.m., and it will resume next week. I give the floor to the
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If I may for a minute very briefly
6 to put forward a procedural issue. In the break I received a submission
7 by the Registry based on Rule 33(B) concerning the translation of books,
8 on the 7th of February, 2008. The Registry is informing me that they have
9 not yet submitted the books for translation. They are asking you to
10 confirm the order for the books to be translated and I see they have found
11 agencies who will do this for twice or three times the amount of money
12 required by the agency I have found. And here you can see that the
13 Registry is doing this and yet you are telling me, you have told me many
14 times, that I am not having documents translated and so on and so forth.
15 Until the Registry translates these two books which are the basis
16 of my defence case, I have no reason to submit any other documents for
17 translation. That's all I wanted to say.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. The Registrar has
19 seized us, according to Rule 33(B) of a request to confirm it is one of
20 our decision made and ordering for 10.000 pages to be translated, because
21 they came up with quotes starting on this decision, and we have a high
22 quote and a low quote, and the Registrar is asking us to confirm whether
23 we really want these 10.000 pages translated and what is the price range
24 that the Trial Chamber is looking for.
25 We will very soon rule on this.
1 You yourself, of course, can write your own submissions -- just to
2 reconfirm orally what you want. And next week we will rule on this.
3 Mr. Seselj.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just a small correction. You gave
5 me a total quota of 10.000 pages of translation. These two books have
6 only 2.000 pages. Ten thousand pages is the overall quota, all the
7 documents put together.
8 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Absolutely. That is true. The
9 Registrar's document only deals with 2.000 pages, not 10.000. That's
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. The Chamber is going
13 to look into this once again, and the Trial Chamber will have to answer
14 the requests coming from Registry, and we will answer, but now let's
15 continue with the examination-in-chief, and I give the floor to the
17 MR. MARCUSSEN: Your Honours, I gave you a handout. I think we
18 have covered a number of the things in that handout, so I'm going to jump
19 down a little bit in the overview, if you're following where we're going
20 on that one.
21 Q. Mr. Theunens, you -- you described that you have -- sorry. You
22 have already described that the armed forces of the former Yugoslavia had
23 two components, the JNA and the TO. What was the command relationship, if
24 any, between the two?
25 A. Your Honours, according to doctrine if units of the JNA and the TO
1 would operate in the same area with the same mission, there would only be
2 one command in application of the principle of single command and control.
3 This would mean in practical terms that in most scenarios or in most,
4 yeah, scenarios for operations a JNA officer would be in command.
5 However, there is at least one situation which was described as the
6 temporary occupation of the territory, i.e., that the enemy has taken part
7 of Yugoslav territory, and then a TO officer could be in command.
8 This makes sense from the military point of view because TO units
9 were mainly local units, i.e., manned by people from the area, and they
10 would know the area, which in this case would be occupied by the enemy
12 Q. Would you just -- could you explain briefly what the units coming
13 under the Supreme Command were? If we move from the Supreme Command, what
14 would be the main units -- or entities moving downwards in the JNA
15 structure? At the time relevant to the indictment.
16 A. Yes. It would be helpful to have the chart, but I can do it
17 without a chart.
18 So when you move from the Supreme Command and the Supreme Command
19 Staff, the Supreme Command Staff orders the military districts. There
20 were three army districts as well as a military -- a military naval
21 district, as well as the air force and the air defence. And the Military
22 Districts would then be composed of corps, divisions, brigades, and then
23 you go downwards, brigades, regiments, battalions, companies, and
25 Q. And if you could just clarify the geographical structure of the
1 Territorial Defence. What were the main components of that?
2 A. Territorial Defence was organised by republics, so each republic,
3 as well as autonomous region or province had its own Territorial Defence
4 whereby the structure reflected the territorial structure. So from top to
5 bottom you would go from on the staff level from Republican staff, zonal
6 staff, regional staff, Municipal Staff, and these staffs would then be in
7 charge of the units, various levels going from lowest level platoons to
8 the highest level brigades. And also a distinction would have to be made
9 between local TO units, which was the majority of the TO, as well as
10 mobile TO units which were, according to one source, only 20 per cent of
11 the TO.
