1 Tuesday, 8 March 2011
2 [Rule 98 bis Hearing]
3 [Open session]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.32 p.m.
5 [The accused entered court]
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Registrar, kindly call the
8 THE REGISTRAR: Thank you and good afternoon, Your Honours.
9 This is case number IT-03-67-T, the Prosecutor versus
10 Vojislav Seselj.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Registrar.
12 Today is Tuesday, the 8th of March, 2011. Let me greet all the
13 people in the courtroom and around the courtroom, and more specifically
14 the OTP representatives, Mr. Marcussen, Ms. Biersay, and their case
15 manager. Good afternoon to you, Mr. Seselj, and good afternoon to the
16 people assisting us.
17 We're going to hear the Prosecutor today in the Rule 98 bis
18 arguments, following Mr. Seselj's intervention yesterday.
19 You may proceed, Mr. Marcussen.
20 [Prosecution Submissions]
21 MR. MARCUSSEN: Thank you, Your Honours.
22 Your Honours, the Trial Chamber should dismiss the accused's
23 motion under Rule 98 bis.
24 A Rule 98 bis hearing is supposed to be about evidence admitted
25 into the trial record, and whether there is some evidence taken at its
1 highest upon which a Trial Chamber could base a conviction. There is
2 evidence in the trial record upon which a Trial Chamber could base a
3 conviction in this case. There's evidence to show that the accused and
4 other Serb leaders, as Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina set on the path
5 towards independence, set their differences aside, pooled their resources
6 to carve out what the accused called Greater Serbia from large parts of
7 Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, and expel non-Serbs from Serbia in
8 places such as Hrtkovci. There's evidence to show that the accused made
9 both a significant and substantial contribution to this massive campaign
10 of ethnic cleansing. There's evidence to show that forces -- Serb forces
11 sent by the accused and other members of the JCE alleged in the
12 indictment and controlled by them, committed widespread and systematic
13 atrocities in Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Serbia. There's also
14 evidence that the accused, himself, committed some of these crimes.
15 In large parts of yesterday's speech, the accused chose to talk
16 about other things in evidence in the case. Instead, he, for example,
17 talked about Carla Del Ponte's book, but the book is not part of the
18 trial record. He talked about documents that he had been receiving from
19 Vaske. These are not part of the trial record, because the Trial Chamber
20 explicitly did not admit them on the 20th of January, 2008.
21 The accused sought to give the impression that unless there's
22 proof that his volunteers had committed the crimes charged in the
23 indictment, then the Trial Chamber could not find that there's evidence
24 in the trial record that could sustain the counts in the indictment. He
25 did this despite being fully aware that this is incorrect.
1 Where there's evidence that a group of persons participate in a
2 common plan, design, or purpose to commit crimes within the Tribunal's
3 jurisdiction, each one of them can be held responsible for all the crimes
4 committed in furtherance of this common plan, design, or purpose. They
5 can also be held responsible for foreseeable consequences of the
6 implementation of the common plan, design, or purpose. And as was made
7 clear by the Appeals Chamber in the Brdjanin case, they're also
8 responsible for crimes that the JCE members used -- sorry, that they're
9 responsible for crimes committed by other persons that the JCE members
10 used in furtherance of the implementation of the common plan, design and
12 And I refer Your Honours to the Prosecution versus Brdjanin, the
13 Appeals Chamber's judgement. The case number is IT-00-39-A from the
14 17th of March, 2009, paragraphs 413 and 430.
15 This said, contrary to what the accused claimed yesterday, there
16 is evidence in the record that a Trial Chamber could rely on which
17 demonstrates that SRS/SCP volunteers participated in heinous crimes,
18 including crimes charged in the indictment.
19 For example, Milan Lancuzanin, known as Kameni, participated in
20 the killing of hundreds of Croats at Grabovo, near Vukovar, on the 20th
21 of November, 1991. Miroslav Vukovic, known as Cele, oversaw and
22 participated in vicious beatings and killings of non-Serbs at the
23 Ekonomija Farm in Zvornik. Branislav Gavrilovic, known as Brne, who
24 introduced himself by his men as Chetnik -- introduced by his men as
25 Chetnik Vojvoda, viciously beat and murder prisoners of war at
1 Mount Igman, while saying Seselj was the be-all, end-all in Sarajevo,
2 God, and the law. I refer Your Honours to the testimony of Stoparic,
3 VS-16, VS-1015, and Koblar for these propositions.
4 The accused decided to give a long speech yesterday. Regardless,
5 some of his speech touched upon one of the core issues in the case. He
6 claimed that it was his intention to create a Greater Serbia that would
7 encompass Croat Serbs and Muslim Serbs, but that, unfortunately, the war
8 had prevented this healing process -- a healing process that he would
9 have wished.
10 Let's take a look at a video from the evidence which is
11 Exhibit P355 to see how the accused contributed to this healing process.
12 This is from a speech that he held at a funeral of a fallen volunteer in
13 August 1991.
14 [Video-clip played]
15 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "The enemy shall suffer the
16 punishment of the Serbian people. We will no longer forgive like we did
17 after the First and the Second World War. The time has come for us to
18 square the old accounts as well. The time has come for us to avenge all
19 the Serb victims and unite all the Serb lands."
20 MR. MARCUSSEN: Yesterday, the accused tried to excuse his
21 actions by arguing that crimes were commited by other parties in the
22 conflict; for example, at transcript page 16647. However, the argument
23 known as "tu quoque," that defence has been rejected at this Tribunal as
24 confirmed by the Martic appeal judgement. And that's case
25 number IT-13/1-A from the 5th of May, 2009, and I refer to paragraph 111.
1 And insofar as this is a claim of self-defence, self-defence
2 cannot be used as an excuse for targeting a civilian population. And
3 support for that is also found in the Martic appeal judgement at
4 paragraph 268.
5 As I indicated a few minutes ago, we will now refer the
6 Trial Chamber to some of the evidence that a Trial Chamber could base a
7 conviction of the accused on.
8 This is a case about the accused's responsibilities for crimes,
9 crimes that were committed against non-Serbs in Croatia, in Bosnia and
10 Herzegovina, and in Serbia because they were of the wrong ethnicity. The
11 non-Serbs were victimised because they happened to live on land that the
12 accused thought belonged to Serbs. They were victimised because the
13 accused believed and encouraged others to believe that they should pay in
14 blood for the wrongs of previous generations. They were victimised
15 because the accused recruited a fighting force and deployed them with the
16 message to expel Ustasha and clean up Bosnia. Of course, he was not
17 alone in this.
18 As the former Yugoslavia disintegrated, other military and
19 political leaders recognised a historic opportunity to forcefully obtain
20 an expanded, unitary Serb-dominated state, and so the accused, who up
21 until then had been viewed by the authorities as a dangerous extremist,
22 suddenly was granted a veneer of legitimacy. Thereafter, he acted
23 together, with other military and political leaders, to achieve their
24 objective through violent and criminal means. In pursuing these common
25 goals, the JCE members and their subordinates committed all of the crimes
1 charged in the indictment.
2 Let me briefly set out how we will present our argument today and
3 describe the evidence that a Trial Chamber could rely on for the
4 conviction of the accused.
5 First, the Prosecution will outline the legal test applicable
6 under Rule 98 bis.
7 Secondly, we will present evidence demonstrating that a
8 Trial Chamber could find that there was a common plan, design, or purpose
9 of which the accused was a part to create an ethnically-homogeneous
10 Greater Serbia, and that an integral part of this common plan, design and
11 purpose was the persecution, deportation, and forcible transfer, murder,
12 torture, and inhumane treatment, rape, sexual assault, looting,
13 destruction of places of worship and other religious buildings, and other
14 discriminatory measures, all directed against non-Serbs, as alleged in
15 paragraph 8 of the indictment.
16 Thirdly, we will describe how the accused made a significant
17 contribution to the common plan by: One, using his power and popularity
18 to promote the idea of Greater Serbia and that it had to be carved out by
19 force; raising and deploying volunteers to participate in the
20 persecutorial campaign aimed at implementing Greater Serbia, and that
21 these volunteers committed multiple crimes in doing so; and in committing
22 persecution through hate speech which promoted a climate of fear and
23 hatred and also resulted in deportation and inhumane treatment through
24 forcible transfer. Finally, we will show that a Trial Chamber could find
25 that the crimes charged in the indictment were committed in furtherance
1 of this common plan, design, or purpose.
2 While we are not required legally to address every incident
3 charged, we will show that there is evidence of the commission of
4 indictment crimes in each of the areas where crimes have been charged,
5 the crime base areas. The Prosecution will show that there is evidence
6 upon which a Trial Chamber could base a conviction and that the accused's
7 motion for dismissal of the indictment, therefore, should be dismissed.
8 I will be presenting the first substantive segment of these
9 arguments today, and Ms. Biersay will be presenting the second argument
10 as to the accused's contribution to the JCE and the evidence about the
11 crimes committed in the -- alleged in the indictment. At the end of it,
12 I will briefly sum up, and we will be answering any questions that the
13 Trial Chamber might have.
14 During the presentation, we will use and show various exhibits
15 and excerpts of exhibits. Additionally, there will be a few
16 demonstrative exhibits that have been prepared based on the evidence in
17 the record. It may facilitate the future review of the transcript if
18 these exhibits were part of the record, and I would propose to tender
19 these various aids that we use today into evidence later on. I propose
20 to tender an electronic version on a CD and hard copy. Obviously, this
21 is just for the guidance of the presentation.
22 I would also say that when we today refer to page numbers of
23 various exhibits, the page number we refer to is the page in the version
24 of the exhibits as they are found in our e-court system, and it's the
25 English version we're referring to.
1 The Prosecution will highlight some of the evidence that a
2 Trial Chamber could use to enter a conviction of the accused for each
3 count in the indictment. It is not possible, in the time allotted at
4 this hearing, to --
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection.
6 I really had the best of intentions --
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Seselj, I warned you
8 yesterday. I told you that the Prosecutor had not intervened when you
9 spoke. Had he intervened, I would have said exactly the same thing to
10 him yesterday as I'm doing to you now. Under the 98 bis proceedings,
11 there are no objections. You just listen to the other party.
12 What do you want to say?
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, do you want me to
14 leave the courtroom? When the first document in the English language is
15 shown by Mr. Marcussen here, and if there is no Serbian version, tell me,
16 if that is your wish, I can leave even before that happens. He cannot
17 display documents only in English. He has to display them in Serbian as
18 well. I cannot assume, on the basis of the appearance of the document,
19 what this is all about.
20 I had the best of intentions not to interrupt Mr. Marcussen at
21 all, but this is insufferable.
22 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Marcussen, this has
23 been said. It has been observed that if there is a text in English,
24 there's no translation into B/C/S, so I don't know what your intention
25 was about it. But if you do have a text in English, the interpreters can
1 interpret and translate it, because there's going to be interpretation
3 MR. MARCUSSEN: Indeed, Your Honour, and I believe most of the
4 things we will show would be either videos or maps and things like this,
5 so I don't think that will be a problem. But if there are things, we'll
6 make sure that it gets translated and read into the record.
7 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
8 So I see that everybody wants the best for everybody else, so
9 let's continue.
10 MR. MARCUSSEN: The Prosecution will highlight some of the
11 evidence that a Trial Chamber could use to enter a conviction against the
12 accused for each count in the indictment. It is not possible, in the
13 time allotted at this hearing, to discuss the evidence in support of
14 every incident alleged and every mode of liability charged, but that is
15 also not necessary under Rule 98 bis or this Tribunal's jurisprudence.
16 Under Rule 98 bis, a Trial Chamber is only to determine whether
17 or not the Prosecution has adduced enough evidence for each count, taken
18 as a whole, as opposed to all the various charges making up each count.
19 As a consequence, at the Rule 98 bis stage, a Trial Chamber may only
20 enter a judgement of acquittal with respect to an entire count in the
22 Furthermore, although the accused is charged under various modes
23 of responsibility, it is sufficient for the Trial Chamber to establish
24 that there is evidence supporting one. Hence, once there's evidence
25 supporting one mode of responsibility alleged in the indictment, the
1 Trial Chamber will dismiss the motion for acquittal. And I refer here
2 to, for example, the Prosecutor versus Mrksic, case number IT-95-13/1-T,
3 their oral decision on the 28th of June, 2006, at transcript pages 11311
4 and 12 in that case, and to the Prosecutor versus Prlic, another case
5 number, IT-04-74-T, and that's at the hearing on the 20th
6 of February, 2008, transcript pages 27206, 207 and 237.
7 The Prosecution would, therefore, not be addressing the probative
8 value of evidence in any detail, and we will, for example, generally not
9 be addressing corroborating evidence in our submissions today.
10 I will turn to the more substantive parts of the argument today.
11 A Trial Chamber could, as I said at the start, find that there
12 existed a common plan, design, or purpose to create Greater Serbia, as
13 the accused called it, through forced displacement of non-Serbs, as well
14 as through murder, cruel treatment, torture, detention, destruction of
15 property, and a lot of other persecutorial acts. These crimes were
16 necessary means of implementing the common objective of removing by force
17 non-Serbs from large areas of Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and a
18 smaller part of Serbia. The JCE members used brutal violence and
19 ruthlessly took advantage of the coercive environment that they,
20 themselves, had promoted.
21 The accused has denied yesterday, for example, at transcript
22 pages 16628 and 29, that deportation and forcible transfer occurred,
23 claiming instead that these were voluntary, what he called, population
24 exchanges; that population fluctuated for economic reasons, for example.
25 This is both incorrect legally and factually.
1 I would note at this point that the Appeals Chamber, in its
2 judgement in the Prosecutor versus Krajisnik, case number IT-00-39-A,
3 from the 17th of March, 2009, in paragraph 319, held that:
4 "The term 'forced,' when used in reference to crimes of
5 deportation, is not to be limited to physical force, but includes threats
6 of force and coercion such as that caused by fear of violence, duress,
7 detention, physical oppression, or abuse of power against such person or
8 persons or another person or by taking advantage of a coercive
10 In this case, Your Honours, the evidence shows that the accused
11 and other members of the JCE both physically forced and used all other
12 types of forcible measures described by the Appeals Chamber in the
13 Krajisnik case to expel non-Serbs. We will refer Your Honours to
14 evidence in this regard in much more detail along the way in our
15 arguments today.
