1 Thursday, 23 October 2003
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.
5 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.
6 MR. NICE: The next witness, who's had protection until giving
7 evidence, is Ante Markovic. I trust the Chamber has a copy of a witness
8 summary that has been signed by him a couple of weeks ago now and has been
9 served on the accused in both English and B/C/S. My request is that, to
10 the extent the Chamber judges it appropriate, the signed statement may
11 stand as his examination-in-chief.
12 Before concluding what I have to say, may I have, well, 30
13 seconds or a minute in private session, please.
14 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
15 [Private session]
14 [Open session]
15 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May.
17 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. Just a moment. We, you know, cannot
18 rule on these summaries to admissibility unless we have them in advance.
19 I've not seen this before sitting down today.
20 MR. NICE: Yes. Your Honour, they were certainly sent earlier on
21 my instructions, and Ms. Dicklich tells me they were with your legal
22 officers on Monday, or they were sent to your legal officers on Monday
23 because I had this problem, of course, in mind. And I think I mentioned
24 last week that they either had been served on the accused and were
25 forthcoming, but there was no reason for them not to be available to you a
1 long time ago.
2 JUDGE MAY: We'll look into that, but I haven't seen this.
3 What is the -- we could quickly go through it.
4 Yes, Mr. Milosevic, you wanted to say something.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I only have two remarks, Mr. May.
6 The document from Igalo has already been produced here. I don't know
7 through which witness, and in public session. It's the document from the
8 meeting when Lord Carrington was there, Veljko Kadijevic and myself, and
9 this document has been under consideration, so it is under no restriction
10 of any kind. However, Mr. Nice, of course, has overlooked this.
11 My second remark, in connection with Jovic's book. I suppose
12 Jovic himself can introduce it. Why should Ante Markovic introduce
13 Jovic's book?
14 JUDGE MAY: The only relevance, I guess, are episodes which deal
15 with Mr. Markovic himself, in which case he can -- is in a position to
16 comment on them.
17 MR. NICE: Your Honour, it was certainly my recollection that the
18 Igalo document had been produced. We searched for it last night in the
19 various indices and couldn't find it. That's the reason I've taken the
20 cautious step of seeking it again and then finding it was subject to Rule
22 JUDGE MAY: I don't recollect it. I recollect talk of it,
23 because having read my notes, there is talk -- mention of the Igalo
24 agreement. But I do not remember the agreement. It is may be that it is
25 in the -- in some of the Defence documents which were produced to Mr.
1 Samardzic or a witness of that sort, but I don't recollect it. But in any
2 event, a search can be made.
4 MR. NICE: In summary, of course, if I can just explain, of
5 course, Mr. Markovic was the last Prime Minister of the federal --
6 equivalent to Prime Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. He
7 gives an account of, in very summary form, of his years in office, ending
8 in December 1991. And that includes an account of the accused's attitude
9 towards the policies then being pursued, which will be of value in the
10 overall context of the case.
11 He gives an account of the arming of the Bosnian Serbs. You can
12 find that on page 11.
13 He gives a very brief account of the summary of military activity.
14 On page 14, a reference to paramilitaries.
15 Then we come to page 17 to 22, which is a passage -- perhaps the
16 most part of the evidence from the point of view of the trial, because the
17 Chamber is not concerned to -- to determine which political policies are
18 wrong or right, I don't suspect, and you see that there are personal
19 contacts with the accused which are significant in what they reveal of
21 And then on page 19, a detailed account of what he was told about
22 Karadjordjevo. That would obviously have to be given live, in any event,
23 as would the meeting in The Hague and the last meeting that he had with
24 the accused.
25 So that in reality much of -- or everything from 17 onwards will
1 have to be given live and there are quite a lot of references or many
2 references to the accused in the earlier passages which I could touch on
3 or deal with in detail as appropriate.
4 JUDGE MAY: Would it be a sensible way to go about it so that the
5 evidence could be put into context - and I make this as a suggestion by
6 myself, of course - that you summarise what's in the rest of the document
7 as you go along but those references to the accused you deal with now.
8 MR. NICE: It sounds evidently sensible, and I can deal with that
10 JUDGE KWON: And speaking for myself, I'm not happy with the term
11 "summary." If this document is to be admitted into evidence in one way or
12 another, I think you will have to find another term for this document.
13 MR. NICE: Your Honour may remember that I made the point myself;
14 this document happened to have been signed when we were only able to
15 produce summaries. It was signed because the witness had been here and
16 had then had to go away on account of the accused's ill health. And you
17 never know when you may need a signed document, signed as to its truth.
18 The witness may have to come back in the future. I entirely agree; from
19 now on the word "summary" will not appear and it will be "statement."
20 JUDGE KWON: Has this witness ever given a prior statement apart
21 from this?
22 MR. NICE: Given a prior statement indeed, and that's available
23 should you wish to see it.
24 JUDGE KWON: That being the case, I think that this summary
25 should give specific reference to the paragraphs in the -- of the prior
1 statements, page numbers.
2 MR. NICE: Generally, it would have done, but --
3 JUDGE KWON: Yeah, for the preparation of the accused, for his
4 defence or anything else.
5 MR. NICE: And that's our almost invariable practice. Again, the
6 problem here was we received at the last moment notice that because of the
7 ill health of the accused it wasn't going to be possible for the evidence
8 to be given. The summary had been prepared, and I think my recollection
9 is that the witness only had time to go through it before flying away and
10 we didn't get the annotations done. Normally they are done.
11 JUDGE KWON: Okay.
12 [Trial Chamber confers]
13 JUDGE MAY: Well, we will admit this document on the ground -- on
14 the basis that -- of Rule 89(F), but counsel must summarise, the witness
15 must summarise those -- the rest of the document and those parts which
16 deal with the accused must be given live.
17 MR. NICE: Thank you.
18 JUDGE MAY: We will see what the position is about the document,
19 but I think we need to have the practice clear that if an application is
20 to be made under Rule 89(F), the Chamber must have the document before the
21 hearing and -- and not on the same morning of.
22 MR. NICE: Absolutely. And I'm only sorry that something went
23 wrong somewhere, that you didn't have it at the beginning of the week or
24 last week.
25 May the witness come in and --
1 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Before we do --
2 MR. NICE: Sorry.
3 JUDGE MAY: -- just a question of timing. We cannot sit beyond
4 1.45 today. We've got -- there's another case coming in to this court in
5 the afternoon, in any event. Obviously this is an important witness.
6 MR. NICE: And one who is very anxious about having had to have
7 come back twice already. I'll just have to see how I can do, I think.
8 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Very well.
9 We'll have the witness, please.
10 MR. NICE: The exhibits, I think, will come in with this witness
11 in two or three different numberings, because as I've already explained,
12 I'm going to deal with them as swiftly as I possibly can. And although I
13 shan't be touching the extracts from Jovic's diary in any detail or at
14 all, simply to draw to your attention that they're there, you'll find, I
15 think, that they're highlighted as potentially relevant passages should
16 the Chamber have any time to read them outside court.
17 [The witness entered court]
18 JUDGE MAY: Yes. If the witness would take the declaration,
19 please. And would you stand to do so.
20 WITNESS: ANTE MARKOVIC
21 [Witness answered through interpreter]
22 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. If you'd like to take a seat.
23 Examined by Mr. Nice:
24 Q. Your full name, please.
25 A. Ante Markovic.
1 Q. Mr. Markovic, did you on your last visit to The Hague prepare, in
2 cooperation with the Office of the Prosecutor, a document called a summary
3 but signed by you as to its truth and accuracy?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. A couple of qualifications or corrections identified yesterday;
6 is that a document that is true?
7 A. Yes.
8 Mr. NICE: Your Honour, may that be given an exhibit number. And
9 for registry purposes, I can announce that there's no problem with
10 distributing the document. Nothing will be redacted.
11 THE REGISTRAR: It's 569, Your Honours.
12 Mr. NICE: May the witness have a copy in front of him in B/C/S
13 to follow should he wish.
14 Q. Mr. Markovic, by way of general summary, you were the last
15 effective Prime Minister of the SFRY from the 16th of March of 1989 up
16 until the 20th of December of 1991. And I think the position is you have
17 avoided making any comment publicly on matters with which we are concerned
18 since that date.
19 A. Yes. This is correct. After almost 12 years, this is the first
20 time I'm speaking in public.
21 Q. Your -- I'm going to call it a signed statement and a statement,
22 because the word "summary" is inappropriate. Your statement sets out your
23 background; your education as an electrical engineer, your long history in
24 business and industry until you were persuaded in 1982 to enter politics,
25 thereafter having roles as president of the executive council and
1 president of the Presidency of the Republic of Croatia until you became
2 the effective Prime Minister, by title president of the Federal Executive
3 Council, on the 16th of March of 1989, being at all times a member of the
4 Communist Party, still working as a businessman.
5 A. Correct.
6 Q. Paragraph 5. When given authority to form a government, you were
7 the first person to be able to make your own choice of office-holders,
8 although in doing that, you consulted the republics. Of the various
9 republics you consulted on a voluntary basis, which, if any, made demands
10 for the position of favoured candidates?
11 A. The condition I put forward for accepting the authority to
12 compose a government was to have the greatest possible freedom possible in
13 such cases to form a government. I visited many institutions and had
14 talks. I went to companies, to the various republics. And wherever I had
15 talks - and this includes the highest bodies - no demands were placed upon
16 me but everyone tried to meet my requests. It was only Mr. Milosevic who
17 asked me for something quite definite. He wanted Serbia to have the
18 minister of the interior.
19 Q. This is touched upon in an annex of the -- or this topic is
20 touched upon in an excerpt from Jovic's diary. The position, I think,
21 Mr. Markovic, is that in preparation for giving evidence you have reviewed
22 passages from that book that you had already read and that some of those
23 passages are produced as exhibits for the Judges to consider if it's
24 helpful. Is that correct?
25 A. Yes, that's correct. I can say that I was at least a month late
1 with my proposal for the government before the Federal Assembly because of
2 Mr. Milosevic's request that at any cost he should have the post -- or
3 rather, he should have control of the post of minister of the interior. I
4 had my own candidate, Mr. Zemljaric, who was from Slovenia and who before
5 that was the Prime Minister of Slovenia. Mr. Milosevic went so far as to
6 insist, even after I offered him other solutions - I offered him the post
7 of minister of foreign affairs for Serbia - but he rejected all this and
8 insisted that Serbia should have the post of minister of the interior. He
9 put forward various names, I rejected every one of them because in my
10 opinion none of them was suitable. Finally, he proposed Gracanin.
11 Mr. NICE: Your Honour, can we just deal with the administration
12 of the exhibits. May the file of exhibits for this witness be given a
13 number, presumably 57 --
14 JUDGE MAY: Let us just check these. These are virtually all and
15 concern --
16 Mr. NICE: Many, but not all.
17 JUDGE MAY: -- selections.
18 Mr. NICE: Yes.
19 JUDGE MAY: There are one or two others, some of which have
20 already been tendered, I see.
21 Mr. NICE: Yes.
22 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll get a number for it.
23 THE REGISTRAR: 570, Your Honours.
24 Mr. NICE: So 570 -- I simply alert Your Honours to 570, tab 1,
25 is capable of covering or covers the same general topic.
1 Q. Gracanin thus became office-holder. Why was it, in your
2 judgement, that the accused particularly wanted the Ministry of the
3 Interior? Paragraph 7.
4 A. I think it's quite clear. Throughout this time, Milosevic
5 persistently insisted on this, and in this way he showed what it was he
6 wanted. He wanted to put under his control the intelligence services at
7 all levels; although, in the development of Yugoslavia and its structures
8 as a state, this was no longer such an important institution because every
9 republic had its own Ministry of the Interior, which was well developed
10 and they had their own intelligence and counterintelligence services. The
11 army had this as well. In spite of this, at the federal level there was
12 still many functions and a lot of information linked up to the post of
13 minister of the interior, which were not negligible.
14 Q. The man Gracanin eventually fell out of favour with Milosevic and
15 we can see some reference to this - and I don't need you to expand on this
16 - in tab 2 of the same exhibit, 570. Is that correct?
17 A. After we, as the federal government, developed our own conception
18 and programme for reforms for democratisation of the country - and we were
19 all working on this concept very correctly - there was no reason to
20 exclude from this Gracanin and to have him function outside this team.
21 And as he worked as part of this team, he accepted more and more the
22 elements of this joint policy, those that pertained to his field of work.
23 And, of course, having done this, he could no longer meet the demands made
24 upon him by Mr. Milosevic.
25 Q. For about a year and a half after forming your government, you
1 had a stable and well-functioning government, the programme, paragraph 11,
2 that introduced was one of economic reform and democratisation, you taking
3 the view that the measures you took were not themselves reforms but were
4 aimed at creating an environment where reform could happen. I think your
5 programme included changes in politics, economy, society, and citizen
6 rights, and it was a programme of several phases, starting with a
7 stabilisation programme, moving through economic reforms towards
8 privatisation, state reform, and a multi-party system. Is that correct?
9 A. Yes, this is correct. The first part of what you said, when you
10 said it was not a real reform, it was a programme of stabilisation, to put
11 a stop to inflation and to create the possibility of normal business and
12 also all the other programmes which were to be implemented after this.
13 Q. In your signed statement, at paragraph 11, by bullet points you
14 identify what you were aiming at, and I needn't run through all of those.
15 The accused's attitude in the Federal Assembly expressed through delegates
16 from Serbia, Vojvodina, Kosovo, and Montenegro was what towards your
18 A. From the information I received from several deputies from
19 Serbia, talks were held with the deputies, and they were given the task of
20 toppling the programme put forward by the federal government. They said,
21 "If we don't topple Ante Markovic now, we won't be able to do that in the
22 next four years, and he is not favourable to us, so everything has to be
23 done to topple him." However, at that session of the Federal Assembly,
24 both bodies had a joint session, and I reported to them, putting forward
25 all the basic elements of the programme, and I announced that the currency
1 would become convertible and showed them the new convertible currency,
2 which no one knew had been printed -- and that's a special story, how I
3 managed to do this. At that moment, there was such thunderous applause,
4 such ovations in the Assembly, that no one could put forward any
5 objections. However, when bills were tabled in parliament, a sufficient
6 number of deputies were found who did everything to try to impede this
7 process of reforms to make it more difficult and to slow them down. In
8 Serbia, for example, salaries were increased, and this was not supposed to
9 be done in that period of time.
10 Q. What was it in the programme, in your judgement, in the programme
11 that you were putting forward that was objectionable to the accused and
12 his supporters?
13 A. First of all, they had a global objection, saying that this
14 programme would enrich the richer parts of the country and would further
15 impoverish the poorer parts. Of course, a programme of reform for society
16 is such that not every part of society is equally able to accept it and to
17 implement it. Some need more time than others. And because there was a
18 difference between the developed areas of Croatia and the underdeveloped
19 areas of Croatia - Slovenia and Croatia were more developed; Serbia was in
20 the middle; Macedonia, Bosnia, and Herzegovina were less developed than
21 the average - and because of this, the government made a decision within
22 the scope of the programme that the foreign obligations of Macedonia,
23 Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, and Kosovo would be taken over by the
24 government. This, as far as I can recall -- it's been quite a long time,
25 but it amounted to, I think, 988 billion dollars. This was not an
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 inconsiderable amount, which was transferred from the budgets of the
2 republics to the level of the Federation, which was to pay all this.
3 There were some other elements where they were favoured.
4 Q. I --
5 A. Do I need to expand further? There were other objections as
6 well. One of these was --
7 Q. Just if I could interrupt you for one minute, Mr. Markovic. You
8 realise that time is a problem, and I know that your concerns about coming
9 back, so there's a balance between the fullest answer and getting things
10 done in a summary way. If I can move you on just at this extent: What,
11 in your judgement, if any, was the accused's personal objection to your
12 programme? Which of his personal objectives was thwarted by it?
