1 Tuesday, 11 November 2003
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.04 a.m.
5 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Now, Dr. Donia is to return. My note is that he
6 is to be recalled for 45 minutes cross-examination, and meanwhile, he is
7 to review, or was to review the transcript of the 30th Session Minutes,
8 9th of May, 1993, at which Mr. Milosevic spoke. So what would seem to be
9 sensible is that I will ask him first if there is anything he wants to add
10 about that and then we will hear the cross-examination.
11 And that is followed by -- if I'm right, by Witness B-1097, who
12 was being cross-examined when the accused fell ill. My note is that there
13 was half an hour, in that case, left of cross-examination when the witness
15 MR. GROOME: That agrees with our records as well, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE MAY: Is there anything anyone wants to add before we have
17 Dr. Donia in? Very well.
18 MR. NICE: Only to say that perhaps after the second witness if I
19 could address you on one or two procedural matters I would be grateful.
20 JUDGE MAY: Let us deal with the witnesses and then we'll hear
21 those procedural matters. I should say, though, there is a change of
22 dates which I can deal with now while it's in my mind and that is that the
23 United Nations has changed the date of the Eid Al-Fitr
24 holiday. As you know from the -- we have the dates here. It was on
25 Tuesday the 25th. The date has been changed to Wednesday, the 26th.
1 Sorry. It was -- I thank Judge Kwon. It was Wednesday the 26th; it is
2 now the 25th.
3 I take it that there is no objection to our changing those dates
4 for the sitting, and we will now sit on Wednesday the 26th.
5 MR. GROOME: None from the Prosecution, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE MAY: Very well. Dr. Donia, please.
7 [The witness entered court]
8 JUDGE MAY: Dr. Donia, you are under the same declaration.
9 There's no need to take it again.
10 WITNESS: ROBERT DONIA [Resumed]
11 JUDGE MAY: Thank you for returning, first. You have been
12 recalled. You were, I think, going to review the transcript of the 30th
13 Session of the 9th of May, 1993, at which the accused spoke, and then
14 there was also the matter of further cross-examination.
15 Before the cross-examination, is there anything you want to add to
16 what you said on the last occasion, anything about this particular
17 transcript that you want to add, or we'll go straight into the
19 THE WITNESS: Mr. President, there are a number of things about
20 that transcript that I'd like to point out that came up in the prior
21 questions, but I wonder if they may be covered in either cross-examination
22 or redirect. However you would like me to proceed.
23 JUDGE MAY: Let's deal with it this way, shall we: Let's hear the
24 examination and the redirect. If there's anything at the end of it which
25 you would like to add, of course you will have the opportunity to do so.
1 THE WITNESS: Fine. Thank you, Mr. President.
2 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. You have three-quarters of an
4 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]
5 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Donia, in November 2001, you gave an
6 interview to the paper Dani, and my question has to do with one of your
7 responses to the question that was asked of you. They said you were a
8 Hague witness twice, one of -- in Blaskic and the second time you went
9 into the background of the conflict, and you were asked what your
10 experience was with The Hague Tribunal. And the point of my question is
11 the following: You go on to answer and say that: "Tadic is the most
12 important case for me on the basis of which on the 15th of July, 1999, the
13 basic fact was confirmed of the investigation and established that the
14 activities of Serbia or, rather, Yugoslavia was an international armed
16 So for you, Tadic is the most important case, where it was
17 establish that what was happening in Yugoslavia at the time was an
18 international armed conflict. Now, you as an historian, do you really and
19 truly consider that what was going on within Yugoslavia was caused by the
20 forceful secession of an international armed conflict, the forcible
22 JUDGE MAY: May I interrupt. This is really for the Court to
23 determine. That should be said first. But the witness can, of course,
24 answer as to his interview. And perhaps the best way to deal with it, to
25 say, if you would, Dr. Donia, first of all whether what's been put to you
1 is direct, that that is what you said, and then perhaps you'd like to
2 amplify and clarify what you said.
3 THE WITNESS: Yes, Mr. President. I think I did indeed give an
4 interview, and the essence of at least part of it was just conveyed by
5 Mr. Milosevic.
6 At that time, the Appeals Chamber decision in the Tadic case was
7 relatively recent, and I viewed that as probably the most important
8 conclusion to have come out of the Tribunal and accepted and accept its
9 conclusions, again as an historian and not rendering a legal opinion, but
10 that was my conclusion at the time and would still be the case, that that
11 was an important step and one with which raw judgement I concur from a
12 historical standpoint.
13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Mr. Donia, I'm asking you as an historian precisely. Don't you
15 feel that historical facts are being restructured here, for example, in
16 the Tadic case? And I don't think that anybody knows about him in
17 Yugoslavia, that the facts are being established by way of the fact that
18 Serbia and Yugoslavia was involved in an international armed conflict.
19 A. No, I do not believe that.
20 Q. Tell me, please, Mr. Donia, do you know that this conflict emerged
21 through the armed secession -- was caused by the armed secession of
22 certain parts of what was once Yugoslavia and that it took place
23 exclusively within Yugoslavia?
24 A. In my view, this conflict was caused by a determination on the
25 part of you and others in the Belgrade leadership to prevent the peaceful
1 secession of those republics from Yugoslavia as independent countries.
2 Q. Well, are you aware of the fact that it was precisely Yugoslavia
3 which advocated a peaceful solution and even all the international
4 mediators are well aware of that fact? Do you yourself know that it was
5 precisely the activities of external factors, the premature recognition
6 and pushing individual parts of Yugoslavia into a conflict amongst
7 themselves caused the conflict and that the war was imposed upon Serbia?
8 Do you know anything about that, Mr. Donia?
9 A. In my view, the principal cause was the determination of yourself
10 and others in the Belgrade leadership to instigate uprisings amongst Serbs
11 in Croatia, in Bosnia-Herzegovina against the peaceful process that was
12 going forward, which was, for example, peaceful in the Soviet Union for
13 almost all republics as that federation dissolved in the course of 1990
14 and 1991. So I cannot accept your premise. I disagree with your
15 fundamental rendering of those -- those causes.
16 Q. Very well. There'll be time to go into those causes in greater
17 detail in due course in other areas, but you as an expert witness, as an
18 historian yourself, deal here with the various Assembly sessions of
19 Republika Srpska. Tell me, please, Mr. Donia, how many Assembly sessions
20 did you deal with of Republika Srpska?
21 A. I'm not exactly certain. The total number of sessions was, I
22 believe, 62, and in this report I've not dealt with the first 15 and dealt
23 selectively with almost all of them after that. There were a few for
24 which I did not have the complete transcript, and there were a few which
25 had, in my view, nothing that rose to the standard that I was asked to
1 examine these transcripts for. So I guess the answer probably is I deal
2 with here about 35 or 40 sessions.
3 Q. So you chose the sessions selectively, ones where you could pull
4 out of context somebody's observations or conclusions. Is that right,
5 Mr. Donia?
6 A. That's wrong. I reviewed the transcripts and minutes with an eye
7 toward selecting those citations which rose to the level of the things
8 that I was asked to address, which were, first of all the fundamental
9 policies of the Bosnian Serb leadership and then the relationship of that
10 leadership to external factors, including international negotiators,
11 yourself and the Belgrade leadership, Montenegrin leadership,
12 paramilitaries, JNA, and other external factors.
