1 Wednesday, 11 September 2002
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.
6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, before I continue, I should
8 like to make a procedural demand, a point of order, in fact.
9 JUDGE MAY: Is there any reason why we can't deal with it after
10 we've finished with the witness or does it relate to the present evidence?
11 We will be, at the end of the witnesses evidence and before we finish
12 today, we will be dealing with administrative matters. Is there any
13 reason we shouldn't deal with it then?
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, but what I have to say relates
15 to -- that is to say, the point of order, Mr. May, relates to the
16 interview that Mr. Wladimiroff had, one of the friends of the Court --
17 JUDGE MAY: That doesn't relate to this witness. Let us finish
18 the witness's evidence and then we can deal with these other matters.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. That means that I'll be
20 able to make the point of order and present my request after this witness;
21 is that it?
22 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic, you can deal with that during the
23 administrative matters.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Fine, Mr. May.
25 WITNESS: PHILIP COO [Resumed]
1 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]
2 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Coo, in my notes, I have jotted down that in
3 answer to my questions, that is my question of whether you studied the
4 activities of the KLA terrorist organisation, that you said that you
5 didn't -- that was not one of your duties. So could you please tell me
6 who defined your duty and assignment.
7 A. Your Honours, the general guidance I received for my report I
8 received from the Prosecution legal team.
9 Q. And did it ever occur to you yourself that for an analysis into
10 the conduct of the armed forces of Yugoslavia in Kosovo and Metohija, that
11 it would be -- that you wouldn't be able to sidestep looking into the
12 question of terrorism, you would have to look into that as well? So what
13 I'm asking you in fact is how you were able to exclude that entire matter
14 from your analysis.
15 A. I think all I can say is that the guidance I received and the
16 scope of the report did not require that sort of analysis.
17 Q. All right. That means that the Prosecution instructed you not to
18 deal in that subject matter; is that right?
19 A. Not specifically. It wasn't included in the guidance I was
21 Q. Well, as it's the 11th of September today, there will be a lot of
22 talk about terrorism. Do you consider it significant that under this roof
23 stands should be made and something said about that same form of terrorism
24 in Serbia?
25 JUDGE MAY: It's not for the witness what's appropriate. All he
1 can do is talk about his evidence. You can ask him about his
2 instructions, of course, but it's not for him to say what's appropriate
3 and what isn't.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I've just received an answer
5 as to the guidelines that the witness received, Mr. May.
6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. You analysed, read, and indeed presented here a number of orders
8 and reports from the field by the army and the Ministry of Internal
9 Affairs; is that right?
10 A. That's correct.
11 Q. Now, did you happen to note that all the orders, reports relate to
12 terrorism and the aggression of the NATO pact? Is that correct?
13 A. I don't recall if all of them did, but certainly some contained
14 that sort of content.
15 Q. All right. As the reports and orders refer to terrorism and
16 aggression, NATO aggression, and as we're mentioning some sort of plan
17 here, as a military analyst, did you conclude that in fact it was us who
18 planned this NATO pact aggression and Albanian terrorism?
19 A. I'm sorry, Your Honours, I --
20 JUDGE MAY: Do you want the question clarified?
21 THE WITNESS: Yes.
22 JUDGE MAY: Could you clarify the question, Mr. Milosevic? It's
23 not clear what you mean.
24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Since the orders and the reports that were the subject here of
1 analysis, the analysis -- analysis by your military analyst, and as they
2 refer to the NATO pact aggression and to terrorism, and as the opposing
3 party over there is trying to link it up with some sort of plan - that's
4 their conduct - my question is the following: Does that mean that we are
5 ourselves planned the NATO aggression and Albanian terrorism? Because
6 that's the only explanation that you would arrive at if you were to join
7 up those two elements. So yes or no.
8 A. That's not something I looked at, Your Honours, in the documents I
10 Q. All right. If you consider that to be an answer, then we can move
12 Now, did you compare the doctrine of defence of Yugoslavia with
13 the defence doctrines of other countries?
14 A. No, I didn't.
15 Q. All right. And as you did study the constitution and laws of
16 Yugoslavia, what was not contained in the constitution and legal acts and
17 provisions of Yugoslavia? What is it that was not in conformity with the
18 legal acts and documents of other modern states in the realm of the
19 country's defence? Did you come across anything that was not in keeping
20 with the usual relationship that a country has towards its own defence and
21 the defence of its own territory?
22 A. Nothing in the documents I reviewed suggested that.
23 Q. And in addition to the documents that you were able to look
24 through, did you bear in mind the situation and circumstances in which our
25 country found itself and all its citizens throughout the territory of
1 Yugoslavia during the NATO aggression and the terrorist activities of the
2 KLA in Kosovo and Metohija and other pressures as well that were brought
3 to bear against Yugoslavia? Did you bear all that in mind as well as a
4 military analyst?
5 A. I did have some knowledge of what was occurring in Yugoslavia in
6 1999 and 1998, but I should emphasise that the scope of my report was to
7 outline the structures of the armed organisations and to examine their
8 means of command and how that was implemented.
9 Q. Very well. As you say, you studied the methods of command, et
10 cetera, means of command. How do you envisage the relationship of
11 subordination to a strategic and operative level in a given situation in
12 the kind of specific situation that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was
13 faced with, faced with the NATO pact aggression and terrorism in Kosovo?
14 A. I'm not sure if I understand the question fully, but the nature of
15 subordination in the VJ and the other armed organisations is quite clear
16 and it's laid out in the report. There are clear chains of command and
17 those are provided.
18 Q. All right. In the testimony of General Sir Peter de la Billiere,
19 which had as its groundwork and foundation the documents that you yourself
20 presented, and in this particular case, he put forward his professional
21 opinion as a military expert, and he said that it was advisable and that
22 in the relations of subordination it was customary, indeed, that the
23 command at any level should have knowledge about what is happening and
24 going on two levels below it. That is what he said, if you remember.
25 A. Yes, I do remember that.
1 Q. So the Supreme Command, by the same token in our particular case,
2 should have had knowledge and information according to the standards put
3 forward by General Sir Peter de la Billiere about what was going on at the
4 army level and at the corps level. So those two levels, two steps below
5 the Supreme Command.
6 Now, do you yourself have any knowledge about any irregularities
7 in the work of any of those two levels on the basis of the information
8 that you received; orders, reports, documents, or anything else?
9 A. I haven't seen any specifics regarding irregularities, but I
10 wasn't asked to cover in detail the operations conducted by those
11 organisations at our indictment sites.
12 Q. Well, all right, then, but I can't understand what you're talking
13 about, then, what you're testifying about. Are you just testifying to the
14 fact that the constitution laws, orders and so on are the documents that
15 you presented here? Is that just it? But you drew conclusions from that.
16 So now I'm asking you quite specifically your view. Did you come across
17 any irregularities at those levels? Or let's go further down from those
18 levels. Not only army, corps, and so on, but brigade. What about the
19 brigade level? Did you note any irregularities on that score?
20 A. Within the scope of the report, the comments, conclusions, or
21 assessments in my recollection were confined to the documentation
22 concerning the structures and the systems of commanding the organisations.
23 Irregularities concerning what actually happened on the ground were not
24 within the general scope of the report. Where I came across information
25 related to some of our indictment sites, that was put into the report, and
1 no conclusions were drawn from that by me on whether or not a crime was
3 The closest, I think, I came to commenting or concluding on
4 anything that might be an irregularity was on the contents of a MUP report
5 from 1998 where they -- it was an operations order where they specified
6 that the attack should make use of Chinese ammunition, which, to me,
7 seemed strange, specifying the ammunition by origin in an operations
9 The only other area where I may have come close to an irregularity
10 comment concerned the -- was in essence a comparison between what I had
11 presented as the disciplinary system in Part I and what I had seen in
12 documentation regarding the promotions and commendations awarded to
13 various people who had disciplinary responsibility.
14 Q. Well, all right. But didn't we clear that matter up yesterday?
15 Do you -- are you saying that the people who were punished and disciplined
16 were promoted? Is that what you're saying? Or are you saying that the
17 ones who prosecuted them and brought them to task - and there are many
18 examples of these disciplinary measures being taken - should not have been
19 promoted and that they should have been punished, too, in turn? Is that
20 what you're saying?
21 A. I pointed out in the report that there are examples of
22 disciplinary measures being taken. I noted that the disciplinary measures
23 taken, at least those I was aware of, were -- did not include command
24 responsibility cases. I also noted alongside that the fact that, or the
25 point that all -- if not all, most key positions in the chains of command
1 of the MUP and the VJ were promoted and/or retained after the war. And
2 there's no information available to me to show any investigation or
3 disciplinary action into their responsibilities or any connection they may
4 have had to events on the ground.
5 Q. All right, Mr. Coo. Is anything illogical there to your mind?
6 You say that you know that there were a number, in my opinion a large
7 number, of individuals for which disciplinary action was taken, and these
8 were cases of the individual committance of criminal acts. Are you saying
9 that some of the commanders at a higher level, some of the higher-up
10 commanders, perhaps perpetrated a crime and then disciplinary action and
11 the necessary measures were not taken against him? Do you have any
12 documents on the basis of which you claim that, or any knowledge to that
14 A. What I did say in the report was that on the basis of the
15 indictment, the scope and the scale of the crimes, I would expect, again
16 based on the regulations and the laws outlined in Part I, that as a
17 minimum, some disciplinary-related activity and investigation would have
18 taken place with regard to command responsibility.
19 Q. Well, how do you know that investigations were not launched and
20 that the persons who committed crimes were in fact punished or held
21 accountable and the process for this launched and that there is no
22 responsibility for the commander that indicated, pointed out these crimes
23 and these individual cases and brought them under the long arm of the law
24 and the rules and provisions, as a military analyst? If he did so, did he
25 in fact conduct himself professionally, in keeping with his professional
1 ethics, if he took those steps? Or perhaps you think he didn't.
2 A. The only thing that I can say is that the documentation I saw
3 provided no information on disciplinary or investigations taking place in
4 relation to those in key command positions. And specifically, the book
5 issued by the Vojska publishing house -- the VJ's publishing house,
6 Vojska, in 2001 which reviewed how the VJ conducted itself with regard to
7 humanitarian law and the international law of war did not provide any
8 examples of such investigations or disciplinary measures, and I would have
9 expected to see such things highlighted in that type of book.
10 Q. And how is it possible there was no investigation on the
11 application of measures if you yourself state that a number of people were
12 prosecuted for individual crimes that they committed? How can you then
13 draw the conclusion that there were no investigations, that there was no
14 application of measures if that was what happened? Your conclusion must
15 have been quite the opposite, because all this leads to the fact that such
16 measures were taken if a certain number of people were held accountable
17 and if processes and disciplinary action against them was undertaken.
18 Isn't that so, Mr. Coo?
19 A. Some investigations were conducted. None, to my knowledge,
20 related to command responsibility, and very few with any connection to
21 violations of the laws of war. A lot of the investigations and
22 disciplinary measures taken and covered in the documents I present in the
23 report relate to common crimes.
24 Q. Of course there are some like that, unintentional ones, but a
25 crime is a crime. There were intentional and unintentional ones that were
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 prosecuted. But let's move on from here.
2 You are testifying against me. Now, you looked at a variety of
3 documents. As you put it yourself, you looked at that paper that this
4 other side calls the indictment. In it, it says that I committed crimes
5 by way of ordering, commanding, controlling, instructing, et cetera, et
6 cetera, not to enumerate all of that.
7 With the assistance of this entire apparatus and all the archives
8 that were put at your disposal, did you find a single order, command,
9 instruction? Not only mine but any commander's which contained an order
10 to commit a crime? Did you find any such thing or did you not find any
11 such thing? Do you have something like that or do you not have something
12 like that?
13 A. Your Honours, I did not come across any such documents.
14 Q. All right. Tell me, now, since we did not quite clarify matters
15 yesterday with regard to the directive of the Supreme Command, you
16 explained that you did not give it to General de la Billiere because it
17 came in at a later stage, but I assume that at least you read it yourself.
18 Is that right or is that not right?
19 A. I did read it, yes.
20 Q. Did you notice that, as opposed to many directives of Supreme
21 Commands of various armies in the world, this particular directive of the
22 Supreme Command contains provisions that pertain to humanitarian law? I
23 would like to remind you that on page 8 of this directive, in chapter 5,
24 Combat Operations, et cetera, it says, and I quote: "Vis-a-vis the enemy,
25 prisoners and the wounded, one should apply treatment in accordance with
1 the Geneva Conventions according to international humanitarian law and the
2 law of war which is deeply embedded in our national ethos of heroism and
4 It is well known that in the Serb tradition it is the greatest
5 possible shame to shoot at a prisoner of war, a civilian, namely a person
6 who is unarmed. And here in the -- in the order issued by the Supreme
7 Command, that obligation is pointed out. Did you have the opportunity of
8 becoming aware of that?
9 A. I was aware of that passage. I didn't choose to use that report
10 because I have considered very similar reports with similar information,
11 similar references, in my report.
12 All that I can say with regard to that is that there are three
13 aspects, in my mind, to discipline. And one is -- concerns the issue of
14 orders, which I've pointed out in my report was done, reminding people to
15 abide by the regulations.
16 The second is that there has to be recognition by those in the
17 chain of command of the regulations, and I've pointed out that there was
18 -- rather than recognition, I should rephrase that and say awareness.
19 There did appear to be awareness within the chain of command.
20 But third is that they have to act in accordance with the
21 regulations. And I pointed out that within the narrow constraints of my
22 expertise and scope of the report, there's at least some elements in the
23 documentation to suggest that acting in accordance with the regulations
24 may not have occurred, and that's in relation to the -- the lack of
25 command responsibility, disciplinary cases.
1 Q. All right. Can you point out these documents that suggest that at
2 the level of some command, and which level of command that would be, that
3 somebody did not abide by these rules? Do you have any such document that
4 could indicate what you've just been saying?
5 A. I'm not referring to a specific document. I'm referring to my
6 review of a collection of documents and the linking of them. That
7 collection included the 2001 book issued by Vojska showing the number of
8 orders and instructions relating to adherence to the laws of war. Some
9 documents - for example, one from the 52nd artillery, air defence and
10 artillery brigade in Djakovica - relating to some what I considered minor
11 disciplinary measures taken against soldiers, the review of disciplinary
12 measures in that 2001 book and a comparison of that with the absence
13 command responsibility measures and the promotion of those in key command
14 responsibility positions.