12 Q. In the last group of military formations, you have already touched
13 on the ad hoc groups that you describe in your report. You mentioned them
14 this morning, but would you please just sum up. Which ad hoc groups are
15 you familiar with in the Yugoslav army?
16 A. This is discussed on page 41 in the English version of the report
17 where I provide an overview on the JNA doctrine in relation to Operational
18 Groups, Tactical Groups, and Assault Detachments.
19 As I explained this morning, in particular operational
20 circumstances it was considered useful to change the arrangements in order
21 to facilitate the execution of the task as well as the implementation of
22 command and control, in particular in areas where, for example, it was --
23 where the terrain was difficult or where it was difficult to communicate
24 with each other, and therefore these kind of ad hoc groupings would be set
25 up which actually also exist in Western armies where we have the concept,
1 for example, of battle groups.
2 Q. At -- at pages 45 to 61 in the English version of your report you
3 describe in quite some detail the application of various disciplinary laws
4 and implementation of international humanitarian law.
5 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment, please. I see that
6 you're moving on to a different topic, and I have not understood anything
7 about these ad hoc groups. I was wondering if you had thought of the
8 possibility of ad hoc groups being made up only of volunteers.
9 Well, Witness, could you tell us what these ad hoc groups were?
10 Can you be more specific?
11 THE WITNESS: I will try to be, Your Honours, and maybe I can
12 explain it with a practical example.
13 The Vukovar situation is a very particular situation because it
14 is -- it is an operation conducted in an urban environment, urban warfare,
15 so warfare in a city. We see when we look at the situation there between
16 end of September 1991 and the fall of Vukovar on the 18th of November,
17 1991, that on the side of the JNA, if I can express myself that way, we
18 have different kinds of units. We have the Guards Motorised Brigade,
19 which is normally subordinated to the Federal Secretariat -- secretary,
20 excuse me, for Peoples Defence but there you're subordinated to the First
21 Military District. We have units of the 1st military districts and units
22 of the TO of the Republic of Serbia but we also have units of what I would
23 call the local Serb TO, i.e., you can call it remnants or self-established
24 formations which may well have been part of the TO of the Republic of
25 Croatia prior to the conflict but now have become separate entities who do
1 not respond any more to the authorities of the Republic of Croatia, but
2 they want to fight alongside the JNA. And we have also volunteers and
3 both volunteer groups as well as volunteers included JNA units.
4 MR. MARCUSSEN: If I may interrupt you for one minute, I'm sorry.
5 If Your Honours would like to look at Exhibit 622 which you have in your
6 binder and we can maybe call it up in e-court as well.
7 THE WITNESS: So, Your Honours, you see an order here from
8 Operational Group South, which, and is explained in my report, is based on
9 the Guards Motorised Brigade. So the Guards Motorised Brigade has the
10 command of OG South but it also includes other units, other brigades which
11 come from different establishment units. So we have an ad hoc arrangement
12 where we have units coming from different establishment or parent units
13 who are supposed to work together.
14 MR. MARCUSSEN:
15 Q. Can I stop you just for one minute just so we go through -- first
16 of all where on this document do we see that this is an Operational Group?
17 A. Because on -- on the left top heading it says "Command OG,"
18 Operativna Grupa, and then it says "Jug." "Jug" stands for "south."
19 Q. And when you say we see different groups involved, what part?
20 You're referring to item number 2, for example?
21 A. Yes. I was not yet at that level. I was mainly giving the
22 background information but we can go to item 2, to units' tasks.
23 Q. Yes. And so could you explain what these different units are, how
24 that --
25 A. Yeah. So the Operational Group consists of different units which
1 are not necessarily all establishment units or units which are normally
2 part of the Guards Motorised Brigade. In addition, the Guards Motorised
3 Brigade has resubordinated. Instead of being subordinated to the federal
4 secretary for People's Defence they are now under the command of the 1st
5 Military District. In order to -- because of the size of the group, the
6 Operational Group is much bigger than the brigade, we are operating --
7 that's the first factor. Secondly, we're operating in a particular
8 environment. We are operating in a city which in general makes it
9 difficult to exercise command and control, because on one hand you're
10 acting in a very small area but, on the other hand, it's much harder to
11 see each other. It's not the same as launching an armoured attack in --
12 somewhere in the plains.
