1 Tuesday, 2 July 2002
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
5 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, I understand there are some matters you
6 want to raise about the hearing in your absence. There was a transcript.
7 You should have had a copy of it, so you should know what happened.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. First and foremost, I think
9 that sitting in any way in my absence, especially if some rights of mine
10 were discussed, is wrong, because my presence is compulsory during such a
11 sitting. And therefore, I object.
12 Secondly, in relation to the fact that you discussed some kind of
13 examinations and the condition of my health, first and foremost, I want to
14 say that I have no objections whatsoever with regard to the prison doctor.
15 He behaves in a correct, professional manner. I pointed out to him that I
16 am not asking for any kind of sick leave. I'm not asking for anything.
17 I want to tell you that you should not harbour any illusions that
18 I seek anything of you. I am not going to accept any kind of examinations
19 by any kind of commission if my own doctor who treated me over the past
20 few years is not on that same commission.
21 The third thing I wish to say has to do with the proposals of the
22 other side to have nine witnesses that are supposed to testify under Rule
23 92 bis do not be cross-examined. I categorically oppose that, and I
24 remind you that you yourselves have ruled that all witnesses, even those
25 under 92 bis, are supposed to be subjected to cross-examination.
1 On the 11th of March, 2002 - this is in the transcript, on page
2 1964, line 16 - that was precisely your decision, as far as I could see.
3 [In English] "It is right that witnesses should appear for
4 cross-examination." [Interpretation] That is your decision.
5 On the 17th of April, 2002, in the transcript, page 3360 --
6 JUDGE MAY: I'm going to interrupt you because we decided in that
7 case that we would leave the decision about whether to allow those
8 witnesses to be called until a later date, until we'd heard the evidence
9 of the events about which they give evidence from other witnesses. So
10 what we will do is this: We will hear the other witnesses about those
11 events. We will then make a decision as to whether the evidence should be
12 accepted under Rule 92 bis, and at that stage we will give you the
13 opportunity to address us on the matter. So for the moment, that is not
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then I'm not going to present this
16 now. Only in principle, in relation to your decisions concerning 92 bis
17 witnesses, I wish to remind you that on the 17th of April, you said
18 precisely that -- when you were dealing with the question of the
19 cross-examination of 92 bis witnesses, you allotted one hour to me and
20 five minutes to the other side because these are written depositions. In
21 practice, it is the opposite that happens. The other side has unlimited
22 time, and even that hour that you yourselves allotted to me, you shortened
23 that to 45 minutes, although you know that, in principle,
24 cross-examination can last ten minutes or ten hours, for as long as
25 necessary. It shouldn't be shortened. At any rate, you have deviated
1 from your own decisions in this regard.
2 The third thing I wish to say by way of an objection is the fact
3 that reports are not being submitted. For example, expert reports in part
4 have not been discovered at all, and in part they have been disclosed only
5 in the English language. And you know full well that I cross-examine all
7 As for the history expert, we have a report only in English. For
8 the financial expert, only in English. For the military expert, there is
9 no statement whatsoever, no findings whatsoever. As for the demographer,
10 we haven't get a statement or any findings. As for the MUP expert, I
11 haven't got a statement or any findings. As for the constitutional
12 expert, no findings, no statement. For the constitutional and criminal
13 expert Srdja Popovic, as it says here, there is no statement, no findings.
14 In addition to that, I wish to object to disclosing witnesses --
15 witnesses by statements from -- by witnesses from Serbia. I am being
16 given their statements in the English language and I'm sure that they gave
17 statements in Serbian. K33, no statement. K37, no statement. K38, no
18 witness statement, K39, no witness statement. K35, although it is a Serb,
19 again I have the statement only in the English language. Dragan Karleusa,
20 who certainly gave his statement in the Serbian language, I have his
21 statement in English. Radojkovic, also in the English language. Then R3
22 I have no statement whatsoever. R4, R5, R6, R7, no statements.
23 Therefore, I think that with regard to everything I've said to
24 you, no further comment is necessary.
25 In addition to that, the next thing I wish to deal with --
1 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- is the following: Several times
3 I asked that you decide or, rather, pass a writ of disclosure that will
4 make it incumbent upon the intelligence services of the relevant states to
5 disclose the information that they have available. On the other hand, I
6 see that for a long time now there has been discussion here with regard to
7 the application of your own Rule 70, which is supposed to protect even
8 regular Prosecution witnesses from providing information that these
9 witnesses -- that these witnesses could consider unfavourable to be
10 presented here. Therefore, I think that any court of law anywhere in the
11 world would have to proceed from the fact that they care about the truth.
12 And these requests are contrary to that. I want this information to be
14 As for the request of the other side, not only not to have
15 information disclosed but to have certain witnesses freed from the
16 obligation to respond to certain questions related to this kind of
17 information, this is a question of principle, actually.
18 JUDGE MAY: We will -- we will be coming to that on Friday. So
19 there's no need to address us on that now.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Then just -- then just one more
21 objection, because I saw that you discussed the punishment of Witness K12
22 because he didn't want to testify. I wish to remind you of the existence
23 of a declaration against torture that was adopted by the United Nations.
24 JUDGE MAY: This is irrelevant to you. Absolutely nothing to do
25 with you. The contempt proceedings -- the contempt proceedings are
1 nothing to do with you and are between the Court and the witness.
2 Mr. Nice, is there any matter you want to raise?
3 No. You have been allowed to go on for a very long time. You are
4 now dealing with irrelevant matter.
5 Yes, Mr. Nice. Yes, Mr. Nice.
6 MR. NICE: Your Honour, only a couple of matters arising from what
7 the accused said. I will revert later today as to the service of material
8 in relation to K33 because we are now two days late in respect of his
9 material, and I'll come and explain why I hope by the end of the day. The
10 Court has the list of witnesses which of course has had to be amended in
11 light of the two weeks that we haven't been able to sit.
12 I'm -- I don't see any problems with keeping the diary full, but
13 looking ahead, not now because it will take time now, but looking ahead, I
14 understand that the travel difficulties to and from Kosovo and getting
15 tickets are such that if I'm going to have to advance witnesses from
16 there, I've got to start making my plans by this Friday. So therefore,
17 admissibility issues for the period between now and the 26th of July are,
18 wherever possible, best addressed by this Friday so that I can make
19 arrangements for filling time with witnesses should that be necessary.
20 JUDGE MAY: Will you let us know what there is that you want ruled
22 MR. NICE: Certainly, yes. I should alert the Chamber to two
23 things I haven't told you about before in terms and that don't appear on
24 the list. Merovci has got to come back very briefly to deal with a tape.
25 I think the accused was going to provide a tape. I'm not sure if he has
1 yet. I think I've got a copy myself from another source, but he's got to
2 come back.
3 Hendrie was not cross-examined as to the suggestion that the
4 photographs he took were photographs of something that was a setup. I
5 could deal with that in rebuttal but it's frankly much better to deal with
6 the issue while it's fresh in everybody's memory. So I'm going to ask to
7 slot him in at some stage. He's not on the list.
8 And lastly, the Court recalls that there's a witness named Jemini
9 who gave an account of what he overheard from his building of a
10 radio contact between the neighbours -- not the neighbours, between
11 soldiers in the neighbouring building. He was cross-examined as to the
12 accuracy or honesty of that. The person with whom he was in company in
13 hiding was contacted I think before the witness went back. There are
14 statements from him and there's an application in written form coming to
15 add him. So those are the only three additions.
16 And so far as Sandra Mitchell is concerned, we would be assisted
17 by a ruling on her position. She's scheduled for Thursday but we'd be
18 grateful if we could know about her. She's actually in The Hague at the
19 moment, so were we to fall short of witnesses for any reason, we could
20 perhaps take her evidence in chief if we can, as it were, whistle her up.
21 And I think that de la Billiere, Sir Peter de la Billiere may require some
22 abbreviation of service if he's to give evidence on the day listed, but
23 that's all.
24 And Mr. Ryneveld will be taking the next witness, who is a
25 substantial witness, Mr. Petritsch.
1 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, we've heard you. There's no call for
2 comment on what the Prosecution has said. It's merely a matter of
3 informing the Chamber of the current position. There's no need for
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, this is not a comment, this
6 is an objection. Do you allow me to -- I mean, are you going to keep my
7 microphone on?
8 I oppose that. I oppose having material provided to me in a
9 shortened period of time. Within ten days, that's become the rule rather
10 than 30 days. You have proclaimed my alleged right here to defend myself.
11 That can only be a reason to extend deadlines, not shorten them. And what
12 you've allowed here is the shortening of deadlines. Now I've heard that
13 this Sandra Mitchell is supposed to come on Thursday. I haven't got any
14 statement of hers. Nothing has been given to me. And then --
15 JUDGE MAY: Let us look at it. Let us look at it. I'm going to
16 ask the senior legal officer to come up.
17 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, I'm going to give the Court's rulings
20 on the various matters you raise.
21 The first matter you raise is an objection to our holding a
22 hearing in absence of the accused, yourself. The position is this: That
23 if there comes a time when for some reason or other an accused is for a
24 long time absent, it becomes essential for the Court to deal with
25 administrative matters, even in the absence of the accused. Nothing was
1 done at that hearing, as you know quite well, to prejudice your position,
2 and you've had the opportunity to raise matters now. If again you are ill
3 and it becomes necessary to hold a hearing for administrative and other
4 reasons, then such a hearing will be held, but you will get a transcript,
5 and you will also have the opportunity to raise matters during the next
7 The next matter is this: Your application that you wish to have a
8 doctor from Belgrade present during the medical examination. We will
9 consider that.
10 Your next point was that cross-examination allowed to you is too
11 short. I have explained many times, and I will explain again. A Court
12 has an inherent power to limit the time available to the parties before it
13 in the interests of justice. It's not right that a Court's time should be
14 wasted on irrelevant matter. We have, therefore, considered your
15 cross-examination of the witnesses, and I note that in at most two or
16 perhaps three cases only out of the 70-odd witnesses that we've heard have
17 you finished within time. We note that you take every minute available,
18 and therefore, we have had to limit the time and come to the conclusions
19 which we have had in the interests of justice and securing a fair and
20 expeditious trial, as we must.
21 We -- just one moment. We turn next -- I turn next to your
22 complaint about disclosure of expert reports and the absence of disclosure
23 of statements in B/C/S. We shall order the Prosecution to address those
24 matters. It would be best if you would deal specifically with the matters
25 raised by the accused, and if you could let us have a schedule of those
1 particular matters dealing with disclosure; what disclosure has taken
2 place and where it falls short of the Rules, what is required in the
4 The final matter you raise which I'm dealing with is your
5 application for what you call a writ of disclosure. Now, it is a matter
6 which you've raised before, it's true, and what you say today is you want
7 disclosure from the intelligence services, the relevant intelligence
9 Now, there is a regime in the Tribunal for parties to obtain
10 documents or information by application to the relevant Judge or Trial
11 Chamber. The Rule is Rule 54 bis, to which I draw your attention. You
12 will see there the regime set out. It requires you to apply in writing,
13 identifying the possible documents or information which you want,
14 indicating how they're relevant to any matters in issue, and explaining
15 any steps that you may have taken to obtain the assistance required.
16 I'm not going through the rest of the regime. It is set out in
17 the Rule, and you can read it.
18 Yes. Let's have the witness, please.
19 MR. NICE: Your Honour, certainly. And while the witness is
20 coming in, most of the information on disclosure is already in the
21 right-hand column of this document. Insofar as it falls short in respect
22 to matters raised by the accused, I'll deal with it. So far as Sandra
23 Mitchell, number 7, is concerned, I gather that the B/C/S translation
24 that's referred to there as to be provided as soon as possible was in fact
25 provided on the 27th of June.
1 JUDGE MAY: The 20 --
2 MR. NICE: 27th of June. And we'd grateful for a ruling as to
3 whether she'd be subject to Rule 92 bis because we'll make the appropriate
5 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, we'll consider that.
6 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes. The Prosecution then would call Ambassador
7 Wolfgang Petritsch.
8 [The witness entered court]
9 WITNESS: WOLFGANG PETRITSCH
10 JUDGE MAY: Yes. If the witness takes the declaration.
11 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
12 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
13 JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat.
14 Examined by Mr. Ryneveld:
15 Q. Ambassador Petritsch, I understand, sir, that you are presently
16 the permanent representative of Austria to the United Nations and the
17 World Trade Organisation in Geneva; is that correct, sir?
18 A. That's correct.
19 Q. And is it also right, sir, that between August of 1999 and May of
20 2002, you were the high representative of the international community for
21 Bosnia and Herzegovina?
22 A. That's all correct.
23 Q. And when you stepped down, that position was taken by Lord
24 Ashdown; is that correct?
25 A. That's correct.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. Now, sir, I understand that you are also the author of a number of
2 books, and one of those books is -- concerns the history of Kosovo up
3 until the 24th of March, 1999, and it's entitled "Kosovo-Kosova Mythen,
4 Daten, Fakten"; is that correct?
5 A. That's correct.
6 Q. Now, Ambassador Petritsch, while you were Austria's ambassador to
7 the former Yugoslavia -- first of all, perhaps you could tell me, were you
8 in fact Austria's ambassador to the former Yugoslavia, the FRY, and if so,
9 what those dates were.
10 A. Yes, I was. Between September of 1997 and July, beginning of
11 August of 1999 formally, officially.
12 Q. And at some time, sir, did you become the European Union's special
13 envoy for Kosovo?
14 A. That's also correct, and the dates are between October of 1998 and
15 July of 1999.
16 Q. While serving in that capacity, sir, did you have occasion to act
17 as the European Union's chief negotiator at the Rambouillet negotiations?
18 A. Well, I was actually appointed by the Contact Group to be one of
19 the three chief negotiators, along with Chris Hill from the United States
20 and Boris Maiorsky from the Russian Federation.
21 Q. Can you tell us, sir, what the Rambouillet negotiations were about
22 and when they took place.
23 A. The Rambouillet negotiations started on the 6th of February, and
24 that was an initiative taken by the Contact Group. These are the six
25 nations; United States, Russian Federation, and four European countries
1 like Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain. And they invited, rather,
2 summoned the two sides, the Yugoslav side and the Kosovo Albanian side, to
3 meet in Rambouillet, outside of Paris in the consul, to find a peaceful
4 solution to the Kosovo conflict.
5 Q. And approximately when -- I think you said it was the 6th of
6 February that it started?
7 A. It started on the 6th of February. Rambouillet ended on the 23rd
8 of February, and then it was -- the negotiations were resumed after a
9 hiatus of about close to three weeks, on the 15th of March in Paris, at
10 Centre Kleber, and they lasted until the 19th of March.
11 Q. And just so that the record is clear, the year was what?
12 A. The year was 1999.
13 Q. I see. All right, sir. Now, we will get back to Rambouillet, but
14 I just want to ask you something. During the course of your tenure, did
15 you have any meetings with the accused in these proceedings?
16 A. I had several meetings during my stay in Belgrade, both in my
17 capacity as the Austrian ambassador and then subsequently as the European
18 Union special envoy. Also at the time of the Kosovo crisis in -- from
19 July 1998 to December 1998, Austria held the European Union presidency as
21 Q. I see. And in addition to meeting with Mr. Milosevic, did you
22 also meet with any members of his immediate staff or senior legal advisors
23 or senior political advisors?
24 A. Yes. I had several -- rather, many more meetings with his
25 advisors than the accused. In fact, very frequent meetings with the
1 Deputy Prime Minister, Nikola Sainovic, who was Mr. Milosevic's Kosovo
2 man, so to speak. And Mr. Sainovic was obviously the Vice-Premier of the
3 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I also had meetings with Bojan Bugarcic,
4 the foreign policy advisor to the then President Milosevic.
5 Q. Now, sir, during your dealings with both the accused and the
6 others that you have mentioned, did you form any impression with respect
7 to who, if anyone, was in charge?
8 A. Well, let me put it this way: At the time of my arrival, of
9 course I had a lot of information about the situation in the Federal
10 Republic of Yugoslavia, and everything invariably pointed in the direction
11 that there is one person who called the shots, so to speak, and that was
12 Mr. Milosevic, first as the president of Serbia and then as the president
13 of Yugoslavia. I was skeptical at the beginning, but then I started, in
14 the course of my work there, I started to realise that this is indeed the
15 case. For me it was quite significant when Mr. Milosevic became president
16 of Yugoslavia, which is a far less - how should I say? - formerly a far
17 less influential position. He, nevertheless, remained the political
18 figure, number one, the undisputed leader of Yugoslavia, so to speaking,
19 and that became clear in many -- on many occasions in my meetings,
20 particularly with his advisors or Foreign Minister Jovanovic, Mr. Sainovic
21 I've already mentioned, and many others. Everything pointed in the
22 direction that indeed the final say is, in spite of the differences now in
23 the former power, with the then Yugoslav president, Milosevic.