13 A. There are several elements here that we could discuss, but I'm
14 afraid it would take too long, so I'll try to be very rational with time.
15 Number one, the implementation of the reforms of the state, the state
16 system, then the legal system because ultimately Mr. Milosevic used the
17 street to topple his political opponents. He used a kind of political
18 lynching, and he would no longer be able to do this if democracy
20 Further, he was to be put on an equal footing with all the
21 others, and he could not usurp the rights he was usurping, because such
22 communication would be established between society, the parliaments, the
23 governments, and all the political elements, because when a reform is
24 implemented, not only an economic but also a political and social reform
25 and society is democratised and the state is reformed and all this was
1 part of the programme in its entirety, then rights could no longer be
2 usurped by one man, who although he had no legal basis was able to control
4 Q. Thank you. You mentioned how --
5 MR. NICE: I should say, Your Honours, that through the witness
6 the approach to the witness's democratisation programme and other aspects
7 of the programme of the accused and of Jovic is dealt with in tab 3 of
8 Exhibit 570, or touched on at tab 3.
9 Q. You've mentioned how salaries were raised. Can you tell us,
10 please, what was or approximately what was the level of inflation when you
11 took over the reins of government?
12 A. It was several thousand a year, the level of growth. And after
13 the programme, regardless of the fact that because of the demands of the
14 Serbian delegation, talks were prolonged and certain elements were
15 implemented with delays, 10- or 15-day delays, the programme could not be
16 implemented on the same day and this was one of the prerequisites for its
17 success. But by April inflation had been reduced to zero, and in May and
18 June I think it was even below zero, and this was the first time in any
19 socialist country that inflation had been reduced to zero. Besides this,
20 we managed to establish large hard currency reserves. According to the
21 French governor of the central bank, we had larger hard currency reserves
22 than many European countries, and they amounted to almost 11 billion
24 Q. Well, against your programme of economic reform, you've mentioned
25 how salaries were raised. I think was there also a one-and-a-half-hour
1 strike staged in Belgrade on the 20th of December of 1989? Just yes or
3 A. Yes. It was organised, and about 600.000 people took part,
4 protesting against the programme.
5 Q. Did the accused express his views - just yes or no - about the
6 programmes reforms in closed sessions of the Serbian Assembly and the
7 Serbian government?
8 A. I don't know that for a fact. I know that the Serb government,
9 which met during those days, did give a negative response to the reform,
10 and it also gave a negative answer, and so did the government of
11 Vojvodina. They gave a negative answer, and the government of Montenegro
12 had certain remarks and criticisms to make, which is logical, but in
13 general terms this attitude meant that it was being rejected.
14 Q. You have explained how on producing as a surprise, and I think
15 actually waiving the currency, you were able to attract wide support. Was
16 the position - paragraph 15 - that by the beginning of 1990 opinion polls
17 put your popularity higher than Kucan's in Slovenia and indeed higher than
18 the accused's in Serbia, so that had you been able to have elections at
19 that time you would have been almost inevitably somebody who couldn't be
21 A. Well, yes, that's right. All the opinion polls at the time spoke
22 highly --
23 Q. Thank you.
24 A. -- of myself. They assessed me highly. And this, of course,
25 emerged from the overall programme, a comprehensive programme which had
1 never been put forward in Yugoslavia until then. And the conditions were
2 ripe for it, and of course this was one of the reasons for which certain
3 people felt envy, and they felt they could be politically jeopardised.
4 Within the frameworks of the programme put forward by my government were
5 necessary changes to be made, new laws to be drafted, and the constitution
6 too for general Yugoslav elections to be held, and we wanted to go to the
7 polls generally, for a general Yugoslav election straight away, but
8 certain points in the constitution had to be changed and the
9 representatives of the two republics came out emphatically against that,
10 that is to say, of Serbia and Slovenia.
11 Q. I'd like to summarise a few matters from your statement. And I
12 hope if I get them right, you'll be able to acknowledge that by a simple
13 yes or no. You've told us about reducing inflation to zero, paragraph 16,
14 and having foreign currency reserves I think of the order of 11 billion
15 dollars and getting a positive balance of payments. And you also had some
16 65.000 private companies established during your very first year in
17 office. All correct? Just yes if it is.
18 A. Correct. And we could even say that this was in -- within the
19 space of a year and a half, because in the first nine months, from the
20 16th of March, 1989, until the 18th of December, when I came out with the
21 programme, that same year, that is, I was diligent in preparing the
22 programme and devised the preconditions for putting it into practice. And
23 when it started to be implemented, then those were the results that were
24 scored. And let me also add that the country's debts at that time dropped
25 from 21 and a half billion dollars to 12.2 billion dollars.
1 Q. Paragraph -- thank you. Paragraph 18. One of the problems - and
2 we've heard about this from another witness - was the primary issue of
3 money, that is, the printing of money. You would not support subsidies to
4 the agricultural sector by the primary issue of money, planning for
5 agriculture to be supported from elsewhere and achieving a regime where
6 agricultural product prices did not rise, indeed where you had stockpiles
7 of wheat, corn, and other -- other commodities to intervene in order to
8 control prices.
9 As part of your anti-inflation approach, you ended a policy
10 whereby goods exported to the USSR were paid automatically by the bank
11 without proof of receipt of the money from the USSR, and this, I think, is
12 one of the various things commented on by Jovic in his book, you trying to
13 stop that practice, you seeking to have proof of payment to the Yugoslav
14 National Bank before providers could themselves be paid. And
15 this, again, led to an improvement in the exchange rate for clearinghouse
16 of the dollar.
17 And this is all covered, the first parts, I think, at tab 4, and
18 the second passage is at tab 5 of Exhibit 570 in Jovic's book. Just yes
19 or no, if I've summarised the position correctly, please.
20 A. Yes. You've summarised it very correctly. May I just add the
21 following: It was customary in Yugoslavia before our government, and
22 especially before this particular programme, to make great use of primary
23 emissions for the financing of different areas and for financing the
24 budget deficit, also to finance agriculture and the deficit that was
25 incurred with the exchanges with the Soviet Union. Our firm decision as a
1 component part of our programme was that we must not use primary emission,
2 even to finance the budget of the Federation, except in extraordinary
3 cases, which were stipulated. So when it came to agriculture, we provided
4 resources to assist agriculture within the budget, and we allocated these
5 resources through the budget and not by printing money from the National
6 Bank of Yugoslavia.
7 Now, as far as the Soviet Union is concerned, we had an enormous
8 debt run up there.
9 Q. An eye to the time, Mr. Markovic, a matter for you, but it's
10 really -- you may think -- if we can just deal with it in summary, it's
12 Just to get the context right, of course, the 1989 budget was the
13 budget that applied to the calendar year 1990. And then at the end of
14 1990, you prepared a budget for the calendar year 1991. Correct?
15 A. Yes, that is correct.
16 Q. Before we come to the difficulties that you encountered in that
17 second budgetary year - paragraph 20 of the signed statement - was there
18 an incident involving the accused which you describe as "the robbery of
19 the century"? Please just explain it to us in a couple of sentences and
20 your contacts with the accused about it.
21 A. At the end of 1990, I received information from my friends that
22 the Serbian government or Serbian National Bank had made a break-through,
23 had broken into the monetary system, and that it had transferred to the
24 Central Bank of Serbia, the National Bank of Serbia, 18.2 billion dinars
25 for its purposes without any coverage. That was daylight robbery, pure
1 and simple. And it shook the very foundations of Yugoslavia.
2 Mr. Milosevic, who bragged a lot and said he was fighting for Yugoslavia,
3 showed how much this was true and how much he was actually fighting for
4 his own interests.
5 When I received that information, I called him up straight away.
6 I got him over the phone, and I talked to him, and I was very sharp with
7 him. Mr. Milosevic said he knew nothing about it, and I told him that
8 there was not a single detail that was going on in Serbia which could have
9 gone on without his knowledge and without him agreeing to it, let alone
10 this kind of daylight robbery, to the tune of 2 and a half billion German
12 All he said was that he would look into the matter. And I said,
13 "There's nothing to look into. What you must do is take steps
14 immediately and rescind that decision and put the money back." He said he
15 would investigate the matter, and if that were true that that was what he
16 would do. He didn't, of course, do that, but I convened a government
17 meeting straight away and the government ordered the National Bank -- the
18 Central Bank of Yugoslavia to take the most rigorous steps vis-a-vis the
19 National Bank of Serbia and to have the moneys sent back as urgently as
20 possible. And I think that indeed in the space of two or three weeks the
21 money was returned. About 10 billion, I would say, approximately.
22 However, the rest of the money was never returned.
23 Q. So that 1 billion approximate Deutschmarks shifted from the
24 federal --
25 A. That's right, yes, 1 -- actually, 2 and a half billion marks were
1 returned but 1 and a half billion we never got back.
2 Q. And the robbery had been achieved by manipulation of the banking
3 system; is that correct?
4 A. Yes. Yes, through a manipulation of the banking system. It
5 wasn't real money, it was quasi-money, the kind of transactions that banks
6 have amongst themselves.
7 Mr. NICE: Your Honours, Jovic's account of this can be found at
8 tab 6.
9 Q. Then we move on to the next year, the budgetary difficulties of
10 1991. By this time - paragraph 21 - were difficulties arising because
11 Slovenia and Croatia were retaining taxes they would otherwise have paid
12 to the federal budget, and this made balancing the books that much more
14 A. At first, when the budget was established for 1991, we still had
15 normal conditions prevailing, regardless of what the National Bank of
16 Serbia had done by breaking into the system of the National Banks of
17 Yugoslavia. And we set up the budget in the same way we had set it up in
18 1990 and 1989 -- or rather, the 1989-1990 fiscal year. However, within
19 the -- within that year, there was greater tension in relations between
20 individual parts of Yugoslavia, especially Slovenia and Croatia and
21 Serbia, or that portion which was under Milosevic's control, which wasn't
22 only Serbia. And then at one stage, when they proclaimed their
23 independence and secession, that is to say, Slovenia and Croatia, what
24 happened was that they usurped the funds which were direct resources from
25 the budget of the Federation, such as customs, taxation, revenues and so
1 on. And in that way, in actual fact, the budget was left without a large
2 portion of the federal resources, federal funds. And Serbia took the
3 decision not to pay into the budget any more, so for a time it was only
4 Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia, which were in fact the poorest
5 regions or amongst the poorest regions at that period of time, and they
6 were not able to cover the needs and requirements stemming from the
7 responsibilities that the budget had to tend to. And so there were calls
8 for emissions of money, financing by this method, but we can only do that
9 up to a certain level, because the regulations did not allow us to do that
10 and to become indebted in that way.
11 However, as major changes had taken place in the second half of
12 1991 and as there were major changes in the National Bank as well, because
13 the governors had stepped down from the Council of the National Bank of
14 Yugoslavia, the governors of Croatia and Slovenia, in fact, they had
15 stepped down, so that it was impossible to keep emission and the printing
16 of money under control, because it was the governors' council who would
17 okay that.
18 And then what happened was what Mr. Milosevic did when he took
19 over 18.2 billion, billions. This was primary emission. Money was
20 emitted, printed, and the insistence was that those moneys should be used
21 to finance various areas. I was not able to prevent any of that, so that
22 I was -- became impotent in various areas and in that as well.
23 Q. [Microphone not activated] And indeed by the autumn and early
24 winter of --
25 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
1 MR. NICE: Thank you.
2 Q. By the autumn and early winter of 1991, you found yourself
3 isolated and alone in government - paragraph 22 of this signed statement -
4 with no support and no chance of taking matters forward. And there came a
5 time when you produced a report --
6 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm not intending that we should take the
7 witness through this in detail now. He provided it to us yesterday.
8 We've managed to get a draft translation. It's a document of several
9 sides, but it summarises events. And I would ask that that may be added
10 to the Exhibit 569 and perhaps become -- 570, I beg your pardon, and
11 perhaps become its tab 16, if that would be convenient.
12 Q. Is it right that you prepared this report, Mr. Markovic? We're
13 not going to go through it at the moment, but it's available for the
14 Judges to read.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. I will, however, ask you to do something with a rather shorter
17 document, which is to read at this stage the statement you made when you
18 finally resigned from office on the 20th of December before you left for
19 Graz via Zagreb.
20 MR. NICE: And I wonder if this statement could become tab 17.
21 Again, it's the subject of a draft translation and a final translation
22 will have to be provided in due course.
23 A. "Thank you very much for giving me the opportunity of publishing
24 the statement in its entirety of the president of the Federal Executive
25 Council who has tendered his resignation. Allow me to read it out. It is
1 very brief: The political crisis and the war have eliminated the results
2 of the reform and the process of democratisation. Neither the support of
3 the world or the European Community or the United Nations or the United
4 States of America, the Troika, the 14 agreements on a cease-fire from
5 Igalo to Geneva, The Hague Conference, were not able to make for a
6 peaceful solution of the Yugoslav crisis but the flames of war broke out
7 more and more, with thousands of casualties, destroyed towns and villages
8 in Croatia. There's the threat to Bosnia-Herzegovina, the enormous number
9 of refugees, mostly poor people who have been left without anything. The
10 economic catastrophe is therefore becoming deeper with the growth of
11 hyper-inflation, millions of people unemployed, the production reductions,
12 a great deal of poverty for millions of people, the citizens of this
13 country who are not to blame for any of this and which will necessarily
14 lead to a social explosion of unprecedented proportions.
15 For anything to be done to stop this imminent process of
16 disintegration, each individual and all of us together must do everything
17 to stop the war, to establish peace, and to enable the arrival of the Blue
18 Helmets. And on the basis of general European principles and documents
19 that have already been adopted, including The Hague one and the Brussels
20 one, to seek to find a solution to the Yugoslav crisis through peaceful
21 means and agreement. The Federal Executive Council in that process of
22 stopping economic and social crises, as well as war devastation, has been
23 made completely incapable of doing so. It has no competence or authority,
24 nor is it allowed to work, let alone to wage any sort of policy with the
25 budget for the following year, which from the Federal Executive Council is
1 being required, should be financed and politically supported, because
2 about 81 per cent of the budget goes towards financing the Yugoslav
3 People's Army, which is quite outside the control of the Federal Executive
4 Council. The revenue for this is found through emissions, which means the
5 printing of money, and this contributes to the growth of hyper-inflation.
6 This means not only a continuation of war and death and destruction but
7 the loss of all economic and social prospects, and I always during my term
8 of office fought to counteract this.
9 So I see no other possibility than to resign because I was always
10 for democracy and peace and against war, and that is why a war budget for
11 me is quite unacceptable and I cannot put anything like that forward and
12 shall not do so. As the Assembly at the SFRY is no longer functioning as
13 a parliament able to represent all sections of Yugoslavia and as the Rump
14 Presidency is not qualified to bring in valid decisions, there is no organ
15 or institution which would legally be able to give me back my term of
16 office, and in that respect I am ready to involve myself in all activities
17 that will be required of me by the lawful representatives of the country
18 in order to prevent war, mutual killing, and in the quest for a peaceful
19 and democratic solution to the crisis. Thank you."
20 Q. And then having read that resignation statement, telling
21 journalists about your decision, you flew to Graz.
22 MR. NICE: Your Honours, I'm going to come back to paragraphs 23
23 to 50 at the end and deal with them as succinctly as I can. But may we
24 now turn to paragraph 51.
25 Q. Mr. Markovic, having set the overall political scene in which you
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 encountered the accused, can we deal in a little more detail with your
2 personal contacts with him.
