1 Friday, 14 June 2002
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.01 a.m.
6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
7 WITNESS: KLAUS NAUMANN [Resumed]
8 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]
9 Q. [Interpretation] Well, let's continue where we left off
10 yesterday. I was asking you about the goals. Tell me, please: Who
11 approved the bombing of the central television station, central studios of
12 Radio Television Serbia? Because, as you know, it was a completely
13 civilian target; there was no military in the building at all.
14 A. Well, with regard to your last point, Mr. Milosevic, there are
15 some doubts whether it was a completely civilian target, as you
16 intimated. Some people believe that it was also used for communication
17 purposes. The bombing of the TV tower was eventually approved by the
18 Secretary-General of NATO.
19 Q. Here, in this statement, which this institution has prepared and
20 which is called "Final Report," submitted to the Prosecution for a team
21 set up to look into the bombing campaign of NATO into the Federal Republic
22 of Yugoslavia, is that the representatives of NATO in Brussels told
23 Amnesty International that they did not issue any concrete warning because
24 that would jeopardise the pilots. Is that correct?
25 A. What do you mean with "any concrete warning"? To whom? Warning
1 to whom.
2 Q. Concrete warning, which was otherwise envisaged that a warning be
3 issued, according to Article 57 of the Second Protocol of the Geneva
4 Conventions, when you are targeting a target of that nature. And it says
5 here in the Prosecution document, the material supplied by the
6 Prosecution, that you said in Brussels that you did not issue any concrete
7 warning because that would jeopardise the pilot. Is that so?
8 A. I should have said this, Mr. Milosevic? Me? I should have said
10 Q. No. No. It doesn't say any name here. It doesn't state
11 anybody's name. All it says is the representatives of NATO, that they
12 said that they didn't issue any specific concrete warning.
13 A. Well, the issue of warning was discussed in the NATO council, that
14 is correct, and it was said that we had issued a clear statement that we
15 would attack targets throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and it
16 was regarded as sufficient.
17 Q. All right. Yes, that. But as it says here, and I was quoting
18 it: Possibly the casualties among the civilians working in Radio
19 Television Serbia are great because of the lack -- the fact that NATO
20 didn't issue a warning. Now, as you are attacking the whole of
21 Yugoslavia, then, by the same token, you consider that all the targets
22 have in fact been announced. Is that what you want to say, having
23 announced a general warning?
24 A. To some extent, yes. But I also have to add, and you should note,
25 that I was only there until the 6th of May. I do not know, and I never
1 followed that in detail, since there was no longer any need for me to know
2 that in detail and I had no access to classified information any longer,
3 that some changes took place after the unfortunate event on the Chinese
4 embassy on the 7th of May, and I'm not aware of the details of the
5 discussion then. All I could say was what happened until the 6th of May,
6 and there the policy clearly was that we should target targets of a
7 military nature, and that was what we did.
8 Q. As you've already mentioned the Chinese embassy, I should like to
9 ask you to comment on just one paragraph. There is quite a lot about the
10 Chinese Embassy here because allegedly you didn't know where the Chinese
11 embassy was although hundreds of foreign diplomats attended receptions at
12 that same Chinese embassy and knew full well where the building was
13 located and so on and so forth. But let me quote here what it says under
14 point 85 in the material that the Prosecution has provided me.
15 "It is the commission's view that the crew of the plane that
16 attacked -- launched the attack," and I'm talking about the Chinese
17 embassy, "need not be ascribed any responsibility for the fact that they
18 had been given the wrong target to attack. And also that it is
19 unacceptable that higher officials be taken to task because the officials
20 from other agencies got wrong information."
21 Now, may you have your comments to that passage? Is this making
22 fun of the Chinese and the truth at the same time?
23 A. Mr. Milosevic, do I not want to duck your point, but I would like
24 to remind you that I was no longer in NATO when this happened. So I'm --
25 I really do not know much more about this event of the Chinese embassy
1 than what was published in the press. So I'm awfully sorry. I cannot
2 give you any further information.
3 Q. All right. As we don't have much time, I would like to ask you a
4 collective question. How do you explain the attacks on the convoys of
5 Albanian refugees? How do you explain the targeting of the Dr. Dragisa
6 Misovic hospital in Belgrade including the maternity ward of that
7 particular hospital, the casualties that resulted on the -- from that --
8 JUDGE MAY: One question at a time, Mr. Milosevic.
9 The first question concerned the attacks as alleged on the convoys
10 of Albanian refugees. Can you assist as to that?
11 No. You can't put a series of questions to a witness and expect
12 him to answer. It's neither fair nor rational.
13 Now, the first question related to the convoys.
14 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I think it had been clearly stated by
15 NATO that this was a tragic error, a pilot's error which happened, and I
16 think no one regrets more than any of the military in NATO that something
17 like this happened. It's one of those unfortunate events which happened
18 in war operations.
19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. All right. So that is your explanation, then.
21 Now, tell me this: Who approved the use of cluster bombs, the
22 cluster bombs that were thrown, as you know, throughout Kosovo on towns,
23 including one of the largest towns in Serbia, Nis, in the central urban
24 district of Nis which is where many citizens were wounded, especially
25 children, by these cluster bombs. So who approved the use of cluster
1 bombs, and who approved the use of the depleted uranium devices that were
3 A. Okay. Two questions. The first one, the cluster bombs. I'm not
4 aware that cluster bombs were used against cities during the time that I
5 was in the Military Committee. The use of cluster bombs against military
6 targets was included in the approval of the air operation in general, and
7 the final approval on the air operation was given by the NATO council.
8 With regard to depleted uranium munitions, they were part of the
9 equipment of the -- of an American aircraft which was used against tanks,
10 and this ammunition belongs to the equipment of this aircraft. And since
11 the aircraft was accepted in the order of battle, it was also part of the
12 general approval of the air operation.
13 Q. Does that include the fact that as you say that in the fight
14 against tanks that they were not to be used in the bombing of urban
15 centres such as Nis, the town I mentioned, in front of the hospital, the
16 marketplace, the university building in Nis, and various other places?
17 A. Well, if -- if there were no military targets hidden in these
18 buildings or in these areas, then the munitions were not used against
19 civilian targets. If someone used camouflage tactics to hide tanks, let's
20 say, in a hospital surrounding, then the question is: Who violated
21 international law first, those who took advantage of coverage protected by
22 the International Red Cross in bringing military targets into the area of
23 those protected areas or those who then attacked these military targets?
24 I have to state in front of this Court, Your Honours, that I am
25 not -- I do not recall a single event where NATO attacked a hospital. I'm
1 not aware of that.
2 Q. All right. You're not aware of that. That's an answer too.
3 Now, you said that the exercises and training of our army in the
4 winter of 1999 was allegedly a preparation for an action against the
5 Kosovo Albanians. I'm now going to ask you, as a general, in view of the
6 threats made by NATO from the middle of 1998 already and the
7 intensification of those threats towards the end of 1998 and the beginning
8 of 1999, was it logical to you that a country which is being threatened
9 and on whose borders both towards Macedonia and towards Albania there is
10 an amassment, build-up of NATO troops, that that country should undertake
11 nothing with respect to the deployment of its forces in order to protect
12 its own country?
13 A. Well, the defence of a country and of your country in that case, I
14 think, is absolutely legitimate. I would not -- I would not oppose such
15 action being taken from a military point of view if one could clearly see
16 that these exercises were meant to reinforce border protection troops.
17 That, I think, was not as clearly evident as it -- as you just intimated.
18 When we saw as troop movements in these winter exercises seemed to
19 be a preparedness for forces outside Kosovo to deploy into Kosovo. Had
20 the entire thing been done in such a way, Mr. Milosevic, that you had
21 brought up to full wartime strength your 52nd Corps in Pristina and
22 deployed it at the borders of Kosovo and then trained the reinforcement of
23 those border elements, one could have seen a little bit more logic in
24 that. But otherwise, since we did not know much more than what we learned
25 from signal intelligence and satellite imagery, we came to the conclusion
1 that you deployed forces in order to bring them into the Kosovo area, and
2 with that you left ambiguous signals with us. One interpretation is the
3 one you gave. The other one is that you prepared forces for actions
4 against the civilian population in Kosovo. The only one who really knows
5 it, Mr. Milosevic, is either you or the chief of General Staff.
6 Q. Well, all right. Answer me this, then, a professional question:
7 As you mentioned the 3rd Army, within whose area of responsibility was the
8 protection of borders towards Albania and Macedonia, as the 3rd Army, in
9 view of the proclamation of a state of war, once you decided to attack
10 Yugoslavia, and as it numbered over 150.000 men, what would you say the
11 depth of deployment ought to be of an army numbering this many men,
12 150.000 men? Can they make a line along the border or must their in-depth
13 deployment be over a large area? And as you know, the Kosovo area and the
14 southern part of Serbia and generally that part of the country is not very
15 big in order to be able to have a different pattern of deployment. So
16 what would you say the depth of deployment and the area it covers ought to
17 be for a strategic formation of that magnitude?
18 A. Well, Mr. Milosevic, I think you would definitely be right in what
19 you presented in these statements a minute ago if there were not the fact
20 that NATO had publicly ruled out the use of ground forces. I should say,
21 from a military point of view, that was not the wisest of all decisions,
22 but it was the decision that was taken. And you also saw, and your
23 intelligence services saw, that there was no deployment of ground forces
24 of NATO which really mattered in either Macedonia or in Albania. The
25 small NATO elements which were there were part of the KVM protection
1 force, and they were so small that there was no need for you to deploy
2 anything but, let's say, a thin wheel of border-protecting forces, since
3 your Pristina Corps, I think, outnumbered the NATO forces which were there
4 in Macedonia and Albania by a large degree.
5 So there was no need for you to deploy army elements, and for that
6 reason I think all these preparations of the 3rd Army are, to some extent,
7 at least, questionable. I cannot see a military justification for that,
8 since no ground forces were there, and you knew exactly that NATO would
9 need a couple of weeks to deploy ground forces in a sufficient number to
10 launch a ground operation against Kosovo, which, by the way, as you know
11 as well as I, is difficult to launch anyway.
12 Q. General Naumann, you're not really going to deny the fact that we
13 had up in the area the threat looming with a ground force invasion as
15 A. Mr. Milosevic, that is not correct. The threat of a ground
16 invasion began to emerge with first signals after the Washington Summit,
17 and from that moment on we tried - and I have no difficulties to tell the
18 Court this - we tried to send signals to you which could indicate that a
19 ground operation was about to happen. But before the Washington Summit,
20 nothing like this was under consideration. It was repeatedly stated in
21 public by NATO political leaders that no ground forces were envisaged, and
22 on that ground, Mr. Milosevic, all preparations of the 3rd Army and of the
23 52nd Corps cannot be related to the defence of Kosovo and of Yugoslavia,
24 since there was no threat of a ground invasion.
25 Q. Now, as you're talking about the 3rd Army, do you know that the
1 1st Army had been deployed because our side expected a possible ground
2 invasion from the north as well? Do you think that we should have trusted
3 and had confidence in what you were stating, what you were saying as to
4 what you were going to do, or not, in a situation where there was bombing
5 24 hours around the clock? Why did we deploy the 1st Army, for example,
6 towards the northern stretches?
7 A. Well, I do not know what the threat assessment of your General
8 Staff was, but the 1st Army, if I recall it properly, is in the northern
9 part of Yugoslavia. If you deployed them outside of their garrisons, then
10 it was a protective measure, presumably, to protect them against air
11 attacks in the barracks. If you look at NATO forces in the north, you
12 saw, and you may have noticed, that first of all there were no substantial
13 NATO elements in the neighbouring country of Hungary and that the
14 Hungarian armed forces were not in alert status. They were sitting in
15 their garrisons and were doing peacetime training. So there was no reason
16 at all to be afraid of a ground invasion from the north since no forces
17 were there which could invade your country.
18 Q. You, therefore, consider that we, without any reason at all,
19 counted with this possibility of a ground invasion. Now, you, as the
20 Chief of General Staff of an army upon whom an aggression was launched, of
21 a country an aggression was launched against, when you have the world's
22 greatest power before you, would you have excluded the possibility,
23 really, of a ground invasion and given up deploying your troops in
24 readiness for that kind of invasion? As a general, would you have done
1 A. Well, Mr. Milosevic, again I have to say I'm not aware of the risk
2 assessments of your General Staff. I have always lived in my military
3 life that I should take decisions to deploy forces only if I have a real
4 reason to fear that something may happen in the concerned area. In the
5 case of the northern part of your country, I think your General Staff
6 would have really arrived at an assessment of the situation which is not
7 based on facts if they believed that something could happen from the north
8 without a preparation which may take four to six weeks or more, and there
9 were no indications at all that forces were deployed to Hungary. And you
10 also know from your political background that the country of Hungary has
11 very strict rules with regard to the deployment of foreign forces on
12 Hungarian territory. It requires an approval of the Hungarian parliament
13 and the Hungarian president. Nothing like this was in the making. And
14 all of this is in a democracy, done in the open, in the public, so your
15 General Staff had, I think, every assurance that nothing could happen from
16 the north without a warning time of six to eight weeks.
17 Q. All right. That is customary that there are no war secrets and
18 that everything is public.
19 Now, you said that the plans for the deployment of these troops
20 were probably prepared at least three or four months previously. Do you
21 know that our army has plans, defence plans, plans for the country's
22 defence, planned decades ahead, and that they are always updated,
23 continuously or from time to time, depending on the risk assessment of the
24 situation that prevails, and that every country does this; every country
25 has ready made defence plans. They're not made once the country is
1 actually threatened. Are you aware of that?
2 A. Mr. Milosevic, I'm aware of that, and I did not talk about plans
3 of your General Staff to defend your country. I suggested that the
4 operation, which obviously was prepared to act inside your country, and
5 that is something which is different from the defence of the country, was
6 obviously prepared well before the operation really started in March
8 Q. So you're saying that you consider that a country which has
9 proclaimed a state of war, having been attacked and having become the
10 victim of aggression, should not put into effect its measures and defence
11 plan but should do something quite different regardless of how great the
12 threat from outside is. That in fact it is not threatened from outside,
13 it's just that it's -- hasn't got enough to busy itself with and has
14 decided to undertake these measures to become occupied.
15 A. Well, again I should say the only one who really knows the truth
16 about all this is you, Mr. Milosevic, since you are the commander -- you
17 were the Commander-in-Chief of the Yugoslav armed forces. We could only
18 come to conclusions based on what we saw on the ground, what we heard by
19 listening to your command channels, as far as we could do this, and
20 whatever information we gained through intelligence. And based on that,
21 we came to the conclusion that preparations were taken for military
22 operations other than the defence of Kosovo, operations which obviously
23 were partially aimed, at least, at the population of Kosovo and operations
24 which were launched before NATO dropped its bomb.
25 Q. That, as you know, is not true, but I can't waste my time on that
1 because my time is limited. Now, could you give me a brief answer if
2 possible, please, to the following questions. My time is very limited.
3 After the beginning of the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia, did you
4 make statements for the public at NATO headquarters in Brussels on several
5 occasions? That's a fact, isn't it? You did do so?
6 A. I had to give from time to time some statements in the press, yes.
7 Q. And in those statements were figures such as 100, 500.000
8 allegedly killed Albanians mentioned?
9 A. Five hundred thousand, you said? Five hundred thousand killed
10 Albanians? I never said this.
11 Q. Which were the figures mentioned in your announcements to the
12 effect that Albanians were being killed, hundreds of thousands of
13 Albanians? Is that true or not?
14 A. I do not recall that I said on any occasion that hundreds of
15 thousands of Albanians were killed. The figures which I mentioned were
16 those which I mentioned yesterday in my testimony here, that more than --
17 Q. I'm not saying you personally but your spokesman.
18 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you must make it plain. If you say
19 "you" to the witness, he's bound to think that it refers to him.
20 Do you know, General, of a spokesman saying anything of this
22 THE WITNESS: Well, Your Honour, I cannot recall that a NATO
23 spokesman said -- spoke of one hundreds of thousands of killed Albanians.
24 I'm not aware of any of those statements, and I can only assure the
25 accused and Your Honours that in all the statements for which I had
1 responsibility in the NATO council, we never used figures like this in
2 order to indicate the magnitude of casualties or killed people of the
3 population of Albania, never.