13 These factors require the establishment of -- of particular -- the
14 implementation of particular command arrangements where you create an ad
15 hoc groupation, Operational Group with its subcomponents, which are under
16 a particular command. Okay. In this specific case the command of the OG
17 consisted of the command of the Guards Motorised Brigade. I've seen other
18 Operational Groups where the command of the OG is an ad hoc arrangement
19 including officers from, for example, the commands of the subordinate
20 units who may well for the first time work together in this particular
21 context. So it helps to have a special command established for those
22 circumstances, in particular when you're operating in a particular -- or
23 in a specific environment like a city.
24 When you go into paragraph 2, "units' tasks" we see Assault
25 Detachments. Assault Detachments are also ad hoc arrangements. Now,
1 according to JNA doctrine an assault detachment can be established, for
2 example, when you want to attack a fortified facility and you want to
3 include JNA elements and TO elements. An assault detachment would have
4 the size or could have the size of a battalion. Could also --
5 Q. No. And in this particular assault detachment we're looking at
6 now, what units do we see? We have a -- could you just go through them
7 and -- yeah.
8 A. We see that the assault detachment consists of the 1st Motorised
9 Battalion. Then we have the 1st and the 3rd Company of the 2nd Military
10 Police Battalion. We have the Leva Supoderica police detachment which and
11 will become clear later is a TO detachment with particular links with the
12 SRS War Staff. There's also the TO detachment Petrova Gora, as well as a
13 unit known as the volunteers company Novi Sad.
14 Q. And where is Novi Sad?
15 A. Novi Sad is a city in Serbia. The first city you see close to
16 Danube, important city. There's also armors included as well as other
18 Q. Thank you. Now, and here we have been talking about just the
19 issue of Operational Groups and what it means.
20 A. Mm-hmm.
21 Q. This particular document you mentioned in the context of Vukovar,
22 and it identifies in your view the units that were involved in the attack
23 in -- yeah, operational in the area of Vukovar at the time that's relevant
24 to your report?
25 A. Yes. And to be more specific at the time of that order. When the
1 commander says "units' tasks," well, all the units he mentions there are
2 subordinate to him, so are his units, and he's responsible for their
3 activities while they are subordinated to him.
4 Q. Including the volunteer units?
5 A. Exactly. Indeed, Your Honours.
6 MR. MARCUSSEN: Your Honours, I'd like to tender this exhibit.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] One moment, please, before that.
8 I have two questions to the witness.
9 Mention is made here of the Assault Detachment made up of various
10 units, motorised battalion, Military Police Battalion, and also Leva
11 Supoderica. It's a unit headed by Kameni. But I see that mention is also
12 made of Petrova Gora. Who are these people?
13 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, Petrova Gora is another -- what I
14 describe as local Serb TO formation in Vukovar. Petrova Gora refers to a
15 geographic area, and so people from that area considered it important or
16 useful to establish their own TO unit or detachment and which is then --
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We see that we have volunteers
18 coming from Novi Sad. Were these volunteers of the SRS or are we talking
19 about different volunteers here?
20 THE WITNESS: In this -- in the specific context of Vukovar and
21 also taking into account the documents I reviewed, these would be other
23 Now, while doing research for this report, obviously I tried to
24 find more information on -- on this unit, but I haven't been able to find
25 any information their allegiance. The only thing we know is it consists
1 of volunteers coming from Novi Sad and who decided they wanted to
2 participate in the fighting in Vukovar and they are subordinated to the
4 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I see that mention is made of
5 one tank, M-84. Who did this tank belong to, to Novi Sad or to the
6 Motorised Battalion? Where did that tank come from?
7 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, that tank would come from the armoured
8 battalion of the Guards Motorised Brigade. The Guards Motorised Brigade
9 had two motorised battalions -- excuse me, three motorised battalions, two
10 military police battalions which made a very special unit, as well as one
11 armoured battalion, and obviously supporting elements, engineering,
12 artillery, and so on.
13 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We can see as well that another
14 detachment is mentioned, another Assault Detachment, and I see here the
15 following: "Ustasha forces." What does it mean?
