1 Wednesday, 18 June 2003
2 [Open session]
3 [The witness entered court]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice. We must ask you to finish within the
7 hour, given the constraints of time.
8 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I may have to abandon a lot of material.
9 I shall do so. I have planned on that basis.
10 Mr. Lilic, there will be many points where I shall be asking you
11 for yes/no answers; I hope you will be able to comply.
12 WITNESS: ZORAN LILIC [Resumed]
13 Examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]
14 Q. Exhibit 469, tab 24, is the minutes of the Supreme Defence Council
15 held on the 4th of October, 1998. You've reviewed this when preparing to
16 give your evidence. In it, we find Perisic arguing that a NATO strike is
17 unavoidable, Djukanovic stating that he is opposed to war, and suggesting
18 that everything should be done in accordance with the United Nations
19 Security Council resolution. Milutinovic and the accused make statements
20 consistent with one another. What was your inference from the fact that
21 they made statements consistent with one another, please, Mr. Lilic?
22 A. This is a very particular record of minutes that was being kept at
23 a time of great danger for the FRY, and there must have been a prior
24 meeting at which this overall situation was reviewed.
25 Q. Thank you very much.
1 A. The minutes provides alternatives --
2 Q. Thank you very much. That's all I need on that. We'll move on to
3 paragraph 194 in the summary, bringing the exhibit back, please.
4 Was there a meeting of the Kosovo staff coordinated by Milutinovic
5 on the 13th of June of 1998, attended by a large number of political and
6 military elite, including, apart from Milutinovic, Pavle Bulatovic,
7 Perisic, Dimitrijevic, Samardzic, Pavkovic, Stojiljkovic, Djordjevic,
8 Sreten Lukic, Sainovic, Stanisic, Obrad Stevanovic and possibly Minic, the
9 accused not being present?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. In the course of the debate, what did -- paragraph 198 -- what
12 about Stojiljkovic say in relation to the one and a half million Kosovo
13 Albanians in Kosovo? What was your reaction to his observation?
14 A. If I may, I must briefly explain that that meeting follows on to a
15 visit that occurred prior to that in Djakovica where Mr. Stanisic reported
16 on the overall security situation in Kosovo and Metohija and on the
17 behaviour of certain reserve police units. So at this meeting, that same
18 discussion was continued, and I cautioned Mr. Stojiljkovic regarding what
19 was going on at Kosovo and Metohija, particularly around the village of
20 Ponasevac, to which he responded very strongly. We had a heated dialogue,
21 and he said, in the final analysis, they should all be killed, but he was
22 irritated by what I had said. And I said that because of what certain
23 members of the reserve police force were doing, one day, we might be
24 ashamed for being Serbs and our children will be ashamed and the children
25 of our children will be ashamed. And I asked Milutinovic to intervene in
1 response to this outburst.
2 Q. Paragraph 199, line 3, did the purpose of this meeting apparently
3 have something to do with participation of the army in Kosovo?
4 A. My conviction is that that meeting was intended in the first place
5 to analyse the overall situation in Kosovo and Metohija primarily from the
6 security point of view. Secondly, to examine the behaviour of the army
7 top leadership, which did not wish to accept acting in coordination with
8 the police. And thirdly, to show that Mr. Stanisic was not conducting the
9 operations in Kosovo and Metohija properly in view of the fact that he was
10 insisting on a unity of command and more efficient activities,
11 particularly in the centres of terrorist activity.
12 Q. Paragraph 200, was there a meeting following that, a narrower
13 meeting, where it was decided to form a particular body?
14 A. This meeting on the 13th was the only meeting of its kind that I
15 attended, upon the proposal of Mr. Milosevic in the first place. But
16 according to my knowledge, there was a narrower meeting after that when it
17 was decided to form the united command of the state security and public
18 security forces of the police, and the command of those forces was given
19 to Mr. Sreten Lukic.
20 Q. Lukic's appointment said what of Stanisic's authority?
21 A. I believe that shortly after that, Mr. Stanisic was withdrawn from
22 Kosovo and Metohija and transferred to Belgrade, so his command position
23 was taken away from him with respect to the state security. Immediately
24 after that, a couple of months later, Mr. Stanisic was replaced from his
25 position altogether.
1 MR. NICE: Your Honours will see a reference in the summary to an
2 existing exhibit which I won't weary us with today, Exhibit 319, tab 9,
3 which dates from a little earlier, the 15th of May of 1998. The witness
4 has reviewed this document, which was signed by Djordjevic and related to
5 the formation of a staff in the ministry at Pristina. And at that earlier
6 stage was the body formed in Pristina, Mr. Lilic, a national security, not
7 a joint command body?
8 A. As far as I can remember, that order signed by Mr. Djordjevic, the
9 head of the public security service, it relates to the public security.
10 Q. Thank you. Paragraph 202, there was a decision to form a
11 ministerial staff for the suppression of terrorism. Tab 25. If we can
12 just briefly look at that. Very briefly. And you can see the composition
13 of this ministerial staff for the suppression of terrorism, Lukic, Gajic,
14 Djinovic, Lukovic, Trajkovic, Radosavljevic, Vukovic, Zdravkovic and
15 Vucurevic. Is this joint security forces, Mr. Lilic?
16 A. This decision was signed by Mr. Vlajko Stojiljkovic, Minister of
17 Internal Affairs. This is the unified staff of the public and state
18 security services, including special units. One can see that Sreten Lukic
19 is at its head, and there is a mixture of people from state security and
20 public security. Gajic is from state security, Milorad Lukovic is a
21 member of the special unit but he belongs to the state security, and so
22 on. But some of the people I don't know personally, but that is the staff
23 as it was at the time.
24 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I apologise. This was previously tendered
25 through Babovic as 466, tab 6. 466, tab 6, I am told. We'll move on.
1 Q. We've covered already the changes in the rules of the Supreme
2 Defence Council. We can see them considered at tab 26, just for
3 reference, in the minutes of the Supreme Defence Council for the 23rd of
4 March of 1999, and the witness has already commented on the coincidence of
5 that date in relation to the NATO bombing. We don't need to look at it
6 beyond that. It can be exhibited, I hope, by my referring to it in that
8 Just tell us this, please, Mr. Lilic: The new rules changed
9 certain previous arrangements. They no longer allowed for telephone
10 consultation and they included the requirement that the Federal Ministry
11 of Defence and the chief of the general staff must be present at sessions.
12 In your judgement, what did that say - paragraph 209 of your summary -
13 what did that say of the move of responsibility, if any, for what was to
14 follow from the accused?
15 A. Clearly, that's something that used to be the practice in the
16 previous Defence Council is now being formalised and made obligatory. So
17 I think it also implies the corresponding sharing of responsibility.
18 Q. So as a result of this, there would be less responsibility on the
19 accused? Is that what you're saying?
20 A. It is hard to say that he would have less responsibility, but
21 there was a possibility for certain decisions not being taken if the
22 provisions of the new rules of procedure are not respected. So possibly
23 it was possible for certain decisions not to be taken if taken in
24 accordance with the rules, that is, through the Supreme Defence Council.
25 Q. Paragraph 210: The witness has reviewed a previous exhibit,
1 Exhibit 245, instructions for the defence of inhabited places. I'm not
2 going to present that again to the Chamber. You've reviewed this
3 instructions for the defence of inhabited places. Are you able to form a
4 view, Mr. Lilic, as to whether that comes from the existing defence plan?
5 A. This document that I managed to see, the source of which I cannot
6 know, certainly is part of the country's defence plan adopted by the
7 Supreme Defence Council, the implementation of which is determined by the
8 Supreme Commander, and I must say I was surprised to see it in this form
9 without the accompanying decision of the Supreme Defence Council.
10 Q. Paragraph 215: Did you, Mr. Lilic, shortly after the start of the
11 NATO bombing campaign, hold discussions with various foreign officials,
12 including Frans Vranitsky, Moammer Ghadhafi, and Helmut Kohl? Were these
13 discussions held with the knowledge of and, as you understood it, with the
14 approval of the accused, and did they lead to your writing a letter to the
15 accused on the 5th of May of 1999, tab 27?
16 A. Immediately after the beginning of the bombing, or some 15 days
17 into it, it was clear that the raids would not last, as had been expected
18 by a certain number of people in the Yugoslav leadership, so I tried my
19 best to use connections and influential people that I had met earlier on,
20 and my answer to your question is --
21 Q. I'm sure you understand that the detail of what you would be
22 saying is contained in your summary so that people can know the detail if
23 they need to pursue it and it's just simply for the pressure of time that
24 I would ask you to be brief. Am I right in the question that I asked you,
25 that you had these international discussions and wrote the letter
2 A. Yes, but I would like to finish my sentence, and I was going to
3 say yes, anyway, Mr. Nice.
4 Q. If we look at this letter, which sets out your cogently expressed
5 arguments in favour of the Kohl plan - and the learned Judges can consider
6 it in detail later - it ends on what is page 4 of the English text at the
7 foot and simply the end of letter. It ends with your saying to the
8 accused that: "The responsibility of each one of us is historic. Perhaps
9 we experience it differently." And you indeed conclude by saying that:
10 "The fate of the Serbian people, the fate of Serbia and the FRY, is in
11 your hands."
12 Now, did this draw any reaction from the accused himself?
13 A. Regarding what is stated in this letter, prompted by the wish to
14 make an attempt to stop the bombing, no. As far as my personal status and
15 the attitude towards me is concerned, it provoked a very tumultuous
17 Q. Paragraph 218 of the summary: Were you called to a meeting with
18 Milutinovic, Marjanovic, Tomic, Jovanovic, Minic, at the Presidency of
19 Serbia's building on the 17th of May, 1999?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Was this effectively a party hearing, or as you describe it, a
22 party tribunal?
23 A. In view of the fact that those were people who were the leaders of
24 state institutions and political bodies in the SDS, it was like a
25 political and state tribunal which acted in that way with respect to the
1 letter we referred to. It was literally a trial for something that they
2 themselves did not understand and in which they themselves had not
4 Q. And the particular complaint against you, in a sentence, was what?
5 A. That I shouldn't have given myself the liberty to write such a
6 letter to Mr. Milosevic.
7 Q. Was there a concern as to how such a letter might be interpreted
8 or subsequently used as evidence?
9 A. Yes, this was quite openly stated by Mr. Milutinovic, though that
10 is something that really never occurred to me.
11 Q. Tab 28, did you write a further letter to the accused on the 17th
12 of May? Again, the Chamber will be able to review it at leisure, Mr.
13 Lilic, so we can deal with it in a sentence. Did this reject the
14 criticisms made of you and did it end, as we can see on the second page,
15 the penultimate paragraph, your asserting your desire to help without
16 personal interests and your willingness to step down after the aggression
17 was concluded?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And in the following months, months that followed these events,
20 did it become clear to you that one of the political or military options
21 was being favoured? If so, which one?
22 A. It was quite clear that as far as the attitude towards NATO was
23 concerned, the conviction was that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
24 could even have some influence; at least, some people believed that NATO
25 could be defeated, and this was later stated in certain public statements,
1 to break the spine of NATO, as people said. So I really do believe that
2 those were unreasonable beliefs, and that every effort should have been
3 made to stop the bombing as soon as possible.
4 Q. Paragraph 222 of the summary, Perisic, Stanisic, and Dimitrijevic
5 were all replaced or sideways moved. Do you believe there to be a link
6 between those moves and the accused's wife's JUL Party?
7 A. Yes, I'm convinced of that.
8 Q. Paragraph 224, Perisic was replaced by Ojdanic. I think he was
9 somebody who you yourself had actually relieved of command, is that right,
10 or moved from one post to another as your judgements on the man?
11 A. Yes. From position of commander of the 1st army, he was moved to
12 the general staff, which was a position that was higher - I think he was
13 deputy chief of staff - but it had marginal powers, insignificant powers,
14 in fact.
15 Q. Tab 29, please. We can see how this matter was dealt with at the
16 Supreme Defence Council meeting held on November the 14th of 1998. Page 3
17 of the English, under "Personnel Issues," and at the top right-hand corner
18 for you, Mr. Lilic, 2465, is the page number, it's the bottom of the page
19 where the session is opened with the accused reminding of the necessity to
20 replace the chief of the general staff because it was said he had been on
21 duty for a long time.
22 If we look further on, we see about a page further on that
23 President Djukanovic of Montenegro expressed a contrary view.
24 Milutinovic, on our page 4 of 3, it says -- it says concurred with the
25 views of the accused. And then at our page 5 of 3, as it's recorded,
1 Djukanovic's response was that "the Supreme Council of Defence is working
2 the way it does. If you agree with that, then it will be that way. I am
3 against." So there was a conflict. You can see it all in detail, if
5 Any comments on that conflict between Milutinovic and the accused
6 and Djukanovic?
7 A. First of all, I think that such an important issue should have
8 been resolved by a consensus, and in the new rules, such a provision is
9 made with regard to such a high position in the army of Yugoslavia.
10 Secondly, it is really not important how long somebody's doing a certain
11 job, but how he's doing it. And thirdly, regardless of the fact that the
12 president of the Republic of Montenegro, Mr. Djukanovic, had a very firm
13 position, the decision was nevertheless taken by Milutinovic, who
14 concurred with President Milosevic and gave legitimacy to a decision which
15 in those days, according to the rules in force, could have been taken by
16 Milosevic alone without any polemics. But it is a fact that the chief of
17 staff was always appointed and dismissed with the absolute concurrence of
18 both Republics.
19 Q. You're recorded as saying the decision was taken by Milutinovic.
20 Did you mean Milutinovic or Milosevic?
21 A. Milutinovic agreed that Perisic should be replaced. And by
22 agreeing, in a sense, he made the decision. But the final decision is
23 made by President Milosevic, who confirmed it with his signature.
24 Q. Paragraph 226, what's your understanding or belief as to the
25 reason why Stanisic was relieved of his command and replaced?
1 A. I think yesterday we spoke at some length about the principled
2 positions of Mr. Stanisic, when it came to the struggle against terrorists
3 in Kosovo and Metohija regarding the need to have the public security
4 under a single command, the need for the army to provide logistics, but in
5 a legitimate way, and I think that was one of the reasons. But no less
6 important reason was the fact that it didn't suit the Yugoslav left. And
7 immediately after that, the story was spread about that Mr. Stanisic was
8 working for the GSYA, and this was rumoured for quite a long time until he
9 was dismissed. It is true that Mr. Dojic [phoen], the director of the
10 GSYA was in Belgrade, and he spoke with a different person, and he had a
11 tete-a-tete meeting of more than four hours with somebody quite different,
12 but I don't want to go into that now. The point was for the Yugoslav left
13 to have its people take over the leadership.
14 Q. [Previous translation continues]... Dimitrijevic, did you regard
15 Farkas as up to the job? Paragraph 227.
16 A. Without underestimating General Geza Farkas, I don't think that he
17 was somebody who could have replaced General Dimitrijevic, not only for
18 professional reasons but for certain other reasons as well.
19 Q. Paragraph 228, the failure to call a state of emergency resulted
20 in what, so far as responsibility falling on Milutinovic was concerned?
21 A. The fact that a state of emergency was not proclaimed has as its
22 consequence the illegal and unlawful deployment of the army of Yugoslavia,
23 and quite certainly, that somebody's responsibility ought to be sought,
24 and not only Mr. Milutinovic's as far as the Republic of Serbia is
1 Q. Of course, the failure to call a state of emergency was the
2 decision of whom?
3 A. This was a decision, a possible decision, made by the president of
4 Serbia possibly. But under conditions of that kind, it ought to have been
5 a decision by the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia because
6 it implied the use and deployment of the army of Yugoslavia, or rather,
7 the Supreme Defence Council, their decision.
8 Q. Paragraph 229, voting on the Rambouillet accords was in which
10 A. If I remember correctly, I think it was the Assembly -- the
11 National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia.
12 Q. Was that proper or improper, and if improper, what does that show
13 of the accused? What does that reveal of the accused's method of
14 operation, please?
15 A. I personally think that the fact that the National Assembly
16 discussed proposals and positions to be advocated at Rambouillet is its
17 legitimate right. However, at the same time, it was the duty of the
18 Federal Assembly to discuss issues of that kind as well. So this kind of
19 responsibility is left at the level of the Republic of Serbia and
20 marginalises the federal state in a way.
21 Q. Just dealing generally with the composition of those assemblies,
22 party composition gave authority to which party?
23 A. Well, de facto, the SPS was the party mentioned everywhere, at all
24 levels, but the SPS was not the party that covered the most important
25 regions of power, but my answer would be the SPS at any rate.
1 Q. Just remind us, we covered it in detail, but just to have a
2 general, would it be the case that the president of Serbia when he was
3 only the president of Serbia or was the president of Serbia, the accused
4 was able to control federal institutions? How did he achieve that? By
5 what method?
6 A. Well, when we're talking about Mr. Milosevic's -- if that's who
7 you have in mind, I think his influence should be viewed from two aspects,
8 one from the aspect of a head of state, and the authority vested in him
9 throughout those years. And secondly, as a leader of the political party,
10 first of one, then the other, and then both. So it was via the political
11 parties, in fact, the SPS and JUL, that this influence was dominant, by
12 the deputies in the Federal Assembly or via the deputies in the Republican
13 Assembly or rather the ministries in either government.
14 Q. Mr. Lilic, paragraph 230, you were shown or listened to, rather,
15 an audio recording. The number is given on the summary. We have nothing
16 like the time to go through it. It's audio recording T0000114. You heard
17 the recording in preparation for evidence. Whose voices did you
19 A. On the tape, there are a number of voices. I was able to
20 recognise just one of them.
21 Q. [Previous interpretation continues] ...
22 A. It was the voice of General Mladic, in fact.
23 Q. Thank you very much. That's at tab 30, Your Honours. And now I
24 must sweep up matters that were postponed yesterday on grounds of possible
25 sensitivity, but I think there's no need for any closed session. A couple
1 of matters of detail, please. Can you have tab 17 in front of you.
2 This shows the termination of professional military service for
3 Galic, General, whom you're aware has been on trial here. And we see your
4 signing off on his termination. Can you just explain that, please.
