1 Wednesday, 15 May 2002
2 [Open session]
3 [The witness entered court]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.00 a.m.
6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.
7 MR. NICE: I've temporarily forgotten and failed to mark which
8 paragraph I was at. My mistake. If I can find it.
9 JUDGE MAY: While counsel is looking for the paragraph, Mr. Tanic,
10 could you try and keep your answers as narrowly focused as possible.
11 You've got a lot of evidence to give and it's important that we hear it,
12 but our time is limited, and we'll get through it more quickly and you can
13 get away more quickly if you would just focus on the questions and answer
14 them. If counsel wants more information, he can always ask for it. If
15 you'd keep that in mind.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'll do my best to respect those
18 MR. NICE: I think it was paragraph 53, was it? I may be wrong
19 about that.
20 JUDGE MAY: Judge Kwon reminds me the private chain of command was
21 the last topic.
22 MR. NICE: I'm grateful. It was paragraph 54 and indeed I now
23 have found the mark I've left myself. Thank you very much.
24 WITNESS: RATOMIR TANIC [Resumed]
25 [Witness answered through interpreter]
1 Examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]
2 Q. Mr. Tanic, you were telling us yesterday of the fact-finding
3 mission and of the recommendations that it was able to make. Were those
4 recommendations - yes or no - acted on by the accused?
5 A. No.
6 Q. Did he ever pronounce the KLA to be a terrorist organisation?
7 A. Not in the legal framework, but just as a political accusation.
8 But not within the law as provided for by the constitution.
9 Q. Yes/no will do to this answer: Did he ever proclaim a state of
10 emergency in Kosovo which would have allowed for official action against
12 A. Not in keeping with the law.
13 Q. Just yes or no to this, and I mean just yes or no: Following the
14 recommendations of the fact-finding group, were you aware of the accused
15 laying blame for what was happening in Kosovo elsewhere? Just yes or no.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. From whom did you hear this account of blame, if not from the
18 accused himself? From whom did you hear it?
19 A. From the leadership of the State Security Service and from
20 political structures with whom we had a regular exchange of information,
21 both in parliament and in the government of Serbia.
22 Q. And in a sentence, what was now being said by the leadership as to
23 who bore responsibility for the problems in Kosovo?
24 A. Well, it turned out at the end that the responsibility for the
25 problems in Kosovo was to be borne by a group of unresponsible --
1 irresponsible policemen, and the Security Service and the army that were
2 covering up the facts and did not wish to act against the terrorists.
3 Those were the rumours and story bandied about within the circle, inner
4 circles of Yugoslav and Serbian parent authority.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 JUDGE KWON: Excuse me a minute. Mr. Tanic, you just mentioned
7 that the action against the KLA was not done in legal framework. Is it
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
10 JUDGE KWON: Could you clarify more about the legal framework?
11 Does it mean that the actions taken in the Kosovo area was kind of
12 unofficial one?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I can't say they were
14 unofficial. All I can say is that they were illegal with respect to our
15 constitution and legal frameworks, at least as far as I am aware of them,
16 and as I was able to check up in consultations. So an extraordinary state
17 of affairs or an emergency situation is proclaimed by the Assembly of
18 Yugoslavia. That is provided for by the constitution. It is the Assembly
19 that decides on war and peace. And to proclaim a group terrorist, you
20 have to follow a procedure that is much stricter than a political
21 qualification by saying that somebody is a terrorist or is not. So the
22 actions were official, but they weren't in conformity and dovetailed to
23 the constitution and the legal provisions of the country.
24 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
25 MR. NICE:
1 Q. There's one event that occurred rather later, on which you draw a
2 particular inference. It's paragraph 55. And I want you to deal with
3 this very shortly. Was there, on the 23rd of March of 1999, a session of
4 the Republic of the Serbian Assembly which was televised, in the course of
5 which Mr. Milutinovic made an observation? If yes, just tell us about the
6 observation and, in one sentence, its significance.
7 A. Yes. At the Serbian Assembly meeting held on the 23rd of March,
8 1999, first of all there was a completely illegal discussion as to whether
9 Yugoslavia would enter into a war with the NATO pact or not, and that does
10 not come under the competencies of the Assembly of Serbia but the Assembly
11 of Yugoslavia.
12 Q. Mr. Tanic, we're going to get on better if you remember what His
13 Honour Judge May said to you this morning and if you listen carefully to
14 my questions. We'll do this as an experiment to make sure that we get it
16 What I asked you is this: On that 23rd of March, did
17 Mr. Milutinovic make an observation? And, if yes, tell us about the
18 observation and, in one sentence, its significance. So all I want from
19 you is two things: what he said and what was important about it.
20 A. Mr. Milutinovic said that the political problem with the Kosovar
21 Albanians did not exist at all, neither did it exist in Rambouillet, the
22 problem of a political agreement, and that the Western powers and the
23 Contact Group was -- offered the Serbian delegation in Rambouillet a
24 political agreement of whatever kind it liked, as it saw fit and as it
25 understood the interests of Serbia and Belgrade and Yugoslavia, but that
1 the only problem in that was that the Contact Group and the international
2 community wished to ensure the implementation of that political agreement
3 with the ground troops who would be present in Kosovo.
4 Q. Thank you. And so the significance of that observation, in your
5 understanding, is what?
6 A. The significance of that observation, in my opinion, is that that
7 talk about the fact that the Western forces and the Contact Group wanted
8 to impose a bad political agreement for Serbia and Yugoslavia at the
9 detriment of Serbia was completely incorrect, not to say untruthful,
10 because Mr. Milutinovic did acknowledge that we could have had a
11 favourable agreement, favourable to Serbia and Yugoslavia.
12 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 57. In the course of that Serbian Assembly
13 session, did other SBS representatives make statements contrary to or in
14 support of war?
15 A. Well, they spoke in favour of a war conflict, but in complete
16 contrast to what Milutinovic had said. He said that we were being offered
17 a bad political agreement and that that is why we had to accept war, to go
18 to war with NATO.
19 Q. And finally, paragraph 58. Did Mr. Vuk Draskovic provide an
21 A. To the best of my knowledge, yes, he did, on behalf of a group of
22 people who compiled an alternative solution to the Serbian Assembly which
23 should have been sufficient to avoid this conflict with the NATO pact,
24 which would have been suicidal.
25 MR. NICE: Can we now, then, please, look at a document which
1 comes in three parts. It needs a little explanation. And can we have TX
2 8, please.
3 The original, Your Honours, is an old-style fax paper. The
4 significance will become obvious, but includes that, of course, old-style
5 fax paper used to degrade over time, so it was recopied when it came into
6 the possession of the OTP. But I think we can probably survive on this
7 version. Now, if we'd like to lay the original on the overhead projector
8 so that we can see it.
9 Q. Mr. Tanic, is this a document that you've seen before and indeed
10 that you received?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. What's on the overhead projector on the moment is, I think, an
13 original fax document. Is that correct?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Dated March 24th, 1999. How did you receive it, please?
16 A. The document is draft conclusions, as you can see, and it was sent
17 to the deputy group --
18 Q. Now let's put the -- we'll move --
19 A. -- for a meeting of the Assembly that we mentioned a moment ago.
20 Q. Can we now please lay the English translation on the overhead
21 projector. Then we'll come back to the original in a minute. And if we
22 look at the draft conclusions, running through them:
23 1. At its session on the 23rd of March, the National Assembly
24 accepted positions and work of the Republic of Serbia state delegation at
25 Rambouillet and Paris.
1 2. The National Assembly affirms that the state delegation made
2 every effort and did everything it could, in direct dialogue with the
3 delegation from the separatist movement of Albanians from Kosovo and
4 Metohija, both in Rambouillet and Paris, et cetera.
5 3. It is with regret that the National Assembly notes that the
6 international goodwill mediators and co-chairs of the talks in Rambouillet
7 and Paris did not find a way to persuade the delegation of the separatist
8 movement to sit at the same table.
9 4. And there's an illegible line ... be ascribed to the state
10 delegation of Serbia, which insisted the whole time on direct discussion.
11 Instead the blame lies exclusively with the delegation of the separatist
12 and terrorist movement.
13 5. And I'm summarising it to save time: The National Assembly
14 appeals to eminent representatives of the Contact Group to find a way to
15 get the delegation of the Albanian separatist movement to sit at the same
16 negotiating table.
17 6. If the delegation of the Albanian separatist movement does not
18 want to talk and reach such an agreement, then the state delegation is
19 prepared, at any time, and so on.
20 7. As soon as any political agreement is reached, the state
21 delegation of Serbia and the Federal Republic is prepared to conclude an
23 8. The National Assembly demands an end to all threats of
24 aggression by the NATO pact.
25 9. Expresses the determination of Serbia to reach a quick,
1 peaceful, and just agreement.
2 Now, if we go back to the -- well, let's just read 7 in detail.
3 Again, 7: "As soon as any political agreement is reached, the
4 state delegation of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is
5 prepared to conclude an agreement with the international community on the
6 application of the said political agreement, with a clearly specified and
7 strictly limited mandate from the UN Security Council."
8 Now, let's go to the original, please, the fax copy, on the second
9 sheet, where we can see that there is a handwritten addition there. Just
10 yes or no: Did somebody tell you whose hand that was in?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Who told you whose hand it was in?
13 A. I got that information from Vuk Draskovic and Dusan Mihajlovic.
14 Q. And whose handwriting did they say that was?
15 A. According to that information, it is the handwriting of
16 Mr. Slobodan Milosevic.
17 Q. Had you seen his handwriting yourself before? Yes or no.
18 A. Yes, on two or three occasions.
19 Q. Right. Let's now go back to the English version to see what the
20 amendment reads. And so at the end of paragraph 7, the amendment in hand
21 reads: "Respecting the sovereignty of Serbia and the Federal Republic of
23 MR. NICE: Very well. May that be given an exhibit number, then,
25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be marked Prosecution's
1 Exhibit 149.
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, did the witness answer to your question how
3 he got this document? He said it was sent to the deputies. Was it the
5 MR. NICE: That's the only answer he gave, and it wasn't
6 sufficient. I'll get a little bit more -- I'm sorry not to have dealt
7 with that properly earlier.
8 Q. You heard His Honour Judge Kwon's question. It was sent to the
9 deputies. How did you receive it yourself? How come you were talking to
10 Vuk Draskovic about it?
11 A. I got the document from my own personal archive and from my own
12 knowledge, from the president of our deputy group, and I noticed
13 differences between what had been agreed and what was actually discussed
14 at the meeting. So I wanted to have the paper, to have the document, to
15 see whether it had been circulated, and that's how had I came by that
16 paper, or rather, the draft conclusions.
17 Q. And how did you come to be talking to Mr. Draskovic about it?
18 A. Not only with him, but with a series of other individuals. Well,
19 for the simple reason that I was included in the group of people who
20 prepared a document which would have been sufficient to avoid this
21 unnecessary and suicidal war with the NATO pact, and I received
22 information that Mr. Milosevic, in principle, was in agreement but that
23 all that had to be done was to find a solution which would not be to the
24 detriment of the sovereignty of Serbia and Yugoslavia. And at the
25 Assembly meeting of Serbia, I saw a completely different discussion taking
1 place which was directly leading into an unnecessary war with NATO. And
2 this enormous difference cropped up over two days, and I think that that
3 caused --
4 JUDGE MAY: That again is the point that I had in mind. Just
5 stick, if you would, to the question.
6 MR. NICE:
7 Q. Just so that we understand the position, Mr. Tanic: The draft
8 conclusions, apart from the handwritten addition, are they conclusions
9 that you accept had been reached and were a plan that had been made?
10 A. According to my information, yes, between Mr. Draskovic and
11 Mr. Milosevic.
12 Q. And what you're saying, but correct me if I've got it wrong, but
13 what you're saying is that this plan, even with its handwritten amendment,
14 was inconsistent with the debate you heard in the Assembly where
15 Milutinovic and others were speaking; is that correct?
16 A. Yes, because capital differences rose to the surface.
17 Q. And I think there was -- I needn't trouble with that. We'll move
18 on to the next page, paragraph 65.
19 From your knowledge, Mr. Tanic, going back a couple of years,
20 1996, 1997, how large or small was the KLA?
21 A. According to professional intelligence on the security assessment,
22 about 2.000 people who were poorly armed and distributed in small groups,
23 generally young villagers, young male villagers.
24 Q. The KLA leadership was where, and how numerous was it?
25 A. Well, the true leadership was, for the most part, abroad, perhaps
1 not more than five or ten people: Switzerland, Germany, Croatia, from time
2 to time Albania.
3 Q. Now, you told us yesterday there were already indications from
4 other countries that they would give assistance to Serbia if it was
5 determined to control the KLA; is that correct?
6 A. The conditions for the political -- based on the conditions of the
7 political solution for Kosovo, yes.
8 Q. And what, if anything, had President Rugova said was his intention
9 so far as KLA or other radicals were concerned? What was he prepared to
10 do for them?
11 A. Generally speaking, they waged a policy of non-violent resistance
12 and they were ready to politically marginalise the KLA if a political
13 solution to Kosovo were to be found.
14 Q. Paragraph 67 to 72 I can deal with in, I think, one sentence. As
15 to the possibility of foreign troops functioning on the soil of Serbia,
16 was there any, to your knowledge, constitutional objection to that
18 A. No.
19 Q. Paragraph 74. In the late 1990s, but maybe earlier, but certainly
20 in the late 1990s, were there occasions of Kosovar Albanians being killed
21 in the course of this developing conflict?
22 A. Yes, already at the beginning of 1998.
23 Q. Were these deaths discussed in the political circles in which you
24 moved? Yes or no.
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Was this topic brought to the attention of the accused? Yes or
3 A. I'm sorry, but I'm getting the English interpretation on my
4 headsets -- the French, sorry. I'm getting the French.
5 Q. Was this topic brought to the attention of the accused? Yes or
6 no, please.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And again, do you know - yes or no - what his reaction was from
9 time to time to the problem of Kosovar Albanians being killed? Just yes
10 or no.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Now, did you learn of that from direct contact with the accused or
13 from other sources, or perhaps from both?
14 A. From both. First of all, from other sources.
15 Q. Then also from the accused himself?
16 A. Yes, on the occasion that I mentioned yesterday.
17 Q. When he said what about the deaths of Kosovar Albanians?
18 A. Well, that there was collective support of the Albanian people to
19 the Albanian terrorists, and so if there was collective support, then the
20 death of civilians is something that will come about in a war conflict as
21 an unfortunate consequence.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I appreciate your attempt to be
23 concise, but it's not clear to me how it is being alleged that these
24 Kosovar Albanians met their death.
25 MR. NICE:
1 Q. Can you please tell us, Mr. Tanic: The deaths of which we're
2 speaking, how did they come about, typically?
3 A. Well, they came about -- and I have to explain this at length. I
4 find it difficult to strike a balance between being precise and being
5 allowed to explain, so may I get instructions as to that?
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]... the reason
7 why I'm asking is that this is in the early stages of the conflict, the
8 developing conflict, and I consider it useful, in fact necessary, to find
9 out exactly how it is alleged that these Kosovar Albanians met their
10 death. And you can give the answer as concisely as possible.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Those deaths came about through the
12 regular activities of our police force against the Albanian terrorists.
13 However, bearing in mind the fact that this activity was conducted in the
14 manner that I described previously, according to the chain of
15 semi-personal command, without constitutional and legal frameworks,
16 without police logistics and security logistics, what happened was that,
17 together with the terrorists, civilians would be killed too, and a large
18 number of civilians at that, sometimes larger, sometimes smaller. The
19 classical example took place in the Donje Prekaze village in March 1998.
20 If you want me to, I can explain that case to you.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: This would be in 1997, or what year was this?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 1998, the beginning of 1998.