16 THE WITNESS: I don't have the exact -- I see it here. Well
17 Ustasha is the name that is used to identify the opposing force and this
18 would be then taken into context members of the Croatian national guard as
19 well as other members of the Croatian forces.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. They are identified that
21 way there. Very well.
22 Mr. Marcussen, you wanted a number.
23 Mr. Registrar.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Exhibit number P199.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you. Please proceed.
1 MR. MARCUSSEN:
2 Q. Mr. Theunens, you -- in your report at pages 45 to 61, you have
3 looked at the armed forces of the Republic of Serbia. In your report you
4 describe a change to the constitution of Serbia which provided that the
5 president of Serbia commanded the armed forces in peacetime and war. And
6 similarly you mentioned the Serbian Law on Defence which provides that the
7 president commands the armed forces in peacetime and in war.
8 Now, based on your research, have -- were such armed forces
9 established in 1991, 1992 -- sorry, 1990, 1991?
10 A. Your Honours, just for the accuracy of the record, it is page 62
11 to 70 in the English version of the report. And to answer the question,
12 no, based on my research I -- such armed forces were not established, and
13 so the Territorial Defence was considered the armed force of the Republic
14 of Serbia during that time period.
15 Q. According to these laws, who were allowed to organise and
16 reinforce, arm, equip, and train armed forces?
17 A. Your Honours, Article 118 of the 1991 Law on Defence of the
18 Republic of Serbia states that such tasks could only be accomplished by
19 competent state bodies.
20 Q. Now, although no Serb or Serbian army was formed, have you during
21 your research come across anything that leads you to believe that armed
22 formations did exist in Serbia at this time?
23 A. Yes, indeed, Your Honours. From the documents I reviewed, one can
24 indeed conclude that there were armed formations existing in Serbia which
25 participated in the conflict in Croatia and which were not foreseen or
1 which were actually not permitted by the Law on Defence.
2 Q. And have you formed an opinion about who organised these
4 A. Indeed. In the context of this report, there is information
5 included on the role of political -- certain political parties in the
6 establishment of such formations.
7 Q. Were these formations based on the material you have reviewed,
8 were they supported by the Republic of Serbia?
9 A. Well, overall -- as an overall comment one could say that they
10 were at least allowed to exist. There are indications that some groups
11 were the subject of investigation or even that they were prevented from
12 continuing to exist, and I refer, I think, to the Serbian Volunteer Guard
13 in specific references.
14 Now, I focus my research on the Serbian -- on the groups that were
15 affiliated with the Serbian Radical Party, and there the conclusion would
16 be that there was cooperation with the Ministry of Defence and/or the
17 Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Serbia in order to organise,
18 equip, arm, and dispatch these units, as well as cooperation with the JNA.
19 MR. MARCUSSEN: Your Honours, the two laws that have been referred
20 to, namely the constitution of Serbia and the proclamation on the Law on
21 Defence are found as Exhibit numbers 2019 and 385, and I would like to
22 tender these two exhibits. They're in your binder. These are -- again
23 they're simply texts from the Official Gazettes.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection. Mr. President, we see
25 here a reduced, abbreviated version of the constitution of the Republic of
1 Serbia. It is correct that the constitution of the Republic of Serbia
2 stipulates the role of the president of the republic in the command of
3 armed forces, but there is provision that says that as long as Yugoslavia
4 exists, it is transposed onto the federal state. So during the existence
5 of Yugoslavia, the Republic of Serbia, in fact its president, has nothing
6 to do with the command of the armed forces.
7 You should instruct the Prosecution to deliver to you the
8 constitution of the Republic of Serbia and the translation, because I know
9 the Prosecution has it translated.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I have two problems. I would
11 like to find these documents. We cannot find them. 2019. Can you tell
12 us where it is exactly?
13 MR. MARCUSSEN: It should be the next document in your binder
14 after the order that we just looked for relating to Vukovar. So the
15 next -- the next one is 2019. Essentially Your Honours would have noticed
16 that we tried to put the exhibits in the binders in the order that they
17 are coming up during the examination.