16 The existence of the JCE and the intent to commit the crimes
17 alleged are evidence in the following elements, each of which will be
18 discussed in detail in the following: First, the accused's relentless
19 pursuit of the Chetnik aspiration of a homogeneous Greater Serbia; two,
20 the co-ordinated efforts of JCE members to ethnically separate areas
21 claimed by Serb land -- claimed as Serb land through the creation of
22 Serb-only political and governmental structures, supported by
23 co-ordinated armed forces; three, the co-ordinated ethnic separation of
24 non-Serbs demonstrated by the pattern of crimes committed by the forces
25 and structures that were deployed from mid-August 1991 onwards.
1 I'll turn to the first point.
2 As Yugoslavia disintegrated, the accused rose to prominence on
3 the back of an extremist Chetnik political ideology and military
4 traditions. His notoriety as the Chetnik leader was cemented in 1989 on
5 the day of the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo Polje. On that
6 day, he was appointed the highest Chetnik military rank, that of vojvoda,
7 by an accused World War II criminal. Your Honours are referred to
8 Exhibit P150.
9 During the period covered by the indictment, the accused was a
10 leader of both the Serbian Chetnik Movement, that we will refer to as the
11 SCP, and the Serbian Radical Party, which we refer to as the SRS. They
12 functioned as two components of one entity; the SRS, the so-called
13 political component, and the SCP, its military wing, if you like.
14 The accused's embrace of Chetnik ideology, his revival of its
15 military structures and symbols, and his relentless incendiary language
16 against non-Serbs all demonstrate his intent to achieve a Greater Serbia
17 through violence and crimes.
18 The accused styled himself as a proud standard-bearer of the
19 Chetniks. In public appearances, he repeatedly made reference to Chetnik
20 history. He disseminated its ideology and goals; in particular,
21 Greater Serbia. He organised followers in Chetnik organisations which he
22 deployed tens of thousands of as volunteers in conflict areas during the
23 indictment period. The acts, statements and intent of the accused must,
24 therefore, be seen in the light of the Chetnik ideology and traditions
25 that he associated himself with so strongly.
1 On February 18th, 1991, just prior to establishing the SRS, which
2 absorbed the SCP, the Central Fatherland Board of the SCP issued a
3 proclamation to the Serbian people expressly declaring themselves to be
4 "reviving the historic --" sorry, start that over:
5 "... reviving the heroic traditions of Serbian freedom fighters
6 and continuing the endeavours of our glorious predecessors,
7 General Draze Mihajlovic, Dragisa Vasic, and Dr. Stevan Moljevic, and
8 having again unfurled the Chetnik flag throughout the Serbian lands."
9 This is found in Exhibit P3 at page 37.
10 So what were these traditions and endeavours?
11 As described by Yves Tomic, the word "Chetnik" refers to "a
12 particular mode of armed and military action." Chetnik organisations
13 historically have been military organisations, some of which have also
14 developed political programmes, as he explains in his report, which is
15 found in Exhibit P164, and I refer Your Honours to page 38 for this.
16 Now, from Moljevic that was referred to in the proclamation and
17 who was one of the Chetnik movement's foremost ideologists, the core
18 purpose of the Chetnik Movement was to create a Greater Serbia which he
19 envisioned as:
20 "... a homogeneous Serbia encompassing all Serb-populated ethnic
21 regions, even where Serbs did not constitute an ethnic majority."
22 I'll give you the reference to these quotes in a bit, but there's
24 Achieving a homogeneous Serbia required:
25 "... a plan for the cleansing or displacement of the rural
1 population with a view to achieving the homogeneity of the Serb community
2 in the state."
3 The Chetnik Movement, therefore, euphemistically called for
4 population exchanges which, in its application in reality, meant ethnic
5 cleansing. This is what the historic traditions and endeavours boiled
6 down to: A struggle for territorial control over Greater Serbia and the
7 expulsion and destruction of non-Serbs in the targeted lands to ensure
8 Serb hegemony. And the quotes that I made come from Exhibit P141, and I
9 would also -- page 2, sorry, and I would also refer to, again, Tomic's
10 report, P164, at page 44.
11 In his propaganda campaign, the accused repeatedly lionised the
12 Chetnik armed forces whose World War II leader had gained a reputation
13 for extreme brutality. For World War II Chetniks, "mopping up of
14 liberated territory" meant burning villages to the ground "so that not a
15 single house remains intact," and so that non-Serb population was
16 completely decimated, "irrespective of sex and age." The Chetniks'
17 legacy of brutality, systematic and widespread crimes were so profound
18 that Chetnik commanders, such as Momcilo Djujic, the accused's Chetnik
19 benefactor, were listed as war criminals by the Yugoslav authorities.
20 And I would refer Your Honours again to P164, pages 48, 49, 53 to 57.
21 So, Your Honours, these were the aims, methods and symbols the
22 accused proudly adopted and endorsed when he seized the mantle of
23 vojvoda. This was why he created the Serbian Chetnik Movement in
24 August 1990. This was what he continued in February 1991. When forming
25 the SRS, he incorporated the SCP as its military wing. This is the
1 backdrop which provides vital context for the understanding of the
2 accused's many calls for Greater Serbia. This explains why the accused's
3 many invocations of past wrongs committed against Serbs, and threats of
4 revenge, had such a powerful impact on both his supporters and those he
5 targeted as enemies, as he did in his speech at the funeral of the fallen
6 volunteer in August 1991 that we saw a little while ago. It also
7 explains why, under the accused's leadership, the SRS and its military
8 wing, the SCP, grew to have branches throughout Yugoslavia and became
9 synonymous with the brutality of the World War II Chetnik era. It
10 explains why he proclaimed himself the commander of "Chetnik operational
11 units," as can be seen in the statement found in Court Exhibit C10 at
12 paragraph 5. It explains why SRS/SCP volunteers were deployed
13 extensively throughout the area claimed as Greater Serbia and why
14 volunteers, such as Kameni, Cele and Brne committed the crimes they did.
15 Taken together, the accused's intent could not have been more clear: He
16 wanted to create Greater Serbia through ethnic cleansing, including the
17 commission of the crimes charged in the indictment.
18 Turning to the second limb about the JCE.
19 The accused was not the only Serbian leader pursuing a
20 Greater Serbia. Irrespective of the terminology they used, the unspoken
21 nature of their objectives, others shared the criminal purpose embodied
22 by the term "Greater Serbia," the creation of a homogeneous, unified,
23 cohesive territory for Serbs committed through crimes against non-Serbs.
24 Nationalism replaced the old slogan of brotherhood and unity as the
25 Socialist Federal Public of Yugoslavia disintegrated. And when Croatia
1 and Bosnia and Herzegovina set out on their path of independence, Serb
2 leaders opted for the ethnic separations of Serbs within those republics
3 in order to avoid the two new countries encompassing what was considered
4 Serb land and containing a vast Serbian minority, would be created.
5 In 1991, for the first time in his political career, the
6 accused's incitement of ethnic hatred, his claims of historical
7 injustice, and his desire to unify Serb people into one Serb land at any
8 price finally coincided with what others, more powerful and
9 better-resourced Serb political and military leaders wanted to achieve.
10 These Serbian politicians and political leaders set aside their
11 differences and pooled their resources in order to seize and cleanse
12 lands that they claimed belonged to Serbs.
13 To achieve their common purpose, JCE members created Serb-only
14 political and administrative structures, backed by armed forces. They
15 deployed these structures and armed forces to carve out Greater Serbia.
16 The evidence that we will now discuss is divided into four parts.
17 It shows that from the second part of August 1990, Serbs in the
18 Republic of Croatia, led by, among others, Mile Babic, one of the alleged
19 JCE members, set up Serb-only authorities, Serb-only police, and
20 Serb-only TO or Territorial Defence units. They did so with the
21 significant assistance of Milosevic and other JCE members primarily in
23 2. In the Republic of Serbia, from early 1991, Milosevic reached
24 out to other Serb leaders, including the accused, to join forces with him
25 in defence of Serb interests. Volunteers were rallied. A new elite
1 special operations unit of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior, the
2 Serbian MUP, was created. And by July 1991, the JNA, in effect, was
3 operating as a Serbian army.
4 3. We'll be turning to Bosnia and Herzegovina. The evidence we
5 will talk about will show that Serb leaders in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
6 again with the significant assistance of Milosevic and the accused and
7 other Serb leaders, set up Serb-only authorities, police and TO, very
8 much in the same way they had done in Croatia.
9 And, finally, the evidence will demonstrate that the authorities
10 and forces that had been established, co-ordinated and deployed by the
11 Serb leaders that are alleged members of the JCE committed massive
12 atrocities as a part of their efforts to carve out parts of
13 Greater Serbia from Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
14 Turning to Croatia first.
15 According to JCE member Mile Babic, the Serbian Democratic Party,
16 the SDS, in Croatia endorsed the redrawing of regional and municipal
17 lines to reflect ethnic composition, and they asserted the right of those
18 areas with what they called special ethnic composition to autonomy.
19 Excerpts of Babic's testimony is admitted as Exhibit P1137, and the SDS
20 platform for Croatia is found in Exhibit P169.
21 Serb leaders set out to create, as I said, Serb-only political
22 and administrative structures. These steps were taken with the objective
23 of ethnic separation and enforced domination of Serbs in targeted
24 territories. The areas over which Serb control was established was
25 gradually joined and consolidated, and eventually they declared that they
1 wanted to join Serbia and apply Serbian law. Your Honours, we refer to
2 Exhibits P895, P896, P898, P903, and, for example, the testimony of
4 As evidenced in P1137, as early as August 1990, Serbs, under the
5 rule and leadership of Mile Babic -- excuse me, under the leadership of
6 also him, but under the leadership of Milan Martic, started to arm
7 themselves with weapons from police depots. JCE members Jovica Stanisic
8 and Franko Simatovic, and other members of the Ministry of the Interior
9 of Republika Srpska, assisted in establishing Serb police in Croatia and
10 were training them. The evidence also shows that the Serbian police was
11 overseen and controlled by Milosevic. This is evidenced not only by
12 Babic's testimony that I've already mentioned, but also, for example,
13 P1029, under seal, P1144, under seal, the accused's own speeches found in
14 P66, and P1039.
15 In the Serb-claimed areas in Croatia, Serb-only territorial
16 defence units were also gradually built up, especially from January 1991
17 onwards. I'll not go into details for this, but Reynaud Theunens' report
18 which is found in the record as Exhibit P261, explains this, and
19 Your Honours could, for example, refer to pages 205, 211 and 212.
20 Babic testified how acts of provocation were orchestrated. They
21 included acts to try to engage the Croatian police, attacks on shops,
22 newspaper kiosks, and various facilities belonging to Croat and Albanian
23 enterprises. These acts were carried out by armed groups of Serbs which
24 Babic associated with the Serbian MUP. He also describes how the Serbian
25 media, notably those based in Belgrade, controlled by Milosevic,
1 increasingly portrayed Croats as Ustasha, as genocidal, and advocated
2 ethnic separation. The accused did not miss the opportunity to try to
3 inflame the situation by raising the spectre of genocide against Serbs in
4 Croatia and offering to send his Chetnik volunteers to assist.
5 Exhibit P1266, for example, is a message to the Serbs of heroic
6 Knin Krajina that the accused signed on the 27th of February, 1991, as
7 the president of the newly-created SRS and as president of the
8 Homeland Central Administration of the SCP. I'll read out this message:
9 "Fellow Serbian brothers and sisters, nowadays you are
10 reacting --" excuse me. "Nowadays, you are reaching a historic decision
11 which the future of our people and homeland depends on. All Serbs are
12 with you. You have endured at the front combat lines for the restoration
13 of Serbian national honour and dignity and for the victory of freedom and
14 democracy over the forces of evil and darkness which threaten us with
15 genocide. The Serbian Krajina is Serbian pride. All Serbs will preserve
16 it and defend it to the last day. We are willing to come to your
17 assistance at any time. Your fate is also our fate, the fate of us from
18 the presently narrowed Serbia. Fellow Serbian brothers and sisters, we
19 congratulate you on your freedom and independence, and we wish a lot of
20 success to the Serbian National Council and its wise president,
21 Dr. Milan Babic, with their dedicated official state work."
22 Your Honours, I'm directed to the fact that Reynaud Theunens's
23 report is Exhibit P258, but I think there are two versions, public and
24 redacted versions, but now you have both reference.
25 It is not contested that there is plenty of evidence in the
1 record that indeed the accused, shortly after the message that I just
2 read, sent Chetnik volunteers or SRS/SCP volunteers to numerous areas in
3 Croatia. Your Honours, from this brief sampling of evidence in the
4 record, a Trial Chamber could conclude that co-ordinated efforts were
5 made between members of the JCE to establish Serb political,
6 administrative and armed structures in the area of Croatia that the
7 accused had identified as Greater Serbia.
8 I move now to events in the Republic of Serbia, primarily, and
9 talk about Serb leaders -- evidence about Serb leaders in Serbia. It
10 shows, first, that in the middle of March 1991, Milosevic called for the
11 creation of a fighting force to present -- to protect Serb interests, and
12 urged Serb politicians to set aside their differences and join in the
13 defence of Serb interests. The accused and other politicians responded
14 to this call and contributed their volunteers to the fighting force. The
15 Serbian MUP created a new special operation unit which was deployed
16 extensively during the wars both in Croatia and in Bosnia and
17 Herzegovina, and Milosevic gradually gained control over the JNA.
18 Milosevic had written -- risen to power on a Serb nationalist
19 agenda and had declared himself the protector and patron of Serbs outside
20 Serbia and, of course, in the Serbian Republic. In mid-March 1991, in
21 the wake of a failed attempt by the Serb members of the federal
22 Presidency to declare a state of emergency, the accused made no --
23 Milosevic made it clear that he would use armed force -- use the armed
24 forces of the Republic of Serbia to defend Serbian interests elsewhere in
25 Yugoslavia. In Exhibit P1005, he announced:
1 "I have ordered the mobilisation of reserve Republic of Serbia
2 MUP security forces and urgent establishment of additional police forces
3 in the Republic of Serbia. I have asked --" or, "I asked the Government
4 of the Republic of Serbia to carry out necessary preparations for the
5 establishment of the additional forces in a number that would guarantee
6 the protection of the interest of the Republic of Serbia and the Serbian
8 Milosevic proceeded to invite opposition politicians, such as the
9 accused, to join him. I quote again:
10 "I plead to all political parties to establish full co-operation
11 in this difficult situation, and also, in the interests of Serbia,
12 disregard their differences and disputes among them."
13 It was this call to arms that explains why the Government of the
14 Republic of Serbia had four days prior officially registered the
15 accused's SRS party with its military SCP wing. It is significant that
16 the SCP had been denied registration just a few months prior to this
17 because it was deemed too extreme, yet, as shown by Exhibit P901, the
18 Serbian authorities now registered the SRS, with its SCP component,
19 around the time of Milosevic's call to arms.