5 A. I assume that I signed this document because this isn't a decree
6 that is specific for decrees of the Supreme Defence Council, which I
7 presided over, and I don't know this Colonel Branko Fezer either. But I
8 don't think that's of any importance. Now as far as signing this decree,
9 the members of the 30th cadre's centre, I think that I spoke about this a
10 great deal yesterday. We didn't view the personal centre and the
11 individuals in it individually, but we looked at the people who had
12 belonged to the JNA or who on a volunteer basis were on the territory of
13 Republika Srpska. This decree probably came as a proposal by Mr. Radovan
14 Karadzic, for example.
15 Q. I see. Now I want to turn to another topic. Yesterday you
16 volunteered to us in relation to Srebrenica that certain individuals were
17 responsible. Can you tell us, please, who those individuals were.
18 A. It is difficult that you can expect me to name any individual.
19 That would be difficult. I don't think you can expect me to do that. But
20 I think that there is individual responsibility, and I am sure that in the
21 course of this trial, you will be able to show and prove who those
22 individuals were. And I said I was convinced that that kind of order
23 didn't come from any political or military person from Belgrade, and that
24 I'm completely sure --
25 Q. Mr. Lilic, that's the third time you've told us that. Can you
1 help us please, because time is very short, with this: You volunteered
2 that individuals were involved. Can you just perhaps help us with who it
4 A. No. Had we known who was involved, we would have taken the
5 appropriate measures ourselves.
6 Q. How soon after the massacre at Srebrenica were you aware of it?
7 A. It's difficult for me to be precise enough. I think it was a
8 relatively short space of time.
9 Q. Days, weeks, days?
10 A. Well, let's say several days.
11 Q. Thank you. How soon was the name of General Mladic, who, of
12 course, is indicted in respect of Srebrenica, associated with those events
14 A. There were a lot of polemics and discussion as to that. According
15 to the intensity of President Milosevic's anger, the degree to which he
16 was angry, I don't think much time elapsed.
17 Q. Very well.
18 A. I can't be precise on that score.
19 Q. Can we now go to tab 20, please, Your Honour. And I'm going to
20 ask that you add to tab 20 so that it becomes part of it an earlier record
21 of the same general kind. Tab 20 at the moment is the 29th of August,
22 1995, Dobanovci meeting. The one that you're now being provided with is
23 the immediate preceding one is the meeting of the 25th of August. And
24 Mr. Lilic, I'd be grateful if you would take, please, the B/C/S version
25 which has page numbers in the top right-hand corner, small page numbers,
1 at least starting on page 2 it does, and I will guide you to the relevant
2 passage that I want you to look at.
3 Starting at the beginning, this is a record of a meeting of the
4 highest political and military leaders on the 25th of August in Dobanovci.
5 And it's in accordance with conclusions adopted at the 42nd session of the
6 Supreme Council held on the 23rd of August of 1995. Can you help us,
7 please, with this: Did General Mladic attend Supreme Defence Council
9 A. General Mladic was invited in his capacity of a man who can exert
10 pressure on the leadership of Republika Srpska to accept the groundwork
11 and basis to prepare the peace negotiations in Dayton. So my answer is
12 yes, he was present at the initial stages of the Supreme Defence Council
14 Q. Very well. Let's go then please to English page 4, at the foot,
15 and for you, Mr. Lilic, I think it is page 6 at the top. Now, this is not
16 a Supreme Defence Council meeting, it's a special meeting following on the
17 SDC meeting, and we see the following at the foot of page 4: "Since
18 General Ratko Mladic arrived at the meeting at about 1430 hours,
19 President Milosevic addressed those present and instructed them that this
20 meeting is secret, that is, it can never be mentioned or referred to
21 publicly, and he quoted a letter that President Karadzic sent him on the
22 23rd of August, saying that the letter entailed 'important elements.'"
23 Was the proclamation of secrecy linked to Mladic's arrival, please?
24 A. No.
25 Q. You see following on from that, President Milosevic reminded him,
1 reminded Karadzic that he suggested that...
2 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
3 MR. NICE:
4 Q. Reminded Karadzic, "he suggested that very thing a year ago. The
5 Muslims had to be offered something they deemed important, and they would
6 give us something we would be particularly interested in. Of course,
7 we're not referring to the enclaves. The three in Eastern Bosnia
8 (Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde) would blend into Serbian surroundings
9 without a fight." Was that the general view of the Serb leadership at the
10 time, please, Mr. Lilic?
11 A. No, but may I be allowed to put you right on one point, or rather
12 a detail in this document is not correct. The letter received by
13 President Milosevic from President Karadzic, and the response to your
14 question is no. My answer to your question is no.
15 Q. Further down, page 5 in the English, and at the very foot of page
16 6 for you, Mr. Lilic, we see at the end of the paragraph, two-thirds of
17 the way down, the accused saying: "... Under-Secretary of State Holbrooke
18 told him about the U.S. view according to which, if the Serbs fail to
19 accept the peace, the war would be made to escalate. And if the Muslims
20 refuse the peace solution they will be told they are to be left alone with
21 the sword of Damocles hanging above them in the form of General Mladic."
22 Was that the approach taken by the Serb leadership to the use of General
24 A. No. I think that from the text you can see, according to the
25 words of Mr. Milosevic, that this was stated by Mr. Holbrooke.
1 Q. Over the page, please, to our page 7, and for you, please,
2 Mr. Lilic, your page 8. A quarter of the way down in the English version,
3 Prime Minister Kontic "informed the others that the economic situation in
4 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had been increasingly difficult and
5 that we would not be able to assist Republika Srpska as we have been so
6 far. When President Karadzic heard about this inability to assist
7 Republika Srpska, he asked President Milosevic, 'President, does this mean
8 that I shouldn't go to the Neretva and into Eastern Slavonia?' The
9 President of Serbia replied that what Karadzic was suggesting was a war
10 option." Do you remember that passage of debate?
11 A. Yes, of course I remember that debate.
12 Q. We move on, please, because I'm going to come to your contribution
13 to this debate in a second or so. But at the foot of our page 7, we have
14 Karadzic warning that the Muslims aspire towards all the territories west
15 of Brcko and are prepared to leave the Drina area east of Bosnia "to us.
16 Therefore, we must fight for a wider corridor and as compact a territory
17 as possible..." Is that the policy being accepted and discussed at that
19 A. Well, yes, it's clear that as broad a corridor as possible was
20 needed at Brcko. As for the agreement and common position, this was quite
22 Q. Your contribution can be found on English page 9, B/C/S page 11.
23 This is what you said: "[President Lilic] stated that the question of
24 whether we are giving up on Krajina is now moot. We have done everything
25 to help Krajina, but what happened happened. They left their traditional
1 homesteads without a fight. You could rather say that the Krajina
2 politicians have given up on their mother country.
3 [The accused] added a less-well-known piece of information.
4 Namely, he mentioned a telegram sent to General Mrksic in which he was
5 told to hold out for just two days until we send him help. They did not
6 hold on. They fled."
7 You, Mr. Lilic, continued, stating that "the key question at the
8 moment was whether we would keep, whether we would retain Republika Srpska
9 or not. The question of Serbian destiny is now posed." You went a step
10 further than the previous speaker by saying that "for us the issue of a
11 quick war or a quick peace practically no longer exists. Now we must only
12 choose the quick peace" solution; and as the chairman of the Supreme
13 Defence Council, you warned that "military resources are fairly exhausted,
14 that some are depleted. That is why we are making a historical decision
15 today: Will Republika Srpska exist or not. It will if we accept peace,
16 not war." Is that your attitude?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Over the page to page 10, we see the contribution of General
19 Mladic. It's at your page 12 at the top. And in the middle of the page,
20 I haven't the time to read all of it out, but just point it to the
21 Chamber. It was Mladic expressing his satisfaction at seeing all Serbian
22 politicians gathered since, as he said, "This is no time for a tug-of-war
23 competition." Is that the reality of General Mladic's contributions?
24 A. In view of the specific way this sentence rang, yes, I remember it
1 Q. No discussion recorded here on Srebrenica. Was the topic raised
2 at the meeting, please?
3 A. No, this meeting was related to the Dayton peace agreements
4 exclusively. Of course, Srebrenica was discussed before that, before the
5 meeting, as to what was actually going on, but for their part, there were
6 no explanations or recognitions of any kind, confessions or such.
7 Q. Did Mladic give any explanation? Was he challenged by anyone?
8 A. No. Mladic arrived -- No.
9 Q. Has Mladic ever given you an explanation?
10 A. Not to me personally, no.
11 Q. You speak to Mladic, do you, from time to time, or not?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. When most recently?
14 A. Our intensive conversations took place precisely after these
15 meetings, or to be more specific, in December sometime when I went with
16 General Perisic and Dimitrijevic to make an attempt to save the French
17 pilots, and this was a condition posed for the signing of the Dayton
18 agreement in Paris. And we had intensive conversations at that time, and
19 negotiations at Han Pijesak because President Milosevic, at my initiative,
20 had accepted the fact that I should go to Han Pijesak where I talked at
21 the time to practically the whole of the main staff of the army of
22 Republika Srpska. And after very difficult discussions and debates, we --
23 Q. Just yes or no: Mladic never explained Srebrenica.
24 A. No.
25 Q. The personnel centre continued to pay Mladic until when?
1 A. I don't know to Mladic himself, but to the whole group, the
2 personnel centre paid out the salaries until 1994. This afterwards,
3 social and welfare and assistance, and as far as I know, this went on to
4 the year 2001, up until March. Whether Mladic was paid out as well, I'm
5 not quite sure.
6 Q. Was there ever any investigation to your knowledge by the SDC of
7 what was being alleged about Srebrenica? Was there ever any decision to
8 cease supporting any of the VRS soldiers possibly implicated in that
10 A. No.
11 Q. Can we go to the next part of the similar record, as I'm very
12 short of time. It's the other part of tab 20, and it's the record for the
13 29th of August, 1995. Just look at two excerpts on this, please. And in
14 the English version at the bottom right-hand corner, the page numbering is
15 6 of 19. Mladic is present at this meeting as well, as we can see. But
16 on page 6 of 19, which in your case, Mr. Lilic, can be found on page 5 at
17 the top right, we have Karadzic saying: "We ought to insist on having
18 Serbian territories compact --" sorry. "We ought to insist on having
19 Serbian territories compact, answered President Milosevic. Let us leave
20 Gorazde, Muslims alone would offer it on exchange." Is that an expression
21 or view that the accused offered?
22 A. I can't remember this, but as I know the principled positions
23 with respect to the exchanges, then I think yes.
24 Q. At the foot of the English page and just a paragraph or so on, we
25 have the accused warning again there wasn't much time left, "that it was
1 in our interest to reach an agreement, for if we fail to do so - neither
2 Republic of Srpska would exist, nor its Constitution." Was that the fear
3 you all had?
4 A. Yes, this is enormous pressure, and from President Milosevic,
5 too, to go to the Dayton negotiations.
6 Q. At page 8 of 19 in the English, and at page 11 for Mr. Lilic, we
7 see the beginning of -- we see Mladic's contribution. I don't have time
8 to go through it for want of time.
9 So far as the 30th personnel centre is concerned, can you
10 remember, please, we know that there was an embargo against RS between
11 August 1994 and sometime in 1995. When did the 30th personnel centre
12 actually resume paying salaries, please? What part of 1995?
13 A. In view of the position taken by General Mladic, which he
14 presented on the 10th, or rather, 11th of December while I was in
15 Republika Srpska at Han Pijesak myself, to abolish the borders on the
16 Drina, then I assume that that did not even take place in 1995. Perhaps
17 at the beginning of 1996, but the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was so
18 exhausted by that time that I don't think it was able to finance this at
19 the rate that it had been able to do previously, the monthly sums that
20 were paid out, and I spoke about that yesterday.
21 Q. Yesterday you said that the resumption of payments was in 1995,
22 and you dealt with the matter in preparation for giving evidence, and we
23 can find the paragraph number. What are you saying as to when the
24 salaries were paid in 1995, please?
25 A. If you allow me to say, after the sanctions were introduced
1 against Republika Srpska, we took a decision that the minimal part, that
2 is the social welfare part, should be given to the families of the 30th
3 personnel centre to continue their children's education, and I think that
4 part of it was continued. That's what I had in mind. But they were not
5 the entire amounts, they were just amounts that were guaranteed --
6 salaries guaranteed in the Federal Republic at that time, the guaranteed
7 wages in fact.
8 Q. And in what part of 1995 did those payments resume, please?
9 A. Well, those payments were hardly interrupted, this minimum
10 guaranteed portion, for a part of the members of the personnel centre who
11 were mostly threatened. And I think those lists exist today and you can
12 have them.
13 Q. Very well. You shall be asked some further questions.
14 Oh, one other question I should have asked you: You remained a
15 member of the SPS until when, Mr. Lilic?
16 A. In mid-August 2002, I was replaced. I was given my work booklet
17 and was left without a job in the state administration. And then I tabled
18 my resignation to all the other posts that I held in the SPS, et cetera
19 and other volunteer ones within the Federal state. So it was until
20 mid-August 2000.
21 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: 2000, not 2002.
22 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'll deal at the end of the evidence with
23 the tabs that haven't been produced. By and large they're SDC records
24 outside the period of this witness, it obviously being of only limited
25 value to have his comments on them.
1 JUDGE MAY: There's a query about tab 8, if we've dealt with it.
2 THE REGISTRAR: Tab 8 is currently marked for identification, Your
4 MR. NICE: Tab 8 is one that --
5 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for Mr. Nice.
6 MR. NICE: Tab 8 is one that the government representative are now
7 happy that I should deal with because it falls outside the narrower period
8 for which they would otherwise want protection. In those circumstances,
9 may it now be marked as an exhibit.
10 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
11 MR. NICE: Thank you. The other matter is the confusion between
12 466, tab 6, and our own 469, tab 25.
13 MR. NICE: I'm told that the other exhibit is different from this
14 because it's only an extract.
15 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
16 MR. NICE: And therefore, since it was an extract upon which a
17 witness may have relied for his views and opinions, it's probably
18 preferable that it remain as a separate exhibit.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Lilic, I just want to take you back to an
20 early part of your testimony, the 1997 runoff for the elections. You were
21 the SPS candidate, and I believe you said that the campaign was obstructed
22 by the JUL, and Mira Markovic, and that their influence affected your
23 position. Could you tell me or let me know whether anything was done, any
24 strategy, specific strategy was employed by them to affect your campaign?
25 You eventually withdrew your candidature.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Robinson. This entire
2 campaign was obstructed in terms of the media, including the fact that
3 information from my election campaign and rallies were broadcast towards
4 the end of the evening news. And the TV was in our hands, so to speak.
5 I'm speaking from a political point of view, from the point of view of the
6 political party. And it's another thing that I found out later on, that
7 even the actual ballot counting was influenced.
8 But by your leave, I really would not like to discuss that
9 particular subject here.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you very much.
11 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, before I start
13 cross-examining this witness, I would like to hear your position
14 concerning the time that I have available. As you can see, Mr. Nice just
15 gleaned through certain documents. He just asked the witness to identify
16 them. Quite simply, we have a pile of documents here that had merely been
17 identified, and nobody went into their substance.
18 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic, we've got to bear in mind that the
19 amicus may have some questions. We have to bear in mind that there may be
20 some re-examination. But subject to that, you can have the balance of the
21 time until the conclusion tomorrow. But in this case, in particular, I
22 counsel you and warn you not to waste time arguing with the witness - if
23 you do, the time will be taken against you - or to deal with irrelevant
24 matters. Now, we'll see how we get on. We'll see what progress we make.
25 But that is the time at the moment that you have available.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That means until the end of the
2 day tomorrow? That is just somewhat longer, a bit longer, just a bit
3 longer --
4 JUDGE MAY: This is the way in which your time is taken up,
5 arguing. Now, move on. Ask the questions. And I suggest you begin with
6 the tabs about which there could be no dispute. There may be dispute
7 about the admissibility of other questions.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In order to be efficient, Mr. May, I
9 will try to move in some kind of order, taking the same order, perhaps,
10 that the examination-in-chief took. I think that would be appropriate,
11 and we are going to get to the documents, too. But before that, just a
12 few questions to the witness.
13 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:
14 Q. The subjects that are being discussed here are Kosovo, Bosnia,
15 Croatia. In view of information offices held familiarity with the
16 situation, to which extent did the Serb people, the Muslims, the Roma, the
17 Turks, Egyptians, the Gorani and others, and other non-Albanian population
18 in Kosovo, to what extent were jeopardised in Kosovo by the Albanian
19 Separatist Movement?
20 A. All the members of these ethnic groups that you mentioned were
21 equally jeopardised, I would say, and it is certainly their survival in
22 Kosovo and Metohija were jeopardised and any kind of safety and security,
23 including their economic safety and security.
24 Q. Economic safety is very important, but this is something more
25 important than economic safety and security, and that is life jeopardy,
1 vital jeopardy. So what extent were they vitally jeopardised? To what
2 extent were their lives in danger in view of the constant killings that
3 were going on in Kosovo and Metohija?
4 A. I said a short while ago as number one that their safety and
5 security was truly jeopardised and yes, their lives were in danger.
6 Q. When you spoke about the fact that there were many killings,
7 Mr. Nice put the question as to whether I knew about that. I think that
8 this is a bit of a misunderstanding between you. I don't think you
9 understood each other correctly. You spoke about a large number of
10 killings whose victims were primarily Serbs and other non-Albanian
11 population and the perpetrators were Albanian terrorists; is that right?
12 A. That can be seen from the transcript. I was very precise. I said
13 there was a very large number of attacks by Albanian terrorists. It goes
14 without saying that they were not attacking themselves. They were
15 attacking the Serb and other non-Albanian population. But they even
16 attacked the Albanian population in some cases.
17 Q. That would have been my next question. Is it correct that there
18 was a large number of Albanians who wanted to live in peace, who wanted to
19 live in cooperation, tolerance, and who had very good and friendly
20 relations, and that they were also victims of the Albanian separatist
21 forces, especially the Albanian terrorists?