15 Q. All right. Tell me, in addition to this directive that you read,
16 you say, did you read and at the same time did you show General de la
17 Billiere, as the military expert, for example, this order dated the 28th
18 of June, 1998, in which it says that in case of taking some terrorists
19 prisoner, they should be treated in accordance with international
20 humanitarian law and the Geneva Conventions? That means that in 1998,
21 when there was no war yet and when, in accordance with international law,
22 terrorists do not fall under any Geneva Conventions, we treated them in
23 accordance with the Geneva Conventions. Did you bear in mind that order,
24 for example? And did you give that order to General de la Billiere as
1 A. If I remember correctly, that order was a Supreme Command or a
2 General Staff order or instruction. I think it was reissued by the Joint
3 Command in 1998. I can't remember if I did show it to General de la
4 Billiere, but I'm fairly sure that I did. I'd have to double-check that
5 against the list we reviewed yesterday.
6 But in any event, I just have to reiterate that such an order and
7 similar orders were issued and reviewed in my report. They were issued
8 throughout 1998 and 1999. And I just have to re-emphasise that. There's
9 the aspect of issuing such orders and the other consideration of whether
10 or not they were followed through.
11 Q. Well, since many people were accused and prosecuted, the
12 assumption is that this was abided by. Isn't that logical, Mr. Coo?
13 A. No, I don't think you can conclude that, Your Honours.
14 Q. Oh. So there are orders and there are individuals who were
15 criminally prosecuted. The orders relate to criminal liability. There
16 are those who are held criminally liable, but the conclusion is not that
17 orders were abided by but they were not abided by. So that's your logic.
18 Did you, for example, read the order of the 3rd of April, 1999?
19 And it's number 06692/1, and it says the perpetrators of crime should
20 immediately be brought before a court. Did you bear in mind that order,
21 for example?
22 A. I don't recall that one specifically. I may have read it. It
23 doesn't sound any different from a large number of similar orders that I
25 Q. All right. I have quite a list of orders here, and I'm not going
1 to present all of that now because I don't want to spend time doing that.
2 However, it is obvious that everything that you read is in accordance with
3 what I have been quoting. Namely, it is not clear to me how -- well,
4 actually I didn't find this clear even in the explanations that you gave
5 to General de la Billiere and the quotations you gave: How do you link up
6 the functioning of courts of law with command responsibility? This
7 linkage is not clear to me. How did you establish that?
8 A. I don't think I specifically attempt such a linkage in my report.
9 I can say that commanders, in accordance with the regulations, are
10 responsible for acting on information that suggests that a crime had been
11 committed. Ultimately, those may end up in the military courts or war
13 Q. Yes. But for example, awhile ago I quoted an order to you in
14 which it says perpetrators of crimes should be brought before the
15 investigative judge of the military court in charge. Do you think that if
16 a military commander establishes within his own unit that somebody had
17 committed a crime, and when somebody arrests that kind of person and hands
18 him over to the investigative judge of the military court in charge, that
19 he finished his task, that it is not for him to deal in the court
20 proceedings that will follow, et cetera? The court proceedings are
21 independent of the chain of command, and the commander cannot follow the
22 court proceedings if he finished his part of the job. He arrested the
23 perpetrator of a crime, handed him over to the investigative judge of the
24 military court in charge. Do you think that it's really his
25 responsibility to further take care of how the military court is going to
1 act? And anyway, what kind of powers can he have over the military
2 court? And what kind of chain of command can have any kind of authority
3 over a military court of law, or any court of law, for that matter? How
4 can you hold accountable in that sense any commander of a company, of a
5 battalion, of a brigade, et cetera, if he actually took care of his part
6 of the duty involved?
7 JUDGE MAY: Can you answer that, Mr. Coo?
8 THE WITNESS: I think I can, Your Honour.
9 The scope of my report was not to conclude whether or not proper
10 command responsibility action was taken. That has to be -- the remainder
11 of the evidence presented in this case has to be taken into consideration.
12 But command responsibility does not end at the handing over of a soldier
13 under investigation or the charging after a soldier has been charged and
14 brought before a court. Command responsibility may, if -- if the
15 information is available or if activities support this, may be -- command
16 responsibility can be brought into -- into play if there's reason to
17 believe that the crimes committed were extensive enough or in some way had
18 -- or relate to the responsibilities of a commander. The -- I think I
19 referred directly to this passage in my report yesterday where it states
20 in the regulations that the commander bears responsibility for failing to
21 investigate, for failing to take action if the scale or the scope of the
22 criminal acts are such that they suggest complicity at the command level.
23 So the bringing before a war court or a military court of a single
24 soldier is, in some cases, sufficient. But in other cases, and such a
25 case might be if widespread crimes are being committed by a unit, there's
1 suggestion that the commander has in some way either lost control or
2 connived with what those subordinates of his are doing.
3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. That is quite logical, what you've just said, Mr. Coo, but do you
5 have any knowledge whatsoever from the documents that you reviewed that a
6 unit committed, as you had put it here - I can't remember your expect
7 words now - extensive crimes, systematic, et cetera, was out of control,
8 and so on and so forth? Do you have any kind of knowledge to that effect
9 about any particular unit, or any evidence that some unit, a unit in an
10 organised way and under control committed some crimes, and under a
11 command, on orders, that is, as a unit?
12 A. I don't feel, Your Honours, that that was a conclusion that my
13 expertise or the scope of my report allowed me to reach. Specifically, I
14 did not see any orders to that effect.
15 Q. All right. And do you have at least any information, then, to the
16 effect that members of the military and the MUP did not obey their
17 superiors or their equals, their peers, or their subordinates and then
18 they committed crimes and then somebody did not hold them accountable
19 because of that? Do you have any specific information about this?
20 A. All I can say is that the latter part of that, the holding
21 accountable, I point out again that there is in the indictment a --
22 allegations that a large number of crimes on a widespread basis were
23 committed. And I contrast that in my report with the lack or the absence
24 of command responsibility disciplinary measures. The final conclusion is
25 not mine to make.
1 Q. Yes, on the condition that what the indictment says is true;
2 right? That is to say that the military and the police committed crimes,
3 and that is what the indictment says. So on the condition that that is
4 true, then it would be the way you've just put it. Is that right,
5 Mr. Coo?
6 A. Your Honour, I have to -- I had to operate on the basis of the
7 allegations in the indictment being largely correct.
8 Q. Well, there we are. That is the point; that you are proving the
9 indictment by giving allegations from the indictment. It's called
10 perpetuum mobile otherwise, everywhere else except here, I guess.
11 JUDGE MAY: That's not a question, Mr. Milosevic. Now, have you
12 got a question for the witness? That's all comment,
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course I do, Mr. May. Of course
14 I have questions. Well, after all, you do recall -- we're of a similar
15 age, we probably read similar books. You remember the story of Baron
16 Munchausen who got himself and his horse out of the mud by pulling his own
18 JUDGE MAY: We're not going into the baron now. Let's get on with
19 the witness.
20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Mr. Coo, since I see that you have been following public
22 appearances, et cetera, et cetera, the members of the military and the
23 police - officers, that is - when they appeared in public, notably when
24 they spoke in the media, did they talk against the Albanian people or did
25 they always express an unreserved loyalty to the basic principles of the
1 military and the MUP towards confidence-building and the protection of all
2 citizens? Did you see in any individual case a phenomenon of this kind of
3 discrimination, an unfair attitude that would be shown through any
4 statement made, anything that you read that came into your hands as a
5 military analyst?
6 A. I don't recall specifics. The example I put into the report
7 concerns - and I think we touched on this yesterday - concerns a
8 statement, in fact a letter written by General Pavkovic, the 3rd Army
9 commander in 1999, written by him in 1998 to his superiors. And I pointed
10 out that that, in my opinion, showed some of his -- to some degree his
11 mind-set. And to me, that wasn't a completely professional mind-set. It
12 didn't seem to be concerned with what I would expect a military officer to
13 be concerned with.
14 Q. I haven't got the letter here now and I don't really have time to
15 delve into that, but it is highly doubtful that he did not abide by his
16 professional and moral stand. He probably did. It's probably a question
17 of some kind of misinterpretation.
18 But tell me something else: Did you ever hear from any official
19 of Yugoslavia, including myself? Did you hear that I said something in
20 public? Is there any document that shows that I would be against the
21 Albanian people or did I ever speak against them, or in the chain of
22 command did anybody ever decide to take action which is not in line with
23 the principles that are incorporated in these documents? Do you have any
24 knowledge about any such thing?
25 A. All I can say is in my general background reading and including
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 the reading of witness statements, but I can't comment on other witness
3 Q. Well, when we make a sociological analysis of the witnesses that
4 we are going to see, that they include terrorists, murderers, criminals,
5 employees of this institution, and representatives of NATO. I don't know
6 whether there's any other category involved.
7 Tell me, now, for example, the 52nd Corps, section 1 of your
8 opinion. That is II A, 1/13. You mentioned the composition of the unit
9 concerned. Tell me one thing only; where did you take the names from? Do
10 you notice anything illogical in the names?
11 You write here that the names of brigades are the mechanised and
12 infantry brigades. That does not exist in our list. You did not take
13 that -- you could not have taken that, you could not have found that in
14 military doctrine documents or in the combat documents of the 52nd or,
15 rather, the Pristina Corps. Where did you get these names from?
16 A. I don't know I've found the specific reference in the report, but
17 the documents are -- where I got them from is identified in footnotes.
18 Some of the names of the units, or many of the names of the units in the
19 report are taken directly from orders of the Pristina or the 52nd Corps
20 and other VJ units. Official -- in simple terms, from official
21 documentation. I had to operate on the translation into English, but it's
22 my understanding that the VJ has various types of combat arms units,
23 including mechanised infantry units, motorised infantry units, infantry
24 units, and armoured units.
25 Q. Mr. Coo, there are no such names in the Yugoslav army, "mechanised
1 infantry," and "motorised infantry" units. There is no such name. There
2 is a Mechanised Brigade, there is an Infantry Brigade, there is a
3 Motorised Brigade, whereas these compilations do not exist. That's why I
4 ask you where you got these names from, because you could not have found
5 them in our documents. And if you're ascribing that to the translation,
6 then that's the easiest way out, isn't it? So I'm not going to deal with
7 that any longer.
8 Please, tell me --
9 JUDGE MAY: Yes, you can certainly answer that, Mr. Coo.
10 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, I'm looking at page 8 -- Part I,
11 section A, page 8, paragraph 18. The list in paragraph 18 of some units
12 within the Pristina Corps is derived from footnote 31 which mentions the
13 Pristina Corps order of the 20th of April, and that order, or at least the
14 translation of that order and other documents all provide, on a consistent
15 basis, these unit names.
16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. All right. All right, Mr. Coo. I don't think that's the way it
18 is, but time is too costly, and we really don't want to go into all these
20 In section 4, you talk about the arming of personnel, and you say
21 that, in Kosovo, weapons were given to individuals rather than
22 institutions. Is that right, Mr. Coo?
23 A. Yes. Based on a 1998 document, I think it's May 1998, and which
24 we covered yesterday, the Pristina organ for defence --
25 Q. Just say yes or no. We don't have time to go into lengthy
1 explanations. So what you're suggesting is that the weapons were handed
2 out to individuals and not institutions. Is that right?
3 A. In some cases, yes.
4 Q. All right. You quoted here a few documents, and from that we
5 ought to conclude quite the contrary, and that is -- for example, you
6 mention a document, the administration for the defence of Pristina, for
7 example. That is an organ of the federal Defence Ministry and not, as you
8 show it in your diagram, an organ of the army. It is the federal Ministry
9 of Defence that that comes under. And it has its vertical line and writes
10 to the assistant federal minister in charge of the Civil Defence section.
11 And as it is a response to his telex to give an explanation as to what is
12 being required, and he goes on to explain in this document that for the
13 needs of the Civil Defence detachment, he mentions detachments, says that
14 other weapons, not this weaponry, will be exclusively stored in the
15 warehouses of the army for the territory of such-and-such a district in
16 such-and-such a locality, et cetera, and that the means in the warehouses
17 would be organised according to the departments and sections and units and
18 how it will be issued, and so on.
19 From all this, isn't it clear that the armament, the weapons, were
20 not handed out to individuals ad hoc but that they were in fact sent to
21 institutions? And do you know that up until June 1998, the terrorist
22 forces, to all intents and purposes, were in control of a large part,
23 almost more than half the territory of Kosovo and Metohija? Do you know
25 JUDGE MAY: There are two questions there. The first one you can
1 deal with, Mr. Coo, is in relation to the weapons being organised
2 according to departments and sections.
3 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, yes. Weapons were handed out to the
4 Civil Defence departments and sections, and that document demonstrates
5 that. They were handed out under a federal programme.
6 There are two -- at least two documents in my recollection that
7 suggest arming of individuals, one which I alluded to from, I think, May
8 1998, and it was mentioned yesterday. That discusses what was, at least
9 then, a secret programme and it lists or it mentions that the following
10 groups do not need to be armed in accordance with this instruction because
11 they are armed through their own organisations, and it listed what, to me,
12 was an exhaustive list of all the official armed organisations, federal
13 and republican, leaving the conclusion that - and to my recollection it
14 stated quite emphatically in the document itself - that the arming was of
16 Secondly, the letter that General Pavkovic wrote at around that
17 time made reference to his dissatisfaction with the way the arming of the
18 population was being implemented, or for its failure to be -- become fully
19 involved in the conflict.
20 So those -- at least those two documents demonstrated to me that
21 there was some arming of individuals.
22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. All right. I'm now going to prove to you, Mr. Coo, the extent to
24 which you looked at these documents in the incompetent manner you did,
25 which is not strange in view of the qualifications.
1 Now do you know that up until June 1998, the terrorist forces
2 practically were in control of most of the territory of Kosovo and
3 Metohija, the largest part of it, at least?
4 A. I can't say whether -- how much of Kosovo they controlled. I have
5 a general idea that they controlled parts of Kosovo at that time.
6 Q. All right. Do you know that during that time the mass killings of
7 civilians were prevalent, Serbs, other non-Albanian citizens, but also
8 Albanians too who were peace abiding loyal citizens to the state in which
9 they lived, who did not lend their support to the KLA? Do you know about
10 that? Do you know about this phenomenon, this large-scale phenomenon of
11 killings, let alone the killings of policemen, soldiers and so on? I'm
12 talking about the mass killing of civilians. Do you know about that, with
13 all the kidnappings that went on and all that kind of detail? Do you know
14 about this particular phenomenon?