3 First seeing him, I think, in Zagreb in about 1986 or 1987, in
4 relation to a man Ivan Stambolic, of whom we've heard and who was a friend
5 of yours. Did he organise a visit of Serbian officials to Croatia and was
6 that the first time when you met the accused?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Thereafter, your first working contact with him concerned
9 Stambolic. In summary, can you explain what happened?
10 A. One day, after a session of the Central Committee of the League
11 of Communists of Serbia at which Milosevic toppled Ivan Stambolic and
12 threw him out of the Central Committee, as well as a number of other
13 people who were together there with Stambolic, he called me up. At that
14 time, I was president of the Presidency of Croatia. But for many years I
15 was also one of the leading people in the Yugoslav Bank for Economic
16 Cooperation. And as the director and president of Rade Koncar, which was
17 one of Yugoslavia's largest companies, which I led for 24 years, I
18 insisted greatly on organising businessmen to set up the JUBMES Bank for
19 economic support to exports from Yugoslavia, and this proved to be an
20 excellent idea.
21 Milosevic asked me whether I could find a place for Ivan Stambolic
22 in that bank, the Bank for International Economic Cooperation. As I had a
23 high regard for Ivan Stambolic and as I knew that his survival in Serbia
24 would be, to say the least, bitter or practically impossible, I accepted
25 to do this and I helped him come to the post of president of that bank.
1 At the time, Ilija Marijanovic was the bank's president - he's another
2 good friend of mine - and we met and we discussed this matter, and we
3 discussed his tendering his resignation so that the road be open for Ivan
4 Stambolic, and that's how Ivan Stambolic came to be elected general
5 director of JUBMES and Ilija Marijanovic remained as his deputy.
6 Q. After that business encounter with the accused, you then found
7 yourself having the mandate of forming the government. Was your
8 appointment something of which he ever appeared to approve?
9 A. Well, there's a difference between courtesy and doing something
10 just in informal terms and in actual substance. Of course, he would
11 congratulate people, but of course everything that was done from the first
12 day was done and geared towards making it impossible for the government to
13 function at whose head I stood. On many occasions, relations were
14 severed, and we could mention an instance in point; with respect to the
15 re-election of Stambolic to the post of president of the Yugoslav Bank for
16 reconstruction and development, for example, which is when --
17 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...
18 A. Yes. Which is when Milosevic asked me that the Federal Executive
19 Council should not lend its support to the re-election of Stambolic. In
20 fact, that bank was a bank of a large number of Yugoslav companies, export
21 companies. But also, the federal state had its own interests there, and
22 via the budget it had participation in the proprietary of the bank, but it
23 didn't have the majority vote, and the state always wields great influence
24 in that respect. So he asked me to propose on behalf of the Federal
25 Executive Council that Stambolic should not be re-elected as bank
2 I refused to do that. There was no reason for that, and in fact
3 Milosevic made it be known that he personally did not like to have
4 Stambolic around and that he was interfering in certain affairs in Serbia,
5 which, as he said, wasn't a good thing either for Stambolic or for Serbia,
6 as he put it. I didn't know about all this, and I don't think it could
7 have been proved either. So I refused to do that, and Milosevic then
8 proceeded to write a letter, addressing it to the Federal Executive
9 Council, officially asking the Federal Executive Council of the Yugoslav
10 government not to support Stambolic's election. And I, of course,
11 informed the Federal Executive Council about this and asked them to
12 authorise me to function along those lines. I was given the power to do
13 so, and I went to the bank Assembly meeting and lent my support to the
14 re-election of Stambolic, who won the vast majority of votes.
15 Q. By this time --
16 A. Many companies from Serbia even voted for him. And may I just
17 finish, please.
18 After that, Milosevic cut off all communications with me and the
19 federal government for the next few months, which means that for him it
20 wasn't important that a state system should be allowed to function. And
21 Serbia was the largest republic in Yugoslavia. He didn't like his demands
22 being rejected. And because of that, he blocked work between Serbia and
23 the federal government.
24 Q. One point, not quite clear from what you said: At this time, was
25 Stambolic also a potential political competitor of the accused?
1 A. In formal terms, he was not. And he did his best not to meddle
2 in politics at all. However, by the positions he took, not only in Serbia
3 but in Yugoslavia as well, Stambolic was a highly-respected man. He was a
4 very diligent and honest man. And by his very existence, he presented a
5 danger to Milosevic.
6 Q. Back to paragraph 53 for some general points. When dealing with
7 the accused, was he straightforward and open in his manner of dealing?
8 And a second point: We've heard some evidence that he dealt with people
9 on a one-to-one basis. What was your experience?
10 A. Well, it differed. Milosevic very rarely said what he thought,
11 and also he hardly ever did what he thought, so that it was very difficult
12 to assess all this. You would have to take everything with a pinch of
13 salt, some reservations, and look at the global trends and then deduce why
14 he was doing something. So I never gained the impression that he did
15 something along those lines, something that would be constructive for the
16 whole country. I was not able to deduce that from anything, and I also
17 have to say that never in front of me did he speak of a Greater Serbia.
18 He always came out in favour of Yugoslavia. However, at the same time
19 what he was doing was undermining Yugoslavia, in fact.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Markovic, why didn't Mr. Milosevic get his
21 way in having Stambolic removed?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It did not depend on him, so he was
23 not able to do this, because the Yugoslav Bank for Economic Cooperation
24 was an institution at the Yugoslav level. It did not fall within his
25 competence. It was quite independent. And if anyone was competent over
1 it, it was the federal government. So he was unable to exert any
2 influence on the replacement of Ivan Stambolic, apart from persuading some
3 members of the Assembly of the Yugoslav Bank to vote against him at the
4 annual Assembly. But as I said before, the majority of delegates in the
5 Assembly of JUBMES, this bank, voted in favour of Stambolic, not against
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.
8 MR. NICE: Thank you very much. The -- I'll just get the tab
9 reference. The tab reference to what we've been dealing with is -- well,
10 I'll find it in a second and come back to that. Is it 8? Sorry. I'll
11 come back to that in a second.
12 Q. As well as the other things that he did following his
13 unsuccessful attempt to remove Stambolic, were you attacked in the press
14 by him and also by Jovic?
15 A. Yes. Not only Jovic. In this period of time, after I refused to
16 support Milosevic's demand that Stambolic be replaced, there was a media
17 campaign in Serbia and beyond. I think there was something in Montenegro
18 as well -- against me. It was organised against me personally and not the
19 Federal Executive Council. And there is something I would like to add. I
20 don't know to what extent it's relevant, but when the NATO attack on
21 Serbia occurred because of Kosovo, Ivan Stambolic contacted me. He was in
22 Bulgaria at the time. And, of course, the two of us had socialised quite
23 a lot while I was in Belgrade, and we had the same opinions and world
24 view, so we became very close and were able to talk rather intimately. He
25 told me when he called me from Bulgaria, "Ante, I can see how things are
1 developing. Although I have refused to do so up to now, I will have to
2 become politically active." And I, of course, supported this. I felt
3 that the time was coming when Serbia would need him. It seems that
4 someone else understood this besides myself, which is why Stambolic
6 JUDGE MAY: Let us make sure that we have for the record the
7 right tab number for Stambolic.
8 MR. NICE: 14 was the -- I'm sorry not to have been it at my
9 fingertips. Tab 14 was the one that dealt with the previous passage, and
10 we're just moving on now to tab 15, which is paragraph 57.
11 Q. In the fall of 1990, Mr. Markovic, did the accused approach you
12 in respect of a constitutional change and did he make a proposal to you?
13 A. This was when, let's say, an unofficial chat about this and that,
14 when we were advocating constitutional reforms, at one point Milosevic
15 said: "It would be best to go for changes of the constitution that would
16 remove the Presidency, which is ineffective and which is in fact impeding
17 work in this country, and that instead of the Presidency there should be a
18 president. I propose, if you agree, that we both work on this, and we are
19 prepared to nominate you for president," I waved this aside; I didn't take
20 it seriously. In order to carry out amendments to the constitution, you
21 needed the approval of all republics, and it was a very complicated and
22 long process, which could not be realised that quickly. But I wasn't at
23 all interested in that. If that's what you were referring to.
24 Q. Thank you. And this is touched on to the degree it is at tab 15.
25 And can I now move to Karadjordjevo and the March 1991 meeting
1 between Tudjman and the accused. Following that meeting, did you have
2 meetings with both Tudjman and the accused where they spoke of that
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. There are two ways of dealing with this: You can either, as it's
6 set out in your statement, deal with the way in which their accounts to
7 you had elements in common; or, whichever is most convenient for you, you
8 can tell us item by item -- not item by item -- person by person what the
9 accused and what Tudjman said to you. Can you give us an account of what
10 you were told.
11 A. As I had received information about the topic discussed in
12 Karadjordjevo, that is, the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina between
13 Serbia and Croatia, and that Milosevic and Tudjman had agreed to carry out
14 this division, and also there was talk of the dismissal of the Prime
15 Minister, Ante Markovic, because he was in the way of both of them in
16 implementing this division of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
17 At my initiative, I had a meeting with Milosevic in Belgrade and
18 with Tudjman in Zagreb. According to my custom, I spoke to both of them
19 very openly. The results of these talks were that both of them confirmed
20 to me that they had agreed to divide up Bosnia and Herzegovina. Milosevic
21 told me this very soon. Tudjman needed much more time to admit this and
22 to say that they had reached an understanding about it.
23 They did not have identical interpretations of this agreement.
24 Milosevic said that Bosnia and Herzegovina was an artificial entity
25 created by Tito, that it could not survive, and that most of the Muslims
1 were in fact Orthodox who had been forced to change their religion. When
2 I asked him directly or, rather, I asked both of them directly, "Do you
3 think --" that's what I said to Milosevic, "Do you think that this will be
4 so simple? Do you think you will be able to do this without bloodshed,
5 without blood up to the knees?" Milosevic said he didn't believe that.
6 He said that Bosnia and Herzegovina anyway has a majority of Serbs and
7 Croats in the population so that there would be no conflict, and that they
8 had envisioned an enclave for the Muslims, the two of them, and that the
9 Muslims could live in that enclave.
10 I asked the same question of Tudjman. I said to him, among other
11 things, "Do you think that people who will be born and who will die to the
12 sound of gunfire, that this will not transform Bosnia and Herzegovina into
13 a kind of Palestine? How many victims will there be? How much
14 destruction? How much will be ruined?" Tudjman thought this would not be
15 the way things would happen. He said, "Europe will not allow a Muslim
16 state in its heart. We will gain the support of European. And as for
17 your fears that there will be war there, all I can say is Bosnia fell
18 silently," because in history Bosnia once fell without an armed struggle,
19 so there is this saying in our language that Bosnia fell with a whisper.
20 Tudjman said that the Muslims were anyway Catholics who had been forced to
21 adopt Islam. So each of these men admitted and thought this was something
22 quite normal. Tudjman even asked for my approval and support that Bosnia
23 and Herzegovina should be divided.
24 With respect to the dismissal of the federal Prime Minister, both
25 of them said this was true but each of them said that this had been
1 proposed by the other. But, of course, the other had no reason to
3 In any case, I parted with both of them totally dissatisfied and
4 said I would fight against this to the end and that I would do whatever
5 was in my power - and this was not much, but there was still something I
6 could do - to prevent such an intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina which
7 could not but end in bloodshed, refugees, ethnic cleansing, and a
8 destroyed economy and society. And this is precisely what happened
10 Q. Perhaps, without inconveniencing the Chamber too much, we can go
11 back, for chronological reasons, to paragraph 35, to give some sequencing
12 of events. Mr. Markovic, in July of 1991 -- no, I beg your pardon.
13 There's something I've forgotten.
14 Can you just tell us, in respect of your meeting with the accused
15 about Karadjordjevo -- at Karadjordjevo, how did the accused end his
16 explanation of what -- of what had happened? What did he say as to his
17 forecast for the future, arising from what had happened at Karadjordjevo?
18 A. He told me what I've just said, that nothing would happen, that
19 this would succeed because of the ratio of Serbs, Muslims, and Croats.
20 And when I insisted and said, "What if war does break out?" he said,
21 "Well, then we'll see what we'll do," and he didn't go into it in greater
23 Q. Did you indicate to either or both of these men whether you would
24 accept what they'd done or whether you would contest it?
25 A. I have just said that I told them I would contest it with all
1 means at my disposal, which were not very large but by any means I had at
2 my disposal I would fight against this.
3 Q. Did you inform Izetbegovic -- the late Izetbegovic about what had
5 A. Yes. But not right away; a little later.
6 Q. Let's go back to -- in your signed statement, to paragraph 35.
7 From your relationship with Izetbegovic in July 1991, were you informed of
8 a plan to arm the Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
9 A. At that time, I visited Macedonia and Kiro Gligorov and Alija
10 Izetbegovic in Bosnia often. There was not a month where I didn't go to
11 see them, exchange views with them, exchange information, and thus
12 Izetbegovic informed me that they had intercepts of conversations between
13 Milosevic and Karadzic from which it was evident that Serbian paramilitary
14 units in Bosnia and Herzegovina were being armed. I asked him to give me
15 these intercepts, and he sent them to me by his minister of the interior,
16 who came to see me in Belgrade and who played the tapes for me. There
17 were several tapes. And from these, I recognised Milosevic's voice and
18 Karadzic's voice. They were discussing the organisation of armies, the
19 arrival of helicopters, the arrival of a colonel, an RAM programme which I
20 was not aware of, I don't know what it was, and of ammunitions which were
21 to be taken from certain places and sent to certain places.
22 Alija Delimustafic, the minister, showed me this. When I asked
23 him to give me this because there was a session of the Federal Executive
24 Council taking place, I wanted to play this there, but he disagreed and he
25 deleted the tapes. I gave this information to the cabinet, but in any
1 case this is the information I received.
2 I told the government meeting about it --
3 Q. Carry on. Sorry. The government, having been told about it,
4 what --
5 A. Admiral Brovet was there at the session, and he denied this. He
6 said it was impossible, he said this was a forgery, that the army had
7 nothing to do with this. But this was absolutely untrue, because I
8 clearly recognised the voices, and it was quite clear that they were
9 discussing the handover of weapons and the places where weapons could be
11 I heard a tape like this here in your office, and I didn't hear
12 the ones that Delimustafic played for me, but I did hear similar ones
13 here --
14 Q. Now, there's --
15 A. -- where RAM is mentioned.
16 Q. There was one tape that you listened to. It's tab 30 -- Exhibit
17 353, tab 31. It's been played already. It's available for listening to
19 MR. NICE: I see the time. I'm in the Chamber's hands as to
20 whether it should be done now or after the break.
21 JUDGE MAY: It's time for the adjournment now.
22 Mr. Markovic, we're going to adjourn for 20 minutes. Could you
23 remember, as we tell all witnesses, not to speak to anybody about your
24 evidence until it's over, and that does include speaking to the members of
25 the Prosecution about it.
1 We'll adjourn for 20 minutes.
2 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.
3 --- On resuming at 10.58 a.m.
4 JUDGE MAY: We've considered the position, Mr. Nice, about the
5 extracts from the book.
6 MR. NICE: Yes.
7 JUDGE MAY: And our practice, which we adopted with the last
8 witness, we propose to adopt with this one, which is at this stage to mark
9 the extracts for identification.
10 MR. NICE: Certainly, yes.
11 JUDGE MAY: So they will be marked in that way.
12 MR. NICE: Thank you very much.
13 Two tiny administrative points: The late provision to Your
14 Honours of the summary now referred to as a statement of the witness was
15 not something in respect of which I was making any complaint or -- on whom
16 I was allocating any responsibility. I always assume I am to blame for
17 anything until anyone tells me otherwise.
18 JUDGE MAY: With -- I don't know that you were to blame, but
19 there was plainly some misunderstanding.
20 MR. NICE: Well, I think it's a misunderstanding. Is a
21 reflection a rather good thing. The separation of powers between Bench
22 and bar is overcome to the extent it can by the telephone system. And as
23 the Chamber knows, the telephone system has been in a only partially
24 work-operative form this week and we've all been unable to get in touch
25 with the other. In any case, I think the misunderstanding has been sorted
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
2 And the second thing is that I do now have, courtesy of
3 Ms. Bauer, an annotated version of the statement identifying from which
4 paragraphs of the original witness statement various items have been
5 drawn. So if anybody wants the references, I have them to hand.