13 Q. Do you think that from the aspects of historical signs and your
14 expertise that it is proper to extract several quotations from a
15 particular Assembly session out of context and then, on the basis of that,
16 to reconstruct some sort of headings or titles under which you accuse the
17 Serb side of being responsible for the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
18 A. Sir, you have mischaracterised both my intention and the outcome
19 as you see it in the report. This was an examination in which the first
20 thing I did in each Assembly session was to outline the context. There
21 was a deliberate, conscious effort on my part to explain the context in
22 which the debates and the citations took place.
23 I had no intention of blaming what you call the Serb side. I was
24 looking for evidence of the policies of the Bosnian Serb leadership as
25 represented by the SDS and also its relationship to external factors.
1 Q. Mr. Donia, was it your task to take a look at the documents of the
2 other two sides as well? And they had their organs, their assemblies, the
3 Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, or
4 to be more precise, when we had a member, Kljuic, here testifying, a
5 member of the Bosnian state Presidency, I showed him the stenogram of a
6 session he attended from which it could be seen that the Presidency, led
7 by Izetbegovic, was fully aware of the unlawful mass confinement of Serbs
8 in their camps, and so on and so forth.
9 So these flagrant matters, did you analyse those when it comes to
10 the Muslim side, for example?
11 A. There are several questions within that locution. My sole task
12 for this particular case was to look at the Bosnian Serb Assembly minutes
13 in the period beginning with the 16th Session. I did not look at any
14 other Assembly sessions in connection with this task. I have looked at
15 other minutes, meetings, press reports in conjunction with other sides,
16 both for other cases in my preparation for those cases and in my own
18 Q. So you didn't deal with the other parties, other sides. Is that
19 it, Mr. Donia?
20 A. In the report that you have before you and my summaries of it, I
21 have dealt only with the Bosnian Serb Assembly, but as I said, I've
22 reviewed other documents and reports for other situations.
23 Q. Very well. Now, since we have very little time, the way you
24 portray things, let's take a look at the 33rd Session, for example,
25 Assembly session, and you say - and I think that's on page 226, the ERN
1 number and the last digits of that - where you say: "The Defence Ministry
2 is currently negotiating the financing of all production of ammunition and
3 equipment in the republic, and by means of compensatory agreements from
4 the SRY and selling of goods from the war reserves," et cetera, et cetera.
5 And you quote Krajisnik in that regard.
6 Isn't it quite clear that the Ministry of Defence of the republic,
7 or Republika Srpska -- or, rather, that Republika Srpska, let me put it
8 that way, is negotiating with various enterprises in the FRY for the
9 purchase of necessary goods?
10 A. I'm sorry, I've just not been able to -- could you give me your
11 page reference again, please?
12 Q. It is the 33rd Assembly session. The page in Serbian is 5526, the
13 last digits. And after that, we come to Srebrenica and Zepa, and the
14 title is "Srebrenica and Zepa Are Part of the RS."
15 MR. GROOME: I can be of assistance. It's page 32 of Dr. Donia's
17 THE WITNESS: Yes. I have it, Mr. Milosevic. I'm sorry, could I
18 ask you to repeat the question.
19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Well, it says here that the Ministry of Defence of Republika
21 Srpska is negotiating with different enterprises from the Federal Republic
22 of Yugoslavia. Well, you've had different texts from the purchase from
23 abroad of necessary equipment and so on. So what is there that is out of
24 ordinary, unusual there, or not normal?
25 A. This is one of those citations which speaks to the relationship
1 between the Bosnian Serb leadership and an external entity, in this case
2 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or enterprises in the Federal Republic
3 of Yugoslavia and the sale of goods from war booty and commercial
4 reserves. It therefore is included in the report as part of the effort to
5 describe those -- capture what this source says about those relationships.
6 Q. Well, did you find in any of those texts that they weren't
7 purchasing goods from enterprises in Yugoslavia alone but from other
8 countries as well? Just give me a yes or no answer and we can move on,
9 not to lose time.
10 A. I don't recall seeing any reference to purchases of munitions and
11 equipment from other countries. I don't recall, or could potentially have
12 been but I don't recall seeing any.
13 Q. Very well. I'm not going to show you those quotations and look
14 through all of them, but do you have any knowledge about the fact and did
15 you have any dealings with the fact of where the Muslim side was getting
16 assistance and weapons and munitions and everything else that
17 Mr. Izetbegovic speaks about quite publicly about procuring? He said this
18 in a public speech. He mentioned the figure of 300.000 weapons, millions
19 of pieces of ammunition, and so on and so forth. So do you have any
20 knowledge anywhere as to the sources of their equipment and goods?
21 A. That is outside the realm of my brief for this particular report.
22 Q. Very well. So it was your brief merely to establish whether and
23 to what extent the organs of Republika Srpska had any kind of - how shall
24 I put this? - incriminatory acts that they could be accused of. So that
25 is your task as an historian, is it?
1 A. My task was to describe, to capture as I was able through those
2 citations, the relationship of the Bosnian Serb leadership, namely the key
3 leaders of the SDS, with other external entities. Whether that is
4 incriminating or is good or bad, or whatever it is, is not for me really
5 to judge. That's something that is put forward here as part of the effort
6 to characterise those relationships as seen through the eyes of the
7 Bosnian Serb leaders themselves.
8 Q. Do you know that that Assembly of Republika Srpska, the one you're
9 analysing, was composed of people's deputies elected at direct multi-party
10 elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina before the war broke out and that it was a
11 legitimate, lawful organ of Republika Srpska?
12 A. The deputies who made up the Assembly of the Bosnian Serb
13 Republic, or Republika Srpska, were elected in 1990 not as delegates to
14 the Bosnian Serb Assembly but as delegates to the Assembly of
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina. They were elected from districts all over
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina that had mixed populations and were specifically
17 elected for the purpose of serving in the Assembly. That seems to me to
18 raise a question of whether their break-away and formation was in fact a
19 legal and fully warranted act in light of the fact that they formed a
20 self-proclaimed body that had no constitutional status in the original
21 documents under which they were elected.
22 I, however, can't make that judgement. I'm not too sure that --
23 well, I'm certainly not a legal historian of the former Yugoslavia and
24 would certainly defer to others to make that judgement, but it does seem
25 to me that it's an open question as to their ability to represent the
1 constituents which elected them.
2 Q. Are you aware, Mr. Donia, that they represented the constituency
3 that elected them, to use your words, only after the Assembly of Bosnia
4 and Herzegovina, contrary to the constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina
5 and by ignoring the positions of representatives of the Serb people in
6 that Assembly, took the decision on the sovereignty and independence of
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and so on?
8 So the principle of consensus was not respected. What other
9 choice did they have then?
