1 Thursday, 11 April 2002

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.30 a.m.

5 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

6 MR. NICE: General Drewienkiewicz. Your Honour, this witness is

7 going to produce a large number of exhibits. With the agreement of the

8 Registry, you're going to be provided with binders, and we'll be, I hope,

9 producing the exhibits in the order in which they appear in the binder.

10 Those binders are in the last stages of preparation.

11 The summary of this witness caused me some concern. Indeed I

12 discussed it with your legal officer before Easter when we were originally

13 hoping to call the witness. He's provided a very long and detailed

14 statement which the accused will have had, and it was my guess that the

15 accused will have been working in preparation of any questions he wants to

16 ask the witness on the basis of that statement.

17 The statement in the proofing sessions and for the production of

18 exhibits has been added to by some other passages which I've had

19 italicised, and it seemed to me that the accused would find it more

20 helpful to navigate his way around a document if it was simply a document

21 on this occasion with which he was familiar, added to by the additional

22 materials. So basically what you're getting is a very full document on

23 this occasion. You'll see when it comes. It's being copied at the

24 moment. It didn't have paragraph numbers, and I thought paragraph numbers

25 really do assist in finding our way around the document.

1 I can start the witness, though, without the document, because

2 there are quite a lot of background matters we can deal with in a

3 conventional way.

4 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We will have the witness, please.

5 MR. NICE: This really is a witness whose name ought to be spelled

6 out on the overhead projector. He tells me that even in native Poland

7 where his family came -- comes from, it's a name that is extremely

8 difficult for Poles to pronounce, and indeed he's often known as

9 General DZ, the first and last letters of his name.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: May we use that?

11 MR. NICE: I think so, yes.

12 [The witness entered court]

13 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness take the declaration.

14 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

15 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

16 JUDGE MAY: If you would like to take a seat.

17 WITNESS: JOHN DREWIENKIEWICZ

18 Examined by Mr. Nice:

19 Q. Is your name Karol John Drewienkiewicz?

20 A. It is.

21 Q. Sometimes known, because of the length and complexity of your

22 name, as "DZ"?

23 A. It is.

24 Q. Would you object if people so describe you in the course of this

25 hearing if they find that more comfortable than to use your full name?

1 A. By all means.

2 Q. General, we're going to be speaking in English, and one of the

3 problems there is that, because the material has to be interpreted, we can

4 get tempted to talk too rapidly and in particular for one to follow the

5 other without leaving the necessary break. Your evidence is going to take

6 a considerable time in chief, and you will be speaking to me.

7 One technique that can work is to turn to channel 5, the French

8 channel, leave the headphones either around your neck or on the table with

9 the volume turned down so that it's the mildest background for you but

10 enables you to know when the previous question has been translated. It's

11 a matter for you but that sometimes works. The trouble is, if you turn

12 the volume up too much, it then interferes with the other interpreting.

13 MR. NICE: Coming now are the document summaries. It's not really

14 appropriate, but the documents of this witness. I'll hand them to the

15 usher, please, for distribution. The exhibit binders will be with us in

16 about five minutes.

17 Q. General, I'm going to deal with matters in a very summary way so

18 far as background and that sort of thing is concerned. You are or have

19 been a career soldier, starting off with the Royal Engineers, landing up

20 with the rank of Major General, as we already know. Is that correct?

21 A. That is correct.

22 Q. In 1989 - paragraph 2 - 1988/1989, were you Secretary to the

23 United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff Committee, and then in due course appointed

24 as Director, in 1995, of Support at NATO headquarters, and in 1996

25 starting your association with the former Yugoslavia headquarters for IFOR

1 in Sarajevo; is that correct?

2 A. That's correct.

3 Q. In 1997, you became Commanding General for SFOR Support Command in

4 Zagreb, returning to Heidelberg in August 1997, going back to Sarajevo in

5 January 1998 as a military advisor to the Civilian High Rep for some six

6 or seven months?

7 A. That's correct.

8 Q. And then to the Staff College for a period of time --

9 A. Sorry, no. That -- that's out of sequence.

10 Q. I'm sorry. Yes. Of course it is, yes. You were due to go as an

11 instructor to the Royal College of Defence Studies. That was postponed

12 when you were seconded - this is paragraph 4 - to the Organisation for

13 Security and Cooperation in Europe, OSCE.

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. Page 2, paragraph 6, you retired from the army and you retain a

16 position with OSCE at the moment in Sarajevo, in Bosnia?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. Now we'll go back to your involvement in Kosovo.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. You started working for the OSCE in Vienna in October of 1998. At

21 that time, there had been an agreement between Holbrooke and Milosevic; is

22 that correct, as you understand it?

23 A. I understand there was an agreement, but the agreement that was

24 signed was between Bronislaw Geremek, the Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE,

25 and Minister Zivadin Jovanovic, the Minister of Foreign Affairs.

1 Q. Your function at this time, when you started working with the

2 OSCE, was as what, or to do what?

3 A. At the start, I was seconded by the British Foreign Office to the

4 UK delegation of the OSCE to assist the OSCE permanent staff in planning

5 the operation of the Kosovo Verification Mission. So at the start, I was

6 the Chief of Planning.

7 MR. NICE: The Exhibit binders have now arrived. We can

8 distribute those.

9 THE INTERPRETER: Could the interpreters please have a copy of the

10 resume -- of the summary.

11 JUDGE MAY: The interpreters are asking for a copy of the summary.

12 MR. NICE: Certainly. If it hasn't arrived, it must ... May the

13 witness have the registry copy? I understand that the summaries for the

14 interpreters are being distributed.

15 THE REGISTRAR: The bundle will be given the exhibit number 94.

16 MR. NICE: Thank you very much. Tab 1 of 94, if that could be

17 laid on the ELMO.

18 Your Honour, I see that the witness has with him, I think, a copy

19 of the summary that we are looking at.

20 Q. Is that right, General?

21 A. Yes.

22 MR. NICE: We haven't explored this as a practice, and I don't

23 know what the view of the Chamber is as to whether he should have his own

24 summary before him. It's really his statement.

25 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Kay, any objection? It's a lengthy document.

1 MR. KAY: If it's a note made by him, then of course it's

2 perfectly acceptable. If it's a note made by someone else, then a

3 distinction has to be drawn.

4 JUDGE MAY: He's got to deal with a huge amount of material.

5 MR. KAY: Yes. That's what ...

6 JUDGE MAY: If it's a statement that he's adopted ... I notice

7 there are some 299 paragraphs, 44 pages. It's asking a great deal of a

8 witness to give evidence without reference, isn't it, to some document?

9 The old rules were fine for cases in which witnesses were dealing with a

10 small amount of evidence.

11 MR. KAY: Yes.

12 JUDGE MAY: Here we're dealing with a huge amount of evidence, and

13 isn't it more realistic that a witness should be entitled to refer to a

14 statement?

15 MR. KAY: Perhaps it would help the Court if he was able to tell

16 us about his input onto the note itself, and then any ambiguities will be

17 clarified as to the document.

18 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

19 Mr. Nice, perhaps you could explore that.

20 MR. NICE:

21 Q. Yes. This document, General, just tell us, was it a statement

22 that you made originally?

23 A. This is a copy of a report which appears to be the report of a

24 Serbian government --

25 Q. No, no. Not the -- we're not looking at the document.

1 A. Sorry.

2 Q. We're just looking at your -- the document you've been looking at,

3 I think, your own summary. Are you looking at that?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. That's what we're concerned about.

6 A. Right.

7 Q. Your summary is a statement that's been prepared how?

8 A. In June of 2000, I came here, and with all of my contemporaneous

9 notes, and went through them and, with the aid of them, described the

10 things that I had seen and the circumstances in which they took place.

11 And a statement which was a summary of I think about a six-day process was

12 put together, which I then went through line by line and agreed that that

13 was a correct shorthand version of the six days of description that I had

14 gone through with the aid of the notes that I made at the time in a number

15 of notebooks.

16 Q. And before Easter -- sorry. I'm making the same mistake. Before

17 Easter, did you come back here, expecting to give evidence then --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- go through the statement, adding to it largely from handwritten

20 notes of your own, prepared while you were here, passages that typically,

21 but not always, appear in italics in the present version?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. I think that's all I need.

24 A. Other documents were made available before Easter --

25 Q. Yes.

1 A. -- some of which I recognised as documents I had had a hand in

2 producing. Others were descriptions of meetings I had been at, which I

3 had not seen before, and I went through those, identified them where

4 necessary, and made comments that I felt were appropriate at the time.

5 That was just before Easter.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Mr. Kay, is there anything you want to add?

7 MR. KAY: No, as long as the status of the document is, of course,

8 acknowledged by all.

9 JUDGE MAY: It's not the witness's evidence.

10 MR. KAY: Yes.

11 JUDGE MAY: It's merely an aide-memoire when he's trying to give

12 evidence.

13 MR. KAY: Yes. It will help us to follow the paragraphs perhaps

14 that he's referring to.

15 JUDGE MAY: And help him when he's being referred to different

16 parts of it.

17 MR. KAY: Yes.

18 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, the issue here is whether this witness

19 should be allowed to refer to the statement which he has in front of him,

20 which you've heard him describe how he came to make it. He went through

21 it line by line. Normally, as you will appreciate, witnesses do not have

22 their summaries in front of them and give their evidence without it, but

23 because of the detail and the amount of this evidence, it may be

24 appropriate for this witness to have it in front of him to refresh his

25 memory and as an aide-memoire. It is, of course, not evidence. It's what

1 he says which is evidence. Do you want to make any observations about

2 that? Do you object?

3 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]

4 JUDGE MAY: We didn't get the translation.

5 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

6 JUDGE MAY: Could you put your microphone on, please.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What I said was it's up to you, your

8 affair.

9 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just like the several kilogrammes

11 that we've just received.

12 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Yes.

13 MR. NICE: May I, in fact, have substituted for the version, or

14 additional to the version that the witness has got, one that's got

15 paragraph numbers on it? Because I suppose his doesn't, being an earlier

16 generation. Right.

17 Q. If you'd like to just get yourself through to the appropriate

18 paragraph, please, General, which is paragraph 8. And in the exhibit

19 binder now on the overhead projector, there is tab 1, OTP reference 2790.

20 It's a document, a statement of the Serbian government, dated the 13th of

21 October, which outlines the principles of the political framework for

22 resolving the situation in Kosovo during a government session, as reported

23 by Serbian President Milutinovic, and related to the talks between

24 Yugoslavia, President Milosevic, and Ambassadors Holbrooke and Hill.

25 We have only very limited time in which to deal with your

1 evidence. Going to principle 9 and 10, what are your comments on those,

2 please?

3 A. First of all, I only saw this document just before Easter. I was

4 certainly not aware of it and it was never drawn to my attention when I

5 was in Kosovo. That said, I note that it talks about the establishment of

6 police under local communal direction, representative of the local

7 population.

8 If this had actually been carried out, then many of the problems

9 that I observed might not have happened. And it was never, in my

10 experience, carried out nor was it ever declared that it was going to be

11 carried out.

12 Similarly, principle 10, which talks about the -- the access for

13 foreign, including forensics, experts to -- to the issue of crimes against

14 humanity and international law, this certainly does not describe the

15 experience that we discovered, that I discovered, when the forensic team

16 investigated the killings at Racak. The -- at that stage, the

17 international forensic team was certainly not allowed complete and

18 unimpeded access, which is what is described in paragraph 10.

19 Q. As to the -- I'm sorry. And as to the timetable?

20 A. The timetable which is described in this document again was not

21 made evident to the OSCE on the ground or in Vienna, to the best of my

22 knowledge.

23 Q. Tab 2, please. OTP reference 1404. The agreement of the 16th of

24 October being one, I think, of three working documents of the agreement

25 for which you have comments on two paragraphs in section 1 and section 4.

1 Section 1, paragraph 9, please.

2 A. Yes. At this -- in this document, the degree of cooperation that

3 was described in this document - and we referred to this document or I

4 referred to this document a lot in my time in Kosovo since it was, in

5 effect, the mandate of the -- of the Verification Mission - the level of

6 cooperation was described as full, and this was not, in fact, the case.

7 Specifically, when we wanted to bring in the verifiers from -- from the

8 contributing states, one of the things that slowed down their arrival was

9 the issue of visas in Belgrade.

10 Secondly, we -- when we reviewed, when I reviewed, the level of

11 medical facilities available, I recommended and it was accepted that the

12 OSCE should hire a medevac, a medical evacuation helicopter from

13 Switzerland, in fact. And there was then a request made by the mission

14 for access into -- into the air space above Kosovo so that it could come

15 and be stationed at Pristina airport. This was denied both when we first

16 asked and subsequently, so that we were never able to use the medical

17 evacuation helicopter that we felt we needed.

18 Q. And --

19 A. And this is reflected again in, I think, section 4, paragraph 6.

20 Q. Thank you.

21 A. And I was certainly present at -- on at least one occasion when a

22 direct request was made to Deputy Prime Minister Sainovic on this affair,

23 and he flatly refused the request.

24 Q. Tab 3, please. OTP reference 1426. This document, an agreement

25 to determine required measures for Yugoslavia's compliance with UN

1 Resolution 1199. Paragraph 1, on the reduction of police levels, please.

2 A. Yes. This paragraph stated that police numbers would be reduced

3 to the levels in Kosovo of February 1998. At paragraph 5, it was stated

4 that the VJ would return to barracks except for three company-sized teams,

5 which I would estimate then and now as equating to a force of about 400

6 men in total, three company-sized teams to protect communication lines in

7 specific locations. And further, at paragraph 8, that VJ and MUP

8 commanders, that is army and police commanders, were to supply weekly

9 reports of the manning, weapons, and activities, and to immediately notify

10 the KDOMs and the OSCE of any deployments that were contrary to these

11 provisions.

12 On the basis of those three statements made in the agreement, we

13 continually requested, firstly, baseline statements and, secondly, updates

14 of those baseline statements on army and police deployments. And they

15 were met in -- we never got a real baseline statement, and we very rarely

16 got statements of -- of deployments as they happened.

17 Q. I'll deal with what were and what was the history of KDOMs quite

18 shortly, but let's turn to tab 4 first. OTP reference 1428. Is this the

19 third working document of the mission?

20 A. Yes. Yes, it is.

21 Q. The basis for another agreement made on the 25th of October,

22 limiting the number of police in its checkpoints and observation posts.

23 We can see that document there. So your comment on this?

24 A. This document again was one that we referred to quite a lot. It

25 was unclear at the time, and I never found out whether it was supposed to

1 be a one-off agreement or not which only reflected the situation in

2 October of 1998, but we used it as a benchmark for seeing the level of

3 occupation of these -- of these checkpoints, and we specifically, in early

4 January 1999, did a simultaneous check of all of the locations and found

5 that the majority of them were manned at that time on a basis which

6 appeared to us to be continuous when we -- when we checked it later. So

7 it was not the case that only one-third were being manned.

8 Q. Now, that document, being dated the 25th of October, takes us

9 slightly ahead of where we've reached in your history of events. Just

10 picking it up, and very briefly, at paragraph 14. You went on a

11 fact-finding mission on the 17th of October?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. You attended a meeting - paragraph 15 - in Belgrade. And in 16,

14 you can tell us that, at that meeting, somebody who introduced himself as

15 an Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs and the Serbian OSCE liaison

16 person, Mrs. Ratkovic, were present?

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. And were you the subject of requests at that meeting that you were

19 unable or disinclined to answer?

20 A. Yes. The purpose of our going to Belgrade and down to Pristina

21 was to see what the conditions were in order to plan the mission, and it

22 was very much a fact-finding mission. We were not given the authority to

23 negotiate on the specifics of the agreement, and I believe that the

24 meeting that I attended in Belgrade was intended to discuss the fine print

25 of the agreement which, as I say, I was -- I was not authorised, nor was

1 Sandrock who was with me, authorised to discuss that.

2 This was less than 48 hours after I had actually arrived in

3 Vienna, and so I was very much not in a position to do any serious

4 negotiating at that point. So we were asking questions rather than --

5 rather than discussing the fine point of the agreement.

6 Q. Paragraph 17 and what you sought in relation to safe passage or

7 clear passage.

8 A. Yes. We had quite a long shopping list of what we needed in order

9 to set the mission up quickly. It included requests for accommodation;

10 full sets of maps; identification of where there were likely to be mines;

11 a speeded-up procedure for the issue of visas, because then and later we

12 were only getting single-entry visas, which considerably hampered us; and

13 a statement on freedom of movement both for our staff and equipment we

14 wanted to bring in.

15 We also wanted to be sure that the -- the VJ and the MUP on the

16 ground in Kosovo knew that we were coming, because we were going to drive

17 down from Belgrade to Pristina the next morning, and we wanted no

18 interference over issue -- over whether or not we had the right

19 documentation or something like that, which was something we were

20 concerned about.

21 Q. Just in a couple of sentences, as you've dealt with on paragraph

22 17 and 18, satisfactory or unsatisfactory arrangements and as to visas.

23 A. We got a satisfactory arrangement as far as the people on the

24 ground being aware of who we were and that we were coming. As far as

25 visas were concerned, we continued to have problems, and it was always

1 slow, and we never got a really quick and satisfactory way of getting

2 multi-entry visas for our staff. And that would often delay the arrival

3 of key people by up to two weeks.

4 Q. Paragraph -- sorry. Paragraph 19, just one point. On arrival and

5 following discussions with, amongst others, the UK military attache, John

6 Crossland, what was your understanding or assumption about the number of

7 chains of command that you would see in operation on the ground?

8 A. At that time in October 1998, John Crossland said to me that it

9 was his understanding, having been in the area for over a year, that there

10 were two separate chains of command operating; one for the army and one

11 for the police.

12 Q. Summarising 20 through to 22 or 3, you drove from Serbia to

13 Pristina and found the reaction of the population negative and sometimes

14 threatening.

15 A. Yes, that was the case. It was particularly difficult when in

16 the -- in the towns along the way, particularly as we got closer to

17 Kosovo, that the local population were quite hostile and made gestures to

18 us as we -- as we sat at the traffic lights.

19 Q. The identifying colour of your vehicles being?

20 A. At this stage, they were white.

21 Q. Later?

22 A. Later, because we had identification problems and ended up with a

23 white vehicle being shot at as it drove into the back of a firefight

24 between MUP and the Kosovo Liberation Army, and the MUP had got a mix of

25 blue, green, and white vehicles, I recommended and it was agreed that we

1 should repaint our white vehicles into orange since that was a much more

2 distinctive colour and was useful both when the snow was on the ground and

3 when it was not on the ground. So we turned to orange.

4 Q. In Pristina - paragraph 23 and 24 - did you meet the head of

5 something called the Temporary Executive Counsel, Zoran Andjelkovic?