23 JUDGE KWON: And if you could give us some concrete conversation
24 between you and Milosevic at that time, in concrete terms, your comment
25 and Mr. Milosevic's answers.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said yesterday that it wasn't a
2 conversation in the classical sense, but a sort of short verbal
3 communication. When it was said by Mr. Milosevic that the Albanians had
4 the massive support of the people and that it was a case of mass terrorism
5 in fact. So this wasn't, in fact, a conversation, and I was quite
6 specific when I described it yesterday. Because you couldn't discuss
7 those matters with Mr. Milosevic, at least I couldn't, because I didn't
8 have that rank.
9 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
10 MR. NICE:
11 Q. So far as you were aware, were other senior -- were senior
12 officials at that time, including Perisic, Stanisic, Mihajlovic and
13 others, were they taking any line on the death of Kosovar Albanians,
14 either a line that was consistent with the attitude of the accused, as
15 you've described it, or different? What was the position?
16 A. Yes. I am aware of that much better, because I could discuss
17 these matters with these persons at much greater length at meetings.
18 Their positions were mostly to the contrary to the position held by the
19 accused. They were opposed to the unselective use of force.
20 Q. More recently, and I think probably in the course of the
21 preparation of the book you've told us about, you've had conversations
22 with various people, including with Perisic; correct?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. In the course of those conversations, were you shown a letter,
25 which we'll have a look at, dated the 23rd of July of 1998, from Perisic
1 to the accused? Is this the letter that you were shown by Mr. Perisic?
2 A. Yes.
3 MR. NICE: If the original can just be -- or not the original. If
4 the B/C/S version could be laid on the overhead projector, first of all as
5 to the first page, so the accused can see what it is. The next sheet,
6 please. The date, the 23rd of July of 1998, and we can see the address to
7 the president. And then if we just look on to the last page, we can see
8 the signature of Momcilo Perisic. So if we can now put the English
9 version on the overhead projector, please, starting at the first
10 substantive page.
11 JUDGE MAY: Before we do, we need to know where this comes from.
12 MR. NICE: Yes.
13 Q. Is this -- first of all, do you recognise this as the letter that
14 you were shown?
15 A. Yes. That is the letter of the Chief of General Staff, addressed
16 to Mr. Milosevic, as President of Yugoslavia.
17 Q. In fact, this version comes, I think, from a book, is that
18 correct, the letter having been published?
19 A. Yes. Yes. That's quite clear to me. But it is quite identical
20 to the original of the letter that I saw, read, studied, and discussed
21 with several people.
22 JUDGE MAY: Yes. It comes from a book, the witness's book, is
24 MR. NICE: No. It's another book, and I think it's -- the front
25 cover of it, I think, gives you -- in the original. And it's got the
1 authors at the top and the date of publication at the bottom.
2 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
3 MR. NICE: I'm not sure that I have the whole book here. If the
4 Court wants it --
5 JUDGE MAY: No. I just want to know how it comes to be in
7 MR. NICE: Yes. I hope the method of summarising these texts for
8 people who can probably read faster than I can read out loud is
9 satisfactory, to save time. The English translation, by the way, of the
10 book title is "Fire and Flood." I'm grateful to Ms. Graham. She had
11 already told me that, and I should have told you that.
12 Q. "Dear Mr. President: Having analysed your attitude towards the
13 Yugoslav army, I need to urgently convey to you certain facts ..."
14 Paragraph 2: "I hope you've had an opportunity to assure yourself
15 of the high military patriotic consciousness..." and et cetera.
16 Paragraph 3: "We would not be correct and sincere under these
17 fateful circumstances if, as professionals who safeguarded the VJ and the
18 SRJ in conditions known to you, we did not point out the following
19 negative facts:
20 The constant tendency to use the VJ outside the system's
21 institutions; the separation of VJ units from the Yugoslav army; the
22 attempt by unauthorised persons to command VJ units, passing over command
23 levels in official conversations with VJ members; conducting personnel
24 policy on an unlawful basis and without criteria; financial expenditures
25 outside the law" and so on.
1 Then it gives some typical examples: "The tendency to use the
2 army outside the system's institutions." It says that the state -- The
3 situation in Kosovo and Metohija could have been overcome if a state of
4 emergency had been declared when written proposals had been sent, which
5 had not been accepted.
6 And over the page to B, setting out a request to the government to
7 ensure legal definitions, the proclamation of one of the following: A
8 state of emergency and material and financial conditions.
9 Then it goes on to say: Using the VJ in this manner is untenable
10 for three reasons: The army is not being used adequately and the effects
11 are minor; true goals not being achieved; and we are being accused of
12 behaving as traitors. The use of the army in this manner has been noticed
13 by observers which may provoke reprisals from the international community
14 and NATO.
15 The proposed solution was to use the VJ lawfully and, "The
16 position is clear to us," this part concludes, "but we must have a legal
17 political decision."
18 And 2: "Separation of units from the VJ. You have decided to
19 separate the Guards Brigade from the VJ," and the suggestion in the letter
20 is that that's not lawful and that the decision should be annulled.
21 Attempts by -- 3, attempts by unauthorised persons to command VJ
22 units. Then this: "Constant aspirations by members of the MUP to have
23 some VJ units subordinated to them leads to misunderstandings if the units
24 are not given, and if they are given, this represents unauthorised and
25 unprofessional use which has counter-effects, the best examples being
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Decani and Orahovac."
2 "B, attempt by civilian members of the staff to command the corps.
3 The responsibility of the Corps Commander is to evaluate the situation,
4 plan operations for the VJ and the MUP in cooperation with civilian
5 members of the staff and the MUP, and report to Sainovic and Minic."
6 And then it goes on to say: "In practice, the commander of the
7 Pristina Corps plans what he is ordered to do, which is at the request of
8 Sainovic, Minic and the MUP, and is then turned in to their service for
9 planning and realisation. Since it is his wish, like the wish of us all,
10 to realise the plan if others cannot or will not do it, he does it with
11 the Pristina Corps units, which leads to illegal, unsystematic and
12 inadequate use of VJ units, thus violating the system..." and so on.
13 And the proposal for this part of the letter is to disallow
14 command of the VJ outside the system of military subordination and unity
15 of command and that the third army should set up a forward command post in
17 4: Passing over command levels and official conversations with VJ
18 members, the letter says: "According to VJ service regulations, you have
19 the right to conduct official conversations with all members of the VJ,
20 however you sometimes do this without the knowledge of the Chief of the
21 General Staff, contrary to military subordination and unity of command.
22 Violation of these principles leads to the break-up of the unity of the
23 VJ. Proposal: Respect the principles of military subordination."
24 5: Conducting personnel policy on an unlawful basis and without
25 criteria. Sets out: "Generals and colonels are often promoted at the VSO
1 and outside VSO on an unlawful basis, without decrees or criteria, which
2 has far-reaching negative effects in the VJ."
3 VSO, please, Mr. Tanic? What does VSO stand for?
4 A. The Supreme Defence Council.
5 Q. Thank you. It's not on our list of acronyms, I don't think. It
6 goes on to say: "Necessary to respect the laws, decrees, and criteria for
7 promotion." Over the page in the English: "Each institution depends on
8 the main elements of the system," and sets out what a general should be
9 and proposes refraining promotion of colonels and generals to higher ranks
10 if this is not in agreement with the law.
11 And 6, financial expenditure outside the law. "You often order me
12 to give up movable and immovable property for the needs of the MUP on the
13 basis of the SRJ law on property. Neither do you have the right to order
14 me nor do I have the right to carry out orders regarding material
15 payments." The solution proposed: "Direct such requests to the legal
16 owner of the property, namely, the government."
17 Then various concluding paragraphs which we can read rapidly to
18 ourselves, with the concern that if the proposals made aren't met, second
19 to the last paragraph on the English version of that page,: "Otherwise,
20 this sole highly functional Yugoslav institution will turn into a
21 non-functional and disunited amorphous mass."
22 The rest of it we can read. Just a couple of comments from you on
23 what we've been looking at. Can you help us? We saw reference to the
24 Guards Brigade. Can you help us with the significance of that, please, if
1 A. The Guards Brigade was singled out to be under Mr. Slobodan
2 Milosevic's personal command in order for them to carry out orders that
3 the army would not have carried out because it would have implied illegal
4 use of force.
5 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness please
6 speak slower.
7 MR. NICE:
8 Q. If you could speak a little more slowly, Mr. Tanic. I know you're
9 getting a bombardment of instructions as to how you should give your
10 evidence. A little more slowly, please. Bombardment from me. I'm not
11 describing anybody else's addresses in those terms.
12 Similarly, any significance in the reference to civilians giving
13 instructions? Can you deal with that, the civilian staff?
14 A. Well, that pertains to this private chain of command that went
15 through the personal representatives and envoys of Mr. Slobodan Milosevic.
16 These were civilians who were engaged in the staff for Kosovo, or rather,
17 in the commission for Kosovo. The army cannot receive orders from
18 civilian persons.
19 JUDGE KWON: The exhibit in Serb, you said it's the original one.
20 So is this the copy -- photocopy of the original letter or is it printed
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. This is a photocopy of the
23 original letter, but probably adjusted for printing purposes, because it
24 was written on A4 because that is the official format for official
25 communications, A4.
1 JUDGE KWON: So is it that Mr. Perisic kept this letter after he
2 had sent this letter to Milosevic?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course he kept a copy. That is
4 official documentation. It can be seen from the letterhead and the number
5 and also it says "confidential," and also the official channels through
6 which it was sent. The Chief of General Staff has the right to retain a
7 copy of such official documents.
8 JUDGE KWON: Did he serve as chief of the staff of the army later
9 on, after he sent this letter to the accused?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, for another three and a half to
11 four months, I think.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
13 MR. NICE: We'll be coming to the end of Perisic's engagement in
14 due course. But I think it may be that what His Honour would like to know
15 just a little more in detail is this:
16 Q. When Perisic showed you a document, did he show you his own copy
17 that he had retained or did he show you a copy that had already been
18 published in somebody else's book?
19 A. No, not then. This copy was not printed in any book. He showed
20 me his very own copy, two or three years before it had been published in
21 any book.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, just to go back to the first typical
23 example given, the chief of staff says that the situation in Kosovo and
24 Metohija could have been overcome if a state of emergency had been
25 declared, as indeed he had recommended. The witness is not a lawyer, but
1 would he be able to say, briefly, how the declaration of a state of
2 emergency would have made the difference? Does he have any knowledge of
3 the powers that would be available to Mr. Milosevic in a state of
4 emergency that would have been critical in that situation?
5 MR. NICE:
6 Q. Mr. Tanic, you've heard --
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: If he doesn't have that knowledge, then he need
8 not answer.
9 MR. NICE:
10 Q. You've heard the question and its limitations. Can you help His
11 Honour? You've touched on it to some degree, but can you help a little
13 A. I assume that I can be of assistance, but it is up to the Trial
14 Chamber to decide whether I'm capable of doing it or not. According to
15 our constitution, Mr. Milosevic would not have any greater or lesser
16 powers if a state of emergency had been declared in a regular way through
17 the Assembly of Yugoslavia. The problem lies elsewhere. If a state of
18 emergency had been declared by the Assembly of Yugoslavia, it would have
19 had to be preceded by a serious national debate as to whether there was
20 really terrorism in a part of the country to such an extent that it did
21 necessitate the use of the army and the police, or was this not the case.
22 So then we would have had an in-depth discussion as to whether the problem
23 of terrorism in Kosovo was really so great or whether it was just blown
24 out of all proportion, fabricated, whatever.
25 On the other hand, the declaration of a state of emergency also
1 makes it incumbent upon the president of the republic, in this case Mr.
2 Milosevic, to take other political action, and this would have prevented
3 the voluntaristic and non-selective use of force. This is the way I see
4 it and this is the best I can do in terms of assistance.
5 Q. Just a couple more questions arising from the document we've been
6 looking at. VJ equipment going to the MUP - just, again, yes or no to
7 this question - do you know the involvement, if any, of the accused in the
8 decision that VJ equipment should go to the MUP? Just yes or no.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Did you learn that from the accused himself, from documents, or
11 from being told about it by an individual?
12 A. Not from the accused personally. I didn't find out from him
13 directly. I found out from talking to the leaders of the SDB,
14 politicians, and through my insight into certain documents.
15 Q. Well, then, in those circumstances, can you tell us, please, what
16 from those sources you understood to be the involvement, if any, of the
17 accused in the movement of VJ equipment to the MUP.
18 A. To the best of my understanding, the participation of the accused,
19 Mr. Milosevic, was crucial.
20 Q. All right. Let's move on, but we may return to some of those
21 topics when they become relevant in later passages.
22 JUDGE MAY: Exhibit number.
23 MR. NICE: I'm so sorry, yes.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this will be Exhibit 150.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this this book?
1 JUDGE MAY: I'm sorry?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is this book becoming an exhibit?
3 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
4 JUDGE MAY: The letter, for the moment, is an exhibit. If you
5 want the book -- just a moment. Let the accused see the book if he wants
6 to see it.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am asking whether the book is an
8 exhibit, because I see that this is a book that is called "Fire and
9 Flood," published in Belgrade.
10 JUDGE MAY: I'm going to have the book passed over to you. You
11 can have a look at it and you can address us on it in due course if you
13 MR. NICE: I'm checking whether I have it available in the
14 building. If I do, I'll make it available, I hope, by the break. If not,
15 we'll try and get the book -- we'll find a source for the book and try and
16 get a copy as soon as we can.
17 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Very well. Yes.
18 MR. NICE:
19 Q. Paragraph 77, and it's just the middle -- sorry, 78, and let's
20 take the Court to the source of the evidence that is to be given. Just
21 yes or no to this: Did you have a conversation with somebody which
22 touched on the business of orders being given in 1998 to local commanders
23 in Kosovo? Did you have a conversation with somebody about that topic?
24 Just yes or no.
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. With whom did you have that conversation, and when?
2 A. The leadership of the state security and my political colleagues,
3 the president of my party. This was an entire series of talks with regard
4 to that.
5 Q. And were these conversations you had contemporaneous with events
6 or were they after the event, when you were preparing your book?
7 A. At the same time, contemporaneous. And later on I could only
8 compare certain things.
9 Q. What was said to you about the giving of orders to local
11 A. I received information from several sources, completely identical,
12 that practically the so-called State Commission for Kosovo, consisting of
13 seven or eight persons, commands over the situation in Kosovo. This is a
14 parapolitical body which practically goes beyond the legal authorities of
15 Yugoslavia and this meant carrying out Mr. Milosevic's personal will
16 regarding the non-selective use of force, for unpurposeful means in terms
17 of using force.
18 Q. We'll come, then, directly, I think, to the body you've described
19 as the State Commission, paragraph 83, over the page in the summary. When
20 was this body formed; who, in your understanding, were its members?
21 A. In my opinion, it was formed at a very early stage, during the
22 first third of 1998. And the members of this commission, that has nothing
23 to do with my opinion really, it's a question of knowledge.
24 Q. I was going to interrupt you to invite you not to give us your
25 opinion, which is exclusively the province of the Judges; just to tell us
1 what you learnt at the time, as a matter of fact. But I interrupted you.
2 The commission was formed early, and it comprised whom?
3 A. Sainovic, Minic, Andjelkovic, Matkovic, the civilian part. And
4 then the military part, Generals Pavkovic and Velickovic. Probably there
5 were some other members, but these are the members that I know for sure,
6 persons who I know for sure were members of the commission for Kosovo.
7 Q. When you speak of Markovic, which Markovic are you speaking of?
8 What's his first name?
9 A. Matkovic. Matkovic.
10 Q. And his first name?
11 A. Dusan, I think.
12 Q. Very well, I misheard. Can you tell us now a little bit about
13 something that's been referred to but occasional, something called
14 Horseshoe. Again, not opinion; just facts, please. Was there a plan that
15 went by the name of Horseshoe?
16 A. Not in that sense. This was a colloquial nickname for a
17 completely different plan.
18 Q. Just so that we can understand the colloquial nickname, can you
19 help us at all with when the name was first used and applied -- when it
20 was first used?
21 A. I know what the plan meant. Now, when the term was used first, I
22 really can't say, especially as it was the colloquial term applied and not
23 an official one.