10 A. The delegates who made up the Bosnian Serb Assembly served in the
11 Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina, I think without exception from its
12 convening in, I believe, December -- mid-December 1990 through 1992. In
13 other words, at times when they were also serving as members of the
14 self-proclaimed Bosnian -- Serbian -- or Assembly of the Serbian people of
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So there was a period in which there was simultaneous
16 representation, at least by a few people, in both Assemblies, and
17 certainly the first thing that these delegates did was to serve in the
18 body to which they were elected.
19 Q. They performed their duties in the Assembly of Bosnia and
20 Herzegovina, they advocated a peaceful solution, as you know full well,
21 and even with the help of the Carrington conference or, rather, his
22 assistant, Ambassador Cutileiro, the three sides reached agreement over
23 the so-called Carrington-Cutileiro plan signed by all three parties, and
24 then Izetbegovic withdrew his signature upon instructions from your own
25 ambassador and provoked a conflict. Are you aware of that as an
2 A. Well, as I'm sure you're aware, Mr. Milosevic, the notion that
3 that decision of Izetbegovic's was motivated by Mr. Zimmerman has been
4 specifically denied by him publicly on numerous occasions, and I believe
5 him. The question of the Cutileiro agreement, of course, is one that is
6 beyond my specific competence here to address, and I would only note that
7 it was one of many situations that arose in which the three sides were
8 very close to agreement. If you'll recall, the Cutileiro agreement was an
9 agreement in principle and not in details, with further specifics to be
10 worked out. And owing to developments that took place in
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina, those further agreements on detail were never reached.
12 Q. Without going into why something happened, let us go back within
13 the framework of your expertise here. You refer to the 33rd Session, and
14 your heading is "Srebrenica and Zepa are Part of Republika Srpska."
15 Radovan Karadzic, at the 33rd Session, held on the 20th and 21st
16 of July, 1993, spoke about Resolution 836 of the UN Security Council;
17 isn't that right?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. And that is part of his statement on the page we just quoted, and
20 you put that under the heading of "Srebrenica and Zepa are Part of
21 Republika Srpska" as being an allegation made by Karadzic. Is that right,
22 Mr. Donia?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Isn't it, however, true that Karadzic speaks about the failure of
25 the Resolution to be in conformity with the Geneva Conventions, which says
1 that only demilitarised areas may be protected? That is what he speaks
2 about, as far as I am able to read your own excerpts.
3 A. The fourth to last line in that citation begins - I'm citing the
4 English here: "That's RS territory. That Muslim state has no right nor
5 does it need to be a party to that agreement."
6 That was the basis of the headline that I chose for that passage.
7 Q. Yes, but it's taken out of context, because he says in that same
8 sentence: "Our Assembly must decide on any exception, for our Assembly
9 enacted a general decision that UN forces not be deployed on our
10 territory." Yet they were deployed there, and they were in both
11 Srebrenica and Zepa. Is it true that Karadzic says that the
12 demilitarisation of these two enclaves was not carried out and that only a
13 small quantity of weapons had been surrendered? So the topic of
14 discussion is a different one.
15 A. The topics of discussion in this citation are actually several and
16 all pertaining to Gorazde and Zepa, and in fact, Srebrenica, beginning
17 with the discussion of the Resolution and the subsequent agreement that
18 was reached on the ground and the fact, which is indeed the case, that the
19 Assembly had adopted a general decision that UN forces not be deployed,
20 and in other citations which I believe are included, had made exceptions
21 for first the Canadian force that went into Srebrenica in April of 1993
22 and subsequently a unit of Ukrainians that was deployed, and later the
23 exchange of forces of the Canadian for the Dutch forces. All that is
24 consistent with his statement here and consistent with the statement that
25 he made that in his view, these are part of RS territory, that's RS
1 territory, and that the Muslim state has no right. So the headline in
2 this case, I would argue, accurately reflects one part of what is covered
3 here and captures an important part of what Karadzic said.
4 Q. Well, isn't it contradictory that he speaks of exceptions and that
5 it is through the agreement of the bodies of Republika Srpska that UN
6 forces were deployed in Gorazde, Srebrenica, and Zepa?
7 A. No. It's perfectly consistent. He's saying, "Our Assembly must
8 decide on any exception." It subsequently did.
9 Q. They decided that those forces be deployed in Zepa, Srebrenica,
10 and Gorazde. Wasn't that so, Mr. Donia?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. That is what I wanted to hear. And is it true that Republika
13 Srpska never for a moment required that the Muslims hand over their
14 weapons to them but exclusively to UN forces?
15 A. That was Karadzic's position, yes.
16 Q. At that same session in 1993, Karadzic speaks of Srebrenica as
17 well, doesn't he?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Is it true that Karadzic then said that if the Serbs were to enter
20 Srebrenica at the time, that would be a major mistake?
21 A. This citation from Mr. Karadzic says that if they - that is the
22 Bosnian Serb forces - had entered Srebrenica, there would have been blood
23 to the knees. And the reason for that was that those entering would be
24 from -- would be those whose families were killed. He foresaw that the
25 entry into Srebrenica could be a bloody and catastrophic event for the
1 Muslims and that the arresting of that process by Morillon probably had
2 more benefits for the Bosnian Serbs because it would have fully
3 discredited them in the eyes of the international community. That's what
4 I see him saying here, and foreseeing that bloodbath which would occur if
5 RS forces entered.
6 Q. So he says that it would be an error, and the reasons for that is
7 the fact that all Serbs around Srebrenica had been burnt by the forces
8 that were leaving the area, that more than 1.200 Serbs were killed, and
9 that if the people whose families had been killed were to enter, this
10 could have a catastrophic effect.
11 So it is not disputed that the leadership of Republika Srpska is
12 fully conscious that something like that would cause a disaster and that
13 it would be extremely damaging for Republika Srpska as well. Isn't that
15 A. Yes, recognising this is at the time of the 33rd Session in 1993.
16 Q. So if someone has an awareness of how disastrous such an act would
17 be for Republika Srpska in 1993, surely they would have the same awareness
18 later on. This awareness could not have changed regarding the
19 significance and disastrous consequences of such an event. If there was
20 awareness of this earlier on, surely that awareness must have continued as
21 to how disastrous and damaging such an act would be. Isn't that right,
22 Mr. Donia?
23 A. Mr. Karadzic here is expressing the consequences of this
24 foreseeable slaughter not in terms of the Muslims who might be killed but
25 the fact that it might compromise the security of the Bosnian Serb state
1 by which he, in this context, typically meant its international
2 recognition. This was the case in 1993 when the primary goal of the
3 Bosnian Serb leadership essentially from May 1992 until this time and
4 somewhat further was the international recognition of the Republika
6 In 1995, that situation had appreciably changed along with the
7 military situation along the ground, and the threat to Republika Srpska in
8 1995 came principally from military sources rather than from the lack of
9 diplomatic recognition.
10 So those two contexts, in fact, are quite different.
11 Q. But there's no difference with regard to the fact that there was
12 very clear awareness among the leadership of Republika Srpska that such an
13 event would have a very negative impact on the interests of Republika
14 Srpska, not to go into the interests of those who were the victims,
15 because something like that could only have been done by somebody who was
16 an enemy of both the Muslims and the Serbs, that is, the event of 1995.
