1 Thursday, 18 September 2003
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
7 WITNESS: WITNESS C-1164 [Resumed]
8 [Witness answered through interpreter]
9 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]
10 Q. Tell me, please, on which date were you evacuated from the
11 area of Eastern Slavonia and when did you go to Serbia?
12 A. I was not evacuated from Eastern Slavonia. After the 16th of
13 September, when I was taken prisoner, I was transported to Serbia, and
14 from there we joined a convoy in Sremska Mitrovica and I think we left
15 Sremska Mitrovica on the 19th or 20th of November, 1991.
16 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. The interpreters did
17 not --
18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. What was the date when you were transferred?
20 A. We left Vukovar, I think it was the beginning of November 1991.
21 Q. And then you were in Mitrovica.
22 A. Yes. Then we were taken through Serbia to Mitrovica. So I was
23 in Mitrovica, yes.
24 Q. How long were you there?
25 A. I've lost all sense of time by now, so I can't say how many days
1 it was, but in the prison itself, the prison in Mitrovica, I think it was
2 about six days, five or six days, up to seven. I can't say exactly. I
3 can't say the exact number of days.
4 Q. All right. So when you were transported to Serbia, you were
5 transferred from an area where there were conflicts to an area that was
6 peaceful and where you were safe; is that right?
7 A. We were not safe. As a matter of fact, we were -- we had an
8 armed escort, the army, the police, and you cannot really talk about
9 safety in that sense. What does that mean? What kind of safety is that
10 when you are there under force, when you are being driven by them and you
11 don't know where they are driving you and how long this will last. So one
12 cannot speak about safety.
13 Q. All right. On page 5, in paragraph 3, you say that an officer of
14 the JNA, Brigadier Zoric, addressed your group. That's what you said.
15 A. Yes, when we came to Mitrovica.
16 Q. Do you have any idea --
17 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I see that my microphone was not
19 on, yes.
20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Do you have any idea what this man was by rank? Because in the
22 JNA there is no such rank as "brigadier."
23 A. I don't know. I'm not familiar with ranks. I said "brigadier,"
24 but at any rate, he wore a military uniform. He was not a plain soldier,
25 he was an officer of the Yugoslav People's Army.
1 Q. When he spoke to you, what did he say?
2 A. Since we had already met him in Sremska Mitrovica -- or rather,
3 in Sid, in Mitrovica he said that we would stay there. There were young
4 children with us. The youngest child was about one year old. I think
5 that some of the women asked what they would do with their children when
6 we realised that we were within prison walls, and he said what did we
7 want? Think of what the Ustasha were doing with the Serb women and
8 children, and then he talked about Yugoslavia and the army, things like
10 Q. Did he offend you in any way, insult you in any way?
11 A. What offended us was that he addressed us in such a way, that all
12 of us who were brought there were Ustashas from that youngest child up to
13 the oldest woman who was there. However, nobody said anything. We were
14 all silent.
15 Q. You say that he thought that you were all Ustashas, starting from
16 that youngest child up to the oldest woman? Is that what he said?
17 A. Well, that's how they spoke about Croats who were there in their
18 captivity, in their hands.
19 Q. All right. In this same paragraph that I quoted, you say that in
20 the JNA bus that transported you there were two Chetniks sitting on the
21 two seats behind the driver. That's what you said.
22 A. Just a moment, please. Let me find this section.
23 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. I've already quoted that paragraph to you.
1 A. There were always men who were armed, who sat at the front seats.
2 They wore uniforms, and they had weapons.
3 Q. What kind of uniform did they wear, these two soldiers?
4 A. Olive green-grey uniform.
5 Q. So why did you use the word "Chetnik" if they were JNA soldiers?
6 A. These were not young soldiers. These were older men, and they
7 kept playing songs to us over the loudspeakers. That's why I said they
8 were Chetniks.
9 Q. There were songs that they played to you on the bus?
10 A. Well, their entire behaviour towards us was that way. At any
11 rate, I didn't think that they were soldiers who were behaving according
12 to military rules.
13 Q. Did they offend you in any way?
14 A. They never spoke to us. They never communicated with us in a
15 normal way. It was always in an insulting way.
16 Q. Do you remember any of that? Can you describe any of these
17 things that were insulting when you say they drove you on that bus and
18 they were sitting behind the driver? What were the ways in which they
19 offended you, insulted you, since they did not address you, as you say?
20 A. Throughout that journey, it was very, very hard. We felt unsafe.
21 It was tough for us. We stopped in a town and a group of people walked up
22 to the bus and they started rocking the bus. Everything that was
23 happening to us and around us was more than terrible.
24 Q. I assume that the soldiers did not allow anyone to harm you in
25 any way or to do anything to you.
1 A. I don't know whether they allowed it or not. We spent some time
2 there, when this group of people happened to be around the bus. Now, I
3 don't know whether they knew who we were, but they were intimidating us
4 and then the bus went on.
5 Q. Is it correct that when you arrived in Becej you were examined by
6 a doctor?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And after that you were put up at the kindergarten; is that
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. On page 6, paragraph 3, you say that in the kindergarten you were
12 visited by a certain Sveto. That's what you said.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And you understood that he was a member of the state security,
15 judging by your statement.
16 A. Not at the very beginning. But as we were there and as he told
17 us that he was in charge of us and we were locked up there, we were not
18 allowed to go out at all, he would come to see us, and I don't know how it
19 was that somebody found out that there were some people from Vukovar and
20 some civilians showed up and then he put us into a room. He put a pistol
21 on the table. He asked to say who it was that said that we were from
22 Vukovar. After that, the International Red Cross was there and then he
23 was with the members of the then-state security. They questioned us and
24 he put us on the buses, and he said before the Red Cross appeared, he said
25 that if anybody said anything else, we would all end up in the woods, all
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 of us who were there. He was not in uniform. That's why I said that he
2 was from state security. He didn't say anything. But judging by how
3 things were developing, I came to the conclusion that he came from state
5 Q. All right. So this man was upset that somebody had said that you
6 were from Vukovar, because he was afraid that because of the things that
7 were going on in Vukovar this might cause some trouble, that could put you
8 in harm's way.
9 A. Well, it's not that he was afraid that there would be any
10 trouble, because otherwise he would not have said that if anybody said
11 anything else, we would all end up in the woods and nobody would know what
12 happened to us.
13 Q. I wanted to clarify that, but from what I can see in your
14 statement, page 6, paragraph 4, while you were staying in Becej, you were
15 visited by representatives of the International Red Cross. Is that right?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Is it correct that you were asked to write down the names and
18 telephone numbers of persons in Serbia or in Bosnia that you wanted to go
20 A. No. I don't think that they asked us for that then.
21 Q. I think I saw that in your statement.
22 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: If I may be of assistance. That relates to
23 Sremska Mitrovica, Your Honours, and not to Becej.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Right. Yes.
25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation].
1 Q. All right, in Sremska Mitrovica. Did they ask you to give the
2 names and telephone numbers of persons you wanted to go to?
3 A. This happened only at the sports hall in Sremska Mitrovica.
4 After we were transported there by buses from the prison. It was at the
5 sports hall where we met the people who had come from Vukovar. But I
6 remember that only Bosnia was mentioned. I don't know whether anybody had
7 anyone in Serbia, but that is what we were asked to do, to give a name and
8 address, telephone number. But this was only at the sports hall in
9 Sremska Mitrovica, not in prison. In the sports hall.
10 Q. You spent a few days in total in Serbia from the moment you
11 arrived and when you were -- until you were sent away in this convoy; is
12 that right?
13 A. That can be seen from my statement. I don't know whether it was
14 a total of 10 days or 12 days. It can be seen from the statement. I
15 really made an effort to try to remember every day when they were
16 transporting us from one place to another, but I had lost all sense of
17 time, what day it was and things like that.
18 Q. All right. But I assume that you understand whether this convoy
19 was being prepared, whether there was some kind of a preparation
21 A. No way.
22 Q. You were transferred to Bosnia and then to Croatia in Djakovo; is
23 that right?
24 A. That's right.
25 Q. So then they gathered you all there at the sports hall and from
1 there they organised convoys and through Bosnia you arrived in Djakovo in
3 A. I said yesterday that we did not come in a convoy. We are a
4 group of women and children that was taken from Vukovar to Serbia and we
5 came from the prison in Sremska Mitrovica. We were not in the convoy.
6 Q. But from this sports hall, since you were brought there to this
7 sports hall, then you were transported through Bosnia to Croatia and
8 Djakovo in a convoy; is that right?
9 A. Together with all the people who had come there, this large group
10 of people that had come there to the sports hall, yes.
11 Q. Now the microphone is on. Tell me now, what about you and the
12 members of your group? Were you beaten or mistreated in any way while you
13 were in Serbia?
14 A. There was no physical mistreatment.
15 Q. All right. Did you hear of anyone perhaps being killed?
16 A. While I was there, while we were all there, while we were in
17 prison, there was absolutely no information coming our way as to what was
18 going on. Everything I heard I heard after I had come to Croatia and
19 after we became free again. I didn't hear anything.
20 Q. The JNA organised a convoy there, that's what you're saying, and
21 then you who were in Mitrovica and everybody else who was evacuated and
22 who was brought to that sports hall from the war-affected area, the JNA
23 evacuated all of you and took you to Croatia; is that right? And nobody
24 was mistreated, tortured, or nobody got killed; is that the way it was?
25 A. No, that's not the way it was. The convoy that came to
1 Mitrovica, to the sports hall, was brought with representatives of the
2 European Community, the people in white. We managed to join the convoy
3 and to get out. It was not the JNA that evacuated us from the sports hall
4 in Sremska Mitrovica.
5 Q. Tell me, then, and who brought you to that sports hall from which
6 you were evacuated?
7 A. We were brought to the sports hall by bus from the prison at
9 Q. Were these JNA vehicles?
10 A. No. They were just buses, coaches.
11 Q. In whose vehicles were you transported from the final assembly
12 point via Bosnia to Croatia?
13 A. We were transported in buses. Whose they were or which buses
14 they were that came from Vukovar, I don't know who they belonged to.
15 Q. I assume they did not belong to the European Union, or the
16 European Community at the time, but that it had been organised by the JNA.
17 A. I don't know that.
18 Q. Very well. Thank you, madam.
19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
20 Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:
21 Q. [Interpretation] Madam Witness C-1164, could you please tell
22 Their Honours a few more things by way of clarification. On page 3 of
23 your statement, which is paragraph 8 - it is the third paragraph on that
24 page - during your testimony yesterday you already spoke about the people
25 who were from your town, who you knew by sight, and within that group
1 there were persons who looked scary, who were dirty and who were wearing
2 beards; is that right?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Will you please look at the last two sentences of that paragraph.
5 You spent a time in a house. You mentioned the name of the man - I don't
6 have to repeat it - and you say that "We stayed in their house for several
7 hours. We were guarded by two or three young men in JNA uniforms." So I
8 would like to ask you about this expression "we were looked after, or
9 guarded." Did these young men protect you from these people who had a
10 scary appearance?
11 A. No. They all belonged to the same group. They were not
12 protecting us from them. We couldn't go out. So they were in fact guards
13 who were guarding outside the door of that house. I don't think that they
14 were protecting us from anyone. They were just there so that we couldn't
15 go anywhere.
16 Q. Now, look, please, at page 4, paragraph 12. This is a long
17 paragraph, third in the B/C/S version, where you said that for a time you
18 were in the basement. Then again you mention two names - I don't wish to
19 mention them here - and then they took you from that basement towards the
20 Velepromet factory. And then towards the end you say that you were in a
21 Serb house next to the railway tracks, not far from the factory. You also
22 mention the name of the owner. "There were two women already in that
23 house. Each of them had two children. There were some other people.
24 There was a total of us, 14. It was a private house. I remember that
25 some came from a certain family." You mentioned the name of the family.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 "The soldiers brought us food once a day." And then again you use the
2 term "cuvati," which could mean protect or guarded, by a Serb woman. So
3 who did she guard you from or protect you from?
4 A. She was there to check on us and not to protect us.
5 Q. Very well. Then we have page 5, paragraph 14. Again you use
6 similar terms when describing the bus that took you to Sid in a military
7 vehicle. "We got off the bus," and then you say in the middle of that
8 paragraph, "That was the first time that we saw regular JNA soldiers for
9 the first time." Is that right, that it was only then that you saw JNA
10 soldiers for the first time?
11 A. When I was saying that, I meant officers of the JNA. All these
12 others were members of the Territorial Defence, reservists, all these
13 locals of ours in Vukovar wearing uniforms of the then-Yugoslav People's
14 Army. This was the first time that we saw JNA officers.
15 Q. Madam Witness, that is not the way you put it. It says here, and
16 I quote, "It was the first time I actually met regular JNA officers." But
17 very well, you've explained that now.
18 Then later on you said, "On the stage, there were several young
19 soldiers who were guarding us or protecting us." Again, they were
20 protecting you so that no one could endanger you; is that right?
21 A. They were not protecting us so that no one would hurt us. They
22 were there to keep a check on us. They were young soldiers, and it was
23 their duty to check on this hall where we were all staying. There were a
24 lot of people there.
25 Q. I'm not trying to suggest anything to you, I'm just using your
1 words. Because you used the same expression on page 7, second paragraph.
2 When you arrived in the sports hall, again you were looked after by women
3 in uniform, or guarded or protected. This is page 7, paragraph 22. "The
4 women guards never hurt us and they didn't take us to any kind of
5 interrogation during our stay in Sremska Mitrovica." Again you use the
6 words "cuvati" and that no one mistreated you there. Doesn't that mean,
7 after all, that they were in a sense protecting you from physical abuse
8 and mistreatment?
9 A. No, it's not in the sense of protection. We were detained there
10 and these were people who were keeping check on the people detained. They
11 were prison guards, looking after prisoners or guarding prisoners.
12 Q. Now, please, the last two paragraphs of your statement. You say
13 that you were taken from Sremska Mitrovica. There was a convoy of 1.000
14 people. And then in the last paragraph, paragraph 26, you said that when
15 you left Sremska Mitrovica -- I know where Sremska Mitrovica is, and I
16 know where the border with Bosnia is. You say that you drove the whole
17 day. Were you secured by the army or the police? I don't know. You were
18 there. Was the convoy escorted by the army or the police up until the
19 Bosnian border and to the spot where you were exchanged? Yes or no.
20 A. I cannot give you a yes or no answer. First of all, whether it
21 was all day, as I already said, all of us had by then lost all sense of
22 time, what day it was. We didn't even know what season it was. All we
23 cared about was to join the convoy because we were -- we had been alone in
24 Mitrovica, that is, our group. We were not registered. And our main aim
25 was to join this larger group of people and move on. We didn't know where
1 we were going. Whether someone was escorting the convoy, securing the
2 convoy, I can't tell you. What I did see was the men in white.
3 Q. I understand all the difficulties you went through, but you were
4 riding in buses. I'm asking whether you saw through the windows any
5 troops or the police securing this convoy and escorting it through much of
6 Serbia to Bosnia, where you were exchanged. It is impossible for such a
7 large convoy not to be escorted so as to secure the safety of such a large
8 number of people. So did you see any escort?
9 A. I didn't see anyone securing the convoy of which we were a part.
10 Q. Thank you very much.
11 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Your Honours, I would only like to clarify
12 one matter.
13 Re-examined by Ms. Uertz-Retzlaff:
14 Q. Witness, Mr. Milosevic asked you during his cross-examination why
15 your father had grenades in the house, and I would -- you said you would
16 not know that. Do you know whether in Eastern Slavonia grenades and other
17 explosives are used for fishing?
18 A. I think so, yes.
19 Q. Did your father occasionally go fishing?
20 A. I can't really say that he did.
21 MS. UERTZ-RETZLAFF: Thank you, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE MAY: Witness C-1164, that concludes your evidence. Thank
23 you for coming to the Tribunal to give it. You are free to go. Would you
24 just wait until they pull the blinds down.
25 [The witness withdrew]
1 JUDGE MAY: We'll deal with some administrative matters. Sorry,
2 no, we'll stay in open session just for one moment, please.
3 Tomorrow we are sitting between 9.00 and 12.00, as we've already
4 announced. Also, Judge Robinson has a hospital appointment, and therefore
5 Judge Kwon and I will sit under the appropriate Rule. Judge Robinson, if
6 it's possible, will return, of course.
7 And there is a matter I want to deal with in private session,
8 while we're on to these.
9 [Private session]
13 Pages 26927 to 26928 – redacted – private session.
7 [Open session]
8 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honour.
9 MR. NICE: [Microphone not activated]
10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
11 MR. NICE: I apologise. May the next witness, David Harland, be
12 brought in. And while he's coming in, may I make the obvious point to
13 which we've also -- which we've also addressed in a filing, that the
14 Prosecution is obviously concerned about the degree to which it's
15 inevitably losing witnesses because of the passage of time -- that is,
16 losing witnesses it won't have the time to call. With this witness, I
17 will attempt to get the essence of his evidence in the shortest possible
18 time. To begin with, I'll only produce one of the two volumes of exhibits
19 and then we'll defer the position about the other one until a little later
20 in proceedings.