24 Q. What did it mean?
25 A. It was an exercise plan of the Yugoslav army while it was the JNA,
1 the Yugoslav People's Army, and the plan provided for training and
2 exercise in case of an aggression on Yugoslavia from south-east Europe,
3 and if the Albanian population should take the side of the foreign
4 aggressor, then it would come into force. The army of Yugoslavia would
5 come into force if these two conditions were met. They would take seven
6 defensive positions and they would be geared towards neutralising the
7 Albanian strongholds, and this exercise -- this plan was actually stored
8 in an archive and then it was reactivated and would be reactivated with
9 all the rest for taking action in Kosovo.
10 Q. The seven defensive positions, can you -- are you in a position to
11 list them, and if so, would you rather have a map to point them out for
13 A. When we discussed this, I had this jotted down in writing, but as
14 I haven't got the right to have my notes with me, I'm afraid that if I
15 speak off the bat, I might make some mistakes. But they were seven
16 directions making this semi-circle, and I think that those exact
17 directions, the seven of them, are contained in my statement.
18 MR. NICE: Your Honour, we can see the ones that have been set out
19 in paragraph 85, at the top of page 15. I don't know if the Chamber would
20 want to see those places, if I'm allowed to refer to them, on a map. We
21 can either use the map that's at the front of the atlas --
22 JUDGE MAY: Yes. I find it useful.
23 MR. NICE: If I can just make mine, I think, available. This may
24 do. It may be too big for the overhead. But if you can just look at
25 this. I'm just going to read you some --
1 Q. Would you point them out with the pointer, please, Mr. Tanic.
2 First of all, there's the -- something called -- well, that's Mount
3 Deravica. Can you just point that out for us?
4 A. I do apologise, but if the Court agrees, I'm not a military expert
5 and I'd prefer not to indicate something on the map that I haven't already
7 Q. Very well. I'll abandon that exercise.
8 MR. NICE: We can see how he lists it and we can get somebody else
9 to do it maybe later. Thank you very much, I'll take the map back.
10 Q. Now, do you know, one way or another, whether there was any
11 intention or expression of intention at the time, the time of this
12 conflict, to have anything to do with the Horseshoe plan?
13 A. Well, quite simply, the basic purpose and intention of that plan
14 was altered. There was no foreign aggression, and the Albanian population
15 did not take the side of a foreign aggressor.
16 Q. Mr. Tanic, back to where we were. Just yes or no: Was there any
17 intention or expression at the time to have anything to do with this plan?
18 Yes or no.
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Was there general acceptance of its appropriate -- of its being an
21 appropriate plan or not? Did anybody resist its use? Paragraph 87.
22 A. As far as I know, the peaks of power in the army and the security
24 Q. Did they accept it or did they reject it?
25 A. No. They didn't want to use the plan at all, because there was no
1 external aggression or Albanian rebellion, or rather, that they should
2 take the part and go to the side of the foreign aggressor, because it
3 didn't exist.
4 Q. And from where did you learn that they were rejecting the use of
5 such a plan, or from whom did you learn that they were rejecting the use
6 of such a plan?
7 A. From the army leadership. I would prefer not to mention any
8 names. I don't want to harm those people, because many of them are under
9 pressure anyway. So could we deal with it in a different way?
10 Q. Very well. Let's move to paragraph 88.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Objection.
12 JUDGE MAY: Yes. What's the objection?
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] My objection is that the witness
14 must answer the questions asked. What does it mean if he can say some
15 nonsense like this and then he says that he can't tell you who he heard it
17 JUDGE MAY: That's a point you can make in due course. You can
18 ask him again in cross-examination and we'll decide what to do about it.
19 Meanwhile, the witness can go on in the same way.
20 MR. NICE:
21 Q. Paragraph 88, and this turns to the topic His Honour Judge Kwon
22 was asking you about a little earlier. Were there some personnel changes
23 at a very high level in the autumn of 1998? And just list them, please,
24 for us.
25 A. Yes, there was. After the signing of the agreement between Mr.
1 Milosevic and Mr. Holbrooke on a peaceful settlement of the crisis in
2 Kosovo, the military-political agreement, and the chiefs of the Security
3 Services of Serbia and the Chief of the General Staff were replaced later
4 on, Mr. Stanisic and the whole group of the leadership cadre. And Mr.
5 Perisic as the head of the General Staff.
6 Q. They were replaced by, and just give us the names of those who
7 replaced them. Perisic was replaced by --? Paragraph 90.
8 A. General Ojdanic.
9 Q. And before we move from him, how had he ranked before this
10 appointment? What were his political associations, if any?
11 A. I apologise. As to rank, I don't answer the question -- I don't
12 understand the question. And as to his political connections, as far as I
13 know, he was strongly connected to the JUL party. I can't tell you about
15 Q. Very well. Stanisic's replacement was whom?
16 A. Mr. Radomir Markovic. We referred to him as Rade Markovic but his
17 full name is Radomir Markovic.
18 Q. What had been Radomir Markovic's previous political associations,
19 if any?
20 A. Very close personal ties with Mr. Milosevic and his family.
21 Otherwise, before that, he didn't deal in any intelligence work but in the
22 classical police force, or rather, the public Security Service, the public
23 police force.
24 Q. Thank you very much.
25 A. SJB, as we call it.
1 Q. Yes. And then Dimitrijevic's replacement, can you help us with
3 A. I'm not quite sure.
4 Q. Very well.
5 A. And I don't want to give you an incorrect answer.
6 Q. Paragraph 91. In 1998, did something happen in relation to what I
7 think you described as economic materials in Kosovo? Just tell us about
9 A. Well, economic materials was the term I used, and it relates to
10 movable and immovable property, if I understood you correctly. Is that
11 what you were referring to?
12 Q. Yes.
13 A. If they were material -- economic materials, yes, then that did
14 take place.
15 Q. And what sort of materials are you talking of and what time are
16 you talking of, so that we can see how far it was before NATO's
18 A. Well, there might be a misunderstanding, but we'll be able to
19 ascertain. If we're talking about allocations for Kosovo, then immovables
20 are combat vehicles belonging to the artillery, light artillery, tanks,
21 and that is the materiel, in fact, of the army that must not be used
22 against civilians because in this case the Albanians were citizens of
23 Yugoslavia. If that's what you mean, combat resources. Now, if you're
24 referring to economic material of a different nature, we could perhaps
25 clarify that too.
1 Q. Gasoline reserves?
2 A. Yes. I assumed that there was a misunderstanding. That's right.
3 For several months before the conflict with the NATO pact, fuel, strategic
4 fuel reserves, they were transported to lesser reservoirs all over Serbia,
5 both belonging to military and economic organisations. So the strategic
6 fuel reserves were transferred to other places several months before,
7 between the conference in Rambouillet, or rather, the Milosevic/Holbrooke
8 agreement and the conference in Rambouillet.
9 Q. Thank you. Yes. Paragraph 94, conversations you've had, but I
10 want you to move carefully and listen to the questions carefully, please.
11 Vladimir Stambuk, remind us of his position at the time.
12 A. Vice-president of the government of Serbia, one of the
13 vice-presidents, actually.
14 Q. Now, did you - just yes or no - did you have a conversation with
15 him in I think 1998 about the problems with Kosovar Albanians? Just yes
16 or no.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Where and, so far as you can be precise, when?
19 A. The conversation was between the British ambassador, Mr. Donnelly,
20 the German ambassador, Mr. Gruber, Mr. Stambuk and myself, and this took
21 place on the premises of the German embassy, and I think that that was two
22 weeks before the Milosevic/Holbrooke agreement, perhaps ten days prior to
23 that, a brief time before the Holbrooke/Milosevic agreement.
24 Q. Very well. The topic of the conversation, in the most general
25 terms first?
1 A. The topic of conversation was how to avoid NATO intervention
2 against Yugoslavia, because at that time the danger already loomed over
3 the country that the intervention might take place, and could Holbrooke
4 prevent this intervention? Those were the general lines discussed. Or
5 rather, whether a Milosevic/Holbrooke agreement would come into being at
6 all to prevent the intervention, to be more precise.
7 Q. In other words, I think a particular observation made by Stambuk
8 that you can tell us about in the course of that conversation?
9 A. Yes. Mr. Stambuk did make an observation which I heard from
10 others as well. I quoted Mr. Stambuk by way of one example. He made the
11 observation to the two foreign ambassadors, ambassadors of NATO-pact
12 countries, that official Belgrade had nothing against a small-scale
13 bombing operation by NATO, and of course I reacted to that.
14 Q. Did he go on to qualify and explain what would happen at all, if
15 there was a small bombing operation?
16 A. Well, he didn't carry on his explanations in the face of these two
17 ambassadors, the ambassadors of Great Britain and Germany, because I asked
18 him to go to one side and to stop that kind of conversation, and then he
19 explained it to me. The explanation he gave was -- actually, I asked him
20 how was it possible for any official - and as we knew each other, I was
21 free to ask him that - any official to say that official Belgrade had
22 nothing against a limited bombing? That kind of observation was
23 completely taboo because that means an invitation to them to bomb.
24 Q. I'm going to expand on the answers, because we just want an
25 account of what was said. So you made those observations to him, and
1 what, if any, further explanation did he give to you?
2 A. Well, he answered me by saying that I didn't understand certain
3 things, but the president of my party, Mr. Mihajlovic -- that is, he said
4 that a small-scale bombing would be a great pretext and alibi for us to
5 continue with the persecution of Albanians and the Serb opposition as
6 well, because in times of war, nobody can ask anything. So he advised me
7 to convey to the president of my party that we go back to the ruling
8 coalition and to stop resisting attempts of this artificial construction
9 of a war conflict.
10 Q. You've used in your evidence the phrase "continue with the
11 persecution of Albanians." Obviously it's a long time ago, and don't
12 guess if you can't, but can you help at all with exactly what he said
13 about the Albanians and/or persecution of them?
14 A. Well, he said to finish ethnic cleansing, to have a pretext for
15 completing the ethnic cleansing of the Albanians or to throw them out of
16 the territory of Yugoslavia, and I heard words to that effect from others
17 as well, mentioned in other documents, irrespective of my views and
19 Q. You say in relation to that last topic but also the earlier topic
20 about the acceptability of --
21 A. To that effect about other nations as well.
22 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter corrects herself in the previous
24 MR. NICE: Thank you.
25 Q. I'll repeat my question, then. You say in relation to the last
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 topic but also in relation to the earlier topic of the acceptability of
2 small-scale bombing, that others said similar things to what Mr. Stambuk
3 had said. Can you give us the names of any of the others who said such
4 things, either at this meeting in the embassy or elsewhere?
5 A. Well, this is a very large group of people, from Mr. Milovan Bojic
6 to Mr. -- that is to say, various people from the SPS, leaders, Mr.
7 Milutinovic himself. I just can't enumerate all these people, there were
8 a lot of them. And they were all closed talks. They all spoke about this
9 little bit of bombing as if this wouldn't make a problem. Of course, not
10 in their public statements, but in their private conversations. Not only
11 then but on many other occasions as well.
12 Q. Paragraph 96. There's a man called Bogdan Tomas. Who was he in
13 1998? What was his job?
14 A. Could I ask us to leave this question for a private session, to
15 protect these people? Not because I don't wish to answer, but I don't
16 wish to place anybody in a precarious position. These people are in a
17 sufficiently precarious position already when they want to say what
19 MR. NICE: Your Honour, can I put that on one side, then, and come
20 back at the end to a collective, if there is to be any private session, a
21 collective private session? And that, I think, will take care of 97 as
23 Q. You may have touched on this yesterday, but just tidy it up, if
24 you wouldn't mind, today: Did you get to learn of the accused's attitude
25 towards information gathering on the KLA generally and about his attitude
1 towards the surrender to this institution of any who had committed crimes
2 against the Serbs? Just yes or no to that. Did you get to learn of his
4 A. Yes. Yes.
5 Q. From where did you learn of his attitude? From him himself or
6 from others?
7 A. From others.
8 Q. Give us the range of people and their jobs, if you can, from whom
9 you learned of his attitude.
10 A. The leadership of the security structures, the military
11 leadership, the socio-political structures, and I can name them at a
12 private session. That will be no problem.
13 Q. What was the accused's attitude towards learning about the KLA and
14 handing them over to this institution?
15 JUDGE MAY: Just one moment.
16 [Trial Chamber confers]
17 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, this is important evidence. I think better
18 that you come back to it.
19 MR. NICE: Certainly.
20 JUDGE MAY: We'll consider the whole question of a closed session
21 in due course.
22 MR. NICE: In that case, I think, although part of 1998 may be
23 separable, if I just come back to that generally. We can then go over to
24 page 18, and I think probably it will be better if I deal with this major
25 element on page 18 later. I'll come back to that, but not in closed
1 session, Your Honour, but I think in open session, but I'll come back to
3 Paragraph 101.
4 Q. Now, did you learn of the conduct of certain operations against
5 the KLA in 1998, and in particular, of one involving the Jashari family?
6 Just yes or no.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Was there any pattern -- according to your information, was there
9 any pattern in the way some of these operations were mounted, in
10 particular, in terms of the size of the initial action taken against the
12 A. Yes. There was a terrible pattern in opposition to everybody --
13 anything that could be read in the leadership of the army, et cetera.
14 Q. The pattern that you identified or that's been identified was
16 A. This pattern consisted of the fact that they should allow a
17 smaller number of Serb victims first in order to raise tensions, and then
18 to launch a massive non-selective use of force against the Albanian
19 population much greater than would be necessary for eliminating the rebels
20 and to destroy civilian lives and civilian buildings. This pattern, not
21 only with the Jashari family was used, but in Decani as well, with certain
22 variations. But usually it was the overly great use of force and
23 unselective use of force, which was contrary to the rules and regulations
24 of the police force as well, the rules of service of the police force and
25 the laws generally.
1 Q. Now, you've given the pattern. We'll come back to the two
2 particular locations you've identified briefly in a few minutes. But as
3 against this, and from your understanding of the Security Service with
4 which you had contact, what was the appropriate way to deal with
5 terrorists who would be in a civilian community? Paragraph 105.
6 A. Well, it's not my understanding. There is procedure that is
7 prescribed, and that procedure, combat procedure, that's what I'm talking
8 about, not legal procedure. Combat procedure was dovetailed with the law
9 and ascribed in the rules of services with respect to the deployment of
10 the services, at all attempts to divide civilians from terrorists,
11 particularly under circumstances where we know that many terrorists do
12 have, as a rule, resort to using civilians as a human shield or things of
13 that kind. There are technical means and logistics to combat that and the
14 equipment of our units. After that, what is done is to arrest them at all
15 costs rather than killing them, and you can carry out arrests in various
16 ways. You have combat means for effecting an arrest and taking people
17 into custody, but at any right, the mass use of force against civilians
18 would be --
19 Q. I think that's enough. And just this last question from paragraph
20 106. Were units at that time available equipped with the necessary
21 materials and equipment to deal with terrorists in this proper and formal
23 A. Nor were they equipped with the materiel, nor did they have the
24 necessary cadres, and so those were one of the criticisms that Stanisic
25 and Perisic made.
1 Q. It may be my misunderstanding.
2 A. They were criticised for.
3 Q. Did the units at that time have, for example, tear gas or material
4 like that that might have been usable against terrorists in a controlled
5 way, of the way you've explained a few paragraphs before?
6 A. Yes, they did, in their warehouses, but they didn't use them, and
7 that's why the misunderstanding came about. They didn't use them on the
8 terrain, in the field. They did have all the equipment necessary and
9 logistics, theoretically speaking.
10 Q. Thank you. Now, you've given two examples, Jashari family and
11 Decani. As to any detail of what happened at either of those events or
12 incidents, what was your source of information, in general?
13 A. Well, once again, the leadership of the State Security Service and
14 the army, and this can be brought up at a private session. And some
15 people who were there on the spot as well.
16 Q. But passing beyond your sources, then, to what they told you, who
17 did you understand to be in charge of these missions at those times?