22 A. Yes, there are very precise reports to that effect, and I think
23 that these Albanians were a great force that we should have drawn on in
24 terms of improving the relations between Serbs and Albanians. These
25 prominent Albanians who were prepared to have this kind of coexistence in
2 Q. Did this ever happen in our policy, or rather I am referring to
3 the time period when you and I were in the political -- on the political
4 scene. I'm not talking about before that. Was there ever a single moment
5 when a distinction was not made between the terrorists of the separatist
6 movement on the one hand and the Albanian people on the other hand? I
7 don't know if I have been clear enough in putting this question.
8 A. I just wanted to wait for the interpreters because I don't want to
9 make their life too difficult.
10 It's clear enough. If you're talking about this period until
11 1998, when in some cases there were some uncontrolled operations. I
12 talked about that, but that is really an exception. So this was an answer
13 to your question. There were no such situations.
14 Q. So we never identified Albanians terrorists with the Albanian
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. As for uncontrolled behaviour or rather, crimes, that you referred
18 to and that happened, did all officials know, political officials, police
19 officials, and military officials, that no operations should be launched
20 if civilians were to be imperilled by that?
21 A. Yes, this was a clear, principled stand that was often
22 highlighted. I was not often present at meetings after 1998, but I know
23 about the period when I attended these meetings.
24 Q. So my categorical position is that even as far as operations
25 against terrorists are concerned, these operations cannot be launched if
1 civilians lives would be jeopardised. You're aware of that?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Are you aware of the position that for each and every crime, the
4 perpetrators should be held accountable and that not a single crime should
5 be concealed regardless of whether it is a question of looting, theft, or
6 the most serious crimes, like killings, rape, et cetera?
7 A. I'm aware of that position, but we also presented different
8 examples, and we sought investigations and we wanted to have this matter
9 looked into. But whether it was carried through, I don't know.
10 Q. All right. Generally speaking, since a sufficient number of
11 documents have been introduced here, I would nevertheless like to bring in
12 another one which shows what our political position was precisely in
13 mid-1998. I have a tape recording here of the 16th session of the main
14 committee of the Socialist Party of Serbia. At the end, there are even
15 the minutes and also the press release that was subsequently issued. In
16 the minutes, it says that the persons present -- that the meeting was
17 attended by Slobodan Milosevic, president of the Socialist Party of
18 Serbia, and then the vice-presidents who were present. I don't want to
19 use too much time, and among these vice-presidents was Zoran Lilic, and so
20 on and so forth. This is the 16th session held on the 10th of June, 1998.
21 So that is when the problem in Kosovo had truly escalated. Now, I
22 want to ask you the following: Do you remember this? I'm going to quote
23 only part of what I said in my final remarks. I am quoting this, and I am
24 putting a question in advance. Do you remember this position? This is a
25 meeting, a session of the top party leadership. There is a list of all
1 the attendants. There is a couple of hundred of people, and also
2 presidents of the municipal committees. That is in the meeting room where
3 we usually had about 400 people present at such big party meetings? Is
4 that right? So do you remember --
5 JUDGE MAY: Before you have to answer this, Mr. Lilic, you can
6 have a look at the minutes. The accused can read out the passage he wants
7 to rely on, and then you can have a look at the minutes yourself. Yes.
8 MR. NICE: May I ask for a copy at some stage because it's not a
9 document we have immediately available.
10 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let us have it here. We'll have it in evidence
11 in due course.
12 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You'll receive it. I have just one
14 copy. I have no reason why not to give you the entire minutes.
15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. So this passage that refers only to the item on the agenda that
17 involved the debate on Kosovo, do you remember when I spoke about that,
18 this is what I said: "Our policy is that Kosovo should be resolved by
19 political means. We approach this solution bearing in mind our
20 convictions, our programme which involves the principle of national
21 equality -- ethnic equality. We don't want to harm the Albanians in any
22 way, and we do not want Albanians in Kosovo to be second-rate citizens.
23 Therefore, we should bear in mind, as Minic pointed out in his report,
24 because he did submit a report in this regard, we should bear in mind,
25 therefore, that we should make a major distinction, and we have
1 highlighted this several times, between the separatist movement on the one
2 hand, and the Albanian people on the other hand, the Albanian people who
3 live there. No matter what this looks like," I mean, I'm skipping over
4 certain passages because I want to save time but you can have a look at
5 the entire text. "No matter what this looks like, this is precisely the
6 approach that we should espouse. A political solution and also promoting
7 the principle of ethnic equality. We should also bear in mind that those
8 who have been manipulated," because, beforehand, I said that some
9 Albanians, some people had been manipulated and some of our comrades said
10 that the majority was manipulated. So we should bear in mind that even
11 those who have been manipulated should be taken into account. "These are
12 unfortunate people who are being manipulated like all the pauperised
13 masses in the world. And it is these world manipulators who are trying to
14 use them in order to destabilise southern Europe. And in this way, they
15 are trying to create an alibi all the time in order to have a military
16 presence of the great powers. They are not the mainstays of activity." I
17 am referring to the Albanians. "They are being used by someone as their
19 Here it says Fukoshi, but I am actually referring to Bukoshi, so
20 it's a typo. He became a millionaire in Germany, collecting funds
21 allegedly for the needs of the Albanians, and so on and so forth. And
22 then I conclude by saying: "In relation to Kosovo, a political approach,
23 in relation to Kosovo the principle of ethnic equality. As for our
24 political activity down there in Kosovo, not only our personnel in Kosovo,
25 but also our people outside Kosovo who should be down there." And then I
1 say: "Dialogue." You may remember that I spoke at the end, and I
2 extemporised, I didn't have a written speech, but I hope that I have been
3 consistent enough. The dialogue that started, I am referring to the
4 dialogue when Rugova was there and so on and so forth. "The dialogue that
5 began is not reserved only for the state commission and for the
6 representatives of Albanian political parties, for Ratko Markovic, as you
7 recall, this was the Deputy Prime Minister who led the government
8 delegation there, and Mahmut Bakalli, or Bajazit Nushi, and Gani. This
9 dialogue is not reserved only for them. Of course, it is not only a
10 Serbian/Albanian dialogue, but it is also a
11 Serb/Albanian/Turk/Muslim/Roma/Montenegrin dialogue, everybody should be
12 involved. This dialogue should be present at all levels in the
13 municipality, at local commune level, in a formal and informal sense.
14 Formal and informal dialogue because people should be mobilised for life
16 And then I say that: "There is a clear difference in terms of
17 where the terrorists are operating as opposed to places where there is a
18 normal and peaceful life. They see this. And I think that all sensible
19 people do not want to see destruction, misery, suffering of the civilian
20 population. Everything that this process may bring forth. So on the one
21 hand, we are going to insist on dialogue. And we are going to work for a
22 political solution. On the other hand, we have to deal with terrorism.
23 If the Albanians themselves manage to halt terrorism, good for them. We
24 wish them all the best in this endeavour." Again, I'm skipping passages.
25 And then I move on to say: "The party should coordinate political
1 activities down there," so I emphasised that. "Political activity. That
2 is the role of the party. Milo Martic, Dusko Matkovic, Minic is in charge
3 of this three-man team for coordination on behalf of the party leadership
4 of political events down there in Kosovo." So I hope you remember this
6 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness see those minutes. Would you mark the
7 passage or indicate somewhere the passage you've relied on so that he can
8 check that. Yes, if the usher would collect them, please.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can give the whole minutes to the
10 witness, and he can look at page 52, the passages that I have marked,
11 begins with Kosovo to the end. And I've marked what I have quoted. But
12 I'm quite sure that the witness remembers very well that meeting.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] These are tape recordings, I assume,
14 from the session.
15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Yes, it's a transcript of the tape recording.
17 A. Mr. May, I do indeed remember this meeting very well. I don't
18 know whether it was on the 10th of June exactly, as Mr. Milosevic just
19 said. I certainly cannot confirm the authenticity of the entire speech,
20 but the political positions and the principled positions that you referred
21 to were certainly the positions that you upheld and the positions of the
22 SPS, and that is indeed what was considered at the main board; an appeal
23 for dialogue, for cooperation, for a peaceful solution of existing
24 problems. Efforts of the state commission consisting of a commission of
25 the Republic of Serbia headed by Mr. Markovic, that is also not at issue.
1 I was present there, but what actually happened on the ground, I wasn't
2 there, nor can I testify whether this principled policy was actually
3 implemented in the way you put it.
4 Q. Was -- was it clearly stressed at this meeting and always, at
5 least when the party leadership was involved, that we could be a
6 progressive country, a country developing successfully only if we respect
7 the principle of national equality or ethnic equality?
8 A. I can give you a very short answer to that: Yes.
9 But I must also add that this meeting was held not long after my
10 lengthy tour of Kosovo and the information I conveyed to you as to what
11 was actually happening over there at Kosovo and Metohija.
12 JUDGE MAY: Yes, we will exhibit the minutes. It can get the next
13 Defence number, please.
14 THE REGISTRAR: Defence Exhibit 142, Your Honours.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Could I ask the registry to copy
16 this document and return this copy to me, please.
17 JUDGE MAY: Yes. You will have the copy back in due course.
18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Do you know as to whether ever, throughout all these events, there
20 was any political position to the effect that the Albanians from Kosovo be
22 A. No, meetings that I attended of the main board, executive board,
23 meetings with you, I'm not aware of any such position.
24 Q. Was there ever any plan to expel the Albanians from Kosovo?
25 A. I am not aware of any such plan.
1 Q. Those are some general questions with which I wish to embark upon
2 the question of Kosovo. I should now like to go on to Bosnia with a few
3 general questions as well.
4 I assume that you followed this so-called trial here, at least
5 partially. I said with regard to Bosnia and Croatia, that we were there
6 concentrating on peace and not war. Is it well known and is it true that
7 Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and I personally, invested
8 all our efforts with respect to both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia to
9 achieve peace as soon as possible? Is that so or not?
10 A. Yes, the outcome of that was the whole series of peace plans that
11 were offered, either to the Bosnian side, if we're talking about the Serbs
12 in Bosnia, or the Serbs in Croatia.
13 Q. Did anyone from Serbia, and when I say "anyone from Serbia," I'm
14 talking from the authorities including the police, the state security, and
15 other bodies, any bodies, did anyone from those bodies instigate, through
16 any activity on its part, the war in Bosnia or Croatia?
17 A. It is rather hard for me to answer that question.
18 Q. Very well. Tell me, please, when talking about the events in
19 Croatia, did anybody from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, or in those
20 days it was still the SFRY, or from Serbia participate in those events in
21 Croatia when those pressures came about on the Serb populations, when
22 people were dismissed, fired from their jobs, when they were eliminated
23 from the constitutions, silent liquidations and everything that was
24 reminiscent of the Ustasha genocide of the Second World War due to which
25 the people were frightened, and with reason. Is that so or not?
1 A. Yes, exactly the way you put it.
2 Q. And the Serb population that was in jeopardy at the time, and what
3 they did to protect themselves, did they do so as an act of self-defense?
4 A. Yes, I would say so, absolutely so.
5 Q. Are you aware that they, when I say "they," I mean the Serbs in
6 Croatia, had lived in those areas for centuries?
7 A. Of course. I'm very familiar with that area, the people who lived
8 there and who are now mostly living in the territory of the Republic of
10 Q. And is it true they were not conquering territories on which they
11 did not live or rather that they wanted to defend the territories on which
12 they had lived for centuries?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Is it true that apart from the problems we are familiar with, they
15 took up arms to defend themselves, but immediately accepted -- though
16 there were problems of course --
17 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, I think these are matters which the
18 Trial Chamber is going to have to decide. I've allowed you to ask the
19 witness's opinion about some of them, but strictly it's irrelevant.
20 Unless he has got direct evidence on matters, he can't give evidence about
21 these things. So if you've got some direct questions, concrete questions
22 to ask, of course, you can, but not evidence of opinion.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that Mr. Lilic, with
24 regard to the suffering of the Serbs in Croatia in 1990 and 1991, up to
25 1995, has many things to say on the basis of his own direct knowledge.
1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Mr. Lilic, do you have any direct knowledge as to what was
4 A. Yes, I do.
5 Q. Therefore, just briefly, in one sentence, please tell us what was
6 going on.
7 A. I think, to put it mildly, when talking about the Serbs in
8 Croatia, not to use too heavy a word, but in view of the percentage of
9 Serbs that lived there, 18 to 22 per cent, today there's less than 2 per
10 cent remaining, so this in itself speaks for itself. On the other hand, I
11 think as early as 1992, thanks to the activities of the Federal Republic
12 of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia, that the Vance Plan was a good
13 opportunity for Krajina, the opportunity was missed in the first place I
14 would say because a part of the leadership of the Republika Srpska Krajina
15 were not serious enough. Of course, that does not justify the two major
16 operations of the Croats and the expulsion of the Serbs from that area
17 through Storm and Flash.
18 Q. I think you've told us enough in general lines about those
19 matters. What happened to the Serbs in Bosnia as a politician and as a
20 functionary from that time period? You knew that we all referred to
21 Bosnia as Yugoslavia in miniature precisely because it was inhabited by
22 both Serbs, Muslims and Croats. Is that right?
23 A. The ethnic composition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, if we're talking
24 about the time of the SFRY, I think fully reflected the ethnic composition
25 of Serbia until recently. So what you say is quite correct.
1 Q. Was the practice and the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina
2 such as to require a consensus of all three constituent peoples as defined
3 in the constitution regarding all decisions, that is, Serbs, Croats, and
5 A. As far as I know, yes.
6 Q. Is it true that the decision on independence of Bosnia and
7 Herzegovina was taken without the participation of the Serb people as a
8 constituent people, and that it couldn't be considered lawful and legal?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Is it true that the Serbs and Muslims had achieved something that
11 they called a historical agreement?
12 A. I'm not familiar with the details of that agreement, but I do know
13 that it existed.
14 Q. And is it true that all three parties eventually signed - and
15 Carrington was chairing the conference at the time - signed this plan but
16 the plan itself was under the leadership of Ambassador Cutileiro, and all
17 three sides eventually signed it.
18 A. Yes, that is true, and this was not long after the beginning of
19 the war. And I think that, later on, it was the Muslim side that reneged.
20 Q. The Cutileiro plan was signed before the beginning of the war, and
21 when the Muslim side changed its mind, recognition occurred, and the war
22 broke out.
23 A. Yes, in broad lines, but there were, I think, individual clashes
24 even before the Cutileiro plan.
25 Q. Is it true that all those initial attacks were mostly such that
1 the victims were Serbs? I'm talking about the incursion into Northern
2 Bosnia, Slavonski Brod, the killing at the wedding ceremony in Sarajevo.
3 The first victims of the war were Serbs, were they not?
4 A. According to my knowledge, yes, and I think that the war in Bosnia
5 actually started with the killing of somebody called Gardovic, if I
6 remember correctly, at a wedding ceremony in Sarajevo.
7 Q. Very well. We shall now follow the order in which you testified
8 to the extent that I will be able to keep track of that order, because Mr.
9 Nice did occasionally go from one topic to another.
10 JUDGE MAY: If you're moving to another topic, that would be a
11 convenient time to adjourn. We'll adjourn now for 20 minutes.
12 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.
13 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.
14 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Mr. Lilic, in view of the fact that you held one of the highest
17 positions, and afterwards, in fact, the highest position, in those peace
18 efforts, you yourself were also involved in a certain way, were you not?
19 A. Yes, one could put it that way. I didn't participate in the
20 foreign political diplomatic and in the negotiations themselves, but
21 otherwise, yes.
22 Q. Do you remember my letter published in Politika immediately after
23 the outbreak of the war in Bosnia, addressed to the Islamic conference in
24 Istanbul, saying that the Serbs and Muslims were brothers and that the
25 conflict should stop immediately, and that the conflict served only the
1 interests of the enemies of both Serbs and Muslims and that the problems
2 must be resolved by peaceful means?
3 A. I don't remember the details, but I do know of that letter, and I
4 do know that its substance was in accordance with what you just said.
5 Q. Do you remember my visit to Turkey and the talks I had with the
6 president of Turkey at the time, Ozal, and the Prime Minister Demirel, and
7 my position that Serbia would support every solution that the three
8 peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina agree on?
9 A. Yes, that was our political position later on.
10 Q. And do you remember that immediately after that, the international
11 community invested certain efforts and sought our assistance to achieve a
12 peaceful solution, and that as a result of those efforts that lasted
13 several months, I would say, in Athens in the 1st of May, 1993, the
14 Vance-Owen plan was signed?
15 A. Yes, you participated in all the negotiations with representatives
16 of the international community, whichever group we are talking about, then
17 and later, and I do remember that that Vance-Owen plan was initialled in
18 Athens, that it was initialled by Mr. Radovan Karadzic, I believe, in the
19 presence of Mr. Mitsotakis, if I'm not mistaken, and that met with general
20 approval in -- amongst us in Belgrade.
21 Q. Do you remember who contributed most to the leadership of the
22 Republika Srpska headed by Karadzic - and the whole delegation of the
23 Republika Srpska was present - who contributed most to them accepting that
24 plan and signing it in Athens?
25 A. I think certainly you made the greatest contribution, and you have
1 the greatest merit for it.
2 Q. Do you remember that they had the proviso that that signature had
3 to be confirmed by the Assembly of the Republika Srpska?
4 A. Yes, that is what you conveyed to us at one of the meetings we had
5 in Belgrade, that there was a possibility for them to betray the trust
6 shown in them by you personally and the international community.
7 Q. Do you remember that I went to attend that Assembly meeting in
8 Pale, we drove in the same car, the Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis and
9 myself, and Mitsotakis invested maximum efforts to help achieve peace in
10 Bosnia and Herzegovina?
11 A. I assume that that Assembly meeting at Pale should have verified
12 what had been initialled in Athens. And in addition to you yourself and
13 Mr. Mitsotakis, I think that our delegation from the Republic of Serbia
14 included Mr. Dobrica Cosic, Mr. Momir Bulatovic, representing Montenegro,
15 and even I was present, so that I remember that trip very well and our
16 attendance at the Assembly in Pale.