20 It is not a mere coincidence that accused -- that Milosevic's
21 call for additional fighting forces coincided with his embrace of the
22 accused and the registration of the SRS/SCP. The accused could, as will
23 be discussed in further detail when considering his contribution to the
24 JCE, deploy a sizeable, highly motivated Chetnik fighting force to
25 realise Serbia's interests.
1 The atmosphere at the time is captured in a statement by the
2 accused on the 23rd of February, 1991, at the time when the SRS was
3 created. He vowed that he was and the party was prepared for a bloodbath
4 if it should be necessary; Exhibit P1255, page 9.
5 As described in Exhibits P258 and P183, other Serb paramilitary
6 organisations also were engaged by the JCE. This included
7 Arkan's Tigers, commanded by JCE member Zeljko Raznatovic, who had ties
8 with the Serbian MUP, and other groups with political affiliations, such
9 as the White Eagles and the Srpska Garda.
10 The additional police forces ordered by Milosevic also quickly
11 materialised, as can be seen from Exhibit P131. I would refer
12 Your Honours to pages 527 of that. It's a video, quite a telling one.
13 And Your Honours may also want to review the video, but we will not have
14 time for that today here. It shows that on the 4th of May, 1991, less
15 than two months after Milosevic's public declaration, the MUP of Serbia,
16 under the leadership of Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic, established
17 a special operations unit which was known as the JSO or the Red Berets.
18 At the sixth anniversary of the unit, Simatovic, in the presence of
19 Milosevic, Stanisic, and numerous other Serb leaders, described the
20 mission of the unit. As Simatovic admits, it had as its mission the
21 protection of:
22 "... national security in circumstances where the existence of
23 the Serbian people were directly jeopardised through its entire ethnic
25 To this end, thousands of men, tons of equipment, was deployed
1 throughout Croatia and Bosnia, a helicopter squadron was established. In
2 Bosnia and Herzegovina, the unit operated a network of airfields. And
3 much more detail are given by Simatovic at pages 5 to 7 that I referred
4 Your Honours to.
5 Around the 20th of March, so around the same time, Milan Babic
6 and Milan Martic travelled to Belgrade to ask for assistance. There, as
7 described in Exhibit P1138, at pages 115 and 116, they met with Milosevic
8 and JCE member Bogdanovic and Stanisic of the Serbian MUP. Milosevic
9 assured Babic that he had already purchased 20.000 pieces of weapons for
10 him. And Stanisic confirmed that 500 of those had already been sent to
12 The substantial assistance that the Milosevic regime additionally
13 provided to Serb-claimed areas in Croatia is further evidenced by a
14 1st November 1991 report by the Serbian Ministry of Defence on the
15 assistance to districts in Croatia, which is found in the record as
16 Exhibit P932. The request -- or the report shows that from the second
17 half of 1991, the Republic of Serbia intensified its practical assistance
18 in forms of weapons, communication equipment, and other supplies to
19 Croatia. It also reveals that the Republic of Serbia was financing
20 salaries and pension contributions of approximately no less than 50.000
21 Serb TO members throughout the SAO Krajina, Western Slavonia and the
22 Serbian districts of Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem.
23 Republican forces were not the only ones to participate in the
24 common purpose. According to General Kadijevic, the highest-ranking
25 officer in the JNA, during the spring and summer of 1991, the JNA became
1 a Serbian army. In Exhibit P196, he describes:
2 "The JNA completely achieved its aims. It protected the Serb
3 nation in Croatia, enabled and helped it to prepare militarily and
4 politically for what was to come."
5 Pages 68 and 69.
6 From May 1991 onwards, Milosevic, Borisav Jovic, then president
7 of the Federal Presidency, and General Kadijevic held frequent meetings
8 regarding the JNA's role in protecting Serbs, as described in
9 Exhibit P198, at page 6. By the 5th of July, 1991, General Kadijevic
10 accepted their directions "without any discussion."
11 Thus, by the end of July 1991, key members of the JCE alleged in
12 the indictment, including the accused, Milosevic, Babic, Stanisic and
13 Simatovic, Arkan had established Serb-only political administrative
14 structures, backed by police and territorial defence in Croatia.
15 Moreover, the accused and Arkan had responded to the calls of Milosevic
16 for the unity among Serb leaders, and provided fighting forces to be sent
17 to Croatia. A special MUP unit from Serbia had been created, and
18 Milosevic had gained control over the JNA. As we will see, these forces
19 were deployed in a co-ordinated fashion from July 1991, with devastating
21 As evidenced by Exhibit P258, page 33, over the summer the JNA
22 had faced growing problems with manpower shortages. Volunteers,
23 therefore, became increasingly important. Consequently, JCE members were
24 willing to provide key logistical support to the accused's volunteers,
25 including the provision of arms, equipment and military training. The
1 Trial Chamber could, for this, refer to: Exhibits P857, paragraphs 38 to
2 41 - this is under seal; P1074, paragraphs 84 to 86, 89, 90, and 96, 97;
3 Exhibit P10 -- or Exhibit P1076, page 26 and 7; Court Exhibit C12,
4 paragraph 24; Exhibit 1058, paragraph 9 - its under seal - and the
5 accused's own account of events found in Exhibit P30.
6 This evidence shows that after being recruited, SRS/SCP
7 volunteers were often sent to JNA or the Serbian MUP training facilities
8 to be equipped. For instance, the JNA barracks in Novi Sad received
9 SRS/SCP volunteers and issued uniforms and personal weapons to these men
10 before conducting a week-long training session with them. Other SRS/SCP
11 volunteers recruited by the SRS War Staff in Belgrade for the use in
12 Western Slavonia were sent to a JNA barrack in Belgrade to be equipped.
13 For the deployment to Vukovar, SRS/SCP volunteers received training at a
14 centre in Lipovaca, near Sid in Serbia, which was organised by the
15 Serbian MUP. SRS/SCP volunteers often received their weapons from the
16 local TOs where they were deployed as well. And Arkan provided
17 additional logistical support to SRS/SCP volunteers at his base in Erdut
18 in Slavonia which operated under the auspices of the
19 Serbian State Security Service. The accused, himself, indeed visited
20 Erdut when he brought a group of volunteers there together with JCE
21 member Goran Hadzic. This particular visit is described, for example, in
22 Exhibit P528.
23 As mentioned a minute ago, from July 1991, the 5th of July, 1991,
24 Kadijevic accepted directions from Milosevic and Jovic without any
25 discussion. The instruction that he so willingly accepted was to
1 concentrate the JNA along three strategic lines in Croatia and Bosnia, as
2 shown in this exhibit which is P400 -- no, it is P243. It is a map
3 marked by my military expert, Reynaud Theunens, during his testimony.
4 The lines that are marked with A, B and C are the lines along which
5 Kadijevic was instructed to concentrate the JNA. The dotted lines
6 Your Honours will surely recognise as the Serb-claimed areas in Croatia,
7 so Krajina, Western Slavonia, Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem. Line
8 C runs along the Neretva Valley -- River in Bosnia, a very strategic
9 important area.
10 If we look -- I refer Your Honours also to P245. It shows the
11 areas in which the JNA was in operation soon after; namely, in
12 September 1991. So it shows how the instructions that were given by
13 Milosevic and Jovic to Kadijevic were actually implemented. The orange
14 areas on this map indicate where the JNA was active. And, again, as can
15 be seen, this is basically activities in the - should we call
16 it - Serb-claimed lands.
17 Kadijevic confirms that the operations were carried out in
18 co-operation with the local Serb forces in Croatia. He explains that the
19 operations were carried out in "close co-operation with Serb insurgents,"
20 and that, "the future army of Serb Krajina was actually built up in the
21 course of the fighting and equipped by the JNA, with corresponding arms
22 and material." This is found at P196, page 77.
23 It is hardly surprising that on the 26th of September, 1991, as
24 shown in Exhibit P1257, page 22, the minister of national defence of the
25 Republic of Serbia, Tomislav Simovic, could tell the National Assembly of
1 the Republic of Serbia that:
2 "The JNA measures that are currently being taken, in the
3 government's estimate, are in the interest of the protection of Serbia
4 and the Serbian cause."
5 On the 1st of October, 1991, three further significant
6 developments consolidating the Serb power over the JNA took place, and
7 important in the understanding of the JCE. First, the Serb bloc or the
8 so-called rump of the federal Presidency started to exercise power in the
9 federal Presidency. Second, as seen in Exhibit P261, at page 130, the
10 Supreme Command of the armed forces, headed by Kadijevic, issued a stark
11 ultimatum to the Croatian political and military authorities. And,
12 third, as seen in, for example, Exhibit P210, which is under seal, the
13 accused renamed the SRS/SCP's Crisis Staff the War Staff, and I believe
14 the evidence reflects that he made a remark that this was done in light
15 of the current political situation. Three days later, the rump
16 Presidency declared a state of imminent threat of war. And as a
17 consequence of that, under the prevailing laws of the time, it now became
18 the Supreme Command of the JNA.
19 General Kadijevic issued a bulletin which made clear that he no
20 longer recognised the federal prime minister, Ante Markovic, or the
21 official chairman of the Presidency, Stjepan Mesic. In other words,
22 Kadijevic now publicly accepted the authority of the rump Presidency.
23 The JNA was now firmly in the hands of the Serbian leadership, primarily
24 based in Belgrade and headed by Milosevic. These developments are set
25 out in the evidence in, for example, Exhibits P246 and P261, at page 130.
1 The evidence discussed so far demonstrates that the accused,
2 Milosevic, Milan Babic, Stanisic, Simatovic, Arkan, and a number of other
3 alleged members of the JCE established, deployed and controlled a
4 considerable fighting force which, from July 1991, was deployed in
5 Croatia. We shall get back to the devastating effect this had for the
6 non-Serbs living in these areas. But before that, we will move our focus
7 to Bosnia and Herzegovina to discuss evidence of events which partly took
8 place at the same time as the events we have just been discussing.
9 The evidence that I will discuss demonstrates how the methods
10 used in Croatia for the establishment of ethnic separation were also used
11 by the Serbian leadership in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Parallel political
12 and administrative structures were set up. Separate police and
13 territorial defence forces were created, and eventually the Bosnian Serb
14 army, the VRS, was created. And as in Croatia, Milosevic, the accused
15 and other Serb leaders in Belgrade provided considerable support. As in
16 Croatia, JCE members took steps to form local Serb political and
17 administrative structures that later merged into bigger units, and
18 eventually culminated in the declaration of the Serbian Republic of
19 Bosnia and Herzegovina on the 8th -- sorry, on the 9th of January, 1992,
20 subsequently named Republika Srpska. Supporting evidence is found in
21 Exhibits P931, 941 and 945, as well as in a number of adjudicated facts
22 found by the Trial Chamber's decision on the 23rd of July, 2010.
23 As in Croatia, Serb-only police and territorial defence units
24 were also established, as shown by the evidence of VS-1112.
25 As early as the 8th of April, 1991, Karadzic, a JCE member, had
1 his telephone tapped because he was suspected of favouring paramilitary
2 organisations and being involved in the purchase of illegally arming
3 Serbs. This is found in our transcripts at page 9122.
4 By July 1991, Karadzic and Momcilo Krajisnik had been discussing
5 organising a meeting with officers of the Serbian -- of the MUP of Bosnia
6 and Herzegovina. This is reflected in an intercept found in
7 Exhibit P913.
8 In October 1991, the ethnically-mixed Assembly of the Socialist
9 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina debated whether to declare
10 independence. Karadzic warned that if Muslims and Croats were to pursue
11 independence, it would be the "same highway of hell" as in Croatia, and
12 he threatened, Don't think you won't take Bosnia and Herzegovina to hell
13 and Muslims to possible extinction, because the Muslim people will not be
14 able to defend itself when it comes to war here. Exhibit P1004, page 3.
15 When the Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina did opt in favour of
16 sovereignty, the Bosnian Serb leadership, including JCE members Karadzic,
17 Momcilo Krajisnik and Biljana Plavsic, proclaimed a Serb Assembly, as
18 reflected in Exhibit P931.
19 In Exhibit P871, from the 19th of December, 1991, the SDS
20 leadership of Bosnia and Herzegovina distributed what essentially was a
21 blueprint for the implementation of an ethnic separation in Bosnia and
22 Herzegovina in case the republic should declare independence. These
23 so-called Variant A and B instructions set out steps to be taken for Serb
24 seizure of power, as explained by Witness Deronjic in Exhibit P877,
25 paragraph 45. It contains detailed instructions to be implemented in two
1 phases, both in municipalities where Serb had the majority, Variant A,
2 and where Serbs were in the minority, Variant B. The first phase
3 described in this document orders the formation of Serb-only crisis
4 staffs and municipal assemblies. It also contains directions to the
5 creation of mono-ethnic Serb territorial defence forces and Serbian
6 police forces. In the second phase, the Crisis Staff would take physical
7 control over strategic locations and installations and become the public
8 municipal authorities, asserting Serb control in all of these
9 municipalities. These developments were, as in Croatia, supported by the
10 Milosevic regime and other JCE members in Belgrade. We have on record a
11 number of intercepted communications between Karadzic and Milosevic which
12 illustrate this co-operation, and I'll not go into detail about it, but
13 refer Your Honours to Exhibits P498, P504, P506, P509, P510 and P511.
14 As in Croatia, the training and army activities again illustrate
15 the high degree of co-ordination and organisation among the Serb forces
16 controlled by different JCE members. For instance, in Bosnia and
17 Herzegovina, the Serbian MUP trained and supplies SRS/SCP volunteers and
18 local Serbs, as seen in the following examples: The Serbian State
19 Security Service's Red Beret established training camps in places like
20 Banja Luka, Trebinje, Brcko and Bijeljina for special police units from
21 Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina, found in P131,
22 page 6. Both Arkan's men and SRS/SCP volunteers were reported in Brcko,
23 and one witness saw Red Berets train local Serbs at JNA barracks there.
24 This can be seen from P -- Exhibit P980, page 1, and the testimony of
1 For the attack on Bosanski Samac in Bosnia, volunteers, including
2 volunteers from the SRS/SCP, were trained, transported and armed by the
3 Red Berets, the JNA and the Serbian MUP. And for this, again,
4 Your Honours might refer to Exhibits P131, page 6, P988, P986, and the
5 testimony of VS-1058.
