1 Tuesday, 16 April 2002
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
5 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Ryneveld.
6 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes, Your Honours. Just before I call the
7 Prosecution's next witness, I wonder if I might have the Court's
8 permission to deal with a matter of housekeeping from one of the last
9 witnesses that I dealt with.
10 You'll recall that when I spoke -- when I led the evidence of
11 Mr. Loku, there were some questions during cross-examination by
12 Mr. Tapuskovic about some further photos that might be available in the
13 bundle of photos available to the Prosecution concerning the hole -- the
14 holes in the mountainside and perhaps the foliage that might have affected
15 his ability to see what he testified about. We had promised at that time
16 to produce the balance of the photos in our collection, and due to
17 circumstances, those appeared not to have ever been presented into
18 evidence, and I propose to do that now, if I may.
19 JUDGE MAY: Yes. You will have to remind us of what a convenient
20 number is going to be.
21 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes. I believe those photographs -- do we have a
23 JUDGE MAY: It may not matter just for the moment.
24 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes. They appear to have gone in -- the original
25 ones went in as 56 and 57, so perhaps we could make it 57A.
1 JUDGE MAY: Yes, 57A.
2 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you. That matter attended to, the
3 Prosecution proposes to call Richard Ciaglinski. Ciaglinski is spelled
5 JUDGE MAY: Pronounced Ciaglinski.
6 MR. RYNEVELD: Pronounced Ciaglinski. I don't know where the "N"
7 comes from, but that's the way it's pronounced.
8 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.
9 [The witness entered court]
10 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness take the declaration.
11 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
12 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
13 JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat.
14 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
15 WITNESS: RICHARD CIAGLINSKI
16 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
17 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honour.
18 Examined by Mr. Ryneveld:
19 Q. Witness, I understand that you're presently a Colonel with the
20 British Armed Forces and at present a defence attache to Bulgaria and
21 Sophia; is that correct?
22 A. That's correct, yes.
23 Q. Is it right, sir, that from the 5th of December 1998 to
24 approximately the 23rd of March 1999, you served with the OSCE in Kosovo?
25 A. I did, as a member of the Kosovo Verification Mission.
1 Q. I see. And just briefly, by way of background, sir --
2 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers pause between answer and
3 question, thank you.
4 MR. RYNEVELD:
5 Q. I understand, sir, that you joined the British Armed Forces in
6 August of 1974, attended and graduated the Sandhurst Military Academy and
7 received your commission in 1975.
8 A. That's correct.
9 Q. Then in 1994 to 1997, you served as a British Military Attache to
11 A. I did.
12 Q. And you hold a Bachelor of Arts degree in mathematics, a Master of
13 Education degree, and you're a first-class interpreter in Polish?
14 A. Yes, I hold all the above, and I am an interpreter in Polish.
15 Q. And I understand - this is particularly relevant to the issue that
16 I'm going to be asking questions about later - you completed a host of
17 military courses, particularly in the areas of weapons recognition; is
18 that correct?
19 A. That's correct.
20 Q. Sir, is it also true that you commenced your operational duties
21 with the KVM in December -- on December 5th of 1998 in Pristina as part of
22 Major General Drewienkiewicz's staff?
23 A. Yes. I arrived on the 5th of December, did some training in
24 Brezovica for two, three days and then moved down to General DZ's staff.
25 Q. And by "General DZ," that's -- we accept that that's a shortening
1 of "Drewienkiewicz"; is that correct?
2 A. That's correct, and it saves a lot of time.
3 Q. Yes. Now, sir, when you were there, did you assume the role of a
4 particular aspect of the Verification Mission?
5 A. Yes, I did. Because of my previous experience as a military
6 attache and other types of work I had done in the British Armed Forces,
7 General DZ asked for me to actually join the mission and to work on his
8 weapons and arms verification team.
9 Q. And you agreed to do that, I take it, and as a result of that,
10 what kinds of things did you do?
11 A. Well, the intention was that, in accord with the various
12 agreements, my job was to try to design a method of inspection to verify
13 that the agreement was being carried out in order that we could see that
14 the troops were in barracks, the tanks were in barracks, the number of
15 weapons of certain calibres were also being stored in barracks or not
16 there at all.
17 Q. All right. Now, sir, if I remember correctly, you said something
18 in pursuance to the agreements. What types of agreements are you
19 referring to?
20 A. There were two main agreements. There was the agreement which was
21 signed which allowed us to operate, which I think was referred to as the
22 Holbrooke agreement but in fact I think it was an agreement signed by
23 Mr. Geremek, the head of the OSCE, which specified exactly the size of the
24 force, the size of the KVM, and what responsibilities we had pursuant to
1 Q. And was that the agreement the basis upon which you conducted your
2 particular aspect of the mission?
3 A. Yes. That and the Sean Burns document which also then specified,
4 went into a little bit more detail about, for example, the number of MUP
5 patrol points.
6 MR. RYNEVELD: Might the witness be shown Exhibit 94, tab 3, Madam
8 Q. First of all, Witness, if you could look at that and tell us if
9 that in fact is the agreement to which you've made reference.
10 A. Yes, it is.
11 Q. All right. And did you have reference to that document during the
12 course of your duties?
13 A. I kept the document in my pocket throughout the entire time I was
14 in Kosovo.
15 Q. All right. And secondly -- I don't know if we need to show that
16 on the ELMO.
17 MR. RYNEVELD: I believe it was shown on the ELMO during the
18 evidence of the last witness, Your Honours. We can perhaps refer to that
19 later, if need be.
20 Q. The second document that you referred to --
21 MR. RYNEVELD: Might the witness be shown tab 4 of Exhibit 94,
23 Q. And this document, if you recognise it, perhaps should be put on
24 the ELMO.
25 First of all, Witness, do you recognise it?
1 A. I do.
2 Q. Is that the document to which you have referred as the Sean Burns
4 A. It certainly is.
5 Q. And did you have reference to that document during the course of
6 your duties?
7 A. Yes, throughout the entire time I was there.
8 Q. What kinds of issues were of particular relevance contained in
9 that document to your particular task?
10 A. Well, it was very important that the verification went according
11 to the agreements, and therefore we tried to sort of keep both sides to
12 these two documents. And it was important that the number of the MUP, the
13 MUP patrols, was kept down to the number specified in this document,
14 otherwise movement around Kosovo would have been impossible because there
15 would have been so many checkpoints that no one could have moved. And so
16 this is the main relevance, is just limiting the number of MUP patrols and
17 checkpoints throughout Kosovo.
18 Q. Yes. Now, as a result of this, did you in fact visit various
19 parts of Kosovo in the course of your duties of verifying that these
20 agreements were being adhered to by both sides?
21 A. Yes. So for example, we did try to carry out a verification of
22 barracks and military VJ locations, and we also carried out a spot check,
23 at one point in our tour during our stay in Kosovo, of the number of MUP
24 locations that were actually on the ground at any one time.
25 Q. Yes. Witness, part of the difficulty of you and I both speaking
1 the same language is that there can be immediate response and answer.
2 A. Sorry.
3 Q. We need to wait for the interpretation.
4 Now, did you have unlimited access to MUP and VJ sites?
5 A. No, not at any time.
6 Q. Tell us about that.
7 A. Well, when we first tried to carry out our very first
8 verification, which was of the barracks, the Junik barracks just west of
9 Pristina, we were met with a very hostile reception. We were not allowed
10 into the barracks. We were threatened that we were parking illegally,
11 obstructing the barracks, and this went on for some time.
12 Q. Yes.
13 A. This was just the very first attempt to verify, and this was done
14 with the presence of General DZ and a number of other verifiers.
15 Q. Allow me to interrupt at this point to ask when your initial
16 attempts would have been, in time.
17 A. This would have been at the beginning of January 1999 -- sorry,
18 wrong. It would have been about a fortnight after I started my work in
19 Pristina, which would have been the second or third week in December
21 Q. All right. And you've told us about your initial attempts. Did
22 you ever visit some other three main VJ sites?
23 A. Yes. After a great deal of negotiation with the Serbian
24 Cooperation Commission in Pristina, we were allowed to take a team to
25 visit three particular sites at various locations around Kosovo.
1 Q. And did you have reasonable access to those sites?
2 A. Yes. Obviously our visit was awaited and prepared for, and
3 therefore, we were shown what the VJ wanted us to see. But certainly we
4 had no difficulty with access on those days.
5 Q. Had they had notice, through these negotiation proceedings, of
6 your impending arrival for inspection?
7 A. Yes. On every occasion, we gave notice. For the three
8 inspections, there was a great deal of notice. For the -- our first
9 inspection at the Junik barracks, it was a very short notice, I think,
10 less than 24 hours. And then we also tried an inspection at the barracks
11 in Prizren for which we gave more than 24 hours notice, and we were also
12 met with a very hostile reception, eventually being allowed to accompany
13 the commanding officer to his office to carry out some discussions but not
14 allowed to carry out any inspection.
15 Q. I see. Had you requested to visit other sites and were you given
17 A. Yes. We -- there were two tiers of inspection. There was the
18 high-level tier where the actual headquarters, myself, I would organise
19 the high-level visits; and each of the Regional Centres would also, as
20 they controlled or looked after certain parts of Kosovo, they would also
21 try to carry out their own local inspections. Certainly, even with
22 notice, the only inspections we were allowed to carry out were the three I
23 just mentioned. All the others were turned down or they were not
25 Q. How many sites had you anticipated wanting to visit? In other
1 words, how many permissible sites were there, according to the agreement?
2 A. According to the agreement, we had free access to the whole of
3 Kosovo and, therefore, every site was permissible.
4 Q. Are you able to give a numeric number to the amount of sites, VJ
5 sites that you would have wanted to visit? I realise all of them
6 throughout Kosovo, but do you know how many there were?
7 A. Well, we -- well, we certainly would have wished to visit all the
8 permanent fixed garrisons and fixed locations. We -- anything to do with
9 air defence was excluded because that was covered by a different
10 agreement. But on top of the fixed locations, there were also deployed
11 units that we wished to visit. So in total, there probably were 30 or 40,
12 at least, sites that we should have been able to visit.
13 Q. Now, your initial attempts were, as you say, a fortnight after you
14 started so that puts us about the third week of December 1998. Did this
15 continue on into the -- into 1999, January and February, these attempts at
17 A. Well, yes -- yes and no. It became more and more difficult,
18 impossible to verify. So I continued to negotiate with the Commission for
19 Cooperation for access for myself and also for the teams out on the -- in
20 the regional areas. But slowly we had to change our method of operation,
21 and so, for example, eventually we had to, when carrying out the
22 inspection of the number of MUP patrol points, we had to mount a spot -- a
23 surprise check on them.
24 Q. Yes. When --
25 A. Sorry.
1 Q. I'm waiting for translation. Did there come a time in February of
2 1999 when you decided to send out, shall we say, a mass cover of all of
3 the known sites?
4 A. Yes, we did. The way we did this was to plan this beforehand
5 using about 40 teams from the Regional Centres. We sent the teams to all
6 the locations which were declared by the MUP as patrols, patrol bases, and
7 we also sent additional teams to areas where we knew that the MUP had
8 operated from before. And in the process, we also identified a number of
9 other areas that we hadn't previously noted where the MUP were actually
11 Q. I see. And I don't know if you've actually said this: You said
12 there was sort of a spot check. I take it that means you gave no notice.
13 A. No. We wanted to -- there was no notice given as we wanted to see
14 exactly what on any one day was deployed, because our feeling was that
15 movement was very, very restricted throughout Kosovo.
16 Q. Do you know how many sites that your teams visited that day?
17 A. Yes; up to 40.
18 Q. And what were the results of that inspection, to the best of your
20 A. Well, the MUP were allowed 29 points at any one time which they
21 could actually be in, but on this occasion there were almost 40 points
22 where the MUP were actually located, therefore contravening the agreement
23 they had with Burns.
24 Q. Did you report those findings to anyone?
25 A. Yes. A report was written. A detailed report was compiled from
1 the older regional teams and passed to the OSCE chief of operations,
2 General DZ.
3 Q. I see. Now, you've just referred to the fact that they had too
4 many MUP units as a breach of the Sean Burns agreement. Were there any
5 other breaches of the agreement that your inspection teams noted? And
6 what did they -- what were they, if any?
7 A. Well, as time went along, we certainly noticed that activities
8 were increasing and the deployment of troops outside barracks, which was a
9 clear breach of the agreement, had taken place. This was around
10 Christmas, when the Serbs deployed military units just to the south-east
11 of Podujevo in large numbers; tanks and self-propelled artillery and
12 mortar. That was just one of the examples of how -- what they were doing.
13 Later on, they were bringing in additional equipment. New types
14 of tanks were coming in, much more advanced tanks than the ones which were
15 presently in Kosovo, based on the T72, I believe the M84 type of tank came
17 They seemed to stop the conscripts going back after the end of --
18 at the end of completion of the conscript's service, thereby extending,
19 increasing the number of troops in Kosovo.
20 There were regular convoys coming in now from along the main
21 supply route which is a road that went from Nis past Podujevo into
22 Pristina, and these were convoys of ammunition, equipment, people.
23 And then later, of course, we had problems at the border.
24 Q. Now, I just want to question for clarification before I ask you to
25 comment on your last recitation of breaches. The first incident you
1 referred to referred to the MUP, which is the police; is that correct?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And that was they had more units than they were permitted by the
4 agreement, and that is the police arm of the Serbian forces?
5 A. That's correct.
6 Q. The second -- the second incident you referred to, I believe you
7 use military forces and you referred to tanks and matters like that. Was
8 that the MUP again or was that now the VJ or what? Can you help us with
10 A. Yes. Excuse me. The -- sorry. The MUP were the police units.
11 My second reference to the tanks deploying and supplies arriving mainly
12 applies to the VJ, the Yugoslav army. However, the MUP were also
13 increasing their forces with the quality and type of equipment they were
14 bringing in.
15 Q. To your knowledge, did the MUP have access to tanks and things
16 like that or was that more the domain of the military?
17 A. The MUP did not have access to very heavy equipment, so they did
18 not have access to -- they didn't have their own T55s or M84s or heavy
19 artillery, but they did have access to smaller wheeled armoured personnel
20 carriers and sort of medium gunnery equipment as well as mortars.
21 Q. Now, Witness, you've already referred to the agreement that was --
22 went in as tab 4, as well as tab 3. You then recited to us a number of
23 matters that you deemed were breaches, and I think you recited those for
24 us. Would you also look, please, at Exhibit 94, tab 52 in these
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. Thank you.
2 Q. Before it's placed on the ELMO, you can tell us whether, first of
3 all, you recognise this document.
4 A. I do.
5 MR. RYNEVELD: Might it be placed on the ELMO.
6 Q. It refers to the 26th of February, 1999. Can you tell us what
7 this document describes and how it is that you know about it?
8 A. Certainly. Every single day the OR KVM units throughout Kosovo
9 would compile a report on the previous 24 hours. These reports were then
10 passed to our headquarters in Pristina where they were then, if you like,
11 fused into one document which would cover the sort of main activities
12 which had taken place in Kosovo in that period. And therefore, this is a
13 document I would see every single day on first coming in to work.
14 Q. This is but one of a daily report that would pass your desk; is
15 that correct?
16 A. It certainly is.
17 Q. And would you at times have also been the source of the material
18 contained in those reports?
19 A. Yes, I would.
20 Q. Looking at Exhibit 94, tab 52, would you describe for us, if you
21 would, please, what kinds of matters are covered in this particular daily
23 A. Certainly. As you can see, first of all, the sort of a summary
24 showing the developments, and then any major issues before the security
25 situation and any other major issues which have taken place, as well as a
1 state of the number of people within the mission on any particular day.
2 Q. And then it seems to divide the security situation into various
3 districts; is that correct?
4 A. Yes, that's correct.
5 Q. Their Honours have a copy, I believe, so perhaps you could just
6 tell us, roughly, what some of the notations were with respect to this
7 particular date.
8 A. All right. Well, something of particular interest is that, for
9 example, the Mitrovica district reported that at 1330 hours, the VJ
10 declared Bukos an area of a permanent garrison, which, to us, was
11 extremely significant.
12 Q. The next line after that. Were you given access?
13 A. No. As I said, it was generally denied, and the only way we could
14 gain access was if the patrols, the teams on the ground came back to
15 myself, I would then contact the -- somebody from the Cooperation
16 Commission. If it was army, I would contact Colonel Kotur or General
17 Loncar. If it was the MUP, I would contact Colonel Mijatovic and try and
18 agree access for the -- for our units on the ground. Usually the access
19 was denied.
20 Q. Sir, is the expression "winter exercises" in relation to your
21 duties in Kosovo a term that is known to you?
22 A. Yes. I have -- I came across this term.
23 Q. In what context?
24 A. Certainly when -- just before Christmas when we discovered -- it
25 was announced to us just after we started that the VJ were deploying units
1 to the Podujevo area. When I questioned this and pointed out it was a
2 breach of the agreement, I was then told: "It's not a problem. We need
3 to exercise. The agreement allows for exercises and therefore we are
4 exercising our troops and we are allowed to exercise our troops on our
5 training areas." When I pursued this further and asked for a
6 clarification of what a training area was or a permanent garrison was, I
7 was informed that the training area that the Serbian forces used in Kosovo
8 was in fact the area of Kosovo.