17 Q. You were present at that Assembly meeting in Pale.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And do you remember that I spoke twice at that Assembly meeting in
21 A. Yes, I remember all the speakers who took the floor, who were
22 trying to exert pressure, but in inverted commas pressure. I think it was
23 the most reasonable solution which, unfortunately, was not accepted at the
24 time. The effort was to persuade the Assembly majority, if we can talk
25 about the majority, in which the SDS almost held all the seats in the
1 Assembly of Republika Srpska.
2 Q. What you're saying is quite correct because with the exception of
3 four members of the Reformist Party, or whatever they were called, the
4 Assembly actually consisted of members who were all SDS members.
5 Do you remember that after my first speech, there was an extensive
6 debate by representatives of the Republika Srpska against the plan, and
7 that I took the floor a second time, insisting that the plan be adopted
8 and explaining why peace was in the interest of all the peoples, including
9 the Serb people, that it was the only option, and that the plan had to be
10 accepted. Do you remember that?
11 A. Yes, I must be even a little more precise, if I may. I think it
12 was quite clear that the Assembly meeting itself had already been prepared
13 so that the plan would not be accepted and that a part of the members
14 acted in that way, and that did require two of your interventions. I
15 think Mr. Dobrica Cosic also spoke, Prime Minister Mitsotakis spoke, Momir
16 Bulatovic, you're taking the floor a second time. In my conviction,
17 almost achieved the result of the plan being accepted.
18 Q. That is precisely what I wanted to ask you because in my second
19 address, I sought to refute the arguments used to reject the plan. And
20 that the Assembly, in spite of its composition and in spite of that
21 atmosphere, responded with applause. Do you remember that?
22 A. Yes, that's precisely what I wanted to say a moment ago.
23 Q. And then the proposal was put forward by individuals who did not
24 want the plan to be adopted to have a timeout situation. Do you remember
25 that, in order for the SDS deputies' club and its members to be able to
1 consult each other, to confer?
2 A. Yes, a members' club was held. That was the proposal made,
3 although that was superfluous according to my mind.
4 Q. Do you remember how many hours we waited down below for them to
5 hold this members or deputies' club meeting up above, on the storey above?
6 Do you remember?
7 A. I think we even asked, or rather it was -- they asked some of us
8 to attend the club meeting, but that they refused, and they went on
9 conferring for several hours. I can't give you a precise answer. But it
10 was indeed several hours.
11 Q. Yes, and I insisted that we attend this meeting of the deputies'
12 club, and they refused to allow us to take part because the conviction was
13 that we would have our opinions prevail and convince them. Wasn't that
14 how it was?
15 A. Well, I think it was just slightly different within the context of
16 what you just said in your last sentence. They thought that they wouldn't
17 be able to speak openly and frankly in front of us and that they had
18 already decided not to adopt the plan. So if there were any reservations,
19 it was possible they thought that under our pressure -- not pressure, but
20 by force of argument that the deputies would be prevailed upon to
21 understand that this was the best possible moment and option. And I'm
22 certain from this distance of time that that for the Republic of Serbia
23 was the best way in which to achieve a peace plan.
24 THE INTERPRETER: Republika Srpska, correction.
25 MR. MILOSEVIC:
1 Q. And the rigorous sanctions were introduced at the time against us
2 and the Republika Srpska as well and against one and all, in fact, and the
3 war continued in which countless people suffered, many more people lost
4 their lives than had lost them until then, until the conclusion of the
5 Vance Owen plan. Isn't that right?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. So after this deputy club meeting, the matter was put to vote, and
8 the plan was rejected. Isn't that right?
9 A. Yes, the plan was rejected. This happened in the early hours of
10 the morning, if I remember correctly, or deep into the night.
11 Q. After that, in view of the fact that our reactions were highly
12 negative to this kind of wrong decision that had been taken, if I can put
13 it that way, and a tragically erroneous decision, if I might say, we
14 introduced a blockade in order to attempt to force them to reconsider
15 their policy and position and accept the peace plan in the long run.
16 Isn't that right?
17 A. I think you are confusing the Vance Owen plan and the plan of the
18 contact group, Mr. Milosevic.
19 Q. Well, it doesn't really matter, but I'm sure you'll remember that
20 Serbia, and I personally, lent our support to five different peace plans,
21 in fact, which were put forward and placed on the negotiating table,
22 always on the basis of the negotiations that were marathon ones held in
23 Geneva, mostly in Geneva, actually, but in other places too, of course.
24 And that it was not successful.
25 A. Well, what is certain when it comes to the Vance Owen plan is that
1 following your decision, we stormed out of the meeting prior to dawn,
2 regardless of the fact that they wanted us to stay on because there was
3 the threat of a Muslim attack, and quite certainly there were a lot of
4 restrictions in 1994 with respect to any assistance from the Republic of
6 Q. So the war continued, and at the end of the examination-in-chief
7 today, you commented on a note on the records from a meeting of the
8 highest top military leadership and political leadership of the Federal
9 Republic of Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska, as it says. This is the
10 document that you were asked to comment on and that you looked at a moment
11 ago. And the meeting was held on the 22nd of August.
12 JUDGE MAY: Tab 20. Let the witness have the document first.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I assumed that he already had the
14 document and that it was in front of him. But of course, he ought to have
15 it, yes.
16 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. On page 1, it says that the Yugoslav side was represented at the
19 meeting by: "The president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
20 Zoran Lilic; the Republic of Serbia president, Slobodan Milosevic; the
21 Republic of Montenegro president, Momir Bulatovic; Federal Prime Minister,
22 Dr. Radoje Kontic; Chief of the Army of Yugoslavia General Staff, Momcilo
23 Perisic, General; Federal Minister of Defence, Pavle Bulatovic, and Chief
24 of the FRY President's Military Cabinet, General Slavoljub Susic."
25 And the delegation of Republika Srpska consisted of the following
1 persons: Radovan Karadzic, who was the president; the vice-presidents of
2 Republika Srpska, Nikola Koljevic and Biljana Plavsic; the president of
3 the Assembly, Momcilo Krajisnik; the Prime Minister, Dusan Kozic; the
4 Foreign Minister, Aleksa Buha; the Commander of the Main Staff of the VRS,
5 Lieutenant General Ratko Mladic; Assistant to the VRS GS Commander for
6 Security, General Lieutenant Zdravko Tolimir; the man in charge for
7 religious affairs, legal information, and moral guidance, Milan Gvero; and
8 for logistics Djordje Djukic, General.
9 And also attending the meeting were the Patriarch of the Serbian
10 Orthodox Church, Mr. Pavle, and Irinej Bulovic, the Orthodox bishop;
11 isn't that right?
12 A. Yes, I remember the meeting well.
13 Q. At the beginning, I asked the representatives of Republika Srpska
14 to inform those of us present as to what had happened at the last meeting
15 of Republika Srpska and the American peace plan was welcomed and the
16 readiness expressed on the part of the delegations of the Republika Srpska
17 together with the delegation of Yugoslavia should take part at the
18 forthcoming international peace conference; isn't that right?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Krajisnik proposed that Koljevic take the floor and expound on the
21 issue. Koljevic considered that on behalf of one and all, this should be
22 done by Radovan Karadzic, president of Republika Srpska. That's what it
23 says here. And then Karadzic goes on to explain that they had a lengthy
24 discussion, there was a lot of fear expressed, not enough confidence, but
25 finally that the conclusions were adopted according to which the Assembly
1 supported the American peace initiative and accepted to -- accepted that
2 people should go to the peace negotiations. They said that they feared
3 that the -- with the delegation becoming part of the Yugoslav delegation,
4 the Muslims would have the advantage. They didn't want to have Republika
5 Srpska lose its legitimacy in the eyes of the international community,
6 that the Serbs could become a national minority. These were all the
7 anxieties that were expressed, and they were all nonsense actually, and I
8 assume you were of that same opinion, were you not? Is that right? Is
9 that correct?
10 A. Are you asking me a question?
11 Q. Yes.
12 A. Yes, that is right. Except for the fact that I think that at that
13 point in time, the Assembly of Republika Srpska had still not reached its
14 decision to go to Dayton, and that was a pretext later on to try and
15 prolong this process and continue negotiations with respect to the
16 delegation's composition, in view of the fact that Karadzic insisted that
17 there were two delegations, one of Republika Srpska, and the other of our
18 own with six members and under pressure from us, that is to say from you,
19 primarily, they accepted and accepted to go to the negotiations as it says
20 in these second minutes or records.
21 Q. Pay attention to a sentence in the middle of that paragraph. On
22 page 2, paragraph 3, it says according to the opinions of Republika
23 Srpska, America wouldn't like the relationships between the Republika
24 Srpska and the FRY of Yugoslavia to improve, it would not suit them. So
25 this sentence, which was just mentioned by the by, in passing here, I hope
1 for you who were well aware of the situation speaks miles. We helped the
2 people, did we not, and we had fairly poor relationships, especially since
3 the Vance-Owen plan, with the leadership of the Republika Srpska; isn't
4 that right?
5 A. Yes, that is right.
6 Q. Do you know that the party cooperation of the SDS was for the most
7 part with opposition parties in Serbia, that there was never party
8 cooperation between the SPS and the SDS, in fact?
9 A. You're right, there wasn't party cooperation at the level -- at
10 this level or at any level, but yes, there was party cooperation between
11 the SDS and some opposition parties of the day. I think they are in power
12 in Serbia today, actually.
13 Q. I'm so sure you'll remember that Karadzic had criticisms of the
14 media in Yugoslavia and their conduct. He mentioned specifically in the
15 last paragraph - you have that portion - criticisms of the radio which
16 said that the people had finally come to realise what was happening and
17 that they said that the time has come to place matters on healthy
18 foundations, and he emphasises that cooperation between Republika Srpska
19 and Yugoslavia was open and frank and sincere. Is that right?
20 A. Yes, that's right, and I think that he was promised at the time
21 that the media would change their position somewhat.
22 Q. Now I should like to draw your attention to page 4 of the same
23 document. They were having a discussion, and the discussion is contained
24 in these minutes, second paragraph. It says, President Slobodan Milosevic
25 referred to speeches made by the previous presenters and assessed that
1 they were still in the slow-thinking phase as regards the direction in
2 which the situation was progressing. We must abide by the key conclusion
3 from the last meeting that now we had to choose between either prompt
4 peace or prompt war. And he added that we only had a few more weeks left
5 and that we were not in a position to discuss principles which we had
6 already debated numerous times with the international community. Should
7 you believe that -- and I'm being quoted here in this record, and it says:
8 "Should you believe that you can reach a solution with Muslims alone,
9 just go ahead and try it. We shall support you, but I doubt that you'll
10 be successful," said President Milosevic, addressing the Republika Srpska
11 leadership. And he once again put forward the conviction that Alija
12 Izetbegovic did not have a strategy for peace, but a strategy for war, and
13 he said that he was working to provoke the Serbs to make some
14 thoughtless move which would make NATO do the work for them. America
15 would like to have peace, it suits them, they would like to have talks,
16 and the model was the five-plus-three makeup, the contact group members
17 representatives of FRY, Croatia, and the Muslims. And I reminded them
18 that proposals were needed to have the Yugoslav delegation include several
19 people from Republika Srpska who would accept peace, who would accept what
20 was discussed and debated at the conference, and the results of the
21 conference itself.
22 And I cautioned to the fact that for the international community,
23 the existence of Republika Srpska was not a prerequisite for the
24 conference but that Republika Srpska ought to be the result of the
25 conference. Is that correct?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And was Republika Srpska the result of the conference, in fact?
3 Was that the upshot? It was sanctioned in Dayton?
4 A. Yes, that's right.
5 Q. And then I go on to insist that we have a clear-cut stand with
6 respect to the contact group as a plan as the starting point for future
7 negotiations because that was indeed the proposal made by the contact
8 group itself, and I also strove to ensure that there would not be more
9 than two representatives of Republika Srpska, that we should work speedily
10 and expeditiously, and that the peace process had to be continued.
11 And then there is an explanation where Karadzic tells us which the
12 two delegates would be who would take it upon themselves to have the
13 responsibility for such a crucial decision for the entire people in
14 Bosnia and Herzegovina and required that there be six delegates in the
15 delegation of Republika Srpska. We insist once again upon our views, our
16 views and positions were the same, to have a united delegation, including
17 the representatives of Republika Srpska, he said. And then he says at the
18 same time: "The Muslims with the support of NATO will hit us in our
19 positions until our territories are reduced to 20 per cent."
20 And towards the end of that page I once caution and say that
21 there's not much time left, that it is in our interest to reach an
22 agreement because if we fail to do so, there will not be a Republika
23 Srpska either. Because they referred to the constitution, I said there
24 will be neither Republika Srpska, and then I say neither will it have a
25 constitution, to which you refer when you insist upon the fact that you
1 must have the consent of the Assembly on all matters. Then we'll have
2 nothing, we'll end up with nothing.
3 And then of course we get to an explanation. They explain why,
4 why they should just be an appendage to Yugoslavia, and to that I say
5 quite directly, frankly, and to their faces in no meagre terms, I say that
6 is because we have had bad experience with you so far. Isn't that right?
7 Therefore, our insistence was upon what is accepted by the delegation and
8 signed by the delegation must be the final outcome and that we cannot
9 leave any possibility of having a repeat of what happened with the
10 Vance-Owen Plan. That's right, isn't it?
11 A. Yes, that's right, and I think that there was another condition or
12 position put forward that your vote should be the decisive vote if they
13 were to make any reservations on their part, because Karadzic, in part of
14 this conversation, indicates that in the international community there was
15 great concern that the mad Serbs, as he said, from Bosnia could reject
16 this peace plan, too. So I think that this was the purpose of setting the
17 conditions with respect to the composition of the delegation, and that
18 your vote should be the decisive vote, and I think that's what happened at
20 Q. Therefore, I'd like to draw your attention now to page 8 where
21 Milosevic cautions the leadership of Republika Srpska that his proposals
22 should not be taken to be as his will to impose anything that goes against
23 the grain of the Serb people of Bosnia and Herzegovina, he indicated the
24 lack of understanding as to the seriousness of the situation by the
25 leadership of Republika Srpska and did not agree with the views put
1 forward that they had overridden some of their stands of principle in
2 order to go along with Serbia. He said that if they really thought that
3 what they were doing was what they were doing for Serbia and for the SR of
4 Yugoslavia, they were along the wrong road. And vice versa, that
5 everything that the leadership of Yugoslavia was doing should be
6 understood as a service for good, something in the interests and to the
7 advantage of the Serb people as a whole.
8 And Perisic takes the floor - and this is on page 9 - that the
9 fact that people are saying that the international community is conspiring
10 against our own people and that there were situations of excess, that to
11 make the Serbs behave in keeping with the interests of the makers of a new
12 world order, he appealed to reasonable and well-thought-out steps on our
13 part, and then he goes on to advocate the fact that the contact group
14 should not be mentioned specifically but that we ought to enter the peace
15 process as soon as possible.
16 He then cautions that time is running out, that NATO is preparing
17 for its air strikes against Serb positions, and that the land forces would
18 be engaged, that that was not out of the question, and that this was not
19 the right to have discussions and debates among the leadership about
20 details because if the whole world is against us, we must be wise and
21 protect our interests, protect what can be protected.
22 And then President Milosevic suggested to the leadership of
23 Republika Srpska to issue a statement in which two things should be
24 highlighted: Firstly, to criticise the shelling of Sarajevo and the
25 killing of innocent civilians in a stronger manner; secondly, to propose a
1 cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of heavy artillery to a
2 distance of 20 kilometres from Sarajevo.
3 Do you remember that up until then, in that period of time,
4 officially the government of Serbia on several occasions, and this was
5 made public by the daily press, condemned in the strictest possible terms
6 the bombing of Sarajevo?
7 A. Yes, that's right, and not only the government of Serbia, but
8 others, too.
9 Q. I'm talking about the government because this is official
10 condemnation. Of course there was condemnation from other quarters as
12 And then Karadzic, continuing on from Mladic's elaboration, voiced
13 his opinion that Muslims after the lifting of the Sarajevo blockade will
14 not want to talk and discuss anything with the Serbs. He was opposed to
15 the fact that only Krajisnik and Koljevic be part of the delegation,
16 taking into account that their participation could be manipulated because
17 both were members of the parliament, or rather, the former BiH Presidency
18 under Alija Izetbegovic's power and authority.
19 Milosevic once again warned that if, as of today, the two
20 leaderships did not reach an agreement to go to the peace process, then we
21 ought to know what would await us as a consequence of that. If we don't
22 go to the conference, if we're not there, and if we don't reach an
23 agreement with the opposing side, then the Security Council and NATO would
24 conduct a demarcation arbitrarily as it sees fit. People were upset
25 because, quite obviously the RS leadership did not understand the
1 seriousness facing the Serb people on the territory of the former Bosnia
2 and Herzegovina. President Milosevic said: "Your suspicions could cost
3 us dearly. If you don't have any confidence in the best intentions and
4 sincere wishes of the whole Yugoslav leadership, President Lilic,
5 Bulatovic, Kontic and the others who are present here to help you to the
6 best of their ability, then there's no point in discussing this issue any
8 Then the patriarch joined in the debate. The patriarch, as a
9 support for the negotiations, and he says it is much more important what
10 is signed than who signs it, although it is good thing for the signatory
11 to be somebody who is trusted and respected by the people. And he
12 reiterated the church's appeal for Serbian unity in the interests of the
13 Serbian people.
14 And then, as there was a lot of pulling and tugging from all
15 sides, I'm sure you'll remember that once I had thanked His Eminence for
16 his wise words, President Milosevic put forward a new proposal that the
17 delegation to represent Serb interests number six members, three from the
18 FRY, and three from Republika Srpska. And to make all this official, he
19 proposed the text of an agreement for these two leaderships, clearly
20 determining the compositions and competence and authority of the
21 delegations involved. Krajisnik was against the formal signing of any
22 mutual agreement between the two leaderships. He said, Why should we have
23 a piece of paper? Is that not a trust of no confidence to the
24 leadership? And President Milosevic told him that he was forced to do so
25 on the basis of experience so far that he had had in agreements with
1 Republika Srpska which did not abide by many oral decisions and agreements
2 and brought us into a difficult situation vis-a-vis the international
3 community. He also said that it would be dangerous to prolong the
4 process, and that time should be bought, but any buying of time worked to
5 the advantage of the enemies. And then he quotes Radovan Karadzic as
6 saying that he always thought he had a better solution. He was prone to
7 waver. And he said that he always thought that if you don't accept the
8 written agreement between the two leaderships, then good luck to you, you
9 can fight alone. I merely wish to draw you to the fact that if you don't
10 accept the proper paper on mutual agreement, President Lilic, myself,
11 Bulatovic, Kontic, Perisic, and the others, we shall only think about the
12 interests of the Republic of Yugoslavia and you do what you want. The
13 responsibility is up to you, history will tell, and you will have to be
14 held accountable to history for your acts.