6 In the crime base areas, the evidence of VS-032, VS-036 and
7 VS-037, in respect of Zvornik, illustrates how, for example, both Serbian
8 MUP and the JNA supported Serb crisis staffs -- excuse me, the Serb
9 Crisis Staff in Zvornik to implement the JCE. The JNA armed Serbs from
10 Zvornik, and a JNA officer, Dragan Obrenovic, participated in
11 Crisis Staff meetings. Local Serbs also received weapons from the MUP of
12 Serbia, which were distributed by the Crisis Staff. Among those who
13 provided the weapons were JCE member Bogdanovic. I refer to now an
14 exhibit which I would like to ask not be broadcast in public because it's
15 under seal. It is Exhibit P1039.
16 We seem to have a little technical issue. There we are.
17 So this is a diagram from the evidence which illustrates how the
18 links go from Zvornik to Belgrade. Based on evidence in the record, I
19 would maybe note that the person named Kostic, who appears as an
20 important figure in the arming, would belong under "Tepavcevic" to the
21 left of this diagram, and Bogdanovic would belong somewhere up at the top
22 where it says "Ministry of the Interior." This can be seen, for example,
23 in the evidence of VS-37.
24 In addition to Zvornik, the role of the JNA in the arming and
25 training is in evidence -- there's evidence of arming and training of the
1 JNA --
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have to intervene.
3 Maybe I have been given a wrong document. I don't see
4 "Bogdanovic" anywhere here. Maybe they give me wrong documents
6 MR. MARCUSSEN: "Bogdanovic" is not in this. What I said was,
7 based on the evidence in the record, Bogdanovic would belong someplace up
8 on the top.
9 I see the accused is laughing, so I get he have understood it.
10 There's other evidence of arming and training that the Chamber
11 might refer to in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina. For example, in
12 relation to Bosanski Samac, there is Exhibit P1026, it's under seal.
13 Greater Sarajevo, the Chamber could refer to the evidence of VS-1055.
14 Nevesinje, arming as described by Witness Kujan in Exhibit P524, page 3.
15 For Bijeljina, the evidence of Gusalic at transcript pages 14299 and
16 onwards, describe arming and training. And for Brcko and Potocari,
17 there's evidence from VS-1033 at transcript page 15783 and in P1055,
18 paragraph 10.
19 All these preparations, what were they for? An intercept with a
20 conversation which includes Radovan Karadzic from February 1992, makes it
21 plain. It is Exhibit P503. He says:
22 "Our optimum is a Greater Serbia, and if not that, then a federal
23 Yugoslavia. There are no further concessions."
24 We've thus seen that by the time of the Serb take-over of
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina, political, administrative and armed structures had
1 been established to carve out Greater Serbia.
2 One more armed formation must be mentioned, the Army of the
3 Republic of Serbia -- the Army of Republika Srpska, the VRS, which was
4 created after the outbreak of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. It was
5 officially declared on the 12th of May, 1992. Once again, we see a Serb
6 armed force being created with the backing of the Serbian leadership in
7 Belgrade. This is evidenced by two facts accepted by the
8 Trial Chamber -- or three facts accepted by the Trial Chamber in its 2007
9 judicial decision. They are Facts 186, 190 and 191. Those facts
10 establish two things: first, that when the JNA withdrew from Bosnia and
11 Herzegovina, it left behind officers, soldiers and significant amounts of
12 equipment, which formed the basis for the VRS; second, officers and
13 non-commissioned officers continued to be paid and receive pensions from
14 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
15 The same day -- the same day that the VRS was officially
16 established, six strategic goals were announced by the Bosnian Serb
17 leadership. They are set out in Exhibit P870. Your Honours will surely
18 remember that. Reynaud Theunens testified that although these goals were
19 adopted in May, the offensive that has started more than a month earlier
20 were essentially pursuing the goals now officialised [sic] in this
21 document. It's in his testimony from the 21st of January, 2008.
22 The exhibit that is being shown now is Exhibit P1006, and it
23 illustrates the six strategic goals. I will just mention the first one;
25 "Establish state borders separating the Serbian people from the
1 other two ethnic communities."
2 The five other goals are various geographical aims or objectives
3 that have to be achieved.
4 The combat readiness report of the VRS for 1992, which was
5 approved by Ratko Mladic, was unequivocal about what these strategic
6 aims/goals were intended to achieve; namely:
7 "The liberation of territories which are ours and which belong to
8 us by historic birthright."
9 Exhibit P992, page 159.
10 As will be clear, the Prosecution -- from the Prosecution's
11 presentation of evidence in relation to the crimes committed in Zvornik,
12 Greater Sarajevo, Mostar and Nevesinje, the crimes carried out there were
13 carried out by the armed formations we have been discussing; SRS/SCP
14 volunteers, members of the JNA and later the VRS, Arkan's men, members of
15 local Serb TO and police units, and members of the forces of the
16 Ministry of the Interior of Serbia.
17 Before the break, we can maybe round up this segment with a short
18 clip from a video admitted into evidence. It is P644. It's a clip which
19 begins at 1:05:24.
20 [Video-clip played]
21 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Who told -- you seen, in May 1992,
22 Milosevic definitely took over control over the Yugoslav People's Army.
23 It was then that the new Constitution of the Federal Republic of
24 Yugoslavia was adopted, and he formally and actually became the main man
25 in the country, the man who makes all the decisions. The Zvornik
1 operation was planned in Belgrade. Bosnian Serb forces participated in
2 it, and they were the most numerous ones. However, the special units,
3 and the units most eager to fight, came from this side. Those were the
4 very police units, the so-called Red Berets. Those were special units of
5 the Serbian State Security Service. They were volunteers of the
6 Serbian Radical Party, Arkan's volunteers, and there was also a smaller
7 volunteer unit also under the control of the police. The army did not
8 participate much in this operation. They mainly provided artillery
9 support, where needed. It took a long time to plan, to prepare the
10 operation, so there was no nervousness or calls such as, Come on, we need
11 this or that urgently. Everything was well organised and well executed
12 up until the hostilities ceased. Afterwards, when the looting began, no
13 one could control it anymore.
14 "It was key people of the State Security Service who thought it
15 up, among them Franko Simatovic, Frenki. He was also one of the key
16 executors. There were also some other people there, but I don't remember
17 all the names. Our volunteers gathered, and Loznica was the centre from
18 where they were sent to Zvornik. Vojvoda Cvetinovic was their leader,
19 and he received his orders directly from the commanders of the special
21 MR. MARCUSSEN: I believe it's maybe time for the break,
22 Your Honours.
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Absolutely, we're going to have
24 a 20-minute break.
25 --- Recess taken at 4.02 p.m.
1 --- On resuming at 4.24 p.m.
2 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well. The court is back
3 in session.
4 Please proceed, Mr. Marcussen.
5 MR. MARCUSSEN: Thank you, Your Honour.
6 Your Honours, we ended evidence about how various Serbian
7 leaders, including the accused, established a number of political and
8 administrative structures and armed forces, and how they were deployed in
9 Croatia. The last segment concerns, briefly, some evidence about the
10 devastating effects that the deployment of these forces had in Croatia
11 and Bosnia and Herzegovina.
12 As is clear, the forces, when they engaged, did not only engage
13 in military operations against enemy forces; they also ethnically
14 cleansed areas under their control. I just refer Your Honours to two
15 pieces of evidence which show that the magnitude of these crimes was so
16 significant that they became known outside Serbia and Croatia and Bosnia
17 and Herzegovina in the international community, and that even the JNA,
18 itself, reported on these crimes. And I would refer Your Honours to P183
19 and 259 for these things.
20 Your Honours, in Croatia the affect on the non-Serb population
21 was devastating. By early 1992, over 220.000 non-Serbs were forcibly
22 expelled. The map that is now being shown has been prepared on the basis
23 of the data included in P632, page 77. It might be --
24 JUDGE HARHOFF: Mr. Marcussen.
25 MR. MARCUSSEN: Yes.
1 JUDGE HARHOFF: What is "DP"? Is that "Deceased," or "Deported,"
2 or "Detained" --
3 MR. MARCUSSEN: I was getting to -- yes, Your Honours. It means
4 "Displaced Persons."
5 JUDGE HARHOFF: Thank you.
6 MR. MARCUSSEN: I should say -- as I say, this is not an exhibit
7 in the case. It is one of the exhibits that have been prepared for today
8 that we will tender, with Your Honours' permission, after the hearing.
9 The widespread and systematic --
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have a remark. I have an
12 This is not allowed. I'm astonished to see the Prosecution
13 showing something I don't recall ever seeing, but he has just said,
14 himself, that this is not a document from the case file. He cannot show
15 new documents today, documents I've never seen, and tender them for
16 admission. This is not allowed. They have finished their Prosecution
17 case. Now it's my turn with the Defence case. If you want to allow them
18 to call additional witnesses and tender new documentation, but now
19 tendering new documents at this 98 bis hearing is brazen.
20 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] I understood. Let me discuss
21 this with the fellow Judges.
22 [Trial Chamber confers]
23 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Marcussen, the majority of
24 the Judges - Judge Harhoff being of another opinion - is of the view that
25 you are not allowed to use this document, as it was not dealt with during
1 the Prosecution case. You should have sought to introduce the document
2 then, not now, when you try to specify the Prosecution evidence. The
3 evidence on record is only that one. This is a new document even for me.
4 So the majority of the Judges are of the view that you're not allowed to
5 use the document.
6 However, if Mr. Seselj, as part of his Defence case, mentions the
7 issue of displaced persons, then, when you cross-examine his witnesses,
8 you may use the document. But you can't do it now.
9 So please continue without using this document.
10 MR. MARCUSSEN: Very well, Your Honours. The document merely
11 demonstrates what's in the record, so it's not anything new. So we --
12 that's fine. It wasn't, as I explained in the beginning, intended to
13 prove anything. It was just an illustrative aid.
14 Your Honours, the widespread and systematic crimes committed by
15 Serb forces were repeated when, to a large extent, the same forces
16 launched their massive offensive and take-over operations in Bosnia and
18 Another revealing exhibit showing the co-operation among key
19 members of the JCE directly relate to the commission of two crimes
20 charged in the indictment; the forcible displacement of -- the forcible
21 displacement of the Muslim population from Divic and Kozluk in the
22 Zvornik area.
23 At a meeting held with General Mladic on the 30th of June, 1992,
24 with Serb representatives from various Serb municipalities, the
25 representatives from Zvornik municipality reported that they had
1 implemented JCE member Radovan Karadzic's decision that Divic and Kozluk
2 be settled with Serbs. Your Honours will, of course, remember from the
3 evidence that a few months prior to this, Serb forces had evicted,
4 forcibly, all the Muslims from these locations.
5 They also reported that volunteer formations under the leadership
6 of Arkan and the accused had been "exceptionally successful."
7 Your Honours, this is found in one of the excerpts from the Mladic
8 diaries that were admitted with yesterday's decision. I don't believe it
9 has a P number yet. I'm told it has, so we will get you that in a
10 minute. It is P1347.
11 Again, the criminal purpose and the enormity of the crimes
12 carried out in furtherance of the JCE is demonstrated by the demographic
13 changes that they caused. P669, which is now being displayed, shows the
14 demographic composition of Bosnia and Herzegovina before the war.
15 Sorry, what did I say? It's -- 1991 is the year.
16 The areas that are green and pink are Serb areas or Serb majority
17 areas. The green areas are Muslim majority areas, predominantly Muslim
18 areas. And the blue and -- the blue colours are Croat areas, and then
19 there are some areas with a more mixed ethnic composition.
20 If we now --
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Judges, this may be a
22 mistranslation, but this says that the green and the purple areas are
23 areas with a Serb majority. It's recorded in the transcript, so it can't
24 be a misinterpretation, but it was probably said that way. And that is
25 wrong. It is actually the red areas that have a Serb majority.
1 MR. MARCUSSEN: That's correct. I don't know if there's a
2 mistake somewhere, but, anyway, it's the red and pink areas that are Serb
3 and the green that are Muslim. And if I made a mistake, I'm grateful for
4 the accused for assisting.
5 If we now look at P629, it shows the ethnic composition after the
6 war, and obviously the demographic changes have been enormous, and we
7 see, basically, three mono-ethnic entities have now been created as a
8 result of the deployment of forces by various groups, but including Serb
10 So, Your Honours, to sum up, there is ample evidence which shows
11 that the accused adopted a Chetnik ideology and revived its militaristic
12 organisations to pursue Greater Serbia through ethnic cleansing. There
13 is evidence that other Serb leaders of the Socialist Republic of
14 Yugoslavia, when it disintegrated, pooled their resources and embraced
15 the accused in pursuit of a homogeneous, cohesive Serbian state. To this
16 end, they created and used Serb political, administrative and armed
17 structures. They included SRS/SCP volunteers, units that were deployed
18 and established by the accused, JNA forces which were subordinated to
19 Slobodan Milosevic, General Kadijevic and General Adzic. In Bosnia and
20 Herzegovina, VRS forces, which were hierarchically in the structure under
21 JCE members Ratko Mladic and Radovan Karadzic, were established and used.
22 We see local TO and police forces. In Croatia, these forces were under
23 the control of Milan Babic and Goran Hadzic. In Bosnia and Herzegovina,
24 they were under the control of JCE members such as Radovan Karadzic and
25 Biljana Plavsic and other Serb leaders. And after the JNA had withdrawn,
1 we have the VRS taking control over TO forces. We also saw Serbian MUP
2 or police forces operating. They are under the control of JCE members
3 Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic, and ultimately they were controlled
4 and operated in co-ordination with Slobodan Milosevic. And, lastly, we
5 saw paramilitary groups, including Arkan's men, under the control of
6 Arkan. And these units, as the evidence has shown, operated often
7 closely with the Ministry of the Interior of Serbia.
8 These forces, once they were deployed, operated and fulfilled
9 each their designated role. The aim of these operations was clear.
10 Through a widespread and systematic campaign of ethnic cleansing, to
11 claim areas as Serb lands. Indeed, international observers in Bosnia and
12 Herzegovina at the time were clear what the principal objectives of the
13 military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina was. It was to establish
14 ethnic homogeneous regions. Ethnic cleansing was not a consequence of
15 the war, but one of the goals. This is shown in Exhibit P982.
16 Your Honours, from this evidence, the evidence of the -- the
17 evidence of the accused's contribution, which we will now turn to, and
18 the evidence of the crimes that were carried out, as charged in the
19 indictment, a Trial Chamber could conclude that there indeed existed at
20 the relevant time a joint criminal enterprise, as set out in paragraph 8
21 of the indictment.
22 That concludes my submissions for now, and Ms. Biersay will now
23 be continuing the Prosecution's arguments.