9 Q. And what did that interpretation do, from your perspective, to the
10 terms of the agreement?
11 A. Well, it was a total breach of the agreement.
12 Q. Thank you. Moving on to paragraph 6, if I may, Your Honours.
13 Now, apart from those earlier three VJ sites that you mentioned
14 that were -- that were inspected with prior notice, can you give a general
15 description of the scope of your mission and how successful it was in
16 terms of verifying adherence to the agreements?
17 A. Well, I would say that in -- if we tried to follow the agreement,
18 it was totally unsuccessful. It was a disastrous attempt at verification
19 by the sort of methods which we thought we had been allowed to carry out
20 in accordance with the agreement, and that's why we then had to think of
21 other ways of trying to see what was going on and trying to keep a record
22 of what was going on within Kosovo.
23 Q. And what tactics, if any, if I can use that phrase, did you then
24 adopt in an attempt to find a way to successfully monitor the situation?
25 A. Well, the only thing we could do was to flood the ground with as
1 many verifiers as possible, to have not only our bases within the main
2 sort of five regional locations headquarters, but we actually tried to get
3 as many people out, living in villages, in towns throughout Kosovo who
4 would actually report. They would note the movement of troops, they
5 would note the movement of the MUP, they would note the movement of the
6 vehicles and any aircraft that the Serbians were using. As well as we
7 would actually aggressively, if you like, follow, pursue any convoys or
8 any units that left their barracks or left their winter exercise
10 Q. So you'd sort of wait outside the barracks and, as they moved, you
11 would follow; is that what you're saying?
12 A. Exactly. It was a difficult task because in those sort of -- in
13 trying to carry this task out, we would be harassed to a great extent. We
14 had patrols who were threatened at gunpoint. We had patrols who were
15 deliberately blocked by armoured vehicles. We had two occasions, at
16 least, where our verifiers were beaten up.
17 Q. Part of this process that you've just described, this new tactic,
18 as it were, the movement of equipment, for example, how would you be able
19 to identify whether equipment from one place ended up in another place?
20 Is there some method of recording?
21 A. Yes. Fortunately, virtually every military organisation I know
22 has a system of putting numbers on their -- all their vehicles, all their
23 tanks. So it's very easy to see if a vehicle has moved from one location
24 to another location by just noting the number on -- painted on the side of
1 Q. Now, having conducted this new tactic, how long a period of time
2 would you say you were involved in that method of attempted verification?
3 How long did that go on?
4 A. I would say that once we were -- we knew that we couldn't carry
5 out what we considered to be our sort of right of inspection, we carried
6 on this method virtually until the end.
7 Q. The end being near the 23rd of March, 1999?
8 A. Correct.
9 Q. And what degree of success did you have with this new process?
10 A. We, I believe, were quite successful, as can be judged by the
11 amount of time that the VJ and the MUP would try to prevent us from
12 carrying this out, although the VJ and the MUP became much more aggressive
13 as we approached the 23rd of March.
14 Q. Did you come to any conclusions based on these records you kept
15 about troop movements, vehicle movements, et cetera, et cetera, in regard
16 to whether or not there was a breach of the agreements?
17 A. Yes, we did. The conclusion we drew is that they had virtually
18 more than doubled the size of the garrison in Kosovo as well as having
19 brought in a great many new pieces of equipment and equipment which was of
20 a much higher quality and greater lethality.
21 Q. Were those all matters covered by the agreement? Were those all
22 no-nos so to speak?
23 A. Yes, every one of those was a breach of the agreement.
24 Q. I'm going to ask you, sir, while you were engaged in your official
25 observer capacity, can you give us some specific instances of Serb forces
1 involving aggressive conduct by Serb forces?
2 A. Yes, I certainly can. One of the very first instances of this I
3 came across was the doctor's house just west of Podujevo in an area called
4 Lapastica where -- this was a doctor's house. It was a medical station
5 where the KLA, wounded KLA, were being treated. And it was shut up. The
6 doctor was murdered. The entire area looked as if it had been hit by a
7 nuclear bomb. A few days after the incident, we searched the area and we
8 also found the body of an 80-year-old man who had been shot, unarmed, in
9 part of the surrounding buildings.
10 Q. Just so that we can orient ourselves in terms of time, are you
11 able to give us an indication of when you made this inspection?
12 A. This was in December 1998.
13 Q. All right. And you say this is a doctor's house near Podujevo.
14 All right. And did you take any photographs or see any photographs of
15 this 80-year-old man in situ, as it were?
16 A. Yes. I had the opportunity to, and I thought it was important
17 that I should photograph the scene.
18 Q. You personally photographed the scene?
19 A. I -- yes. I took a number of photographs.
20 Q. I'm going to show you now a photograph with a number K021-8721.
21 MR. RYNEVELD: Mr. Usher, could you show a copy of that to the
22 usher and hand copies off to the other parties.
23 Q. Is that the photograph you took, sir?
24 A. It certainly is.
25 Q. And where was this individual found, the body of this individual
1 found in relation to the house?
2 A. The -- I would say about 30 or 40 metres from the house, in a
3 compound next to some stables where the man had obviously run away to
5 Q. And you said, I believe, in your evidence that he was unarmed. At
6 least, you found him to be unarmed?
7 A. The only thing you might see lying next to his body is an axe.
8 Q. Now, could you tell from what you saw about the doctor's house and
9 the immediate surrounding area how this -- how this death came about or
10 how the damage to the house came about?
11 JUDGE MAY: Exhibit number.
12 THE REGISTRAR: The photo will be Exhibit 96.
13 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honour.
14 THE WITNESS: I had a chance to speak to the -- the unit
15 overlooking the -- the Serbian unit overlooking this doctor's house, and
16 they informed me that they -- they confirmed that they had attacked this
17 house because it was a building that was being used for the treatment of
18 wounded, and they regarded this as a legitimate target and, therefore,
19 they had attacked it in force, using -- they had a T55 tank. They had a
20 weapon called the Praga which is a 30-millimetre heavy machine-gun usually
21 used in the anti-aircraft role, as well as mortars and small-arms fire,
22 but the target was fairly -- extremely well destroyed. Everything was
23 shot up. The entire building was shot up, the room had been trashed,
24 medical supplies had been destroyed. There were several other bodies not
25 far away.
1 Q. I believe you also indicated that the doctor himself had been
3 A. The doctor had been shot as well, yes.
4 Q. Was it clear to you from what you could see upon your arrival that
5 this in fact had been a medical facility?
6 A. It was very clear. In the first place, it was known as the
7 doctor's house, and secondly, there were medical supplies strewn all over
8 the place. Several rooms and around the outside of the house as well, the
9 -- there were syringes, there were bandages, there were various drugs,
10 saline solutions; and all this had been scattered around and destroyed.
11 Q. The injury to the 80-year-old man, now you've taken the
12 photograph, could you determine how it was that he came to his tragic end?
13 Could this have been as a result of shelling or mortar rounds or -- are
14 you able to tell us a conclusion that you may have come to?
15 A. Yes. Because of the weather conditions which, as you saw from the
16 photograph, there was snow on the ground and had been for some time, since
17 November, and the fact that he had two bullet wounds - one in his head,
18 one in his chest - and the fact there was no blood except where he was
19 lying, it would seem to indicate that he had actually been shot where he
20 was lying.
21 Q. When did you speak to the Serbian units who admitted
22 responsibility for this incident?
23 A. I had been visiting this military location for some time, and in
24 fact, I became very familiar with Podujevo and this particular location
25 which we referred to as Tank Hill, and probably on -- I would speak to
1 them almost every single day. They got to know me quite well. And the
2 day that we actually went down the hill to look at this building, before
3 we went down, they told me what they had done and why they had done it.
4 Q. So you knew before you went down what had happened because they
5 told you what they did?
6 A. Yes. And I also knew that the body of the old man was missing,
7 because some of the relatives had complained that they hadn't seen him for
8 some time and they were wondering whether he was still somewhere within
9 the complex.
10 Q. If I understand your evidence correctly - and please expand on
11 this if I have it incorrectly - you were told that they regarded this as a
12 legitimate military target; is that correct?
13 A. Yes. They said that because the KLA were being treated there, it
14 was a totally legitimate target.
15 Q. What was your view, and did you communicate that to them?
16 A. Myself and a colleague did in fact say that they should -- that
17 they must have been aware that it was a medical facility, to which they
18 replied that it was also a facility which treated terrorists and harboured
20 Q. From your understanding as a military man, sir, is that a
21 legitimate military target?
22 A. If the KLA had actually been using the house as a point from which
23 to attack or use as a fire base, then I suppose you'd have to regard it as
24 a legitimate fire target. But this was only ever used as a medical
25 facility. It was known throughout the area as the doctor's house. He was
1 the local doctor for that whole area.
2 Q. Thank you. That's one incident, sir. I'm going to perhaps focus
3 your attention: Were you familiar with an incident concerning villages
4 near Jablanica and Decani, and if so, can you tell us about that?
5 A. Yes, certainly. It's another area I know quite well, and around
6 the 10th of January, 1999, there was a certain amount of activity in the
7 area because of locations and movements of both the MUP, the VJ, and the
8 KLA. And it was also an area, especially Jablanica, where one of the top
9 KLA commanders had his headquarters.
10 I was down there on the 10th, carrying out various negotiations,
11 and shortly after my departure from this area, the Serb forces launched a
12 massive attack, using heavy artillery, against the villages from the
13 Decani area towards Jablanica, and they continued to shell the villages in
14 that area for two days.
15 Q. When you say, "shell the villages," they weren't shelling a
16 particular headquarters, or were they sort of mass shelling the village
18 A. It would be very difficult for them to know the exact location of
19 the headquarters of Mr. Ramush because it was an area that Serbs had
20 actually no access to. So that would have been an impossibility. They
21 were generally shelling the area and the villages and locations around
23 Q. Did you notice during part of your verification duties, shelling
24 of another area?
25 A. Yes. There were at least two other occasions when I -- maybe
1 more, where I sort of watched the shelling. There was the shelling of an
2 area south of Podujevo. This was in March, where the tanks and artillery
3 were lined up along the main road between Podujevo and Pristina, and they
4 were just shelling the hillside. They were obviously shelling some
5 positions, but they were also shelling villages.
6 And on another occasion, near -- south of Mitrovica, one foggy day
7 they were shelling, firing at tanks, at targets somewhere to the south of
8 Vucitrn. As it was a foggy day, I asked the VJ what they were firing at,
9 and they said that they were just doing target practice as part of their
10 training, and they were firing against deserted villages. And I said,
11 "Well, how do you know that they are deserted villages because you can't
12 see them in the fog?" And he said, "Well, because, first of all, we
13 chucked the people out, and therefore we know they're empty villages."
14 Q. These incidents that you've referred to, how did you view them in
15 your official capacity in terms of whether or not those were legitimate
16 military actions or matters that you needed to report as a breach?
17 A. I was happy that one of the activities, the shelling of the trench
18 lines and bunkers to the west of the main road south of Podujevo was
19 legitimate, because they were KLA positions. But other instances were
20 definitely, in my view, illegal as they were against civilian targets.
21 They were indiscriminate, and we reported this to DZ in Pristina.
22 Q. Did you notice any incidents of looting of civilian homes?
23 A. Yes. I certainly on several occasions personally saw, at a
24 distance because we weren't allowed any closer, Serbs walking out or
25 military walking out with refrigerators, TVs, other goods, as well as on
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 one occasion, in the Gornja Lapastica area, I actually went into a house
2 that had been looted previously by the Serbs and there was nothing left in
3 there of value.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Colonel, just to return to what you said earlier,
5 that you are satisfied that certain positions were KLA positions, how did
6 you satisfy yourself as to that?
7 THE WITNESS: Sir, I was in a very good position - in an open area
8 with binoculars, with two of my colleagues - and we were able to observe
9 -- we were actually in between -- halfway between where the guns were
10 firing and where the positions were. So the actual rounds were flying
11 over my head. And I was able to see quite clearly the KLA positions and
12 the KLA fighters in those positions.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
14 MR. RYNEVELD:
15 Q. Sir, I'd like you to turn next, if I may, to -- you've mentioned a
16 number of times your dealings with the Serbian Commission on Cooperation;
17 is that correct? Perhaps you could give us a very brief idea at this
18 point in terms of the make-up of that committee -- that commission, its
19 mandate, who did what, and what role you played with them.
20 A. As far as we understood and what we were told was that the Serbian
21 Commission of Cooperation with the OSCE was the official Serbian body that
22 the OSCE did all its business with and through.
23 Q. Yes.
24 A. The commission was headed up by a retired general, Dusan Loncar,
25 and his second-in-command or his military person on this committee was a
1 Colonel Kotur, Milan Kotur. He also occasionally would have on this
2 committee a VJ representative, Colonel Mijatovic, who was probably the
3 most -- second-most senior MUP person after General Lukic in Kosovo.
4 Q. Was there any -- sorry.
5 A. There were also at times a member of the Ministry of Foreign
6 Affairs from Belgrade on the commission, a Mr. Babic.
7 Q. How often -- I'm sorry, that's the Serbian representatives.
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. The OSCE would meet with them. Who, on a regular basis, would
10 meet with these individuals, from the OSCE or KVM?
11 A. The senior representative would have been General DZ -- DZ,
12 accompanied by myself as the liaison, Serbian liaison officer for the
13 OSCE, with the OSCE to the commission, and usually with one or two
14 interpreters, a Ms. Irina Babic or Mr. Dejan Trga. However, what -- the
15 way we began to work was, because these meetings were on a daily basis,
16 every day at 10.00, and the meetings could go on for as long as five hours
17 at a time, this was not seen as a good use of DZ's time, and therefore he
18 delegated to me that I should attend all the meetings, and this is what I
20 Q. During the course of these daily meetings, who appeared to have
21 the authority on behalf of the Serb leaders of this commission?
22 A. Certainly initially I would say that General Loncar started off
23 very confident and able to answer most of our questions. But as time went
24 along, we noticed that he had to refer more and more often back to
25 Belgrade for guidance and solutions.
1 Q. And when you say "back to Belgrade," did you then know or later
2 discover who, if anyone, he was consulting with in Belgrade in order to
3 deal with the issues that were raised at the meetings?
4 A. Yes, we did. We discovered this probably for the first time on
5 the 27th of December when there was a serious breach of the agreement by
6 the VJ. And there was a possibility of a very serious conflict breaking
7 out between the KLA and the Serbian security forces.
8 Q. You told us when you discovered it. Can you tell us what you
10 A. What we discovered in this incident was that the -- there was a
11 Serbian farmer who had been taken prisoner by the KLA. There had been an
12 attempt by the MUP to get him out, and it ended up with the MUP patrol
13 having to withdraw because of the amount of KLA fire that was coming from
14 that area. I was then informed at this meeting, at the end of this
15 morning meeting, that the decision had been taken to send in a very large
16 force against this position, against the KLA in this area, and to extract
17 this man by force.
18 I'd said that it was crazy because in the -- in the process of
19 getting one man out, they would lose a great deal of people and so would
20 the KLA, resulting in huge loss of life, especially as I knew what the KLA
21 had actually prepared for the Serbians. They had actually -- at that
22 time, they possibly had between 1.000 and 2.000 fighters not far from this
23 village. They had moved equipment, truckloads -- tractor loads of
24 ammunition in preparation for the Serbs. The Serbs also had a large
25 force. So I suspected that if this action took place, there would be a
1 huge loss of life. Therefore, I volunteered, prior to any activity, to go
2 in and attempt to try to get this farmer released by the KLA to prevent
3 any further sort of fighting.
4 Q. How was that proposal by you met?
5 A. When I gave this proposal to General Loncar, he said he was unable
6 to stop the activity and to affect the activity, however, he would have to
7 refer to Belgrade and -- for a ruling.
8 Q. Yes.
9 A. So he then left the room, went next door. I could hear him on the
10 telephone. I mentioned to Colonel Kotur, you know, "Who is he ringing?"
11 And he indicated that it was probably Mr. Sainovic he was ringing in
12 Belgrade. I later -- the following day, when the whole activity was over,
13 I came back and sort of mentioned this again to him about who he'd called,
14 and I mentioned Mr. Sainovic's name. And he said, "No. It was even
15 higher. You have no idea how high level General Loncar spoke to in
17 Q. To your knowledge, who, if anyone, was even higher than Sainovic
18 at that place?
19 A. Well, I don't know anyone any higher than Mr. Milosevic.
20 Q. Did you at any time have discussions with General Loncar about, on
21 his trips back and forth to Belgrade, who -- the kinds of people he would
22 be meeting with and did he name any names?
23 A. General Loncar began to visit Belgrade more and more often, and
24 more and more often he wouldn't be present at the -- at our meetings in
25 the mornings, and he began -- indications I had by talking to him
1 informally and to Colonel Kotur was that he was having high-level meetings
2 in Belgrade, usually with Mr. Sainovic.