6 We're at the moment in paragraph 35 of the statement, and I'd
7 like the witness now to hear part of an already-produced transcript, which
8 Your Honours may recall, part of Exhibit 353, tab 31. It's on Sanction,
9 and we're going to pick it up where the accused picks up the open line and
10 just take it a little bit on beyond that, but not very far.
11 [Intercept played]
12 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover]
13 Radovan, I spoke to the highest place.
15 Please, you need to understand this, because as they say, I don't
16 have -- I cannot explain everything.
17 All right.
18 It is of strategic importance for the future RAM. You know what
19 RAM is?
20 Yes, I know. I know everything.
21 That the Banja Luka group is ready and mobile.
22 All right.
23 This is why you must, first, make sure that it is able and mobile
24 and that it has no problems. And secondly, call Uzelac in one hour and
25 invite him to an agreement.
1 All right.
2 At the highest level.
3 All right.
4 All the additional people that you can provide.
6 That they need to stay and keep their houses and the territory
7 and block those centres of the HDZ, et cetera. They shall be armed. And
8 they shall be provided with everything, we shall fly the helicopters in
9 and all that ...
10 Excellent. I also ask you to --
11 Accordingly, I ask you personally regulate numbers one and two.
12 All these other matters, Kupres, this is very important.
14 And the third thing I told you, the rally, it is very important
15 because of the international community.
16 Yes, that's underway. But, tell me, can we arrange the same
17 thing, that they give me back the armament of the TO in Sipovo and
19 That's a small matter.
20 All right. Let them arm them there, here I -- we've got 170
21 ready in Mrkonjic and 150 in Sipovo and they're ready to go to Kupres.
22 Is Uzelac also in charge of that?
23 No, no, that is -- I think that is him, yes, yes.
24 Tell him that, brother, no problems. We cannot discuss every
25 small detail like this.
1 All right. All right. These 150 and 170 shall go to Kupres and
2 there we've got 750 people.
3 Yes. It is also important for us that this battalion, which is
4 mobilised by the army is in Kupres and that everything be as it should be.
5 It shall be, but if they receive this. Those who stay should put
6 themselves under their command because Kupres is terribly -- that's 50/50
7 and the Serbs suffered horribly there during the war.
8 Let me tell you something, even this crazy Seselj fucked the
9 opposition yesterday.
10 I saw, I heard.
11 You know what he told hem he said, "Did you decide to attack the
12 JNA now when the JNA needs to defend the Serb people."
13 Yes, yes, that's.
14 That's the one he says has the tie of Zimmerman's waiter on.
15 Yes, yes.
16 Fucking hell.
17 Yes, yes.
18 It is even clear to him.
19 Clear, clear, certainly
20 And it is not clear to they'd those traitors.
21 I saw it, I saw.
22 Yesterday in direct contact with Mesic.
23 Have you got a number of Uzelac by any chance?
24 I don't, but you shall find it. Let these find it for you.
25 Yes, yes, all right.
1 Let them find it for you, and please, in an hour.
2 All right.
3 It is now one o'clock.
4 Call him at two.
5 All right.
6 And please tell him that I wish to secure a maximal political
7 support ...
8 Is he going to accept more of our boys if he needs them, or just
9 the ones that already ...
10 He shall receive them if needed. But you give him as many as you
11 judge that should stay there. Everything shall be transported for them in
12 the helicopters, so they've got everything. So that they stay and guard.
13 All right, agreed.
14 Accordingly, you've got everything.
16 But now it is to be or not to be concerning Krajina because they
17 wish to cut off Krajina.
18 Yes, yes.
19 They don't want to go to Knin because many of them would get
20 killed, but they do want to come from behind.
21 Yes, yes. Now we shall ...
22 ... in the JNA, that shan't stop them there. How is it going to
23 stop them with the armour alone, if there's no brigade?
24 All right, agreed. Everything will be all right.
25 When, I mean, now is, as they say, war and this is one of the
2 There are no problems whatsoever.
3 Please take care of it.
4 Only if these numbers work, I think it shall be completed.
5 Everything must work.
6 I will, I will, all right. Talk to you, do call again.
7 MR. NICE:
8 Q. Was this the tape of an intercept you heard when in The Hague a
9 few weeks ago?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. The two voices on the tape, can you recognise either of both of
13 A. Both of them, very distinctly. It was Milosevic and Karadzic
14 talking. This is the same tape that Delimustafic brought to me in
15 Belgrade and that I heard there.
16 Q. It's one of a series of tapes that covered the topics you spoke
17 about before we adjourned half an hour ago?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Do these tapes in general reveal to you that what was happening
20 in the territory of which you were Prime Minister?
21 A. Very clearly.
22 Q. And what was happening? Just remind us. I know we've covered
23 it, but just remind us, what was happening on the territory?
24 A. It's very clear: These were preparations for war in Bosnia and
25 Herzegovina. They were discussing the deployment of the army, the arming
1 of men, the procurement of weapons, Banja Luka, and so on. It's quite
2 clear. Helicopters and so on.
3 Q. Lest anybody is interested in the detail and you can help us with
4 the explanation, the reference to the one with the tie of Zimmerman's
5 waiter, can you remember who that refers to?
6 A. I heard that, but I have no idea who it refers to. No.
7 MR. NICE: This transcript has been produced, I think, earlier
8 for identification, marked for identification. I don't necessarily invite
9 a change in the status of that by reason of this evidence, but this is
10 evidence that says this transcript existed in July of 1991.
11 Q. Can we in the statement return, please, to paragraph 59, on page
12 20, paragraph 16 of the witness's original statement for anybody following
14 Were you in The Hague, Mr. Markovic, in October or November of
15 1991 with presidents of the republic when Vukovar and Dubrovnik were being
16 shelled or had been shelled?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Did you have short conversations with both the accused and
19 Tudjman about this?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Please explain. First I talked to Milosevic and asked him
22 whether he could see what was happening in Vukovar and Dubrovnik. I asked
23 him how he could allow Dubrovnik to be shelled, a famous place like that,
24 important for the culture of this country and for world culture.
25 Milosevic replied, "Who would be crazy enough to shell Dubrovnik?
1 Dubrovnik isn't being shelled." But it was clear, you could see on
2 television that it was being shelled.
3 I then asked Milosevic to go and see Tudjman, wanting Tudjman to
4 confirm to Milosevic that what I was saying was true and that Dubrovnik
5 was being shelled. I repeated my statement. He replied in the same way,
6 saying that this was impossible, that it couldn't be because were this the
7 case, he would know about it. And Tudjman replied to this quite calmly,
8 "Well, you see what Milosevic says." He didn't say anything in favour of
9 an intervention against the shelling of Dubrovnik.
10 Q. The inference that you drew from this as a politician on the
11 ground at the time?
12 A. Well, it imposed itself logically. The conclusion was that
13 Milosevic did wield influence, quite obviously, on what was happening, and
14 Tudjman didn't find it to be in his interest that Dubrovnik should not be
15 shelled, and Vukovar either, or rather, it suited him in the sense of
16 winning over arguments for his emancipation or for his secession and
17 having Croatia recognised.
18 Q. During that last conversation, the conversation where Tudjman
19 said you'd heard what the accused had said, who else was present, if
21 A. Sarinic was. He was the chief of Tudjman's cabinet.
22 Q. Dealing generally with the accused's ability to control events at
23 this time and to deal with the army, is there something you want to say
24 about the agreement at Igalo not covered in the signed statement? But you
25 can rest assured the Chamber has heard of the Igalo agreement before.
1 A. I think it's quite clear. Three men - Milosevic, Tudjman, and
2 Kadijevic - signed the agreement in Igalo, and later on it was to be
3 transformed into other agreements right up until Geneva, and I think it's
4 quite clear; three men that held political power, that had weapons in
5 their hands, and that had in one way or another their soldiers, who were
6 able to obey them or not obey them, they signed the agreement and thus
7 took responsibility upon themselves for the weapons and for everything
8 that was to follow. They didn't stop it, in actual fact.
9 Q. Your last meeting with the accused, dealt with at paragraph 60 of
10 your latest statement, paragraph 32 of the original, longer version, was
11 in Belgrade. And although you haven't dealt with this, I could perhaps
12 summarise it to you. In your last few weeks or months in Belgrade, were
13 things becoming potentially dangerous for you? Did you respond to that
14 danger not by surrounding yourself with bodyguards and close protection
15 but by doing no more than sleeping with a pistol under your pillow at
17 A. For me, those last months were not -- it's not enough to say
18 difficult; they were highly risky. I had a driver who came from Zagreb
19 with me and who drove me while I was working for the Rade Koncar company
20 and in the Croatian institutions, he was my chauffeur there. And I had a
21 man from the security service whom I could rely upon 100 per cent. All
22 the rest I eliminated. I didn't ask anybody to safeguard me. In the
23 situation that I was in, the greatest danger could have come from the
24 people actually providing security for me. And in history, that has been
25 proved right many times, that those who allegedly are there to keep
1 someone safe end up by killing them.
2 Of course, symbolically speaking, I slept more peacefully by
3 having my own pistol and keeping it under the pillow; although, that was
4 just a gesture, because what could I do if I was faced with people who
5 were well armed and so on and wanted to eliminate me?
6 However, my talk with Mr. Milosevic took place sometime at the
7 beginning of December, that is to say, just three or four weeks before I
8 left Belgrade. And the main -- or rather, I asked for the meeting, and
9 the meeting was held in Mr. Milosevic's cabinet. We were alone, there was
10 nobody else there, and we mostly analysed the situation. I said I had
11 come to analyse the situation, in fact, which was a terrible one, and
12 which had its ramifications. The crisis was being made more difficult,
13 there was no chance of an agreement being reached, we were faced with
14 imminent war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And Mr. Milosevic to that said, "What
15 war? Which war?" And I think that was his customary sort of turn of
16 phrase, regardless of the fact that I knew about it. I had listened to
17 the conversation sometime in the middle of that same year, the
18 conversation Mr. Milosevic had with Karadzic, and it was quite obvious
19 that they were arming and preparing themselves, and he said, "Which war?
20 There's no war, nor will there be a war."
21 Anyway, that conversation, as far as I was concerned, was
22 time-out, if I can put it that way, and I would leave the conviction that
23 I would continue to work in the Federal Executive Council, regardless of
24 having made my decision to leave, and, on the other hand, to try and gain
25 an impression of future plans, Mr. Milosevic's future plans, although he
1 never stated them clearly, but I was able to draw my own conclusions from
2 what he said. And the conversation took the following -- those kinds of
3 lines. And that was all, no other characteristic features.
4 Q. Did you make any allegation to the accused by -- about what he'd
5 done and what effect he'd had on your political decisions and movement?
6 A. No. No, we didn't have a conversation along those lines.
7 Q. In all your conversations with the accused - and I think I've
8 probably come to the end of questions about that topic - were you able to
9 discern whether he was a Serb nationalist, in your judgement?, or not?
10 A. No. No. Slobodan Milosevic used everything he could to ensure
11 power for himself and power over people. And if that was nationalism,
12 well, then he used nationalism. But in principle, he wasn't a
13 nationalist. He was quite simply somebody who was ready to use everything
14 at his disposal to secure power for himself.
15 Q. May we return, then, to earlier parts of the statement, which
16 I'll take more briefly, having dealt with the overall history and the
17 involvement of the accused in direct conversations, although he features
18 in other bits of the evidence.
19 Paragraph 23. Mr. Markovic, I intend to summarise lots of these
20 passages, if I can, and where it's possible simply to say that I've got it
21 right by saying yes, that may save time.
22 Paragraph 23. The military budget was part of the general budget
23 initially prepared by the Ministry of Defence and adjusted. The
24 Presidency would be informed about it and the Federal Assembly would take
25 the final decision on it, so that in preparations for the 1991 budget that
1 took place in 1990, the government and you still had control. Correct?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Paragraph 24 deals with the authority required for the primary
4 emission of money. And I think you've dealt with a large part of that
5 already, including the fact that Milosevic had no influence on decisions
6 of the Council of Governors in 1989 and 1990, although this did change in
7 the second half of 1991. For what reason, please?
8 A. Well, first of all, the change from these sources of financing to
9 finance the budget and the army, because contributions were not being paid
10 in nor were taxes being paid or customs dues either. And on the other
11 hand, in the years that led up to that time, it was legally made
12 impossible for the National Bank to print money, unless it had certain
13 reserves and grounds for doing so. But -- also, the Council of Governors
14 and its members, who would have to have okayed the primary emission was
15 such that the governor of each republic and autonomous province was a
16 member of the Governor's Council. And already at that time, in the middle
17 of the year, there was nobody from the National Bank of Slovenia or
18 Croatia, so that was -- its positions were weakened, if I can put it that
19 way, the position of the Council of Governors, because Milosevic had
20 complete domination of it and could make the decisions he wanted to.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 MR. NICE: Your Honours may want to note that at the end of
23 paragraph 24, on page 9, the second-to-last line should be corrected.
24 Where it says "the republics have left the council," should read "because
25 the governors of the national banks of the Republics of Croatia and
2 Q. I don't need to take you through the exhibits already produced by
3 Morten Torkildsen.
4 The Jovic book reference is tab 7, and we can move on to some
5 other miscellaneous topics.
6 Very briefly, please: The public auditing service, or the SDK,
7 was that the only tool available for carrying out financial transactions
8 between institutions in the federal republic?
9 A. Generally speaking, money transactions, financial transactions
10 went through the public auditing service, the SDK. There was no other way
11 of communication. And we had already prepared a reform which would move
12 this competency to the banks, but that was not done at the time.
13 Q. So that it remained possible to move money to the regions outside
14 Serbia --
15 A. Yes, it was possible.
16 Q. -- at a time when, if they were in some independent state, they
17 should have been raising their own taxes or something to that effect?
18 A. Yes. They could have, but they didn't have the necessary
19 organisation nor were capable of actually doing so. They didn't have any
20 great money transactions. So it was logical to expect that part of the
21 financing for such independent islands within a whole was to be financed
22 from outside, and the only way was for them to go via the public auditing
23 service and its channels.
24 Q. Paragraph 26. Your experience of the Serbian government and the
25 Presidency showed you what as to the accused's control over the government
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 itself and over its individual members?
2 A. I think that was quite clear: Milosevic was the overall ruler of
3 Serbia, and absolutely nobody could even have dreamt of doing anything
4 otherwise, contrary to him. Everything had to be done as he instructed,
5 according to his instructions and under his control. So in actual fact,
6 this applied not only to the government but also to the parliament, until
7 the multi-party elections took place where he didn't have complete control
8 but nonetheless he had most of it.
9 Q. And --
10 JUDGE MAY: Perhaps you can clarify that for us who weren't there
11 at the time, Mr. Markovic. Can you give us an example of the way in which
12 that control demonstrated itself and the ways in which you came to the
13 conclusion that Mr. Milosevic was the overall ruler and had absolute
14 control in -- in Serbia?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, it would be easier to find
16 evidence and proof that that was not so, rather than that was so, because
17 the whole life of Serbia and its communication with others was conceived
18 in such a way and constructed in such a way that it was in fact wholly --
19 all Serbia's institutions had to behave wholly according to the dictates
20 of Milosevic. He didn't have a legal foundation for that, but that was
21 what it was like in actual fact, in reality. And if he didn't agree with
22 anything, then he would organise popular demonstrations, he would get
23 together hundreds of people, and then would have somebody replaced. So
24 that didn't happen once; it happened umpteen times, and that is quite
25 obvious. He would gather together 100.000 people, and you can see the
1 tapes of that, with the cameras and so on.