24 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Very well.
25 Good afternoon, Ms. Biersay. You may proceed.
1 MS. BIERSAY: Thank you, Your Honour.
2 The accused in this case contributed significantly to the
3 execution of the common purpose of the JCE to forcibly remove the
4 non-Serb population from areas considered as historically belonging to
5 Serbs. As the Trial Chamber is well aware, a JCE member's participation
6 need not involve the commission of a specific crime, but it may take the
7 form of assistance in or contribution to the execution of the common plan
8 or purpose.
9 As already addressed, the accused contributed to the JCE in three
10 ways: He promoted the idea that Greater Serbia had to be forcibly carved
11 out of what was then Yugoslavia; he raised and deployed armed volunteers
12 to fight for this objective; and he committed persecution, deportation
13 and inhumane treatment through his hate speech.
14 The evidence of the accused's contribution also demonstrates his
15 responsibility under other charged modes of liability. First, the
16 accused contributed to the implementation of the JCE through his
17 oratorical persecutory campaign. And how did he do that? The impact of
18 the accused's words and acts must be understood in the context of the
19 tense atmosphere and ethnic hostilities that prevailed as Yugoslavia
20 began breaking apart.
21 The powerful -- the extremely powerful symbolism of the Chetnik
22 movement appealed to ethnic nationalism, and he, the accused, served as
23 one of its most popular and effective proponents. His Chetnik revival
24 and use of violent rhetoric was a valuable contribution to the JCE
25 because it promoted the idea of a homogeneous unitary Serb land, and it
1 also justified the force necessary to achieve it.
2 As evidenced, for example, by Exhibits P1278 and P1196, the
3 accused's rhetoric and activities were recognised as being hateful and
4 dangerous instigation and incitement to ethnic violence. Exhibit P1278
5 shows that in suspending his membership from the Philosophical Society of
6 Serbia in 1991, the executive board of the society explained that:
7 "Colleague Seselj, supporting a position of militant chauvinism,
8 had openly advocated violence and ethnic hatred as a means which would
9 allegedly lead to realising the interest of the Serbian people."
10 Despite being put on notice about the effect of his campaign of
11 hatred, the accused freely disseminated his messages in the media through
12 television, through radio, through newspapers, including his own
13 newspapers; namely, "Velika Srbija," which means "Greater Serbia," and
14 through "Zapadna Srbija," which means "Western Serbia." He also appealed
15 directly to the public through personal appearances and rallies. He was
16 the founder and general director of "Velika Srbija." His popularity and
17 influence was so overwhelming that radio listeners in Serbia voted him
18 man of the year in 1991. He had a significant audience for his hateful,
19 persecutory campaign. His individual speeches were sometimes so
20 inflammatory that they rose to the level of direct perpetration of the
21 crimes. He committed persecution through hate speech in Vukovar and
22 Hrtkovci, and he committed deportation and inhumane acts through forcible
23 transfers in Hrtkovci.
24 It's true, other JCE members may not have used the same exact
25 language or even shared the same Chetnik ideology as the accused, but
1 they did share the same common criminal purpose. Because of his
2 popularity and the political and military support that he commanded, and
3 because of his shared intent, the accused was embraced as a member of the
4 JCE, for not only did the accused's hate-filled ideology appear to
5 justify committing crimes against non-Serbs, it also presented a simple
6 and easily understood message around which ordinary Serbs, who were
7 frightened by the situation in Yugoslavia, and further terrified by the
8 kind of language and speeches that the accused gave, it's around that
9 message that ordinary Serbs could be persuaded to rally. He knew that,
10 and he manipulated that, and he exploited that.
11 The accused employed his words as weapons against non-Serbs in
12 his persecutory campaign. As described in Exhibit P1263, he used his
13 publication "Velika Srbija" as, what he calls it, "a mighty weapon." So
14 each reference to an exhibit -- an article contained in "Velika Srbija"
15 has to be understood as the relentless weapon that the accused knew he
16 was using.
17 In Exhibit P1215, he, himself, explained that:
18 "... words can be a very dangerous weapon. Sometimes they pound
19 like a howitzer."
20 Witnesses, including Stoparic, describe how, to average
21 listeners, the accused's words tapped into this lethal mixture of
22 nationalism, on the one hand, and fear, on the other, with all his
23 calls -- the accused's calls for revenge. Exhibits P350 and P355 are
24 just two examples of such calls.
25 The accused presented the enticing prospect of a powerful,
1 expanded Serbia, and at the start of this presentation the Trial Chamber
2 heard about the brutal Chetnik ideology that the accused revived. So
3 when he used his Chetnik battle cry for Greater Serbia, he was promoting,
4 through symbolism and through words, he was promoting and justifying the
5 subjugation, expulsion and maltreatment of non-Serbs. Among the relevant
6 evidence in this regard are P1275, and the Trial Chamber also has before
7 it the testimony of Witness Oberschall. And for that, I would refer
8 specifically to transcript page 1971 and others, of course.
9 There are many components to the accused's persecutory campaign.
10 First, he advocated force to gain and retain what he considered Serb
11 lands outside of Serbia, and simultaneously he attacked and called as
12 traitor, and other words, anyone who proposed a peaceful solution to the
13 ongoing conflict. For example, he used his appearance in the
14 Serbian Assembly to declare that in order to achieve their territorial
15 objectives, only a military, and not a political solution in Croatia,
16 would suit "us Serbs," and that is in Exhibit P1257.
17 To increase tensions, the accused repeatedly publicly proclaimed
18 that Serbs, Croats and Bosnian Muslims simply could not live together,
19 and he rejected and condemned any negotiations -- any position based on
20 that premise. For the Chamber's reference, I refer to Exhibits P1298 and
22 For example, in October 1991, in response to draft proposals
23 ahead of The Hague Diplomatic Conference that would allow parts of
24 Yugoslavia to gain independence while remaining connected to a federal
25 core, in face of that proposal the accused threatened, in
1 Exhibit P1259 -- he was addressing other Serbian leaders when he said
2 this. He said:
3 "I can guarantee to you that the Serbian Radical Party will call
4 the people to an armed uprising. Do not play with your lives and accept
6 A second component of his persecutory campaign: To mobilise an
7 armed Serb force and to justify the commission of crimes against
8 non-Serbs, the accused propagated a climate of fear in which Serbs could
9 believe themselves to be under threat. Witness Anthony Oberschall's
10 report is very clear about this, as was his testimony. His report is
11 before the Trial Chamber as Exhibit P5. Witness Oberschall described how
12 the most effective propagandist tool to drive a targeted audience to act
13 violently to remove the perceived threat is to relentlessly press the
14 anxiety and fear in one's audience with repeated threat messages.
15 The accused and his SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement organisation
16 incessantly evoked the past victimisation and genocide that Serbs
17 suffered during World War II.
18 If we could now prepare for showing Exhibit P62. This is a video
19 of the accused in May 1991, when he raised the spectre of Ustasha hoards
20 attacking Serbs in Croatia.
21 [Video-clip played]
22 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Ustasha hoards are attacking Serb
23 women and children in our villages. The Ustasha hoards are planning
24 genocide against the Serbs."
25 MS. BIERSAY: In front of this enormous crowd, what he said was:
1 "The very roots of the Serbian cause are under threat. Hoards of
2 Ustashas are attacking Serbian villages, Serbian women and children. The
3 Ustasha hoards are trying to finalise the genocide of the Serbian
5 And yesterday the accused presented himself as a uniter of the
6 ethnic peoples in the former Yugoslavia.
7 He and the SRS/SCP repeatedly warned that non-Serbs pose a
8 physical, demographic, cultural and even economic threat to Serbs. Just
9 a few exhibits in this regard. I'd refer the Trial Chamber to
10 Exhibits P1280 and P1205.
11 A third component of his persecutory campaign was to use the
12 pretext of historical wrongs to justify revenge and violence as morally
13 legitimate and necessary. For example, in Exhibit P35, this is what he
14 warned in June 1991:
15 "All those with an unclear conscience should fear us Serbs. They
16 have reason to fear us. We Serbs have forgotten and forgiven too much in
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection.
19 MS. BIERSAY: "We have told Croatians --"
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Judges, I demand -- [Overlapping
22 MS. BIERSAY: "...resort to genocidal activities against the
23 Serbian people --"
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have an objection, and I must
25 utter it.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Mr. Seselj, what do you want to
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I demand that you remove this
4 interpreter, because she is wrongly interpreting. She is saying the
5 opposite of what Ms. Biersay is saying. She said:
6 "All those with an unclear conscience should fear us Serbs."
7 And the interpreter interpreted it wrongly. She said:
8 "All those with a clear conscience should fear Serbs."
9 Whereas Ms. Biersay said "unclear conscience." I only noted this
10 by chance.
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] As you know, Mr. Seselj knows
12 English perfectly, so he realised that there was a problem with the
13 language. In order to avoid such a problem, I would ask you to read the
14 sentence again.
15 Very well. And I'm asking the interpreters to translate those
16 words exactly.
17 MS. BIERSAY: "All those with an unclear conscience should fear
18 us Serbs. They have reason to fear us. We Serbs have forgotten and
19 forgiven too much in history. We have told the Croats should they ever
20 again resort to genocidal activities against the Serbian people, not only
21 shall we take revenge for every victim, but we shall also settle scores
22 for the victims from World War I and World War II."
23 Public declarations of this sort were designed to encourage Serbs
24 to perpetrate crimes against non-Serbs and to absolve them of legal and
25 moral responsibility for committing such crimes. And I'd refer the
1 Trial Chamber to Exhibit P3, which is an addendum to the Oberschall
2 report and illustrates some examples of that kind of justificatory
3 language that I just mentioned.
4 The final component of the accused's persecutory campaign: The
5 accused's discourse also contributed to a campaign of a coercive
6 environment in which non-Serbs felt threatened and unsafe. For example,
7 in May 1991, as shown, for example, in Exhibits P1001 and P1003, the
8 accused used incendiary language about past genocide against the Serbs
9 and encouraged retaliation, again, for past crimes. He denigrated and
10 debased Croats, Muslims and other non-Serbs, and denied their legitimacy
11 as national groups. All of that was meant to undermine the idea of their
12 basic human rights and to support the destruction of these people.
13 The accused's intentional use of ethnic stereotypes, evident, for
14 example, in Exhibit P1295 [Realtime transcript read in error "P1245"],
15 promoted contempt and hatred for non-Serbs, and there was only one
16 purpose for it. It was meant to instigate violence against them.
17 And I note that on page 48, line 21, I may have said the
18 incorrect exhibit, but, in any regard, it should be Exhibit P1295.
19 The accused persistently used the term "Ustasha" as not so coded
20 language, to denigrate and debase all Croats, not just the Nazi
21 collaborators from World War II, but all Croats, as murderous threats to
22 Serbs. And that's why he used the term over and over and over again
23 during the conflict.
24 Just as he used the powerful symbolism of World War II Chetniks
25 to mobilise Serbs, he labelled all Croats as Ustashas to invoke the
1 memories of fascist atrocities committed against Serbs during the war and
2 to depict all Croats as a present-day threat. VS-004 explained the
3 significance of that to this Trial Chamber, and what he said was:
4 "The word 'Ustasha' among all Serbs is the worst thing you can
5 mention, because throughout their history, it was the Ustasha who
6 committed the greatest crimes against Serbs. It is something that exists
7 as the worst in the world, as an executioner."
8 And for that, I direct your attention to transcript pages 3380
9 and 3624.
10 Even the early 1990 political platform of the Serbian
11 Chetnik Movement, which is Exhibit P27, that platform referred to a new
12 Ustasha leader who had emerged in Croatia with a new genocidal policy
13 against Serbs. This was repeated again in the SRS 1991 founding
14 documents, like in Exhibit P153 at page 11. The accused did the same
15 again in Exhibit P179.
16 Additionally, the accused urged reopening the volatile issue of
17 the responsibility of the Croatian people for the Ustashas' crimes
18 committed during World War II, and he declared repeatedly that Croats
19 must be punished for those past crimes. And I'd refer the Trial Chamber,
20 for example, to Exhibit P32. He repeated referred to ethnic Croats and
21 anyone representing modern Croatia as Ustasha.
22 As described by Witnesses Stoparic and Karlovic, the accused's
23 volunteers echoed the same language, for example, by insulting Croat
24 detainees with the term "Ustasha," along with other expletives and
25 denigrating terms.
1 "Velika Srbija," the accused's monthly publication, disseminated
2 articles like Exhibit P1289, criticising prisoner exchanges and calling
3 for Ustasha prisoners of war to pay for their crimes.
4 During the lead-up to the war, the accused's public discourse
5 clearly told his listeners that he viewed all Croats as Ustasha. The
6 accused, himself, said this, for instance, in Exhibit P34:
7 "How is one supposed to negotiate with the Ustashas? Did you see
8 today that the Croatian people are entirely Ustasha? There are very few
10 In April 1992, in Exhibit P1194, the accused declared that there
11 were only "16 good Croats" who could stay in Serbia. The rest would have
12 to be expelled.
13 Whenever questioned or criticised about his expulsions of
14 non-Serbs from Serbia, the accused simply perpetuated the Chetnik
15 mythology that expulsions of non-Serbs were merely a "civilised exchange
16 of population." That's how the Chetnik ideology viewed it, and it's the
17 ideology that the accused perpetuated himself.
18 Witness Stojanovic, for example, in Exhibit P528, described how
19 the accused told volunteers, before they went into the field, to expel
20 Ustasha wherever they found them.
21 Now, as will be discussed later, the devastating effect of the
22 accused's labelling of Croats as Ustasha was particularly shown in
23 Vukovar and Hrtkovci. In Exhibits P298 and P1201, he called these once
24 Croat areas as Ustasha strongholds or having the worst Ustashas.
25 As Witness Baricevic, at transcript pages 10755 to 10756, told
1 this Trial Chamber:
2 "We were taught history, and the way we were taught history,
3 Chetniks and Ustashas were the enemies of the Yugoslav people."
4 To those in Vukovar who heard him say that not one Ustasha must
5 leave Vukovar alive, and to those who heard him talk of bussing out
6 Ustashas in Hrtkovci, his message was perfectly clear. All Croats were
7 enemies, especially if they lived on Serbian lands, and they should all
8 be killed and would be killed if they stayed where his volunteers and
9 sympathisers were.
