Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 7880

1 Wednesday, 10 July 2002

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

7 WITNESS: WITNESS K25 [Resumed]

8 [Witness answered through interpreter]

9 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

10 Q. [Interpretation] Considering that you had been to Kosovo six times

11 within a relatively short time, I suppose that you are pretty familiar

12 with the situation there, so I now have a specific question. Did the

13 local population, according to what you know, frequently dig trenches for

14 the KLA?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Do you have any knowledge about whether they did it as a form of

17 forced labour? Were they forced to do that?

18 A. I can't tell you that. I don't know.

19 Q. Did you talk to that --

20 JUDGE MAY: We've lost the translation.

21 THE INTERPRETER: Can you hear me now?

22 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let's go on.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Did you talk about that with Albanian villagers?

25 A. Yes, sometimes they --

Page 7881

1 JUDGE MAY: We don't have the translation.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Sometimes they dug trenches of their

3 own free will --

4 THE INTERPRETER: Can you hear on this microphone? Can you hear

5 the English now? "A. Sometimes they dug trenches of their own free will,

6 sometimes they were forced to do so."

7 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Yes. Let's go on.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. All right. Do you know about stories or rumours that in Mala

10 Krusa - and that's precisely the area where you were deployed at the

11 critical time - there are over a hundred people? You were there. Did you

12 hear or see anything that would indicate that a crime had been perpetrated

13 there?

14 A. No. I never heard or saw anything about a hundred people being

15 killed.

16 Q. Was there ever any shooting there that could be linked to such an

17 event?

18 A. No. I never heard shooting of such intensity that it could kill

19 such a number of people.

20 Q. Since you were a member of special police units, you were there

21 many times with a lot of your friends, comrades, and you had been in the

22 police for a long time, although you're a young man, do you consider it

23 possible for our police to round up some citizens and take them away to

24 execute them? Can you possibly imagine even the worst policemen in our

25 services do that?

Page 7882

1 A. I can't imagine anyone that I know doing anything of the kind.

2 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, it doesn't matter what the witness

3 could imagine or what you could imagine. What we have to deal with is the

4 evidence, so that sort of question is totally irrelevant.

5 Yes. Let's move on.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, if we were dealing only

7 with facts, none of this would be happening. You didn't allow me to quote

8 to Vollebaek Clinton's own speech where Clinton is lying through his teeth

9 about women and children being executed in Racak.

10 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you have heard what we've said. Now,

11 there are bounds to what's relevant, and the sort of question of what a

12 witness could imagine or not imagine is wholly irrelevant. It doesn't

13 matter what he could imagine. It's the facts and the evidence with which

14 we are dealing, particularly the evidence.

15 Now, let's move on.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. We'll stick to facts,

17 Mr. May.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. So, you would certainly remember if you had seen or heard anything

20 about that, if you had heard shooting or anything?

21 A. Yes, of course I would.

22 Q. Did you see any houses burnt down in Mala Krusa?

23 A. Yes, perhaps two or three. I can't tell you the exact number.

24 Q. Were those fires of a large scale?

25 A. There was nothing on a large scale. I don't know how they were

Page 7883

1 burnt down; from rifle fire or otherwise, I really couldn't tell.

2 Q. You say you didn't see how they were burned. Can you even guess

3 how they were burnt down?

4 A. No.

5 Q. Please answer me precisely: Did our police, for instance your

6 unit, burn anybody -- burn anybody's house down?

7 A. No.

8 Q. So did you have occasion to speak to your colleagues about those

9 events? Do you have any knowledge that your colleagues had heard anything

10 about what was talked about, those operations in Mala Krusa, torchings, et

11 cetera?

12 A. No, nobody knows anything.

13 Q. When were you there exactly?

14 A. From the 25th to the 27th or 28th.

15 Q. Well, this specific event took place on the 26th of March. So you

16 were there at the critical time, on the spot?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. From your written statement, I understand that you first heard

19 about this event from investigators of this Tribunal when they interviewed

20 you. Is that correct?

21 A. Yes. But I first heard of it actually on the television.

22 Q. And when you heard that news on TV and you had been there

23 previously, what was your conclusion?

24 A. I didn't believe it. And I talked to my colleagues later, and

25 nobody could tell me anything about it. Nobody knew anything.

Page 7884

1 Q. So you took part in the operations. You had been to Mala Krusa.

2 You hadn't seen any of those vehicles coming to Mala Krusa. You don't

3 know who could have possibly done such a thing, and according to your

4 testimony, the police couldn't have done it; is that correct?

5 A. From our company, no.

6 Q. And is it possible that when they were burying some people, that

7 those were actually members of the KLA who had been killed in fighting

8 with our forces?

9 MR. NICE: Your Honour, that's well outside the ability of this

10 witness to deal with. It's entirely speculative.

11 JUDGE MAY: He was there. Do you know who was buried? First of

12 all, do you know if anybody was buried, Witness K25?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is the first I hear of it.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. What do you know about stories concerning alleged planting of hand

16 grenade booby-traps in Mala Krusa?

17 A. I know nothing about it.

18 Q. While you were in your positions around Mala Krusa, was there any

19 artillery fire from your positions, such as from cannons, tanks, and so

20 on?

21 A. No.

22 Q. And what did you in the PJP use except for your infantry weapons,

23 hand-held Zolja rocket launchers? Did you have any heavier weapons,

24 artillery weapons?

25 A. No. Our company didn't, at least.

Page 7885

1 Q. And do you know anything at all about removal of dead bodies in

2 Mala Krusa?

3 A. I heard of it here for the first time. I know nothing.

4 Q. While you were in Kosovo, did you or your colleagues hear about

5 this event, about such an event?

6 A. No.

7 Q. While you were responding to questions in chief yesterday, you

8 said that ribbons were worn, and I understood you as saying that you had a

9 code which told you every day what colours are to be worn, and that

10 prevented the KLA from coming close to the police and playing a dirty

11 trick on them.

12 Do you have any knowledge about the KLA using or, rather, abusing

13 uniforms of our police in order to commit crimes?

14 A. Yes. I know of one incident in 1998 when they were dressed in our

15 uniforms, and they called out to our colleagues who were standing on the

16 road, and as a result, those people were injured by the KLA.

17 Q. Here in this room we heard about municipal Crisis Staffs and

18 things like that. Have you ever heard anything about that? Did you know

19 about it? And do you know that such staffs were organised within

20 municipalities to deal with their everyday problems during crisis

21 situations and to organise citizens? Do you know anything about that?

22 A. No, I don't.

23 Q. Yesterday in response to a question of the opposite side, you

24 explained what the task was of the local reservists, and I noted down what

25 you said. You replied, "They protected and defended themselves." Is that

Page 7886

1 in fact the entirety of your answer? Does it mean that there was not

2 enough police there to protect the civilians, that reservists defended

3 their own houses and settlements?

4 A. Yes, that is correct, because the necessity for them to protect

5 themselves indeed existed.

6 Q. From what you know, did they have any other task except to protect

7 their own settlements?

8 A. No. Not as far as I know.

9 Q. Yesterday during examination-in-chief, there was talk about an

10 event where I noted down here robbing of refugees, namely three persons,

11 as you described, had attempted to rob some refugees, and you drove them

12 away. Would you please explain when that happened, what exactly happened,

13 who these people were, and were you at all able to determine any of it?

14 Could you please describe this event.

15 A. The incident happened. Indeed I can't tell you the exact date,

16 but it was during our stay in Mala Krusa. Three policemen -- I suppose

17 they were policemen because they were wearing blue camouflage uniforms and

18 masks on their faces -- they tried to rob refugees, but the commander of

19 our company took a stand in front of them and put on his rank insignia in

20 order to drive them away. However, they cocked their weapons at him, and

21 we had to approach too and support him. We eventually drove them away.

22 They retreated. They got into their own vehicles, which were civilian

23 vehicles, and drove away.

24 Q. Civilian vehicles?

25 A. Yes.

Page 7887

1 Q. Three persons. Why didn't you arrest them?

2 A. They were in uniform. I said they were in uniform, although they

3 were using civilian vehicles. That was normal there.

4 Q. I didn't understand what you said.

5 A. Civilian vehicles were in use down there.

6 Q. A policeman, when caught red-handed committing a crime is normally

7 arrested.

8 A. We were afraid they would open fire at us.

9 Q. Did they actually succeed in robbing anyone?

10 A. No.

11 Q. How did they approach and what did they want?

12 A. They approached refugees who were moving along the road.

13 Q. Did you have a similar experience anywhere else where you met

14 those predators preying on columns of refugees?

15 A. No. This was the only time.

16 Q. Yesterday, Mr. Nice said something about men, women, and children

17 who were at the railway station of Mala Krusa to the effect that they

18 would never have gotten any water there if you hadn't intervened. Could

19 you please explain, did anyone refuse food, water, or medical aid to those

20 refugees? What was the problem with those refugees? Did anyone forbid

21 them from using water, from having access to it?

22 A. I said yesterday that something like that was not customary. It

23 was normal for them to have everything they needed.

24 Q. At that railway station, did the police force those people to stay

25 at those railway stations to board trains or were those people who came

Page 7888

1 there of their own free will, wishing to leave the territories affected by

2 combat operations?

3 A. They had received an explanation that transport would be organised

4 from the railway station, so they stayed there and waited.

5 Q. Did you see at or around those railway stations that the police,

6 local or otherwise, was mistreating those citizens, beating anyone, doing

7 anything to hurt those people who were waiting for the trains to come?

8 A. At one point there were over 500 refugees at the railway station.

9 They were not guarded by anyone. They were alone there. One policeman

10 was standing on the road in order to protect the children who were

11 crossing the road in order to fetch water. There were no other policemen

12 except those few on the road. They were alone at the railway situation,

13 although they were not transported by trains but by buses.

14 Q. That makes no difference, and that was not my question. You say

15 one policeman was on the road, protecting children crossing the road in

16 order to fetch water, from anything that might come up and hurt them.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. So that was to protect their safety?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. I didn't quite understand something you said yesterday. You said

21 there were many refugees there, but I noted down, "Nobody came from Velika

22 or Mala Krusa but from the direction of Celine." Were there refugees from

23 the Krusas or elsewhere, or did I misunderstand this?

24 A. Not a single refugee came from the direction of Velika or Mala

25 Krusa villages. All the refugees came from the direction of Celine

Page 7889

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Page 7890

1 village. I don't know from which villages they were originally, but

2 that's where they came from, not from the Krusas.

3 Q. We often hear it said here that the policemen - meaning our

4 policemen - took away money, valuables, watches, rings, jewellery from

5 people, that our police committed many crimes, robberies, murders, rapes.

6 Do you know anything about that?

7 A. No, I don't. I know only about this incident which we thwarted,

8 but that's all I know. At least nothing happened which would involve the

9 people I was with.

10 Q. Could you please tell me one more thing: I understand you have a

11 university degree.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. You have a law degree?

14 A. No, not a law degree.

15 Q. You said in your written statement that the commander of all those

16 units was General Obrad Stevanovic and the commander of all Kosovo units

17 was General Sreten Lukic. Have you ever, from either headquarters, either

18 from the commander of special units Stevanovic or from General Lukic

19 received any assignment which would run counter to the law or would

20 constitute a violation of the rules governing police work?

21 A. No.

22 Q. Including even discrimination in terms of treatment of the

23 population in Kosovo?

24 A. No, never.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no further questions.

Page 7891

1 MR. WLADIMIROFF: I have no questions, Your Honour.

2 Re-examined by Mr. Nice:

3 Q. At the time of these events, you tell us you were a corporal, I

4 think.

5 A. Corporal first class, if that's what you mean.

6 Q. Did you receive instructions directly from generals in the course

7 of your time as a corporal?

8 A. No.

9 Q. You've been asked about what other policemen may have done or did

10 in the course of the incident that you've described. You, I think, were

11 on the road at the junction; is that correct?

12 A. Correct.

13 Q. On the road, as you've told us, there were tanks, other armed

14 police officers, and other deployments further up the road, also armed; is

15 that correct?

16 A. Correct.

17 Q. The road itself, from time to time, was filled by -- or not filled

18 by, used by refugees, all walking in the same direction; is that correct?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. Did you have -- did you yourself ever go to the houses in the

21 Krusas at the time when the people were leaving the houses?

22 A. No.

23 Q. Were you ever in any position to hear what was said to them or

24 done to them at the time they left their houses?

25 A. No, but no one from my company ever entered the village because we

Page 7892

1 had no such orders. We were holding blockade lines.

2 Q. The police of which you speak -- I beg your pardon. The police of

3 which you've been asked questions in the most general terms, was it in

4 fact composed of several different components, coming from several

5 different places?

6 A. I don't understand your question. If you mean along our road,

7 then yes, but ...

8 Q. The people -- if there were police or other armed units in the

9 villages themselves, if there were, were they from a unit different from

10 yours?

11 A. There was no one in the villages. Along the road, there was the

12 army of Yugoslavia, our company, and the local police, but there was no

13 police inside the villages.

14 Q. To your knowledge; is that right?

15 A. Fire was opened at us, and it is certain that policemen were not

16 shooting at us.

17 Q. If we look at the map that you've shown, we can see that the

18 area --

19 MR. NICE: Perhaps we could just put the map on the ELMO again.

20 Q. If you look at the map that's on the overhead projector, is it

21 right that we can see the area with which we are concerned completely

22 surrounded on three sides by forces of either the army or the police? Is

23 that correct?

24 A. Yes, that is.

25 Q. Thank you. And as you've explained, you were never present at any

Page 7893

1 house when any resident left the house or was told or advised to leave the

2 house, were you?

3 A. No, never.

4 Q. We've heard something about a Zolja. Just remind us what sort of

5 a weapon a Zolja is, please.

6 A. It's a hand-held rocket launcher.

7 Q. Does that have some form of guidance mechanism that enables it to

8 seek out its target?

9 A. No, it doesn't.

10 Q. Was one fired in the course of the operation, to your knowledge,

11 at the Mala Krusa bridge?

12 A. Yes, only once.

13 Q. And at the time it was fired, were there, to your knowledge,

14 people at the Mala Krusa bridge?

15 A. Not at the bridge. Under the bridge there was activity directed

16 against us, and we could not repel them with a hand-held rocket launcher.

17 And after this one shot fired at them, all activity ceased.

18 Q. Consistent with or --

19 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Mr. Nice.

20 MR. NICE:

21 Q. Consistent with or inconsistent with casualties being suffered at

22 the bridge as a result of the use of the hand-held rocket launcher?

23 A. On the bridge, no. Let me repeat: Under the bridge there was

24 this going on. And nobody can say whether there were any casualties or

25 not. All I can say is that there was no more shooting from that area

Page 7894

1 afterwards. But that's only my assumption.

2 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

3 MR. NICE: Thank you.

4 Q. You've been asked about crimes committed by police or otherwise.

5 So far as you were aware, if the six people or the three people that you

6 saw taken away and never saw again, if they were killed, is that something

7 for which people should be held to account, please?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. You've been asked by the accused --

10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

11 MR. NICE:

12 Q. You've been asked by the accused an extensive question about the

13 phrase "mop-up." Just help us, please, with when you first heard the

14 phrase "mop-up" and by whom it was used and in what circumstances.

15 A. It was used all the time, that term. But as I said at the

16 beginning, it was just a phrase, an expression.

17 Q. There was a general suggestion put to you about why it was that

18 the refugees were or were not moving. Help us - it's covered in your

19 materials - just yes or no, were you in fact given accounts of what had

20 happened to them by the refugees when they were in the lines?

21 A. There were different stories.

22 Q. Staying with the refugees, you've been asked accounts of what

23 happened at the railway station, the number of armed people there and so

24 on. If those refugees had wanted to return along the road from which they

25 had come, would that have been along a road where there were tanks and

Page 7895

1 armed police and indeed the army present?

2 A. Would you repeat that question? I'm not sure I understood it.

3 Had they wished to return or what?

4 Q. Had they wished to return along the road from which they had come,

5 would that have been along a road where there were tanks, armed police,

6 and indeed even the VJ army present?

7 A. Had they wished to return, they had to go back the same way they

8 had come.

9 Q. You say that nobody emerged from the village of Mala Krusa itself

10 along the road at the junction where you were. Were there other roads, to

11 your knowledge, from Mala Krusa leading towards other villages or don't

12 you know the geography sufficiently well?

13 A. I was up on the blockade lines. I didn't go in-depth into the

14 territory.