4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Very well. In point 35 of your statement that I have in front of
6 me, paragraph 35, based on your interview with the investigator, you said
7 that on the 25th of October, 1998, it was established that there were
8 10.000 in peacetime. Let me remind you. Ten thousand and twenty-four was
9 the figure, and that is correct. There's no need to dispute that. But
10 then in paragraph 35 you say that NATO had proof that the Yugoslavs had at
11 least 500 excess police.
12 First of all, that is not true. But even if it were and if the
13 number of 10.000 was increased by 500 policemen, that is 5 per cent, which
14 is statistically considered negligible. So a 5 per cent increase, is that
15 a reason why we should constantly be threatened with airstrikes? Please
16 give me a yes or no answer so we don't waste any more time.
17 A. There's no need to waste any time, Mr. Milosevic, since what I
18 said in this statement is, I think, crystal clear. We discussed not the
19 percentages and whether it is necessary to mention it or not. The fact
20 was that we provided this figure to you in order to indicate that you were
21 not in compliance with the agreement, that's all. And that was what we
22 had as our intelligence at the time. Whether this was the truth or not is
23 again a point which only you can reveal to this Court.
24 Q. My question was whether this number could be a cause for such
25 threats of bombardment regardless of --
1 JUDGE MAY: The witness has answered. He has explained why the
2 figure was given. It's nothing to do with airstrikes.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. We noted yesterday that you were aware that the KLA was abusing
6 the October agreement because it engaged in all the activities that we
7 referred to yesterday. So when you became aware that the KLA was abusing
8 that agreement, why did you continue to threaten Yugoslavia when it was
9 clear that it was the KLA that was engaging in these abuses?
10 A. Mr. Milosevic, I tried to explain this yesterday, and I said that
11 many of the incidents were indeed triggered by the KLA, but your security
12 forces reacted to these incidents with disproportionate force, and then
13 they triggered the next step of escalation. So it's not a one-sided
14 picture which you can portray here. It's both sides which were not
15 behaving as they should, and you cannot one-sidedly accuse the KLA for
16 being responsible for everything. There were also incidents which were
17 triggered by your forces.
18 Q. That question as to what is proportionate and what is
19 disproportionate I hope is a relative issue. I hope we can agree on
21 A. I don't think that this is an issue which one can simply put
22 aside. I think you -- you will find a lot of sympathy if you defend your
23 country against terrorist attacks, against subversive attacks with means
24 which everyone regards as legitimate and proportionate.
25 And I tried to explain this yesterday in front of this Court, and,
1 Your Honours, I repeat it today. If they are terrorist incidents, I think
2 it is the normal reaction of a country to defend itself by using the
3 police forces. But it's disproportionate, at least in the view of the
4 countries which I know, to use tanks and artillery to shell villages and
5 cause casualties among the civilians and then go after the terrorists.
6 Q. That, Mr. Naumann, simply is not true, but let us go back to the
7 agreement that you referred to yesterday or, rather, which the other party
8 showed yesterday, and that is this piece of paper, single piece of paper,
9 with a few lines on it. And it is true that this is my signature.
10 There's absolutely no dispute over that. But one can see quite clearly, I
11 hope, that I was not the signatory of the agreement. I accepted your
12 request that by signing an agreement that you signed, Mr. Naumann and
13 Mr. Clark together with Sainovic and General Djordjevic, because they were
14 your partners, I confirmed that I approved such an agreement because that
15 is what you requested of me. And you said to me, "Please confirm that you
16 approve this agreement." And I said, "Okay. I'll put my signature on it
17 as confirmation that I approve this agreement." So there's no mystery
18 about it.
19 But I do draw your attention to the following: Since this
20 agreement was not really an agreement, it just says a record of a meeting
21 indicating who was present. In the second it says that the aim of the
22 meeting is to discuss specific steps. So the first item is a list of
23 attendees. The second is to discuss specific steps that need to be taken
24 for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to fully comply with the request
25 contained in UN Resolution 1199. And the third item is the position of
1 the government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the government of
2 Serbia, which is presented in the attached announcement which the military
3 representatives of NATO took note of, and you signed this. So this is a
4 technical document, whereas the substance is contained in the announcement
5 that this document refers to and which was not produced here, but it says,
6 and I will just quote --
7 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness finish. You've been talking now for
8 three minutes. It's time that we had a question.
9 General, is the final comment correct, that this was merely a
10 technical document and the substance was contained in an announcement?
11 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, if I understood Mr. Milosevic
12 correctly, then he said that the first page, the page which has the
13 signatures on it, is a technical document. And if he refers to this one
14 page, then he is undoubtedly correct. This is a record of a meeting, and
15 I would regard this as a technical document as well.
16 But para 3 of this technical document speaks of an attached
17 statement, and the attached statement is, with that word, I think an
18 integral part of this entire document. And we had asked Mr. Milosevic
19 also to take note and to authorise the actions which were contained in
20 what is then called the statement. And as a matter of fact, I should
21 again state that Mr. Milosevic obviously authorised the actions since
22 we -- we saw the compliance of the Serb security forces with the
24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Mr. Naumann, is it clear to you that that is precisely what I am
2 A. Well, Mr. Milosevic, I think that was already discussed yesterday,
3 and I stated in front of the Court that you were, for a couple of days, in
4 compliance with the statement and that you also asked the withdrawal of
5 the forces, as requested.
6 Q. Of course. But let me just remind you, because I was interrupted
7 by Mr. May in my explanation, because as you yourself say, this was an
8 integral part of this note. And it says, proceeding from the fact that
9 organised terrorism in Kosmet has been defeated, that:
10 "Since the 29th of September, 1998, no further operations are
11 being undertaken against the terrorists. The authorities of the Federal
12 Republic of Yugoslavia have decided, among other things, to take a series
13 of measures which will contribute to the further confidence building among
14 citizens, members of all national communities living in Kosmet, as well as
15 to the resolution of all outstanding humanitarian problems, and especially
16 the problem of the earliest possible return of all displaced persons to
17 their homes. These measures are being taken with the clear objective to
18 normalise life as soon as possible throughout Kosmet, ensuring security
19 and well-being of all citizens and innocent civilians of Kosmet, and
20 guaranteeing the rights of all citizens, members of all national
21 communities inhabiting Kosovo and Metohija, to continue their everyday
22 life without any restrictions, which complies freedom of movement of all
23 citizens and representatives of state authorities, as well as the normal
24 operation of all state bodies."
25 And then it goes on to say that these forces should be reduced to
1 the normal strength, that is, the strength prior to the outbreak of
2 terrorist activities. And then it goes into the detail. So there's no
3 dispute over that.
4 And now I wish to draw your attention to paragraph III. I will
5 not read it out in its entirety either, but it says, among other things,
7 "The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia calls on all other parties to
8 unconditionally abide by Resolution 1199. The Federal Republic of
9 Yugoslavia will continue, by peaceful means and in cooperation with the
10 OSCE, to find solutions to all outstanding problems."
11 And then at the end it says:
12 "However, the state authorities, as an extreme measure, and in
13 accordance with the right to self-protection, retain the right adequately
14 and proportionately to reply to all forms of terrorist activity and
15 violations of the law threatening the lives and security of citizens and
16 representatives of state bodies."
17 Is that correct, Mr. Naumann?
18 A. Mr. Milosevic, you just read out the statement which is in front
19 of the Court, which is part of the evidence which this Court has, and I
20 have nothing to add to that.
21 Q. Therefore, we did retain the right to respond to terrorism if it
22 rears its head again, and that is precisely what we did when terrorism
23 escalated, as it did, as you yourself stated. So is it not the legitimate
24 right of a state to defend itself from terrorism?
25 A. May I draw your attention, Mr. Milosevic, to two words which are
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 included in this statement, and that is "adequately" and
2 "proportionately," and that is obviously the point where we have a
3 different point of view. No one challenges your right to defend your
4 country. The question is whether you were in compliance with the
5 obligation you took in this para III to respond adequately and
6 proportionately, and there, as I have stated yesterday and repeat it
7 today, I have every evidence that you were not in compliance with this
9 Q. Yes, but the withdrawal of the army, as you yourself noted,
10 created a vacuum, and the KLA filled in that vacuum, constantly killing
11 civilians and members of the police and the army. Are you aware of that?
12 A. I'm aware of that. I stated this yesterday. But there is also
13 another side of the coin which has to be considered, and that is that your
14 police forces took much more action than they were entitled to in the
15 agreement on the police, since they increased mobile patrols and
16 established, soon after the withdrawal of the excess police forces,
17 additional checkpoints, which was monitored by the KDOM and by the KVM.
18 So it's not only the KLA which took action; it is also to some extent your
19 police, which was not in full compliance with this agreement.
20 Q. Isn't an increase of strength at checkpoints the result of the
21 terrorist presence and, as we see from this document, in compliance with
22 our right that we retain to react adequately in response to that? A
23 checkpoint is no offensive unit or phenomenon; it's just a checkpoint,
24 which needs to be strengthened if somebody shoots at it. Two policemen
25 cannot man it and get killed. There need to be 10 or 15 to be able to
1 defend themselves if a terrorist group appears. Isn't that logical,
2 Mr. Naumann?
3 A. If everything had happened in that way you just described,
4 Mr. Milosevic, one could find a lot of sympathy for that point and it
5 would be legitimate. But there was also -- there were actions where your
6 police established checkpoints in areas where nothing had happened. They
7 simply wanted to keep tight control of every movement of citizens, unarmed
8 citizens, often absolutely innocent people who did nothing but peasants'
9 work or things like this and were arrested by the police. So I think we
10 would end in an endless discussion on who triggered which incident at
11 which time. I think the fair statement is, as I said it yesterday and
12 repeated it today: Many of these incidents were triggered by the KLA, but
13 some of them were also caused by your police forces, and we saw an
14 unfortunate tit for tat and an escalation.
15 Q. Very well, Mr. Naumann. Whether a checkpoint was placed were
16 unarmed citizens were moving implies that you would know where the armed
17 ones were moving around, but even the police couldn't know where the armed
18 citizens were moving, and you certainly couldn't know, to be able to claim
19 that the checkpoint was a place where unarmed citizens were passing
20 through. Isn't that right?
21 A. That's not correct, Mr. Milosevic. Of course we did not know
22 where the armed civilians were and were the unarmed civilians were. What
23 I just reflected was a statement of fact, that there were incidents where
24 police people arrested peasants who were just doing their normal work on
25 the fields, and there was no evidence at all of any terrorist attack.
1 Q. Very well. Let us be as efficient as possible, please. Do you
2 know that Zivorad Jovanovic, the then foreign minister of Yugoslavia, at
3 the end of December 1998, addressed a letter to Kofi Annan, informing him
4 that in the course of 1998, 1.854 terrorist attacks had been carried out
5 in Kosovo, involving the death of 244 persons and the wounding of 566?
6 Are you aware of this letter addressed to Kofi Annan containing these data
7 linked to the UN resolution and all the efforts being invested and
8 everything else? Quite impressive figures, I would say, of course in the
9 negative sense. Just tell me whether you're aware of it or not, please.
10 Yes or no.
11 A. Yes, I was aware of this letter, but you may forgive me that I
12 don't recall the details at this moment.
13 Q. Very well. And do you know that out of that, 470 terrorist
14 attacks were carried out after the signing of the October agreement,
15 together with 22 violations of the frontiers of the Federal Republic of
17 A. Mr. Milosevic, that may be correct. I do not know the precise
18 figures. We monitored the events as good as we could. And the only thing
19 which I would add as a comment is I would have hoped that Mr. Jovanovic
20 had included in his letter as well the incidents in early spring 1998,
21 which were not triggered by terrorist attacks, as you said, but which
22 obviously were triggered by actions of your security forces.
23 Q. The early spring in Prekaz and Jasar, these were events that we
24 have discussed here, and it is quite clear how many people were killed
25 prior to that by them, so I won't dwell on that.
1 Tell me, please: In your opinion, how many soldiers, policemen,
2 and civilians did the KLA need to kill for the state to have the
3 legitimate right to fight against it?
4 A. Mr. Milosevic, I think it would be -- it really would be ludicrous
5 to establish a figure which triggers the right of a state to respond. A
6 state has the right to respond to every violation of the internal order.
7 The question is again and again, and there's a point where we really
8 differ --
9 Q. Thank you.
10 A. -- the proportionality or not.
11 Q. Very well. You think Blair, in Ulster, in mid-1998 --
12 JUDGE MAY: Irrelevant. Let's move on.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Everything is irrelevant.
14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. The OSCE verifiers, or anyone else, did they inform you about the
16 influx of weapons for the KLA from Albania?
17 A. The OSCE informed NATO regularly on evidence they had, and as you
18 may know, NATO considered actions to stop the flow of weapons through
19 Albania into Yugoslavia, and some of these actions were indeed taken and
20 were implemented with the consent of the government of Albania.
21 Q. Did NATO succeed in stopping the flow of weapons from Albania into
23 A. Mr. Milosevic, you know better the conditions on the Balkan
24 state. Ever in history anyone succeed in stopping all smuggling on the
1 Q. That is absolutely an exaggeration. But you will agree with me
2 that NATO was not powerless to stop the inflow of weapons from Albania,
3 and in that connection I have the following question: Paddy Ashdown
4 stated here, sitting in your place, that he informed his government about
5 this, which did nothing in that connection, and Klaus Kinkel, in August
6 1998, declared that Germany did nothing either to stop the flow of weapons
7 for the KLA. So did you, I mean NATO - Clark, you, NATO - do something of
8 substance to stop the flow of weapons from Albania?
9 A. Mr. Milosevic, I think we did something of substance. We
10 discussed all possible steps how to stop the flow of weapons. We proposed
11 a couple of measures which the NATO council should consider. We were then
12 not given the authority to stop -- to take measures to stop the flow of
13 weapons there, where it all started, and that is there where the money is
14 collected to get the weapon -- to get the money to buy the weapons. We
15 were more or less given the task to stop the flow of weapons to the best
16 of our ability at the final end, and this was the most difficult task,
17 since we had only the means to stop the routes across the Adriatic and, to
18 some extent, as far as the Albanian government gave us the opportunity, on
19 the routes leading into Kosovo. And there we took some action. I think
20 we achieved some partial successes, but we did not achieve 100 per cent
22 Q. Thank you for stating that, that you were not allowed to stop it
23 where it was possible to stop it.
24 Do you know that the Helsinki Final Act explicitly authorises
25 states to combat terrorism within its territory and that no other state
1 has any right to prevent it from doing that or interfering? Please just
2 tell me whether you're aware of that. Yes or no.
3 A. Mr. Milosevic, there we come back again to the old question. You
4 state correctly what the Helsinki Final Act says, and I'm pleased to note
5 that you refer to the Helsinki agreement. Also, you have chosen not to be
6 part of the OSCE. And the other point which one I think has to consider
7 is to which extent national sovereignty - and you refer to that by this
8 statement - really means that a country can do inside its territory
9 whatever it wishes to do to its citizens. I think that is an
10 understanding of national sovereignty which emerged from the Westphalian
11 peace in 1648, but it seems to me that the modern understanding of
12 sovereignty means that the head of state has the responsibility to make
13 sure that its citizens are protected, that they can live in freedom, and
14 that human rights prevail. And that limits the acts of a state, in my
15 view. But I think this legal question, this legal interpretation, may be
16 considered by this Court at a different point in time.
17 Q. Let us not waste more time. You said that we chose not to be
18 members of OSCE, whereas you know that we were illegally expelled from
19 OSCE. The decision was taken by consensus minus one, though the rule is
20 that such decisions should be taken by consensus. So we were expelled,
21 and we, of course, protested. So how can you say that we chose not to be
22 members of the OSCE?
23 A. Well, this decision by the OSCE was triggered by your behaviour.
24 So I think it goes back to what your country was responsible for.
25 Q. All right. Let's just speed this up. Yesterday, we observed that
1 the NATO intervention, the aggression against Yugoslavia, was contrary to
2 the United Nations Charter. And I'm not going to go back to that now, but
3 was the NATO aggression also contrary to your pact, the North Atlantic
4 Alliance, in which it precisely states that it should not touch upon the
5 system of security established by the United Nations Charter and that the
6 decisive role should be played by the Security Council of the United
7 Nations in that regard? So did you violate your own agreement and pact?
8 And I quoted the point.
9 A. Mr. Milosevic, the NATO council took a decision based on the
10 consent of all member countries in -- and the NATO council was fully aware
11 of its own charter. It nevertheless came to the conclusion that the
12 action was necessary and legitimate.