10 The accused also debased, denigrated and threatened
11 Bosnian Muslims with his incendiary language. For example, in
12 Exhibit P1180, addressing June 1991, the accused announced that he had
13 very powerful strongholds in North-Eastern Bosnia, and proudly declared
15 "The very fact that in some places the Croats and the Muslims
16 have not been sleeping in their houses for days speaks of the fact that
17 the activity of the Serbian Chetnik Movement is not insignificant at
19 In other words, the Serbian Chetnik Movement was successful in
20 making Croats and Muslims so fearful that they dared not sleep in their
21 own homes. And of this, he was proud, and he told Bosnian Muslims. He
23 "Firstly, Bosnia is Serbian land, and it will remain Serbian. If
24 you do not like it, there's always Anatolia, so you can go there. As far
25 as a division of republics is concerned, that is an outdated division,
1 and the Serbian people will never recognise or accept it."
2 With increasing frequency, the accused continued to threaten
3 bloodshed in Bosnia. This reached a crescendo before the April 1992 Serb
4 take-overs in Bosnia, in implementation of the Bosnian Serb leadership's
5 Variant A and B instructions, as previously described to the
6 Trial Chamber. The Trial Chamber has before it, for example,
7 Exhibits P1192, as well as Exhibit P1293, P685, P1324.
8 The accused's inflammatory rhetoric prepared the ground for
9 discriminatory violence against non-Serbs that surrounded those
10 take-overs. In Exhibit P1324, for example, he can be seen using a press
11 conference in Belgrade to threaten and intimidate Bosnian Muslims. If
12 Bosnian Muslims rejected unilateral Serb territorial ultimatums, the
13 accused promised "bloodshed," he promised a "bloody civil war," and he
14 promised "rivers of blood" would follow.
15 While charactering those who favoured Bosnia's independence as
16 Islamic fundamentalists, he used the word "Chetnik" to evoke, among other
17 things, memories of mass murders of Muslims by the Chetniks in World War
19 In another press conference that same month, and that month being
20 from March 1992, as is described in Exhibit P1298, he threatened again.
21 He said "a bloodshed of wider proportions" would follow if so-called
22 Muslim fundamentalists wanted to play with fire. And he called the land
23 that he and other JCE members coveted as part of Greater Serbia.
24 The Trial Chamber will note that the accused's references to
25 bloodshed in Bosnia also echoes that of Radovan Karadzic's threatening
1 speech in the Assembly in October of 1991.
2 Finally, in front of a large, publicised rally held in Serbia in
3 May 1992, the accused was accompanied by Nikola Poplasen, who, contrary
4 to what the accused claimed to the Trial Chamber yesterday, Poplasen was,
5 in fact, the acting president of the SRS in Bosnia as of May 1992. And
6 relevant exhibits in this regard include P218, P1205 at page 8, and P1208
7 at page 15. At the rally, the accused summarised the territorial
8 conquests of Serb forces and highlighted there was more to be done. He
9 continued to promote cleansing, cleansing the Bosnian side of the Drina.
10 And as he described in Exhibit P1200:
11 "The only thing left in Bosnia and Herzegovina is to clean up the
12 left bank of the Drina, and secure the corridor between the Bosnian
13 Krajina and Semberija, and liberate the Serbian part of Sarajevo.
14 Everything else is in our hands already."
15 "In our hands already."
16 Throughout the following months, in implementing this "clean-up
17 of non-Serbs," SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement volunteers and sympathisers,
18 as well as other co-operating Serb forces actively committed brutal
19 crimes in Greater Sarajevo, in Mostar and in Nevesinje.
20 The accused contributed to the JCE by providing his SRS/Serbian
21 Chetnik Movement volunteers as part of the fighting force that would
22 implement it. He was intensely aware of the mobilising power of
23 persecutory propaganda in general, and he acknowledged in Exhibit P1337
25 "Passive onlookers are all potential fighters. We just need to
1 enlighten them, teach them, provide them with a nationalist education,
2 arouse their patriotic consciousness, and inspire love for the homeland.
3 Propaganda is based on the fact that the vast majority of people are
4 naturally ready to believe indiscriminately in everything they read,
5 hear, or see on television."
6 In the context of the tension created by the disintegration of
7 the former Yugoslavia, and against the backdrop of open inter-ethnic
8 conflict, this nationalist education, the Prosecution submits to you, was
9 a euphemistic term for inciting hatred against non-Serbs.
10 The violent persecutory ideological foundation of the SRS/Serbian
11 Chetnik Movement, its military-style structure, and the accused's
12 position as its undisputed leader enabled him to mobilise and control a
13 considerable number of followers. This included numerous volunteers who
14 were sent to carve out parts of Greater Serbia from Croatia and Bosnia.
15 And according to SRS Chief of War Staff Ljubisa Petkovic, as described in
16 Exhibit P1275, by May 1991 there were, according to him, 15.000 Chetniks
17 who belonged to the accused's ranks.
18 The accused was fully aware of his influence, boasting that he
19 held extensive influence over Serbian public opinion, even outside of
20 Serbia, and that thousands of Serbian volunteers listened to him. The
21 Trial Chamber has before it relevant Exhibits P1220 and P1248.
22 His ability to offer a fighting force that could assist in
23 implementing the JCE made his contribution of manpower significant and it
24 made it substantial. This is particularly evident in the fact that the
25 accused felt empowered to promise practical assistance to Serb
1 populations throughout former Yugoslavia. Consequently, other JCE
2 leaders and members began to appeal directly to him for manpower. That
3 he could both make and keep such promises belie any suggestion that he
4 was a purely political figure, disconnected from military organisation
5 and influence.
6 The accused's persecutory campaign fully served to recruit and
7 motivate the fighting forces who carved out Greater Serbia. For example,
8 if we could now show Exhibit P38, and this is from the July 1991 edition
9 of his publication "Velika Srbija" and had, on the front page, a map on
10 which is written "Serbia." And it proclaims that Chetnik guards were
11 present from Macedonia to the beaches of the Adriatic.
12 Now, in the lower left-hand corner, you'll notice some words with
13 exclamation points after them, and what that says is:
14 "Serb brother, do not forget. These are Serbs' lands."
15 The boundaries shown were those that the accused and his
16 SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement organisation wanted for Greater Serbia. And
17 I'd refer the Trial Chamber to Exhibit P1074.
18 Just weeks before the accused sent his volunteers to Borovo Selo
19 in Croatia, and where they participated in murdering Croatian police
20 officers, the accused spoke before an enormous Serb audience in Plitvice,
22 Now, before we show it, Exhibit P339, which is from
23 17 April 1991, shows the accused praising Milan Babic and the creation of
24 the SAO Krajina. Most importantly, you can see on this video the
25 accused's popularity and the impact of his discourse about this land in
1 Croatia being rightfully Serbian land.
2 And if we could now play that video.
3 [Video-clip played]
4 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "In such an atmosphere,
5 Vojvoda Seselj, announced already at the beginning of the meeting,
6 started his speech.
7 "Here, Serbian people live. This is Serbian land, and it will
8 remain Serbian forever.
9 "After labelling the decision on the establishing of the Serbian
10 Autonomous District of Krajina, historical Seselj said:
11 "Serbian brothers and Serbian sisters, you find yourself in the
12 front-lines defending the Serbian cause, Serbian state borders. You are
13 in the most difficult position, you are the pride of the whole of
15 "Journalist: He has promised them that they would not be left to
16 themselves and that all the Serbs in Croatia have only one party, the
17 Serbian Democratic Party.
18 "You have a wise and brave leadership here, headed by the heroic
19 Dr. Milan Babic.
20 "Those who divide the Serbian people he labelled as traitors.
21 "Only Ante Markovic's mercenaries and those of foreign
22 intelligence services believe today that there are more important
23 problems than your defence, your protection. They offer you up to
24 Tudjman. They would sell you. You will not be sold or betrayed.
25 "Instead of calming them down, Seselj sent a message to the
1 gathered people at the end.
2 "We are sending a message to the new Ustasha head of state and
3 Ustasha regime in Croatia: Serbian heads have rolled, struck down by the
4 Ustasha hand in the Serbian Krajina. A Serbian head has rolled in
5 Serbian Western Srem and Slavonia as well. We will avenge Serbian blood.
6 "We will."
7 MS. BIERSAY: And again, days later, in Jagodnjak, Croatia, the
8 accused evoked the genocide of Serbs and declared that Croats could only
9 have land west of his KOKV line, the Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica
11 Now, I'd like to show Exhibit P70, which is also a video, and I'd
12 ask the Trial Chamber to note the applause in this exhibit when he
13 mentions the infamous refrain about the KOKV line.
14 [Video-clip played]
15 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "The Croats can, as far as we are
16 concerned, leave Yugoslavia as they please, whenever they want. But we
17 are openly letting them know that they will not take away a foot of
18 Serbian territory: Not one piece of land where there are Serbian
19 villages, destroyed Serbian churches, Serbian mass graves, Serbian camps,
20 Serbian Jasenovac. If we allow that, we would be unworthy of our
21 glorious ancestors, and we would have to be ashamed in front of our
22 descendants. The Croats can create their new state, but only west of the
23 Karlobag-Ogulin-Karlovac-Virovitica line. Everything east of that line
24 is Serbian."
25 MS. BIERSAY: And he told people at that rally that if, in fact,
1 they ceded any land that was rightfully Serbian land "we would be
2 unworthy of our glorious ancestors and ashamed before our descendants."
3 His message of ethnic cleansing to achieve the KOKV western
4 borders of Greater Serbia was clear to his volunteers, and that is
5 evidenced in Exhibit P57 from 19 November 1991.
6 In this video-clip, I'd also ask the Trial Chamber to note the
7 infamous Chetnik flag with the skull that is depicted.
8 If we could now play P57. Video.
9 [Video-clip played]
10 "Reporter: Extremist Serb militiamen and women, posing
11 triumphantly for an end-of-battle photograph before returning to a
12 morning feast of music and laughter fueled by alcohol. The motto on
13 their flag is 'Freedom or death,' and they vow they will fight on.
14 "What do you [indiscernible] the Serb undertake before the war is
16 "The war will be over when we have our limits
17 Karlobag-Karlovac-Ogulin-Virovitica. All places where the Serbian people
18 live must be free, you know. We must clean up the Croatians.
19 "Reporter: [Indiscernible] many of the hard-line militiamen,
20 certainly not on the Serb side, and if the current --"
21 MS. BIERSAY: As that volunteer said:
22 "War will be over when we have our limits
23 Karlobag-Karlovac-Ogulin-Virovitica, all place where Serbian people live
24 must be free, you know. We must clean up the Croatians."
25 The accused --
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Judges, I must intervene because of
2 this flagrant lie. The man who made a statement said that, We must clear
3 our accounts with the Croats. And Ms. Biersay is now misrepresenting
4 that as a statement that, We must cleanse the Croats. You have seen what
5 it says in the text. The text is translated. You saw that man, and I
6 heard the man speaking in Serbian. She is falsifying. One thing is
7 settle accounts with the Croats --
8 MS. BIERSAY: Your Honours, is he going to be allowed to
9 indiscriminately interrupt when the Prosecution was prohibited from
10 raising any objections at all during his presentation?
11 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Biersay, you are quite
12 right. There was a translation problem.
13 MS. BIERSAY: The accused said there was a problem with the
14 translation. He has an hour after we're done to clear up any confusion
15 or what he deems to be misrepresentation on behalf of the Prosecution.
16 This time should be deducted from his remaining time.
17 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Ms. Biersay, as far as I
18 remember, the person taking the floor or speaking there, I believe, is an
19 American from New York, and this person explains why he is there and why
20 there is fighting. So it is important to know whether he is saying
21 "settling scores" or "cleanse."
22 Could you give up a little bit of your time so that we could see
23 that video again, which only lasts a few minutes?
24 MS. BIERSAY: I would not agree to giving up our time to replay
25 an exhibit based on the accused's unwarranted intervention. This exhibit
1 was entered into evidence, and the translation that I just read is what
2 was entered into evidence. And if he has a problem with --
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President --
4 MS. BIERSAY: -- the translation, it should be raised during his
5 time. This is -- it's so unbalanced.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President, since we have
7 interrupted, I had to intervene, I agree that the two minutes should be
8 taken off my time for the clip to be repeated. You will see that I am
9 right. The gentleman says -- the man says, Settle the score with the
10 Croats, not to clean up the Croats. I will grant two minutes from my
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] You said that you would accept
13 if two minutes would be taken off your time. When you have the floor,
14 you can see the video again or show it again.
15 Ms. Biersay, please proceed.
16 MS. BIERSAY: Certainly, what this volunteer said was that the
17 goal -- the war would be over only when the accused's K or KV line was
18 achieved. That's the point.
19 The accused's words had a pronounced effect on Serb nationalists
20 who heard them. Some responded by volunteering directly after hearing
21 him speak, as described, for example, by Witnesses Stojanovic in
22 Exhibit P528; Stoparic, transcript pages 2440 to 2441; as well as VS-002
23 at transcript pages 6526 to 6527.
24 The accused's position as the undisputed Chetnik leader and
25 commander within the SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement, and his veneer of
1 legitimacy as a politician, all facilitated his indoctrination of the
2 volunteers, especially to embed fear and hate to justify ethnic
3 separation and forcible removal of non-Serbs.
4 As recounted in Exhibit P1074 by the deputy head of the SRS
5 War Staff, before volunteers embarked for the front, the accused imbued
6 them with hatred for non-Serbs, telling them to "be heroes," "kill the
7 Ustasha," and, "fight for Greater Serbia." The accused's hateful
8 discourse clearly impressed upon SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement recruits
9 the goal for which they were fighting. Exhibit P528 describes that:
10 "One of Seselj's objectives was to ethnically cleanse parts of
11 Croatia that he considered to be Serbian land."
12 SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement volunteers and sympathisers who
13 committed crimes were primarily fighting for ethnic motives.
14 Now, put on the screen at this time is a photograph that's been
15 admitted as Exhibit P184 and was discussed, I believe, in the testimony
16 of VS-004.
17 As its supreme commander, the accused operated the
18 SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement to further the purpose of the JCE. Senior
19 members of the SRS War Staff recounted that as leader of both the SRS and
20 Serbian Chetnik Movement, the accused made all important decisions
21 concerning their policies and operations. His
22 SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement, both the Crisis and War Staffs, were
23 created to spear-head the accused's support to Serbs outside Serbia, and
24 that included deploying volunteers.
25 The accused appointed Witness Ljubisa Petkovic as head of the
1 War Staff and Witness Zoran Rankic as deputy head. Their statements
2 describe how the accused maintained complete power over both the Crisis
3 and War Staff. Rankic, for example, noted that:
4 "Seselj had absolute power and made all the decisions himself."