24 Q. Now, I take it, sir -- I asked you initially for an impression.
25 Later on, I'm going to ask you for some examples which may or may not have
1 influenced that impression or reinforced that impression. In particular,
2 I'd like to turn next, if I may, to whether or not there was anything that
3 happened at Rambouillet which may have reinforced that view.
4 A. Well, Rambouillet, first and foremost, I think it is quite
5 remarkable the change of mind in accepting the invitation to come to
6 Rambouillet by the Yugoslav side because Mr. Milosevic invariably stressed
7 that this is a Serb problem so it needs to be dealt with by Serb
8 authorities, not even Yugoslav so much, Serb authorities. This is an
9 internal problem, therefore, it has to be dealt with inside of Serbia.
10 And of course the other side, these were terrorists and they were,
11 therefore, not considered partners in any peace talks, referring to the
12 KLA in particular.
13 Now, by -- by accepting the invitation to deal with this issue
14 first outside of Serbia, secondly with international mediation and,
15 thirdly, accepting the KLA as being part of the other side, so to speak,
16 of the Kosovo Albanian side, that was, of course, a huge departure from a
17 stated policy. And this decision was taken by the then president,
18 Milosevic, the president of Yugoslavia, in spite of the fact that it has
19 been a -- or considered a Serb internal issue. So that was, for me, at
20 the time, of course, a hopeful sign that, with this change of mind, we
21 would be able to reach a peaceful settlement of the Kosovo crisis.
22 Q. Yes. Now, was there anything that happened during the course --
23 once Rambouillet actually got under way, was there anything else that you
24 noticed or knew or were told about which reinforced your earlier stated
1 A. Well, a second point which I consider very important is the
2 delegation that was sent to Rambouillet. It was basically the delegation
3 that had already in the past many months negotiated with Chris Hill, in
4 particular, and then subsequently also when I joined Chris Hill as the
5 European Union special envoy in the so-called phase of the shuttle
6 diplomacy between Pristina and Belgrade when we were delivering proposals
7 for an agreement back and forth, that these people whom we dealt with in
8 this period of the shuttle diplomacy in the summer and fall and winter of
9 1998, these same people, well-versed, excellent experts on the Yugoslav
10 side, came to Rambouillet. This again was, on the one hand, for me a
11 positive sign inasmuch as we knew that they knew up to the minutest detail
12 all the problems and issues. Also, of course, the unresolved issues in
13 this complex issue, and so that was very good.
14 On the other hand, however, I also realised that, with the absence
15 of Mr. Milosevic, the final political decision will be taken by
16 Mr. Milosevic.
17 Now, it was at the time already criticised that well, without
18 Milosevic, there's not going to be a settlement possible. He has to be
19 there. And it was compared, of course, to Dayton. Dayton, Mr. Milosevic,
20 as you might recall, represented the Serb side in these negotiations, and
21 also the Yugoslav side.
22 At the time already it was clear with the modern means of
23 communication, telephone and so on, mobile telephone which also played a
24 crucial role in Rambouillet, it can be possible at any time to get, at
25 crucial junctures, the go ahead from Belgrade, so to speak. So in this
1 way, I was not so much worried about this. And indeed, there were very
2 intense communications going on between Rambouillet and Belgrade. There
3 was also -- of course, there were also visits. I recall distinctly one
4 visit with Mr. Sainovic. Maybe there were two, I don't recall this
5 exactly, to Belgrade in order to -- and it was -- above all, it was
6 expressed to me by the negotiators on several occasions that this we
7 cannot decide there. We have to -- we have to ask -- it was made
8 reference to asking President Milosevic whether this is possible or not
9 possible. So it evolved a very distinct and clear pattern that the
10 mandate was with the negotiators, the expertise was with the negotiators,
11 but in the end, the political decision to accept any agreement rests with
12 President Milosevic.
13 Q. Thank you. Two comments, sir. The translators have to keep up
14 with us, so I'm going to leave some time between my questions and your
15 answers, and I'm going to ask you as well to just keep the translators in
16 mind in giving your responses, if you would, please.
17 Now, let me just see if I've got this straight. I think you've
18 been very clear about the expertise of the negotiators and the fact that
19 they would have to refer to Mr. Milosevic at some time. Perhaps you could
20 clarify this for me: You said during Rambouillet. Are you talking about
21 while the negotiations were going on, they would pause in the middle of
22 negotiations and go check, either by phone or by trip to Belgrade, to
23 speak to Mr. Milosevic? Is that what you mean by that?
24 A. Yes, basically.
25 Q. And who would do that?
1 A. Well, that is for me difficult to answer, but definitely
2 Mr. Sainovic was the one, and Mr. Sainovic was, so to speak, the political
3 head of the negotiating team, whereas the formal head was Professor Ratko
4 Markovic, the Serbian vice-premier and eminent legal scholar. If I
5 remember correctly, he's the author of the Serbian constitution. So he
6 was, of course, intimately involved in the ins and outs and the
7 intricacies of the subject matter.
8 Who else? I would not know exactly who it would be, but it
9 transpired and it was very clear that there were regular contacts.
10 Later on, around 11th of February, the Serbian President, Mr.
11 Milutinovic, arrived. He stayed in Paris and also served as an informal
12 point of contact, obviously, for -- for the Rambouillet delegation, the
13 Yugoslav-Serb delegation, and then later on also occasionally dropped by
14 and became involved more and move engaged and involved, however, more on a
15 political level when it came to contacts with the Contact Group foreign
16 ministers who were chaperoning, so to speak, these negotiations.
17 I forgot to add that -- that the British and French foreign
18 ministers were the two co-hosts, so to speak, of the Rambouillet
20 Q. I see. Now, sir, earlier in your evidence you indicated to the
21 Court that there were some things that you saw as being positive
22 indicators that there was some hope for success at Rambouillet. One of
23 the things you mentioned was the fact that President Milosevic allowed the
24 talks and allowed the participants.
25 Once Rambouillet started initially, can you tell the Court
1 anything about whether or not -- or what your impression was of the
2 attitude at the initial stages of Rambouillet by the Serb FRY delegation?
3 A. Well, just merely by the fact that Yugoslavia accepted this
4 invitation, it was very clear that they were aware that this new phase now
5 will have to be brought to an end along -- basically along the lines of
6 the Dayton negotiations and the Dayton accords. And since quite a few of
7 those who were parts -- were part of this issue now on the Belgrade side
8 were also in Dayton, of course it was clear to us that it must be clear to
9 them that this Rambouillet accords will -- an agreement will consist of
10 two parts; the civilian, rather, political part, and a military part in
11 order to secure the implementation of the civilian part.
12 So this kind of Dayton formula was, in fact, the theme, so to
13 speak, of the negotiations or the talks leading up to Rambouillet, and
14 then also, of course, in Rambouillet itself.
15 Q. What observations, if any, did you make with respect to the FRY
16 Serb negotiating team's mandate in the initial stages?
17 A. Well, we were told that basically they have a mandate to
18 negotiate, so to speak, the political part, that is constitution, the
19 political setup, and so on. And it was also clear from the outset that
20 there has to be a solution which would bring substantive autonomy to
21 Kosovo. That was unanimously declared and supported by the Contact Group.
22 That was basically the framework. And the -- with the invitation, the two
23 sides also got -- received what was called the basic elements, a set of
24 principles, about -- about the agreement that needs to be negotiated.
25 There were general elements in there. There were -- there was about the
1 governance in Kosovo, about the legislative, executive, the judiciary.
2 There was one chapter for -- about human rights, and then also
3 implementation where it was clearly spelled out, these are the principles,
4 and according to the principles, the agreement has to be negotiated.
5 By accepting these principles, and they were non-negotiable, they
6 -- of course, both sides agreed to use this as a basis and to continue
7 where in -- in the era of shuttle diplomacy, the negotiations stopped.
8 And at the time of Rambouillet, we were -- we had sixth and seventh
9 version, revised version, of the proposed agreement already there.
10 So what I want to say with this is it was very clear to both sides
11 what the framework is. No independence, however, substantive autonomy, on
12 the one hand. And on the other hand, the very clear principles spelling
13 out the political, judicial system, human rights, and so on necessary,
14 and also the implementation points. So it was a very transparent and a
15 very systematic approach that was taken. A lot has been learned in Dayton
16 both for the international negotiators as well as for the Yugoslav side in
17 particular, and that was then started and followed through.
18 At the beginning, the Serb Yugoslav side made clear that they have
19 now the power to discuss the political side of the agreement, basically.
20 And that was -- and that was fine with us because we wanted first to have
21 the agreement, so to speak, with all the nuances, how much -- what degree
22 of autonomy, how does it concretely look like in the different bodies of
23 governance and so on, and then the military implementation part which
24 basically is, of course, very restricted in regard to what can be
25 negotiated, because that derives, of course, from the civilian part. What
1 do you need in order -- how many troops and so on do you need in order to
2 secure the implementation of this agreement. This is a technical issue
3 that needs to be decided by those who would provide the international
4 military presence there.
5 So therefore, it was not -- it was not a part and parcel from the
6 beginning, but it was for methodological and systematic reasons at the
7 very end. However, we were confident already from the outset, and there
8 were a lot of discussions, of course, already prior to Rambouillet, that
9 since we're following the Dayton model, all sides know what it basically
10 means. So therefore, again, a lot of negotiations were not necessary and
11 also not called for.
12 Q. Let me stop you there, sir. Rather than get into the detail,
13 shall we say, of the negotiations themselves, my next question is directed
14 more about, given this background, given this backdrop of what you were
15 hoping to accomplish, whether or not, in your view, progress appeared to
16 be made towards reaching some kind of a positive solution during the
17 initial stages. For example, between the 10th and 14th of February, 1999.
18 A. Well, in the beginning it was very, very difficult. On the 7th,
19 8th, 9th of February, because actually both sides -- the Kosovo Albanian
20 side still had to get its act together. They were deeply divided between
21 one side around Rogova and the other side around the KLA, Thaci, and so
22 on. They had to first find and form a negotiating team which was
23 obviously, for them, not very easy.
24 This time, of course, the Yugoslav side realised that the Kosovo
25 side had difficulty, so there was no progress really achievable. We also
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 had difficulties with the situation on the ground, in Kosovo, where there
2 were several incidents happening which could have derailed the
3 negotiations. So there was a very tense situation.
4 However, once things started to roll on both sides, there was a
5 very constructive phase with the Yugoslav side. Experts taking over, so
6 to speak, from the politicians negotiating, hammering out compromise
7 solutions, proposals that were then in turn passed on to the Albanian
8 side. The Kosovo Albanians dealt with it and it came back, and so on. So
9 it was this kind of negotiating situation which we were hoping for. But
10 that went to a certain degree.
11 And it was clear, of course, that on -- on the Albanian side, they
12 were not interested, really, in a political settlement because they did --
13 they wanted independence and not substantive autonomy. But what they
14 wanted was NATO in Kosovo.
15 On the other hand, you had the Yugoslav side. They did not want
16 NATO in Kosovo, but they wanted substantive autonomy. As little as
17 possible, but nevertheless, they wanted this side.
18 Now, it was very clear and it became very obvious to all sides, to
19 both sides and of course also to the mediators and the wider group of
20 internationals, that only the two together, the civilian side - political
21 side - and the military side would be a viable -- would create a viable
22 agreement and a solution. It was, of course, very clear that the Albanian
23 side was highly concerned about the prospect of demilitarisation, of
24 decommissioning of the KLA. And that was, of course, a precondition in
25 order to create peace in Kosovo. And since -- since the Albanian side was
1 very much dominated by the KLA, it was the toughest, of course, to
2 negotiate with them and to bring them to accept this.
3 That, of course, went only in exchange for NATO which, in their
4 eyes, would provide the necessary security. And on the other hand, of
5 course, and more importantly for us, only an international military could
6 decommission and demilitarise the KLA. Because the VJ and the MUP had
7 already proven that they cannot achieve this goal. So it was actually,
8 objectively speaking, in the very interest of the Yugoslav side to get
9 NATO to do the job that they were unable to accomplish. And it was, of
10 course, also very clear that Albanians would have never agreed to VJ doing
11 the job. Only -- they would have only accepted when an international
12 military detachment would do this.
13 That was a very realistic and a very plausible situation, that
14 basically nobody, including -- including voices from the Yugoslav side,
15 was against.
16 Q. I appreciate, Ambassador Petritsch, that these were very complex
17 negotiations and that there was a certain logic that you were hoping to
18 sell to both sides. Accepting that to be the case, and I think you've
19 done an excellent job of explaining that background, by the 20th of
20 February, sir, did something occur with respect to Mr. Milutinovic about
21 the political aspects of the proposed agreement?
22 A. Well, yes. I must say that Mr. Milutinovic who, as I already
23 pointed out, was dealing more with the political side, dealing with the
24 Contact Group foreign ministers, Albright, Ivanov, Vedrine and so on, and
25 at the time with Vedrine, Cook, even Mr. Milutinovic, who was the fiercest
1 critic, very cynical, very negative in general in this whole negotiations
2 and talks, even he in the meeting with the Contact Group foreign ministers
3 on the 20th of February, indicated that with the political agreement, they
4 can live, so to speak. "They" meaning the Yugoslav side.
5 Q. To follow up on that, did you ever receive any correspondence on
6 the 23rd of February from the person you've mentioned earlier? I believe
7 you mentioned Professor Markovic.
8 A. Yes. The three negotiators, Maiorsky, Hill, and myself, we
9 received on the 23rd of February, a letter --
10 Q. I'm just going to stop you there, sir. I see that you are now
11 referring to the book that you wrote. I take it that contains the letter
12 to which you're about to refer.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Rather than refer to that, sir, I would prefer perhaps if we could
15 show you the originally signed copy that we can then distribute to the
16 Court and the various officials. I understand you've got a copy in your
17 book, but ...
18 Now, while this is being distributed, the copy of this letter, the
19 version that I have here is actually a signed copy. It's in English,
20 signed in English, and there is also a translation into B/C/S.
21 Just for curiosity, sir, you speak B/C/S, do you? You speak
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And these negotiations that you were involved in, were they
25 conducted in English, or in B/C/S, or --
1 A. They were translated. There was simultaneous translation. But in
2 our informal contacts, they -- we spoke mostly English.
3 Q. You spoke English. All right. And so this letter -- sorry. Have
4 you been provided with --
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. -- a copy of Professor Dr. Ratko Markovic's letter?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. All right. First of all, could you look at that, please, sir, and
9 it's dated the 23rd of February, 1999, at Rambouillet. It indicates that
10 -- it's on the letterhead of the delegation of the government of the
11 Republic of Serbia, and it lists the three of you; Christopher Hill,
12 Wolfgang Petritsch, and Boris Maiorsky. Is that the letter to which you
14 A. Yes, that's correct.
15 Q. And in this letter, sir, are there specific sentences perhaps that
16 you might like to draw to the Court's attention that would indicate to you
17 perhaps the state of or the spirit of negotiation that was --
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. -- reached as of that date?
20 A. Yeah. Well, to the letter part of the question, in the last
21 paragraph there, the delegation expresses its full readiness to continue
22 the work. And what is crucial for me now is -- and they say, "... in line
23 with the positive spirit of this meeting." So at the very last day of
24 Rambouillet, the Yugoslav head of delegation is clearly, in writing,
25 indicating that there was a positive spirit in this meeting in
1 Rambouillet. I think that that is very important, particularly for later
2 accusations that that was all a sham and that this was -- that was not
3 really done in order to reach a peaceful agreement and so on.
4 And substantive-wise, the next-to-the-last paragraph is of crucial
5 importance. And there it reads: The FRY - Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
6 - agreed to discuss the scope and character of international presence in
7 Kosmet, meaning Kosovo, to implement the agreement to be accepted in
9 Now, what's important here is -- and this is fully in line with
10 the status of the discussions and negotiations at the time, the scope and
11 character of international presence, the size of the civilian presence,
12 the size of military, and so on and so on. And crucial in this context is
13 that it says "international presence." It is not restricted to
14 international civilian presence. And that was, of course, discussed
15 already prior to this letter because I should add in parentheses that this
16 was the third letter that they sent to the same subject matter which over
17 in the course of the afternoon became more constructive. And the last
18 one, of course, is the one that is valid. That it clearly indicates
19 international presence not restricted to civilian presence, including, of
20 course, in this way what was crucial, that there is the possibility for a
21 military presence. And that was the key, actually, which Professor
22 Markovic and, of course, the whole delegation was very much aware of.
23 I distinctly remember --
24 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Petritsch, I must ask you, please, if you would,
25 to try and shorten your answers. We are very, very pressed for time.