18 A. Well, we first discussed the problems at length. They didn't tell
19 me that once, we had an ongoing discussion about that kind of problem.
20 Q. You're not listening -- you are listening. It's my mistake for
21 not getting the question properly. Who in the leadership was in charge of
22 these missions that bore this characteristic you've described? Paragraph
24 A. Well, to all practical terms, it was the civilian part of the
25 staff, and this is mentioned in General Perisic's letter as well. To all
1 practical purposes, it was that part that conveyed orders from Mr.
2 Milosevic and his closest associates, not from institutions, but from them
3 as local commanders, according to my information.
4 Q. And can you give us the names of the civilian individuals who were
5 responsible for these particular missions?
6 A. Well, mostly it was Mr. Nikola Sainovic's name that was mentioned.
7 Q. Anybody else?
8 A. And Mr. Vlajko Stojilkovic as well, but the gentleman has died
9 since, so I don't like to ...
10 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I don't know if that would prove to be a
11 convenient moment.
12 JUDGE MAY: Yes. I'd be grateful for your assistance. Perhaps
13 you can reflect on it during the adjournment, and also the amicus, is the
14 course which we should follow with this evidence. Some of it's important
15 but based on sources which either are not given or are said to be given in
16 private session. The question is the value of that evidence and whether
17 it should be admitted at all. But perhaps you would reflect on it.
18 We'll adjourn now. We're going to adjourn, Mr. Milosevic. We'll
19 hear you afterwards.
20 We'll adjourn now for 20 minutes.
21 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.
22 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.
23 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tanic, I should have explained this to you, since
24 you may not have followed the procedural argument, that the question of
25 naming any names is a matter on which you will be guided by counsel, and
1 in due course it may be the Trial Chamber will have to make a ruling on
2 the subject, but you'll be told what to do and what your position is.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I simply did not understand that,
4 and that is why I asked for instructions.
5 MR. NICE: I don't know if the Court wants to discuss the utility
6 of a private session now or whether we should get through the rest of the
7 evidence and deal with it all at the end.
8 JUDGE MAY: Let's get on with the evidence.
9 MR. NICE: I have a copy of the book. It's actually a private
10 copy of Mr. Shin, but he's prepared to make it available if not to donate
11 it to the greater good. It's the only copy we have got at the moment, so
12 can I make it available so the accused can look at it?
13 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
14 MR. NICE: I've flagged it, or rather, Ms. Graham has flagged it
15 at the two letters that are going to be produced. We can consider its
16 status as an exhibit or whatever later.
17 Q. Paragraph 107. No. That falls for the same consideration later,
18 I'm afraid.
19 Let's move on to paragraph 108, to events during the NATO bombing.
20 Did you, in the course of the NATO bombing, have any face-to-face meetings
21 with the accused?
22 A. There was communication with the accused, through official
24 Q. But did you have any face-to-face meeting with him, at receptions
25 and things of that sort, in April of 1999?
1 A. Not a meeting that could prove anything. The accused is denying
2 everything. I cannot prove this. I can prove all the rest. So let that
3 be my answer to this question. Indirect communication through official
4 channels, communications between the governments of Serbia and Yugoslavia
6 Q. Mr. Tanic, I'm just going to press you. The question of how
7 things are proved is a matter for the Court really. Just yes or no: Did
8 you have conversations with the accused in April 1999?
9 A. During the spring of 1999, yes, on a very brief occasion.
10 Q. Whereabouts?
11 A. I repeat: It is quite hard to prove that now, and I would kindly
12 ask that, if possible, this also remains for this other part, when these
13 specific matters will be dealt with, names and things like that.
14 Q. Very well. Paragraph 110. In the course of the NATO bombing, the
15 -- did you learn - just yes or no - about some of the things that were
16 happening in the course of the bombing; for example, deployments of the
17 armed forces, aircraft -- anti-aircraft positions, that sort of thing?
18 Did you learn about any of those sorts of things?
19 A. Yes. Yes, absolutely. Personal insight.
20 Q. What appeared to be the main strategy about, so far as an approach
21 to NATO was concerned, from what you understood?
22 A. On the basis of what I understood and found out, the main strategy
23 was to procrastinate as much as possible and to extend the war with NATO
24 for as long as possible, to the detriment of own country, and then the
25 civilian loss of lives and the civilian destruction would constitute a
1 kind of moral victory over NATO, and that strategy was clearly enunciated.
2 That can be proven as well.
3 Q. Very well. I think 113 will fall in the same category probably as
4 some of the earlier passages. But over the page: Did you have contact
5 with the Russian foreign minister at the time?
6 A. No. I beg your pardon. This must be a mistake. In everything I
7 said, there was not a single indication that I could have had that kind of
9 Q. Very well. My mistake. Yes. We'll have to move on from that, I
11 As to civilian buildings, what happened to civilian buildings -
12 paragraph 115 - in the course of the conflict?
13 A. Well, they were used for military purposes, and this was
14 unauthorised. I'll give an example. I'm talking about the command of the
15 town of Belgrade, the city of Belgrade, which was at two different
16 locations. I personally saw this. I can mention both locations. There
17 is no problem with that. The elementary school of Sveti Sava in the
18 street of Marsala Tulbuhina and also the department store company in
19 Marsala Tulbuhina Street as well. They are very close to one another.
20 The one is a civilian company, the other an elementary school. And the
21 command of the city of Belgrade was relocated to these locations and the
22 officers who were in command of the city of Belgrade for long periods,
23 during the day wore civilian clothes. And then tanks for a while, they
24 were deployment around the church of Sveti Sava, Saint Sava, and then when
25 people started complaining about this, then they were moved from there.
1 But as for the command, the headquarters of the defence of the city of
2 Belgrade, I personally saw where they were relocated.
3 Q. Paragraph 117. RTS, Radio Television Serbia, did you get some
4 information about that?
5 A. Yes, I did have information about the bombing of the RTS building
6 with two days before and two days later, and I communicated this through
7 official channels to the command or defence, or rather, to Mr. Milosevic,
8 who at that time was the supreme commander of the defence, so he had to be
9 informed, and I have doubt that he must have been informed. The building
10 was not evacuated and civilians were left there on purpose so that they
11 would lose their lives, and I know that there were several sources of
12 information with regard to this RTS building bombing.
13 Q. The SDB, did it have information about future targets other than
14 whatever you may have acquired from somewhere else? Did it have other
15 sources of information?
16 A. Yes, there were other sources of information, two or three
17 different types of sources of information, quite valid, without any kind
18 of espionage involved. I'm not referring to that.
19 Q. And was this continuously provided to the accused or was there any
20 change in the pattern of provision to him, as you understood it?
21 A. He absolutely had to obtain this information, and his behaviour
22 showed that he did have this information and that sometimes he would
23 evacuate the population and sometimes he would not. It depended on what
24 was useful for him. Also this refers to goods, property, not only the
1 Q. Did the SDB continue to provide him information throughout the war
2 or not?
3 A. Yes, yes, absolutely.
4 Q. Your role at this time was to do what, and on whose authority?
5 A. According to the decision or opinion. Please take into account
6 one of these two wordings. The opinion or the decision of the united
7 defence of the town of Belgrade and the SDB. I went abroad twice during
8 the war. I cannot call this being sent out on official business, but the
9 explanation was that I should do my best, depending on the people I know,
10 to investigate, to investigate - I emphasise that word - the possibility
11 of bringing the conflict with NATO to an end as soon as possible.
12 JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues]... to an end. Mr.
13 Nice, I'm concerned about this evidence, based on what are described as
14 sources. And the question really is: Of what value is it to the Trial
15 Chamber to have evidence of that sort?
16 MR. NICE: Your Honour, yes. That, of course, falls for
17 determination when we -- in part when we look at the next thing. As to
18 this particular passage of evidence, he's told us what he was doing. I
19 now need to know on what authority he was doing it and then we come to
20 another concrete piece of evidence.
21 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
22 MR. NICE: At this stage, I think we're in a slightly different
24 JUDGE MAY: Very well, but if you would stick to the concrete for
25 the moment and in due course we can consider the rest of it.
1 MR. NICE:
2 Q. Mr. Tanic, you've told us what you were doing. You were abroad on
3 official business, investigating the possibility of bringing the conflict
4 to an end. Whose authority was it that you should do that?
5 A. The united staff of the defence of the town of Belgrade and the
6 State Security Service. There was no way of leaving Belgrade during the
7 war for private purposes only.
8 Q. And you were able to leave Belgrade to do the functions that
9 you've described; yes?
10 A. Yes. Yes. But being officially seen off and met by the Security
11 Service at the border with Hungary, and that is where I left the country,
12 and there are official records of that. So this was an official
14 Q. Very well. As a result of those missions, or that mission, did
15 you have any proposals that you were able to advance?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. One or more than one?
18 A. One. One. It was one proposal that was figuring prominently
19 throughout this time. Various variations of it, but basically one
21 Q. And when did that proposal come about, first?
22 A. As far as I know, mid-April 1999, at the latest, to the best of my
24 MR. NICE: Your Honour, there's a letter that we may be able to
25 produce from Mr. Lilic to the accused.
1 Q. Does that letter have a bearing on this potential agreement, or is
2 it a reflection of it?
3 A. I did not understand this question as being addressed to me.
4 Q. Yes, it is addressed to you. There's a letter --
5 A. I'm sorry.
6 Q. There's a letter from Mr. Lilic in May of 1999, and does that bear
7 out what you're saying about the offer of an agreement that you came back
9 A. Yes. Yes, it does bear it out. The spirit and many concrete
10 provisions of that proposal as well.
11 Q. Now, that letter is in the annex or the appendices to the book
12 that we've just provided to the accused. Had you ever seen the letter
13 before seeing it in that book?
14 A. No, and I did not see the letter in the book either. I found out
15 about it from an interview that Mr. Lilic gave to the weekly called Vrema,
16 about three months ago, and I saw that it coincided to a great degree.
17 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm proposing to deal with that letter at
18 a later stage in the evidence, by another witness.
19 Q. But can you tell us, just in the shortest possible form, please:
20 What was the agreement that you -- what were the elements of the agreement
21 that you were party to proposing?
22 A. No. No. I was not putting it together. I did not have the
23 mandate to put anything together. The elements of this agreement were the
24 following: The unilateral ceasefire of all combat activities of the army
25 of Yugoslavia and the special units of the MUP for a 24-hour period,
1 except for cases of self-defence. After that, the suspension of combat
2 activities of NATO for a period of 24 hours. And then a longer unilateral
3 ceasefire by the army of Yugoslavia and the combat units of MUP, except
4 for cases of self-defence. And a longer suspension of bombing by NATO.
5 In the meantime, the urgent initiation of political dialogue with Kosovar
6 Albanians, specifically with Mr. Rugova, about resolving political
7 problems related to Kosovo. The Pristina Corps remains in Kosovo, and
8 peace troops enter Kosovo and they possibly -- no, not possibly. They do
9 cooperate with the Pristina Corps. And then after a lasting ceasefire and
10 after a peace agreement is reached, then the economic community would help
11 the reconstruction of Kosovo and then peace troops would enter under the
12 UN flag, and official Belgrade would be free to influence the composition
13 of the peace troops of the UN in the following sense: That there would
14 not be too many people from NATO countries there, so that this would be a
15 bit of a face-saving formula for Yugoslavia.
16 That is, in rough terms, the content of the peace proposal, and
17 there was not only one of them, and they were shown to President
19 Q. Thank you. Was there a proposal for a ceasefire on Catholic
20 Easter, and was there a linkage of that, or temporal linkage of that, with
21 the release of some American soldiers?
22 A. Yes. Yes, there was. That was also one of the variants of this
24 Q. Was that discussed by you and your party leader Mihajlovic, and
25 did that lead you to making a telephone call? Yes or no.
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. To whom was the telephone call made?
3 A. First we addressed a proposal in writing to Mr. Milutinovic, and
4 then, after that, the president of my party spoke on the telephone to Mr.
5 Milutinovic in connection with a reply to that letter.
6 Q. Were you in a position to hear one side or both sides of that
7 telephone conversation?
8 A. Both. Both. It's no secret; the speakerphone was on.
9 Q. What was said by Mihajlovic to Milutinovic and what was said by
10 Milutinovic in reply?
11 A. Well, first of all, Mr. Milosevic clearly made it known that he
12 would accept a ceasefire for Catholic Easter, and it is not only that we
13 knew about it, but also Mr. Sedano [phoen], the Secretary of State of the
15 Q. [Previous translation continues]... background. You really must
16 focus on the questions. Thank you.
17 A. That's right.
18 Q. The phone call now, please: What was said?
19 A. Well, quite simply, our question was: Why was there no ceasefire
20 for Catholic Easter when it was promised? Because Catholic Easter was
21 already in the past. And also, the freeing of the three American
23 Q. The reply?
24 A. Well, the answer that Mr. Milutinovic gave was that he said there
25 would be a ceasefire but a little later on, because he said we - and he
1 meant Belgrade - we have not finished the job done there yet, meaning
2 Kosovo, and that it would take place for the Orthodox Easter.
3 Q. This is how much later?
4 A. He wasn't specific, Mr. Milutinovic. He said, "We haven't
5 finished the job down there in Kosovo yet, and once we do finish it, then
6 we'll see to it."
7 Q. Thank you. I think at one stage you had a conversation with the
8 president of the Assembly, Tomic, about the peace negotiations of which
9 you were aware. Just yes or no: Did Mr. Tomic seem aware of those
10 negotiations at all? Had they been communicated to him?
11 A. Yes, but with others too; Vuk Draskovic, in the first place, who
12 was the vice-premier. Perhaps there was a mistake in my basic -- that is
13 to say, technical mistake, because there was far more communication with
14 Mr. Draskovic as the vice-premier of the Yugoslav government at the time,
15 but also with Tomic, yes.
16 Q. Paragraph 131. No. Paragraph 131 will have to come later, if at
18 Paragraph 137, just a few odd details now, please, Mr. Tanic. The
19 Republic of Serbian police, did they have any particular characteristics?
20 Did they have any particular source from which they were drawn which would
21 identify them in a particular way?
22 A. Could you repeat that question and be more specific? I'm not
23 quite sure I understood it.
24 Q. Yes. The Republic of Serbian police, how integrated were they
25 with the other agencies of law enforcement? How separate were they?
1 A. The composition of the public Security Service was integrated.
2 However, the composition of the specialised units were not integrated into
3 those basic forms. But I still don't think I've understood your question
4 fully, at least not precisely enough to give you a full answer.
5 Q. I'm not going to pursue the matter. I'll move on to something
7 The control of the MUP -- no, I think you've actually dealt with
8 that already. That's paragraph 138.
9 Paragraph 148. Special units, again, then, picking up on that.
10 Did you see anything of those special units yourself at the time with
11 which we're concerned?
12 A. Well, yes. The special units and the police, they were referred
13 to as the JSO.
14 Q. Did you learn - just yes or no - by whom they were controlled?
15 A. Yes. Yes.
16 Q. In particular, by whom they were controlled when they were
17 operating in Kosovo?
18 A. Mr. Milosevic, using his private chain of command through Sainovic
19 and Rade Markovic and Vlajko Stojilkovic.
20 Q. Paragraph 149. Did you have any conversation, I think, with
21 Perisic about these units? Yes or no.
22 A. Could you be more specific once again when you say "special
23 units," because there are special units both in the army and the police
25 Q. Very well.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. It would be difficult for me to discuss special police units with
2 Perisic, for example.
3 Q. That is my error, I think. Can I come back to it? Did you have a
4 conversation - yes or no - with Perisic about military equipment going to
5 the police? Just yes or no.
6 A. Yes. Yes. Yes, absolutely so.
7 Q. When did you have that? Was that contemporaneously or was that
8 more recently, when you were sourcing material for your book?
9 A. It was at the time when I was preparing the material for my book
10 and comparing my knowledge from the previous times with that of Mr.