15 A. I'm generally aware of killings taking place, but not in the way
17 Q. All right. And do you know this: In view of those events, the --
18 what was happening, the size of the territory that these hordes were
19 rampant in, that it wasn't possible that all the population threatened
20 could be protected by the police force and that that is why we had to
21 resort to what we call self-organisation of -- and armed protection of
22 settlements, built-up areas, roads, and so on by setting up village
23 watches, patrols, and so on? Do you know about that?
24 A. That's generally one of my conclusions in the report. I point out
25 that the local defence concept would have taken some of the weight off the
1 VJ and the MUP for that responsibility. Not for command.
2 Q. And now we come to the crux of the question which relates to you
3 yourself, because what you were doing was reading papers, not looking at
4 events. Do you know that it is precisely that possibility, the
5 possibility of a self-organised armed defence, the local defence concept,
6 that that provided -- that that was provided for in the law on defence of
7 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia? Because you mention having read the
8 law, and that is stipulated in Article 61 of the law, and that along those
9 lines, Yugoslavia in no respect whatsoever found itself in any
10 transgression, transgression of the norms and regulations that prevailed
11 for that particular area and field.
12 Did you, therefore, read this in the law that you say you have
13 read? Did you happen to read that it provides for that type of local --
14 of the local defence concept and self-organisation, that that is provided
15 for, in fact, by the law of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia? Have you
16 read it or not, Mr. Coo?
17 A. I have read it, and I state that in my report.
18 Q. Well, if you've read it, why then in your report is this fact
19 construed in a negative light?
20 JUDGE MAY: You will have to clarify what you mean by that.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, your military expert places
22 in a negative context this notion of self-organisation for the protection
23 of citizens that are exposed to daily terrorist action, killings,
24 kidnappings, et cetera.
25 JUDGE MAY: You mean that he refers to arming of civilians? Is
1 that what you mean?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, you are using the kind of
3 vocabulary that is found in the indictment. I did not refer to
4 individuals, I was referring to --
5 JUDGE MAY: You complain that the witness puts it in a negative
6 light. I ask you what you mean by that, to clarify it so the witness can
7 follow. The negative light, as I understand it, is his suggestion that
8 civilians were being armed. Is that right? So we can understand what
9 you're saying.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, precisely that. The negative
11 context. He places it in a negative context.
12 JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues]... understand what
13 you mean.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, all right. If you understand
15 what I mean, then we can move on.
16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. You're also suggesting --
18 JUDGE MAY: No. You have to hear what he says about it. You
19 complain it's a negative light. He's entitled to answer.
20 THE WITNESS: Your Honours, the report, for the most part, lays
21 out, or sets out, or seeks to set out the existence of and the structure
22 and where it fits into the chain of command of armed civilians, armed
23 civilian defence, and other armed groups outside the VJ and the MUP for
24 the purpose of demonstrating that there was more in Kosovo than just the
25 VJ and the MUP and to show where they fit into the chain of command.
1 The negative connotation, the only one that I can think of is
2 where I make a -- I think it's in the conclusion of the Local Defence
3 part, and I make a comment that -- suggesting that there are risks or
4 dangers inherent in arming one ethnic group and disarming another ethnic
5 group when those ethnic groups are mutually hostile.
6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. And do you really see village watches in remote villages that are
8 there to protect their own homes from violence, do you really link that up
9 into the chain of command of the army of Yugoslavia? Is that actually
10 what you're claiming, Mr. Coo?
11 A. In my review of the documents, there are links from local defence
12 into the VJ chain of command. One such example, if I may say, is the 30th
13 of March, 1999 order from the Pec military territorial sector. The order
14 relates to the subordination of, I think it's worded "republican and
15 municipal organs" to the Pec military sector within its area of
16 responsibility. You might recall that the Pec military sector is, I
17 think, shown on the Annex 1 of Part I, section A, as being tied into the
18 VJ chain of command.
19 Q. All right, Mr. Coo. You said something a moment ago that was even
20 more - how shall I put this? - flagrant; namely, the assertion that it was
21 the Serb population that was armed, whereas the Albanian population was
22 disarmed. What you're in fact doing is suggesting that in Kosovo and
23 Metohija there was a clash between two ethnic groups, the Albanian and the
24 Serbian ethnic group. Are you -- do you realise that that's what you're
1 A. That's not at all what I was doing in the -- in the conclusion I
2 referred to of the -- regarding the arming and disarming of two ethnic
3 groups. I was pointing out that there was a mutual hostility between the
4 Serbian ethnic group and the Albanian, or elements of the Albanian ethnic
5 group, and to arm one and disarm the other had risks.
6 Q. All right, Mr. Coo. Now, are you aware of the fact that what we
7 were dealing with there was a conflict with a separatist armed uprising
8 and a terrorist onslaught carried out by the KLA on the legal system of
9 Yugoslavia, an onslaught against the civilians, the army, the police, the
10 citizens, their property, cultural and historical monuments? And when I
11 say citizens, I mean both the Albanians, Serbs, Turks, Muslims, Egyptians,
12 Romany; everybody in fact. Do you know that that's what it was all about?
13 It was a separatist armed uprising and terrorism against a state, its
14 system and peace-abiding citizens regardless of their national and ethnic
15 affiliation. Are you aware of that?
16 A. I am aware of the general nature of what the KLA was doing. Some
17 of the specifics you just mentioned I can't comment on; it wasn't the
18 scope of my report.
19 Q. I see. And do you remember that with Paddy Ashdown's testimony we
20 were able to conclude that some million pieces of weapons which were
21 pilfered in that chaos in Albania, that they were out in the open market
22 and that an enormous number of those weapons were transported through
23 illegal channels to Kosovo and Metohija and the territory of Yugoslavia
24 and Serbia? Do you know at least about that?
25 A. Again, the specifics were not within my remit, but I do have a
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 general knowledge of -- from reading media reports, that indeed some
2 weapons were lost during the breakdown in organisation in Albania.
3 Q. Well, as a military analyst, do you think that it is the task of a
4 state to collect up all that weaponry which can be used and which was in
5 fact used to kill people at random whenever anybody has occasion to do so
6 on the part of these terrorist, bandit, pilfering groups, et cetera? So
7 do you think the state was at fault for having amassed all these weapons
8 from people who were in possession of them illegally? Is that something
9 it shouldn't have done? Is that a criticism on your part?
10 A. I do agree that there have to be controls on who has weapons. I
11 cannot, because I did not see any information regarding it, comment on
12 where the Albanians in the villages from which weapons were being
13 collected under the programme I noted, where they obtained their weapons
14 from, whether they had those weapons legally or illegally.
15 Q. Well, Mr. Coo, as you've read the provisions and that's what you
16 base your report on, do you know that no citizen of Yugoslavia, not only
17 in Kosovo and not only an Albanian, but any Yugoslav citizen - in
18 Belgrade, Nis, Pozarevac, Kragujevac, anywhere - they cannot be in
19 possession of an automatic rifle, and there are regulations as to which
20 kinds of weapons a citizen can legally be in possession of. That can be a
21 pistol, if there is reason for him to carry a weapon of that kind and has
22 a permit to do so, that they can have a hunting rifle or weapon, but that
23 nobody, according to the law, can be in possession legally of any of the
24 heavier types of weapons, automatic weapons.
25 So you cannot question at all, or you cannot question whether it
1 was procured illegally or legally. Is that clear to you? Let alone tops,
2 guns, tanks, heavy machine-guns, et cetera, and how they were illegally
3 procured. Is that something that is clear to you, Mr. Coo?
4 A. The documentation reviewed with regard to the disarming programme
5 made no reference to the types of weapons or how they were obtained. It
6 merely made reference to weapons and who held them, which ethnic group. I
7 have no awareness -- for the second part of the question, I have no
8 awareness of the legislation surrounding ownership of weapons.
9 Q. Well, in that case, Mr. Coo, does it seem to you to be feasible,
10 Mr. Coo, that the military weapons taken from the citizens in Albania was
11 not looted by Serbs who went to Albania but that this was done by the
12 Albanians themselves in order to sell them and to equip the terrorist
13 groups in Kosovo, Albanian terrorist groups in Kosovo?
14 A. Again, Your Honours, I don't feel that I have sufficient knowledge
15 of that -- that incident in Albania to comment on its connection to
17 Q. All right. We're dealing with a lack of knowledge. That is not
18 something that is contested here. But explain this to me now: Whether
19 you talk intentionally or unintentionally in part of your report on
20 command and the relationships between the army and police, you present a
21 number of inaccuracies in order to demonstrate the subordination of the
22 Ministry of the Interior to the army, allegedly, and we cleared that up.
23 It wasn't the ministry, in fact, it was those in the area.
24 And you refer to Article 16 of the law on defence. Then you quote
25 that particular law. And instead of the term "combat operations," you use
1 the term "combat activities." And on that basis, one ought to conclude
2 that the army was in command of all combat activities and not combat
3 operations, as it is precisely termed in the article quoted.
4 Now, my question for you, Mr. Coo, is as follows: Do you make a
5 difference, do you differentiate between combat operations and combat
6 activities? Because according to military doctrine, which you say you
7 know, those are two very different concepts. So do you differentiate
8 between the two, between combat operations and combat activities?
9 A. I have no awareness of the distinction.
10 Q. All right, Mr. Coo.
11 JUDGE MAY: What is the difference, Mr. Milosevic? You say
12 there's a difference. What is it?
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I just complete the entirety of
14 my question, Mr. May, because it's not me that's doing the answering here,
15 it's the witness.
16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Now, in your testimony, for you to be able to refer back to
18 article --
19 JUDGE MAY: No. If you put a point to a witness that there is a
20 distinction when there is no apparent distinction, you better explain to
21 the witness what it is that you are putting. You can't put confusing
22 questions like that and then think you can get away with it and move on to
23 something else.
24 Now, will you tell us what the difference is, according to you,
25 between combat operations and combat activities, so the witness can
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I just want to ask one more
3 question and then I'll go on to explain. Don't worry about that, I will.
4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. What does military doctrine, Mr. Coo, of the Yugoslav army imply
6 under the concept and term of "combat operations"? Do you know what it
7 means when it uses that term "combat operations"? What is implied?
8 A. The term "combat operations," to me, means armed operations
9 conducted by an armed group against an opposing armed group, in very basic
11 Q. Well, you're fairly near it, yes. That is more or less it.
12 Now, what about -- so "combat operations" imply military
13 operations, defence -- attack, defence, and other operations that are
14 being prepared and conducted in certain areas where combat operations take
15 place. So we agree there, do we? So attack, defence, military
17 Whereas combat activities can imply all sorts of preparations and
18 all the inherent activities linked to waging any kind of defence or attack
19 or anything else which is linked to the activities of an army as an
20 organisation or the police as an organisation. So combat activities also
21 include moving in combat formation, for example, between Pristina and Pec,
22 without engaging in any combat operations. But, for example, a company is
23 moving in military formation with all the security provided, not to be
24 attacked and so on, and no attack takes place. But that is a part of the
25 combat activities without combat operations. Whereas with the police,
1 they are resubordinated to the commanders, the military commanders during
2 combat operations, Mr. Coo, and they are not resubordinated to the
3 Ministry of the Interior but the police units find themselves to be there
4 in the terrain during combat operations when combat operations are taking
6 So do you differentiate between the term the "zone of combat
7 operations" or "area of combat operations" and "area of responsibility,"
8 Mr. Coo?
9 JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues]... do you
10 understand? Do you follow the point, the distinction which the accused
11 makes, if there is one? Perhaps you would like to comment on it or not.
12 THE WITNESS: I do, Your Honours. It sounds like a reasonable
13 distinction to me. The final, I think, point which I interpret as a
14 question, a differentiation between the zone of operations and area of
15 responsibility, I can't say because I haven't seen it in VJ terminology
16 whether they make such a distinction. The area of responsibility is the
17 area, geographic area allocated to a specific unit for which that unit's
18 commander is responsible for the conduct of combat operations. I don't
19 know, because I haven't seen it, what the difference between area of
20 responsibility and area of operations is, but would assess that area of
21 operations simply means the area in which combat operations happened to be
22 taking place within an area of responsibility.
23 JUDGE MAY: It's now half past ten. We'll adjourn there for 20
25 --- Recess taken at 10.30 a.m.
1 --- On resuming at 10.50 a.m.
2 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you have another half hour, we'll give
3 you, which is more time than we said, but we have slightly more time
4 available. But on the other hand, we must leave time to deal with the
5 administrative matters today.
6 The article that you mentioned is being translated. We should
7 have a translation available at the next adjournment, so we will deal with
8 that after the next adjournment.
9 One further matter. We are asked by the interpreters to ask you
10 not to put your headphones around the microphone because it creates an
12 THE ACCUSED: Very well, Mr. May.
13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Mr. Coo, do you know that Article 16 -- I'm continuing where we
15 stopped -- of the law that you quoted pertains to zones of combat
16 operations, not of areas of responsibility or the territory as such? Is
17 that clear to you?
18 A. Your Honours, I'm not sure if we should be referring to Article
19 17, which deals with subordination of the MUP. Article 16, to my
20 recollection, of the law on defence concerns the fact that the VJ is
21 responsible for unifying organisations in defence of the country. So I'm
22 not clear which article we're referring to here.
23 Q. I said quite precisely Article 16 that you quoted. Now, this is
24 my assertion: It pertains to zones of combat operations, not of -- it
25 does not pertain to areas of responsibility or territory as such. Is that
1 clear to you?
2 A. That's not clear to me from Article 16. All that I can derive
3 from Article 16 is that, during periods of armed conflict - and again I'm
4 not sure if I'm remembering the precise wording - but during periods of
5 armed conflict, defence of the country -- during periods of armed
6 conflict, the VJ unifies all armed organisations in defence of the
8 Q. No. Article 16, Article 16 of the law on defence authorises the
9 army of Yugoslavia and commanders of its units to command all forces that
10 take part in operations only until these operations as concrete forms of
11 combat operations are taking place.
12 I asked you awhile ago whether it is clear to you that the article
13 of the law that you quoted, Article 16, pertains to zones of combat
14 operations, not to areas of responsibility or to territory as such. Is
15 that clear?
16 A. Again, no, it's not something that I could derive from the
18 Q. All right. And do you know that that is precisely regulated in
19 Article 17 of this law? For reasons only known to you, you did not quote
20 it. That article reads as follows: Those authorities - that is to say
21 the authorities of the MUP - when carrying out combat operations, are
22 subordinated to military commanders who command combat operations. That
23 is what Article 17 says, and I assume that you read the entire law, not
24 only one article.
25 A. That's correct. That's my understanding of Article 17, and I did
1 read the entire law.