13 Q. All right. And Germany, according to its constitution, could it
14 have undertaken operations outside its own territory?
15 A. I'm not aware of any part of our constitution which bans Germany
16 from taking military actions outside its own territory. We -- the only
17 thing which is clearly banned in our constitution is the preparation of a
18 war of aggression. That is clearly stated in Article 26 of the German
20 Q. Are you aware of the fact that the KLA burnt Serbs, Serb
21 civilians, in the Klecka crematorium? Did you receive that piece of
22 information amongst all the other information that you received about
23 their operations? Were you aware of that?
24 A. At least I do not recall it, and I think if some atrocity of that
25 nature had happened, I think I would recall it. But I don't recall it,
1 Mr. Milosevic.
2 Q. Well, why was it important for Clark and Solana to exclude
3 terrorist units from the territory of Kosovo when it was clear that we
4 were dealing with top-ranking terrorism in Kosovo?
5 A. Could you please elaborate on that? I didn't understand what
6 you're referring to since I'm not aware of that anyone excluded any -- any
7 terrorist or something like that from Kosovo territory. Could you please
8 explain to me what you mean?
9 Q. Not terrorists but anti-terrorist units, our anti-terrorist units
10 in Kosovo.
11 A. I think we achieved an agreement that some additional special
12 police units which you had deployed into Kosovo were to be withdrawn. And
13 that is part of the 25 October agreement.
14 Q. All right. You described three meetings. I don't want to repeat
15 who attended the meetings, when they were held, et cetera, because all
16 that was already quoted and I don't wish to waste time. But you did
17 introduce a new factor, which at least for me, and I hope for the Yugoslav
18 public as well, is very important, and that is the fact that your
19 competent authorities in NATO took the decision to activate the famous
20 activation order that you mentioned and that this was done at the request
21 of Holbrooke. Isn't that right?
22 A. That is correct.
23 Q. It is a very good thing that we should look at his two-faced role
24 here, because he came allegedly to help --
25 JUDGE MAY: No. Stop the comments. If you have a question for
1 the witness, ask it.
2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. When you came to me for a meeting, I stated loud and clear that
4 your information was not correct with respect to this overly strong use of
5 force, and at the same time, we were conducting negotiations with
6 Holbrooke. Isn't that right? Yes or no?
7 A. I believe, Mr. Milosevic, that your negotiations with
8 Mr. Holbrooke had come to an end, I think on the 13th of October. That is
9 two days before I had the first opportunity to meet with you.
10 Q. I'm talking about - how shall I put this? - within the same time
11 framework. And I said that NATO did not have the right to threaten to use
12 force against a sovereign country; isn't that right?
13 A. You stated this when Mr. Solana came to see you on the 15th of
15 Q. And I told Holbrooke that too, and that was something that the
16 press published as well, that the threats made to Yugoslavia were also --
17 also constituted a criminal act. And the press informed the population
18 about that. So there was nothing covert or secret for this to be heard
19 after three years.
20 A. Your Honours, I'm not aware that there's any need for me to
21 comment on that.
22 JUDGE MAY: No. It's not a comment.
23 Yes, next question.
24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. And do you remember very well that I told you and Clark, when you
1 threatened that you would bomb us, that I told you, "Yes, you are a super
2 power and you can bomb us, but then you will be war criminals." Do you
3 remember me saying that to you?
4 A. I remember very well, Mr. Milosevic, that you called us two
5 potential war criminals, and I have also stated this when I was asked by
6 the Prosecutor. So I'm glad that you confirmed that. We rejected this at
7 the time, and we told you that we would act if ordered so on behalf of the
8 NATO council, on behalf of 16 democratic countries who also tried to find
9 a peaceful solution and to try to avoid hostilities, hoping that you would
10 cooperate, but unfortunately, we failed.
11 Q. Well, isn't it true that with this illegal aggression against
12 Yugoslavia you in fact perpetrated war crimes, Mr. Naumann?
13 JUDGE MAY: No need to answer that.
14 It's just a comment by you.
15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Did I not tell you loud and clear that the army and police were
17 not using excessive force and that they were acting completely within
18 conformity of the laws of Serbia and Yugoslavia? Didn't I say that
19 clearly to you?
20 A. Mr. Milosevic, you stated this. I repeated that in my evidence
21 which I gave to this Court. And we also mentioned to you that our view is
22 different from what you call as legal actions. And again, we are
23 returning to that like this famous cat which is walking on a pot of hot
24 soup. It is again and again the question of the proportionality, and
25 there is our basic disagreement. You regard, obviously, the use of tanks
1 and artillery, and that has been repeatedly been reported by, I should
2 say, neutral observers like the KVM observers, against villages of your
3 own country, used by your own forces as legal and proportionate, and I
4 disagree with that.
5 Q. And did you look through all the reports of the OSCE which were
6 compiled at that time, during that period, and is what you're saying about
7 our violations, does that emerge from those reports or was that some
8 subsequent explanation, from some subsequent explanations fabricated later
9 on? Because we received those Verification Mission reports too. Our side
10 received them too, and you received them, as did everybody else.
11 Now, are you basing what you're saying on those reports which were
12 officially circulated by the Verification Mission?
13 A. I base my statement on the reports which indicated that villages
14 were shelled by artillery, were surrounded by tanks. And that was written
15 in those reports.
16 Q. All right. Now, is it true -- is it true that I, in front of you,
17 asked the chief of the General Staff whether your assertion was correct
18 and that before your very eyes he said, "No, that is not what is
19 happening"? Was that how it was or not?
20 A. He denied, that's correct. And that's also included in my
22 Q. All right. When he -- you say that he perhaps had not been
23 informed about that at the time. Do you consider that I could have been
24 informed about the alleged incidents for which the chief of the army
25 didn't know what was going on? Is that what you're saying?
1 A. Mr. Milosevic, if the chief of the General Staff, Perisic, was not
2 informed at the time, I also take it that you were not informed at the
3 time, which doesn't rule out that the incident took place.
4 Q. All right. Did I state to you loud and clear that the officials
5 of NATO relied on unsubstantiated records by the KLA and that nothing that
6 they said was correct and that I even suggested that your delegation hold
7 technical reports with the -- negotiations and talks with the commanders
8 of the police and army? Was that how it was, Mr. Naumann, or not?
9 A. Mr. Milosevic, I can assure you and you, Your Honours, that NATO
10 never got any reports by the KLA. There was no information channel
11 between NATO and the KLA.
12 Q. Well, what about contacts between Ambassador Hill and others? If
13 they were not official, under the official cap of NATO, then I'm sure they
14 do belong to the realm of information which NATO logically receives as
15 well. Yes or no?
16 A. Mr. Milosevic, what ambassadors of individual NATO countries get
17 as information I simply do not know. I do not rule out that
18 Ambassador Hill may have got some information. You should also not
19 forget, and you know that pretty well, that the KLA tried to inform the
20 media on all incidents and that they gave their view of the picture as
21 your people gave their view of the incidents.
22 Q. You're talking about -- that is to say, in point 17, para 17, and
23 you devoted a lot of time to that, you say and claim that part of the
24 conversation was focused on reducing tensions in the area around Malisevo
25 and that the focus of attention on that day was Malisevo, in fact. Now,
1 do you know what Malisevo was, that the KLA had its main headquarters in
2 Malisevo, for example? And do you know why Malisevo was so important for
3 your own side?
4 A. Well, Mr. Milosevic, with that you allege that we were taking
5 sides with the KLA, which we did not do. And as I repeatedly stated, Your
6 Honours, we did not have any contacts with the KLA.
7 JUDGE MAY: What -- Mr. Milosevic, what do you mean by "your own
8 side" in relation to the general? Do you mean NATO? That's what one
9 would take it to mean. Or do you mean something else?
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am not insinuating anything and
11 saying that General Naumann fought against the KLA, but -- on the side of
12 the KLA. I'm sorry. But I do say that persistently and for a long time
13 talks were conducted about Malisevo and that that is indicative because
14 that is where the headquarters of the KLA were. Now --
15 JUDGE MAY: It's suggested because there were talks which
16 mentioned Malisevo, that shows that NATO, as I understand it, was in some
17 way in contact with the KLA. Is there any possible comment?
18 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I think Mr. Milosevic is talking about
19 discussions in which he did not take part. These were the discussions
20 which started in the -- in the General Staff headquarters. And what I
21 stated was that based on the requests of the Yugoslav side, we started to
22 negotiate on the situation around Malisevo in order to find an agreement
23 there. And then we learned, after two or more hours, that we would not
24 come to an end of finding a solution for the entire region of Kosovo if we
25 continued in that way.
1 So it was not us who started with Malisevo. It was the done on
2 the request of the Yugoslav side. And it was obviously done since at the
3 time when we came to Belgrade, Malisevo was the centre of tensions.
4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. The centre of what?
6 A. Of tensions.
7 Q. Tensions. Yes. Now, I'm asking you now, General Naumann, whether
8 at the time or perhaps later on it -- you became aware of and came to know
9 that Malisevo was also one of the camps of Al Qaeda at that time.
10 A. I'm not aware, Mr. Milosevic, that the word "Al Qaeda" was ever
11 mentioned in any of the discussions I participated in on the Kosovo
13 Q. Please. May I just have your comments to several facts which I'm
14 going to read out to you. Just a few of them. I have to save time, the
15 time I have, so I'm going to be brief [In English] "[Previous translation
16 continues] ...1994, major Balkan terrorist training camps included Zenica
17 and Malisevo and Mitrovica in Kosovo. Number of Mujahedins operating
18 before that time in Bosnia alone continued to grow from a few hundred to
19 around 6.000 in 1995. So where was the US in all this? It was not until
20 1995 that Clinton Administration was forced to start pursuing the Islamic
21 network in Balkans. Not quite a month after the Dayton Accord had been
22 signed in November 1999, an influx of Iranian arms came into Bosnia with
23 the apparent tacit approval of the administration in violation of US
24 sanctions. Islamic infiltration --"
25 JUDGE MAY: It's time -- it's time we came to a question. What
1 you describe -- what you describe as facts are clearly some report which
2 you have, which is the opinion, I suspect, of some journalist. Would you
3 tell us what you are quoting from?
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll tell you in just a moment, but
5 may I finish? I have just a few lines to read out to you.
6 JUDGE MAY: No. You will tell us now what it is you're reading
7 from so we may understand it and then you may continue.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'm reading from a report
9 based on -- I'll tell you in just a moment. Based on information by
10 Joseph Podansky, who was the Director of the US House of Representatives
11 Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare. And it was written
12 by -- it was written by Christoph Corp, editor of the Washington-based
13 weekly newspaper Defence News, Defence News. And it was published in its
14 entirety by the Wall Street Journal in November -- on November the 1st,
16 So there you have it, please. And may I read out just a few more
17 lines which are remaining?
18 [In English] "[Previous translation continues] ...of the Kosovo
19 Liberation Army advanced meanwhile. Bin Laden is said to have visited
20 Albania in 1996 and 1997, according to the murder trial testimony of an
21 Algerian born French national Claude Kader, himself an Afghanistan-trained
22 Mujahedin fronting at the Albania Agro-Islamic Bank. He recruited some
23 Albanians to fight with the KLA in Kosovo."
24 THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please slow down for the
1 JUDGE MAY: Could you slow down, please.
2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. [In English] "[Previous translation continues] ...meanwhile,
4 Albanian separatism in Kosovo and Metohija was formally characterised as a
5 Jihad in October 1998 at an annual international Islamic conference in
6 Pakistan. Nonetheless, the 25.000-strong KLA continued to receive
7 official NATO-US arms and training support. And at the talks in
8 Rambouillet, France, the Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, shook
9 hands with the `freedom fighter' Hashim Thaci a KLA leader. As this was
10 taking place --"
11 JUDGE MAY: Yes. I think we've had enough -- we've had enough
12 reading. Now, the witness is here to give evidence, not you read out
13 these documents. No. You're abusing the process again.
14 Now, General, you've heard what's been read out. You may be able
15 to see at least some of it on the screen while it's there. Can you help
16 at all about this? First of all, do you know anything about this article,
17 this report?
18 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I haven't seen this article. And I
19 should also mention: As far as I saw Mr. Milosevic -- heard Mr. Milosevic
20 read out, that the article was published in 2001, so I couldn't have been
21 aware of the article at the time when the Kosovo conflict was all about.
22 I'm not aware -- as I have stated, the word "Al Qaeda" was never mentioned
23 in any of the Kosovo-related discussions I had with anyone. I should also
24 add that I did not know, and it was never in any NATO intelligence, that
25 Osama bin Laden allegedly had been in Albania. That is something I heard
1 today the first time. So I think that is all what I can add to
2 Mr. Milosevic's read-out. We knew -- but I take it that Bosnia is
3 something which is going to be dealt separately in this Court
4 proceedings. We knew that Islamic Mujahedin were in Bosnia. We took
5 action with the NATO SFOR forces against some of these Mujahedin. But
6 this has nothing to do, I believe, with Kosovo, and that's all I can
7 contribute to Mr. Milosevic's read-out here in front of this Court, Your
9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. From what I've read out, you can see that their presence was
11 recorded from 1994 and 1995, let alone 1998, the supply of arms and so
12 on. That's why I'm asking.
13 JUDGE MAY: He has answered that question and says that they knew
14 nothing about it, Mr. Milosevic, so it's really pointless going on. If
15 it's true.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, when we bear this in mind, I'm
17 asking the following question: Who is being told tales here about human
18 rights? Isn't it quite clear that what is being attempted here is to help
19 the former allies from this aborted Clinton Administration which --
20 JUDGE MAY: You're not going to ask that question. Now, you have
21 theoretically half an hour more. Have you any other questions you want to
22 ask which are proper questions and relevant? You raised the question of
23 relevance before. By now you should know in this trial what is relevant
24 and what isn't. That which is connected with the indictment is relevant,
25 and that which isn't is irrelevant. Now, do you want to ask the general
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 any more questions? You've exhausted this topic.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have many more questions, and
3 since the witness is giving rather lengthy answers, I hope that you will
4 increase the time that you say I have left, which is half an hour, because
5 I do have a number of questions for which I would need a little more time.
6 JUDGE MAY: No, there will be no more time. Half an hour. At
7 least, you've got five minutes more and then you've got half an hour after
8 the break.
9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] Very well.
10 Q. Now, you knew that young Serb policemen were being killed and
11 tortured by the KLA and that incidents of this kind led to violence and
12 counterviolence. That is what is stated in paragraph 8 of your
13 statement. So you did have knowledge about that.
14 Now, where do you get the idea from that a decision was made at
15 the time to expel the Albanian population? Because you say -- let me
16 explain and clarify my question. You speak about the fact that there was
17 talk of national equilibrium. Now, haven't you mixed some concepts up?
18 Because what was talked about was the equality of national communities,
19 ethnic communities in Kosovo, and not the numerical balance and
20 equilibrium thereof, because that is physically impossible. So are you
21 aware of the fact that the key positions of our policy was the equality of
22 citizens and the equality of ethnic communities, so that there was no
23 majorisation, that national communities, ethnic communities, should be
24 equal? Did you mix up equality with striking a balance when you speak
25 about this balance and equilibrium?
1 A. No, Mr. Milosevic, I did not mix it up. I remember very well that
2 you repeatedly stated that you wished to see a solution in which all
3 ethnicities and all nationalities in Kosovo would have the same rights. I
4 think you did never live up to that claim in reality. And I remember also
5 very well that you and Mr. Sainovic talked about the need that, in terms
6 of quantity, a better balance should be there, and otherwise the same
7 problem would return in a couple of years again.
8 Q. Well, better balance, Mr. Naumann. How can you strike a better
9 balance either by expelling or killing? Is that the substance of your
10 testimony, that by trying to justify the NATO aggression, you are accusing
11 us of wanting to either kill or expel Albanians from Kosovo? How can the
12 number be reduced otherwise but by expelling someone? And then you speak
13 again of our political positions, which are quite contrary to that. Can't
14 you see the contradictions in what you're saying?