12 Q. Just yes or no to this: Did Perisic tell you something of
13 Milosevic's attitude towards this topic? Just yes or no.
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Last line of paragraph 149: What did he tell you of Milosevic's
17 A. Well, similarly to what he had written in his letter. Let me be
18 precise: That Mr. Milosevic kept asking him that the military equipment
19 be issued to MUP units and that that military equipment would be used in
20 combat operations, and Mr. Perisic, for many reasons, which he set out in
21 the letter and one which he explained to me, was the deployment of this
22 against the civilian population. There is no rule and regulation for this
23 to be deployed and used against the inhabitants. And I'm referring here
24 to heavy military materiel, equipment.
25 Q. Any reference or consideration given to how the personnel would be
2 A. Well, there was mention of tanks, combat vehicles, infantry ones,
3 and grenade launchers, 120 millimetres and over. And as I was told, Mr.
4 Perisic said that that was absolutely impossible, and Mr. Milosevic
5 responded to that and said that this would not be used by the army but by
6 the police, so there was no danger of having the army blamed for it.
7 Q. Were local commanders, in your experience and understanding, able
8 to arrest special unit members for wrongful acts?
9 A. Of course. Members of the reserve force as well. They also did
11 Q. In the course of the war, in general, what did you observe about
12 the output of the local media, newspapers and so on?
13 A. Well, I noticed a whole series of incorrect information put out,
14 information which fanned the flames of war and masked the true results of
15 the combat operations of the war; and this was true throughout 1998 and
16 1999. I'm talking about the official media.
17 Q. What sort of distortions were there?
18 A. As to the number of terrorists, for example, they were
19 exaggerated, and the peaceful solutions were diminished. Our own victims
20 were made less of, and generally, the whole operation was masked. So that
21 kind of distortion, more or less, a distortion of the actual situation, in
23 Q. Last paragraph. Some graves, mass graves, were found in Serbia.
24 Did you have a conversation with someone about them?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Who was that?
2 A. Well, first, in the summer of 1999, when I was preparing my book
3 and when we researched into the Serb and Albanian victims - where they
4 were, where they could be found - and the second time was --
5 Q. I asked you who it was.
6 A. I do apologise, but I'm a little confused now. Do you want me to
7 answer now or can I ask to answer this in a private session, if we're
8 going to have one? If not, then I can give an answer. There's no problem
9 there. I don't wish to refrain from answering, I just want to see
10 whether we're going to have this in open session or in closed session.
11 Q. Obviously, I would prefer, if this is a name you can give
12 publicly, that you give it publicly. Is there any reason not to give this
13 name publicly?
14 A. Well, all right. Very well. I won't be jeopardising these
15 people, because there was an official investigation. Zoran Mijatovic,
16 deputy head of the Security Services of Serbia, Dusan Mihajlovic, the
17 Interior Minister of Serbia.
18 Q. What did Mijatovic say about these mass graves that were found?
19 A. That there was an official investigation conducted by the MUP
20 which indicates exactly the perpetrators, the locations, the sites
21 themselves, but that for some reason that investigation was stopped.
22 Otherwise I myself, when I was kidnapped, was exposed to torture --
23 Q. I'm coming to that in a minute.
24 A. -- linked to the mass graves.
25 Q. Yes. I want to know a little bit more about what you learnt about
1 the mass graves. There were mass graves. Mijatovic told you about it.
2 Was there any connection made between those graves and any other finding
3 or occurrence at that time?
4 A. Not only Mr. Mijatovic, but Mr. Mihajlovic as well, the Internal
5 Affairs Minister. They merely told me the results of the investigation,
6 as far as it had got. Now, could you clarify what you mean by the
8 Q. Had a vehicle been found in the Danube River? Is there a
9 connection between one and the other?
10 A. Yes, a vehicle had been found in the Danube, at a place called
11 Vitusi Puteljak, near Tekija, and it was a vehicle which Mr. Keta took
12 from the customs department and gave to the units of public security to
13 transport the bodies, just prior to the NATO intervention in Kosovo and
15 Q. What did Mijatovic tell you about all this? And then we'll turn
16 on to the circumstances of your leaving Yugoslavia. What did Mijatovic
17 tell you about all this?
18 A. Well, quite simply, that -- actually, he didn't tell me his
19 opinion, but the results of the investigation, that there was a clear
20 connection between Mr. Milosevic and the order to mask -- cover up the
21 graves, and that these bodies had been brought in before the NATO
22 intervention and that the origin of those bodies, unfortunately, was that
23 in the units of Sreten Lukic and not the state security of Serbia, and
24 that that is why a cover-up was under force, a cover-up for the truth and
25 the mass graves, although our official organs were well aware of it.
1 Q. Were these the only mass graves of which you learned or were there
3 A. No. I just discussed one. I didn't have the psychological
4 strength to go into the others.
5 Q. Sreten Lukic at the time the head of the MUP in Kosovo; correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. We'll come back now, then, to deal with the circumstances in which
8 you came to leave Yugoslavia. What happened to you?
9 A. Well, after I had started preparing my book and sourcing the
10 material for the book linked to Kosovo and the crimes connected with
11 Kosovo, a short time after that, and after my telephone conversations had
12 been intercepted and that they came to learn that I was preparing a book
13 which would be expounding the kind of things I am saying here today, I was
14 quite simply kidnapped in the street, and two hours later so was my wife,
15 at the beginning of October 1999.
16 Q. How long were you held for, altogether?
17 A. We were both kidnapped, drugged, and taken to two different
18 private prisons, where we spent two days each, my wife and myself, that
20 Q. What happened to you in prison? I don't want to distress you and
21 we don't need to go into it in great detail, not because it may not have
22 been --
23 A. No, and to save time too. But it was torture of the Latin
24 American variety, from administering injections to being beaten up, to be
25 suffocated, and I'm building up this source and these materials for my
1 book, but I don't want to present them all. But there was an attempt to
2 show a sort of non-existent international plot and conspiracy against Mr.
3 Slobodan Milosevic.
4 Q. And the -- were you questioned?
5 A. If you can call it questioning, if beating with a sack over your
6 head and being drugged can be called questioned, then I was questioned.
7 That's how I was questioned.
8 Q. And what was the topic of the questioning? What was its apparent
10 MR. NICE: Your Honour, this is page 18 of the summary. I'm sorry
11 not to have directed you to it earlier.
12 A. Well, it was geared towards knowing why I was investigating this,
13 the Serb graves and the mass graves, why I was in contact with the SDB, do
14 I really want to write this book, and so on and so forth. And around
15 public -- private matters of that kind.
16 Secondly, we discussed the investigations. That was the reason
17 for my being tortured, because they wanted me to acknowledge the so-called
18 conspiracy against Mr. Milosevic, his private security, and so on, British
19 conspiracy, and that I had contacts with intelligence services. And then
20 they tortured me and my wife and wanted us to say that it was -- we were
21 engaged in espionage. Now, we managed to survive this torture. I was
22 drugged, my wife was not drugged. She was only beaten.
23 And then the next stage of the investigation took a somewhat
24 different turn. In that next stage, these individuals said that they were
25 the people who wanted to overthrow Milosevic, in fact, and that everything
1 I went through was in fact a test on their part to see how fit I was to
2 survive and that they wanted me to link them up to the people from the
3 British intelligence service so that we could cooperate to toppling Mr.
5 Q. You were released. How much longer after your release did you
6 stay in Serbia at that time?
7 A. Well, I was released two hours prior to the abortive attempt to
8 assassinate Vuk Draskovic, and I stayed on for another month.
9 Q. And then eventually you were able to leave the country?
10 A. Yes, legally, because I saw that a killing was being prepared this
12 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I think I'm going to pause there, and
13 perhaps we can deal with the other topic in general. Might it be
14 convenient to deal with that itself in private session? Because names may
15 get mentioned. The argument about the admissibility.
16 JUDGE MAY: I think the matter should be dealt with, if possible,
17 in public, because it's a matter of principle, without mentioning any
18 names. If you want to refer to the statement, perhaps that would be a
19 convenient way to deal with it.
20 MR. NICE: My notes would suggest that this issue relates or would
21 become relevant to page 2, paragraph 3. Now, I'm not sure about that one.
22 That's the one I'm not sure about. I've got an annotation at the foot of
23 paragraph 3 which may relate to this sort of material. And then the rest
24 of the material turned up today, and I have annotations starting at page
25 17, paragraph 96. 97, 98. Then at page 20, paragraph 108.
1 JUDGE KWON: How about paragraph 87, page 15?
2 MR. NICE: I didn't note that one at the time, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE KWON: If you could check it out later.
4 MR. NICE: Certainly, yes. Now, it seems to me that when we come
5 to page 17 -- I've dealt with 17. When we come to page 20, the issue
6 arises in a similar way in respect to paragraph 113, but rather
7 differently in relation to paragraph 108.
8 I'm passed a note that Your Honour is quite right about the
9 earlier page, paragraph 87.
10 Paragraph 113 is the usual problem. Paragraph 108 I think is a
11 different problem, because paragraph 108 is not dependent upon anxiety
12 about the well-being of others, and it's a matter perhaps for the witness
13 to give further explanation of his reasons for not wishing to give this
14 evidence publicly. It may be convenient if I asked him about that once
15 more, so that we can understand the difference.
16 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
17 MR. NICE: So that he can understand the difference as well.
18 Q. Mr. Tanic, as you realise, the Chamber is about to consider
19 evidence that turns on what you were told by other people, you being
20 concerned to protect their names in order to protect them from risk. Now,
21 before we come to deliberate -- or before the Chamber comes to deliberate
22 on that and to hear argument about it, there's another passage of evidence
23 which related to the conversation or encounter certainly you had with the
24 accused in April 1999.
25 What's your reason, so that we can have it, for preferring to give
1 that evidence in private session, given that you've said everything else
2 you've had to say about the accused publicly and given also that, as we
3 know, you're protected in these proceedings by facial distortion in order
4 that your future security may be properly preserved? So what's your
5 concern about the evidence in April 1999?
6 A. It is my overall relationship to the Tribunal. I wish to show
7 maximum respect. Mr. Milosevic rejects everything I say, beginning with
8 my very existence in these affairs onwards. So I'm ready to give the
9 Tribunal just those statements which I can confirm by at least two or
10 three independent sources, so that it becomes quite clear that --
11 Q. Mr. Tanic, I'm going to stop you there. It's the Tribunal and the
12 lawyers who address it who decide issues of law, sufficiency of evidence,
13 and matters of that sort, not for you. So the question is quite simple.
14 There's no reason not to give that evidence; if you don't wish to give it,
15 just say you don't wish to give it, and then we'll move on, but there's no
16 reason in what you've advanced for not giving the evidence. Are you
17 prepared to give that evidence?
18 A. Well, not because there is official communication with Milosevic
19 at that time. That is sufficient for public -- for a public statement,
20 public testimony. Nothing changes in this communication. He did the same
21 thing he did in the private communication, which I can't prove. So it's
22 the same thing. I have not cut short this information to the Tribunal.
23 Q. Very well. Are you prepared, then - it's for the Tribunal to
24 weigh - are you prepared to tell us what was said at that meeting in April
25 1999, please?
1 A. I am prepared to state what was said in official communication
2 with Mr. Milosevic, and that is the same substance as the other kind.
3 JUDGE MAY: It is pointless going on fencing like this. Let us
4 move on.
5 MR. NICE: Yes, certainly. Well, I think that comes to an end of
6 that paragraph.
7 Paragraph 113 falls into the same category, the general category,
8 and page 131 [sic] certainly, and I think that's all I have.
9 The Tribunal is in a position to provide closed session under --
10 or in camera proceedings under Rule 75, subject also to Rule 79, and Rule
11 79 is fairly narrow. It deals with closed session for public order or
12 morality. Safety, security or non-disclosure of the identity of a victim
13 or witness is provided in Rule 75, or the protection of the interests of
14 justice, which is rather more broad. It may be that it's the protection
15 of the interests of justice that is one thing that the Chamber should have
16 in mind in considering the present position.
17 When we come back to 75, making sure it hasn't been amended,
18 because I still haven't got an up-to-date version with me. I'll read from
19 the amended version:
20 "A Chamber may hold an in camera proceeding to determine whether
21 to order..." and then "(i) measures to prevent disclosure to the public or
22 the media of the identity or the whereabouts of a victim or witness or of
23 persons related to or associated with a victim or witness by means such
24 as..." and then it runs through protective measures not including closed
1 And then without listing a series of criteria, identifies (ii),
2 "closed session in accordance with Rule 79." And then (iii),
3 "appropriate measures to facilitate the testimony of vulnerable victims
4 and witnesses, such as one-way closed-circuit television."
5 So that looked at in the most technical sense, simply because Rule
6 79 is not given further criteria in Rule 75, the category of persons
7 identified in 75(B)(i), which is inclusive of persons related to or
8 associated with a victim or witness might not, prima facie, cover this
9 particular circumstance, although if it would be appropriate, and we would
10 invite you to say it really must be, to incorporate that wider reasoning
11 for closed sessions, then it could be. And in any event, the interests of
12 justice -- it's not described as the interests of justice, it's described
13 as the protection
14 of the interests of justice -- would allow what this witness seeks.
15 He seeks to be able to give his evidence in certain particulars,
16 withholding from the full public scrutiny the names of people from whom he
17 derived information. The names will, of course, be known to the accused
18 and may be provided by the accused to those assisting him in the
19 preparation of his defence as to the amici, and in those circumstances,
20 there is no unfairness on the accused. His rights are fully preserved.
21 He's able to cross-examine. It might be necessary to have discrete areas
22 of closed session or private session testimony for the cross-examination,
23 but he's quite able to deal with the case, and there is no loss to him.
24 The witness's concerns, of course, reflect that there are others
25 who may hold views contrary to his, who may be concerned by illegal means
1 to thwart these proceedings, and who would thus pose a very real threat to
2 sources of information upon which he acted. The Court knows of the
3 concerns we've had about the dissemination of information, but so far,
4 apart from the matters I've drawn to your attention in the past, nothing
5 further has come to light. And now, of course, the accused's assistants
6 are committed to the Rules of the Tribunal. So there's a realistic
7 prospect of material heard in private session not leaking out, and the
8 accused has told you himself on an earlier occasion that his word is
9 enough for these things and he doesn't have to be bound by your Rules.
10 So that the witness identifies a real distinction between what is
11 provided here in -- or could be provided here in private session, to make
12 the trial fair, and what could only be provided, in his judgement,
13 publicly, at risk to those individuals. My understanding is that there
14 have been earlier occasions of selective private-session evidence being
15 held, I think once in the Tadic case.
16 JUDGE MAY: That's not a difficulty. We can order part of the
17 evidence to be given in private session.
18 MR. NICE: I was saying also for the protection of people other
19 than witnesses, although I think in the Tadic case it was probably for a
20 relation. And with this sort of case and with these sorts of issues,
21 although we are doing everything we can to ensure that everything is given
22 in public in this case, this sort of evidence, which is potentially
23 valuable or very valuable to the Tribunal, does expose certain individuals
24 to risk.
25 Now, there's, of course, a difference between -- and it's a
1 difference that the accused has himself really articulated - between
2 naming the people, whether they are named as co-perpetrators or whether
3 they are simply people closely associated with government at the time, and
4 he's named those entirely straightforwardly. There's a difference between
5 those people and the functionaries who don't fall within those categories,
6 who may not themselves be associated with any wrongdoings of the kind
7 charged here but whose provision of information to this witness, in the
8 public good, could be deeply damaging to them. And so we would invite you
9 to say that it's entirely proper, for these comparatively limited number
10 of instances, to allow private-session testimony, in both direct and
11 cross-examination, for the Chamber in due course to decide what weight to
12 place on that evidence if it decides that there is any diminution in its
13 value by reason of its being in private session.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, wouldn't you say that the Rules are
15 primarily designed for the protection of victims and witnesses and that
16 insofar as the protection of other persons is concerned, there would be a
17 higher threshold to be met to gain that protection?