17 Someone with a criminal consciousness and someone who is a lunatic.
18 However, here they clearly indicate that they are aware how
19 harmful that would be for Republika Srpska. Isn't that right, Mr. Donia?
20 A. The statement here is that it -- we might lose the state for
21 that. And as I've explained, what I think that statement refers to is the
22 dimming of prospects for international recognition. That was the key
23 issue for the Bosnian Serb leadership at this time. By 1995, losing the
24 state meant its being overrun militarily, particularly in Western Bosnia,
25 and therefore, the entire context changed.
1 In this statement, there is no sensitivity, no indication that the
2 consequences of this possible entry would be detrimental to the Muslims.
3 That's not a part of the expression here of concern. The concern is
4 purely one for the existence of the Republika Srpska. But I don't think
5 the interests of the leadership of the Republika Srpska were the same in
6 1995 as they were in 1993 when the military situation in 1993 was
7 extremely favourable for them.
8 Q. I'm quoting from what you yourself say under the heading "Entering
9 Srebrenica would produce catastrophic results," and I assume you correctly
10 quote from the transcripts. I never saw those transcripts, nor have I
11 read them, nor have I studied them, so the quotation is yours under the
12 sub-heading "Entering Srebrenica would produce catastrophic results," and
13 Karadzic apparently says: "How does that apply to Srebrenica? I think
14 that's a point for us, for if we had entered Srebrenica, the people
15 entering would be those whose families were killed. 1.200 Serbs were
16 killed. There would be blood to the knees and we could lose the state for
17 that. That is why I believe that Morillon saved us, not the Muslims, when
18 he entered Srebrenica."
19 So when he says that there would be a major conflict and that
20 there would be many conflicts proves -- disproves what you said a moment
21 ago. That is, you say that he doesn't mention the victims. On the
22 contrary, he does talk about the victims that in such a terrible situation
23 would necessarily be incurred. Is that in dispute, Mr. Donia?
24 A. I think these words speak very clearly for themselves. They are
25 not as you suggested, my words. They are Mr. Karadzic's words, and they
1 were taken directly from the statement that he made in the Bosnian Serb
2 Assembly. I've provided a brief summary of the context at the beginning
3 of this, and the rest of the words are Mr. Karadzic's as directly taken
4 from the Assembly minutes.
5 Q. There may be a misunderstanding between us, Mr. Donia. I didn't
6 say that they were your words but a quotation that you chose, and I even
7 said that I assume that you correctly quoted from the minutes of the
8 speech of Radovan Karadzic, and then you quote him.
9 JUDGE MAY: Well, I think we've exhausted this topic. We've been
10 over it. We can read what the witness has said. It will be for us to
11 determine what effect those words had. We shall move on to something
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May.
14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. On page ERN 227 is the last number, you quote another speech of
16 Karadzic's under the heading "We must incite incidents to intensify
17 conflict." That is what you put down. And here is what Karadzic says:
18 "It is important that we have pulled out the Serbs from Gorazde. We don't
19 want to open fire on Gorazde. There is no need for us to fire a single
20 bullet at Gorazde. We have won militarily, we must win politically. We
21 must foresee what will happen and preempt the events. The contract signed
22 is disastrous for the Muslims. It is for history. It is recognition of
23 Serb victory, and Morillon signed it."
24 Is that quotation correct, Mr. Donia?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Tell me, please, where did you read that Karadzic said that
2 incidents needed to be incited to intensify the conflict?
3 A. Centering on the words "inflame these events," which is my English
4 translation as I have it here: "We must foresee what will happen and
5 inflame those events or a day beforehand take measures which will incite
6 senseless measures against us."
7 Q. Doesn't Karadzic speak about political solutions and the absence
8 of the need for waging war? He even says there is no need to fire a
9 single bullet around Gorazde.
10 A. That is part of his locution here, yes.
11 Q. Very well. The 34th Session of the Assembly of the Republika
12 Srpska, several sessions from the 27th of August to the 1st of October,
13 this is what you say in your report, because I -- I didn't use any other
14 sources except your own report.
15 Is it true that there were three basic topics of this session that
16 took place in seven hearings? Was the peace plan, the plan of union of
17 the three republics, and then analysis of the military rebellion,
18 September 1993, the appeal to Serbian Krajina to send aid because of the
19 attack by Croatian units?
20 Is it true, since you're quoting Karadzic in the first place, that
21 Karadzic had a positive attitude towards the plan of the union of three
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Is it true that Karadzic expressed readiness in the interest of a
25 peace agreement for the Serbs to renounce certain parts of the territory
1 that they had under their control?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And then a chapter headed "Karadzic explains the nature of the
4 relationships with Milosevic." Is it true that in answer to this he says:
5 "I have to tell you that they are cautious with us. They have burnt their
6 fingers. They are very cautious. I can't say that they're not bringing
7 pressure to bear, but not in the form of ultimatums. They talk to us.
8 They are showing a great deal of patience with us."
9 And then he explains that I assisted in particular with respect to
10 the constitutional principles. Anyway, Lord Owen also spoke about my role
11 in connection with those constitutional principles. Are you aware, Mr.
12 Donia, that it was thanks to my own efforts that those constitutional
13 principles were adopted? And once certain principles are adopted by all
14 three parties, isn't that the best proof that the approach taken is an
15 objective one and it is not to the detriment of any one side? So that
16 these were endeavours to find a peaceful solution, in fact. Are you aware
17 of that, Mr. Donia?
18 A. I can't speak to those generalisations.
19 Q. Very well, Mr. Donia. Tell me, please, on page 03085232, when
20 you're recounting Karadzic's speech, you say that in a rather disconnected
21 sentence he declares that he's expecting a massacre in Sarajevo. Is that
22 what you said?
23 A. It doesn't help me with that. Could you kindly suggest an English
24 language reference? Oh, I see it. I see, it Mr. Milosevic.
25 JUDGE MAY: Where is it, please, Dr. Donia?
1 THE WITNESS: I see the bottom of -- if I look at the ERN number,
2 it's 02989205.
3 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.
4 THE WITNESS: Page 38 of my report.
5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. So you say that he expects a massacre in Sarajevo, and you
7 attribute that to Karadzic in interpreting a sentence that was rather
8 disconnected and difficult to understand. Is that right, Mr. Donia?
9 A. Yes, and I regret not having cited that sentence even though it
10 was somewhat circumlocuitous. I meant to highlight the fact that in terms
11 of the use of heavy weapons, he was sensitive to constraints of
12 international -- he expressed himself to be sensitive to the constraints
13 of international law and the international media.
14 I could certainly provide or we can identify where that sentence
15 is and get its explicit translation. I don't have that with me,
16 unfortunately, but it can be provided.
17 Q. What kind of a massacre are you talking about in Sarajevo as
18 coming out of that rambling sentence?
19 A. I'd have to go to the original. I think that he was speaking of a
20 cataclysmic conclusion to Sarajevo events without suggesting that any one
21 side was going to perpetrate that cataclysmic conclusion.
22 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Milosevic, you've had nearly the time which was
23 allotted but we'll give you another five minutes so you can wrap up.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, what I can do in five minutes'
25 time I really don't know, Mr. May. I'll try.