15 And then Momir Bulatovic goes on to say: "The only way to achieve
16 anything at all is if we have a joint appearance before the world, if we
17 pool our efforts." And Krajisnik ultimately agrees that the joint
18 delegation number six members. And if there is an equal number of votes,
19 there will be no solution. Then I insist upon the fact that as we have a
20 ratio of three to three, it will be the voice of the head of the
21 delegation that will prevail, that is to say, I will have the casting
23 Is that right?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. The president of the FRY, Zoran Lilic, said that such procedure is
12 Blank pages inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts. Pages 22710 to 22719.
1 common in the work of delegations, and he quite understands that it is
2 quite understandable that President Milosevic and, as you put it at that
3 time, being the most skillful and most experienced negotiator, decide when
4 and what is to be accepted in the interests of our people. Again,
5 questions concerning a single delegation are raised. A joint delegation
6 with equal decision-making rights, and so on and so forth. The others,
7 the majority, accepted this. The majority of the leadership accepted a
8 single delegation.
9 Then again there was a break at the proposal of Republika Srpska.
10 The atmosphere was tense, and there was uncertainty regarding the final
11 outcome. The discussion was continued in an even more tense atmosphere
12 burdened with apparent suspicion from the RS leadership side that, by
13 accepting the obligation, they would let down the trust of the Assembly's
15 And in the meantime, I had prepared a text of the agreement that
16 should be signed. And then finally, after I don't know how much time, I
17 don't know how long this went on, again, around 2300 hours, a break was
18 requested. It is obviously angry because of the procrastination and in
19 view of the seriousness of the situation, President Milosevic proposed
20 that the leaders of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia sign the agreement
21 and this way they would confirm that they are working for the general good
22 of the Serb people and all citizens of Yugoslavia without any
23 reservations. The document was signed by the patriarch of the Serbian
24 Orthodox church, His Holiness Pavle and Bishop Irinej Bulovic. After a
25 long debate in a separate conference room, the leadership of Republika
1 Srpska was joined by the house representatives of the Federal Republic of
2 Yugoslavia, followed by Patriarch Pavle and Bishop Irinej. They asked
3 that priorities be set forth. Patriarch Pavle also signed the agreement,
4 and we finally reached it.
5 Now I'm asking you not only as a witness and as a participant in
6 this meeting, but as a politician as well who held the top office in the
7 state, was it possible at all -- would it have been possible to have
8 reached Dayton if this step had not been made, this interim step, if I can
9 put it that way?
10 A. Only one thing is certain, and I have repeated that many times and
11 there is no need for me not to say it today too: There wouldn't have been
12 any Dayton accords if had there not been this much persistence in exerting
13 pressure primarily from your side upon I should perhaps say almost the
14 entire leadership of Republika Srpska because Dr. Koljevic and, I believe,
15 Biljana Plavsic quite soon realised that this should be agreed to. And
16 Karadzic obstinately refused most of the proposals that were made.
17 Two meetings preceded this. Actually, a letter that you got from
18 Karadzic preceded these two meetings, and you could not trust him
19 therefore, in view of everything that had happened until then. And in the
20 letter he accepted that he would make concessions, as he had put it, in
21 terms of withdrawing heavy artillery around Sarajevo, and then at the
22 meeting itself he voiced his reservation, that is to say, that if the
23 artillery is withdrawn, that the Muslims would have an advantage, and so
24 on and so forth. Again, he showed that he was not a person you could
25 trust unless there were such clear-cut positions that are later translated
1 into a specific document stating that there would be a single delegation.
2 The briefest answer would be that Dayton certainly would not have
3 happened had it not been for these meetings. These documents were made at
4 my insistence, and they were composed by General Susic. They were really
5 in great detail and they truly portrayed the atmosphere at these meetings.
6 So everything you have said just now is quite true.
7 Q. That's what I wanted to hear, because at the very beginning of the
8 text, you were nominated as the person who was in the top position, that
9 is, the delegation of the FRY and Republika Srpska, and the FRY delegation
10 is headed by President Zoran Lilic. So it is your responsibility that
11 this should be authentic by all means, and I believe that this is
12 authentic. So your secretary, or rather, the secretary, or rather the
13 head of the military office of the president compiled these minutes, and
14 therefore this is an authentic record.
15 A. I highlighted that fact, but my name is the first here, only de
16 jure, and I believe you'll agree to that, too.
17 Q. Well, I will agree. There's no doubt that my efforts in this
18 respect were crucial. I'm not denying it, and it is my understanding that
19 you're not either.
20 A. Absolutely. Your efforts, your influence, and as I said, your
21 negotiating abilities in view of all of the negotiations you conducted
22 over all those years in conditions that were not exactly easy. These were
23 important meetings. And certainly, or rather, it is a big question as to
24 whether there would have been any Republika Srpska had it not been for
25 these meetings.
1 Another thing you did not refer to is that the leadership of the
2 Republika Srpska, primarily Mr. Karadzic, did not believe that NATO
3 strikes were possible in the area around Sarajevo. They were cautioned
4 about that too by you in view of the intelligence that you received and
5 that we all had together, that the strikes would follow quite soon after
6 these meetings. And unfortunately, because of their obstinacy, this truly
7 happened only a few hours after this agreement was signed.
8 Q. After Dayton, you were familiarised with the negotiations that
9 were quite difficult, and that went on for three weeks in quite a bit of
10 detail. Isn't that right?
11 A. Yes, I think that at that time, I was practically the only person,
12 or rather, the only high-ranking official, if I can use that term, who
13 remained in Belgrade.
14 Q. The highest ranking official who remained in Belgrade. Well, do
15 you remember that at the first meeting in Dayton, the Muslim delegation
16 proposed that the territory of Republika Srpska be only 37 per cent of the
17 territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
18 A. Yes, according to the information that I could see.
19 Q. Do you remember that then the representatives from Republika
20 Srpska invoked the position of the contact group concerning the half/half
21 division, and they were given the following answer: "All questions are
22 open, and there are no obligations that had been taken over from the
23 previous period, that is to say that everything is subject to debate and
24 negotiations." Do you know, then, to what extent an effort had to be made
25 and what kind of negotiations we had to go through in order to reach this
1 half/half solution? I'm asking you this because there is a rather
2 distorted picture that is bandied about among the public, saying that in
3 Dayton, the Serbs got only 49 per cent, and the situation was quite
4 different. And it was quite different. In this 50/50, we then included a
5 significant part of the territories that had already been lost after the
6 NATO strikes and after the collapse that then followed in the army of
7 Republika Srpska. Is that right?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Mr. Lilic, several times you started out to say during the
10 examination-in-chief something in relation to Srebrenica but Mr. Nice
11 interrupted you. Now I'm asking you --
12 JUDGE MAY: That's not fair. He didn't. The witness was allowed
13 to give his views, although of course they are only views. He's only
14 giving an opinion about it. What Mr. Nice rightly pointed out was that
15 it's only a matter of opinion, it will be for the Trial Chamber to
16 determine the matter.
17 But yes, go on.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I believe that that is not
19 a correct interpretation because this is not the opinion of Mr. Lilic;
20 this is a question of what he knows in relation to the high office he
21 held. He is not the usual kind of witness that Mr. Nice brings here.
22 JUDGE MAY: Very well. You can ask the witness questions, of
23 course, about his knowledge, his detailed knowledge of the matters. But
24 certainly he was giving an opinion yesterday. But you ask him.
25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Please be so kind as to answer my question. What was it that you
2 knew with regard to that? What did the leadership of Serbia know? What
3 did the leadership of Yugoslavia know? Because what happened was truly
4 dramatic, tragic. So I'm not asking you for your opinion only because, as
5 you can see, opinions are not allowed. I'm just asking you about your
7 A. I presented what I knew yesterday and today. And I also
8 established that no one from the leadership of Serbia and Yugoslavia could
9 have issued such an order, and we were not aware of this either. I also
10 presented my own impressions regarding this tragic event several days
11 later at a meeting I had with you. I said that you were more than angry,
12 shaken, and you used the following sentence, or rather to this effect:
13 "These crazy Serbs from Pale" - and you were primarily referring to the
14 leadership of Republika Srpska or part of the leadership - "I cannot
15 believe that they did something like this."
16 I also presented my impression that I do not believe that in any
17 capacity you took part in any such thing. And quite simply, no one on our
18 side was informed about that unless there was some private communication
19 along certain lines between certain individuals who were outside our
20 day-to-day meetings in a way. I don't know what expression to use really
21 in this context. I think I explained this already: The Srebrenica case is
22 a truly tragic case. It was done by individuals. That is my opinion,
23 that is my impression, and it is certain that this Chamber will make a
24 final ruling on that. There was no organised participation of the Federal
25 Republic of Yugoslavia and the leadership of the Federal Republic of
1 Yugoslavia, at least not as far as I know.
2 Q. Do you know that the leadership of Republika Srpska, when we asked
3 what happened and how it was possible that something like that happened,
4 they answered that they were not aware of this either?
5 A. Yes, I said that. I tried to say it today, and I said it during
6 my examination yesterday, so my answer to your question is yes.
7 Q. I'm going to go back to the beginning of your examination in chief
8 from yesterday, then. Mr. Nice asked you about the role that was played
9 by the Socialist Party of Serbia in the legislative process. And he asked
10 whether it had a leading role. Is it being contested that a party that
11 has parliamentary majority in any parliamentary democracy does, of course,
12 have a leading role in legislation, or rather the work of parliament?
13 A. That's the answer I gave, and that's the explanation I gave. That
14 is the essence of parliamentary life in Serbia, that the parliamentary
15 majority which was almost absolute during the first term, as far as the
16 Socialist Party of Serbia is concerned, I think we had a total of 194
17 seats, if I'm not mistaken, and we passed legitimate decisions in the
18 Assembly, and we certainly influenced the bringing of laws. And after
19 all, this was our right therefore.
20 Q. When were you president of the Assembly of the Republika Srpska?
21 A. President of the Republika Srpska, that's what I became in January
22 of 1993, after the elections, the extraordinary elections that were held
23 in 1992 that you agreed to, although they were not regular elections, but
24 you did this in response to demands put forth by the opposition. And at
25 that time, the Republican Assembly, I think, had over 100 seats, or rather
1 the SPS had over 100 seats. And then we had a coalition within
3 Q. At that time, we established a minority government. Is that
5 A. Yes, yes, we had a minority government. And in parliament, we
6 were seeking ways and means of getting the necessary 126 votes, which was
7 only logical.
8 Q. Later on, the Serb Radical Party brought about a crisis in the
9 National Assembly, and then at the proposal of the government, I dissolved
10 the Assembly and new elections were held.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. At the time when we were -- when you were president of the
13 Assembly, we did not have a majority in the Assembly. Is that right?
14 A. Yes, that's right, we did not have a parliamentary majority.
15 Q. In that sense, consultations and preparations in bodies of the
16 National Assembly were held in parliamentary committees at the proposal of
17 the government with our participation which could not have been absolute,
18 only relative. We were relatively the biggest party, but we did not have
19 the possibility of reaching decisions on our own in relation to bills and
20 laws. Is that right?
21 A. Yes, that's right. During that term in the Assembly of Serbia,
22 our participation was not dominant. We did not have a majority.
23 Q. And then, after the extraordinary elections were held, we
24 were -- we had almost reached half of the seats in parliament, and then we
25 had a coalition with the New Democracy Party.
1 A. Well, if I'm not mistaken, we had 123 seats then. It is true that
2 we did have a coalition with the Nova Demokratija of Dusko Mihajlovic.
3 Q. Yes, and his party had a total of seven seats?
4 A. And we got the necessary majority.
5 Q. What was that?
6 A. The necessary majority.
7 Q. The necessary absolute majority in parliament.
8 Now, well, I don't know why Mr. Nice highlighted this as something
9 really important in your statement, but you say towards the end of 1995,
10 the Yugoslav Left was established. And the Yugoslav Left entered a
11 coalition with us before the 1996 elections. Is that right?
12 A. Yes, that's right. But if you allow me to explain, the 123 seats
13 from the previous Assembly, if I can. It is certain that it is
14 indispensable to have an absolute majority of 126 MPs in order to fully
15 control the work of parliament from the point of view of the political
16 party that has this majority. However, in view of the rule that for the
17 most part, decisions are passed by a majority vote of the MPs present,
18 then this majority didn't have to guarantee a particular outcome. I
19 wanted to explain this so that there would not be any wrong ideas in
20 respect of what I said previously.
21 Q. Is it correct that the Yugoslav Left was established at that time
22 in 1995 by 23 parties that had a left orientation, workers' parties,
23 socialist, social democratic, and so on and so forth? It wasn't the way
24 you put it, that this was done by me or my wife.
25 A. I really don't know that it was formed by 23 parties. I do know
1 what influence it wielded in the political and economic life of the
2 Republic of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I do know that
3 they never took part independently at elections before 2000.
4 Q. We'll come to that, and because it's not correct, I'll remind you
5 now. My impression is not that you're saying something incorrect
6 intentionally, but only because, probably under the influence of the
7 present-day propaganda, you forget the facts as they were. But I'm quite
8 sure that when I remind you, you will remember.
9 So please, don't think that I consider anything you say as
11 A. You know very well I was never malicious.
12 Q. Let me remind you as I have the programme here.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And if you have any interest, I have
14 it in English also, Mr. May.
15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. It says, on the 23rd of July, it was founded out of 23
17 left-oriented parties and a large number of individuals who joined the
18 movement on an individual basis. This left was seen flexibly: Communist,
19 socialist, social democrat, the wide spectrum, right up to the greens.
20 And then it says: "The Yugoslav Left is not an expression of
21 something new, only in terms of organisation. It is also new in the
22 understanding of its theoretical basis. By its theoretical basis, the
23 Yugoslav Left considers every idea of freedom or every thought
24 contributing to the liberation of man, of violence, poverty, exploitation,
25 humiliation, ignorance, contained in philosophy, science, religion, and
2 Do you remember that, Mr. Lilic?
3 A. Not really, but I have no reason not to believe that that is what
4 it says in their programme.
5 Q. I'll let you have a look at it as I do believe that this was the
6 best programme drafted by the left in Europe at the end of the last
7 century. They say at the very beginning, "It is possible for humanity to
8 enter the third millennium respecting and using everything liberating and
9 progressive, that it has -- man has achieved by thought and work in the
10 course of his development regardless of what part of the world he may be
11 in, and what time he may have achieved it, that is regardless of which
12 social system the liberating and progressive was created in. In that
13 respect, we attach the greatest importance to the idea of material
14 prosperity, which is the supreme idea of a capitalist society, a civil
15 civilisation on the one hand, and the idea of equality as a supreme value
16 of socialist theory and practice on the other.
17 "United, these two ideas could change the world and take man
18 forward into a new peaceful and prosperous society." Therefore, the
19 programme is quite extensive and lengthy. I can't quote all of it, but
20 this obviously is not in harmony with the intrigues that are being bandied
21 about and that are part of the struggle against the left in the world in
22 general. Now, let us back come to what you're saying --
23 JUDGE MAY: Before we do, you've produced this programme. Let the
24 witness just see it just to confirm it is what it says it is, and we'll
25 exhibit it.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I can give it to you in English,
2 Mr. May, for you, and to the witness, I'll give him a Serbian copy.
3 JUDGE MAY: We'll have it both. Let the witness see the B/C/S
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm quite sure that the witness
6 doesn't doubt that I quoted the text correctly. But, of course, he can
7 look at it. He can see for himself what I have quoted. I have marked the
8 passages at the beginning. I don't believe that he doubts my correctness,
9 correctness of my quotations. Anyway, it is a public document.
10 JUDGE MAY: Could we have the next number, please. Wait a minute.
11 Let's just have the number.
12 THE REGISTRAR: Defence Exhibit 143, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Lilic, do you want to say something?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, indeed. Thank you, Mr. May.
15 I do not doubt at all the correctness of the programme that
16 Mr. Milosevic spoke about, nor the principles of the left. I do not wish
17 what I'm going to say to be seen as a political speech. I'm a leftist by
18 orientation, and those principles have very close to my heart, and I have
19 been and I remain a leftist regardless of the fact that I am no longer in
20 the establishment. I didn't speak about the programme of the Yugoslav
21 Left, the correctness of options and ideology and -- that is contained in
22 the programme. What I spoke about is the influence of individual people
23 from the Yugoslav Left on the SPS and the state as a whole. And I could
24 say quite freely, regardless of whether we will agree on that or not, I
25 will refer to the abuse that was made by many people from the Yugoslav
1 Left of their positions.
2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. We will come to that.
4 A. So I wasn't talking about the programme of the Yugoslav left, and
5 I wasn't talking about the correctness of that programme otherwise.
6 Q. Very well. But since you mentioned my wife, and my wife was
7 exclusively involved with writing, and she wrote this programme, and that
8 is her role in the Yugoslav Left. She was not responsible for the
9 organisation or the financing or any - I don't know how to put
10 it - material activities. But mental activities that she was committed to
11 as an intellectual, and she is the author of this programme of the
12 Yugoslav Left. Now, as you have said --
13 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer. Can you help us as to that,
14 Mr. Lilic? Is that right? Do you know, or not?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know whether Mrs. Markovic
16 wrote the programme. I assume she did, and I don't think that is in
18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Since you've said that the Yugoslav Left did not take part in the
20 elections independently until 2000, I just wish to remind you that the
21 Yugoslav Left was in a coalition at the elections in 1996, a coalition
22 that was officially called the Socialist Party of Serbia, the Yugoslav
23 Left, the New Democracy, Slobodan Milosevic. That was the official title;
24 is that right?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. In view of the fact that that included SPS, JUL, the New Democracy
2 under my name, all three were together, this coalition, you said that in
3 view of that, there was no basis on which to judge the share of the
4 Yugoslav Left in that coalition, the contribution of the Yugoslav Left
5 within that coalition. Is that right?