3 Q. Now, returning to this particular incident, the phone call is
4 made, the speculation is that it's Sainovic. You later find out it was
5 someone higher than Sainovic who you then understood to be Mr. Milosevic;
6 is that correct?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Now, as a result of that telephone communication, was there an
9 answer given to you about your offer to negotiate to attempt to prevent
10 this massive loss of life?
11 A. Yes. There was. There was an immediate -- following the
12 telephone conversation, I was given an immediate answer that I could
13 proceed, together with the Red Cross, in trying to extricate the Serb, and
14 the Serbian forces were pulled back to their start line, to their starting
15 locations, and we were given access, freedom to move across sort of the
16 line, if you like, to negotiate with the KLA and to -- by the -- sort of
17 by the time it got dark, we had just managed to get the Serb out and there
18 was no activity. There was no action. So we prevented this conflict that
20 Q. How -- I'm sorry, how did you manage to resolve the conflict?
21 A. Well, because we handed the Serb -- we took him from the KLA and
22 delivered him to the -- to the police station in Podujevo, to the police.
23 Therefore, that was immediately -- the Serbs were immediately informed in
24 Pristina that the man was out and, therefore, they kept their word and
25 they didn't attack that day.
1 Q. So as a result of your intervention at that particular point,
2 there was no armed conflict between the two sides.
3 A. Right.
4 Q. Now, I understand, sir, that humility may prevent you from
5 volunteering this, but did you receive any commendation for your efforts
6 in this instance?
7 A. Yes. I was awarded a British Gallantry Award.
8 Q. Now, sir, I'd like to move on to January 6th of 1999. Were you
9 present at a meeting that occurred that particular day?
10 A. Yes. Yes. Uh-huh.
11 Q. Can you tell us who you may recall, if you have recall of this,
12 who may have been present?
13 A. I believe this was the meeting with Mr. Sainovic.
14 Q. Yes.
15 A. This was a meeting that Ambassador Keller, one of the deputies of
16 the OSCE mission in Pristina, was heading, and I was there as the -- again
17 as the Serbian representative, and the other side was headed up by Mr.
18 Sainovic, and Mr. Andjelkovic was also there.
19 Q. Do you recall whether General Loncar may have been there?
20 A. I think he probably was. I can't swear I remember now.
21 Q. Would you happen to recall if Brigadier General Maisonneuve was
23 A. Yes, General Maisonneuve definitely was there.
24 Q. And I understand, sir, that this particular meeting on the 6th of
25 January was held at the request of the OSCE/KVM because of what you
1 collectively deemed to be a deteriorating situation as you've outlined to
2 us. Do you remember what, if anything, occurred at that meeting after it
4 A. Yes. There were a number of issues that we discussed and points
5 we made to Mr. Sainovic, as he also made points to us. Mr. Sainovic
6 accused the OSCE, and in particular the Americans and the Germans, of
7 actively supporting and helping the KLA, which we obviously rebuffed.
8 We -- we made a number of points. We spoke about the continued
9 difficulty we were having in the Serbs allowing us to keep -- to have a
10 medical evacuation helicopter, our own helicopter, which was an unmarked
11 civilian helicopter as opposed to the ones that we were being offered by
12 the Serbs, which was a military helicopter and military markings at the
13 time and of a type that would immediately have the KLA firing at it, which
14 wouldn't have been good for medical evacuation. There was a problem of
15 fuel delivery to the OSCE. Occasionally we had difficulty in obtaining
16 diesel for our vehicles because petrol stations refused to sell it to us.
17 And we also spoke about the prisoners, the KLA prisoners who were
18 in a gaol somewhere in Serbia, that we wished to visit and to negotiate
19 their release.
20 Q. During the course of this meeting and the topics that were
21 discussed and Sainovic's participation in this meeting, did you personally
22 form any opinion with respect to the authority that Sainovic may have had
23 on behalf of the Serbian government? The Federal Government, sorry.
24 A. Mr. Sainovic came across as an extremely confident and competent
25 Minister who we had no doubt represented the Federal Government. He was
1 able, on his own, to make a decision, far-reaching decisions. So for
2 example, he allowed us instantly to visit the prison in Nis. And the
3 following day, I had my very first visit with the prisoners in Nis.
4 He was able to give us answers immediately on the helicopter, the
5 fuel, border access. And we also discussed the funeral arrangements for
6 Racak, and he was able to give us absolutely definite answers which were
7 not maybes, but they were, Yes, this will happen. So we had no doubt at
8 all that he had the support of Belgrade when he made these answers, gave
9 these answers to us.
10 Q. Now, were there, during the course of time, some other matters
11 that you discussed with General Loncar which were ultimately referred to
12 Sainovic? For example, you mentioned the permission to visit the 11
13 prisoners, the KLA prisoners, in Nis. Were there some other examples
14 where matters had to go from Loncar to Sainovic?
15 A. I'm sure there were, but my mind's gone blank. I'm sorry.
16 Q. All right. For example, did you ever make any requests about
17 information about troop movements?
18 A. I'm sorry. Yes, of course. Yes. One of the -- part of the
19 agreement did actually state that any troop movements would be notified to
20 us. And similarly, we had an agreement that every day we gave our sort of
21 daily records to the Commission of Cooperation, and this is in fact one of
22 the topics that was discussed with Mr. Sainovic on this particular
23 occasion. Because although we'd asked Loncar repeatedly for these
24 documents to be given to us, we never actually received any troop movement
25 details. For example, we would often find out or be told in the morning
1 meeting that two hours ago, at the start of this meeting, a troop movement
2 had actually already commenced. When asked why, they wouldn't inform us.
3 They said well, because they didn't trust us, that if they passed
4 information to us, we'd pass the information to the KLA and the KLA would
5 then attack this convoy. So they felt no respect and no trust for us
7 Q. While we're on that point and before I move to another example,
8 maybe you could clarify to the Court something I understand from your
9 answer, and that is you would have these daily meetings with them and you
10 would give them daily reports about things that you saw about their own
11 troops, I take it. Similarly, would you have also had negotiations or
12 discussions with members of the KLA from time to time?
13 A. Yes. I certainly would pass on all our requests for information
14 and also any protests that we had on a daily basis. So I would protest
15 any violations. I would protest any sort of activities which were out of
16 proportion to the amount of force that -- and violence that they were
18 I personally, from about the end of December, had no more contact
19 with the leadership of the KLA. I felt that my position as the liaison
20 officer with the Serbs would have been compromised if I had been regularly
21 meeting with the various KLA commanders. So another one of my colleagues,
22 David Wilson, his job was to -- he was the KLA -- liaison officer to the
23 KLA, and we would meet several times a day or in the evenings or somewhere
24 out on the ground if there was an incident taking place, and we would sort
25 of exchange information. Therefore, I was very aware of what the KLA were
1 doing but I wasn't personally talking to the KLA.
2 Q. The follow-up to that question is: Were you or was your
3 colleague, to your knowledge, passing information from one side to the
4 other in terms of what the other side was doing?
5 A. We were regularly accused of this by the Serbian Cooperation
6 Commission, but I can very honestly under oath say that at no time to my
7 knowledge did any of my colleagues or myself communicate any equipment to
8 the advantage of the other side. It would have been unethical and broken
9 the agreement. It would have compromised our position as verifiers.
10 Q. Another example, sir. I'm not saying a final example, a final one
11 I'm going to ask you about: Racak funeral arrangements, was that another
12 issue that may have been referred by Loncar to a higher authority?
13 A. Yes. I mean, this was obviously one of the main occurrences in
14 Kosovo and the funeral itself was going to attract a huge amount of public
15 and international interest, and therefore, we spoke over several weeks
16 while the bodies were being forensically examined and the examinations and
17 investigations were going on. There was quite a long delay between the
18 massacre and the funeral itself, so we had a lot of time to discuss this,
19 and we were continually asking for a dignified, quiet funeral.
20 Loncar was fairly adamant, certainly in my discussions with Loncar
21 and Kotur. We kept being told repeatedly that if any KLA were seen at the
22 funeral, for example, the VJ and the MUP, especially the MUP forces, would
23 go in and sort it out. And during our discussions, this meant that if any
24 terrorists were seen down there during the funeral, they would actually
25 open fire and, you know, try -- upper hand, trying to kill the terrorists.
1 During these five weeks, we did in fact manage to persuade them that there
2 were other, better ways of dealing with funerals and these types of events
3 based on the UK experience of Northern Ireland and dealing with similar
4 types of events, and in fact, eventually as a result of our discussions
5 and as a result of discussing it with Mr. Sainovic, we were able to sort
6 of implement this more peaceful way of dealing with the funeral. So that
7 was one of our successes.
8 Q. That is a decisions that Sainovic made. You're nodding
9 your head, meaning yes?
10 A. Yes.
11 MR. RYNEVELD: Your Honours, with this 9.00 schedule, I'm not sure
12 when the break is.
13 JUDGE MAY: Half past.
14 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you. I'll continue with the examination.
15 Q. Now, sir, are you familiar with General Brankovic?
16 A. Yes, I am.
17 Q. And how it is that you came to know him?
18 A. What happened was that as the -- the activity of the Serbian
19 security forces was increasing and growing, so we felt that General Loncar
20 and his commission were becoming -- having to refer more and more often
21 back to Belgrade. And also, you know, in his frequent absences, we were
22 not surprised to be informed one day that there was going to be a brand
23 new commission of new experts coming out who would be able to deal with
24 this more directly. And in fact, my very first meeting with General
25 Brankovic, he did inform me that he was not just there to represent the --
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 the VJ and the military but he was actually a direct representative of the
2 Belgrade government.
3 Q. And by "Belgrade government," you're talking about the Federal
4 Government --
5 A. Federal Government, yes.
6 Q. -- headed by the accused.
7 A. Correct.
8 Q. And what would you -- so was Loncar still there at that time? Did
9 he replace him or were there -- were they there together, or -- tell us
10 about that.
11 A. No. What had happened is that at the few meetings I had with
12 General Brankovic, which were fairly acrimonious because of the way he
13 tried to treat us and -- he was -- basically, he became very difficult.
14 He became a difficult man to speak to. He insisted on all topics that
15 were to be discussed being submitted 24 hours in advantage. He wouldn't
16 take any sort of current questions without notification. Meetings had to
17 start exactly when he insisted, making our -- this would have made our
18 work impossible because sometimes we'd have up to two or three meetings a
19 day during the escalation of events and there was no possibility of
20 notifying him, giving him this type of notification. So Brankovic was
21 there for a few times, difficulty to see, these meetings no longer
22 happened on a daily basis.
23 Loncar had disappeared. Kotur had told me that he had had enough
24 of this politicking and he had asked to go back to his military unit, and
25 so he was also out of the commission.
1 Q. Are you able to give us a rough time frame of when this transition
2 took place? Are we talking December 1998, or January or February?
3 A. This was March.
4 Q. March 1999?
5 A. 1999.
6 Q. Thank you. Okay. And who were some of the -- okay. So we've got
7 Loncar disappearing, Kotur returning -- Kotur returning to his unit and
8 he's no longer in the commission.
9 A. No.
10 Q. Who are some of the other Serbian staff? Are you able to remember
11 or --
12 A. I'd have to refer to my notes which I've left downstairs, but --
13 Q. All right. Well, perhaps --
14 A. -- there were at least two other colonels who came in but
15 Mijatovic still remained as part of the commission.
16 Q. All right. And since you mentioned Mijatovic, what dealings would
17 you have with Mijatovic, under what circumstances?
18 A. Colonel Mijatovic, we took to be the second in command of the MUP
19 Kosovo, and he would usually come along to the meetings on an infrequent
20 basis, usually to inform us that one of his patrols or his policemen had
21 been attacked or killed or wounded, and -- excuse me. And we would then
22 be sort of subject to a good half hour, 40 minutes of abuse about our
23 inefficiency in preventing these killings and only wishing to verify the
24 one side and not verify what was happening to the Serbian side, which was
25 totally untrue.
1 Q. I see. Do you recall the name of the colonel who replaced
2 Colonel Kotur?
3 A. I'm not sure if it was Petric or Petrovic.
4 Q. And if it was Petrovic, he would have replaced Kotur as the VJ
5 liaison officer?
6 A. Correct.
7 Q. And then we have Mijatovic as the MUP man basically?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. And who is Lukic, Sreten Lukic?
10 A. General Lukic was the chief of the MUP in Pristina, in Kosovo.
11 Q. Right. Do you know where Mijatovic and Lukic may have operated
12 from, their headquarters or where they were located?
13 A. Yes. I -- even though Colonel Mijatovic rarely came to the
14 commission for the meetings, I would -- there were occasions when I would
15 go to his headquarters to have meetings in his office. So both Lukic and
16 Mijatovic worked in the sort of operational part of the MUP headquarters
17 which was based behind -- between the stadium and the main administrative
18 part of the MUP headquarters, not far from the OSCE headquarters, in the
19 centre of town.
20 Q. A little later in your evidence I may ask you actually to look at
21 some maps and describe some things for us. And now, this -- this
22 location, do you know whether helicopters had access to that location?
23 A. Yes. The next to the operational headquarters was the sports
24 stadium, and there were regular helicopters arriving and landing in this
25 airfield. For example, when Mr. Sainovic flew in, he would often land in
1 the stadium with the helicopter.
2 Q. And just so -- I may have not have -- this is in Pristina, I take
4 A. It's right in the centre of Pristina.
5 Q. Now, sir, in the time remaining before the break, you've talked to
6 us about winter operations or winter exercises, and you've talked to us
7 about the agreement that you were verifying or observing. Can you give us
8 a list of things that you witnessed which gave you some indications of
9 perhaps planned operations for the springtime?
10 A. Yes, there were a number of indicators which not only showed us
11 that there was something being prepared but also which then prevented us
12 from operating and working to our mandate. So as you say, the first thing
13 was the deployment of troops outside the barracks into their winter
14 exercise areas; the fact that the conscripts were not being allowed to go
15 home, they were being kept on for an extra term, thereby increasing their
16 numbers; the fact that these ammunition columns were coming in; the fact
17 that we saw trains arriving with tanks at Mitrovica and being driven to
18 locations around Kosovo.
19 Q. I believe you mentioned earlier in your evidence about the
20 improved material. I think you said certain kind of tanks and things like
21 that were of a better quality. What significance did you place on it?
22 A. Well, it wasn't just the fact that new equipment was coming in of
23 a better quality and greater performance and lethality but we also noticed
24 that there were a greater number of MUP coming in and a type of MUP which
25 we had not seen before. The normal policeman in town is dressed almost
1 like your average policeman. The MUP which operated out in the field wore
2 a form of combat kit, not very modern -- with not very modern equipment
3 being carried, or modern helmets. Whereas suddenly the MUP who were
4 appearing in Kosovo, these were people wearing the very latest kevlar
5 helmets, body armour, a new type of combat clothing which we hadn't seen
6 before, carrying weapons which were of a quite different sort, short
7 barreled -- shorter-barreled weapons, automatic weapons of MP5 Scorpion
8 type. These were qualitative improvements and changes. And also these
9 troops were -- it was very obvious from the way they acted and carried out
10 operations that we saw, these were a qualitative jump, increase in the way
11 they performed, they looked, and what they did, and their general
12 aggressive behaviour.
13 Q. And you were able to note that when? When did this --
14 A. This was all happening in March.
15 Q. Now, in addition to better equipped MUP units, or as you've
16 described these, you've also referred to the fact that there were people
17 being replaced on this commission. Did that factor into your indications
18 as well, the fact that you had Loncar and Kotur leaving and new people
19 coming in?
20 A. Yes. When you factor in the increase in number of troops, the
21 equipment, the extension of the border area, which I should have
22 mentioned, and the fact that what had become a reasonably good working
23 relationship with the Loncar commission, the commission had now been
24 replaced by an aggressive organisation which made our work virtually
25 impossible and wouldn't really listen to reason. These were all
1 indicators that things were changing and drastically changing in Kosovo.
2 Q. You also mentioned Exhibit 52, where there was a declaration of
3 Bukos as a permanent garrison. You recall that?
4 A. Uh-huh.
5 Q. I'm sorry, that was Exhibit 94, tab 52. What, if anything, did
6 that factor in for your assessment?
7 A. What was happening were these garrison areas, as they were
8 referred to, which were areas of open countryside or strategic positions
9 within Kosovo, these were now becoming areas, huge areas which we had no
10 access to and therefore the Serbs could carry out their activities
11 whatever they may be, training or what they were doing, without any
12 observation possible by the Verification Mission. So when they set up one
13 of these garrison areas, they would -- they would block off with armed
14 guards every single access route, track, road, and we were stopped at
15 gunpoint. In fact, on one occasion myself, DZ, a number of other people
16 from the headquarters, we tried to move around the Vucitrn area and we
17 spent several hours detained by VJ on this occasion, troops at gunpoint,
18 with cocked weapons, ready to shoot us if we carried on and tried to enter
19 one of these areas.
20 Q. My final question before the break, if permitted, is you referred
21 to I believe border areas earlier in your evidence. Can you lay out for
22 us what you mean by that?