1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Mr. Donia, I'm going to skip over some of the notes I've made
3 here, but on page 003 -- 540 are the last digits. You use the expression
4 "Greater Serbia," and you use it in your chapter heading, and that chapter
5 heading reads as follows: "Greater Serbia Will Integrate Around Belgrade
6 and Regional Centres." Is that right, Mr. Donia?
7 A. Again, in search of an English language citation.
8 Q. It is the 35th Assembly session, Mr. Donia, and then there is a
9 sub-heading within the 35th Assembly session. I think that the numbers I
10 have must be different to yours. 240 are the last digits.
11 JUDGE KWON: Page 46, Doctor, bottom of the page.
12 THE WITNESS: Yes, I see it now. It is ERN 02989213.
13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Tell me, please, Mr. Donia, why did you use the expression
15 "Greater Serbia"?
16 A. I used it as a commonly used equivalent of the entire Serbian
17 nation and its integrated form as foreseen by some -- some Serbian
18 intellectuals and policy-makers. I would agree that the term "Velika
19 Srbija" does not appear in the citation, but nevertheless, the sense of
20 that terminology there I think is suitable to use the term "Greater
21 Serbia" there.
22 Q. Mr. Donia, are you aware of the fact that not a single
23 representative of the Government of Republika Srpska ever used the term
24 "Greater Serbia" or any plan for a Greater Serbia or anything along those
25 lines nor was our support to peace plans in Bosnia-Herzegovina could be
1 tied with any aspirations to create a Greater Serbia? I hope you know
2 that, Mr. Donia, at least.
3 A. Well, I would reject that characterisation completely. I think
4 the citations that were cited, or I cited last time in my appearance here,
5 indicated that it was not only an objective but a -- simply assumed
6 objective of the Bosnian Serb leadership to eventually reach integration
7 with other Serbian lands.
8 Q. Please, didn't Karadzic say that the overall Serb nation, and he's
9 speaking about the Serb nation, should be integrated around several of its
10 core points, and he speaks about the largest centres in that regard and
11 around Belgrade, to begin with, which is the largest centre, and it's the
12 largest centre in the Balkans, for that matter; a university centre, an
13 administrative centre, an industrial and banking centre, financial centre,
14 scientific centre. In all respects it is a centre. So is it clear to you
15 that Belgrade is the historical, cultural, university, medical, religious,
16 Orthodox centre? It is the starting point, the be-all and end-all of the
17 entire Serb nation for Serbs in America, Australia, Europe, Serbs
18 throughout the world in fact.
19 I assume you know that as an historian.
20 JUDGE MAY: You're taking up a lot of time on a very simple point.
21 Yes. Do you accept that?
22 THE WITNESS: Well, Karadzic doesn't say that here, but I would
23 concur of the -- on the importance of Belgrade as a centre in the Balkans,
25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Mr. Donia, is it true and correct that Karadzic said, and I think
2 that that is at the 42nd Assembly session, in your analysis of that, he
3 says: "We know for sure that we have to give up something --" so they
4 have to give something. That is without any doubt. "-- if we wish to
5 realise the first strategic goal, and that is to get rid of the enemy in
6 our own home."
7 And --
8 JUDGE MAY: You have one minute left, Mr. Milosevic. This is in
9 the report, 42nd Assembly.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
11 THE WITNESS: Yes, he makes that statement, and I think it is
12 indeed almost a summary of the position of the Bosnian Serb leadership
13 from April 1992 until late 1994, that some territory will probably have to
14 be given up in order to secure the first goal, and that first strategic
15 goal, of course, was the creation of a separate Serbian polity that
16 achieved international recognition. And many people in the Bosnian Serb
17 Assembly were not prepared, were not eager to give up such territory, but
18 that was what the leadership, specifically Messrs. Karadzic, Krajisnik,
19 Koljevic, and Mrs. Plavsic felt was required in order to achieve that
20 first strategic goal, which was a separate community divided completely
21 from Croats and Muslims.
22 JUDGE MAY: Your last question, Mr. Milosevic.
23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Well, where does Karadzic mention driving out the Croats and
25 Muslims from their homes at all? Where does he say that at all?
1 A. Mr. Milosevic, I believe this was a -- the subject of an errata
2 which I submitted with a translation that is provided in the supplement to
3 the report, and it is a faulty translation for which I take
4 responsibility. I'll find the page in the supplementary report in a
5 minute. Let me see. I think it's the last page. On page 9. On page 9
6 of the supplement to the report -- and I do not have, Mr. President, the
7 ERN number on the copy I have.
8 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, it's ERN ending 5362.
9 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
10 THE WITNESS: I highlighted page 64, note number 133, and offered
11 this correct -- more correct translation: "That is beyond doubt insofar
12 as we want to achieve the first strategic goal, which is to rid our house
13 of the enemy, that is the Croats and Muslims, so that we will no longer be
14 together in a state."
15 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Now the amicus. Any questions?
16 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
17 Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:
18 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Donia, since my time as an amicus is very
19 limited, I should like to ask you to explain to the Trial Chamber certain
20 aspects having to do with four paragraphs of your report, and I should
21 like to start with the 39th Assembly session, the English version is on
22 page 56, and it is the 39th Assembly session of Republika Srpska, in
23 actual fact, held on the 24th of March -- 24th to the 25th of March, 1994,
24 and would you focus your attention on the following paragraph: The title
25 is "Karadzic: I am responsible for all army decisions." That's right,
1 isn't it?
2 A. Yes. This is ERN 02989233. Am I correct in that?
3 JUDGE KWON: 9223.
4 THE WITNESS: 9223, yes. Pardon me.
5 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I'll focus your attention on the
6 English version. So in this case, it is page 56 of your English text.
7 This is what you say. We have the heading, the title, and further down in
8 the text, as you quote Karadzic, it says the following in inverted commas:
9 "I am responsible to you and the people and the commanders are
10 responsible to me," et cetera, et cetera. And then it says: "I sign. I
11 decide -- that I sign, decide and am responsible for every decision." Is
12 that right? Further down in the text. Is that right?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. So is that a little different from what it says that he is
15 responsible for every decision of the army? He says that he is
16 responsible for each of the decisions he signs and where his signature
17 exists, the decisions signed by him; is that right?
18 A. Well, I think the essence of his statement is that he accepts
19 responsibility for all army decisions and explains that on the basis of
20 his having -- he assumes responsibility for having formed the high command
21 and agrees in not hiding behind it that he is indeed accepting
22 responsibility for its decisions.
23 Q. But only the decisions he himself signs, puts his signature to.
24 Yes or no.
25 A. Well, I think in saying that "not that I hide behind high command"
1 goes beyond saying that only those things that he signs and decides are
2 his responsibility.
3 Q. Thank you. Now look at your report on page 75, the English. It
4 is the 52nd Assembly session, and it says: "Karadzic issued a written and
5 oral order to take control of Srebrenica."