2 Q. All right. Is it clear to you, then, that your assertion is wrong
3 because you're dealing with activities, combat activities, not combat
5 A. I don't think I've made the distinction in my report between
6 combat activities and combat operations. I've used the term "combat
7 operations" because it's used in the documentation I've reviewed. In
8 general terms, what the documentation showed to me was how the system of
9 commanding the armed organisations in Kosovo was set up and functioned, to
10 some degree. That system was described in the report as consisting of the
11 internal chains of the VJ and the MUP and other armed organisations, and I
12 also covered the issue of the role and function of the Joint Command and
13 the Supreme Command.
14 The specificity of whether -- or of how those chains of command
15 related to joint operations that were combat operations doesn't come out,
16 isn't addressed specifically in the report. What I do say is that the
17 documentation shows that in 1999, and in 1998 but we're dealing with 1999,
18 the chains of command of the MUP and the other armed organisations outside
19 the VJ were connected in some way to the VJ's chain of command. And that
20 appeared to be the case not just for combat operations but for activities
21 outside combat operations, one of the more important of which is the
22 planning activity for combat operations. In other words, the various
23 chains of command, internal chains of command, are brought together for
24 the planning of combat operations, among other operations.
25 Q. All right. Is it clear to you, then, that neither the MUP nor all
1 the elements of the system of defence on the ground could have or could
2 they have been constantly subordinated to military commanders but only for
3 the duration of certain combat operations in a certain area? Let me be
4 quite clear. I'm talking about the system of observation, reporting, the
5 system of territorial control, the Civil Defence, the military territorial
6 authorities, that is to say the civilian authorities like the secretariats
7 of national defence. Is it clear that these authorities cannot
8 automatically be subordinated to the army of Yugoslavia but only on strict
9 orders by the superior command and only for the duration of the combat
10 operations? Is that clear to you?
11 A. That wasn't strictly the case. The -- some of the orders issued
12 concerning subordination, orders issued by the VJ directing that, for
13 instance, its brigades subordinate the MUP to command of the brigades do
14 specify that the subordination relates to combat operations, and they make
15 reference to Article 17 in the law on defence.
16 There are other broader orders and instructions and information in
17 various documents showing that the scope of the VJ's authority extended
18 beyond combat operations. And again, I can refer to a good example and
19 that's the 30th of March Pec military sector order which states that
20 republic and municipal authorities in its zone will subordinate themselves
21 to the Pec military sector. It made no reference to that subordination
22 being solely for combat operations.
23 Q. That is not an argument, that is not an explanation, because you
24 did not interpret this properly. But let us deal with another question
25 now that has to do with reporting.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Did you study, through the documents that were made available to
2 you, how the reporting process goes through the chain of command, from the
3 smallest units up to their higher commands and further on?
4 A. Yes, I did.
5 Q. Was it your conclusion that this reporting chain worked its way up
6 the chain of command just like commands, orders move down the chain of
8 A. Yes. The reports I saw showed reporting up the chain of command.
9 Q. All right. Let's take an example now, one that we saw here --
10 rather, heard here. This is a witness who was an officer of the army of
11 Yugoslavia, an Albanian, who claimed that some civilians were killed by
12 the military, not by NATO because it's well known how many were killed by
13 NATO in the village of Meja and in the zone beyond. He said here that
14 over his -- over a shoulder, he saw how a report was being typed, that is
15 to say a report, this lowest level from this unit of his to the commander
16 of the brigade, and then this report was sent further up by the brigade
17 command, where it said what he said, that civilians were killed and that
18 60 terrorists were killed. In response to my questions, of course, he
19 answered that he did not make any objections to the person who was writing
20 the report, but he says that this was an inaccurate report because he says
21 it was not 60 terrorists who were killed but it was civilians who were
22 killed. And he saw that the NCO who was typing the report was typing it
23 out that way.
24 Now, if you have this chain of reporting and if from the lowest
25 level a report arrives, and in view of professionalism, discipline, et
1 cetera, nobody has reason to believe that it is inaccurate -- I also
2 believe it is truthful. I believe that what he is saying is inaccurate,
3 but that doesn't matter.
4 Let's take a theoretical assumption that the report is inaccurate.
5 How, then, in this chain of reporting that works its way up, if on site an
6 inaccurate report was made, on the basis of what can a higher command come
7 to the conclusion that that report is inaccurate except if they assume
8 that the lower level is providing reports that are not truthful?
9 As a military analyst, I hope that this is quite clear to you.
10 JUDGE MAY: Now, Mr. Milosevic, you have now been talking for two
11 minutes, and the time has come to bring an end to this. This is not, as
12 you've been told, the occasion for argument or discussion or to make
13 points. It is to ask questions. Now, if you have a question arising from
14 this, you must ask it. We cannot allow you to waste time by this talk.
15 Now, what is the question?
16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. My question is whether the higher command should proceed from the
18 assumption that the report it receives from the ground is incorrect or
19 should it go without saying that in accordance with the rules of service
20 and the carrying out of this service in a proper army, that that report is
21 precise and accurate?
22 A. The higher command, the recipients of the report, would have to
23 consider the reports they receive in relation to any other reporting
24 they're receiving, including what they're hearing through the media, and
25 that's really all that I can say on that subject.
1 Q. Well, if it is said, then, that in the media there is assertion by
2 the representative of the Ministry of Defence of the United States that
3 100.000 Albanians were killed in Kosovo and if that is not true, are then
4 they supposed to compare that to such claims made by propaganda which was
5 evolving along parallel lines, parallel to the aggression against
6 Yugoslavia, or should they believe what they see with their very own eyes
7 in the field?
8 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. No. I'm going to get the witness to
9 answer what you've put to him.
10 What are they supposed to take out of the media, Mr. Coo?
11 THE WITNESS: All I can really say, Your Honour, is that
12 commanders have a responsibility to consider all reporting made available
13 to them and assess it as they may.
14 And I can also point out that -- for instance, the Vojska book
15 from 2001 does show that investigations or -- that investigations and more
16 generally there was awareness that mass graves had been found, that crimes
17 had been committed, and investigate -- in some cases investigations were
18 conducted. The end result of those investigations I've alluded to in my
19 report with reference to command responsibility, disciplinary measures.
20 But it's simply the commanders in the chains of command I've outlined have
21 a responsibility to consider more than just reports that they're receiving
22 from subordinate units.
23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. All right. On the basis of what do you conclude, then, that
25 commanders did not use all the knowledge they acquire? Why do you think
1 they only stick by the reports that they receive? You're an intelligence
2 officer. You said that yourself. So the assumption is that commanders
3 have all kinds of information that they can get under objective
4 circumstances. On the basis of what do you assume that they do not avail
5 themselves of all the knowledge they acquire? Why do you think that they
6 only stick to the reports they get?
7 A. I don't think I've assumed that, but I don't have information to
8 show in great detail exactly what reports commanders were relying upon,
9 but I certainly wouldn't assume that they were relying merely on reports
10 from subordinate units.
11 Q. All right. But in the documentation that you found, you did not
12 establish that an omission or a mistake was made somewhere or - how should
13 I put this? - that some kind of a false report was sent, one that would
14 not correspond to the situation on the ground. Did you have something
15 like that in your hands or not?
16 A. That wasn't mine to establish, or that could not be established
17 from the documents I reviewed.
18 Q. All right. Let us then move on to another subject. It has to do
19 with some of the assertions you made as a military analyst.
20 As a military analyst, do you make any difference between a staff
21 organ and an organ that is engaged in commanding?
22 A. Yes. The commander is the individual with command responsibility.
23 The staff organ is the staff of officers supporting the commander in the
24 exercise of his command responsibility, but they themselves do not have
25 command responsibility.
1 Q. Well, then, why did you write in a part of your report, the
2 summary of section 1, the General Staff of Yugoslavia is said to have been
3 the highest level of commanding the army of Yugoslavia? The General
4 Staff is the highest professional and staff organ, and so on and so forth.
5 That's what Article 5 of the law on defence says; right? So why did you
6 write something else?
7 A. The -- if I -- the General Staff of the VJ, in my interpretation
8 of the documentation, is a slightly different case from the staffs of
9 headquarters at the army corps and brigade levels where the chiefs of
10 staff do not have command authority. The General Staff of the VJ, and if
11 I recollect correctly, there is a definition in Part I given from, I
12 think, the VJ Manual on Command and Control, which states that the chief
13 of the General Staff commands the army on behalf of the -- or pursuant to
14 the FRY president's direction and that the chief of the General Staff
15 issues -- does this through documents such as orders, directives, and
17 Some specific examples on the chief of the General Staff's command
18 authority come out in the Supreme Command Staff documents that we reviewed
19 yesterday. The signature block on these is the chief of the General
20 Staffs, General Ojdanic. He's not signing on behalf of somebody else. In
21 the case of chiefs of staff at the army brigade, corps levels, the chief
22 of staff may sign an order, but he's signing on the authority and the
23 signature block of the commander of that unit.
24 So in this case, the General Staff and the chief of the General
25 Staff is regarded, in my interpretation, as something slightly different
1 than the staffs at other levels.
2 Q. All right. Please. You wrote in item 8, the Supreme Command, you
3 said that the civilian leadership and the General Staff became the Supreme
4 Command once a state of war was proclaimed. Do you know that a Supreme
5 Command exists in times of war and peace and that that assertion of yours
6 is wrong?
7 A. I made that assertion on the documentation again. I saw no
8 references to the Supreme Command or Supreme Command Staff prior to the
9 state of war. Once a state of war began on the 24th of March, the
10 documentation for the most part refers to the Supreme Command and the
11 Supreme Command Staff.
12 Q. In a state of war, Mr. Coo, do you know about this: The General
13 Staff grows into the staff of the Supreme Command. It grows into the
14 Supreme Command Staff. So it's no longer called the General Staff but the
15 Supreme Command Staff. But the Supreme Command exists in war and peace.
16 What does this term "Joined Supreme Command" mean for you? Does
17 it mean that there is a civilian command and -- that there is a civilian
18 command and a military command in times of peace and that in times of war
19 only are they brought together?
20 A. No. All I can say again is that the references to the term
21 "Supreme Command" and "Supreme Commander," and "Supreme Command Staff" all
22 appear in a state of war documentation. The -- prior to the state of war,
23 the civilian leadership appears in documentation as the -- what is known
24 as the Supreme Defence Council headed by the president of the FRY. And as
25 you said, and I agree with that, the General Staff is known as the General
1 Staff during peacetime and becomes, during time of war, the Supreme
2 Command Staff.
3 Q. All right. Did you read in the constitution that the president of
4 the republic commands the army in times of war and peace? Did you read
5 that in the constitution?
6 A. Yes, I did. That's in the report.
7 Q. And did you read in the constitution that the president commands
8 in war and peace on the basis of decisions of the Supreme Defence Council?
9 That's what the constitution also says.
10 A. Yes, I did.
11 Q. Why, then, in section I, do you say that the Supreme Command -- in
12 item 7, you say that the Supreme Command rely -- why do you rely on an
13 interview, actually, of General Pavkovic, which perhaps was not even
14 carried the way it was said because General Pavkovic certainly knows how
15 things are organised.
16 In that interview, as you observed, General Pavkovic says that the
17 Supreme Defence Council is an advisory body. That is your conclusion.
18 And the constitution and the law on defence and the army spell out the
19 role of the Supreme Defence Council quite differently. You have Article 4
20 of the law on the army and Article 135 of the constitution. Why, then,
21 Mr. Coo, did you take this probably free interpretation of General
22 Pavkovic to be more meaningful than the letter of the law and
23 constitution? Didn't it seem to you that, as a military analyst, you had
24 no right to do that?
25 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Coo, before you answer, do you have the passage in
1 the report to which the accused is referring?
2 THE WITNESS: No, I don't, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE MAY: What is the passage that you are referring to, item 7?
4 Is it paragraph 7 in part I?
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Coo knows where he wrote
6 this. He also refers to the interview.
7 JUDGE MAY: No. We can't deal with this in a vacuum. We have to
8 know what is being referred to.
9 Yes, Mr. Nice.
10 MR. NICE: I think it's section D, page 5.
11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
12 MR. NICE: I think it's section D, page 2 of 5, paragraph 7.
13 JUDGE MAY: Yes, that appears to be it. Have you got that,
14 Mr. Coo?
15 THE WITNESS: Yes, I have, Your Honours.
16 JUDGE MAY: Would you like to explain the paragraph?
17 THE WITNESS: This is General Pavkovic who, at that time, was the
18 chief of the General Staff but commanded the 3rd Army in the war. This is
19 General Pavkovic in an interview, commenting on the public discussions
20 regarding the legitimacy of the title "Supreme Commander." And I think
21 he's responding to allegations by former Chief of General Staff Perisic
22 that there was no such title in the law.
23 The legislation and the constitution all refers to the Supreme
24 Defence Council and defines the president's role with respect to that,
25 stating that he commands the army pursuant to decisions of the Supreme
1 Defence Council.
2 During a state of war, the top level of command was known as the
3 Supreme Command, of which the VJ General Staff was the Supreme Command
4 Staff. The civilian membership of that, I haven't seen documentation to
5 set it out in detail, but the documentation does state that the Supreme
6 Command is headed by the Supreme Commander, the FRY president.
7 I don't know if that addresses the question of Mr. Milosevic.
8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. All right, Mr. Coo. I understand your difficulties. But please,
10 you've just partially given some explanations. In the diagram, and it's
11 this one here, the diagram that you showed yesterday, the organisation of
12 the FRY military forces. According to that diagram of yours, the General
13 Staff is outside the supreme --
14 JUDGE MAY: 54. Part I, section A, 54.
15 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. According to your diagram, the General Staff is outside the
18 Supreme Command and is depicted as being one command instance between the
19 Supreme Command and the 3rd Army interposed. It could be the 2nd Army or
20 the 3rd Army, it doesn't matter. Or the RVO or PVO or navy or whatever.
21 You took one strategic group - and I don't mind that, I'm not criticising
22 that - but you placed the General Staff outside the Supreme Command and
23 have depicted it to be a command instance between the Supreme Command and
24 the strategic group, in this case the 3rd Army.
25 Do you know that that is not correct, that the General Staff, as
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 you and I together established a moment ago, its part, it is within the
2 composition of the Supreme Command as its staff body? So the Supreme
3 Command Staff organ is part of the Supreme Command and not an instance in
4 between, interposed between the Supreme Command and the strategic group of
5 the army.