1 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Ambassador, if you could tell me the reason why
3 Mr. Ratko Markovic wrote this letter. Is it what was requested by the --
4 THE WITNESS: Because he is -- because he was the head of the
5 negotiating team of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia, as it's
6 indicated on the top.
7 JUDGE KWON: What was the motive for him to write this letter?
8 THE WITNESS: Well, it was -- they were asked by the Contact Group
9 foreign ministers to state their opinion to the status of the negotiations
10 because that was the end of the negotiations. This was already the second
11 time that the negotiations were prolonged for -- originally, it was one
12 week foreseen for the negotiations. After one week, there was an
13 assessment by the foreign ministers, since this was quite positive, the
14 developments in the negotiations, to prolong this for yet another week.
15 And then on the 20th of February, the second week ended and then it was
16 decided since there was, again, progress to grant yet another three days.
17 And then the 23rd - this is the date on this letter - was the very
18 deadline for the negotiations.
19 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
20 MR. RYNEVELD:
21 Q. Now, Ambassador Petritsch, you've told us earlier about their
22 mandate to negotiate what you believe was a political agreement, but did
23 you form any impression about their mandate to negotiate the
24 implementation at this stage of any agreement that would be reached?
25 A. Well, it was very clear that there was -- that they did not --
1 that the negotiating team in Rambouillet did not have the mandate to
2 negotiate the implementation side. And that was the reason why, in the
3 end, the foreign ministers decided to postpone the -- and grant a
4 three-week hiatus to the negotiations, exactly in order to clarify this
5 implementation issue, the military side, so to speak, of this
6 implementation issue, to be more precise.
7 Q. Now, you've just expressed to us the importance of the February
8 23rd letter, which, by the way, I'm just reminded I haven't yet asked to
9 be marked as an exhibit. If I may do that before I forget.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 235.
11 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.
12 Q. You've talked about the main objection, if I remember correctly,
13 about an international military presence to ensure compliance with the
14 agreement. Was -- was one of the negotiators a Vladimir Stambuk? Do you
15 recall whether he was present there?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And what, if anything, can you share with the Court about the
18 negotiations as expressed by Mr. Stambuk?
19 A. Well, I had several -- of course, we had many, many - how should I
20 say? - one-on-one meetings, informal meetings in the couloirs, at dinner
21 or breakfast or wherever in Rambouillet, and on one occasion Vladimir
22 Stambuk -- and we were discussing -- and he is a member of JUL. And when
23 we were talking about -- when I was referring to the necessity to ensure
24 the implementation of this agreement and for this we need, in order to
25 demilitarise the KLA, international military presence, and if this is not
1 granted then we will reach the end of our negotiations. And then
2 Mr. Stambuk basically said well -- that if there is bombing of -- then it
3 will -- this will mean a massacre in Kosovo. And of course it was -- I
4 was quite impressed, to say the least, by this. It was very clear to me
5 that he was referring to a massacre on the part of the Yugoslav army or
6 MUP on the Kosovo Albanians.
7 We did not -- I -- since I was taken aback very much and shocked
8 in a way, I did not further elaborate, but it left in me the distinct
9 impression that there was a clear view, at least with Mr. Stambuk, what
10 would happen if there would be a war or bombing happening in Kosovo.
11 Q. Now, sir, you've told us that the Rambouillet portion stopped.
12 And did negotiations continue at another location at a later date?
13 A. Yes. As I already indicated, first of all it was necessary for
14 the Yugoslav side to get its act together in regards to the implementation
15 side, and this is what they also asked for. I remember a one-on-one
16 meeting with Ambassador Branko Brankovic, who -- who was a member of the
17 Yugoslav team, telling me, "Well, of course we know that we need a
18 military component there in order to secure the implementation of the
19 agreement, but we need more time. This cannot be done immediately here in
21 On the other hand, we had the Kosovo Albanian side, and there the
22 KLA was of course visibly shocked, the representatives, Thaci and so on,
23 that they were asked to demilitarise. So basically to wither away. And
24 he realised -- Thaci at the time realised that if he would sign now in
25 Rambouillet, that would basically mean, or at least potentially, that he
1 would be killed if he returns home and tells his people that he's just
2 given up his own organisation.
3 So it was very clear that both sides needed time to explain this
4 and to come to terms with this difficult issue. The one, the Yugoslav
5 side with military implementation, of course.
6 Therefore, the foreign ministers granted this three-week
7 interruption, and then we resumed the talks in Paris on the 15th of March.
8 Q. All right. And between the talks, between the 23rd of March [sic]
9 and the 15th of March, did you engage in further discussions with Serb
10 officials or any other shuttle diplomacy, I believe is the word you used?
11 A. Yes, that's correct. We immediately went -- I immediately went
12 back to Belgrade, and also Chris Hill joined me there. And either
13 together or separately we had several meetings with Yugoslav and Serb
14 officials, with a delegation, with the negotiators. The same applies to
15 Pristina. And I also accompanied German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer
16 to a meeting with President Milosevic and his closest associates. That
17 was, if I remember correctly, on the 8th of March.
18 Q. All right.
19 A. And so there were others, several other meetings and encounters in
20 order to discuss exactly this issue of military implementation.
21 Q. If you permit me, sir, to shorten what I anticipate could be a
22 detailed answer. Is it fair to say that on this 8th meeting, that there
23 was a sort of a general meeting of a number of you and then at some stage
24 Fischer and Milosevic retired for a separate one-on-one in one room and
25 then you remained behind with Milutinovic? Is that correct?
1 A. Yes. The larger -- the larger party remained in the larger room,
2 and Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Fischer then went to a separate room for a
3 one-on-one talk.
4 Q. Yes. And obviously you remained behind, and were you with Mr.
6 A. And I used the time to discuss some of the aspects of the
7 agreement with Mr. Milutinovic. But at the time, it became very clear to
8 me that what we already feared and saw somehow dawning on the horizon was
9 a total change in the attitude. Now it was not only the military issue
10 which was so non-acceptable, at least verbally and publicly, it was also
11 the political part that was basically already agreed where the Yugoslav
12 side had, as the letter demonstrates, already indicated, "Okay. We can
13 live with this. We can. There's still a few nuances, but in general we
14 can. We are ready to do the next and crucial step." This kind of
15 attitude was totally gone already prior to the meeting on the 8th of
16 March. There must have -- something happened, so to speak, after the 23rd
17 of February when this letter was written to us. There was a total change
18 of attitude. And as was indicated on several occasions to me, it was Mr.
19 Milosevic who did not like it and who then obviously in the course of the
20 ensuing weeks between the 23rd of February and the 15th of March, decided
21 not to continue the path of negotiation.
22 Q. Now, did you attempt to discuss the details of the Rambouillet
23 agreement with Milutinovic on the 8th of March?
24 A. Yes. Definitely. I tried, but it was basically disregarded. It
25 was not -- Mr. Milutinovic was not interested in the details, and he in a
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 very polemic manner, actually referred to this as this is all fake and so
2 on. I was already informed about this through an official statement on
3 the Serbian side, I guess this is a written statement of the 5th of March,
4 where it became so to speak official and public. The new line, I would
5 say, of discrediting Rambouillet and undermining it.
6 Q. Now, sir, to your knowledge, had there been a parliamentary
7 sitting between the 23rd of February and the 15th of March?
8 A. Not to my knowledge. I don't know where, who in fact formally
9 decided on this fundamental change of the Yugoslav Serb approach to
11 Q. Did that change in attitude continue when discussions continued on
12 the -- in mid-March 1999 in Paris?
13 A. Yes, absolutely. From the very first day, it was clear that --
14 that there was no positive spirit on the Yugoslav side left. It was also
15 quite characteristic that it was not Ratko Markovic who was still formally
16 the head of the delegation who spoke, it was basically Milutinovic who
17 took over and who fully dominated the negotiations and which were now not
18 negotiations any longer. It was -- it was just done in a very accusatory
19 verbal way. No constructive approach, no nothing where we could have seen
20 a possibility to still -- to rescue, so to speak, this obviously now
21 failing process of Rambouillet.
22 Q. I see. And when Mr. Milutinovic came to Paris, what, if anything,
23 did -- what impression did you form as a result of what Mr. Milutinovic
24 was saying in light of what had happened before?
25 A. Well, it was basically absolutely negative. It was nothing
1 constructive there. I could not see -- although we were still hoping
2 against hope, but rationally speaking, it was -- became very clear that
3 this -- that the Yugoslav side is not ready to constructively re-engage in
4 these negotiations. They backtracked, in fact. All what was already
5 agreed was then disputed and there were formalities that were criticised
6 and so on. So it was, in my opinion, very clear that the Yugoslav side
7 was instructed not to achieve a positive outcome.
8 Q. Do you know by whom?
9 A. Well, I can -- I can only guess. And what I have said before, in
10 view of who called the shots, it was Mr. Milosevic.
11 Q. Now, sir, I just want to go to a slightly different point in time.
12 You've indicated to us that you had various meetings with Mr. Milosevic.
13 Do you recall your very first meeting with Mr. Milosevic and when that
15 A. Well, the very first meeting was an occasion of the presentation
16 of my credentials to President Milosevic when -- as Austrian ambassador.
17 Q. And that was when?
18 A. That was -- I arrived in September. It must have been in October
19 of 1997.
20 Q. And at that time, sir, did you, as part of this -- at the time of
21 this -- presenting your credentials, did you also deliver any kind of a
23 A. Yes. It was -- that's usually a rather ceremonial situation,
24 presenting the credentials, but for me it was clear already by then, after
25 a few weeks in Belgrade, that it was, although, as I indicated previously,
1 a Yugoslav president is a more ceremonial post and does not have so much
2 power, in fact, Mr. Milosevic continued to be the number one, so to speak,
3 in Yugoslavia. So I thought this would be one of my rare occasions to
4 talk substance with him, and I, in a way, abused the situation, the formal
5 occasion, and addressed a few substantive issues. Not the least I
6 appealed to President Milosevic to finally start cooperating with ICTY.
7 Q. Now, a year later, October of 1998, did you -- this is soon after
8 your -- I believe you were just recently appointed as EU special envoy.
9 Did you deliver a speech in Luxembourg to the foreign ministers?
10 A. As the European Union special envoy, I used to brief the European
11 Union foreign ministers, either in Brussels or in Luxembourg, depending on
12 where the session took place. The occasion that you're referring to in
13 Luxembourg, there was a discussion when the already escalating situation
14 in Kosovo was well under way, a humanitarian disaster with up to 300.000
15 displaced people inside Kosovo and outside, refugees, the European Union
16 discussed the situation; political situation, humanitarian, human rights
17 situation in Kosovo, and this was the occasion where I took the floor and
18 gave a report on the situation there.
19 And in their communique, the European Union foreign ministers then
20 made very clear reference to this and also asked the Yugoslav authorities
21 to now finally start doing something against it.
22 Q. Now, after your appointment as the EU special envoy, did you meet
23 again with Mr. Milosevic and other of his officials or, perhaps more
24 frequently, his senior officials?
25 A. Yes, that's correct. More so with his immediate officials than
1 with Mr. Milosevic himself, who at the time was more inclined to speak
2 with the US special envoy, Ambassador Hill, whereas the European side did
3 not seem to be so relevant to him, I must say, which was in fact even
4 criticised by his closest advisors who also were of the opinion that in
5 dealing more with the European side, one could find a more constructive
6 solution, but that was not the case. But I was dealing very intensively
7 with his foreign policy advisor, whom I mentioned before, as well as with
8 Mr. Sainovic. These were my two principal contact points.
9 Q. Now, I take it as in most organisations, there is a sort of a
10 hierarchical structure and normally one goes up the hierarchical ladder.
11 Did you, during the course of your discussions and negotiations, choose to
12 go outside of the normal chain of command, as it were?
13 A. Well, I must tell you that it didn't make a lot of sense to speak
14 to -- or to follow this hierarchical ladder. It was far more successful
15 to directly go to the boss, so to speak, or to his people, and this is
16 what I in fact did most of the time.
17 Q. Sir, you intimated earlier -- you've told the Court what your
18 impression was about him being in charge and I indicated we would return
19 to some additional examples which may have reinforced that impression. Is
20 there an incident about an exchange of VJ and KLA soldiers that may have
21 had some influence on that impression you formed?
22 A. Yes. In -- it was in early 1999, early January 1999. A group of
23 VJ soldiers was taken hostage by the KLA, and in turn, a group of KLA
24 people were then taken in by the VJ, and there was a situation where I was
25 asked to help and mediate the release these two groups. And I was dealing
1 with Mr. Sainovic, and we were able to strike a deal and indeed the KLA
2 released these VJ soldiers in exchange for the release of the KLA people
3 by the VJ later on. It was not an exchange on the very same day, it was
4 about ten days in between. And Mr. Sainovic, with whom I dealt in the
5 situation, very clearly indicated that that was a decision of the
6 president to -- to enter into this deal.
7 I could give you another example, in dealing with Mr. Bugarcic.
8 When I was able to impress upon Mr. Bugarcic to invite an international
9 forensic team to look into alleged massacres on both sides committed by
10 Albanians, committed by allegedly the Serb side, that was also managed and
11 in the end decided in a positive way, and Bugarcic clearly indicated it
12 was the president who -- who took this decision in the end, which took me
13 several months to negotiate. But in the end, it didn't look very good,
14 because everything coming into Kosovo from the outside was, of course,
15 unwelcome, and again, in this kind of complex and complicated situation,
16 it was Mr. Milosevic who took this decision.
17 MR. RYNEVELD: Your Honours, I note the time. I'm at the end of
18 paragraph 13.
19 JUDGE MAY: Is it a convenient moment?
20 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes.
21 JUDGE MAY: How long do you anticipate being from now?
22 MR. RYNEVELD: No more than ten, ten minutes, perhaps.
23 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Thank you.
24 Mr. Petritsch, we're going to adjourn now for 20 minutes at the
25 usual time. Could you remember, please - I must give you the standard
1 warning - not to speak to anybody about your evidence until it's over, and
2 that does include the Prosecution team. Would you be back, please, at ten
4 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
5 --- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.
6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Ryneveld.
7 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honour.
8 Q. Now, Ambassador Petritsch, I'm about to turn to a meeting that I
9 understood you had with the accused Mr. Milosevic on the 22nd of March,
10 1999. And before I do that, you've earlier described to the Court in some
11 detail your impressions of the logic behind the negotiations that were
12 going on at Rambouillet and how it would be advantageous to each side.
13 Without going into the detail of that again, I wonder whether you
14 would tell the Court at this time whether or not you had a meeting on the
15 22nd of March, 1999, who it was with, and the purpose for the discussion.
16 A. Yes, Your Honours. The meeting on the 22nd of March was after the
17 failed Rambouillet and Paris peace talks, and it was a last-ditch effort
18 on the part of the Contact Group which sent three mediators to meet with
19 Mr. Milosevic. And that happened on the 22nd of March, in the afternoon.
20 I was together with my two colleagues, Mr. Hill and Mr. Maiorsky, and on
21 the side of President Milosevic there were several people from the
22 negotiating team; Mr. Milutinovic, Foreign Minister Jovanovic, some others
23 from his -- from Mr. Milosevic's cabinet.
24 Q. Where did the meeting take place?
25 A. The meeting took place in the presidential palace, in Beli Dvor.
1 Q. That's in Belgrade?
2 A. And that's in Belgrade, yes, that's correct.
3 Q. And why did you go there? You said it was a last-ditch effort.
4 What was the message you were trying to deliver?
5 A. Well, our message was, as the negotiators, to impress upon
6 President Milosevic that time is running out, that we need now a positive
7 re-engagement on their side and that otherwise, we would end up in a
8 cul-de-sac where we as the negotiators could not be of help any longer and
9 that others, meaning the military, so to speak, would then take over, we
10 were afraid. It was very clear to everybody that this was the only
11 alternative, given the fact that for many, many months NATO had already
12 put out its warnings, and it was very clear that the alternative to the
13 Rambouillet accord was a military intervention on the part of the
14 international community.