2 JUDGE MAY: Did you have any personal experience of that absolute
3 control being demonstrated?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, because I kept in
5 communication with the government of Serbia, just as I did with the
6 governments of the other republics. That was my duty and task. And
7 everything that Milosevic said was put into practice by his Prime
8 Ministers and his ministers. I never encountered a single instance of
9 anybody saying anything different, or even dared to think differently. So
10 those communications were very intense. And I always knew exactly what
11 his representatives would advocate at the meetings. It couldn't differ in
12 one iota from what Milosevic said. And even if they were given
13 counter-arguments, they would be like parrots, repeating one and the same
14 things. And they weren't always that intelligent either.
15 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Nice, if you'd care to follow that and we could
16 have some concrete examples, it might be helpful, but it's a matter for
18 MR. NICE: [Microphone not activated] I can first of all approach
19 it in the negative.
20 Q. Did you ever experience anybody advancing an argument or a
21 position counter to that of the accused and succeeding with his position,
22 succeeding in, as it were, arguing against the accused?
23 A. Do you mean somebody from Serbia?
24 Q. Yes.
25 A. No, never.
1 Q. I think what --
2 A. A person like that wouldn't have kept his post for 24 hours had
3 he done so.
4 Q. I think what would assist the Court would be if you can think now
5 or at any stage in your evidence of concrete examples of people in high
6 office or comparatively high office being as controlled by the accused as
7 you have described. We'll come back to it a little later before I sit
8 down, but if you think of any example now or if you think of any as we're
9 looking at any other bits of the evidence, perhaps you'll alert us to us
10 and we can hear from you about it.
11 Before we part from this very general issue, the issue of the
12 accused's approach --
13 A. All the Prime Ministers of Serbia behaved that way. For example,
14 when communicating with me, at all times Radmilovic and other Prime
15 Ministers - I can give you their names - Bozovic, another instance.
16 Q. What about those who were expressing views counter to your
17 economic reforms and democratisation programme? Were they, in your
18 judgement, people expressing views of free will, or were they acting or
19 instructions, or can't you say?
20 A. Well, there were both, of course. It was enough for a general
21 negative position to prevail, and then of course everybody would have the
22 right to add to it and embroider based on their own thinking.
23 Q. One other topic about the accused's general performance: As
24 people sustained injuries and losses and bereavements, did he ever, to
25 you, show or was he ever seen to show understanding or sympathy of the
1 losses that people were suffering as a result of these wars?
2 A. In what way do you mean?
3 Q. Well, sometimes rulers -- leaders go and see the injured in
4 hospitals or go and show their sympathy to individuals. Did he ever do
5 that sort of thing?
6 A. No.
7 Q. We'll come back to the other more particular point a little
8 later. Paragraph 27 of the latest statement emerging from proofing and
9 not from the earlier statement. The Brioni declaration July in 1991, was
10 it an initiation of whom, yours?
11 A. The Brioni declaration emerged from the various discussions held
12 at the Brioni Islands with the representatives of the republics and
13 provinces taking part. However, in preparing that meeting, I myself
14 inaugurated at our government meeting that our government should prepare a
15 proposal on the so-called three-month moratorium. I, first of all, wanted
16 this to be six months, thought about six months, because we had very
17 profound problems, so in my opinion, we should have had six months to be
18 able to deal with the situation and bring it up to the level of being
19 able, on a legal basis, logically, without any bloodshed, to implement all
20 the decisions that were made. If we were supposed to scatter and go our
21 separate ways, that that should be done without any bloodshed. But we
22 thought that nobody would accept this, so we suggested a three-month
23 moratorium. And that moratorium found its place in the Brioni
24 declaration, and as the federal government, we took it upon ourselves to
25 prepare all the elements that would enable, within that three-month
1 moratorium period, to create a situation which would enable the
2 functioning of our society, at least at a minimum level, minimum
3 conditions. And then after that, that decisions could be taken which
4 would not mean leading to war or further conflict. And I must say, that
5 we waited over a month for a Presidency meeting to be convened and to have
6 a debate pursuant to our proposal. And when the proposal was actually
7 made, then the same tendencies became evident; one side considered that
8 the proposal was insufficient and that it should be -- that the functions
9 of the Federation should be strengthened of this joint state, joint
10 country. That was the group led by Milosevic. And the other stream that
11 thought things should be left more loosely, and that stream was led by
12 Kucan. But anyway, that three-month moratorium, which was designed to
13 assist matters and to help us allow society to function at a minimum
14 level, to prevent further erosion and a complete disintegration of
15 everything, which would mean anarchy and the struggle of everybody against
16 everybody else, this general uprising, unfortunately it wasn't able to
17 form its function. The war followed, first with Croatia and then with
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and so on and so forth.
19 Q. Very well. You set out as well how you gave advice to Vance
20 after the declaration in which you expected by way of bloodshed and how
21 many troops would be required to stop that. And I needn't take you
22 through that in any more detail.
23 The Chamber will know that the Brioni declaration has already
24 been exhibited, Exhibit 330, tab 35. I don't ask to look at it for the
25 time being.
1 In paragraph 29, originally from the proofing session, I think in
2 that second half of 1991 and as a matter of detail you actually suggested
3 13 new laws. So you were still actively pursuing the job of government.
4 But only three of them, and you think the least important or significant
5 three, were adopted, the rest being blocked by the accused and his
6 representatives; correct?
7 A. Within the frameworks of that three-month moratorium, for us to
8 be able to implement the basic proposals of the Federal Executive Council
9 or, rather, their ideas as to how the state could function, these laws
10 were proposed and only three sporadic ones were adopted, the rest weren't,
11 of the 13.
12 Q. Let's deal with another incident: In October 1991 at, I think,
13 apart -- for private family reasons you went to Zagreb, you were called by
14 Tudjman to a meeting, he asked you to talk to Mesic, and the result was
15 that the three of you, prime minister and two presidents, found yourselves
16 in the presidential palace when the palace was bombed.
17 A. Yes. I --
18 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... I just want to ask you a
19 question. The bomb, as was subsequently discovered, was sent from a very
20 high-flying aircraft. And did it come to a position very close to where
21 the three of you had been having lunch?
22 A. No. I had talks which lasted roughly four and a half hours in
23 the so-called Banski Dvori, the palace in Zagreb. And there was a cabinet
24 there, a set of offices of Franjo Tudjman. And in a more -- in another
25 section of the building, Mesic had his office there too. I was in
1 communication with both of them, and Tudjman organised a joint lunch.
2 After that luncheon, Mesic, Tudjman, and myself went to his office -
3 Tudjman's office, I mean - and we started discussing how we could use the
4 elements of the Brioni delegation and the moratorium in general to solve
5 the situation in the most peaceful way. When we started talking -- we'd
6 just got through a few sentences, I think. We were having a conversation
7 and speaking about Mesic going back to Belgrade. He hadn't been to
8 Belgrade for a long time and that the ministers from Croatia should also
9 go back to Belgrade. At one point, Tudjman even phoned Kucan to have a --
10 talk to him about that. And when they started their conversation, there
11 was an explosion. Several missiles exploded that were shot, and two or
12 three planes were flying at a height of 14 to 15 kilometres and one of
13 them fell quite near the dining room in which we were having lunch a few
14 minutes before.
15 Q. Had you been gathered together, the three of you, long enough for
16 information to be sent back outside Croatia to another state and for an
17 aircraft to be activated to send this plane to Zagreb?
18 A. Yes, that's correct. And it is interesting to note that Tudjman
19 had his office, his cabinet, he had had it there for months. Mesic had
20 had his offices there for months, and they hadn't been shelled, bombed.
21 The bombing took place when I was there, and I was there for about four
22 and a half hours, which yes, was sufficient time to send information from
23 Zagreb to Belgrade and to send planes out. They were the fastest type of
24 aircraft. The assumption is that they were the MiG-29 type aircraft that
25 can fly at very high altitudes. General Tus, who used to be the commander
1 of the air force, said that there were only three pilots capable of flying
2 at such high altitudes and targeting targets with such precision. And had
3 we remained in the dining room, I wouldn't be sitting here with you today
4 most probably.
5 Q. Paragraph 33. Towards the end of 1991, just so we can have a
6 picture of your life and position, were you being threatened from both
7 Serbia and Croatia? From the Serbian perspective, you were being said to
8 be an Ustasha; from the Croatian perspective, you were being seen to be
9 pro-Serb in orientation. Just yes if I've got that right.
10 A. Yes. I was demonised by both sides.
11 Q. A word about Kosovo, paragraph 34, from proofing. Your
12 relationship with persons in Kosovo was -- was good during your time as
13 Prime Minister?
14 A. Yes. I advocated autonomy for Kosovo such as it had had during
15 Tito's time. For this reason, I was attacked by both Jovic and Milosevic.
16 I was on good terms with the president of the executive board of Kosovo,
17 Jusuf Zegnullahi, who was threatened with liquidation and had to flee
19 Q. Do you know how he was threatened or who threatened him?
20 A. Well, threats are not made by someone threatening in public.
21 This is done by creating a network of threats around a person which
22 prevents him from functioning normally.
23 Q. So that we have the picture of Kosovo at this early stage, was it
24 safe for you to travel to Kosovo at that stage or not? That's 1991.
25 A. I did go to Kosovo in 1989 and in 1990 on several occasions, but
1 in 1991 I didn't go any more.
2 Q. [Previous translation continues] ...
3 A. It was too risky.
4 Q. What was the level of police presence in Kosovo at that stage?
5 A. There were large numbers of policemen, primarily from Serbia but
6 also from other parts of Yugoslavia, because there was a Presidency
7 conclusion, with which I disagreed, that a police unit should be sent from
8 the federal reserve police force, so to say, to keep law and order there.
9 Q. Paragraphs 37 and following deal with military activity until the
10 end of 1991 but, very briefly, can you just confirm, please, that as to
11 events in Slovenia the first you knew of these was when you were
12 telephoned on the 26th of June at 4.00 in the morning by Kucan. You asked
13 him why he called you and not the Presidency since the JNA was not under
14 your jurisdiction. He said he was unable to reach the Presidency; you
15 called Kadijevic, who was at the Main Staff, and he confirmed that the
16 army in Slovenia had been brought out of their barracks. Correct?
17 A. Correct.
18 Q. And at a government meeting with Kadijevic present, you
19 explaining that you would have objected to military intervention, although
20 you couldn't have prevented it, he replying that that was the reason why
21 you hadn't been reformed, he then saying that you would never return to
22 the government cabinet again. Correct?
23 A. Yes. I intervened and asked why use had been made of my name,
24 although no one had talked to me and I had not given approval to anyone to
25 do this. Kadijevic answered, "Well, because we knew you wouldn't agree,
1 we didn't even ask."
2 Q. In fact, it was your understanding of the constitution that the
3 army was not allowed to make decisions without decisions of the
4 Presidency, a political decision being taken and for which a majority was
6 A. Correct. Correct. The Presidency never made this decision, nor
7 was the Presidency ever asked about this. I had a long talk about this
8 with Jovic, who claimed that it was the army's duty to do that, but the
9 use of the army was exclusively within the competence of the Presidency,
10 and it was insisted on the fact that the Presidency should proclaim a
11 state of emergency that would allow the army to intervene, but the
12 Presidency was split. Milosevic's group was in favour; the others were
13 against. It was four against four. So the army could not be used. In
14 this case, it was done without the approval of the Presidency. Of course,
15 they tried to use this against the Federal Executive Council, as if it
16 could have given such approval at all.
17 Q. We've heard a little about the use of the air force over
18 Ljubljana some days after this. Paragraph 39 and paragraph 25 of the
19 original. Did you invite Kadijevic to your cabinet on learning of this
20 and say that if he was going to bomb Ljubljana he was going to bomb you,
21 since you were going to go there to stop what you described as a
22 ridiculous war? Were you advised by your own Ministry of Interior or,
23 rather, Croatia's Ministry of Interior not to go because of the risk of
24 your being liquidated, and were you advised further by Stjepan Mesic not
25 to go, but despite all that, did you go to Ljubljana --
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. -- having talks with some of his "young Turks," as he described
3 them, and without whom he seemed decision inclined to talk?
4 A. No. It wasn't he who called them that; I did.
5 Q. Very well. My mistake. Sorry.
6 A. I learned that the army was preparing to send all its air force
7 against Ljubljana, which would certainly have destroyed Ljubljana. The
8 people in Ljubljana discovered that the entire leadership was in shelters,
9 so I set out for Ljubljana and I told Kadijevic, "If you bomb Ljubljana,
10 you'll be bombing me." A team spent the night with me and this reads like
11 a thriller. We travelled from Belgrade to Zagreb and then from Zagreb to
12 Ljubljana by car. In Ljubljana, we were met with machine-guns pointed at
13 us at the ready, but we did manage to stop the further escalation of the
15 Q. The withdrawal of the JNA from Slovenia - paragraph 41, 26 in the
16 original - the withdrawal of the JNA from Slovenia by the Presidency was
17 something over which you had no right to vote, and I think you say that
18 was under the influence of the accused?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. What position did Mesic and Tupurkovski take?
21 A. Mesic and Tupurkovski were against this. And after this session
22 we met in my office to analyse the consequences of such a decision,
23 especially as it was clear that the army was to withdraw from Slovenia to
24 Bosnia and Herzegovina, which meant that there was going to be an enormous
25 concentration of army in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and we already knew that
1 part of the future war on this territory was to take place there. Mesic,
2 to be sure, was afraid that part of the army would remain in Croatia, but
3 this did not happen.
4 Q. Paragraphs 42 and 43, paragraph 27 in the original. A word or so
5 about the accused's relationship with Jovic, having in mind the time.
6 What was the relationship between the two of them like?
7 A. They worked as a team.
8 Q. An example; the demonstrations of the opposition on the 9th of
9 March of 1991, was Milosevic at risk of losing power then? And if so,
10 what did Jovic do?
11 A. There is a lot of evidence as to the way in which the two of them
12 worked as a team. What you are referring to now are events that happened
13 in March of 1991, when the citizens of Belgrade went out into the streets
14 and demonstrated against Milosevic. The army went out into the streets
15 then with tanks. I was in Zagreb at the time, not in Belgrade, because
16 this happened during the weekend, and I knew nothing about it. Later, at
17 the session we had in Belgrade, Jovic said that he had received approval
18 by telephone from the other members of the Presidency. As for me, I then
19 held my well-known speech in the Presidency, saying that the tanks should
20 be withdrawn to the barracks. This was published in the press, and for
21 this reason I came under attack in the Presidency of Yugoslavia. Jovic
22 then resigned because attempts were underway to declare a state of
23 emergency. And when this did not succeed after several attempts, Jovic
24 resigned. And then Milosevic gave a dramatic speech on television in
25 which he said, among other things, that he did not recognise the federal
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 units for this reason and because a situation had now arisen in which
2 there was no Presidency, because the president had resigned. The other
3 members of the Presidency who were under Milosevic's control were also
4 resigned. And to avoid a hiatus of power and to prevent the possibility
5 of the army being used against everybody else, Tupurkovski, who was the
6 Vice-President of the Presidency of Yugoslavia, and I agreed in my cabinet
7 to call the remainder of the Presidency, Drnovsek, Bogicevic, Mesic, and
8 of course Tupurkovski. I also attended and we declared that there was not
9 a hiatus, that there was an institution that was still functioning. After
10 this Jovic and the other members of the Presidency who had resigned came
12 Q. Moving now to a different topic, paramilitaries, very briefly.
13 Paragraph 46, which emerges from proofing, not from the earlier statement.
14 Were you when you were here a few weeks ago asked to review a statement of
15 the accused reported in a newspaper to be found at tab 11 of Exhibit 570,
16 headed "I ordered mobilisation"?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Would you be good enough to go to the English version, and rather
19 than read all of it, the third page in the second complete paragraph we
20 find a passage that reads: "I deem that despite the new circumstances in
21 Yugoslavia there is no need to introduce emergency measures in the
22 Republic of Serbia. All institutions of the system and the entire life in
23 the republic ought to follow the normal course. The citizens can rest
24 assured that the Republic of Serbia is in a position to provide the
25 protection of interests of the republic of all its citizens and the
1 Serbian people."
2 Now, having -- that's one passage. On the previous page perhaps
3 was the passage I should have taken you to first. Towards the bottom of
4 the page, the last complete paragraph: "In the present circumstances of
5 attempting to incite disorder in Sandzak and in Kosovo and Metohija, I
6 ordered mobilisation of the reserve task force of the Serbian Ministry of
7 Defence security forces and the urgent forming of the supplementary forces
8 of the Republic of Serbia police."