6 A. I do appreciate that, and it's evident in my report, I think. I
7 -- this diagram is intended to -- is an attempt to show the chain of
8 command during times of peace and war. During times of peace, according
9 to the legislation, it's the Supreme Defence Council that's the civilian
10 leadership, and the -- my interpretation is that the General Staff of the
11 VJ is not incorporated within the Supreme Defence Council.
12 During times of war, yes, the Supreme Command does incorporate the
13 General Staff of the VJ.
14 Perhaps a better diagram for this purpose, specifically for the
15 state of war, was the one shown during the opening statement, and I seem
16 to recall a dotted line drawn around the civilian staff and the General
17 Staff of the VJ and the collective title "Supreme Command" assigned to
19 Q. Please. Let's clear up one point. The General Staff and the
20 staff of the Supreme Command is not part of the Supreme Defence Council,
21 but like any other command, the Supreme Command too has its commander and
22 its staff, and this, taken as a whole, represents the Supreme Command.
23 In point 52, the commands and instances of information, Part I,
24 29/58 [as interpreted] in that first sentence, you state the following:
25 At every level of command from the General Staff down to each and every
1 brigade, there is a command which acts according to instructions from the
2 Chief of Staff. That is what you yourself wrote, Mr. Coo.
3 My question to you is as follows: Do you know that the command
4 does not act according to instructions from the Chief of Staff but
5 according to instructions and orders from the commander? Or, rather, do
6 you know that the Chief of Staff organises the work of the staff, that the
7 assistant commanders for the individual departments are responsible for
8 the work of their own departments but the command does not follow the
9 instructions of the Chief of Staff but the orders of the commander. So
10 we're talking about each separate level, and you're talking about each
11 separate level precisely in the passage and section that I quoted from.
12 Is that clear to you, Mr. Coo?
13 A. Yes, the intention of that first sentence, to elaborate, is to
14 show that in general terms, the -- these levels in the chain of command,
15 the army corps and brigades, have staffs to assist the commander, and
16 those staffs are operating on the basis of direction received from the
17 top. And it does go on to say that those command staffs support the unit
18 commander by turning his intent into detailed direction in the form of
20 So, yes, those staffs respond directly to their own immediate
22 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you have gone over the time by another
23 ten minutes, so you really must bring this to a close. You can ask one or
24 two questions more.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] How much time -- one or two
1 questions you say; right?
2 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Now, the application of international war law, you interpret bans
5 on attacks on civilian targets, et cetera. There were a lot of orders
6 here which I intended to quote, but I will have time in due course,
7 although you do allow for the possibility that civilians could be acted
8 against if they are in military facilities, that this can be a legitimate
9 method if civilians are found in those localities.
10 Do you know that there existed a ban of opening fire when it was
11 quite obvious even that they were dealing with terrorists if there was the
12 danger that civilians would be harmed during that action, and that that's
13 what many terrorists did; they infiltrated them into groups of civilians,
14 and the police did not open fire either on the terrorists who were clearly
15 distinguished from the civilians, although they took off their uniforms
16 and were left in their underclothes, precisely not to harm the civilians?
17 So were you able to find this in the documents you studied, Mr. Coo? Did
18 you come across situations of that kind?
19 A. I am aware of the orders concerning how to handle civilians and
20 members of the KLA. I'm not aware in detail of the implementation of
21 those orders.
22 Q. Yes. All right. But let's ask a hypothetical: If an army were
23 to attack civilian targets and it knew at the same time that those targets
24 were just being used for civilian purposes, would that be a war crime? So
25 it knows it's attacking civilian targets, it knows that civilians are
1 located there, and it knows that the facilities are used for civilian
2 purposes. Would that be a war crime? Yes or no.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. All right. So when NATO attacks Yugoslavia and destroys
5 civilian --
6 JUDGE MAY: You're going well beyond the witness's evidence now.
7 Have the amicus have any questions?
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have an objection to make,
9 Mr. May.
10 JUDGE MAY: If it's about the time, you've had well over the time
11 that we allowed you to ask questions, and you must organise your time to
12 use it efficiently.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, it is not my intention to
14 discuss time with you, but I do have an objection to make, the
15 participation of Mr. Wladimiroff, because with the interview that he
16 granted, he has disqualified himself in so doing.
17 JUDGE MAY: We are going to rule on that matter or, rather, we're
18 going to look at the article that you've complained of when we've had it
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Wladimiroff.
22 MR. WLADIMIROFF: I think, Your Honours, that the accused covered
23 all the topics I had selected. Let me check to be sure. Except for one.
25 Usher, would you mind showing this to the witness, please.
1 What I have given to the witness, Your Honours, is a chart which
2 has been used by the Prosecution during opening statement, and I'm going
3 to ask the witness if he recognises that chart.
4 Questioned by Mr. Wladimiroff:
5 A. Yes, I recognise it, Your Honours.
6 Q. Do you know who made that chart? Have you drawn it up?
7 A. I produced that chart.
8 Q. Right.
9 MR. WLADIMIROFF: That's all I have to ask. I tender that chart.
10 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Any re-examination?
11 MR. NICE: Yes, Your Honour, there are a few matters.
12 Re-examined by Mr. Nice:
13 Q. As to the chart that we were looking at very briefly, Mr. Coo, is
14 there any comment you want to make about it? Is it still a chart you
16 A. Yes. I still agree with the contents of that chart.
17 Q. While we're on the topic of charts, may the witness have this one,
18 please, and everybody else.
19 Only if this is the chart you were referring to earlier as a chart
20 shown in the opening that you thought was a more accurate depiction of the
21 state of affairs. Is this the chart you had in mind, Mr. Coo?
22 A. Yes, it is, Your Honour.
23 MR. NICE: Perhaps it could be placed on the overhead projector,
24 and two points really.
25 Q. First of all, here we see a line, horizontal line, between the
1 Supreme Command and the Supreme Command Staff which you've dealt with
2 differently in the other chart, I think by an oblique line. Any comment
3 you want to make on that?
4 A. Again, it's an attempt to represent in the best way I thought
5 possible the structure of the highest body commanding armed organisations
6 in Kosovo and to show that it was a Supreme Command comprising civilian
7 leadership and the Supreme Command Staff, which, as explained, was a
8 military General Staff.
9 Q. Now dealing with the dotted line and the point you were making in
10 answer to the accused about this being a more useful document. Please
12 A. Can I just ask if you're referring to the dashed line from MUP to
13 VJ or the dotted line around --
14 Q. Both or whichever one was significant in the answer you were
15 giving to the accused.
16 A. The dotted line, the large box, shows -- attempts to show the
17 organisation's levels of command in Kosovo. And I should also highlight
18 the fact that this is a simplified chain of command. It doesn't show
19 every unit.
20 The position of the Joint Command as shown is -- shows a
21 connection to the Supreme Command, and the documentation suggests that the
22 Joint Command was the Supreme Command's representation in the theatre of
23 -- or the most important theatre of operations. The whole of the -- the
24 whole of Serbia was a theatre of operations at that time, but this is
1 The two separate chains of command, internal chains of command, of
2 the MUP, Serbian MUP, and the VJ are shown. And the oval around the MUP,
3 VJ, and local defence units is meant to represent the role of the Joint
4 Command in coordinating the operations of those units. The units had to
5 retain their own internal chains of command, because once they receive
6 direction from the Joint Command or the Supreme Command, they have to
7 enact that direction and that requires the issue of orders down through
8 their own chains of command.
9 I think that's about all I have to say on that.
10 Q. Thank you very much.
11 MR. NICE: May that perhaps be given a separate exhibit number.
12 THE REGISTRAR: This will be Prosecutor's Exhibit 325.
13 MR. NICE:
14 Q. Mr. Coo, just going through the questions starting yesterday, we
15 needn't look at it, but you made clear that Annex 1 to your first report
16 sets out the promotions that were achieved by the participants; is that
18 A. That's correct, Your Honours.
19 Q. And widespread promotion is what is suggested within your report
20 as the consequence of participation; is that correct?
21 A. That's correct.
22 Q. You were asked questions about the Joint Command and the existence
23 or otherwise of Joint Command documents beyond those that you've already
24 spoken of or referred to. Is it the case that the Office of the
25 Prosecutor has sought Joint Command documents from the relevant
2 A. Yes, it has.
3 Q. With or without any proper response?
4 A. With none received. No response.
5 Q. You made the observation that there was, you thought, command
6 implications from the VJ doctrine so far as the Joint Command was
7 concerned, and you made that observation when the accused was suggesting
8 Joint Command was coordination rather than command. Can you amplify
9 further, if I've recorded your answer correctly, what it was in the VJ
10 doctrine that had command implications for the Joint Command?
11 A. VJ doctrine, the -- specifically the Manual on Command and Control
12 from 1997, defines various command terms, and two of those terms are
13 "coordination" and "cooperation." And it states that, to my recollection,
14 the difference or at least the significance difference between
15 "coordination" and "cooperation" is that coordination has command
16 implications. Cooperation is merely simply as it says, cooperating, but
17 there's no command relationship.
18 The other -- the remainder of the explanation I used in response
19 to that question was to refer to at least two of the Joint Command related
20 documents, showing that the Joint Command was -- or at least I referred to
21 two documents in which references to Joint Command orders were made, and I
22 stated that orders are executive documents. And again, that's defined in
23 the VJ Manual on Command and Control.
24 Finally, the very name "Joint Command" has to suggest its
25 function: One, a function of command; and the other, a joint aspect of
1 that command. All of the reporting from the Joint Command, or the
2 reporting I've seen, does cover operations of the VJ and the MUP,
3 suggesting a joint aspect.
4 Q. Thank you. You've been shown by the accused a few documents. My
5 recollection is the two documents from the OSCE to which we are still
6 awaiting translations, Your Honour, and therefore can't deal with further.
7 But comment is made by him in questions about the materials you had to
8 work on. Have you reviewed, so far as you can, all the appropriate
9 documents held by the Office of the Prosecutor?
10 A. Yes, I have.
11 Q. Were further documents to come to light, whether provided pursuant
12 to requests by the Office of the Prosecutor or provided by the accused,
13 would you be able to review them and consider whether your report needed
14 any adjustment?
15 A. Yes, I would.
16 Q. Would you perhaps take this as one document. It's D36, marked for
17 identification, produced to, I think, Mr. Zdrilic by the accused.
18 MR. NICE: Perhaps you would just lay it on the overhead
19 projector, please. It came from the accused's possession. I'd like to
20 see the bottom of it as well as the top, please.
21 Q. This is a document slightly shorter in size than A4, and it's been
22 cut off at the bottom. Would you just have a look at it, Mr. Coo. Take
23 it, and you can see at the bottom, right at the bottom that it's been cut
24 of and indeed a fax sending line can just be seen, showing where the
25 document came from, which has been concealed.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 If you look at the front page of this document, we can see, again
2 if the projectionist can show it, that the addressee has been blanked out.
3 A. Yes, I see that.
4 Q. But nevertheless and although we're still waiting for a
5 translation, it would appear to be a command document or an order, and the
6 date of it is within the period of interest, and it came from the accused.
7 Is this the sort of document that you would wish to review were they
8 available to you?
9 A. Yes, it definitely is, Your Honours.
10 Q. Thank you.
11 MR. NICE: Your Honour, we remain unable, in respect of that
12 document, to say more than I've effectively said through the witness
14 Q. There was, amongst questions of a similar type - or I should
15 perhaps suggest comments of a similar type - the suggestion that you had
16 not made reference to Article 17, and then this observation, "for some
17 reason known only to you," you then revealing that of course you'd read
18 Article 17 in full.
19 In the selection of Articles from which you have quoted, what has
20 been your guiding principle, please?
21 A. The guiding principle was the direction provided to me by the
22 Prosecution legal team on what the scope of my report should be, and that
23 scope was the organisation and the means of commanding and to some degree
24 the implementation of the command and control means of the Armed Forces of
25 the FRY and Serbia.
1 Q. Thank you. You've been asked a number of questions about facts on
2 the ground, events, for the most part, that you said you only had really
3 everyday knowledge of through press reports and so on. Apart from the
4 degree to which your second report still covers any reported evidence of
5 witnesses, did you have as any part of your responsibility consideration
6 of the facts as evidence other than so far as that covered the
7 organisation of the army?
8 A. No, I did not, Your Honours.
9 Q. I think you dealt with this, but just to cover the area once more,
10 you were asked a hypothetical question about the possibilities for
11 knowledge further up the reporting chain of reporting that was inaccurate
12 when it started, and it was suggested to you that you'd assumed some kind
13 of restriction of reporting to that which was in writing, and you said you
14 hadn't done so. Can you just amplify that, please, and explain what, from
15 the materials you've read, are the reporting mechanisms that should apply?
16 A. The reporting mechanisms in the VJ and the MUP cover written form
17 and oral form. So orders can be issued orally as well as in written form.
18 Q. We know that, of course, your material was some of the material
19 considered by General Sir Peter de la Billiere and that in a perfect world
20 his report would have come -- his evidence would have come second in time
21 to yours. Do you now recall what he said about the consequences of
22 certain findings - that is the possible findings of widespread commission
23 of crimes - and oral instructions being given? If you don't, say you
25 A. I'm sorry, I don't remember that.
1 Q. The Pavkovic interview, we can see how it's set out. Can you
2 recall now whether that is a transcript directly from a tape or a
4 A. There is -- there are two Pavkovic interviews, at least that I can
5 recall in the report, or two statements. I think the one we dealt with
6 most recently was a transcript of a broadcast, a television broadcast.
7 Q. So that will have been, so far as the words used by Mr. Pavkovic
8 are concerned, word-for-word translation of a transcript?
9 A. That's correct, Your Honours.
10 Q. And the words "free translation" being used, it being unclear to
11 me whether that was relating to the report of the broadcast or the
12 understanding of the general.
13 MR. NICE: Nothing else from me for this witness. Thank you.
14 Questioned by the Court:
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Coo, you mentioned about the MUP staff for
16 Kosovo, which was headed, as I understand, by Mr. Sreten Lukic.
17 A. That's correct, Your Honours.
18 JUDGE KWON: I wonder if you could tell us as to who else was
19 involved in that organisation and during what period it existed.
20 A. The names of the other members of that organisation I can't recall
21 off the top of my head. The document -- there's two documents from May
22 1998, one of which names the members of the staff, the other lays out the
24 I remember that the head of the staff was named as General Sreten
25 Lukic. I think another name may have been Radoslav Djinovic, but I can't
1 recall for certain. I also recall that the mandate of the staff, or
2 perhaps the document naming members, made reference to the fact that the
3 heads or chiefs of the seven Kosovo police districts or SUPs would be --
4 would also be members in some form.