6 Now, I can't quote everything, but he stands behind directive 7
7 and he expressly states that, and we've already dealt with that directive,
8 it was brought up by the OTP, but somewhere in the middle of that
9 paragraph he mentions Tolimir and then says that: "Tolimir is encouraging
10 the army to persevere. While people didn't say to me, Hey, man, he wants
11 to intervene in this order in order to say that you weren't for it."
12 Now, did you find that in the documents and is that -- was it how
13 it is stated here in your report? Is that how it was?
14 A. Well, you have the Serbian original, I believe, in the footnote,
15 so that would be the way it was stated by him, yes.
16 Q. I'm going to move on now to page 83 of the English version. It is
17 the 54th Assembly session, and the paragraph is entitled: "Karadzic
18 Signed Seven Directives which were put before him -- Submitted to him."
19 And in that paragraph, you state under quotation marks that he said the
20 following: "I looked over, approved and signed seven directives. The
21 eighth and ninth were not submitted to me by anyone, nor did I read them
22 let alone sign them. That is because General Gvero wrote and those others
23 who should listen to this. I will not tolerate this."
24 Is that something that you came across in the documents as being
25 ascribed to Karadzic, Karadzic having said that?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Now, we have here, and it's already been put forward before this
3 Trial Chamber in tab 2, in actual fact, 553, Rupert Smith, that is
4 directive number 7. It was introduced into court through Rupert Smith.
5 And I'd like to draw your attention to what the directive says. The
6 Prosecutor has already shown us this in a single sentence with respect to
7 the Drina Corps, and it is to be found on page 10 of the directive. It is
8 the last paragraph. I have the directive here, directive 7.
9 Would you please take a look at page 10 and the last paragraph on
10 that English version page. And it refers to the Drina Corps. And the
11 Prosecutor quoted a sentence from that. I'm not going to go back to that
12 sentence. It is also to be found in that portion. But what is referred
13 to here is the fact that the -- that with an active and persistent
14 defence, breakthroughs should be prevented of the enemy. And then at the
15 end it says that the opposite side should be thwarted and war plans are
16 what is referred to, that the enemy should be routed.
17 A. Sir, what is your question? I --
18 Q. In that paragraph of that directive, is mention made of the fact
19 that certain territories should be defended mostly, and does it refer to
20 military operations by and large?
21 A. Yes. Military operations with stark consequences for civilian
23 Q. Well, I won't interpret it myself. Every -- we can read what it
24 says, and the Judges can too.
25 There was another piece of evidence produced here in Rupert
1 Smith's testimony, and it is 553 in tab 3, which refers to the operational
2 elaboration of that particular directive. I have the document of that as
3 well, and I'm sure you've had occasion to see it, but you can take a look
4 at it here and now.
5 It is the directive for further operations and the elaboration of
6 the previous directive given by Karadzic, and this one is signed by Ratko
8 Now, take a look at point 1. The basic characteristics of the
9 military and political situation. That is the heading. And then it says:
10 "From the beginning of the year, and especially in the second half of the
11 month of March, the Muslim forces have synchronised their approach to a
12 flagrant violation of the four-month truce agreement."
13 Have you had a chance of seeing that and did you link it up to the
14 operative that -- and operation that the Prosecutor asked you about?
15 A. There is two questions there. Have I seen it? No, I have not
16 seen this document before you gave it to me. And second, did I link it up
17 with this statement of Karadzic or with the operation? No, that's not
18 been my -- my intent has not been to do that but to sort of let the
19 leaders of the Bosnian Serb Assembly speak for themselves in regard to
20 these matters.
21 Q. There is a lot of material there, and Their Honours can take a
22 look at what it says about the various groupings at the front. Their
23 Honours can read that for themselves. But what I am going to read out is
24 point 2 of that same document. It is on the next page. "The tasks of the
25 army of Republika Srpska on the basis of directive number 7, the army of
1 Republika Srpska has as its task to be persistent in its defence on all
2 areas of the battlefield and to defend the territory of Republika Srpska."
3 Were you able to place that in the context of everything else that
4 you were able to read in the minutes from the Assembly sessions?
5 A. Well, as I've indicated, that has not been my intent in this
6 piece. I deliberately did not include any references to other documents,
7 either press reports or various chronologies or things. That would have
8 been an absolutely enormous task. So no, I have not sought to link this
9 particular document to the Bosnian Serb Assembly deliberations.
10 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] And Your Honours, I just have two
11 more matters to address. I think I will get through them in several
12 minutes. I am convinced and you know we amicus did not conduct any
13 investigations of our own, nor is that our job nor could we have done so.
14 However, I am quite convinced that the OTP must have this book here which
15 was published several months ago, and I would like to see if in actual
16 fact Mr. Donia has had a chance of coming across this book and reading it,
17 because they are orders, all the orders issued by Mr. Karadzic himself.
18 I should like to focus on two orders which have been translated
19 into English, and this book does exist both in Serbian and in English. It
20 is all -- contains all Karadzic's orders. I would like to refer to the
21 one of the 11th of July, 1995, those orders of that particular day. The
22 date is the 11th of July, 1995, which is when the attack on Srebrenica
23 started. Just two, if I may.
24 JUDGE MAY: Let us see if the witness can help at all. It may be
25 that he doesn't know anything about this.
1 Dr. Donia, you have heard of what Tapuskovic has said. Do you
2 know anything about what he is talking about?
3 THE WITNESS: No, Mr. President, I'm not familiar with the work
4 that he's citing.
5 JUDGE MAY: It may be that you can find a witness who could deal
6 with it.
7 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, if all the
8 decisions and documents exist, the ones that Mr. Donia looked at --
9 because you dealt with written documents, as far as I understand it. Here
10 we have two decisions passed on the 11th of July signed by Radovan
11 Karadzic which have to do with the order to the appointment of the
12 commissars, Miroslav Deronjic, in actual fact, who was to have seen to
13 respect of the humanitarian orders. And both are dated the 11th of July.
14 So it would be a good idea to have a look at them, to see them.
15 Q. If you have not, Mr. Donia, then we can perhaps wait for another
16 witness to do so.
17 JUDGE MAY: Yes. That's the very point. Let's wait for another
18 witness and we can deal with it with him or her.
19 Yes. Thank you very much, Mr. Tapuskovic. Yes.
20 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I had another question, Your
21 Honours. One more.
22 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
23 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. And it is to do with page 72 of the English version. It is the
25 52nd Assembly session, and it discusses the problems of Srebrenica and
1 Zepa and an order by General Gvero in that respect, and he says: "At the
2 time when the Drina Corps at the Sarajevo battlefront and when we did not
3 bring in the unit -- this was a time when the same Drina Corps gave up a
4 brigade to the Sarajevo front and when we couldn't spare either a MUP unit
5 or a unit from other zones of responsibility except from the Drina Corps."
6 Did you find a single piece of evidence or fact to show that any
7 commander called a unit of the army of Yugoslavia to take part in any
8 operation whatsoever linked to these areas and regions in
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina? That's my first question.
10 My second question is: Now, was the case quite different when it
11 came to Croatia? Could you answer that, please.