15 Q. What was -- what kind of reception did you receive from Milosevic?
16 A. Well, for me it was actually quite depressing, because I
17 immediately realised that there -- that there was no real interest in
18 identifying a way out of this situation. Mr. Milosevic seemed to me very
19 aloof and not engaged in this issue. My impression in the course of these
20 talks was that he had already made up his mind basically and was not
21 really listening to -- was also very typical and very indicative of the
22 situation that he presented us with a Kosovo Albanian newspaper, Koha
23 Ditore, I don't know, from early February where they had printed one of
24 the last versions of the agreement, of the political agreement, and he
25 claimed that we preferred the Kosovo Albanian side and gave them something
1 that they did not have. Obviously this was incorrect, because we always
2 consistently in the previous months had shared all versions with both
3 sides as mediators. That was, for me, quite interesting and depressing to
4 see that not -- that this was a rather feeble attempt to prove to us that
5 we were dishonest. And you need to imagine that this is not a Western
6 plot, so to speak. That was very clearly, with the inclusion of the
7 Russian negotiator, Boris Maiorsky, who as a real professional tried to
8 find a solution. It was even more important, of course, politically
9 speaking, for the Russian side to find a peaceful solution because the
10 Russians, of course, realised otherwise NATO would call the shots, and
11 that was politically devastating, of course, for the Russian side. So
12 that was also in this situation that Maiorsky made an attempt, a rather
13 hypothetical one, so to speak, by proposing to President Milosevic and
14 addressing him and saying, "Mr. Milosevic, what would you say if we would
15 reopen the whole agreement and start negotiating from the outset?"
16 Q. Yes?
17 A. Of course that was something which was not agreed and well beyond
18 our mandate as negotiators. However, it attests to the fact how desperate
19 the Russian side was in this situation. And even in this situation,
20 Mr. Milosevic did not really react in a positive way. He was rather kind
21 of saying, "Well, if you want, you can," something like this. He did not
22 feel that he had a role in this.
23 So then in the end of -- at the end of our conversation, we said
24 -- Mr. Maiorsky said, "Well, tell your negotiators to come to us. We're
25 now all here in Belgrade, and let's now find a way." And nothing
1 happened. That was the 22nd of March, only a few hours, as we know, prior
2 to the start of the bombing campaign.
3 Q. While you remained in Belgrade, did Milosevic follow up in any way
4 at all on that offer put by Maiorsky?
5 A. Not to my knowledge, and also I do not think anything happened,
6 because Boris Maiorsky the next day called me up who originally had said,
7 "I will stay here even if bombs fall." These were the words of Maiorsky.
8 He then on the 23rd in the afternoon called me up and said, "I've been
9 called back by my authorities to Moscow, and I'm leaving Belgrade the next
10 day," which was the 23rd, the very day of the start of the bombing.
11 Q. Sorry. Just -- did you just say that the next day was the 21st
12 or --
13 A. 3rd.
14 Q. 23rd.
15 A. 23rd, and then in the afternoon, that is when he called me. For
16 me, it was then very clear; once the Russians have given up, then
17 something must have really come to an end on the Yugoslav side.
18 I stayed there, whereas Hill left on the 23rd. With him also
19 Holbrooke, who was in parallel trying to convince Mr. Milosevic to agree
20 to continue and agree to the agreement. I remained there and left a few
21 hours prior to the start of the bombing campaign.
22 Q. Did something happen overnight on the 23rd of March?
23 A. Yes. In -- during the night of 23rd to the 24th, I received at my
24 residence some anonymous calls and threats, obviously based upon the
25 rumours that were spread in Belgrade that I had in secret -- or secretly
1 promised independence to the Kosovo Albanians, which of course was utter
2 nonsense. But it did the trick, obviously. And so I was in a situation
3 where I had to call up presidential advisor Bugarcic and first of all tell
4 him what has happened and ask him for -- to provide security for me; and
5 secondly, to inquire whether there is still an opportunity to go back to
6 the negotiations. And he answered both in the negative and suggested to
7 me to leave the country.
8 Q. And you did that on the 24th of March?
9 A. And on the 24th of March, in the afternoon, I left Belgrade.
10 Q. Thank you, Ambassador Petritsch. I understand, sir -- those are
11 my questions. Before you answer questions of cross-examination, I
12 understand you speak Serbian. Perhaps I could ask you -- I know that you
13 will be able to understand, but could you wait for the translation so that
14 the interpreters don't have the difficulty of trying to have people
15 overlapping. Thank you very much.
16 A. I will, for once, listen to the translation.
17 Q. Thank you very much.
18 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, it's now for you to cross-examine.
19 We've considered the time, the time that you should have available, and
20 we'll give you an hour and a half to cross-examine the witness. It will
21 be 20 minutes longer than the Prosecution had of one hour and ten minutes
22 or thereabouts.
23 I will ask the witness if he would be good enough to keep the
24 answers as short as possible because time is limited. It will be taking
25 up time for cross-examination. Of course, you should have the opportunity
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 of explaining things, and you must feel to do so, but if you can keep,
2 wherever possible, the answers short, it will enable more to be done.
3 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I first of all know why you're
5 limiting the time for my cross-examination at all?
6 JUDGE MAY: We have been through that. You know full well why the
7 time limits are being applied. It's right you should know before you
8 begin how long you've got rather than at the end.
9 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:
10 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Petritsch, is it true that several years ago
11 in an interview to the Vienna Courier you said that your dog was of Serb
13 A. Do I answer immediately?
14 JUDGE MAY: Yes, if you can.
15 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, may I explain? When I became
16 ambassador to Belgrade, a street dog joined our household from the streets
17 of Dedinje, by the name of Malena, and this dog is still with us.
18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. You didn't answer my question.
20 JUDGE MAY: He has. Yes, what's the next one?
21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. My question was as follows: My question was: Did you, in an
23 interview to the Vienna Courier, say that your dog was of Serb ethnicity?
24 A. I have tried to answer the question. I think this is not a
25 serious question because when a dog -- because a dog does not have an
2 Q. All right, then. Did you say that to the Vienna Courier or not?
3 Let's put it that way.
4 A. To the best of my knowledge, I was never referring in these terms
5 to my dog, but since my dog is from Belgrade and from Serbia, so to speak,
6 it is, of course, a dog from Serbia or a Serbian dog in this broad sense,
7 in this broad geographic and not in an ethnic sense.
8 Q. In your numerous statements, not only the one that you gave to
9 this but to the media and your other statements, you said that you
10 invested a great deal of effort for a peaceful solution of the Yugoslav
11 crisis or, rather, a peaceful solution to the crisis in Kosovo; is that
13 A. Yes, that's correct.
14 Q. On the basis of that, can we say that without exception you were
15 friendly disposed to all the peoples of the former Yugoslavia?
16 A. I think one of the key issues for -- as a foreigner for being of
17 help in former Yugoslavia is to stick to the principle of equality, and
18 that was, of course, also my guiding principle in Yugoslavia while I was
19 there as a mediator, as well as the last three years in Bosnia-Herzegovina
20 where the three ethnic communities - Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs - are
21 trying to form and trying to live a peaceful life.
22 Q. And why do you think, for example, a million and a half Serbs in
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina does not share that assessment of yours as to the
24 impartiality point?
25 JUDGE MAY: It doesn't matter what they think. You must ask the
1 witness questions with which he can deal. He's given you his answer.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. May.
3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. How long were you ambassador to Yugoslavia?
5 A. It was from September 1997 to July -- I guess my date, formal date
6 of the end of my ambassadorship in Belgrade is early August, July/August
7 of 1999.
8 Q. I assume that you consider that that appointment of yours implies
9 an above-average knowledge not only of the political situation in
10 Yugoslavia but the history of its peoples as well, their relationships,
11 the problems that they together had to face, et cetera; isn't that so?
12 A. That's correct.
13 Q. So you consider yourself to be well-informed. And then you wrote
14 the book "Kosovo-Kosova," which you published in 1999; that's right, isn't
16 A. I published the book as a co-author with two scholars from the
17 University of Gradska, Professor Kaser and Mr. Pichler.
18 Q. In your book, it says: "During the funeral of a village teacher
19 that was killed on the 28th of November, 1997, for the first time in
20 public three KLA fighters appeared in public in order to hold a speech
21 with respect to that tragic event, and thereby, the KLA became the sole
22 force fighting for the national interests and liberation of Kosovo and
23 which will continue to fight along those lines and that the bloodshed of
24 the victims will not have been in vain."
25 Are those your words, Mr. Petritsch?
1 A. These are not my words.
2 Q. That's on page 205 and 206 of your book.
3 Is it true that on that same page, you said: "On the 4th of
4 December, 1997, the KLA took over the responsibility for a series of
5 attacks; among other things, the assassination on collaborationists and
6 activists of the Socialist Party of Serbia, Dali Podgoli [phoen], around
7 Stimlje on the 29th of November, and Qamil Gashi, an envoy, a deputy in
8 the federal parliament and president of the organisation of the Socialist
9 Party in Glogovac. In one of their demands, the KLA asked the premier of
10 the self-proclaimed Republic of Kosovo, Paja Koposi [phoen], to hand over
11 the money that had been collected from Kosovo Albanians living abroad."
12 My question is as follows: Do you consider that these killings
13 and these assassinations, like all the others that the members of the KLA
14 perpetrated over the Albanian Serbs and others, were in the function of
16 A. First I would like to say that of course I cannot now corroborate
17 the correctness of the translation of the text that you have quoted from
18 my book, but secondly, I would say unambiguously that no terrorist act is
19 warranted and justified, no matter which side it perpetrates.
20 Q. As a former Yugoslavia -- ambassador to Yugoslavia, do you know
21 how many requests for asylum were submitted to the Austrian authorities on
22 the part of Albanians from Kosovo?
23 A. I don't know.
24 Q. All right. But I'm sure you know what the conditions are for
25 giving asylum, granting asylum; right?
1 A. I'm not familiar with the details of granting asylum in Austria.
2 Q. And your country, via its embassy in Belgrade, did it check out
3 the authenticity of the documents that the Albanians used to allegedly
4 prove their political -- that they were being politically persecuted?
5 A. We have provided, if I remember correctly, at one stage, the
6 Ministry of the Interior in Austria with a political assessment of the
7 situation for the Kosovo Albanians in Yugoslavia.
8 Q. And are you aware, once again as a former ambassador, that of the
9 hundreds of requests for asylum in Austria, 98 were submitted on the basis
10 of falsified judgements and sentences issued by the court in Kosovo? Just
11 say yes or no. Did you know that or not?
12 A. I did not know that, and I do not know whether this is correct or
13 not. That has to be checked with the appropriate authorities in Austria.
14 Q. And do you know at all whether your authorities persecuted
15 Albanians from the territory of your own country for the crime of forgery?
16 Do you know anything about that?
17 A. I do not know anything about this. This is not and never was in
18 my professional realm.
19 JUDGE MAY: The transcript says persecuted. No doubt what it --
20 THE INTERPRETER: Prosecuted. Interpreter's mistake.
21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. You claim that you had a meeting with me between seven and ten
23 times and that at those meetings you were able to learn a lot about me and
24 as you said, the control that I had, as you say, over all aspects in the
25 SFRY. That's what it says on page 2 of your statement.
1 A. Yes, that's correct.
2 Q. Do you know at all how many times you did actually have a meeting
3 with me?
4 A. I do not know the exact number. I had at least, I can recall,
5 four substantive meetings, and of course on several other occasions, maybe
6 more formal protocol occasions, we had other meetings, so that this is the
7 reason why the figure is not so precise.
8 Q. All right. Then I'll skip over a few questions linked to that
9 point. And tell me this, please: On page 3 of your statement, you claim
10 that the Serbian delegation in Rambouillet had a mandate to achieve a
11 political agreement but that it did not have the mandate to negotiate the
12 implementation of that agreement. How do you find that to be logical,
13 that it has the mandate to negotiate about the main issue and does not
14 have the mandate to negotiate a subordinate issue? Is that your way of
15 thinking, your mental construction, or is it based on a fact?
16 A. Well, that transpired in the course of the very intense --
17 intensive meetings in Rambouillet. It was very clear and clearly
18 expressed on several occasions by the negotiators.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ambassador, could you give us an example of that,
20 the lack of capacity to negotiate implementation.
21 THE WITNESS: Well, under concrete circumstances when we were
22 approaching the issue of implementation, it was expressed very clearly
23 that we cannot do this now, we have to finish the political negotiations
24 and only then we would have to go back, so to speak - literally or via
25 other means of communication - to the president and then ask for the next
1 step to be -- to get agreement to -- for the next step.
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. And tell me this: The implementation of the political agreement,
5 did that imply the presence of NATO forces on the territory of the FRY?
6 Yes or no.
7 A. Well, it was very clear that without an international military
8 force, there is not going to be a possibility, a remote possibility to
9 enforce this agreement. And I think, Mr. Milosevic, you know from the
10 situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that without the military side, this
11 would not have happened there either. So it was, in my opinion, clear to
12 everybody that a military component in this overall agreement is indeed
14 Q. How can you identify Bosnia and Herzegovina, in which there was a
15 civil war as a whole throughout the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
16 the conflict between the forces of the government and terrorists in a
17 sovereign state, in one of the provinces of a sovereign state? How can
18 you equate that? Don't you see any difference between the two?
19 A. First of all, I -- it is very clear by now that the war in
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina was, first and foremost, an aggression on a sovereign
21 country, and it indeed had aspects of a civil war inside.
22 And the second point which I would like to make, I think that
23 those whom you consider terrorists, the Albanians, are citizens of your
24 country, and in this way, they also -- this also has aspects of a civil
1 Q. But in the territory of a province of that sovereign state and not
2 throughout that sovereign state.
3 A. The civil war aspects in Bosnia-Herzegovina were confined and were
4 not throughout the territory of the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
5 Q. I'm talking about Yugoslavia.
6 A. And the same applies to Yugoslavia. It was in a certain part of
7 Yugoslavia; that's correct.
8 Q. And do you know about the statement made by Christopher Hill, whom
9 you mentioned several times today, given to the BBC, An Untold Story was
10 the name of the programme, in which he claims that the aim of Rambouillet
11 was to bring in NATO troops into Serbia?
12 A. I am unaware of this statement, and knowing Mr. Hill, I do not
13 believe that this was the only statement that he gave there.
14 JUDGE MAY: Before you go on, Mr. Milosevic, when was that
15 programme broadcast?
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As far as I know, the witness has
17 answered and said he was acquainted with that, but I can inform you in due
18 course. I don't know exactly now. It was a BBC programme, it's easy to
20 JUDGE MAY: You know if you're putting these allegations, you have
21 to give us the chapter and verse of when it was that these were said.
22 Yes, go on.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. May, I will indeed inform
25 MR. RYNEVELD: Excuse me.
1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. In your book on page 29 --
3 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Ryneveld.
4 MR. RYNEVELD: I got the witness's answer to the effect that he
5 was unaware of the statement whereas the accused then summarised to the
6 effect that he said he was acquainted. I just wanted to point that out.
7 If they're at cross-purposes on the issue, I don't want the accused to be
8 suffering under the misapprehension that the witness actually agreed that
9 he was acquainted with it.
10 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. In your book "Kosovo-Kosova" on page 296, you claim that 2, 5 and
13 7, sections 2, 5, and 7 of the Rambouillet agreement were given to the
14 Serbian delegation only at a later stage; is that right?
15 A. That's correct.
16 Q. However, you do not refer to that in your statement, not in a
17 single part, as a matter of fact. Why not?
18 A. Let me explain this. I do not want to go too much into the
19 details and technicalities of this, but the 2, 5, 7, these are the
20 so-called implementation chapters of the Rambouillet accords. Police
21 implementation -- civilian implementation, police implementation, and
22 military implementation. And these were, as I tried to explain
23 previously, the technical side which for this reason first you need a
24 political part of the agreement and then, based upon these -- the text and
25 the concreteness of the political agreement, you then in turn put the
1 technical, the implementation paragraphs and chapters.
2 Q. All right. As for what technical matters are or are not, we will
3 get to that later. But tell me, do you know about the fact that some
4 parts of this so-called agreement were never approved by the Contact
6 A. Again I have to explain that the military implementation, not the
7 police, not the civilian implementation but the military part, there the
8 Russian position was as follows in the Contact Group which you are
9 referring to: As long as there is no agreement, no positive signal,
10 rather, from Belgrade, we, the Russian Federation, are not support -- or
11 actively engaging in the negotiations and supporting the -- this part.
12 But it was made clear at the same time that the Russian side, of course,
13 is aware of it and that it is also aware of the necessity of a military
14 component in the agreement, again following the Dayton example where the
15 Russian side, only after the end of the negotiations, agreed to the
16 military side of the Dayton Agreement.