5 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. I think it's helpful. And as to the
6 Joint Command in Kosovo, it comprised of political, VJ, and MUP elements,
7 and according to this diagram you just mentioned, it seems that it was
8 headed by Mr. Sainovic; is that correct?
9 A. That's correct, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE KWON: Then could you tell us who represented each element
11 and -- each element, the VJ and the MUP element? The MUP should be MUP
12 staff. So --
13 A. That's an assessment I had to make, Your Honour, on the basis of
14 the documentation. The documentation available to me did not name
15 specifically the VJ and MUP members. The assessment I made was that that
16 membership could be expected to include the commander of the Pristina
17 Corps, which is based in Kosovo and responsible for Kosovo, General
18 Lazarevic, and the head of the MUP staff which is the mirror organisation
19 on the MUP side of the Pristina Corps.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. And the period the Joint Command existed,
21 could you tell us about that?
22 A. Again, I know that it existed as early as July 1998. To my
23 recollection, that's the first document I came across referring to the
24 Joint Command, but I came across nothing to tell me when precisely it was
1 I think -- I don't think I answered your MUP staff question
2 completely, Your Honour. The MUP staff was established as early as 1996,
3 to my recollection. There was a reference to it in 1996. It appeared
4 that the heads of the MUP staff and perhaps the other members of the staff
5 would be appointed on a rotating basis, and General Lukic was appointed in
6 May 1998.
7 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. And my last question is a somewhat minor
8 one. We've heard about the Civil Protection Unit and also about the Civil
9 Defence Unit. Could you tell us what the difference between them is?
10 A. Yes, Your Honour. In the law, the definition of civil protection
11 is that it's -- there's no reference to it being armed. It seems to be a
12 unit tasked with the -- with assisting civilian members of the population,
13 helping them -- extracting them from rubble, applying first aid, assisting
14 in the maintenance and running of the infrastructure during periods of
16 The civilian defence units, as defined in the law, are armed
17 organisations tasked with defence on a local level, so they're citizens
18 conscripted or tasked with defence at a local level, and they're armed.
19 This is FRY federal law that I'm referring to.
20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
21 JUDGE MAY: There has been evidence about the Joint Command and
22 its membership from one of the witnesses. I forget which military witness
23 it was, but I certainly recollect that evidence. Perhaps someone could
24 find it out during the break with a reference to it.
25 MR. NICE: Certainly.
1 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Coo, thank you for your evidence. You're free to
3 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honour.
4 [The witness withdrew]
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] [No interpretation]
6 JUDGE MAY: We're not getting any --
7 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters did not hear.
8 JUDGE MAY: Put your microphone on, please.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Nice referred to various papers
10 awhile ago. I wish to object to the fact that, due to time constraints, I
11 did not have the opportunity of making comments with regard to any one of
12 these papers that I had selected, as a matter of fact, and that were
13 served yesterday. And you heard yourselves how many binders were taken
14 out or, rather, how many binders were produced through this so-called
15 expert, this employee of the OTP. So I didn't really have any time to
16 comment on any of this.
17 JUDGE MAY: If you've got any comments, you can make them. If you
18 want to put any documents in, you can do so.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, they have already been put in
20 because Mr. Nice did that with the assistance of this witness. But then
21 that comes also with 15 binders. I did not have any opportunity to
22 question the witness about any one of these papers because they went
23 through them with such speed that there has been no time for me to put
24 questions with regard to that. And all of these papers are actually in
25 favour of what I have been saying rather than what that other side has
1 been claiming.
2 JUDGE MAY: You may draw our attention to those exhibits in due
3 course when you come to address us, those that are in favour, as you say,
4 of your case.
5 I've just been handed two documents.
6 MR. NICE: Your Honour, if I --
7 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. I've just been handed two documents
8 which the accused apparently put in.
9 Mr. Milosevic, you handed two documents in, I guess yesterday. I
10 don't know what they are because they're in B/C/S. Do you want us to --
11 do you want to have these exhibited or do you want them back?
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, exhibited. And those two
13 documents, Mr. May, are reports of the Verification Mission of the OSCE
14 for two days, the two days referring to the activities of the KLA and the
15 army of Yugoslavia that were verified by the OSCE, and they were linked to
16 my questions put to your investigator Zdrilic as to why he did not
17 question his false witness in line with the findings of the Verification
18 Mission of the OSCE.
19 JUDGE MAY: Marked for identification in the usual way.
20 MR. NICE: Your Honour, before we part from Mr. Coo's evidence,
21 two points. One, of course, the point I was making about documents -- I'm
22 so sorry.
23 THE REGISTRAR: The document dated the 12th of March will be
24 Defence Exhibit D38. The document dated 15th of March will be D39.
25 Marked for identification, Your Honours.
1 MR. NICE: The point I was making about documents is not only in
2 respect of documents that have been available for a long time to the
3 accused to use in cross-examination but other documents that were
4 available to him. And available to Mr. Coo.
5 We have prepared, or to be precise, Ms. Graham and her colleagues
6 have prepared two charts that will, I hope, enable people to navigate
7 their way around the Coo documents better and to make the links between
8 the Philip Coo documents as produced in his binders and as separately
9 exhibited. Can I make those available now? They are self-explanatory.
10 One for volume I and one for volume II. They contain --
11 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
12 MR. NICE: As far as this document is concerned, if you look at
13 volume I, or Part I, item 13, you can see the way the document may exist.
14 Bold entries highlight and take our attention to exhibits previously
15 exhibited and give, in the second column, the number. So under 13, it's
16 also Exhibit 223. The same format, of course, for the second index.
17 I'm not sure if the Chamber was minded to adjourn now.
18 JUDGE MAY: Yes, we are.
19 MR. NICE: I have a list - at least I hope I have a list - of
20 topics, which is being provided. There are one or two others as well.
21 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Wladimiroff, we've been given a translation of
22 this article which the accused has raised. I don't know if you've got it
23 so you know what we're working from. The accused also should have a copy
24 of it since he's raised it, and we will have to deal with it after the
25 adjournment. So perhaps you would read what's the English version.
1 MR. WLADIMIROFF: I have been down during the break, because I was
2 not aware of this article. There seems to be a second version of it as
3 well on the Internet, which I have been given. On the face of it, just
4 quickly looking at it, it looks different to me. So perhaps you should
5 consider the Internet one as well.
6 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Thank you. We'll see if we can get that.
7 Yes. Have you got the list of topics so we can consider them?
8 MR. NICE: Some of them will be self-explanatory, others may need
9 a word or so from me. It's just a guide to what I'm going to be asking
10 you to deal with.
11 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We will adjourn now. Twenty minutes.
12 --- Recess taken at 12.10 p.m.
13 --- On resuming at 12.34 p.m.
14 JUDGE MAY: There are three matters we have to deal with. First
15 of all, the outstanding issues; secondly, the interview to which we've
16 been referred. We still do not have a complete copy of the translation of
17 that. We are waiting for it and it will come to us in court, it's
18 anticipated. It may be sensible, therefore, to start on the Prosecution
19 outstanding issues. And finally, we will deal with any other issues of an
20 administrative nature which anybody wants to raise but bearing in mind, of
21 course, that we have to adjourn in an hour and ten minutes.
22 We've got the outstanding issues.
23 MR. NICE: In addition to those there are a couple others, one of
24 which will take a little time and will be subject to the request that we
25 go into closed session, but before I come to that, could I help with a few
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 short points.
2 First, the opening on a fortnight tomorrow is an opening that I
3 intend, for the Prosecution, to be short and functional.
4 JUDGE MAY: Yes. I should say and make it plain that this case
5 will adjourn today. There will be two weeks for preparation, and the case
6 will restart on Thursday, the 27th, I think it will be, of September. I
7 could be wrong about that. 26th. Thursday, the 26th of September.
8 MR. NICE: Sorry, to come back, I hope, and things may change, but
9 I hope to make a short opening which will be entirely functional and a
10 route map --
11 JUDGE MAY: My recollection is the limits are three hours on both
13 MR. NICE: I will be considerably less than that. And
14 accordingly, the accused must be ready to start on the Thursday. There's
15 no expectation that he's just going to have until the Friday to start.
16 I'm hoping that we will be on to evidence on the Friday.
17 Also, having in mind the manner of the accused's opening address
18 which we did not in any sense or way interrupt, we would at this stage of
19 the trial and in light of the experience, be pressing the Chamber to
20 ensure that the accused confines his opening to appropriate material and
21 doesn't allow it to be used simply as an opportunity to address a wider
23 The second point that I can make is one that's off the list. It's
24 a procedural thing. Throughout the Kosovo section of the trial, we've
25 been serving the accused a second time with statements that he's already
1 had because he said he couldn't find them. It happens that the first
2 series of witnesses are mostly those for whom there's only ten days'
3 provision in any event, so he will only be getting them now for
4 preparation for the witnesses, but generally it would help us to know if
5 the accused is being
6 obliged, as we'd invite you to say he should be, to use the materials that
7 he's got and indeed on which he's no doubt been working over the summer
8 and that it shouldn't be necessary for us to serve him again with
9 statements in addition to all the other materials we serve him, but we'd
10 like clarification of that, if the Chamber would be able to assist us. At
11 some stage. I don't mean immediately, obviously.
12 JUDGE MAY: You want us to put on notice the accused that
13 statements of the first witnesses -- has a list been served of the first
15 MR. NICE: Yes, there's been a list.
16 JUDGE MAY: And the statements of most of them will be coming; is
17 that right?
18 MR. NICE: It happens that the -- those early witnesses are mostly
19 subject to a ten-day limit and so they will be coming to him, but
20 thereafter, when witnesses are witnesses of the type he's had in advance,
21 we would ask that he be required to find them himself in the usual way.
22 JUDGE MAY: Very well. He's to be on notice of that.
23 MR. NICE: Your Honour, we also have it in mind to assist the
24 accused by provision of a more comprehensive schedule of exhibits which we
25 hope will assist him and everybody else. It's the type of document we've
1 been preparing ourselves and so it will come with him and enable him to
2 navigate his way - and everybody else to navigate their way - around the
4 Can I then turn to the itemised items on our list of 15. I can
5 deal with most of these quickly.
6 We've mentioned the expert evidence of Morten Torkildsen simply
7 because at one stage there was the suggestion that the admissibility of
8 this financial report would have been dealt with before, I think, even the
9 summer break. The matter's been fully briefed on both sides. It may be
10 we've overlooked an application by us to postpone its consideration until
11 the Croatia/Bosnia section, and in any event, that might be a sensible
12 course. But we respectfully remind the Court that it would appear on the
13 record that resolution of the admissibility is an outstanding issue.
14 JUDGE MAY: It hasn't been dealt with. We have it in mind. We
15 had assumed that it was being left until the second part of the case and
16 it may be better to leave it until then to hear oral argument, if need be.
17 MR. NICE: Thank you. The linked issue is item 2, the Rule 92 bis
18 statements of the three Cyprus bank officials. They, of course, relate to
19 the financial evidence and the expert report of Mr. Torkildsen. It may be
20 the Chamber will be able to rule separately from deciding on the expert
21 report. Alternatively, that could be put back. But, of course, if they
22 required to attend and required to attend, for example, at the same time
23 as Morten Torkildsen gives his evidence, if that's what happens, it will
24 be convenient to know in advance. So that appears to be outstanding.
25 Item 3, there appear to be two witnesses for whom we were given
1 leave, subject to cross-examination, to call, and just for purposes of
2 good order, we make it clear that we are not intending to call those two
4 JUDGE MAY: There was a third with a difficult name to pronounce.
5 I remember our ruling on it.
6 MR. NICE: I'll see if I can find that.
7 JUDGE MAY: But may we take it you don't intend to call him.
8 MR. NICE: Same decision applies. Can I come back to 4 because 4
9 and one other topic would require closed session, and perhaps 5 as well.
10 The Chamber is respectfully reminded that, so far as Braddock
11 Scott and other witnesses designated as Rule 70, even if they relate only
12 to the Kosovo section of the trial, or predominantly to the Kosovo
13 section, applications to call them must necessarily be deferred until
14 resolution of the Rule 70 issue generally.
15 JUDGE MAY: May we ask you to provide us with a list of those
16 witnesses who relate to Kosovo, purely to Kosovo, who you have either had
17 leave to call after the close of the Kosovo case or for whom you will be
18 asking for leave. It would be helpful to have the list so we know. It
19 would also be helpful if the Prosecution could organise those witnesses in
20 a single batch. I just have in mind the consideration.
21 MR. NICE: Of course, yes. As to Rule 70 witnesses and in light
22 of the construction put upon the Rule by the provider, I can't even deal
23 with that ex parte.
24 JUDGE MAY: No.
25 MR. NICE: That part, the answer is yes. It may indeed be they're
1 effectively provided by item 9, but I'll just check on that and we'll
2 provide that in writing subject to the Rule 70 point.
3 Item 7, Helena Ranta. It's a point for -- not a small point.
4 It's a point that we ought to have in mind for fear that the accused will
5 proceed on an unsatisfactory basis in months to come when he makes his
6 closing arguments.
7 Helena Ranta is the person performing forensic scientific work in
8 respect of mass graves, and her then-documentation was relied upon by the
9 accused in opening, transcript pages 226 to -7, for example, and also 353,
10 and was relied on extensively in the cross-examination of General
11 Drewienkiewicz and also in General Naumann.
12 That perhaps, or other stimuli, drew from Ms. Ranta answers in
13 press interviews that go to clarify her position on Racak and go to
14 clarify it in a way that would make it inappropriate for the accused to
15 rely on interpretations of her report favourable to him. We have no
16 present intention of calling her, but what I propose to do is to serve on
17 the accused and the amici and, because her reports have been referred to
18 to the Chamber, on the Chamber the newspaper report together with what she
19 has said in a letter as to its accuracy to us, because had this
20 cross-examination, had this opening address been made when this material
21 was to hand, we would have sought to introduce it as countering the
22 propositions being advanced by the accused.
23 In short, the material may show that she is now satisfied that the
24 scene was in no sense a fake, and that's the general topic. It will put
25 the accused on notice in relation to this witness if he does call her,
1 there is material to counter the thesis he may wish to advance or
2 otherwise to help him, but what we cannot allow for is her report suddenly
3 being brought out at the close of the proceedings as material to show
4 doubt on the Racak evidence in some particular when there is in fact
5 contrary written material from her.
6 Item 8. We are obviously in the hands of the Court as to how, or
7 to be precise, by whom the Louise Arbour correspondence should be
9 JUDGE MAY: Well, we noticed the name of the Deputy Prosecutor on
10 it. It may be he would be an appropriate witness since Louise Arbour is
11 no longer here.