12 A. Your second question, I'm not too sure what that refers to,
13 different in Croatia. I'm unable to understand what you're asking me
15 Q. Did you have any information to the effect that on the side of the
16 Bosnian Croats, on the Bosnian Muslims, when there was moving across the
17 territory to Serbian Krajina, whether there were Croatian military units
18 involved. And the orders which have to do with the work of the Drina
19 Corps, we see that no unit of the army of Yugoslavia ever took part, nor
20 was it called upon to do so.
21 A. I think that was your first question. The second question as to
22 Croatia, I haven't addressed here nor am I in a position, not being a
23 military expert, to address what units were or were not in Bosnia in July
24 of 1995.
25 As to -- your first question really is about the documents about
1 the army of Yugoslavia. I have not sought nor am aware of such documents.
2 I'm sure that they exist in the archives of -- those roles are probably
3 explained in the archives of Serbia which, unfortunately, are not open to
5 Q. I don't think you understood me. In the quotation that you
6 yourself quote, it is General Gvero who says that he did not call upon any
7 other unit, not only of the army of Yugoslavia but no other MUP unit or
8 unit from other zones of responsibility except for the Serb army in
9 Bosnia. So the army of Yugoslavia is not mentioned here at all and that
10 is not what I asked you.
11 The Drina Corps only deployed units of Bosnia-Herzegovina. That's
12 what I am saying, according to this quote, of the Serb army in
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, in actual fact.
14 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Well, we can read what it says. Thank you very
15 much. Yes.
16 Re-examined by Mr. Groome:
17 Q. Dr. Donia, I would like to return to the 30 the Assembly session
18 and in particular to the words of Mr. Milosevic, and that is Exhibit 538,
19 tab 9. The text will be displayed on the screen in front of you. If I
20 could ask the usher to adjust it for the Sanction system.
21 I want to direct your attention to five different sentences in
22 Mr. Milosevic's second address to that Assembly session and I want to ask
23 you to put them into context for us.
24 The first passage you've already testified about previously. I
25 want to draw your attention to a particular part of it. It begins with:
1 "The question was asked, which I really find unacceptable: Whether we
2 give up on our goal? I shall tell you no, we do not give up on our goal."
3 Then just reading the last line of that paragraph: "The goal was
4 completed in many aspects but not in all of them but it represents a way
5 towards the ultimate goal, of course it does."
6 Now, when Mr. Milosevic said, "The goal was completed in many
7 aspects but not in all of them," you testified previously about how the
8 word "goal" would have been interpreted. Can I ask you to place in
9 context or what can be reasonably concluded from Mr. Milosevic saying,
10 "but not all of them." What aspects of that goal at the time that he was
11 making this address in May of 1993, what aspects of the goal were still
12 yet to be achieved?
13 A. The -- in the context in which he was speaking, the only thing
14 that can be concluded about "the goal" is that it referred to the unity of
15 Serbs in some polity. What was at that time not yet completed was the
16 integration of Serbs within Bosnia-Herzegovina in a single territorial
17 unit nor the integration of Serbs on a broader basis, that is to include
18 the Republika Srpska Krajina, those Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia
19 and so on.
20 Q. A few sentences below that passage I want to direct your attention
21 to another line, and again it will be displayed before you. Mr. Milosevic
22 says: "The question arises, who has the right to choose the unreasonable
23 losses, the huge losses in the name of the people?" Can it be reasonably
24 concluded from this passage that in Mr. Milosevic's view, a rejection of
25 the Vance-Owen Peace Plan would have resulted in unreasonable losses, in
1 huge losses?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. The next line I would like to draw your attention to --
4 JUDGE KWON: Just a second, Mr. Groome. Could you give the tab
5 number of the document. Is it tab 9 of 538?
6 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour, and it is page 96 of that exhibit.
7 JUDGE KWON: The document we are given consists of 116 pages.
8 MR. GROOME: I apologise, Your Honour, this is on page 96 of that
10 JUDGE KWON: 96, not 116.
11 MR. GROOME: Right.
12 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
13 MR. GROOME:
14 Q. The next line I would like to draw your attention to, and again
15 it's a few sentences below that last passage, is Mr. Milosevic says: "If
16 we preserve our people and territories, we shall win these factories
18 What can be reasonably concluded from Mr. Milosevic's reference to
19 "our people"? Who would he be referring to?
20 A. A few paragraphs before this, or a few sentences before this,
21 Mr. Milosevic began -- begins to use the plural first person "we" or its
22 grammatical equivalent in Serbian. And for essentially the rest of this
23 address, he continues to use the term "we." And that "we" is first used
24 or used early on in regard to the Bosnian Serbs. He speaks collectively
25 of himself and the Bosnian Serbs and speaks of himself in the role of the
1 leader of the Bosnian Serbs. And this is one sentence in a series -- or
2 several sentences in which he actually speaks in that first person plural
3 of going beyond the specific provisions of the Vance-Owen Plan to further
4 steps to consolidate Serbian authority and establish Serbian gains in
6 Q. The next line I'd like to draw your attention to is again just a
7 few lines below that, where Mr. Milosevic says -- and I'm now referring to
8 page 97 of Exhibit 538, tab 9: "The question is especially asked now how
9 are we going to amalgamate the economy of the Serb provinces?"
10 What can be reasonably concluded from his use of the word "Serb
11 provinces"? What territories would he have been referring to?
12 A. It's reasonable to conclude in this context that he is speaking of
13 the various polities in which Serbs reside, to include the Republika
14 Srpska Krajina, Serbia, the Republic of Serbia, Republic of Montenegro,
15 and the Republika Srpska.
16 Q. And a few lines below that, Mr. Milosevic says: "Serb lands shall
17 belong economically, culturally, educationally and in every other respect.
18 Karadzic spoke about the same primer, et cetera. Accordingly, I suppose
19 it doesn't take too much imagination to realise to where this process is
21 What can be reasonably concluded from Mr. Milosevic's statement
22 that it doesn't take too much imagination to realise where this process is
23 heading? Where is the process heading?
24 A. In this context, the process is heading toward the unification,
25 unity of the Serb people in a single polity.
1 Q. And the last sentence I would ask or seek your comment on is
2 further down on that page - and again it will be displayed before you -
3 Mr. Milosevic says: "And not to realise the tragic mistake that would
4 brutally cut off our way to success, is the Assembly going to decide on
5 the reasonable way or the unreasonable way to the goal?"
6 What can be -- what can we conclude from his interpretation of
7 what is the reasonable way towards the goal?
8 A. The reasonable way to the goal in this context is the Vance-Owen
9 Peace Plan and the acceptance of the Vance-Owen Peace Plan and subsequent
10 steps to consolidate Serbian authority.
11 Q. And the unreasonable way?
12 A. And the unreasonable way is in this context to reject the
13 Vance-Owen Peace Plan.
14 Q. Considering these words in the historical context of the time and
15 in the context of the debate that preceded his words, do his words reflect
16 a person who has fundamental disagreement with the goals of those members
17 of the RS Assembly who oppose the Vance-Owen Peace Plan or do they reflect
18 someone who shares the fundamental goals of those opposing the Vance-Owen
19 Peace Plan and has strong disagreement with them regarding the best
20 strategy or means of achieving those goals?