23 A. Yes. A very important aspect of our work, because these were very
24 sensitive areas, especially the border between Albania and Kosovo, was
25 that we have access to this area because there were a great many incidents
1 taking place. In December, for example, there was a very major ambush by
2 the Serbian forces of a KLA rearmament, re-equipment convoy, and a great
3 number of the KLA were killed.
4 Our problem, our mandate was to verify these events. Now, at the
5 beginning, we had some access. The access to the border areas became more
6 and more restricted, even though the document did state that we have free
7 access around the whole of Kosovo. In certain areas, like the Prizren
8 area, the border where General Maisonneuve had his regional
9 responsibility, the access became virtually nonexistent. He had to apply
10 on a daily basis, which was normally refused, for access to any of his
11 patrols to go into the border zone, which was a zone about four or five
12 kilometres in depth.
13 In March, we were suddenly informed that this border was growing.
14 It was going to be extended to possibly 14 or 15 kilometres, and access to
15 it was definitely restricted. We would not be able to, at any time, enter
16 this zone. Now, this now took in a huge area where there were a large
17 number of Albanian villages, villages that the Serbs saw that I believe
18 that these were villages occupied by terrorists and therefore we would
19 have no ability to verify or to even try to prevent any fighting. And
20 this, to us, was a major indicator that, (a), we couldn't carry out our
21 work, and if we tried to carry out our work in these areas and in fact
22 increasingly more in all areas, there was a danger to our verifiers, a
23 physical danger, of either them being beaten up, roughed up, or actually
24 shot or crushed by one of the large vehicles because we only had light --
25 well, non-armoured and lightly armoured jeep-type vehicles.
1 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.
2 JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn now. Colonel, would you remember
3 this, in this and any other adjournment there may be in your evidence, not
4 to speak to anybody about it, including the Prosecution, until it's over.
5 We will adjourn now for 20 minutes.
6 --- Recess taken at 10.34 a.m.
7 --- On resuming at 10.59 a.m.
8 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Ryneveld.
9 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Q. Witness, in the course of the last answer you gave before the
11 break, you referred to access to an expansion of the border area. Might I
12 invite you, please, to turn with me to Exhibit 94, tab 63.
13 Now, 63 is -- appears to be a chronology of major events. Are you
14 familiar with that document? Perhaps we'll wait until you get it. And
15 then turn to our internal markings, it's about four or five pages into the
16 document, K00078021, page 021. And that page has in fact got a serial
17 number, numerical from 118 to 140. I'd like you to look at lines 128 and
18 129, referred to as events on the 16th of March.
19 Now, is that the date, looking at that -- first of all, I should
20 ask this question: Are you familiar with a chronology of events of this
22 A. I am, yes.
23 Q. And by looking at the 16th of March entry at lines 128, 129, and
24 130, does that refer to the incident that you indicated to the Court, for
25 example, where it says,"enlargement of border zone from five kilometres to
1 around ten kilometres"?
2 A. Yes. In fact, I can say also that serial 128, T72 tank, I was
3 actually in Mitrovica and I saw the train and I then followed the tanks
4 down to the Glogovac area. So I can confirm that myself. And the border
5 area was, say, extended from five to around ten, which also meant up to 14
6 or 15 in some areas.
7 Q. And the next entry, at 130, "extension of VJ conscript service by
8 30 days," is that in reference to the other matter that you mentioned, the
9 retention of conscripts beyond their normal term of service?
10 A. Correct. That would be confirmation of -- by then, we knew it was
11 happening but we suspected it was happening before as well.
12 Q. Thank you. All right, sir. Now you've told us, sir, that you had
13 meetings with various individuals, including Mr. Lukic. How did you know
14 Mr. Lukic, and how did you know -- I think you said that he was the head
15 of the MUP for Kosovo. How did that information come to your attention?
16 A. Well, certainly on arrival and being briefed as to how the
17 organisations were constructed. I was informed that General Lukic was the
18 man in charge of the MUP. I was also -- this was also confirmed at many
19 occasions during my 10.00 meetings with the commission, and on the rare
20 occasions that I managed to meet him, he was also announced as the head of
21 the MUP in Kosovo, as well as the day when I was introduced to the new
22 commission, General Lukic was present and that was confirmed that he was
23 the boss.
24 Q. I see. And one other question by way of background, in our
25 earlier references to Sainovic, you mentioned that he did -- you did see
1 him on occasion. How often would you say that he visited Kosovo from
2 Belgrade during your tenure?
3 A. Well, the first thing I have to say is that his -- each visit he
4 made, he did not necessarily see any representatives from -- of the OSCE,
5 the Kosovo Verification Mission. So -- but we were occasionally aware
6 that he was there. I personally saw him three or four times, but I know
7 he was there more often, having meetings with, for example, Ambassador
8 Keller, who was one of his main points of contact with OSCE mission.
9 Q. So over, say, a three-month period of January, February, and
10 March, are you able to give us a rough estimate of how often he would come
11 to Kosovo?
12 A. I would say he was probably there every few days, maybe every two
13 or three days.
14 Q. Thank you. Now, sir, talking about the MUP, did you, during the
15 course of your tenure in Kosovo, form any opinion about the role that the
16 MUP played in Kosovo?
17 A. Yes. The -- the first thing I learnt was that the MUP really
18 wasn't particularly interested in carrying out ordinary policing
19 activities. They certainly did not behave like any police force I've ever
20 come across before. They were not particularly interested in local crime,
21 traffic control, you know, sort of presence in the streets, doing what we
22 think policemen do. They were mainly in their infantry/military role. So
23 whenever we saw the MUP out in the field, they would be carrying assault
24 rifles, wearing combat kit, combat-type uniforms with some sort of
1 Q. All right. Perhaps this might be an appropriate time to show you
2 some photographs.
3 MR. RYNEVELD: Madam Clerk, can the witness be shown Exhibits 17,
4 18, and 21A and B, and I'll just do all of them at once.
5 Q. While those are being gathered to show you, sir, I believe you
6 mentioned earlier in your evidence that there were different kinds of
7 police, that there were some kind of police wearing normal uniforms and
8 then there was the different kind of police, better equipped, totally
9 different. Would you be able to recognise those uniforms if you were to
10 see them again?
11 A. I think so.
12 Q. Well, then we'll wait for the exhibits and ask you to look at
14 Perhaps we can look at the uniforms first, and I think that's
15 Exhibit 18. Let's display it on the ELMO first of all.
16 Looking at Exhibit 18 - and I'll describe it briefly - there
17 appear to be a series of ten photographs on this sheet, depicting
18 individuals wearing different kinds of uniforms. From your experience as
19 an observer and your military background, sir, are you able to indicate to
20 us whether or not you saw any troops or individuals wearing uniforms of
21 these kinds, and if so, can you describe them?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. By number.
24 A. Yes, I certainly saw all these types of uniform being worn in
25 Kosovo. So the first -- number 1 is a typical VJ uniform.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Number 2 is probably also a VJ unit. They're preparing a track
3 Three is definitely the type of police force that was used by --
4 in Kosovo for sort of routine operations and clearing villages and working
5 around Kosovo on Tank Hill, for example, overlooking Lapastica near
7 Number 4, this is something that appeared much later, probably
8 mid-March, and this is a new type of police force which appeared with no
9 real insignia, except it does say "Policija" on the man's arm, but he was
10 not displaying any unit. And also the type of weapon he was carrying
11 would indicate it was some type of special forces of specially trained
13 Q. If I can just back up to photograph number 3. Is that Cyrillic
14 writing on the shoulder patch of the individuals in number 3?
15 A. Yes. Because I speak some Bulgarian, Bulgarian is in Cyrillic so
16 I do read Cyrillic.
17 Q. And what does that patch say? Are you able to --
18 A. Yes, "Policija."
19 Q. That's also police, eh? And the weapons, if you're able to tell
20 from the restricted view you have of what they're holding?
21 A. Well, number 3, they're an AK47 variant but the Yugoslav-produced
22 variant of the AK47. I think it's called an M70.
23 Q. I see.
24 A. Number 4, this seems to be possibly an AK47 type of weapon with a
25 folding stock, which is usually for parachute type forces or special
1 forces use.
2 Q. Number 5.
3 A. Number 5, although this looks like a combat uniform of the VJ,
4 this is again a police unit. These are some of the two types of uniform
5 that appeared on the police arriving much later. So you also see in 6,
6 the same type of helmet is being worn but whereas on the left it appears
7 to be a sort of greeny-olive camouflage kit, on the right they are wearing
8 the typical dark blue of the MUP.
9 In 6 -- well, in fact in both 5 and 6, the soldier in the
10 foreground is holding a sniper rifle. This is another version of the AK47
11 but a long-barreled weapon, a longer-barreled weapon.
12 Q. And again there appear to be pocket flashes indicating -- is that
14 A. That's policija again, yes.
15 Q. And in number 6, there appears to be a blue uniform with, is that
16 a green kind of a vest or something they're wearing?
17 A. That's their vest in which they keep their ammunition and bits and
19 Q. I see.
20 A. It's typical combat clothing worn by combat troops.
21 Q. Number 7, if you're able to assist us.
22 A. Yes. Again, number 7 is something which is a bit more than
23 ordinary police. It's -- they're not army. It's difficult to tell if
24 they're police, but I think, looking at the shoulder flash, it's difficult
25 to make out, but I think this is another special type of police unit.
1 Q. And the weapon?
2 A. AK47.
3 Q. Number 8.
4 A. This is -- I can only surmise that this is more of a some sort of
5 paramilitary unit with heavy machine-gun. I can't really tell what type
6 of vehicle it's mounted on, but these units were seen around and they were
7 associated with the Serbs.
8 Q. Nine.
9 A. Number 9 is a truck full of VJ soldiers, it looks like. This is
10 typically the webbing they wore. The helmets, I'm now guessing that this
11 -- if this was the VJ, then this would have been taken towards the end of
12 the campaign when the Serbs were leaving Kosovo, judging by their sort of
13 overgrown appearance.
14 Q. All right.
15 A. Number 10 is certainly a KLA fighter. He doesn't have a -- well,
16 the uniform is unusual. This might even be sort of a German or Swiss
17 patterned uniform, with UCK on the shoulder, indicating he is KLA.
18 Q. And are you able to tell from the very small portion what kind of
19 weapon that might be, if that indeed is a weapon?
20 A. Looking at the magazine, it appears -- it's an automatic magazine
21 weapon, so again, it would be the back side of an AK47, which was the
22 weapon of choice of both sides.
23 Q. While we're at photographs, we may as well deal with -- you
24 referred to equipment you saw. Perhaps Exhibit 17, please. Now, Exhibit
25 17, just so that we're clear, is a multi-page document, but again it has
1 four different pages, each numbered, with some vehicles on it, from 1 to
2 15. If you can tell us, first of all, if you saw vehicles of this type
3 during your tenure, and if so, if you're able to identify any of them,
4 that would be of a great assistance. Starting perhaps, with number 1.
5 A. Yes. I mean, I recognise all these vehicles as vehicles that were
6 used in Kosovo. Certainly 1 and 3 came in much later, whereas we saw more
7 of 2 and a great deal of number 4. If you -- I prefer to go backwards
8 from 4.
9 Q. Sure. Just let us know which one you're talking about.
10 A. Number 4.
11 Q. Yes?
12 A. This is the vehicle we referred to as the Praga, which is actually
13 an anti-aircraft weapon of quite a high calibre, rapid firing, which was
14 used extensively throughout the entire time I was in Kosovo, usually
15 against buildings or positions held by the KLA. It's a direct firing
16 weapon of high velocity.
17 Q. So it would be used for purposes other than aircraft, at least,
18 while you were there?
19 A. While I was there, it was regularly used to -- in actions against
20 the KLA and against KLA villages or against Albanian villages.
21 Q. And that's a Praga, then.
22 A. A Praga, yes.
23 Q. Go ahead.
24 A. The vehicle above number 2 is called a BTR60, and again this is a
25 vehicle which can move troops and also commandos. These vehicles, I used
1 to see down at Prizren, at the barracks in Prizren, usually used by the
2 army but not exclusively.
3 Q. And if they're used to move troops, would they also be referred
4 to colloquially as "APCs," meaning armed personnel carriers?
5 A. It could be. Certainly number 1 is -- is a true APC, although
6 number 2 is a wheeled, if you like, APC, armoured personnel carrier,
7 whereas number 3 is more of an armoured fighting vehicle, which is --
8 which can be used to deliver troops, but it also has a fairly heavy gun
9 which can actually be used as part of an assault.
10 Q. And did you in fact see those vehicles in operation in assault
11 type of situations?
12 A. Yes. Yes.
13 Q. Next page, if you would, please, numbers 5 through 8.
14 A. Number 5 is a variant of the T72 which was brought in in March
15 through Mitrovica, referred to as -- its correct designation is M84. And
16 this is a much more powerful, potent weapon than the number 6, which is a
17 T55 type of vehicle, which is very old a 1950s generation tank. Still
18 very effective but nowhere near as fast and manoeuverable or fire control
19 system as good as the M84. And 5 is what raised our sort of hackles, if
20 you like, when we saw these things arriving at Mitrovica, that something
21 was afoot.
22 Q. I see. Now, I'll ask perhaps a couple of naive questions, but 5
23 and 6, you've given them numbers, I take it they're tanks?
24 A. Sorry. Yes, they are tanks, yes.
25 Q. And from your earlier evidence, you understood that to be VJ or
1 army type equipment and not MUP?
2 A. This is army equipment, yes.
3 Q. And in fact, the individuals riding in the top of number 6 are
4 wearing what?
5 A. They are wearing typical tank clothing with the protective head
7 Q. I see. I forgot to ask you earlier: The vehicles 1 through 4,
8 would they be MUP or MUP and VJ or just VJ, or are you able to say?
9 A. They were certainly driven around by the -- by the MUP, except --
10 well, both, because, for example, 4, it was usually used in support of the
11 VJ -- of the MUP, and that would actually have a VJ gunner sitting in the
12 back there, firing the gun. Again, 2 could be used by either, whereas 1
13 and 3 were seen usually sort of by the MUP.
14 Q. I'm going to pause here to ask a question about what you actually
15 saw. When you saw operations --
16 A. Uh-huh.
17 Q. -- against villages, was it exclusively the MUP or exclusively the
18 VJ or were they together or what can you tell us about that?
19 A. Certainly the normal method of operation was that the -- that the
20 MUP would actually lead the entire operation, and the MUP would provide,
21 if you like, the infantry soldiers on the ground who would actually
22 advance toward the position and take the position.
23 The VJ role initially was to provide heavy fire support. So they
24 would have an outer ring, if you like, of artillery or tanks who could
25 either, beforehand, soften up the target or at any time required could
1 actually shell the target by indirect and direct fire. But all the
2 activity, the sort of going into the villages, clearing the villages that
3 we ever saw, was carried out by the MUP.
4 Q. When you say, "carried out by the MUP, going into the villages,"
5 were the VJ present as well?
6 A. Yes. The actual assault would be carried out solely by the MUP.
7 Only later would the VJ, the soldiers, the army, move in. Except for one
8 occasion just north of Kosovo -- of Pristina, in the town called Lebane,
9 where a patrol of VJ one day were driving through and a sniper KLA,
10 presumably sniper, fired and wounded one of the soldiers, an officer, in
11 one of the four-wheel drive vehicles. And then the operation, the
12 response, because this was an attack directly against the VJ, the response
13 was purely VJ, and the VJ then assaulted the village.
14 But for the first time, I actually saw a different type of
15 assault. So rather than shelling the village or doing a lot of damage in
16 the village during the assault, they surrounded the village and carried
17 out a meticulous search but without actually any firing taking place. And
18 we went in the village later and there was no sort of wholesale
19 destruction at all.
20 Q. I'm not sure, because of my non-military background, that I'm
21 not quite sure when the word "shelling" is used, what is shelling? Is
22 that from big -- big guns or does it mean bombs or what does that mean?
23 A. It means all of those. I'm basically -- prior to an assault or if
24 you want to destroy a target by indirect - in other words, without
25 actually soldiers going in and fighting house to house - what you can do
1 is -- I've used aerial bombardment to bomb an area. You can use
2 artillery, which is indirect, which can be from a range of 20, 20-odd
3 kilometres out, you can shell a village from; or if you're using tanks, it
4 has to be direct fire because their range is no more than a few kilometres
5 and they have to fire in a straight line. So -- and also if you use
6 mortar fire, for example, which is also indirect. So to create a great
7 deal of damage, sort of damage to buildings and personnel if there are any
8 open, you would use shelling as opposed to putting infantry into a village
9 and doing house-to-house fighting where the soldiers would obviously have
10 to take house by house, building by building, block by block, making sure
11 that there was nothing left of these buildings.
12 Q. So if I understand you correctly, the process that you normally
13 saw would be shelling first, then the MUP going in.
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. I see. And the shelling would be performed by whom; the MUP or
16 the VJ?