21 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
22 MR. NICE: I should say -- I should have said perhaps earlier
23 that Monday's witness is a witness who has to start on Monday, as far as I
24 am aware, and that position seems unlikely to change. That --
25 JUDGE MAY: That's the next witness, is it?
1 MR. NICE: No. The next witness is C-028, I think you'll find.
2 That witness is a witness I would very much like to conclude
3 tomorrow. There would then be another witness who will be postponed in
4 order that Monday's witness can start on Monday. But we are very pressed
5 for time and perhaps we can review the position in one of the breaks.
6 [The witness entered court]
7 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
8 Yes, if the witness would take the declaration, please.
9 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
10 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
11 WITNESS: David Harland
12 JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat.
13 MR. NICE: Your Honour, for this witness there is a first volume
14 of exhibits in 24 tabs, and if we can simply focus on that to begin with.
15 We'll address the position about the other volume a little later.
16 Yes, may the usher have the volume to display on the overhead
17 projector as this hasn't been Sanctioned, I'm afraid. And may the witness
18 have his own volume for ease and speed of reference.
19 Usher, that one can go straight to the -- one can go straight to
20 the witness and -- thank you very much.
21 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
22 MR. NICE: Your Honour will have a summary of this witness's
23 potential evidence in 27 pages. You'll see a number of passages are in
24 italics, and I'm not intending to lead those and I may indeed delete other
25 passages as well in the interest of saving time.
1 Examined by Mr. Nice:
2 Q. Your full name, please, sir.
3 A. David John Harland.
4 Excuse me, could I say my -- the headset is very squeaky. That's
6 Q. I hope not.
7 A. No, when you're listening. Put it on. That's electronic
9 JUDGE MAY: Can we get this dealt with. Yes, we'll get a
11 Well, let's try, first of all, with another pair.
12 MR. NICE:
13 Q. Does this sound any better?
14 A. Not much, no. No, it's quite interfered.
15 MR. NICE: Could we perhaps try the other microphone, in case
16 that makes a difference. Usher, the other microphone?
17 [Prosecution counsel confer]
18 MR. NICE: Mr. Groome makes the obvious point: He doesn't need
19 them with me and we can sort it out over the break. I think you'll find
20 I'll be speaking to you in English, Mr. Harland.
21 JUDGE MAY: We don't need the technology after all. We'll go
22 back and do it the old-fashioned way.
23 MR. NICE:
24 Q. Mr. Harland, your full name, please.
25 A. David John Harland.
1 Q. And as United Nations civil affairs and political affairs officer
2 in Sarajevo - we needn't trouble with all the detail of your movements -
3 did you serve in Sarajevo from 1993 and until 1999, being based for a time
4 in Kiseljak?
5 A. Yes, I did.
6 Q. That made you, I think, the longest serving UN -- senior UN
7 official in Sarajevo. And included in your tasks was a reporting duty.
8 The Chamber is pretty familiar with reporting duties. Yours was, what, to
9 prepare a weekly report?
10 A. Yes, there was a regular weekly report which described and
11 analysed the political situation and also there were reports written after
12 almost daily meetings, either with the Pale leadership or with the
13 Sarajevo leadership.
14 Q. And when you say "the leadership," as you say in your summary and
15 statement, this is the top-level of leadership, Karadzic, Krajisnik,
16 Koljevic, to name three?
17 A. Yes, also Babic, Gvero, Milovanovic and Karadzic's adviser,
19 Q. Your meetings at Pale or the Lukavica barracks in Sarajevo?
20 A. In Lukavica or in Pale, yes, with the Serbs.
21 Q. Yes.
22 MR. NICE: May the usher be good enough to help us getting the
23 Sarajevo map - I shan't take time - onto an easel so that we can refer to
24 it if necessary. We'll come to that later and move straight on to
25 paragraph -- page 6, ethnic cleansing.
1 And may we please go to your documents which are in an exhibit
2 which will be given a number?
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, Prosecution Exhibit 546.
4 JUDGE KWON: We have two binders?
5 MR. NICE: I'm suggesting that we just deal with first binder
6 now, reserving the position as to what we do with the second binder as we
7 see how time passes.
8 546, was that?
9 Q. The position, Mr. Harland, I think is this, that the documents in
10 Exhibit 546 are some of the various documents and reports that you
11 prepared which you have reviewed generally and which you are happy to
12 present an overall view of your position at the time.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. We are just using these reports to trigger by odd paragraphs
15 within them particular events and recollections; correct?
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. So if we go straight away to tab 2 in this, which we find is a
18 report of the 15th of July - and I'd simply ask the usher to be good
19 enough to try and follow the directions and to display the relevant part -
20 this is your report of the 15th of July. If we go to page 5 of it -- the
21 numbering may have been axed off. I hope it's there. Under the title
22 "Bosnian Serbs," we see this entry: "Meeting with the new Bosnian
23 commander Briquemont and with Andreev, Karadzic made it clear that his
24 first priority was to get the Bosnian-Herzegovinian government in Sarajevo
25 to come to the negotiating table and to start discussing the partition
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 map. Although Srpska has supported exchanges of population, Karadzic
2 emphasised that Serbs recognise right of people of different ethnic
3 background to remain or return to homes in territory allocated to a
4 different community should they so wish.
5 "Karadzic appeared confident that BH would soon be forced to
6 negotiate, Serb military efforts seem to be aimed at getting the BH to the
7 table and at securing as much as territory as possible for anticipated
9 Comment on that as a general tactic?
10 A. Yes. Dr. Karadzic and the other Bosnian Serb leaders emphasised
11 to us that their principal goal was to force the Bosnian government to --
12 to negotiate peace -- a peace agreement on terms that would be acceptable
13 to them and that the reason they were shelling Sarajevo, for example,
14 which I think was what we were protesting about that day, was to -- to
15 apply pressure on the Bosnian government.
16 Q. How, if at all, did this sort of response fit with any
17 justification that could be raised for ethnic cleansing?
18 A. Karadzic generally blamed ethnic cleansing on the international
19 community for not having established any legal mechanism to allow people
20 to exchange their homes and to move into the -- the cantons into which
21 their nationality would be dominant. He felt it would be an inevitable
22 outcome of the international community's failure to do that.
23 Q. Can we turn to tab 3, your report of the 5th of August of 1993,
24 the first page, and right at the bottom where we see this paragraph and
25 then over to the next page. "Karadzic appeared relaxed, confident, and
1 cooperative. He presented proposals on Serb withdrawal from Mount Igman
2 and on the establishment of safe routes in and out of Sarajevo" and is
3 that oil cooperation for the restoration or is that on "cooperation for
4 the restoration of utilities. He indicated that these Serb initiatives
5 would encourage Izetbegovic to join the talks and would remove any
6 suggestion of the use of airstrikes. He proposed that Serb forces
7 withdraw from Mount Bjelaznica and Mount Igman as demanded by Izetbegovic
8 as a precondition for joining the talks in Geneva. Indicated that the
9 Serb offensive in the area was not an attempt to annex those territories
10 to the Republika Srpska but simply part of a military operation intended
11 to deprive BH forces of artillery positions which endangered
12 Serb-controlled areas surrounding Sarajevo. He said that Serb forces
13 would be willing to withdraw so long as UNPROFOR would ensure that BH
14 forces did not re-occupy the area."
15 Your comments on this, please.
16 A. Well, most obviously, of course, it's another example of the --
17 the Serb modulating their military effort and modulating the amount of
18 terror, that is, the amount of humanitarian difficulty placed on the
19 population of Sarajevo, to -- in the context of a -- for political
20 objectives, that is, of getting the Muslims to negotiate, or in terms of
21 deterring any NATO military attack on them. Our sense was they -- there
22 was, as it were, a spigot of terror which they would open or close
23 according to how much pressure was on them from the international
24 community or what political concessions they hoped to get from the other
1 Q. Was there any question of testing NATO's probable reaction? Was
2 there any element of, as I think you called it, cat and mouse?
3 A. Yes, there was. NATO had made a number of declarations, and the
4 -- the one in the context of the Mount Igman one was the firmest so far,
5 an indication that they might use NATO air attacks to end the siege of --
6 of Sarajevo. And this was an example of the Serbs approaching us and
7 saying that they would be willing to make some concessions, such as
8 withdrawing from one Igman-Bijelasnica, it's an area around Sarajevo, and
9 they would be willing to improve the humanitarian situation in Sarajevo if
10 the threat of airstrikes were taken away and if the Bosnian Muslim party
11 would join them in -- in peace talks for a final settlement to the
13 Q. The comparative military activity in the years 1993, 1994, and
14 1995, please.
15 A. 1993 was the most militarily active of those years. There was a
16 conflict both between the Bosnian government, that is, the Muslims and the
17 Serbs, and between the Bosnian government and the Croats.
18 1994 was relatively quiet throughout most of the year.
19 And then 1995 saw a sharp deterioration again right up till the
20 end of the war in October.
21 Q. Roughly how many shells a day were landing in Sarajevo over that
23 A. Approximately 1.000, though there were significant lulls during
24 the -- the period of the 1994 cease-fire.
25 Q. Paragraph 17, tab 4 of Exhibit 2 -- 546. Rather than return to
1 an exhibit, and to save time, just look first, please, at the very first
2 page of this, the second starred entry, where in your report of the 31st
3 of November -- I beg your pardon, the 3rd of November, is it? The 3rd of
4 November of 1993, you note that unlike the BH side, the Serbs seem to be
5 directionless. Political leader Karadzic is blocked by Serbia and by the
6 international community at large. Mladic is frustrated and becoming
7 increasingly bellicose. The Serb army has been pounding Sarajevo and
8 Gorazde. Any comments on that before I turn to page 6?
9 A. I would just say that our -- this is an assessment drawn from the
10 Bosnian Serbs themselves. They felt, and our military experts tended to
11 agree, that they could have prosecuted the war more vigorously. They
12 could probably even have forced the surrender of Sarajevo, we felt, but
13 they had political reasons not to do that and they often referred to
14 pressure from Milosevic in that respect.
15 Q. Shall we go, then, to page 6 of this same report. One of five
16 paragraphs to read here. Infrequently will I read so much from one of
17 these documents. It's usually much smaller entries.
18 So under Bosnian Serbs -- and the interpreters will tell me if
19 I'm going too fast; I have the headsets on. "The Bosnian Serbs are
20 politically frustrated and increasingly volatile. The pressure on them --
21 especially from Milosevic -- is intense and a major eruption is possible
22 in the near future.
23 "The Serbs invested heavily in the Owen-Stoltenberg peace package
24 brokered in Geneva. Since the collapse of that package, the Serbs have
25 been less certain and less unified in their political strategy.
1 "Karadzic, acknowledging pressure from Serbia and from the
2 international community at large, appears reluctant to use the Serb war
3 machine to force a settlement."
4 Missing the next paragraph. "Perhaps in an effort to regain
5 centre stage, Mladic has been very vocal recently. One issue which he is
6 following and on which he is striking a strong posture is that of the 22
7 Serb POWs held in the Gorazde pocket. In a meeting with the UNPROFOR
8 Chief of Staff recently he threatened, among other things, to kill
9 everyone in the Eastern enclaves (except for the children) unless the POWs
10 were not returned by the 10th of November.
11 "Mladic's insistence about the Gorazde POWs (one of whom is the
12 son of one of his senior colleagues) is causing a number of problems for
13 UNPROFOR. UNPROFOR, Mladic feels, could be doing more to secure the POWs'
14 release. Perhaps as a result, Mladic personally held up a French
15 re-supply convoy in Sokolac recently. He also ordered the impounding of
16 two UNPROFOR helicopters returning from Srebrenica. These were released
17 only after intervention from Owen, Stoltenberg, Milosevic, and Karadzic."
18 And then finally, over on page 7, the top paragraph: "The Serbs
19 have been militarily more active than usual recently. They've not been
20 trying to take territory, but their artillery has been busy. Sarajevo and
21 Gorazde have both been under heavy bombardment in the past week. In
22 response to BH mortar fire, the Old Town of Sarajevo received almost 500
23 shells in a one-hour period on the 27th of October. The Old Town, which
24 has the highest percentage of Muslims of any Sarajevo area, is densely
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Any further comment beyond the entries themselves, and how the
2 accused Milosevic features in this, in your judgement?
3 A. At this period we were -- we were aware, of course, that the
4 Bosnian Serb establishment spoke with several voices and the voices didn't
5 always agree. Over time, the differences between the civilian leadership
6 with Karadzic at the centre and the military leadership with Mladic at the
7 centre appeared to grow. And here we can see already some intervention
8 from Milosevic with respect to activities by the -- by the Serb military.
9 As time passed, we felt more confident that there was a degree of -- of
10 influence, if not control, from Milosevic over that military element.
11 Q. And we may see more about that, specifically in relation to
12 Mladic later, I think.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And just as an -- not as an aside but as something of a
15 parenthetic observation, perhaps, you see a reference there to Mladic
16 being concerned about someone's son. As a matter of interest, did you
17 make an observation, a general observation, about the personal investment
18 of the leadership in this war, generally?
19 A. Yes. And in fact, it often struck us on all three sides how
20 amazingly little any of the leaders were willing to invest or sacrifice.
21 That unlike in, you know, other wars, such as our countries in World War
22 II or their countries, nobody's children - and they all had military-age
23 sons whom they had all squirreled out of the country or who were serving
24 in -- officially in uniform but just doing desk jobs. And in this case I
25 think it might have been General Talic's son - I can't remember now - was
1 a very strange one, when the son of a high leader had actually got
2 anywhere near a front line and had been captured; an extreme rarity which
3 enraged Mladic.
4 Q. Tab 5, please. And tab 5 is your report of the 9th of February
5 of 1994. We know that this was the year generally a little quieter of
6 military activity. Page 2 -- if we can go to page 2 of it. We come to a
7 well-known incident. And it's the mortar bomb landing in Sarajevo's old
8 town at lunchtime on the Friday, with 68 people being killed. And your
9 report on page 2 goes on to say how the ballistics expert confirmed that
10 all the casualties were caused by a single bomb, the round fired from the
11 north-east, from near the confrontation line, not possible to say for
12 certain that it came from Serb positions. The attack was, however,
13 similar to one the day before in which Serb gunners caused 28 casualties
14 when they mortared civilians waiting in line for humanitarian aid.
15 "The massacre was followed by renewed calls from the BH
16 Presidency to bomb Serb gunners surrounding the city." A sympathetic
17 response from the international community is summarised as to both UN
18 Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, foreign ministers of the EU, and
19 so on.
20 Now, what was the overall effect of this, the first Markale
21 shelling, please?
22 A. Well, the overall effect was a stabilisation of the situation
23 around Sarajevo. The Serbs told us that they wanted to make a number of
24 dramatic concessions on the humanitarian front and on the military front
25 so as to head off the possibility of any possible NATO air attacks. And
1 the cease-fire that resulted lasted through -- well, at least through the
2 summer of 1994 and into the autumn of 1994.
3 Q. We see a conclusion from what a ballistics expert said. Was
4 there only the one investigation at that stage, or was there a two-stage
5 or a double investigation?
6 A. Yes, there were at least two. And in fact, the -- the initial
7 report -- I was with Krajisnik and Silajdzic and General Rose, the
8 UNPROFOR commander, at the -- negotiating at the airport when the shell
9 landed. There was a very quick initial report which indicated that the
10 shell -- the mortar bomb had probably come from inside the confrontation
11 line, that is, it had come from Bosnian government positions firing
12 against themselves. There was then a -- a fuller investigation or -- in
13 which they determined that that was in error and that the shell had come
14 from an area just north-east of the old town area - about here where I'm
15 pointing to on the map - which could have been either side of the
16 confrontation line. In other words, no final determination could ever
17 definitively be made as to who fired it.
18 MR. NICE: Now, I'm not sure whether His Honour Judge Robinson has
19 sight of the map because of the angle. I don't know if there's an easel
20 upon which the map can be placed. If there is ... Have you got an easel,
22 THE WITNESS: The old town of Sarajevo is here in the valley of
23 Sarajevo. The mortar came from this high ground to the north-east of the
24 old town, and the -- the confrontation line runs roughly where I'm putting
25 the indicator now. And the -- the ballistics experts were aiming -- only
1 able to determine it came from somewhere within that -- that range. So it
2 was a rather unsatisfactory investigation in many ways.
3 MR. NICE:
4 Q. Thank you very much. I'll get an easel for the second session
5 and we'll deal with matters of map geography then.
6 Tab 6, please. Did you tell us, I think, a complete cease-fire
7 following Markale was agreed for the 10th of February?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Tab 6 is your report for the 17th of February. Page 3 of that,
10 just over halfway down, a record of the humanitarian situation being -- in
11 Sarajevo being relatively good. Water, electricity, and gas still
12 limited, food flowing in well, lack of adequate supplies of especially gas
13 is important because Sarajevo is in the grip of the coldest weather this
14 winter. Night-time temperatures falling to below minus 20 degrees
15 centigrade and the government claiming that the valves on the gas supply
16 lines turned off by the Serbs, who deny this and say the problem
17 originated in Serbia.
18 Can you give an observation about gas supplies generally and deal
19 with it perhaps comprehensively here?
20 A. All right. Well, as the Judges probably know, gas for
21 Bosnia-Herzegovina comes along a pipeline from Russia. It passes from
22 Russia to Hungary to Serbia, across the border into Bosnia, I think at
23 Zvornik, then down through Kladanj, then Olovo and into Sarajevo. Now, it
24 could be cut off or pressure could be reduced at several points, and this
25 would induce great suffering for particularly the old people of Sarajevo
1 because they had no heating. And often people died when there was no gas,
2 the vulnerable. So we made a large effort to try and keep it on.