15 MR. NICE: Nothing else for this witness, thank you.

16 Questioned by the Court:

17 JUDGE KWON: Witness K25, I have some questions about the six KLA

18 members captured by you and handed over to the local MUP. What is

19 suggested is that they might have been executed by the local MUP members.

20 Is that right?

21 A. I'm not sure I understood your question, Your Honour. Could you

22 repeat it, please?

23 JUDGE KWON: They might have been executed by local MUP members

24 inside the house after having been handed over?

25 A. Yes.

Page 7896

1 JUDGE KWON: You said that you heard the sound of automatic

2 gunfire after they entered the house. What did you do after you heard

3 this automatic gunfire sound? Did you try to find out what it was about

4 or did you talk with your superior about that?

5 A. No. Along the whole blockade line, there was shooting going on.

6 There was firing from rifles, and this noise coming from that direction

7 left no doubt because there was shooting all the time. We just thought

8 that somebody was trying to escape, perhaps.

9 JUDGE KWON: What did you do after you had found some bodies

10 inside the house? Did you talk with your superior about that or did you

11 try to find out what it was about afterwards?

12 A. I don't remember exactly. Everything took place very quickly, so

13 I don't really remember the order and sequence of events, but I think that

14 straight after that, we left the territory and went to engage in our next

15 operation. So I don't know really what happened afterwards.

16 JUDGE KWON: You did nothing after, even after you had seen those

17 bodies, a lot of bodies?

18 A. Well, it was sent on to the higher authorities but -- and I wrote

19 a report to my own service. I wrote a report to my own service, but I

20 don't know what happened afterwards.

21 JUDGE KWON: May I take it that you or your company allowed them,

22 allowed the local MUPs or some paramilitaries doing some bad things? Not

23 by preventing them from doing some bad things or not by punishing them

24 afterwards.

25 A. How could we prevent them when the orders were that they should

Page 7897

1 give themselves up? How were we supposed to know what they would do? We

2 had orders to hand them over to them.

3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

4 JUDGE MAY: Witness K25, that concludes your evidence. Thank you

5 for coming to the Tribunal to give it. You're free to go.

6 [The witness withdrew]

7 MR. NICE: While arrangements are being made for the next witness

8 to be called, can I simply at this stage explain that I will have an

9 administrative matter to raise later in relation to a witness forthcoming,

10 but I will be assisted if I can put off making that application until as

11 late as possible in the morning when my information will be as complete as

12 it's going to be by the time I have to deal with the issue. I think the

13 Chamber knows what I'm dealing with.

14 JUDGE MAY: No, but --

15 MR. NICE: Very well.

16 JUDGE MAY: But raise it at the end of the morning. We've had the

17 application in relation to Colonel Crosland, and we will grant it. That

18 means he will give evidence with facial distortion and redaction of date

19 of birth.

20 MR. NICE: Thank you very much, Your Honour. The witness I was

21 dealing with was K33 and the particular order that relates to him, and we

22 must probably deal with that order today given that the Court is not going

23 to be available tomorrow and Friday, but I need to have maximum

24 information to make my decision, and I'll therefore deal with that at the

25 end of the morning, if I may.

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Page 7899

1 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

2 MS. ROMANO: The next witness is Shyhrete Berisha. Do Your

3 Honours -- do you have the summary? It's just a question. I believe it

4 was distributed before, but I just would like to confirm. No? I have

5 copies here. My apologies. I believe -- I thought it was distributed

6 before.

7 [The witness entered court]

8 WITNESS: SHYHRETE BERISHA

9 [Witness answered through interpreter]

10 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness take the declaration.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

12 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

13 JUDGE MAY: If you would like to take a seat.

14 Examined by Ms. Romano:

15 Q. Witness, can you please give the Court your full name.

16 A. My name is Shyhrete Berisha.

17 Q. Were you born on 5th December, 1961?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Ms. Berisha, do you remember giving a statement to officers of the

20 Office of the Prosecutor on the 17th of May, 1999?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And do you also remember attending a meeting on the 17th of June,

23 2002 with a presiding officer of this Tribunal, and at that time you had a

24 copy, in the Albanian language, of your statement?

25 A. Yes.

Page 7900

1 Q. Do you also remember making an addendum of your statement?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. And at that time, you confirmed that the contents of your

4 statement are correct and true?

5 A. Yes.

6 MS. ROMANO: The Prosecution submits the statement of Ms. Shyhrete

7 Berisha into evidence.

8 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, this will be marked Prosecutor's

9 Exhibit 252.

10 MS. ROMANO: This witness is a survivor of the mass killing by

11 Serb police and paramilitaries in Suva Reka on the 26th of March, 1999.

12 Her husband and four children were amongst those killed. The witness is a

13 female Muslim who lived in Suva Reka with her husband Nexhat Berisha and

14 their four children. They shared the house with the family of Faton

15 Berisha, a nephew of the witness's husband. It is situated across the

16 road from the Suva Reka police station.

17 Can I ask, please, the usher to show the witness the first photo.

18 The photo I'm referring to is located in tab 3, photo 14 of the Suva Reka

19 binder.

20 Q. Witness, can you confirm if this is the house where you lived with

21 your husband and four children?

22 A. Yes. That is the house where I lived with my husband and four

23 children. On the left side. Whereas on the right side was the nephew of

24 my husband, Faton, with Fatime and his wife two children and his sister.

25 Q. Thank you, Witness.

Page 7901

1 MS. ROMANO: In late 1998, OSCE moved from their former

2 headquarters to the witness's house. OSCE used the witness's part of the

3 house as their headquarters and Faton's part of the house as sleeping.

4 After the OSCE pulled out of Kosovo on 20 March, 1999, there were

5 a lot of movement of Serb police and military. On the following days, the

6 witness saw tanks, Pinzgauers and military vehicles. On 25th March early

7 in the morning, the police knocked on the door and forced the witness's

8 husband Nexhat into the part of the house where the OSCE officers had

9 been. He was severely beaten and the rooms containing OSCE equipment were

10 burglarised. The witness and others were robbed of about 50.000

11 Deutschmarks. Throughout these events, a large tank was parked outside

12 with its gun barrel pointing direct towards the house.

13 After this assault, the witness and her family moved over to the

14 house of her husband's uncle, Vesel Berisha, approximately 30 metres from

15 the witness's house. At this time, there were 25 people of all ages

16 living in Vesel's house.

17 THE INTERPRETER: Could you please slow down, please. Thank you.

18 MS. ROMANO: The witness names these persons.

19 On the morning of the 26th of March, 1999, two tanks were situated

20 outside Vesel's house with their gun barrels pointing towards it. At

21 12.20 p.m., many men, approximately 30 in number, some in police uniforms

22 and some in civilian clothes, all carrying automatic weapons, run over

23 from the police station to the house of the witness. One of these men,

24 known as Zoran, family name perhaps Popovic or similar, from Suva Reka,

25 called for one of the house occupants, Bujar, to come out. And on doing

Page 7902

1 so, Bujar was shot dead. The other occupants were terrified and run out,

2 trying to escape. All the men were stopped. The witness's husband,

3 Nexhat, was told by one named Miskovic to raise his hands in the air. He

4 did so, and the witness saw him shot in the back by --

5 THE INTERPRETER: Could Ms. Romano please slow down, thank you.

6 MS. ROMANO: My apologies.

7 She was holding the hands of two of their children at the time.

8 There was a lot of shooting and many people were wounded. The survivors,

9 40 or 50 people, mainly women and children with several Berisha families,

10 were forced into a cafe.

11 Can I have the witness shown the second photo. This photo is also

12 located in the Suva Reka binder, Exhibit 166. It's photo number 2, tab 3.

13 Q. Witness, is this the coffee shop where you were?

14 A. Yes. This is the coffee shop where the Serb police killed my four

15 children, the children of my sister-in-law, and two other -- the members

16 -- the other members of the Berisha family, of the two Berisha families.

17 They forced us into the cafe and told us to sit down. Some were sitting

18 on blankets and some were sitting on chairs. But very soon after that,

19 they began shooting with automatic weapons.

20 The first one I saw who was closest to me was Zoran, with a lot of

21 others. And after that, I didn't see any more because there were so many

22 people around. And I just heard the shooting, the firing. It lasted

23 about 20 minutes, maybe 30 minutes, without interruption at all. Shooting

24 kept on all the time.

25 Then it stopped, the shooting, and then I looked up and I saw

Page 7903

1 Vjollca was still alive and said, "Oh, Shyhrete, look what they're doing

2 to us." I said, "Look at, look at Dafina, see where she is." And I

3 looked around and I saw Dafina, Vjollca's daughter. She was suffering.

4 And the daughter of Musli Berisha said, "Oh, look what they've done to me.

5 Look at my feet, look at my legs," she screamed. And then the

6 bother-in-law of Hajdini said, "Look at my poor Granit. Look what they've

7 done to him."

8 Q. Ms. Berisha --

9 A. Then Majlinda spoke, my largest daughter. She was uninjured, with

10 her son and brothers. And Sebahate was uninjured with her two children.

11 Ismet was 3 and Eron was ten months old. And Altin was near me. He was

12 ten years old. We were uninjured.

13 JUDGE MAY: Ms. Berisha, help us with this: How old were your

14 four children who were killed?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My children were Majlinda Berisha,

16 who was 16; Herolinda, who was 14; Altin who was 11; and Redon, who was

17 only 21 months old -- 22 months old.

18 Then Majlinda said, "Mummy, mummy, look at how they've killed

19 Herolinda." And when I looked around, I saw Herolinda over there and saw

20 her, that she was lying on the ground with five or six bullet holes in her

21 flesh. She had been such a beautiful girl. And Sebahate on the other

22 side said, "Look. They've killed -- they've killed her. They've killed

23 Jori [phoen] and Sherine." Sherine was a brother-in-law, and the other

24 one was his brother.

25 MS. ROMANO:

Page 7904

1 Q. Witness, how did you survive?

2 A. It was terrible for me. I don't know how to explain it to you.

3 It was -- it was absolutely horrible.

4 Q. Did you feign death?

5 A. Yes, I did. I pretended I was dead. And my son Altin and

6 Vjollca, I said to them, "Lie as if you're dead." Because we heard the

7 Serbs talking in their language, saying, "Get the trucks ready and get the

8 bodies out of here as quickly as possible."

9 Q. Thank you, Witness.

10 MS. ROMANO: The witness and two other survivors and the corpses

11 of the dead were then loaded onto a truck which drove off in the direction

12 of Prizren. Two gold chains were removed from around her neck. The

13 witness, although severely wounded, managed to jump off the truck in the

14 village of Malsia e Re (Ljutoglav) where some Albanians took care of her.

15 She was taken to Grejkoc and subsequently Budakova, where she received

16 medical treatment for her wounds. Her husband and four children - two

17 daughters and two sons - were killed in Suva Reka.

18 Can I have the witness just shown the map? This map is also

19 located in the Suva Reka binder, tab 18.

20 Q. Witness, if you can, can you just point out the route from Prizren

21 to -- I'm sorry, from Suva Reka to Prizren and the place where you jumped

22 off the truck. I know that the letters are very small, but if you can.

23 A. It's -- this is it here.

24 Q. Thank you.

25 MS. ROMANO: The witness spent six weeks moving around the area

Page 7905

1 under very difficult conditions until around 10th May, 1999, when she

2 managed to cross the border to Albania by joining a convoy. Before they

3 reached the border, they were stopped in the village of Bukosh where some

4 men and women were taken out of the convoy. They were brought to the

5 school and stripped and robbed of all gold and money.

6 Older men and some of the women were released, but the young men

7 were never seen again. At the border with Albania, they had to hand over

8 at gunpoint all their identification papers.

9 The scenes referred to by the witness are all depicted in the Suva

10 Reka binder volume 1, tab 6, photos 1 to 4; tab 3 photos 14 to 24; photos

11 of the firing range in tab 4; and the map at tab 18.

12 Can I have the witness shown the article in the Newsweek

13 magazine.

14 Q. Witness, do you recognise or are you aware of any magazine or any

15 article written about what happened to your family?

16 A. Yes. I saw the article.

17 Q. And do you know, how did they get this information?

18 A. I think that the head of the OSCE gave them the information, and

19 all the others in Suva Reka provided information too.

20 Q. Anybody from your family?

21 A. Yes, from Vjollca.

22 Q. Thank you, Witness.

23 MS. ROMANO: The article containing an extensive report about what

24 happened in Suva Reka is in tab 2 of the Suva Reka binder.

25 That's all, Your Honours.

Page 7906

1 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, if you have no questions for this

2 witness, then that will be understood, considering the experiences she

3 went through. But of course if you want to challenge her evidence about

4 how she lost her husband and four children, you can do so, but I suggest

5 for once you try and restrain your questioning and keep it to less than

6 the time which you're allowed, which is three-quarters of an hour, given

7 the circumstances of her evidence.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I will use only one minute.

9 And as for the witness, who obviously lost her husband and children, I

10 have no intention whatsoever to question her. I would only like to ask

11 you to accept as an exhibit the statement of Marjan Krasniqi, your pages,

12 your numbers 03045454 until 03045463. He gave a statement in Tirana on

13 8th June 1999. I received it. He is a former traffic policeman, and in

14 his statement he explains that this crime had been committed by members of

15 a local criminal group, that the reason was money, that among them were

16 people mentally disturbed, and it was not an intra-ethnic thing. There

17 was an Albanian among those criminals by the name of Rexha Berisha. This

18 statement exists and has been disclosed. I just would like to tender it

19 into evidence. This statement proves, or claims, that this crime had been

20 committed by a criminal group. I will not otherwise question this

21 witness.

22 JUDGE MAY: Very well. You can tender the statement. We'll

23 consider whether to admit it as an exhibit. However, if it's going to be

24 suggested that -- just a moment. If it's going to be suggested that this

25 was the work of local criminals, the witness should have the chance to

Page 7907

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Page 7908

1 deal with it and to give her comments which she may have on it since she

2 was there.

3 Just let me --

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I only mentioned some of

5 what is written in a statement of your witness, not my witness. I refer

6 to that. I just tendered it into evidence. You accept into evidence

7 newspapers which Mrs. Romano tendered a moment ago, and you are

8 questioning a statement of your --

9 JUDGE MAY: Just one moment. Let us have the statement. It's

10 right that the witness should have the chance to deal with it. Give me

11 the statement. Will you go and get it, please.

12 Would you tell the usher to go and get the statement.

13 Would you give it to the usher, please.

14 [Trial Chamber confers]

15 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We have the page numbers; is that right? Can

16 the registry confirm that, please?

17 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour, we have the page numbers.

18 JUDGE MAY: The Prosecution can get a copy?

19 MS. ROMANO: Yes. The Prosecution is right now trying to locate

20 and get a copy.

21 JUDGE MAY: No doubt that will take a few minutes.

22 MS. ROMANO: Probably. I just -- I will just confirm. Yes. It's

23 going to be down as soon as possible.

24 JUDGE MAY: I think the sensible thing, I think, would be to take

25 a break now while that's being done, and then we'll deal with it.

Page 7909

1 Mrs. Berisha, there may be just a few more questions you're going

2 to be asked when we've got this statement. It is right that you should

3 have the chance to deal with it.

4 We're going to adjourn now for 20 minutes. Could you remember not

5 to speak to anybody about your evidence until it's over, and that does

6 include the members of the Prosecution team.

7 We will adjourn now for 20 minutes.

8 --- Recess taken at 10.11 a.m.

9 --- On resuming at 10.35 a.m.

10 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Ms. Romano.

11 MS. ROMANO: Your Honours, the statements are coming. And since

12 at that time we cannot find the exact passages that the accused referred

13 to. We have one copy here with us that we are reviewing. In fact --

14 JUDGE MAY: Well, let's have the copy. Let me have the copy and I

15 can examine the witness on it.

16 MS. ROMANO: Your Honours, we believe that this is the one that

17 the accused is referring to. We have two others, but we believe that this

18 is the one that he's referring to. We have highlighted --

19 JUDGE MAY: This is the statement of Marjan Krasniqi; is that

20 right?

21 MS. ROMANO: Yes, that's correct.

22 JUDGE MAY: Yes. It may be that it's difficult quite to follow

23 what the accused is relying on in that statement, but we don't want to

24 detain the witness here. But on the other hand, she should have a chance

25 of dealing with the particular issues which the accused has raised.

Page 7910

1 Questioned by the Court:

2 MR. MAY: Mrs. Berisha, can you help us with this, please: Were

3 you able to identify any of those who were responsible for the killing?