17 A. By the VJ.
18 Q. So VJ first, MUP goes in later, and then VJ might come in after
20 A. Yes. Uh-huh.
21 Q. So it's a coordinated type of activity?
22 A. Absolutely.
23 Q. All right. I'm sorry, I stopped you describing once. You told us
24 about tanks. Is there anything further you want to say about --
25 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Ryneveld, before you go on. Earlier, the
1 Prosecution submitted a list of names of vehicles titled as Recognition
2 Guide for Vehicles.
3 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes.
4 JUDGE KWON: Could you clarify those names first with the
5 assistance of this witness so we can name the --
6 MR. RYNEVELD: Certainly. Now, this is not the witness who we
7 propose to call who composed these but he certainly will be able to do
8 that for us. Mr. Coo will eventually give evidence about all of this, but
9 I think -- I don't have that list right here. Perhaps -- do you have the
10 list, the recognition -- perhaps I'll ask a couple more questions, Your
11 Honour, and then --
12 JUDGE KWON: Yes, you can go on.
13 MR. RYNEVELD: -- while the list is being provided. I didn't
14 bring my copy of the list.
15 Q. Seven and 8, sir, appear to be like trucks, lorries, I suppose, in
17 A. Uh-huh. Number 7 is what's referred to as a Pinzgauer.
18 Q. A Pinzgauer. And what is that used for?
19 A. It's used for transporting troops, as is number 8, which is
20 another type of vehicle used by the VJ. The Pinzgauer tended to be used
21 by the VJ -- by the MUP, sorry.
22 Q. Pinzgauer was largely by the MUP?
23 A. By the MUP.
24 Q. And in number 8, we see a number of people driving by -- oh, it
25 looks like a crowd there. What kind of uniforms are those we see?
1 A. Once again, that's the VJ army and it's another type of truck. I
2 cannot give you the exact specification though.
3 Q. All right.
4 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honour. I now have that list.
5 Perhaps that list, a copy of that list, can be shown to the witness. And
6 I see because it purports to name these, I should let him tell us first
7 and then ask to describe the terms. I will give you the vehicle list
8 first, the recognition guide.
9 Q. Have you been given a list? Now, Witness, just before we start,
10 you have not been shown this list before coming to court today?
11 A. No.
12 Q. Thank you. You have seen the photographs but you've not seen the
13 recognition guide; is that correct?
14 A. I have not seen the recognition guide.
15 Q. Looking for the first time at the recognition guide, the
16 photograph that you refer to as number 1, you've indicated is sort of an
17 APC; is that correct? That's what you told us earlier in evidence.
18 A. Yes, it is. Yes. That's the M60 APC.
19 Q. And number 2 --
20 A. Would be the RTR -- I called it the BTR because that's the Russian
21 designation of it, and the NATO designation is BTR60. "VB" indicates it's
22 a command vehicle.
23 Q. Number 3?
24 A. Can I just say that although -- recognition and identification are
25 two different skills, and whereas, you know, I'm quite good at the moment
1 on Bulgarian types of weapons, these skills very quickly degrade and
2 although I can recognise what each vehicle is, I don't necessarily -- I
3 can't guarantee that I can actually put, you know, each number to each
5 Q. Number 3, I don't recall what you called it or what you thought it
7 A. It was -- it's -- it's -- I said it was a troop carrier but this
8 one actually had some gun on it so it probably is the M80 APC.
9 Number 4, as I said, is the M53 Praga, as it was referred to.
10 Q. And you've already described for us what a Praga was.
11 A. Yes, it's an anti-aircraft weapon.
12 Q. Number 5, I think you told us, was a tank.
13 A. M84, which I think I identified correctly, and a T54/55. The
14 difference between the two being the position of the muzzle break, as they
15 call it, where -- you know, where the fat bit on the gun is at the front
16 or at the middle. That differentiates whether it's a 54 or a 55.
17 Q. I see, so in all other respects, they look very similar?
18 A. Yes, they do, yes. Only train spotters can see the difference.
19 Q. I see. Number 7, you told us was a MUP type of transport carrier;
20 is that correct?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. And would you have known what the name of or number designation
23 was or not?
24 A. No. No, I didn't know. It was Neimar-A [phoen].
25 Q. And number 8? I think you said that you didn't know the type of
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
2 A. No, I didn't, no.
3 Q. But it's a VJ troop transport?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Number 9. What kind of vehicle is that?
6 A. Well, we call these Bobs. It's a particular Yugoslav vehicle that
7 is not seen anywhere else, it's their own development. So again, it's an
8 armoured personnel carrier, APC, as is number 10, as is number 11.
9 Although number 12 is based on a Russian type of vehicle which in fact the
10 correct designation is BRDM. It's a light-reconnaissance type vehicle.
11 This one is armed with a gun, machine-gun.
12 Q. And again, did you see examples of these vehicles in operation in
13 Kosovo during your tenure?
14 A. Yes, we saw -- I saw all of these vehicles in Kosovo.
15 Q. 13, 14, 15 appear to be what?
16 A. 13 is the -- and 14 are both Land Rovers, and 15 is an American
17 Humvee. The interesting thing is that 13 and 14 were the type of vehicles
18 that the units that -- the MUP units which came later were driving around
19 in. They were not blue or armoured but they were unarmoured, as you see
20 here, painted in a variety of colours. White, we -- we saw this at the
21 very beginning. We saw the Serbs using white vehicles which could be
22 confused for our OSCE vehicles. This is why DZ ordered the vehicles be
23 painted orange. And there was one occasion when some of the Serb vehicles
24 suddenly became orange as well and we protested this.
25 Q. I see. Sir, there is one final photograph --
1 MR. RYNEVELD: And Your Honours, I have not had an opportunity to
2 give copies to anyone before. I only have a single copy. Might the
3 witness be shown K0215385, and we'll put it on the ELMO.
4 Q. Tell us, sir, if you have seen any vehicle of this nature during
5 your tenure. First of all, have you ever been shown this photograph prior
6 to coming to the courtroom?
7 A. No. I have not seen this before.
8 Q. Do you recognise the vehicle depicted in the photograph at all?
9 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please pause between answer
10 and question.
11 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you. I'm sorry.
12 Q. If you're not able to say, that's fine.
13 A. I don't -- I can't hand and heart say that I can recognise -- it's
14 very difficult from the back and from the scale to -- whether there was
15 any foreshortening of the actual vehicle making it look larger than one I
16 would recognise.
17 Q. The troops, are you able to indicate what type of troops those
19 A. They are police.
20 Q. Police?
21 A. MUP, yes.
22 Q. Thank you. Now --
23 A. Better trained and better equipped than the army.
24 Q. I think we're going to move on, if we could, to Exhibit -- the
25 uniforms. We've done that. So it's 21 and 21 -- 21A and B, please.
2 MR. RYNEVELD: Does Your Honour wish the recognition guide for
3 these? Yes? Okay.
4 Q. First of all -- I've got a copy of that.
5 A. Sorry.
6 Q. First of all, could you look at the photographs of certain weapons
7 and tell the Court whether or not you're familiar with these weapons.
8 A. Yes, I'm quite familiar with the four weapons shown here.
9 Q. And again, just for the record, we have two pages. One starts --
10 looks like a photograph, and the others look like they're -- well, I'm not
11 sure whether our 20 -- Exhibit 21B is the same as the one that the court
12 document is.
13 JUDGE KWON: Yes, this is 21A.
14 MR. RYNEVELD: 21A, the one on the ELMO?
15 JUDGE KWON: Yes.
16 MR. RYNEVELD:
17 Q. What are those photographs of, sir?
18 A. Well, number A1 is an artillery piece which I think is a D30,
19 which is an indirect fire weapon. You can fire at long range, 14, 15, 18
20 kilometres range, possibly more, depending on the type of ammunition that
21 you use. Used exclusively by the VJ, and we saw this weapon being used
22 in Kosovo.
23 Q. Okay. You are looking at something that's on the ELMO that I have
24 listed as 21 --
25 JUDGE KWON: This is B, yes.
1 MR. RYNEVELD: This is B. Yeah, that's what I thought.
2 Q. Perhaps, sir, you could be shown the recognition guide. We have
3 some copies here.
4 All right. Just so we're clear, we're now looking at the
5 photograph on the ELMO, and that is Exhibit B1, I believe. That appears
6 to be on wheels, is it, and is it sort of like the kind of gun you'd find
7 on a tank or smaller or larger?
8 A. No. In fact, according to the recognition guide, I said it was a
9 D30 to D20, which is a slightly different calibre. Again, one of the ways
10 you'll notice is by the thing on the end, called the muzzle break, which I
11 wasn't looking at too carefully but it's 152-millimetre, which is a large
12 round, it's a range of over 20 kilometres. And this is towed behind a
13 truck, on wheels, and then when it's put into position, the wheels come
14 off the ground and the trails here are spread out to give it stability.
15 And again this is a weapon that's used by the VJ.
16 Q. And you say it has a range of, like, 20 kilometres?
17 A. Yes, at least. Depending on the type of ammunition that you use.
18 Q. Number 2.
19 A. This is an infantry mortar, portable mortar, M70 commander mortar,
20 which is shoulder carried. It's only a small weapon which is -- fires
21 mortars a few kilometres maximum range. And this is the type of weapon
22 that was often see on the -- on the VJ -- on the MUP positions.
23 Q. Did you see either one or two in use at any time?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Number 3.
1 A. Number 3 is a Scorpion. I think they've got these the wrong way
2 around. The -- the MP5 is number 4. That's a Heckler Koch.
3 Q. So number 4 is actually --
4 A. An MP5, which is a German weapon. They're used by security
5 forces, people like the police, airport police would use this because it's
6 a short weapon. Fire 9-millimetre rounds. And it was used -- we saw this
7 in the possession of the -- of the MUP special forces as the newer, better
8 equipped forces came. Not a weapon we saw with the VJ. And as was number
9 3 here, which is a weapon called a Scorpion Zastava, which is a weapon
10 produced in Yugoslavia. Also again not used by regular forces but used by
11 the MUP.
12 Q. On any of the photographs in this page, did you see any of those
13 in use by KLA forces?
14 A. Well, they had a variety of mortar, and the odd KLA might have had
15 a three or a four, but only if they'd come into possession by you finding
16 it or from taking it from a MUP or VJ after some action. But these were
17 not weapons that were generally seen. Rarely seen, very rarely seen
18 amongst the KLA.
19 Q. The next page, which I have as A, 21A, do you recognise the five
20 weapons depicted in that exhibit?
21 A. Yes, I do; all five.
22 Q. And can you assist us in terms of what they are?
23 A. Yes. Well, numbers 1, 2, and 3 are basically the same type of
24 weapon based on the Russian Kalashnikov, AK47, which is the typical
25 infantry assault rifle used by both the MUP and the VJ. Number 1 -- the
1 difference between 1 and 2 is that 1 has a folding stock. In other words,
2 it can be shorten. The metal stock that you see can be folded underneath
3 making it a much shorter weapon for fighting in built-up areas, for
5 Q. I see. The mechanism itself --
6 A. Is the same and they fire the same type of ammunition. They're
7 both 762, although there is a version that fires a smaller round and a
8 different designation.
9 Q. That's not depicted in these photographs?
10 A. No.
11 Q. Did you say that number 3 --
12 A. Is basically --
13 Q. -- is another variant of it?
14 A. Yes, but that was called a Zastava because it's produced locally
15 in -- but it's a machine-gun so it has a much heavier, longer barrel with
16 a bipod and a larger magazine for the ammunition.
17 Q. And a tripod, I take it, to steady it?
18 A. Yes, so -- because it's a longer-range weapon and it has a higher
19 rate of fire, it needs a longer, stronger barrel to withstand the heat and
20 obviously the tripod to stabilise it.
21 Q. And who -- did you see that weapon in -- or that type of weapon in
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. By whom?
25 A. By the VJ and the -- and the MUP.
1 Q. Number 4.
2 A. Number 4 is a sniper rifle. And this is quite a different calibre
3 because its designed for single-shot telescopic rifle, much longer barrel,
4 a better balanced weapon. Called the M76. And again we have seen
5 photographs of the MUP carrying this weapon.
6 Q. So this is -- this is the type of weapon that we've seen in the
7 uniform where they're carrying weapons; is that correct?
8 A. Correct.
9 Q. All right. And because this is a Zastava, does that give you any
10 indication as to where it was produced?
11 A. Yes, it indicates it was produced in Yugoslavia.
12 Q. Okay. Number 5, is that the same case in terms of where it's
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. What is that?
16 A. That's another -- we call it a general purpose machine-gun, GPMG,
17 Zastava M84. The same, except this time, rather than having a magazine,
18 it has a belt-feed but it's an automatic heavy machine-gun.
19 Q. All right. Thank you, Witness. I'm going to turn to a totally
20 different topic now, if I may.
21 Now, reference was made earlier in your evidence to an incident
22 involving Racak, and do you recall being present during negotiations at
23 the Stimlje police station concerning Racak, and if so, can you tell us
24 about that?
25 A. Yes. As part of the ongoing investigations being carried out by
1 Judge Marinkovic into the killings at Racak, we were having regular
2 meetings with the local police commander in Stimlje, and on this
3 particular occasion, we were informed that Judge Marinkovic was going to
4 visit the camp -- the village, sorry, of Racak to carry out further
5 investigations, and she was going to do this with the support and escort
6 of a large number of armed MUP with armoured vehicles, APC-type vehicles,
7 vehicles with heavy machine-guns to provide her with protection.
8 We knew from our discussions with the KLA that if the -- if the
9 Judge came in with this large police presence, armed police presence, they
10 weren't going to take this sitting down, and they would actually sort of
11 -- there would be a confrontation. So General DZ, General Maisonneuve
12 came up with a plan that we would flood the village with a very large
13 number of verifiers with vehicles and good communications, and we also had
14 discussions previously -- Maisonneuve's team had discussions with the KLA
15 to ensure that there were no KLA, armed KLA within the village which would
16 do any harm to Judge Marinkovic, and we had their assurance that nothing
17 would happen to Judge Marinkovic. But to ensure this, we would also
18 surround Judge Marinkovic with our own verifiers, almost like a human
19 shield, to give her the protection she required.
20 Now, we agreed to meet Judge Marinkovic with the local police at
21 Stimlje, and these discussions went on for most of the morning, several,
22 many hours, at which I was present all the time, and the conversation
23 basically hinged about not -- her not going into the village with the
24 police, and the assurance DZ was giving that this would be done.
25 The only condition that kept on being mentioned throughout this
1 conversation - this was mentioned repeatedly - was that if the judge
2 decided at any point to enter the village with armed escort, then we would
3 like at least ten minutes' notice to get our people out because our people
4 are unarmed and in unarmoured vehicles and the last thing we wanted was
5 for verifiers to be killed as well in the cross-fire. And the judge
6 acknowledged this but neither agreed or disagreed.
7 As the conversation went on and was coming to a conclusion, she
8 suddenly announced that ten minutes before, she had already ordered the
9 troops into the village to go into the village and secure the village, at
10 which point I immediately left the room, got on the radio to Maisonneuve,
11 and I just gave him a few words, and I said, this is -- "Maisonneuve, this
12 is CZ. Get out now." And he had ten minutes to get his people out of the
13 village. Well, he had less; he had no time to get out of the village.
14 And it was touch and go whether in fact his verifiers were going to get
15 out in time. And in fact, several verifiers were stuck in the village,
16 and there was a confrontation. We were very lucky not to take casualties.
17 The important thing, I think, in this instance was that DZ, on
18 several occasions, pointed out to Judge Marinkovic was that if anything at
19 all happened to his verifiers and because of her inappropriate anything
20 did happen to them, he would definitely pass her name -- her name would go
21 forward to The Hague, to the International Criminal Court as someone who
22 actually perpetrated a war crime in endangering the lives of verifiers
24 Q. Do I understand your evidence to be that an armed conflict in fact
25 did break out as a result of the MUP troops going in?
1 A. She went into the village and there was shooting, and in fact she
2 then withdraw with her people because she wasn't prepared to be there,
3 obviously, in the middle of a gunfight, although she did go in in an
4 armoured vehicle.
5 MR. RYNEVELD: Now, just before I go to the next topic, I wonder
6 whether the Court -- because this witness has referred to the recognition
7 guides, whether they should be given exhibit numbers. The vehicles then
8 would become 17A --
9 JUDGE MAY: Why?
10 MR. RYNEVELD: No?
11 JUDGE MAY: No. We've got numbers.
12 MR. RYNEVELD: I'll move on.
13 Q. Ultimately, sir, in late March the KVM left Kosovo; is that
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Why?
17 A. Because we had reached a point where our presence was no longer
18 safe or effective. For example, we were no longer able to access anything
19 worthwhile, and therefore affect any outcomes in Kosovo because we were
20 restricted in moving throughout Kosovo. We were restricted in going
21 anywhere near the border areas into this new enlarged border area. Our
22 verifiers were meeting with repeated hostilities from the -- both the MUP
23 and the VJ. So as I said, we had several instances where our verifiers
24 were severely beaten or threatened, and on numerous occasions our vehicles
25 were shot at and, in some cases, damaged with gunfire.