3 The Serbs -- Bosnian Serbs in particular, I should say, often cut
4 off the gas or reduced its pressure in order to apply political pressure
5 to the Bosnian Muslims to -- to negotiate.
6 Q. Thank you very much. The same report, now can we go to page 6,
7 please, top paragraph. "The threat of NATO airstrikes has made the Serbs
8 more cooperative than usual. The Serb policy was summed up by the
9 Assembly president Krajisnik, who stated, 'We will do everything to avoid
10 airstrikes except capitulate." A word or two about that, relating it to
11 the Markale incident if appropriate.
12 A. Well, Krajisnik was just one of many who very directly stated the
13 dilemma as they saw it. They wanted to put as much pressure on the
14 Bosnian Muslims as possible by making life as difficult for them as
15 possible, by taking as much territory as possible, but not pushing the
16 situation so far that it would bring about a NATO military intervention of
17 any sort. So they sought to modulate their military and humanitarian
18 pressure according to the -- the likelihood as they perceived it of a --
19 of a NATO intervention.
20 Q. Tab 7, please, your report of the 1st of March of 1994, page --
21 the first page, which is actually page 2 at the bottom. And under
22 "Sarajevo," the third paragraph reads: "The Serbs have been caught
23 moving heavy weapons inside the 20-kilometre exclusion zone. In the most
24 serious incident, seven T-55 tanks are seen in the Sarajevo suburb of
1 And then if we turn over to page 5, please, under "Bosnian
2 Serbs," the fourth paragraph and fifth paragraph: "Serb leader Karadzic
3 has approved an extension of freedom of movement: bus routes,
4 Zenica-Sarajevo and Pale-Sarajevo are to be opened; some pedestrian
5 traffic is to be allowed between downtown Sarajevo and neighbouring
6 Grabovica. BSA Chief of Staff Milovanovic stated on the 27th of February,
7 however, that the Serb military would knot not allow the United Nations
8 unrestricted freedom of movement over Serb territory.
9 "Milovanovic stated that his forces would block UN convoys,
10 regardless of the joint declaration signed by Srpska President Karadzic on
11 the 18th of November, 1993 and even at the risk of NATO airstrikes. He
12 added that Serbs would not allow the UN or anyone else to use the
13 Bratsvo-Jedinstvo bridge linking Serb-held districts of Sarajevo to the
14 main downtown area."
15 Now, your comment about this. We've heard a little bit about the
16 exclusion zone already. And what about the tanks? Where were they going?
17 A. Your Honours, I believe those tank -- I believe those tanks were
18 on their way to participate in the attack on armed guards that was about
19 to happen. I must say it was a relatively small incident.
20 As I hear you read it, the thing that strikes me here is that it
21 was one of an increasing number of statements by the Bosnian Serb military
22 that they didn't care what the Bosnian Serb civilian leadership said.
23 Here we have General Milovanovic stating that whatever Karadzic has done,
24 he is going to take certain actions, and that grew over time.
25 Q. Well, me may be asking you later to give some more overview
1 answers about the influence and power of one over the other. But let's
2 move on in the developing picture of which you're giving an overview to
3 tab 7, please, your -- I beg your pardon, tab 8, your report of the 9th of
4 March. We can see on the first page, the first line under "Highlight,"
5 says "Peace appears to be breaking out in much of Bosnia."
6 And then on the second page, under "Sarajevo," "Most days there
7 are fewer than 5 heavy weapons violations in the exclusion zone. Civilian
8 casualties mainly from sniping average fewer than one per day. Some
9 small-arms fire is still heard, however, particularly where the
10 confrontation line runs through the downtown area, Grbavica-Jewish
11 cemetery." We'll perhaps pick that detail up for the judges later.
12 Anything else you want to say about the tone of optimism that now
13 is to be found in your report?
14 A. Well, nothing, except to say that this was a very encouraging
15 time for us all. The Muslim-Croat war had come to an end under American
16 pressure, and the Serb -- the Serb concessions after the NATO threats,
17 after the Markale attack, had also stabilised the Muslim-Serb
18 confrontation line. So there was a -- a substantial relief of the
19 humanitarian situation during -- during this period.
20 Q. Now, then, let's go to tab 9, the 16th of April. We can see on
21 the second page, page 2, headed "Gorazde crisis," a summary of events
22 there. And if we go down to -- towards the bottom of the page, this:
23 "Gorazde had been reasonably quiet for several days following a second
24 use of NATO air power.
25 "Late Monday morning, artillery rounds began landing in the
1 centre of Gorazde town. At 11.45 a demonstration of close air support was
2 made, and at 12.25 General Mladic was verbally warned that air power would
3 be used if the shelling did not stop immediately. NATO jets made further
4 low passes over the area, but shelling continued. Russian envoy Churkin
5 then spoke to Serbian President Milosevic who, in his presence, called
6 Dr. Karadzic and told him that the firing must stop. At 14.19, following
7 further low passes by NATO aircraft, two US F-18 jets struck at a tank and
8 two armoured personnel carriers. All three vehicles are believed to have
9 been destroyed."
10 If we can turn over to page 4, halfway down the page: "On
11 Thursday, the 14th of April, 1994 Serbian President Milosevic was quoted
12 in the Belgrade daily Politika as `expressing his conviction that the Serb
13 side would accept new negotiations without prejudice to the conditions of
14 a general cessation of hostilities.'"
15 And two paragraphs on, under "Comment," "It appears that Serbian
16 President Milosevic is attempting to appeal to the best interests of
17 Bosnian Serbs, pointing out that a major conflict with NATO is in nobody's
18 interests except Sarajevo's. Pale, however, appears defiant and ready to
19 take the risk that NATO will not intervene to defend the designated area."
20 I hope we've extracted enough from this substantial report to
21 enable you to give some comments and in particular your comments on where
22 you think the accused Milosevic fits into this part of the narrative.
23 A. Yes. In April of 1994, the Serbs decided to attack Gorazde. The
24 UNPROFOR attempted to stabilise the situation, as did other members of the
25 international community, including Russian envoy Churkin. We had meetings
1 -- constant meetings, both in Pale and in Belgrade. Our strong
2 impression, as stated to us by the Pale leadership, was that they wanted
3 to continue their -- their attack on -- on Gorazde as vigorously as
4 possible. They also relayed to us their concern that Milosevic was trying
5 to persuade them to call it off, because he was -- he was worried about
6 possible NATO intervention in the war, which they seemed less concerned
7 about at that point.
8 Q. And what was Karadzic's response, I think when General Rose
9 asserted that guns were still firing despite Karadzic saying they weren't?
10 If you can remember.
11 A. There was a -- there was a very high level of frustration, most
12 pointedly when Mr. Churkin walked out of the talks altogether and, in
13 fact, never returned, after he said he had never heard so many lies. But
14 despite those difficulties, in fact, Mr. Milosevic, as they told us, the
15 Bosnian Serbs told us, had prevailed on the Serb military to pull back,
16 and an agreement was made and stabilised the situation in -- around
17 Gorazde, and it was stabilised without significant loss of life. So
18 despite the frustrations of Mr. Churkin and others, the international
19 interventions and the work with Milosevic had -- had helped.
20 Q. Do you remember one meeting where Krajisnik was present and where
21 he left the room from time to time to speak to others? And if so, to
22 which others did he speak, as you understood it?
23 A. Yes. Yes, there is -- at the Hotel Panorama, where these
24 meetings took place, there is a small meeting room -- sorry, a small
25 telephone booth room off the main conference room, and Krajisnik would go
1 into that room. He went in several times and said, "I've spoken to
2 Milosevic," or, "I've spoken to Mladic." Mladic was not very far away,
3 but he was directing Serb forces around Gorazde, so he wasn't at the
4 meeting. So Krajisnik was clearly in a -- a state of some -- some
6 Q. Move on now then, please, to tab 10, 15th of October of 1993. So
7 -- is that correct? We've changed a year back and we're on a different
8 topic; sniping and shelling and the campaign generally. You've said
9 something already about whether this was a focussed campaign or whether it
10 had a different objective. But let's look at this report, first page,
11 paragraph 3: "General Briquemont stated that he had seen no evidence of
12 it, but that he noticed that Serb shelling of civilian areas in Sarajevo
13 was increasing. He insisted that this has no military value and causes
14 political damage to the Serbs. Dr. Karadzic stated that he had given
15 orders for shelling and sniping to stop. He said Muslim shelling and
16 sniping was a major problem and that he might 'be forced to take the
17 Muslim part of Sarajevo if the sniping does not stop.'"
18 Can we then look immediately to tab 11, which is the, I think,
19 16th of October. There may be an error in the initial dating of this
20 document. And if we go to the last page of it, unnumbered pages, but the
21 first asterisked paragraph. We can see here Karadzic claiming to have
22 given written orders halting sniping and shelling in Sarajevo. Briquemont
23 pointing out that sniping and shelling are continuing. Karadzic stating
24 this was the action of rogue individuals, that he would take further
25 action to curb it if the Muslim side would do the same.
1 Your general comment, please, about complaints and protests being
2 made about shelling and sniping and the general response to the Bosnian
3 Serbs and whether you accepted their response.
4 A. I should say this is a fairly typical week. This doesn't -- in
5 fact, I have no particular memory of this week as opposed to others, but
6 it was certainly a normal pattern. And the first thing to note is that
7 the pattern of shelling was very distressing to the military commanders in
8 UNPROFOR who were generally NATO military officers. One of the normal
9 tactical principles of artillery bombardment, of course, is concentration
10 of fire. You concentrate fire in order to clear ground or suppress enemy
11 fire in order to take it or something. Whereas, the pattern of artillery
12 fire around Sarajevo was precisely the opposite; it was a dispersion of
13 fire. Shells would be dropped apparently randomly across the densely
14 populated civilian areas of the city in a way that would cause a small
15 number of casualties in a large number of places. We assumed that this
16 was to keep the general level of terror high and to forestall any dramatic
17 events around which an international response would coalesce.
18 With respect to your second question about the chain of command,
19 yes. Whenever we would prevail upon the Bosnian Serbs to -- to restrain
20 themselves or to issue orders, they would complain that they had only
21 limited control over the snipers and the artillerymen involved. However,
22 we noted that when they passed orders which they wanted implemented, as
23 opposed to ones which they were doing -- they were issuing at our behest,
24 they found them quite -- quite easy to implement. So we felt that the
25 Serbs were -- were dissembling. They were exaggerating their problems of
1 command and control.
2 Q. If we look now at tab 12, which is an agreement of the 14th of
3 August of 1994, signed by General Karavelic for the BiH army and by
4 General Dragomir Milosevic for the VRS, we find an agreement which
5 includes, under the undertakings, that they shall within 24 hours issue
6 publicly orders which explicitly forbid sniping activities against
7 military personnel, civilians, and UN personnel. What does their signing
8 up to that show to you?
9 A. Well, yes. The most significant thing about this agreement from
10 our point of view was that sniping did stop almost entirely for the at
11 least six-week period after it. And what it seemed to show to us was that
12 both sides, which always claimed that they had no control over snipers,
13 when they wanted to, could in fact stop sniping almost completely
14 relatively easily.
15 MR. NICE: Your Honours, we're on page 12, in paragraphs 30 and
16 following of the summary.
17 Q. Paragraph 31. Any references to uncontrolled paramilitaries?
18 You may have told us about this expressly, but if not, just fill it in.
19 Was the phrase "uncontrolled paramilitaries" ever referred to, and what
20 view did you take of that?
21 A. I'm sorry, what document are you referring to?
22 Q. I'm not at the moment. Just generally.
23 A. Oh, yes. The Serbs in particular often said that they were
24 unable to restrain or limit restrictions on humanitarian aid or limit
25 shelling or sniping because those actions might be taken by some
1 paramilitary groups, often from Serbia, over which they said they had no
2 command and control. And, for example, there is a -- a little dent in the
3 confrontation line at a place called Nedzarici, where I'm pointing to on
4 the map, where there was said to be a -- a unit of Chetnik irregulars
5 under the command of a certain Aleksic. And they -- it was right near the
6 main road and they would often shoot at people on the main road. And when
7 we protested it, they would say, "Unfortunately, these are people who are
8 not part of our chain of command."
9 Q. But your view about that, in due course, was?
10 A. Our view was that when they had a positive will to pass an order,
11 they were able to implement that order.
12 Q. Your description of the campaign -- terrorising campaign, or
13 however you would summarise it, and its objectives in relation to signing
14 peace agreements, was that ever expressly acknowledged by any of the Pale
16 A. Oh, yes. And in these documents and in many others, we would
17 come back with quotes from Karadzic and Krajisnik and Koljevic and Mladic
18 and others, saying, "We will continue to do these things until Izetbegovic
19 accepts the Owen-Stoltenberg peace plan," for example. I remember them
20 being very vigorous about we will only turn on the -- the electricity or
21 give them gas or allow food in if they will make further concessions on
22 one of the later peace plans. No, it was a common theme, and they didn't
23 even try to hide it from us, I should say.
24 Q. Now, if your interpretation is correct and if the things that
25 were said to you were correct, then what connection, in your judgement,
1 was there between what was happening in Sarajevo and population movements
2 being enforced elsewhere?
3 A. Certainly Dr. Karadzic openly said - and so did Dr. Plavsic, in
4 particular - that the basic goal of the basic Serb war aim was to
5 redistribute the population of Bosnia and Herzegovina so that the Serbs
6 would be left in control of a -- a single continuous block of territory
7 embracing the whole of the border with Montenegro and Serbia and also
8 including all of the traditionally Serb-inhabited areas. And due to an
9 historical accident, this required the removal of very large numbers of
10 Bosnian Muslims because Bosnian Muslims were the majority population along
11 the Drina River Valley in North-Eastern Bosnia, adjacent to Serbia. So
12 they were quite open that the purpose of these -- of the war and the
13 purpose of the pressure they were applying was to extract from the Bosnian
14 government an acceptance of this redistribution of the populations, this
15 ethnic cleansing.
16 Q. And in your judgement, did that pressure include what was being
17 done at Sarajevo?
18 A. Yes. Not only in my judgement, but as they directly stated.
19 Q. Thank you. I think paragraph 36: UNPROFOR reached a conclusion
20 by a sampling of Bosnian households and other things that defence of the
21 city was untenable without a flow of water and gas, and things like that.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. It -- the supply of that was in fact dependent on cooperation of
24 the Serbs.
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. This is back to your spigot point?
2 A. Yes. Sarajevo was completely sounded. By agreement with the
3 Serbs, in 1992 UNPROFOR had taken control of Sarajevo airport, which had
4 been Serb controlled, and the Bosnian Muslims later dug a tunnel under
5 that, giving them access to the main block of their territory. So there
6 was a tiny supply line of their own, more or less tolerated by the -- the
7 Serbs. Karadzic even said he tolerated it. But in general, the city
8 relied for water, food, electricity, gas, and almost everything else on
9 the -- the -- on the Serbs to let those things through.
10 Q. Tab 13, page 2 in your report of the 10th of December of 1994.
11 Coming to the end of that year. "This office spoke with the Chief of
12 Staff, General Brinkman, this morning, and he made the obvious point that
13 it is no longer particularly useful to protest individual incidents of
14 this nature, as we are not dealing with random incidents, we are dealing
15 with an organised campaign. The incidents will stop when the campaign of
16 obstruction and harassment stops."
17 A small point. How does that fit in with the account you've just
18 given us or is it reflective of it?
19 A. Very much. Because the -- the Serbs knew or felt - and they told
20 us that they felt - that the Bosnian Muslims would not sign a peace
21 agreement unless there was substantial pressure on them. The Serbs
22 rightly understood that we were facilitating the entry of humanitarian
23 goods into Sarajevo and so we were in some sense acting contrary to their
24 war aims. And when they grew particularly frustrated at the lack of
25 political progress, as well as directing their fire at the Bosnian
1 Muslims, they would very strongly obstruct our own efforts to bring
2 humanitarian relief to Sarajevo.
3 Q. Page 14 of the summary, the reference to Exhibit number 16 I'll
4 tidy up by the second session. I'll move straight to tab 14, please, page
5 3, and paragraph 2, of this report of the 24th of June of 1995. We can
6 see on page 3, just a third of the way down, that "On Sunday, the 18th of
7 June, UNPROFOR withdrew from all of the weapons collections points around
8 Sarajevo, maintaining that the heavy weapons total exclusion zone,
9 established in February 1994, is in existence but that it was not -- no
10 longer possible to support it with troops on the ground. The Serbs are
11 believed to have about 500 heavy weapons within 20 kilometres of Sarajevo.
12 The Bosnians are believed to have about 100 to 150, and it seem that is
13 most of these weapons are now being deployed for action."
14 And then at the foot of that page: Shelling. Serb gunners have
15 killed a large number of Bosnian civilians this week, shelling water lines
16 and marketplaces.
17 Seven people were killed and 12 injured when queuing for water in
18 Dobrinja on Sunday, the 18th of June. On Wednesday, the 21st, six people
19 were killed and 15 injured in another attack on a Dobrinja water line.