9 Having read that article, which I've just read a couple of
10 passages, what comments do you make about the accused's actions at that
11 time and his ability to control armed forces?
12 A. I remember well that at the time I wrote an open letter to
13 Slobodan Milosevic in which I demanded that he withdraw this decision and
14 in which I listed all the dangers ensuing from such a decision. I haven't
15 got the text with me, but as far as I remember I concluded that
16 unfortunately we are living in a time where it is far easier and safer to
17 advocate war than to advocate peace.
18 JUDGE MAY: Which year again, Mr. Nice, please, the 16th of March
19 I see is the date. Which year?
20 [Prosecution counsel confer]
21 MR. NICE: It's 1991 for the article.
22 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
23 MR. NICE: The letter, I think, comes later and is in September,
24 September the 30th. I'm grateful to Ms. Tromp.
25 Q. Were you in any position - paragraph 47 - to do anything about
1 paramilitaries insofar as you were aware of them, or was that outside your
3 A. It was completely outside the competence of the Federal Executive
4 Council because everything that had to do with the army and the
5 paramilitary units was directly within the competence of the Presidency of
7 Q. Thank you very much. I should have asked you, what was the
8 accused's and Kadijevic's personal relationship like? Did they get on
9 well together or not? Paragraph 48, and I think also in earlier paragraph
11 A. It was not always the same. Before I took up my post in
12 Belgrade, Milosevic and Kadijevic communicated well. They went on
13 vacation together in a place near Dubrovnik, and I have to admit I learnt
14 a lot later, that Kadijevic had suggested to the then-president of the
15 Presidency of Yugoslavia, Mr. Dizdarevic, that Milosevic should be given
16 the mandate of forming the new government. At the time I formed the
17 government and in the first period, communication with Kadijevic was
18 relatively good, and Kadijevic tried to prove that he was adhering to the
19 reform programme, especially the part that related to stabilisation. But
20 as things went on and as the programme never ended in stabilisation but in
21 political changes, changes in government, changes in private property and
22 so on, our ways diverged, and then there were problems in the relations
23 between the republics in Yugoslavia and relations between Kadijevic and me
24 cooled more and more, until they finally declined completely. And as
25 relations between Kadijevic and me cooled, so they got better and better
1 between Kadijevic and Milosevic, and in the end they got on together very
2 well. But they cooperated throughout this time. In some periods,
3 however, communication between Kadijevic and me overcame or was better at
4 times than the communication between Kadijevic and Milosevic. And this
5 can be seen from our communication. We would agree about something with
6 Kadijevic, and later on he would change his mind. Kadijevic and I would
7 sometimes talk for hours and exchange views, analyse the situation, make
8 comparisons. And when I managed to convince him that drastic measures
9 should not be taken and that things should not be done that would only
10 deepen the crisis and so on.
11 Q. Just to conclude this passage, paragraph 49. In the same way as
12 you'd received an offer from the accused to become president of a
13 re-formed structure in the fall of 1990, in the beginning of 1991, did
14 Kadijevic raise with you a possibility which would have put you at the
15 head of government? And head of state, actually?
16 A. In contrast to Milosevic's earlier proposal, which I didn't take
17 at all seriously, because there was no basis for such a plan to be
18 implemented, after the first sessions that were held about declaring a
19 state of emergency in Yugoslavia and giving the army certain powers to
20 act, when this fell through, there was a period I think in early January
21 1991 when Kadijevic came to see me with a proposal that had been
22 developed, as he said, in the General Staff. They suggested carrying out
23 a campaign because at the time there were units of the JNA all over
24 Yugoslavia, so they developed a project according to which the leadership
25 of Croatia, headed by Tudjman, and the leadership of Slovenia, headed by
1 Kucan, should all be arrested. And if they resisted, one knew what would
2 happen to them.
3 As Kadijevic was unable to obtain approval in the Presidency, he
4 tried another route; he asked me whether I would agree for them to do
5 this. And as they would be doing it without the approval of the
6 Presidency and bypassing the Presidency and they would in fact be
7 replacing the Presidency, if I supported this plan, because I was the
8 prime minister and the senior executive official at the level of the
9 Federation, I would be made president. He pulled out a bundle of papers
10 to show me this plan, and I asked him not to show it to me. I said, "You
11 seem to think you're going to solve the Yugoslav crisis in this way." He
12 said, "Yes." I said, "You have named Kucan, you have named Tudjman, what
13 about Milosevic?" And he said to me -- he jumped up and said, "Milosevic
14 is the only one fighting for Yugoslavia and who would back this up if it
15 wasn't for him?"
16 Q. Mr. Markovic, just a gentle reminder on time, if you can bring
17 this passage to a conclusion with how it ended, please.
18 A. Well, of course, I declined this. That's clear.
19 Q. Thank you. I think that you -- in March, Kadijevic travelled to
20 the Soviet Union- paragraph 50 - without informing you. Matters between
21 you got worse in June. You asked for his resignation at one session of
22 the government, but he could only be dismissed by the Assembly, which
23 didn't meet, and he had further support from the Presidency. And he sent
24 his deputy, Admiral Brovet, or one of his assistants. And we can see
25 reference to your seeking the resignation of both Kadijevic and Brovet in
1 tab 12. I'm not going to go through it in detail -- at tab 12, which is a
2 Vreme article of the September the 23rd of 1991. And you've reviewed that
3 and can answer questions about it if anyone wants to ask you. Correct?
4 A. Yes. Yes.
5 Q. Referring to a letter of protest to Milosevic about partial
6 mobilisation, is that to be found in our tab 13? And it's in fact the
7 letter of the 30th of September of 1991. It's here again simply reported
8 in a newspaper. You were under the impression we had a copy of the letter
9 itself, and it may be we have, and if so we've mislaid it, but at the
10 moment we're dependent upon this newspaper report of your letter of
11 protest to the accused. Correct?
12 A. Yes. I wrote an open letter to Mr. Milosevic, asking him not to
13 do what he was doing.
14 Q. Indeed, mobilisation at that stage was, so far as you were
15 concerned, unlawful.
16 A. Completely.
17 Q. Before I come to the last couple of questions, which are going to
18 be about intercepts, can we go back to the question that His Honour Judge
19 May asked you earlier, examples of the accused exercising complete control
20 over other individuals. Have you been able - I know it's difficult when
21 you're answering questions to think of something else - but have you been
22 stimulated to think of any other examples or any particular examples of
23 how he exercised such complete control?
24 A. In fact, formally it was the Assembly who elected Prime
25 Ministers, but it was he who designated them, and they did exactly what he
1 asked. There was no difference, not even in nuances.
2 Q. Very well. Finally, did you review a number of recordings of
3 telephone intercepts when you were last here in The Hague a few weeks ago
4 and did you sign a document to the effect that you'd listened to those
5 intercepted telephone conversations, identifying voices of participants as
6 revealed on the table that accompanies the documents?
7 MR. NICE: Perhaps he can have this before him, just to look at
9 A. I did listen to them, and apart from one voice, I recognised all
10 the voices, and I have signed all this.
11 Q. You're referred to, I think, on only one of the intercepts
13 MR. NICE: If the Chamber will be good enough to give an exhibit
14 number to the certificate producing the transcripts and to the transcripts
15 themselves. The witness is himself referred to only in tab 3 of these.
16 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
17 MR. NICE: And in tab 3, on the first page, at the foot of the
18 first page --
19 JUDGE MAY: Just one moment.
20 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
21 JUDGE MAY: Now, you're producing a number of tapes here, are
22 you, intercepts, as well as the certificate?
23 MR. NICE: I am in the Court's hands. I'm afraid I've actually
24 forgotten the precise routine we've been pursuing. I know that whatever
25 happens, the intercepts are produced for identification only at this
1 stage, because they all have to be produced in order to show their
2 provenance later. The important evidence, of course, is the evidence of
3 the identification of voices, so far as this witness is concerned. That
4 could conveniently be done by production of this entire exhibit, which has
5 the transcripts of the intercepts attached to it or, alternatively, just
6 by the certificate and the accompanying table.
7 JUDGE MAY: The certificate obviously can be produced. But
8 these, I suspect, are tapes which have already been produced, haven't
9 they, and marked for identification? Or are they new tapes?
10 MR. NICE: No. I think these are new ones. These are new ones,
11 because they haven't --
12 JUDGE MAY: These are new ones.
13 MR. NICE: I think so. But they haven't yet been -- His Honour
14 Judge Kwon --
15 JUDGE KWON: They have an exhibit number here. 35.28. Some are
16 and some are not.
17 JUDGE MAY: Well, could you during the adjournment sort that out?
18 MR. NICE: Yes, I will.
19 JUDGE MAY: Because I think there will be difficulty in due
20 course with these tapes if we don't get them in one place and organised.
21 MR. NICE: There's a consolidation exercise under way at the
22 moment for putting all the tapes together and having them tabulated in a
23 uniform way, so that the important point is the certificate and the table
24 from the witness.
25 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, I suggest that the simplest way to deal
1 with this would be to have -- to give the certificate an exhibit number,
2 the attached transcripts will be marked for identification, and when we
3 come back, perhaps you can tell us which of these have been produced and
4 which haven't.
5 MR. NICE: Yes, certainly.
6 JUDGE MAY: So we have it on the record.
7 We'll have a number now for the exhibit.
8 THE REGISTRAR: The certificate, Your Honour, is 571.
9 MR. NICE:
10 Q. And just looking at tab 3, which is a conversation on the 4th of
11 September of 1991 between Karadzic and the accused, and at the foot of the
12 page when the accused's spoken of speaking to Alija, who he alleges was
13 behaving badly and would not come over to talk, Karadzic says here his
14 ideas. "He is expecting the Berlin Congress. I told him openly that the
15 Berlin Congress is not possible any more." And he goes on a bit.
16 And then in the middle of this block of text: "Fine. I will
17 probably be more clever after The Hague. But his opinion is that Europe
18 will force Croatia and Slovenia to stay in Yugoslavia. He thinks he has
19 some information that such pressure is already being made and that they
20 will first put pressure on them to stay in the Federation. If not, they
21 will try to leave. Keep Yugoslavia the way it is. In some -- some
22 boundaries, but in loose connections. That is the line of thinking of
23 Ante Markovic. He is hoping for that. However, we -- in that case, we
24 don't accept -- we want to have strong ties with the federal state."
25 Mr. Markovic, was this a true and accurate reflection of your
1 opinions at that time or not; some boundaries but in a loose connection?
2 A. Well, it's like this: If we're talking about boundaries within
3 the country, then yes. But frontiers or borders towards the outside, no.
4 What I understand this to be is boundaries within Yugoslavia. So yes,
5 loose connections. I thought it was better for us to have any kind of
6 connection rather than none at all, and so that is my thinking fairly
7 accurately interpreted.
8 MR. NICE: Ms. Dicklich informs me, and I'm sorry not to have
9 understood this earlier, when the documents were so well prepared for me
10 by Ms. Dicklich, that the intercepts already tendered are not in the
11 bundle but are in the spreadsheet and so therefore the ones in the bundle
12 are the new ones.
13 JUDGE MAY: Yes. In that case, we'd better have them marked for
14 identification with a separate exhibit number. Two of them have been, I
15 notice, exhibited before. But I think let's at this stage simply give the
16 next -- to give them all a separate exhibit number marked for
18 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honour. 572, marked for
20 MR. NICE:
21 Q. Finally, Mr. Markovic, just to return to something that we've
22 touched on already and that is dealt with but in a summary way at
23 paragraph 61 of your latest signed statement. The pressure of the
24 accused's -- of the things the accused said being consistent with or
25 inconsistent with what he was doing or subsequently to do. Can you just
1 help us a little bit more with that. You said something about it, but to
2 what extent -- what was it, a trait, that his actions belie his words?
3 A. It depended on who he was talking to. As you can see, when he's
4 talking to Karadzic, he's saying exactly what he's thinking, because he's
5 trying to arrange things with him. Whereas, what he discussed with me,
6 there was a certain amount of reservation in this regard, always had to
7 think what was behind it all, what he was actually thinking. So it was
8 always a fact of him thinking one thing and saying another. So you would
9 have to give the whole thing a lot of thought if you were to know what his
10 true intentions really were.
11 [Prosecution counsel confer]
12 MR. NICE:
13 Q. Well, I'm reminded that you haven't in a sense answered the whole
14 question. Thinking and saying is another thing. What was he doing? How
15 did that fit with what he had said?
16 A. Well, no. He would say one thing and do another. And his acts
17 were different. He would say that he was fighting for Yugoslavia;
18 whereas, in actual fact he was fighting for something different.
19 Q. What do you say he was fighting for?
20 A. He never actually told me, but it was quite obvious that he was
21 fighting for a Greater Serbia.
22 Q. Yes. Thank you very much. You'll be asked some further
24 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll adjourn now before cross-examination.
25 Twenty minutes, please.
1 --- Recess taken at 12.17 p.m.
2 --- On resuming at 12.45 p.m.
3 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, before I begin with my
5 cross-examination, I just wish to say that a moment ago I was given a new
6 plan, a new schedule for the witnesses, or list of witnesses, as of the
7 beginning of next week, and it is radically different from what we were
8 given a few days ago. I really would like to protest because by
9 constantly changing the order of witnesses leads to confusion, and quite
10 simply makes it impossible for me to work normally. I don't see that with
11 all the machinery the other side has at its disposal that they can't stick
12 to a schedule. You can compare the two and you'll see for yourself.
13 JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues] ... a change of
14 order between 1345 and 1780, I see that, and there's one additional
15 witness, it seems, 1448 to -- yes. Mr. Milosevic, we bear that in mind.
16 One advantage of our abbreviated sittings, though, is that you will have
17 more time for preparation and won't be under the pressure which you were
18 when we were sitting for such long hours. And we invite the Prosecution,
19 of course, to keep these changes to an absolute minimum that's necessary.
20 Mr. Nice, I'm sure you have that in mind.
21 MR. NICE: We have it in mind at all times. It's, of course,
22 difficult for witnesses to schedule themselves into the three-day week.
23 We're all doing our best.
24 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
25 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Markovic, I shall do my best to use my time
2 as rationally as possible; however, let me begin with some questions which
3 you dealt with at the end of your testimony and for which we even have
4 documents here which shows that the situation has been portrayed quite
5 incorrectly. Is it at issue, Mr. Markovic, that you were the man who made
6 the decision to involve the army, engage the army, at the beginning of the
7 Yugoslav conflicts and clashes or, rather, the man who caused the war in
9 A. That is not correct. And in the decision of the Federal
10 Executive Council, which relates to infringement of the boundaries by
11 Slovenia and taken over the borders, it says that the Federal Secretary
12 for the Interior is duty-bound to coordinate with Slovenia and, if the
13 needs arises, that he can utilise that part which was on the so-called
14 green line; that is to say, the people in the army protecting the borders.