6 A. Generally speaking, I believe that somebody -- if somebody forms a
7 coalition and takes part in the elections as a coalition, it is difficult
8 to assess the constituent behind the component parts of the coalition.
9 Q. That is quite correct, and in principle, that is quite in order.
10 I just wish to remind you that precisely for that reason, because it was
11 difficult to assess the support and the share in the powers, except on the
12 basis of the criteria of the quality of the cadres elected, and the same
13 principle applied to all, a yardstick of participation in the authorities
14 was also the fact that JUL took part independently at local elections in
15 1996, except in Belgrade, and these were held simultaneously with the
16 general elections, so it participated in the local elections, and at those
17 local elections, their candidates for municipal MPs won more than 400.000
18 votes. So this was a concrete criterion on the basis of which it was
19 possible to evaluate the contribution they had in the elections in which
20 they took part as part of a coalition. They had more than 800 municipal
21 deputies in various municipalities in Serbia --
22 JUDGE MAY: Okay, stop. The witness can't possibly assimilate all
23 this if you go on so long. Would you come to a concrete question.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, indeed, I will. I think that,
25 Mr. May, you underestimate the witness and his knowledge. He's very
1 familiar with all these things. He held the highest political
2 positions --
3 JUDGE MAY: No doubt, but we aren't. We can't follow it either.
4 So let's get to a concrete point and put it shortly, please.
5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Can I remind you, therefore, that when simultaneously with the
7 elections you referred to there were local elections and this party won a
8 total of 400.000 votes, no, over 400.000 votes? Do you remember that now?
9 A. Yes, I'm aware of those figures that were used and referred to.
10 Q. Very well. Since you said yesterday that representatives of the
11 Yugoslav Left who were coalition partners in the coalition SPS JUL New
12 Democracy held key positions, I asked my associate to get for me from
13 Belgrade the composition of the government at the federal and republican
14 level, and we have that here, for several dates because certain
15 reconstructions had to be made. And they have been faxed, but since the
16 composition of governments in published in the Official Gazette, they are
17 elected by the Assembly, so all this can be checked out in the Official
19 For instance, the government of the Republic of Serbia in August
20 1997, you will remember that, and I will let you have a look at the list.
21 I just crossed out one name here because it was repeated twice under 30
22 and under 34. The same name is given twice. So I assume the typists made
23 an error. But anyway, Mirko Marijanovic, the Prime Minister, who is a
24 member of the SPS, wasn't he, then? Then, Dragomir Tomic, Minister
25 Coordinator, also SPS; Slobodan Radulovic, vice-premier of New Democracy;
1 Professor Doctor Ratko Markovic, vice-president, SPS; Svetozar Krstic,
2 vice-president from New Democracy; Milutin Stojkovic, vice-president from
3 the SPS; Vlajko Stojiljkovic, vice-president and Minister of the Interior,
4 also SPS; Borislav Milacic, Minister of Finance, SPS; Arandzel Markicevic,
5 Minister of Justice, JUL. I don't need to read out all the names, but the
6 whole government consists of 38 names, actually 37, because Ivan Sedlak is
7 a minister without portfolio from JUL, but he is not a Serb. He's from
8 JUL. He's a member of JUL. That is the Yugoslav Left. I will give you
9 this list to look at. So in this whole cabinet, there were one, two,
10 three, four, five, six JUL members of which two are without portfolio.
11 So out of 37, 6 of them. So that is less than 20 per cent. As
12 for the ministers from JUL, one is Vladimir Ljubicic, who is Minister of
13 Tourism; Arandzel Markicevic, Minister of Justice; Bratislava Morina,
14 Minister for Family Welfare; Ljeposava Milicevic, Minister of Health;
15 Zoran Modric, Minister for Local Self-government; and there is Ivan Sedlak
16 and Andrija Milisavljevic, ministers without portfolio. And there are two
17 nonparty ministers, Professor Radmila Milantijevic, for information, Milan
18 Bego, Minister for Economic Relations and Property Transformation, also a
19 nonparty member. So not a single key department is held by the left, the
20 Yugoslav Left. And the numbers I have given are as they are on this list.
21 Now, let us look at the federal government --
22 JUDGE MAY: No, we won't. Let the witness see the list which you
23 have been reading out.
24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, please, look at it.
25 Q. I assume this will refresh your memory. I myself couldn't
1 remember offhand, but I know that it wasn't as you put it, and that is why
2 I asked for this list.
3 A. I assume the list is correct. There is no reason for me to doubt
4 it. The only thing is whether I was talking about the composition of the
5 government or key positions throughout the territory of Serbia. I think
6 it was the latter. If I just may finish, I also said that individual
7 members of the SPS were the people who implemented the Yugoslav Left's
8 policy within the SPS, and one of those is certainly Mr. Vlajko
9 Stojiljkovic who was formerly a member of the SPS.
10 Q. He was one of the founding members.
11 A. Yes, most of the people who were later in JUL were in the SPS.
12 Q. But you had excellent relations with the Yugoslav Left?
13 A. Unfortunately, I did not. If that had been so, I wouldn't have
14 lived through everything I did after 1996. I didn't wish to enter this
15 polemics between JUL and the SPS. I thought that you would agree that the
16 SPS was the dominant political party, that all the mandates belong to the
17 suspects, that JUL never participated in the elections independently
18 except in 2000, that it won .38 per cent of the votes. And I still claim
19 that it held key positions in the government of Republic of Serbia, and
20 the federal government, and in other institutions, but that is not in
21 dispute. What is in dispute is whether they abused those positions or
23 Q. Do you challenge any of the facts written here, including this,
24 that they had more than 400.000 votes in 1996 at the local elections? Do
25 you challenge that?
1 JUDGE MAY: We have been through that. Let's -- we'll produce
2 this document now. Which government is this?
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The government of Serbia.
4 JUDGE MAY: Wait a moment, wait a moment. We'll have it
6 THE REGISTRAR: That's Exhibit 144, Your Honour.
7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation].
8 Q. Now have a look at the federal government, numbering 21 members.
9 It has only two members who belonged to JUL in the federal government in
10 August 1997. And they were Vukovic and Markovic, who before joining JUL
11 was in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in charge of economic relations.
12 Nebosja Markovic was a prominent businessman. So 2 out of 21. You can
13 look at that, too.
14 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness see the list.
15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. The rest were SPS and DPS from Montenegro, and the Prime Minister
17 was Rade Kontic who was from Montenegro.
18 We have to hurry up.
19 A. My comment, Mr. May, regarding this government is similar to the
20 comment I made regarding the previous government. Here, too, there are
21 SPS members who were absolutely in the function of the Yugoslav Left which
22 need not mean anything, but let me say something about Mr. Vukovic.
23 Through him, all foreign trade arrangements at the level of the Federal
24 Republic of Yugoslavia went through him.
25 Q. But he was Minister for Foreign Trade, wasn't he?
1 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Let the witness finish, and we'll deal
2 with this in an orderly way. Yes, Mr. Lilic.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was speaking of the significance
4 of the positions held by the members of the leadership of the Yugoslav
5 left. At that point, that was one of the most important positions in the
6 federal government. The quantity is not important, it's the quality of
7 the positions, and that is a fact, without entering into the programme
8 orientation of the Yugoslav Left.
9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. Very well. We won't dwell on that any further.
11 JUDGE MAY: We're leaving that document, we'll exhibit it, and
12 then we'll adjourn, because the time has come for an adjournment.
13 THE REGISTRAR: Defence Exhibit 145, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. We'll adjourn now, 20 minutes.
15 --- Recess taken at 12.15 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 12.41 p.m.
17 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Mr. Lilic, I think we agreed a moment ago that without a doubt,
20 the Socialist Party of Serbia was the leading political force in Serbia
21 throughout the material time. And I would also go as far as to say that
22 it was the largest party in the Balkans. Do you share that view and
23 assessment of mine, that the Socialist Party of Serbia in all those
24 difficult times performed its role honourably, and in the best interests
25 of the people and all citizens of and inhabitants of Serbia?
1 A. Yes, I do agree that the Socialist Party of Serbia really did give
2 an enormous contribution to the stabilisation of overall events and the
3 situation not only in the territory of the former Federal Republic of
4 Yugoslavia but further a field as well, that it was the most important
5 party, and that it was precisely for that reason that I said that
6 according to its merits, it didn't actually get as much rights in the
7 elections as befitted it.
8 Q. And did you ever happen to hear, and I'm not talking about the top
9 leadership of the Socialist Party of Serbia alone, but of any other
10 leadership of the Socialist Party of Serbia having assumed positions and
11 attitudes which were contrary to its programme, the interests of the
12 citizens and people, or contrary to the interests of any ethnic community
13 at all?
14 A. I don't know of any case like that.
15 Q. And do you happen to remember that in the membership of the
16 Socialist Party of Serbia at that time, too, and as far as I know, that's
17 the case today as well, that there were many members from other national
18 communities, ethnic communities, both Hungarians and Croats, and
19 Albanians, and Turks, and Goranis, and Romanis, Romanians, Ruthenians, and
20 so on, Muslims, et cetera? And in Serbia, there are a large numbers of
21 ethnic communities living there, and there was not a single ethnic
22 community which did not have its representative in the Socialist Party of
23 Serbia. Is that right?
24 A. Yes, I did speak about that, and I tried to explain how strong the
25 Socialist Party of Serbia was, and the fact that it had almost 10.000
1 local committees, boards. And as far as its membership, it was truly a
2 heterogenous party and within the frameworks of that party, you would find
3 members of all the ethnic groups, both majority ethnic communities and
4 minority ethnic communities living on the territory of the Republic of
6 Q. Does that not mean, then, that the Socialist Party of Serbia in
7 that way expressed the profoundest interests of all the citizens of
8 Serbia, both by virtue of its structure and by virtue of its composition,
9 judging by its programme, and the things it actually did in practice?
10 A. Absolutely yes.
11 Q. You mentioned yesterday during the examination-in-chief something
12 that I have heard for the first time, I must say, and I saw that figuring
13 in your statement as well. What you mention is this: You used the term
14 "shadow government," I believe. As far as I know, shadow governments are
15 set up by opposition parties. Why would a government in power set up a
16 shadow government? So what kind of shadow government are you talking
18 A. Not in that context, Mr. Milosevic. I think that I understood it
19 well. I used the term figuratively, which is used in the vernacular
20 during our conversations that the people who had privileges, the privilege
21 of having frequent consultations with you were, to all intents and
22 purposes, a form, a part of that government. Not in the official sense of
23 a shadow government, no.
24 Q. Yes, but it was no secret that I had a so-called coordination
25 meeting at least once a week. I assume you'll remember that.
1 A. I think that you could see from the statement that was handed to
2 you that I said it sometimes took place once a week and sometimes more
3 frequently, as the situation required.
4 Q. Yes, sometimes once a week, sometimes less, sometimes more,
5 that's not essential. But you give the names of people who took part in
6 these meetings, probably not all their names, but you did enumerate them
7 correctly. You said Mirko Marijanovic, he was one, he was the Prime
8 Minister, in fact, wasn't he?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Then you mentioned Dragan Tomic, the president of the National
11 Assembly. Right? Then, there's Milomir Minic, and I jotted this down in
12 the order you gave those names. And Milomir Minic, I jotted down his rank
13 as being president of the federal parliament, or rather, the lower house
14 of the federal parliament, the chamber of citizens. Then there's Milan
15 Milutinovic, president of the Republika Srpska; Zivadin Jovanovic, Foreign
16 Minister. Gorica Gajevic, the Secretary-General of the Socialist Party.
17 Nikola Sainovic, the vice premier of the federal government, who was from
19 So those then were the top officials of the Socialist Party at the
20 same time, and the top state officials who attended these coordination
21 meetings in view of the fact that they were at the head of important
22 institutions themselves independently, so this was a chance to exchange
23 information and opinions and to consult one another. So is there anything
24 that would be out of the ordinary in that -- in that practice or something
25 that was unusual for any country?
1 A. Well, I don't think that I said that anything was unusual or out
2 of the ordinary.
3 Q. All right, thank you for the answer. Let's move on now, then,
5 I think you said quite correctly, explained quite correctly a
6 thesis that is heard and underlined very often here. You know that people
7 like to put forward a position here that is ascribed to the Serbs by
8 ascribing blame to the Serbs for the alleged intention of setting up some
9 sort of a Serb state with only the Serbs, and the slogan of "All Serbs in
10 one state" is usually bandied about in that context. Is it true and
11 correct that the fact that when we say all Serbs to live in one state,
12 this referred to the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in fact,
13 and therefore it was our policy at the times that you're testifying about,
14 from 1990 to the year 2000, and in 1990 when the crisis in Yugoslavia
15 started, it related to Yugoslavia, that there was an additional interest
16 on the part of Serbia to safeguard and retain Yugoslavia because it was a
17 country in which all Serbs lived together in one state?
18 A. That's what I talked about yesterday when I said that it was
19 precisely that Yugoslavia, that is to say, the Socialist Federal Republic
20 of Yugoslavia, which allowed all the Serbs to really live in a single
21 state, in one country.
22 Q. Did it ever occur to any of the leaderships, did anybody anywhere
23 ever launch any kind of idea about a Greater Serbia of some kind? Did
24 that ever happen?
25 A. They were not the political positions of the Socialist Party of
1 Serbia, and none of us personally, as far as I know, put that forward.
2 They were the positions of some other political parties, however, or some
3 other leaders outside the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
4 Q. Yes, but not --
5 A. I said not ours meaning not the SPS's positions.
6 Q. As we have been provided with an enormous number of documents
7 here, I'm going to skim over some of them because I have to do so. But
8 could you tell me this, please, give me an answer to a very general
9 question to begin with: In any of the documents that you have been given
10 access to that have been presented to you here, including the documents
11 that you just identified as recognising, is there any mention of any
12 decision which was reached unlawfully or illegally?
13 A. I just commented on one document for which I said that I didn't
14 recognise it and that I was surprised from the aspects of what you're
15 saying now if the document is correct, so I don't know. The document
16 refers to some kind of monies issued from the National Bank of Yugoslavia,
17 large amounts of money, but it wasn't a document either from the Republika
18 Srpska or the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The second document that we
19 looked at was a document in which Perisic, General Perisic is writing a
20 letter --
21 Q. I'm not talking about Perisic's letter. I don't mean that.
22 We'll come to that in due course later on, and we'll see how far there are
23 grounds for that.
24 A. So I don't know the number of documents that you're referring to.
25 Q. I'm referring to all the documents presented here. Is there
1 anything unlawful in them?
2 A. Well, as far as I was able to see, if we're talking about the same
3 documents, and I assume we are, then no, there is nothing unlawful or
4 illegal in them.
5 Q. You mentioned the following: You said in view of the fact that
6 these were exact facts, the constitution of Serbia was adopted before that
7 of Yugoslavia and of Montenegro, too, and they were not formally
8 dovetailed and harmonised, that is true. However, do you happen to
9 remember that in the constitution of Serbia, as far as I know, and you'll
10 perhaps remember this better than me, it is Article 136, I believe, which
11 stipulates as follows: That Serbia within the composition of Yugoslavia,
12 that the authorisations provided for by the constitution -- under the
13 constitution of Yugoslavia are to be implemented at the level of
14 Yugoslavia regardless of whether they were provided for by the
15 constitution of the Republic of Serbia, because it implied all the
16 authorities and competencies?
17 A. I believe that article. I don't think it was Article 136. 136
18 does indeed describe the authorisations, I think, of the president of the
19 Republic of Yugoslavia, but I'm sure that kind of article exists, the
20 contents of what you say, but I'm not sure it was Article 136, in fact.
21 Q. The witness testifying before you here indicated that according to
22 some sort of law, I had the right to give out decorations of some kind as
23 president of the Republic of Serbia. Now, as I never in my capacity as
24 president of the Republic of Serbia gave any decorations to anybody, do
25 you ever remember me giving out decorations when I was president of
2 A. I don't remember you gave out decorations even to the people you
3 promised them, Mr. --
4 Q. Yes, but that goes for me as president of Serbia, too, doesn't it?
5 A. Yes, yes, it implies both.
6 Q. You said that the president of the Republic had the right to
7 promote generals and officers first-class, which is not being challenged
8 at all. The promotion of officers first-class is a ceremonial act, and it
9 refers to all those who have completed military academy and joining the
10 army with the lowest officer's rank, and they are being taken in as
11 officers of Yugoslavia once they complete their military academies. A
12 whole new generation of officers in the JNA, and this is an official
13 ceremony and decree signed by the president of the republic.
14 A. Yes, this generation who has graduated, every new generation
15 graduating from the military academy, this final ceremony is defined by
16 the president and signed -- this decree signed to that effect.
17 Q. You were also asked something in connection with the period when
18 Dobrica Cosic was president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and you
19 were asked about the existence of a state council which he had set up. Is
20 that right?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. That particular body did not -- was not founded pursuant to the
23 Yugoslav constitution. That's right, isn't it?
24 A. Yes, that's right.
25 Q. Therefore, it was the principal reason for which you did not when
1 you yourself became president of Yugoslavia continue to utilise that body
2 or to appoint or nominate it again. There was no reason to do so. Isn't
3 that right?
4 A. Yes, I adhered to the constitutional provisions regarding the
5 authority of the president, and as far as I was concerned I didn't see the
6 need for the existence of that particular council. That's right, yes.