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. But then this
19 document 2019 on the constitution of Serbia, Mr. Seselj raised an
20 objection regarding this, saying that there is an article that is not
21 included in the text we have, and it provides for the following: If -- if
22 Serbia has no army, then it's the federal army that takes over. At least
23 that's what I understood. But we don't have the relevant article in the
25 MR. MARCUSSEN: Your Honours, the -- the version of the exhibit
1 which is in e-court is the complete version this law. As I said earlier,
2 what we have done for the purpose of this binder is to just include the
3 excerpts that are most relevant to the Prosecution. I think we should
4 include the full law. I'm sure that the accused will be referencing it,
5 so --
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Registrar, we
7 need a number for number 2019, but that's for the constitution that is in
8 full in the e-court system. Can we have a number for this?
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, that will be Exhibit number P200.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. And the second
11 document was 385, I believe.
12 MR. MARCUSSEN: That's correct, Your Honour.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that 65 ter number 385 will be
14 Exhibit number P201.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, one more objection.
16 The examination-in-chief has to be consistent. The witness has already
17 told you that Serbia did not have formed armed forces. You were offered
18 an abbreviated document, a diminished document. I made an objection
19 saying that the document is not comprehensive, and it prejudices its
20 probative value.
21 Now, it would be appropriate for the Prosecutor to show you the
22 final clause in the constitution which contains that provision, that
23 restriction. It would be important both for my objection and for the view
24 you are ultimately going to take.
25 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, you can come back to this
1 during your cross-examination. During cross-examination, you will have
2 opportunities to ask this question to the witness. "You said this, the
3 Prosecutor did not say this. I'm showing you article X of the
4 constitution and this and so forth." That's the way you should play the
6 Please continue, Mr. Prosecutor.
7 MR. MARCUSSEN: Thank you, Your Honour.
8 Q. Mr. Theunens, moving to the topic of volunteers, now again you
9 touched upon this this morning, but just to clarify and remind us, who
10 would -- who were the members of the armed forces of the former
12 A. Your Honours, the SFRY armed forces consisted of the JNA and the
14 Q. Sorry, I'm talking about who would be the staff or the -- who
15 would be soldiers, officers. Who would be composed -- who would be the
16 individuals in the army?
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Prosecutor, I'm sorry to
18 interfere and intervene, but we have to -- this is very complex. We have
19 to keep things in mind.
20 When you're asking a question and you're talking about armed
21 forces of the SFRY or armed forces of the Republic of Serbia, these are
22 very different entities, and we have to be very specific in order to avoid
24 I heard very carefully what the witness was saying at one point in
25 time and he told us in the Republic of Serbia there was no army or only
1 TOs, TO units that volunteers would join.
2 Three Judges here on this Bench are highly qualified. They have
3 attended, taken part in a good number of trials, so this is not unknown to
4 them. So be extremely specific, please.
5 MR. MARCUSSEN: Indeed, Your Honour. I have not -- yes, of
7 Q. Let me -- let me put the question differently. How would the army
8 of the SFRY fill the ranks in normal circumstances?
9 A. Your Honours, in normal circumstances there would be different
10 levels of units. There would be units of level A, B, C, and these three
11 categories refer to the level of professionalisation of these units, i.e.,
12 A would have the most professional personnel, whereas B and C the least.
13 For example, the Guards Motorised Brigade was for the largest part
14 professional with professional officers and COs, and then of course there
15 would be conscripts, people doing their military service. There could --
16 there would be regular call-ups of units, in particular for reserve units
17 where there would only be a skeleton structure in peacetime consisting of
18 a few officers and other members of the command where then reservists
19 would be called up, reservists being people who have accomplished military
20 service and who are still subject to military obligations.
21 Q. And --
22 A. Maybe to finalise, in addition, as we discussed, this Article 119
23 of 1982 All People's Defence Law states that people without military
24 obligations can still -- could still join the armed forces in one of the
25 three states, and these would be volunteers.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, but as a backdrop, you just
2 told us, you just explained there were three types of units, A, B, and C,
3 the highly professionals being the As. But the backdrop for the JNA
4 during Tito's time, was JNA a member of the Warsaw Pact? Was it? Yes or
6 THE WITNESS: I'm not sure about the date, but I think in --
7 sometimes in the '50s, Yugoslavia left the Warsaw Pact, and Yugoslavia or
8 the SFRY became one of the most well-known non-aligned nation and also
9 leading country in the non-aligned nation movement.