17 Q. You mentioned a meeting with me, and you said that I showed you
18 Koha Ditore, an Albanian newspaper, from the month of February, and that
19 before Rambouillet it carried the entire Rambouillet agreement, and in two
20 instalments at that; very extensively. Tell me, these 83 pages of the
21 military section of the draft, why were they handed over to the Yugoslav
22 side over after the last day of the negotiations in Rambouillet?
23 A. Because that was the point in time where the necessary
24 prerequisites on the part of the political agreement were negotiated and
25 therefore this was the time to hand over the military part of the
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
2 Q. And do you claim that you handed it to all the parties then or was
3 it only to the Serb party? Did you give it to the other party earlier or
4 did you draft it together with them?
5 A. That was only given to the Yugoslav side because of the fact that
6 the military agreement, of course, can only -- can only be concluded with
7 a government and not with a group like in the case of the Kosovo
8 Albanians. So for formal reasons, your government or your negotiating
9 team was, in this case, the only interlocutor in concluding this agreement
10 because you have your party, your VJ, your army has to leave and so on and
11 so on. So you were the partner in this and not the Albanian side. That
12 was the reason why it was officially handed over to you, to your
13 negotiators, rather.
14 Q. Are you trying to say that the Albanians did not even know about
16 A. The Albanian side who protested and wanted to get the text was
17 informed that, yes, there is a military agreement but this needs to be
18 concluded with the Yugoslav side only. And they were informed about the
19 content but were not formally considered a negotiating partner in this.
20 Q. Well, how come, then, before the Yugoslav side was informed and
21 before the negotiations even started in Rambouillet, how did they manage
22 to publish this in Koha Ditore?
23 A. Koha Ditore, to the best of my knowledge, published a political
24 agreement and not the military.
25 Q. All right. You quoted here the letter of the head of the
1 delegation, Ratko Markovic, and you yourself interpreted it. The
2 penultimate paragraph, it says very specifically: [In English] "Agreed to
3 discuss the scope and character of international presence in Kosmet to
4 implement the agreement to be accepted in Rambouillet." "... to discuss
5 scope and character of international presence..." "Scope and character."
6 [Interpretation] When saying "scope and character of international
7 presence," how could you infer on that basis that the Yugoslav side agreed
8 to a military presence? On the basis of what did you infer that?
9 A. On the basis of the phrase "international presence."
10 Q. "International presence." That was a fact during Rambouillet
11 itself. There was a delegation, rather, a Verification Mission of 1.400
12 people in Kosovo. Isn't that an international presence?
13 A. That's correct. But this is a civilian one, and you did not, in
14 this letter - or Mr. Markovic, rather - did not define this or restrict
15 this to civilian presence, which would have been possible, of course. On
16 purpose it was left open in order to have this negotiating room for the
17 next step, for the military implementation aspects to be discussed.
18 Q. My question was only on the basis of what did you infer -- from
19 the words that are here in this letter, on the basis of what did you infer
20 that there was consent to a military presence?
21 JUDGE MAY: I think the witness has already answered that.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.
23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. And the representatives of the Russian delegation, Maiorsky
25 himself included, did they see these parts of the draft agreement, those
1 related to the military aspect, before the last day of the negotiations?
2 A. Formally not; de facto, yes.
3 Q. All right. Thank you. And is it correct that the representative
4 of the Russian Federation, precisely this Ambassador Maiorsky, refused to
5 sign precisely for that reason?
6 A. No, that's not correct.
7 Q. Did he sign?
8 A. No, he did not sign, the reason being that he wanted to see both
9 sides to sign at the same time. Because as he put it in public there, it
10 needs two to tango.
11 Q. And are two required for an agreement, Mr. Petritsch, in your
13 A. That's correct. This was the reason -- if I may, Your Honours,
14 this was the reason why the Contact Group foreign Ministers appealed to
15 the Yugoslav side, then to use the next hours after the 18th of March to
16 reconsider and to sign. That was the reason why we came on the 22nd of
17 March to Belgrade.
18 Q. I'm going to remind you what it says here in section 8. [In
19 English] "NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles,
20 vessels, aircraft, and equipment free and unrestricted passage and
21 unimpeded access throughout the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, including
22 associated air space and territorial waters. This shall include but not
23 be limited to the right of bivouacs, manouevres, and utilisation of any
24 areas or facilities as required," [Interpretation] et cetera, et cetera.
25 [In English] "[Previous translation continues]... use of airports,
1 roads, rails, and ports," et cetera.
2 [Interpretation] Et cetera. That is to say that the entire
3 territory of Yugoslavia, the territorial waters, the air space, and under
4 item 15, even a whole spectre of electromagnetic frequencies,
5 communications, et cetera.
6 So is all of that correct, all of what I read out to you?
7 A. If -- to my best knowledge, it is correct what you have read out
8 to me, if I remember correctly. However, in order to understand this, one
9 has to explain that this text was basically taken from the Dayton Accords,
10 which is, of course, well known to you since you signed it, and already in
11 the Dayton Accords, you signed the same, also applying to the Federal
12 Republic of Yugoslavia.
13 SFOR, which is the stabilisation international force NATO, plus in
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina has even today and since the Dayton Accords the right
15 to use exactly what you have described here in the Federal Republic of
16 Yugoslavia. By the way, also Croatia, because that was the agreement.
17 And what has happened is for this military agreement, basically the text
18 and the rest was taken from the Dayton Accords and then transferred and
19 applied and made more concrete in regard to the Rambouillet accord.
20 Q. That means, according to the Dayton Accords, the occupation of all
21 of Yugoslavia was supposed to be carried out in order to implement some
22 kind of an agreement about Kosovo which had not ultimately even be
24 A. This is your interpretation. I consider this not correct. It is
25 not to talk about an occupation. It is a mutual agreement, the Dayton
1 Accords, which you signed up on your free will. And of course it is not
2 about occupation, it is about using, in case it is necessary for
3 transport reasons, logistical reasons, also the territory air space, sea,
4 and so on from the neighbouring countries in order to get into
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina or, in the case of Kosovo, in order to get into Kosovo
6 which, as you know, is a landlocked country or part of your country.
7 Q. And who actually negotiated with whom in Rambouillet? The
8 Yugoslav delegation with the Albanian delegation or with somebody else?
9 A. That was, in the case of the military agreement, as I tried to
10 point out, this is the sole responsibility between a sovereign country,
11 your country, and the international community. In this respect, the
12 Kosovo Albanians did not play a formal role. Did not have a formal role.
13 Q. I am not talking about this aspect. I am talking about the
14 so-called or, rather, purported negotiations in Rambouillet, where the
15 negotiating party, that is to say the Serb party and the Albanian party,
16 never met. They never had a single meeting. Is that right or is that not
18 A. That's not correct. There was one single meeting under the
19 auspices of Secretary of State Albright between the heads of the two
20 delegations. But in substance, you are right. There was never a formal
21 meeting. Therefore -- therefore, these negotiations were conducted by
22 mediators to mediate between the two delegations who were not able and,
23 above all, not ready to sit down together and to negotiate. This is part
24 of the problem there. This is why, the very reason why the international
25 community had to assume a mediating role in this conflict.
1 Q. My question was: Did the delegations negotiate, Mr. Petritsch?
2 Did they have mutual negotiations?
3 JUDGE MAY: The witness has answered the question, he's explained
4 how it came about.
5 THE WITNESS: May I add, Your Honours, if you permit, that at the
6 outset it was even difficult to arrange the opening session with president
7 Chirac at Rambouillet where the Yugoslav side protested that terrorists
8 are in the same room and they would not be -- want to be in the same room.
9 This position was, however, changed on the part of the Yugoslav side and
10 so the opening ceremony took place in the presence of both delegations in
11 the same room. And later on, the Yugoslav delegation tried to initiate
12 direct talks with the Kosovo Albanian side. However, the Kosovo Albanian
13 side refused to -- to agree to direct talks, with the exception that I
14 just mentioned before, and insisted on the continuation of the mediation
15 role of the international community.
16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. All right, you've explained. There were no direct meetings
18 because the Kosovo Albanians would not accept them. Did I understand you
20 A. This is the -- these are the well-known facts.
21 Q. Do you know that Professor Ratko Markovic, as head of the
22 delegation, three times at various meetings of the working group asked
23 Hill whether in addition to the documents or, rather, proposals there were
24 some others that were not tabled at all? Do you know about that?
25 A. No, I don't.
1 Q. Do you know anything about why Hill evaded giving an answer to
2 these questions?
3 A. I don't know about this. I cannot testify to the fact that he --
4 that he evaded this. But I know from my contacts with your delegation
5 that of course from the outset everybody was aware of the whole realm of
6 the -- of the proposed agreement, including the military side.
7 Q. On page 3, paragraph 8 of your statement, you claim that the Serb
8 delegation did not only disagree to a military presence, but they also
9 opposed the presence of foreign military and police forces. Is that
11 A. I'm sorry. Could you again refer to what -- to what you just
12 quoted? Could you repeat this, please?
13 Q. I'm quoting from your statement.
14 JUDGE MAY: Have you got the statement, Mr. Petritsch?
15 THE WITNESS: Which statement are you referring to now?
16 JUDGE MAY: You're referring to the witness statement; is that
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, yes.
19 THE WITNESS: Yes. And, Mr. Milosevic, you said paragraph 3?
20 JUDGE MAY: Page 3, paragraph 8, he said.
21 THE WITNESS: Page 3.
22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Paragraph 8.
24 A. Unfortunately, I have to count the paragraphs because there's
25 no --
1 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, in the English
2 version, it's on page 4, actually. It's on page 4 in the English version,
3 the actual section that's being referred to.
4 MR. RYNEVELD: I don't want to disagree, but in my copy it's at
5 the bottom of page 3.
6 JUDGE MAY: And we don't have a copy. Yes. Let's try and get on
7 with this as best we can.
8 THE WITNESS: Well, what that basically means is of course what
9 you referred to prior with 2, 5, and 7. All the implementation aspects
10 were something that the delegation felt not to have the mandate to
11 negotiate. But on the other hand, that was of course also a clear
12 distinction between the political part and the implementation part, as I
13 have referred previously to.
14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. All right. So an agreement was about to be reached regarding the
16 political part of the agreement but not the presence of NATO forces on the
17 territory of a sovereign state. Is that right or is that not right?
18 A. That's not correct. The first part of the negotiations was
19 dedicated to the political agreement, to the political system, to clearly
20 define the Contact Group framework, which means what is substantive
21 autonomy for Bosnia and Herzegovina. That was the political part, so to
22 speak. How to implement once this political part is agreed upon, as it
23 appeared to be at the end, on the 23rd of February, that is the
24 implementation part.
25 Q. On page 4, paragraph 4, you say: "The Serbian delegation really
1 worked, and we made considerable progress and reached a compromise
2 regarding the political and legal system in Kosovo." Is that correct?
3 A. Yes, that's correct.
4 Q. Now, after this compromise, the Serb party was supposed to agree
5 to the occupation of Kosovo as well, and the occupation of Yugoslavia by
6 NATO forces. My question is: Wasn't this the core of the matter? Wasn't
7 this the core of the matter, the core of the demands put forth in
9 A. No. There was no occupation envisioned. There was an agreement
10 envisioned between the international community, between the Contact Group,
11 to be more precise, and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in regard to
12 the implementation of the Rambouillet accords, more specifically, the
13 international military presence.
14 Q. Well, I wouldn't quote other parts of the agreement to you now.
15 As you know, since you've read it properly, you know that this agreement
16 envisages the commander of the forces to be the main arbiter. You know
17 that he is the only one who decides about everything regarding the
18 agreement. You know, therefore, that they have the right to use the land,
19 the air, the water, the frequencies, and every conceivable thing in
20 Yugoslavia. So you do not consider that to be occupation.
21 Do you consider the occupation of Kosovo, at least, to be an
22 occupation, with the withdrawal of Yugoslav forces, et cetera, and also
23 with the full occupation of the territory by NATO forces? Do you consider
24 that to be occupation at least?
25 A. No. It's not an occupation either, and it was never envisioned an
1 occupation in Rambouillet as this was not the case in Dayton which you
2 signed up to. It was the Dayton model that -- what the -- where the
3 Contact Group - United States, European countries, and the Russian
4 Federation - agreed upon, to follow, basically, the Dayton model. And
5 that, of course, was not an occupation, but there was a mutual agreement
6 signed by you on behalf of Yugoslavia, by Mr. Tudjman, Mr. Izetbegovic for
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So this is not an occupation. And this was the same
8 -- the same model and the same idea was behind Rambouillet.
9 Q. Mr. Petritsch, what does Dayton have to do with Rambouillet?
10 Isn't it clear to you that as far as the occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina
11 is concerned, this took place through the abuse of Dayton, not in
12 accordance with the letter of Dayton?
13 A. I disagree with you.
14 Q. All right. Do you agree with a quotation that I'm going to read
15 out to you? Agreement is quoted. [In English] "Not negotiated settlement
16 but an ultimatum for unconditional surrender, a dictate that spelled death
17 of Yugoslavia and could not be accepted by Belgrade."
18 JUDGE MAY: Who are you quoting from?
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm quoting John Pichler from the
20 New Statesman, May 1999. This is how it reads: [In English] "Anyone
21 scrutinising the Rambouillet document is left in little doubt that the
22 excuses given for the subsequent bombing were fabricated."
23 JUDGE MAY: You know, Mr. Milosevic, this is of limited use to us
24 in the Tribunal. This is the view of a journalist writing in a British
25 paper in 1999. Now, we are going to have to determine these facts, not
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 the views of journalists.
2 However, since you've put to the witness that this wasn't a
3 negotiated settlement, we'll take it as a question which is being put, but
4 an ultimatum for unconditional surrender.
5 THE WITNESS: That was not --
6 JUDGE MAY: You hear that that suggestion is made. Would you
7 characterise the agreement in that way?
8 THE WITNESS: The agreement was -- or let me put it this way:
9 Rambouillet was the attempt to find a peaceful agreement. It was
10 conducted in the most transparent way. It was based upon month-long
11 negotiations on the ground, the so-called period of the shuttle diplomacy.
12 There were clear principles established and fully supported on the part of
13 the Contact Group. So to talk about an ultimatum, to talk about a
14 dictate, is utterly wrong.
15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. All right. Since you won't let me quote here and since you won't
17 let me treat this as a question of mine, you can treat them as questions
18 that I am putting myself. I am given the direct quotation out of respect
19 for the person who originally said this, but this is my own view as well.
20 Do you agree with this: [In English] "[Previous translation
21 continues]... stage managed and the Serbs were told, 'Surrender and be
22 occupied or don't surrender and be destroyed.'"
23 A. I can attest to it that this was not the case in Rambouillet and
25 Q. [Interpretation] All right. And is it correct that -- this was
1 John Pichler in the New Statesman. What about Ronald Hashman [phoen],
2 what he writes in his book "War to War"? He says the following: [In
3 English] [Previous translation continues]... "an ambush. Ronald Hashman
4 sums it up well. It was a declaration of war disguised as a peace
5 agreement." [Interpretation] Is that right or not? It is --
6 A. This is not.
7 Q. And do you know, Mr. Petritsch, that George Kenney, an American
8 diplomat who, in the State Department, was the Yugoslav desk officer,
9 wrote in the Nation on the 14th of June 1999 - that is to say an authentic
10 piece of writing - that the United States, and I quote him literally [In
11 English] "set the bar higher than the Serbs could accept."
12 JUDGE MAY: That's just the opinion of that writer. And if you
13 want, Mr. Milosevic, you can call him as part of your case. But it's of
14 no assistance to us what his views are.
15 Yes. Did you set the bar higher than they could possibly reach?
16 THE WITNESS: That's not correct and can be proven by the simple
17 fact that definitely the Russian Federation would have never agreed to
18 this in the Contact Group. I want to stress the fact that all the
19 preparations for Rambouillet and throughout Rambouillet, the Russian side
20 was fully engaged and fully informed about this. It would not have been
21 possible otherwise. And this in itself is, in my opinion, ample proof
22 that there was no scam, no dictate, no ultimatum, but difficult
23 negotiations which went for quite some time, quite positive, and
24 unfortunately, after the 23rd of February collapsed, to the dismay and
25 disappointment of many, including some in the Yugoslav delegation.
1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Well, I suppose it's clear to you that the Yugoslav delegation
3 went there with the best intentions in the world and the conviction that a
4 peaceful solution would be reached. Yes or no.
5 JUDGE MAY: Mr. --
6 THE WITNESS: I would assume so.
7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. And can that clearly be seen from the letter from Ratko Markovic
9 that you quoted and which is very precise and says: "We would especially
10 like to emphasise the fact, as the Contact Group has indeed done, that
11 there can be no independence of Kosovo and Metohija or a third republic."