15 A. No, Mr. Milosevic, I don't see the contradiction, since the facts
16 speak against you. In spring 1999, I think hundreds of thousands -- at
17 least a hundred thousand or so were expelled from Kosovo, and they were
18 forced to leave the country, and this was done by your security forces.
19 Q. Mr. Naumann, in 1999, at the beginning of the year, I think that
20 at least several hundred thousand Albanians lived in different cities of
21 Europe, where they worked and where they had been living for a whole
22 decade, et cetera, et cetera. So that is not something that is
23 challenged, just as several hundred thousand Serbs have been living -- I
24 don't know if they are tens of thousands in Vienna alone perhaps, or
25 several tens of thousands in Paris, living in Paris, who have been working
1 as guest workers throughout Europe for decades now. Hundreds of thousands
2 of Albanians from Kosovo have for decades been living in Germany,
3 Switzerland, Austria, Italy, and many other European countries.
4 JUDGE MAY: You're here to ask questions. What is the question?
5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Therefore, how many of them there are outside Kosovo, that's not a
7 question at all, it's not an issue, just as it isn't an issue how many
8 Serbs there are outside Yugoslavia. There are a million Serbs in America
10 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer.
11 A. Mr. Milosevic, we do not talk about those people who left
12 Yugoslavia to be guest workers elsewhere. I referred to those people who
13 were driven out of their homes in spring 1999 and were forced to leave the
14 country, and entered, forced by your forces, Macedonia and Albania, where
15 we established refugee camps to house them and to shelter them.
16 Q. Mr. Naumann --
17 JUDGE MAY: The time is now half past 10.00. It's time for an
18 adjournment, and we'll adjourn for 20 minutes.
19 Would you be back, please, at 10 minutes to 11.00, General.
20 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour.
21 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
22 --- On resuming at 10.52 a.m.
23 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. In your statement, in paragraph 24, you said that I described the
1 Kosovar Albanians as criminals, killers, and rapists. Is that how I
2 called the Kosovar Albanians or the terrorists?
3 A. As far as I recall, Mr. Milosevic, you referred with these words
4 to the Kosovar Albanians who did not comply with your way of keeping them
5 under control.
6 Q. That means that I said to you that all Kosovar Albanians are
7 criminals, murderers, and rapists; is that what you are claiming?
8 A. You left us with that impression. That's not only my impression;
9 that's also the impression of General Clark.
10 Q. What you and General Clark are claiming now, three years later, is
11 quite transparent. But let me ask you: Since you mentioned Drenica, do
12 you know that between the two world wars, in Drenica, there were bandits
13 called Kacaks, and that the Royal Army had to intervene on several
14 occasions because they plundered and murdered, in most cases, wealthy
15 Albanians, as they were those who were the most numerous there? Are you
16 aware of that?
17 A. No, Mr. Milosevic, I'm not aware of that detail of the history of
18 that part of former Yugoslavia.
19 Q. That is the point, that Drenica could only have been mentioned as
20 a cradle of terrorism and banditism, and in no other way, in view of these
21 historical facts. Is that logical to you or not?
22 JUDGE MAY: That's not a question. The witness can only deal with
23 what he saw and heard, which he has dealt with.
24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] Very well.
25 Q. Yesterday you declared that Clark wrote in his book that I said to
1 you that I would find a solution in the spring of 1999 similar to the one
2 in Drenica. But if you look closely at the book, you will see that Clark
3 makes no mention of the spring, though it is quite clear that you have the
4 same attitude towards me as Clark. So do you know that he doesn't mention
5 the word "spring" anywhere?
6 A. Mr. Milosevic, first of all, I did not mention General Clark's
7 book yesterday. I said he published this remark in publications which he
8 made in the United States of America. Secondly, I'm not aware of any
9 attitude of General Clark towards you. I can only tell you that I have no
10 specific attitude towards you. That's all I can say.
11 Q. Even in his statement given to the journal "Parameters," a
12 quarterly, he makes no mention of any spring. So my question is: Did you
13 perhaps misquote my words, especially in view of the fact that such a
14 cardinal statement was not used by you or Clark until 2001 by Clark and
15 2002 by you? Doesn't that seem too transparent to you?
16 A. Mr. Milosevic, again I may correct you. I believe that the fact
17 of spring 1999 was mentioned by General Clark in one or the other of his
18 publications; and secondly, I'm not using this statement as late as 2002.
19 I have used this before, in discussions with people, in the public, when
20 we discussed the Kosovo events.
21 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, the witness's evidence was that during
22 the talk you said -- this was his evidence, as I took it down: You said
23 that you would try to find a solution of the Kosovo problem in spring
24 1999. Do you challenge that you said that?
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course I challenge it. Of course
1 I do. Isn't it quite logical, Mr. May, that just when we had signed an
2 agreement, when everyone felt relieved, when we were talking about
3 improving relations between ethnic communities, and everything else that I
4 have quoted, that I should then say, "I won't observe any of that, but I'm
5 going to execute them all in the spring"? Can anyone believe any such
7 JUDGE MAY: It doesn't matter what you say is logical, according
8 to you. This is what the witness's evidence is that you said, that you
9 would find a solution to the Kosovo problem in spring 1999.
10 Since it's challenged, General, do you have any doubt that that
11 was what was said by this accused?
12 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, if I had had any doubts, I would not
13 have stated this in front of this Court.
14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Mr. Naumann, you didn't even tell the truth when you said what we
16 drank. You said that we were drinking slivovitz. We were not drinking
17 slivovitz, because I don't drink slivovitz. We were drinking pear
18 brandy. So even regarding that detail, you were wrong, not to mention
19 other things.
20 A. Mr. Milosevic, you may forgive me that I'm not an expert on
21 alcohol. Perhaps I confused that. But this does not mean that I did not
22 tell the truth on other things.
23 Q. Very well, Mr. Naumann. In view of the fact that reference is
24 made to Drenica, the only parallel is with terrorism. It cannot refer to
25 anything else but terrorism.
1 JUDGE MAY: We have been over this point.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please, I'm showing you a document
3 of the Prosecution, page 16, second paragraph, of the report by the
4 historical expert of the Prosecution, Audrey Budding, which, although it
5 is not objective or competent, nevertheless recognises that the partisans
6 in the Drenica region --
7 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, I pointed out to you yesterday that as
8 far as this witness's evidence is concerned, it doesn't matter what the
9 history was. Whether you're telling the truth about it or not, it doesn't
10 matter. The witness doesn't know what the history was, but it's what he
11 said you said that matters. His evidence is that that is what you said.
12 Now, whether it's a background for it or whether it's historically
13 accurate, it doesn't matter.
14 Now, there's no point going over it again with this witness.
15 You've been over it several times.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Surely if there's a historical
17 explanation, it becomes clear that I couldn't have said something that has
18 nothing to do with the historical explanation.
19 JUDGE MAY: There may have been a hundred reasons why you've said
20 it. It doesn't matter what the reasons are. It's the fact of your saying
21 it which is of significance as far as this witness's evidence is concern.
22 Now, we have exhausted this topic.
23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Please. Is it clear that the mention of Drenica has nothing to do
25 with the civilian population?
1 JUDGE MAY: I think you're being asked how you interpreted the
3 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, to the best of my recollection, there
4 was no differentiation between bandits or civilian population. It was
5 mentioned in a rather general way what Mr. Milosevic had in mind when he
6 mentioned it, and I -- I don't know.
7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. First of all, I didn't say that. And secondly, are you claiming
9 that I made no distinction between civilians and terrorists? Even the
10 birds know that there was even an order that units of the army and the
11 police may not open fire where civilians may be in danger. How, then,
12 could someone say that no distinction was made between civilians and
13 terrorists? Those orders exist, and they were complied with.
14 A. Do I not challenge, Mr. Milosevic, that such orders may have
15 existed. The facts of the events which took place on the ground then
16 indicate that some of your forces were not in compliance with the orders
17 you had issued.
18 Q. Do you know, Mr. Naumann, that that very police and that very
19 army, the army I had the honour to command, during the war arrested more
20 than 500 persons who had committed crimes?
21 A. I do not know that, Mr. Milosevic, but if they did so, well done.
22 Q. You spoke to me about Racak. Is it clear -- is it true that I
23 clearly told you that there was no massacre?
24 A. This is exactly what you said. You rejected all our claims that
25 the crime had committed -- had been committed there.
1 Q. You said yesterday that you had previously talked to Walker. In
2 that conversation, did Walker tell you that Racak was a stronghold of the
3 KLA where there was a KLA unit?
4 A. Mr. Walker told us during that conversation that initially there
5 had been some KLA activity in that area and that your forces had taken
6 action against that KLA area. And I referred to the fact yesterday that
7 to the best of my knowledge, I think some seven KLA members had been
8 killed by your forces there.
9 Q. Did Walker tell you -- I'm asking you about what Walker told you.
10 The area is rather broad. I'm talking specifically about the village of
11 Racak. Did he tell you that it was a KLA stronghold? Did Walker tell you
13 A. He did -- he did not call Racak a KLA stronghold. As I just
14 stated a minute ago, Mr. Milosevic, he spoke about the fact that at Racak,
15 some KLA activity had --
16 Q. Please. Could you please answer my questions with a yes and no,
17 out of fairness, because my time is limited. Did he tell you that the
18 fighting between the KLA and the police lasted from the morning until
19 4.00 p.m. in Racak?
20 A. That may have been. I do not know whether he told us exactly the
21 amount of time.
22 Q. And did he tell you that there was a report of his Verification
23 Mission about the killed members of the KLA?
24 A. That is what I just referred to.
25 Q. Well, how, then, can you explain that in his statements he did not
1 mention the killed members of the KLA but he only spoke of civilians in --
2 JUDGE MAY: The witness can't answer that.
3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Did Walker tell you that on that day, that critical day when the
5 conflict between the police and the KLA took place in Racak, that OSCE
6 observers were present? Did he inform you of that?
7 A. He mentioned that the unarmed OSCE observers had been in the
8 vicinity and that they withdrew as soon as the fighting started in order
9 not to be in between the crossing lines of fire.
10 Q. That's very good that you said that and quoted Walker to that
11 effect. But linked to this Prosecution of crime within the territory of
12 Yugoslavia that I mentioned an moment ago, how many people the army and
13 the police had arrested as perpetrators of crimes, were you aware that in
14 Serbia, already in 1992, several people were tried for war crimes
15 committed in Bosnia, even before this institution was set up, before
16 anyone spoke about it? As long ago as 1992, we tried individuals for war
17 crimes committed in Bosnia. Are you aware of that?
18 A. I'm not aware of that, Mr. Milosevic, since it did never belong to
19 my obligations to follow legal proceedings in your country.
20 Q. And in that conversation when you referred to Racak, did I tell
21 you explicitly that a conflict had occurred and that people had been
22 killed in combat and that not a single Serb policeman would have committed
23 such a crime?
24 A. Yes, Mr. Milosevic, you said this, and I stated this in my
25 evidence which is in written form in front of you. But I think we still
1 have to make a difference between those KLA members which were killed in
2 action and those -- I think there were 23 or so people who were not
3 members of the KLA and who, according to the findings of the Finnish
4 doctor, did not show the slightest signs of any involvement in combat
5 operation at all.
6 Q. And do you know that the findings of the Finnish, Belorussian, and
7 Yugoslav pathologists do not differ, with the exception of one single
8 case, to the effect that all had been killed by firearms fired from a
9 distance and in movement? Are you aware of that?
10 A. I'm not aware of that, and I'm not aware of the fact that the
11 findings of the Yugoslav and Belarus doctors do not -- do not differ from
12 the findings of the Finnish. I am aware of the fact that the Finnish
13 doctor stated that you and the Belarus doctors applied techniques which
14 are outdated and not very accurate.
15 Q. That was said in respect to the paraffin glove, which is a legal
16 technique and which showed that 37 out of the 40 killed had used firearms
17 to shoot with. And a paraffin glove --
18 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, these are all matters which the Trial
19 Chamber is going to have to determine. There's no point arguing with the
20 witness about them.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. You said, because of the lies conveyed to you by Walker, "I got
24 very angry and started shouting." That's what you said, isn't it?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Did I repeat several times that the police and the army would
2 never do something contrary to the law?
3 A. You stated that repeatedly, Mr. Milosevic.
4 Q. And did I then draw attention to the fact that I felt that Clark
5 and Naumann, as well as Walker, had fallen into a trap by making such
7 A. That is what you said, and that is in my written evidence. And
8 you know that we rejected that claim that we had fallen into a trap but
9 that we simply had looked at the facts which were given to us by
10 Ambassador Walker.
11 Q. And did I inform you at the time that a Finnish team had been
12 invited to do the abductions, post-mortems?
13 A. Yes, Mr. Milosevic, and that's also part of my statement.
14 Q. Did I tell you that Walker had insulted the Yugoslav government?
15 A. That is also part of my statement, yes.
16 Q. And was it logical for Yugoslav authorities, judicial, crime, and
17 other institutions, to carry out the investigation? I mean the courts,
18 the prosecution, the investigating magistrates, the crime department, the
19 police, that they should do the abductions and pathological investigations
20 on their territory when an instance of this kind occurs?
21 A. Mr. Milosevic, when you're talking about logic, I wonder why you
22 did not accept the offer which both Clark and I presented to you to invite
23 Judge Arbour and her team to come to your countries. If you're talking
24 about logic, nothing would be more logical than to have an objective, and
25 that is a hypothetically impartial check of the events that took place.
1 And the best instrument to that is an United Nations appointed Judge.
2 Q. Were you aware of our position? Because you say that that was
3 absolutely unbiased. But I am claiming that this court is an instrument
4 of war against my country. Were you aware of our position --
5 JUDGE MAY: We've heard all this. Now, what is the question for
6 the witness?
7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Talking about Louise Arbour, are you aware of our position that we
9 considered this to be an illegal institution that was founded contrary to
10 the United Nations Charter and that it was politically motivated?
11 JUDGE MAY: We've heard all this several times. Now, let's go on
12 to something else.
13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Are you aware of the indirect connection between Louise Arbour and
15 terrorist KLA groups, as was evidenced?
16 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, if you're going to make these kind of
17 allegations, you're going to have to support them. Now, you've got five
18 minutes, five minutes more.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Why five? We started at five to --
20 five to eleven. If you gave me half an hour, then I have at least another
21 ten minutes.
22 JUDGE MAY: Well, make use of it sensibly. Yes.
23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Please. Do you know that Mrs. Arbour is a member of the board of
25 management of the so-called international crisis group together with
1 Thaci's advisor Abrahams and Wesley Clark?
2 JUDGE MAY: There's no point going on in this vein. If you have
3 any other questions on any other topic so well and good. The witness has
4 told you what he suggested, the fact that you rejected the suggestion.
5 There seems to be little further point going on with it. You can produce
6 your evidence in due course.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There is a point to ask a witness
8 when he doesn't know why I said that the political position of that group
9 that I have listed the members of was bombing the independence of Kosovo
10 and Montenegro, the abolition of Republika Srpska, the centralisation of
11 Bosnia and so on. Is he aware of the positions of that group?
12 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, shall I answer to that question? It I
13 think --
14 JUDGE MAY: No. There's no need to trouble.
15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Very well. You said in your statement that at the time, you gave
17 me some ten examples of violations of the agreement; isn't that so? And
18 that I took this from you and said that we would investigate it. Do you
19 think that I could have said anything else, that I could have given you
20 any other reply when faced with this from you?
21 A. Well, Mr. Milosevic, in my view you could have given us another
22 reply since many of the events which were on this list took place well
23 before the 19th of January, but you preferred to say, "We'll look into
24 that and we'll come back to you." The fact is that we never got an
1 Q. When you use the term "many," I remind you that you said that you
2 gave information for some ten or so alleged violations of the agreement in
3 total. So "many" can only mean a limited number. And do you know what
4 kind of reports I received after looking into that information?
5 A. No, I can't know it since we never got an answer.
6 Q. Mr. Naumann, I was informed that you were not telling the truth.
7 A. Would you kindly elaborate on that? I can only tell you that I
8 got never an answer. And I think the same is true for General Clark.