15 So never anywhere in any of the documents does it refer to the deployment
16 of the army. And I spoke about this at a number of meetings, including
17 the fact that as was common knowledge, at a meeting of the Federal
18 Executive Council or Yugoslav government - I've already said that and
19 there are documents to back this up - I dealt with this issue and
20 discussed it with Veljko Kadijevic and there was absolutely no permission
21 given for him to deploy the army. And I couldn't have given him
22 permission to do so anyway, because permission for the deployment of the
23 army is something that the Presidency alone could give.
24 Q. Well, that's the point, that the Presidency did not give
25 permission for the deployment of the army and because the president of the
1 then-Presidency, Mr. Borisav Jovic, knew absolutely nothing about the
2 deployment of the army, and you knew that full well.
3 A. I had no idea either.
4 Q. Well, whether you had an idea or not is another matter.
5 I'm going to ask you a few questions, and I have grounds for
6 asking them. In the stenograms from the session of the 21st of August
7 1991, the session commenced at 11.00 of the Presidency of the SFRY. And
8 you attended that Presidency meeting, as did I myself, and the president
9 of Slovenia, Milan Kucan too, and of course all the other members. I
10 don't have time to enumerate all their names.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So that is the stenogram that I'm
12 referring to, Mr. May. Part of it exists in the big binder that I was
13 provided with, but there's no tab number. All I have here is a portion of
14 those. R0006543 is the number. And I'm going to quote from that.
15 Could this document be shown to the witness, please.
16 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Do you have the document? Have you got a copy
17 of it or you only have one copy there?
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have my own copy; however, it is
19 a document from Mr. Nice -- or rather, it is a transcript of the
20 Presidency session, and I was disclosed it by the other side.
21 JUDGE MAY: I suppose they could put their hands on it
22 immediately. No doubt searches can be made.
23 MR. NICE: We'll get it.
24 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Yes. You'll have to get on for the moment
25 without it, Mr. Milosevic, because there's only one copy, which you have.
1 What is it that you want to put to the witness?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'm going to quote certain
3 portions from that shorthand transcript. Just let me see it in the
4 binder. I've been given a binder here with respect to the witness which
5 contains part of that shorthand transcript.
6 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll try and extract it from the
8 binder to give the witness a copy. I have another copy for myself. I
9 don't know whether this is the entire document, but I'll begin from here
10 and the witness can follow. The pages have been marked.
11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Mr. Markovic, this is on page 239 of the stenographic notes. It
13 is a Presidency session of the 21st of August, 1991. And in the middle of
14 that page, it says: "Ante Markovic --" this is how you begin: "I
15 nevertheless think that we have to say something with respect to the
16 functioning of the borders, regardless of the fact that it is not a purely
17 economic matter but it is also an economic category." And Gligorov goes
18 on to ask something and your answer is "absolutely so." And then we come
19 to Slobodan Milosevic speaking, yes. And on page 4, it says, it quotes
20 the lack of respect for this decision of the Federal Executive Council
21 with respect to the payment of customs revenues. And I end the quotation
22 there. And I say to you --
23 JUDGE MAY: You may have got -- we may have got the copy.
24 MR. NICE: We can help. 427, tab 6 -- the English page. But if
25 it starts on page 239 of -- of the B/C/S, it should be about three pages
1 in from the back of the English, which will be roughly at the foot, page 7
2 or thereabouts, I should suspect, but perhaps if we hear the text read out
3 we'll be able to find it.
4 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Go on, Mr. Milosevic.
5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. I was quoting your document, the one on the table, and I say, and
7 I'm quoting from the stenographic notes now: "On the basis of this
8 approach, you began the war in Slovenia. About customs, dues, and
9 borders, customs mostly." So that was common knowledge at that time,
10 wasn't it, Mr. Markovic?
11 A. Are you asking me?
12 Q. Yes.
13 A. I never said that. Quite the contrary. I do remember this
14 meeting, and you said two or three times that I had started the war
15 against Slovenia, and Kucan said something along those lines as well. But
16 at that same meeting I pulled out a document and read from it. It was a
17 government decision. Nowhere does it say there that the army can be used.
18 That does not exist anywhere. And there is no evidence at all that the
19 Prime Minister of the federal government gave any instructions along those
20 lines because he couldn't have given it. But documents do exist, however,
21 which testify to the fact that there was a sharp clash between the
22 minister of the army, or national defence, whichever you like to call it,
23 and the Prime Minister about that question, and the Prime Minister went to
24 Slovenia to stop that completely useless war.
25 Q. That it was completely useless is quite clear. Now, that it was
1 highly detrimental, that is very clear too. But let me remind you what
2 the then-president of Slovenia, Milan Kucan says. And you can turn the
3 page, it is page 243 of these stenographic notes, and it begins with
4 Kucan. It says, Milan Kucan speaking, "I don't want to be held
5 responsible before the Prime Minister and answer to him who quite
6 obviously wants, now that he has lost the war, to win all that."
7 And then he goes on to discuss other matters. I'll skip over
8 those to save time, but that is not only what I claim in the quotation
9 that I read out, which is a quotation by me, but that is what Milan Kucan,
10 president of Slovenia also says.
11 On the next page, on page 244, when he refers to your
12 explanations and your request to have two members from the Slovenian
13 government returned to the government, in that middle paragraph on page
14 244, he says the following -- I'm beginning with the beginning of the
15 sentence, not the beginning of the paragraph, to save time: "I don't have
16 to convince you that you're not going to find a single man in Slovenia,
17 including these two here, who would go back to the Federal Executive
18 Council, the SIV, or rather, the government, Yugoslav government, and to
19 work in the government. It is a Federal Executive Council which we all
20 know about in Slovenia and we know that it began the war in Slovenia."
21 And that is what Kucan says. Is that being contested, Mr. Markovic?
22 A. You mean is it being contested what Kucan said or what the facts
23 are or were? What Kucan said is one thing, and the facts are something
24 else again. Nowhere do you speak when I reacted and said, "I've had
25 enough of those accusations. I'm going to read out what the government
1 decision says with respect to customs dues, and it will emerge that nobody
2 had the right to deploy the army."
3 Q. Well, I'll help you.
4 A. Well, yes, you can, but I can't find that here. Now, as to what
5 Kucan said, those were political games that suited him at the time. It
6 suited him to say that at that time. But nowhere did he say that he
7 called me up in the morning and asked me to help him stop the army to
8 march forward, although I couldn't do anything because it didn't come
9 under my power and authority. And did the army ever act pursuant to
10 anybody else's orders except those of the Presidency of Yugoslavia?
12 Q. Well, in this case here, it acted according to yours. On page
13 246, it begins and says, "Ante Markovic." So that is where you refute
14 what Kucan is saying. Now, how you refute him can be seen from the actual
15 quotation. You are quoting your decision, and this is what you say.
16 A. I don't have that here.
17 Q. On page 247. You haven't got page 247? I gave you everything
18 that I received in the binder, but it's the same stenographic notes.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The page has the ERN number,
20 Mr. May, 00526240. So I'm now quoting --
21 JUDGE MAY: Let's see if we can find it.
22 I don't seem able to find the passage. Just read it out for the
23 moment while we look for it. Just read it out slowly to the witness so he
24 can follow it.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Page 247.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I ask the Court something in
2 the meantime, please?
3 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Presiding Judge, am I the
5 accused here or am I a witness?
6 JUDGE MAY: No, don't -- don't be offended, Mr. Markovic, if
7 you're asked questions by the accused. There's no --
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I'm not.
9 JUDGE MAY: There's no question of you being offended or anything
10 like that. He is entitled to ask questions. And if he asks things which
11 are improper or unfair or prejudicial, he'll be stopped. But he's
12 entitled to put his case to the witnesses, and that is what he's doing.
13 If you don't agree with him, just simply say no.
14 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. So I'm quoting you, Mr. Markovic, because you are responding to
17 Kucan and explaining the decision. You say, "The decision brought in by
18 the Federal Executive Council in which members of the Federal Executive
19 Council from Slovenia took part. And they have now written out their
20 resignations, so the decision that was made after Slovenia took over by a
21 single act the borders and by a single act it took over the customs as
22 well and a single act control of flights. All this was done by their own
23 one-sided acts, without acquiescence from anybody. The Federal Executive
24 Council has made the decision on the immediate implementation of federal
25 rules and regulations with respect to borders and taking over borders in
1 the Republic of Slovenia." I'm going to read it out because there are
2 just two paragraphs. And to be fair towards you, I'm reading your
3 decision, the decision of the Federal Executive Council as quoted by you
4 from these stenographic notes, quotation marks placed here and you read
5 the decision, which reads as follows: "In order to ensure that federal
6 regulations are being adhered to with respect to our outside borders and
7 the movement of the populace, the Federal Secretariat --" I keep losing
8 the interpretation, so I don't know if I'm speaking too quickly for the
9 interpreters. But anyway, "The Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs
10 will directly ensure the control of border crossings." And then you go on
11 to comment and say, "So the Federal Secretariat for Internal Affairs has
12 been given that assignment. And then you go on to quote, secondly: "In
13 order to provide for the implementation of federal rules and
14 regulations --"
15 Yes, I do understand that the interpreters don't have the
16 documents. I'm being cautioned to speak more slowly. I shall do my best
17 to do so to help the interpreters interpret.
18 But you're quoting the decision: "In order to implement federal
19 rules with respect to border crossings, the Federal Secretariat of
20 Internal Affairs will realise direct cooperation with the Federal
21 Secretariat of National Defence in order to engage border units of the
22 JNA, in order to provide security for the state borders at border
23 crossings and in built-up areas in the border belt." So you are saying
24 there that the decision that you made does not involve the deployment of
25 the army and that you didn't do; whereas, here it says that they will
1 cooperate with the army and engage frontier units of the JNA to provide
2 security for the border and border belt. That is what you yourself state.
3 Is that right?
4 A. That's what I said myself a moment ago. The border units,
5 frontier units, are there to secure the frontiers, the borders, and
6 nothing more than that. So tell me, please, where you can find a single
7 document which states that the army in Slovenia should leave the barracks
8 with tanks and to move around with the different units and to take control
9 of certain regions of Slovenia. You will not find that stated anywhere.
10 Q. Well, you didn't enter into the details of the federal government
11 decision; that is to say, whether they would deploy tanks and leave the
12 barracks with tanks or arms or without arms. All you say is that the
13 units should be deployed and the units are deployed according to their
15 JUDGE MAY: You are not paying attention, I suggest, to the
16 words. The words said "To engage border units in order to provide
17 security for the state borders or border crossings." Now, if you're going
18 to quote documents, you must quote them accurately.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I did quote it accurately, Mr. May,
20 word for word.
21 JUDGE MAY: What you're putting -- are you putting -- so that the
22 witness can understand it, are you suggesting that this was an order for
23 the JNA to go beyond the borders, to attack other parts of Slovenia? Is
24 that what you're suggesting?
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, that's not what I'm suggesting.
1 I'm saying that this is an order to have the army activated in Slovenia,
2 that the army that was stationed in Slovenia, anyway, should be activated.
3 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Let us -- wait a moment. We -- now we
4 understand the suggestion. We'll put it to the witness.
5 Mr. Markovic, what the accused is suggesting is that this was an
6 order to activate the army in Slovenia. Is that the case or not?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. It cannot be correct. The
8 Federal Executive Council has no jurisdiction over the armed forces. The
9 Federal Executive Council did have jurisdiction over certain police units,
10 and those that had to do with border patrols and border crossings and
11 customs duties. The Federal Executive Council concluded that in order to
12 protect the borders of Yugoslavia, the police should be activated and -
13 which is quite logical - that it should cooperate. This is not an order
14 to the armed forces. It cannot be an order to the armed forces. It's
15 order to the police, that they should cooperate with the border units
16 inside the green belt, nothing further than that, nothing beyond that.
17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Well, you have just quoted the decision which reads, literally,
19 that "They will cooperate with the Federal Secretariat for National
20 Defence, that is, the armed forces, in order to activate the border units
21 of the JNA" and so on and so forth. So activating JNA units. Look at
22 page 249.
23 JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues] ... the document and
24 I think it's futile to go on arguing about it. We can read it and we will
25 draw our own conclusions from that. You've heard what the witness has
1 said about it.
2 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
3 JUDGE MAY: Yes. The registry have confirmed that the exhibit is
4 427, tab 6, but there's no other copy in court at the moment.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Mr. Markovic, would you then, please, comment what Milan Kucan,
9 the President of Slovenia said on that occasion in connection with your
10 quoting this decision. He says: "Milan Kucan:" -- I'll read everything
11 he said, because it's very brief. "Secondly, as for the conclusion you
12 have read --" that's the one I quoted -- "there was a debate while Zivko
13 Pregl," who was a member from Slovenia, "protested against using this
14 conclusion for the purposes for which it was used. If you didn't know to
15 what this conclusion would lead, that's your problem. Objectively this is
16 what it led to. Look, we have at our disposal and the comrades from the
17 Secretariat for National Defence can show you how this was implemented in
18 particular commands and orders." They were referring to your conclusions,
19 so how can you say it's none of your business?
20 And then Ante Markovic says, "I'm sorry, but that has nothing to
21 do with it."
22 Milan Kucan: How do you mean it has nothing to do with it? You
23 are the president of the Federal Executive Council who signed this and
24 this was the occasion for the resignation of --"
25 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters didn't catch the name of the
2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. This conclusion led to the intervention of the armed forces in
4 Slovenia, and Milan Kucan and Zivko Pregl, the member from Slovenia of the
5 federal government, who resigned for this reason, also said this. And
6 you, Mr. Markovic, are saying that you had nothing to do with your order
7 -- your conclusion being implemented and nobody else knew about this in
8 the Presidency. Is this in dispute, Mr. Markovic?
9 A. Absolutely is it in dispute. Not only is it in dispute, it is
10 incorrect. Zivko Pregl handed me his written resignation in which he said
11 that he was asked in Slovenia to resign. Unfortunately, I don't have all
12 these documents. I am doing everything based on my recollection. And
13 this has nothing to do with what we are talking about. Whether Zivko
14 Pregl resigned because he disagreed or because he was forced in Slovenia
15 to do this, that's the question. In his resignation to me, in his letter
16 of resignation, all it says is that he was asked in Slovenia to resign,
17 and that actually is not anything that proves something in this respect.
18 And if Mr. Milosevic has no better arguments than these, don't let him use
20 Q. Mr. Markovic, what you said is about something I quoted that
21 Milan Kucan said, that you created the war in Slovenia.
22 JUDGE MAY: He has already dealt with that, so let's move on to
23 something else.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. Mr. Markovic, you were at the head of the federal government at
2 the time Slovenia declared independence and at the time Croatia declared
3 independence and when this war that you caused in Slovenia began and when
4 conflicts broke out in Slovenia -- in Croatia and Bosnia.
5 JUDGE MAY: You are not to put matters which are in dispute.
6 He's dealt with the war in Slovenia. He's denied completely that he had
7 anything to do with it. So for you to put it tendentiously as though he
8 were responsible is wrong. Now, what you can do is put questions, not
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I quite tendentiously and
11 correctly quoted Mr. Markovic, who was quoting his own decision activating
12 the JNA. Yes, tendentiously, with a tendention towards establishing the
14 JUDGE MAY: We are not concerned directly with Slovenia in this
15 case. We've now spent about half an hour on it. So let's move on to
16 something which is more relevant and involves your case. The witness gave
17 quite a lot of evidence involving you, and you may want to ask him about
18 that, if you challenge it.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course I will put all the
20 questions I consider relevant, Mr. May. The witness is testifying to
21 events up to December 1991, and that's the period I'm asking him about,
22 not beyond that.