20 The same day, five people were injured when a shell hit the Ciglane
21 outdoor market. The next day, 22nd of June, one more person killed and
22 five injured, improvised rocket at the TV building.
23 This is a reflection of what?
24 A. Several things. First, the -- the weapons collection points,
25 which were established under the threat of NATO air attacks under the
1 first Markale attack, were areas in Serb territory where the Serbs had
2 agreed to concentrate their weapons so that we could send some monitors
3 there. As the situation degenerated, we wanted to withdraw our monitors
4 so there would be no hostages available to be taken if we had to call on
5 NATO air attacks. And they also wanted to take weapons out of those areas
6 so they could resume the -- their campaign against the -- basically the
7 civilian population of Sarajevo in order to force the government to make a
8 political accommodation with them.
9 Q. Thank you very much. And this was all part of the deteriorating
11 [Prosecution counsel confer]
12 MR. NICE: If the Chamber would be good enough to go to tab --
13 well, tab 24.
14 Q. This is your report for the 3rd of June. If we could go and look
15 at page 2, paragraph 5. And it's paragraphs 40 and 41 of the -- of the
16 summary. On paragraph -- on page 2, paragraph 5 we see this: "On Friday,
17 the International Committee of the Red Cross had a meeting with Koljevic
18 in Pale pledging that UN personnel held in detention --"
19 THE INTERPRETER: Mr. Nice, please read slower, thank you.
20 MR. NICE: Sorry.
21 Q. "Held in detention by the Bosnian Serb army would be released
22 unconditionally as a gesture of goodwill. 120 hostages were indeed
23 released and transported to Serbia, but the Bosnian Serbs still kept about
24 200 of them. Apparently the release was effected due to pressure by
25 Milosevic on Karadzic and was fairly well coordinated by the military and
1 the security services."
2 Can you -- thank you very much. Can you summarise that for us,
3 focussing on the accused Milosevic's role in it.
4 JUDGE MAY: And then we must break after that answer.
5 THE WITNESS: Sure. Well, some hostages had been taken by the
6 Bosnian Serbs after we had authorised some air attacks by NATO on them.
7 The Bosnian Serbs had been inclined to escalate this confrontation. They
8 told us rather directly that they were under pressure from Mr. Milosevic
9 to -- to be cooperative, to release the hostages or at least to hand them
10 over to the authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, who would
11 then release them. And this was done, and our released hostages reported
12 that the -- the operation had gone very smoothly, as between the Bosnian
13 Serb hostage-takers and the Serbian security personnel who had taken some
14 of the hostages back to safety.
15 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll adjourn now for 20 minutes.
16 Mr. Harland, could you please remember in this and any other
17 adjournments not to speak to anybody about your evidence until it's over.
18 THE WITNESS: Sure.
19 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.
20 We'll adjourn.
21 --- Recess taken at 10.36 a.m.
22 --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.
23 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.
24 MR. NICE:
25 Q. Mr. Harland, I've been asked to leave -- by the interpreters to
1 leave a pause between question and answer, my fault, not yours. But if
2 you can help with that, I'd be very grateful.
3 Page 14 of the summary, paragraph 43. In the summer of 1995,
4 Mr. Harland, did you see a new type of bomb? Tell us about it briefly.
5 A. Yes. There were a small -- there were a small number of bombs.
6 I saw one from my window in the PTT building in June. It was a -- they
7 were large relatively slow-moving -- slower moving than mortar shells,
8 because you could see them as they were airborne -- coming from a
9 northerly direction. And the one I -- the one I saw hit the television
10 building, the RTV building, which was close to my PTT engineering
11 location. It made a very loud detonation and sent up a plume of white --
12 of white smoke.
13 Q. Did they appear to have any ability to be aimed or focussed on
14 where they were landing?
15 A. Judging from their trajectory, it was a parabolic trajectory, so
16 it was not particularly -- it was an area weapon.
17 Q. This incident was, I think, covered in the last exhibit we may
18 have looked at but is more particularly covered at tab 15, your report of
19 the 2nd of July of 1995. I think we'll find that on page 2, but I'll look
20 at a few entries there for your comment. On the top of page 2: "Early in
21 the week, Serb forces counter-attacked in Cemerska heights to the north of
22 the city and on the eastern slopes of Igman. In both areas they seem to
23 have pushed the Bosnians back. On Wednesday, the Bosnians attempted
24 another attack out of the city. The main attack came from the western
25 part of the town, focussed on Serb-held Nedzarici."
1 The next paragraph but one: "Both sides seem to see the
2 unfolding battle as a critical moment in the war. Serb officials told the
3 civil affairs during the week that they believe the outcome of this battle
4 will decide the outcome of the war. They seem reasonably confident they
5 will contain the Bosnian offensive, and have even said they will launch
6 punitive counter-attacks against the urban area."
7 The bottom of the page, the reference to this type of weapon that
8 we've just touched on: "Improvised rockets fired at the Alipasno area.
9 One struck the RTV building, home to much of the international press
10 corps, killing one person, injuring more than 30 others, including several
11 foreign correspondents. The same day, four people killed when a similar
12 weapon hit a nearby apartment building, destroying apartments on three
13 floors. UNPROFOR condemned the use of what it called `highly inaccurate
14 indiscriminate, highly destructive weapons of terror.'"
15 And finally -- or nearly finally, over the page, the top of the
16 page: "Sniper activity has spread to a number of areas usually considered
17 safe. On Sunday, a 16-year-old boy killed while riding his bicycle near
18 UNPROFOR headquarters. Sniping spread to the old town."
19 Then going on two pages to page 5, three-quarters of the way down
20 under the heading: "UNHCR brings convoy over Igman for the first time
21 without informing the Serbs".
22 Second paragraph, "It was the first time since the war began that
23 a convoy had been brought into Sarajevo area without the express consent
24 of the Serbs. Seven trucks," and so on.
25 Your comment generally on what was happening at this time. We've
1 already dealt with the new type of weapon.
2 A. There was a sense in UNPROFOR that the Serbs had changed tactics,
3 that is, since 19 -- since the autumn of 1992, with the fall of Jajce, the
4 Serbs had basically been during our period in a -- in a defensive posture.
5 They held most of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 70 per cent of
6 it, and they -- they used their military capacity not to take more
7 territory in general, but just to inflict a certain level of terror and
8 hardship on their enemies in order to induce their enemies to -- to accept
9 the terms of a peace agreement that would be generous to the -- to the
11 Now, the assumption of this defensive posture they -- they
12 adopted was that time was on their side. By 1995, however, enough weapons
13 were getting to the Bosnian government and the relations between the
14 Bosnian government and the Bosnian Croats had improved to such a degree
15 that there was a real military threat from the Bosnian government for the
16 first time, and of course the Bosnian government actually had a numerical
17 advantage in -- in troop strength over the Serbs, and the Serbs became
18 anxious of that.
19 The Serbs were also aware that the government of Croatia was
20 vastly more powerful than the Croatian Serb party and that the government
21 of Croatia was preparing to destroy the Croatian Serb party. Now, the
22 Serbs therefore decided, as they told us, that they had to quickly resolve
23 the situation in Bosnia, and one of the ways in which they sought to do
24 that was to reduce the eastern enclaves and the threat from Sarajevo in
25 order to be able to move troops west to the -- to the main front, where
1 the -- where the Croats were -- were gathering. And these events which
2 are being described in this report are all part of that and part of a
3 fairly successful reaction by them to a Bosnian attempt to break out of
5 Q. Thank you. We'll pass over tab 17 directly to tab 18. Sorry, I
6 didn't leave a gap. I should have done.
7 Your report of the 8th of July, page 2 of it, under "Attacks on
8 civilians." "Sniping and mortaring are still at a reasonably high level.
9 This seems to have no particular military value but contributes to a
10 general atmosphere of terror in the city. Almost no civilians now use the
11 city's main east-west thoroughfare ('Sniper Alley') -- so much so that
12 snipers who used to work that area now seem to have relocated. Sporadic,
13 almost random, bombardment of the city continues, and the Ministry of
14 Health reported 39 civilian deaths and 190 wounded this week, most of them
15 from mortars."
16 The Chamber is already acquainted with the road that amounts to
17 Sniper Alley, but perhaps you'd just point it out very rapidly now that
18 the map is on an easel.
19 A. Yes. Sarajevo, of course, is in the floor of a valley. The
20 Serbs were on the hills on either side, the Muslims were at the bottom.
21 The Serbs controlled a part of the downtown area, Grbavica, here, which
22 fronts onto this main road which we called Sniper Alley.
23 Q. You say the Muslims were at the bottom. You mean they were at
24 the bottom of the valley or --
25 A. They were at the bottom of the valley. That is, the whole valley
1 of Sarajevo, as in other Bosnian cities, was predominantly Muslim, and as
2 in other Bosnian areas, the hills surrounding were predominantly Serb.
3 Q. I think there was a historical reason for that that you could
4 give if we ever find the time in this trial.
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. I think you actually visited a sniper's position yourself, didn't
7 you, sometime in 1995? Give us an indication of what it was like.
8 A. Yes. I think that was just before this time, I did, with the
9 help of the Russian Battalion, which was stationed in the Serb area of the
10 downtown part of the city. I visited a sniper nest which they had
11 identified which was overlooking Sniper Alley and -- and Marin Dvor. And
12 it was a standard sniper position. It was in an apartment building, a
13 small aperture had been made in the outer wall and then sandbagged around
14 it to resist counter-fire. A second aperture had been made in the next
15 wall internal in the house. The sniper had put an armchair and a
16 cigarette stand and a television, in fact, in back, along with a mount for
17 his gun, along which he could line up the two holes and shoot at
18 civilians, yes.
19 Q. Without being at risk of being -- sorry, I didn't leave a gap.
20 Without being at risk of being fired back on because he was firing through
21 two apertures?
22 A. Without significant risk. Though there was a lot of
23 sniper-on-sniper activity and they got very good. In fact, snipers, we
24 observed, would move between three or five of these nests in a morning, in
25 a shift, in order to resist -- to avoid counter-fire.
1 Q. Tab 19, please. The 15th of July, page 4, as it is numbered on
2 the bottom, under the heading "Military situation around Sarajevo..."
3 Second paragraph from the top: "Despite the relative lull, the Serbs
4 continue a sporadic bombardment of the downtown area -- apparently in an
5 effort to terrorise the population, rather than to attain any particular
6 military objective." Yes?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Paragraph 50 of the summary, on page 17. You've told us in
9 general about the -- the meetings that you had, and in addition to the
10 names you've given, I think Zametica and Buha were others you spoke to?
11 A. Correct.
12 Q. When you were dealing with the Bosnian Serb side, did you get any
13 evidence or indication from them whether they'd been to Serbia or
15 A. Yes. They -- they would often -- Mr. Buha, I think, lived there,
16 Dr. Buha, for quite a long time. And they -- they were often late for
17 meetings in Pale, saying they had just got back from meetings in -- in
19 Q. Which ones of them said that, to your recollection?
20 A. The ones that seemed to spend the most time there, I would say,
21 would be Koljevic, Krajisnik, Zametica. Koljevic -- I think Plavsic spent
22 a lot of time in Novi Sad, I think she said, and then of course she had a
23 problem entering Serbia sometimes. But yes, certain -- I would say
24 Koljevic was the one who spent the most time. General Mladic too would
25 often come back saying he had -- sorry he was late, he had just been
1 coming back from meetings in Belgrade.
2 Q. Your view, paragraph 51, of the Bosnian Serb command and control
3 structure. You've touched on this a bit already in reflecting how they
4 were able to effect decisions when they wanted to. Any particular
5 examples beyond those you've given? Have you touched on the evacuation of
6 Serbs from Gorazde in October 1994?
7 A. Yes. There was a very complex operation. You mentioned this
8 morning the concern General Mladic had about the son of his colleague who
9 was one of 22 prisoners of war held by the Muslims in -- in Gorazde. An
10 arrangement for their release was finally made, and it was a very
11 complicated operation, involving humanitarian assistance coming in, people
12 going out, people going to third places, other people independent of the
13 process having to enter. This was all choreographed very effectively by
14 the Serbs; mines were removed, checkpoints were informed. We were
15 actually very favourably impressed by the efficient command and control
16 arrangements of the Bosnian Serb side during this episode in which they
17 clearly wanted to secure the -- the release of this one young man.
18 Q. Page 18 of the summary, paragraph 52. We've already seen the
19 threat by Mladic in tab 4 to everybody being killed in the Eastern
20 enclaves except the children. Was there any occasion where Karadzic said
21 something that you can recollect about the consequences for Muslims on a
22 numeric basis if there was no cooperation with the Serbs? Or what would
23 happen to Muslim towns?
24 A. Well, yes. I mean, he frequently said, "If they don't cooperate
25 we will take more of their towns." And in fact, I remember this one
1 meeting, I remember it most because General Mladic then contradicted him.
2 Karadzic said, "If the Muslims don't do what we want --" and I forget what
3 it was at that meeting -- "we will take up to five of their
4 municipalities. We might trade back two in a final peace settlement, but
5 they've got to know that we are -- we are going to keep making things
6 worse for them" until they agree to the peace settlement that he was
7 pursuing at the time.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Harland, what did you understand that to
9 mean? They would take the towns by removing the Muslims or by -- by
10 killing them or by whatever means?
11 THE WITNESS: Yes. He didn't -- he didn't specify. Our
12 experience, though, of the other towns they had taken showed a fairly
13 standard pattern, I mean, that would imply very -- very dire consequences
14 for the local population. So it was a -- a threat we were obliged to take
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: As to the method?
17 THE WITNESS: Well, they would militarily secure a place,
18 defeating the -- the Muslim defenders, and then they would disarm them and
19 they would -- there would normally be some killings, even of those who had
20 surrendered. Some of the women from other places had been subjected to
21 abuses, including rape, and there had been large-scale deportations,
22 sometimes from the whole -- the whole town. Like Jajce had been
23 surrounded and taken and the whole city had been deported.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: But what I'm trying to get at is whether you had
25 formed a view as to the policy.
1 THE WITNESS: Yes. Yes. We -- we felt that if they took the
2 five towns, their policy would be to ethnically cleanse them.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.
4 MR. NICE:
5 Q. Did you form a view as to any antagonism between the Pale
6 civilian leadership and Belgrade or between the Pale civilian leadership
7 and the Bosnian Serb military?
8 A. Yes, both. And the Pale leadership was -- was quite open about
9 that in -- in many ways. During the attack on Gorazde, for example, after
10 the formal meetings, I stayed behind at the Hotel Panorama. In fact, we
11 weren't allowed to go back, so officially, I suppose, we were hostages.
12 But we stayed behind and I talked with Zametica, Jovan Zametica, and he
13 said that Milosevic was being unhelpful; in other words, Karadzic wanted
14 to continue the offensive on Gorazde and Milosevic was inclined to
15 restrain the Bosnian Serbs, and as he put it to me then and later, he
16 successfully exercised influence over Mladic to -- to stop the attack
17 before they took any of the downtown area or eliminated the pocket
18 completely, which militarily they could probably have done relatively
20 Q. As between the Pale civilian and Bosnian Serb leaderships?
21 A. Yes. Well, I mean, that was a part of it. The Bosnian Serb
22 civilian leadership, they were mumbling to us their frustration in the
23 spring of 1994, though during this case which we are discussing now,
24 Gorazde. But as time went by, they became more and more open, and
25 Karadzic used the word "insubordinate" to describe -- publicly even -- to
1 describe Mladic's behaviour. Milovanovic and Mladic would say, "We aren't
2 taking orders from Karadzic." Sometimes Karadzic, at the beginning of
3 August 1995, even officially I believe, fired Mladic, but Mladic continued
4 in his post with the support of -- of Belgrade.
5 Q. Did you form a view - paragraph 55 - of Mladic's connections, if
6 any, to the VJ or to the accused?
7 A. Yes. I mean, there were several levels of it. I mean, first of
8 all, there was a basic level of support from Serbia to the Bosnian Serbs
9 and in particular to the Bosnian Serb military. They, you know, provided
10 them with everything from money to vehicle maintenance and, you know,
11 anti-aircraft systems, and so on. So there was a level of common cause,
12 and the military emphasised that they -- their chain of command really ran
13 to Belgrade. And when I personally had to write the signs for negotiation
14 meetings for General Mladic and the Bosnian Serb delegation, he would
15 cross out the word "Bosnian" and say, "No, no, we are a single Serb
16 delegation. You know, Belgrade is our capital," and so on. And in
17 general, when we had problems with getting the Bosnian Serb civilians to
18 take the appropriate decision, there would often be a delegation would go
19 to Belgrade, as in this Gorazde case we were discussing, and talk with
20 Milosevic, who would be able to bring about the desired outcome with the
21 -- with the Bosnian Serb military. So there was certainly a -- a level of
22 influence. How far it went, we were never completely sure.
23 Q. And before we part from this topic, you've already mentioned the
24 level of support that came from Serbia. And you may want to say something
25 about tanks as well in your reply, because I think you have a view about
1 that. But if there was support in logistics, materiel, equipment,
2 weaponry, or money, continuing after 1992, how does one reconcile that
3 with the tensions that you say there were between the decisions made by
4 the Pale leadership and the view of Milosevic?