6 A. We did.

7 Q. Your view, rapidly, as to his true authority and power?

8 A. He introduced himself as the head of the temporary government and

9 the Executive Council, but we never managed to get any action out of him.

10 He did not appear to actually have any executive authority, and he

11 certainly never actually produced any results for us. And we felt that he

12 was simply a symbol, a figurehead. He also found -- we became aware that

13 he was summoned back to Belgrade later in October, but we never found out

14 the purpose of it, and certainly his demeanour and his ability to produce

15 results did not improve as a result.

16 Q. Paragraph 25. Was he, along with people like Ambassador Walker,

17 to be on something called the Commission of Cooperation? Was that a body

18 that existed but, in your view, withered on the vine?

19 A. Yes, that is the case.

20 Q. But of no great consequence?

21 A. Nothing ever came out of it. No action ever came out of it, and

22 so I have to say that the meetings became very infrequent because they

23 produced no result. It was -- the commission was called into being one

24 last time in early March of 1999, after an incident on the border in which

25 a serious breach of the Vienna Convention had taken place with regard to

1 some of our people and their vehicles, and so a meeting was convened under

2 this -- the authority of this group, which bore all the hallmarks of all

3 of the previous meetings; namely, it had a lot of people, it went on for a

4 long time, and produced no result.

5 Q. Tab 5, very shortly. In Pristina, were there four main Serbian

6 authority buildings: the civil administration building and the public

7 police headquarters, to which you did have access; the army headquarters

8 and the main police headquarters, to which, to your knowledge, no OSCE

9 people ever had access?

10 A. That is correct. I apologise for the scruffiness of the sketch.

11 I'd have done better if I'd realised it was going to be produced here.

12 Q. Nevertheless, there's a sketch of that, if it ever becomes

13 relevant, and we can move on in your statement.

14 We needn't trouble with the listing of representatives. They're

15 there if others want to ask about them.

16 Paragraph 29. On the 29th of October of 1998, did you drive from

17 Pristina to Pec?

18 A. I did, yes.

19 Q. Noticing, as to police presence, what?

20 A. Yes. The police presence was extensive on the ground along the

21 roads that I used, but while there were checkpoints, we were waved

22 straight through them. However, the police presence was more than I had

23 expected.

24 Q. Uniforms and markings on uniforms?

25 A. All of the police I saw wore blue uniforms, which I expected, and

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1 had the word "Policija," normally in white lettering, somewhere about the

2 uniforms; sometimes on the back, sometimes on the front. Some of

3 them - and it seemed to correspond with the fact that they were getting

4 more heavily armed as we went west towards Pec - but some of the police

5 then had the word "Milicija" on their uniforms, but again this

6 was -- these were mainly blue uniforms.

7 Q. During the drive, which I think took some five hours, what did you

8 observe about people working in the fields?

9 A. The journey was remarkable in that there was nobody in the fields

10 whatsoever, and this being October, I would have expected people to have

11 been working in the fields, particularly since the area that I drove

12 through was a mainly agricultural area. There was only one place where I

13 met or saw an Albanian outside of his house, and he was driving a tractor

14 within a village, and he was in quite a hurry to move on so was

15 disinclined to stop and chat to me.

16 Q. Did you, in fact - paragraph 31 - get directed by him to a family

17 home?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And this is on the eastern edge, I think, of Decani.

20 A. That's correct.

21 Q. You approached Pec from the south?

22 A. Yes. I went to Pec and then turned south and drove south down the

23 Pec-to-Prizren road; and within Decani, where there had been a lot of

24 destruction, I turned east and went to the eastern edge of the village,

25 where I found a family that was prepared to open their doors and show me

1 what state they were living in.

2 Q. Your observations, please.

3 A. Throughout the whole village of Decani, all of the courtyard gates

4 were closed, locked, barred, and bolted, in effect, or if they were open,

5 it was because they were destroyed to some degree; they had been forced

6 open.

7 The family that I met who were prepared to let me into their

8 courtyard and talk to me were living in one downstairs room of their house

9 because the roof of the house had been burned, and so they -- and the

10 windows were out, and so they were living in this one room with plastic

11 over their windows. I was able to speak with them because one of the

12 family spoke some German and I speak German.

13 Q. Same journey but now on the Pristina-Pec road, what observations

14 did you make, with your military experience, of damage there?

15 A. Throughout the journey, there was a constant -- there were

16 constant signs of any position from which anyone could possibly have taken

17 cover in order to dominate the road had been knocked down. In particular,

18 walls -- the walls that were between a village and the road, perhaps 100

19 or 200 metres from the road, those walls had all been knocked down. So

20 the walls that were parallel to the road, that might have afforded cover,

21 had generally been knocked down systematically. You would expect that to

22 be done by forces that were concerned for their safety and worried about

23 being ambushed.

24 Q. Did you make another observation - paragraph 33, I think something

25 you added in the time you were here before Easter - did you make another

1 observation about bridges and the military significance of what you saw or

2 didn't see about the bridges?

3 A. Yes. I was particularly struck by the fact that all of the

4 bridges were standing, and obviously this was in contrast to my previous

5 experience in Bosnia. And as an engineer, I'm well aware of the benefits

6 that having a good road system, well-bridged, gives to a force which has

7 superior mobility to the people it's fighting. So given that the Yugoslav

8 forces were quite mobile, I was surprised that no attempt appeared to have

9 been made to knock any of the bridges down by the insurgents in order to

10 reduce the mobility of the Yugoslav forces. It would certainly have

11 reduced the ability of the Yugoslav forces to move rapidly from one area

12 to another, and therefore would have reduced their capability to a

13 degree. From this, I concluded that, certainly at this stage, the UCK,

14 the Kosovo Liberation Army, did not have the resources or the expertise to

15 demolish bridges.

16 Q. Thank you. Your impressions of Pristina and its inhabitants,

17 please. Paragraph 34.

18 A. Yes. It was certainly bustling when we arrived in October 1998;

19 however, as you walked around the place, you noticed that a lot of people,

20 and in particular, those who were dressed in the distinctive dress of the

21 Kosovar Albanians, appeared rather cowed and did not make eye contact with

22 us as we walked around.

23 Q. Linked to that general observation, and from contact with Serbs,

24 what did you judge their -- what was your reception by Serbs or, indeed,

25 by Kosovar Albanians at that time?

1 A. The general degree of reception we got was welcoming, really from

2 all sides, because we got the impression that there was a very real

3 feeling that NATO bombing had been imminent and that that risk had passed

4 with the agreement to deploy the Kosovo Verification Mission. So they

5 were really quite pleased to see us at most levels, certainly at official

6 levels.

7 Q. On the 21st of October, you returned to Vienna, being appointed

8 one of the deputy heads of mission on the 2nd of November, coming back to

9 Pristina on the 23rd of November?

10 A. That's correct. And in between those times, I was in Vienna,

11 putting together the plan to deploy the Kosovo Verification Mission and

12 starting to procure equipment and to call forward individuals who had been

13 offered by the nations.

14 Q. Itself a major logistical exercise, I think.

15 A. Yes, particularly because the OSCE deploys missions by putting

16 them together on an individual-by-individual basis. It's not like a

17 military unit where you've got, you know, a hundred people with vehicles,

18 with rations, with radios, with tentage, able to drive down the road or

19 get into a transport aircraft and get off the other end and start to be

20 effective. We had to procure every vehicle, every radio, we had to

21 procure the accommodation they were going to live in --

22 Q. Right.

23 A. -- and so on. So it was much more tedious and slow.

24 Q. Two things from paragraph 37, or one perhaps: The primary role of

25 the OSCE, KVM in relation to verification and elections, please.

1 A. Yes. Stemming directly from the original agreement, the role was

2 to liaise with the relevant authorities, to supervise an election, and to

3 conduct arms verification and verification of forces in the field.

4 Q. The framework of the organisation - paragraph 38, but only in

5 summary - was that there were a number of deputy heads of mission, each

6 with an appointed liaison function allocated by Ambassador Walker?

7 A. That is correct. I was given the job of Deputy Head of Mission

8 for Operations, but other deputies were given the task of liaising with

9 the Serbian authorities, specifically, liaising over police, liaising with

10 the Albanian community, and so on.

11 Q. We can just note that you've listed the people concerned and go

12 straight to paragraph 43. There was no appointment, in relation to police

13 and justice, until a later stage, namely, late December 1998?

14 A. That is correct. There was something of a hiatus over the

15 appointment of the deputy who was to be principally responsible for

16 policing matters. As a result of that, the nomination that was accepted

17 by the OSCE didn't take place until late December, and the individual

18 concerned arrived quite late in January. So until then, I found myself

19 dealing with police matters as well, despite the fact that it wasn't quite

20 what I thought I was going to be doing.

21 Q. And that then brings me to the conclusion of the end of paragraph

22 45. Having this additional role thrust on you, were you able to form a

23 view about the level of cooperation between the police and the VJ?

24 A. Yes. As I said, it is -- it was not originally my job, and it

25 came my way because nobody else was doing it and it interfaced with what

1 we were doing with the Yugoslav army anyway.

2 And in doing so, it became increasingly apparent that what the

3 police were doing was to an increasing extent interlocked with what the

4 army was doing. And so over the period that I was in Kosovo, it became

5 clear to me that the police and the army began to function more closely

6 for operations rather than operating as two separate bodies with two

7 separate chains of command. So their chains of command seemed to coalesce

8 over the period that I was there.

9 Q. Paragraph 47 and on. In your role as Deputy Head of Mission -

10 Operations, assisting Ambassador Walker, were you also to absorb what were

11 the various KDOMs?

12 A. Yes. That was the --

13 Q. And so could you just explain what they were, and very briefly,

14 because it will probably save time, run through the substance of the

15 paragraphs that deal with which KDOMs were absorbed and which weren't.

16 A. Yes. The KDOMs were called the Kosovo Diplomatic Observer

17 Missions, and they were set up as, in effect, forward outposts of the

18 various embassies in Belgrade which reported directly back to the various

19 embassies in Belgrade and operated on the ground. They were put together

20 quite quickly in the late summer of 1998 and were primarily military

21 people who were simply ordered through national channels to go to Belgrade

22 and then deploy from Belgrade. They -- their mandate was limited simply

23 to reporting, and they were on the ground in some strength in October 1998

24 when I first arrived.

25 The biggest player in this was the US-KDOM which, as I have said,

1 reported in a straight line -- was commanded, in effect, by the US

2 embassy. There was a UK, a British KDOM reporting to the British embassy,

3 and then we later saw a French, a Russian, and a Canadian KDOM of varying

4 sizes.

5 They had good vehicles, good communications, but they didn't

6 really cooperate with one another. They certainly didn't coordinate

7 particularly well when I first saw them in October, and so you tended to

8 either see -- see five of them or none. The --

9 Q. As to -- sorry. Yes.

10 A. Of the -- the intention was that as the Kosovo Verification

11 Mission was built up, that the KDOMs would be folded into and taken over

12 by and absorbed within the Kosovo Verification Mission. This happened to

13 a degree. We absorbed the UK-KDOM and the French KDOM and the Russian and

14 the Canadian KDOM over various periods of time. The US-KDOM built up to

15 about -- first to 60 and then to about 120, and we absorbed some of the

16 US-KDOM but not all, and a proportion of the US-KDOM remained independent

17 all through our time in Kosovo.

18 There was also an EU-KDOM which, again, remained independent

19 although it was not very big.

20 Q. And as a result?

21 A. The result of all of the KDOMs was, frankly, a degree of

22 inefficiency, because they -- while we talked to them, we didn't totally

23 share all information, they not with us, and it tended to confuse the

24 issue. The reason given for the US-KDOM keeping some people as dedicated

25 was to assist Ambassador Hill in his diplomatic efforts, and in order to

1 do that, about 30 were kept as the remnant of the US-KDOM.

2 Q. Paragraph 52. The police structure in the province was a five

3 regional structure -- I beg your pardon. The structure of the province

4 was five regional, but the police had seven; is that correct?

5 A. Yes. This was because some of the areas were of a size - long and

6 thin - that would make it difficult to -- to get to places if they were

7 all being deployed from one central location.

8 Q. So the five police units -- or the seven police units were,

9 please?

10 A. There was one for each of the five regions, but then one of the

11 regions which was long and thin had Pristina in the north and Urosevac in

12 the south, and so a separate police force was based in Urosevac and

13 another one was at based at Djakovica.

14 Q. Thank you. The other four regions apart from Pristina being

15 Prizren, Pec --

16 A. -- Mitrovica and Gnjilane.

17 Q. Did the KVM establish five Regional Centres?

18 A. Yes. We mirrored the administrative backgrounds to the greatest

19 extent possible because obviously there were regional officials that we

20 needed to deal with, and so we followed the existing regional boundaries

21 to the greatest extent possible. And then below the regional level at

22 each -- we intended to establish a smaller centre subordinate to the

23 Regional Centre at each opstina. We called those coordination centres.

24 The idea simply was to have so many people on the ground that

25 whenever something happened, we would always have people within a few

1 minutes to be able to get there, or patrol based on a very local area so

2 that they built up their knowledge of the area and established good

3 working relations with the people in the area.

4 Q. Paragraph 54 and just in general. At that stage, night-time

5 patrolling by the KVM easy or difficult?

6 A. It was dangerous because, having decided we would have orange

7 vehicles, that only worked in the day. And obviously all vehicles at

8 night are black, and therefore, we were, I was, reluctant that we should

9 patrol at night until the situation stopped being as volatile as it was.

10 The result was that, it being winter with only about 10 hours of daylight,

11 there was a lot of patrolling in the day by the Kosovo Verification

12 Mission and really not very much at night. And I think both -- both sides

13 took advantage of this.

14 Q. Paragraph 56. Briefly, please, explain the last sentence of that

15 paragraph which follows on from a meeting you had with Sean Burns, head of

16 US-KDOM. The last sentence speaks of threats to kill made by the KLA.

17 Can you just help us with that?

18 A. Yes. It was our understanding that one of the reasons why there

19 was no agreement with the Albanian -- the Kosovo Albanians, which we hoped

20 would have matched the -- the agreement that had been already signed in

21 Belgrade in October was that there was a publicly -- a publicly-known

22 threat that any Kosovo Albanian who did a deal with Ambassador Hill or

23 with anybody else in the international community to restrain the

24 activities of the Kosovo Liberation Army would be killed. And certainly

25 there was then no agreement with the Albanian side at any level, and this,

1 I believe, was a factor.

2 Q. In paragraph 57, you deal with an administrative delay to the

3 establishment of KVM that you believed to be intentional, but I needn't

4 trouble you with the detail of that. You can answer questions about it if

5 asked.

6 Can we then move, in paragraph 59, to the structure that enabled

7 you to -- and others at the head of the mission to pick up reports.

8 A. Yes. Firstly, in -- set -- in choosing somewhere to operate from,

9 and we obviously needed big premises, sort of bank premises were

10 typically -- banks or hotels were typically good buildings, and in order

11 to do this, contracts had to be set up and agreed. And this took a long

12 time and certainly was not done as quickly as possible, and this was

13 another of the factors in delaying everything. And most of the -- since

14 most of the property was owned -- was owned by the state, these contracts

15 all went back to Belgrade, and again all of this took longer, and we never

16 really detected any -- any wish to do this more quickly or to expedite the

17 process.

18 In setting ourselves up to work on the ground, at each level, at

19 the Regional Centre level and at my level in Pristina, three people were

20 appointed; one to deal with the VJ as a liaison officer on a daily basis,

21 one to deal with the MUP, and one to deal with the Kosovo Liberation

22 Army. These people were -- were specially selected as our -- the best

23 people we had because we relied on them very much for their view of what

24 might happen next.

25 Q. You've set out the names in your statement. I'm not going to ask

1 you to give all those names at this stage.

2 Paragraph 63. I think your general pattern in meetings was to

3 have notes taken for you. Is that correct?

4 A. Yes. Firstly so that I could remind myself later, and obviously I

5 would pass copies of those -- the notes of the meeting to the Head of

6 Mission and the deputies so that we kept as coordinated as possible. We

7 obviously met at the beginning of each day, but from -- from those

8 meetings at the beginning of each day, several of us would go away with a

9 shopping list of things to do, and it was important that we kept everybody

10 else informed of what was going on. So notes were taken, and the record

11 was circulated as quickly as possible.

12 Q. The position -- paragraph 64, the position in Pristina, so far as

13 MUP liaison was concerned, was that there was a daily 9.00 meeting at the

14 police station.

15 A. That's correct.

16 Q. Typically what happened?

17 A. The normal -- in fact, almost -- on almost every occasion, the

18 meeting was a list of a police view of what had happened over the past 24

19 hours, which tended to be, "An attack took place by the UCK at this place,

20 shots were fired," and so on. And there was not an ability to discuss

21 what the police deployment was. This was asked for but was very, very

22 seldom given. Nor were future -- future changes to deployment ever

23 notified in advance. So it was not an information exchange, and it was

24 certainly not the sort of meeting that we had anticipated we would be

25 going to.

1 Q. Paragraph 65 and 6, a word or so about Sreten Lukic, please.

2 A. Sreten Lukic identified himself as the police general in Kosovo,

3 and he generally regarded himself above dealing with liaison officers. I

4 managed to get into his presence on occasion, but it was a rare thing for

5 anyone to be allowed into the presence of Lukic, and one certainly was not

6 able to have discussions of substance there.

7 Q. I think your view at the time, based on military experience and

8 possibly experience of communist regimes, was that the Serbian authorities

9 would probably have been creating daily situation reports.

10 A. Yes, that is correct. We certainly did, and we felt that this was

11 taking place with the people with whom we met. Typically at meetings,

12 long lists of -- were read selectively from pre-prepared reports, which

13 appeared often to be a report of what had been happening over the past day

14 or days.

15 Q. Tab 6, please. Thank you. OTP reference 1439, a document you had

16 not seen, I think --

17 A. Yes, that's correct.

18 Q. -- until shortly before Easter of this year. A document headed

19 "The Republic of Serbia, Ministry of the Interior, Police Station Pec,

20 dated the 28th of December, 1998." Your observations on it?

21 A. I have not seen this before when I saw it just before Easter, but

22 it certainly supports my view that there were daily situation reports

23 generated by the Serbian authorities, but if you read this, you'll find

24 that its purpose is to show what the OSCE is doing rather than actually

25 assist the OSCE. So we were described in terms, if not of enemy forces,

1 certainly not of friendly forces.

2 JUDGE KWON: General DZ, are you able to read Serbian?

3 THE WITNESS: No, I'm afraid not, so I've relied on the

4 translations.

5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

6 MR. NICE:

7 Q. Paragraph 68, the Fusion Centre. Couple of sentences, please.

8 A. The Fusion Centre was our attempt to bring all of the different

9 strands of -- of information and fact that were reported and to try to use

10 them to create an overall picture and then to try to work out what might

11 happen next. In other words, to identify trends. It was also the formal

12 basis on which the Head of Mission would decide whether or not we were

13 dealing with formal compliance or non-compliance to the OSCE/FRY

14 agreement, because we were very concerned that individuals on the ground

15 should not, in effect, be able to declare whether or not an incident was

16 compliance or non-compliance.