1 So we couldn't verify. We couldn't move. Our verifiers were in
2 danger of being killed or wounded. Our job basically was over. We could
3 not verify anything at this point, and that was the main purpose of our
5 Q. So the decision to leave was made and implemented; is that
7 A. Yes. We had sort of mentioned, I think, previously, a month or so
8 previously that if the situation didn't improve and that this troop
9 concentration, troop additions and so on, if it didn't cease, then
10 obviously we would have to consider leaving because we couldn't carry out
11 our function.
12 Q. I will return to this general area at the end of your evidence,
13 sir. I want to move on now to another topic. When did the KVM leave,
15 A. About the 23rd.
16 Q. The 23rd of March 1999?
17 A. 1999.
18 Q. And by that, you physically left Kosovo?
19 A. Yes. We formed a very large convoy of all our vehicles and
20 with the support and help of the Serbian Cooperation Commission and the
21 police, we managed to clear Kosovo very quickly and get through the border
22 very quickly.
23 Q. Did you personally ever return to Kosovo near the end of the
25 A. I did. I returned on the very first day that the NATO forces
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 entered Kosovo.
2 Q. That was the 13th of June?
3 A. 13th of June.
4 Q. 1999. And what -- what did you do upon -- where did you go and
5 what did you do?
6 A. By this time, I had actually reverted to my NATO role --
7 Q. Okay.
8 A. -- as a British army officer based at Rhinedahlen where the ARK is
9 based. I was then put on to General Jackson's staff and was part of his
10 command group together with DZ. And I came into Pristina, and on the
11 second day I was in Pristina I went to the old MUP headquarters where we
12 in fact set up a temporary office, DZ and myself.
13 Q. And while there, did you see any MUP officers doing -- engaged in
14 doing something?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. What was that?
17 A. The -- obviously there was a fair amount of damage in this area
18 because behind the MUP administrative building was the operational
19 building which had taken several direct hits, as did the communications
20 site. And so there was a large amount of damage to the admin building as
21 well. But what we saw on arrival were employees of the building, MUP and
22 civilians employed by the MUP, removing huge quantities of documents and
23 taking them down to trucks and having them shipped out. But the other
24 thing that was very obvious was in a little alcove, an open area by the
25 buildings as part of the building, there was a very large pile of -- there
1 was a large fire burning which looked like rubbish or documents. This was
2 a pile of about the size of a large truck which had been burning for some
3 time and the smoke had permeated the whole building and there were bits of
4 paper flying around. And on the second day I was there, I was tempted to
5 go down and have a look and see what this pile of documents was, and I
6 actually picked up several handfuls to discover -- from different parts of
7 the pile to discover that these were applications for travel, they were ID
8 documents, these were passports, applications for passports. So amongst
9 this huge pile of burning rubble it seemed to be mainly documents to do
10 with personal identification.
11 Q. Did you look at any of the names on any of these documents?
12 A. Yes. I looked through the applications and all the names of these
13 people were Albanian.
14 Q. Now, I understand, sir, that you actually took photographs of that
15 pile, did you?
16 A. I did, yes.
17 Q. And you don't have those available?
18 A. I'm afraid that, as I moved from the UK to Bulgaria, a lot of the
19 stuff disappeared into long-term storage and I thought I had taken them
20 out, but I'm afraid I didn't.
21 Q. You say that the size of this pile of documents was about the size
22 of a large truck?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. A truck?
25 A. Yes, a large truck.
1 Q. Now --
2 A. It burned for several days. It carried on burning for about a
3 week, this pile.
4 Q. Now, in relation to -- I think you indicated earlier that in
5 Pristina there was the headquarters of Lukic and some people in a stadium,
6 and I told you we'd come back to a map.
7 MR. RYNEVELD: Perhaps the witness could be shown -- is it Exhibit
8 61 that is -- I believe it is. No. Actually, I'm thinking of the -- no,
9 the -- there's a Kosovo atlas, and I'm afraid I didn't note down the
10 number of that. Madam Clerk? 83?
11 THE REGISTRAR: Uh-huh.
12 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you. If you could be shown Exhibit 38 and
13 turn to pages 19 and 20 of that.
14 Q. Now, sir, do you recognise at pages 19 and 20 a -- which purports
15 to be a map of downtown Pristina, do you recognise this map?
16 A. I do.
17 Q. Just so we're clear about a couple of things, perhaps you could
18 tell us, where is the stadium located on this map, if it's depicted at
20 A. It's this oval location here.
21 Q. And for the record, you're pointing to what appears to be page 19,
22 there's sort of an oval with the number 108 in the middle of it; is that
24 A. Correct, yes.
25 Q. And were the -- you indicated to us I believe that the general
1 headquarters was a building next to it?
2 A. Yes. The -- the main administrative MUP headquarters was this
3 building here, 79, 77 --
4 Q. Thank you.
5 A. -- as depicted on this map.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 A. And right behind it, what is shown as number 77, is in fact a
8 building which is there, which -- I was in Kosovo recently so I know that
9 this is an occupied building, but what is not shown is perpendicular to
10 that building, between that building 77 and the stadium, was the building
11 that was the operational MUP headquarters which was -- had received
12 several direct hits and was -- is now uninhabitable.
13 Q. All right. And where -- so -- do you know where the office was of
14 General Lukic and -- is it Mijatovic?
15 A. Yes. Both General Lukic and Mijatovic had offices in this
16 building. They're just behind, perpendicular to 77. And next to that was
17 the communications site, the large tower which allowed them to communicate
18 to Kosovo and elsewhere.
19 Q. And 108 would be where the helicopters would be landing; is that
21 A. Correct.
22 Q. And the area where you saw the documents burning, is that area
23 visible on this map?
24 A. Yes. It's probably where it says 79 and a little rectangle on 79.
25 Q. That you referred to as an alcove.
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. That would be a sort of outdoor area enclosed by the building
4 A. Correct.
5 Q. I see. Now, these -- just wondering, sir, obviously you don't
6 have those photographs of the burning pile available now. If in the
7 course of events, you're able to have access to those photographs, could
8 you forward them to the Tribunal for future reference?
9 A. Certainly.
10 Q. Now, sir, after -- shortly after the KVM withdrawal from Kosovo,
11 did you go to the border crossing with Macedonia referred to as Djeneral
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And that is near, I take it, the Macedonian town of Blace, is it,
15 or Blace?
16 A. Bllaca.
17 Q. Bllaca, sorry. Thank you. When was that? When did you go there?
18 A. I was there -- after we left Kosovo, I would go back towards the
19 crossing point, especially if -- at this time there was indication that
20 there were refugees already sort of coming across the border around
21 different parts of Djeneral Jankovic, Bllaca, through the minefields and
22 possibly also coming down the road and trying to get through the main
23 crossing point.
24 Q. And did you have any discussion with any of the people that you
25 found at that area?
1 A. Yes. Especially on one occasion, and the exact date escapes me,
2 but on the day that for the first time we saw people walking down the
3 railway track, a long what looked like to be a kilometre or two kilometres
4 of people walking down a railway track, wearing coats and carrying
5 suitcases, which reminded me of a scene from the Holocaust, I sort of went
6 down to the field where they were -- they were coming in and I went to
7 talk to the people, find out what had happened to them, you know, how it
8 was that they were actually walking down the railway tracks. They then
9 informed me that somebody -- that the police -- not somebody but the
10 police in Pristina had been going round, telling people to take whatever
11 they could carry, get themselves down to the railway station because they
12 were going on a trip.
13 When they got to the railway station, most of them, because there
14 was some amount of chaos, most of them had their ID cards and ID documents
15 removed from them. This was a story that was recounted to me on many
16 occasions by many different people in this field at Bllaca. And when I
17 asked them why, you know, what was the purpose of, you know, sending you
18 down here without ID documents, they said, "Well, because we were never to
19 return to Kosovo. This was to ensure that there was no evidence of us
20 ever having lived or been citizens of Pristina and Kosovo."
21 Q. Did they tell you whether they left Pristina voluntarily?
22 A. Yes, they did tell me that, why they left, and they left because
23 they were -- they were forced at gunpoint to walk down to the railway
24 station, and by gunpoint they were shoved onto these carriages, not
25 knowing where they were going or why they were going.
1 Q. And where did they end up?
2 A. They ended up for the first three days, the people that came on
3 the train, approximately 20.000, 25.000 people, they were in the field
4 right next to the border, almost in sort of no-man's land. The first day
5 was a nice sunny day, they just sat around. And by the third day, people
6 were dying of disease, cold. By then it began to rain, the field turned
7 into a quagmire, while the others were trying to decide how best to deal
8 with them.
9 Q. Did the train take them right to the border?
10 A. Certainly not, no. It stopped -- according to the -- the -- the
11 stories I've been told by the refugees, as they were, they were dropped
12 several kilometres short of the border and they had to walk along the
13 railway track.
14 Q. Now, you say you estimate about 25.000.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. In what kind of an area?
17 A. Probably an area of a couple of -- couple of soccer pitches. So
18 people were crammed in. I mean, there was no space between these people
19 at all. I mean, there was -- you could maybe sit down, it was difficult
20 to lie down. There was no water, no sanitation, nothing.
21 Q. During the early stages of witnessing this event, did you take a
22 photograph of what you saw?
23 A. I took several photographs in this field.
24 Q. And after you took these photographs, did the numbers increase?
25 A. Considerably.
1 Q. I'm going to show you a blown-up photograph under number
2 K021-8722. I don't know whether these have been distributed before.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 97.
4 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Madam Clerk.
5 Q. Witness, you brought a photograph with you to the Tribunal, and
6 we've had it blown up. Is this a good representation of the photograph
7 that you took?
8 A. Yes, it is.
9 Q. And what -- what is depicted in this photograph? Is this the
10 field of refugees or the early part when you first saw it?
11 A. This is still the very early part, because the field hasn't turned
12 into a field of mud and filth. So this is probably within the first 36
13 hours. This is probably, actually, the end of the first day.
14 Q. And it's your evidence then that the numbers considerably
15 increased; is that correct?
16 A. Yes. On subsequent photographs, you can't see anything in this
17 picture except black, except bodies, except people.
18 Q. And in your estimate, the total number was about 25.000?
19 A. We think in the first few days about 25.000 people came through.
20 MR. RYNEVELD: Turning now, if I may, to the additional summary of
21 evidence, Your Honours. During the course of this discussion, I'm going
22 to ask the Court for permission to move into a very brief private session
23 to ask one or two questions and then move back into open session.
24 Q. Sir, you've told us earlier about the departure of the KVM from
25 Kosovo, and was there -- and you've told us as well that you met on an
1 almost daily basis with the Serbian Cooperation Committee. Was there some
2 time when you met with that committee where the discussion about the
3 pending departure of the KVM was the topic of discussion?
4 A. Yes, there was.
5 Q. When, approximately, would you say that those discussions took
7 A. In the -- virtually in the last few weeks, possibly the last few
8 days of our stay in Kosovo.
9 Q. And at one of these regular scheduled meetings, the departure of
10 the KVM was the topic of discussion?
11 A. It certainly was.
12 Q. And at the conclusion of that meeting, did something occur that
13 was particularly noteworthy to you?
14 A. Yes. I was given some information which I found rather
16 Q. And without disclosing the name of the individual who provided
17 that information, can you tell us the general circumstances about how it
18 was that you had an opportunity to get this additional information?
19 A. At the conclusion of one of our meetings, when most of the members
20 who had taken part in this meeting had departed, myself and my interpreter
21 met with this official, and he put a map on the table and began telling us
22 exactly what the future options were for Kosovo.
23 MR. RYNEVELD: Might we move briefly into private session.
24 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
25 [Private session]
(Confidentiality lifted by later order of the Chamber)
1 MR. RYNEVELD: Once we've been assured that your comments can now
2 not be heard by anyone -- are we at that stage?
3 THE REGISTRAR: Yes.
4 JUDGE MAY: We're in private session.
5 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.
6 Q. Sir, who was the individual who you met with, in the presence of
7 your interpreter, who spread out a map?
8 A. Colonel Kotur.
9 Q. And just so that we know who he was, he was the gentleman who had
10 been part of the commission for some time?
11 A. Yes. He was -- he was there right from the very beginning as the
12 -- sort of the main VJ, serving VJ officer on the commission who had in
13 fact disappeared when the new Brankovic commission came in but
14 occasionally put in an appearance again.
15 Q. And he was present at this particular --
16 A. He was present at this meeting, and what happened was that it was
17 just himself, my interpreter and myself present when these discussions
18 took place.
19 Q. And how high a level was he with the VJ?
20 A. Well, he was an extremely experienced officer who had served for
21 more than ten years, possibly as much as 15 years in Kosovo, had a house
22 in Kosovo, had been -- had taken part in the activities in 1998 as a
23 commander in the Djakovica area where various events, fairly serious
24 fighting took place. He was also a commander prior to that in the
25 Mitrovica garrison. And although I can't verify this, by his knowledge,
1 his expertise, his stature, the type of uniforms he wore, he was a -- he
2 tended to wear a special forces uniform but he was very well-informed,
3 very well-respected, and certainly on my trips with him around Kosovo,
4 everybody would sort of defer to him regardless of their rank within
5 Kosovo. So he was known and deferred to. And he was extremely
6 knowledgeable on all matters military in Kosovo.
7 Q. His rank?
8 A. He was a colonel, full colonel.
9 Q. And he appeared to be immediately under whom?
10 A. He worked with the commission with General Loncar.
11 Q. Thank you.
12 MR. RYNEVELD: That's the end of private session. We can move
13 back into open session, if we may.
14 [Open session]
15 MR. RYNEVELD: Are we?
16 THE REGISTRAR: We're back in open session.
17 MR. RYNEVELD: Just waiting for the announcement. Thank you.
18 Q. Now, Witness, you say that a senior official spread a map out; is
19 that correct? And during the course of that, were there discussions about
20 what the plan was?
21 A. Yes. This official spread this map on the table in front of me,
22 and without any preamble at all, he told me exactly how the plan to deal
23 with the KLA would take place.
24 Q. Witness, if you are able, I'm going to hand you a copy of a map
25 that has been previously admitted in these proceedings as Exhibit 61.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 It's just a map of Kosovo. And I'm going to give you a green marker and
2 ask you if you could perhaps make markings on this in an attempt to
3 outline what it was that you were told and narrate, and then we can have
4 that marked as an exhibit. With the Court's permission, if that can be
5 done. I'm also providing a green marker.
6 MR. RYNEVELD: This is a colour map of the kind produced, Your
7 Honours, of Kosovo.
8 THE WITNESS: What we have to remember, that by this time, by the
9 time we left, there were already very large numbers of VJ and MUP
10 dispersed in strategic locations around -- around Kosovo. So what I'm
11 going to describe doesn't actually involve a chase. It actually involves
12 a predetermined strategy of eliminating the KLA through a series of
13 geographical points.
14 Q. Yes. And I want you to approximate as closely as possible what
15 this senior official told you and what he described to you.
16 A. Yes. I mean, he stood in front of me and pointed on the map, a
17 larger scale map, what they were doing, and he said, "Right. Basically
18 we're going to carry on our operations from Vucitrn and push the KLA
19 across towards Glogovac. At Glogovac, there is a large force of --" this
20 was where T72s and T84s were -- "we will then cut off and destroy any
21 stragglers that manage to make it over the hill towards Glogovac."
22 The next part of activity would be that the forces, the Serb
23 forces that were positioned around Podujevo would push Commander Remi's
24 forces over the mountains, down towards Vucitrn where in fact there would
25 be -- since there was a large garrison at Kosovska Mitrovica, they would
1 be cut off and killed, eliminated. So we've gone like this at the moment,
2 so we've cleared this whole area of KLA. They would then move down
3 towards -- by Stimlje and Suva Reka, which was another sort of very large
4 area of KLA. By this time, the -- most of the KLA resistance around
5 Kacanik had already been dealt with. This had been achieved before we
6 left. So this wasn't an important area. The greatest concentrations of
7 KLA were in this part of the country.
8 So through -- via Suva Reka, through the mountain passes, towards
9 Prizren, clearing up all the pockets. Again, Prizren had a very large
10 garrison, reinforced garrison, and they could deal with any sort of
11 pockets around this area.
12 Then moving up towards Djakovica, operations obviously on sort of
13 both sides, taking out any KLA. Orahovac, which was a problem area.
14 Working their way up to Decani, going east -- one part going east to
15 Decani to an area called Jablanica, where one of the most serious
16 commanders of the KLA had his headquarters, Ramush, and eventually ending
17 up in Pec. And therefore completing the operation to eliminate all the --
18 all the serious hot spots and major groupings of the KLA.
19 Q. I see. And that comment was with respect to how they would deal
20 with what?
21 A. This is -- it was purely to do with the elimination, total and
22 permanent elimination, as he put it, of the KLA.
23 Q. Did he at any point go on to say something else?
24 A. Yes, he did. Again, I found both these events quite
25 extraordinary, that he should tell me this, which is -- although it
1 appears a simplistic plan, a plan like this would actually require a great
2 deal of planning and coordination and staffing. This isn't something you
3 could start tomorrow morning because it seemed like a good idea. This
4 would require weeks, possibly months, of coordinated planning.