10 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. Is it true or false,
11 then, that the army of former Yugoslavia at the time was very numerous in
12 terms of soldiers? Some could even say that it was almost at the same
13 level as the armies in the Warsaw Pact or in NATO. What do you think of
15 THE WITNESS: Indeed, Your Honours. There were estimates at the
16 time, and certainly still in the '70s, that the JNA was the third army
17 of -- of Europe, for example. Now, I don't recall exactly what this
18 estimate was based on, mainly manpower, so quantity or was it also
19 quality, education, weaponry and so on and so on, but indeed it was
20 considered a very serious armed force. And of course we cannot neglect
21 the factor of the TO, which was size-wise much bigger, during conflict was
22 to be much bigger in size than the JNA and which would carry out a
23 specific part of the duty.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Now regarding
25 professionalisation, officers in -- were the officers in the JNA as able
1 in terms of standards as officers in the UK or in the Russian army, in the
2 Soviet army, or in the US, or was their level lower?
3 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I can only speak to the -- the
4 officers I met while working here at the ICTY, as well as reviewing expert
5 reports by other military experts -- by outside military experts, I wanted
6 to say, and the impression I had from -- mainly from these reports but
7 also my own [indiscernible], that the JNA officers were very
8 well-educated. There were different levels of training, military academy
9 and subsequent staff courses, so very well-educated and very familiar with
10 military doctrine. And actually, of course the defence concept was
11 different. You had All People's Defence, whereas in the countries I'm
12 familiar with, we don't have such a concept. But otherwise, tactical and
13 operational doctrine was very similar, and also the level of education,
14 just based on what I have seen here in these reports, were all experts
15 when they assess and analyse that level of education and training, as well
16 as from own meetings with former JNA officers.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, one last question since
18 you've -- in order to be an officer in the JNA, did you have -- did you
19 have to be -- a senior officer in the JNA, did you have to be a member of
20 the League of Communists or could you have a military career within the
21 JNA without belonging to the League of Communists?
22 THE WITNESS: I haven't looked at this issue in detail,
23 Your Honours, but based on my recollection one had to be a member of
24 the -- of the League of Communists to achieve the highest level of ranks.
25 But I'm -- it's not part of the research of my report.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
2 MR. MARCUSSEN: Thank you, Your Honour.
3 Q. In the time frame that's relevant to your report, were there
4 staffing difficulties for the army of the SFRY?
5 A. Indeed, Your Honours. In particular, Veljko Kadijevic highlights
6 that -- this aspect in his book where he talks about the problems caused
7 by the poor response to mobilisation and call-ups, as well as also what he
8 describes as the, I think, negative control of political parties who want
9 to send their own armed groups to the conflict zone instead of having
10 these members, the members of these groups, become part of the JNA or the
11 TO as they should have been in accordance with the doctrine.
12 Q. Now, based on your reports -- sorry, based on your analysis were
13 nonetheless volunteer formations incorporated into the JNA?
14 A. Yes, indeed, Your Honours. I mean, before they can become
15 incorporated they first have to exist, and I start with, I think, that
16 aspect on page 74 of part 1 of the report, and it continues to page 76. I
17 give names of units which -- or formations which became like commonly
18 known in the latter half of 1991. There were groups who identified
19 themselves as White Eagles. There were groups who were known as
20 Dusan Silni and other volunteer formations as well as SRS/SCP volunteer
22 Q. And what was the attitude of the authorities towards these
23 formations? You've stated that Kadijevic was not particularly keen on
24 them at least in the beginning, but could you explain what your analysis
25 has shown on this?
1 A. Yes, Your Honours. This is discussed on the second part of page
2 76 where one notices that on the level of the government of Serbia, based
3 on an interview Miodrag -- Vice-Admiral Miodrag Jokic, who was then
4 Minister of Defence in the Republic of Serbia gave. He was -- and this
5 interview was actually discussed on page 78, this dates from 25th of July,
6 1991. Jokic is asked, "Well, what is your view about the creation of --
7 or the call, excuse me, the call of the Serbian National Renewal Movement,
8 SPO, for the establishment of a Serbian guard"? And Jokic refers to the
9 existing legislation to say, "Well, look, there is no need for party
10 armies or for volunteer formations which are outside the armed forces.