12 And before that, he says: "Definition of self-determination for
13 Kosovo and Metohija respectful of sovereignty and territorial integrity of
14 the Republic of Serbia and the FR of Yugoslavia." So those are the limits
15 within which the Yugoslav delegation -- the frameworks, within these
16 frameworks was sovereignty and territorial integrity and substantial
17 self-government, that those were the frameworks for the negotiations. Is
18 that clear? Yes or no.
19 A. That is correct, and I would like to reiterate that the Contact
20 Group and the negotiators took specific care of this sensitivity in regard
21 to the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Yugoslavia. And it was
22 stressed, to the best of my knowledge, or written into the Rambouillet
23 accords on three different occasions, so to speak, in order to make sure
24 that this is clear beyond any doubt.
25 Q. Well, now I'd like to draw your attention to the third paragraph
1 of Ratko Markovic's letter, which in establishing all that, says:
2 "Therefore, all elements of self-government --" "All elements of
3 self-government at the time of defining the agreement have to be known and
4 clearly defined."
5 That means the agreement must be such that all elements be known
6 and clearly defined. And in further work, this should be adequately
7 addressed and consistently resolved. In that sense, we're ready to
8 participate in the next meeting, et cetera, et cetera. And then he
9 proposes another meeting of the two delegations, but all that was, of
10 course, in vain.
11 Now, in view of that position, does this position seem to you to
12 be logical, that the delegation of the Republic of Serbia should ask that
13 all elements of that self-government should be known and regulated when
14 the agreement was drawn up? Is that an unrealistic demand?
15 A. Absolutely not. And all elements of self-government, of course,
16 and I'm referring to what I was quoting in regard to the political side of
17 the agreement, that was, of course, on the table at the time and they were
18 clearly defined and known to the Yugoslav delegation. However, I also see
19 the point that it is from the Yugoslav viewpoint and the delegation's
20 viewpoint clear such an important point to underline in such a letter in
21 order to make it sure beyond any doubt, and that, of course, was the case.
22 I repeat, all elements of the self-government were defined and known, well
23 known, to both sides.
24 Q. Right. Now, as you yourself have said that we don't exist --
25 agree with respect to the occupation, let's not enter into a discussion
1 and debate about occupation which is obvious from the agreement and also
2 from reactions throughout the world, but let's get back to what we've just
3 been discussing. I'm going to quote point 3. It is part of the amendment
4 of comprehensive assessments and final clauses, and it is point 3 of that
6 [In English] "After the entry into force of this agreement, an
7 international meeting shall be convened to determine a mechanism for a
8 final settlement for Kosovo on the basis of the will of the people,
9 opinions of relevant authorities, each party's effort regarding
10 implementation of this agreement, and the Helsinki final act to undertake
11 a comprehensive assessment of the implementation of this agreement and to
12 consider proposal by any party for additional measures."
13 [Interpretation] Do you think that with this, when it says three
14 years afterwards that the will of the people should be tested, as it says
15 here, and that a final ultimate agreement be reached, do you not think
16 that this is such a transparent schematic, first of all with respect to
17 occupation and then the Albanian national minority, let's proclaim that a
18 nation with the right to self-determination, and then let's go on to
19 legalising this with Yugoslavia's signature, with the signature of Serbia,
20 the legalisation of snatching away Kosovo which represents otherwise an
21 integral part of Serbia. And is that in keeping with what you said a
22 moment ago, that it is very pertinent, the delegation's request, to
23 pertinently ask for clearly defined elements and known elements of each
24 particular part of the agreement?
25 A. I believe that you have touched upon a very relevant and very
1 important point now in this agreement, and you have read this out, and I
2 think by reading this out you have proven to the contrary what you have
3 actually -- what you are insinuating. This is a clear, albeit rather long
4 language, where this -- where it is spelled out that a final settlement
5 has to be based on the will of the people, which is of course democracy,
6 with all the elements of democracy, not just the Albanian, of course,
7 Albanian community as well, the Serb community as well. Secondly, that
8 each party, therefore, is being taken into consideration, which is how
9 much are both sides contributing to building a peaceful Kosovo. And both
10 -- I --
11 Q. Well, I've read all that, Mr. Petritsch.
12 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness finish and explain.
13 THE WITNESS: Both parties, both sides, Mr. Milosevic, have to
14 agree. So if one side wants independence and the other side is against
15 it, it is not possible. And the last very important point, you mentioned
16 the Helsinki final act, which we put into this agreement on purpose. And
17 you know the Helsinki final act means no changes of existing borders.
18 So this was, in fact, the guarantee for Yugoslavia to keep Kosovo
19 inside Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, this was misrepresented in the
20 propaganda in your own country and did not achieve the desired effect. No
21 change of this interim agreement without the agreement of both sides would
22 have been possible.
23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Do you really think that you're being convincing when you say that
25 nothing without the agreement of both sides would have been possible when
1 a moment ago, with Rambouillet, when speaking of Rambouillet, both sides
2 did not agree, and then what happened was the bombing. How come that now
3 you're able to say that this meant that there should be agreement of both
4 sides whereas, on the other hand, where the two sides were unable to
5 agree, the result was the bombing? Does that seem to you, Mr. Petritsch,
6 to be logical? Do you really think that anybody can believe what you're
7 saying here now?
8 A. Unfortunately, if there would have been a Yugoslavia signature on
9 this Rambouillet accord, this paragraph, the final paragraph which you
10 just quoted, would have come into force, and then the Helsinki final acts
11 -- final act would have been the basis for any final solution.
12 Unfortunately, your side did not sign, and, therefore, you had to bear the
14 Q. All right. And as this lack of -- I leave this lack of logic to
15 be decided upon those who are attending this. Do you consider the present
16 occupation of Kosovo and the crimes against the non-Albanian population
17 there including over 360.000 Serbs and other non-Serb inhabitants who were
18 expelled from Kosovo --
19 JUDGE MAY: Before we go into this tendentious argument, what is
20 the relevance of this?
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The relevance of this, Mr. May, lies
22 in the crime that was committed against my country and which you are
23 endeavouring here and now to cover up with justifications --
24 JUDGE MAY: What is the relevance for this indictment to the
25 question you want the witness to answer?
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, precisely the fact that we
2 were dealing with topsy-turvy issues, a reversal of theses, and I spoke
3 about that at the beginning. You who proclaim criminal those who defended
4 their country and those who perpetrated aggressions against that country
5 and perpetrated crimes against peace and a series of other crimes, you are
6 trying to justify that with these kinds of explanations that are given
7 here in this courtroom and a series of false testimony --
8 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you're off the point. Now, have you
9 got any relevant questions for this witness?
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is a relevant, very relevant
11 issue, and I'm asking Mr. Petritsch, who was otherwise the occupational
12 chief of Bosnia-Herzegovina, whether he understands that the present
13 occupation of Kosovo and the crimes perpetrated against the Serbs --
14 JUDGE MAY: You're not going to use abuse against the witness.
15 We're going to adjourn now. It's almost ten past. We will adjourn for
16 twenty minutes and then go on.
17 MR. NICE: Just before you do, I was alerted to the timetable
18 allowed for the cross-examination. I think there will be no witness
19 available to fill the balance of the morning because of the various
20 difficulties that have arisen over witnesses coming and going over the
21 last few weeks.
22 The only conceivable witness would be one in respect of whom you
23 have yet to make a decision about 92 bis.
24 JUDGE MAY: If it's Ms. Sandra Mitchell, the answer is we admit
25 that under 92 bis, and if she's ready, at least she can make a start.
1 MR. NICE: Unfortunately, then, she hasn't yet been bis'd and I
2 don't think it will be possible between now and then. If there are any
3 other matters I can be help with, I'll hold myself in readiness.
4 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We will adjourn now for 20 minutes.
5 --- Recess taken at 12.10 p.m.
6 --- On resuming at 12.33 p.m.
7 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, have you got another witness or not?
8 MR. NICE: The witness Sandra Mitchell is coming to the building.
9 Her statement hasn't yet been subject to the provisions of 92 bis, but
10 were the Chamber to arise -- assuming she arrives in the next ten minutes,
11 and were the Chamber feel able to rise for a few minutes, that process
12 could be gone through right here and now and then she would be ready for a
13 summary and cross-examination.
14 JUDGE MAY: I suspect it's going to be a bit tight. We'll see how
15 we get on. But it would be helpful if we could have witnesses here
16 normally, ready to go.
17 MR. NICE: As Your Honour knows, we've had witnesses stored in
18 hotels for weeks, and I'm afraid the unforeseen circumstances made it
19 quite impossible to get more witnesses here than the ones we have for this
21 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
22 Mr. Milosevic, we'll give you a bit longer in the circumstances.
23 You've got another 40 minutes.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] With what we were talking about --
25 with regard to the Sandra Mitchell issue, this morning I said -- I told
1 you here when I enumerated the statements we have not received, we haven't
2 received Sandra Mitchell's statement. The opposite side told me that
3 Sandra Mitchell's statement had been distributed on the 27th of June. I
4 have not received it. I did not receive it on the 27th of June when they
5 claim it was distributed, nor has my associate received it, who is here in
6 town and in the building. He has not received the statement either.
7 JUDGE MAY: We will have that looked into. Now, let's finish the
9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. A moment ago, Mr. Petritsch, you said that because we didn't sign
11 the agreement, that's why we were bombed. That's why you felt the brunt
12 and consequences of that. That's what you were saying a moment ago.
13 A. What I was saying is that we know now in retrospect what happened
14 after the collapse of the negotiations. I did not refer to the bombing.
15 I just said that our part, the negotiators' part, had come to an end,
16 thanks and because of the non-cooperation on your part.
17 Q. Well, does that confirm precisely what I said, that it was
18 ultimatum in fact? It was, "Either sign or you're going to be bombed."
19 Which is what actually occurred; right? A sovereign state did not accept
20 the occupation and that's why it was occupied. It did not accept the
21 ultimatum and that is why it was bombed; is that so or not?
22 A. You are aware of the fact that NATO had already, back in October
23 of 1998, if I recall correctly, issued their act 1 statement, which was
24 then further elaborated. So it was clear to everybody that if the
25 negotiations fail, there is going to -- another actor on the scene, so to
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 speak. And I've also clearly indicated that we, the negotiators, had
2 tried, and went the extra mile, to Belgrade, in order to rescue the whole
3 situation, in order to continue the negotiations. Unfortunately, we met
4 deaf ears at Beli Dvor.
5 Q. And didn't you observe a moment ago that there were, in fact, no
6 negotiations between the Albanian and Serb delegations?
7 A. I'm referring to the facts on the ground, the facts that occurred
8 after Rambouillet and Paris, when the Contact Group and the three
9 negotiators were making a last-ditch effort in regards to settling the
10 conflict in a peaceful way.
11 Q. And this peaceful means, peaceful way, by that you mean NATO
12 troops, the NATO troop presence in Yugoslavia; is that it?
13 A. That is not correct. I was throughout the negotiations referring
14 to a peaceful settlement, and I was referring to the necessity to include
15 a component, a military component, in order to implement the agreement.
16 Otherwise, this agreement would have merely remained on paper and the
17 conflict, the armed conflict in Kosovo, would have continued.
18 Q. And have you heard of the statement by a member of the Albanian
19 delegation, Veton Surroi, whom I'm sure you've met, the statement he made
20 for the BBC and the programme entitled "Moral Combat"? He explains
21 Albright and Thaci, and says: "You sign, the Serbs don't sign, and we
22 bomb. You sign, the Serbs sign, and you have NATO on your territory. It
23 depends on you. Unless you sign -- if you don't sign and the Serbs don't
24 sign, then we'll forget about this." In her talks with Thaci, are you
25 aware of her having said that?
1 A. No, I'm not aware of that.
2 Q. All right. Let me just diverge for a moment. During the break, I
3 got the statement by Vladimir Stambuk, although this is a very marginal
4 issue, but as you did quote him, he said -- this is the statement: "Under
5 full material -- moral responsibility, I say that the statement given was
6 incorrect during the meeting in Rambouillet."
7 THE INTERPRETER: Could the accused please slow down when
9 JUDGE MAY: Could you slow down, please, Mr. Milosevic. Could you
10 slow down for the interpreters.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. "If there should be an
12 attack on Yugoslavia by NATO and the bombing, the Albanians in Kosovo will
13 suffer too." So he was quoting, and it is written down in black letters,
14 "If there should be an attack on Yugoslavia, the NATO bombing will result
15 in Albanian victims in Kosovo as well." And the statement is given for
16 these purposes here. You can have it, but let's move on.
17 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer that.
18 What is being suggested is that -- he simply said that there would
19 be casualties among the Albanians. Would that be right?
20 A. I stick to my original statement.
21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. And have you heard of the book by a compatriot of yours, the
23 Austrian historian Hofbauer who also quoted George Kenney, a competent US
24 diplomat, when he said: "We deliberately set the bar higher so that the
25 Serbs could not accept it"?
1 JUDGE MAY: We've been through that, Mr. Milosevic.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is just an explanation of my
4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. On page 219 of his book, he adds the following: That you have
6 great responsibility for that. Are you aware of that, Mr. Petritsch?
7 Hofbauer is your own fellow Austrian. Do you consider yourself to be
9 A. I know Mr. Hofbauer and I know the book and I know his position,
10 which I fully disagree with.
11 Q. All right. Let's move on, then. You claim that the Serb
12 delegation consulted Belgrade with respect to the details of the agreement
13 and that in the political sense, a compromise was struck. Do you consider
14 that with respect to that compromise that they consulted me as the head of
16 A. This is my assumption.
17 Q. All right. Now answer me this: What -- what do we do with this?
18 Isn't it logical that the delegation of a state should consult the
19 president of that same state when it comes to questions which are of great
20 importance, paramount importance, for that state?
21 A. Which in turn means that my assumption is right, that you took the
22 final decision on the fate of the Rambouillet peace talks.
23 Q. But a moment ago, you responded by saying that you considered that
24 a political compromise had been reached and that you considered that, with
25 respect to that political compromise, that they consulted me; right?
1 A. In regard to the political part of the agreement, yes. As well as
2 I assume that the military implementation part was also decided by you.
3 Q. All right. What you assume is your own affair. But tell me this:
4 Do you know who the Albanian delegation consulted, the Albanian delegation
5 at the Rambouillet talks?
6 A. I do not have a full knowledge, but I know that Thaci once
7 travelled to Ljubljana in order to consult with Mr. Demaci.
8 Q. And are you aware of the fact that, along with them, there was
9 Morten Abramovic as a consultant and link with the US administration?
10 A. Morten Abramovic was, to the best of my knowledge, an advisor,
11 independent advisor to the Kosovo Albanian delegation, and as such he was
12 in Rambouillet.
13 Q. So he was an independent advisor, was he, to the Kosovo
14 delegation, as far as you knew. And who did you consult during the
15 Rambouillet negotiations, Mr. Petritsch?
16 A. I consulted with the European Union presidency; at the time,
18 Q. And tell me how often during the Rambouillet negotiations did
19 Albright, Vedrine and Cook spend there? How many times were they there
20 and for how long?
21 A. Messrs. Vedrine and Cook were the co-chairs of the Rambouillet
22 conference, and Paris of course included, and they were, on an average,
23 every other day in Rambouillet. Ms. Albright, Secretary of State
24 Albright, I do not recall, but she was also there on several occasions.
25 Q. And was not the attack by the NATO alliance on Yugoslavia
1 precisely proof of the fact that a political compromise, which you
2 yourself claim had been reached, was not in fact the aim of the
3 international community at the negotiations but that it was precisely the
4 stationing of NATO forces on the territory of the FRY and in Kosovo. Yes
5 or no.
6 A. It was first and foremost very clear that in order to implement
7 the political compromise that you referred to, a military component was
8 necessary. And the second point is that after the 23rd of February, the
9 Yugoslav side started to backtrack on the political compromise.
10 Q. On page 280 of his -- of your book "Kosovo," you, in
11 characterising the nature of the proposal made by the Contact Group, you
12 say - and I'm quoting you, Mr. Petritsch - the following: "The agreement
13 was characterised by a strong influence from the international community.
14 Kosovo de facto would have become a protectorate provisionally. The
15 provisions of the agreement consciously were formulated in two ways to
16 provide -- equivocally to provide broad possibilities for review." For
17 review of what, Mr. Petritsch? For review or for abuse; which is it?
18 A. Definitely not for abuse but for review. And it was de facto a
19 provisional protectorate. That was in order to explain to an interested
20 public, through this book, what this in practical terms would have meant.