4 A. Yes.

5 JUDGE MAY: Can you tell us who they were.

6 A. They were police who were from the police station of Suhareke. I

7 saw them with my own eyes. From the police station, they went first of

8 all to the use of Ismet Kuci, saw that there was no one there, and came to

9 Vesel Berisha's house. They were policemen. They weren't any bands of

10 people, they were police. Not as the accused said. They were actually

11 policemen and I saw them with my own eyes.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: How were you able to recognise them as policemen?

13 A. They were policemen because Sedat, Vjollca's husband, said to my

14 husband, "Look at -- all the policemen of Suhareke are here. And there's

15 policemen we don't even know." And I saw them myself. They were all

16 wearing police uniforms. They were police uniforms with automatic weapons

17 in their hands.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Did you know any of them before?

19 A. Yes. Among them I knew one, Zoran, who was wearing a police

20 uniform too. And on his shoulder he had a white insignia. He was a

21 paramilitary, I think, because Zoran didn't used to be a policeman. He

22 was only dressed as a policeman that day.

23 JUDGE MAY: Who was Zoran? You say he wasn't normally a

24 policeman. What did he do?

25 A. He used to drive the bus. He used to be a bus driver. And he

Page 7911

1 spoke Albanian very well. And there were a lot of policemen there. There

2 were about 30. About 30 came to the house where we, 25 members of our

3 family, were.

4 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. What were they wearing?

5 A. They were wearing camouflage green and blue, dark blue, uniforms.

6 They were all the same, with caps.

7 JUDGE KWON: Mrs. Berisha, what did you know about a man called

8 Miskovic? Was he also a policeman or was he a paramilitary like Zoran?

9 A. No, it seems to me he was the commander of the police, but he was

10 wearing plainclothes. He was wearing black.

11 JUDGE KWON: Not in uniform?

12 A. No. Miskovic was wearing black clothes. He wasn't wearing a

13 uniform. But the others, about a hundred, when they surrounded our house,

14 about a hundred of them, there were a few Romany civilians among them

15 apart from Miskovic, who was in plainclothes. His brother, who's guard of

16 the house where the OSCE was, apart from him, all others were all wearing

17 police uniform.

18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

19 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Ms. Romano. Do you have any questions?

20 MS. ROMANO: Your Honours --

21 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

22 MS. ROMANO: Your Honours, I have right now a copy with me, and

23 the delay was just because we had to redact the address that was in the

24 original statement. So you -- probably Your Honours won't be able to

25 exhibit or use the ones you have, but I have one here that I will produce.

Page 7912

1 JUDGE MAY: First of all, have you any questions for the witness

2 or can we let her go?

3 MS. ROMANO: Yes.

4 JUDGE MAY: Yes?

5 MS. ROMANO: Your Honour, no. I just wanted to highlight and to

6 direct Your Honours to page 6 of the statement that you have in hand,

7 where it refers to Petrovic, Zoran Petrovic. And the witness, while

8 answering the questions, she made reference of the man being a

9 paramilitary, and that's exactly what it is stated in the -- and as you

10 can see, he has been -- it says that he had been involved with the

11 paramilitary service since 1998.

12 I also would like to inform that we tried to locate any reference

13 of any mentally or mentally ill or disturbed persons that the accused made

14 reference, and we could not locate that in the statement.

15 JUDGE MAY: If we've finished with the witness, she can go. We

16 will then decide on what should happen to the statement.

17 Do you have any questions of her?

18 MS. ROMANO: No, Your Honour.

19 JUDGE MAY: Mrs. Berisha, thank you for coming to the

20 International Tribunal to give your evidence. That concludes it. You are

21 free to go.

22 [The witness withdrew]

23 JUDGE MAY: We will return the copy which we were given,

24 unredacted, of that statement. The issue is now what should happen to it.

25 The accused applies for it to be exhibited. One possible course is this,

Page 7913

1 it being, of course, an uncross-examined statement, is that it should be

2 simply marked for identification purposes.

3 MR. NICE: Well, Your Honour, that's one possibility. I've only

4 had a chance briefly to review the statement, but I can see from one of

5 the passages highlighted that it is by no means favourable to the

6 accused's position. Entirely to the contrary. And he may, therefore, be

7 acting ill-advisedly and in a way that he would not act if properly

8 represented in seeking to lay before the Court for a very narrow purpose

9 that we still cannot tie down a document that is adverse to his cause. I

10 also observe, and unless I'm wrong, I don't know that we've exhibited many

11 or any witness statements of witnesses other than the witness giving

12 evidence, and the status of such an exhibited statement would be hard for

13 us to identify at a later stage.

14 JUDGE MAY: It may be, of course, that the right course should be

15 that this witness is called to give evidence, if the accused wants him to

16 give evidence, by the accused. Now, that is the normal way in which such

17 statements are dealt with. The question is, at the moment, what action

18 should we take, if any, about it? The accused wants to have it exhibited.

19 It may be that a simpler course is to simply to mark it for identification

20 purposes and then, in due course, we could decide what should happen to

21 it.

22 MR. NICE: I'm happy with that course because that doesn't give it

23 any evidential status. But there's one question only and that is the

24 accused has made reference to mental ill health as being a feature of the

25 people who were present, or one of the people present. We haven't yet

Page 7914

1 located it. Before we forget the issue altogether, if he can identify the

2 passage, so much the better so we can at least see what it's all about.

3 [Trial Chamber confers]

4 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you've heard what's been said by the

5 Prosecutor. The position is this: That this is a witness statement, of

6 course, of someone who hasn't given evidence. And while it's true that we

7 do admit hearsay in various forms, we do not usually admit witness

8 statements unless there are particular reasons for doing so or the Rule

9 comes within -- or the statement comes within Rule 92 bis with which you

10 will now be familiar.

11 The Prosecution suggests that the -- you may want to consider

12 whether to admit the statement. The proper course would be for you, if

13 you thought right, to call this witness during your own case, in which

14 case, of course, he could give his evidence. But meanwhile, if you want

15 still to have this statement exhibited, we will -- we have in mind to mark

16 it for identification. That means at the moment it is not admitted, but

17 it is noted.

18 Now, what do you want to do? And I should add that a final

19 decision about whether it's to be admitted will be taken in due course

20 towards the end of the trial.

21 Now, what course do you want to follow? Do you want it exhibited

22 or not?

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, you can do whatever you

24 wish.

25 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

Page 7915

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I merely emphasise that the

2 statement indicates the fact that we're dealing with criminals, and who

3 else could have killed somebody's children, I ask you, but the worst of

4 criminals?

5 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We will simply mark it for identification

6 with the next Defence exhibit number.

7 MR. NICE: And, Your Honour, the only other thing I would add to

8 that is that when I have reviewed the three statements in full, I will

9 give some thought to whether we should apply to serve him as a 92 bis

10 witness in case there's anything that one way or the other might be of

11 material value to the Chamber. But I'll give thought to that in due

12 course.

13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Defence Exhibit 23,

14 marked for identification.

15 MR. RYNEVELD: Your Honours, the Prosecution calls as our next

16 witness Colonel John Crosland.

17 Your Honours, you will note that I have provided, just moments

18 ago, a summary of this witness's statements in the usual format that the

19 Court is familiar with receiving. In light of Your Honours' order that

20 the witness be partly bis'd and partly live, I will use this summary and

21 indicate to Your Honours where I am. And if there's any particular

22 paragraph which has got a highlight that the Court wants me to deal with

23 live in addition to the ones I propose, I invite Your Honours to simply

24 direct my attention to proceeding with it in a live fashion.

25 At the moment, I propose to summarise paragraphs 1 through 5, take

Page 7916

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Page 7917

1 live 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, 14, 18, 19 -- paragraph 19, I believe, might

2 assist a request from the Court on an earlier occasion to have a live

3 witness concerning Racak on the 15th -- 20, 23, 25, and then deal with 27,

4 which are the SitReps.

5 Should there be anything else that the Court wishes me to either

6 summarise or do live, I would be grateful if you would let me know.

7 JUDGE MAY: The topics which must be dealt with live are the

8 cooperation between the VJ and the MUP and the meetings with the VJ

9 hierarchy.

10 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes. Thank you. Thank you. In light of the very

11 limited protective measures - we have asked for facial distortion of the

12 image - I've asked that the witness be brought in and then these things

13 can go back up, I suppose. And can I be assured that the AV booth is

14 aware? Thank you.

15 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let's have the witness, please.

16 [The witness entered court]

17 WITNESS: JOHN CROSLAND

18 JUDGE MAY: Yes. The witness will take the declaration.

19 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the

20 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

21 JUDGE MAY: If you would like to take a seat.

22 Examined by Mr. Ryneveld:

23 Q. Yes. Colonel Crosland, I understand, sir, that you are a retired

24 colonel with the British army with some 35 years experience; is that

25 correct?

Page 7918

1 A. That's correct, sir.

2 Q. And you were at one point appointed the defence attache to

3 Belgrade from the August of 1996 to the 23rd of March, 1999. Is that also

4 correct?

5 A. That's correct, sir.

6 Q. Now, your role as defence attache, were you in fact accredited to

7 the VJ in that capacity? In other words, were you the accredited attache

8 to liaise with the VJ of the Yugoslav army?

9 A. That's correct, sir. I was accredited to General Perisic who was

10 then the chief of defence staff, on behalf of my own chief of defence

11 staff, and accredited solely to the Vojska Yugoslavia.

12 Q. I see. Did you have a lot of dealings with the Ministry of the

13 Interior or MUP?

14 A. No, we did not except for when I was travelling in Kosovo.

15 Obviously, I then came into contact with the MUP on a daily basis.

16 Q. All right. And, sir, you left on or about the 23rd of March. Did

17 you then again return, after a hiatus, on the 12th of June, 1999, as a

18 liaison officer for KFOR?

19 A. That's correct, sir. I was then tasked to oversee the withdrawal

20 of the Vojska Yugoslavia and to liaise with them, the VJ and the MUP, and

21 also the Kosovo Liberation Army.

22 Q. And you held that position until mid-July, 1999, I understand?

23 A. That's correct, sir.

24 Q. Now, Colonel, is it true that you provided witness statements with

25 respect to your experiences in Kosovo? You provided statements to the

Page 7919

1 investigators of the ICTY on the 25th and 26th of May, 1999, and then

2 again over the 5th through the 7th of December, 2000. Did you provide

3 statements?

4 A. That's correct, yes, I have the copies with me.

5 Q. And you have had an opportunity to review the contents of those

6 statements?

7 A. I have, sir, yes.

8 Q. In the course of a recent review, did you note any typographical

9 errors made?

10 A. Just one, which is the date of 1988 was changed to 1989.

11 Q. And that would be on page 8, I understand, sir, of the statement

12 of May 1999?

13 A. That's correct.

14 Q. In particular -- sorry. It helps if I get the right statement in

15 front of me.

16 A. Page 8, in the second last paragraph.

17 Q. Those paragraphs have been assigned numbers. I believe it's

18 paragraph 40 of -- the second to last paragraph on page 8; is that

19 correct?

20 A. That's correct, sir.

21 Q. That's now paragraph 40, numbered 40. All right. Now, sir, did

22 you also yesterday, on the 9th of July, appear before a presiding officer

23 of this Tribunal and indicate that the contents of these statements were

24 true to the best of your knowledge, information, and belief and make a

25 solemn declaration to that effect?

Page 7920

1 A. I did so, yes.

2 Q. All right.

3 MR. RYNEVELD: Your Honours, at this time, I would tender the

4 statements in compliance with Rule 92 bis, with one caveat. I would ask

5 that the date and place of birth marked on the cover sheets be redacted

6 for -- in other words, the copy that the Court can have certainly, I don't

7 have any difficulty with that information being there, but could we have a

8 redacted copy to go into the public record, for security reasons?

9 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

10 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you. Your Honours --

11 JUDGE MAY: Let's have an exhibit number.

12 MR. RYNEVELD: Sorry, I always do that. My apologies.

13 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be Prosecutor's Exhibit

14 253.

15 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you. Your Honours, while that is being

16 distributed, perhaps I can give the Court a very brief overview of what is

17 contained in these statements and then turn to those portions that I would

18 propose to deal with live.

19 Your Honours, in these statements you will find that Colonel

20 Crosland sets out the various tours that he conducted of Kosovo in his

21 role as Defence attache and the discussions he had with various senior VJ

22 personnel. You will also note that he submitted regular reports in sort

23 of a telegram form to the Ministry of Defence in London and that part of

24 his duties were to assess the build-up of forces. He monitored equipment,

25 vehicles, members of the various PJP and MUP forces in order to provide

Page 7921

1 data to the British ambassador.

2 You will also note that he describes in these statements with some

3 particularity, especially in his background as a military officer, the

4 kinds of uniforms and equipment used by various Serb forces. He outlines

5 for you the identities and positions of various VJ staff members, the

6 various generals, et cetera.

7 He also outlines the incident referred to as the Ahmeti and

8 Jashari massacres in March of -- February and March of 1998. He describes

9 for you his observations of the roles of the PJP, the SAJ, and the JSO,

10 all of which have been referred to in evidence before you.

11 I will lead further evidence about evidence of joint VJ and MUP

12 operations, his understanding or observations of what appeared to be the

13 Pavkovic-Sainovic-Milosevic chain of command; he will deal with the issue

14 of the JSO and someone referred to as Frenki Simatovic, the commander of

15 the JSO in and around Pec.

16 The statement also reviews meetings that he had with General

17 Dimitrijevic and discussions about the KLA, his observations of KLA

18 activity. Then we will be dealing live with what he noted to be a change,

19 a perceived change in the role of the VJ. He will describe for you

20 accompanying Lord Ashdown, who has given evidence here before, on tours of

21 Kosovo, and the evidence of Serb attacks during his 11 visits in Kosovo.

22 He will describe for you a meeting with General Dimitrijevic, and

23 you will see in the statement about his observations towards the end of

24 1998 the KLA were becoming more organised, the fact that General Perisic

25 was replaced by Colonel General Ojdanic, and also refers in his statement

Page 7922

1 to various other personalities and their roles.

2 I will deal live with his observation of a build-up of forces

3 pre-Christmas 1998, and I will also be dealing with his observations on

4 the 15th of January of the Racak incident.

5 You will be hearing about his observations of burning and looting

6 by VJ and MUP forces in January in various areas and the type of equipment

7 used by a VJ battalion.

8 He will talk about in March 1999 further VJ force build-up. In

9 his statement, you will see the fact that he witnessed on two occasions

10 significant VJ reinforcements being sent to Kosovo and describes their

11 armoured vehicles and the various brigades.

12 Very briefly, Your Honours, he then provides opinions about - as a

13 military man - the capabilities of the combined VJ and MUP forces of being

14 able to displace the bulk of the population. He will deal with the Istok

15 prison visit that he made in June of 1999; and finally, I intend to show

16 him some seven telegram SitReps, which are the situational reports that he

17 prepared which is almost like a contemporaneous note of what he had

18 seen. These are the copies of documents that he provided to the Ministry

19 of Defence. Sort of source documents for some of the opinions that we

20 will be seeking from him.

21 That being the case, then, Your Honours, that is my very brief

22 summary of what is contained in both the statements that you will have,

23 and I propose now to turn to paragraph 6 of my summary.

24 Q. Now, Witness, I've been reading rather quickly. We speak the same

25 language, but we have to wait for translation. Let's both try to remember

Page 7923

1 to observe a pause, if we can, between question and answer.

2 Now, Colonel Crosland, what capacity were you working -- in what

3 capacity were you working on the 24th of March, 1998, in the Decani area?

4 A. Your Honours, I was working in my capacity as the United Kingdom's

5 defence attache, accompanied by other attaches, and we were touring in the

6 province of Kosovo to ascertain just how serious the situation was

7 becoming of an increasing build-up of Vojska Yugoslavia against what was

8 the Kosovo Liberation Army intrusion.

9 MR. RYNEVELD: And if it assists Your Honours, since I'm dealing

10 with Decani, the Kosovo atlas, page 4, I believe, shows Decani. Right at

11 the bottom of page 4, you will see Decani is right at the bottom of the

12 page.

13 Q. Now, do you have also a map available, Colonel Crosland? Perhaps

14 you can use the ELMO to show from time to time, as and when required,

15 perhaps all on one page, the areas that you were when you made certain

16 observations, during the course of your testimony.

17 MR. RYNEVELD: I will see if that comes up on the screen. Can the

18 audiovisual please put that on for just a moment.