9 Q. Did I tell you, in respect to Solana's observation, that the
10 Assembly of Serbia automatically approves Milosevic's decision that they,
11 meaning the Assembly, has the last word? Is that so or not?
12 A. That is what you told us and that's also part of my written
14 Q. Is it clear that the ultimatum given to Yugoslavia was to accept
15 an occupation that was contained in the Rambouillet agreement? Is that so
16 or not?
17 A. That's -- Mr. Milosevic, that is not true and you know that. I
18 think that is part of really flawed information which you and others are
20 Q. Is the following true that I'm going to read out to you: [In
21 English] "[Previous translation continues] ...appointed rulers of the
22 planet issue an ultimatum to another country. It is surrender or die. To
23 maintain our`credibility,'" that is under quotation, "`credibility', we
24 must crush any semblance of resistance to our dictates to that country."
25 JUDGE MAY: Who is saying that? Who are you quoting,
1 Mr. Milosevic?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm quoting Walter J. Rockler,
3 former prosecutor of the Nuremberg war crimes trials. I'm quoting him.
4 JUDGE MAY: That is simply the opinion of Mr. Rockler. No point
5 putting it to the witness.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, if there's no point.
7 Q. I wish to ask the witness something in connection with his
8 statement to the PBS Frontline, which I shall quote to refresh your memory
9 [In English] "[Previous translation continues] ...which was fought for a
10 principle, and the principle was that human rights have to be protected,
11 and from that point of view, I think the Kosovo war is perhaps the first
12 war in the European history which was fought for this principle, and by
13 that we denied, we denied the continuing validity of the principle
14 territorial integrity which dominated and still dominates international
15 law since the Westphalian peace of 1648."
16 [Interpretation] Does that mean that NATO decided to abolish the
17 basic principle of international law, the principle of territorial
18 integrity and sovereignty of states?
19 A. Mr. Milosevic, I referred to that earlier on. I think you quoted
20 me correctly. And that's again part of the conviction at which I
21 personally arrive, but others as well, that we have to find to -- a more
22 modern understanding of what the sovereignty of states means. It cannot
23 be seen exclusively as the right of a ruler to do to his citizens whatever
24 he wishes to do, but it has to be seen as the responsibility of that ruler
25 to protect human rights of his citizens.
1 Q. And do you know that those whose human rights you say were in
2 jeopardy and they were terrorists and murderers, that they killed an
3 enormous number of Albanians, and that the current leaders - and this was
4 even shown and demonstrated even in this courtroom - committed murders of
5 wealthy Albanians and others that they considered to be loyal to the
6 authorities of Serbia? Are you aware of that?
7 A. Mr. Milosevic, I have repeatedly stated in public that I do not
8 consider the KLA or UCK as an aggregation of angels, and that many of them
9 misbehaved, grossly misbehaved. But you should not mix up the KLA
10 activists who did not behave properly and the many thousands of innocent
11 Kosovo Albanians who fell victim to the suppression executed by your
12 security forces.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, in my view, this is ground that
14 we've already gone over. You're now repeating yourself. And in my view,
15 your cross-examination is coming close to being abuse of the process of
16 the Court. If you have no further questions that are germane to the
17 issues, we should stop.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do have questions, Mr. Robinson.
19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. In that same interview that I quoted from a moment ago, in answer
21 to a question whether you consider such humanitarian intervention to be
22 justified, you declared that in political practice you doubt their
23 justification because of cases such as the hesitation of the international
24 community in Eastern Timor and looking the other way when the Russians
25 were violating human rights in Chechnya; is that right?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. That is correct, Mr. Milosevic, but the hesitation of the
2 international community does not rule out that on one occasion the
3 international community acted in legitimacy.
4 JUDGE MAY: This must be your last question. This must be your
5 last question. It's now 11.25.
6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Does that mean that you agree with the former German defence
8 minister, Rupert Schultz, who said -- who spoke at a meeting of the
9 Bundeswehr, and I quote:
10 [In English] "We are concerned with dealing with the consequences
11 of World War I."
12 He was referring to the destruction of Yugoslavia when he said:
13 "Yugoslavia, being a consequence of World War I, is a very
14 artificial construct which has never been compatible with the idea of
16 [Interpretation] Is that in the background of such selective
17 interpretations of policies and pressures under which Yugoslavia was
18 broken up? Is that the ideology? Is it the same ideology as from the
19 First and Second World Wars?
20 A. Mr. Milosevic, I am not here to comment on statements of German
21 politicians. I can only assure you that these historical connotations did
22 not play a role when NATO took its decision. The decision was based on
23 severe violations of human rights and on the necessity to restore the
24 stability of an entire region which was endangered.
25 Q. Are you claiming --
1 JUDGE MAY: No. No more questions.
2 Mr. Tapuskovic, have you any questions you wish to ask the
3 witness? Although time is rather limited.
4 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. In view
5 of the sensitivity of the moment, I should like to ask you how much time I
6 can reckon with, so that I can make a selection of my questions, and I
7 will do my best to be as brief as possible.
8 [Trial Chamber confers]
9 JUDGE MAY: Yes. The general has to leave by midday. Twenty
10 minutes, Mr. Tapuskovic, should be more than enough. We've been
11 cross-examining for two hours or more.
12 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I hope it will be enough, yes.
13 Thank you, Your Honours.
14 In order to assist the Court -- this is not a question for the
15 general, but in order to assist you, Your Honours, I should like to draw
16 your attention to the fact that in view of the questions that were asked
17 yesterday, in the draft of the expert finding of Budding, on page 16, you
18 have sufficient data from which you are able to see what happened in
19 Drenica between 1945 and 1949. And I just wanted to draw your attention
20 to that. You have the information there, how many Yugoslav soldiers were
21 engaged there in a war that lasted four years.
22 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tapuskovic, as I've said quite plainly, it doesn't
23 matter what happened in Drenica it's in 1940s, as far as this evidence is
24 concerned. The witness has said this is what the accused told him. Now,
25 that's an end of it. Whatever happened in Drenica is irrelevant.
1 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I didn't wish to
2 ask the general this. I just wanted to assist the Trial Chamber and draw
3 your attention to those facts in that report which you have
4 Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:
5 Q. [Interpretation] Now, the first question I have for the general is
6 the following, and it has to do with one particular matter. You said that
7 you had decided to do what you did in the interests that you stipulated,
8 the UN General Assembly; is that right?
9 A. I did not speak of the UN General Assembly. I think when you
10 refer to the justification for the intervention --
11 Q. Security Council, I meant.
12 A. I mentioned the Security Council on one occasion. I said that the
13 Security Council in the Kosovo crisis was not able to do its duty since it
14 did not achieve agreement, and in that exceptional situation, the NATO
15 nations decided to take actions which they believed was legitimate,
16 although the authorisation by the Security Council was lacking.
17 Q. But I'm interested in something else. Perhaps that might be more
18 important. Did the parliaments of all the countries, the member states of
19 NATO, did all those parliaments, the parliaments of all those countries,
20 approve that action of yours; and if not, which of them did not? Did, for
21 instance, the parliament of your country approve the action?
22 A. Yes. The German parliament approved the participation of German
23 armed forces in this operation, with a majority which would be sufficient
24 to alter the German constitution. With regard to the other countries, all
25 those countries where there is a necessity, a legal necessity to ask for
1 parliamentary approval of such operations, approved the operation. But
2 it's not necessary in all NATO countries.
3 Q. Did all the parliaments approve?
4 A. No. As I just said, it's not necessary in all NATO countries that
5 the parliaments approve. It depends on the national legislation, which
6 differs from country to country.
7 Q. Thank you. General, you know that when this decision was taken by
8 NATO, the activation order that you yourself mentioned, that via the
9 Yugoslav Albanian border, for a considerable period of time, arms were
10 carried illegally, in substantial quantities, and brought into the
11 territory of Kosovo. You've already said that. Is that correct?
12 A. Yes, that is correct. We saw that smuggling took place, and as I
13 said, we tried to take action to stop it.
14 Q. Thank you. You also said that before the 15th of October, on the
15 territory of Kosovo, that armed groups of Albanians existed, and they
16 carried out a number of violent actions against the army and the police,
17 and I think that is proper what you said. Is that right?
18 A. That is correct. But again, I should remind you that one should
19 not look at this in isolation. The armed resistance of Kosovar Albanians
20 against Yugoslav suppression is also the result of actions which took
21 place long before the armed resistance began.
22 Q. Thank you. General, my question is the following: Does that mean
23 that in addition to the existence of this constant illegal smuggling and
24 introduction of weapons to Kosovo, and the facts as to the violence on the
25 part of the armed Albanians - I'm not saying whether they're terrorists or
1 rebels or whatever but that they were armed - what that justified that you
2 should ask from that state in which this was happening to reduce the
3 number of soldiers and policemen to the number that was there in
4 peacetime, despite these two facts? So were these peace conditions, the
5 same conditions that existed as they did in peacetime? And that was the
6 condition made, that these numbers should be reduced to what they were in
7 peacetime. Now, tell me, please: Were these peacetime conditions?
8 A. Well, as you may remember, in summer 1998, the Yugoslav security
9 forces undertook really quite extensive operations to crush the KLA and
10 the armed resistance. And what we intended to achieve is a return to
11 normalcy which would allow both sides to return to a peaceful living
12 together, as it, by the way, is clearly expressed in this statement which
13 we signed.
14 Q. Yes. But in view of the fact that the conditions were not
15 peaceful ones, the position that you took in the negotiations and that you
16 expounded yesterday, could it have been -- could you have used the
17 argumentation you used, that is to say that you came and said that you had
18 authority to attack unless the conditions stipulated were complied with?
19 A. Mr. Tapuskovic, we wanted to achieve conditions under which a
20 cessation of hostilities could take place, and one precondition to that
21 was to reduce the number of forces in the country and to limit the
22 disproportionate response to incidents.
23 Q. Can you tell me this, General: Had the army withdrew, to your
24 surprise, and the police, and had this taken you by surprise, and had they
25 withdrawn from these areas and regions, but had the KLA taken control of
1 these regions, could that have been a reason for that police force and
2 that state to gain back control of the territory that had been left in
3 order to achieve these peaceful conditions?
4 A. Well, it was not entirely so that the KLA more or less filled the
5 vacuum completely. They tried, on one or the other occasion, and in other
6 incidents it was action taken by the security forces which triggered the
7 incidents. I think I have explained that repeatedly in my statements
8 yesterday and today.
9 Q. Thank you. No. What I'm saying is when the army actually
10 withdrew, this area was taken over by the others. That's what I'm talking
11 about. Once the police had withdrawn, the KLA took control of these
12 areas, and the police and army withdrew in order to abide by these
13 peaceful circumstances and conditions. That's what I'm talking about.
14 A. Well, Mr. Tapuskovic, as far as I know, this is not entirely the
15 case, not 100 per cent. This happened occasionally. And in other areas
16 nothing happened; it remained as it was.
17 Q. Thank you. General, the NATO council, did it know about the
18 estimated number of armed Albanians who performed and perpetrated the acts
19 that you talked about? Did you have information of that kind?
20 A. We had some information. Whether we had the full information or
21 not, I simply dare not to say, since, as you know, intelligence is always
22 based on the availability of sources, and we definitely did not have 100
23 per cent information.
24 Q. And the Verification Mission had begun its work. Now, I'm
25 interested in the following: During your first conversation, and then
1 with respect to your second conversation, and especially when, on the 19th
2 of January, you talked again, were there any facts and figures or
3 information as to the number? A high-ranking official, officer,
4 Mr. Ciaglinski, of the Verification Mission, said that there was knowledge
5 about 10.000 KLA members at a given moment. Now, did you have the same
6 information that the OSCE had at its disposal?
7 A. The OSCE shared its information with us, and I can only tell Your
8 Honours that the figures varied again and again, and we never had a
9 clear-cut, agreed-by-everyone figure which indicated the full strengths of
10 the KLA.
11 Q. Now, here's why I'm asking you this, General. As you are an
12 officer, and as you are well acquainted with military doctrine - I'm a
13 layman in that area myself - can you agree with the following observation,
14 bearing in mind military doctrine: What could the ratio of state forces
15 be against armed people in any state, in any country? What ratio would
16 this be? We keep speaking about what is proportionate and what is
17 disproportionate. What would a ratio be? Now, I have read some things.
18 Would the ratio be, say, 3:1? And it even goes as high as 6:1, that
19 ratio. That is to say the state, a state, can, under certain
20 circumstances, use three men, three of its men, against one armed
21 individual, whether terrorist or otherwise. Do you have any knowledge as
22 to that, linked to military doctrine, and how important that was for your
24 A. Mr. Tapuskovic, this is not a question of military doctrine, since
25 we are talking about internal security, and that's normally the
1 responsibility of police forces. But in order to arrive at a balanced
2 judgement of what the strengths of police forces should be, we did some
3 comparative calculations in NATO to compare, I should say, the police
4 density in Kosovo under peacetime conditions, the 10.024 individuals
5 Mr. Milosevic mentioned, to other areas, where we have, let's say, a high
6 rate of criminality, and we came to the conclusion that the 10.000-or-so
7 figure is approximately commensurate to the security challenges in this
8 part of former Yugoslavia.
9 Q. Well, I would -- that would be that. Now, I would like to move on
10 to Racak, the topic of Racak. Ambassador Walker, before the meeting with
11 Milosevic on the 19th of January, informed you of the events in Racak. He
12 presented the view and the position that the victims were civilians and
13 gave his reasons for doing so, didn't he?
14 A. He did so, yes.
15 Q. And you accepted that evaluation of his, that assessment?
16 A. Well, he had the unique advantage, compared to the two of us,
17 General Clark and myself, that he had been on the site and that he had
18 seen what had happened, at least with regard to the victims.
19 Q. Thank you. On page -- that is to say, in paragraph 31 of your
20 statement, in your last sentence, you said that they also told him that
21 one of the victims was a 14-year-old boy. Did Walker tell you that or
22 somebody else, or was it Walker who told you that?
23 A. That was Mr. Walker.
24 Q. Did you ever come to learn whether this was true among the people
25 who were in the ditch? Was there, in fact, a 14-year-old boy among them?
1 Did you ever learn whether that was true or not?
2 A. I saw other publications which indicated that there was a
3 youngster among them. Whether he was 14 years old or perhaps 13 or 12, I
4 don't know. But it was indicated that there were among these I think 23
5 people women, as well as one youngster.
6 Q. But that was later on. I'm interested in what you came to learn
7 before the 19th of January, before you were to meet with Mr. Slobodan
9 A. There the main evidence was the information we got from Ambassador
10 Walker, and he also told us that there were women among them and there was
11 a boy, a young boy, among them.
12 Q. Thank you. And you said - we won't repeat it, but could you
13 please confirm it - that there were also victims; that is to say, some
14 members of the KLA were also killed. Right?
15 A. That was also a piece of information which Ambassador Walker
16 shared with us.
17 Q. Now I'm interested in this: Did anybody tell you that - it was
18 exactly on the 15th of January, before you were to meet
19 Mr. Milosevic - did anybody tell you then that on the 15th of January, in
20 that circle, that two policemen were killed as well?
21 A. I think that was mentioned also by Mr. Walker.
22 Q. And did Mr. Walker tell you, or anybody else, did they tell you
23 that on the 18th of January, that is to say, the day when the bodies were
24 taken over, the bodies which the Serb investigating authorities wished to
25 take for their expert findings, that according to the OSCE reports on
1 those days, 17 Serb policemen were killed in front of the mosque in which
2 those bodies were placed? Did you know about that when you went to talk
3 to Mr. Milosevic?
4 A. I recall that Mr. Walker mentioned that there had been an
5 incident, but I do not recall the number of police officers being killed.
6 Q. So you didn't know about the 17 policemen killed. So you were
7 told about the two policemen who were killed on the 15th. You were also
8 told about the 17 policemen killed in front of the mosque. Did anybody
9 tell you that one day prior to that, that is to say, on the 18th, in the
10 period between the 15th and the 19th, when you were to see Slobodan
11 Milosevic, that a further number of Serb policemen had been killed and
12 that the total number killed between the 15th and 19th was 47 policemen?