18 MR. NICE: I'm not sure that I'd agree with the second
19 proposition, although I think the first proposition is clearly right,
20 because the Rules, when they were being drafted, probably had victims and
21 witnesses more specifically in focus. But I would respectfully doubt
22 whether a court would operate on a higher threshold of safety or danger --
23 a higher threshold of danger or lower threshold of safety, if it was aware
24 that testimony was about to be given which would expose someone to real
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, you know, one reason for the higher
2 threshold might be the availability of reliable evidence to the Chamber.
3 That evidence would certainly be easier to get in relation to a victim and
4 witness than in relation to other persons. So it's a question of how will
5 the Chamber be satisfied as to the need for protection of a person who is
6 neither a victim nor witness? So it's a question of evidence to satisfy
7 the Chamber, and it seems to me that it would be much easier to get that
8 evidence in relation to victims and witnesses.
9 MR. NICE: Well, that's a different proposition, and I think the
10 threshold of evidential material may typically be different. Yes. I
11 don't necessarily disagree with that. But it's the very nature of the
12 material that the witness is providing here that would - and we can see it
13 from the summary - which would point to the obvious danger that providers
14 of that material might be in, given the nature of people who still hold
15 very strong views in a country that has, as we know, quite a high level of
16 crimes recently associated -- killings, indeed, recently associated, or
17 comparatively recently, associated with these events. People have
18 disappeared, and, as we know, people have been shot, and so on, for one
19 reason or another, but it's of that sort of country.
20 So if we look at just one or two of the particular passages, and I
21 think probably page 17 is as good as any, without going into the detail of
22 either the sources or the topics upon which they were providing
23 information to this witness. Paragraph 96, but perhaps more particularly,
24 97, one can see particular places referred to. And then I think also if
25 you go over to page 107.
1 JUDGE MAY: The paragraph?
2 MR. NICE: I'm sorry. Paragraph 107, page 19. And then finally,
3 page 22, paragraph 131. One can readily imagine how people providing
4 information on those topics might very well be at considerable risk from
5 the intervention of others but how their provision in private session will
6 mean that the accused is well able to conduct and have a fair trial.
7 I think that's all I can say on it.
8 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Kay.
9 MR. KAY: Yes, Your Honour. This is an issue where we should look
10 at the Rules first of all. I note His Honour Judge Robinson's
11 observations about Rule 75, which does seem, on our reading, to be a
12 provision more directly connected with protection of victims and
13 witnesses. When one looks at 75(B)(i), again victim or witness or of
14 persons related to or associated with a victim or witness, looks rather to
15 deal with more of a witness's personal situation as he finds himself in a
16 courtroom at that time, the protection of others who are close to him.
17 And we would say that this provision is more specifically designed for the
18 witness who comes from a place where his family is, his associates, people
19 related to him, could in some way be affected by his giving particular
20 evidence. That isn't the case here with this particular witness and his
21 circumstances. It is not the normal one and would fall outside Rule 75 in
22 its general application. We say it's more Rule 79 issue that the
23 Prosecution are bringing here, relying more upon the protection of the
24 interests of justice.
25 This is an issue where an accused is entitled to have evidence
1 which a witness gives in public and to be accountable for that which he
2 says. Reliance upon sources which are not identified publicly does put
3 him at a disadvantage, although the names may be given in closed session
4 and identities able to be investigated by his associates in preparation of
5 his defence. This kind of material can also help an accused if it is made
6 public, because others associated with these events and information at the
7 time are able to scrutinise what is said and able to offer themselves to a
8 defendant as witnesses on his behalf if they disagree with what is said.
9 The equality of arms principle does, to a great extent, require, as much
10 as possible, for a Defence to be in public so it is capable of being
11 analysed by external sources, scrutinised, and witnesses to be held
12 accountable for what they have said publicly. The difficulty is, with a
13 closed session, that that becomes less likely and it can affect the
14 equality of arms which the Court must seek to achieve in providing a fair
16 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.
17 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
18 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Yes, Mr. Tanic. You want to say
19 something. This is really a legal argument, as you must understand, but
20 if there's something you want to say about your evidence, you can.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. I'm not going to
22 interfere in the legal argument. This has to do with my evidence. I
23 believe that this question is unduly hampering my testimony, and therefore
24 I am prepared to state in public what I said I would like to say in public
25 [sic] session. I don't want to make the work of the Trial Chamber, of the
1 Office of the Prosecutor, more difficult, so I'm prepared to do that.
2 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.
3 MR. NICE: That's very helpful. I'll go back over those
4 paragraphs. I do, for my own reasons, and in order to communicate
5 something to the accused, need about 30 seconds in private session. It's
6 got nothing to do with the current testimony, it has something to do with
7 the witness. May I do that literally now, while we've broken the
9 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
10 [Private session]
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
12 [Open session]
13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're back in open session.
14 MR. NICE: Right. Well, I think I'm going to go as swiftly as I
15 can. We're going to revisit certain topics that you've given us some
16 answers on earlier. Again, briefly, please, if you can.
17 Q. Paragraph 87, page 15. You spoke of the Horseshoe plan, and
18 indeed you spoke of the peaks of power - those were your terms - who
19 opposed it. Who were the peaks of power who opposed and refused to
20 implement this plan?
21 A. The army -- the use of the army and police for these purposes were
22 opposed by Jovica Stanisic, head of state security of Serbia, Zoran
23 Mijatovic in the capacity of his deputy, that is to say, head of the
24 centre of the services of state security of Belgrade. That is practically
25 80 per cent of the SDB. General Momcilo Perisic, in his capacity as chief
1 of general staff. General Aleksandar Dimitrijevic, in his capacity as
2 head of the intelligence service of the army. It is known as the KOS.
3 Q. Thank you.
4 A. Then there are other persons as well. I'm sorry, there are other
5 persons who also opposed this.
6 Q. Very well. Go on.
7 A. Then the leading persons in the operations of the SDB and the
8 military security. Then -- I have to pull myself together in order to
9 recollect all of this. Then politicians from the so-called Reformist
10 Group within the government of Serbia, or rather, within the Serbian and
11 Yugoslavia political scene. Mr. Zoran Lilic, Mr. Dusan Mihajlovic, Mr.
12 Nebojsa Covic, people who were popularly known as the Reformists. That
13 would be a group of people. Perhaps I've forgotten someone. It's a
14 broader group but I really don't want to burden you with more of this.
15 They always opposed this in a substantiated manner.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I'd like to find out, if the witness is
17 able to tell us, what was the basis for their opposition to the Horseshoe
18 Plan, very briefly.
19 And just let me tell you: My recollection is that your evidence
20 is that the essence of the plan was that if an aggressor attacked from a
21 particular point, and if the Kosovar Albanian population supported the
22 aggressor, then particular action would be taken. So the plan was really
23 based on a hypothesis. So in the context of that hypothesis, can you help
24 me as to what was the basis for the opposition to the plan?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I shall gladly answer, but I have to
1 make a point. Horseshoe plan did not exist as an official name. I said
2 that quite precisely. So there was an abuse of this old military plan for
3 exercises and training. It was not a new Horseshoe plan. This was just a
4 colloquial nickname, as I had put it.
5 And now I'm going to answer your question. The point of their
6 opposition was that, first and foremost, there was no external aggression
7 and therefore there was no Albanian population that sided with the foreign
8 aggressor. Therefore, there was less need to use the army in such a large
9 scale and all these special units.
10 Additional reason for their opposition was that the problem of
11 Kosovo could have had been resolved through political means and through
12 selective force, and that was something that was known two or three years
13 prior to that, including me. I knew that. And this entire group, and I
14 had opposed this, of course, at a lower level than the group of people I
15 just referred to.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Proceed, Mr. Nice.
17 MR. NICE: Thank you.
18 Q. Page 17, paragraph 96. You had started to tell us about knowledge
19 of the detail of the KLA forces. How well was their strength known, and
20 who talked to you about this in Belgrade in 1998?
21 A. Most of what I know, when speaking about the top echelons of the
22 State Security Service, is based on working conversations. These are not
23 private conversations or dinner-table conversation. This is with -- these
24 are conversations with Mr. Zoran Mijatovic, the deputy of Mr. Jovica
25 Stanisic, and also head of the State Security Services for Belgrade, and
1 also with his other associates. I think that identifying this one name is
2 sufficient. And this name became known to the general public later. It
3 was mentioned that, according to the assessments of the MUP and the SDB,
4 there were 2.000 terrorists at that time. Excuse me, Mr. Nice; which
5 period are we actually discussing? 1998 or before that?
6 Q. When you went to Belgrade on leave in 1998, did you have
7 conversations with someone about the strength of the KLA, particularly in
9 A. I'm sorry. 1998. I have to correct myself. The KLA was more
10 than 2.000-strong. I was referring to the period 1997, 1996. I'm sorry.
11 This was inadvertent. So as for 1998, I discussed that with the officers,
12 or rather, the officials of the SDB. I mentioned one name. And also a
13 man who was in charge of SDB operations down there in the region of
14 Djakovica. His name is Bogdan Tomas.
15 Q. And what was he able to tell you about the strength of the KLA and
16 about the Security Services' level of knowledge of where they lived and so
18 A. I have to insist upon the following: The question has to be a bit
19 more precise. There is a great difference between the KLA in 1997 and
20 1998, and these mentioned persons held these particular offices in both
21 years. Please make the question as precise as possible so that the
22 accused, Mr. Slobodan Milosevic, would not later abuse an omission made on
23 my part. As I already said, in 1998, the KLA became stronger, but by
24 then --
25 Q. We want to know what Mr. Tomas told you about his level of
1 knowledge in relation to Djakovica.
2 A. First of all, we talked about the example of Decani. The centre
3 of Decani was razed to the ground by a tank unit of the Army of
4 Yugoslavia, around Easter 1998, under the pretext that they wish to do
5 away with terrorist sniper nests. The special units of the SDB of Serbia
6 knew about these sniper nests. The police could have done away with them
7 without any army participation. Instead of that, the army came in and
8 unselectively destroyed part of Decani, the old part, where Albanians
9 lived, Kosovar Albanians, and this gave rise to ethnic tensions, and the
10 terrorist nests were -- and the sniper nests were not demolished. And the
11 State Security complained that this action was ineffective, and in
12 response it was said that this was ordered from the top, and the shelling
13 of Decani went on for days. I do not know who the military officer in
14 charge of this particular operation was. And as for the -- all right.
15 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, it's past the time usually for an
16 adjournment. Are you going to be many minutes more, do you think?
17 MR. NICE: I think probably about five or ten, but no more than
19 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let's go on, then.
20 MR. NICE:
21 Q. So no sniper was killed. But generally, what did Mr. Tomas tell
22 you, if anything, about his level of knowledge in Djakovica?
23 A. Perhaps some sniper was killed, but first and foremost, Mr. Zoran
24 Mijatovic, who was the person in charge, told me that Mr. Milosevic would
25 not allow the State Security Service to operate against the KLA leaders
1 who were abroad, that they do not allow the electronic surveillance of the
2 border, that also he was impeding active measures, as they were called, in
3 terms of Albanian terrorism, also drug trafficking, and also that he
4 refused equipment that was practically offered with a credit, that was
5 entailed for border surveillance. So that he was talking against, but in
6 practice that he was impeding actions aimed against terrorism. Because
7 terrorists were not peasants; it was their leaders.
8 Q. We'll come back to this page, but paragraph 107 fits together with
9 this. Did you learn anything about what had happened in Likosane and
10 Prekaz? If so, from whom?
11 A. Yes, I did. In the village of Likosane, a patrol was killed, a
12 police patrol, which was --
13 Q. You did learn about it. From whom?
14 A. Tomas Bogdan, Mijatovic. And when I use the term "the service,"
15 that's who I have in mind.
16 Q. And what were you told by them about what had happened in Likosane
17 and Prekaz?
18 A. The results of the internal investigation conducted by MUP show
19 that the situation was highly suspect, that the police units, our Serb
20 police units in the village of Likosane -- that is to say, they were sent
21 to Likosane, to the terrorist stronghold, which we knew existed, without
22 the necessary equipment, vehicles, logistics, intelligence, and so on and
23 so forth, and it was just as if you had thrown them to their death.
24 After that, our police force, in their quest for the perpetrators,
25 the killers, the Kosovar Albanian terrorists, killed a certain number of
1 people. The Jashari brothers set up barricades in their own house in
2 Donje Prekaz. There were there with their families. And our police force
3 was well aware of the age-old tactics of the Albanian terrorists and
4 Muslims, that in any terrorist [as interpreted], they take a sort of human
5 shield to protect them, both amongst their family members, their friends,
6 and so on. So that is a very ugly thing, but it doesn't mean to say that
7 you can kill them.
8 Now, our police intervened en masse, using force en masse, and
9 along with the Jashari's who were killed, a large number of women,
10 children, and civilians were killed, without any need at all. This gave
11 rise to great concern in professional circles: the police, the army, and
12 the Security Services, because we knew that this would give rise to the
13 Albanians' wish to take their own back and to retaliate.
14 Q. Thank you. Let's just come back to paragraph 98.
15 JUDGE MAY: When you finish that, we'll adjourn.
16 MR. NICE:
17 Q. Was there an identified Albanian called Agim Ceku?
18 A. Yes. The Albanians were identified, several of them. Even when I
19 wanted to learn information about them, I was prevented by people who were
20 loyal to Milosevic in doing so. I mean Agim Ceku, Ramush Haradinaj,
21 Hashim Thaci.
22 Q. Did you discover - just yes or no - the accused's attitude towards
23 pursuing these people in order to hand them over to this institution, the
24 ICTY? Did you learn about his attitude to those things? Yes or no.
25 A. Yes, I did learn about that, in a very drastic way.
1 Q. From whom?
2 A. Well, first of all, from the leaders of the State Security
3 Service, and then my example, through torture. Because one of the
4 accusations against me and why I was tortured was what did I have to do to
5 meddle into the investigations against the Albanian terrorists together
6 with The Hague Tribunal? So I was beaten for two hours on that particular
7 topic alone.
8 MR. NICE: I may have a few more questions, but it will only be a
10 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll adjourn now. Twenty minutes.
11 --- Recess taken at 12.24 p.m.
12 --- On resuming at 12.45 p.m.
13 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
14 MR. NICE:
15 Q. Paragraph 113, page 20. Now, just yes or no to these questions,
16 please. Did you learn anything about the ordering of troops into the
17 Djakovica region in June 1999 or thereabouts? Just yes or no.
18 A. Yes, but before June 1999.
19 Q. From whom did you learn what you did learn?
20 A. We're talking about the Easter of 1998, and it was Bogdan Tomas.
21 Perhaps there was a mistake in the typing.
22 Q. No. It's because we're jumping around to tidy up matters that
23 were left incomplete.
24 I'm now moving on to June 1999. During the NATO bombing. There
25 may be some confusion in the typing, you're quite right. But did you at
1 that time, June 1999, learn something about an occasion of ordering troops
2 into the Djakovica area? Just yes or no.
3 A. Yes, but before June. That's the mistake. In June it was almost
4 all over. I do apologise.
5 Q. From whom did you learn that?
6 A. An officer of the State Security Service, Tomas Bogdan, was down
7 there under direct bombing and was able to see what was going on and what
8 was happening to the troops and how they were being sent off to die under
9 the bombs.
10 Q. What was it that he was able to tell you about that?
11 A. Well, quite simply, he said that when they were bombing, it was as
12 if the earth was boiling. That's how strong it was. That it was burning.
13 And that without any need, after the bombing was over, the soldiers had
14 been sent to take control of the fields where the bombing had taken place,
15 and then NATO planes would turn up again and the army would lose their
16 lives again. And the Chernomyrdin agreement was already known,
18 Q. Just yes or no to this: Did you learn what the troops were
19 supposed to be doing in Djakovica? What was their purpose there? Just
20 yes or no to that.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Was it from the same Mr. Tomas or from someone else?
23 A. Yes, plus subsequent sources afterwards.
24 Q. What was the purpose of the troops being there, as related to you
25 by these people?