19 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I don't think it's particularly clear.

20 It's certainly not clear from this end.

21 MR. RYNEVELD: Perhaps we'll just continue to use the Kosovo

22 atlas.

23 Q. In any event, sir, when you were there, did you note anything

24 regarding the VJ?

25 A. It was on that visit that we first came across a considerable

Page 7924

1 Vojska Yugoslavia presence in and around Decani which included a large

2 artillery position that we managed to visit which was providing the fire

3 support basically for the western area of Kosovo, from Decani down towards

4 Djakovica and north towards the town of Pec. This artillery position was

5 guarded by elements of the JSO and also other Vojska Yugoslavia units.

6 Q. I understand, sir, that your statement is clear, but for the

7 benefit of those who do not have a copy of your statement, the JSO was

8 what? Was that part of a VJ or a MUP organisation or what?

9 A. The JSO is part of a MUP special police force, used for -- for

10 both counter-terrorist and for strike action. I'd also say that in all

11 the major towns within Kosovo during that time, there were joint or there

12 were starting to become joint Vojska Yugoslavia and MUP bases. And on

13 many occasions one noticed that Vojska Yugoslavia equipment had been

14 painted into blue colour, which indicated MUP, but it was quite clearly

15 underneath green VJ paint.

16 Q. When you say "Vojska Yugoslavia," that's the official name for

17 what I've been referring to as the Yugoslav army, the VJ?

18 A. Correct, sir.

19 Q. And from that you're saying that they were repainting army

20 vehicles into police colours? Is that --

21 A. That is correct, sir.

22 Q. I get you. All right. And did you in fact see evidence of that

23 throughout Kosovo?

24 A. I saw throughout Kosovo and throughout the early part of 1998 and

25 the summer and the late autumn numerous vehicles that had been repainted

Page 7925

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Page 7926

1 from the Vojska Yugoslavia green to the MUP blue.

2 Q. Referring to the MUP for a moment, sir, did you formulate an

3 opinion or -- I'll leave it at that -- of the MUP forces that were capable

4 of being deployed at about that time, in terms of numbers?

5 A. The estimate was roughly between 8 to 10.000 were capable of being

6 deployed, and that figure went up and down, depending on the role of the

7 MUP units in Kosovo at the time. That was in addition to the approximate

8 15.000 of the Vojska Yugoslavia which were stationed there in their normal

9 barracks.

10 Q. Now, those were observations, sir, that you saw March and April.

11 Did that develop in July of 1998?

12 A. Yes, it did, because up until that period, the KLA had technically

13 taken control of three of the major routes across the province of Kosovo,

14 and it was in about July/August time that the Vojska Yugoslavia and the

15 MUP seemed to combine together to start a clearance operation across the

16 whole of the province of Kosovo.

17 Q. Now, this is something that you saw happening, and did you

18 subsequently have a conversation with General Dimitrijevic concerning your

19 observations on a subsequent occasion? Did you refer to the events that

20 you witnessed in July and August of 1998?

21 A. Yes, I did, sir. Under the constitution of the FRY of Yugoslavia,

22 the Vojska Yugoslavia, who was allowed to maintain control over the

23 borders to initially, I think, 500 metres, that was then further enlarged

24 to two kilometres and eventually out to 20 kilometres. This was partly to

25 do with the deterioration of the current situation. But it was in

Page 7927

1 mid-July when Colonel General Ojdanic then informed the defence attache

2 association in Belgrade, of which I was then the president, that the

3 Vojska Yugoslavia would now defend the lines of communications throughout

4 the province of Kosovo, indicating a much more heavy involvement of the

5 Vojska Yugoslavia in support of the MUP operations.

6 Q. On yet a later occasion, did the issue of what they actually did

7 in the summer of 1998 become the subject of discussion with General

8 Dimitrijevic?

9 A. Yes. I took video film and photographic evidence which indicated

10 artillery of various calibres, main battle tanks, and armoured personnel

11 carriers of the Vojska Yugoslavia in direct support of MUP operations. In

12 other words, they were providing the heavy indirect and direct fire

13 support to MUP ground operations.

14 Q. And was that form of assistance within the allowable limits at

15 that stage of the proceedings, in your view?

16 A. Under the Yugoslavia constitution, no. This was a clear break

17 with what had been the current areas of operation and in part was a

18 knowledge of the deterioration of the situation on the ground within

19 Kosovo itself.

20 Q. Did you confront General Dimitrijevic with that? And if so, what

21 was his reply?

22 A. I informed General Dimitrijevic that we had got evidence, and I

23 think I produced it to himself. I confronted Colonel General Ojdanic at

24 that meeting because he, in front of the defence association, said that

25 the Vojska Yugoslavia was not involved in ground operations, and this was

Page 7928

1 clearly untrue.

2 Q. Was there an explanation given for what they did?

3 A. As a professional military man, one could see the reason why it

4 was happening. It was the ferocity of these assaults of artillery, main

5 battle tank, and heavy machine-guns from armoured vehicles that was way

6 outside a reasonable level of force.

7 Q. All right. Were there any discussions with General Dimitrijevic

8 concerning the relationship of the 3rd Army command and Sainovic and

9 Milosevic?

10 A. Yes, there were on two occasions. And on the 3rd of October, we

11 had a meeting with General Dimitrijevic, and on the 5th, at his

12 invitation, with my ambassador where General Dimitrijevic said he was

13 extremely worried about the situation within Kosovo and that General

14 Pavkovic, the commander of the 3rd Army, now currently the chief of

15 defence staff, was working outside the loop of command which went back

16 past General Perisic and General Dimitrijevic to Mr. Milosevic and

17 Sainovic.

18 Q. And was there anything unusual about that to your understanding of

19 the normal chain of command?

20 A. This was totally outside the normal chain of command.

21 Q. Was there any further explanation given as to how that would

22 actually work on a step-by-step basis? In other words, who would do what

23 to whom or how did that relationship work? Were you told?

24 A. We weren't specifically told, no, but it was fairly obvious to

25 work out that General Perisic and General Dimitrijevic within the Vojska

Page 7929

1 Yugoslavia were not fully informed as to what was going on on the ground

2 in Kosovo and therefore were being excluded from the operational chain of

3 command which went direct from General Pavkovic back to Mr. Milosevic and

4 Sainovic who was his day-to-day operational man.

5 Q. Thank you. Now, you've referred to the JSO. Do you happen to

6 know who was the commander in charge of the JSO in and around Pec?

7 A. Yes. He was a man called Frenki Simatovic, who I met, I think, on

8 one occasion in Pec itself.

9 Q. And do you know where the JSO were based?

10 A. They had several bases. One was close to the -- an old hotel by

11 Decani monastery, which is in the western side of Kosovo. They had

12 another base in the Istok prison, which is east of Pec, on the road

13 towards Ribnik.

14 Q. If I could just stop you there.

15 MR. RYNEVELD: Your Honours, page 4, at the intersection of 40 and

16 14.5, describes this area now in the Kosovo atlas.

17 Q. Sorry. Yes?

18 A. And also they had a base at Srbica in the Drenica, between

19 Kumanjia [phoen] and Gornja Trnava [phoen], in the ammunition factory

20 there.

21 Q. When we talk about Istok, is there a prison there by special name?

22 A. Yes. There is a very big prison which I refer to as Istok but is

23 sometimes called Dubrava.

24 Q. So when you talk about Istok, that's synonymous with Dubrava

25 prison area?

Page 7930

1 A. That is correct, sir.

2 Q. I see. All right. And did you at some point meet with a person

3 who described himself as the commander of the JSO?

4 A. Yes, I did. On one occasion at least, and that was just before a

5 combat group, which is a combined group. We met on the Pec-Pristina road

6 at a place called Lapusnik, which is about 25 kilometres west from

7 Pristina. And within this combat group, there was Vojska Yugoslavia main

8 battle tanks, there was the JSO, there was the SAJ and PJP who were lined

9 up in two bases, one at Lapusnik and one at Kijevo, prior to assaulting

10 Malisevo, which was then the head of or the base for the KLA, Kosovo

11 Liberation Army.

12 Q. You may have given a date. If so, it's escaped me. Did you give

13 a date, approximately, when you met this commander of the JSO?

14 A. It's on the 28th of July, 1998, sir.

15 Q. And did he refer to himself by any name or nickname or name that

16 you happen to recall?

17 A. I recall -- I think I recall right, sir, it was Legija, and that

18 was about it.

19 Q. All right.

20 MR. RYNEVELD: Your Honours, if I might, I propose now to move to

21 the summary, paragraphs 11, 12.

22 Q. Now, sir, you have earlier in your statement mentioned the

23 capacities of certain high officials, including officials in the VJ, and I

24 believe you mentioned General Perisic. Is that correct?

25 A. That's correct, sir.

Page 7931

1 Q. And what was his role when you knew him in the early stages?

2 A. I was accredited as the Defence attache to General Perisic who had

3 been the chief of defence staff for about three or four years, and he was

4 defence -- chief of defence staff until replaced by General Ojdanic in

5 October 1998.

6 Q. So at some point in October of 1998, General Perisic was relieved

7 of that command function and replaced by General Ojdanic, to your

8 recollection?

9 A. That's correct, sir.

10 Q. And prior to October of 1998, sir, what did you understand the

11 VJ's tasks or duties, largely, were intended to be?

12 A. Your Honours, as I explained earlier, under the FRY constitution,

13 they had sole task to defend the borders of Yugoslavia. That was out to

14 some 500 metres. That was then extended towards two kilometres and then,

15 finally, out to 20 kilometres. And then in July 1998, Colonel General

16 Ojdanic, who was the Chief of Staff of the Vojska Yugoslavia army then

17 informed the defence attache association that they would now not only

18 defend the borders but also the training areas which they exercised in

19 within Kosovo, some of which were of tactical importance but also the

20 lines of communication across the province of Kosovo. As I indicated,

21 there were four major routes which allowed supplies coming mainly from

22 Serbia to be brought across to the Vojska Yugoslav units and MUP units

23 operating in the western province of Kosovo.

24 Q. Now -- thank you. I was asking originally about Perisic. You

25 also referred to a General Pavkovic. Can you tell us what if anything you

Page 7932

1 noted in the summer of 1998 concerning VJ operations involving General

2 Pavkovic, and what was his role in relation to Perisic?

3 A. It was quite clear from meetings with General Perisic and General

4 Dimitrijevic that General Pavkovic was -- had sought -- had seen an

5 opportunity to carry out the wishes, presumably of Mr. Milosevic, and to

6 exert far more operational control direct from Pristina and Nis, his

7 headquarters, in the operations within the Kosovo area. And I believe he

8 saw this as a chance to show that he was willing to carry out the orders

9 of the Yugoslav government outside the normal chain of command which

10 should have gone through the chief of defence staff and General

11 Dimitrijevic, who was the chief of counter-intelligence.

12 Q. Now, you've already alluded to the fact that you've had

13 conversations with these individuals a few moments ago, and I asked you in

14 a different paragraph, but am I right that you in fact discussed these

15 observations about incidents in the summer of 1998 with General Perisic

16 and General Dimitrijevic?

17 A. That is correct, sir. We had very long conversations, because as

18 a professional soldier, one has been in several situations not dissimilar

19 to what was going on in Kosovo and, therefore, was attempting to give

20 advice as a professional soldier. And it was quite obvious from General

21 Perisic and General Dimitrijevic's demeanour that they were unhappy with

22 the way that operations were now being organised and that the normal chain

23 of command was being relatively ignored in pursuit of a much more

24 aggressive policy which involved the Vojska Yugoslavia, as I've said, in

25 direct support of MUP operations across the province of Kosovo.

Page 7933

1 Q. Now, just so I understand the functions and what was happening, I

2 believe you may have expressed this, but I'm going to ask you to clarify

3 for me, if you would, please. What the VJ was doing in the summer of 1998

4 as you described, was that purely a border thing or was this now being

5 involved in internal security operations?

6 A. Initially within the -- within the early part of 1998, the Vojska

7 Yugoslavia was deployed on the border and particularly on the Albanian and

8 southern and western borders. And then as the operations became more

9 involved, they had to move back to take -- to support the MUP who were

10 incapable, in some respects, of carrying out these particular operations.

11 Q. So when they supported the MUP, was that part of a different

12 function? Was that internal security?

13 A. Yes, that was bordering on internal security. And this was

14 definitely changed and made formally aware to the defence attaches in July

15 28th when Colonel General Ojdanic made that statement in front of the

16 attache corps.

17 Q. Did you have a conversation with Perisic and Dimitrijevic

18 concerning whether or not they agreed or disagreed with that type of

19 deployment of the army?

20 A. They both were unhappy and disagreed with the heavier involvement,

21 the Vojska Yugoslavia, and said to -- said that to me on at least two

22 occasions, but, rather, said that they were, as I've said already, now

23 more or less outside the regular chain of command and therefore unable to

24 influence, apparently, the situation and the operational tasking that was

25 going direct from Belgrade down to Pristina and Nis, the headquarters of

Page 7934

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Page 7935

1 3rd Army outside of Kosovo.

2 Q. Sir, you've already made reference to the 27th of August, I

3 believe, when General Ojdanic met with the accredited defence attaches and

4 outlined the new policy. Do you -- would this have been before or after

5 you presented the video? I believe you made reference earlier that you

6 had a video. Did you present that video at all?

7 A. Yes, I did. I believe I had shown it to General Dimitrijevic who

8 had spoken to General Perisic, and I also produced it for the foreign

9 liaison service after General Ojdanic's speech to the accredited defence

10 attache association.

11 Q. And what did this video show? What was it of?

12 A. It showed Vojska Yugoslavia units, heavy artillery, and main

13 battle tanks working within the central region of Kosovo in and around, I

14 believe, Suva Reka, Blace, and Dulje areas, which were then under fairly

15 constant bombardment as a part of the "clearance," in inverted commas,

16 operations that were ongoing throughout July, August, and September of

17 1998.

18 Q. Now, sir, perhaps you can assist us. Your familiarity of the

19 geography of Kosovo; the locations of Junik, Prilep, Rznic, and Glodjane,

20 where are those villages located? Generally in what area?

21 A. These are all in between the western town of Djakovica and Decani,

22 about 10 kilometres south of Decani, and in towards what was called the

23 Jablanica area. The small villages of Rznic and Prilep were just on the

24 main road and just off the main road. We were taken there in I think it

25 was August because there had been a massacre at a place called Glodjane.

Page 7936

1 Whilst we were taken under escort, having been met in Djakovica by the

2 MUP, we actually went past troops still on operations, which included

3 elements from the Vojska Yugoslavia, the SAJ, the JSO, and the PJP, who,

4 as we drove past, were still torching, burning, and firing into various

5 houses as we were driven through, this armoured convoy, and we eventually

6 arrived at the small village of Glodjane.

7 The MUP who brought us there indicated in the deep water channel

8 had been a massacre, and I myself saw six to eight bodies that had been

9 shot, and there were bullet marks on the concrete of the water channel.

10 Who these people were was impossible to tell because we were not allowed

11 to go close to the bodies concerned, but the MUP commander from Djakovica

12 informed me that these were Serb -- Kosovo Serbs who had been killed by

13 the local KLA. But as I said, we could not confirm that. But there were

14 definitely six to eight bodies there.

15 Q. Now, did that incident that you've just told us about that you

16 witnessed, this continual firing, was that raised at all on the 28th of

17 August with Ojdanic?

18 A. Yes, it was. And he, Colonel General Ojdanic, really didn't seem

19 to want to know what was going on in truth. It was witnessed by myself

20 and other defence attaches that, despite what was being portrayed from

21 Belgrade, the truth was very far from that within the province of Kosovo

22 and that many of the operations were extremely heavy-handed. I myself saw

23 over -- between 2 and 300 villages burnt throughout 1998, 1999. Crops

24 were just wantonly burnt. Businesses of all sorts were routed and looted.

25 Petrol stations, any shops. And within towns like Decani, Pec, and

Page 7937

1 Djakovica, the Albanian areas were completely burnt out. And this

2 included damage to mosques, which I, amongst other people, informed the

3 Vojska Yugoslavia was not the clever way of doing operations.

4 So there was significant civilian damage done purely to drive out

5 civilians from both their homes, their farms, and also from the towns that

6 I indicated of Pec, Decani, and Djakovica.

7 Q. Thank you. Sorry to come back to this topic, but those four

8 villages that you mentioned by name - Junik, Prilep, Rznic, and Glodjane -

9 you described to us what you saw. Was the incident of what you witnessed

10 there the subject of discussion with Ojdanic, and if so, did he say

11 anything to you, having been confronted with that, about how that might be

12 viewed in terms of security or humanitarian concerns?