5 A. Well, yes, I think that -- that is a good question. I think that
6 the -- there was certainly - and the Pale leadership never denied it - a
7 certain basic level of support that allowed them to prosecute the war and
8 the campaigns of ethnic cleansing. And they were proud of -- of the
9 support they got. However, they felt that Mr. Milosevic was an
10 opportunist, rather than a true Serb nationalist. In fact, Dr. Plavsic
11 used to rather loudly complain that she wished that Mr. Milosevic was more
12 like Dr. Tudjman, that is, willing to send in formed units of his own army
13 and willing to provide passports for the citizen -- for the co-nationals
14 in Bosnia and Herzegovina. And they were frustrated that having embarked
15 together on this joint enterprise, Mr. Milosevic seemed to hold their hand
16 at Sarajevo, at Gorazde, at Igman, and in other places, and that he did it
17 through -- through his control in -- or his influence on -- on the
18 military. That was a source of great frustration to the Bosnian Serb
19 civilian leaders I spoke to, and they regularly complained about it to me
20 and to others.
21 Q. Did you -- did you form a view at the time about the level of
22 support, including financial support, that was coming from Serbia?
23 A. At the time -- I'm much clearer in retrospect, but at the time, I
24 must say we were not a hundred per cent sure. There was a mutiny of a
25 part of the Serb army or at least a disturbance, of a part of the Serb
1 army around Banja Luka, in -- it was the time of the Owen Stoltenberg
2 plan, so it was September of 1993. And Mladic moved to Banja Luka to deal
3 with the problem. So when we needed to deal with Mladic, we used to
4 helicopter to Banja Luka, which had previously been off-limits to us. And
5 as we ran into soldiers and junior officers of the Serb army in Banja
6 Luka, it transpired that a lot of this dispute was about pay and their
7 expectation that they were going to be paid from the Yugoslav army or at
8 least from the same sources as the Yugoslav army.
9 Q. And finally before --
10 JUDGE MAY: Something for us, Mr. Harland. Dealing with the
11 relationship as expressed by the Bosnian Serb leadership with
12 Mr. Milosevic, you used this expression, "They were frustrated that having
13 embarked together on this joint enterprise, Mr. Milosevic seemed to have
14 held their hand at Sarajevo, Gorazde, and Igman, and he did it through his
15 control or his influence on the military." Could you clarify what you
16 mean by or what you were told about their having embarked together on a
17 joint enterprise. Can you clarify that, please.
18 THE WITNESS: Sure. They would say -- actually, they would call
19 it the "Serbian national project." Whenever we referred to ethnic
20 cleansing or the war or whatever, they would say - particularly
21 Professor Plavsic, Dr. Zametica, Professor Koljevic - that the Serbian
22 national project had been launched with the full understanding of -- of
23 Serbia and that they had got a lot of support and, in fact,
24 Professor Koljevic always said, "We always thought this war would only
25 last a few days and that the -- the JNA," as the army was then called, not
1 the VJ, "the JNA would be able to clean things up very quickly. " And
2 their -- their frustrations had grown over time. And as -- as they
3 articulated it, as the Western pressure in particular on Serbia, on
4 Mr. Milosevic had mounted, they had felt themselves rather as if the rug
5 had been pulled out from underneath them. Of course, they still had all
6 the JNA military equipment, including, we estimated about 300 tanks that
7 had been left by the JNA, by the Yugoslav authorities when they officially
8 left Bosnia and Herzegovina under Western pressure in May of 1992, but
9 the -- the support wasn't as fulsome as they hoped to be able to bring the
10 war to a conclusion.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Would you also explain more specifically what
12 you meant by "holding their hand." That would suggest an element of -- of
13 restraint, of pulling back?
14 THE WITNESS: Yes, yes, that's what I meant, staying their hand.
15 The Bosnian Serbs told us regularly, at several -- at many levels that
16 they -- they wanted to take Mount Igman and Mount Bjelasnica and to hold
17 it as a way of tightening the siege on Sarajevo, because that would
18 effectively stop any leakage of material into Sarajevo from -- from this
19 narrow corridor out. They also told us that they had wanted to take
20 Gorazde or at least reduce it just to a tiny population centre, both
21 because they wanted that finally to be a part of Republika Srpska, because
22 it's near the Serbian border, and also because a large amount of troops
23 were required to garrison it and they wanted to take it and Mr. Milosevic,
24 under Western pressure, had persuaded them not to or not to prosecute the
25 offensive so far. And -- and that was true in other cases as well.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: This may be related, and I had intended to ask
2 you at the end of the examination-in-chief: In the earlier part of your
3 testimony, you said that Karadzic, in response to pressure from Serbia and
4 the international community at large, appeared reluctant to use the Serb
5 war machine to force a settlement. And I had intended to ask you to
6 clarify the pressure from Serbia.
7 THE WITNESS: Yes. I mean, I'm simply reporting what the Bosnian
8 Serbs told us, and they said, Dr. Karadzic in particular, that he might
9 have wanted to do a number of things which he was -- in particular around
10 Sarajevo. He -- they were always considering cutting off the water and --
11 and other things, and he was talking both with us and with his associates
12 about influence from Serbia to stop that. And this pattern continued all
13 the way through, until after the fall of Srebrenica too.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.
15 MR. NICE: Thank you.
16 Q. A few questions to tidy up on that as you've been covering, one
17 matter of detail. The tanks, so far as you understood, did they need
18 servicing? And if so, where were they serviced?
19 A. Yes. We felt that there was -- they certainly needed servicing,
20 and that there were some maintenance facilities available to the Bosnian
21 Serb army in Bosnian Serb-held territory, but there was also movement of
22 them across the border for -- for maintenance purposes. And members of
23 the Bosnian Serb army we would run into would even refer to that.
24 Q. Second question: From what you're describing - and this covers
25 what period, post-1992 or ...?
1 A. From my arrival in the spring of 1993 until the end of the war in
2 the late autumn, early winter of 1995.
3 Q. And Milosevic staying the hand or holding the hand to the degree
4 he did covers what period?
5 A. I should say that our awareness of this came principally from the
6 Bosnian Serbs and so one has to factor in some possible level of
7 disinformation. But we had many Bosnian Serb sources, and they seemed to
8 agree on it. But I would say it grew over time. Mladic -- in their
9 version, the influence of Milosevic over Mladic grew over time and reached
10 its peak in 1995, when Karadzic was so concerned about it that he
11 attempted to dismiss Mladic.
12 Q. That really takes care of my next question: What does this say
13 about the accused's authority or control or influence over Mladic and
14 others? That he had some?
15 A. Yes, he clearly had at least influence.
16 Q. And then this -- of course, the Trial Chamber will in due course
17 have to decide it insofar as it needs to, the level of financial,
18 logistical, materiel support to the Bosnian Serbs, and in particular to
19 the Bosnian Serb army. If that support had been withdrawn earlier and cut
20 off, what would have been the consequences for both Sarajevo and the
21 surrounding areas which, as you've told us, were affected by what was
22 happening in Sarajevo?
23 A. Well, obviously Bosnian Serb domination of the battlefield was
24 largely a function of support from -- from Belgrade. In fact, the -- the
25 Bosnian Serbs were outnumbered by their enemies. They were substantially
1 outnumbered by the Bosnian Muslims alone, but they had provided the
2 Bosnian Serbs with very substantial armaments. Or strictly speaking, they
3 had left them in place when -- when they withdrew from Bosnia-Herzegovina
4 in 1992, but effectively it was simply a -- a transfer to their proxies.
5 Q. So the withdrawal of support would have had what effect?
6 A. It would have taken away their military advantage and it would
7 have forced them to settle on -- on terms that might have made it
8 impossible to bring about the -- the major relocation of populations that
9 they had -- they had been pursuing.
10 Q. And then finally -- or perhaps almost a matter of opinion, but in
11 light of Their Honours' questions: So far as the accused is concerned,
12 the accused Milosevic, do you remember I asked you a question about
13 attention between his doing one thing and doing another, and supporting
14 the Bosnian Serbs, if it's found that he did, and holding their hand.
15 What do you say this reveals as to his agenda or agendas, if they can be
17 A. I'm -- I've never met the -- the accused, so I can really only
18 comment as it was perceived in the Bosnian Serb leadership. They
19 perceived him as an opportunist. They felt themselves to be true Serb
20 nationalists, and they felt that Mr. Milosevic was trying to have it both
21 ways; that he wanted to be conciliatory to the West and to rein in the
22 Bosnian Serbs at the moment of their greatest victory, and yet he wanted
23 to be supportive enough of the Serb national project, as they called it,
24 to retain solid support of -- of those with genuinely nationalistic
25 feelings. And it was this opportunism which they contrasted, for example,
1 with Dr. Tudjman's pure nationalism, as they saw it.
2 Q. Moving on. Paragraph --
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Sorry.
4 MR. NICE: I'm so sorry.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: What view, if any, did the -- did your
6 organisation take of this ambivalence -- apparent ambivalence?
7 THE WITNESS: Well, we were very -- we were aware both of the
8 basic level of support being provided by Serbia and we were aware of the
9 -- the tensions between them. And as -- as you will recall, the
10 international community at large, the Security Council and the contact
11 group, were endeavouring to exacerbate it and to play on it. There were
12 Security Council resolutions passed which offered relief of sanctions on
13 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia if the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
14 would put sanctions on and put pressure on and hold -- stay the hand of
15 the Bosnian Serb party and the Croatian Serb party. So we were aware both
16 of the basic level of support and we were aware and hoping to take some
17 advantage from the differences that arose between them with respect to how
18 far to push this Serbian national project in the face of very vigorous
19 opposition from NATO, for example.
20 JUDGE MAY: Now, is the position, are we to understand, as your
21 organisation saw it or as you saw it, that on the one hand the Serb
22 government and the accused were giving support to the Bosnian Serbs,
23 materiel support, and general - correct me if I'm wrong in any of this,
24 because I merely want to get it right - and general moral support to the
25 Bosnian Serbs, but on the other hand the Serbs -- the accused was
1 restraining the Bosnian Serbs where he thought it was in his interest to
2 do so? I don't want to put words in your mouth, but -- but what was your
3 impression? You were there at the time.
4 THE WITNESS: That was our impression. Our impression was that
5 Milosevic was inclined as a gambler to leave the table with his winnings,
6 that the Bosnian Serbs with the support of Serbia had done very well in
7 the war. They had very quickly taken 70 per cent of the -- they were only
8 30 per cent of the population of Bosnia, but they had taken 70 per cent of
9 the land area of Bosnia in a few weeks, at the beginning of the war.
10 Milosevic's position -- in fact, I believe he publicly stated it, and
11 including at the discussions on the Vance Owen Peace Plan -- was that they
12 should now make substantial concessions in order to get a peace settlement
13 and the relaxation of pressure from the West. That could be contrasted
14 with the much more maximalist position of the Bosnian Serbs.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Would his position also be consistent with
16 the -- the pressure that you say he was receiving from the international
18 THE WITNESS: Yes, it would be consistent with that; though, I
19 should state again that I've never met the accused. I got this only
20 through my daily contacts with the Bosnian Serb leadership, so I see it
21 through the lens of -- of their frustration.
22 JUDGE MAY: Yes, we understand that. To make it clear, that of
23 course we're going to have to make our minds up on these matters, on all
24 the evidence in the case. But having the view or the impression of a
25 witness who was actually there at the time is a matter for us to take into
2 Yes, Mr. Nice.
3 MR. NICE:
4 Q. On this topic, can we look at tab 25, if we haven't looked at it
5 already - perhaps we have - no. Is there a tab 25? No, there isn't.
6 I'll move on from that and come back to what's marked as tab 25 as later,
7 if necessary?
8 MR. NICE: And Your Honours, I think we've covered really
9 paragraphs 58 and 59 sufficiently. And I'll move on just to a couple of
10 observations of paragraph 60, about General Mladic.
11 Q. You've spoken already of the relationship, the developing
12 relationship as you saw it, between the accused and Mladic. What was
13 Mladic like in meetings? Just in a couple of sentences so we can have a
14 picture of the man.
15 A. He's -- he's a heavy set, large, red-faced --
16 Q. Not physically. I meant his behaviour. We know what he looks
18 A. He was usually quiet for a very long time at the beginning of
19 meetings. He would even stay in a separate room and play chess with
20 General Gvero often. He would then take notes for the whole first session
21 of a meeting. And then he would give answers that were not very -- he
22 would give a presentation that was not very logical in its development.
23 He would almost always mention the history of the Serbs, which he didn't
24 really seem to know very well, and the suffering of his own family. His
25 father had been killed during World War II. And he would very much
1 emphasise the individual suffering of -- of Serbs. He was not a coherent
2 and interlocutor really and he was given really to ending meetings with a
3 series of -- of demands.
4 Q. Thank you very much. Can we now go back to -- I think the
5 Chamber will have a tab 25, even if --
6 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, it's Prosecutor's Exhibit 470, tab
7 25. It's a re--used document.
8 MR. NICE: I'm sorry, yes. My error.
9 Q. Can you look at this document, please, if the witness has it?
10 A. No, I don't think I do.
11 Q. It's coming to you. And it's your -- it's the report from Viktor
12 Andreev of the 20th of September of 1994.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. In paragraph 3, on the first page, it speaks of the Serbs,
15 entering into a lengthy discussion on the closing of the border with the
16 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia anxious about this, threatening various
17 retaliatory measures and concerned about the possibility of that the
18 Security Council will tighten sanctions on Pale. And Karadzic saying that
19 such a move would put UNPROFOR in the position of having sided with the
20 enemy. Saying, "If the international community treats us like a beast,
21 then we will behave like a beast," and mentioning the use of utilities as
22 a means of war.
23 How does that fit in with the discussion we were having a
24 question or so ago, including the topic of political influence, as opposed
25 to just military?
1 A. Karadzic's view, as expressed to me and to others, was that they
2 were vitally dependent on Serbia and that the threat by the Security
3 Council, of which we as a United Nations organisation was seen to be an
4 extension, was seen as an attack on the Bosnian Serbs' vital interests.
5 He said that we were treating him as -- as a beast. I mean, it doesn't
6 sound very sensible in English, but it might sound better in their
7 language. He -- and he said that, you know, they would attack us and he
8 would use utilities to -- the restriction of utilities such as gas and
9 water to make life further miserable for the -- the Bosnian Muslims in
10 Sarajevo unless the Security Council stopped threatening this essential
11 lifeline between -- between him and his providers in Serbia.
12 Q. One more question on -- or a couple more questions on logistical
13 and equipment support, paragraph 63. I think you've covered everything,
14 pay and equipment, but you haven't dealt with air cover. Was there ever
15 any evidence available to you of Serbian air cover being provided?
16 A. Well, there was a no-fly zone of course above
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and so aircraft of all three sides did violate it.
18 But when they did, they were at risk of being shot down, so there was not
19 much air military activity.
20 Four Galeb, I believe, light fighter strike aircraft were
21 launched from Banja Luka and shot down in 1994. Another one was shot down
22 later -- oh, sorry, crashed in Cazin later in 1994. When they crashed on
23 Bosnian Muslim territory, when we were able to investigate them, as
24 certainly we did, and took photographs in the case of the one that crashed
25 in Cazin, the pilots were wearing Yugoslav uniforms, and indeed the
1 Yugoslav press reported their funerals in -- in Yugoslavia. So --
2 Q. Thank you. Tab 20, please, in the Exhibit 546. It deals with
3 another weapon system in a report of the 1st of December, 1994. And this
4 report, in paragraph 2, speaks of General Rose at a meeting explaining
5 that the Serb decision to activate their air defence system had heightened
6 tensions significantly, and pointing out that NATO aircraft responded
7 automatically when locked onto or when fired upon. What was the weapons
8 system referred to here or touched upon here?
9 A. I believe this is referring to the activation of the SAM-2
10 missile system.
11 Q. What did you know about that?
12 A. The SAM- 2 missile system, of course, is a radar-based system
13 rather than a heat-based one, so you can detect the radars when they lock
14 on. And the first time this happened was in late 1994. Now, the SAM-2
15 system is physically large and it is complex and the fact that it didn't
16 -- it wasn't active in Republika Srpska, Serb-held territory in Bosnia,
17 prior to this date and then it was able to be activated when the level of
18 NATO air coverage became more aggressive was seen as almost certainly
19 being facilitated by -- by Serbia, because the only other places they
20 could have got them were from the Muslims or the Croats, which didn't seem
22 Q. Tab 21, please. I haven't marked a passage on this, so I'll deal
23 with it in the ordinary way. Was there a meeting of the Bosnian Serb
24 leadership in Sanski Most in March 1995 where Mladic spoke of RS strategy?
25 A. The Bosnian Serb leadership told us that there was, yes.
1 Q. And what was their change in strategy?
2 A. There was an understanding that they would have to become -- they
3 would have to move on the -- onto the offensive in 1995 and to move away
4 from the defensive posture of 1993 and 1994 in able to -- in order to end
5 the war before the Republic of Croatia could become a threat or before the
6 Bosnian Muslims were able to turn their numerical advantage into a -- into
7 success on the battlefield.