7 Q. You were then asked by Mr. Nice during your term of office how
8 many times the Supreme Defence Council met. Your answer was over 50. He
9 said 53. You said over 50. There's no need to quibble over the number of
10 meetings. I'm sure that that many were indeed held, roughly. But at all
11 those meetings, various issues were discussed, various subjects placed on
12 the agenda as proposed by the General Staff of the Army of Yugoslavia and
13 so on. Now, was there a single -- there were many generals there who were
14 promoted, many of them were relieved of their duties, too. Now,
15 throughout that whole time, all the time that you were president of the
16 FRY and Supreme Defence Council, was there a single instance in which a
17 general was promoted or relieved of duty at my own insistence personally?
18 A. They were all promoted along with agreement from the members, all
19 the members of the SDC, the Supreme Defence Council. And the agenda of
20 the SDC was composed very often from the presidents of the republics who
21 were members of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. They didn't all only
22 come from the general staff and president of Yugoslavia.
23 Q. Did I ever place an item on the agenda of the SDC at all, myself
25 A. Well, the agenda for the SDC was dovetailed usually amongst all of
1 us together. I would propose it, you would accept it or something of that
3 Q. So that was standard procedure, was it?
4 A. If I may, let me just say that the Supreme Defence Council is
5 quite a specific body, and it's difficult to speak about minutes or
6 records of those meetings because I don't have agreement to comment them.
7 But they had specific relationships, and they focussed on an acceptance of
8 the contact group for Republika Srpska, for example, and I think that
9 particular meeting was held at your proposal, and you wanted all the
10 members of the team to be present, the chief of staff, the army
11 commanders, the senior staff, and of course you, Momir Bulatovic, and Mr.
12 Kontic was there, too, so that was quite a specific meeting, and that is
13 why it comes to mind.
14 Q. All right. But that was exclusively as a function of achieving a
15 peaceful solution, was it not, for Republika Srpska?
16 A. Yes, it was geared to inform all the members of the Yugoslav army
17 about the behaviour and conduct of the leadership at Pale, and yes it was
18 with the aim of having a peaceful solution and accepting the contact group
19 plan. I think we're talking about 1994 here.
20 Q. Do you consider that it was in order for the leadership, the
21 members, the top military staff, to become informed with our peace efforts
22 and endeavours and for them to understand the policy being waged with
23 respect to reaching a peaceful solution generally? And we had problems on
24 that score in Bosnia and the leadership at Pale?
25 A. Well, I don't think that we can add anything negative to that. I
1 think the meeting was highly necessary, just like many others that were
2 geared towards establishing peace in the area as soon as possible.
3 Q. Mr. Nice asked you, and I wrote this down because we are talking
4 about these meetings of the Supreme Defence Council now: "How did the
5 accused impose his own will on the Supreme Defence Council, the way in
6 which he did that? How did the accused influence the Supreme Defence
7 Council?" Now, tell me, did I impose any will of my own on the Supreme
8 Defence Council? Did I do anything outside the framework of the rights
9 that I had as a member of the Supreme Defence Council to take part in its
10 work and to present my opinions?
11 A. You did not do anything outside the rights that you had as a
12 member of the SDC, except that that right of membership was dominant. I
13 don't think that at any point in time, or from any point of view should
14 your dominant role be denied -- your dominant role be denied. And
15 Serbia's influence over everything that was going on in Yugoslavia was
16 more dominant than that of Montenegro, although you always try to find
17 ways and means of sorting things out with Bulatovic. So the position you
18 held, the office that you held was dominant.
19 Q. I'm certainly not denying that I had a dominant position which was
20 derived from some kind of authority that I had acquired, I assume.
21 However, the question was whether I imposed some will of my own to you?
22 When one uses this term, "to impose one's will upon someone," it means
23 that the other party does not agree to that but is compelled to agree to
25 A. No, it wasn't that way.
1 Q. Were you compelled to accept something because I was advocating
3 A. No, nothing was forced upon anything at the Supreme Defence
4 Council. I repeated this several times, all decisions that were reached
5 were reached by consensus, at least while I was president of the Federal
6 Republic of Yugoslavia. As for your authority, I referred to it a short
7 while ago.
8 Q. I'm not denying it. I'm not denying it at present either. You
9 explained that the relations between Bulatovic and Djukanovic were
10 disrupted, and that that in a way affected the functioning of the
11 federation because later on there was a split within the party as well,
12 the part that remained along with Bulatovic remained in the federal
13 government, and this was also apart from the leadership in the Republic of
14 Montenegro. Isn't that right?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Nevertheless, Djukanovic did come to meetings of the Supreme
17 Defence Council, and he did carry out his duties. Sometimes, he didn't,
18 of course, but for the most part, he would come. Is that well known?
19 A. I know that he attended a few meetings in the beginning, and that
20 later on, he did not come. It's just the way you put it.
21 Q. I wish to draw your attention to the following, because Mr. Nice
22 talked about it, and you commented upon it. These are the records of the
23 6th of session of the Supreme Defence Council. It's a very long record.
24 I'm not going to comment upon all its points. It's minutes from the 6th
25 session of the Supreme Defence Council held on the 4th of October, 1998,
1 present Slobodan Milosevic, Milan Milutinovic, Milo Djukanovic, however
2 let's be quite specific about this. Let everyone see this clearly. The
3 only members of the Supreme Defence Council are the three presidents.
4 Isn't that right? Everybody else is simply present at the meeting of
5 Supreme Defence Council sessions, and they cannot reach any decisions at
6 the Supreme Defence Council. Is that right?
7 A. Perhaps I should correct this a bit. The only members of the
8 Supreme Defence Council with the right to vote are the three presidents.
9 But there's really no purpose unless the chief of general staff is there
10 and the Minister of Defence, at least. If we were even to exclude the
11 Federal Foreign Minister, and I think that later on as the new rules of
12 procedure were being adopted, that is how you treated their presence as
13 well. For professional reasons, primarily. As for decision making --
14 Q. Practice was translated into a new set of rules and procedure.
15 Does that -- did that mean that there would be a sharing of responsibility
16 then? How can you talk about sharing of responsibility, the constitution
17 clearly stipulates whose responsibility is what. If the practice that had
18 already existed was translated into new rules of procedure, that has
19 nothing to do with sharing responsibility.
20 A. The Supreme Defence Council that I chaired and whose member you
21 were as well, precisely functioned the way you defined it later in the
22 rules of procedure on the 23rd of March, 1999, so it was exactly in
23 accordance with those principles.
24 Q. Now, I hope that you have these minutes.
25 MR. NICE: Tab 24.
1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. So it is the 4th of October, 1998, in the Serb version, it is the
3 page that is marked by a number ending in 459. "The president of the FRY,
4 Slobodan Milosevic, presented our general orientation yet again that all
5 pending issues should be resolved by peaceful means and he presented some
6 of the main arguments supporting this orientation. First of all, the
7 cessation of armed operations."
8 MR. NICE: Page 7 of 10.
9 JUDGE MAY: Let's make sure we have all got the passage.
10 MR. NICE: I think it's page 7 of 10, right-hand corner.
11 JUDGE MAY: Make sure the witness has it, too.
12 Mr. Lilic, do you have the passage? Yes. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. So, "he presented the general orientation that all pending issues
15 should be resolved by peaceful means, and he presented some of the main
16 arguments supporting such an option. First, the end of all armed
17 operations." Let me just briefly comment upon this. In The beginning of
18 October, practically this so-called KLA, or rather this terrorist
19 organisation had been defeated. And armed operations had ceased. Is that
21 A. That's the kind of information that was coming in from the people
22 who were in Kosovo and Metohija.
23 Q. So first of all, the cessation of armed operations. "Secondly,
24 withdrawal of forces to locations of permanent bases according to the
25 cessation of terrorist actions which is part of our agreement with Russian
1 President Jeljcin. Third, openness of the entire area to free movement of
2 UNHCR members and members of the International Red Cross in order to make
3 it possible to assist in resolving humanitarian issues. Fourth, our
4 readiness for dialogue and resolving problems by peaceful means. All four
5 requests from -- were met from our side despite our criticism in view of
6 this resolution because we do not constitute a threat to peace for
7 neighbouring countries or do we jeopardise their safety. That is what was
8 contained in the resolution. Do you share this view, that we did not
9 constitute any threat to peace for neighbouring countries or that we
10 jeopardised their safety and security?
11 A. Absolutely; we did not.
12 Q. So we met all four requests, although we did have certain
13 criticism vis-a-vis the resolution precisely because we did not constitute
14 a threat to peace in neighbouring countries, and I say they're not even
15 angry when we stated the accusations for this are unfounded because they
16 had underestimated Albanian terrorism in Kosovo. And then it says,
17 Milosevic reminded that the operations ceased last Monday, that is to say
18 six days ago, anti-terrorist units were returned to barracks, full freedom
19 of movement was ensured not only for UNHCR and activists of the
20 International Red Cross but also for diplomatic missions, even for the
21 representatives of the media, which was not even one of the things called
22 for by the resolution.
23 Now, only the obligations -- this is really important: Only the
24 obligations of Albanian parties and movements were not fulfilled, namely,
25 items 1, 2, 3, 4, and 6. Item 7 refers to Albania, but it still tries to
1 bring in military equipment and ammunition into our country, and our
2 border units are efficiently preventing this. So we have fulfilled
3 everything that the resolution called for on our part. All of this was
4 confirmed in the letter of our Minister of the Interior to the UN
5 Secretary-General Kofi Annan, who will submit a report to the Security
7 And then it says that I reminded the persons attending this
8 meeting of the meeting I had with the ambassadors of the contact group
9 member countries, and I affirm the standpoints of the National Assembly of
10 the Republic of Serbia about the resolution of the crisis in Kosovo and
11 Metohija, I also informed the members of the Supreme Council with Russia's
12 positions, whose delegation I had received that day. The Minister of
13 Foreign Affairs, Ivan Ivanov, was there on the delegation, and also the
14 Defence Minister, Igor Sergejev, they presented Russia's standpoint that
15 they would veto a Security Council resolution if one were to be proposed
16 in connection with air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
17 They expect us to affirm what we have done by now in the implementation of
18 Resolution 1199 and our readiness for dialogue. Then I say that at the
19 forthcoming session of both chambers of the Federal Assembly, a consensus
20 has to be reached regarding strategic decisions relating to Kosovo and
21 Metohija. We expect that the Yugoslav Assembly will adopt conclusions
22 that will affirm our decisiveness, et cetera.
23 So the Federal Assembly is expected to react in this way as
24 opposed to what is being alleged here. It was not excluded from all of
25 this. So the session is attended by Milutinovic and Djukanovic, both.
1 This is a session held in October 1998. And the conclusion, I'm referring
2 to the page that ends in 61: "Yugoslavia is firmly committed to peace and
3 it is prepared to resolve by peaceful means all pending issues, but if we
4 are attacked we are going to defend the country by all means." That was
5 adopted as the conclusion of this meeting unanimously. And two paragraphs
6 down, it says that both members of the Supreme Defence Council, the
7 president of Serbia, Milan Milutinovic, and the president of Montenegro,
8 Mile Djukanovic, accepted this proposal made by President Milosevic. So
9 this is a decision of the Supreme Defence Council which pertains to the
10 defence of the country. If the country is attacked, then a decision was
11 passed unanimously in terms of what would be done then. Mr. Lilic, is
12 there anything controversial here?
13 A. As far as the presentation, the minutes, the subject, the
14 conclusion is concerned, I believe that there is nothing controversial.
15 However, as far as we are concerned, we in Serbia, we probably misassessed
16 Russia's position, that they would veto a resolution by the Security
17 Council and also that the campaign would last shorter than we thought,
18 that it did last longer than we thought.
19 Q. But that was not a decision that we adopted, that was not our
20 conclusion. On the contrary, we said that if we are attacked, we are
21 going to defend the country, but before that, our main position is that we
22 are going to try to resolve things by peaceful means, and we also met the
23 four requirements as I had presented them.
24 Now, I would like to clarify that part of your testimony that has
25 to do with assistance to the army of Republika Srpska and the Serb army of
1 Krajina and the 30th and 40th personnel centres respectively. Since there
2 are quite a few insinuations here in this connection, is it correct that
3 in terms of our engagement, if it were to be defined in a single word, it
4 is only the word "assistance" that can be used? Is that right or is that
5 not right, Mr. Lilic?
6 A. Yes, that is right.
7 Q. Is it correct that practically all armies created in the territory
8 of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - the Croatian
9 army, the Muslim army, and the Slovenian army, and the Macedonian army,
10 and of course the army of Yugoslavia - were created basically from the
11 former JNA, at least as far as the officer personnel is concerned, and
12 everything that the JNA consisted of?
13 A. It could be put that way in relation to the JNA, but I think that
14 all republics also had their Territorial Defences, and then the armies of
15 the republics grew out of that. And as for the officers's corps, yes, of
16 course it came from the JNA.
17 Q. Is it correct that this materiel assistance through which we
18 expressed our solidarity with the former members of the JNA who had stayed
19 behind and defended their republic in Bosnia-Herzegovina or in Krajina was
20 only reduced to this welfare aspect, if I can put it that way; the rights
21 they acquired in terms of their salary, their social insurance, and the
22 livelihood of their families depended on that?
23 A. I spoke about that in detail yesterday, and you have practically
24 confirmed in a way most of what I had said. And that is the point why the
25 30th and 40th personnel centres were established. But also to bear in
1 mind the resources that were being allocated for the families that were in
2 the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Perhaps I still owe
3 a small explanation in addition to that. When the word "centre" is used,
4 it's not a sophisticated facility that is used for training or for putting
5 up a large number of people. It was simply military code VP 3001, and the
6 40th centre was military post code 4001, and this was also in Belgrade.
7 So this is a brief additional explanation.
8 Q. Thank you very much for this clarification. Because I even did
9 not know that all of this was just an office and the other one in another
10 office. But it is quite clear that this only meant keeping records of the
11 materiel assistance that was given in relation to the rights acquired
12 until then in the JNA that had existed until then in terms of their
13 salaries and their social insurance. Is that right?
14 A. Yes. The fact is that this centre was established after -- after
15 the contact plan was adopted in 1994, rather, when it was not adopted in
16 1994 and when we ceased to operate as we did until then. And I think that
17 the centres continued to function until the 28th of March, 2001, when
18 President Kostunica abolished this altogether as this annex was being
19 prepared in terms of the cooperation between the army of Yugoslavia and
20 the army of Republika Srpska, and it was supposed to be based on an
21 agreement on special ties between the army of Yugoslavia and the army of
22 Republika Srpska, and this was signed, if I'm not mistaken, the end of
23 February or the beginning of March 1997. And this council of cooperation
24 was established then, and I think that you were elected president of that
25 council, so that is to say that the centre continued to exist until 2001.
1 And the annex was prepared like the annex that had already been worked out
2 between Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
3 Q. Can you just confirm this with a yes or no, this was in accordance
4 with the Dayton accords, wasn't it?
5 A. Yes, I omitted to mention that.
6 Q. Did you sign that agreement with the representative of the army of
7 Republika Srpska?
8 A. I signed that agreement with Mr. Momcilo Krajisnik in a ceremonial
9 hall in the Presidency of Serbia. I remember it well because I attended
10 that ceremony. It was an agreement on relations between FRY and Republika
11 Srpska based on the Dayton accords.
12 Q. Now, let us go back to this aid that we were extending as a key
13 matter arises here which needs to be answered and you are quite competent
14 to provide that question. Did the general staff of the Army of Yugoslavia
15 in any way have a command role in relation to the staff of the Army of
16 Republika Srpska or over the main staff of the Serbian Army of Srpska
18 A. That is simply impossible. If all our normative and legal
19 decisions were abided by, the general staff of the Army of Yugoslavia
20 could not be placed in such a decision, and by decision of the Supreme
21 Defence Council that matter was never raised or discussed, so my answer is
23 Q. I'm asking you this because various tables were drawn here and
24 various patterns and diagrams in which the general staff of the Army of
25 Yugoslavia appears at the top, then below it, the main staff the VRS, et
1 cetera, because the intention is to give the impression that these were
2 united armed forces commanded from Belgrade. Will you please comment on
4 A. I did not have occasion to see any such diagrams, but such a
5 statement simply does not correspond to the truth or the factual
6 situation, and it was quite impossible without the knowledge of the
7 Supreme Defence Council and an appropriate decision by them.
8 Q. Thank you very much. We've cleared that up.
9 Mr. Nice asked you what kind of control I had, I,
10 Slobodan Milosevic, over the leadership of the Bosnian Serbs, et cetera.
11 You answered that the word control could not be used. Is that right?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Then you answered that you had some influence, but it was
14 insufficient for them to accept the peace plans. Is that right?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Is it true that my contacts and endeavours were directed, to the
17 extent I was able, and I used my influence sometimes greater, sometimes
18 lesser, but it was always directed towards seeking a peaceful solution and
19 the acceptance of peace plans. Is that right or not?
20 A. I said that there's no question that you had influence, and that I
21 was present in situations that you have referred to, and this can be seen
22 from the minutes in Dobanovci, also in the preparations for the adoption
23 of the various plans, the Vance Owen and the contact group plans. But I
24 said that obviously that influence was not sufficient since they did not
25 accept those plans. So I think that a part of the leadership of
1 Republika Srpska had a different aspiration, and that was for the Federal
2 Republic of Yugoslavia to be drawn into the war at all costs, and I think
3 there was a joint meeting of the Assembly of Republika Srpska and the
4 Serbian Krajina at Plitvice in response to our pressure to accept the
5 contact group plan, and they wanted to create some kind of a joint Serbian
6 Republic between these two entities which absolutely none of us could
7 accept, you in the first place.
8 Q. In that connection, as a jigsaw is being formed using the wrong
9 pieces, Mr. Nice asked you whether the leaders of the Bosnian Serbs came
10 to the building where my offices were, that is, the presidency of Serbia.
11 You said yes, but you added that most frequently, this occurred prior to
12 negotiations. There were many negotiations which were most frequently
13 conducted in Geneva. Is that right?
14 A. Yes, that is as much as I know.
15 Q. And I assume that you know on the basis of those negotiations
16 which were not secret and which were led first by Vance and Owen, and
17 after that by Owen and Stoltenberg, that the efforts of the Republic of
18 Serbia and me personally were geared towards the achievement of a peaceful
19 solution. Isn't that right?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Mr. Nice asked you about Mladic. You said that he was
22 unpredictable, and that between us, and this doesn't apply only to Mladic,
23 but to the -- to several members of the leadership, that relations
24 deteriorated after the Vance Owen plan was not accepted. Is that right?