13 Did you know that at the time or not?
14 A. I did not know the figure of 47 police officers, and I'm not
15 aware -- and I do not know whether this was taking place in the area of
16 Racak or whether the 47 are related to incidents elsewhere in Kosovo.
17 Q. Thank you. Can we conclude that prior to your conversation with
18 Slobodan Milosevic, that you did not know what the injuries and wounds to
19 the victims from Racak were except for what Walker told you? And that's
20 what you said yesterday, that they were all hit in the neck, or that most
21 of them were hit in the neck.
22 A. I would like to emphasise what you last said, that most of them
23 were hit in the neck. He told us that, and he showed us, I think, one or
24 two photographs which he had taken.
25 Q. But General, all those forensic findings have been dovetailed, and
1 we are faced with a situation in which there are no further dilemmas on
2 that score. Now, the injuries, the wounds, were predominantly in the
3 chest and the head, in the region of the chest and head --
4 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tapuskovic, we've been over this, you know, a
5 great deal. It's not helpful to go over it again. The witness can only
6 deal with what he was told at the time. It's for us to determine what
7 happened and to look at all the forensic results. It's not helpful for
8 further examination.
9 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I do know that, Your
10 Honours. I'm aware of that. But the General said yesterday that if the
11 injuries are gained in combat, that they are usually injuries to the
12 chest --
13 JUDGE MAY: We know. We know. And you're going to say, "But they
14 weren't in the neck." Very well. You can make the point. It's no good
15 arguing with the witness about it. He just made a point on what he was
17 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I have no need to
18 argue, and I will skip over that question. But may I now address the
19 issue of deportation?
20 JUDGE MAY: Yes. If you would be fairly brief, because the
21 witness has a plane to catch and he must leave by 12.00, and it's right
22 there should be some re-examination, and you've been nearly 20 minutes.
23 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes. I have to ask him about
24 deportation and NATO bombing and that will complete my questions.
25 Q. You said the operation, the deportation operation and the
1 expulsion was very well planned and that it began after the NATO bombing.
2 That's what you said. Now, my question to you is the following: Were the
3 plans for exportation of the Albanian population outside the territory of
4 Kosovo, could they have been made if NATO bombing was not a known fact?
5 Because the people did start leaving at the very point when the NATO
6 bombing started.
7 A. Well, Mr. Tapuskovic, there is something which I think you
8 misquoted when you referred to me. I stated yesterday that based on the
9 information we had got, the expulsion, if I may say so, of Kosovo
10 Albanians started before NATO had bombed, and it was then accelerated. So
11 I think we have to correct your impression in that respect and bring it
12 back to the line which I took yesterday and today.
13 Q. And what about the members of the Verification Mission? Did they
14 leave Kosovo first and foremost because the NATO bombing was due to start
15 and so they left for their own security and safety, or was it what you
16 said yesterday, so that they would not remain as hostages and become
18 A. Well, we were concerned about the security of the OSCE observers
19 and invited the OSCE to consider NATO's recommendation to withdraw them
20 since we saw that the bombing was imminent. And the OSCE then took the
21 decision to withdraw them, I think on the 20th of March.
22 Q. We have been speaking over these days and months that the
23 Albanians were fleeing Kosovo for certain reasons. I don't want to go
24 back to that now.
25 Do you have any information as to the number, how many from the
1 territory of Serbia and the rest of Serbia, so Serbia proper, Vojvodina,
2 et cetera, how many Hungarians from Subotica went to Hungary, how many
3 Serbs fled to Serb Krajina, how many Romanians escaped to Romania, and in
4 general terms how many people from Belgrade, for instance, who had the
5 ability -- the possibility of leaving Serbia left because of the danger of
6 NATO bombing? Did you have any information as to the problems these
7 neighbouring states had because of the people from Serbia who were leaving
8 en masse, who were fleeing from their country en masse? Did you have any
9 information of that kind? Because half of Budapest was, for example, was
10 inhabited by Serbs who had fled. Or didn't you have information of that
12 A. We had information that people left their homes, also people of
13 another nationalities, and that this number, of course, increased when the
14 air operation started.
15 Q. Thank you, General. And just one -- several more points with
16 respect to the NATO bombing. You say in your statement, in paragraph 39
17 to be exact, towards the end, with respect to the NATO report from the
18 meeting, and it says Naumann's decoded notes from the meeting, and then
19 under an asterisk here it says: "One should be clear if we undertake
20 military action, we will end up in the field, in the terrain."
21 Does that mean when you undertook this action you had decided to
22 go on the ground, action then end up on the ground, that you decided to
23 use ground troops, the infantry, and go on the ground? That's what it
24 says. "Need to be clear: should we take mil action then end up on the
25 ground." That's what you said in your statement.
1 A. Well, Mr. Tapuskovic, that was my statement, that was my
2 assessment, and that was my statement to the NATO council telling them
3 that if they take the decision to intervene by air operations, that they,
4 at the end of the day, may end up with a necessity to include and involve
5 ground forces. I wanted to make them aware of the necessity to be
6 prepared to see it through, since you should never start an intervention
7 if you're not prepared to escalate as appropriate and also if you're not
8 prepared to stay in the country in which you acted in order to restore
9 peace and stability.
10 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tapuskovic, you've had -- you've had nearly half
11 an hour.
12 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Two more questions, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE MAY: One more question and then we must give a chance for
15 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Two more questions, please.
16 JUDGE MAY: No. Mr. Tapuskovic, please don't argue. We cannot go
17 on in this way. This is ground which is all covered. And speaking for
18 myself, I do not find it helpful for the amicus to be taking these sort of
20 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Judge, this is the point of what
21 I wish to ask: What --
22 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Ask it.
23 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. What quantity of uranium bombs were called when the operation was
25 called Angel -- what quantity of these types of these bombs were thrown on
1 Kosovo? And in the military sense, did you think that it was all okay for
2 bombs to be thrown from a height of 10.000 metres? That is my question.
3 A. Well, Mr. Tapuskovic, I cannot give you detailed numbers and
4 figures on the amount of depleted uranium that was used. With regard to
5 the height, the 15.000 feet flight level, there are two elements which you
6 should consider. First is, of course, to some extent we decided to take
7 this flight level in order to protect the pilots against air defence
8 missiles. And one other not too often discussed issue is that if you use
9 laser-guided ammunition, the 15.000 feet flight level is presumably the
10 optimum flight level to allow the biggest accuracy of the laser-guided
11 ammunition. So that was another step which I think was taken in order to
12 ensure that the utmost care was taken to ensure accuracy of the bombing.
13 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
14 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
15 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Ryneveld. I'm afraid there's just five
17 MR. RYNEVELD: I understand that, and accordingly, I will reduce
18 my re-examination and restrict it to one area.
19 Re-examined by Mr. Ryneveld:
20 Q. General Naumann, both yesterday and today, you were challenged on
21 whether or not the accused, in fact, made the statement that you claim he
22 made on the 25th of October concerning the Drenica incident. It was
23 suggested to you, sir, that you fabricated that statement. I believe in
24 response you indicated that you were aware that those statements were made
25 previously, not only by you but by General Clark, is that correct, and
1 that you had read publications?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. This morning it was put to you that -- there was a quote from a
4 book. You said you weren't referring to the book. Are you aware that
5 such a book exists by General Clark?
6 A. I know that General Clark has written a book on Kosovo.
7 Q. Are you familiar with that book? Have you read it?
8 A. I have not read it in detail. General Clark kindly gave it to me
9 and I read the concluding part in detail, but I did not read all the
11 Q. All right.
12 MR. RYNEVELD: I have for Your Honours' benefit a copy of a few
13 pages of that book I'd like to put to the witness. It is entitled --
14 there are only four pages. The first page is a cover page called "Waging
15 Modern War," by General Wesley Clark. The second page is the date of
16 publication or copyright, 2001. And then there's an excerpt from pages
17 151 and 152. And just so that everybody is clear, this is part of a
18 disclosure package that was given -- it's on our witness -- it's on our
19 exhibit list under K2591, and I'm referring to pages K2 -- 0209078 through
20 to pages K0209101.
21 Q. Very briefly, General. At the bottom of page 151, there is
22 reference, third to the last paragraph, which starts with the words: "And
23 so the paper was completed ...," et cetera, et cetera. And then the next
24 paragraph refers to Milosevic bringing in "... brandy in for himself,
25 Milutinovic and me, and for once I joined him. He grew philosophical...
1 began to discuss the economic future of Serbia." And then he - I'm
2 skipping - he abruptly changed subjects and he said, and I propose to
4 "`You know, General Clark, that we know how to handing these
5 Albanians, these murderers, these rapists, these
6 killers-of-their-own-kind. We've taken care of them before.' His face
7 turned red, and his voice rose in strength as he condemned them. This is
8 the paragraph out of some public statement. He wasn't really speaking to
9 us, I thought.
10 "`In Drenica in 1946, we killed them all. We killed them all.'
11 Naumann and I were just staring at him.
12 "He must have thought we didn't believe him, so he began to
13 qualify the accomplishment. `Oh, it took several years but we eventually
14 killed them all.'"
15 How, if at all, does that accord with your recollection?
16 A. I think that is not -- not too far away from what I stated, and it
17 confirms what I had said. The wording is slightly different but all in
18 all I think it's identical.
19 Q. Similarly, sir, you indicated that there was another publication
20 to which you originally referred, and you said it was not the book
21 yesterday. Were you referring to an interview on Frontline by any chance?
22 A. That could well be. But, Mr. Ryneveld, forgive me if I don't know
23 exactly the publication.
24 Q. But you were aware of other publications?
25 A. I was aware of that.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. Very briefly, sir, I'm going to --
2 MR. RYNEVELD: Perhaps, Your Honours, I could show another
3 document. Again this has been the subject of disclosure. It's exhibit
4 list reference OTP number K2328. It is -- purports to be a copy of an
5 interview with General Clark, and at the bottom it says -- it's a
6 "Frontline War in Europe Interview" with General Wesley Clark on the 14th
7 of November, 2001. In response to various questions on page 6 of 19
8 pages -- and I'll wait until Your Honours have it.
9 JUDGE MAY: You want these exhibited?
10 MR. RYNEVELD: Oh, yes, please. I'm sorry.
11 THE REGISTRAR: First document Prosecution Exhibit 231. Last
12 document 232.
13 MR. RYNEVELD:
14 Q. Again, sir, do you see the third paragraph from the top of page 6
15 starting with three dots just before that rectangle? There's a five-line
16 paragraph which refers to: "He recounted to us that he knew how to deal
17 with the Albanians, that in 1946, the Albanians that he called `murderers
18 and bandits,' were handled by `killing them all, although it took several
19 years, we killed them all.' He then signed the promises to NATO that he
20 would use only normal policing methods."
21 Is that the publication or a publication like it to which you
22 referred to in evidence?
23 A. It is a publication like it, Mr. Ryneveld. I'm not sure whether
24 it was this one or another one.
25 MR. RYNEVELD: Might that be given an exhibit number? And those
1 are all my questions in light of the time.
2 THE REGISTRAR: This was already exhibited. 232.
3 MR. RYNEVELD: I'm sorry. I had my headphones off. Were we just
4 given a number? Thank you.
5 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Mr. Ryneveld.
6 JUDGE MAY: General, thank you for coming to the Tribunal to give
7 your evidence. You are free to go.
8 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours.
9 [The witness withdrew]
10 JUDGE MAY: I think we usually take the break at ten past twelve.
11 MR. RYNEVELD: We do, Your Honours, and I propose for the balance
12 of the time after the break to call the first of two crime base witnesses,
13 depending on the time. I will, however, anticipate that at some point
14 today I'd like to address you on a couple of issues, administrative
15 issues. I'm asking when that might be the most convenient time.
16 JUDGE MAY: Why not now?
17 MR. RYNEVELD: Excellent. Thank you. I was hoping you'd say
19 The first matter, Your Honours, has to do with the discussion that
20 Mr. Nice had with the Court concerning a decision on the Rule 70 issue,
21 and reference was made to a matter that we believed at that time to be a
22 confidential decision. It in fact is a public decision. And in that decision
23 decision, the Ambassador was referred to under a pseudonym, and the
24 (redacted)is mentioned as a government. I just wanted you to be aware
25 that we will be providing a copy of that since it is a public decision.
1 JUDGE MAY: Very well. If you would do that as soon as possible.
2 MR. RYNEVELD: We shall. The other thing, Your Honours, is that
3 there is before the Court at the moment an application by the Prosecution
4 to consider, to use the expression, to fully bis, in other words, allow a
5 92 bis statement in without cross-examination for some witnesses, one of
6 which is K24, and the other one is K31. My understanding is that filling
7 and scheduling arrangements are extremely difficult and there is a
8 schedule that they would be flying in next week. So I'm simply asking if
9 the Court might turn its attention to that in sufficient time for us to
10 alter scheduling in the event the Court is in accord with our request.
11 And finally -- excuse me just one moment while I get a
12 clarification of a note.
13 [Prosecution counsel confer]
14 MR. RYNEVELD: The final matter, Your Honours, is the issue of
15 perhaps when Mr. Nice might address you with respect to some further
16 administrative matters. I understand that the Court may be disposed to
17 hear us on Tuesday. However, there is one issue that have will have been
18 dealt with earlier and that involves the witness that was the subject of
19 discussions in private session, and we --
20 JUDGE MAY: I can tell you we're not in a position to deal with
21 that. We were told the witness can wait.
22 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes.
23 JUDGE MAY: I'm afraid that we -- it's a matter which is going to
24 take very serious consideration, and we are not in a position to deal with
25 it at the beginning of next week. We will try and deal with it in the
1 middle of next week.
2 MR. RYNEVELD: So the request that I've been handed is would it be
3 possible by Tuesday afternoon. I take it from your answer that is
5 JUDGE MAY: I think I have to tell you it's unlikely.
6 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you. Those are the administrative matters
7 that I wanted to deal with, and after the break, I propose to call the
8 first of our two witnesses, Mr. Thaqi.
9 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you've heard the application in regard
10 to K24, and K31. They both deal with the same sort of subject matter, and
11 perhaps you could reflect over the weekend whether you wish to
12 cross-examine them or not, and it's a matter that we can deal with on
13 Monday. There's no need to say anything at the moment.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can tell you straight away I
15 insist on cross-examining them.
16 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll consider that matter.
17 We will adjourn now. Twenty minutes.
18 --- Recess taken at 12.10 a.m.
19 --- On resuming at 12.32 a.m.
20 [The witness entered court]
21 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness take the declaration.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak
23 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
24 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. If you'd like to take a seat.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
1 WITNESS: MILAZIM THAQI
2 [Witness answered through interpreter]
3 Examined by Mr. Ryneveld:
4 Q. Mr. Thaqi, I wonder if you could tell the Court your full name,
6 A. Yes. My name is Thaqi Milazim, Hetimi, from the village the
7 Broje, municipality of Skenderaj in Kosova.
8 Q. And how old, sir?
9 A. I am 53 -- correction, 56 years old.
10 Q. Do I understand correctly, sir, that you you were married in 1970
11 and you have nine children of the marriage?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. And I understand that five of those children are still living with
14 you at home; is that correct?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. At least in March of 1999, five of them were living with you at
18 A. Yes, that's correct.
19 Q. Now, Mr. Thaqi, you've told us that you are from Broje. Do I
20 understand correctly, sir, at some point you --
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. -- you found yourself in the village of Izbica on the 28th of
23 March, 1999?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. We'll get to that in a moment. Did you --
1 A. Okay.
2 Q. Did you give a statement to investigators of the Tribunal on the
3 9th and 12th of November of 1999?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And did you give a further statement for clarification on the 17th
6 and 20th the of October of the year 2001?
7 A. Yes, I gave that too.
8 Q. Recently, sir, on the 10th of June of 2002, did you have an
9 opportunity to review those statements you gave and appear before an
10 officer of this Tribunal and indicate under solemn declaration --
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. -- that those statements were true to the best of your knowledge,
13 information, and belief?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. All right.
16 MR. RYNEVELD: Your Honours, perhaps those statements might now be
17 distributed and marked as an exhibit. And while that's being done, I
18 propose, if I may, to simply read a brief summary of what is contained in
19 that statement.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 233.