17 We certainly felt at the start that there would be relatively few

18 incidents that would amount to formal non-compliance and that this was a

19 prerogative that should be dealt with at head-of-mission level so that he

20 could then formally put the opinion together that went to Belgrade and to

21 Vienna to say that, "This is so bad that I formally --" "I," the Head of

22 Mission, "declare it to be non-compliance."

23 In order to do this, the facts as seen from Pristina were put

24 together overnight, every night, by the Fusion Centre, and this was

25 referred to loosely by us as "the Blue Book," which was circulated to the

1 Head of Mission and his deputies for his morning meeting.

2 Q. I think that on the 18th of November, Ambassador Walker told you

3 that General Dusan Loncar had been appointed coordinator --

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. -- for the FRY liaison to OSCE; is that correct?

6 A. Yes, it is. My impression was that Loncar was appointed because

7 Andjelkovic was being ineffective. There was also a connection between

8 Loncar and Walker in that Loncar had dealt with Walker in Eastern Slavonia

9 when Loncar was there and Walker was the UN head of the -- the head of the

10 UN mission there.

11 Q. We may have to take things in a little more summary form because

12 of time, General, but paragraph 70, your judgement or your opinion about

13 General Loncar?

14 A. Loncar was very well-informed. He certainly appeared to have good

15 communications with people in the field and was generally one of the first

16 to know when something happened. He also seemed better able to get

17 decisions from Belgrade, and either as a result of a telephone call, or he

18 sometimes said to me that he had just spent the night driving up to

19 Belgrade and driving back down.

20 Q. Your attitude towards meeting the KLA was that you, I think,

21 because of your particular function, preferred not to. We'll explain that

22 in a second. You first met them in January of 1999, I think, KLA

23 commanders.

24 A. Yes. I felt that it was not going to be helpful to my relations

25 with the senior Serb officials for me to be seen with KLA commanders, who

1 were known to use television quite skillfully, and so I didn't want to be

2 seen in a compromising position with them, and I had got people whose only

3 job it was to deal on a day-to-day basis with them. It was also the

4 impression that was around from the turn of the year that Walker was

5 perceived, certainly by the Serbs, as being anti-Serbian, and therefore he

6 increasingly became reluctant to deal with the Serbian authorities.

7 Q. We'll move on to paragraph 73. I don't think I need trouble you

8 with 72. 73. I think you were due to meet Serbian Chief of Staff Perisic

9 in Belgrade on the 27th of November, or thereabouts, but in fact you

10 discovered he had been dismissed.

11 A. That's correct, and the meeting went ahead with General Ojdanic.

12 The purpose of the meeting was to seek a baseline of where everything was

13 and what the deployment of the VJ was in Kosovo, to get a detailed

14 statement that we could use as the basis for our verification and

15 subsequent inspections. This never actually arrived, and we ended up

16 having to base our knowledge, such as it was, on an arms-control document

17 that had previously been made available to the OSCE in a different

18 context, but it was agreed that that should be used by us.

19 Q. However, from that meeting, did you make discoveries about

20 intended and undertaken military training?

21 A. Yes. One of the issues was how many people were out of barracks,

22 how many soldiers were out of barracks, and at this point it was stated

23 that normal training outside barracks would be -- would now be undertaken

24 and that soldiers would be rotated in and out of Kosovo; that is, soldiers

25 stationed outside Kosovo would be moved into Kosovo, and soldiers

1 stationed in Kosovo would be moved out of Kosovo. In that context, I said

2 that it was important that we knew what the training areas were, and were

3 told: "Noted."

4 It appeared, in the end, that these training areas were not formal

5 training areas that actually existed as military lands on any map but that

6 they were simply training over open land, and quite often training very

7 close to villages where a KLA presence was known to be. And of course, if

8 you drive past in a tank and someone shoots at you, you're then able to

9 respond in self-defence. And the way this training was carried out was

10 certainly intimidating to the local population, and as our time in -- as

11 we spent longer in Kosovo, the degree to which training started to take

12 place outside barracks increased on a quite dramatic scale.

13 In terms of rotation of people, I discussed this at the time and

14 said that while this was feasible, it would need to be verified so that we

15 knew that when X people went out, X people came in. And this was not used

16 in order to increase troop strengths in Kosovo, which obviously was one of

17 the factors in the October agreements. And therefore, I attempted to set

18 up a mechanism for being there when this happened, and this was flatly

19 refused at the time.

20 Q. I think you sought a meeting with a Pristina Corps Commander on

21 this topic, Pavkovic, and that was refused.

22 A. That's correct. I said if -- basically said to Ojdanic that if

23 this is below his level, then can I please talk to the man on the ground

24 whose job it is, and was told that no, I couldn't.

25 Q. Before we part from paragraph 78, you've told us about the

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1 cooperation between the MUP and the VJ and the strengthening of the

2 command link.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. What was your view, nevertheless, about --

5 A. My --

6 Q. -- or otherwise of chains of command?

7 A. Yes. The chain of command -- from the time that Ojdanic took

8 over, the chain of command links between the army and the police seemed to

9 strengthen gradually. I had been given the impression in conversation

10 that the predecessor, Perisic, had been keen to retain some space between

11 the actions of the army and the actions of the police, but over my time in

12 Kosovo, there appeared to be a stronger link developing as time went on.

13 Q. Paragraph 82, perhaps. No, I don't think I need trouble you with

14 that. Yes, I need. It was at the meeting on the 4th of December, in

15 Pristina, that Loncar - paragraph 84 - made criticisms of KVM?

16 A. Yes. This was a meeting at which, rather than try to work out

17 what we were going to do next, we had a long list of everything that had

18 happened that had been bad since October, and my point there was that we

19 had not been on the ground in October, despite the agreement having been

20 signed, and that my intention was to talk about how we were going to work

21 in the future rather than trawl over the history of it.

22 Q. Loncar, on one occasion, I think, answered the telephone.

23 A. Yes. And in explaining to us that he needed to stay on the

24 telephone rather than just simply say, "I'll ring you back later," he

25 said, "It's Sainovic." So it was clear to me that he was being rung up to

1 be given instructions, but having taken the phone call, there was no

2 reference to it when we returned to the meeting.

3 Q. Paragraphs 86. Loncar identified areas of concern: the Decani

4 area, which was said to be heavily mined; Malisevo, which was said to be

5 tense and said to be the centre of KLA activity, from which residents had

6 been driven; and Podujevo. Correct?

7 A. Yes. The first two, Decani and Malisevo, are in the west of

8 Kosovo and had been areas where there had been a lot of violence over the

9 summer.

10 Podujevo was new to us, and this was important because it was

11 north of Pristina, on the Pristina-to-Nis road, and was essentially the

12 umbilical cord between Pristina and the rest of Serbia. And there started

13 to be opportunistic action by the Kosovo Liberation Army moving forward to

14 dominate the road and to carry out random shootings at vehicles on the

15 road, which was obviously of great concern to General Loncar.

16 It was certainly the fact that positions which had been

17 established by the VJ in the summer and which had been vacated as a result

18 of the October agreement by the VJ when the VJ had gone back to barracks

19 were gradually being occupied by the Kosovo Liberation Army, and General

20 Loncar was obviously very concerned that we should go and get the Kosovo

21 Liberation Army to move out and to not adopt this opportunistic action.

22 Q. I think he was also interested in the way KVM would describe and

23 even denounce the KLA.

24 A. Yes. He always referred to them as "the so-called KLA" and as

25 "terrorists." I attempted to not use quite such emotional language and

1 tended to refer to them as "the insurgents," which I felt described them

2 in a way that was accurate but not emotional.

3 Q. By this time, in December, you say in paragraph 89, the KVM were

4 not yet engaged in regular contact with the KLA, but that was to come

5 later, you being short of vehicles at the time --

6 A. That's correct.

7 Q. -- so short of vehicles that, some six weeks after the signing of

8 the agreement, you were still not verifying in the way that you had been

9 required to do.

10 A. That's correct, and it goes back to the need to build up the

11 mission. We had to go to the vehicle manufacturers and say, "How many

12 vehicles have you got on your outpark? Can we buy them quickly?"

13 Q. We needn't trouble with the details on that.

14 JUDGE MAY: Is that a convenient moment? It's now 11.00.

15 General Drewienkiewicz, during this and any other adjournment,

16 would you please remember not to speak to anybody about your

17 evidence - that does include members of the Prosecution team - not until

18 it's over. Thank you very much.

19 We'll adjourn for half an hour; half past 11.00.

20 --- Recess taken at 11.00 a.m.

21 --- On resuming at 11.30 a.m.

22 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

23 MR. NICE:

24 Q. I think on the 9th of December you went and made an inspection of

25 the Pristina Brigade barracks; is that correct?

1 A. That is correct, yes.

2 Q. Tell us about that in a couple of sentences.

3 A. I started off by telling General Loncar I was going to do this and

4 asked him if he wanted to come with me, and he said no, he wouldn't. So I

5 took a group of verifiers to the barracks. We got as far as the front

6 gate and said, "We are coming in to make an inspection," and that was

7 denied. So we waited at the gate of the barracks, and eventually the base

8 commander came to the -- to the barracks gate and we discussed the need to

9 do inspections. I explained to him that this was important in view of the

10 various agreements that had been made, and he said that he was not

11 remotely interested in it.

12 I stayed there for an hour and a half, during which time we

13 continued not to be allowed in. Eventually, we gave up and drove round

14 the barracks very visibly taking photos over the wire to attempt to

15 establish the level of equipment actually held in the barracks.

16 Q. Yes. And then on the evening, that evening, you went to a

17 meeting, I think, in a restaurant, the top floor of the OSCE in Pristina?

18 A. Yes. This was a major meeting between the Head of Mission and

19 Deputy Prime Minister Sainovic with General Loncar and myself also

20 present. The purpose of the meeting was to attempt to speed up the

21 process of getting KVM requests approved and facilitated, and it had no

22 effect at all. Deputy Prime Minister Sainovic rejected all the requests

23 and -- and read out a long list of complaints, of his concerns about what

24 the international community was doing. He specifically said that we

25 should stop supporting the Kosovo Liberation Army and that the

1 international community should cut off monetary support for the Kosovo

2 Liberation Army from the western banking system.

3 There was no doubt in my mind that the person who was senior on

4 the Serbian side was Deputy Prime Minister Sainovic. And my eyes met the

5 eyes of General Loncar at several moments when Deputy Prime Minister

6 Sainovic was haranguing the international community, and I noted that

7 General Loncar was grimacing at some of the more outrageous statements.

8 Q. Bo Pellnas was your liaison to the government --

9 A. That's correct.

10 Q. -- in Belgrade, and paragraph 93, very briefly, he, I think,

11 identified Sainovic as the person you were to deal with. And just as a

12 slightly earlier, out of sequence matter, I think in November -- 23rd of

13 November, Walker had written a particular letter of request to which you

14 attached some significance.

15 A. Yes. This was a letter which I had had a hand in the drafting of

16 in which it was specifically stated what Walker proposed to do in order to

17 fulfil his mandate. This letter was written to Milosevic because it was

18 felt that he was the correct level to deal with. There was subsequently

19 complaints from Sainovic that Walker should have not been so forward as to

20 send that particular letter, but that was what happened.

21 Q. And I think your overall impression about Walker and his access to

22 the accused was what?

23 A. Walker felt that he should have been granted more access to the

24 accused. Walker felt that he was being fobbed off with people at a lower

25 level when there were issues that should rightly have been dealt with at

1 the highest level. The result was that those people that Walker dealt

2 with were able or quite often claimed that a particular request was above

3 their -- above their level of competence, which obviously would have been

4 avoided had Walker had more regular access to the accused.

5 Q. Ninety-six and then 94. You organised the inspection -- or 95 and

6 94 -- or 96, to follow the pattern described to Ojdanic on the 27th of

7 November, and you waited two weeks, I think, before going to Prizren to

8 inspect the barracks there.

9 A. Yes. I was concerned that we should not attempt to do anything

10 before there had been an opportunity for orders to be passed down chains

11 of command and indeed for discussions to take place, and so it was not

12 quite two weeks before we actually went and attempted to do our first

13 inspection. Again, prior to doing the inspection, I had a meeting in

14 Pristina where again we -- we wanted to lay down the modalities for doing

15 the inspections.

16 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 98. On the 14th of December, there was a

17 ceasefire breach.

18 A. Yes. This occurred close to the Albanian border, broadly between

19 Prizren and the Albanian border. We first got reports via Loncar's office

20 that several terrorists had been killed, and this information came to us

21 via Bo Pellnas's office in Belgrade as well, who got it from Sainovic.

22 At that point, the KVM were invited to go and see what had

23 happened. We contacted the KVM at Prizren and told them to get some

24 people down there. The patrols went to the scene of the action and got

25 there several hours after it had happened, obviously in the daylight. The

1 patrols, my people, were able to confirm that there had been a firefight

2 in the area which had appeared to have been in the hours of darkness, in

3 the early hours of that morning. My people were taken to three specific

4 locations where they observed dead bodies and a lot of equipment.

5 The action appeared to have been between a Kosovo Liberation Army

6 resupply column which had walked into a VJ position which was an ambush.

7 The KLA were fired at, and they then withdrew and eventually 34 KLA

8 members were killed in -- over the period of the ambush. And it was

9 reported that nine Albanians, nine Kosovo Liberation Army members, had

10 been taken prisoner, including one female. The patrols photographed the

11 bodies which were in three broad locations but were given no sight of the

12 prisoners.

13 At a later date, the prisoners reoccur in the --

14 Q. Yes.

15 A. -- in the statement. But shall I leave it at that for the

16 moment?

17 Q. Leave it -- all right.

18 A. At the time we concluded, and I still believe that this was a

19 legitimate ambush, but we did have some concerns that not all 34 of the

20 people that were killed were killed during the ambush or whether this was

21 a subsequent hunting down and killing. But it was a fact that most of the

22 Kosovo Liberation Army people that we photographed were wearing KLA

23 uniforms. And we subsequently were told that there had been 145 people in

24 this resupply column. That was consistent with the number of backpacks

25 and the like that were found at the scene and was subsequently confirmed

1 by the accounts of the KLA who had been taken prisoner.

2 Q. Paragraph 101, Prizren was advised of this incident by the Brigade

3 Commander, Bozidar Delic.

4 A. Yes. He -- he was seen by us -- this brigade commander was seen

5 by us as the man on the ground whose forces were most constantly in -- in

6 contact with -- with the Kosovo Liberation Army, having clashes with

7 them. And we -- we felt he was one of the more skilled brigade

8 commanders. It was a difficult area, and we felt he did know his job.

9 Q. He had contacts with the KLA, which in your judgement were

10 different in quality from the contacts or non-contacts --

11 A. Yes. By "contact" I mean not meetings with but fights with. His

12 forces fought with.

13 Q. Yes.

14 A. Further east, in the Urosevac area, there appeared to be a far

15 lower level of military activity, and the -- the VJ and MUP forces

16 appeared to have far -- far less contact and hence experience in dealing

17 with the Kosovo Liberation Army. And it is my view that this is one of

18 the reasons why events at Racak got out of hand, because it is, in my

19 view, quite possible that the commander on the ground was not as

20 experienced as the man in the Prizren area.

21 Q. Paragraph 102. Same day, 14th of December, a shooting at the

22 Serbian Panda Bar in Pec where four teenage Serbs were killed and seven

23 wounded. But your view, formed from an experience on the ground at the

24 time, as to how that came about was what?

25 A. At the time, the two incidents were placed in -- were linked by

1 observers on the ground. Not by us but by people that were describing

2 what was going on. Because the ambush took place in the early hours of

3 one morning and later that day this bad event took place in Pec, it was my

4 view that the two were -- were not connected, that it was a coincidence

5 that it happened, because the view that this was an attack laid on by the

6 Kosovo Liberation Army in response to their being ambushed on the border

7 about 12 to 14 hours earlier to my mind indicated a level of command and

8 control that they simply didn't have.

9 Q. Right. Then briefly, 104. On the 15th, you asked Loncar for

10 access to the prisoners. He confirmed that he had them but didn't tell

11 you where they were and didn't indicate that you would be allowed access?

12 A. That is correct.

13 Q. He accused - 105 - the United States of supplying the KLA with

14 weapons, giving as evidence of that --?

15 A. That among the weapons that had been found at the ambush site,

16 there was a weapon with an infrared site, in other words, a night site.

17 This became a very ill-tempered meeting and became very confrontational

18 between Loncar and Walker, with Loncar accusing the United States of

19 arming the Kosovo Liberation Army, Walker having nothing to do with the

20 statement, and it just became -- it degenerated into a shouting match.

21 Q. Paragraph 107. On the 19th of December, at a meeting where

22 Colonel Kotur was asked about a VJ armoured unit south of Podujevo --

23 A. Yes. This relates to a unit which left its barracks, ostensibly

24 for training, and moved first to a small grass airstrip south of Podujevo,

25 which is north of Pristina, and then the intention was announced that it

1 would carry out out-of-barracks training on a training area. And since

2 all of the area west of Podujevo was known to be villages where mainly

3 Albanians lived, I stated at the time, and stated repeatedly, that to go

4 manoeuvring in that area, to do driver training in that area in armoured

5 vehicles, was bound to lead to trouble and would be provocative, and so I

6 strongly advised him not to do it.

7 In the event of subsequent --

8 Q. Shall we move on a little?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. 109. You asked Loncar, on the 20 of December, for defined limits

11 of a training schedule, and you never received those.

12 A. That's correct. Again, I was of the view that if units were to be

13 allowed out of barracks to train, that we should be informed of where they

14 would train and what the limits of the area they would train on. That

15 would have been perfectly normal practice in a normal context, and that

16 was the sort of detail I was asking for. And again, I never got those.

17 Q. And then 110. You travelled to the area, you met a Major

18 Drankovic, who was engaged in some apparent training, you asked him what

19 his boundaries were, and he told you --

20 A. And again, he produced a map and very broadly waved his hand over

21 it and said, "Well, this is the training area." And I said, "Well, that

22 area clearly includes a lot of areas which are populated by Kosovar

23 Albanians. Most of these villages are villages where only Kosovar

24 Albanians live. If you carry out your training next to those villages,

25 then it's quite likely that you will provoke an incident." And he said,

1 "Yes. Well, in that case, we shall exercise our right of self-defence,"

2 and that was really the end of that meeting.