23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. So you were at the head of the federal government when the
25 break-up of Yugoslavia began, up to the end of 1991; is this correct,
1 Mr. Markovic?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And in paragraph 16 of your statement, you say that I had de
4 facto control over the government of Serbia. There's no need to go into
5 that now, but is it in dispute that you had both de jure and de facto
6 control over the federal government, both at the time of these large-scale
7 exoduses of the Serbs and the events that led to the break-up of
9 A. No. I had control over the government up to the end of 1960.
10 After that, the competencies of the government were reduced and little by
11 little its scope of activity was reduced. And ultimately, the members of
12 the government who started working together as a single team on a
13 programme of reform and democratisation and change in our society, that
14 was a single team at the time, as the nationalisms grew, whether they were
15 separatist or nationalist with a tendency to expansion, they all started
16 working more and more under instructions from their own republics and less
17 and less as members of the government.
18 Q. Very well. Is it in dispute that you had both de jure and de
19 facto control over the time I am charged with the shelling of Dubrovnik,
20 the events in Vukovar? Throughout this time, you were the Prime Minister.
21 A. But the Prime Minister had no competency and no power over the
22 armed forces, none whatsoever. So nothing that concerned the activities
23 of the armed forces was something I could affect. But what you had with
24 Kadijevic, that did affect the armed forces.
25 Q. As you were the Prime Minister and had the de facto and de jure
1 control over the federal government, why when you say that meetings with
2 Kadijevic and members of the Presidency took place in your office and, as
3 you say, you even heard some intercepts, doesn't that mean that you had
4 all the strings of power in your hands?
5 A. This was not at the time when Slovenia and Croatia seceded. That
6 was before. But under the constitution, the Yugoslav government had very
7 modest competencies. The things that happened, including your breaking
8 into the monetary system of Yugoslavia and the other things that you did,
9 such as blocking goods from Slovenia and so on, by these actions you
10 brought into question even these modest competencies of the federal
11 government. You mounted an attack on these competencies.
12 But I did whatever I could, however futile. I went to the
13 Assembly of Slovenia to get agreement from them and not to take any
14 radical measures. I also gave a speech in the Croatian parliament. I
15 won't say how I was greeted there. I asked you to let me speak in the
16 parliament of Serbia but was never given permission to do this. Look at
17 the speech I held in the Croatian parliament, where among other things I
18 said, "This is the first and last time I am speaking as a Croat. I am not
19 the same kind of Croat that you are because you hate Serbs and others
20 because you are Croats. That's not the case with me." I told Tudjman a
21 long time ago, and I repeated that before the parliament, "Don't talk to
22 the Serbs in Croatia through Belgrade, through Milosevic, because that
23 will end in war. Talk to them directly. Sit down with them and talk." I
24 also said to him, and repeated this before the Croatian parliament - and
25 there are documents to prove this - I said, "Keep your hands off Bosnia
1 and Herzegovina."
2 My competencies were so modest and my personal activity and
3 involvement was -- well, I won't go into that. That was a long time ago.
4 But I did my best to prevent the worst from happening, and I failed,
5 thanks in large part to you.
6 Q. Mr. Markovic, you are explaining what you said, but as to what I
7 said, you keep saying that I acted otherwise. Just a while ago you said
8 that in 1991 you didn't perform activities that might be termed control of
9 the government of which you were the head, and you were at the head of the
10 government until the end of 1991.
11 A. In formal terms, yes. But in fact - and I said this in my letter
12 of resignation - the scope of activity for the government, which was small
13 anyway under the constitution, was restricted more and more, to such an
14 extent that in the end there was nothing for the government to do. And I
15 stated this publicly in my letter of resignation.
16 Q. We'll come to what you said in your letter of resignation later
17 on, but this is not relevant for what I'm asking you now. Is it in
18 dispute that throughout 1991 you exercised full activity, meetings with
19 the armed forces, the police, their relevant political factors throughout
20 this time when the sides were arming themselves and there were clashes?
21 A. I didn't have any talks with the army. I don't understand why
22 you're asking me this. What does Mr. Milosevic want?
23 Q. Mr. Milosevic wants to say that you had both de facto and de jure
24 authority, that you controlled the federal government up to the end of
25 1991, while all these events were taking place leading to the break-up of
1 Yugoslavia, and that this can be seen, for example, from your review of
2 the obligations of the president of the Federal Executive Council for
3 1991, 1990, 1999 [as interpreted], and you can see that there is no
4 difference here. There are no discrepancies. This was all written down
5 in your cabinet.
6 JUDGE MAY: Let the witness answer. And then if you're going to
7 put a document to him, you can do so.
8 Now, Mr. Markovic, is there anything you want to add to your
9 previous answer in relation to what the accused is putting to you?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There is no need to add anything,
11 because the course of events were such that, as I've already said, the
12 Federal Executive Council had very little control or competency or none
13 over the armed forces, and their competencies were restricted more and
14 more. And starting around June 1991, there was hardly any possibility to
15 do anything. We attempted to establish a moratorium, to set up some kind
16 of system for the country to function during the moratorium until the
17 final decision on the fate of Yugoslavia was made. But for this Tribunal,
18 it is not important what the government and its Prime Minister were doing.
19 This is about President Milosevic. And I repeat, he wants to transform
20 the indictment against him into an indictment against me. I ask to be
22 JUDGE MAY: [Previous translation continues] ... Mr. Markovic,
23 let me explain the process. You have come here to give evidence on very
24 serious offences [Realtime transcript read in error "various areas"]
25 against the accused. Now, he's entitled to defend himself against those
1 charges. And the same with any witness, he's entitled to put his case.
2 Now, you may disagree with it. It may be completely untrue. That doesn't
3 matter. He's entitled to put it. And I would ask you, if you would,
4 please, to deal with him as courteously as I hope you should be dealt with
5 here. This is a trial, and we have to decide ultimately on the guilt or
6 innocence of the accused. So if you would just answer his questions, and
7 if you could do it briefly, so much the better.
8 Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Yes. I wish the transcript would be more
9 accurate. What I said to the witness was not that he had come here to
10 give evidence on various areas. I said he had come to give evidence on
11 serious offences.
12 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. As we were saying, I have here -- I'm not going to provide it
15 all, but, for example, a review of the obligations of the president of the
16 Federal Executive Council of the Yugoslav government dating back to 1991.
17 This is the original from your cabinet. And we can see the overall
18 activities or, rather, those which were recorded of your activities. And
19 they go on continuously, ending with the 12th of December, 1991 -- 20th of
20 December, 1991, where it says "leave" or "vacation." So this includes
21 your numerous meetings with the army and the police and the Presidency and
22 various political figures, both domestic and foreign, and so on and so
23 forth. So throughout that year of 1991, while Yugoslavia was being broken
24 up, you have a lot of activities, and from all this we cannot conclude
25 that your competencies were limited and restricted in any way. So take a
1 look at this review.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And I should like to tender it into
3 evidence as an exhibit.
4 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness see the document.
5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation] But before that, I should like to
6 ask you to tell me when it was that you had this meeting with me in
7 December. When was that?
8 JUDGE MAY: Let us deal with one thing at a time. We're dealing
9 with this --
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'd just like to look for it,
11 because I don't seem to be able to find it, any trace of a meeting where
12 it says "Milosevic." It just doesn't seem to be here.
13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. So do you remember when it was that you allegedly had a meeting
15 with me in December?
16 A. It was the beginning of December.
17 Q. Well, I have the beginning of December here. From the beginning
18 of December - and I'm looking through the pages - your agenda, programme
19 of work and the meetings recorded. And there's no record of that meeting
20 with me throughout December 1991.
21 JUDGE MAY: Wait a moment. What are you looking at,
22 Mr. Milosevic? What are these documents?
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, this is a review of the
24 obligations of the president of the Federal Executive Council in 1991. It
25 was his own cabinet that kept these records, and I got them from the
1 archives of his own cabinet, that is to say, from the federal government.
2 It records each of his meetings. For example, it says, "The 18th of June,
3 1991, luncheon with S. Milosevic at 1400 hours, Slobodan Milosevic; at
4 1500 hours, lunch with Milosevic." That was the 18th of June, 1991, for
5 example. So it's that whole day of the 18th. "Telephone, Warren
6 Zimmerman, US ambassador; at 11.00 a.m., Vukotic; 11.45, Murat Galic," and
7 so on and so forth, the agenda. "11.50, agreement with respect to the
8 Slovenian laws, Mitrovic, Maksic, Gracanin, Borovec, Zlokan, Santonaz
9 [phoen], Medjovanovic [phoen], Vajovic, Pecar," and so on.
10 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And at 1400 hours, Milosevic --
12 JUDGE MAY: We have the idea. Now, let the witness see the
14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. So all your contacts and meetings --
16 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Mr. Markovic, if you'd care to look at that.
17 And first of all, tell us if it seems to be an authentic document when
18 you've had a chance to look at it, and then you can also look through
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] December is at the very end, and it
21 is rather short.
22 MR. NICE: While the witness is reviewing the document, the
23 Chamber will perhaps have in mind that this is not a document we were able
24 to provide, because archives, of course, have been, in general, completely
25 unavailable to us. But if documents of this kind exist for other organs
1 of the government, in particular for the organs of the accused, we'll be
2 very interested in seeing them.
3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. It is a document -- well, yes, I'll wait.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The paper has gone all yellow in
7 the 12 years since. It's the document. Mr. Nice asked about it. It's
8 the document from Mr. Markovic's cabinet.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I say something? I wasn't able
10 to read through this whole document. It would require much more time.
11 According to what it says, one could say that the document was authentic
12 and that that is what my -- the notes that my cabinet kept with respect to
13 my activities. But we can also see that from July onwards there -- or
14 thereabouts, all the topics of my activities from people who know what all
15 this was about, we can see that this was just within the frameworks of the
16 government. For example, "Friday, the 6th, Tasic, Aco Mitrovic,
17 preparations for The Hague Conference, the flight to The Hague, the
18 meeting in The Hague, internal consultations, interview for Radio B-92,
19 monitoring and so on." All this was internal consultations. There
20 weren't any activities which would speak about the functioning of --
21 functioning outside the building, if I can put it that way, of the Federal
22 Executive Council or Yugoslav government. And let me just add, although
23 it's not important in this context, that I asked to be given from the
24 Federal Executive Council material relating to my work there and a whole
25 library of materials and documents that I worked on during those three
1 years. I was not able to get anything from them.
2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. All right. Now, as you say -- you yourself say that the
4 government is authentic, would you please find this meeting with me in
6 A. Perhaps it doesn't -- it's not recorded, but that doesn't mean
7 that the meeting didn't take place. Most probably I didn't verify this,
8 so I didn't check it out.
9 Q. So your cabinet didn't know where you had gone. You went
10 secretly. You left the cabinet secretly.
11 A. Well, you can put it that way if you want to.
12 Q. In 1991, the prime minister of the federal government goes to see
13 the president of the Republic of Serbia in the centre of Belgrade
14 secretly, not recorded anywhere.
15 JUDGE MAY: No. No, Mr. Milosevic, you've made your point.
16 You've heard the answer. No point going over it again.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
18 Would you exhibit this, please? And I should like to have the
19 document returned to me once it has been photocopied.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I be allowed to add something,
21 please? I informed Loncar about that conversation. Loncar at the time
22 was the foreign minister. And I mentioned that in a conversation that I
23 had in Trieste with de Michelis also sometime at the beginning of 1992.
24 JUDGE MAY: Very well.
25 Yes, Mr. Nice.
1 MR. NICE: The document is being spoken of by the accused as if
2 it's an original. If it's an original, then in accordance with your usual
3 policy you should retain the original and he should have the copy. And it
4 will be interesting to know in due course how the yellowed pages of the
5 original come to be in the accused's hands, when, as I say -- whatever it
6 is. But the original we'd like to see as well.
7 JUDGE MAY: Yes, of course you shall.
8 [Trial Chamber confers]
9 JUDGE MAY: The registry will keep the original. You can have a
10 photocopy back. The Registry will keep it. The Prosecution can have a
11 look now.
12 We will give it the next D number, please.
13 THE REGISTRAR: D207, Your Honour.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May. I don't have
15 anything against having a photocopy myself.
16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. I should now like to ask you, Mr. Markovic, to take a look at
18 this document from the cabinet of the then-Foreign Affairs Minister Loncar
19 about the conversation with the US Secretary of State, James Baker, in
20 1991, in which it is also clearly set out that the army, under the control
21 -- is under the control of the Presidency and the government, as it
22 states. This, then, otherwise is a document, Mr. May, which the opposite
23 side possesses. It is 064611, the ERN number. And it is titled "The
24 Federal Secretariat for Foreign Affairs, the Cabinet of the Foreign
25 Secretary." It has a confidential number, et cetera, et cetera. I don't
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 want to read it out. The date is the 11th of May, 1991. It is a note on
2 the telephone conversation between the federal secretary for foreign
3 affairs, Loncar, with the US Secretary of State, J. Baker. And the note
4 was sent out to the president of the SFRY, the Presidency and the
5 President Jovic; to the president of the Federal Assembly, Gligorijevic;
6 to the president of the Federal Executive Council, Ante Markovic; to the
7 vice-minister of the Federal Defence Secretary, Kadijevic and Gracanin;
8 and then also to certain key figures in the Federal Secretary for Foreign
9 Affairs. It wasn't sent out to anybody in Serbia, just sent out at
10 federal level.
11 And let us take a look at what the third paragraph of the document
12 states. I assume that you provided that to the opposite side over there,
13 because you are mentioned -- or perhaps you didn't provide them with that.
14 Anyway, paragraph 3 says: "In response to Baker's question
15 whether there was the danger of the army acting autonomously or that this
16 should be done by some of its parts, in the area of Croatia, the Federal
17 Secretary Loncar said that the army was under the full control of the
18 Federal Secretary of National Defence and that he was responsible to the
19 Presidency and the government."
20 And then a few lines further on - and you can read that for
21 yourselves, you can read it all, but to save time - it says: "The actions
22 of the army were calculated basically on guaranteeing security to the
23 population and saving them from unrest and conflict, protecting them from
24 unrest and conflict." So that, then, is the government's position and
25 Loncar is discussing this with Baker. Loncar also comes from Croatia --
1 or rather, he's a Croat from Croatia. He was the foreign minister at the
2 time --
3 JUDGE MAY: Let's move on. Let the witness see the document, and
4 then we must adjourn.
5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. When you come to look at the document, would you take a look and
7 see that it says quite precisely that the JNA was to be deployed to
8 protect and safeguard the safety of the population, which is what your
9 minister, the minister of foreign affairs, is saying.
10 A. This was a telephone conversation in fact, if I understand it
11 correctly, between Mr. Baker and Mr. Loncar. Now, what Baker and Loncar
12 discussed and who drew up these minutes, I really can't enter into that.
13 At any rate, this is not a document of mine.
14 JUDGE MAY: Very well. We'll give it the next D number.
15 THE REGISTRAR: D208, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE MAY: We must adjourn now.
17 Mr. Markovic, I'm sorry that we haven't been able to conclude
18 your evidence today, particularly as I understand you've already been here
19 once and have been inconvenienced in that way. But as you will
20 appreciate, your evidence is important in this case, and we must deal with
21 the matter thoroughly, and we must, therefore, ask you to come back at a
22 date convenient to yourself to continue your examination, which we will
23 endeavour to make as expeditious as possible and certainly finish within
24 the day.
25 Mr. Nice, if you'd like to arrange with the witness a suitable
1 time for him to come back.
2 MR. NICE: We will, and obviously we'll restrict our
3 conversations with him to that topic.
4 JUDGE MAY: Yes, of course. You certainly have permission from
5 that point of view to talk to him.
6 We'll adjourn now. Tuesday morning.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May I know today, Mr. May, whether
8 Mr. Markovic will be continuing on Tuesday?
9 JUDGE MAY: Not on Tuesday. It won't be on Tuesday. Unless
10 there's a sudden change of plan. If there is, you will be informed
11 promptly; but probably not on Tuesday.
12 We'll adjourn.
13 --- Whereupon the proceedings adjourned at
14 1.49 p.m., to be reconvened on Tuesday,
15 the 28th day of October, 2003, at 9.00 a.m.