21 MR. RYNEVELD: Your Honours, my understanding is that the
22 witness's statement is that Serb troops came close to his village of Broje
23 on the 25th of March, 1999, where there was a KLA presence. He and his
24 family left their home in Broje on the 26th of March and went to the
25 village of Izbica, about five or six kilometres distant. Now, Izbica was
1 considered to be a safer place because there was no known KLA presence in
2 that village, according to the witness. The rest of the population of
3 Broje also left for Izbica in a large convoy of assorted vehicles, and of
4 course some on foot. They gathered together with a large number of
5 refugees in a field outside of Izbica. He estimates that several thousand
6 people were in this area from all over Skenderaj municipality.
7 You will note that in his statement he describes that on the
8 morning of the 28th of March, 1999, which happened to be the Muslim holy
9 day of Bajram, at about 9.30 in the morning, that field was surrounded by
10 Serb troops, which consisted of a mixture of both army and police forces,
11 and in his statement he describes the different uniforms worn by the Serb
12 forces. He tells you that the soldiers demanded money from the crowd and
13 that he saw many people handing over large amounts of money. The witness
14 personally handed over 30 Deutschmarks. After a while, men were separated
15 from the women and children and were ordered to sit in four rows on the
16 road. The majority of the men were elderly. He estimates that there were
17 about 150 men in total.
18 The witness then goes on to describe in his statement that the men
19 were physically and verbally abused. They heard someone, whom he believed
20 to be the commander in charge, say to the policemen, "Everybody knows
21 their duty. Now, do it." The men were divided and taken away in two
22 groups, in opposite directions. The witness was in one of those groups of
23 about 33 men who were taken in two lines towards the woods, escorted by
24 one policeman armed with a machine-gun. After some 200 to 250 metres or
25 so, they were stopped close to a water channel. They were still in two
1 lines and were ordered to kneel down facing the woods. The policeman then
2 opened fire from about eight metres' distance. No other police were seen
3 by the witness to be nearby. There was a continuous burst of machine-gun
4 fire. Two persons fell against the witness and knocked him to the
5 ground. One was his cousin, Uke Uka, who was aged 74 years. He describes
6 the injuries of that witness and that he was hit by debris. The witness
7 himself was not hit, but laid still until the shooting was over. He
8 estimates that the shooting lasted only a matter of seconds, and he then
9 heard a single shot. He later discovered that bullets had penetrated his
10 jacket, his jersey, and his shirt, without harming him. They appeared to
11 have come from the side, skimming over his back. The witness then
12 describes some of the perpetrators in his statement.
13 Well, after the shooting was over, the witness remained quiet and
14 unmoving on the ground for about half an hour, he says. During this time,
15 he heard more automatic gunfire. It was the other men being killed.
16 Then, hearing what he thought were tanks returning, he, with two other
17 survivors, Sheqir Halil and Jetish Qallapeki, moved into the woods. He
18 and Sheqir remained in the woods until around 7.00 p.m., and then they
19 walked into the neighbouring village of Vojnike.
20 He said he came back to Izbica on the 1st of April, 1999 and
21 participated in the burial of bodies. And he describes there were 147
22 victims but some had been taken by their families and buried elsewhere. A
23 hundred and thirty of those were buried in Izbica.
24 He also indicates that when he returned to his home in Broje on
25 the 14th of June, 1999, he found his house burned, his property destroyed,
1 and some of his livestock and farm animals missing.
2 And I ought to have done this at the outset, Your Honours, but if
3 you can look at what has been marked as the Kosovo atlas 2, I might refer
4 Your Honours to page 5, and at the top you'll see an "L," and then down
5 the right-hand column you'll see "13." If you see where they match, just
6 down to the bottom you'll see Izbica, and that's just above line 30, the
7 horizontal line. And then if you go about an inch down, into the next
8 square, you'll see Broje. That, I understand, is the village of Broje
9 from which the witness originated, and that's about five to six kilometres
10 from Izbica, according to his statement, if that assists the Court in
11 noting where it is.
12 Now, I propose to show the witness, Mr. -- or Madam Usher, and ask
13 you, if you would, please, to show this to the witness, and after he's had
14 a chance to look at it, put it on the ELMO.
15 And Your Honours, this is an aerial photograph of Izbica, which
16 you can find in your binders, Izbica binder, tab 2 of the binder.
17 Q. Witness, would you just look at the photograph, the aerial
18 photograph. I don't know if you can see it well enough on the screen.
19 A. No, I cannot distinguish it.
20 Q. There we go. There are some --
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. There are some letters on the screen. First of all, there's a
23 letter "A," which is now off the screen.
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. There is a letter "A." Do you see that? And it points to --
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. What is that?
3 A. Letter "A" indicates the places where there were victims. We were
4 the first group.
5 Q. All right. And in your statement you've described the first group
6 being taken somewhere. Is the place where you were taken and shot at, is
7 that shown --
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. -- anywhere in this photo?
10 A. I cannot really see it very well.
11 Q. Might I ask you, Witness, to turn to your left and look at the
12 actual photograph that's lying on the ELMO. It will be easier for you to
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Do you see number "B"?
16 A. "B," here. We were here, the first group.
17 Q. And what happened there, at where the arrow from "B" points to?
18 What happened at that location?
19 A. When they sent us there, they told us to stop, and told us to stop
20 near a wall, at a distance of eight metres. They told us to turn our
21 backs towards them, and so we did. We were told to kneel. And before we
22 actually kneeled, they opened automatic fire on us, and I fell down on the
23 ground. I had a victim close to me.
24 Q. Yes.
25 A. After that --
1 Q. Yes. Sir, I've already summarised your statement. I just want to
2 be able to assist the Court in orienting where these things happened. So
3 "B" is the place where you were shot, is that correct, where the group of
4 you were shot at?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Do you see a letter "C"? Look at the diagram --
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. -- on your left. Yes. Do you see a letter "C"? I don't --
9 A. Yes, I can see it.
10 Q. And what does the letter "C" -- how does that assist the Court?
11 What happened there, if anything?
12 A. That's where the second group was. I don't know how many victims
13 were of that group there.
14 Q. All right. You're aware that a second group of people were
15 killed, and that's in that area, "C"?
16 A. Yes. Yes.
17 Q. Moving to the letter "D" --
18 MR. RYNEVELD: Perhaps we'll have to move that on the ELMO.
19 A. "D" is where the third group was. I don't know how many people
20 they killed of that group. They were close to the woods. And of the
21 second and third group, there were no survivors.
22 Q. And we're having some difficulty seeing it on the ELMO. And
23 finally, at letter "E," if we can find that ---
24 A. "E."
25 Q. I don't see it being displayed on the ELMO, but... Top left-hand
1 corner. Yes. Do you see the letter "E," sir, on the top left-hand
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. What does that describe?
5 A. This is where the fourth group was, on the right-hand side. Many
6 were killed there. Nine of them were saved, survived. They survived the
8 Q. All right, sir. Now, I'd like to show you a series of three
9 photographs, if I may.
10 A. Thank you.
11 Q. Thank you. All right.
12 MR. RYNEVELD: Madam Usher, if we can remove that, and I'll give
13 you three photographs.
14 And Your Honours, you will find --
15 JUDGE MAY: Let me have that photograph, please.
16 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you. Sorry.
17 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
18 MR. RYNEVELD: The next three photographs, Your Honour, is in the
19 Izbica binder, at tab 2, and they're photos 2, 3, and 4 in that binder.
20 Q. The first one, sir, seems to show an item of apparel, a garment.
21 Do you recognise that item shown in that photograph?
22 A. This is my shirt, the shirt in which the bullet came through.
23 Q. Can you point to the bullet holes?
24 A. Yes. Here is one, here, and here.
25 Q. All right. Next photograph. What's that?
1 A. This is my jumper, which also has three bullet holes in the back.
2 One, two, three.
3 Q. And the next photograph. What's that?
4 A. This is my jacket. It also has one, two, and I cannot see the
5 third one, but I know that there were three bullet holes in this one too.
6 Q. All right. Thank you.
7 A. Thank you.
8 Q. Those bullet holes, sir, is it your evidence that those bullet
9 holes were as a result of the shooting incident, or were they there
11 A. These -- that day. This is what happened that day. When I fell
12 down on the ground, the bullets hit me in my back, on my clothes.
13 Q. Finally, sir, I'm going to show you a fold-out photograph that is
14 a still photo of a video, and it's got -- first of all, do you recognise
15 the scene of the bodies in that photograph? Have you seen that photograph
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Is that a photograph of the people -- the group that you were with
19 who were shot?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Can you indicate to the Court on that photograph, to the best of
22 your recollection, where you were in relation to that pile of bodies --
23 A. I was here, in the middle of the bodies. I was here. And then
24 here was Uke and Isuf.
25 Q. All right, sir.
1 MR. RYNEVELD: Those are my questions of the witness. Thank you,
2 Your Honour.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
4 JUDGE MAY: Yes. If the photograph comes back, please.
5 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
6 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:
7 Q. [Interpretation] In your statement, on the 25th of March, 1999,
8 after the beginning of the NATO air raid, the police set up checkpoints at
9 Josanica, at about three kilometres from Broje. That's what you stated in
10 your statement. What did NATO bomb in your area?
11 A. Yes, that's correct. NATO did not bomb in our area at all,
12 nowhere in that area.
13 Q. Before that date that you mention, you left the village on two
14 occasions - in March 1998 and in July 1998 - is that right?
15 A. Yes. Yes, that's correct. That's correct.
16 Q. What was the real reason for you to leave? Was it perhaps the
17 fact that at the time, as in March 1999, there was fighting between the
18 KLA and the police and the army?
19 A. Yes. The Serb forces attacked us, all of us.
20 Q. And how many were there on the other side, the KLA?
21 A. I do not know how many of them there were, but there was KLA
23 THE INTERPRETER: Correction. Was not.
24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Well, tell me simply -- oh, there were none. I see.
1 A. Yes. Yes, there were.
2 JUDGE MAY: Let's not get at cross-purposes. It's important to
4 Were the KLA in the village before March 1999?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was. However, there were more
6 in other areas.
7 JUDGE MAY: And was there any fighting on the 28th of March -- or
8 rather - I'm sorry - earlier, when you left the village. Was there
9 fighting that day or not?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. No, not that day. There was no
11 fighting that day.
12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. When was there fighting between the police and the army and the
14 KLA, on the other hand?
15 A. When there was fighting? I don't know exactly when, but there was
16 some fighting around Jashareva. I don't know.
17 Q. My question was in reference to the time before this day that you
18 mention, that you left the village on two occasions: in March 1998 and
19 July 1998. In those days, in March and July 1998, was there any fighting
20 in those days between the KLA and the police and army?
21 A. I left, and I don't know whether there was fighting or not, but
22 certainly there must have been fighting going on --
23 Q. Why did you leave the village in July 1998 and in March 1998? Why
24 did you leave the village in March 1998?
25 A. Why we left? We left because the Serbian army came from the
1 municipality of Klina on the 5th of March. They came, so we left. And on
2 the 30th of July, they came again, from both sides - from the asphalt road
3 and from Resnik - so we left, in order to go somewhere to hide, in order
4 not to fall in their hands.
5 Q. Either in March or in July, were they looking for somebody? Did
6 they open fire at somebody? Did they shoot at somebody? Or were they
7 just passing through?
8 A. No. They killed that day two or three people, and then they set
9 off towards somewhere. They left Broje, and I don't know what happened.
10 Q. And who were those two or three people that they killed that day?
11 A. I don't know their names. They were from different villages
13 Q. They were from different villages and they were there. Were they
14 in uniform or were they in civilian clothing?
15 A. No. They were all in civilian. They were young, all of them.
16 Q. Did they have weapons?
17 A. No. No. What weapons? No.
18 Q. Do you know that it was precisely in your area that there were
19 many KLA forces - the 145th Brigade of the KLA was there - and that in the
20 whole region about two and a half thousand, the 111th, 112th, 113th,
21 114th, 140th in your area? Do you know all that?
22 A. I know that there were some. How many there were, that I do not
23 know. But I do know that there were some of them, and they were in
25 Q. And according to my information, there were about two and a half
1 thousand of them. Were there that many or were there less?
2 A. That I do not know. These things are not true.
3 Q. You said in your statement that you were afraid of what the Serbs
4 might do when, you said, the police set up checkpoints three kilometres
5 away from your village. Why were you afraid of a police checkpoint that
6 was three kilometres away from your village?
7 A. Because we saw even before in Recak, we saw in Likoshan, in Cirez,
8 and that's why we were scared. We saw what happened.
9 Q. Now, when Mr. Ryneveld was reading a summary of your statement,
10 you said that you went to Izbica because there was no KLA there, so you
11 considered it to be safer. Isn't that right? You went to Izbica because
12 there was no KLA there, and you thought it was safer there because the KLA
13 was not there. Is that right?
14 A. That's right. That's what I stated, because that's what it was
16 Q. And in your village, that means that there were KLA there, and
17 that's why you left it and went to Izbica, where there were no KLA
18 members. Isn't that right?
19 A. There was no KLA in our village that day. Not that day.
20 Q. And what day was the KLA there?
21 A. What day? I don't know what day. But that day there was none.
22 Q. All right. But since you went to Izbica, the reason for your
23 going to Izbica was that there were no KLA there. Why did you leave your
24 village if there were no KLA in your village?
25 A. Because they came from the municipality of Klina and they started
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 shooting with their weapons, so we left. We heard the shots and we left.
2 We left the village.
3 Q. So the fact that you went to this place Izbica was because there
4 were no KLA there. Does that mean that where the KLA were present, it was
5 dangerous because of possible clashes between the KLA and the police?
6 A. In Izbica village there was no KLA that day. Where there was KLA,
7 the Serbian army did not dare go in, except - correction - they only
8 entered in areas where there were elderly people, women, and children.
9 Q. Who went to the area where there were elderly people, women, and
10 children? Who do you mean?
11 A. The Serbian army, your army.
12 Q. So it didn't go where the KLA were?
13 A. No.
14 Q. Well, does that mean, then, that the police and the army did not
15 fight the KLA anywhere?
16 A. No. We did fight. But I don't know. I didn't see.
17 Q. Well, all right. As the army and the police was not in contact
18 with the KLA in your area, how do you explain the great number of soldiers
19 who were killed in your area? Who killed these soldiers, then?
20 A. The Serbian army. Who else?
21 Q. I'm talking about the large number of persons killed - that is to
22 say, our soldiers, soldiers belonging to the army of Yugoslavia - in that
23 particular area. Who killed them, if you say that there were only
24 civilians there?
25 A. I don't know that. I don't know whether there were victims from
1 the Yugoslav army.
2 Q. Well, for example, on the 1st of April, 1999, precisely in your
3 village -- I have a figure here. My information tells me that a soldier
4 was killed, or rather, a member of the MUP, in your particular village.
5 His name was Igor Vrosevic. He was killed. And then in Likovac, for
6 example, several of them there, and several in Mrkalj, more in Likovac
7 again, and so on, also a large number of soldiers in that whole area of
8 yours, in the Srbica municipality. Do you know about that?
9 A. I don't know about that.
10 Q. You didn't hear of any fighting in which the army and police and
11 the KLA members lost their lives in your area?
12 A. I have not heard about that. I was trying to leave with my family
13 to seek shelter somewhere.
14 Q. All right. You say in your statement that on the night of the
15 26th of March, "... my friends from Izbica, Gani Rama received my family
16 to spend the night in one of the rooms of his house. And during that
17 particular night, it was very difficult to sleep because of the constant
18 shelling." Is that right?
19 A. That's right. That's what it was. That's true.
20 Q. Well, what kind of constant shelling was this? Was it bombing?
21 What was it that was so loud that you couldn't sleep the whole night?
22 A. That is where those came from, the Serbian army. From your army.
23 Q. And which village was shelled on the 27th of March? You say that
24 it was shelled by our army. Which villages were in fact shelled?