8 Q. We're coming up to Srebrenica. Just before we do, look at how
9 you prepared a report on that, one or two other things. What do you know
10 -- what did you discover about the presence of Mladic in or around
11 Belgrade at the time of and leading up to Srebrenica?
12 A. The -- the massacres at Srebrenica I believe took place on or
13 after the 14th of July. The town fell on Tuesday, the 11th of July. And
14 at least one member of the contact group said that he had seen
15 Mr. Milosevic in Serbia with General Mladic on the -- the 7th of July, and
16 that is one day after the -- the attack had -- had begun but still well
17 before the -- the fall of the town and the massacres.
18 Q. Can we look at tab 22, if you can help us with this. Do you
19 recognise this document, first of all, or not?
20 A. Yes; I wrote it.
21 Q. Can you summarise for us the effect of this, because we are
22 pressed for time. It comes under paragraph 68 on the summary.
23 A. Yes. After the fall of Srebrenica, the Serbs almost immediately
24 attacked Zepa. And while Zepa was falling and there was great confusion,
25 the Bosnian Serbs approached us very urgently and said that they wanted to
1 arrange a so-called all-for-all prisoner exchange. In theory, this would
2 have been very attractive to the Muslims because many more -- prior to
3 Srebrenica, many more Muslims were being held by the Serbs than Serbs were
4 being held by Muslims. Of course, at the time of this meeting, the
5 killings had already taken place at Srebrenica and -- but we didn't know
6 that, nor did the Bosnian Muslims know that. And the Serbs were trying to
7 say it should be all for all, not counting Srebrenica, which we'll put
8 into a different -- a different batch.
9 Q. And your inference from their enthusiasm was what?
10 A. Well, they were very nervous, because they thought that knowledge
11 of the killings at Srebrenica would come out and then they would have no
12 chance of getting back the -- the Serb prisoners held by the -- held by
13 the Muslims.
14 Q. Who on the Bosnian Serb side was conducting these negotiations?
15 Because if your calculation is correct, then there would be knowledge in
16 whoever was conducting those negotiations.
17 A. General Mladic sent messages. He did not appear in person. He
18 was actually in Zepa at this time with General Tolimir and General Panic,
19 the Muslim commander. And he sent two people, Lieutenant Colonel Indjic
20 and an officer he always -- he -- a person he always sent for prisoner
21 exchanges called Bulatovic.
22 Q. Did you at any time receive from the Bosnian Serbs any
23 explanation for the people missing, killed in Srebrenica?
24 A. No. However, I think that the first survivor of the massacres
25 came out on the 19th or the 20th and spoke on Tuzla television. And after
1 that, there were a series of investigations leading up to Mrs. Albright's
2 presentation in the Security Council of aerial photographs of disturbed
3 earth where previously people had been seen gathering. And during that
4 period, as the story was coming out, the Serbs broke off these -- these
6 Q. Moving on just to get the chronology right and then we'll come
7 back to your Srebrenica report and one or two other matters. On the 30th
8 of August, did you send the text of a letter from Mr. Akashi to Karadzic?
9 A. The 30th of August?
10 Q. If you don't recall it, it doesn't necessarily matter, we'll move
12 A. I don't recall now.
13 Q. Very well. And on the 11th of October, did you receive letters
14 from Muratovic and Buha agreeing to a cease-fire effective for the 12th of
15 October? We can see that on tab 23.
16 A. Yes. That is the instrument which ends the war in Bosnia.
17 Q. It's a short document. We don't need to look at it in any great
19 Before I conclude these questions, just this: Was there any --
20 within the United Nations and elsewhere, was there a debate and -- as to
21 what the safe areas were aimed at and what they were doing?
22 A. Yes. There was a very --
23 Q. Paragraph 75. Summarise it, please.
24 A. There was an active debate as to whether or not the safe area
25 concept was there to protect people or to protect areas, which would later
1 become part of Bosnian Muslim territory. There was great concern about
2 the concept within UNPROFOR because it was felt that the Security Council
3 mandate, which was to deter attacks on them, was not militarily possible
4 with the forces provided, and that the populations were therefore
5 significantly at risk.
6 Q. Thank you.
7 MR. NICE: Your Honours, we now could come to the second exhibit.
8 Before I produce it, because I'm anxious not to burden you with paper that
9 you won't want to have, can I explain what it is and what it may become.
10 First of all, the -- the first, whatever it is, 20 - 37, 36 -- 35
11 tabs in this document are UN Council resolutions. Now, they are really
12 public documents that in the vernacular of the Tribunal could self-propel
13 themselves into exhibit status. Nevertheless, it occurred to me it might
14 be quite helpful for there to be an exhibit that had the relevant ones
15 collected and numbered and they could be added to, and this witness could,
16 as it were, nominally produce them. Although, I don't want to take any
17 time going through them with him, and he doesn't hold himself out as a
18 particular expert on them, although he could make just a few observations
19 about them.
20 The last document in this possible exhibit is his report on
21 Srebrenica, about which I can get him to tell you. It's, of course, a
22 long document, and I'm not asking that we go through all of it. And I'm
23 certainly not asking that a great deal of time should be taken on it,
24 unless it's appropriate to do so. But it seems to me that that possibly
25 is a document that the Chamber would like to have available. And if so,
1 what I would propose to do -- what I would do is to get him to explain his
2 methodology and probably beyond identifying paragraphs that the Chamber
3 might find interesting to read, perhaps, if it has the time in the next
4 break, not to take him through it in detail. But I'm very much in the
5 Chamber's hands, first, as to whether these self-propelling documents
6 should more conveniently be produced by this witness; and second, whether
7 he, having given his evidence, it would nevertheless be helpful to hear
8 how he prepared this report on Srebrenica.
9 JUDGE MAY: We'll consider that.
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 JUDGE MAY: The tab number 37 in that binder is a report of the
12 Security Council mission. What is that?
13 MR. NICE: I'm not sure -- I think 37 may be a mistitle. 36 is
14 the Srebrenica report.
15 JUDGE MAY: Yes, we have that.
16 MR. NICE: The other document, I haven't yet -- the report on the
17 Security Council mission pursuant to Resolution 819 of the 30th of April,
18 I'm not sure that we have that. If we do -- no, that's been incorrectly
19 attached to the Srebrenica report. It's the last few pages of it. You'll
20 see it's a different -- a slightly different --
21 JUDGE MAY: So you're asking 37 to come out, so we can understand
23 MR. NICE: No, we're including it really as part of the report.
24 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll admit this exhibit and get the next
25 number, please.
1 THE REGISTRAR: 547, Your Honour.
2 MR. NICE: Your Honour, as to -- as to the Security Council
3 resolutions, there are a couple more that the witness believes may be
4 helpful. We were discussing it just before he came to give evidence this
5 morning. They've been made available. Over the break I'll find a way of
6 agreeing with the legal officers how they should be included so that this
7 exhibit can be available for the addition of any other resolutions that
8 others may find useful or appropriate to add later in the trial.
9 Q. And, Mr. Harland, so far as the resolutions are concerned -- and
10 you may not be able to remember the numbers. Just give a sketch, if you
11 will, of what you think is the material and important histories and then
12 we can track them down later if necessary.
13 A. There are a very large number of Security Council resolutions
14 with respect to the conflict in the former Yugoslavia. The first
15 significant one, I think, is -- is 713 of 1991, which imposes an arms
16 embargo on all parties to the -- the conflict.
17 Q. That's an additional one that we're going to have to add to the
18 bundle. Yes.
19 A. And there are a very large number dealing with issues such as the
20 provision of humanitarian aid and the authorisation of the United Nations
21 to use force to ensure its delivery, such as Resolution 770 and 776.
22 Those were both 1992, I think.
23 There were also a series of resolutions setting up and mandating
24 the United Nations and NATO in the deterrence of attacks on six designated
25 safe areas, so-called safe areas, including Srebrenica. Those would be
1 resolutions 819, 824, and 836 I think of 1993.
2 Then there are additional resolutions seeking to induce the
3 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to become more cooperative by either
4 lifting sanctions on them in return for them establishing some blockade on
5 the -- the Drina and -- and a very large number of -- of other measures
6 taken by the international community in the context of the Security
8 Q. Let's turn to tab 36 of this second exhibit of yours, 547, which
9 is your report to the Secretary-General. And we're going to take this
10 very briefly. Explain first who instructed you, where you prepared it,
11 how you prepared it. And the Chamber may want to turn to what is on the
12 bottom right-hand corner, page number 111, I think, which identifies
13 your -- your various interlocutors.
14 A. Yeah. First, I should say it's not my report. It's -- to the
15 Secretary-General. It's the Secretary-General's report to the General
16 Assembly of the United Nations.
17 Q. Yes.
18 A. I just drafted it. The -- and researched it.
19 The -- and I should also say that the list of people on page 111
20 is -- interview -- is very much not complete because a substantial number
21 of people who were interviewed asked not to be identified.
22 For the -- the methodology, the methodology was the -- to go over
23 the reports of the United Nations personnel in Srebrenica and dealing with
24 Srebrenica. And I was given unrestricted access to the -- to the
25 classified files of the United Nations for that. And also to conduct
1 interviews with the -- the major participants. Unfortunately,
2 particularly as -- with respect to this trial, I didn't interview anybody
3 in Serbia. I did send faxes to people, but unfortunately NATO was
4 attacking Serbia at the time. It was written during the spring and summer
5 of 1999, including General Perisic and others, and they agreed to meet me
6 in fact. But -- but they were not able to -- to meet with me because of
7 that, that war situation.
8 Q. As to any conclusions in the report as against the accused in
9 this case, anything adverse, anything positive, or simply neutral?
10 A. Well, as -- sorry. As we said before, there is one -- there is
11 no direct connection established in the report between Mr. Milosevic and
12 the massacres that took place at Srebrenica. Of course, prior to it, the
13 Serb army was getting a lot of support, and prior to the fall he obviously
14 met with Mladic, so he knew there was an attack going on, but somehow the
15 -- the -- the problem as regards both our outrage and the law is not so
16 much the -- the attacks, of which there were many, but the massacres, and
17 this report makes no link to Mr. Milosevic with those massacres.
18 And in fact there is one piece of evidence, as I mentioned to you
19 before, which somewhat inclines me to believe that Mr. Milosevic was not
20 involved in commissioning the massacres, which is that immediately after
21 the fall of Srebrenica, the two days after the Serbs began their attack on
22 Zepa, and Mr. Milosevic did in fact help to save some of the men of Zepa.
23 At least according to interviews -- I did not interview Mr. Milosevic, but
24 at least according to the interviews I conducted with Mr. Muratovic, who's
25 a Bosnian government official, and with Carl Bildt, who was then an
1 international peace negotiator, when Zepa was falling, they wanted to
2 ensure that the men wouldn't be massacred, even though they didn't yet
3 know about the Srebrenica massacres. And because Zepa is very close to
4 the Serbian border, some of them were fleeing by rafts in -- into Serbia.
5 And according to Dr. Muratovic, he did call Mr. Bildt and asked Mr. Bildt
6 to speak to Mr. Milosevic to ensure that those who fled into Serbia would
7 not be killed or mistreated. And according to both Bildt and to
8 Muratovic, Milosevic did that and the people were detained, which is
9 normal and customary, I believe, under the rules of war, and then were
10 released after the war. And as far as I am -- or at least as far as those
11 two interviewees were concerned, Mr. Milosevic played a helpful role.
12 MR. NICE: Your Honours, what I would very respectfully propose
13 is that the Chamber looks at the summary, starting at paragraph 79. It
14 can see and could read more swiftly than I could a summary of what may be
15 some interesting paragraphs, going on to paragraph 92 of the summary. It
16 deals with paragraph 501 of the report. So either the summary or indeed
17 the original paragraphs of the report might conveniently be read, if the
18 Chamber thought this appropriate, in the break. And I have then only one
19 other question of this witness to cover, which I've overlooked, before I
20 shall conclude, and it relates, in fact, to the earlier exhibit, 546, and
21 to tab 21.
22 Q. If you could just briefly look at it. I don't think it's
23 necessary to display this on the overhead projector. This is a document
24 not of your own authorship, I think, but it deals with something that
25 Mladic said about the eastern enclaves. Was what he said reported to you
1 at the time?
2 A. Yes. I should say -- yeah, all other meetings referred to, I
3 think, in this exhibit I was at. This meeting I was not at, but it took
4 place in Vlasenica, the command post of the Drina Corps. General Smith,
5 with his military assistant, James Baxter, met with General Mladic and
6 General Mladic did seem to indicate - and James Baxter reported back to me
7 orally - that the Serbs had indicated that they wished to attack the
8 eastern enclaves during 1995 in order to reduce them just to purely
9 guarded camps, in order to free up troops for other essential military
11 JUDGE MAY: That concludes the evidence, does it, apart from some
12 tidying up?
13 MR. NICE: Apart from some tidying up, if I think of it, after
14 the break, and apart from possibly reading the summary in the way that
15 I've suggested.
16 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, I think it would be difficult to cut short
17 dramatically the accused's cross-examination on this witness, in the light
18 of the evidence he's given.
19 MR. NICE: Well, I accept that. I made great progress in the
20 first session, but it became perhaps impossible to move as fast in the
22 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
23 JUDGE MAY: We're being handed two additional resolutions, we
25 MR. NICE: Your Honour, yes. These are the two other
1 resolutions. If the Chamber thinks it's a good idea to have a library,
2 then the obviously sensible thing would be for them to be fitted in in a
3 chronological way rather than to simply tag them on at the end. That could
4 probably be done by fitting them in at the appropriate place
5 chronologically and amending the index for two entries that contain two
6 resolutions. We can do that.
7 JUDGE MAY: Let us deal with that after the adjournment. I don't
8 know that we do think it's a good idea to have a library, but we'll add
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Whenever you mention a library, Mr. Nice, I'm a
11 little intimidated.
12 MR. NICE: Well, I'm sorry, I didn't mean to intimidate. I
13 simply know that for some materials -- some examples of materials, it
14 probably should be available. That was my intention.
15 JUDGE MAY: We'll adjourn.
16 --- Recess taken at 12.17 p.m.
17 --- On resuming at 12.42 p.m.
18 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
19 MR. NICE: Just one -- one matter that I ought to have tidied up,
20 and I'll do so now, if I may. The Chamber may want to have paragraph 77
21 of the summary in mind and also to look at Exhibit 547, tab 37, the tab
22 that I'd mislaid but which is the report of the Security Council mission
23 of April 1993, where Diego Arria from Venezuela was the coordinator. And
24 if the Chamber would be good enough to go to page number 5 of that tab,
25 the page numbers being at the top. You'll see that at the foot of that
1 page, the report reads as follows: "The council should note that when it
2 was discussing Resolution 819, it did not know that negotiations involving
3 the force commander of UNPROFOR had been taking place and that UNPROFOR
4 had participated actively in the drafting and in the process of convincing
5 the Bosnian commander to sign the agreement. The alternative could have
6 been a massacre of 25.000 people."
7 Now, this is a report, Mr. Harland, if not compiled by,
8 participated in by Diego Arria in April 1993. I think reference to it is
9 made in your report and the distribution of that earlier United Nations or
10 Security Council report could have alerted people to the views of some
11 that massacre at Srebrenica was a possibility; correct?
12 A. Correct.
13 Q. You, as you've made clear to us and in paragraph 77 of the
14 summary, page 24, would not yourself have anticipated a massacre?
15 A. No, certainly not on that scale.
16 Q. Not on that scale.
17 A. No.
18 Q. You've explained to the Judges what the pattern of takeovers,
19 including killings were in other places.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And by reference to Diego Arria's report, you may recognise that
22 others held other views.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Thank you very much.
25 MR. NICE: That's all, Your Honours.
1 JUDGE MAY: We ought to get the last two tabs, which we were
2 referring to earlier in 547. Yes, if you would.
3 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, Resolution 713 will be tab 38 and
4 Resolution 776 will be tab 39 of 547.
5 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.
6 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
7 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:
8 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Harland, I see that you arrived in Sarajevo
9 in June 1993; is that right?
10 A. That's right.
11 Q. Right after you got your doctoral degree at the Fletcher School
12 of law and diplomacy; is that right?
13 A. Yes, right after it was awarded. Actually, I'd stopped studying
14 several years earlier.
15 Q. Did you then live in America? Is that right?
16 A. No. Prior to -- while I studied at the Fletcher School and at
17 Harvard universities, which is until 1991, I lived in the United States.
18 Between 1991 and 1993, I lived in the -- the Great Lakes region of Africa,
19 with the United Nations.
20 Q. When did you start working for the United Nations? Just after
21 you graduated, after 1991?
22 A. Yes. I had some brief earlier service before I went back and
23 finished my Ph.D., but effectively in 1991.
24 Q. Yes. Did you have a scholarship at the time?
25 A. Yes, I did.
1 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter could not hear the answer --
2 the question, sorry.
3 THE WITNESS: Who gave the scholarship, I think.
4 The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy has a fund for their own
5 -- for scholars they accept and Harvard University did -- and both
6 organisations funded me almost fully to complete my degrees at their two
8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Very well. In paragraph 3 of your statement, you say, they sent
10 me to Sarajevo -- "I was posted to Sarajevo, rather, Bosnia-Herzegovina in
11 June 1993 as a Civil Affairs Officer, under Viktor Andreev at
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina Command based in Kiseljak"; is that right?