5 The accused was "always three steps above the others," and only
6 the accused had authority to promote anyone within the SRS/Serbian
7 Chetnik Movement.
8 The accused celebrated and revelled in these roles throughout the
9 conflict. He described himself with military titles like commander, the
10 supreme commander, and even as "the commander of the operative
11 detachments of the Serbian Chetnik Movement in the homeland." This is
12 evidenced by Exhibits P59, P154 and P1058.
13 He liked to emphasise that he always exercised control over the
14 situation in the field. And SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement volunteers also
15 acknowledged the accused as their supreme commander. For some, he was a
16 god. Witness Kopic, at transcript pages 5892, 5893 and 5913, testified
17 about this phenomenon.
18 The accused did not hesitate to use his authority, stating:
19 "I organise interventions by our guerrilla organisation and
20 define aims of attack and points that have to be won."
21 Evidence in this regard includes Exhibits P154 and P59, and the
22 testimony of witnesses, including VS-33.
23 Moreover, the accused's extreme nationalist agenda and militant
24 stance against ever ceding what he viewed as Serb lands gave him moral
25 authority over TO members and other volunteers who both admired him and
1 shared his Greater Serbia doctrine. As VS-002, a TO member, testified:
2 "He was a vojvoda. We would not have refused his order."
3 Now, Your Honours, I'm about to begin another section, and I
4 understand it may be time for the break, so I seek some guidance from the
5 Trial Chamber whether I should just continue or if this is a good point.
6 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] We shall have a break now.
7 Just one point of clarification.
8 You mentioned a sentence:
9 "I organise interventions of our guerrilla organisation ..."
10 What document is that?
11 MS. BIERSAY: I direct the Trial Chamber that's -- and I cited
12 two exhibits, and that one is from Exhibit P59, specifically page 3 in
13 the English version.
14 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 We shall have a 20-minute break.
16 You have had two hours and forty minutes, approximately.
17 --- Recess taken at 5.43 p.m.
18 --- On resuming at 6.04 p.m.
19 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] The court is back in session.
20 Ms. Biersay, you have the floor.
21 MS. BIERSAY: Thank you, Your Honour.
22 The first thing that I have been instructed to do is to correct
23 myself. I gave the Trial Chamber the incorrect reference when I said
24 that the quote came from Exhibit P59. I was looking at it and misread
25 it. It is, in fact, Exhibit P39; not 59, but 39.
1 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Thank you, Ms. Biersay.
2 The reason I put the question to you is because there was an
3 element of doubt.
4 MS. BIERSAY: The SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement --
5 [French interpretation on English channel]
6 MS. BIERSAY: The SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement not only
7 co-operated with JCE members to train and arm volunteers; it did so,
8 itself. As previously discussed, the accused's significant contribution
9 of volunteers was made possible through the assistance of other JCE
10 members. Ljubisa Petkovic, working for the accused as chief of the
11 War Staff, maintained contacts with the General Staff of the JNA and the
12 Serbian Ministry of the Interior to facilitate this assistance. The
13 accused described, in Exhibit P1234, Petkovic's role, which was to
14 organise volunteers, send them to the battle-fields, obtain weapons and
15 uniforms, and provide transport, et cetera.
16 In Exhibit P1001, the accused's own "Velika Srbija" admitted that
17 the Radicals organised several camps in the Sombor area for training of
18 volunteers. This included a camp in Prigrevica which was run by Chetnik
19 Duke Jovo Ostojic. Witness Gusalic testified about the Serb take-over of
20 Bijeljina, where Seselj's men and Arkan's men participated in both the
21 training and arming of the local Serb population. In Sarajevo, the
22 accused Vojvoda Branislav Gavrilovic established volunteer training
23 centres through which at least 1500 SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement
24 volunteers passed during the course of the war, and this is evidenced by
25 Exhibit P1000.
1 The accused exercised authority over where his volunteers were
2 deployed. Key JCE members of the military and of the Serbian, Croatian
3 and Bosnian political leadership, including Milosevic, courted,
4 encouraged, and requested the accused's contribution of a fighting force
5 for the implementation of the JCE. For example, in Exhibit P1074,
6 Goran Hadzic and Milan Martic travelled to the SRS/SCP office in Belgrade
7 to request volunteers, and I direct the Trial Chamber to paragraph 86.
8 An abundance of evidence reveals that the volunteers were, at the
9 insistence of the accused and the SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement
10 leadership, deployed most often as units and were not merely incorporated
11 into existing formations on an individual basis. They would operate with
12 other units. At times, they were also subordinated as separate units
13 under the command of the JNA and VRS, local TOs, MUP and municipal
14 authorities. The Trial Chamber has before it, for example,
15 Exhibits P1002 and P250.
16 Evidencing that the accused would exercise his authority to
17 determine where his volunteers were deployed, we'd cite, in the case of
18 Eastern Slavonia and Vukovar, Exhibits P30, Exhibits P55, P1277, and the
19 admitted statements of Zoran Rankic and Ljubisa Petkovic. He pledged
20 assistance, he asked for assistance, and he delivered assistance.
21 The accused, himself, described how:
22 "In 1991, we began deploying volunteers in a massive scale and
23 sending them to already-established front-lines particularly in
24 Eastern Slavonia."
25 And I'd refer the Trial Chamber to Exhibit P30.
1 He also deployed volunteers to Krajina. In Exhibit P31, he
2 admitted that he responded to the request of Milan Babic by sending
3 volunteers to Krajina, who actively participated in the conflict there.
4 In Western Slavonia, the Trial Chamber heard from witnesses such as
5 VS-004 and VS-033, and they told the Trial Chamber how, from at least
6 October 1991, volunteers recruited by the SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement
7 were deployed to Western Slavonia upon requests from local Serb TOs.
8 Ljubisa Petkovic admitted to personally assigning approximately 500
9 volunteers to Okucani and other places in Western Slavonia. Zoran Rankic
10 said that he accompanied about 1.000 additional
11 SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement volunteers to the same region.
12 The pattern of deployment was repeated in Bosnia, where the Serb
13 leadership also courted and encouraged the accused's contributions of
14 manpower. For example, Biljana Plavsic, a member of the Presidency of
15 the Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, admitted in the Bosnian
16 Serb Assembly that she sent requests for assistance to the accused and
17 other JCE members. She said:
18 "I was looking for the people who were willing to fight for the
19 Serbian cause, who were willing to fight for the territory of
20 Republika Srpska. The letters were sent to the Soviet Union, to Seselj,
21 Arkan and Jovic."
22 And this is before the Trial Chamber as Exhibit P987.
23 I'd also refer the Trial Chamber to Exhibit P1206, in which the
24 accused boasts about the SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement contributing an
25 unlimited number of volunteers to the conflict in Bosnia, as well as the
1 testimony and evidence through -- written and oral, through
2 Witnesses Rankic, Jovic and VS-037. I'd also refer the Trial Chamber to
3 Exhibit P1233, in which the accused admitted that he had a high degree of
4 control over SRS/Serbian Chetnik volunteers who participated in the
5 attack on Zvornik.
6 Now, in Eastern Herzegovina, the area that encompasses Trebinje,
7 Mostar and Nevesinje, the president of the SDS and the War Staff
8 commander there, whose name is Vucurevic, he was one of the closest
9 associates of Radovan Karadzic. And the accused's Vojvoda
10 Branislav Vakic, described in Exhibit P55, he described how the president
11 of the SDS and War Staff commander for that area made a "dramatic
12 appeal," requesting a large group of SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement
13 volunteers to that front. And the accused responded by sending his
14 SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement volunteers to Mostar and Nevesinje and
15 elsewhere in that region. The Trial Chamber has heard that his
16 volunteers operated with a Red Beret unit based in Boracko Jezero as part
17 of a Nevesinje Brigade of the VRS, and that is under seal. And if the
18 Chamber wishes, I can give a specific cite after the close of the hearing
19 or in private session.
20 The accused maintained supervision of volunteers in the field.
21 Like any commander or general of his troops, the accused frequently
22 visited his men in the field, including in and around municipalities
23 named in the indictment. He thereby reinforced his moral and doctrinal
24 authority over his volunteer units after they were deployed and under the
25 command of the JNA, VRS, or TOs. For example, he frequently described
1 himself as toured his units, being constantly present -- and being
2 constantly present at the front, especially early in the conflict. And
3 for this, I'd refer the Trial Chamber to Exhibits P31 and P1181.
4 Now, in evidencing his significant contribution to the JCE,
5 Biljana Plavsic, in December 1992, summarised the accused's impact on
6 motivating Serb fighters and frightening non-Serbs. In Exhibit 1310, she
8 "He came to see us, visited the front. His presence meant a lot
9 to the men. The troops would talk about his visits long after he would
10 leave. On the other hand, news that he was at the front would act as a
11 great demoralising factor of our enemies."
12 Other senior SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement members also described
13 how they repeatedly travelled to the front to visit volunteers, and for
14 this I'd refer the Trial Chamber to Exhibit C10 and P1074.
15 In Exhibit 1191, the accused admitted, in a 1992 interview, that
16 his volunteers were in constant contact with the leadership of the
17 Serbian -- of the SRS and the Serbian Chetnik Movement and transmitted
18 information from the front. He even bragged about the extent of his
19 personal supervision of his volunteers in the field, as in Exhibit P31.
20 This personal supervision also continued in Bosnia. For example, the
21 accused visited Sarajevo, and when he did so, he would always inspect the
22 SRS/Serbian Chetnik units commanded by his three vojvodas,
23 Branislav Gavrilovic, Vasilije Vidovic, and Slavko Aleksic. These visits
24 are addressed, for example, in Exhibits P1207, P1204 and P1221.
25 The accused also had the power and influence to intervene
1 personally to assist vojvodas in the field. As shown by Intercepts P513
2 and 514, the accused wanted to have a group of his volunteer, commanded
3 by Gavrilovic, rescued from an ambush around Sarajevo in April 1992. So
4 what did he do? He simply threatened the Serb political and military
5 leadership in Bosnia, including Momcilo Mandic and even Radovan Karadzic
6 that he would withdraw his men from the front-lines and never deploy them
7 again if he didn't get what he wanted. And what happened? His men were
8 withdrawn, illustrating the accused's power to withdraw volunteers from
9 the front-line and co-ordinate with other members of the JCE if they did
10 not bend to his will.
11 Finally, the accused publicly commended vojvodas who participated
12 in crimes committed. When I say "finally," I mean this section. While
13 war was still raging, the accused publicly recognised 18
14 SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement commanders and leaders as heroes, boasting
15 about their roles in fighting for Greater Serbia and in changing the
16 ethnic map of the former Yugoslavia. This is before the Trial Chamber in
17 Exhibits P217 and P255, as well as P218. Yet, as previously discussed by
18 Mr. Marcussen, several in this group, including Gavrilovic, Vidovic, had
19 participated directly in crimes against non-Serbs.
20 The accused used his contribution of manpower as leverage with
21 other JCE members to influence their deployment decisions regarding his
22 volunteers, and this is described also in Exhibit C18, in which Petkovic
23 recalled how, between August and October of 1991, the accused had
24 threatened the JNA leadership that he would stop sending volunteers to
25 Croatia unless arrangements were made for arms and uniforms to be
1 supplied to his volunteers. And what happened? Because of his
2 influence, the JNA leadership gave him what he wanted. They gave his
3 volunteers arms and uniforms.
4 Now, I direct the Trial Chamber's attention to a 1993 radio
5 interview, which is Exhibit P1233. And the accused talks about his
6 contribution to the attack on Zvornik, and he said:
7 "You must know that our volunteers fought together with the
8 Serbian Ministry of the Interior Special Unit, and that it was owing to
9 this co-ordinated action that Zvornik was liberated in time."
10 There's also a part of the segment that was played for you
11 previously, I believe.
12 In Exhibit P32, he admitted that he contributed at least 30.000
13 armed volunteers to the conflict in Croatia and Bosnia. Forgive me,
14 that's P342, and hopefully I got that right this time.
15 In Exhibit P1249, he summed up his contribution to the JCE very
16 nicely and profoundly. He said:
17 "Without our support and that of the Socialist Party of Serbia, I
18 do not believe that the Serbs of Republika Srpska and the
19 Republic of Serbian Krajina would have succeeded in their struggle to
20 attain their own countries, their own territories."
21 He contributed his fighting force for one reason: To finally
22 achieve what he'd always wanted, and that was to forcefully achieve his
23 Greater Serbia, and thus the common purpose of the JCE. In multiple
24 exhibits, such as Exhibit P1207, the accused proudly admitted that
25 because of his assistance to other JCE members, by the end of 1992 Serbs
1 had seized about 80 per cent of the territory of the former
2 Republic of Croatia and about 70 per cent of former Bosnia.
3 And we submit to you that the evidence supports the finding --
4 that a Trial Chamber could find that the accused contributed in a
5 significant and a substantial way to the crimes alleged in the
7 Your Honours, I will now turn to the last of the three segments
8 of the Prosecution's presentation, highlighting some of the evidence
9 supporting all of the counts in the indictment. The commission of the
10 charged crimes is relevant to all modes of liability.
11 In particular, the accused, himself, even committed some of the
12 crimes directly in Vukovar and Hrtkovci, but all the crimes charged were
13 committed by JCE forces. The similarity of the crimes, their sheer
14 scale, protracted duration, and geographical scope show: One, that the
15 crimes were purposeful, they were not spontaneous; and, two, that they
16 were within the shared criminal common purpose of the JCE members.
17 In each of the crime bases, the Trial Chamber will note the
18 repeated patterns, as described by witnesses. I will turn first to
19 Croatia, where the first full-scale conflict erupted. This area was
20 within the KOKV line advocated by the accused and that he saw as
21 constituting Greater Serbia.
22 In Exhibit P298, the accused described Vukovar, in
23 Eastern Slavonia, as the most powerful Ustasha stronghold, and he
24 declared that it was the key line that needs to be broken through. As
25 previously discussed when considering the accused's contribution, he both
1 promised and then delivered SRS and Serbian Chetnik Movement volunteers
2 on a massive scale to participate in the fighting in Eastern Slavonia.
3 Specifically, in Vukovar, the Trial Chamber has before it the relevant
4 evidence about events and perpetrators. This includes the testimony of
5 Witnesses Theunens, Radic, Bosanac, Berghofer, and many others. It also
6 includes the adjudicated facts admitted by the Trial Chamber in its
7 decision of 8 February 2010.