1 A. To expel the Albanian terrorists from the areas in which they
2 could return after the NATO bombing. Then a fresh bombing, fresh Serb
3 victims, fresh expulsions.
4 Q. Next question: Yes or no, was Mr. Tomas able to tell you - just
5 yes or no - who had instructed the troops to go there and do that? Just
6 yes or no.
7 A. No, he couldn't tell me that. I learnt that in a different way.
8 Q. Without telling us the conclusion, how did you learn it? What was
9 this different way in which you learned it?
10 A. In discussions with General Perisic later on, preparing the book
11 on the sense of using an army under such circumstances, deploying the army
12 under such circumstances.
13 Q. And from that source, as you understood it, who had instructed the
14 troops or ordered the troops to go to Djakovica for those purposes?
15 A. Once again, the private chain of command, as far as I was
16 informed. I can't confirm this directly, but it was the private chain of
17 command, going down from Milosevic, via Sainovic, and Pavkovic, without
18 any institutionalisation and conduct in times of war, or even as it was a
20 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 131, page 22. Did you learn from any source
21 about - just yes or no to this - who was instrumental in ordering or who
22 ordered the operation in Racak? Just yes or no. Did you learn who
23 ordered that?
24 A. Yes. Yes. Yes.
25 Q. Who informed you?
1 A. Foreign source.
2 Q. Can you name the source?
3 A. I can't. I can name the public source.
4 Q. You say the public source. Who was the public source?
5 A. The writings of the press, just one paper, actually.
6 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, those are not admissible.
7 MR. NICE: I'm not going to take that further in those
8 circumstances. All right. That tidies up, I think, the paragraphs that
9 we passed over. I have a couple of concluding question and one other
10 exhibit that we must sort out from yesterday. Let's just deal with a
11 couple of questions.
12 Q. As a matter of detail, when looking at the possible agreement that
13 you've spoken of, had Yugoslavia itself participated in United Nations
14 peacekeeping forces on any other earlier occasions, to your knowledge?
15 A. Yes, in the peacekeeping forces, for keeping the peace.
16 Q. As a matter of fact, do you hold any views about Kosovar Albanians
17 or about Albanians or about their culture? Are you particularly fond of
18 it? What's the position?
19 A. My personal one or the political one?
20 Q. No. Your personal one.
21 A. Very negative.
22 Q. Because, as a matter of fact, why?
23 A. Well, because they do represent a problem for the state and
24 national interests of Serbia, not in the extent to which it is being
25 viewed, but they do nonetheless, especially now.
1 Q. Thank you very much.
2 MR. NICE: Thank you, Your Honour. That's all I want. Can I tidy
3 up the newspaper exhibits that we produced or started to produce
4 yesterday? I needn't go through them. The Chamber will remember that --
5 JUDGE MAY: Is this from the last witness?
6 MR. NICE: Yes. You'll remember the problem was that the original
7 newspaper reports had been redacted, and it looked as though they had been
8 redacted to excise the witness's name. And so we had unhelpfully redacted
9 originals with redacted copies. I'm very loath to burden the CLSS with
10 the retranslation of newspaper articles, so what I'm going to propose. If
11 this is acceptable to the Chamber, that we hand in first for yesterday's
12 exhibit the original, which has been underlined with wherever there's a
13 redaction, and -- this is Exhibit 147. And even for those unfamiliar with
14 the Cyrillic script, I think the name of the witness is clearly that which
15 has been redacted. And so that will make sense, if it's necessary to make
16 sense of the English translation. But underlined is "Ratomir Tanic" on
17 several occasions. I think on one occasion his title may have been
18 redacted as well. That's about it.
19 Then there are two other similar newspaper articles, and in this
20 case I've presented them I think as - I hope I have - presented them as a
21 clip of materials where there's the English translation followed by the
22 original newspaper article with underlinings of the redacted passages, and
23 the same for the other. I wonder if they could all become 147. There's
24 no need for them to have a separate number. If that would be acceptable.
25 There are therefore two more parts to 147. And with the leave of the
1 Chamber, if we can save the further translation of the articles that have
2 simply had the names redacted, I think that will save time and money.
3 JUDGE MAY: It may be helpful to have 147, 1, 2, and 3, so there's
4 no confusion.
5 JUDGE KWON: And Mr. Nice, if you could tell us whether Mr. Tanic
6 dealt with paragraph 108 in page 20 in full after he decided to give
7 evidence publicly.
8 MR. NICE: I'll ask him once again.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we'll have the article dated 18
10 September 1996 as 147.2, and then the article dated 31 July 1997 as 147.3.
11 MR. NICE:
12 Q. My last question to you, Mr. Tanic, is this, following on from His
13 Honour Judge Kwon's inquiry: In light of your willingness to give
14 evidence publicly, are you willing now to tell us what happened at the
15 meeting in April 1999 with the accused? Just yes or no. No explanation
16 is required.
17 A. Yes, but with a correction as to the description. The description
18 does not correspond entirely. That's probably my fault in describing
20 Q. Tell us when it was and what happened.
21 A. During April and May, four or five meetings were held. I'll have
22 to take up a little more time, but I will try and be as concise as
23 possible. So during April and May, there were five or six meetings held
24 in Belgrade on the premises of the business club of the Novo Demokracija -
25 the street is Majke Jevrosime Street - between the Italian ambassador,
1 Amerigo Sessov [phoen], and Vuk Draskovic, the vice-president, the
2 vice-premier of the Yugoslav government, the president of my own party,
3 Mr. Dusan Mihajlovic, and myself. The purpose --
4 Q. Mr. Tanic, it may be that this background is going to be helpful.
5 Our immediate interest is in what the accused said to you at a
6 face-to-face meeting or a face-to-face encounter, however you describe it.
7 If you can move there very swiftly and then answer His Honour Judge Kwon's
8 or my inquiry with your evidence, please.
9 A. Well, that's what it's about. As we did not have a face-to-face
10 meeting, there was a telephone conference, actually, and I'll take upon
11 myself the responsibility. But I wasn't thinking of going into that, but
12 into some other matters, and perhaps I did not devote attention to that.
13 There was a personal telephone conversation, but not face-to-face, not a
14 face-to-face encounter.
15 Q. What was said?
16 A. What was said was that, quite simply, there would be no ceasefire
17 in the conflict for some time to come, that Serbia and Yugoslavia needed
18 some more civilian victims. This was said upon insistence to bring the
19 war conflict to an end as soon as possible. But nothing -- I don't wish
20 to say anything else about that because there are other traces of that
21 accusation against Mr. Milosevic.
22 Q. Who said that, and who was at the other end of the telephone?
23 A. In order to prove that NATO was a criminal organisation, at the
24 end of the previous paragraph.
25 Communication between Mr. Milosevic and Draskovic; I heard that on
1 the speakerphone. It was a reception, but it was our own reception. Now,
2 may I explain the context of that, if the Tribunal wishes to hear it?
3 Because the context is highly significant.
4 JUDGE MAY: No. But, Mr. Tanic, we do need to understand
5 precisely what was said. The important part of your -- of this is the
6 conversation. Now, do I understand this all right: There was a telephone
7 conversation between Mr. Draskovic and Mr. Milosevic; is that right?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, on the open speakerphone.
9 JUDGE MAY: And you were listening in on the speakerphone and
10 heard what you've described?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, because it was held in the
12 offices of our own party.
13 JUDGE MAY: Yes. You mentioned a reception. It might have been a
14 mistranslation. Has that got any relevance?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It was a small reception that we
16 held with the presence of the Italian ambassador, and we used that
17 occasion to -- it was a small reception. I spoke of this superficially
18 earlier on. And the mistake is mine. I wasn't going to talk about it in
19 this way but in a different way. Now we've cleared that up. But the
20 substance of it all is the same.
21 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
22 MR. NICE: Your Honour, that concludes all that I need ask this
23 witness at this stage. I will be very grateful if before the close of
24 today's hearing we can have an idea of how long the accused is going to
25 want with this witness. The bulge or whatever it is of witnesses for next
1 week is very difficult to manage and it may be a certain amount of
2 reordering, which I'll be able to give notice properly today or tomorrow.
3 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, how long do you anticipate being with
4 this witness?
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, at any rate, quite a long
6 time, more than Mr. Nice needed in view of the fact that the witness has
7 provided a large bundle of papers.
8 JUDGE MAY: Yes. There's no need to go -- no need to go into the
9 detail for the moment, we're just considering the timing.
10 MR. NICE: That's very helpful. It's probably sufficient for my
12 JUDGE MAY: Certainly tomorrow, I would think.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, all day tomorrow would be less
14 than Mr. Nice had.
15 [Trial Chamber confers]
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you're going to begin your
17 cross-examination of this witness. He has given a lot of evidence,
18 evidence relating to you and evidence that will generally be considered of
19 importance to the Chamber. In order to make the best use of your
20 opportunity to cross-examine, I encourage you to keep your
21 cross-examination as focused as possible, confining it to relevant issues,
22 and resisting the temptation to indulge in bickering and perhaps even
23 quarrelling with the witness, and certainly cross-examination should not
24 be used to score points. I thought I should say that at the beginning of
25 your cross-examination of this witness, whose evidence is of importance to
1 you and to the Chamber.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As far as time goes, I'm going to
3 bear in mind that I have less than 40 minutes left to me today, which
4 means that tomorrow I would spend the whole day and on Monday. I would
5 need tomorrow and the whole day Monday to cross-examine this witness.
6 JUDGE MAY: That is by no means certain. You will certainly have
7 tomorrow. I have just noted that the Prosecution had four and a half
8 hours. If you have the whole of tomorrow, you will have much the same.
9 We will consider what progress is being made and we'll consider the nature
10 of the examination to decide whether the examination will go on beyond
12 On one matter, Mr. Nice, a technicality: Can the witness be here
13 next week?
14 MR. NICE: No difficulties of any kind. It happens I won't be
15 here, I think, on Tuesday but I can be substituted.
16 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll bear that in mind.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. That means that I have
19 at my disposal the first day of the following week. Have we understood
20 each other?
21 JUDGE MAY: No. That's precisely not what I said. I said you can
22 have tomorrow, and we would then consider whether you can have any time
23 next Tuesday, depending on how you get on.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And are you bearing in mind the fact
25 that Mr. Nice started yesterday, started his examination-in-chief
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 yesterday at 20 minutes to 12.00, and that he had a full two hours
3 JUDGE MAY: Yes, I've considered that. He didn't. He had an hour
4 and a half. But let's go on rather than arguing about the time.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Let's move on to the
6 cross-examination, then. But I would like to say that the very fact that
7 the first Serb who is testifying here is a false witness, confirms my
8 assertions --
9 JUDGE MAY: That is a comment. Now, if you have questions, ask
10 them. That will simply lose you time.
11 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:
12 Q. [Interpretation] You claim that you were an associate of mine.
13 A. I apologise. I've never claimed that I was a friend and associate
14 of yours. But due to force and circumstance -- that would be false
15 testimony, if I were to say that I were your friend or associate. But the
16 fact that I was an advisor to the president of one of the three coalition
17 parties over a period of three or four years did bring me into a constant
18 working contact with your policy, and from time to time with you yourself,
19 because you saw that I made a list of very limited circumstances under
20 which we met.
21 Q. All right. All right. We'll come to that, we'll clear that up.
22 A. So I was very modest in representing all this.
23 Q. Very well. Associate in the sense that you said that you got from
24 me some guidelines for work, or that I followed or attended some work of
25 yours. That's what you claimed; isn't that right?
1 A. I've been asked to wait for the interpretation. I said that on
2 several occasions, as far as the work that I did, first of all on behalf
3 of my party, as a member of the ruling coalition, on several occasions
4 this was confirmed on your part, either directly, but much more frequently
5 indirectly. So I never claim that I was your constant associate or
6 friend, and I depicted this in a very modest manner, my working contacts
7 with you in a very modest way. But the fact remains that we were in the
8 ruling coalition of our three parties.
9 Q. I don't want to go into this coalition. You claim that you had
10 direct contacts with me.
11 A. Yes. I'm waiting for the interpretation.
12 Q. Well, you understand Serbian, I assume.
13 A. Yes, I do understand, but for the purposes of the Trial Chamber
14 and --
15 JUDGE MAY: You've got to remember that this has got to be
16 translated, so leave a gap.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise. I have a question. I
19 don't hear the interpretation, so I don't know when I can go ahead and
20 speak or how long I should wait. That is a problem. It's presenting a
22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. You claim that you were a member of the Novo Demokracija or New
24 Democracy. Just yes or no.
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Did you have a post in that party, a function of any kind? Yes or
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Can you tell me, but very briefly, why you think that I, in
5 addition to 700.000 members of my own party, the socialist party, and
6 150.000 members of the left and other distinguished people in Serbia, why
7 would I need to select you, to issue any tasks to you?
8 A. I didn't claim that you gave me any tasks. What I said was that
9 you authorised tasks which I was entrusted with and which I performed in
10 keeping with the ones that I was given by the president of my party.
11 Q. I see. So your president, your party president, gave you some
12 tasks to fulfil. Now, did you ever have a meeting with me personally?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. You said yesterday in response to a question from Mr. Nice that
15 you had meetings with me frequently; is that right?
16 A. No, it is not right, because I enumerated the number of times I
17 actually had meetings with you in response to Mr. Nice's question.
18 Q. All right. I made a note of that, and that's why I say that he
19 asked you whether your meetings with me were frequent. You said yes.
20 Then he asked you was it more than once, you said yes, and then he asked
21 you how many times, and you said five to seven times. Isn't that right?
22 Yes or no.
23 A. Yes, that is correct, and in my opinion, that wasn't frequent.
24 Now, if Mr. Nice thinks it's frequent, well ...
25 Q. All right. You said five to seven times?
1 A. Yes, that's right.
2 Q. He asked you where. You said two or three times at a reception
3 of the delegation of the Novo Demokracija, New Democracy, and two or three
4 times at other receptions, receptions in the JUL party; is that right?
5 A. No. I was far more specific than that.
6 Q. All right. You can be provided with the transcript of what you
7 said. That is what I jotted down and that's what it says.
8 A. Then you didn't make a note of it correctly, because I know what I
10 JUDGE MAY: The note which I have was: "Five to seven times,
11 always in a working environment or at receptions. At two to three -- for
12 instance, at two to three annual meetings between the parties, JUL
13 receptions, or state holiday receptions."
14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Very well. So those were those five to seven times; is that
17 A. Yes, that's right, just like the distinguished judge, Judge May,
19 Q. As far as I'm able to interpret this, you never had a personal
20 meeting with me, did you?
21 A. You mean eye-to-eye, a tete-a-tete, just you and me?
22 Q. Any meeting.
23 A. I'm waiting for the interpretation. Each of these times there was
24 a meeting between you and me, but never a tete-a-tete. There were always
25 other people present. It was always a group of some kind.
1 Q. All right. Now, as you're talking about receptions in the New
2 Democracy party, that these receptions were always attended by the media;
3 the press, journalists, TV cameramen and so on. They were always recorded
4 by the media?
5 A. Mr. Milosevic, I didn't mention a single reception of the New
7 Q. You said meetings and receptions that the Novo Demokracija had on
8 an annual basis with me.
9 A. Yes, Mr. Milosevic, but they weren't receptions by the Novo
10 Demokracija, they were meetings between the Novo Demokracija delegation
11 and you in the building of the presidency of Serbia. There are
12 photographs. This was photographed. I can bring you the photographs
14 Q. Yes, that's what I'm saying. How shall I put this? When the Novo
15 Demokracija turned up, this was a numerous delegation; isn't that right?
16 Yes or no.
17 A. I'm waiting for the interpretation.
18 Q. Oh, come on.
19 A. Sometimes yes, sometimes no.
20 Q. Very well.
21 A. At all events, it was always within a delegation. There was
22 always a delegation, and a delegation implies many people.