13 A. Not really, sir. I mean, I think he found it difficult to

14 understand. I mean, for instance, Your Honours, the very small hamlet of

15 Prilep on the Decani-Djakovica road was probably 40 to 50 centimetres

16 high; all the houses been bulldozed flat. That is the level of

17 destruction we're talking about, and that was throughout. In certain

18 areas throughout Kosovo, major destruction had taken place, and people -

19 certainly Colonel General Ojdanic - did not seem to want to hear this

20 information.

21 MR. NICE: All right. Moving to paragraph 12, if I may, Your

22 Honours.

23 Q. Sir, during the course of your duties, I understand that Lord

24 Ashdown was also a visitor to Kosovo. Is that correct?

25 A. That's correct, sir. He -- I think if I remember rightly, he

Page 7938

1 carried out two visits, and I accompanied him with our ambassador on both

2 these visits.

3 Q. When would that have been, approximately?

4 A. One was in the latter part of September, I believe the 26th, 27th,

5 but they were about four or five days, so it spread over a good period

6 within Kosovo itself.

7 Q. And just without getting into a lot of detail of the tour, what

8 areas did you visit with Lord Ashdown?

9 A. We carried out, Your Honours, a comprehensive tour throughout all

10 of Kosovo, but in this particular time we concentrated on the area around

11 Suva Reka, Dulje, Blace, and we were accompanied by the BBC who filmed

12 footage of ongoing operations that were quite clearly Vojska Yugoslavia

13 supported.

14 Q. And did you have access to the footage taken by the BBC that was

15 travelling?

16 A. Yes, sir. I have seen that, and it was transmitted, I believe, on

17 that evening news.

18 Q. Did you also take any video or photographic evidence of what you

19 had seen?

20 A. Yes, we did, sir, yes.

21 Q. And later on, did you have a meeting with General Ojdanic in the

22 presence of Lord Ashdown?

23 A. I believe we did, sir, yes. And again, Lord Ashdown also went to

24 see Mr. Milosevic directly after his visit to Kosovo, on one occasion at

25 least, and I believe also made those comments to Mr. Milosevic as well.

Page 7939

1 Q. All right.

2 MR. RYNEVELD: Paragraph 13, Your Honours.

3 Q. Between July and October, then - this is sort of summary - how

4 many visits did you make to Kosovo?

5 A. I made approximately 11 visits, Your Honours, and these were

6 sometimes of three, four, five, and six days duration. So I spent a lot

7 of the late summer and early autumn in Kosovo. Also on behest of

8 Mr. Holbrooke when the initiative there was being attempted to be signed

9 in late October, November. And I actually supervised the withdrawal, as

10 on the plan of Mr. Holbrooke, of the Vojska Yugoslavia units back to their

11 barracks in Pristina, in Prizren, and in Urosevac.

12 Q. And on those visits, on each of those visits, did you see evidence

13 of incidents?

14 A. Yes, sir. They were continuous -- there were continually burnings

15 and lootings from villages, and some villages had been looted and burnt at

16 least on three occasions, with the civilian population leaving and then

17 returning once they thought it was relatively safe to come back.

18 Q. And just so that I'm clear about that, when you say three times,

19 you mean they'd burn, they'd leave, they'd come back, it would be burned

20 again, they'd leave, come back, burned again? Is that what you mean by

21 three times?

22 A. That's exactly correct, sir, yes. Because the civilian population

23 would move out to the woods. Bearing in mind it was a very warm summer,

24 but then coming in towards the autumn, the temperature drops quickly. The

25 only shelter they had was either in the woods or back in their dilapidated

Page 7940

1 buildings, which then were starting to get some UNHCR help in.

2 Q. Sir --

3 MR. RYNEVELD: Your Honours, I don't know what time you want to

4 take the break.

5 JUDGE MAY: Well, we --

6 MR. RYNEVELD: I'm going to try and do this --

7 JUDGE MAY: I think we started at 10.35, so you've got another

8 quarter of an hour or so.

9 MR. RYNEVELD: Wonderful. I'm just hoping to try to get through

10 this before the break, but I had no idea as to when that break will be.

11 So thank you.

12 Q. Paragraph 14. Sir, I'll move on a little more quickly. You have

13 already referred to a 3rd of October, 1998, meeting with General

14 Dimitrijevic, and now as part of that discussion, part of which you've

15 already related, did you discuss with General Dimitrijevic some of the air

16 defence assets that you had personally observed in the -- and their use

17 against civilians?

18 A. Yes. Throughout 1998, many of the -- or nearly all of the air

19 defence assets - and these are armoured vehicles, wheeled vehicles and

20 semi-tracked vehicles, what they all BOV 3s and Pragas - were used in the

21 direct fire role against villages, and I personally saw that happen on

22 numerous occasions. And this was a tactic of a standoff, direct attack

23 onto a village in order to destroy the infrastructure of that village and

24 drive any of the population who might have been there out of their own

25 personal houses.

Page 7941

1 Q. From your observations, these villages, did they appear to be

2 apparent military targets?

3 A. No. These were normal civilian villages. Inevitably in some of

4 these villages there would be supporters of the Kosovo Liberation Army

5 because, as you're well aware, the population within Kosovo is probably

6 about a million plus Albanians, or it was in 1998.

7 Q. And to your understanding of the Geneva Convention, was that type

8 of behaviour permissible?

9 A. Not at all. These are 20, 30, and 40-millimetre cannon, which are

10 very destructive and are used, under the Geneva Convention, for use

11 against aircraft and/or other armoured vehicles but certainly not against

12 personnel.

13 Q. Now, sir, is there a group or body known as the HMA?

14 A. The HMA is Her Majesty's Ambassador.

15 Q. Thank you. So when you met with Dimitrijevic, you met in the

16 presence of the then ambassador for Britain, is that Ambassador Donnelly?

17 A. That is correct, sir, yes. And it was on his -- on my return from

18 Kosovo and on my ambassador's wishes to speak with the most senior person

19 we could do in order to attempt to rationalise a situation that was

20 rapidly becoming out of hand.

21 Q. And in the company of Her Majesty's Ambassador -- I take it he was

22 present for this October 3rd meeting; is that correct?

23 A. That's correct, sir.

24 Q. And so was there any discussions concerning the responsibility for

25 Kosovo at that point?

Page 7942

1 A. I believe my ambassador made it perfectly clear that he was

2 holding Mr. Milosevic and the Vojska Yugoslavia and MUP responsible for

3 what was going on in Kosovo and indicated that future action may be taken

4 against those who were responsible for quite clearly crimes against

5 humanity.

6 Q. Now, was there also a report where you got a message about the MUP

7 PJP detachments operating in Kosovo?

8 A. It was during this time under Mr. Holbrooke's initiative various

9 MUP units were redeployed out of Kosovo, and I personally witnessed them

10 moving out. However, not very long afterwards, other MUP/PJP units were

11 brought back in to replace those who had been on duty for three or four

12 months.

13 Q. So there appeared to be an initial compliance and then things

14 changed?

15 A. Yes. The Vojska Yugoslavia, as I've said earlier, I personally

16 saw the three battle groups return to their barracks and signal this back

17 to the relevant authorities. We also, as I've said, saw the withdrawal of

18 certain elements of the MUP/PJP, and then we saw other elements coming

19 back in over a period of days, replacing those who had been sent back out.

20 Q. It was a matter of days before other units replaced them?

21 A. As far as I recall, Your Honours, within a week to two-week

22 period, yes, so the status quo was regained in terms of numbers of Serbian

23 security forces within Kosovo.

24 Q. Very quickly skipping down to paragraph 18, just before Christmas,

25 around the 19th, the 21st of December, 1998, did you witness anything in

Page 7943

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Page 7944

1 relation to the 211 Brigade from Nis?

2 A. Yes, Your Honours. This brigade from Nis, which we could very

3 easily identify by various signs it had on it, was deployed to the west on

4 the high ground just outside of Podujevo, along the main supply route

5 which went back to Krsumlija Banja, which is an advances headquarters for

6 3rd Army from Nis, and therefore, they were protecting their main supply

7 route from the KLA who mounted various attacks within that area. But this

8 was a battalion-plus sizing deployment and also down onto an airfield

9 called Donje Pudenje [phoen] where they had another battalion-minus. So

10 there was, in effect, just under a brigade of armour, including main

11 battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers, and artillery within and around

12 the Podujevo environs.

13 Q. And again I'm sorry, being a non-military person, you may have to

14 state the obvious for my benefit. When you saw tanks, was that MUP or --

15 A. No. The Vojska Yugoslavia maintained control of all main battle

16 tanks and in particular some units were equipped with the later T-84,

17 which indicated that these were units mainly external from Kosovo. They

18 were from either Nis or even from Belgrade.

19 Q. So this 211 Brigade from Nis, that was definitely an army brigade?

20 A. Yes, sir.

21 Q. And a brigade is approximately how many men or how many --

22 A. In rough terms, between 3 and 4.000, depending on how much

23 strength it had at the time.

24 Q. I see. This is a large group of people.

25 A. It is a very large and a very powerful organisation, and they did

Page 7945

1 considerable damage to the villages just west of Podujevo; Bradas,

2 Dobratin, Gornja Lapastica and Donje Lapastica.

3 Q. And did you see any MUP at the same time as you saw this 211

4 Brigade?

5 A. Yes. I visited the headquarters there in Podujevo and also saw,

6 within the perimeter areas, both a combined MUP and VJ presence, and it

7 was quite clear they were working together.

8 Q. One further question on that topic then, sir. As a military man

9 seeing these many people and MUP and police obviously working together,

10 did you form any opinion or speculation as to what was going on?

11 A. It -- Your Honours, it indicated how serious the Vojska Yugoslavia

12 was taking the situation, which was deteriorating with an influx of Kosovo

13 Liberation Army people and equipment. And it was also obviously

14 protecting their major route back into southern Serbia up towards

15 Prokuplje and on to Nis.

16 Q. Were you concerned at all about what you witnessed?

17 A. Very concerned, Your Honours, in that every time there was an

18 operation, there was a completely unreasonable use of force put in against

19 the villages and towns.

20 Q. Thank you. Colonel Crosland, I want to take you now, if you

21 would, please, to the 15th of January, 1999, referred to as Racak. Can

22 you tell the Court in some detail, if you would, in this particular area,

23 I'm going to take -- where were you, what time were you there, what did

24 you see? I'm just going to let you explain for the Court how you happened

25 to be there, where you were, and what you saw.

Page 7946

1 A. Your Honours, the small village of Racak is just west of a place

2 called Stimlje, which is on the -- one of the southern routes across to

3 Suva Reka and on to Prizren. Stimlje was a joint Vojska Yugoslavia and

4 MUP outpost, because just beyond Racak was a small village of Crnoljevo

5 which was really where the Kosovo Liberation Army had a quasi-control over

6 this mountainous road that went up towards Dulje where the Vojska

7 Yugoslavia had a combat group in a fairly isolated position up on the

8 heights that overlooked the village of Suva Reka.

9 If I recall correctly, there was an attack on a MUP - maybe also

10 VJ - patrol just west of the village of Racak, which resulted, I think, if

11 I remember rightly, in three MUP being killed. And it was then quite

12 clear that a major operation would be mounted using Colonel Delic's 243

13 Brigade from Urosevac, the Vojska Yugoslavia formation, and all the

14 combined elements of the PJP/MUP to take out what was disclosed as a

15 Kosovo Liberation Army headquarters, in their terminology. I would just

16 say a base, but that can be debated.

17 Q. I'm going to stop you there just to clarify something. This

18 incident that you referred to about two or three individuals being killed,

19 was that on the 15th or was that some days before the 15th or --

20 A. I think if I recall rightly, sir, it was a couple of days prior to

21 the major operation against Racak which was on the overnight 14th/15th.

22 Q. All right. So -- thank you. It was sometime prior to --

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. -- to the Racak incident?

25 A. Yes. It probably was the catalyst for this operation.

Page 7947

1 Q. I see. Sorry to have interrupted.

2 A. Not at all, sir. I arrived, I think, mid-afternoon, about 2.00,

3 in the area, and there was a - and had been - a continuous bombardment of

4 M-80s, which are armoured personnel vehicles, about nine of them on the

5 high ground overlooking Racak, and they were supported by D-30s, which are

6 howitzers, manned by Vojska Yugoslavia.

7 Q. M-80s --

8 JUDGE KWON: Colonel Crosland, how did you come to know that there

9 would be an operation in Racak at the time?

10 THE WITNESS: Because, Your Honour, the Kosovo KVM, Kosovo

11 Verification Mission was also in the area and attempting to monitor the

12 ongoing operations. And by the amount of troops, both the MUP in all its

13 elements and the Vojska Yugoslavia concentrating in that area, it was very

14 clear that an operation was about to take place.

15 MR. RYNEVELD:

16 Q. Is that why you attended Racak?

17 A. Yes. In -- you tend to get, having been in the area for as long

18 as I've been, a feel for what is going on. And this was an extremely

19 dangerous and difficult area for the Yugoslav authorities to have any

20 control over because they needed to, as I've indicated, as one of their

21 main supply routes westwards to Suva Reka and then on to Prizren.

22 Q. I'm sorry, I cut across His Honour's question. I might use this

23 opportunity now to ask you again. You referred to, I think it was M-80s,

24 a continuous bombardment of M-80s, it says in the transcript. Oh, you

25 said they were armoured personnel vehicles. Are they like tanks or --

Page 7948

1 A. No. These are smaller armoured vehicles which have heavy

2 machine-guns and can lay down a considerable amount of firepower. And as

3 I said, there were about nine of these vehicles, firing more or less

4 continuously into and around the area of Racak.

5 Q. And could you determine where this equipment was from or whether

6 it was JNA or MUP or -- were there tanks there as well or not?

7 A. There were elements of the Vojska Yugoslavia from -- we recognised

8 from 243 brigade which is the Mechanised Brigade out of Urosevac. It was

9 that brigade's area of responsibility.

10 Q. Did you see any tanks?

11 A. Yes, we saw some T55s.

12 Q. Sorry. Again I interrupted. The size of this operation, sir,

13 that you witnessed, what level of, shall we say, in the normal chain of

14 command, what level of knowledge or planning or operational cooperation do

15 you think there would have to have been for something like to take place?

16 A. Your Honours, there must have been a close cooperation between the

17 52 Corps was the VJ corps based in Pristina, under command of General

18 Lazarevic, who I knew and had seen on many occasions and given sustenance

19 to Vojska Yugoslavia soldiers who had been wounded and, in fact, one

20 killed. I went to see the bodies and gave medical aid to their sick

21 soldiers who had been wounded. And that's documented in other areas. But

22 it was quite clear that there had been a coordinated move between the

23 Vojska Yugoslavia and the MUP to clear out this nest of the KLA and, I

24 suppose, to teach the KLA a lesson. But it seemed to me a very blunt way

25 of doing it, directly under the noses of then Ambassador Walker's Kosovo

Page 7949

1 Verification Mission.

2 Q. Did you see members of the Kosovo Verification Mission there while

3 you were there?

4 A. Yes, I did, sir. I believe it was Ambassador Walker, but I can't

5 remember precisely.

6 Q. Perhaps you would -- were you there when the actual conflict

7 occurred?

8 A. I arrived just after the major conflict had arrived. But there

9 was considerable activity ongoing that afternoon and throughout that day.

10 Q. I believe Their Honours would like to know what you actually

11 witnessed. Who was doing what to whom, when, and where?

12 A. It was quite clear for me the way the M-80s, the armoured

13 personnel vehicles were on the ridgeline above Stimlje that overlooked the

14 village of Racak, that they were providing what we would call intensive

15 covering fire into the area of Racak itself. I then believe there was

16 what we would call a sweep operation which went through Racak. And if I

17 remember correctly, there were seven or eight members of the Kosovo

18 Liberation Army brought out who had been killed. The other people who had

19 been killed, many of them had extremely close burn marks, indicating they

20 had been shot from very close range. Obviously I was not present when

21 they were shot, but one has seen enough, sadly, enough bodies in one life

22 to realize that these people had been shot from very close range.

23 JUDGE KWON: Colonel, did you hear or see the exchange of gunfire

24 at that time?