12 MR. NICE: Very well, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE MAY: Perhaps it could be added to the Kosovo list.
14 MR. NICE: Certainly. And that conveniently brings us to item 9.
15 This is certainly a list of the, as it were, Kosovo-only or predominantly
16 Kosovo witnesses to be called later, if they are to be called. Vlassi,
17 who we discussed at some length earlier, K37, K39, and K10.
18 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Vlassi we've ruled against and is not to give
19 evidence. We've ruled on it.
20 MR. NICE: My recollection is that there was a tentative, that we
21 withdrew the application and said that if we were seeking to call him
22 again, we would apply afresh in the latter part of the trial.
23 JUDGE MAY: That was on the basis that he would give evidence
24 about something else.
25 MR. NICE: That's right.
1 JUDGE MAY: Purely on Kosovo, no.
2 MR. NICE: Very well. Then these three are the ones that don't
3 appear in Croatia, Bosnia witness indices and that we may seek to call in
4 the later part of the trial, but, Your Honour, I will complete the list if
5 there are any other names that we've overlooked.
6 Item 10 is one example of a number of exhibits that are, to some
7 degree, being left or have been left, not in limbo but left pending
8 further decision. For example, the document we looked at in
9 re-examination this morning which we can only leave for identification
10 purposes. That was D36. D37, which is spending translation. I beg your
11 pardon, D37 is a tape. It's not pending translation. It was pending
12 translation, and I now have a transcript or a summary, rather.
13 We have no objection to the production of this particular
14 videotape. The accused produced it without playing it, and the Court
15 asked us to look at it. It contains various things. I don't need to go
16 into them nor do I have the time, but we don't object to its production.
17 JUDGE MAY: D37.
18 MR. NICE: We are very grateful to the registry who, I think, have
19 been keeping a list of outstanding exhibits that need resolution. Of
20 those tendered by the accused, I think D11A, 258 and -9 may be -- may have
21 been referred to as requiring authentication by the accused. D10 may have
22 been marked similarly but we have no objection to its production. It's a
23 Novo Demokracija document which we have also obtained and, therefore,
24 since we have it, we don't object to the production of it by the accused.
25 Marked for identification is D23 to 28, I think, D30, 35, and 36.
1 JUDGE MAY: We will ask the registry to provide us a full report
2 upon the state of the exhibits so far and make any necessary rulings.
3 MR. NICE: Very well. Insofar as there are outstanding CLSS final
4 translations of documents, we are obtaining them and providing them as
5 soon as we can, and we have also, in accordance with the Chamber's ruling,
6 been providing the registry with the most original version of items we
7 tender in all cases, with the exception perhaps being in the crime-base
8 binders where it may be that the original documents or the best originals
9 have not yet been provided. We have provided colour copies of some of
10 those items, and the exercise of collating all original documents for the
11 binders will be a substantial exercise. We're in the Chamber's hands. It
12 may be that there being no challenge specifically raised with the
13 authenticity of those particular documents, that that exercise could be
14 properly and safely avoided on this occasion, but that's a matter for the
15 Chamber, of course.
16 Patrick Ball's report. He discovered that there were some, I
17 think, adjustments he had to make to the materials properly available to
18 him. There may have been some deletions because of Rule 70 material, but
19 whichever way it is, he is preparing an addendum or a supplement making
20 sure that what goes or is available to the Court is corrected where
21 correction was judged appropriate. I believe that will be with us by the
22 end of October.
23 Item 12. The document we've provided certainly once in draft
24 form, which we call a fill box document because it's a document where it
25 breaks down the indictment into the various component parts and has boxes
1 then to be filled by reference to or summaries of evidence, is due for a
2 further provision. We'll provide another draft today. I know the amici
3 found it helpful. I don't know whether the accused did. But we will make
4 such a document available today or possibly tomorrow.
5 Before passing from documents or materials that may be useful in
6 closing, we have it in mind to provide the Chamber, the accused, and the
7 amici, should it be thought by the Chamber to be helpful, with electronic
8 material on CDs of the witnesses, witness by witness, where you'll have,
9 if this is what the Chamber would like, a photograph of the witness to
10 remind us what he or she looked like, the summaries that have been
11 provided, transcripts, and statements where statements have been produced
12 as exhibits. And of course it will then all be electronically searchable
13 on a witness-by-witness basis. We don't know if this would be simply
14 duplication of something that the Chamber has already done, in which case
15 we won't complete the exercise, but in case it might be helpful to
16 everyone, we're going to prepare some sample -- a sample CD with a couple
17 of witnesses on it for your consideration, and we will respond if it's
18 thought to be something that would help the Chamber and others.
19 I've dealt, actually, already with 14, save only to say perhaps
20 this: The only problem we've encountered at this stage of the trial --
21 sorry, in the first part of the trial, with service on the accused has
22 been where we've been sought to serve change of witness lists late in the
23 afternoon. Sometimes this is simply unavoidable, and we've been providing
24 up-to-date witness lists whenever we can. It hasn't, I know, been
25 possible for the associates to be more involved with us - they don't have
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13 pagination anglaise et la pagination française.
1 instructions to do so - but it would obviously be in the accused's
2 interest if he can authorise his associates to receive information,
3 whether from the Registry or from us, in a way that enables speedy
4 communication. If not, then we are simply dependent on the good services
5 of the Registry, who I know do all that they can, but there do come
6 occasions where, at 4.00 or 5.00 in the afternoon, it's important to be
7 able to communicate.
8 JUDGE MAY: And the accused will have heard that.
9 MR. NICE: The next disclosure, that's essentially the Rule 68
10 disclosure report, will be coming in a couple of weeks or so, and it's
11 important for us, but we would respectfully invite others associated to
12 reflect what we have to do, it's important for us to review the parameters
13 of search now that we've moved to another stage of the trial and to take
14 the necessary time to think about whether different parameters are
16 I will get Mr. Saxon, who is dealing with Rule 68 disclosure
17 generally, to make an offer to the amici for their attendance at a
18 meeting, and of course, I will make the same opportunity available to the
19 accused's associates. They were unable, for want of instructions, to turn
20 up on the previous occasion, but it must be recognised that this is the
21 best method of ensuring that there is no slip in Rule 68 provision.
22 Your Honour, can I turn then to matters that in a second will
23 require, or in respect of which I will ask for, a closed session. The
24 first is not on this list and relates to difficulties that we are
25 encountering with the authorities in respect of provision of materials and
1 in respect of waivers for witnesses.
2 Notwithstanding the law on cooperation passed in the spring of
3 this year, and notwithstanding cooperation that has been effective in
4 certain areas, particularly, perhaps, in making witnesses available, there
5 are serious impediments in our way, and it may well be that they,
6 unhappily, reflect a failure fully to cooperate with the Tribunal.
7 The most immediate problem we face is in respect of waivers,
8 waivers in respect of those who may be speaking of matter that could be
9 described as secret or otherwise entitled to some protection from public
10 gaze. As the Chamber knows, the mechanism is in place for waivers to be
11 granted, and waivers have been granted for some witnesses.
12 However, for some witnesses, and one particularly important one,
13 there appears to be a refusal to provide waivers particularly in respect
14 of Croatia and Bosnia. It may be that this is being linked by the
15 authorities with the provision of documents. That seems to us
16 inappropriate because it's been made quite plain by this Chamber in a way
17 that's evenhanded as between governments of all types that it is
18 respectful of and will ensure respect for matters that require a
19 confidential approach for whatever reason. And of course where we're
20 coming to deal with Croatia and Bosnia and where there are witnesses who
21 can assist because of their position within or close to government, it is
22 vital if cooperation provided for by the law and effectively promised, it
23 is vital that that is forthcoming to enable this type of witness to help.
24 I say in telling you this that I have alerted the authorities to
25 the fact that I would be raising it because it is -- time is passing too
2 The other way in which provision has been distinctly problematic,
3 as we will see if the Chamber grants us closed session for a short time,
4 is in respect of the provision of documents. Proper requests in respect
5 of documents provided are now substantially outstanding. The Chamber has
6 seen from both the evidence of in particular Sir Peter de la Billiere and
7 the last witness that they identify a limitation of documents. It doesn't
8 necessarily affect their opinion at all, although in each case, of course,
9 they would prefer to work on more. And if documents of the type that are
10 plainly in existence and are of relevance to this trial are not made
11 available to the Chamber, why, then, the Chamber's task in forming a good
12 judgement is made substantially more difficult.
13 Your Honour, in order to amplify that, I would ask we go into
14 closed session briefly, when we can also deal with the one other topic
15 which would require closed session, which is the issue of contempts.
16 [Private session]
12 Pages 10159 to 10163 redacted, private session
1 [Open session]
2 THE REGISTRAR: We're now in open session, Your Honours.
3 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Mr. Milosevic, you wished to raise a matter
4 about comments by Mr. Wladimiroff. We now have the document with an
5 English translation, apparently one obtained from the Internet, but we --
6 it appears that it's the same as the original article in the Haagsche
8 Yes. What do you want to say about it?
9 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters cannot hear the accused.
10 JUDGE MAY: Microphone. Microphone.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like to raise some questions
12 that have to do with what you were saying awhile ago and what Mr. Nice was
13 talking about. Actually, on the basis of what you have said, I draw the
14 conclusion that you are making a 14-day break and that on the 26th we
15 shall have a continuation of this activity with regard to these so-called
16 indictments for Croatia and Bosnia.
17 I have a question for you in relation to that. That means that
18 now, during the cross-examination over these past days, weeks and months
19 in relation to Kosovo, I got a total of 115.000 pages, 600 video
20 cassettes, 230 audio cassettes with regard to the indictment which I call
21 here as well a top absurdity because I was not president of Croatia or
22 Bosnia, so I simply wonder whether you, Mr. May, Mr. Robinson, Mr. Kwon,
23 believe that these two weeks are a reasonable amount of time within which
24 I should get informed, at least in the roughest possible terms, about
25 these 150.000 pages, 600 video cassettes, and 230 audio cassettes, and in
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 the meantime, of course, to hear some information that has to do with the
2 substance involved, and that certainly doubles the figures I've mentioned.
3 So if your answer is that you consider this amount of time to be
4 reasonable, I would like to hear that answer. But I do not believe that
5 anybody could consider this to be a reasonable amount of time for all of
6 this that I've been provided with.
7 JUDGE MAY: We will shorten this. We hear the point you make.
8 Are you asking us for more time? Are you applying for more time?
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I'm not asking you for
10 anything. I'm asking you --
11 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Then in that case I will give you the
12 answer, if you're not asking. The answer is this: That as you were told
13 before the recess, you were given a month's recess, you were given these
14 extra two weeks - a total of six weeks in all - to prepare. We
15 acknowledge that there is an amount of material for you to get through,
16 but as was explained to you before the recess, you should have a list now
17 of the witnesses who are to be called. We will require the Prosecution to
18 serve on you the exhibits which they are going to refer to. You have the
19 pre-trial brief. You have the indictment. And you should prepare those
21 Now, we have considered that before. We made our ruling which we
22 told you about. You don't have any applications? That is the position,
23 that we start in two weeks.
24 Now -- wait a moment. Now, do you want to say anything about this
25 matter which you raised earlier? Do you want to raise a matter about this
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 interview or not? If you don't, we shall ask Mr. Wladimiroff if he has
2 any comments, and we shall pass on to deal with any other business.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have got something to say, but I
4 haven't completed this, Mr. May. Are you claiming that --
5 JUDGE MAY: I have ruled on that matter. You're making no
6 application, and I've told you what the answer is. So we're moving on.
7 You must understand this, Mr. Milosevic: In a court, business has
8 to be dealt with in an orderly fashion. People are not allowed to speak
9 whatever is in their mind at any time.
10 Now, do you wish to make any -- I have invited you to make an
11 observation about the matter which you raised, this interview. If you
12 choose not to, it's a matter for you. If you don't want to make any
13 observation, all well and good, we shall simply ask Mr. Wladimiroff about
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do have a comment, but I have a
16 question that precedes that, Mr. May. Last week, invoking some new facts
17 that we saw from the statement of Mr. Kevin Curtis, I required that you
18 schedule a hearing devoted to habeas corpus and all relevant international
19 covenants and conventions that pertain to that. You did not schedule such
20 a hearing. You did not give an answer. And I wish to hear your answer
21 with regard to that, Mr. May.
22 JUDGE MAY: It's not for you to hear an answer. The position is
23 this: That we have ruled upon the question of the lawfulness of arrest.
24 You will find it in our decision of November last year. You can read it
1 If you say that there is some new matter which arises which makes
2 it right that in the middle of the trial we should consider the question
3 of your arrest, which, as I've said, does not seem to be relevant at this
4 stage, but if there is some new matter, why, then, you must raise it in
5 due course in front us and it may be that you can put it briefly into
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please, Mr. May. Could you give me
8 an answer? My rights that are guaranteed by international covenants and
9 conventions, do they depend on the way I address you?
10 JUDGE MAY: I've given you the answer. It's a matter for you
11 whether you take it up or not.
12 Now, do you want to deal with this interview?
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wish to say something about the
14 interview, but I have some other questions that Mr. Nice spent far more
15 time on, far more than I did. I asked you whether my rights depend on
16 whether I address you in writing or orally, and are these rights not
17 applicable if I address you orally?
18 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment.
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 JUDGE MAY: Right, Mr. Milosevic. You have ten minutes to deal
21 with something new. We are not going to deal with the habeas corpus
22 point. We have dealt with that, we have ruled on it, I'm not going back
23 to it. You can read our ruling, I suggest the one in November, and that
24 will thoroughly cover the matter.
25 Now, in your ten minutes you can deal with any matters which
1 Mr. Nice raised, since there were matters, but you must also deal with any
2 matters concerning Mr. Wladimiroff's interview. We will then give
3 Mr. Wladimiroff the opportunity to respond.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] These ten minutes pertain to both
5 Mr. Wladimiroff and Mr. Nice; is that right?
6 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice's matters were all concerned with
7 administrative matters concerning the Prosecution. They had virtually
8 nothing to do with you and nothing you could take objection to. But if
9 you wish to address us on some relevant matter, you can, but time is
10 going. We only have the court, as you know, for a limited time, and we're
11 rising at quarter to.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wish to make it clear here: As
13 far as I understood it, since you finished this Kosovo stage, it is your
14 conclusion that some witnesses should be called in retrograde, so to
15 speak. You do whatever you please anyway, but I wish to tell you that K31
16 and K39 are persons that we know nothing about. We have no idea who this
17 is, nor did I get ever any kind of statement, any kind of information with
18 regard to these witnesses who are quite new for me.