5 But the second thing he told me, which -- I remember the exact
6 words. He said to me, "And when we have finished dealing with the KLA, we
7 will remove all the Albanians from the territory of Kosovo forever."
8 Q. When this senior official told you this, about how this plan was
9 to be carried out, did you understand that to be solely a VJ operation or
11 A. No. This was -- none of these operations at this scale could be
12 solely VJ. These had to be coordinated MUP, VJ, special forces,
13 paramilitaries. This had to be a combined action.
14 He also informed me, by the way, that -- at the conclusion of
15 this, when I looked sort of completely puzzled, he said we're only doing a
16 job. We're only saving NATO and you and a job, because if we don't deal
17 with the KLA and the Albanian problem, then you will have to at some time
18 in the future.
19 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Ryneveld, that is a convenient moment.
20 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honours.
21 JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn now for 20 minutes.
22 --- Recess taken at 12.20 p.m.
23 --- On resuming at 12.42 p.m.
24 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Ryneveld.
25 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honours.
1 Q. I have only one question, but before I do that, I wonder whether
2 the map that the witness marked be given an exhibit number.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit 61A.
4 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.
5 Q. Witness, in the discussion of the uniforms, I believe you referred
6 to the -- you referred to the word "webbing." Again from my non-military
7 background, I assumed that you meant camouflage pattern, or you may be
8 referring to something totally different. Can you help us with that?
9 A. Yes. The -- the camouflage uniform would be just referred to as a
10 combat uniform. The webbing is the sort of harness you wear on your chest
11 which contains ammunition, water, medical supplies, maps, spare
12 ammunition, grenades, this sort of stuff. So it will enable the soldier
13 to carry a lot more equipment on his body.
14 Q. So, for example, when I asked you about the MUP soldiers wearing a
15 blue camouflage uniform and a green vest, the vest is in fact the webbing?
16 A. Yes. We would call it webbing. You would call it a vest.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 MR. RYNEVELD: Those are the questions I have of this witness,
19 Your Honours. Before Mr. Milosevic commences his cross-examination, I
20 wonder whether the Court would consider instructing him to obviously
21 respect the area of closed session. I just want to ensure that he
22 understands the name of the individual is intended to be kept
23 confidential, which is why I asked for private session. If there's some
24 way the Court can control that, I would be very grateful.
25 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Mr. Milosevic, you've heard that comment by the
1 Prosecution. It is endorsed by the Court. The name is to be kept
2 confidential. Of course you can ask questions about the rest. If you
3 want to ask something about the name, then we should go into closed
4 session to do it.
6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
7 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:
8 Q. [Interpretation] In the KVM, you worked on the verification of
9 arms; is that right?
10 A. That was one of my jobs, yes.
11 Q. What were all the other jobs you had in addition to this activity
12 related to arms verification? What else were you entrusted with? What
13 other kinds of activity?
14 A. It was not solely the verification of arms. It was the
15 verification of military activities and military personnel within Kosovo.
16 I was also responsible for helping with the training of new verifiers as
17 they came in through our training centre at Brezovica. And of course my
18 major job was to be the liaison officer with the Serbian Cooperation
20 Q. In your statement, you mentioned that you were an intelligence
21 officer of the British army.
22 A. I never said anything of the sort. I said that -- I think it was
23 pointed out by the Prosecution counsel that I am a military attache. I
24 was one in Poland, and I'm now the defence attache in Bulgaria. I don't
25 see what connection that has with being an intelligence officer.
1 Q. Well, here in paragraph 4 of your statement, it says, "My career
2 in the military has largely revolved around training systems, support, and
3 in the intelligence areas." And you were the British military attache in
4 Poland, that is to say, in line with your profession.
5 Is it your assertion that this job of yours, as you put it, in
6 training systems, support, and intelligence areas, it has nothing to do
7 with intelligence?
8 A. It depends, Mr. Milosevic, how you define intelligence and
9 intelligence work. As an attache, my job is to -- one of my jobs is to
10 gather information, as is every diplomat's job in an embassy, on the
11 country and to analyse it and to report. It is certainly not my job, if
12 this is what you're insinuating, that I run some sort of network of agents
13 and gather intelligence in some covert way. Everything I do and have done
14 in my work in the military has been a different type of intelligence, and
15 this is often a misunderstanding between what used to be NATO and Warsaw
16 Pact, is that intelligence officers are some sort of counter-intelligence,
17 agent-running officers. This is not anything which I do.
18 Intelligence, in my case, is information gathering, purely and
20 Q. Well, that is precisely what intelligence officers do. But I did
21 not focus on your duty as military attache but the first part of the
22 sentence, where you say, "around training systems, support, and in the
23 intelligence areas." So the intelligence area is your profession, isn't
25 A. It is an area I've been involved in, but my major work has been
1 carried out around training.
2 Q. Awhile ago, you mentioned when you were explaining the range of
3 your activities that you worked on training the newly-arrived verifiers.
4 Since your profession, as you had written it down here as I had quoted it,
5 related to training and intelligence, did you train the verifiers in
6 respect of their intelligence activity?
7 A. I was training the verifiers in observation and
8 information-gathering activities.
9 Q. Well, to the best of my understanding, in other words, this is
10 intelligence work. Yes or no.
11 A. We were not there as intelligence officers. We were there to
12 carry out our mission as verifiers. The only way to verify anything is to
13 actually go out and observe and gather information. Now, I would not call
14 this intelligence work. This is purely observation and monitoring,
15 something the UN asked us to do.
16 Q. Since you say that your military career has largely revolved
17 around training and the intelligence area, do you consider yourself to be
18 an expert, a specialist in intelligence activity?
19 A. I would not consider myself to be an expert on intelligence
20 activity as I have spent most of my life being a trainer and, for example,
21 I was responsible for training -- designing the military training of the
22 first armoured division in Germany for two and a half years just before I
23 came to Kosovo; nothing at all to do with any form of intelligence or
24 information gathering.
25 Q. I am just ascertaining what your profession is on the basis of
1 what you've written here, but let's move on to the next question.
2 Are you aware how many members of the KVM came from intelligence
4 A. No.
5 Q. Are you aware of the conditions, the prerequisites for taking
6 people into the KVM?
7 A. As far as I understood, what happened was that countries were
8 asked to nominate personnel to attend. In my case, I received a message
9 in Germany, asking if I -- if any lieutenant colonels at the time were
10 willing to go to Kosovo to act as verifiers. I was a serving officer, as
11 I am now, and I was not of any particular conditions that were set on who
12 verifiers should be. All I can tell you is that gathering a force
13 together, quickly, of people who can be sent to a hostile area, a
14 dangerous area to carry out verification without any preparation, without
15 any facilities being in place, can only really be done by, I believe, a
16 military force or an ex-military force because these people are trained to
17 survive in difficult conditions. You could not send pure civilians into
18 those conditions because they would be just unable to cope in the initial
20 Q. And are you aware of the criteria according to which the selection
21 of personnel was carried out for the Verification Mission?
22 A. What I'm aware of is that each country made a nomination of its
23 personnel with a brief description of their training and experience and
24 qualities, and these descriptions were sent to Vienna, to the OSCE, and
25 the OSCE held boards to actually put the people in the right slots once
1 they got to Kosovo.
2 Q. My understanding of what you have said just now was that you
3 volunteered to work in the Verification Mission. What were your motives
4 for applying to do this work?
5 A. I think there were several motives. I was appalled about what was
6 happening in Kosovo, and I felt that my sort of experience and knowledge
7 of not necessarily the Balkans but of Eastern Europe, having worked in
8 Poland for several years, there might be some benefit from the language.
9 The Polish I speak might allow me to understand some Serbian. I felt also
10 that my broad career background would actually enable me to work in a
11 mission like this; and I just felt that it was something that I
12 desperately wanted to do, to help just not the people of Kosovo but to
13 take part in this mission which would try and resolve the problem.
14 Q. And are you aware of whether the other members of the Verification
15 Mission were volunteers as well, the other members of the Verification
16 Mission, that is to say, your colleagues, the other members?
17 A. All I can tell you with certainty is that I understood that every
18 single person volunteered. There were -- there were far more volunteers
19 than there were people who were actually accepted. So whoever was doing
20 the acceptance and judging the criteria, I cannot say how they did this
21 and how they whittled down the few hundred British names, for example,
22 down to the 115 British personnel who eventually went. So, no, I cannot
23 tell you how they were selected.
24 Q. So the selection was carried out from the group of names of
25 persons who had volunteered, if my understanding of what you've been
1 saying is correct.
2 A. You are correct.
3 Q. Yesterday during his testimony, your superior, General
4 Drewienkiewicz, said that the military personnel of the mission was there
5 -- were there because civilians could not be ordered to become members of
6 the mission, whereas military men could be ordered to do so. So since
7 military persons could be ordered to become members of the mission, they
8 were indeed ordered to become members. How come your boss gave a
9 different explanation, saying that you were ordered to go there, and your
10 explanation is quite different, that you all volunteered?
11 JUDGE MAY: Even if it was different, it's not a matter for this
12 witness. You can comment on it if you want.
13 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, all I can say is that I don't know what
14 General DZ meant by what he said --
15 JUDGE MAY: No. No, exactly.
16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. But there is no doubt that Drewienkiewicz yesterday said that the
18 members of the mission were --
19 JUDGE MAY: There's no point going on with this. The witness has
20 given his evidence. You can't ask him to comment on what somebody else
21 has said. It's pointless.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, then I would like to indicate
23 that to you, this divergence in explanations.
24 JUDGE MAY: This isn't the time to be indicating things to us.
25 You'll get a chance to do it in due course.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There are too many of these
2 contradictions, so no time would be sufficient.
3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. In the OSCE and in the KVM, who decided on who would be admitted
5 and who would not be admitted? Who actually did the deciding?
6 A. For the British - and I can only speak for the British - it was
7 done at two levels. As I said, there were a number -- several hundred
8 volunteers from the United Kingdom British forces. These names were
9 submitted by the British foreign office to the OSCE, and the final
10 selection of personnel was carried out by the OSCE. Not only that, but
11 the timing of when they arrived in Kosovo was also determined by the OSCE
12 in Vienna.
13 Q. You said in your statement that when you applied as a volunteer
14 and then were taken in in the space of a few days, that you started your
15 training for the task in hand. Now, how long did that training last and
16 where did it take place?
17 A. Right. We had two training sessions. One was in the UK, and I
18 think most nations carried out some -- this type of training, and I'm
19 happy to tell you about the type of training. And then when I arrived in
20 Kosovo, in Brezovica, there was a further two and a half, three days of
21 training carried out in our training centre in Kosovo.
22 Q. And what did the training consist of?
23 A. In the UK, the training -- the major part of the training -- there
24 were two parts of the training: One was mine awareness, knowing how to
25 deal with mines; if you drive into a minefield, if you are stuck in a
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 minefield, how to get out of the minefield; how to recognise mines, types
2 of mines, and booby-traps, because these types of devices could be, from
3 my experience in other parts of the Balkans, could be the most dangerous
4 aspects to our personnel. So that was that training.
5 Secondly, we spent a lot of time on first aid training, how to
6 deal with an injured person, how to give life-saving first aid to these
7 people who you might come across; it could be your partner, it could be a
8 policeman, it could be a KLA fighter. You know, what to do in the first
9 instance, you know, how to help him and to save his life.
10 And on top of that, there were sessions on the history. We had
11 people come in from the Balkans to tell us about the situation in the
12 Balkans, the situation in Kosovo. We had briefings of all sorts to do,
13 (a) with the situation and the history, because the history was very
14 important, obviously, as to how the whole thing -- why it had taken place
15 and what was going on.
16 Q. And after you joined the KVM mission, you as a British officer,
17 English officer, were you still officially under the command of your own
19 A. I was still an officer employed by the British army and paid by
20 the British army. However, once the British army seconds personnel to a
21 mission, any type of UN mission, or in this case the OSCE, we are under
22 the command and control of that mission. So I did not report to anybody
23 in the UK. My immediate boss would have been General DZ, because I was in
24 the operations department of the mission. He was director of operations
25 and so I answered to him, but not as a member of the British army.
1 Q. And did you have any orders whatsoever from the British army
2 during your mission?
3 A. I don't recall any occasion when anybody from the British army
4 gave me a direct order. I only took my instructions from the Head of
5 Mission, from Ambassador Walker, or from the deputies or from General DZ.
6 Q. So I can take it that during your entire mission, you had no
7 contacts with your British command; is that right?
8 A. During my time in Kosovo, I did not have direct contact with the
9 British command, you're quite right.
10 Q. And at a higher level, higher up from your level, did anybody send
11 your information to your British command, with your knowledge?
12 A. I think you will find that in any international mission, that the
13 mission is a grouping of international countries who do actually need to
14 report back to their own countries what is happening with their soldiers.
15 I mean, it would be wrong to deploy a force from the UK and not actually
16 inform the British Ministry of Defence or the Prime Minister or the
17 foreign office if we had injuries, if we had problems, if we had
18 difficulties and what we were doing. So to my knowledge, yes, every
19 single country within the mission would have a link back to their country
20 to report what was going on to their -- as DZ would say, to their boys and
21 girls, what's happening to the boys and girls.
22 Q. But you were a member of the OSCE mission. Wouldn't it be logical
23 for you to report to the OSCE headquarters, to inform them, report back to
24 them, especially in view of the fact that this was, as is emphasised, a
25 civilian mission, and that is what it says in the agreement with
2 A. Yes. We did, in fact, as I say, report back to our foreign
3 office. And the OSCE would not really be interested in the great mass of
4 trivia that we sent back, asking for spares and bits and pieces of
5 equipment that we required in order to keep our British part of the OSCE
6 running. We did send back -- I mean, DZ every single night sent a report
7 back to the OSCE, pointing out the major events of the day, but as I say,
8 OSCE were not interested in the myriad of minor details that each part of
9 the mission was carrying out.
10 Q. You mentioned Donna Phelan whom you helped for a time. Was Donna
11 Phelan a military person or a civilian person?
12 A. Donna Phelan was a civilian who had been working -- I think when
13 she was seconded to the OSCE, she was actually working on the CFE, on the
14 weapons arms control part of the OSCE, UN. So she was an expert, I
15 believe originally from the State Department in America now working with
16 the weapons verification. And this is why I understudied Donna because
17 she had a great deal of knowledge on procedures for weapons and arms and
18 troops verification.
19 Q. When she left, I didn't understand what you said perhaps, or,
20 rather, did I understand you to say that you replaced her once she left?
21 A. Yes. I took over the function which she had carried out, which
22 was to design and facilitate the conduct of verification.
23 Q. So you did replace Donna Phelan.
24 A. I suppose you could say that, yes.
25 Q. Here in the statement of General Drewienkiewicz, it says that
1 Donna Phelan left and went to the United States and that then her function
2 was taken over by Roland Peter from the United States, that he took over
3 her function and post. Is that some misunderstanding or perhaps a mistake
4 in the explanation?
5 A. It's possible that DZ split the function of Donna Phelan. But the
6 verification part of Donna Phelan's function, I assumed.
7 Q. You spoke about the fact that you were not enabled to tour certain
8 barracks. Now, do you know that in the agreement that was made up and
9 that you had in your pocket that this was not provided for, the fact that
10 you should control the army within its barracks? That was not a provision
11 of the agreement you had.
12 A. I'm surprised to hear it from you, Mr. Milosevic, because the
13 agreement actually says that we had access and freedom of movement
14 throughout Kosovo. And if we were trying to verify anything at all, then
15 we'd obviously need to have access also to barracks. I mean, how else
16 would we know how many weapons and tanks and guns you had unless you
17 actually allowed us into your barracks to verify this?
18 Q. But you were well aware of the fact that the army, according to
19 that agreement, was not engaged and involved except for three units which
20 were company size in strength.
21 A. If you're referring to the three units that we were eventually
22 allowed to visit, this (a) took a lot of work to get to these units to see
23 them. Weeks and weeks, if not months, of effort was required to visit
24 these, and we were only ever allowed one visit to these three units.
25 Q. Well, that's what I want to define. According to the agreement,
1 the Pristina Corps was in its barracks and undergoing its regular
2 training, and it did not have any connection with your verifications
3 because its units were not used, were not deployed except for three units
4 which were the size of a company. And according to the agreement, they
5 were precisely deployed in three locations in Kosovo, and that is what it
6 said in the agreement.
7 Now, can I take it that you believe that your verification related
8 to the positions of those three units and their functions?
9 A. Mr. Milosevic, in the first place, the units which were garrisoned
10 in their barracks did deploy. And when they deployed, we were still not
11 allowed anywhere near those units; we were kept at arm's length.
12 Secondly, the agreement, the way it is written is obviously,
13 you're telling me now, open to different interpretation. The way we read
14 the agreement was that we had access not only to those three company
15 groups but also to the barracks. And in fact, in furtherance of this, I
16 believe that a letter was written to you, specifying exactly how we
17 intended to carry out verification, of what units, and to what level, to
18 which we never received a reply.