23 Q. All right. Let's not waste time.
24 A. Well, we've already wasted time, Mr. Milosevic.
25 Q. Do you know that at the receptions in JUL, the Yugoslavia United
1 Left, or state receptions, there were always over a thousand people; the
2 diplomatic corps, representatives of the religious communities, prominent
3 public figures and so on and so forth? Are you aware of that?
4 A. Of course. Of course.
5 Q. Now, receptions of this nature, the receptions at which over a
6 thousand people take part, can they be considered to be meetings with me?
7 A. I described the circumstances very precisely, where there were
8 short brief working meetings with you, Mr. Milosevic, at those receptions,
9 because it was at those receptions, like any other head of state, that you
10 used them to do some business, to hold working talks with some
11 individuals. These were brief encounters, and I mentioned these
12 encounters. I didn't speak of meetings. I was very precise. And when I
13 mentioned your words, I never said that this was a meeting. I just said
14 an encounter in which there was a relevant exchange of opinions. So could
15 you consult the record for that. I don't want it to appear that I was
16 saying something I wasn't.
17 Q. Well, you're representing everything that wasn't correct, because
18 I didn't have working contacts at those meetings and receptions, and you
19 said that the receptions were fairly rare anyway. So I never engaged in
20 working meetings at receptions of this kind and therefore I could not
21 engage in them with you. Now, did you, or how did you receive invitations
22 to attend those receptions within the Novo Demokracija party's quota? You
23 say you weren't a member of the leadership. You say you were an advisor
24 to the president. So how were you invited to those receptions?
25 A. I beg your pardon, but these are three questions at once, if I
1 understand this correctly.
2 JUDGE MAY: Just answer the last one: How were you invited to the
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was invited in writing within the
5 quota of Novo Demokracija, and I never said that I was never an official
6 of Novo Demokracija. I was first and foremost an advisor there, but I
7 also carried out other duties, and I got invitations regularly and they do
8 exist in the register.
9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. All right. In the quota of Novo Demokracija.
11 A. Mr. Milosevic, I really am not involved in quotas here. I'm not
12 dealing in quotas.
13 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tanic, there may be a temptation to argue with the
14 accused. Would you resist it. Just remember, you're in a court,
15 answering questions, and don't personalise it.
16 Mr. Milosevic, on your side, would you slow down when you're
17 asking questions.
18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. My next question is quite brief. Did you represent yourself
20 falsely here? I mean your capacity, not your name and surname, the
21 capacity that you had. Yes or no.
22 A. No.
23 Q. Allow me to read something to you, and then I'm going to ask you
24 for an answer to this question. This is what Novo Demokracija, that is to
25 say, your party, stated yesterday, after your statement here:
1 Novo Demokracija stated the following, your party. As you
2 mentioned, its president is the current Minister of the Interior, that is
3 to say, my political opponent, at any rate. So this is what it says:
4 "The content of the testimony of Ratomir Tanic testifies to his
5 attempt to construct a story in which Novo Demokracija did not take part
6 in the way in which he has presented this, nor did he have the importance
7 that he wishes to attach to himself. According to our knowledge, Tanic
8 least of all could have been a partner to Milosevic in carrying out some
9 kind of plan in order to restore to Kosovo its autonomy."
10 JUDGE MAY: We'll pause there.
11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Did you get interpretation of this?
13 JUDGE MAY: No, but we're going to stop anyway. Mr. Milosevic,
14 what are you reading from?
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This morning's paper. I'll give it
16 to you.
17 JUDGE MAY: Which one?
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let me just finish. Belgrade
19 morning newspapers that I got.
20 JUDGE MAY: No. No. Unless there's a specific question, this is
21 all comment by somebody else.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a specific question.
23 Please. This is not a comment. This is an official statement of his
24 party, and in relation to this official statement, I wish to put a
25 question to him, and I'm trying to read it. It's very short.
1 "'Imagination does all sorts of things, and necessity even more,
2 and we have understanding for the Tanic case,' was stated yesterday by
3 Novo Demokracija."
4 JUDGE MAY: I'm not going to permit this. This is pure comment by
5 a journalist or somebody putting out a statement. Now, if you've got a
6 question, you can ask the witness a question rather than reading out this
7 kind of thing from newspapers.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have to read this to you. This is
9 a statement of his party, a press release. It is not interpretation by
11 JUDGE MAY: Just one moment. I'll consult.
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, who wrote this article?
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's not an article. I told you:
15 This is a press release issued by his party. This was issued by his own
16 party. That's why I'm asking him about it.
17 JUDGE MAY: It doesn't matter for a moment. Which journalist
18 reported it?
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] On this photocopy that I got by fax,
20 there is no signature of any journalist. This is a daily newspaper called
21 Blic, today's newspaper. A journal of this nature --
22 JUDGE MAY: Very well. It doesn't matter. I just wanted to
23 understand the position. Now, what we're not going to permit is a lot of
24 abuse, if that is coming. What you can ask the witness about is questions
25 which go to his credibility. Comments like "imagination" and the rest of
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 it are of no assistance to us at all and we're not going to allow
2 questions about that. Now, is there something concrete in that that you
3 want to put to the witness? For instance, that his representation of his
4 position is incorrect. Now, if that appears, then you can ask it. But
5 merely to read out a lot of comment about his evidence from whoever is not
6 going to assist. Now, can you find a concrete question to arise from it?
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am putting the question on the
8 basis of a very brief sentence that is part of the press release issued by
9 his party and which reads as follows:
10 "Therefore, we are unaware of his decision to testify about
11 something that we do not know that he took part in."
12 That's it. Could it be more specific than that? His party does
13 not know about his participation in that.
14 JUDGE MAY: Well, that is the question.
15 Now, Mr. Tanic, what he's put to you is that your party do not
16 know about your decision to testify, and it's --
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, no, no.
18 JUDGE MAY: And it's something that we do not know that he took
19 part in. It's not at all clear what that means, but we'll allow you to
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I shall give a very simple
22 answer. A party with a membership of 35.000 or 40.000 members cannot know
23 everything that its top leadership does. That is one point.
24 The second point is that many things that I presented here today
25 are things that were unknown to the public of Serbia. Until now these
1 were secret matters, as far as many politicians were concerned, as far as,
2 unfortunately, many members of my party were concerned as well, because
3 Mr. Milosevic concealed these facts so they really do not know about
4 everything that I took part in. That is true. As a party, they do not
5 know about everything that I took part in but therefore, the Ministry of
6 the Interior, Mr. Dusan Mihajlovic, knows that full well and he knows that
7 for two and a half years I have not been in the country and I never said
8 that in this courtroom I represent Novo Demokracija. I said that I am a
9 private person here, that after torture and after kidnapping, I have been
10 an exiled person, so for two and a half years they haven't known whether
11 I've been dead or alive.
12 Q. The question did not relate to your current status, that I also
13 have my doubts, but their claim - and this is not a membership of 30.000,
14 this is your party - that you are talking about something that they are
15 not aware of your participation in, and you claim that you did participate
16 in this. Is that right or is that not right?
17 A. Could you please tell me who signed this press release? I never
18 said that I participated in this through them. This was in the
19 president's office, Mr. Mihajlovic's office.
20 Q. And who was the president of the party?
21 JUDGE MAY: Both slow down for the record.
22 Now, the witness, I think, has dealt with the question of whether
23 the party knew or not. Have you got another question?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let me just ask him one more
25 thing. How does he react to the fact that some persons that he mentioned
1 yesterday in relation to the talks that he allegedly had with them sent
2 letters this morning that they are challenging everything he said in its
3 entirety? I have a letter of Ratko Markovic stating that he had no talks
4 with him before going to Rambouillet, and --
5 JUDGE MAY: You can call Mr. Markovic. You can call him to give
6 evidence and deny it.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can I answer this?
9 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Yes, you can answer about Mr.
10 Markovic, but shortly.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] But I didn't put a question.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My talks, my work, can be shown and
13 proven through independent statements from at least three sides.
14 Mr. Milosevic can seek these statements, and of course people now are
15 going to deny, after this was said, that they had ever met me, because
16 they will be afraid to go through the same things that I went through, an
17 attempt of assassination, et cetera. I can always prove all my contacts
18 from at least two or three independent sources.
19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Are you accusing me of some kind of an assassination attempt?
21 JUDGE MAY: Don't reply to that.
22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. All right. Since you won't let me show these other letters, I
24 will go on, but please save my time and do not interject.
25 What are you by profession?
1 A. I'm a political emigre now, but before that, I was a businessman.
2 Q. And what kind of an education do you have? What did you train
4 A. I graduated from elementary school and I am literate.
5 Q. What was that?
6 A. I don't want to answer questions of this nature, because I already
7 had them put to me in a basement while I was tortured by your men.
8 Q. I don't know who tortured you because you say yourself that these
9 were people who were against me. I'm not going to go into all of that
10 now. Now I'm putting a very legitimate question to you, because I'm
11 trying to establish your credibility. What kind of education do you have?
12 That is no secret.
13 A. I studied economics and philosophy, Mr. Milosevic.
14 Q. Did you graduate?
15 A. That really is not for this Court to deal with, or is it for me to
16 deal with. I don't really think I have to answer this kind of question.
17 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tanic, is there any reason why you can't tell us
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Because I do not wish to do that,
20 because I was not an expert witness here in order to have my education
21 established. I said very precisely --
22 JUDGE MAY: These are some very basic questions. It seems to me
23 there's no prejudice to you in answering them. Now, is there any reason
24 at all why you can't tell us if you graduated or not?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, of course there is a reason,
1 because why would I answer personal questions? The next question, then,
2 is going to be my sock size. I didn't ask Mr. Milosevic what kind of
3 school he graduated from, so --
4 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tanic, you will answer proper questions and you
5 will answer properly. That was a perfectly proper question. There's no
6 reason the Court can see why you shouldn't answer. If you choose not to,
7 the fact that you don't will be noted.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Very well. I studied economics and
9 philosophy, and as for the question where I graduated from and what kind
10 of a degree I have, that is a question that I am unwilling to answer, and
11 I hope I have the right to say that.
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Therefore, are you an ungraduated student of philosophy and
16 economics; one who has not graduated?
17 A. Well, that can be -- from my previous question, I said that I did
18 not want to answer that question, and I don't want to answer it in any
19 other way. I said nothing here to do with a diploma linked to the faculty
20 of philosophy or economics.
21 Q. Right, so what you're saying is your education level is a
22 secondary education level; is that it? A gymnasium.
23 A. No, I did not complete a gymnasium, a secondary school.
24 Q. What school do you have, then?
25 A. Secondary economics school.
1 Q. All right, so secondary economics, school of economics; is that
3 A. No, that's not what I said. We would have to call in experts here
4 to ascertain the level of education, and I don't wish to answer questions
5 that have nothing to do with this trial.
6 Q. But they do have to do with this trial, because I'm trying to
7 establish your credibility, and of course your answers here do that for
8 me. Now, where were you employed and where did you receive a salary
9 during the time you say you were performing all these tasks, doing all
10 this work that you claim you were doing? During that time, where were you
12 A. I received a salary and therefore was employed in my own
13 enterprise, my own company.
14 Q. Where did you say? Where were you employed?
15 A. In my own company.
16 Q. Oh, your own company.
17 A. Yes. I had three companies.
18 Q. Your present job, does it entail the duty to give out insider
19 explanations to this false accusation that has been raised here, false
21 A. No. I am not duty-bound with respect to this trial at all or with
22 respect to any insider explanations or any other political obligations
23 with anything that is false or true, nor do I know that this is a false
24 indictment, as you have termed it.
25 Q. And do you understand that it is very easy to see how parts of the
1 indictment coincide with the pamphlet you wrote on 30 pages, that you
2 wrote in the form of your statement? Do you realise that?
3 A. If there is a coincidence, then probably coincidence of fact. I
4 did not write the indictment, and I doubt that I am qualified to write it.
5 We talked about that a moment ago. So quite certainly I did not study
7 Q. And do you know it is a generally known fact that the indictment
8 was compiled in cooperation with the British service which you worked for?
9 JUDGE MAY: Totally irrelevant. Not for the witness to deal with.
10 Next question.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And is this fact relevant: The fact
12 that Mr. Nice presented, which was that when the statements of this
13 witness were made, that there were two members of the British intelligence
14 service present. Is that a relevant fact?
15 A. Are you asking me or are you asking the Tribunal?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm asking the Tribunal.
17 JUDGE MAY: That is a matter you can ask about, yes. Yes,
18 Mr. Milosevic.
19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Now, if you did not take part and cooperate in writing the
21 indictment, why, then, would they change your identity and ensure a new
22 country for you to reside in and spend enormous money on your protection
23 programme, when you are allegedly testifying here to some generally known
24 political matters?
25 A. I'm not testifying here on general political matters but very
1 specific secrets which your regime tried to hush up, and they are
2 providing protection for me, I assume, because with all their check-outs
3 that they have done, they have established that I was at least the victim
4 of torture, perhaps even an attempted murder, together with my wife, and
5 people from the British intelligence service was there as security and not
6 to tell me what to do or what to write. Because they did not know about
7 many of the things that you did, so how could they tell me what to do?
8 Q. And how many people from the British intelligence service were
9 present while you were making your statement?
10 A. First of all, I don't know whether they were people from the
11 British service or from the British Security Service. There's a vast
12 difference between the two. For brief periods of time, one person would
13 be present for physical protection, and he was never present throughout
14 nor did he influence the proceedings and statement in any way.
15 Q. I would like to ask you to answer my questions. Your opinions and
16 your explanations are something else.
17 A. No, those are facts.
18 Q. Well, I'm not interested in them. Now, are you clear on the
19 following: Do you know at least that in writing the indictment, the same
20 individuals participated from Serbia who throughout all these years were
21 the internal fulcrum for the media war against Serbia?
22 JUDGE MAY: The writing of the indictment is nothing to do with
23 this witness. It's a matter for the Prosecution. So there's no point
24 asking him questions about it. Now, have you got another question for
1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Well, don't you think that, in fact, it is precisely by what you
3 have written in your statement and through your oral testimony that in a
4 way you have in fact confirmed that you are -- were one of the associates,
5 in a way, in the writing of the indictment? Just yes or no.
6 JUDGE MAY: No. Not for him.
7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. And is it clear to you that you are appearing here in that
9 so-called role of an insider, the role of an insider which you in fact did
10 not have?
11 JUDGE MAY: That's a matter of comment too.
12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Do you understand that every literate citizen of Serbia can
14 compare that, what you're saying here and what it says in the indictment?
15 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you are wasting your time and the time
16 of the Court with these comments. Now, there are two minutes left. You
17 can ask another question.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'd like to move on to the
19 point that was made about ethnic cleansing, but as you tell me that I have
20 only two minutes left, then it would be senseless to go into that now, to
21 move on to that area now. So let me ask one interim question, if I can
22 put it that way, a brief one.
23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Why did you seek the status of a secret witness?
25 A. No, I did not seek for that, nor was it the status of a secret
1 witness. I'm here with my name and surname, Mr. Milosevic.
2 Q. Oh, come on.
3 A. How can I be a secret witness if I have a name and a surname?
4 JUDGE MAY: No. Just a moment. Just a moment. There's too much
5 interruption going on.
6 Right. You've got one more question.
7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Are you aware of the fact - let me rephrase my question - that
9 until the day before yesterday, until the end of business the day before
10 yesterday, you were before this illegal institution as a secret witness
11 under the term K3, the code term K3?
12 A. That, Mr. Milosevic, is something I neither knew nor sought to
13 know. And as I am testifying here under my own name and surname, I don't
14 know that, and I'm here under my own name and not under some secret name.
15 And you can sully the name as much as you like.
16 JUDGE MAY: We're going to adjourn now.
17 [Trial Chamber confers]
18 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, if you want us to have the witness
19 statement at any time, the statement of this witness, perhaps you could
20 let the Court know and we'll have copies of them so we can read it over
21 the adjournment, if there's some point you want to make on the statement.
22 You can think about that.
23 We'll adjourn now. 9.00 tomorrow morning.
24 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,
25 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 16th day of May,
1 2002, at 9.00 a.m.