25 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. You could have heard it nearly

Page 7950

1 back in Pristina. This was a very, very serious engagement, and a

2 complete, in my opinion, a complete flouting of the authority of the

3 Kosovo Verification Mission, because they would -- I believe Ambassador

4 Walker arrived with the world's press, who got not as close as we got but

5 were very clearly able to see the nine armoured vehicles firing directly

6 at Racak and the other units that were spread around the Stimlje area who

7 were in support of this operation.

8 JUDGE KWON: So you -- does it mean that you saw the -- some fight

9 back from the KLAs?

10 THE WITNESS: No. It was impossible to see that, Your Honour,

11 because they are down the other side of the hill, totally overlooked by

12 the Serbian security force position. It's a wooded position which would

13 obviously allow some people to have slipped away southwards. But on the

14 Serbian side, it was very much a bare valley leading from their position

15 down towards Racak itself.

16 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

17 MR. RYNEVELD:

18 Q. Just to clarify, if I may. Picking up from where His Honour's

19 question left off, when you responded to His Honour's question about an

20 exchange of gunfire and you answered in the way you did, were you focusing

21 on the word "exchange" or were you focusing on the --

22 A. No. Sorry. It was very difficult to know whether there was any

23 fire coming back. The weight of fire going down was -- was extremely

24 heavy.

25 Q. Did you, in the course of your duties at Racak, visit the area

Page 7951

1 known as the gully after the fact?

2 A. I did not go down into that area because access was restricted. I

3 think Ambassador Walker went down, and one or two people from KVM.

4 Q. You did not personally?

5 A. I did not personally go down there, no.

6 Q. Thank you. Are you able to give us a time frame as to when you

7 witnessed this heavy artillery being shot into Racak? Approximately when

8 are we talking?

9 A. As far as I can recall, sir, it was from mid-morning of the 14th

10 or the 15th. I think it was mid-morning of the 15th.

11 Q. Until?

12 A. Until late afternoon on the 15th, I would suggest.

13 Q. And your observation point? Like, where, approximately, would you

14 have been in order to witness this?

15 A. We managed to get reasonably close to Stimlje by various routes

16 that we'd worked out from before.

17 Q. All right.

18 A. And there's absolutely no -- the definition of who was involved

19 was absolutely clear.

20 Q. Were there KVM observers in approximately the same opportunity to

21 witness the incident; i.e., was their vantage point known to you?

22 A. There was a vantage point known to me. The KVM, as far as I

23 recall, were not allowed in. I think Ambassador Walker was then allowed

24 in with various people, after the operation, to see what had been done.

25 Q. Would the KVM, to your knowledge, have been in a position to

Page 7952

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Page 7953

1 observe the same incident you did and would have had an opportunity to

2 make known their observations to people within their chain of command?

3 A. I would have thought so, sir, yes.

4 Q. Thank you.

5 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Ryneveld, if you're going to move from Racak --

6 MR. RYNEVELD: I am.

7 JUDGE MAY: -- it may be a convenient moment to break.

8 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honour. That's -- yes. I'm about

9 to go to paragraph 20, 23, 25, and 27. That's all I have left.

10 JUDGE MAY: Nonetheless, given the time constraints --

11 MR. RYNEVELD: Absolutely.

12 JUDGE MAY: -- it may not be possible to finish the colonel's

13 evidence today.

14 Colonel, we'll do the best to finish your evidence today, but I'm

15 afraid I can't promise that we'll be able to do so.

16 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.

17 JUDGE MAY: I should warn you formally not to speak to anybody

18 about your evidence until it's over, and that does include members of the

19 Prosecution team. However, if arrangements have to be made for you to

20 come back sometime to complete your evidence between now and the summer or

21 the early autumn, perhaps you could have a word with Mr. Ryneveld about

22 that, just that particular point, to try and find a convenient time.

23 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you.

24 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Ryneveld, perhaps you could report on those

25 discussions.

Page 7954

1 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you. I might say I don't believe it will be

2 necessary for me to speak to the witness in between. Out of an abundance

3 of caution, we have canvassed that, what I hoped was a remote possibility,

4 and I do believe that the witness might be able to make himself available

5 first thing Monday morning if he can get out of here mid-morning sort of

6 thing.

7 JUDGE MAY: Right. That sounds satisfactory.

8 We will adjourn now. Twenty minutes.

9 --- Recess taken at 12.05 p.m.

10 --- On resuming at 12.30 p.m.

11 [Closed session]

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Page 7955

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16 [Open session]

17 THE REGISTRAR: We're now in open session.

18 MR. NICE: Your Honour, returning very rapidly to Marjan Krasniqi

19 referred to by the accused this morning, his statements having been

20 reviewed, the position is that his statements are subject to the full 92

21 bis procedure carried out in the region earlier this year on the 13th of

22 March at a time when we were intending to make him part of our case. As

23 the Chamber knows, we've radically reduced the number of witnesses since

24 then, but he remains a potentially useful witness. And since the accused

25 wants his statements in, I give notice now under 92 bis that I apply for

Page 7958

1 his statements, in accordance with the package of documents provided to

2 the accused and the Court, should be adduced subject to the full

3 provisions of 92 bis. That is to say they can simply be read into

4 evidence. It would be surprising if the accused were to challenge that,

5 as he's asked for the statements to go into evidence.

6 The normal timing under 92 bis is 14 days -- 7 days and 14 days, I

7 think, but I'd ask for an appropriate abbreviation so that the accused can

8 make his position clear as to whether this witness is required for

9 cross-examination or not. One would assume not in light of his own

10 application.

11 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll consider that matter.

12 MR. NICE: Outstanding, then, is the position of Mr. Coo. The

13 Court raised a very practical solution to the problem yesterday simply as

14 a possibility, giving his evidence in chief before de la Billiere were to

15 be called. The only potential problem is that is the normal rule that a

16 witness would not be communicating about his evidence with the Office of

17 the Prosecutor once he's started to give evidence. That hardly applies

18 with the same force if it's only examination-in-chief of an expert, and

19 subject to a resolution of that difficulty, if the Court is minded to

20 pursue that possibility, we would be only too happy to go along with it.

21 But there's one technical issue that we'd like to be resolved in

22 order to help the Court: His exhibits are currently not in a tabbed or

23 divided format. There's a problem about putting tabs on documents or

24 putting numbers on documents that as soon as you change a document at all,

25 you have to have it resubmitted for the whole processing -- process of

Page 7959

1 having numbers put on it and so on and so forth. I'm sure that for future

2 92 bis exhibits we can find a solution to this that won't waste people's

3 time and have documents being numbered twice.

4 As to Mr. Coo's exhibits, we are only too happy to do anything

5 that would assist the management of the exhibits. In particular if it

6 would be thought appropriate for those documents to be placed into tabbed

7 binders, we could do that for their more easy handling. But that's that.

8 But it would help us to know if we can call him on that basis, and we'll

9 get on and make appropriate preparations, discussing the mechanics of

10 handling the exhibits with your legal officer as appropriate.

11 JUDGE MAY: There is in the evidence of Mr. Coo, in any event, a

12 challenge to admissibility of parts. If you're going to oppose what the

13 amici have suggested, then we'll need to have a hearing on that.

14 MR. NICE: Yes. I don't think it will be particularly long, but

15 we're going to submit a written document, I hope today or tomorrow, to

16 narrow the issues.

17 And then finally, we've served the statement of Isuf Jemini, the

18 cousin of the man who overheard the observations from his building. We've

19 been granted leave to call him. Can I give notice that we will seek to

20 call him at any convenient time in the next two weeks? He's the sort of

21 witness who may serve as a useful witness to take a little time if we

22 otherwise fall short.

23 JUDGE MAY: Has his statement been disclosed yet?

24 MR. NICE: Certainly. It was disclosed in the application to call

25 him, and the application was granted, so it's been disclosed already.

Page 7960

1 JUDGE MAY: Disclosed to the accused.

2 MR. NICE: Oh, certainly, yes.

3 JUDGE MAY: Very well.

4 MR. NICE: Thank you very much.

5 JUDGE MAY: We'll have the witness back, please.

6 MR. NICE: Thank you, Your Honour.

7 MR. RYNEVELD: Yes, Your Honours. Thank you. I believe I was

8 about to turn to paragraph 20 of the summary.

9 Q. Colonel Crosland, I'm going to summarise just a little bit here.

10 I understand, sir, that during your various tours you've already testified

11 about having seen destruction, burning, and looting of some of the

12 villages. Did that also occur in 1999?

13 A. Yes, it did, Your Honours, in the area around Podujevo where the

14 Vojska Yugoslavia had deployed 211 Brigade from Nis and at least 3

15 villages, four villages - Gornja Lapastica, Donja Lapastica, Bradas, and

16 Dobratin - were heavily destroyed.

17 MR. RYNEVELD: For Your Honours, that's -- those villages can be

18 seen on page 3 of the Kosovo atlas.

19 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please pause between question

20 and answer. Thank you.

21 MR. RYNEVELD: I've been cautioned to pause.

22 Q. Now, sir, did you note a VJ battalion involved in what you

23 witnessed in those villages you've just mentioned?

24 A. Yes, Your Honour. The direct and indirect fire was coming from

25 equipment which was manned by Vojska Yugoslavia and also by MUP elements,

Page 7961

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Page 7962

1 PJP probably.

2 Q. And very briefly, can you describe the method of operation that

3 you witnessed? In other words, who did what, in what order, to whom?

4 A. It appeared that on most operations, warning shots would be fired

5 into the area of the villages that were about to be assaulted, presumably

6 to try and warn the civilian population that worse was to come, and then

7 there would be a very destructive phase of bombardment which would then be

8 followed up by a ground operation which, as I addressed previously, would

9 be torching and burning and looting of the houses concerned that were

10 still standing. Also the crops, both in the field adjacent to the houses

11 and in much wider areas throughout the middle of Kosovo, which is a fairly

12 agriculture area and really the breadbasket of Kosovo itself, particularly

13 the area around Kijevo, in the middle, was burning for probably several

14 weeks as various fires were lit throughout the summer and late autumn of

15 1998.

16 Q. To your observation, what effect, if any, did the burning of the

17 crops have on the ability of the villagers to return at some later time?

18 A. I think initially this caused considerable distress. Also their

19 livestock was slaughtered in a very wanton way.

20 Towards the end of 1998 when the UNHCR and other aid agencies

21 started to get food and materials back into the area, it was not quite so

22 destructive, but why it was done, I'm afraid I can't answer that question.

23 Q. One further question on this particular paragraph, sir: You've

24 told us the method that you saw things happen. What forces would be

25 involved in the looting or the ground operation, I believe that you've

Page 7963

1 called it? Would that be the army again or would that be someone else?

2 A. Most of the -- most of the ground operations that I came across,

3 the direct fire and indirect fire support would be provided by the Vojska

4 Yugoslavia, and the assault troops would come from either the JSO, PJP or

5 the SAJ units who would then move through the area and systematically

6 clear it and carry out most of the destructive work. Obviously the

7 shell-fire and gunfire from the Vojska Yugoslavia and other elements would

8 be very destructive.

9 Q. In your military experience, would there have to be any

10 coordination between the army and the ground forces in order to avoid

11 friendly-fire casualties?

12 A. Yes, Your Honours. I'm sure there must have been a coordination

13 centre, presumably in Pristina, where joint operations were planned in

14 order to prevent what we would term blue-on-blue but also prevent

15 artillery and other long-range fire going into areas that other Serbian

16 security forces may be involved in.

17 Q. When you witnessed these operations, did you see what the

18 villagers did during these operations that you've talked about? What did

19 the villagers do?

20 A. Your Honours, most -- most times, as far as I was aware, as I

21 said, there would be warning shots fired in the area of the village in

22 order to drive out the villagers before the major attack took place. And

23 therefore, the attacks, certainly onto areas like Malisevo and other

24 villages around that area, probably the majority of the villagers had

25 left, and therefore troops just swept through and wantonly destroyed, and,

Page 7964

1 if you like, ethnically cleansed, or attempted to ethnically cleanse,

2 these areas and succeeded really in pushing, certainly in the area of

3 Malisevo down towards the Podgorusa valley, in excess of 30 to 40.000

4 villagers who were camping out for most of the summer and late autumn of

5 1998.

6 Q. These villages that you've referred to, sir, in your experience in

7 Kosovo, were you familiar with the ethnic composition of the majority of

8 the inhabitants of those villages?

9 A. Yes, Your Honours. The majority of these villages were Kosovo

10 Albanian. The major Serb villages were like -- were places like Kijevo,

11 which is a Serb stronghold in the middle of Kosovo. And then most of the

12 other Serbs -- Kosovo Serbs were in amongst the major towns of Pristina,

13 Pec, and Djakovica.

14 Q. Did you make any observations in 1998 and early 1999 about the

15 Serb neighbourhoods of those towns or Serb villages? What -- did you note

16 any similar destruction in regard to those areas?

17 A. No. Most of these Serb enclaves became no-go areas to the likes

18 of myself and were guarded by local defence units which were all organised

19 on a sort of territorial basis of villagers who were armed and guarded

20 their own properties.

21 Q. Yes. Now, your statement refers to the issues in paragraph 23.

22 In order for time, I'm going to skip that, if I may.

23 MR. RYNEVELD: Your Honours may want to note that at page 3, the

24 intersection of 20 and 06 would assist for the location of those areas in

25 paragraph 23.

Page 7965

1 Q. I want to move on, if I may, to the Istok or Dubrava Prison visit

2 you made in June of 1999. That premises, as I understood it -- you

3 understood it to have been bombed at one point?

4 A. That's correct, Your Honours. It was bombed during a campaign.

5 Q. And did you visit after the conflict was over?

6 A. Yes. I visited in early June, and when we arrived in the area

7 with another defence attache, we found a whole mass of documents, which

8 some purported to be execution orders. There were certainly -- these were

9 handed over to the relevant authorities, along with licna kartas, identity

10 cards and other forms of identity that obviously had been stripped off

11 various individuals which were just inside the main wall adjacent to the

12 major control point in front of Istok or Dubrava Prison, as it's called.

13 Q. Now, quick question, sir: In the course of your duties, did you

14 learn to read or understand the Serbian language in either Cyrillic or in

15 the normal writing?

16 A. Yes. Before taking up the appointment, I learnt Serbian and both

17 Cyrillic.

18 Q. And these documents that you saw, you personally looked at some of

19 them, did you?

20 A. I did indeed, sir.

21 Q. And could you determine these identity cards and documents, what

22 ethnicity of individuals they referred to or are you able to voice an

23 opinion concerning that?

24 A. These documents concerned Kosovo Albanian persons and were both

25 identity cards and some were of -- for execution orders.

Page 7966

1 Q. Now, sir, during the course of your duties, I believe you

2 mentioned earlier that you would prepare reports or summaries in order to

3 notify the people to whom you were responsible. Is that correct?

4 A. That is correct, sir. I produced about roughly 70 -- from 70

5 tours. These tours stretched from one day to the outside of a week in

6 duration.

7 Q. And were you present and did you provide information to Her

8 Majesty's Ambassador at that time as well?

9 A. Yes, I naturally worked very closely with my ambassador who also

10 linked in with the political chain of command in Belgrade as the situation

11 deteriorated throughout 1998 and 1999.

12 Q. And some of these reports which may have been under the signature

13 of Her Majesty's Ambassador Donnelly, would you have had an input or be

14 familiar with the contents of many of those documents?

15 A. Yes, Your Honour. I provided most of the military detail because

16 I was based for a long, long period -- a long period in Kosovo and,

17 therefore, contributed towards the report on the military and geographical

18 side.

19 Q. All right.

20 MR. RYNEVELD: Now, then, Your Honours, I propose very briefly to

21 show the witness a series of some seven documents which are outlined in

22 paragraph 27. In order to avoid confusion, I'm going to do them one at a

23 time, if I may.

24 Q. The first document, Colonel Crosland, bares the date of May 11th

25 and 12th. Perhaps Madam Usher could assist us in distributing those. Do

Page 7967

1 you have a copy of that SitRep available to you?

2 A. I have a copy.

3 Q. You have your own copy of that document? We'll wait until Their

4 Honours get their copy. And we'll just describe --

5 JUDGE KWON: Why don't we get all of them at the same time.

6 MR. RYNEVELD: You want the whole bundle?

7 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll have the bundle together.

8 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you. My apologies, Your Honours. Do we have

9 a bundle now? No. The case manager's going to have to sort those.

10 Perhaps I can deal with the first one while that's being done. I don't

11 want to -- and that's my fault and I apologise for not having them in

12 bundles.