19 Q. And that's what I'm talking about. You had those three companies,
20 and they were strictly enumerated in the agreement, and you were able to
21 control them, and you did have freedom of movement around Kosovo in that
22 respect. Is that correct or not?
23 JUDGE MAY: Well, so we can follow this, Mr. Milosevic, which part
24 of the agreement are you relying on and which agreement?
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The agreement about limiting the
1 number of policemen and which states that the army will be engaged in
2 their regular duties except for three companies, and the regular duties
3 were their regular peacetime duties, which means normal training sessions
4 and nothing more than that. And that is what it says in the agreement,
5 and it is in one of the sections that General Drewienkiewicz brought with
6 him here yesterday. He brought copies of those documents into court and
7 you will be able to find it very easily because I haven't got this large
8 binder with me here today. I don't want to carry it around with me.
9 JUDGE MAY: We'll ask Mr. Ryneveld. There are two agreements.
10 It's not clear which is being referred to. There's the 16th of October
11 agreement and there is what I think is called the Burns agreement.
12 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes, Your Honour. At tab 3, and we have additional
13 copies of --
14 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
15 MR. RYNEVELD: Sorry. At tab 3, we have the 25th of October
16 agreement which has a statement attached to it, talking about various VJ
17 units. Then at tab 4, you have the understanding dated the 25th of
18 October, signed by Sean Burns. So I believe there is a reference to both
19 of those, and I wonder whether the witness -- yes, I see the witness has
20 just been -- had -- been shown Exhibit 94, tabs 3 and 4.
21 I have an extra copy available for Mr. Milosevic, should he need
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't need an additional copy. I
24 know that according to the agreement, three companies were deployed and
25 that that could have been the subject of the verification. So that is not
1 something that is being challenged.
2 JUDGE MAY: Let's find the particular passage in the agreement.
3 Colonel, perhaps you can help us. We take it that the reference
4 is to the statement, which is in our tab 3. There's a reference to three
5 company-sized teams at paragraph 5.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's it precisely. Three units
7 the size of companies. That is what was provided for. And also,
8 provision was made for the level of the police force. And I remember
9 there were 10.024 policemen, and they rotated. A portion of them were
10 rotated. That's what the mission was entrusted to verify.
11 THE WITNESS: Earlier on, Your Honour, it does say that we have --
12 in the first paragraph, 1, towards the end of the paragraph, that we have
13 full freedom of movement, also citizens and state authorities
14 representatives as well as normal activity, and it doesn't actually say, I
15 don't think, in paragraph 5 that those are the only units we can actually
17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Well, you had to tour what was in the agreement and in the
19 terrain. That's logical.
20 A. Well, that's right, Mr. Milosevic. So for example, when paragraph
21 2 says with those goals in mind, the state authorities, how they announced
22 the following measures, for example any additional materiel, heavy weapons
23 12.7 millimetres and above, into Kosovo will be withdrawn from Kosovo and
24 returned to the VJ. Now, how can we verify this? Because this is
25 something we're verifying. How can we verify this unless we can actually
1 go and have a look inside your barracks? You know, do we rely just on
2 what you tell us?
3 Q. You do so by not finding it on the terrain, in the field. If it
4 has been withdrawn, then it's not on the terrain. And what's in the
5 barracks is up to the Yugoslav army and the corps, the Pristina Corps that
6 was there. So I don't know whether it is clear that your right did not
7 compass examining the barracks.
8 A. Yes. And what about the fact that you did deploy the units from
9 these barracks into your winter training locations, into your winter sort
10 of exercises and still didn't give us access to those locations?
11 Q. Units throughout Yugoslavia, both before, at the time, and
12 afterwards, were engaged in their regular training sessions. And as you
13 well know as an officer, you cannot conduct exercises within the barracks
14 compound but you have to go outside in the localities which are allotted
15 for this purpose. So that was not something which was brought into
16 question in any way. But let's move on.
17 In your statement, you speak about your duties and tasks that
18 incorporated organisation, touring, et cetera, et cetera, and you say --
19 and this is at the end of paragraph 7: "These visits --" it is the last
20 sentence of paragraph 7: "These visits necessitated utilising various
21 military units to assist me in visiting VJ and MUP units." That's what it
22 says in your statement.
23 Now, I'm asking you which military units assisted you in visiting
24 the army of Yugoslavia and MUP units.
25 A. Sorry, I don't have my statement in front of me.
1 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness have a copy.
2 MR. RYNEVELD: Would the Court like a copy to follow?
3 JUDGE MAY: We have one. Is this the witness statement or the
5 MR. RYNEVELD: No. They are now referring to the actual witness
6 statement, which I do not believe the Court has.
7 JUDGE MAY: No. We better have the statement.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's the statement, not the summary.
9 MR. RYNEVELD: The paragraphs in the statement are not numbered.
10 That's perhaps where the -- when he refers to paragraph 7, the summary has
11 numbered paragraphs but the statement does not. It's on the first page, I
12 believe, of the statement, it's called page 2, and the sentence is the
13 second to the last paragraph, at the end of it.
14 THE WITNESS: What I would have referred to here is the fact that
15 obviously I could not myself have organised any of these visits, so I
16 would have go to the Cooperation Commission with Colonel Kotur and then
17 we'd decide which units we'd like to visit and get their help in
18 organising these visits because we were in no position to coordinate this;
19 it could only be done by the VJ. So it does not refer to any outside
20 units outside Kosovo, and it does not refer to any other units than
21 Serbian military units.
22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. All right. So this sentence here -- have you found the sentence I
24 referred to, where it says, "These necessitated utilising various military
25 units to assist me in visiting the units of the army of Yugoslavia, or VJ,
1 and MUP units."
2 Now, my question is what other units of the Yugoslav army helped
3 you? Did I understand you to say that other units helped you?
4 A. No. We were just helped by the Yugoslav army units. So, for
5 example, if we were going down to Mitrovica, we would probably go up with
6 General Kotur, speak to the commander, and try and work out exactly what
7 we'd like to do or what we'd like to organise. That's what I meant by
8 cooperation from the other military units.
9 Q. Was that cooperation good?
10 A. It was eventually successful in trying to -- in verifying the
11 three combat groups that you said we were allowed only to see. Yes, that
12 was a very successful visit. But other visits were impossible.
13 Q. But in the next paragraph of your statement you say - and you can
14 follow that easily now because you've found the spot I'm referring to -
15 "There were three main VJ sites that we wanted to visit, and through
16 negotiation, we were able to achieve this goal," et cetera, et cetera.
17 A. Yes. We were given reasonable open access on one occasion to
18 visit each of those sites.
19 Q. As we're on your statement, in order to make rational use of time
20 we can go on discussing it, and in the following paragraph, you say, "In
21 about February 1999 we also attempted a MUP verification visit --" that is
22 to say, of the Ministry of the Interior, that is what the MUP is short
23 for, just to make things quite clear, the police ministry, in fact --
24 "where we sent 30 to 40 teams to every known MUP checkpoint."
25 You say that that was in February, although you say "about
1 February," but I'm not questioning that. I'm not challenging that. But
2 you visited the 27 known sites and identified nine or ten more. And then
3 you go on to say that you confirm that the MUP were breaching the
4 agreement as to how many checkpoints they were permitted to operate.
5 Now, you know full well that in the agreement which you quoted a
6 moment ago and which you quote in your statement as well, it says that the
7 MUP may, if it -- if there are justified reasons to do so, to increase the
8 number of its patrols. Now, do you know that at that time in February, it
9 was a period in which there were very many attacks by KLA terrorists and
10 that therefore, it -- there was no question of whether MUP could increase
11 its patrols. It could in localities where they considered it necessary
12 for security reasons, the checkpoints. So why, then, did you say that the
13 MUP was violating the agreement when that is precisely what is stated in
14 the agreement and according to your statement?
15 A. Because the actual -- in the agreement, it does say that 27
16 observation posts, of which one-third will be manned, so that makes
17 nine, and on this occasion, we found nearly 40 that were manned.
18 JUDGE MAY: I think the point is this, that the understanding goes
19 on to say that in cases of incidents or increased tension, the police will
20 have the right, upon notifying KDOM/OSCE, to perform patrol duties in
21 armoured vehicles, et cetera. So I think what is being put was that this
22 was a time of increased tension and they were entitled to do so.
23 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I think what it was doing, it was
24 actually increasing the tension just by sort of having this increased
25 number of patrol bases which made them targets, invited sort of
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 retaliation from the KLA. And it does actually say that the -- the
2 Serbian Cooperation Commission should have informed, given us prior notice
3 of any increase, which it never did.
4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. On the contrary, it did. But as you've just said this, are you
6 saying that it is the fault of the police for having appeared at all
7 because the KLA attacked it, because the KLA terrorists were shooting at
8 the police, it is the fault of the police for having existed at all, for
9 having been visible?
10 A. Not at all. Of course there is a right to protect and
11 self-defence, but an overreaction and an over -- a larger force than what
12 you actually sort of need, which oppresses the local population from
13 moving, from conducting their ordinary business, will actually cause
14 resentment amongst the population. That's just my opinion.
15 Q. That means that the appearance of the police justifiably provoked
16 the KLA to shoot at the police?
17 A. I didn't say that either. I said that the overpolicing, the sort
18 of strictures imposed on movements and of normal life could irritate the
19 local population, which could in turn, for some people, be they terrorists
20 or whatever, use it as an excuse to actually attack your police.
21 Q. And then it's the fault of the police, not the fault of the
22 terrorists who are attacking them, according to this logic that you seem
23 to be resorting to?
24 JUDGE MAY: The witness has explained his answer.
25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. In the next paragraph, you make a very profound statement. You
2 say: "The method we used, as planned initially by Donna Phelan, was very
3 confrontational." Them, I mean, the army, the police. "And the Serbs
4 were not happy with this."
5 My understanding has been that according to its letter, this
6 mission was a mission of cooperation. Yesterday your superior,
7 Drewienkiewicz, said that you made an effort to establish cooperation.
8 And what you are saying here and now, "The method we used, as planned
9 initially by Donna Phelan, was very confrontational and that the Serbs
10 were not happy with this.
11 How could anyone be happy with confrontation from the side of
12 those that they were supposed to cooperate with? Can you explain this?
13 A. Yes. I think I sort of need to tell you that the first attempt to
14 verify at the barracks just outside Pristina, the Junik barracks, was
15 undeclared by us, or if it was declared, we gave very minimal notice, and
16 we arrived at the barracks, saying what we wanted to do and what we
17 believed the agreement allowed us to do. As this was totally unsuccessful
18 and we got nowhere with this methodology, once Donna Phelan left, I then
19 believe it was, from my experience as an attache, my experience working
20 with other forces, other country's forces, is it's better to, you know,
21 use a policy of diplomacy and negotiation. And so I did begin a complete
22 series of negotiations through the Cooperation Commission to try to
23 rectify this. And even though we attempted to do this and, for example,
24 invited General Loncar to come to the next verification we attended, we
25 gave plenty of notice. That also was unsuccessful. It was only much,
1 much later, after a great deal more of negotiating, trying to explain to
2 the Cooperation Commission why we were doing this and what the reasons for
3 the verification were, an openness to show the world that you were not
4 hiding anything, this was my intention to actually show this, that you
5 didn't have weapons above the quota, you know, that was specified in the
7 That was after a long, long serious of negotiations, we finally
8 got permission to visit those three sites, and I believe that was a
9 breakthrough. However, after that, we had no more access, because once
10 your troops were deployed in the field, again you closed the sort of
11 access to the deployed units to your exercises, which, incidentally, were
12 unusual exercises because these exercises involved shooting at real people
13 and real property which we don't normally do during training. So we then
14 came up with another method of trying to verify where I would go around
15 personally with somebody from the VJ in sort of joint transport and try
16 and see what was going on. But our patrols, our people on the ground
17 could not get into any of these areas at all.
18 Q. I hear this explanation of yours concerning your work. However,
19 my question was for you to explain what it says here. "The method we used
20 was very confrontational."
21 You say that this method was planned initially by Donna Phelan.
22 I'm not interested in who planned it initially. Can you tell us something
23 about this method that you used as you say it was very confrontational, in
24 the Serbian translation, opposing to a maximum.
25 JUDGE MAY: I think the witness has dealt with this when he
1 described what they did when they first went into the barracks at
2 Pristina, and I understood that to be his description of confrontational.
3 Is that right, Colonel?
4 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, that's absolutely correct.
5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Please. An incident, an individual occurrence cannot be
7 identified with an explanation of that which is defined as a method. A
8 method means the use of certain actions or taking certain measures
9 permanently. The method that we used that was initially planned by Donna
10 Phelan. So this is a planned method that was used was very
12 JUDGE MAY: Let's get on with it, if we can.
13 Can you describe Donna Phelan's method in any other way than you
14 have already or can you add something to what you've said?
15 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. The method -- I mean, because
16 Donna was an experienced weapons -- a CFE weapons inspector, verifier
17 sitting in this world of verification, she adopted those techniques which
18 basically is to give a short amount of notice to the country being visited
19 and then to have complete access to everything within the barracks and
20 within every unit, within every sort of barracks, within every training
21 area in that country. This is just a standard procedure for doing weapons
22 and arms verification.
23 Now, because we sort of chose this method, and also at the same
24 time Donna Phelan and DZ had written a letter to Mr. Milosevic outlining
25 how we'd like to do this and had no response, she assumed that no response
1 meant that we had no other option at that point but to carry on with the
2 method we'd thought of.
3 When this method didn't work, that's when we changed it. Almost
4 immediately. Mr. Milosevic believes that we continued this way. We did
5 not continue the confrontational technique. We went away from that. I
6 toured Kosovo, all the Regional Centres --
7 JUDGE MAY: I think that's a separate point --
8 THE WITNESS: Right.
9 JUDGE MAY: -- than the one he was asking about.
10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. I am not aware of having receiving letters from Donna Phelan, from
12 your verifiers, any one of your verifiers, I have to say that. But in
13 relation to this, what you have just described, that you found, in terms
14 of the verification of the MUP, that is to say, your teams did, did you
15 send a report on this to the Yugoslav authorities, or, rather, did you
16 discuss this with the Yugoslav commission that was headed by General
17 Loncar in Pristina?
18 A. Yes. First of all, the letter was drafted by Donna Phelan and
19 given -- signed by the Head of Mission. That was sent to you. And
20 secondly, the letter that was -- the full report of our findings of the 27
21 positions that were more was passed to General Loncar of the Cooperation
22 Commission, the full report.
23 Q. And did you discuss this question with General Loncar and his
25 A. Absolutely. DZ personally discussed it with General Loncar.
1 Q. So did he discuss it fully with General Loncar? When I say "you,"
2 I'm not referring to you personally. I'm referring to you the
3 Verification Mission, the appropriate representative, that is. If it's
4 Drewienkiewicz, then it's him, or Walker, or Keller. That's not what
5 matters, as far as I'm concerned.
6 So I'm saying whether you discussed this.
7 A. It was discussed with the Cooperation Commission and
8 General Loncar, yes.
9 Q. And was it cleared up?
10 A. No, it was left as a protest from us because in our opinion, you
11 had breached the agreement.
12 Q. And Loncar was not in a position to give any explanation of this?
13 A. I think we heard many of the same arguments that we hear from you
14 today, sir.
15 Q. Well, that stems from the letter of the agreement. You wrote here
16 as well that, "In addition to this task of verification of arms, I also
17 assumed the role of chief liaison person with the FRY." This is a fact
18 that is new to me, that you were the chief person liaising with the FRY.
19 Can you explain this, because it seems a bit unbelievable to me?
20 A. I think it's an error of sort of using careless comments when I
21 was making the statement. It obviously means chief of liaison with the
22 Cooperation Commission. I had no direct liaison with the FRY. But as the
23 Commission of Cooperation were the mouthpiece, I presume, of your
24 government, then I suppose indirectly I was speaking to the FRY.
25 Q. That's fine. When you say with the Commission for Cooperation,
1 but also when you say Commission of Cooperation, did you have the chief
2 role in the position of a liaison person? If we were to delete the FRY,
3 if we were to insert the Cooperation Commission with the FRY, weren't the
4 chief persons for this liaison Walker, Keller, Drewienkiewicz, and your
5 other superiors, members of the mission who were superior to you?
6 From what I can see from your explanations, they were at these
7 meetings and you accompanied them to these meetings.
8 A. As it turned out, because of the duration and the frequency of the
9 meetings, I attended without either DZ or Walker or any other Deputy Head
10 of Mission at these meetings, and it was myself and my interpreters, and I
11 would take other specialists along with me to support me to these
12 meetings, but I would also be representing the Head of Mission.
13 Obviously, any member of the mission was a representative of Mr. Walker,
14 including DZ.
15 JUDGE MAY: It's quarter to and we must adjourn now. Colonel,
16 would you be back, please, at 9.00 tomorrow morning.
17 We ought to have a number for the witness statement.
18 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 98.
19 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. We will adjourn now until tomorrow
21 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned
22 at 1.45 p.m., to be reconvened on
23 Wednesday, the 17th day of April, 2002,
24 at 9.00 a.m.