25 A. Turiqevc, Kobiliq, Jashareva. These villages.
1 Q. And did you and your family, from the 26th of March to the 28th of
2 March, in the morning, did you have any problems while you stayed at Gani
3 Rama's place?
4 A. No, we didn't have any problem whatsoever. He received us very
6 Q. And is Hashim Thaqi a relative of yours?
7 A. [In Serbian] Yes, he is. [In Albanian] Yes. Yes.
8 Q. Is it a member of the same family? So he's a member of your
10 A. Yes. Yes, he is.
11 Q. And tell me, who told you that there were 157 of you? Did you
12 count this or did somebody tell you?
13 A. The victims?
14 Q. One hundred and fifty of you males were separated; right?
15 A. Yes, that's true.
16 MR. RYNEVELD: I don't -- in the transcript it reads "157." I
17 think I heard that from the translator. The summary indicated a different
18 number. I just wanted to make sure the witness isn't being referred to
19 something out of context.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What isn't correct? Could you
21 explain this to me? I don't know what I quoted incorrectly. I'm not
22 clear on that point.
23 MR. RYNEVELD: I'm not sure whether the accused quoted
24 incorrectly, but in the summary we indicated he describes 147. The
25 witness -- it was put to the witness 157.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
2 MR. RYNEVELD: I don't know if it's translation or whatever. I
3 just wanted, in fairness in the witness, to point that out.
4 JUDGE MAY: Well, we have that sorted out.
5 Now, Mr. Thaqi, you know what you're being asked about, do you?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
7 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, put your question again.
8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Who told you that there were 157 of you? Did you count them or
10 did somebody tell you that figure?
11 A. I counted them myself.
12 Q. So you counted them yourself, did you?
13 A. Yes, I did.
14 Q. Let me read on page 4 from the third paragraph of your statement.
15 You say: "I have been told that there were 157 in total." That's what it
16 states. "I have been told that there were ..." You don't count them.
17 You say, "I have been told that there were ..."
18 JUDGE MAY: To be fair to the witness, the previous sentence --
19 just a moment. The previous sentence should be read. It says:
20 "We were made to sit in four rows along the road. There were
21 over 150 men altogether. I have been told that there were 157 in total.
22 I was amongst the youngest ..."
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's right.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I don't know what isn't fair
25 to the witness, Mr. May. I asked him whether he counted them or whether
1 he was told, and he said that he told them. In the statement it says that
2 he was told. So I'm asking him which of the two is correct.
3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. As far as I remember - I can look at it to check this out, but I
5 don't think this is challenged - you said that in the field there were
6 several thousand people there who had gathered together in the field, in
7 the meadow. Is that right?
8 A. True.
9 Q. How many thousand, roughly, would you say were there?
10 A. Approximately 15.000, 16.000.
11 Q. So 15.000, 16.000. Of those 15.000, 16.000 people, they singled
12 out just 157; right? And you say they singled out the men, which means
13 that the rest of the 15.000 were women and children and just 157 of you
14 who were men; right?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. All right. When they divided you up into two groups, you say that
17 there were 33 persons in your group, which means that in the other group
18 there were a remaining 144. Is that right?
19 A. The first group, I counted them when they took us up in that
20 place. We were 33 people. Three survived. Thirty were killed on the
21 spot. But I can't tell you how many were in the other groups. That I
22 don't know.
23 Q. All right. You survived this execution. That is the substance of
24 your statement. And you say that this group was taken off by one
25 policeman, that you were taken off by one policeman; right?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And apart from this one policeman, there was nobody else with you,
3 just this one policeman; right?
4 A. I didn't see any other policemen, only that one. The others
5 were -- remained below in the meadow.
6 Q. So you went two by two; right?
7 A. When they separated us, when they told us to kneel, then they made
8 us sit in rows of four but two by twos. They said, "We will take you to
9 another place and the others to Klina." And this is how we went there, by
11 Q. And does that mean two rows, one behind the other? Right?
12 A. We were in rows of twos.
13 Q. Two by two. And when you turned towards them, you were in a -- in
14 two lines?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And you were in the other line. Not in the first line but in the
17 second line; right?
18 A. The first line, in fact.
19 Q. So you -- that means that you were the closest there, the closest
20 to the policeman who executed you, as you say.
21 A. I was on the left-hand side of that policeman.
22 Q. And how far away from you was he?
23 A. Maybe seven or eight metres away, not more than that. I didn't
24 measure it, actually.
25 Q. Did that just one policeman shoot at you?
1 A. Yes. He was the one who shot, but God saved us. And I'm here to
2 tell the truth and only the truth, nothing but the truth.
3 Q. All right. So that means that he shot at you and missed you from
4 a distance of seven metres. He shot a burst of gunfire at you. Now, how
5 did these people all fall on top of you when you were in the first line
6 and closest to him?
7 A. I was on the left-hand side, I said, and I was saved by those two
8 victims who fell over me after he shot at us.
9 Q. Well, you said a moment ago that nobody was in front of you, that
10 you were at the head, up front.
11 A. No. I was on the left-hand side, I said, but not exactly on the
12 first line. I was in the middle.
13 Q. But there were only two lines.
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And you all knelt down on the ground; right?
16 A. Yes, we did.
17 Q. Well, what about the people that were to the left and right of
18 you? How far away were they? The one next to you who was shot and the
19 one to your right and left, how far away were they from you?
20 A. They were half a metre away from me. Not further than that. This
21 is how we were all lined up.
22 Q. So you were kneeling down on the ground. One of them was half a
23 metre to the left of you, the other half a metre to the right of you, and
24 they fell on top of you; right?
25 A. Yes. Yes.
1 Q. And who were the two men in the line in front of you? What were
2 their names?
3 A. I am not the so sure about their names. Uka and Isuf fell on top
4 of me. Uka was on my right side, Isuf on my left side.
5 Q. And who was in front of you then?
6 A. There were many. I don't know their names because I didn't know
7 each and every one of them by name. They were -- they had come from many
8 other places.
9 Q. What did the policemen shoot out of: a pistol, a machine-gun,
10 what? What did he fire from?
11 A. They fired with machine-gun, with heavy machine-gun.
12 Q. A heavy machine-gun, you say. Well, let's say that he shot from a
13 light machine-gun. It doesn't matter. It makes no difference whether it
14 was light or not. But do you know that a machine-gun, from a distance of
15 eight metres, can pierce two bodies, at all events, if not more?
16 JUDGE MAY: The witness can only say what happened to him. He can
17 only give his description of events.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right.
19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. All right. Your description of events. You were kneeling down.
21 To the left of you at half a metre was one man, to the right of you half a
22 metre away from you was the other man. They were shooting at you from a
23 machine-gun at a distance of eight metres. They missed you, and the two
24 people half a metre away from you on the left and right kneeling down fell
25 across you. Their bodies fell over you. One of them fell to your left
1 side, the other fell to your right side, and you were left underneath
2 them. Is that your description of events?
3 A. Yes, that's how it was.
4 Q. All right. Very well. Thank you. Now, do you know the policeman
5 that you describe in your statement on page 5, paragraph 2?
6 A. No.
7 Q. Did that policeman shoot -- do the shooting at your whole group?
8 A. He did.
9 Q. And later on, you discovered that you had three bullet holes on
10 the back side of your jacket and shirt but that none of those bullets
11 actually hit you; is that right?
12 A. That is right. And it was only on the day that we buried them
13 that I noticed the bullet holes in my clothes.
14 Q. Well, tell me, how could they be -- these bullet holes be on the
15 back if this man shot at you and was standing in front of you? You say
16 that it might have been from the side. You said that he shot from in
17 front of you and not from the side.
18 A. It was the same person who took us there to that place that shot
19 at us.
20 Q. That's why I'm asking you. If he was in front of you and you have
21 these bullets holes on the back, you say that maybe somebody shot from the
22 side. How could you have got these bullet holes in the back if the person
23 that was shooting shot in front of you?
24 A. He was on our right-hand side, not in front of us. He was eight
25 metres away from us. And then he fired his machine-gun at us.
1 Q. That means that he was shooting at all of you from the side and
2 not from in front of you.
3 Now tell me this: How did you discover that the other men were
4 later liquidated? How did you find that out?
5 A. After three minutes I felt faint, and then when I saw two victims
6 that had fallen on top of me and the blood running from their injuries,
7 and then after about 30 minutes, Demush Asllani started to moan, and then
8 I said, "Keep up your courage, Demush. We are lucky to be alive." I
9 said, "Don't make any noise." He said, "Who are you?" I said, "I am
10 Milazim Thaqi from Broje." "And who you are you?" I said. The other one,
11 Shaqir Halil from Vojnika. Then we said, "Look what has happened, how
12 many victims are here." The third guy didn't talk with us at all. He was
13 a little bit further up.
14 Q. And on the 1st of April, Demush Asllani, was he buried in your
15 presence when you helped with this air -- burial, with the burial?
16 A. Yes, we helped with the burial. We buried all of them, not only
17 Demush Asllani.
18 Q. But you did bury him, didn't you?
19 A. Yes, I did. His family were there, his son was there, and I was
20 there too.
21 Q. And that's where you buried them; right?
22 A. Yes. There is a meadow there. A neighbour of them gave them a
23 plot of land for us to bury them.
24 Q. Yes. And do you know who Alush Liri [as interpreted] is?
25 A. No, I don't.
1 Q. And do you remember somebody who filmed and made photographs, took
2 photographs of the victims in Izbica?
3 A. Liri Loshi is the person. He's the one who filmed the victims.
4 Q. Well, yes. That's who I'm asking you about. Do you know him?
5 A. Yes. But you mentioned another name. That's why I said no.
6 Q. Well, perhaps my pronunciation wasn't precise enough. So that's
7 my mistake then. So you know Alush Liri [as interpreted] who took
8 pictures of the victims in that event that you're talking about. And do
9 you know that he made up a list of the victims as well, that he drew up a
10 list of victims and photographed the victims too?
11 A. He did that that day. My cousin Sef and myself were there, and he
12 had a camera with him.
13 Q. Very well. And do you know that on the list the name of Demush
14 Asllani does not appear, though you claim that he was buried there
15 together with the others? Do you know that his name is not on that list?
16 A. The truth is that he is on that list of the victims.
17 Q. Very well. Will you now explain one thing for me? There were
18 16.000 people. You were singled out, 157 of you. You said 147 was
19 killed. Is it true that the KLA organised the funeral?
20 A. In the funeral there were civilians and KLA members, because they
21 were there to help bury the victims.
22 Q. And the next witness, Draga, also refers to the KLA. On page 6,
23 in fact, paragraph 3, you can check. You said: "The funeral of the
24 victims was organised by the KLA. Altogether, there was a total of 147
25 victims of the Serb massacre. Some of the bodies were taken by their
1 families and buried elsewhere. One hundred and thirty were buried in the
2 field in Izbica."
3 Did you state that?
4 A. I said there were civilians as well as KLA who helped us, and I
5 was one of them. And we buried the victims. Some took away the bodies of
6 the victims to bury elsewhere. There was a total of 147 victims.
7 Q. Very well. Several, you said, but 130. So 17 were taken away and
8 130 were buried there. And you say that the burial of the victims was
9 organised by the KLA. That is what it says on page 6, paragraph 3, of
10 your statement. Is that right?
11 A. I am saying that there were more civilians and less KLA members to
12 help us bury the victims. That's all I said.
13 Q. Very well. In -- towards the end of paragraph 3 on page 6,
14 there's a short sentence which reads: "The burial of the victims was
15 organised by the KLA."
16 JUDGE MAY: No. We've been over this, Mr. Milosevic. If you have
17 any -- Mr. Thaqi, don't bother to deal with it. You've dealt with it.
18 Mr. Milosevic, you've got two minutes or so left.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May.
20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. In that case, is it true that out of those 15 or 16.000 people and
22 everything that happened there, the people that were buried were actually
23 members of the KLA killed in fighting with the police and the army? Is
24 that true?
25 A. Those whom we buried, they were not KLA members. They were all
1 civilians aged 38 to children of young -- of six months and six weeks old,
2 women, and elderly people.
3 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Tapuskovic, have you any questions?
4 No. That concludes your examination.
5 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have no questions
6 for this witness.
7 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Ryneveld?
8 MR. RYNEVELD: One, if I may.
9 Re-examined by Mr. Ryneveld:
10 Q. Mr. Thaqi, you appear to have been challenged in cross-examination
11 about how it is that the bullet holes in your clothing could be on the
12 back if you were in front. Just for clarification, when the shooting
13 started, were you kneeling down?
14 A. I was lying on the ground. From the position of kneeling I fell
15 down and then I knew nothing of what happened. And as I said, I saw the
16 bullet holes three days afterwards.
17 Q. Thank you. Just let me clarify. When the first shots rang out,
18 as it were, were you already lying down or were you still in a kneeling
20 A. I was in a kneeling position.
21 Q. Were you facing the police officer, away from him, to the side of
22 him? How were you kneeling?
23 A. No. I was -- we were with our backs to him. This is what we told
24 him to do. We were looking to the mountain, to the stream.
25 Q. So at that point is it your evidence - and please correct me if
1 I'm wrong. I'm just trying to visualise what you're saying - you were
2 facing away from the police officer, kneeling down so that your back would
3 have been exposed to him? Is that it?
4 A. I don't know.
5 Q. Fine. Thank you.
6 A. Thank you.
7 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Thaqi, that concludes your evidence. Thank you
8 for coming to the International Tribunal to give it. You are free to go.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. And I'm happy to know
10 that there is justice in the world for people to tell the truth.
11 [The witness withdrew]
12 JUDGE MAY: Let me return the photograph.
13 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]
14 JUDGE MAY: We can't hear.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Question first. According to this
16 list of witnesses that I have, the latest one that I received, the next
17 would be Draga Mustafa. We've had Naumann out of order. So Draga
18 Mustafa, Scott Braddock, Vllasi Azem, Hoxha Hani, Haxhiavdi Ismet,
19 Berisha, et cetera. Is that the order in which we're going to hear the
20 witnesses from Monday on or are there any other changes?
21 JUDGE MAY: There will certainly be one and that is in the case of
22 Mr. Braddock Scott. No decision has been made about him yet.
23 As for the remainder, Mr. Ryneveld, will they follow the order
24 that appears on the latest list?
25 MR. RYNEVELD: There will be a new list printed in a few moments
1 that will be distributed, but the bottom line is yes, Mr. Draga is next.
2 Unless you want me to start him now, and I'm happy to. He's the next
3 witness. That will be followed by Hoxha and Mr. Haxhiavdi and Berisha.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And where's Vllasi? You have Vllasi
6 JUDGE MAY: No. He's not going to give evidence. He's -- we've
7 not admitted him. We ruled on that the other day.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm asking because he's on the list,
9 and he appeared after what you said, Mr. May.
10 JUDGE MAY: Yes. He should have been removed.
11 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes. And the list that will be distributed
12 momentarily --
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Draga Mustafa and then Hoxha Hani.
14 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes. And then the list in the order that we had.
15 So if he's looking at a previous list, the order stays the same and the
16 only ones that are -- that will be -- are the three that are immediately
17 after Draga we'll be missing, because we've had Naumann. We have had no
18 ruling with respect to the next witness. And Vllasi, we've had a ruling
19 and he will not be called. Then the list continues.
20 JUDGE MAY: I think, for completeness, it should be said that
21 prosecuting counsel was withdrawing Mr. Vllasi for the moment, although
22 they might reapply or reconsider having him called at a later stage in the
23 trial. But he's not giving evidence at the moment.
24 MR. RYNEVELD: I see that we have a few moments. Did you wish me
25 to call the next witness or are we breaking?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Excuse me.
2 JUDGE MAY: It would be convenient to adjourn.
3 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have an objection. In my opinion,
5 even according to your Rules, after you tell the witness that his
6 testimony is over, that it would not be correct to switch on his
7 microphone after that and allow him to make speeches. This has already
8 happened several times.
9 JUDGE MAY: It is a mere comment from the witness. They have come
10 a long way. They've come a long way. They have been through, many of
11 them, very great ordeals. It's therefore not inappropriate, if they wish
12 to say a few words, to allow them to do so. You need not worry,
13 Mr. Milosevic. It will have no effect on the evidence in the trial.
14 Yes. We'll adjourn now -- Mr. Milosevic, stop interrupting.
15 We'll adjourn now until Monday morning, 9.00, as I recollect.
16 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.41 p.m.,
17 to be reconvened on Monday, the 17th day of June,
18 2002, at 9.00 a.m.