13 Q. The first document, sir, maybe you can just describe the format of

14 this so that we know what we're talking about. The first document has a

15 number R0118465, and it appears to be confidential. And then it's

16 Britmilrep Belgrade.

17 JUDGE MAY: We need to have these first.

18 MR. RYNEVELD: I'm sorry, I thought Your Honours had been given

19 the first one. My apologies. I'll wait.

20 JUDGE MAY: It is -- it really would be helpful to have these

21 together in future, clipped together so it's convenient for everybody.

22 How far are we in a position to go now?

23 MR. RYNEVELD: Well, Your Honours, I was just --

24 JUDGE MAY: We don't want to waste any time on it. We're now

25 getting a third one. K2490 --

Page 7968

1 MR. RYNEVELD: There are seven.

2 JUDGE MAY: [Microphone not activated]

3 MR. RYNEVELD: There are seven and I think that the total number

4 of pages would be 15 or 20 pages, Your Honours.

5 JUDGE MAY: Let us start with whichever one you want.

6 MR. RYNEVELD: I was going to do them in chronological order, at

7 least in which they were written. The first one is the 11th and 12th of

8 May, and you can see that, and it says: "Subject: Kosovo SitRep as at

9 11/12 May 1998." Does Your Honour have that?

10 JUDGE MAY: Yes. 2490.

11 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

12 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll let that have an exhibit number. We'll

13 give them each separate exhibit numbers.

14 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honours. My apologies.

15 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that will be marked Prosecutor's

16 Exhibit 254.

17 MR. RYNEVELD:

18 Q. Now, this particular document, you're familiar with the details of

19 it? You were the source of much of the information, were you, sir?

20 A. Yes. Your Honours, yes. I wrote this document and most of the

21 other ones, and it's following a very simple format. It gives you the

22 title at the top, the day and the date concerned, and then a summary of

23 the key points and then detail of various areas that we came across and is

24 designed to brief people as to the situation that we incurred during that

25 time.

Page 7969

1 Q. All right. And in this first document, you refer to the situation

2 in area Ponosevac, Djakovica -- I'm sorry, go ahead.

3 A. The area concerned, Your Honours, is Ponosevac, which is on the

4 western fringe between Djakovica and Decani, which was an extremely tense

5 area bordering the Albanian border and therefore a prime area of interest

6 for the Serb security forces.

7 Q. And in paragraph number 2, did you make some observations there of

8 what the villages south of Ponosevac looked like or what was happening

9 there?

10 A. Yes. The majority of these villages from the outskirts of

11 Djakovica up towards Ponosevac and on towards Decani have been severely

12 damaged. Most of the civilian population had left and it was being

13 patrolled by elements from the JSO and the PJP in what I've described as a

14 very heavy-handed fashion; i.e., firing at any livestock that happened to

15 be alive and destroying or adding to the destruction already carried out

16 in the areas of the homesteads of the civilian population who had left.

17 Q. All right. That's been given a number. I turn next, if I may, to

18 the one dated 28 May 1998.

19 THE REGISTRAR: That will be marked Prosecutor's Exhibit 255.

20 MR. RYNEVELD:

21 Q. This appears to be a four-page document. And do you have that

22 document, sir?

23 MR. RYNEVELD: Do Your Honours have that? Thank you.

24 Q. Very quickly. Under the summary, the first paragraph on page 1,

25 you refer there to seeing the villages north of Decani. Can you tell us

Page 7970

1

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3

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8

9

10

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12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Page 7971

1 about that.

2 A. These villages, Your Honour, are on the major western road from

3 Djakovica through Decani up to Pec and particularly in the area of Gornji

4 Streoc, and Prilep, and Rznic that we've already spoken about. These

5 villages had suffered heavy damage. And again, most of the population was

6 either too frightened to appear or they had actually left the area, moved

7 towards the area of Junik, which is west of this particular area.

8 Q. Turning to the next page of this exhibit, under the heading

9 numbered 2, Restriction of Movement, did you attempt access at Zrze?

10 A. Yes, we did, and we were refused permission. Zrze is a small

11 hamlet just north-west of -- sorry, south-west of Djakovica, and it was

12 then a -- I believe a VJ and a MUP control point.

13 Q. In paragraph number 3, did you make some observations about the

14 village of Kijevo?

15 A. Yes, Your Honours. This village is in the middle of the Drenica

16 area, just south of it, and was throughout the entire period of 1998 to

17 1999 a Serb-controlled stronghold backed up by MUP and PJP and remained in

18 Serb hands throughout the period 1998 to 1999.

19 Q. Thank you. The bottom of that page, I believe under numbered 4,

20 burning in villages north of Decani. And then over the top, on the third

21 page, what observations did you make in that report there?

22 A. Basically, Your Honours, in this area there were very few other

23 vehicles on the road apart from ourselves and most of the villages at

24 Ljubenic and Gornji Streoc had been extremely heavily damaged. Their

25 population had either left or was staying hidden for fear of any further

Page 7972

1 retaliation. And the area was rather like a deserted area apart from the

2 vehicle checkpoints or what we call vehicle checkpoints of the MUP and the

3 PJP that were distributed along this area in an attempt to hold the

4 western boundary on this road itself.

5 Q. All right. Paragraph numbered 5.

6 A. This is referring to the area south of Klina, which is in the

7 central area of Kosovo and involved the village of Dolovo down towards

8 Rakovica. Again, there was a transit route for the Serbian security

9 forces, and these villages overlooked this route and had therefore been

10 fired at and, as I reported in this report, fairly large fires were

11 burning throughout that day, which was more or less a very common and

12 daily occurrence throughout 1998 and 1999.

13 Q. Paragraph 6. Did you see any helicopter attacks?

14 A. No, Your Honours. There were various reports indicating

15 helicopters. We saw one Hind, which is a particularly aggressive

16 helicopter, flying in the area of Pec -- sorry, Kosovska Mitrovica, late

17 in 1998, but otherwise we saw very little helicopter activity primarily

18 because the Vojska Yugoslavia does not have many helicopters.

19 Q. Over the page, sir, rather than spend any time on it, you've

20 already testified having seen vehicles painted in various colours. You

21 made reference about repainting in paragraph 9; is that correct? You've

22 already testified about that?

23 A. That is correct, and that was in general evidence throughout all

24 the joint Vojska Yugoslavia MUP compounds or garrison areas as well as out

25 in the countryside, and they were deployed on operations.

Page 7973

1 Q. Thank you.

2 MR. RYNEVELD: Your Honours, I'm just been advised that these

3 documents we're now dealing with, the OTP reference numbers were 2490,

4 we've just dealt with 2491, and the balance of the bundle you have go from

5 2493 do 2496, for ease of reference.

6 JUDGE KWON: Colonel Crosland, on the same document, number 10,

7 could you clarify the meaning of "MUP turning the screw too"?

8 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. That is a typing error. The

9 phrase "turning the screw" is really an English phrase, applying a lot

10 more pressure.

11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

12 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry, there's a typing error there, sir.

13 MR. RYNEVELD:

14 Q. And just -- what do you mean by that expression, they were

15 applying more pressure? To what? To whom?

16 A. It appeared that the actions of the Serbian security forces, to

17 use a blanket term, would involve the attempted complete dislocation of

18 village life by burning the crops outside, by destroying any haystacks;

19 i.e., winter food for the animals, by slaughtering any animals that they

20 came across; horses, cows, et cetera, and then the wanton destruction of

21 private citizens' houses and also the looting and destruction of any

22 businesses that were useful or not useful to the Serbian security

23 forces.

24 Q. Thank you. Turning to the next document, the next SitRep, the

25 30th of July, 1998. Exhibit number, Madam Clerk?

Page 7974

1 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Prosecutor's Exhibit 256.

2 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

3 Q. I want to go very quickly, if I may, sir. Page 1, you talk about

4 meeting an assault force of SAJ, PJP and VJ in relation to Malisevo. What

5 does that mean?

6 A. This was -- this refers to we had come up south through Malisevo

7 which in July was the KLA's headquarters, or one of their headquarters,

8 and we then met this combat group commanded by the SAJ, but linked to it

9 was elements of the Vojska Yugoslavia with their tanks, other elements of

10 the JSO, PJP, both at Kijevo and Lapusnik. There were two strike forces

11 that were poised to attack down towards Malisevo which, later in that day,

12 they carried out, including one of their vehicles being mined just south

13 of Lapusnik.

14 Q. On the following page where there are -- where the numbers 3, 4,

15 and 5 are written rather than in numerical number, you make some comments.

16 I believe you already testified about what you saw in your evidence.

17 These are just the backup documents that you made at the time; is that

18 correct?

19 A. Yes, Your Honour. Basic -- as I said, we put a summary so that

20 people could read the major summary and get the flavour for it, and then

21 if they wanted the detail, we put in the detail, as you can see, in those

22 particular paragraphs, but it refers to the two strike forces that we

23 encountered at Lapusnik and Kijevo prior to the operation towards

24 Malisevo.

25 Q. And on the following page, under the heading Bravo near the top of

Page 7975

1 page 3 of this document, it says "wanton damage, every village." And then

2 you describe again the same methodology that you described earlier in your

3 evidence today?

4 A. Yes, Your Honour. And I -- I personally had driven up from

5 Malisevo just prior to meeting the Serbian security forces on the main

6 road, and all these houses were undamaged, and these crops were unburnt.

7 So this was done directly afterwards when they made the assault. And as

8 it says in Charlie, I then took the troika group of ambassadors down

9 towards this area and they saw for themselves the amount of damage that

10 had been done following this assault onto the Malisevo area.

11 Q. Thank you. 7th of August, 1998, SitRep.

12 MR. RYNEVELD: Next number, Madam Clerk.

13 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Prosecutor's Exhibit 257.

14 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

15 Q. Again, quickly, sir. This refers to an incident on the 5th and

16 6th of August, and you wrote the report on the 7th. You talked about

17 Drenica, Junik, and Jablanica areas. And again you talked about the

18 destruction and damage to infrastructure, crops, businesses in the same

19 way that you've witnessed in other areas?

20 A. That is correct, Your Honours. This was happening all through the

21 middle part of the summer, July, August, and September, when the Serbian

22 security forces were attempting to regain control of the area. And it

23 appeared that their tactics were to -- to try and drive the civilian

24 population out of these areas by destroying their houses and burning and

25 looting any existing businesses or any other areas that might interest

Page 7976

1 them.

2 Q. Then over the next page, under number 2, you refer to "Civpop." I

3 take it that means the civilian population?

4 A. That's correct, sir.

5 Q. What in particular were you recording there?

6 A. Throughout this period in July, August, and September, there was a

7 massive internal movement of internally displaced persons, IDPs, who were

8 the civilian population of the various areas attacked, and they were

9 driven from their homes and took refuge in either nearby forests or

10 actually moved further south to get to larger areas, like the Podgorusa

11 valley which is just north of Suva Reka. So there was very much a

12 transient civilian population that was just trying to keep out of the way

13 of the Serbian security forces.

14 Q. Next SitRep, dated September 1998. I believe this refers to a

15 situation on the 8th and 9th of September.

16 A. Yes.

17 MR. RYNEVELD: I don't know whether Your Honours have that. Thank

18 you. In due course, perhaps we could have an exhibit number.

19 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Prosecutor's Exhibit 257.

20 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you.

21 Q. Page -- first -- front page, numbered 2. IDP, is that the

22 internally displaced persons that you referred to earlier?

23 A. Yes, Your Honours. That's an acronym used, internally displaced

24 people. And as I've already said, it was in the area north of Suva Reka

25 which was held by the Serbian security forces, sandwiched between there

Page 7977

1 and Malisevo, which was also held by the Serbian security forces.

2 Q. How many people did you see in that cluster?

3 A. This -- Your Honours, this varied between, as I put down here, 5

4 and 15.000 people, and it went up to somewhere in the region of 30 to

5 40.000 at times. It's -- it was a more or less impossible task to

6 ascertain because people were living under ponchos or under polyethene

7 bags or in hedges or anywhere they could to get out of the sun and the

8 elements and in just huge groups that were really very difficult to count.

9 But the general information was between 5 and 15.000 on this occasion,

10 but it rose higher than that later in the year.

11 Q. In points 3 through 6 on the following page, I believe you make

12 some observations about seeing the destruction of the villages. And at

13 point 7, did you make any assessment as to what lay in store for these

14 people in the winter months?

15 A. Yes, Your Honours. It was of great interest to the Kosovo

16 Verification Mission, KDOM, and also who had to coordinate the civilian

17 aid that was by now starting to come in, and as you see there, there was

18 outlined figures of 171.000. But again, as I said, it's very difficult to

19 estimate completely accurately this situation. And the attempt by the

20 UNHCR and other non-governmental organisations to bring in aid was to try

21 and prevent a catastrophe happening over the coming winter months where

22 the villagers who had had their houses destroyed and their crops burnt

23 would have no food for them to eat or their animals who had been killed

24 didn't need food anyway.

25 Q. Turning then to the next one of the 3rd of October 1998, this

Page 7978

1 document refers --

2 MR. WLADIMIROFF: May I address the Court to avoid double

3 numbering?

4 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Something seems to have gone wrong.

5 JUDGE KWON: The previous one should have been 258 and the new one

6 should be 259, in my opinion.

7 MR. RYNEVELD: Thank you, Your Honours.

8 Q. If I may then turn to the 3rd of October, 1998. Is that now 259

9 or is that 260? 259? Thank you.

10 Sir, you've given some evidence about meetings that you had with,

11 among others, Dimitrijevic on the 3rd of October, and you've told us --

12 does this document -- is that more or less a more contemporaneous document

13 with the conversation that you had with Dimitrijevic, or a summary of it?

14 A. Yes, it is, Your Honours. It is a detailed summary of the meeting

15 with General Dimitrijevic where he quite clearly wanted to disassociate

16 himself and the Chief of Staff from what was going on under General

17 Pavkovic's arrangements in theatre in Kosovo and also from the direct

18 chain of command that went from Mr. Milosevic to General Pavkovic.

19 Q. All right.

20 A. And I think we covered that in quite a lot of detail already.

21 Q. Yes. I don't intend to belabour that point. But basically, this

22 is a more contemporaneous memorandum you made immediately after that

23 October 3rd meeting?

24 A. Yes, it was, sir, with -- Your Honours, with also input from my

25 ambassador who began to realise the situation was getting extremely

Page 7979

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

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12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.

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15

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18

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20

21

22

23

24

25

Page 7980

1 demanding.

2 Q. And just so that Their Honours are clear, I believe you told us

3 that Her Majesty's Ambassador was also present during that meeting?

4 A. That's correct.

5 Q. And finally, sir -- I believe it's finally, yes -- the 6th of

6 November 1998. Now, on page -- I am sorry, I guess I need a number. 261,

7 would it be?

8 THE REGISTRAR: That will be Prosecutor's Exhibit 260.

9 MR. RYNEVELD:

10 Q. 260, thank you. Paragraph 2, there was a further request to meet

11 with General Dimitrijevic on the 5th of November; is that correct?

12 A. Your Honours, at this time it was a mutual request from both me

13 and General Dimitrijevic to meet to further discuss what was currently a

14 very rapidly deteriorating situation, and the details are in that report.

15 Q. All right. And I want to draw your attention to paragraph 5. I

16 asked you earlier about discussions, and I believe I mistakenly referred

17 to discussions on the 3rd of October. I now right -- I now seem to think

18 that -- I was trying to ask you about something on the 3rd of October

19 where I should have asked you about a discussion on the 5th of November.

20 Paragraph 5, did the summer offensive come up in discussions on the 5th of

21 November?

22 A. Yes, it did, Your Honours, and General Dimitrijevic quite clearly

23 stated that the Vojska Yugoslavia had, in his opinion, overstepped their

24 rightful course of action during the summer offensive. But in his

25 defence, it was because the Vojska Yugoslavia had to step in in order to

Page 7981

1 salvage what the MUP could not tactically handle. And I think that's a

2 fair comment.

3 He also indicated, just before it in paragraph 4, that General

4 Pavkovic, the 3rd Army commander, may well react without permission from

5 the General Staff, indicating there had been a further, if you will,

6 breakdown and the chain of command was no longer through the normal chief

7 of defence staff but extant from the Supreme Defence Council, or what

8 would be called the Supreme Defence Council, direct to General Pavkovic in

9 Pristina/Nis.

10 JUDGE KWON: Colonel, what was the "DA" abbreviation of in

11 paragraph 5? "Comment: VJ were quite clearly observed by DA."