3 Q. 24th of December - paragraph 112 - a VJ column, with the MUP, left

4 Pristina.

5 A. Yes. This was the first major moment at which a really

6 significant force came out of the barracks in Pristina and went up to the

7 area west of Podujevo and attacked the area -- the positions that had

8 originally been occupied by the VJ in October, which had subsequently been

9 pulled out of by the VJ and which the KLA had infiltrated into over the

10 course of the succeeding weeks. The purpose of that column was to attack

11 the KLA in that position, which it did.

12 Q. Paragraph 113. You noticed it on its return towards Pristina and

13 you noticed its composition.

14 A. Yes. This was a column that was returning to barracks at the end

15 of the day, and within the column, the VJ vehicles and the MUP vehicles

16 were mixed up together, and I felt that was odd at the time because it

17 indicated to me that they were all one composite unit rather than units

18 that were separate. I would have expected the VJ to be one column and the

19 MUP to be another. But to have one police vehicle, then two VJ vehicles,

20 then one police vehicle, indicated that they were all operating under one

21 command, in my view.

22 Q. And on that day, you had a meeting -- or there was a meeting or

23 meetings between Ambassador Walker, Loncar, Sainovic, and yourself --

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. -- during one of which something was said about further military

1 action.

2 A. As a result of this -- well, in the course of this meeting, it was

3 stated that this was the last of the military action that would be

4 required.

5 Q. Thank you. On the same day, a phone contact by Colonel Mijatovic?

6 A. Yes. Colonel Mijatovic was the police liaison, and a routine

7 phone call, ringing to say, "Should we have our normal liaison meeting

8 between the liaison officers?" He said, "No, no, no. We don't need to

9 even have a liaison meeting this morning because there's nothing going

10 on." And since the attack on the village of Gornja Lapastica was actually

11 going on at the time, only 30 minutes to the north, this clearly

12 undermined his credibility in future dealings.

13 Q. Paragraph 117, same day, meeting with Lukic to establish a rapport

14 and to discuss the level of MUP forces in Malisevo, you proposing a

15 reduction. His reaction?

16 A. Yes. Malisevo was quite a long way to the west and had got a very

17 substantial police presence there, which was more of a garrison than a

18 police station, and the presence of those police in those numbers was

19 acting as a deterrent to any of the Albanians going back to the village.

20 And so I was trying to persuade him to reduce the level of presence and

21 the way it operated, which was very aggressively, in that area. And Lukic

22 said no, he would not reduce the presence, and I got the firm impression

23 that this was a decision he could make, that he was deciding he would not,

24 but he did not indicate he would have to clear this sort of proposal with

25 anyone more senior.

1 Q. Paragraph 119 is a meeting -- was it the first meeting you had

2 with Walker and the KLA, I think at night?

3 A. Yes. This was on the afternoon of the 25th of December, when the

4 situation again started to be tense and started to flare up. Walker and I

5 went up to Podujevo, and Walker decided that he would personally go and

6 see the local KLA commander, which was a departure from what had been the

7 practice up until that moment. So we went into the village where the KLA

8 were and a meeting took place, and this was really the point at which we

9 started to leave liaison officers with the KLA in order to communicate

10 things to them rapidly, using our communications.

11 Q. 120. You refer to the fact that on the 29th of December, the

12 situation report - which I don't think we've actually got produced, but

13 you've actually seen it - recorded the situation was quiet, when there

14 were five murders, and you say that should compare with what happened a

15 month earlier, when one killing would have excited interest.

16 A. Yes. I think this is simply a comment, looking back on it, that

17 what was regarded as almost commonplace by the end of December was very

18 seriously more violent than the situation only about three weeks earlier.

19 Q. 121. Sainovic was seen in Pristina, but not to make contact with

20 you or the KVM?

21 A. Yes. We got the -- no. I was told by Loncar that he often had to

22 go and see Sainovic, and then within an hour I might see him again, he

23 having seen Sainovic, and so it was clear that Sainovic was not in

24 Belgrade but in Pristina. But Sainovic did not take the opportunity to

25 ever go and see Walker or deal directly with the Kosovo Verification

1 Mission. Loncar continued to be the intermediary.

2 Q. And then relations finally broke down --

3 A. Yes, indeed.

4 Q. -- Sainovic and Walker after Racak.

5 MR. NICE: Next Exhibit, please, tab 7.

6 Q. General, we're going to have to deal with exhibits, which will, of

7 course, remain with the Chamber, to consider as swiftly as we can, because

8 they can consume a lot of time.

9 This is a document that I think you hadn't seen until --

10 A. That is correct. This is the Serbian version of one of the

11 meetings between General Loncar and myself in December, and I only saw it

12 before Easter, but I do recall the meeting, and I think the significant

13 aspect of this meeting is that it is faithfully recorded in that I was at

14 this stage using the words "disproportionate use of force" when we were

15 discussing the actions of the Yugoslav forces in the area west of

16 Podujevo. I did this because there had already been instances of the FRY

17 forces using heavy weapons against villages which were known to contain

18 civilians, and there had been instances both of heavy mortars being used

19 and of tank main armament, in other words, the sort of -- the

20 100-millimetre shell that a tank will fire through its main gun rather

21 than simply using its machine-gun.

22 Q. We see your use of "disproportionate" five lines up from the

23 bottom of the first page, but otherwise you think it's a faithful

24 account --

25 A. Yes, indeed.

1 Q. -- a faithful account of the meeting? Thank you. Was any

2 permission given to you - I think this may be dealt with as well -- to

3 visit the --

4 A. No.

5 Q. -- captives?

6 A. There were regular requests to have contact with the KLA who had

7 been captured in the border ambush, the nine, asking if we could go and

8 see them and check on their condition, and this was constantly denied.

9 Q. Paragraph 125. As things were deteriorating - and we're now in

10 late December - in Podujevo, an elderly Serbian man had been shot, I

11 think.

12 A. Yes. This led to a discussion in Walker's office between Loncar

13 and Kotur at how the recovery of the body should take place. We were

14 concerned about it because we knew that this was a largely Kosovar

15 Albanian village, and therefore to send in a large force of police and

16 army would aggravate the situation.

17 As I recall it, the Serb had been -- had been firing at Albanians

18 himself and had then been shot in something that was quite local. And

19 there was a plan that was described by Loncar, saying that about 15

20 vehicles of various sorts were going to be sent in in order to recover the

21 body, and we were arguing that a smaller delegation would be less

22 provocative and would allow the incident to be defused more rapidly.

23 We thought we had reached an agreement that the recovery of this

24 body, which was clearly important, would be carried out in a low-key way,

25 and we were discussing things like what the exact number of vehicles was,

1 which vehicles were going to lead, was it going to be ours or -- which we

2 felt it should be.

3 And as we were going through this discussion, the telephone rang,

4 and we were told that in fact this operation had gone ahead as originally

5 conceived, that a large number of police with armoured vehicles had

6 entered the village and a firefight had erupted in the village. So this

7 caused Walker to lose patience with General Loncar and basically said what

8 was the point of us trying to work out this sort of detail, to try and

9 keep a lid on the violence when, in fact, operations were going on behind

10 our back, in effect.

11 The meeting became ill-tempered. Kotur, in the course as we were

12 all leaving, turned to me and said, "Police; you just can't trust them."

13 And was saying, "Well, the left hand doesn't know what the right hand is

14 doing." Loncar was adamant that the police were using their own chain of

15 command, but it was my impression that this was not the case.

16 Q. Because? And that would have required independent actions by the

17 police --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- commander in --

20 A. The point was that everything in this area was done with the -- in

21 the presence of the VJ, who were manning the heavy weapons on the high

22 ground. And therefore, to carry out an operation without the knowledge

23 and cooperation of the people who were there to give you support from

24 heavy weapons if you needed it would have been most unusual.

25 Q. You had five or six days of home leave between the 30th of

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1 December and the 31st -- and the 6th of January of 1999.

2 Then we come, I think, to the next exhibit, please. Tab 8. OTP

3 reference 1567. This is an OSCE daily report, summarising the activities

4 of a day when you were still on leave, but, nevertheless, you can help us

5 with it?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. In particular, it's the Racak area that I think on page --

8 A. Yes. This report is the first indication in an OSCE report that

9 the police were stepping up levels of activity in the Racak area, and it

10 specifically mentions an observation point in the mental hospital which

11 had excellent fields of view to the west towards Racak and the road that

12 runs west from Stimlje through Suva Reka through the Dulje Heights, which

13 was an area where clashes between the UCK and the security force -- the

14 Yugoslav security forces took place.

15 Q. We haven't yet had any evidence, I think, about Racak. Yours will

16 be the first.

17 A. That's correct.

18 Q. We're going to -- when we see the plans, either through you or

19 through another witness, we'll find that the mental hospital is a

20 significant feature on the road there, isn't it?

21 A. Yes. It is on the south-west outskirts of Stimlje. And so as you

22 look west from the mental hospital, you can see over the open fields to

23 the west, which -- and to the south, which takes you to Racak.

24 Q. Next exhibit, please, tab 9. Another OSCE report three days

25 later. 6th of January, covering the 5th.

1 A. Yes. This is the first report in which we saw a report of a

2 policeman wearing what's described as a grey jumpsuit in the Decani area,

3 and it is also the first -- so this is the first sighting of the special

4 police unit which we believe carried out the action at Rogovo in late

5 January.

6 It also, on Racak, describes the food situation there as being

7 critical, and that was certainly reflected by the -- my discussions with

8 the UNHCR who were moving food into that area at various times over this

9 period.

10 Q. You just immediately look at page 2 of the document. Just --

11 that's the passage in the Pec district.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. Alternative MUP clothing, one policeman seen wearing a grey

14 jumpsuit is set out.

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Thank you very much. Paragraph 137. You started to receive, on

17 the 8th of January, reports about roadblocks.

18 A. Yes. This was the first action that involved Serbian civilians in

19 the area south of Pristina, to the south and to the south-west, and these

20 roadblocks of local vigilantes, many of them wearing masks over their

21 faces, effectively closed off all communication between Pristina and any

22 area to the south. So it actually cut all communications between Pristina

23 and Skopje.

24 Q. The explanation paragraph, 138, by the "authorities," being what?

25 A. It was described to me as being a spontaneous civilian

1 demonstration which was protesting against government inactivity against

2 the KLA. The -- I went out to see what exactly was happening on the

3 ground and found myself watching Serb paramilitaries driving around in

4 Golfs with their black ski masks on, carrying Kalashnikovs and would move

5 to an area and then harangue the local civilians to get them, to persuade

6 them to erect a roadblock. And this organising of roadblocks was seen by

7 me at a couple of locations.

8 The interesting thing was this was one of the few moments when

9 civic disorder took place and the police were not present to deal with it,

10 because quite -- there were normally enough police present to be able to

11 deal with any civil disorder, but the police were noticeably absent at

12 that stage.

13 Q. Paragraph 140. I don't think I need to trouble with that.

14 A. No.

15 Q. Paragraph 141. On the 8th of January, during a meeting with

16 Loncar --

17 A. Yes. This was a meeting, one of the regular meetings I was having

18 with Loncar, and in the course of it there was a telephone call which

19 Loncar took and then -- and he said, "There has been an incident." And

20 shortly after that, the police colonel, Colonel Mijatovic, entered the

21 room and said that three policemen had been killed in the area of Dulje,

22 which is in the high ground between Suva Reka and Stimlje, quite close to

23 Stimlje, and that there had been a daytime ambush of a police patrol and

24 that these three policemen had been killed in that ambush.

25 This is significant because it was the biggest daytime attack by

1 the Kosovo Liberation Army that we had witnessed upon the police and was

2 clearly a serious escalation.

3 Q. Yes. Now, let's move to the next exhibit, which is tab 10, OTP

4 reference 1580, a document again you hadn't seen until recently.

5 A. Yes. This is the description of that meeting. And the meeting --

6 as you say, I had not seen this document before the period just before

7 Easter of this year, but the purpose of the meeting was a follow-up to the

8 roadblocks established by the paramilitaries, and --

9 Q. Just for good order, we make sure we don't go too fast, if the

10 first page of it is on the overhead projector, we can see just a little

11 bit further down there's your name and the way you're being recorded as

12 expressing concern over the roadblocks and so on. Can you carry on?

13 A. Yes. The other point that I brought up was that we were getting

14 evidence from our people on the ground that the Yugoslav army was looting

15 property when it was searching areas, and I was making the point that this

16 was not acceptable and would -- would bring their forces into disrepute

17 and that this should be investigated and proper instructions issued to

18 make sure that didn't happen.

19 We were then talking about the number of VJ that were out of

20 barracks, and my point there was that the original agreement that we were

21 still, as far as we were concerned, adhering to was that three company

22 positions were allowed but that the area south of Podujevo had now been

23 established as a fourth location at which there was a strong VJ presence

24 out of barracks.

25 Q. May we go to page 5 of the exhibit, please. This meeting, I

1 think, was interrupted, wasn't it?

2 A. That's correct. And this is the moment which --

3 Q. Paragraph 6.

4 A. Yes, six. That's during the discussion. "During the discussion,

5 Loncar was informed over the telephone that three policemen had been

6 killed, two seriously injured, between Suva Reka and Stimlje. Loncar said

7 with concern that we will use tanks and the army and not the police in our

8 search for the killers in order to find them."

9 It is certainly of note that that was what was stated. I did not

10 specifically react to that because he was clearly distressed, and I did

11 not take that as -- as a declaration of intent but, rather, that --

12 because it was a very serious incident, that they would take all steps

13 necessary to track down the killers. And that was, in my mind, a -- a

14 natural reaction in the circumstances.

15 Q. Before we pass from this exhibit, just a little bit further down

16 the page, I think, or thereabouts, you've had the experience, interesting

17 or otherwise, of seeing, after the event, what other people were writing

18 about you. You see their observation here that you were using the KVM in

19 respect of promotion, something to that effect.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. I don't think you need protest too much about any of that as a

22 Major General at the time but to just tell us what was his position.

23 A. Well, I think my -- my reaction to this was to be somewhat upset,

24 having actually been in the Balkans for 22 of the 28 months preceding,

25 since October 1996. I felt that I was there because the OSCE knew me and

1 trusted me as being someone who was quite good at dealing with civilian

2 organisations. I did feel that at the time I was sensitive to the -- the

3 local situation, and I felt that we should be taking every measure

4 possible to prevent the situation from spiralling upward and out of

5 control, and this was really why I had -- I had been prepared to go and

6 join this mission at six hours' notice, at a time when I thought I was

7 about to go to a more normal teaching job. So it wasn't how I saw it.

8 Q. Well, we needn't cover that. Paragraph 143, and the next exhibit,

9 which is tab 11, OTP reference 2794. It is a press release that was put

10 out, condemning that ceasefire breach.

11 A. Yes. This is important, because it was often alleged that we did

12 not condemn the actions of the insurgents when they -- when they carried

13 out actions but we only condemned the actions of the Yugoslav forces. And

14 I think this is quite clear as stating it strongly condemns an

15 unacceptable breach of the ceasefire in that the three police were

16 killed. Further down: "The KVM considers that such terrorist attacks and

17 breaches of ceasefire undermine attempts to reach a political solution of

18 the conflict."

19 So I think this was a very clear statement which was in no way

20 sympathetic to the insurgents.

21 Q. Deal very briefly, in summary, negotiations, paragraph 144, over

22 the VJ prisoners over the next five days.

23 A. Yes. The --

24 Q. And then -- again, I don't think we need the detail of that.

25 A. I think the point here was that we invested a lot of effort into

1 getting the -- securing the release of the eight VJ soldiers who were held

2 prisoner by the Kosovo Liberation Army. There were many moments when we

3 thought that the army and police would storm the position. We literally

4 interposed ourselves between the two sides and attempted to talk the

5 situation down. I personally slept on the floor of my office for three

6 nights in order to be there if telephone messages were received, and

7 eventually, as a result of extensive negotiations, the release of those

8 eight soldiers was -- was secured, and we were able to bring them off the

9 mountain and hand them over to their families.

10 Q. Next exhibit, please, tab 12, OTP reference 1582. Just to deal

11 with the reporting structure, there were daily reports and there were also

12 summarising periodic reports. Would that be right?

13 A. Yes, that's correct. This periodic report is really dealing with

14 a specific highlight describing firstly the meeting between Principal

15 Deputy Head of Mission Keller, who was the French Deputy Head of Mission,

16 to Walker, and Deputy Prime Minister Sainovic in which the strong

17 day-to-day control that Sainovic appears to have exercised comes out, I

18 think.

19 We also, in this, describe the state of VJ forces out of the

20 barracks, which we equated to the equivalent of about six companies,

21 remembering still that the agreement called for only three.

22 Q. Yes. Can we just find that in the document, please.

23 A. Yes. If we go to page -- paragraph 4 --

24 Q. Thank you. Yes.

25 A. -- second subparagraph, paragraph 4, states that KVM patrols

1 report a battalion-sized VJ deployment in the area of Podujevo. It is

2 that battalion-sized deployment by which we would mean about three

3 companies, to be in addition to the three that were authorised. So those

4 three plus the original three make the six that I referred to.

5 Q. Then the last page of the document, in case people want to track

6 this at any time, records the KVM force at 682 by this time.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. 149 deals with the exchange of the eight VJ for nine KLA.

9 A. Yes. And at that point, the tension certainly did reduce and

10 there were the beginnings of indications that the VJ and MUP forces were

11 starting to return to barracks, particularly in the area around

12 Mitrovica. So at the time, this was seen as an encouraging sign and was

13 certainly the result of a lot of hard negotiation on the ground.

14 Q. However, you received a report which was perhaps less encouraging

15 or more discouraging.

16 A. Yes. This was a telephone call from the American military attache

17 in Belgrade, who reported that he had observed an armoured column on its

18 way on the main Belgrade-to-Nis road, which by this stage had passed Nis

19 and by this stage was within 20 miles of Kosovo. Our concern - because

20 this was when we were in the middle of attempting to get the eight VJ

21 soldiers off the top of a hill where the KLA were holding them - was that

22 this was going to seriously complicate the situation if extra forces

23 started to appear from outside. And I brought this up with General Loncar

24 and was assured by him that they were not going to cross into Kosovo. And

25 I said, "Fine, but you're really not sending the right message in

1 deploying these sort of units so close to Kosovo when we are trying to

2 bring this situation to a negotiated solution."

3 Q. Next exhibit - but we won't be looking, I think, at any part of it

4 particularly - is an eight-page document, tab 13, OTP reference 2795.

5 This is a report on the ambush and subsequent hostage-taking incident of

6 the 8th and 9th of January. It gives a chronology of the capture and

7 negotiation surrounding the release of the eight VJ soldiers, which we've

8 taken this morning in summary because we want to deal with it in that

9 way. This report was prepared by whom, General?

10 A. It was prepared by one of the liaison officers who worked directly

11 for me, and was prepared on my instruction because it was important that

12 we just reminded ourselves of the chronology of this thing, because by

13 this stage, we were really all quite tired and there was a danger that we

14 were going to forget where we were, quite frankly. And so -- yes.