13 A. Correct.
14 Q. Who was it that posted you in Sarajevo actually?
15 A. The UNPROFOR. I arrived in Zagreb and their office of civil
16 affairs determined that I should work in -- in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
17 Q. By then you were already an employee of the United Nations for
18 already two years; is that right?
19 A. Correct.
20 Q. You say that there were two aspects of your work; political
21 reporting and political work. Is that right? That's what you say in
22 paragraph 4.
23 A. Correct.
24 Q. Would you care to elaborate on that? What did political
25 reporting involve and what did political work involve?
1 A. Sure. The political reporting was to make -- to communicate what
2 had happened at meetings participated in by UN senior staff in Sarajevo
3 with the Bosnian government or Bosnian Serb leadership, and that involved
4 a regular weekly report and it also involved a -- a daily reporting on
5 whatever meetings we had been to during the day.
6 The political work was to participate in those meetings. And we
7 were normally either trying to negotiate the evacuation of civilians or
8 the restoration of electricity to hospitals, and a range of -- and
9 sometimes even prisoner exchanges or -- or dead bodies or -- a range of
10 things that needed to be negotiated between the Bosnian government and the
11 Bosnian Serbs in which they asked for the United Nations to serve as some
12 sort of intermediary.
13 Q. So that is roughly what the subject of your work was.
14 I noticed during your testimony here that the greatest part of
15 your testimony was dedicated to military matters, but you did not deal in
16 military matters, to the best of my understanding.
17 A. Oh, yes, I mean because when -- when you're -- when we negotiated
18 a -- a cease-fire or an anti-sniping agreement or the withdrawal of Serb
19 forces from Mount Igman, we would always -- I mean, I would always be
20 present and would participate. So the military matters were very much at
21 the centre of -- of UNPROFOR's concerns. They were almost as important as
22 the -- as the humanitarian issues.
23 Q. All right. But just now you used an expression, if I can put it
24 that way. You said, "the Serb national project." You used it several
25 times. You understand this project to mean ethnic cleansing, to the best
1 of my understanding. How did you get that idea, that there is something
2 called the Serb national project, and how could that mean ethnic cleansing
3 of any kind?
4 A. That was actually a phrase used by our -- our Serb partners in
5 Pale, Professor Koljevic and -- and Dr. Zametica. They would -- they
6 would often describe their war effort as -- and what they were trying to
7 produce as a part of the -- the Serbian national project. And in that --
8 that element of it, the element of it with which they and we were
9 involved, was their attempt to create a -- an overwhelmingly Serb
10 territory that would be either independent or highly autonomous and the
11 population of which would be overwhelmingly Serb.
12 Q. All right. But when you started testifying today, I think that
13 you first spoke about a meeting where Radovan Karadzic said that their
14 priority was to have Izetbegovic or, as you put it, the Muslim government
15 should come to the negotiating table, to negotiate the peace agreement.
16 Is that right?
17 A. That's correct.
18 Q. And on that occasion, as far as I could see from the documents
19 that you presented here, he said that in their approach, they did not deny
20 the right of people to remain in their own homes, wherever they lived,
21 irrespective of ethnicity, or the right of those who left due to war
22 operations to come back, no matter what kind of delineations may be made.
23 A. Correct.
24 Q. So how do you link that up to a project of ethnic cleansing? If
25 this kind of clear-cut position was presented, and you spoke about it too,
1 and you also presented at the very outset a paper to that effect.
2 A. That's what they claimed. But what they actually did was to
3 prosecute a -- a campaign of -- of ethnic cleansing.
4 And I should say when -- when we asked Dr. Karadzic about what
5 was actually happening on the ground, he would say that "Well, some old
6 people will probably want to remain," Serbs in the Muslim areas or Muslims
7 in the Serb areas, but he was clearly envisaging the overwhelming bulk of
8 the population remaining in Serb territory to be Serb and in Muslim-held
9 territory to be -- to be Muslim.
10 Q. All right. That is what was being envisaged. However, as far as
11 the right of people is concerned, to remain in any one of these
12 territories, he did not challenge that right in any way; isn't that right,
13 Mr. Harland?
14 A. That is right.
15 Q. At the same time, you say that Serbia extended support, which of
16 course is not in dispute, both to Serbs in the Republika Srpska and in the
17 Serbian Krajina Republic, but you linked that up with this ethnic
18 cleansing project, which is proved false by what we have just referred to.
19 So how could you come to the conclusion that Serbia - and I personally -
20 supported ethnic cleansing and that the whole project was a project of
21 ethnic cleansing?
22 A. Because what was actually happening and the way in which the
23 Bosnian Serbs were actually using the support provided by Serbia was
24 certainly ethnic cleansing. And in fact, they would -- they would even
25 boast about it. I -- at -- at lunch I recall Dr.-- or sorry, General
1 Mladic talking about how they had taken Visegrad, how they had taken
2 Rogatica, how they had taken Brcko, how they had taken some other people.
3 And -- and at one meeting when he was actually challenged and said, "Well,
4 didn't you have hundreds of tanks provided by the Yugoslav armies for this
5 -- this purpose?" he -- he readily acknowledged that. So there is
6 certainly a gap which was barely -- barely disguised between what they
7 claimed was the legal rights of the non-Serb population in the area that
8 they would establish as Republika Srpska and -- and the reality, which was
9 when they entered a town, the -- the non-Serb population was either killed
10 or removed or terrorised until they fled, with a few small exceptions.
11 You know, there were still Muslim villages around Bijeljina when I -- when
12 I arrived.
13 Q. Very well. But I hope, Mr. Harland, as you spent a lot of time
14 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, as Mr. Nice pointed out, you were the
15 longest-serving UN officer over there, you know very well - and I'm sure
16 you visited Serbia as well - so you are familiar with the political
17 situation in Serbia and you must know that ethnic cleansing in the
18 political vernacular of Serbia was defined as a crime. It could not have,
19 under any circumstances, been part of the political approach to the
20 settlement of the crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Is that so?
21 A. It was certainly a part of the -- the military events unfolding
22 on the ground when I was there, and it continued to be that until the --
23 the end of the war. I mean, I -- I agree with you that there may have
24 been legal provisions against ethnic cleansing and even rhetorical
25 statements to that effect, but in fact the -- the -- the stated purpose of
1 what was going on on their side was the creation of a largely Serb
2 populated territory which they would call Republika Srpska. And they were
3 quite -- quite open about that. And I must say that at some of the
4 meetings some of the participants, such as Professor Plavsic, even said
5 that -- directly said, "It's good if all the non-Serbs go. We want them
6 to go. We're not living well together. Let them -- let them all leave
7 when we take over certain areas."
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Harland, your reference to rhetorical
9 statements against ethnic cleansing, could you give us an illustration of
10 some of those and in what context they were made.
11 THE WITNESS: Well, I think Mr. Milosevic has just touched on --
12 on one. And in fact, it's one of -- one of the -- the few I remember
13 Dr. Karadzic making. He -- he would expand on the same idea sometimes and
14 even say that he had a mechanism in mind for setting up an internationally
15 funded sort of housing exchange so that somebody, you know, of nationality
16 X in a zone controlled by nationality Y could exchange a house with
17 somebody in the opposite situation. So at least at the level of that type
18 of discussion Mr. Milosevic is right. There is -- it was not an
19 insistence that they be removed by force.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. As far as forcible removal of people and ethnic cleansing are
23 concerned, as you stayed in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I assume you cannot
24 attribute this only to one side but there were such instances on all three
25 sides, instances that could be defined as "ethnic cleansing" and as a
1 criminal act. I don't think there's a single side that could be said to
2 have been completely innocent in that respect.
3 A. Certainly. Certainly.
4 Q. As for the position of Serbia now. You came in 1993, as I see
5 from your statement, practically one month after the Assembly at which the
6 Vance Owen Plan was reviewed at Pale, the Assembly of Republika Srpska.
7 And I assume you're well informed about it. And do you remember what I
8 defined as goals when advocating the acceptance of the Vance Owen Plan?
9 Let me remind you, that the goals are for the Serb people to be free and
10 equal, not more, not less than that. Is that right, Mr. Harland?
11 A. I believe that's correct, yeah.
12 Q. Therefore, our support -- and I spoke at that very Assembly
13 meeting and said that "With this plan, the Serb people have restored their
14 right to be treated equally as a constituent nation and with this plan its
15 fate will be in its hands, as it will be in the hands of the other two
16 peoples on an equal footing and in freedom." Isn't that right,
17 Mr. Harland?
18 A. That's correct. Though, there was an enormous gap between what
19 was said and the actual situation on the ground, what they were doing with
20 the Serbian support, which was really --
21 Q. That is a question as to what each side was doing and with what
23 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you must let the witness finish what
24 he was saying.
25 Now, Mr. Harland, is there anything you want to add? You were
1 cut off in the middle of a sentence.
2 THE WITNESS: I was just saying that that's -- that's true of
3 what Mr. Milosevic says of his own presentation. And one of the most
4 frustrating things about the conflict was the enormous gap between the
5 relatively high-minded comments that could be made at forums such as that
6 one and the -- the reality on the ground. For example, by the time he --
7 he made that comment, there were already well over a million people in
8 Bosnia and Herzegovina who had been forced to flee their homes, and many
9 of those people, with whom I would often meet, had been forced to flee
10 their homes because of assets, support provided by -- by Serbia to the --
11 to the Bosnian Serb party. And they -- the Bosnian Serbs were grateful
12 for it.
13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Let us make things quite clear regarding this point. It's not
15 quite clear to me, because throughout Serbia in 1991 with the Vance Plan,
16 which was implemented, as is stated in the report of the
17 Secretary-General, and later on, with respect to the Vance-Owen Plan and
18 the five other plans that we supported, I don't understand how you can
19 view our policies - I mean the policies of Serbia and my own personal
20 policy - as opportunism rather than a consistent and uninterrupted effort
21 to achieve a peaceful settlement in the former Yugoslavia. Could you
22 explain that, please.
23 A. No, I didn't consider it an uninterrupted effort to bring about a
24 peaceful solution to the conflict in Yugoslavia, at least not as far as I
25 saw it. The -- what I saw was large amounts of Serbian support, military
1 support principally, enabling the Bosnian Serb party to control 70 per
2 cent of Bosnia and Herzegovina and then to make demands for a final peace
3 settlement that were obviously unjust. So for example, the Serbs would
4 come to us and say, "We will -- we will not accept any of the
5 international plans on the -- on the table, including the one which you
6 referred to about the meeting in Pale, which you will recall that the
7 Bosnian Serb party, who, much supported by Serbian military assets, were
8 successfully able to -- to reject the Vance-Owen Peace Plan.
9 Q. Yes. But those plans, which we supported and some of which were
10 also supported by the leadership at Pale, they never implied that 70 per
11 cent of the territory should remain in the hands of the Serbs. Isn't that
12 right, Mr. Harland? You remember the plan of the contact group, for
13 instance, which was supported by the leadership in Pale. Or to move even
14 further back, you remember the Cutileiro Plan, before the outbreak of the
15 war, which in fact all three parties signed. So not one of those plans --
16 JUDGE MAY: You know you mustn't pile up questions like this.
17 THE WITNESS: Yes, I agree to all -- all the questions. Yeah.
18 That's true.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness is an intellectual and
20 he can understand --
21 JUDGE MAY: Yes. But he can't answer a series of questions. One
22 at a time, please.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, you insist on economy, and
24 I am using my time by asking certain summary questions. But I hope that
25 the witness is not bothered by them and he's fully able to follow.
1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. When talking about Karadzic's insistence on the Muslim side to
3 come to the negotiating table when peace plans were discussed, it was
4 always a peace plan that was proposed by international mediators.
5 Afterwards, there was the Owen Plan, the Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, several
6 plans of the contact group, which again the Serbs accepted and the
7 leadership at Pale. So it wasn't any imposition of a Serbian plan but
8 rather that negotiations be held on the proposal on the table made by
9 international mediators. In your period of time, the plan was drafted by
10 Owen and Stoltenberg; isn't that right?
11 A. That is correct, but we objected very strongly to the use of
12 shelling and sniping and the cutting off of food as an instrument by which
13 the Serbs could convince the Bosnian Muslims to accept an -- an agreement
14 which was -- was unattractive to them.
15 Q. Didn't you, in the examination-in-chief, also mention that
16 talking to Karadzic you heard and you were able to see for yourself as
17 well that it was the Serb side that was having enormous problems caused by
18 the Muslim side as a result of sniping and shooting at their lines?
19 Wasn't that so? That was the reason for them to respond to these
20 provocations. Didn't you mention something along those lines a moment
22 A. I don't believe I -- I did mention that. And certainly, at least
23 in the area which I was serving in, at least 90 per cent of the -- the
24 casualties by sniping and shelling took place on the -- the Muslim side of
25 the line. That sometimes included Serbs and Croats who lived on the
1 Muslim side of the line. But the overwhelming bulk of the -- of the
2 civilian casualties were on the -- the Muslim side of the line, and what
3 was particularly alarming to us was that Dr. Karadzic and his associates
4 would directly say, "We will use this Serbian-supported war machine to
5 make life impossible for the civilians," to terrorise the civilians in
6 order to reach a particular political goal. We -- we found that very,
7 very cynical.
8 Q. Mr. Harland, I hear for the first time that anyone from the
9 leadership of Republika Srpska could have told you that their aim was to
10 terrorise civilians, and you're claiming that that is what they told you,
11 to terrorise civilians was their goal?
12 A. Yes. And in fact, I believe that in the morning we already had
13 an -- an exhibit in which we quoted Dr. Karadzic as saying that if certain
14 political -- if certain political conditions weren't met, in terms of the
15 Muslims going to negotiate with him in Geneva, that he would cut off the
16 water and the electricity to the civilian population of Sarajevo. When
17 the Security Council said that it would attempt to make a blockade between
18 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Republika Srpska, he said that he
19 would -- the Bosnian Serbs, using their Serb-provided military, would
20 behave as beasts. And he made direct threats of shelling, anyway, both
21 against us and against Sarajevo.
22 So in fact, it was, unfortunately, quite explicit that they would
23 use their military apparatus to -- to terrorise the population in the hope
24 of -- of getting the political outcome they -- they wanted, which of
25 course was a recognition in -- in law and in international practice of the
1 -- the territory they had -- they had captured in fighting.
2 Q. But he said that the proposal tabled by international mediators
3 should be discussed at a negotiating table; isn't that right, Mr. Harland?
4 A. I think the one I was quoting was this document of the 20th of
5 September, 1994, which is actually not about peace negotiations at all.
6 It's -- it's about the efforts by the Security Council to bring about a
7 closure of the border between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and
8 Bosnian Serb-held territory, where he claimed that he would treat us like
9 a beast, he would do other things. He said at the same meeting he was
10 going to flatten parts of Sarajevo.
11 He was -- Dr.-- Mr. Krajisnik made similar threats, thinly veiled
12 threats. He said, "It would be difficult to stop Serb soldiers from
13 shooting at UN airplanes bringing humanitarian assistance"; in other
14 words, given what we knew about their relatively strong chain of command
15 and control, they were directly threatening both us and the Bosnian
16 Muslims to achieve a particular aim. And in particular they were saying
17 that their main instrument would be the cutting off of humanitarian
18 supplies and water and electricity and gas using the military assets they
19 had from -- from Serbia.
20 Q. They said that they would use the military assets that they had
21 from Serbia? Is that what you said?
22 A. They didn't -- they did not say that.
23 Q. Very well, Mr. Harland. Do you know how the army of Republika
24 Srpska was formed? All armies in the territory of the former Yugoslavia
25 were created out of former members of the JNA and others that joined them.
1 A. Yes. They had a continuing and ongoing relationship with Serbia,
2 which they relied on for support, and which they acknowledged openly up to
3 the level of General Mladic. And indeed, when the link between Republika
4 Srpska and its armed forces and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was
5 threatened by the Security Council, they became particularly aggressive.
6 Q. It was not called in question by the Security Council but by our
7 side, because at that time we were bringing pressure to bear for the peace
8 plan to be accepted. It was not the pressure of the Security Council but
9 our endeavours to have the peace plan adopted. That is common knowledge.
10 You can find that in all the newspapers from those times, just as you can
11 find, I assume, also that the government of Serbia or, rather, the
12 leadership of Serbia was most emphatically opposed to the shelling of
13 Sarajevo. I assume you know that too.
14 JUDGE MAY: There are two questions there.
15 Mr. Harland, if you'd like to answer them.
16 THE WITNESS: The second one: The government of Serbia may have
17 been opposed at some level to the shelling of Sarajevo, which would be
18 appropriate, because that was not a shelling that we felt had any military
19 value. It was a dispersed fire that only had a -- a sort of terroristic
20 effect. And if the government of Serbia was opposed to that, it -- it
21 certainly wasn't evident on the ground.
22 On the contrary, the Serb commanders said they had links to
23 Belgrade, and at critical moments when we sought intervention from you or
24 from Belgrade that was able to -- such as during the Gorazde crisis --
25 that was able to affect the -- the behaviour of the Bosnian Serb army. In
1 other words, there clearly was a link between Belgrade and the Bosnian
2 Serb army, and yet the Bosnian Serb army continued, day after day after
3 day for a thousand days, to fire a minimum of several hundred shells a day
4 into the civilian centre of Sarajevo. So when the government of Serbia
5 said that it was opposed to the shelling of Sarajevo, I believe that they
6 were being dishonest.