12 THE WITNESS: DA, Your Honour, is defence attache.

13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

14 MR. RYNEVELD:

15 Q. And does that mean you in this case or someone else?

16 A. That means myself. And there is also another mistake. MRS is

17 multi-rocket launcher systems MRLS. These are 122-millimetre rocket

18 systems that are extremely destructive.

19 Q. So it looks like "Mrs." but there's an 'L' missing?

20 A. Yes, I beg your pardon. There is an 'L' missing.

21 Q. And that's a military expression for --

22 A. Multi-rocket launcher system.

23 Q. Thank you for clarifying that. It had escaped me. Thank you.

24 One final question, if I may, sir, and I may have -- I may have

25 led you on an incorrect date. Perhaps you could clarify this for me: I

Page 7982

1 asked you whether in October Perisic was replaced by Ojdanic. Do you know

2 whether that was in October or November, or do you know the exact date?

3 A. I think, Your Honours, it was during -- during the October period.

4 Q. All right. Thank you. Those are my questions. Thank you very

5 much.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have less than 20 minutes left

8 until the close of business today. Could you please tell me how much time

9 I'm going to be allotted for the cross-examination of this witness in

10 total.

11 JUDGE MAY: Colonel, you can be back on Monday morning; is that

12 right?

13 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour, I could be, yes.

14 JUDGE MAY: But you want to get away at a reasonable hour.

15 THE WITNESS: Yes, that would be convenient. I have a further

16 meeting on Tuesday, sir.

17 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, Mr. Milosevic, we anticipate two hours for

18 you for this witness, so there will be 20 minutes, half an hour this

19 afternoon, and you can have a further hour and a half on Monday morning.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. But the opposite side

21 had over two hours, as you can see. First of all, one and a half hours,

22 and 35 minutes in this session.

23 JUDGE MAY: I think your mathematics are out. It was one hour to

24 start with, I don't know about the second session. But let's go on. Let's

25 go on. Let's see how we get on. The witness can come back on Monday

Page 7983

1 morning, but he has to get away.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

3 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

4 Q. [Interpretation] Tell me, please, Yugoslavia in the period when

5 you were the military attache there, was it confronted with the serious

6 problem of Albanian terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija or, as you yourself

7 said in your statement, whether there existed an inherent problem with

8 terrorism? Yes or no.

9 A. Mr. Milosevic, you well know my background, and I have been a

10 professional soldier for 35 years and served all over the world, facing

11 various terrorist threats. There was undoubtedly a Kosovo Liberation Army

12 threat to the state of Yugoslavia. And in my discussions with your staff,

13 I made that very clear that I, as your defence attache, recognised that

14 there was a problem. The question is - and only you and your staff can

15 answer that - is how you went about developing your strategy. I cannot

16 answer that question. I have given you the evidence of what I saw

17 throughout some 70 patrols into that area. There was some very, very

18 heavy-handed attitudes towards what was a majority civilian population.

19 Q. All right. Would you please answer my questions and stick to

20 that. As you said, you gave advice to the General Staff of the army of

21 Yugoslavia; you needn't give them to me.

22 Mr. Crosland, you're talking now about your experience, you a

23 colonel of the British army; that's right, isn't it?

24 A. That's correct, Mr. Milosevic.

25 (redacted)

Page 7984

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 Q. [redacted]

7 [redacted]

8 JUDGE MAY: You do not have to answer that question.

9 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Very well. On page 2, paragraph 4 of your statement, you say that

12 in October 1998, the first indications came that the KLA was a factor of

13 military importance, significance. Is that right?

14 A. Sorry. Could you please repeat where you're getting this from?

15 Q. From your statement, Mr. Crosland. Page 2. Actually, page 2 is

16 page 1, because the page 1 is the title page, so it's on page 2.

17 A. And paragraph?

18 Q. The first indication that the KLA was a force was in October

19 1998. You say that in paragraph 4.

20 A. Sorry, which --

21 JUDGE MAY: I think he's looking at the first of your statements,

22 May 1999. The accused won't have the --

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.

24 JUDGE MAY: -- but it is in fact the fourth paragraph.

25 THE WITNESS: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. That was a fair statement, and

Page 7985

1 I had a discussion with General Dimitrijevic and also, I think, General

2 Perisic about the potential developing situation in Kosovo and Metohija.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. So that the KLA was a factor of military significance. Now, what

5 did you mean by that, a factor of -- a force, the KLA was a force, in

6 fact, you say. What did you imply by force or a factor of military

7 significance?

8 A. From my experience, Mr. Milosevic, in other counter-terrorist

9 situations, a terrorist organisation can start and grow, and this was not,

10 as you well know, not the beginning of the Kosovo Liberation Army but

11 possibly the first time it had been seen in Kosovo and Metohija in the

12 Drenica area.

13 Q. Judging by what you've just said, you were well acquainted with

14 the fact that the KLA was moving men and materiel from Albania into

15 central Kosovo; right?

16 A. There were indications that this was happening, yes.

17 Q. Was this a case of terrorists, fighters? When you say people,

18 moving men, you say, men and materials, do you mean fighters, terrorists?

19 A. I think, Mr. Milosevic, when I spoke with the General Staff,

20 General Dimitrijevic, on the intelligence picture, it was quite clear from

21 your intelligence, which was presented to me in the map form, that various

22 Kosovo Liberation Army elements, both those dressed in uniform - and I use

23 the word loosely - and civilians who were perhaps helping, were moving

24 arms and ammunition across the Albanian border. That came from your own

25 Vojska Yugoslavia intelligence.

Page 7986

1 Q. All right. But you're talking about the fact in your statement

2 that -- you say these are facts, not just intelligence data, that they're

3 facts; right?

4 A. Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Those were facts given to me by the Vojska

5 Yugoslavia intelligence cell, General Krga and, latterly, General

6 Milanovic, who worked directly for General Dimitrijevic and General

7 Perisic. So it was Serbian intelligence.

8 Q. Well, all right. I hope that you yourself established what was

9 going on. Did you ever ascertain the number of men during that period of

10 time, that is to say at the end of the 1997, in 1998, and 1999, did you

11 ascertain the number of fighters, the number of terrorists that were

12 infiltrated into Kosovo from Albania?

13 A. No, Mr. Milosevic. At that time, I think your intelligence was

14 very limited because the Albanians were doing it both in and out of

15 uniform. And therefore, it was very difficult to put an exact number on

16 the type of activities that were going on in a border area that, as you

17 well know, historically has been a smuggling and contraband area. In

18 amongst all this was potentially the beginnings of the Kosovo Liberation

19 Army effort.

20 Q. All right. You say that our intelligence information was highly

21 limited. But what do you know about this infiltration of moving materiel

22 and trained men from your information and intelligence, Mr. Crosland?

23 What do you know about that?

24 A. As I say, Mr. Milosevic, the initial indications were primarily

25 from your own intelligence. And it was not until I went down in early

Page 7987

1 1998 that other information, and one personally saw on the ground and

2 talked to various people down in Kosovo, that it became clear that a

3 movement was starting to form. To try and say there was anything more

4 than a fledgling movement I think would be very difficult and certainly

5 difficult to prove.

6 Q. Did you hear about the training camps in Albania, for instance?

7 A. Yes. General Dimitrijevic spoke to me about those. And I passed

8 this information on to my own authorities.

9 Q. Did you hear about the training camps, for example, in Switzerland

10 or some other Western countries during that period of time?

11 A. There were indications that the diaspore, as it's being called

12 latterly, was potentially aiding and abetting Kosovo Albanian intentions.

13 But at that period, as far as I'm aware, I personally was not aware of the

14 depth, or the potential depth, of the Albanian support outside of Kosovo

15 and Metohija.

16 Q. And did you hear about the infiltration of foreign terrorists?

17 For example, terrorists of Al Qaeda at that time? Did you have any

18 information and knowledge about that, for instance?

19 A. No, Mr. Milosevic. As far as I know, and I personally saw one

20 potential Middle East terrorist in Malisevo in July when I was apprehended

21 by the Kosovo Liberation Army, but I never saw any or had any proof of Al

22 Qaeda or other activities.

23 Q. Well, all right. Are you claiming here and now that your service,

24 and I'm thinking of the British service, knew nothing -- the intelligence

25 service knew nothing about the activities of those organisations in the

Page 7988

1 Balkans and Albania and Kosovo during the period of time that you were

2 there?

3 JUDGE MAY: The witness has answered the question. Go on to the

4 next one.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. You're talking about materials that were moved from Albania into

7 Kosovo. Now, do you know what these materials were? More precisely, with

8 respect to type, quality, and quantity?

9 A. Initially, the KLA, UCK, whatever you want to call them, were not

10 very well equipped. Towards the end of 1998, it became quite clear that

11 they had managed to bring in much more up-to-date small arms weaponry,

12 including new rifles and sub-machine-guns, as well as limited quantities

13 of anti-armour vehicle -- anti-armour grenades as well as a fairly recent

14 shipment of better uniforms. I state that was in October, roughly

15 October 1998.

16 Q. All right. Now, you were with Ashdown in the visit to Kosovo, and

17 he was on the other side, on the Albanian border, and in Albania and in

18 Kosovo, and he spoke here in this courtroom about weapons and about the

19 presence of those formations and units on the other side of the border, so

20 I assume you commented with him about this and had your own information.

21 Now, what do you think? How much weapons and men were smuggled

22 across the border from Albania, across the Yugoslav state borders?

23 A. First of all, the information about various -- seeing various

24 changes in the Kosovo Liberation Army became clearer during the summer and

25 the autumn of 1998 when, as I've already stated, it was clear from when we

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Page 7990

1 used to see the KLA in our tours around Kosovo and Metohija that they had

2 become better equipped and armed. But I mean, Lord Ashdown should answer

3 your question. I can't answer his question.

4 Q. All right. Would it be fair to say that as Britain's defence

5 attache you were familiar with the intensification of the military forms

6 of an organisation which called itself UCK, involving the smuggling of

7 weapons, international contraband, and training of its members on the

8 territory of Albania? Were you aware of that?

9 A. Mr. Milosevic, as I already said, during the progression in 1998,

10 it became a lot clearer that many or much equipment and manpower was

11 coming across the Albanian border, as well as the Macedonia border

12 probably as well. And as you well know, it is an extremely difficult and

13 demanding area to try and guard. It is also, as you're well aware, a

14 historical smuggling and contraband route.

15 Q. Have you -- or, rather, did you inform your government about these

16 insights and the information you gathered? I see a lot of situation

17 reports that you sent to your headquarters. Did you include in those

18 reports also the information about the smuggling of foreign fighting men,

19 weapons, and also their dynamics, types, quality, and so on and so forth?

20 A. Yes, Mr. Milosevic. In various of the situation reports that we

21 have gone through this morning, I laid out that on - I think it was the

22 28th of July - I was apprehended going north out of Orahovac towards

23 Malisevo and was taken for about the first of five times by the KLA into

24 that area which was then their headquarters. And I made a detailed report

25 which stated there were about 150 men and some women in various uniforms

Page 7991

1 with various arms. And that report was made very clear to General

2 Dimitrijevic and to General Perisic when I returned to Belgrade. And I

3 indicated, as I think I've said in one of my reports, that a determined

4 action might well have seen off this problem then. However, this did not

5 happen, as you're well aware.

6 So from my point of view, I reported in a balanced way on what was

7 happening on both sides on the ground, using my considerable experience to

8 try and ascertain where this situation was liable to lead. The

9 unfortunate problem was that your security forces used some very

10 heavy-handed tactics which, as you must realise, cannot adhere the

11 civilian population to either staying in the area or possibly taking up

12 arms against you. I'm afraid I can't answer that question. That must be

13 answered by your own military personnel and Ministry of Interior personnel

14 who commanded the operations in Kosovo.

15 Q. All right. But please, please be more brief in answering my

16 questions because otherwise you'll take up too much of my time.

17 On page 2 again, paragraph 4, you claim that the Serbs perceived

18 the problem of the KLA as anti-constitutional activity and viewed it also

19 as an Albanian Mafia movement.

20 Do you believe, from the viewpoint of rules which apply in your

21 country and worldwide that this is indeed correct, that this was

22 anti-constitutional activity?

23 A. Yes, Mr. Milosevic. There was definitely an element of this and

24 also Mafia embezzlement that is within the Albanian area. The point of

25 issue is how your security forces dealt with this problem, and I've

Page 7992

1 already laid out what they did in the ensuing days and months throughout

2 1998 and 1999.

3 Q. What does that mean, they did it in the way in which they did it?

4 Is it the usual comment that this constituted an excessive use of force?

5 Is that what you are maintaining?

6 A. Mr. Milosevic, I think it is quite clear from the evidence I have

7 produced in front of the Court this morning that, on my many visits to

8 Kosovo over 1998 and 1999, the wanton destruction and heavy-handed

9 efforts, with all the evidence I have produced, is quite clear, and it's

10 not disputed either by your Vojska Yugoslavia Ministry of Defence staff or

11 by the international people who worked on the Kosovo verification movement

12 and the other NGOs, non-governmental organisations, who worked in Kosovo

13 during the latter months of 1998 and 1999.

14 Q. Mr. Crosland, since you assert here - in fact, you allege - very

15 serious things which you claim happened also while the Verification

16 Mission was there and included 1.300 people, how do you explain that such

17 serious events are not reflected in those reports of the Verification

18 Mission from October 1980 --

19 JUDGE MAY: Nothing to do with the witness. You must ask the

20 mission about that. The witness can only give evidence about what he saw

21 or heard himself. He's given the evidence. And if you challenge it, you

22 should put it to him.

23 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction. From October 1998.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Of course I dispute it, because I never heard a more twisted

Page 7993

1 testimony. And the Verification Mission --

2 JUDGE MAY: You're not here to comment. You're here to ask

3 questions.

4 Colonel, you've heard what the accused has said, that your

5 evidence is twisted. Have you told us the truth or not?

6 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I have told you the truth. It has been

7 written down in several reports. It has been backed up by both

8 photographic and other evidence, and other defence attaches who were with

9 me at the time would also complement it and prove that it was also the

10 truth. However unpopular it may be with Mr. Milosevic, I also, on my

11 return back to Belgrade, used to spend a lot of time in direct

12 communication with the Vojska Yugoslavia General Staff and was perfectly

13 open with them about what I had done. I also, as I said earlier this

14 morning, assisted when the Vojska Yugoslavia had a soldier killed and six

15 were wounded. And I personally gave medical aid to the six young soldiers

16 who had been badly wounded, with General Lazarevic, and that is written

17 down in a statement which is in some other document.

18 So from my point of view, I believe I have delivered a balanced

19 view and attempted to look at it from both sides and advise as necessary.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. All right, Mr. Crosland, if you think you delivered a balanced

22 view, how come we have here several of your reports selected in such a way

23 that in none of them can we see the structure, the volume, the dynamics or

24 intensity of the crimes perpetrated by the KLA which you reflect in the

25 reports presented here as evidence? Did you present that view as well?

Page 7994

1 But please answer with a yes or no, because I've been given only two

2 hours.

3 A. Mr. Milosevic, with great respect, I can't answer a question as

4 complicated as that with a yes or no because that would give a very untrue

5 picture.

6 You're asking about the Kosovo Liberation Army. I have already

7 informed you that I passed back information. The reports that have been

8 presented in front of you today were not chosen by me. So those reports

9 are a general view of my overall nearly 70, 75 reports.

10 JUDGE MAY: It's time to adjourn, but while it's on my mind, could

11 you deal with this, Colonel: You've spoken occasionally about your

12 conversations with the General Staff and the relationship, it seems,

13 between a defence attache and the General Staff. Is there such a

14 relationship normally?

15 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. Because of my background, which I

16 think you're perfectly well aware of, and my extensive experience in these

17 areas, it was only natural that one would attempt to advise our host

18 nation, Yugoslav General Staff, on what was obviously going to become an

19 extremely difficult area and problem. And because I was respected in that

20 view and also we spent and talked with Mr. Milosevic, with my ambassador,

21 on several occasions about the deteriorating situation in Kosovo itself.

22 And I think this is all part of a -- what I would call an adult and mature

23 way of doing business.

24 JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn now. Colonel, would you be back,

25 please, on Monday at 9.00 to conclude your evidence.

Page 7995

1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.48 p.m.,

2 to be reconvened on Monday, the 15th day of July,

3 2002, at 9.00 a.m.

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