11 People who want to join the armed forces can do that in the existing
12 units, JNA or TO."
13 However, it seems that later on in the course of time, and this
14 happens very soon, there is change in his attitude. And then one can see
15 that actually these volunteer formations are not only tacitly allowed to
16 exist but are even -- the members are even recognised, and it is stated
17 that volunteers, well, will be considered members of the armed forces like
18 any other soldier or other member of the armed force. Which -- I will try
19 to shorten it. Which on one hand is in line with the law, All People's
20 Defence Law, but on the other hand taking into account these are actually
21 people who should be mobilised into existing JNA units, mobilised on an
22 individual basis, but for -- but prefer to serve in -- in new formations
23 which are not foreseen in the armed force which actually is a kind of
24 peculiar application of the law.
25 Q. From a military perspective, is there -- is there a difference
1 between having -- having volunteers incorporated individually into
2 different units and having a volunteer formation as such deployed?
3 A. Yes, Your Honours, and I will -- my reply will consist of two
4 components. The first one we have already addressed, that is, what is the
5 motivation of these volunteers? Based on the documentation I have
6 reviewed and in particular for what volunteers that were included in
7 SRS/SCP volunteer detachments is concerned, these people are mainly
8 motivated by ethnic motives. I.e., they go to the conflict to, as they
9 call it, defend Serbs, but in practice, well, they -- for example, they
10 call the Croats Ustashas, they're there to fight Ustashas whereas the JNA
11 stood for something else. The JNA stood for brotherhood and unity and
12 when you look at the legal references tries to make a distinction of the
13 individual nationalities and nations in Yugoslavia but says that it is the
14 army of all nationalities.
15 From the purely -- the second aspect of my answer, from the purely
16 military point of view, it is much harder for a commander to exercise
17 command and control over a particular group that is suddenly included in
18 his unit than over individuals that are admitted on an individual basis in
19 that unit.
20 All -- this has to do with cohesion and as they say in French
21 esprit de corps. Group cohesion and, as we would call in the military,
22 Esprit de corps, is one of the essential factors for the functioning of a
23 unit. It starts on the lowest level, the squad, then the platoon and so
24 on. And when I refer to my own education and background, it was one of
25 the first thing we had to do is to teach our soldiers, who could be
1 professional soldiers but as well as conscripts, that they were part of a
2 particular unit and that this unit was part of the a bigger armed force.
3 Now, it is easier to do that with -- when individuals arrive and are
4 incorporated into an existing unit than when you get a group with a very
5 specific motivation which is not necessarily the motivation of the JNA,
6 but you still need to include these people in your unit and you need to
7 make sure that they do the things you want them to do in accordance with
8 the motivation that exists within your armed force.
9 Just to close this, there is a quite famous book about --
10 explaining the military failure of the United States in -- in Vietnam.
11 It's called "Crisis in command." I remember because we had to study at
12 the military academy. It mentions, for example, this aspect where they
13 said it is an error to replace constituent units, companies, battalions,
14 one unit by the other. It's much better to replace individuals when they
15 have done their time on the battlefield or when the mobilisation is
17 The very last element of my reply is that in the course of the
18 preparation of my report, I came across an order by General Ojdanic, which
19 deals with the Kosovo situation in April 1999, where they talk about the
20 incorporation of volunteers into the VJ during the Kosovo crisis and the
21 NATO bombing, and in that order Ojdanic, who is the chief General Staff of
22 the VJ explicitly prohibits the inclusion of volunteer units because he
23 mentions there have been problems, looting, other crimes with units in the
25 So I mean very long answer to, yeah, to show there's a huge
1 difference between individual volunteers and volunteer units.