15 Q. If we need to look for detail of that exchange, we can probably

16 find it in this document.

17 A. I remember using this at the time as my aide-memoire, and it was a

18 document that was constantly updated, and this is the final version of it,

19 but it certainly reflects how we felt at the time on the ground.

20 Q. Exhibit tab 14, a daily report this time for the 11th of January

21 but covering the 10th.

22 A. Yes. This --

23 Q. Now, the passage we particularly want to look at relates to the VJ

24 MUP full-scale combat potential. Can you just take us to that, if you can

25 find it. Certainly it's covered on the assessment in the first --

1 A. Yes. I think it must be the assessment. Let me just ...

2 Q. We see on the first page: "Tensions remain high in the Stimlje

3 area as a result of the two ambushes."

4 A. Yes. Sorry. I've got it now.

5 "Tensions remain high in the Stimlje area as a result of the two

6 ambushes against MUP patrols within the last three days. Strong VJ and

7 MUP forces remain in the area. A report of increased VJ logistical

8 support moving into the area indicates that the VJ are 'repaired' --" by

9 which I think it means "prepared" "-- to remain deployed for an extended

10 period."

11 And then Pec is different.

12 Q. Right. That was --

13 A. The report also describes places where the KVM, in trying to get

14 to investigate events, was having its freedom of movement beginning to be

15 curtailed. And again, this is one of the early indications of it.

16 Q. Next exhibit, please. Tab 15, OTP reference 1584. A short

17 addendum to the daily update.

18 A. Yes. This was an irregular report put out if there was a feeling

19 that we needed to just get everybody aware of an increase or a change in

20 the security situation, and so given that the VJ and the MUP were

21 increasing their activity, this was put out to make sure everybody was

22 aware of it.

23 Q. Tab 16 deals with - OTP reference 1586 - deals with a meeting

24 between yourself and General Loncar on the 11th of January.

25 A. Yes. Again, this is one I did not see until March of this year,

1 but this was our last meeting in the five-day process of getting the eight

2 soldiers off the top of the hill. And again, reference is made to

3 everything being done at the behest of Deputy Prime Minister Sainovic.

4 Q. That's on page 2, I think you'll find, and also 3. Is that

5 correct?

6 A. Yes, that is. We wanted to resolve the problem in a peaceful

7 manner, in a manner agreed upon in yesterday's discussions between Vice

8 Premier Sainovic and Keller and Hill, Hill being the American ambassador.

9 Q. Thank you. Exhibit tab 17, a report for the period covered by the

10 12th of January in our report from the OSCE again.

11 A. And the point of note here is the KVM patrols from Pristina and

12 Prizren confirm the increase of VJ activity in the Stimlje area. Movement

13 of armoured vehicles, including tanks, have been observed.

14 Q. Page 2, paragraph 4. So this is all in the Racak build-up,

15 really, isn't it?

16 A. That is correct, yes.

17 Q. Can you recall the state of concern or anxiety by OSCE at that

18 time?

19 A. Yes. At this point, we were covering in some strength the area in

20 the west, the three counties in Kosovo in the west, which were the areas

21 where the fighting had been worst in the summer. We were not in great

22 strength in the rest of Kosovo, in the east of Kosovo, because that was

23 not an area where there had been big problems or a very large KLA

24 presence. And so as we built up, we were putting down a field presence in

25 the areas in order of priority.

1 The area of Racak and Stimlje were not actually yet in an area

2 where we had got very substantial coverage. As events deteriorated in

3 that area, we put more people into the area, but it was happening in an

4 area where our coverage was less good than it was in the west, in the Pec

5 and Decani area, where the problems had been worst, and therefore, where

6 we had gone to in greater strength most early.

7 Q. The next exhibit is tab 18. This is another meeting, this

8 time -- sorry. It's a meeting evidenced by the Serbs and not seen by you

9 until very recently.

10 A. That is correct, and this again simply describes the situation as

11 it was seen by another member of the Kosovo Verification Mission on the

12 11th of January.

13 Q. Because although you were present at this meeting --

14 A. No, I wasn't.

15 Q. No, you weren't present. This is Nikolaev.

16 A. Yes, correct. I think it's useful really only in describing the

17 situation as seen by others than myself on the 11th of January.

18 Q. Consistent or inconsistent with your own --

19 A. It's entirely consistent.

20 Q. It's available for that purpose of checking, then, if required.

21 Paragraph 160. The nine KLA prisoners were, I think, exposed to a

22 visit by your deputy or one of your liaison officers, Ciaglinski?

23 A. Yes, that's correct.

24 Q. And although we may hear from Mr. Ciaglinski himself, reported

25 back to you was what?

1 A. This referred to the nine KLA who had been taken prisoner in

2 December in the border ambush, and in the course of this, in January, we

3 were told that they could now be seen and identified and spoken to,

4 provided it was done by someone who was entirely discreet, and that was

5 why I sent Richard Ciaglinski, who is someone with whom I dealt with

6 daily.

7 Ciaglinski travelled immediately to Nis and saw the nine

8 prisoners. They stated - and this confirmed what we had learned up until

9 then - that they had been part of a resupply column of the KLA that was

10 moving supplies from Albania into Kosovo. They stated that they had been

11 recruited quite reluctantly and had gone to Albania and been given no more

12 than two days' training before they were sent on the supply mission. They

13 had been armed but had not had very much training on how to use their

14 weapons, so that when they walked into the ambush in the middle of the

15 night, they simply dropped their weapons and ran.

16 The conversations that Ciaglinski had with them, which were

17 consistent, said that about 90 had run away and that about 40 had been

18 killed or captured, and Ciaglinski had revisited the prisoners at a later

19 date, and of course these were eventually handed over in a response to the

20 handing over of the eight VJ soldiers subsequently.

21 Q. And indeed after Racak, as it happened?

22 A. Yes. It occurred to me that I was surprised that there had not

23 been media use made of the fact that these KLA prisoners were actually

24 extremely reluctant and had been -- had not been described as such,

25 because, in my view, it would have very substantially damaged the

1 Albanian -- the KLA image at the time. But the media at the time, I'm

2 sure you can recall, was that the VJ forces were fighting an implacable

3 enemy rather than these groups of scared boys.

4 Q. Tab 19, please, the OSCE report for the 13th of January. And

5 we're interested in seeing how things were developing in the Racak area.

6 A. In Stimlje, yes.

7 Q. It's on the second page, I think.

8 A. Yes. I'm having difficulty.

9 Q. Humanitarian activity, second paragraph.

10 A. Yes. Yes, I've got it.

11 Q. It's now being reported --

12 A. Yes. Pristina Regional Centre visited villages in the Stimlje

13 area following reports that residents had left and taken to the hills.

14 Verifiers found 50 people in Belince, 350 in Racak, and 680 in Malpolje,

15 all of which are in the area around Stimlje.

16 Q. Did that cause any concern to the OSCE, to have this number of

17 people taking to the hills, or was this standard behaviour of --

18 A. It was quite normal by this stage that when there was major

19 activity by the Yugoslav forces, that the residents would move out of the

20 area and be given shelter by neighbouring villages. And so this had

21 happened before - it had happened in the summer - and was relatively

22 commonplace. It obviously was of concern because we were talking all the

23 time to the UNHCR, passing this sort of thing on so that they could be

24 helped in providing food relief and that sort of thing.

25 Q. On the same page, second line of "Security Situation," we can see

1 a reference to a tank firing 50 to 60 main armament rounds. Again, is

2 that a concerning manner or par for the course?

3 A. Yes. Well, a tank carries about 40 to 50 rounds in its turret,

4 and so if tanks are firing 50 to 60 rounds, it means that they are doing

5 more than simply responding to a situation with an aimed shot. So again,

6 this indicates to me a very disproportionate response to small-arms fire.

7 Again, one could argue that if you saw exactly where the person was firing

8 at you from and you had a tank available, you might fire one round at that

9 position, but to fire the entire contents of your turret in that direction

10 is very, very disproportionate and would not be allowed in any normal

11 security situation that I'm aware of.

12 Q. Thank you. Paragraphs 165 and 166. You went, on the 13th of

13 January, to a KLA camp in Stari Trg, waiting for Walker, and held a media

14 conference --

15 A. This was in connection with the release of the eight VJ soldiers

16 and really just describes the mechanism by which we were in one place and

17 Walker was in another, with everybody in telephone contact with one

18 another, while the release of the eight VJ soldiers was finalised.

19 Q. As a reflection of your approach, when the VJ -- the KLA woman, if

20 she was a spokesman or other official, attempted to describe the men as

21 prisoners of war and saying they had been treated correctly, you used

22 different terminology, saying that they were soldiers who had been

23 detained?

24 A. Yes. I didn't want to find myself being quoted as agreeing that

25 these were prisoners of war, because that would certainly have given a

1 flavour to the conflict that I didn't think was at that stage justified,

2 and so I only referred to them as soldiers who had been detained or held

3 against their will.

4 Q. And at paragraph 167, you were able to see that when the soldiers

5 were released, they appeared to have been assaulted, with bruises and

6 black eyes showing --

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. -- terrified of their situation?

9 A. They were certainly very frightened, and it was only when we were

10 able to indicate to them that we were -- you know, we were there to take

11 them back that they began to realise that they were not going to get

12 harmed in any way.

13 Q. Very well. Exhibit 20 -- tab 20. I beg your pardon. A

14 substantial OSCE report, of which probably one of the lines we want is

15 unhappily copied in a fold in the paper, but I think you've been able to

16 work out what you think it says in context.

17 A. Well, the summary starts: "It was --" I think: "It was

18 broadly --" or no. I think it's: " ... generally a quiet day."

19 Q. Or evenly "really," I suppose.

20 A. Yes. "... though there has been much VJ influence on our area of

21 operations because of the Serbian New Year celebrations," I think it is.

22 But I think to see the date on that, which is the 14th of January,

23 and note that we were thinking it was a quiet day, I think indicates that

24 there was not a sort of constant crescendo in the Stimlje and Racak area.

25 Things were happening all over the place that we were responding to, of

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1 which events in Stimlje and Racak were part of, but they were certainly

2 not seen as the main focus of our activity at that stage.

3 Q. 169 and 170 we can perhaps deal with this way: that on the 15th of

4 January, there was a report brought to you in the course of a meeting,

5 about bad things happening in Stimlje. You sent Maisonneuve to

6 investigate and received a report that a KVM member had been wounded in

7 the Decani area, where his vehicle had been fired upon, so you had to go

8 and deal with that as an emergency.

9 A. Yes. These were two completely separate incidents, one in the

10 Stimlje area and the other much closer to where we were in Pec, in

11 Decani. And at the time I sent Maisonneuve, whose area Stimlje was not,

12 but it was just over from his area, and so he knew it quite well. So I

13 told him to go and see what was going on in Stimlje, and I went and

14 attempted to sort out the aftermath of having two of our people wounded in

15 Decani.

16 Q. Exhibit 21, please. Again, this is a one-page document being an

17 OSCE press release dealing with the deliberate shooting at your vehicles

18 at Decani on the 15th of January and setting out how it was that the KLA

19 forces in the area had acknowledged that it was their forces that were

20 responsible for the shooting and the wounding and that it was due to a

21 misunderstanding.

22 A. Yes. This came out sometime later, as you see from the date, 21st

23 of January. At the time that we had our two people wounded, it was not

24 clear who had perpetrated it, and I was very suspicious of everybody at

25 this stage and so was -- was quite convinced it could have been either --

1 either of the parties in this particular dispute.

2 As a result of a lot of discussion with the Kosovo Liberation

3 Army, they eventually admitted that it was their people, and eventually we

4 then said, "Well, you should admit it publicly," and we gave them a day in

5 which we wanted them to publicly state it, and they did not feel able to

6 do that. And so at that point, we -- we issued a statement in which we

7 said that this had happened, and it was the Kosovo Liberation Army were

8 responsible for it, but it took us five days to track that one down. And

9 of course, while all this was going on, other things were happening

10 elsewhere.

11 Q. All right. 172: On the 15th of January, Ciaglinski and others

12 were having discussion with the MUP in the Decani area.

13 A. Yes. This was -- this is the detail of the shooting and the

14 wounding of the two verifiers, and I think this -- I think I've covered

15 this in broad detail.

16 Q. And 173, we come to Racak itself.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. What happened on the 15th of January was that it appears there was

19 an offensive in the village, and according to you, information coming to

20 you, VJ tanks and Pragas were sighted on the hills around the village.

21 A. Yes. This was an operation that started in the morning of the

22 15th and involved firing not only into Racak but into several other

23 villages in the area and consisted at first of tanks and Pragas, which are

24 anti-aircraft artillery which was used in -- heavy anti-aircraft cannon

25 which were used in a ground role and were very rapid firing, being used to

1 fire at Racak and other villages in the area, and it appeared to those who

2 were around and who heard it described that the VJ were firing from the

3 hills, and the police, the MUP, were then going in on foot on the ground.

4 And you can only do this if -- if the people who are going forward are

5 confident that the people who are doing the covering fire are fully aware

6 of your actions on the ground. It does require a very high degree of

7 coordination.

8 Q. Depending on how time goes, I may ask you to look in due course at

9 a large special map that has been prepared. It may not be a map as much

10 of a photograph, I think, but for the time being, can we look, to deal

11 with things swiftly, at Exhibit 22. Really it's the top left-hand bit of

12 it we need trouble ourselves with, having seen its comparative position in

13 relation to Urosevac. And we can see --

14 A. That's Urosevac. That is Stimlje. You can see the two roads

15 joining at Stimlje and then the road going west into the Dulje Heights and

16 on to Suva Reka. The village of Racak is here to the south-west, and the

17 offensive was taking place with the VJ tanks and Pragas firing at this

18 string of villages along the west -- the eastern edge of the high ground

19 that goes away to the west.

20 So the VJ were -- positions were broadly parallel to the main road

21 to the north, and the villages were in a line really north-west to

22 south-east along the edge of the high ground.

23 Q. Well, we -- as I say, we may be able to help the Chamber even

24 today with larger scale maps, but we must press on.

25 Having got that general account, reported back to you by

1 Maisonneuve - paragraph 175 - that on his arrival at Racak, he noticed

2 what?

3 A. Yes. Maisonneuve drove straight to Racak, which took him, I

4 suppose, just over an hour from -- from leaving me, and when he got there

5 at the end of the afternoon, he saw that the VJ were withdrawing from the

6 area. So he went into the village, and there he was advised by the

7 villagers that there had been some deaths but it was not specified how

8 many, but it wasn't said that there were a lot, that some people had been

9 arrested and there were a number of wounded people. At that point, he

10 asked what could be done to help the people and was told that it was the

11 wounded who needed looking after, and that was what he got on with as

12 night fell and the light went.

13 Q. Now, the report of people being arrested, which was in due course

14 to be -- shown to be in complete account of what happened, was that an

15 unusual event?

16 A. It was not unusual at the time. We on various occasions heard of

17 people being arrested, detained, questioned, and then they would turn up

18 later, having been interrogated to quite a degree in -- in security

19 forces' custody, considerably bruised but certainly alive. So the

20 problem, as he saw it, as he arrived on the Friday evening, was one of

21 wounded people rather than anything else.

22 Q. This we -- or part of this we find reflected, I think, in the next

23 exhibit, which we can look at briefly, tab 23, the OSCE's report of the

24 15th of January. It deals with the arrested men, I think, or the alleged

25 arrested men.

1 A. Yes. Sorry, I'm -- yes. There we are. Right. I've --

2 Q. On page 2, I think.

3 A. On page 2, about halfway down, in the middle of the small

4 paragraph, it says that there were five injured, that a female and a young

5 boy were transferred to Stimlje hospital. The KLA spokesman was asked

6 what the OSCE could help to do most and his firm assurance was that they

7 needed -- they needed to know that they could bring in the women and

8 children from the hills, where they had taken refuge, without further VJ

9 attacks that night, and then later that three other wounded civilians were

10 evacuated.

11 If you go back to the front page of this document, you can see the

12 head of RC Prizren comment, that is comment of Maisonneuve, that, "The

13 incident in Stimlje detailed below is a clear breach of the agreement as

14 per our assessment." And that was a very strong statement to come from a

15 Regional Centre head, because I've already mentioned that words of

16 "compliance" and "non-compliance" were reserved very much for the Head of

17 Mission.

18 Q. The same document happens to record the total number of KVM at the

19 time. I think it's probably on the last page, is it?

20 A. Yes. It's also of note that one of the patrols on the ground took

21 a statement from a villager who gave him a list of 21 men who had been

22 detained by the MUP and taken to Urosevac gaol.

23 Would you like me to find that?

24 Q. Yes, please. Well, not necessarily. It's a repeat, isn't it in?

25 A. Yes, it is.

1 Q. Then don't bother.

2 A. Right.

3 Q. It can be found, if necessary. But just as a matter of interest,

4 against the 2.000 mandated KVM manpower force, by this time I think we can

5 work out it's about 854 is the number you derive as being there at the

6 time?

7 A. Sorry, can I see that again?

8 Q. On the last page.

9 A. There was always two figures. Yes. One was -- no, it's the one

10 before. That's personnel status. No. That's -- no, that's Regional

11 Centre Prizren. That's Regional Centre Prizren personnel, which is 285,

12 rather than the total strength of the mission.

13 Q. It may be in here somewhere, but perhaps you can help us. Were

14 you remotely up to full strength by that time?

15 A. Sorry, I think that is -- I think what we've got is -- you're

16 referring to the next document in which is the report from Pristina, from

17 the --

18 Q. I'm sorry. Yes.

19 A. -- the head of the OSCE, in which we stated ourselves as being 854

20 strong at that moment. Yes, you're correct.

21 Q. The -- you've referred to the strength of opinion expressed in

22 these reports. Becoming concerned at what you were learning about?

23 A. At this stage, it was serious, but it was not the most serious

24 thing that we felt we had faced, and so I think that was reflected in the

25 reports that were put together overnight.

1 Q. So we come to Exhibit 24, OTP reference 1598.

2 A. And this is the report that would have been compiled late on the

3 Friday evening, after the reports from the Regional Centres had been

4 received, and that would be sometime after 9.00 at night, and then we

5 would send it up to Vienna in the early hours of the morning. And so this

6 is really our perception around about midnight in Pristina. And it is, I

7 think, worthy of note that we were trying to stick to the facts that we

8 knew rather than -- rather than speculate, because we often found that the

9 first report could be exaggerated. So it was better only to stick to what

10 you really knew.

11 Q. So on page 2, paragraph 4, where you deal with what's coming out

12 of Racak, it says, "Verifiers saw," third line --

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. -- "one dead Albanian civilian and five injured civilians."

15 A. Yes. "The KVM also received unconfirmed reports of other deaths

16 in the area. Residents claim that the men had been segregated from the

17 women and -- from the women and children and that 20 males had been

18 arrested. This remains unconfirmed."