25 A. Yes, it is.
1 Q. You spoke about the financing of the budget of Yugoslavia, that
2 while you were the president, Serbia's share in the budget was 95 per
3 cent, that is, its financing of the budget was 95 per cent, and that later
4 on it was even higher?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. Does that show that Serbia, within the limits of its possibilities
7 and under very difficult economic conditions actually bore the full burden
8 of financing the Army of Yugoslavia?
9 A. That is absolutely true. There can be no doubt about that. And I
10 must add that that item in the budget devoted to the Army of Yugoslavia,
11 because of the overall economic conditions was never fulfilled as planned,
12 so that the Army of Yugoslavia was constantly facing financial problems,
13 had to contend with those problems.
14 Q. Is it true that the election to various posts in the general
15 staff, and I'm not speaking about my own personal role, but our common
16 position was that these should be people who opted for Yugoslavia, who
17 were Yugoslavia-oriented, and that those people were selected and promoted
18 and that that was our policy?
19 A. Yes, I spoke about that yesterday.
20 Q. Then, Mr. Nice went on to ask you in -- about the alleged
21 militarisation of the police, and then you answered that it was not right
22 to say that the police had been militarised. Is that right?
23 A. Yes, that was my answer.
24 Q. Do you have any explanation why every effort it being made to
25 impose -- to give the impression that the police was militarised?
1 A. I think there's no need for me to present any assumptions on my
2 part. I say, and I stand by what I said, that this -- at least as regards
3 the Republic of Serbia, the police was given priority over the army of
4 Yugoslavia. As to your question, it would be difficult for me to comment
5 on it. I could only give you my assumptions, and I don't think that would
6 be in order.
7 Q. The police that was first called Milicija, and then Policija, was
8 within the competence of Serbia, wasn't it?
9 A. A part of it within the competence of Serbia, and a part of it
10 within the competence of the federal government. Until October or
11 November, 1992, I'm not sure.
12 Q. Very well. What the authorities of Serbia were involved in, had
13 to do with the police of Serbia. As for Yugoslavia, Yugoslavia covered 95
14 per cent of the budget of Yugoslavia. So when it came to the competencies
15 of Yugoslavia, Serbia was the one who carried out its obligations in good
16 faith, assisting in every respect it could and contributing in such a high
17 percentage. He asked you in connection with the ranks of police, in a
18 context to the effect that military ranks were applied to the police.
19 First, is it clear that ranks in the police were not military ranks, but
20 police ranks, and that a major or a captain or a general in the police was
21 no military major or captain or general, but a police major, captain, or
22 general. Is that right?
23 A. Yes, one could put it that way. I spoke about the dissatisfaction
24 in answer to a question that the dissatisfaction this provoked within the
25 top echelons of the general staff of Yugoslavia.
1 Q. It was not their affair, that is my first comment. And secondly,
2 did that in any way jeopardise their own status or position? Did that
3 interfere with the army in any way whatsoever?
4 A. From the standpoint of ranks, certainly not, though comparisons
5 were made, and I think that only France has police ranks in addition to
6 us. Of course, this needn't mean anything, that is, they have military
7 ranks in the police, in the gendarmerie.
8 Q. An attempt has been made here, and there was a man who, I never
9 heard of such an occupation policeologist, he was explaining that the law
10 on ranks had a special purpose. Do you believe that that law on ranks had
11 any special purpose except to put some order in the police? Did I have
12 any bad intentions, any secret agenda by using ranks in the police?
13 A. I said yesterday, and let me repeat today, that general ranks or
14 ranks that were introduced in the police did not represent any proof
15 showing that that was the militarisation of the police. I said something
16 else, and I assume you remember that very well, that I personally thought
17 that you did so as a concession to Mr. Radovan Stojicic that was -- rather
18 than being it necessary. That is my opinion.
19 Q. I didn't quite understand. I thought you explained that Radovan
20 Stojicic did not have the necessary qualifications for the post he held.
21 A. No, no, for the post, he certainly had the necessary
22 qualifications. But I compared the rank of colonel general in the
23 understanding of the general staff of the army of Yugoslavia at the time
24 and the rank of colonel general in the army of Yugoslavia. And I said
25 that for the rank of general as such in the army of Yugoslavia, you need
1 to have at least a Ph.D., to have graduated from the National Defence
2 School, very high marks for command duties, and then I compared that with
3 the activities of Radovan Stojicic on condition that we treat those ranks
4 on an equal footing. If they are not on an equal footing, then my
5 comparison is irrelevant.
6 Q. I assume you will admit that you cannot compare something that
7 exists for decades and centuries as a method of work, as a procedure of
8 promotion in the military and when something new is being introduced in
9 the police. And something that has a tradition, when it is something new,
10 can have no tradition behind it.
11 A. I agree with that, but you know that I personally, by my own
12 nature and by my own orientation, because of family history, for many
13 years in the past I was more on the side of the army and was against the
14 introduction of these ranks in the police, especially as they were
15 introduced only in the public security and not in the state security, who
16 were left without those ranks. Of course, when I say this, I have no
17 ulterior motive, and I'm not saying that anything was being done, prompted
18 by such motives.
19 Q. But this referred to the uniform part of the police. The state
20 security is not a uniformed section of the police, so there was no need to
21 introduce ranks.
22 According to the vertical chain of responsibility, all officials
23 in the ministry, from the highest to the lowest, had their superiors and,
24 in the final analysis, were accountable to the Minister of Internal
25 Affairs. Is that right? And to whom was he accountable to?
1 A. The Minister of Internal Affairs is accountable to the president
2 of the republican government.
3 Q. The government in the first place?
4 A. Yes, the government.
5 Q. You were asked about Zoran Sokolovic, and he held the highest
6 political positions, didn't he?
7 A. Yes, I explained that yesterday.
8 Q. He used to be secretary of the central committee, he was president
9 of the National Assembly. After that, he was Minister of Internal
10 Affairs. He was a very dedicated, and in every sense of the word, a man
11 of firm convictions in the leadership of the Socialist Party of Serbia.
12 Isn't that right?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Of course, as a civilian and as a politician, as a Minister of the
15 Police, he had no rank. He had no general or any other rank. Is that
17 A. As far as I know, he didn't have any such rank.
18 Q. Explain, then, please, as I didn't quite understand what you meant
19 when you said that he didn't have real power. Did he perform his duties,
20 or did he not perform his duties?
21 A. He performed the position of Minister of the Police.
22 Q. Minister of Internal Affairs?
23 A. Yes, that is how it was called then, and then later I think he was
24 still a minister when it became the Ministry of the Police or whatever it
25 was that changed after ranks were given and everything that followed. But
1 I don't think that is important. Anyway, I am convinced on the basis of
2 the knowledge I have, that as regards public security, the main moves were
3 made in the first place by Badza.
4 Q. And he headed the public security services just as Stanisic headed
5 the state security. So Stojicic led the public and Stanisic the state
6 security service. Do you know that if they had a problem, or if they
7 wanted to talk to me, they would come, all of them, all three would come.
8 The minister and the heads of two different departments, all three of them
10 A. It is in that context that I said that Sokolovic didn't have real
11 power. What I meant was that all three came to see you whenever they had
12 a problem.
13 Q. Very well. Now, that throws a completely different light on all
14 this, but my impression was, and probably no one could refute this who was
15 familiar with those relationships, that both Stojicic and Stanisic had a
16 great deal of respect for Sokolovic.
17 A. Absolutely so, as opposed to the minister who took over
18 afterwards. That is quite correct.
19 Q. You spoke about the fact that the military security for a period
20 of time was excluded from the possibility of intercepting and tapping into
21 telephone conversations. Is that right?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Now, do you know that this took place when the federal state
24 service security no longer existed, when there was only the republican
25 security service that was in existence?
1 A. What I know is this: I know that of the whole events that led up
2 to eliminating the security administration and department of the army of
3 Yugoslavia to tap into telephone conversations and control them, and that
4 decision was taken - now I'm presenting the assumption here that it was
5 General Aleksandar Dimitrijevic, the head of the security department of
6 the army of Yugoslavia, and this decision was made in 1993, which means
7 that the federal state security service did not exist at the time.
8 Q. Right, not at that time. Now, when it comes to republican state
9 security, because it was guaranteed by the constitution, the inviolability
10 of telephone conversations and the right to communicate, et cetera,
11 letters, and so on, there was a provision that authorisation could be
12 given if it was signed by the president of the supreme court, and only on
13 that basis.
14 A. Yes. As far as I know, they met every Monday, that is the head of
15 state security of Serbia and the Supreme Court judge.
16 Q. I don't know that they met every Monday, but I do know about that
17 particular provision stipulating what it did, so I believe that what
18 Stanisic told me is true and correct, that no measure was ever applied
19 without a signature from the president of the Supreme Court.
20 So as we're talking about the Supreme Court of Serbia, and as
21 we're talking about the security service of Serbia, and as we're talking
22 about every decree that had to be signed by the Supreme Court, I
23 personally, and now I'm asking you whether you are aware and have
24 knowledge of, this but I was personally informed that the military
25 security service, if there are military security reasons to introduce a
1 measure to that effect, which had to pass through this procedure because
2 all the citizens were equal before the law, it was never refused by the
3 State Security Service of Serbia for individuals for which the military
4 security service was in charge and the request came from the military
5 security service. So it was never refused, and this kind of procedure was
6 always put into practice. Right?
7 A. Yes, quite possibly it was like that. I don't know whether that
8 was actually the way it was. But they did ask me to ask you for that, and
9 you will remember that we discussed it several times, that the security
10 service be returned that right to be able to tap into conversations. And
11 even with the pretext in respect to what you just said, that they don't
12 always have to inform the State Security Service of everything they learn,
13 all the intelligence gained on that basis.
14 Q. Now, without informing the supreme court, this wouldn't have been
15 possible for the army either in view of the provisions that held true, but
16 there is --
17 A. There is the supreme military court, too, and I think that later
18 on everything was returned to the state of affairs it was in 1992.
19 Q. I think it was returned to that situation, state of affairs
20 unlawfully and illegally, but let that remain my own personal opinion on
21 that subject. Now, you were asked by Mr. Nice whether the accused had
22 control over high-ranking officers of the JNA. Your answer wasn't quite
23 clear to me. Did I have control of some high-ranking JNA officers?
24 A. I repeated the same thing and said that the word "control" was too
25 strong a term, but I said that you were closer to some generals than you
1 were to others. But that is a relative assessment. That's as it may be.
2 Q. That's all right, Mr. Lilic. Now, I'm sure you will remember that
3 I was very busy with all the work I had, and -- but I was deprived of all
4 possibilities of dealing with the army as such, and that, in fact, I
5 didn't deal in army matters at all except for taking part in the Supreme
6 Defence Council meetings which I had to do pursuant to the constitution.
7 A. Do you want me to give you an answer to that?
8 Q. Yes, I do, but let me just remind you of a conversation you and I
9 had. I'm sure you will remember and won't deny it. You asked me, you
10 said, "You have a lot of obligations and lots of things to do. Can I be
11 of assistance." And I said to you, "What you have under the
12 constitutional competencies, that is to say the army, you deal with that.
13 Because I really don't have time to devote myself, even the least bit of
14 time to that area except that I will come to any meetings when they are
16 A. Well, yes, that was a lucky force of circumstance, that the army
17 was retained, that it remained the cohesive factor in safeguarding
18 Yugoslavia and preserving Yugoslavia because I think on the internal
19 political plane it did show a great deal of understanding for internal
20 policy. We were talking about certain people here from times before 1993,
21 that is to say, some people who stayed on in the army in 1994 and who were
22 closer to the police, if I can use the term, what I meant was
23 Bozo Stevanovic, Boro Ivanovic, and some others. So in that context, was
24 the answer. That is to say, that you had -- you felt closer towards some
25 of them than others. You liked more -- some more than others.
1 Q. But you said maybe. Yes, well maybe I did meet them on different
2 ceremonial occasions, some of the other generals. But you mentioned
3 yesterday General Marijanovic, for example. I heard of him first he was
4 put forward by General Ojdanic, the new chief of staff of the general
5 staff to a post in the general staff. As for General Boro Ivanovic, I
6 didn't know him personally at all. Ojdanic, I did know him by sight, I
7 would see him around, and I gained the impression that he was a very good
8 man, a very honourable and honest man. And at the time, I didn't know
9 that he was a very well-educated man and a very clever man, too. I don't
10 know if you share my views on that.
11 As for Bozo Stevanovic, yes, that's true, he did come to see me.
12 He came to complain, in fact, and he was angry with me because I didn't
13 use my influence and bring it to bear for him to be appointed chief of the
14 general staff because he was one of the candidates put forward at the
15 time. But I do not know that I had close contacts with any of the
16 generals, not a single general, in fact, from the JNA or army of
18 And I can say that I perhaps knew Kadijevic best. He was federal
19 secretary at the time, and I knew him, of course, on a professional basis
20 in terms of the post he occupied?
21 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer all this. Can you deal with
22 any of this, Mr. Lilic?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, of course, I can, Mr. May, yes.
24 As you brought up the name of General Marijanovic, I'm sure you had heard
25 about him, if not seen him beforehand, when General Ojdanic was the
1 commander of the 1st Army, which as you know very well took up over 50 per
2 cent of the area of responsibility of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
3 50 per cent. Marijanovic was the chief of staff, and I think that he
4 followed the Uzice Corps. I know that both of them worked in tandem, if I
5 can say that. But I think you also know him from the days of the
6 negotiations and signing of the Manovo [phoen] agreement.
7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Yes, that was in Ojdanic was in the general staff.
9 JUDGE MAY: I've stopped you because you've interrupted the
10 witness. You spoke for about 5 minutes yourself, and then expect him to
11 answer in a minute, it is absurd.
12 Yes, Mr. Lilic, is there something else you want to add?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Just with respect to
14 General Ivanovic, that was a very specific case with respect to the
15 relationship of the general staff the army of Yugoslavia. I think this
16 took place in the space of 1992, 1993, and 1994, in the course of those
17 particular years, and I might have mentioned him in the context of saying
18 that the military and court supported him. And as far as Mr. Stevanovic
19 was concerned, he was promised that he would be chief of the general
20 staff, or at least was a candidate for that post.
21 JUDGE MAY: Yes, I think that's a convenient time to adjourn.
22 What we have in mind is this, that, Mr. Milosevic, you should have the
23 first two sessions tomorrow afternoon -- tomorrow morning. That will give
24 you an hour or so more than the Prosecution have had. And it would also
25 leave an hour for the amicus and any re-examination.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I have to protest against
2 that decision because it was quite obvious that Mr. Nice was skimming over
3 the documents, riding over them, and now you're giving me the same amount
4 of time that Mr. Nice had. And I cannot ride over all these documents as
5 he did to introduce them as exhibits, to say to the witness is this an
6 authentic document, have it exhibited and so on and so forth. I think
7 that this is extremely --
8 JUDGE MAY: Yes, I have that in mind. The proposal was that you
9 would have an hour more than the Prosecution, not the same time. So. We
10 will review the position. I've said that.
11 Mr. Nice, it may become necessary, it will not be possible
12 tomorrow to sit beyond the usual time. It's not possible to extend the
13 hours today for one reason: Apparently the accused becomes deprived of
14 all exercise if we go beyond the time. Now, we're looking into that, to
15 see whether that's right or not. But the upshot is that we can't sit
16 beyond the usual time. It may become necessary for the witness to return
17 at some stage if we can't finish.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And may we, Mr. May --
19 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment.
20 MR. NICE: If that's necessary, then I'm sure that can be
21 achieved. This is a witness which I shall wish to have a modest amount of
22 time in re-examination, the nature of the evidence he's given, the
23 position he occupies and so on, is such that some re-examination is
24 inevitably essential.
25 JUDGE MAY: It may be sensible to have some discussion with the
1 witness which, of course, you have permission to see when he could come
2 back, if need be.
3 MR. NICE: Yes, we'll deal with that. We can best deal with that
4 via his lawyer, I think might be preferable.
5 JUDGE MAY: Yes, whichever way you proceed is possible. Yes.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, yesterday, I asked you to
7 give me much more time than Mr. Nice had, precisely for the reasons I
8 explained. I don't personally think that the witness will refuse to
9 extend his time for cross-examination after the weekend. I'm sure he'll
10 be available, and I don't see why he shouldn't be. And why the most
11 important thing is to finish everything by the end of business tomorrow?
12 If we're talking about such a large pile of documents, and I cannot skim
13 through the documents in the way that Mr. Nice did.
14 JUDGE MAY: Well, the witness may or may not be able to come back.
15 We have to some regard to his convenience. But if necessary, we will ask
16 him to do so at some time which is suitable.
17 We, of course, have in mind the time, but time must be used to the
18 best advantage by everybody here.
19 MR. NICE: One other point, a number of next week's witnesses I
20 think are scheduled for particular dates and have had difficulty finding
21 dates convenient to them in one or two cases because they have been fixed
22 or times when the accused has been unable to attend for reasons outside
23 his control.
24 Second point is, I'd ask the Chamber to have in mind the character
25 of some of this morning's cross-examination, which was reading out very
1 large passages of meetings to the witness and asking very limited
2 questions. It's a matter for the accused, but of course documents that
3 relate accounts of meetings, and this is going to occur much more when we
4 eventually get the documents of the SDC meetings, are substantially
5 documents that do speak for themselves. They may have to be produced by
6 some technique, but once they're in, they're in, and that's why my
7 questions have always been pointed and less time has been taken by pointed
8 questions than by simply going through the whole document.
9 JUDGE MAY: I have that in mind. But this is an area in which the
10 fact that an accused is representing himself must be borne in mind, not
11 represented by professional lawyers who might be able to do the things
12 more expeditiously.
13 Yes, we'll adjourn until tomorrow. Mr. Lilic, would you please be
14 back at 9.00.
15 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned
16 at 1.56 p.m. to be reconvened on Thursday,
17 the 19th day of June, 2003, at 9.00 a.m.