21 As you referred to prior, there would have been an international final
22 authority in Kosovo as this is the case in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Again, the
23 Dayton model which served as a model for Kosovo for the set-up of the
24 international presence in Kosovo.
25 Q. And what about the following quotation from your book, is that
1 correct: "Although they were provided for during the negotiations, there
2 was not a single direct talk between the delegations and their boards."
3 Full stop. "Several attempts through mediators, the mediation of
4 Maiorsky, to prompt the Yugoslavia side to do so and to set up a forum for
5 negotiation were aborted because of the resistance on the part of the
6 Albanians." End of quotation. Is that correct? Was that true?
7 A. I believe, Mr. Milosevic, I have already explained this, and this
8 is correct.
9 Q. And what about this: Is it correct that the Serb side, precisely
10 via Hill, on several occasions insisted on having a joint meeting but that
11 this was always met with rejection by the Albanian side?
12 A. The Serb side originally, as I have already pointed out, refused
13 to be -- to sit even in the same room for the ceremonial opening but then
14 reconsidered and then later on changed its tactic and was asking for
15 direct meetings, which we tried to facilitate. Unfortunately, in spite of
16 several attempts, it was not agreed to by the Albanian side, as I have
17 already pointed out. So the Albanian side insisted on continuing with
19 Q. Was a single expert meeting held between the two delegations?
20 A. Not to my knowledge. There was the one meeting which I referred
21 to which was organised by Secretary Albright, but that was an attempt to
22 break the ice, so to speak, but there was no follow-up to it.
23 Q. And is it correct that on the 10th of February, 1999, you insisted
24 on a meeting with the Yugoslav delegation in Rambouillet in order to
25 convince them to give up on the ten principle requests among which was the
1 one on the unchangeability of the state border of the FRY and also that
2 the Kosovo Albanians should give up on the independence of Kosovo?
3 A. No, that's not correct. Again, Your Honours, a bit of a longer
4 explanation is necessary. These ten basic principles that Mr. Milosevic
5 is referring to, as I have already pointed out, these were included in the
6 invitation and were a precondition, non-negotiable, had to be accepted by
7 both delegations.
8 In the course of the Rambouillet negotiations, the Yugoslav side
9 tried to arrange a signing of the general principles, the so-called ten
10 principles, which was considered unnecessary because they were already
11 accepted by the mere fact that the Yugoslavs came to Rambouillet. It was
12 a precondition to accept this, and so therefore, a signing was considered
13 not necessary.
14 Q. So the ten principled requests, do you remember that as for the
15 system to be imposed in Kosovo the key request of the Serb side was that
16 there should be a bicameral parliament, a chamber of citizens elected
17 according to the principle one man, one vote, and also another chamber of
18 the ethnic communities that would be constituted on a parity basis
19 consisting of all the ethnic communities in Kosovo? Do you remember that?
20 Yes or no.
21 A. Yes, I remember this. And it --
22 Q. Do you think that it is right to espouse the principle of having
23 all the ethnic communities in Kosovo be equal regardless of their size?
24 A. That was one of our guiding principles. It was even more so we
25 wanted the ethnic communities in Kosovo to be even reinforced in their
1 status, and this is the reason why the Rambouillet accords, according to
2 scholars who have analysed it, would have provided for the Serbs and the
3 other ethnic communities, non-Albanian ethnic communities, about 40 per
4 cent of the political power and 60 per cent to the Kosovo Albanians. And
5 you know that the demographic and ethnic break-up is quite a different
6 one. We wanted to strengthen the ethnic communities there. And as we
7 know, the other non-Albanian ethnic communities are traditionally on the
8 Serb side. This was the reason to come up with a fair and balanced and
9 strong position for the non-Albanians in order to create a viable
10 situation for the non-Albanians in Kosovo.
11 Now, if -- if -- okay. I'm sorry.
12 Q. Well, then, why was the Serb proposal not accepted that there
13 should be a chamber of ethnic communities in which each ethnic community
14 would be represented on a parity basis, if the principle was that they
15 should all be equal and equitable?
16 A. Let me answer this in no uncertain terms: There was indeed a
17 situation when the Yugoslavia side advanced the idea of a bicameral system
18 which was accepted by the mediators and which already was accepted by the
19 Kosovo Albanian side. However, once the Yugoslav side saw the details,
20 they decided actually to give -- to again give it up, to not insist on it.
21 But we -- I personally would have been in favour of such a mechanism.
22 And I can tell you in Bosnia-Herzegovina, just a few weeks ago, I
23 managed to introduce a bicameral system in Republika Srpska. So you can
24 believe me that I very much support a full equality and a strengthening of
25 minority ethnic groups in any part of ex-Yugoslavia.
1 Q. You did not answer my question. Why was this key request of the
2 Serb side not accepted, then, that the Assembly should have this chamber
3 of ethnic communities where all the ethnic communities would be
4 represented on a basis of parity?
5 A. Because the Yugoslav delegation gave up on this idea. And in
6 order to guarantee the equality, it was included in the one cameral
8 Q. Do you know that the delegation of Serbia or, rather, this
9 delegation that negotiated, the one that was headed by Ratko Markovic,
10 consisted of the representatives of all the ethnic communities living in
11 Kosovo, including the representatives of the Albanian party?
12 A. Yes, I was aware of it and I was in contact also with the
13 representatives of the other ethnic communities which represent -- which
14 were part of your delegation.
15 Q. Well, why, then, did you not accept this multi-ethnic principle of
16 equality rather than letting the Albanian majority prevail in Kosovo?
17 Didn't it seem fairer to you that this multi-ethnic principle of equality
18 of ethnic communities be favoured rather than having the Albanians prevail
19 over everybody?
20 A. Mr. Milosevic, I already tried to explain that this was exactly
21 what we were trying, and this is, of course, what is included still now in
22 the draft for -- of the Rambouillet accords, which was, unfortunately,
23 only signed by the Kosovo Albanian side.
24 Q. But you said, when speaking about the Albanian side, that the
25 Albanian side was very heterogenous and that it consisted of a serious of
1 different groups ranging from Rugova to Thaci; independent, moderate,
2 extremist, et cetera. Is that right or is that not right?
3 A. That is basically right, yes.
4 Q. Well, tell me, now, how many of them signed the agreement?
5 A. As it was agreed, there was an internal structure, as in your
6 delegation, with the head of delegation and the negotiating -- a smaller
7 negotiating team. The same -- or this was the case with the Kosovo
8 Albanian delegation, and therefore, it was only, if I remember correctly,
9 then the agreement signed by Rugova, Thaci, and Surroi. Rugova
10 representing one part of this rather heterogenous group, Thaci
11 representing another part, basically the KLA, and Veton Surroi
12 representing the so-called independents, Blerim Shala and himself and
13 hopefully many more people with the same attitude.
14 Q. So out of the 17 members of the Albanian delegation, they were the
15 ones who signed.
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. And how many intermediaries signed the agreement?
18 A. It was Mr. Hill and myself.
19 Q. So here, out of the 17 members of the Albanian side, those that
20 you mentioned signed. Out of the mediators - and you have been invoking
21 their consensus - only you and Hill actually signed up. Maiorsky did not
22 sign it, and that was sufficient to be grounds for the bombing of not only
23 Kosovo but all of Yugoslavia. Is that right, Mr. Petritsch?
24 A. That is wrong, an incorrect conclusion. First, particularly when
25 it comes to the conclusion, but first the facts. The Kosovo Albanian
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 decision to sign was taken collectively, and the ones who signed, there
2 was unanimous agreement inside the Kosovo Albanian delegation that these
3 are the three who should sign.
4 On the part of the three mediators, the decision, as I've already
5 explained previously, was on the part of Mr. Maiorsky to attend the
6 signing ceremony but not to sign there and sign then once the other party,
7 meaning your delegation, would be ready to sign.
8 Q. So out of you three mediators, there was one signature that was
9 missing. You thought that that signature could be ignored. Is that the
10 same like when NATO ignored the fact that it violated the UN charter by
11 carrying out an aggression against Yugoslavia and --
12 JUDGE MAY: You're getting a long way from the point with these
13 polemics. Have you got another question, a relevant question, for the
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do.
16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Is it correct, because I quoted to you that conversation between
18 Thaci and Albright and the motives that can be seen on the basis of this
19 conversation, can you give an answer to who convinced Thaci to sign the
20 agreement in Rambouillet? Do you know about that?
21 A. The agreement in Rambouillet on the part of -- of the Albanians,
22 was signed by Veton Surroi and only in Paris at the Kleber Centre, it was
23 Thaci who, after consultations, met in Kosovo and then decided to also
25 Q. Let me just take a look at some other statements that you made.
1 Mr. Petritsch, you explained that on the day of the bombing, you left
2 Belgrade, judging by what you said here, because Ambassador Bugarcic
3 advised you to leave the country because your safety and security could
4 not be guaranteed. Since this seems highly incredible to me, is it
5 possible that you got this somewhat wrong? Because you were ambassador in
6 Belgrade, and the question of your security could not be brought under a
7 question mark in any conceivable way.
8 Are you trying to give an explanation here that actually Bugarcic
9 said to you that you would have to flee in order to survive?
10 A. That is your interpretation. It's not, by far, not as traumatic.
11 But I was not only the Austrian ambassador there, but when the first -- in
12 October, prior to your agreement with Holbrooke, when most of the
13 ambassadors were leaving, I remained there. But this time, I was not just
14 the Austrian ambassador but the negotiator who, unfortunately, by many
15 people, through propaganda, was conceived as having contributed to the
16 imminent military operation, which of course was an incorrect assumption.
17 But based upon this, Mr. Bugarcic gave me, so to speak, the friendly
18 advice to, rather, leave the country. That was not by me considered as
19 fleeing the country; on the contrary, it was basically a situation where
20 everybody involved knew that war is imminent.
21 Q. All right. But, for example, do you know how many diplomats
22 stayed behind in Belgrade during the war?
23 A. I don't know how many, but several did, but they were not
24 negotiators in Rambouillet.
25 Q. And was any diplomat ever jeopardised in Belgrade in any way?
1 A. I don't know. Not to my knowledge. I was always very
2 well-received and I returned even after the NATO intervention and was
3 well-received both by the wider public, by my friends and acquaintances
4 there as well as by Patrijarh Pavle and your then Foreign Minister
6 Q. All right. So your conclusion was that you should leave Belgrade
7 because it was your assumption that unjustifiably you were considered to
8 be responsible for the coming bombing and for what you did in Rambouillet;
9 is that right?
10 A. That is an interpretation in retrospective, because at the time I
11 did not know and I would not have wished the bombing to happen. It was
12 simply a decision out of security reasons taken by -- by my Foreign
13 Ministry in Vienna, who called me back, and my staff, to return to Vienna.
14 Q. All right. Did you leave in accordance with the instructions
15 given by your ministry for reasons of security that you've mentioned just
16 now, or did you leave because of this friendly advice, as you had put it,
17 that Bugarcic had given you?
18 A. If -- if the -- this conversation would have gone differently,
19 meaning to encourage me to remain and to continue the search for a
20 peaceful solution, I would, of course, have remained there. However, you
21 need to take into consideration, Your Honours, that I was already the last
22 of the three negotiators left in Belgrade. So there was only a very, very
23 slim and dim chance that there would have been a resumption of the
24 negotiations. Once the Russian negotiator had left, it became all too
25 clear to us that we have reached the end of the avenue.
1 Q. You said that you cooperated with Bugarcic the most and that it
2 was thanks to that cooperation that you managed to ensure that an
3 invitation be sent to the Finnish forensic team. This morning during your
4 testimony, you said that months went by until this actually took place,
5 and in your written statement you said weeks. So is it months that
6 elapsed or weeks? What are you actually trying to explain in this way? I
7 did not understand the point at all, the point of this particular
8 statement of yours, or, rather, that part of your statement. Of course
9 the point your entire statement is no secret whatsoever.
10 A. You can choose either to say weeks or months. It was a few months
11 since the summer and the decision by you was taken, if I recall correctly,
12 in October. So you could say, I don't know, 12 weeks or three months or
14 Q. Please, could you comment on this particular part of your
15 statement where you speak about the release of the hostages or, rather,
16 the prisoners, as you put it in your statement, when the soldiers were
17 actually released. It says here in your statement: "However, the
18 Yugoslav side agreed to release these Albanians ten days after the KLA
19 would release the soldiers of the army of Yugoslavia. On the 14th of
20 January, I met with Sainovic, and I said that my credibility depended on
21 whether the Serbs would observe their part of the agreement because,
22 after, the KLA would release the Yugoslav army soldiers. Then, on the
23 15th of January, the massacre in Racak took place and then the press
24 carried the conversation between Sainovic and Lukic. I don't know about
25 that. However, I was concerned as to whether the KLA soldiers would be
1 released after that. However, as agreed, the Serbs did release the
2 imprisoned KLA members ten days after the imprisoned soldiers had been
3 released. When this happened, Sainovic said this was the president's
4 decision and he was actually referring to Milosevic. Sainovic told me
5 this when we were in a tête-à-tête. This is yet another proof that things
6 happened when Milosevic wanted them to happen."
7 What does this entire story mean? This entire story that the Serb
8 side kept its word. You mediated, as you put it here, in the release of
9 the soldiers. And since you were promised that ten days later the
10 Albanians would be released, was there any problem in the fact that the
11 Serb side had kept its word and released these Albanians? What's the
13 A. There is no problem. This is just yet another example that it was
14 President Milosevic who took the decisions. And even under difficult
15 circumstances, like in this case where, as you know, on the 15th of
16 January, this Racak happened, and of course everybody thought at the time
17 that now thinks -- everybody realised at the time that this is a new
18 negative quality in this conflict. And so I personally was very concerned
19 that -- that your side would not stick to this gentlemen's agreement,
20 because that was, of course, one in secret and since your side did not
21 want an exchange to be officially on record, so to speak, and whereas the
22 Albanian side released immediately, we had promised them that your side -
23 and this was my word that was at stake - relieve -- release the KLA
24 prisoners after ten days in order to make -- to make it not so visible and
25 obvious that this was an exchange.
1 However, when Racak happened, of course, which changed totally the
2 situation in this conflict, I simply was afraid that your side would not
3 stick to this gentlemen's agreement. However, you did. And when asking
4 Mr. Sainovic, he said, "That's the president," and this was you. That's
5 basically just to explain who called the shots in Yugoslavia.
6 Q. Yes. Yes. But that is precisely why I'm asking you this. I
7 haven't got it in Serbian because I got this summary of your statement
8 this morning in English only, but it is paragraph number 3 where you say,
9 this is your observation, that I am in charge of everything, and you say:
10 "Milosevic was the one and only person [In English] controlling everything
11 in every way and had de facto control of all decisions and government
13 [Interpretation] Let's be quite clear, Mr. Petritsch: Of course I
14 am not questioning at all the fact that my position with regard to the
15 occupation of my country was that occupation could not be accepted. I am
16 not bringing that into question at all, this fact. But I'm asking you
17 because you were ambassador to that country, because you live in a
18 neighbouring country, why do you represent Serbia and Yugoslavia as some
19 kind of savages where there is no parliament, no government, no --
20 JUDGE MAY: Now, this is pure polemics again. The witness has
21 done no such thing. Now, you can ask one more question because your time
22 is now up. What is the question?
23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Do you think, Mr. Petritsch, that a crime was committed against
25 Yugoslavia? Do you think that this crime goes on until the present day?
1 And does it affect you in any way the fact that yesterday, finally, a
2 legal International Criminal Court started working yesterday and that some
3 day this crime would --
4 JUDGE MAY: This is totally irrelevant.
5 Mr. Tapuskovic, have you any questions for the witness?
6 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
7 Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:
8 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Petritsch, today as well as in your written
9 statement, you said that between the 10th and 14th of February, or round
10 about, 1999, the Serb delegation achieved great strides forward in the
11 negotiation and that a compromise was reached with respect to political
12 and legal aspects regarding Kosovo, that a certain amount of agreement was
13 achieved, in fact. Is that correct? Is that so?
14 A. That's correct.
15 Q. Now, is it also correct that the only problem outstanding was how
16 to implement this?
17 A. That was substantively about the only, but of course big, problem.
18 Q. And when it comes to implementation, the point on implementation
19 for the agreement, did it also say the following: "The participation of
20 the OSCE and other international bodies if this is indispensable." So no
21 mention is made there of NATO or the armed forces. It says: "The
22 participation of the OSCE and other international bodies, if that is
23 indispensable." Is that what was stipulated in the agreement?