19 So there was, as I say, great stress in sticking to what we really

20 knew.

21 Q. Yes.

22 A. But you can see further down that we witnessed VJ tanks and

23 armoured vehicles firing directly into houses near Malpolje and Petrova,

24 again villages in the area.

25 Q. This document - my mistake - sets out your international staff --

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. -- of 854 against the mandated 2.000.

3 A. Yes. And that really sort of, I think, indicates that there we

4 were, three months into a 12-month mission, and we were still not yet at

5 half of our mandated strength.

6 Q. And since your evidence is, we hope, going to give an account of

7 the developing picture, can we now look at another document of the same --

8 JUDGE MAY: I wonder if that would be a convenient moment.

9 MR. NICE: Yes.

10 JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn now. Would you be back, please,

11 General, at half past two. Thank you.

12 --- Luncheon recess taken at 1.00 p.m.

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1 --- On resuming at 2.31 p.m.

2 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

3 MR. NICE:

4 Q. General, Exhibit tab -- start again. Tab 25, OTP reference 1602.

5 Now, this is, I think, an example of an OSCE morning situation brief; is

6 that correct?

7 A. That is correct. This is the brief that was given at 9.00 to the

8 Head of Mission on the morning of Saturday, the 16th of January. So this

9 is what we were -- what we had distilled as the mission's official view of

10 the situation as at the start of that Saturday morning. It's perhaps

11 worthy of note that there's more than one entry on this, and so it was

12 seen as being the morning after a difficult day, when a number of things

13 were going on, all of which were quite important. It was not at this

14 stage seen that Racak was by far the most important event going on.

15 Q. Very well. Now, just look at the format of it. It comes in

16 several pages. You have the map with the identified problem areas,

17 significant events, as reported on a few following pages.

18 A. And then on each page afterwards, the particular serial of the box

19 on the main map, there is the text of the words that we used for

20 briefing. If we go to number 5, you can see the description that was used

21 at the time that the attack had started in the vicinity of Stimlje at

22 approximately 7.00.

23 "Racak and three other villages came under attack. The fighting

24 and shelling were heavy throughout the day, and this attack follows the

25 build-up in the area which occurred last week, after the KLA ambushed a

1 MUP patrol. It's expected this battle will continue tomorrow. KVM

2 patrols are for the most part being denied access to the battle area."

3 Q. There's also a reference to Racak on number 4, Prizren. There's

4 reference to the battle in the area of Stimlje.

5 A. Correct. Correct.

6 Q. This was to do with the rotation of police, isn't it?

7 A. Yes. The concern there was whether or not police were being moved

8 to reinforce in the Stimlje area or whether this was a normal changeover

9 of people, because the police stations tended to be manned on a continuous

10 basis by the same crew for a number of days and then they would be

11 rotated; they would be changed with another lot who would come in and the

12 original ones would go off for a rest. So that's the point behind that

13 entry.

14 Q. Thank you. And I think you had a conversation --

15 A. Yes. Late on the Friday night, I was attempting to phone General

16 Loncar, couldn't get him, and got Colonel Kotur instead.

17 Q. Tab 26. Is this the one?

18 A. Yes. And in this -- in the middle of a note of -- and I think

19 this is a -- I know this is a record of what I said that was taken down by

20 one of the people with me at the time, saying:

21 "The second area I'm concerned about is Stimlje. We're hearing

22 alarming reports of anti-aircraft artillery being used in the ground role

23 and being directed into villages. This is not police action, as we

24 understand it. This is very close to the sort of action that was so bad

25 in the summer." That's referring to 1998. "This sort of action must

1 cease immediately. You are to pass this message from me to the top of

2 your chain of command. The operations in these areas must be ordered to

3 cease immediately. Firing anti-aircraft weapons into villages with women

4 and children in them is not police action. This must be ordered to stop.

5 Ambassador Walker will be contacting your superiors tomorrow, after I have

6 briefed him on this conversation that I am having with you now at 2320, on

7 the 15th of January."

8 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please slow down when

9 reading. Thank you.

10 A. -- these things as they were beginning to unfold might well need

11 to be officially recorded.

12 JUDGE MAY: General, you're being asked to slow down when

13 reading.

14 MR. NICE:

15 Q. What we've seen over the recent bits of evidence and exhibits,

16 that your mission was cautious in its approach, mindful of its experience

17 that reports were sometimes initially worse than reality, even if this was

18 one which was going to turn out to be the reverse.

19 A. Correct. We were, I think, very -- very conscious that you can

20 sometimes make a situation worse by overreacting to -- to an initial -- an

21 initial report. And there had been instances of that certainly in

22 December of 1998 when alarming reports came in which, upon investigation,

23 were less awful than the first report. And we had spent a lot of time

24 stressing to our people on the ground to report the facts and only what

25 they saw. And if someone rushed up to them and said, "Something awful has

1 happened," to make sure that they were reporting it as something that had

2 been told them and distinguish between that and what they had seen.

3 Q. Let's move on. Paragraph 180. On the 16th of January, were you

4 getting reports of more casualties?

5 A. Yes. The reports started to come in as we -- as we started the

6 day on the 16th, that the situation at Racak was indeed worse than we had

7 first thought. Each of these reports on its own was not in itself an

8 immediate trigger to action, but the fact that they were coming in from so

9 many different sources and appeared to be independent was clearly very

10 worrying. And simultaneously, the situation over in the west at Decani

11 was also hotting up, was also becoming a problem again, and exchanges of

12 fire were being reported. And so we appeared to have two separate bad

13 situations at the beginning of the day.

14 Q. Now, I'm going to ask you to deal with paragraph 181, but if you

15 can get the heart of it out quite shortly. This is 11.15 in the morning

16 of the 16th, and you have a conversation with Ciaglinski and Loncar.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. The topic is Decani, Racak, and Podujevo.

19 A. At this time, I walked over to General Loncar's office with

20 Richard Ciaglinski, and I had, in setting up the meeting, indicated that I

21 wanted to talk about the three issues. And literally as we were starting

22 to walk out of our building on the walk across to General Loncar's

23 building, we were getting more and more reports that indicated that it was

24 Racak that was the really big problem.

25 I was still concerned about Decani, because it was there that we

1 had had our two people wounded, and I was of the opinion at that stage

2 that these people had been wounded by the -- by the Serbian police and

3 that this had been an attempt to -- to wrongly implicate the KLA. This

4 was a wrong view, as we eventually found out, but that was my view at the

5 time.

6 Q. You challenged Loncar, and that was what? With the Decani matter

7 rather than with anything else?

8 A. No. We started off on Decani, but we quite quickly moved on to

9 Racak. As I indicated, we had -- we had started to get these extra

10 reports in, and so I said, "I need to talk about what is going on at

11 Racak," and he assumed an air of innocence and was extremely cool in the

12 way he dealt with this, which was not the normal way he dealt with things.

13 Q. You, I think, said to him or he read your comments as allegations

14 of knowledge and he said, "Who, us? No way."

15 A. Yes, or similar words.

16 Q. To which you replied?

17 A. To which I replied, "Look, this sort of behaviour is the way that

18 people end up in The Hague." He was quite angry and said, "How dare you.

19 How dare you say that to me." And I said, "Look, you know, this is

20 getting really serious, and this is the way it is going. You need to

21 understand this."

22 Q. So let's look at tab 27. OSCE report. And it's -- deals with

23 Decani.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. It deals with a meeting involving Loncar and yourself?

1 A. If we go down to Stimlje, at paragraph 4 --

2 Q. There it sets out how you explain --

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. -- how you and Walker were going to investigate and that, "The

5 next stop for your people will be in The Hague."

6 A. Yes. I stated that reports had been received from the villages of

7 the killings of, and at this stage I described it as women, children, and

8 old men. I said on behalf of Walker, because Walker had made it clear

9 that I was to adopt an extremely uncompromising attitude in this matter, I

10 said that he and I were going down to look at this personally, and again

11 this is recorded as, "The next step for your people will be The Hague."

12 If those are not the words, they're very close to the words.

13 Q. And we --

14 A. And over the page, the top of the page --

15 Q. Yes. We can read it, actually, fairly swiftly. You said that --

16 he said --

17 A. Loncar said that we shouldn't refer to regular police work as

18 provocative. I came back and said that, "This is not regular police work,

19 firing anti-aircraft cannon into villages." And -- and he then stated

20 that what had happened at Decani when we'd got our guys or when our guys

21 had been wounded was as a result of ourselves setting it up, to which I

22 responded quite vigorously. And we then discussed the various versions of

23 the -- of the events. At this --

24 Q. You indicated at paragraph 7 that you were going to Stimlje.

25 A. Yes.

1 Q. You had verified that there was no more -- there was more

2 provocative action in Decani, which was stopped, that the situation wasn't

3 helped by force around Podujevo, and you reminded the general of the

4 statement he made that if the VJ prisoners were released, the troops would

5 return to barracks. The VJ prisoners had, of course, now been released,

6 and they hadn't gone back to barracks.

7 A. Yes. That was the firm impression we had got at the end of the

8 situation, which was only a couple of days earlier where we had got the

9 people off the top of the mountain, that this was then going to be allowed

10 to calm down and that troops would be returned to barracks. And obviously

11 this had not happened in that on the Friday there had been this action in

12 the Stimlje-Racak area. And so again I went through the formula of how

13 many forces were allowed out of barracks and how many were out of

14 barracks.

15 Q. Yes. We're going to have to move fairly swiftly, General. I

16 think that you also dealt with the disproportionality and

17 inappropriateness --

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. -- of using anti-aircraft cannon in an internal security

20 situation.

21 So if we just look at the other side -- not the other side,

22 because they weren't another side, but the other side of this meeting's

23 record of it. It's tab 28, a document you've only seen very recently.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Your view, I think, expressed in paragraph 183, is that it mixes

1 up events of Decani with those of Stimlje and Racak.

2 A. Yes. I believe that this happened because the person who was

3 acting as the secretary and signs the document is not the guy who normally

4 did it, and I'm pretty sure that the normal supporting people who General

5 Loncar normally had were not all there at this meeting, because this

6 meeting was called at short notice, was not a pre-arranged meeting in the

7 normal course of events, and so there's evidence of mix-up in this.

8 Q. At the foot of the first page and beginning of the second, we can

9 see you adopting a harsh approach, according to Loncar's notetaker:

10 "Attempting to make points he wished to make to General Loncar, one by

11 one, as urgently as possible, endeavouring in this manner to prevent our

12 side from setting out our own arguments and facts."

13 Just pausing there for a minute, of course in looking at the other

14 side of the meeting's records and looking at the VJ's record of events,

15 we'll be interested to see if there is, in fact, any contemporaneous

16 account of what happened at Racak.

17 A. Yes. As I recall it, I don't think there is a lot.

18 Q. So they go on in their record to note that:

19 "With respect to the note which General Loncar sent to Walker,

20 asking the KVM members to secure the return of weapons," and so on,

21 "General Drewienkiewicz said he had no intention of exposing the lives of

22 his verifiers to danger."

23 And then a demand that army members be withdrawn from Podujevo.

24 Then a demand that operations about Decani be halted. Then a reference to

25 the two injured or wounded KVM members, you saying you didn't know who the

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1 perpetrator was. Then focusing on the operation in the area of Stimlje.

2 It records your information that civilians, including children, women, and

3 the elderly, had been killed, and saying that you were going to go to the

4 scene, as indeed you were. And then at the next page, saying that it

5 would be bad for your side.

6 A. Yes, indeed.

7 Q. A summary of Loncar's position being that your approach was

8 tendentious - paragraph 3 - that your decision to go with journalists

9 reflected bias and that it would be more appropriate if an investigation

10 was carried out first and journalists summoned subsequently.

11 A. Yes. This simply didn't -- this is what was said, and that

12 situation was really not a feasible suggestion in that obviously we didn't

13 control where the journalists were going. It was clear that the

14 journalists had decided they were going to go to this area, irrespective

15 of anything we did. My point was as much that it was important that

16 General Loncar accompanied us so that he could agree with us what was

17 there rather than having to rely on reports at secondhand through the

18 press.

19 Q. But in the event, did he come with you?

20 A. He didn't come with us, in the event.

21 Q. You see at the bottom of the page you were said to have been

22 visibly nervous, refusing coffee, that you calmed down. Were you nervous

23 or angry?

24 A. I was extremely angry. I certainly did refuse coffee and was well

25 aware that that would give an indication of the fact that I was

1 more -- very much more serious than perhaps was normally the case, that

2 this was so serious that I was not prepared to sit down and drink coffee

3 while this situation was evolving.

4 Q. You observe, in paragraph 183, that there were less than the

5 normal number of copies of this particular document made. Any

6 significance in that, or is that just --

7 A. I think it reflects the fact that the normal secretariat people

8 were not there.

9 Q. Right.

10 A. But also that less copies were made, and therefore this report was

11 sent to less people, which would suggest that there was a feeling of

12 sensitivity about it, because if you want to restrict the distribution of

13 it, you obviously make less copies.

14 Q. As we can see, the document contains no narrative account from the

15 Serb side --

16 A. No.

17 Q. -- of what had happened.

18 So if we move on from that document --

19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice --

20 MR. NICE: Yes.

21 JUDGE KWON: -- when you are dealing with these kind of documents,

22 written in Serb and which were not brought by this witness, could you

23 clarify to us how or where you did get these kind of documents.

24 MR. NICE: Yes. These documents came -- [Microphone not

25 activated] -- being produced --

1 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

2 MR. NICE: I'll find out.

3 JUDGE KWON: Microphone.

4 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Nice.

5 MR. NICE: Sorry?

6 JUDGE KWON: Turn on your microphone.

7 MR. NICE: It's on already.

8 JUDGE KWON: Oh, yes.

9 MR. NICE: I can't immediately give you the precise source of this

10 document. I'll do so in due course. But they generally have come to us

11 from sources, the providence of which will be satisfactory, and you can

12 see indeed that they're stamped and signed and everything else. I can't

13 immediately tell you where that one came from, but I will do.

14 JUDGE KWON: Yes. Thank you.

15 MR. NICE: Or probably Ms. Graham, with her access to the records,

16 will be able to tell me in the blink of an eye, I expect. It will take a

17 few more moments than that. I'll come back to it.

18 Q. If we go to the next exhibit, the next tab in the exhibit, tab

19 29. This is an OSCE document on the 16th of January. General, any

20 particular significance in this?

21 A. I think this is -- may I quickly look at it and refresh my memory

22 again? This is our -- is my secretary's -- or my staff officer's version

23 of what -- of the meeting that we have just heard described from the

24 Serbian perspective.

25 Q. We needn't trouble with it any more, I don't think.

1 A. And I think I've covered it.

2 Q. Yes. Now, you had explained you were going to travel to Racak,

3 that Loncar, whatever his initial reaction, in the event, did not go with

4 you.

5 When you arrived - paragraph 185 - at Racak, was there already a

6 substantial presence of other people there?

7 A. Yes. We drove through Stimlje, where there were a lot of Serbian

8 police, and then driving from Stimlje the one and a half kilometres down

9 to Racak, there was a considerable media presence of the international

10 media. There were no Serbian forces in the village of Racak. There were

11 a number of KLA people there, seven or eight of them, I recall, spread out

12 just throughout the village.

13 Q. You have drawn a map, but I've now been able to obtain

14 reduced-size prints of aerial photographs. Which do you think would be

15 more helpful to explain the geography?

16 A. I think the aerial photo is rather better than my rather scruffy

17 print.

18 MR. NICE: These have been distributed in colour, by another

19 reference, to the amici and to the accused earlier. There are two colour

20 copies. Why don't I make one of my colour copies available, my colour

21 copy. Is that -- no, I'll have to keep one back. There are two colour

22 copies and several black-and-white ones for distribution. And if the tab

23 numberings on this exhibit reach number -- I think it's up to 71, or is it

24 72? 72. And this becomes tab 73 of this binder.

25 Q. I know, General, that you've recently seen this map, which is part

1 of the production of another witness yet to come, so that the markings on

2 it - and it's a display map - are not what we are particularly interested

3 in. It's just the map for its own value at the moment.

4 A. Yes, indeed.

5 Q. There are the two. There's the smaller sheet -- three, actually.

6 There's the general aerial view, which shows the whole area. And perhaps

7 you'll just acquaint the Judges, and others watching, with the general

8 geography by reference to this one first. If we could lay that on the

9 ELMO, and then we'll go to the detailed maps. If you can just explain the

10 route, the arrival, and where the village is. Then we'll see it on the

11 other maps in more detail.

12 A. Yes. Right. This road is the main road that goes up into the

13 Dulje Heights. That's the town of Stimlje. And from Stimlje, the road

14 into Racak is down this way, and Racak is in this area.

15 Q. Before we move on, the mental hospital to which you've made

16 reference, can you find that?

17 A. Is about there. Sorry, probably about there.

18 Q. Now, with that, we can probably move immediately to the slightly

19 larger-scale map, forgetting the markings that relate to the work of

20 another witness to come.

21 A. Which one do you want?

22 Q. The first one, the --

23 A. Is that Racak or the municipality of Stimlje?

24 Q. The municipality of Stimlje, I think. Just lay that there and we

25 can see it in a little more detail, and then we can go to the largest

1 scale of all. So this shows, if we can just see the road in --

2 A. Right. The red circles represent the positions from which fire

3 was brought into Racak. That's particularly this ridge, which faces west,

4 and Racak is in this area. You can see it spread out astride this road.

5 And the marking which is shown as "6," which is there, is the ravine up

6 which we went. So to get into the village, we came in along this road,

7 parked up pretty well on that corner, and then were led up a ravine to the

8 point that's marked as "6."

9 Q. Now I'll move to the largest-scale map of all, part of the same

10 tab number, Racak itself. Not map; aerial view. That shows the road in,

11 the ridge still marked in red. And can you now, by leaving that on the

12 ELMO, can you pick up your narrative? You arrived at the village.

13 A. Right. And we --

14 Q. The KLA people, where were they?

15 A. They were scattered throughout the village. There were a couple

16 at the entry to the village, at the eastern edge of the village, which I

17 suppose is down south of the area where the mosque is shown. There's the

18 mosque. So the entrance to the village is round about here. So we saw a

19 couple here, and then as we went into the village, along this fairly

20 straight piece of road there were three or four, visibly in uniform,

21 standing around with weapons.

22 Q. The point you've just indicated, there is another road or roadway

23 or track going off to the right, but that apart, that appears to be only

24 the one road into Racak. What is the position? Can you help us?

25 A. The road into Racak that vehicles used was the one that came down

1 here and turned right and then came in this way. This road is a lot less

2 distinct on the ground.

3 Q. When you arrived -- I'm sorry. I'm going too fast.

4 When you arrived at the village, the first sign of what had

5 happened is, I think, the body of a man in a farmhouse.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Just can you point that area to us?