7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. That may be your opinion, but as you're talking about the
9 influence of the political leadership of Serbia and my own influence, and
10 giving examples of that, do you have a single example showing that that
11 influence was used to instigate the conflict or, rather, do all the
12 examples indicate that all the influence and pressure was brought to bear
13 to stop, to halt the conflict?
14 A. We were able to detect direct intervention by yourself or by
15 others in Belgrade on the armed forces of Republika Srpska only at a few
16 key points in time; most evidently around Gorazde but also during the
17 Igman and -- and Bjelasnica case. Those certainly gave us the -- the
18 impression that the Bosnian Serbs military, regardless of whether they
19 were playing a positive role or were playing a negative role, were very
20 amenable to influence by you; thus -- or by others in Belgrade. And thus,
21 the fact that nothing was done to restrain the Bosnian Serb army around
22 Sarajevo, and in other places - you know, including Srebrenica - we -- we
23 took as meaning that you either acquiesced or supported these activities,
24 because we could see demonstrated in the pattern of behaviour a capacity
25 to influence these -- these events.
1 Q. Mr. Harland, international mediators who came to see me - and you
2 mentioned Churkin and Akashi and others - wanted to help, to stop the war.
3 Serbia -- and I personally for my part did my best to wield all my
4 influence in order to stop the war and to support the peace plans or,
5 rather, to stop having individual situations of the kind that you're
6 describing; that is to say, situations of crisis, to overcome them in
7 order to enable us to solve issues peacefully. So that is the experience
8 gained from each of the examples that you have quoted. Is that something
9 you're aware of or not?
10 A. What I'm aware of is that the -- that you clearly had a capacity
11 to influence the behaviour of the Bosnian Serb armed forces. We saw it.
12 We could ask them about it. There was a large amount of financial and
13 materiel support they got, and yet nothing was done to -- to stop the
14 shelling of Sarajevo or the sniping or the attacks on the safe areas or --
15 or even the massacres that followed the fall of -- of Srebrenica. I've
16 already made something of an exception for Zepa, but I think that the --
17 the pattern of acquiescence in the crimes committed against the civilian
18 population of Bosnia and Herzegovina is -- is relatively -- is relatively
20 Q. Well, you cannot ascribe that to Serbia in any way.
21 Do you know that up until the events in Srebrenica and the attack
22 on the safe zone, I heard about that from Carl Bildt and that was the
23 first time I had heard of it. So what does Serbia have to do with various
24 military operations of the army of Republika Srpska, and especially with
25 the one in Srebrenica? And nobody knew about that in Serbia, and even I
1 heard about it for the first time from Carl Bildt, for example. And it is
2 true that Carl Bildt, whether on that particular day or the following day,
3 asked permission -- or rather, there was a message that some Muslim
4 brigades should be saved and allowed to cross the Drina. And we accepted
5 that. There were 840-odd people. We didn't arrest them, as you said,
6 take them prisoner, but we put them in the camp on Mount Tara, and I
7 insisted that the diplomats from all countries in Belgrade should --
8 JUDGE MAY: You are cross-examining now, not making a speech.
9 What do you want the witness to answer?
10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. What I was saying was this: Are you claiming that there was a
12 chain of command from the army of Republika Srpska down to Yugoslavia and
13 that we were in fact in command of the army of Republika Srpska? Is that
14 what you're saying -- and its operations?
15 A. There was support, maintenance, influence from Belgrade, and
16 Belgrade used that support, maintenance, influence to -- to direct a
17 number of outcomes in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it apparently did
18 nothing to prevent over a period of some years the -- the shelling of
19 Sarajevo, for example.
20 Q. Do you mean we could have done more than we did?
21 A. Oh, vastly more. The Bosnian Serbs were almost entirely
22 dependent on support from Serbia and had a - as they themselves
23 recognised - and had a serious effort been made to restrain them, I think
24 that they would certainly have been responsive. They told us as much
1 Q. Do you consider that the efforts undertaken by Serbia to find a
2 peaceful solution were not serious ones, or do you consider that what we
3 should have done was to withhold any assistance to them and allow them to
4 be killed, just like many others were killed and fell casualty?
5 A. I think that the cause of peace was not advanced by giving them
6 the full military support they needed to secure, ethnically cleanse, and
7 hold very large territories. I think that it is true that -- probably
8 true that Serbia was -- wanted a peace agreement and wanted the Bosnian
9 Serbs to give up more than they were willing to give up and that that may
10 have caused differences between Belgrade and Pale. But I do not believe
11 that that led to significant withdrawal of support by Belgrade for Pale,
12 despite the fact that it could have done that and despite the fact it
13 could have influenced events such as the daily killing year after year of
14 civilians in Sarajevo.
15 Q. I believe that we did wield all our influence and do everything
16 we could to stop the war. Now you say that that was not so, that it was
17 otherwise. But never mind. There are others, and we can clear that point
19 Tell me, Mr. Harland, in paragraph 5 you say that it was your
20 task to make political assessments, prepare political assessments. Did
21 you do that on a retrospective basis, or did you assess what might happen
22 in the future and what had happened in the past?
23 A. There was a limited amount of -- a limited attempt to identify
24 the course of events in the coming weeks and month. The principal object
25 was simply to relay information and to try to understand that information
1 from Pale and from Sarajevo.
2 Q. Mr. Harland, as sources of information, those that you used, you
3 mention the warring sides themselves to start off with and then briefings
4 of commanders, international organisations, and general UNPROFOR
5 information; isn't that right?
6 A. Correct.
7 Q. That would be the gist of it, of your basis and groundwork.
8 Now, assessing the participation of the warring sides in putting
9 forward and placing their information, how much came from the Serb side
10 and how much from the Muslim side would you say?
11 A. I would say we met about the same with the Bosnian Serb
12 leadership in Pale and Lukavica and with the Bosnian Muslim leadership
13 in -- in Sarajevo. We also, of course, had, I mean, some independence or
14 information on -- we had the United Nations military observers who were
15 taking note of who was firing at who and at what rate and were checking
16 with mortuaries and Ministers of Health and so on. But between the
17 parties in Sarajevo, I think we probably saw both sides about -- about the
18 same, and we often saw them together in the context of various
20 Q. You mean as far as the warring sides were concerned, they were
21 sort of balanced, and all the others came from international
22 organisations, did they not, all this other information? Were there
23 various non-governmental organisations as sources of information too? I
24 assume so.
25 A. Yes. I mean, we had -- we had some contact with the local
1 population, both on the Serb side and on the Bosnian government side. So,
2 for example, we used to monitor the price of various commodities to check
3 their availability; we used to monitor through UNHCR the humanitarian
4 situation; ICRC would provide information on missing persons. So yes, we
5 had a -- a range of sources. But I think that the -- the principal
6 sources were the Bosnian government leadership, the Bosnian Serb
7 leadership, and information directly generated by UNPROFOR or UNHCR.
8 Q. All right. Now, to speed up a little bit, before I move on to
9 the chronology of events, as you present them in your statement, let me
10 ask you this first: Do you know how many Serbs were killed in Sarajevo
11 during the war there, during that period of time, 1991-1992?
12 A. No, I don't know the number.
13 Q. Have you ever heard the figure being at 10.000 from anybody, that
14 kind of figure? Because you said you had frequent meetings with people
15 close to the leadership of Republika Srpska, for example, or even with the
16 top representatives themselves. But you never heard anything about that,
17 did you?
18 A. That would not be a credible figure. That would not be a
19 serious figure.
20 Q. Very well. Now, do you know that we still don't know about the
21 fate of some 5.000 Serbs from Sarajevo and its environs?
22 A. That is not correct, according to the number of tracing requests
23 that have been lodged with the International Committee of the Red Cross,
24 nor is it in any way consistent with the -- the number of people who have
25 either appeared at the mortuary or who were killed, for example, by the
1 supporters of Caco and buried without being taken to the mortuary. There
2 certainly were Serb victims, some of them killed by -- by Muslims, like
3 Caco, some of them killed or wounded by the -- the Serb guns and snipers
4 around the city. But if I had to make an educated guess, I would put the
5 number in the low hundreds. It's still a lot. It's terrible. But it's
6 certainly nothing like 10.000 people.
7 Q. Well, that's the figure I have here.
8 But tell me this, please: The figure I mentioned and the Serbs
9 missing to the present day from Sarajevo and around it, do you have any
10 idea about that?
11 A. When I was in -- serving in Sarajevo, the -- the numbers of
12 tracing requests lodged with the International Committee of the Red
13 Cross - and this number normally corresponds with missing people - was
14 certainly not in the order of many thousands. It was much -- much, much
16 Q. Very well. Now, in view of the fact that there are facts and
17 figures about that, I need not discuss the matter with you.
18 Mr. Harland, as you gave us a detailed explanation as to what you
19 consider to be the goals of -- the goals prescribed by Republika Srpska,
20 from what you were able to assess from your talks with Koljevic, Plavsic,
21 and others, and all the other people you talked to - I don't know who they
22 all were - but what were the goals of the other warring side, that is to
23 say, the BH army? Because I assume that you probably had a clear-cut idea
24 of those goals too.
25 A. I think they were much more divided in what they wanted than the
1 Bosnian Serb party. I think that there was one group which felt that the
2 Muslims are the largest community in Bosnia and Herzegovina and therefore
3 they had an interest in keeping Bosnia and Herzegovina together as a
4 single state in which they would not be threatened in any way because they
5 would be almost a majority. And, in fact, of course there is -- there is
6 language in Mr. Izetbegovic's Islamic declaration which refers to the --
7 the role that will be played by a Muslim community once they become a
8 majority in a -- in a given country.
9 I believe that there was also a -- a tendency among Bosnian --
10 some Bosnian Muslims to try and create their own compact territory, that
11 is, to pursue goals similar to those of the Serbs and Croats; in other
12 words, to -- to seek to establish a -- a territory on which they would be
13 the -- if not the exclusive community, the overwhelmingly dominant
14 community. And in fact, these two tendencies even debated each other
15 publicly sometimes, such as at the National Assembly meeting that took
16 place in Sarajevo on -- at the Holiday Inn in September of 1993.
17 Q. Tell me, please -- all right. Yes, I understand that. But since
18 you read the Islamic declaration of Alija Izetbegovic, I assume that you
19 know about his attitude and position that there cannot be any cohabitation
20 between Islam and non-Islamic institutions. I'm paraphrasing it of course
21 now. But I assume you know what I'm talking about.
22 A. Yes, I'm familiar with the views he put down in that book.
23 Q. Well, do you then consider that the Serbs could have accepted a
24 state conceived along those lines, Serbs -- the Serbs which had -- who had
25 until then lived as a nation on a footing of equality with everybody else
1 in the area? Could they have accepted that?
2 A. I think that as in our earlier discussion about what people say
3 rhetorically and what they actually do, it's important to discuss reality.
4 Now, I -- when you mention the figure of 10.000 Serbs possibly killed in
5 Sarajevo, I would mention that I lived in Sarajevo for -- for many years,
6 and it was not an atmosphere of terror. I immediately accept that there
7 was a -- there were crimes committed, but in general -- and there was some
8 level of discrimination against non-Muslims in some areas. But I would
9 say that in general the political structures established by the Bosnian
10 Muslims - and at the beginning of the war this was under the leadership of
11 Izetbegovic - were less violently intolerant than the structures
12 established by either the Serb or Croat party. That was -- not to say
13 that there were not crimes or that they were tolerant, but I do believe
14 that they were less violently intolerant and that there was some space in
15 Sarajevo for those who were not of the majority Muslim community in a way,
16 for example, that there was really no space in Visegrad, when we visited
17 Visegrad, for the non-Serb population. So despite what Mr. Izetbegovic
18 said in the Islamic declaration, during the period in which I lived in
19 Sarajevo, there was some -- some degree of toleration, at least more than
20 there was in the -- in the other areas of the country.
21 Q. Yes. But there was an incomparably greater degree of
22 concentration of international institutions, as well as UNPROFOR and
23 non-governmental organisations, and everything else in Sarajevo; isn't
24 that right? In actual fact, Sarajevo was under a magnifying glass held by
25 you, in view of the number of those present, that is to say, the members,
1 the personnel, the staffs of all kinds of international organisations.
2 Isn't that right, Mr. Harland?
3 JUDGE MAY: This must be the last question.
4 Mr. Harland, is there anything you want to add in relation to
5 that observation?
6 THE WITNESS: I just agree with Mr. Milosevic and confirm that in
7 other Bosnian government-controlled territories which were not so much
8 under our scrutiny, the situation was generally rather less tolerant. So
9 I would agree with that point.
10 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll adjourn now.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.
12 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Just a moment. One at a time.
13 Yes. Time is short, by the way.
14 MR. NICE: My only observations were two: First, to say that I
15 should have drawn to your attention that I was assisted in my work with
16 this witness by Ms. Edgerton who sits with me. I'm grateful to her for
18 The second, that the protective measure matter, our position is
19 unchanged. We've made our inquiries, There is no change. We can, of
20 course, address you about it orally, but otherwise the matter is as
21 revealed on paper at the moment.
22 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll look at that.
23 Yes, Mr. Milosevic, very quickly.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. Just briefly, Mr. May. I'm
25 sure you know that for eight days now - today being the eighth day, and
1 you have documentation about that - that I have extremely high blood
2 pressure, and I have been very patient and have been doing my part of the
3 job at each sitting. And you yourself said that for the reasons
4 emphasised by physicians to you that every second weekend be a long
5 weekend. Last weekend was a short weekend, and as it's eight days since
6 my blood pressure has been unacceptably high - but I'm not worrying about
7 that - but I would like to have a longer weekend this coming weekend,
8 extended, in keeping with the ruling you already made with respect to my
9 timetable and schedule. So I'd like Friday and Monday.
10 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, there we are, application for more time
11 off. What would the effect be?
12 MR. NICE: The effect would be very serious for the witnesses,
13 not least because a witness coming on Monday, who is protected until
14 evidence is given certainly, is I think only available on Monday and into
15 Tuesday and has been the subject of long-standing arrangements. We have,
16 of course, other witnesses, including this witness, who is I know
17 committed to flying home tomorrow afternoon and he's made domestic
18 arrangements in respect of a family member tomorrow night, subject to the
19 hurricane, I suppose, but I'm not sure about that. But he's been here a
20 long time and he's -- he's got those domestic arrangements. And then
21 there are other witnesses who will have to be detained or alternatively
22 sent back and brought back.
23 [Trial Chamber confers]
24 JUDGE MAY: What -- Mr. Nice, what is the effect? If we do this,
25 what is the effect? If we grant him an adjournment, it means, first of
1 all, we'd probably have to ask this witness to come back.
2 MR. NICE: [Microphone not activated] That's the beginning --
3 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Nice, please.
4 MR. NICE: And there's another one who has been here for a week
5 and we were hoping to start tomorrow. That witness is a protected
6 witness. I can't identify the witness.
7 JUDGE MAY: No.
8 MR. NICE: But that witness would then -- would then in any event
9 have to be held over in all probabilities while Monday's witness is taken.
10 Alternatively Monday's witness would have to be stood down with no
11 guarantee of when he could come back, and he's an extremely important
13 What Mr. Groome raises as a possible compromise, going through
14 the -- perhaps those witnesses and allowing a break then. I know we
15 already have a break scheduled for the end of next week.
16 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
17 MR. NICE: On the Friday.
18 JUDGE MAY: I don't accept the -- the accused's mathematics, but
19 nonetheless we obviously have to have some regard to his health.
20 MR. NICE: If -- with regard to this witness - who comes from
21 America and who has made domestic arrangements for tomorrow night. I know
22 there's only two sessions tomorrow, but it would be extremely helpful for
23 him and his family arrangements and so on if he can be back tomorrow and
24 not have to come again. Now, if his evidence could be concluded tomorrow,
25 I can then make inquiries of Monday's witness to see if he's going to be
1 able to accommodate us by, for example, doing Tuesday and Wednesday, and
2 we'll just have to shoulder the expense of all the other witnesses, and in
3 that way it might be possible that a compromise could be arranged by the
4 accused having Monday off, for example, with a view to having Friday off
5 as well so he does a three-day week.
6 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We could look at that. We could look at that.
7 And of course, if he is going to make applications of this sort, it's
8 helpful to have it earlier rather than later than springing it on us at
9 the last minute.
10 MR. NICE: Yes.
11 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, we'll consider that as a possible
13 [Trial Chamber confers]
14 JUDGE MAY: Well, we've -- we've had to consider very carefully
15 the position. We have to weigh up a number of considerations: The health
16 of the accused, of course, but also the conduct of the trial and the
17 concerns and the considerations of witnesses who come sometimes from a
18 very long way and have to stay here a long time.
19 In those circumstances, the decision we arrive at is this:
20 Mr. Milosevic, you will have -- we must finish this witness's
21 evidence now tomorrow. You will have two sessions in which to do that.
22 So finish that by 12.00. We will then release the witness.
23 We will not sit on Monday, but we will sit again on Tuesday and
24 we will review the position later in the week as to the health of the
25 accused and any other relevant circumstances.
1 We'll adjourn now, until 9.00 tomorrow morning.
2 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at
3 1.58 p.m., to be reconvened on Friday,
4 the 19th day of September 2003, at 9.00 a.m.