8 The JNA artillery attacks on Vukovar had commenced in July 1991.
9 From October onwards, Vukovar was being battered by intensifying
10 artillery. As a major offensive was launched against a majority non-Serb
11 city, the JNA deployed the elite 1st Guards Brigade to the region. The
12 JNA had command over all of the armed units operating in the zone. These
13 included local Serb TOs, SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement volunteer units,
14 Arkan's men and police units. By the time the city fell on
15 18 November 1991, almost 15.000 people had already fled from Vukovar.
16 The scenes were of utter and total destruction. Thousands more non-Serbs
17 were expelled after 18 November, and the records show that of the
18 expelled people during this period, 98 per cent were ethnically non-Serb,
19 98 per cent.
20 The accused's own publication, "Velika Srbija," in Exhibit P1291,
21 described Vukovar for what it was in early December 1991. And what was
22 it? It was "a town that doesn't exist anymore."
23 In the days following the take-over, prisoners of war,
24 hors de combat, and civilians, including women, children and the elderly,
25 were gathered, separated and detained at Velepromet warehouse, which
1 functioned as the local Serb TO headquarters. The men were severely
2 beaten and mistreated. One room in Velepromet became feared among
3 detainees as "the room of death." Not one of the victims forced into
4 that room ever came out alive. This abuse was known to the Serb
5 leadership at the time. Because one of the most vivid examples was in
6 closed session, I can simply refer the Trial Chamber to transcript
7 page 7531, at lines 7 through 9.
8 On November 1991, busloads of non-Serb men, predominantly from
9 the Vukovar Hospital, were taken first to a JNA barracks and then to the
10 Ovcara pig farm. The prisoners were systematically brutalised and
11 beaten. Witness Berghofer described the scene:
12 "People screaming, beatings, yelling, trampling on people,
13 hitting them with iron rods, with rifle-butts, kicking them, various
14 implements, and then kicking again and so on. In the middle of the
15 hangar, there were straw and blood."
16 Ruzica Markobasic was killed by a gun-shot fired into her vagina.
17 Other prisoners, like Damjan Samardzic were beaten to death. Later, the
18 prisoners were forced to a pit at Grabovo, approximately 1 kilometre from
19 Ovcara Farm. They were murdered with knives and by firing squad. Back
20 at Ovcara, more prisoners were killed. Subsequent expert investigations
21 exhumed 200 bodies from the Ovcara grave-site, and this is described for
22 the Court in Exhibit P819. The physical perpetrators of these horrific
23 crimes were the municipal president, Slavko Dokmanovic, and JNA soldiers,
24 Arkan's men, and the SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement volunteers.
25 Now, while the accused has claimed that his volunteers departed
1 Vukovar before the massacre, evidence on the record establishes that
2 SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement volunteers were active participants in these
3 crimes. The volunteers included his Chetnik commander, as described by
4 Mr. Marcussen: Kameni; Predrag Milojevic, Kinez; Predrag Dragovic;
5 Marko Ljuboj, aka Mare; as well as a volunteer known as Topola. And,
6 again, there are some references in closed. I would be happy to provide
7 those to the Trial Chamber separately.
8 In summary, the Trial Chamber could conclude that in Vukovar,
9 Serb forces, controlled by JCE members, committed persecution, murder,
10 torture, cruel treatment, deportation, forcible transfer, wanton
11 destruction and plunder of public and private property; every single
13 The Trial Chamber will certainly recall the discussion about the
14 six strategic objectives for the Serbian people. The objectives
15 identified certain geographical locations which encompassed Zvornik,
16 Sarajevo, Mostar and Nevesinje, the forcible take-over of which was
17 strategically vital for realising the plan of ethnic separation and
19 For the accused, Bosnia was unquestionably part of Serbia. As
20 early as January 1991, he stated:
21 "We are not going to give anyone the chance to separate Bosnia
22 from the other Serbian lands."
23 And that is evidenced by Exhibit P1339.
24 As previously discussed, the accused participated in the
25 implementation of the shared objectives of the JCE and deployed his
1 volunteers to each of the targeted areas. For example, in Zvornik, Serb
2 forces began, in April 1992, to force out virtually all non-Serbs through
3 the commission of brutal crimes. Evidence directly relevant to the
4 events and perpetrators in Zvornik includes the testimony of Witnesses
5 Alic, Banjanovic, Boskovic, Jovic, Kopic, Rankic, VS-036, 37, 38, 1012,
6 1013 and more. Evidence -- some of the evidence includes Exhibit P959
7 and Exhibit P1044, as well as Exhibit P1045.
8 On 9 April 1992, a joint infantry force, supported by JNA
9 artillery, attacked Zvornik town. The operation had been planned, and it
10 was commanded by Arkan. In addition to Arkan's men, local Serb police,
11 TO members and SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement volunteers participated. The
12 SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement volunteers had been brought to Zvornik by
13 Zoran Rankic in advance of the attack, upon request of the
14 Zvornik Crisis Staff. And I direct the Trial Chamber to Exhibit P1074 in
15 this regard, as well as the testimony of VS-1062 and 1013.
16 Many Muslim citizens fled in fear of the advancing Serb forces.
17 Some fled after hearing that paramilitaries were coming to kill them, and
18 some fled after witnessing the first killings. During the attack,
19 SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement volunteers entered a shelter and detained
20 the women and children, while 12 men were taken out, lined up against a
21 wall, and shot by Arkan's men. The women and children were then brought
22 to a nearby collection centre, where they were forced onto buses and
23 deported out of Bosnia. From the end of May to June 1992, Serb forces
24 continued the same violent, persecutory pattern of attacks, expulsions,
25 destruction, mistreatment and killings in the settlements around Zvornik
1 town. One example: On June 1, 1992, Serb forces, including JNA, TO,
2 police and paramilitaries rounded up the unarmed Muslim civilians
3 gathered in Klisa and Djulici. They separated the men from women and
4 detained the men in the Karakaj Technical School. The
5 Karakaj Technical School was guarded by local police and TO forces.
6 Between the 1st and 5th of June, 1992, at least 150 non-Serbs were
7 murdered at Karakaj Technical School. On 5th June 1992, the surviving
8 500 Muslims were deported -- were transported to the Pilica Dom Kulture.
9 Three days later, the police took them to Gero's slaughter-house in
10 Karakaj. Upon arrival at Gero's slaughter-house, the prisoners were
11 taken inside, lined up against a wall and executed. At least 180 men
12 were killed in this way. The killings were ordered by members of the
13 Zvornik Crisis Staff and committed, among others, the SRS/Serbian Chetnik
14 Movement volunteers and Niski's men. The same pattern of crimes against
15 non-Serbs was repeated throughout Zvornik municipality, where civilians
16 were expelled from their homes and detained at other detention
17 facilities, including Standard Shoe Factory, the Ekonomija Farm, Ciglana
18 factory, the Celopek Dom Kulture and the Drinjaca Dom Kulture. These
19 were no spontaneous crimes.
20 The last remaining group of Muslims in the Zvornik area was at
21 Kozluk. On 26 June 1992, Serb forces, consisting of members of the VRS,
22 police, TO, Arkan's men, and, again, the SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement
23 volunteers forced the Muslims in Kozluk onto buses and trucks. The
24 Kozluk inhabitants were forced to sign statements falsely saying they
25 were leaving voluntarily. They were then sent to Serbia and, from there,
1 to Austria and elsewhere. The 12 or 13 non-Serbs who refused to leave,
2 what happened to them? They were killed.
3 After Serb forces took over Zvornik municipality, they carried
4 out large-scale destruction of mosques and other places of worship and
5 religious institutions. Abandoned houses that were not destroyed during
6 the attack or in its aftermath were extensively plundered by the Serb
7 forces or seized by the Serb municipal authorities of Zvornik. Further,
8 non-Serb detainees from the Ciglana Factory were forced to loot and load
9 goods on trucks directed to Serbia. A Trial Chamber could conclude that
10 in Zvornik, Serb forces, controlled by JCE members, committed
11 persecution, murder, torture, cruel treatment, deportation, forcible
12 transfer, wanton destruction, and plunder of public or private property.
13 The same persecutory campaign continued in Greater Sarajevo and
14 was described by Witnesses VS-1055, VS-1111, Safet Sejdic, VS-1060,
15 Perica Koblar, Mujo Dzafic, as well as the Trial Chamber has relevant
16 evidence through Exhibits P1110, P993, P1045, P218 and P644. Serb forces
17 attacked, killed and expelled Muslims during the take-over of
18 Greater Sarajevo.
19 The creation of parallel Serb-only institutions, the
20 discriminatory measures adopted against non-Serbs, and the presence of
21 military vehicles in surrounding hills all created a coercive and fearful
22 environment for non-Serbs.
23 VS-1055 described for the Trial Chamber how he saw television
24 reports showing dead bodies on the streets of Zvornik and heard radio
25 reports describing how Arkan's men and, yes, Seselj's men had entered
1 Bijeljina to purge the town of Muslims. It was because of those
2 incidents, those reports, what he was seeing, what he was hearing, he
3 decided to move his family out of the Ilijas municipality. By the end of
4 May, beginning of June 1992, half of the Muslim population of Ljesevo
5 village had fled.
6 In the evening of 4 June 1992, Serb forces, including members of
7 the Ilijas TO, and a group of SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement volunteers,
8 led by Chetnik Vojvoda Vidovic, aka Vaske, attacked and took over
9 Ljesevo. The village was heavily bombarded, houses were shelled, sheds,
10 barns and homes were set on fire, and other non-Serb property was stolen.
11 Vaske personally stole a television set and fired a hand-held
12 rocket-launcher into a private house. And that was described for the
13 Trial Chamber by VS-1055 at transcript page 7833. During the attack, the
14 remaining non-Serb civilians were captured and brutalised. One group was
15 lined up against a fence, threatened, insulted with the term "balija,"
16 and shot. Seventeen of them were murdered. These villagers -- those
17 villagers not killed during the attack were rounded up and gathered at
18 the railway station, where they were forced onto buses and removed from
20 Similar attacks took place on other towns and villages throughout
21 Greater Sarajevo, as recounted by Witness Sejdic. Men under Vaske's
22 command brought some of the surviving villagers from Ljesevo to the Iskra
23 warehouse detention facility in Ilijas municipality. There, between 130
24 and 140 other non-Serbs, including women and children, were detained in
25 inhumane conditions. On one occasion, two men, ordering detainees, told
2 "Get up when an officer of the Seselj's guard comes in."
3 And took away one detainee whose dead body was later exhumed.
4 VS-1055 described that for the Trial Chamber at transcript pages 7836 to
6 In mid-August, the detainees were transferred to Planja's house
7 in Vogosca municipality, which was guarded by the VRS. The detainees
8 were regularly forced to perform labour at the front-lines, where they
9 were exposed to extreme danger and used as human shields. Of the 22
10 non-Serb religious sites surveyed by Expert Riedlmayer in Ilijas and
11 Vogosca, all were found to be either destroyed or heavily damaged, and
12 that is before the Trial Chamber in Exhibit P1045, pages 321 to 384.
13 After the attacks were carried out in Greater Sarajevo, official
14 measures preventing the return of the forcibly-displaced non-Serbs were
15 taken. Exhibit P993, for example, shows this.
16 Based on all the evidence the Trial Chamber has before it, a
17 Trial Chamber could conclude that also in Greater Sarajevo, Serb forces,
18 controlled by the JCE members, committed persecution, murder, torture,
19 cruel treatment, forcible transfer, wanton destruction, and plunder of
20 both public and private property.
21 In Mostar, non-Serbs were systematically terrorised by Serb
22 forces through the use of threats, brutal violence and murder, as well as
23 the shelling and burning of their villages and religious buildings. Many
24 of the non-Serb victims were detained under terrible conditions and
25 illegally forced to work in dangerous circumstances. This is described
1 for the Trial Chamber by VS-1068 and VS-1067.
2 Witnesses describing the specific crimes in Mostar include
3 Fahrudin Bilic, Redzep Karisik, 1067, 1068, and Witness Riedlmayer.
4 There's also some other evidence before the Trial Chamber, but that was
5 given in closed session. Relevant documents include P217 as well as
7 The Serb forces active in and around Mostar included the JNA,
8 later VRS, the Red Berets and SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement volunteers led
9 by Vojvodas Oliver Baret and Vakic. And for this, the Trial Chamber can
10 see Exhibit P217 as well as the other mentioned exhibits.
11 Following an explosion near the JNA barracks on Mostar, on
12 3 April 1992, the JNA began an indiscriminate shelling of the city that
13 continued unabated until 20 May 1992. They then expelled non-Serbs from
14 the nearby village of Topola, looted their property and set their houses
15 on fire. During the offensive, mosques in and around Mostar were
16 specifically targeted and destroyed. Srdjan Djuric, an
17 SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement volunteer used a hand-held rocket-launcher
18 to specifically target mosques. SRS/Serbian Chetnik Movement commander
19 Oliver Baret was subsequently commended by the accused for his role in
20 leading the Serb assault in that area.
21 The now-familiar pattern followed by the forces of the JNA after
22 they had established physical control over the area repeated. Following
23 the attack, VRS Commander Zdravko Kandic ordered that units round up the
24 remaining non-Serbs, expel them from their homes, and detain them. In
25 one of the detention facilities, the small locker rooms of the
1 neighbourhood Vrapcici Stadium, non-Serb civilians were mistreated and
2 starved. Serb forces, including the SRS and Serbian Chetnik Movement
3 volunteers, took at least 88 of these detainees to the Uborak city dump,
4 where they were systematically killed and left in a ditch like garbage.
5 The same pattern was repeated in Sutina, where at least 18 men were
6 murdered. A Trial Chamber could conclude that in Mostar, Serb forces,
7 controlled by the JCE members, committed each and every crime alleged in
8 the indictment.
9 Your Honours, I was about to next move to the Nevesinje
10 municipality. But given the time, I wondered what the Trial Chamber
11 would like to do.
12 JUDGE ANTONETTI: [Interpretation] Yes, given the time and the
13 time you still have, because I believe you have some 30 minutes left
14 altogether. So I think it's best to continue tomorrow. You'll have
15 another 30 minutes, and then Mr. Seselj will have 48 minutes, if my
16 memory serves me right, and that will be the end of the 98 bis
18 One minor regret, Ms. Biersay. I would have liked to have a
19 binder with all the documents you mentioned, because I could have
20 followed, in realtime, everything you said. We may be able to have
21 something like that tomorrow. You've got the whole night ahead of you to
22 prepare the binder.
23 This being said, thank you very much, and I wish you all a very
24 good evening.
25 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.57 p.m.,
1 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 9th day of
2 March, 2011, at 2.30 p.m.