8 A. That would be in about this area. It was just after this corner.

9 We were taken into the courtyard, and the body was lying on the ground.

10 Q. The body being the body of what and in what state?

11 A. The body of an elderly man who had had his head chopped off.

12 Q. Then did you return to the village or to another part of the

13 village where you noticed a newly dug trench system?

14 A. We moved on westwards from this corner to the up -- starting to go

15 up the hill, and where the hill became wooded, there was a trench system

16 which was at least 50 metres long which faced east. In other words, it

17 was about a semi-circle like this, facing in this and this direction,

18 covering the open ground to the -- to the north of the village.

19 Q. We may, if the video that's being produced works on the machine

20 here, which it didn't on the one I was trying to work it on at lunchtime,

21 see a video which shows that trench system, but I think your recollection

22 and note of it was that it was newly-built and unused for reasons you can

23 give.

24 A. Yes. I did take some notes of this, thinking that this might have

25 been an area where there had been fighting. If there had been fighting,

1 then there would almost certainly have been spent cartridge cases and

2 other evidence of it having been occupied. Cigarette papers, cigarette

3 butts, anything like that; the normal litter of a battlefield. You know,

4 clips that ammunition had been in, discarded bits of uniform --

5 Q. Right.

6 A. -- and there was none of that. It was very, very clear.

7 MR. NICE: I didn't want the video yet. Thank you. But we'll

8 come to it in a second. Thank you for turning it off.

9 THE WITNESS: So it was my conclusion that this trench had not

10 been fought over.

11 MR. NICE:

12 Q. Was there any scenes of crime examination being done at the time?

13 A. No. We did not have those sort of specialists in the mission.

14 However, partly because of that, the instruction was given to our -- one

15 of our photographers to video everything he saw in as much detail as he

16 could, which he then did.

17 Q. Just tell us, before we turn over from tab 30, which is probably

18 redundant in light of the aerial views, was tab 30 the map or plan you

19 drew at the time or later?

20 A. That was later. I didn't draw a sketch at the time. This was

21 drawn in June of 2000.

22 Q. Thank you. Now, you were there with Ambassador Walker and the

23 press. Their pressure was what?

24 A. There was a lot -- the press were obviously taking their photos

25 and were hounding Walker to make a statement. He moved around the scene,

1 noted what had been seen and then did make a statement at the time. But

2 it was really quite factual at the time, and no attribution of what had

3 happened was given at that stage.

4 Q. You, at the moment, have only told us of seeing the one

5 decapitated elderly man. I'm going to ask you in a minute to talk us

6 through a little bit more of what you saw, but what was the attitude of

7 the villagers, the surviving villagers in the village, generally?

8 A. They appeared to be extremely shocked and in considerable fear and

9 trepidation. We got, I got, the impression that the KLA were not welcome

10 in the village, that they had imposed themselves upon the village rather

11 than being there and being made welcome. There were no signs that the KLA

12 were in any way welcome in this village.

13 Q. There were KLA present?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And there were villagers present?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. And you were able to see the interaction of one to the other?

18 A. They were not talking to one another, chatting, exchanging

19 cigarettes or anything like that. There was -- they were avoiding each

20 other.

21 Q. Did you -- did you take from any villagers an account - just yes

22 or no at this stage - of what the KLA had done the previous day?

23 A. The account, and I can't remember exactly how I --

24 Q. It sounds as though the answer to my question was yes.

25 A. The answer is yes.

1 Q. And this was through an interpreter?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And it was from one or more than one of the villagers, if you can

4 recall?

5 A. It was from more than one because it was largely when we were

6 standing around after we'd been on the hill, and we were using the

7 interpreter of the UNHCR official who was there. And we were chatting to

8 a number of the people who were there, who were coming up to us to offer

9 their versions.

10 Q. And what, if there was any consistency in the version advanced,

11 was the account of what the KLA had done?

12 A. The consistent account was that the KLA had essentially left the

13 village when the Serb forces had come into the village, that they had not

14 stopped and fought. And there was a degree of bitterness among the

15 villagers that the KLA had stayed there long enough to make trouble but

16 not long enough to do anything about it when -- when trouble came in the

17 other direction.

18 MR. NICE: It might now be convenient to look at the video. The

19 whole video, Your Honour, is a 30-minute video. The extracts are half a

20 minute or something of that extent, I think. For technical reasons, I

21 wasn't able to view the extract that's been prepared, although I have seen

22 parts of it with the witness before. It's Exhibit number -- does it have

23 a separate exhibit number or is it part of this binder?

24 May it have a new exhibit number, please?

25 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 95.

1 MR. NICE: Thank you. It's proposed, and I hope this is

2 acceptable, if the full tape could be produced as 95. The extract which

3 we will play to save time can be 95A, and people can view the whole

4 hand-held video at their leisure if they wish to. So if the extract can

5 now be played.

6 [Videotape played]

7 MR. NICE:

8 Q. General, either speak over it as we see it, although much of it

9 speaks for itself.

10 A. Yes. This is us arriving, coming up the hill through the orchard

11 to the point where the trench is, and I think we then see ourselves

12 crossing the trench. We see our feet going across the trench. But you

13 can see the way that this area looks out over -- over open countryside.

14 You can also see the effects of Serb artillery on the houses in the

15 background.

16 Q. That's, I think, you there?

17 A. I'm in the yellow anorak. Walker is just turning towards us in

18 the blue anorak, with the moustache and glasses.

19 Now this is us coming up to the trench system and crossing the

20 trench system. I mean, it is a trench running from left to right as we

21 crossed it. And then we're going up the hill towards the ravine.

22 Q. Now, from what you've been told, you've already been told what to

23 expect in the ravine, presumably?

24 A. Yes. We knew that there were a number of bodies up there.

25 Q. Did the original video show the bodies as well?

1 A. I believe -- yes, it did. Yes.

2 Q. Maybe we'll make another part of it available tomorrow. But in

3 any event, that's going to be evidenced in another place at another time.

4 But when you got to the trench at the top, what was it that you found?

5 Not the trench, the ravine.

6 A. We went up the hill through -- along a -- what became a path with

7 a -- with a wall on either side. And then as that levelled out towards

8 the top of the hill, it became more open, and at that point we came

9 across -- it really turned into the gulley in which we came across the

10 bodies of 24 men. They had all been shot, and it was my impression that

11 most had been shot in the upper part of the body, in the head and neck.

12 All were wearing civilian clothing. There was no evidence of any uniforms

13 and no evidence of any weapons. In the gulley itself there was nothing to

14 indicate fighting, such as spent cartridge cases.

15 Most of the ones I saw were elderly rather than young. I thought

16 at the time they were 50 to 60, but they might have been younger, a bit

17 younger, because -- but they were certainly not young men. They were more

18 than 40, say.

19 Q. Can we now just deal with a couple of exhibits before we come to

20 the evening press conference.

21 A. Could I also add that their footwear and their clothing was not

22 the sort of footwear and clothing that I associate with people who live in

23 the hills. They were wearing wellingtons and mackintosh sort of garments

24 rather than the sort of things you would wear if you were living in the

25 hills. Several of them were also wearing the white cap, which again was

1 not something that we had noticeably seen in our visits to KLA locations.

2 Q. Can we go to tab 31, please. OTP reference 1558, a press article

3 detailing the casualties for the 8th to the 20th of January. And we can

4 see this in its original form in the publication of a newspaper, I think.

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- of this please?

7 A. This is a statement of what the police casualties were over this

8 period, and I think it's a translation of a newspaper article. The -- and

9 the period covered is the 8th to the 20th of January, which of course

10 includes Racak which was on the 15th. And if you go through the -- the

11 dates on which the report indicates, it appears that one police officer

12 was wounded on the 15th of January and none were reported killed.

13 Q. That's on the second sheet, isn't it, the top of the second

14 sheet?

15 A. Yes, it is. "The officer who was born in 1969 was slightly

16 wounded in a terrorist attack committed near the village of Racak on the

17 15th of January."

18 Now, it therefore appears that while 45 Albanians were killed and

19 five were wounded, one Serbian policeman was wounded, which again hardly

20 indicates a firefight in which the fire was moving in both directions. It

21 indicates to me that the fire was -- was exclusively being directed at the

22 Albanians. If the people on the hillside at Racak had been resisting,

23 then I believe that more than one person would have ended up wounded.

24 More than one policeman would have ended up wounded.

25 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I gather I was too impatient with the

1 video extract, and if we had waited a little bit longer we would have gone

2 from pure blue back to the next passage. So if it's still in the same

3 position -- I see a positive sign -- we can just play the next bit. I

4 gather that -- ah.

5 [Videotape played]

6 MR. NICE:

7 Q. Now, is this in the ravine or is this somewhere else?

8 A. Yes. This is moving uphill, up the ravine. And we started seeing

9 one or two individuals on their own and then we came across a group, a

10 larger group of people who were -- who had fallen, who were heaped on one

11 another. That's Walker there.

12 Q. Walker in the blue?

13 A. In the blue, yes.

14 Q. You made the observation about the footwear.

15 A. Yes. And here is the heap, yes, one of the heaps of bodies which

16 appear to be where they fell. And we could detect no sign of them having

17 been moved around. And similarly, we could see no evidence that clothing

18 had been removed. They appeared to have the bullet holes in the clothing

19 that were consistent with the wounds.

20 Again, if you're going to run around the hills, then these

21 light-coloured anoraks are not the thing to wear because you obviously

22 show up in them.

23 Q. And indeed were there any signs of resistance or fighting, or

24 defence --

25 A. None whatsoever that I saw.

1 Q. -- where these men had fallen?

2 A. There were no indications that they had fought back.

3 Q. That's probably all. There's nothing we've now missed, is there?

4 A. I don't think there is, no.

5 MR. NICE: Thank you very much to the audiovisual unit.

6 Q. Moving on to tab 32, just the contemporaneous record, your own

7 OSCE report. Marked at "C" is your -- I think this is your record, is it,

8 or record of somebody on the same team?

9 A. Sorry, can I look? The paragraph marked "C" at the bottom of the

10 first page exactly describes what I saw. I don't think it was necessarily

11 drafted by me, because this was something that was written I think two or

12 three days later as a formal report to Vienna and again was an attempt to

13 be absolutely specific on the facts as opposed to the press reports.

14 Q. We see a reference there to one of the men shot in the head,

15 having a wound which had scorch marks around it.

16 A. Yes. I did not see that, but that is as a result of putting

17 together everybody's -- everybody's recollection of what they saw.

18 Q. I think the conclusion says -- speaks of execution.

19 A. Yes. That's the top of the next page, isn't it?

20 "Observations recorded in the details in group C led the KVM to

21 the conclusion that the civilians had obviously been executed. The KVM

22 described these observations as a massacre and attributed responsibility

23 to the FRY government security forces."

24 Q. I think you returned to Pristina.

25 A. Yes. We moved back down the hill and then Walker was then asked

1 to go and talk to the -- those of the village elders that were left, and

2 went and did that on his own. At this stage, the rest of us were

3 prevented from leaving, and this is when we stood around and talked with

4 those villagers who came up and were willing to talk to us. And then we

5 then all left the village together. I rode back with Walker, and in the

6 vehicle, we agreed that there would be -- he directed that there would be

7 a further press conference that evening in Pristina.

8 Q. Maybe before we get to the press conference, it's not covered, in

9 fact, in the printed statement, but there's been some reference in these

10 proceedings to phone calls made at the time by individuals who were there,

11 on mobile phones. Just help us with that, please.

12 A. Yes. There was some mobile phone activity from the -- the area at

13 the top of the hill. I specifically remember the aide of Walker making a

14 phone call. I cannot remember to whom he made it. The mobile phone

15 reception in that area was not good, and so not that many were made.

16 Q. Did you make any?

17 A. I don't recall doing so.

18 Q. Are you in a position to help us - yes or no - with the content of

19 anybody else's phone call?

20 A. I think that -- I think that Walker's assistant was phoning

21 through to NATO at the time. I'm pretty sure there was an American at the

22 other end of it. I'm not specifically sure who he did speak to, but he

23 basically was describing the scene on the hillside.

24 Q. Let's move on, then, to the press conference. How was that dealt

25 with?

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1 A. We then went back to Pristina. Walker had spoken to the press on

2 the hillside, had confined himself very much to describing the facts as he

3 had seen them on the hillside, and then we went back to Pristina and

4 arranged a subsequent press conference. And over the course of the time

5 between getting back to Pristina and having the press conference, a number

6 of us did phone back to capitals in order to report that something really

7 bad had happened. I certainly at that stage rang through to London and

8 said that something really bad had happened.

9 Q. Are you aware of anybody else's phone calls?

10 A. Yes. I reported to Walker that the press conference had been laid

11 on as he had instructed it, and when I walked into his office, he was on

12 the phone.

13 Q. Did you hear his phone call?

14 A. I think he was on the phone to Richard Holbrooke, because his

15 exact words that I recall where, "Dick, you can kiss your Nobel Peace

16 Prize goodbye."

17 Q. The press conference itself, was that notable for some attribution

18 of responsibility?

19 A. Yes. At the press conference, either in the original statement or

20 I think in response to questions afterwards, Walker said yes, he believed

21 this was a massacre, and yes, he believed that the Yugoslav security

22 forces were responsible for the killings. So he did at that point

23 directly attribute the blame to the Yugoslav security forces.

24 Q. Now, Loncar had not accompanied you on this journey, despite

25 having once said he would. Did you have contact with him on the 16th?

1 A. Yes. He actually came across to my office and said he needed to

2 talk about this, that he was -- he had just heard of the content of the

3 press conference and that he felt it was not -- had not been done

4 properly, that he had been instructed by Belgrade to come over and to

5 deliver this message. He made the point strongly that Walker had not made

6 the point in his press conference that everything that had happened at

7 Racak had been in response to the earlier murder of the three policemen,

8 that everything that had gone on in Racak was because police had gone into

9 Racak searching for the people who had killed the police a week earlier.

10 And it was that point he was wishing to make at that stage rather than

11 saying what had happened at Racak in the previous 24 hours. He was more

12 intent on justifying the presence of Yugoslav security forces in the

13 village rather than commenting on what had actually happened, whether it

14 was in response to orders or not.

15 MR. NICE: Tab 33. This is a press statement.

16 Before we come to that: His Honour Judge Kwon's inquiry, I do

17 have an answer, but there are certain sensitivities concerned. Can I give

18 you a detailed answer tomorrow morning?

19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. No problem.

20 MR. NICE:

21 Q. 33 is a statement from the press. Your comment coming on --

22 A. Yes. First of all, it's a statement that originated on the 16th,

23 despite the fact that it says the 14th of January, because you can read in

24 the detail that it's all about yesterday, the 15th of January. It is the

25 statement from the -- I think the FRY authorities and was put together

1 after the evening press conference by Walker in Pristina, which I recall

2 happening starting around 6.00 and which lasted about half an hour.

3 Q. Again, we don't want to take time reading documents in detail. We

4 can scan-read them ourselves. The significance for you of this document

5 being what, if you can remember?

6 A. I think it states -- it is very anti-Walker. It states of what

7 Walker did and talking about the competent judicial authorities carrying

8 out their legal obligations. It does not actually state what -- the

9 degree of the killing. It does not state that 40-something people had

10 been killed there. And I think that is remarkable, when lists of injured

11 policemen can be produced, that an incident in which 46 Kosovar Albanians

12 are killed is not worthy of note.

13 Q. We can see in the first paragraph the summary explanation for the

14 event being police undertaking to arrest terrorists who killed a police

15 officer in a terrorist attack.

16 A. Yes, indeed. And again, the statement that the terrorists

17 attacked them with automatic weapons, portable launchers, and mortars is

18 at odds with what I saw on the ground and what had been reported earlier

19 as well.

20 MR. NICE: Tab 34. And His Honour Judge Kwon's query reminds me

21 that I've been, in the interests of brevity, deviating from my normal

22 practice of asking that the original first be laid on the ELMO so that

23 those viewing can see the nature of the original document. So can it

24 briefly be -- can you place the B/C/S original on the overhead projector

25 briefly first so that people can see the nature of the document, and then

1 we'll look at the English version. And while that's being done -- there's

2 the original document. We can now replace that with the English version.

3 Q. Does this appear to be a record from the FRY of the meeting

4 between --

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. -- yourself and Loncar, a document you hadn't seen until very

7 recently?

8 A. That's correct. I saw this again just before Easter. It reminds

9 me that General Loncar, having come first to my office, we then walked

10 together down to Walker's office and there was then a continuation of the

11 discussion, in which Loncar had protested what Walker had said at the

12 press conference. And I think we have some words -- Loncar said on this

13 occasion he was submitting an official report on the given incident and he

14 had to express his surprise that we had already transmitted to the media

15 our perception of events, which was, to say the least, neither complete

16 nor credible. This evening's presentation by the Head of Mission at a

17 press conference, where a biased perception of the incident was

18 presented. Highly inappropriate that no reference was made to the fact

19 that our side - which is the Serbian side - had invited the KVM to verify

20 the need it undertook towards killing on 10th January, being the killing

21 of the policeman.

22 MR. NICE: Too fast, I suspect, General.

23 A. Sorry. That it made no reference to the fact that the Serb

24 authorities had invited the KVM to verify the killings of the policeman on

25 the 10th of January. And he goes on, you can see at the bottom of the

1 page: "The incident had practically occurred because of the organised

2 actions of the terrorists against the activity of the police," and

3 claiming that this had been a scenario prepared in advance for the benefit

4 of the KVM.

5 Q. It's fair to observe, at the bottom of the third page and over to

6 the fourth, that it sets out how Walker, following interjections, was

7 steadfast in his thesis that it was a matter of the plain execution of

8 elderly people and civilians who were killed by close-range fire, a

9 clear-cut case which The Hague Tribunal needed to get involved in. It

10 goes on to deal with the information provided to governments of other

11 countries.

12 A. Yes. And at this stage and at other stages, Walker had made the

13 strong point that the representatives of this Tribunal should be

14 immediately given entry visas so that they could see the facts on the

15 ground for themselves, and of course that was never followed up.

16 Q. And again, apart from the very cursory -- that's a matter for

17 comment. Apart from the explanations thus far given, no detailed account

18 of what happened?

19 A. That is correct. No detailed account of what happened was ever

20 given, nor was any response ever given to the suggestion that there should

21 be a proper investigation that commanders who were involved should be

22 suspended during this investigation that was being recommended. All of

23 this was ignored.

24 MR. NICE: The next exhibit, 35. Your Honours, the same query as

25 to providence of that document.

1 THE WITNESS: Yes, this is the --

2 MR. NICE: Probably the same answer.

3 THE WITNESS: -- the morning brief --

4 MR. NICE: No, no. I'm sorry.

5 THE WITNESS: Sorry.

6 MR. NICE: I'm addressing His Honour at the moment.

7 The providence of this document, probably the same answer as the

8 previous one. I'll deal with it tomorrow.