19 That is what I wanted to say about the review.
20 And the 56 witnesses whose lists you have provided for the
21 beginning of this continuation that you've announced, I did not get
22 anything for 16 of them, and some I got in the English language.
23 And thirdly, if I understand things correctly, Defence attorneys
24 in this institution of yours get materials one month in advance. You've
25 given me a deadline of ten days in advance. Because you proclaimed my
1 right to defend myself, I assume that I should get more time rather than
2 less time let alone three times less than what Defence attorneys get.
3 That is what I have to say on that subject.
4 Now, as for the interview of Mr. Wladimiroff, you can see this in
5 colour here, a facsimile, so you can see the authentic form. First I'm
6 going to say a few words about what you proscribe yourself in your Rules,
7 because in this interview, Mr. Wladimiroff says -- or, rather, explains
8 that there is already sufficient evidence for me to be found guilty, et
9 cetera. And according to Article 20 of the Professional Code of Conduct
10 for Defence counsel who appear before the Court, it is considered to be
11 contempt of court if they act in a way which would not make it possible to
12 have justice done before the court. That is your own Article 20.
13 Pre-empting a court's decision by the friends of the court - that is to
14 say, your friend, one that you're paying - before the Defence case has
15 even started, so that is to say the first third of the Prosecutor's part
16 of the game and before the case for Bosnia and Croatia, is certainly
17 something that hampers justice, which according to your Article 77,
18 constitutes contempt of court and that is acting in violation of the
20 And on the 11th of January, 2002, you ruled about the friends, and
21 it says that the amici should help the Trial Chamber, and pre-empting a
22 decision now is not one that would be helpful to the Court because,
23 according to Article 21 of your own Statute, an accused person is
24 considered innocent before proven guilty. That is in accordance with your
1 So in this case, the friend of the court appears in the role of
2 promoter of the media picture with regard to this failed indictment,
3 trying to get things to be better. So he should be sitting on the
4 Prosecution bench, that other bench over there, not over here.
5 It is my opinion, along with these norms of yours that are
6 obviously not even being observed by your employee who you appointed
7 friend of the court, I think that the fiasco of this indictment should not
8 make it possible to support it in the media so unethically. I'm not even
9 referring to professional treatment, I'm talking ethics. After all, there
10 you can see the true role of the mentioned friend of the court; to support
11 the false indictment.
12 In all fairness, in this interview he does explain that he is
13 going to leave this job altogether because he will no longer be paid, as
14 was originally said, and that's not paid enough, that he's paid very
15 little, et cetera, et cetera. But at any rate, before he leaves, because
16 he is unsatisfied with his salary, he wants to meet the obligation that he
17 took upon himself, namely to support this false indictment, which in my
18 opinion is not only impermissible but also scandalous from the point of
19 view of the behaviour of any individual who aspires to deal with the law
20 or any kind of ethical matters.
21 That is what I wish to say in relation to this interview. Please
22 go ahead and read it. Please. You have three different versions of the
23 translation, so here it is in colour, in the Dutch language, with a
24 picture of Mr. Wladimiroff. According to what I have here in front of me,
25 he is even entering polemics with American media [In English] "[Previous
1 translation continues]... now is enough to convict Milosevic, he says. The
2 trial would only be on Kosovo. There is enough proof. There is a clear
3 link proven between the army, police, slaughters in Kosovo and Milosevic.
4 The Dutch lawyer does not agree with American colleagues that the witness
5 from the former inner circle has to come forward saying that Milosevic
6 actually commanded the murders to make conviction possible. There is no
7 smoking gun found, but it is very naive to think that people from
8 Milosevic regime will testify against him since this would lead to
9 prosecution in their own country as well. The written proof has been
10 destroyed evidently ..." [Interpretation] and so on.
11 He is asserting things that he can truly know nothing about. And
12 this is the blackest possible accusation, even blacker than what we've
13 heard from Mr. Nice, Mrs. Del Ponte and others that we've heard on behalf
14 of this false and failed indictment.
15 Regrettably, through this kind of media gesture, he's trying to
16 revive it and bring it back onto the scene. Of course, with the
17 assistance of the media that are under the control of these quisling
18 authorities in Belgrade now. They immediately took the bait and already
19 last night they said, "Well, here --"
20 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you're going beyond what is proper.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Very well, Mr. May. I
22 think that I have made this point.
23 JUDGE MAY: Let me deal, first of all, with the earlier complaint
24 you made about the amount of time you received.
25 The 16 statements -- Mr. Nice, can you help us with the 16
1 statements the accused says he hasn't got. Would you review that and make
2 sure that he has. It may be that there are statements which have been
3 held back under the Rules.
4 MR. NICE: I think so. And Your Honour, I will also have to
5 advise him and the Chamber of a revised order of witnesses. It's
6 inevitably had to be revised because of the problems we've had with our
7 first one or two witnesses for reasons I've already advanced. I have the
8 list here. I'll make sure it gets to him and to you today.
9 JUDGE MAY: Very well. The other point is the ten days. The
10 order we made that in certain sensitive witnesses there was only ten days'
11 notice to be given, it was an order of the Trial Chamber. But let me move
12 on to the other matter.
13 We will hear from Mr. Wladimiroff in a moment, but I make it plain
14 at the outset, Mr. Milosevic, that this is a Trial Chamber of professional
15 Judges. Much is written about this trial, we know, but it is totally
16 ignored by the Trial Chamber. The only matter with which we are concerned
17 is the evidence which is produced in this court and the arguments which we
18 hear in this court. Those are the only matters with which we are
19 concerned and on which we form our judgement. Comment of any sort outside
20 is completely irrelevant and is ignored. But nonetheless, we will take up
21 the matter which you raise.
22 Mr. Wladimiroff, you should deal, if you would, with this
24 MR. WLADIMIROFF: Yes, Your Honour. The quotes in the article are
25 a misrepresentation of what I have said, let me start to say this. And I
1 can very well understand that the accused is upset reading the first part
2 of these quotes and repetition of that quote further on in the article.
3 The publication has not been authorised, and I regret it has been
4 published. During the break, I went down, because then I learned about
5 the article, asked for a copy, and I got a copy. I read it for the first
7 Let me explain that I have seen representatives of the media
8 before. So far, they all well understood my position, and if necessary, I
9 clarified that, and no one has ever published anything I felt
10 uncomfortable with in terms of not being authorised. And I regret again
11 that this time someone simply published things that I did not approve.
12 But I should clarify myself about the quotes that upset the
13 accused. Let me say this: I have certainly not said there is sufficient
14 evidence to convict the accused. What I have said, or words to that
15 effect, is that at this stage of the trial, on the face of what has been
16 said during the Prosecution case, there is a kind of relation between the
17 accused and the events in Kosovo. Perhaps not all events, but if it would
18 be half of it, it would be a relevant factor for the Trial Chamber, and
19 that's a matter for the Court. That is what I have said, or words to that
20 effect. I remember that very well.
21 Let me say that there were further quotes which are of minor
22 detail. If necessary, I will comment on that, but these are more or less
23 very pertinent words which I do not recognise as to be mine. And if I had
24 it in front of me to authorise, I would have corrected it. But
25 nevertheless, it has been printed.
1 Let me finally say this: I'm not very happy with this situation.
2 This is not good for the trial, it's not good for the accused, it's not
3 good for me, and not good for the amici. Really, I distance myself from
4 things that were distorted, and I regret that it happened.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Wladimiroff, I have read the article, and I
6 have identified three passages that could call into question your
7 qualification to continue as amicus. The first one you have referred to,
8 but what I have here is slightly different from what you read. It says:
9 "If this trial were only about Kosovo and one had to draw up the balance
10 now, Milosevic would certainly be convicted."
11 MR. WLADIMIROFF: I've seen that as well, Your Honour, and as I've
12 said, that's a misrepresentation of what I really have said. It's not my
13 words, and I deny the extent of it. It's not what I said.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: What you're saying you said was something to the
15 effect that there was evidence?
16 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No. What I've said is that we have seen during
17 the Prosecution case, at least on the face of it, there is a link between
18 the offence in Kosovo and the accused. That may be not for all events,
19 but even if it were half of it, it is a relevant factor for the Trial
20 Chamber when reaching a verdict. Something of that extent.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: The second passage is this, it says: "The aim of
22 this trial is to show that Milosevic is responsible for the horrible
23 things that happened in his country."
24 MR. WLADIMIROFF: Yes. In my version here, I have written there
25 -- I am convinced I have not phrased it in this way. If I have said
1 something to that extent, I'm confident I have said "to examine," not "to
2 show." It's a very unfortunate way to phrase it, and I'm sure I have not
3 said it in that way. At least were that pass shown to me before it was
4 printed, I would have corrected it as being untrue; it is to examine.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: I could see how a mistake like that could be
7 The third one is the last page, and you're dealing here with the
8 forthcoming evidence in relation to Bosnia and Croatia, and what is in
9 quotation is as follows: "They had more time to prepare and are more
10 familiar with the issues at hand. It should not be a problem to knit a
11 circle of evidence around Milosevic."
12 MR. WLADIMIROFF: Again, Your Honour, I certainly have not said
13 that. It would be stupid to say. I can't remember having said anything
14 to that extent, really. We had spoken of what is coming up, and I
15 remember something to the extent of they have a different task here
16 because they were prepared, they had more time to do so. So I think I may
17 have said something like it should not be a problem to present the
18 evidence in a more organised way, something like to that, because that
19 fits together with what I've said before. But really, I'm sure I've not
20 said this. And once again, if the article had been presented to me, I
21 would either have struck it out or altered it because that's not a fair
22 representation of what was the discussion about.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: These are important matters that the Chamber will
24 have to consider, particularly in light of the functions that were
25 assigned to the amicus, one of which is to make any submissions or
1 objections to evidence properly open to the accused during the trial
2 proceedings. I mean, I will have to be -- to be sure that I'm confident
3 that you would be in a position to make such submissions.
4 So this is a matter which, as I said, the Chamber will have to
5 look at very, very carefully.
6 MR. WLADIMIROFF: I understand, Your Honour. Once again, I regret
7 it happened. This is the first time that something has been published
8 without authorisation in my experience. It may have been passed without
9 me knowing, but what I am aware of, and once again it's unfortunate it
10 happened, but it's not really something I can avoid, let's put it that
11 way. Normally it's always given back to me for authorisation. This time
12 they failed.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: You can avoid it by not giving the interview.
14 MR. WLADIMIROFF: You're right, Your Honour. In hindsight, you're
15 absolutely right.
16 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Wladimiroff, could you put in writing about your
17 position in --
18 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No problem at all. Sure.
19 JUDGE KWON: That would be helpful.
20 MR. WLADIMIROFF: Yes.
21 MR. NICE: May I make two points which I feel I must make? One
22 is -- three points.
23 First point: Textbook example of why counsel involved in cases
24 should never talk to the press.
25 Second point: There was an earlier occasion when I'm afraid
1 Mr. Wladimiroff had to apologise to the Prosecutor because he was
3 Third point: This report does also refer to closed sessions,
4 which is unfortunate, and I have to draw that to your attention.
5 May I say two other things in 30 seconds. I was going --
6 JUDGE MAY: Let me say this: That the Trial Chamber, Mr.
7 Wladimiroff, if you'd let us have your observations within seven days, if
8 you please, we will then consider the position.
9 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I don't know if I made adequately the
10 suggestion that we might have a mid-break hearing to deal with
11 administrative matters so as not to imperil the start. I had wondered
12 about a week today, which might have been convenient, but I think perhaps
13 possibly Monday week. It may be that nothing will happen, but I can
14 easily see that issues, practical issues, may have arisen.
15 And the final point I would make is that, in answer to Your
16 Honour's question about the testimony on the Joint Command, it was Radomir
17 Markovic who referred to it. And the reason I think Your Honour had
18 trouble immediately identifying it was because he actually went through
19 various terminological changes before the words "Joint Command" were
20 reached. But I think there did come a time when those words were used.
21 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Thank you.
22 MR. WLADIMIROFF: A very short remark, Your Honour, responding to
23 what the Prosecutor said about counsel being appropriate to make comment
24 or speak to the press. Main I remind the court that the trial is a
25 different one than a domestic trial and one of the aims of the Tribunal is
1 to address the public, and consequently, this Tribunal has a press office.
2 Counsel and amici are not a part of that system. They have their own
3 responsibility, and we try to fill that as conscientiously as we can.
4 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.
5 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I should just like
6 to ask for you indulgence one more minute longer and it has to do with
7 something Mr. Nice spoke about linked to what is under point 9, that is,
8 that we would have to hear three more witnesses. But if I understood Mr.
9 Nice correctly, he allows for the possibility of calling some other
10 witnesses after the completion of the Kosovo part of the trial, to come
11 here and give their testimony. That's my first point. I think that this
12 would be something that goes against the grain of the Rules and
13 Regulations because otherwise the Kosovo case would not have been
15 And secondly, when you come to deliberate, Patrick Ball can now
16 change his report in one way and then submit it later on. It's up to you
17 to decide, but I think that what has already taken place, and something
18 that has already been given form and content should not be changed, But
19 of course it's up to you to pass a ruling. Thank you.
20 JUDGE MAY: Thank you, Mr. Tapuskovic. The answer is that any
21 added report or any addendum to the report would require the leave of the
22 Trial Chamber before it would be admitted. That is the first point.
23 Likewise, any further witnesses to be called can only be called subject to
24 leave. So an application will have to be made in each case for leave to
25 call them. Without that leave, they won't be called.
1 Mr. Nice, yes.
2 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I stood up because --
3 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Mr. Nice.
4 MR. NICE: I'd simply stood up because I thought you were
5 addressing the court. I have nothing further to add.
6 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May --
8 JUDGE MAY: It's the last day, as I understand it, of the Albanian
9 booth, the last day that we will have the Albanian translation. It would
10 be wrong for us to part with their services without thanking them very
11 much for their assistance in this case.
12 Likewise, I understand Mr. Ryneveld is leaving us, and again we're
13 grateful for his assistance in the matter.
14 Yes, Mr. Milosevic. What is your final comment?
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no final comment. All I
16 would like to do is to -- for you to enable me to hold a press conference
17 as well. The Prosecutors are constantly giving statements to the press.
18 I can see now that the amicus are making statements to the press. It
19 would be logical to allow me to hold a press conference likewise.
20 JUDGE MAY: The usual Rules of Detention apply to you.
21 We will adjourn now until the 26th.
22 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.49 p.m.,
23 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 26th day
24 of September, 2002, at 9.00 a.m.