2 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Theunens, it would seem to me that as long as
3 you have a difference in the mission of units taking part in armed
4 conflict you would have trouble and problems arising out of that
5 difference. The Presiding Judge asked you this morning exactly the same
6 question, namely, and I'm merely just repeating the President's question,
7 how was this transformed into the cooperation between the various units
8 that took part in the armed conflict? I mean, if -- if what you're
9 telling us is correct, namely that the JNA professional forces would work
10 with the mission that was about brotherhood and unity and the volunteers
11 of various groups would come with an ethnic mission, then my suggestion
12 would be trouble is going to come out of that. So either the ethnic
13 missions were transformed into a battle to secure territory, or the JNA
14 would assume the political ethnic purpose that was carried by the
15 volunteer groups. But can you revert to your answer to the President's
16 question? How did this work out in practice?
17 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, in -- in practice there were, of
18 course, problems, but I think that the length of the volume of reports
19 also shows how complex the matter is, because, for example, the mission
20 changes, the mission of the JNA, based on documents I reviewed. The
21 mission in Croatia changes from the constitutional mission to a mission
22 which is -- consists of, as is qualified by Kadijevic, protecting the
23 Serbs which could be considered an ethnical mission. However -- and I
24 think I can explain that best with a practical example, Vukovar. I know
25 at least of one or even two non-Serb officers, I think they were of
1 Macedonian ethnicity who had, for example, their name changed or they
2 wanted to use another name during the conflict because they feared that
3 the volunteers who were fighting along them would not trust them because
4 Macedonian name it ended on "ovski" and it had to end on "ic," for
5 example. This is a very small example but to show how this very, maybe,
6 stratospheric level of brotherhood and unity, yeah, brotherhood and unity
7 and ethnic we go down to what is happening in the field. In Vukovar there
8 is no doubt based on the documents I reviewed that the volunteers, in
9 particular the members of Leva Supoderica, were there to fight Ustashas.
10 I'm quoting the vocabulary that is being used in articles that are from
11 Velika Srbija that are kind of glorifying the activity of Leva Supoderica.
12 There were still JNA officers in the Guards Brigade and other
13 units who believed that they were fighting to maintain the unity of
14 Yugoslavia. Whether that belief was correct or incorrect I think that's
15 another question, but to summarise the situation was indeed complex.
16 There were sometimes conflicts between -- on the field between the lowest
17 level command and his JNA soldiers on one hand and the volunteers he was
18 in command of because they were not always doing the same. Maybe they
19 were willing to fight, to continue and take the next street or next group
20 of houses in Vukovar, but there were also situations where they didn't
21 feel like fighting. Why that was that could be related to the different
22 motivation, the underlying motivation which is different.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Fine. We're going to stop here.
24 It was starting to be really interesting, but we have to stop because of
25 time constraints.
1 Witness, you've taken the solemn declaration. You're now a
2 Chamber's witness. You're an expert witness, and you're impartial.
3 Furthermore, you are under oath now, and -- but you are a staff member of
4 the OTP. Obviously you can continue working at the OTP, but you are
5 absolutely not allowed to speak to anyone about your current testimony.
6 As a military man, you know what this implies. So you're not to mention
7 your testimony to anyone. You can talk about the weather, about the next
8 football match or whatever, but not about the case. Did you get me?
9 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honours, I understood.
10 MR. MARCUSSEN: And if I may interject, Your Honour, and reassure
11 Your Honours the chief of prosecutions Mr. Gavin Ruxton has instructed
12 Mr. Theunens not to come to work while his testimony is ongoing and not to
13 have any contact with any member of the Prosecutor.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. So you're on leave,
15 actually. It's even better. Really lucky.
16 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours.
17 [The witness stands down]
18 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We are going to move into
19 private session.
20 [Private session]
11 Pages 3722-3728 redacted. Private session
4 [Open session]
5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're now in open session.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well, this is an oral
7 decision lifting the confidentiality.
8 Noting the request of yesterday to lift the confidentiality of the
9 transcript from page 3551, line 9 to page 3553, line 7 regarding the --
10 after -- regarding deliberation of the Chamber regarding orphans that
11 would have been handed over to the opposing party during World War II,
12 given that all this -- that most of this is already public information
13 decides to lift the confidentiality of this part of the transcript, which
14 means that pages 3551 to 3553 are now in the public domain.
15 This was my ruling. We will meet next week for a hearing on
16 Tuesday at 9.00 a.m. Thank you.
17 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.25 p.m.,
18 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 19th day
19 of February, 2008, at 9.00 a.m.