9 JUDGE KWON: Yes.

10 MR. NICE:

11 Q. We then see a document, the appearance of which is already

12 familiar because it is distinctive, and so this is the morning briefing

13 the following day, the 17th of January.

14 A. Yes. I was not actually in the headquarters at this stage, but I

15 know that this is the briefing that was given. I had already left that

16 morning for Stimlje. But I think the facts are outlined.

17 Q. Can you just find the ...

18 A. It's number -- it's labelled on the front as number 4. It's

19 actually number 3, which says:

20 "EU-KDOM reported a large number of local civilians.

21 Approximately 45 had been killed in the vicinity of Racak. A majority of

22 them appeared to be non-combatants. Loncar was informed of these slayings

23 directly by Walker. Survivors --" and this is other reports that I did

24 not myself participate in -- "reported that they had recognised Serb

25 civilians from the Stimlje area dressed as MUP and other local MUP

1 participating in the killings. They further reported that others

2 described as VJ dressed in black and wearing ski masks over their faces

3 were also involved."

4 That statement, starting with "survivors," is something which I am

5 aware of but no -- I am not -- I have never taken part in any of those

6 conversations.

7 Q. If we go to the very end of this little clutch of papers, where

8 the type size changes or --

9 A. Assessment, yes.

10 Q. We see again -- will this be a composite assessment made by the

11 reporting officer?

12 A. Yes. The last sentence, I think, "Movement of forces might only

13 be a further [sic] step if further forces are needed in the vicinity of

14 Stimlje." So this was showing the way troops were being moved within

15 Kosovo, and I think indicates still that bad though Stimlje was, and Racak

16 was, there was a lot of other stuff going on at the time. This was not

17 one isolated incident in an otherwise calm situation, that there was a lot

18 of other movement in other areas that was needing to be watched and

19 reported on as well.

20 Q. Paragraph --

21 JUDGE MAY: Just one comment there. The assessment, if you could

22 help us, General, assessment for 17th of January, page K0223030 --

23 THE WITNESS: The bias --

24 JUDGE MAY: -- begins, if I could just put it --

25 THE WITNESS: Yes. Sorry.

1 JUDGE MAY: Begins: "The area around Stimlje is red hot." It then

2 deals with the bodies in Racak.

3 "Expected that the KLA will retaliate. The apparent massacre has

4 the indications that the Serbian civilians could have been involved.

5 Professional soldiers or MUP forces would not normally conduct such

6 atrocities, given the Charter agreements which has involved OSCE in

7 Kosovo. Consequently, the sighting of Serbian civilians by villagers

8 suggest they could very well be responsible, for they are not controlled

9 by the government."

10 Can you comment on that?

11 THE WITNESS: This was, I would say, the first attempt to assess

12 it, and in this case, I have to say, was using reports which were

13 not -- this was not all of the facts. There was a degree of speculation

14 in this, and that speculation was not borne out by anything we were able

15 to find subsequently.

16 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

17 THE WITNESS: As an assessment, it -- in the assessment, it's

18 really what the briefer feels at the time and what could happen. And so

19 it is -- there is a degree of speculation in that, because he is trying to

20 look forward, to say: So what's going to happen next? And so whereas

21 everything else that you have seen is factual, in the assessment the

22 briefer would, as I say, attempt to look forward and see what the

23 implications of the report that he's just given might be in trying to

24 direct the attention of the Head of Mission to the next place where his

25 presence might be needed.

1 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

2 MR. NICE:

3 Q. Paragraphs 202 and onwards, but we'll deal with them very shortly,

4 I think. You went to Stimlje on the 17th of January, having positioned

5 Maisonneuve in the village of Racak for monitoring purpose. You went to

6 the police station and met Bogoljob Janicjevic, and also a woman judge,

7 Danica Marinkovic, from Pristina; correct?

8 A. That is correct, yes. This meeting was agreed at the Loncar

9 meeting the evening before, when Loncar said, "Look, we still have to get

10 in and carry out the legal obligations here." And it was agreed that I

11 should make contact with the people that needed to go in, in an attempt to

12 keep the situation from bubbling over again.

13 Q. Tell us about the reaction and approach of the woman judge.

14 A. Her view was that she needed to go in with as many police as it

15 needed to ensure her safety. My point was that she would be a lot safer

16 if she went in with us and without a large police presence, because I felt

17 that, in the light of what had just happened, a large police presence was

18 more likely to be provocative than anything, and she didn't need a police

19 presence, in my view, if we were there to guarantee her safety.

20 Q. Did she heed your advice about the potentially provocative nature

21 of a large police presence?

22 A. No. And when I became more specific and said, "Look, if you go in

23 with police, you are not only going to be unsafe yourself, you're going to

24 restart the cycle of violence and there will be more trouble and more

25 people will get hurt," and she said, "Well, in that case, so be it."

1 By this stage, I had actually got my people in the village as

2 well, and I said, "Look, if you are absolutely determined to go into this

3 village with a heavy police presence, you must, at the very least, before

4 you start that, give me time to withdraw my people, because I know that if

5 you do that, there is likely to be an exchange of fire."

6 And she eventually gave the order to the police commander in the

7 room with us to give the order that they were to go forward to the

8 village, and at that point I literally had to turn to Ciaglinski and tell

9 him to use his radio to tell everybody to get out, which they then did.

10 And there was no time given even for my people to get clear of the

11 village.

12 Q. I think that your advice was rather borne out by events, wasn't

13 it?

14 A. She went to the village. There was a firefight, because the KLA

15 were back in the village in some numbers. And as a result of that, she

16 was not able to go into the village, and I think one of the vehicles with

17 her was actually hit by a rocket-propelled grenade, and so they then came

18 back and had another go the next day.

19 Q. Tab 36, please. The 18th of January.

20 A. This is the Yugoslav government's statement, in which Walker was

21 declared persona non grata and was ordered to leave within 48 hours.

22 Q. And apart from that, it also makes observations about this

23 Tribunal having no jurisdiction on Kosovo and Metohija.

24 A. Indeed, yes. Not a view I shared.

25 Q. Right. We move on to 37, daily report for the 18th of January.

1 A. I think the point of this report, which comes from Orahovac, is

2 that there was an attempt not to be completely obsessed with what was

3 going on here, that there was -- it was important that throughout the rest

4 of the area, the KVM continued to operate as normally as possible, because

5 it was clearly important that the reporting continued for as long as we

6 were able to.

7 Q. Something I haven't covered. It's probably obvious taken as read

8 and visible from the video. The OSCE were unarmed, weren't they?

9 A. Indeed, yes.

10 Q. Completely?

11 A. Completely.

12 Q. And although some of your vehicles may have, at some stages, had

13 light protection --

14 A. The vehicles --

15 Q. -- best you could offer?

16 A. The vehicles we had were a mix of Pajeros, which were just

17 commercial Pajeros, and some jeeps which had a bit of extra protection,

18 which we laughingly called armoured, but they actually had hardened glass,

19 which slowed a bullet down but which did not stop it, and slightly more

20 robust doors. So they were not armoured vehicles in the way you might

21 think of them. They were certainly not aggressive-looking vehicles.

22 MR. NICE: 38, please. Please place the original first on the

23 overhead projector so that it can be viewed, and then we'll look at the

24 English. Thank you very much.

25 Q. This, General, being --?

1 A. This is the FRY version of a subsequent meeting between General

2 Loncar and myself on the 19th of January, which of course is two days

3 after the Sunday in which the investigating judge and I had sat in Stimlje

4 and discussed whether or not she should go forward with one policeman or a

5 hundred.

6 Q. You can see on the foot of the first page in the translation, at

7 number 2, your narrative of what had happened with Judge Danica

8 Marinkovic, and that goes on to page 2.

9 A. Yes. And my point here was that this was just increasing the

10 level of violence and went through in great detail because it was the --

11 it had become the norm in these meetings to go through the detail because

12 attempts to describe things in general terms had very early on been

13 rubbished and details was always required by -- by General Loncar and his

14 people. So one always went in there with a chapter and verse ready to be

15 absolutely specific. It was not good enough to say, you know, "Please

16 stop your people from looting." We had to say, "Please stop your people

17 from looting such as happened on last Wednesday at this place with these

18 people." There was always a great demand for detail.

19 Q. We can see on the third page, at 3.1, reference not only to

20 Walker's persona non grata declared status but the welcome or otherwise

21 extended to Justice Louise Arbour, the Prosecutor at this Tribunal.

22 A. Yes. The purpose of the whole meeting was to attempt to find out

23 what were the possible intentions of the Yugoslav government with regard

24 to Walker, because obviously his declaration of being persona non grata

25 had a pretty dramatic effect upon the ability of the mission to carry out

1 its job. There was concern that Walker was only the first name at the top

2 of the list and that other people were on this list, and that also that

3 because Walker had resolved to stay put in Pristina, that there might be a

4 storming of the -- of the KVM premises in order to apprehend him, which

5 was at the time thought to be a possibility by some of the people. And so

6 it was seen as quite important to attempt to find out what the likely

7 intentions were.

8 Q. On the next page we can a see a reference to the IRA and the KLA

9 as a discussion topic. I think that's something that happened quite

10 regularly, wasn't it?

11 A. Yes. That was certainly a parallel that was drawn that we --

12 we -- this was in the context of not -- not honouring the KLA with the

13 word of "army." And I said, "Well, in our operations in Northern Ireland,

14 one of the things that worried us least was what they were called." But

15 it was often brought up.

16 Q. Any detailed account given as to how all these people had died?

17 A. None at all.

18 Q. Thank you. So we come to 30 -- so sorry. I think on the 21st of

19 January, Ambassador Walker spoke to you following a meeting with

20 Sainovic.

21 A. Yes. This was a phone call, and in the course of this phone call

22 Walker reported or said to me that Sainovic had informed him of what he

23 described as the successful outcome of the Racak operation in the

24 afternoon of the 15th of January. So again, at this stage there was no

25 indication from the Yugoslav government side that something really, really

1 bad had happened, that something had happened which was reprehensible.

2 Q. Thirty-nine, which is OTP reference 2800, a report of yours

3 through the period up to the 19th of January.

4 A. Yes. This again gives details of -- of incidents happening

5 elsewhere in Kosovo, including a combined VJ and MUP operation in the

6 Glogovac area, which is roughly in the middle of Kosovo. And again, this

7 sort of level of violence that is being reported is, I would say, typical

8 of what was going on round about then. So again, it wasn't just Stimlje.

9 Q. Forty. I'm passing over some meetings and journeys that you

10 made --

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. -- just to look at the general picture really. 28th of January

13 report, and this, I think, draws attention to an event in Djakovica.

14 A. Yes. Now, this is --

15 Q. At the top, I think. And --

16 A. Sorry, I'm -- yes. Here we are. It's at the bottom there. It's

17 at the bottom of page 2.

18 Q. Thank you.

19 A. "A number of incidents occurred in the border region stretching

20 from Djakovica to Prizren. Near midnight on the 27th of January, a

21 six-man police patrol encountered and exchanged fire with an armed group

22 of men in the Djakovica area."

23 So this is the area north of Prizren in the west of the country,

24 close to the Albanian border. Two policemen were injured and two members

25 of the other group, allegedly KLA, were killed.

1 I believe that this event is linked to the events that took place

2 at Rogovo 24 hours later, because this is all in the same area.

3 Q. Rogovo is a significant incident even if it has to some degree

4 been shadowed by events?

5 A. Yes, indeed.

6 Q. We may look at the detail of that and look at some photographs of

7 that.

8 JUDGE MAY: It's now 4.00. I wonder if the interpreters agree we

9 might sit until ten past.

10 THE INTERPRETER: Yes, Your Honour.

11 JUDGE MAY: Thank you very much. Ten past.

12 MR. NICE:

13 Q. Paragraph 216.

14 A. If I can go back to earlier in the day when we had again been

15 trying to meet with the Regional Centre heads. It seemed every time I met

16 with them, we had another tram smash, but we were told that again

17 something bad had just happened in -- in Rogovo. This was only a few

18 minutes' drive from where we were in Prizren, and so I went straight there

19 as soon as we realised that the initial reports were getting worse and it

20 was moving up to the scale of deaths and becoming a major incident.

21 When I got to the village at about twenty past one, Loncar was

22 there already and was clearly in charge. He was giving orders to the

23 policemen who were there, and they were going to him with questions which

24 he answered in a way that indicated that he was in command.

25 The policemen were broadly of two sorts. They were what I would

1 call normal policemen in their blue uniforms, and there was a group who

2 were wearing light grey coveralls, like a grey-blue, like a jumpsuit. I

3 believe they had a shoulder patch. And it was my firm impression that

4 they were a specialist anti-terrorist unit because we had never seen

5 people in this uniform carrying out normal police duties. They were also

6 fitter, better armed, and more cohesive, better trained than the normal

7 police. And while we were there, they were leaving the location.

8 We were held outside the compound, which was a walled farmyard

9 with a large gate, and we were held outside that until an investigating

10 judge had been brought from Djakovica and he carried out his inspection.

11 And his inspection, I have to say, was extremely short and cursory in view

12 of what was inside and needed to be inspected. But in the -- when we were

13 allowed into the courtyard of the farmyard, we came across a minibus which

14 had got at that stage five bodies inside it with two other ones just

15 outside the bus.

16 Q. I think it will be easier, if potentially a little distressing for

17 some, to look at tab 71. You may be able to give your narrative by

18 reference to these photographs.

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. There are six of them in all. Seven -- six. You simply choose

21 the one that enables you to tell the story first. It's probably the one

22 ending in the figure 59, being the bus itself. That will be a view of the

23 bus.

24 A. That is the sight that I saw when I went into the -- into the

25 compound. And as you can see, there are a number of dead people inside

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1 the bus. And there is a quite considerable pool of blood down here, which

2 is being added to by the contents of the bus, coming out of it.

3 Q. Yes.

4 A. There were five bodies in the bus at the time and two close to it,

5 five other bodies in a shed nearby. And as we were there, the bodies were

6 being assembled rather like the catch at the end of a day's grouse

7 shooting, perhaps. And you can see here also this policeman whose uniform

8 is expressly not the normal police uniform. This is the light grey

9 coveralls.

10 Q. Now, you described the uniform of people who were leaving on your

11 arrival.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. The specialist, fitter-looking men.

14 A. That is this sort of uniform --

15 Q. This the sort of uniform.

16 A. -- they were wearing.

17 Q. Are you able to give us any -- it's almost visible what the

18 marking on the armband was.

19 A. Well, it's certainly red, white, and blue, as you can see.

20 Q. The positioning the firearms beside the bodies, did you see

21 anything that explained all that?

22 A. The firearms were placed next to the bodies, but these bodies by

23 this stage had all been moved. There were -- I counted 12 weapons,

24 whereas there were, I think, 25 dead. General Loncar stated to me they

25 were all armed, but I made a point of counting the weapons and only got to

1 12.

2 Q. Footwear, was that of any significance at this site, in your

3 judgement, or not?

4 A. Well, here you can see that this -- this man here is wearing his

5 wellington boots, which again are not the best footwear for going over the

6 hills. Here you can see someone wearing his indoor slippers. This man is

7 wearing his indoor slippers. So whatever else they were doing at the

8 time, they were not -- they were not dressed for fighting.

9 Q. Anything else in the -- there's another general photograph, the

10 one with the tractor in the background that shows the scene, and it also

11 shows some more uniforms. No, not that one. The one with the tractor in

12 the background.

13 A. Sorry. That's this one. That's the top of this one, I think,

14 here.

15 Q. There's that one as well.

16 A. Yes. Here you can see the different uniforms. That's a VJ

17 soldier, and then here are -- there's our man in the -- in the grey

18 jumpsuit. That is normal police combat uniform, and here is the local

19 traffic cop. So that, I think, gives an indication of the degree to which

20 the uniforms were different. And the ones we were normally seeing were

21 perhaps that one and that one, and this one was only seen on this one

22 occasion and one earlier sighting.

23 Q. And the man in the centre of the picture in the green?

24 A. Is a Yugoslav army soldier, and I think was probably accompanying

25 Loncar. I think he was part of his party.

1 Q. Let's look at Exhibit -- tab 41.

2 A. This is the report from Prizren to the OSCE headquarters in

3 Pristina, and this describes the events at Rogovo where, as I've stated,

4 25 Albanians were killed and one policeman was killed, one Serbian

5 policeman.

6 Q. I think that this contemporaneous reporting comments on the --

7 A. Yes. If I can take you --

8 Q. It's on the first page.

9 A. Yes. Some conclusions that can be drawn already: "The amount of

10 force employed was not proportional. Not all persons were KLA. There is

11 little evidence of fighting back, as there is also little evidence of a

12 large number of weapons. There are also many questions. Why was the MUP

13 in this village at 6.00 in the morning? Where would the KLA come from?"

14 and so on.

15 I think the point that is worth reflecting on is that, firstly,

16 with 25 people killed on the Kosovo Albanian side, this is not what

17 normally happens in an exchange of fire. In a normal exchange of fire

18 between two sides, you can expect to have at least as many wounded as are

19 killed, if not more wounded than are killed. And so it was unusual that

20 nobody appeared to have only been wounded in this, and we were suspicious

21 that not everybody had been killed fighting.

22 Q. No one captured alive?

23 A. No one was captured alive. And again, the bullet holes, the

24 number of bullet holes in the minibus and the damage that it had actually

25 sustained do not suggest any attempt to take prisoners or to use restraint

1 by the security forces.

2 The other fact is that the forensic examination by the

3 investigating judge took about an hour and five minutes at the most, and

4 you've seen in the photos that the place was pretty well ankle deep in

5 mud, slush, and blood, and therefore an attempt to do a proper forensic

6 examination of this site should properly have taken a long time and

7 appears never to have been done.

8 So I think it is my conclusion that these people that were killed

9 may have been associated with the KLA, or some of them may have been, but

10 they appear not to have fought back very significantly, otherwise more

11 people would have been injured on the -- on the police side.

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

13 MR. NICE: We have covered a lot of territory today, and of course

14 by dealing with the history of the OSCE through this witness, we will be

15 able to take later witnesses who cover the similar territory much more

16 swiftly. I am happy to say that he, although inconvenient, I know, will

17 be able to be here on Monday, because I believe tomorrow we're only

18 sitting until --

19 JUDGE MAY: We're sitting tomorrow between 9.00 and just after

20 1.00. So it's not a full day. How long do you anticipate you'll be in

21 chief?

22 MR. NICE: I would hope to conclude his evidence by the first or,

23 it may be, the only break.

24 JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn now. At 9.00 tomorrow morning,

25 please, General.

1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.13 p.m.,

2 to be reconvened on Friday, the 12th day

3 of April, 2002, at 9.00 a.m.

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