24 A. Mr. Tapuskovic, you know that this is exactly the case. The --
25 you're quoting now from -- from the basic elements, and in -- under
1 "Implementation," there's a point saying --
2 Q. Yes.
3 A. -- of OSCE and other international bodies as necessary. Other
4 international bodies, of course, assumes UN, NATO, whatever, is agreed
5 upon and necessary for the implementation.
6 Q. Well, is it first and foremost the UN? Once the UN decides, then
7 they should move forward, or was the order of that somewhat different?
8 A. That was not in the framework of the UN. That was in the
9 framework of the Contact Group which steered and conducted and supervised
10 these negotiations.
11 Q. All right. And did the Yugoslav side, on the 16th February, as
12 you were there, accept stepping up the OSCE mission to have 5.000 or 6.000
13 observers and they should be lightly armed? So this was the first time
14 that it accepted the military presence of 5.000 or 6.000 military
15 observers lightly armed? Is it true that the Yugoslav side offered that
16 as a solution?
17 A. That was once discussed but never pursued, neither by the Yugoslav
18 side nor by the international community side.
19 Q. In fact, already on the next day, if that is true, you were there,
20 did in fact the Yugoslav side offer that the implementation or, rather,
21 for the implementation to go through, that a joint staff be set up of NATO
22 and Yugoslavia? Was that on the agenda and is that one of the offerings
23 made by the Yugoslav side?
24 A. I do not recall this.
25 Q. All right. Thank you. And the very next day, the 19th of
1 February, after the Yugoslav side presented, tabled this offer, that Annex
2 B came into being. We've already discussed it today and I don't want to
3 repeat it. You were there so you know.
4 A. Annex B was, at the time, presented. It was, of course,
5 elaborated on and worked on prior to this, and it was then presented to
6 the Yugoslav delegation, that's correct.
7 Q. Mr. Petritsch, I'm interested in the following: Did you have
8 direct contacts with the representatives of the KLA, you personally,
10 A. You're referring to the -- to Kosovo or in the framework of the
11 Rambouillet talks?
12 Q. I am asking you about the Rambouillet issue. I don't want to
13 expand the topic. We haven't time for that. But did you have direct
14 contacts with the leaders of the KLA with respect and in Rambouillet?
15 A. I had direct contacts with the delegation of Kosovo Albanians
16 including the KLA members of the Kosovo Albanian delegation, in particular
17 with Mr. Thaci. Mr. Thaci speaks German and that made it easier also to
18 communicate directly with him. And since he was the head of the
19 delegation, of course it served a very substantive purpose.
20 Q. Now I'm interested in three meetings and three talks that you had
21 with Mr. Thaci; and you write about them in your book. The first was in
22 the night between the 19th and 20th of February. Was that a telephone
23 conversation and did you, on the night between the 19th and 20th of
24 February, indeed have a telephone conversation with Mr. Thaci?
25 A. I assume you're referring to the direct conversation, meeting with
1 Mr. Thaci in Rambouillet, on the premises of the negotiations.
2 Q. In your book it says as follows, on page 301 of your book: "After
3 a night conversation between Petritsch and Thaci, Thaci was convinced of
4 the need to accept the agreement in principle." That's what it says in
5 your book.
6 A. Yes, that's right.
7 Q. Is that correct?
8 A. That is correct.
9 Q. Next, also in your book, the following: "On the 5th of March," it
10 says, you, together with Ambassador Christian Bos [phoen], the German
11 ambassador, on the rebel territory you met the head of the General Staff
12 of the KLA. On March the 5th. Is that correct?
13 A. That's correct.
14 Q. And is it also correct what it says in your book, that on the
15 occasion you received the answer from Hashim Thaci to the effect that he
16 would sign the agreement offered up in Paris?
17 A. Mr. Thaci, to my recollection, was not present there, but he
18 called and gave me the assurance that they are nearing the decision to --
19 to sign. Basically, he said that he's confident that he will be able to
21 Q. And did the negotiator representing Russia know about all these
22 talks, the talks that you had with Thaci and with the leaders of the KLA?
23 A. Mr. Maiorsky was, as a matter of rule by me, fully informed about
24 my activities as was the case of Mr. Maiorsky when it came to his
25 activities. And so in Rambouillet, he immediately knew -- he himself
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 spoke, of course, on several occasions with Thaci and the other Albanians,
2 and in the interim period between Rambouillet and Paris, Mr. Maiorsky was,
3 to my recollection, in Moscow and could, therefore, not participate in
4 these talks. But Ambassador Powers [phoen] from the European Union
5 presidency was present, as you have correctly, so rightly, so mentioned.
6 Q. Today in this courtroom you said, and we all heard it, that the
7 Yugoslav side did not wish to accept the presence of NATO forces in Kosovo
8 but that the KLA only wanted that kind of solution, that is to say, the
9 presence of NATO forces in Kosovo. Did you discuss that with Thaci and
10 the leaders of the KLA? Did you say anything about that and were there
11 any promises? Were any promises made along those lines?
12 A. Well, it was very clear that the main task of this 5th of March
13 meeting in Kosovo was to send a clear message to the Kosovars, to the
14 Kosovo leadership there as well as to the KLA in particular, that their
15 term has come to an end, that by signing up to the Rambouillet accords,
16 their organisation, their military organisation, will have to be
17 disbanded. That was the difficulty, of course, in dealing with this March
18 5 meeting, because these were active rebels or military or paramilitary or
19 terrorists, whatever you call them, and for them, it was clear that they
20 would have to hand over their weapons and their uniform.
21 So for this reason, we wanted to make it clear beyond any doubt
22 that by signing up to this, this means the end of KLA as a military
23 organisation. That made it so difficult there to convey this message.
24 But this was a very clear thing and necessary in order to -- to provide
25 for the next step, which is -- which was the Paris negotiations.
1 Q. And just one more question on that topic. Was the KLA disarmed,
2 and what did this protection Kosovo corps mean? Who was this corps
3 protecting if NATO was already in the field, in the territory?
4 A. The Rambouillet accords did not include -- now we have to
5 distinguish between the Rambouillet accords and the present solution,
6 which of course is, from a Belgrade viewpoint, a less favourable one.
7 After the war, unfortunately, I would add in my private capacity, personal
8 opinion, at the time of the Rambouillet accords, of course, there would
9 have been a clear decision implemented by the international forces to
10 fully disband the KLA, and on the other hand, Yugoslavia border forces
11 would have been allowed to enforce the sovereignty also in Kosovo. This
12 is in the Rambouillet accords written, close to 2.000 personnel. That, of
13 course, is not any longer now, after the war, included in this. But at
14 the time, the solution that was offered was crystal clear that the KLA
15 will have to disband fully.
16 Q. Thank you. In the statement you gave to the investigators of the
17 Tribunal --
18 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, that is the last
19 page of the statement.
20 Q. -- which in paragraph 3 from the top, refers to a problem, and you
21 state, Mr. Petritsch, that it appeared as if Milosevic did not expect NATO
22 to Serbia. On the basis of what were you able to make that assertion or
24 A. Well, I mean, again this is something which is based on my
25 practical experience and my intimate engagement and involvement in this
1 issue. That was the opinion that was not only held by me but that was an
2 opinion which was shared by many.
3 Q. You also say in the very next sentence the following: "He
4 probably gambled that NATO would bomb for two or three days, then back
5 down and go back to the negotiating table." And that too was your free
6 assessment, was it?
7 A. That was, again, a widely held opinion, opinion which in -- now in
8 retrospect, of course, has been proven incorrect.
9 Q. And did you know anything about the plans that NATO had? If they
10 started to bomb, how long the bombing would go on for? Did you know
11 anything about that or not?
12 A. No. I had no knowledge whatsoever of this.
13 Q. Page 3, referring to Mr. Stambuk and that he told you that if NATO
14 bombs fall, there will be a massacre in Kosovo. We've heard that already.
15 But in the first sentence after that, you say: "He did not qualify this
16 statement." So he didn't explain his statement at all. He didn't tell
17 you anything resolutely, but you concluded what you told us here today.
18 And then you said that he was not referring to the fact that NATO bombs
19 would lead to large-scale deaths in Kosovo. So on the basis of what do
20 you say what you stated here in court today?
21 A. I think it is very clear that I had the impression that what he
22 said meant a massacre by the Yugoslav or Serbian forces and MUP on the
23 Kosovo Albanians. However, in order to be fair, and this is one of my
24 personal guiding principles in -- here in my statement and in my
25 testimony, I added that Mr. Stambuk did not qualify the statement. I
1 think this is a fair -- to be fair vis-à-vis Mr. Stambuk.
2 Q. Yes. But you know full well he used the word "massacre." You
3 laid special emphasis on that. I'm not going to qualify any of what
4 happened in Kosovo by using any terms like that, but you know very well
5 that the Kosovo Albanian refugee columns on the 14th of April in Djakovica
6 was hit by NATO bombs. This was recognised by NATO and there were 70
7 casualties, 70 dead.
8 JUDGE MAY: I don't think it's going to assist us further to go
9 into that. It's nothing to do with this witness's evidence.
10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Well, we have to deal with it.
11 We have to deal with NATO bombs, Judge.
12 JUDGE MAY: No, we don't.
13 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] One more question.
14 JUDGE MAY: Well, one more question.
15 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] And that is what I wish to do to
16 assist, to allow the Trial Chamber to look at all this. I'm sorry that
17 you have limited me to one more question, but I respect your judgement.
18 Q. Now, one more question linked to the refugees -- or not linked to
19 the refugees. Mr. Naumann confirmed that. Yes, people did flee Kosovo
20 after the NATO bombing. They left Kosovo, they did leave Kosovo. But do
21 you know from the whole of Serbia - Vojvodina, Belgrade, Serbia - that
22 people left; they were either in the basements, in their cellars, or they
23 left to neighbouring countries because they were fleeing from the bombing
24 and that this created a problem in these third countries? Were you aware
25 of that or not?
1 A. Yes, I was aware of that. I was also aware of the fact that
2 Kosovars to an overwhelming degree were fleeing because of the Serb forces
3 on the ground. I travelled during the NATO intervention, the refugee
4 camps in -- near and around Skopje and other places, and I can tell you
5 that there was a very clear opinion expressed why the Kosovar Albanians
6 had left the -- their country, their homeland, and how it all came about.
7 I think there is no doubt that the absolute responsibility rests with the
8 Serbian and Yugoslav forces who -- which were at the time in -- on the
9 territory of Kosovo.
10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, he hasn't answered
11 my question. Please.
12 JUDGE MAY: He's dealt with the matter as thoroughly as possible
13 and as far as it's relevant to his evidence. His evidence wasn't about
14 any of this.
15 Now, Mr. Ryneveld, do you have any questions?
16 MR. RYNEVELD: Nothing arising in re-examination. Thank you, Your
17 Honour. I do have two other matters.
18 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
19 MR. RYNEVELD: With respect to --
20 JUDGE MAY: Let's deal with the witness first. Have you finished?
21 MR. RYNEVELD: I've finished with the witness except for one
22 thing. I'm wondering whether, since there's been extensive
23 cross-examination on his statement by both the accused and Mr. Tapuskovic,
24 whether Your Honours want the statement marked as an exhibit.
25 JUDGE MAY: Yes, we will exhibit it. May we have a number,
2 THE REGISTRAR: Prosecution Exhibit 236.
3 MR. RYNEVELD: Then those are all the matters with respect to this
4 witness at this time. Thank you.
5 JUDGE KWON: If the statement is to be exhibited, could you
6 clarify the letter attached to the statements. It gives some brief
7 explanations, some letter to the president.
8 MR. RYNEVELD: Excuse me just one moment. I'm not sure that --
9 that was the speech, I think, that was referred to by the witness in
10 evidence about the speech he gave in 1997 to Milosevic at the time of that
11 ceremonial -- at the time he delivered the message. I believe that's what
12 it is, but --
13 JUDGE KWON: So this is the recollection of Mr. -- Ambassador
15 MR. RYNEVELD: I'm not sure it's a recollection or whether it's
16 actually his printed speech that he had prepared. It looks to me as if
17 he's addressing: "Mr. President, Your Excellency, it's a great honour to
18 be able to present to you --" it looks to me as if this is -- but perhaps
19 I would be allowed one question about that?
20 Re-examined by Mr. Ryneveld:
21 Q. Mr. Petritsch, this letter that is attached to your statement, is
22 that in fact your speech?
23 A. I would have to see this because I have not seen the speech now
24 for a while.
25 Q. I believe it's both in original and in English -- original German
1 and in the English version?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. That's it?
4 A. Yes, that's it.
5 MR. RYNEVELD: That answers Your Honour's question. I don't know
6 whether you wish that attached to the statement or just the statement.
7 That's up to Your Honours. It's tendered in its whole capacity.
8 JUDGE MAY: We will have just the statement not the speech too.
9 Yes. Do we have an exhibit number for it?
10 THE REGISTRAR: 236, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE MAY: Ambassador, thank you for coming to the Tribunal to
12 give your evidence. It's now concluded. You are free to go.
13 [The witness withdrew]
14 JUDGE MAY: If the Registrar and legal officer would come up, one
16 [Trial Chamber, legal officer and registrar confer]
17 JUDGE MAY: I was just raising the date which appears on the
18 LiveNote. It should in fact be day 70.
19 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes, Your Honour. Just one brief housekeeping
20 matter. As you can appreciate, there's been some lapse of time because we
21 haven't sat, and I would have done this earlier, but it occurs to me that
22 on the 26th of April, during the evidence of Aferdita Hajrizi, there was
23 evidence given towards the end of her testimony that she could identify
24 certain people who she claimed were responsible for the death of her
25 husband, mother, son, mother-in-law, and she indicated to the Court, I
1 believe under cross-examination, that those people had been prosecuted for
2 those crimes. I believe His Honour Judge Kwon requested that the
3 Prosecution obtain a copy of the court file. We have now done that, and
4 we would propose to provide that to the Court in accordance with your
5 request. The court file referred to.
6 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll have that exhibited.
7 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.
8 JUDGE MAY: Is there a convenient number in -- together with her
9 testimony or not? If somebody hasn't got it.
10 MR. RYNEVELD: I believe our case manager will be able to suggest
11 a convenient number fairly quickly because she has access to the commuter
13 I believe Mr. Nice has some other matters to address perhaps while
14 we're looking for a number. 115A.
15 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. That will be exhibited, then, 115A.
16 Perhaps you'd like to hand it in.
17 MR. RYNEVELD: We don't have an usher, but... The top copy is the
18 original and then we have a number of copies.
19 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, could you make sure that the accused -- I'm
20 sorry to place the burden on you, but could you make sure he's got a copy
21 of Sandra Mitchell's statements.
22 MR. NICE: Yes. Our understanding was that service on him via the
23 Registry, which is the way we've always had to deal with it, was effected
24 on the day set out in --
25 JUDGE MAY: It may have been.
1 MR. NICE: If we could hand him another copy directly today
2 JUDGE MAY: If you could hand him one now and then he's got it and
3 he can prepare.
4 MR. NICE: Yes. Subject to her being through -- going through the
5 92 bis procedure, then she'll be ready to give evidence tomorrow or
6 Thursday, as originally listed.
7 Your Honour, can I mention two other matters in open court and one
8 very briefly in closed court? The two matters for open session are these:
9 The Rule 68 procedures that we are going through are assisted by
10 cooperation both of the amici and by those associates of the accused if he
11 is instructing them or allowing them to cooperate. So far, they have not
12 come to us with any indication that they are being so instructed. If he
13 can find it in himself to cooperate to that extent, it will help and it
14 will help him. We would be grateful for that. If he feels he really
15 can't, then we will simply have to make the best decisions we can with the
16 assistance of the amici, but of course, that decision won't have the
17 advantage of the accused's input.
18 On a similar topic, the Court will recall that last week I
19 reminded the Court of a process being gone through in another trial to
20 speed up translations into English, namely the process whereby the
21 University of Novi Sad is used. It's not really a matter for the accused
22 in a sense whether he cooperates with that or not or agrees to it, I
23 simply announce, following on the indications of the Court last week, that
24 we will be having documents translated in that general way wherever we can
25 in order to speed up the process and we imagine, from silence, that the
1 accused has no objections to it. I am obviously not inviting him to speak
2 today. He can remind himself of what is in the transcript of last week's
3 hearing and make observations if he chooses, but we're going ahead with
5 May I have one minute for closed session, seeing the time?
6 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Have we got the copies of the statement I asked
8 MR. NICE: It's coming now.
9 JUDGE MAY: Yes, private session
10 [Private session]
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
13 Page 7314 – redacted – private session.
13 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.48 p.m.,
14 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 3rd day of July,
15 2002, at 9.00 a.m.