21 A. These goals are shared by the Bosnian Serb leadership and
22 Mr. Milosevic. This is a person who expresses the sense of a common goal
23 with the Bosnian Serbs, and the course of action to reach that goal is
24 what is in fact in question in these locutions.
25 MR. GROOME: I have no further questions.
1 JUDGE MAY: Just -- just a moment. Dr. Donia, is there anything
2 you want to add?
3 THE WITNESS: I would, Mr. President, if I may.
4 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
5 THE WITNESS: This 30th Session proceeded under I think very
6 intense international media scrutiny, and in the course of this 17-hour
7 debate underwent a very significant change in context. We have last time
8 noted -- I believe Mr. Milosevic read in full his opening comments which
9 cited the importance of or the notion that the goals of freedom and
10 equality of the Serbian people had been reached in the Vance-Owen Plan.
11 Thereafter, the very lively discussion which was somewhat typical
12 in the Bosnian Serb Assembly took place, and the -- a number of things
13 were said directly to Mr. Milosevic. Among others, that two delegates
14 mentioned the idea that they had been deserted or betrayed by the leaders
15 of Serbia and Montenegro, and two different persons in the Assembly
16 directly addressing Mr. Milosevic spoke of soldiers dying with pictures of
17 him on their breasts. Mr. Branko Simic said, "Mr. Milosevic you have the
18 love of the Serbs of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Every soldier that we buried
19 in the valley of the Neretva as a rule had a photo of you on his chest."
20 That is on page 34 of this English translation of the session. The B/C/S
21 ERN is 02150137.
22 And then General Bogdan Subotic said, "Soldiers are dying with
23 your portraits on their T-shirts." This was followed by another, a second
24 speech by Yugoslav president Dobrica Cosic in which he reiterated his
25 earlier formulation of the shared goals of Serbian people everywhere,
1 namely, that the ultimate liberation and unification of the Serbs which he
2 had earlier ascribed to something formulated over two centuries and which
3 had been -- in which -- to achieve those objectives, this was the seventh
4 war that had been fought to fight them. And he said: "There is nothing
5 more urgent and sacred today than fighting for unity and creating
6 conditions to preserve that unity."
7 Then there was a lengthy speech by General Mladic in which he
8 emphasised the thought that the enemies of the Bosnian Serbs had the most
9 up-to-date weapons devised by the mind of man and that the Serbs had
10 nothing. It was then in this context, after these comments, that
11 Mr. Milosevic spoke a second time, and the entire tenor of this was vastly
12 different from his opening remarks. In this second speech, he goes from
13 assuming that the mission has been accomplished to stating that it is
14 partly done and many other things remain to be done.
15 He also changes into this first person plural and speaks somewhat
16 alternately as the leader of the Bosnian Serbs and indeed at one point
17 says that "We should have local authority, our own police, et cetera."
18 Speaking of the areas in Bosnia. That's on page 95 of the document, B/C/S
19 ERN 02150190.
20 There is then one sentence that has not been translated into
21 English in his speech, and if I could read the Serbian, I believe that
22 should be inserted immediately after this statement about "We should have
23 local authority, our own police, et cetera," and that is:
24 [Interpretation] "Those are reserved areas which through the process are
25 gaining in size, are being stabilised, and placed in such a function."
1 [In English] So another feature of this speech is that he is
2 thinking beyond the Vance-Owen Plan and presenting to the audience various
3 steps that can be taken which will effectively supersede and perhaps even
4 undermine the Vance-Owen Plan through these additional steps. And of
5 course there is no further mention in this speech of freedom and equality
6 as the goals of the Serbian people but, rather, this implicit use of the
7 term "goal" as unification of all Serbs.
8 This, to me, is a very significant change in tenor and one which
9 spoke both to the environment in Pale at that time and the objective that
10 the Bosnian Serbs and Mr. Milosevic shared.
11 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Very briefly now because we are
12 beyond our time.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, Mr. Donia has just now
14 presented a whole series of entirely distorted interpretations of my
15 speeches. As I spoke at that session twice, I am not going to repeat what
16 I said. He speaks about goals, and I have here a newspaper issued on that
17 same date which I wish to tender into evidence and from which it can be
18 seen that I say quite clearly: "What is the goal of the Serbian people in
19 the Balkans? I would say very briefly: The goal of the Serbian people in
20 the Balkans has been and remains to be free and equal."
21 And then I explain other reasons why the Vance-Owen Plan should be
22 adopted and why it would be unreasonable and so on not to adopt it.
23 Please can I have this admitted into evidence? These are
24 newspapers from that day.
25 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Very well.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So it's an absolutely clear
2 interpretation rather than these nebulous sentences taken out of context.
3 Secondly, in my second speech, which came, as Mr. Donia said,
4 after a very lively and emotional discussion indeed and which was quite
5 brief, I say that I will tell them what I think with the greatest
6 responsibility but also my impressions. I say to them: "You have spoken
7 openly and from the heart." And this was quite clear, because that
8 session was highly emotional and heated. "Most of what you said refers to
9 the cruelty and injustices of war," because people spoke of the terrible
10 crimes against the Serb people. And I say: "Throughout the history of
11 the Serbian people there are too many truthful testimonies of the horrors
12 of war, but all that we have heard today regarding testimony," and I speak
13 in the first person plural, yes, that those of us here have heard, we, we
14 sitting at that Assembly session.
15 "All that we have heard about the horrors of war can all be united
16 to form one single argument and one single statement and message, and that
17 is that the war must stop as soon as possible. The war must stop
19 So after all these emotional statements, I interpret everything
20 that has been said, that it should form a single statement, a single
21 message, and that is that the war must cease immediately.
22 And then I go on to say what and how things should be done, and I
23 say: "The Assembly must have the courage and the self-confidence under
24 these circumstances on whatever basis we have, but a sufficient basis
25 provided by the Vance-Owen Plan to achieve our goal rather than making the
1 tragic mistake which will truly obstruct the path to success. Whether the
2 Assembly will choose the reasonable or unreasonable path to the goal,
3 surely no one needs to persuade the Assembly, because for me, peace is the
4 reasonable path. Otherwise, under the slogan that only the Serbs don't
5 want peace, crimes can be committed against the Serbs under that slogan.
6 You cannot, now that the path is being opened to peace, explain to the
7 people why it should go on losing its lives -- their lives more cruelly
8 than throughout the war. You cannot explain that to the people of
9 Republika Srpska or the people of Serbia."
10 That is my second speech. And the first one I wish -- I have
11 tendered as an exhibit, and I have tendered already this second one, and I
12 think that after Lord Owen's testimony, there is no point. It is
13 senseless to try and interpret the Assembly meetings in Pale. So please
14 can I tender this into evidence?
15 JUDGE MAY: You can tender it into evidence. It will get the next
16 D number. It will be for us to interpret what those various statements
17 mean. I have allowed you to respond because allegations were made against
18 you, but it will be for the Court to determine.
19 Yes. We will have the next D number, please.
20 THE REGISTRAR: The next exhibit number is 213.
21 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Dr. Donia, thank you for coming back. Your
22 evidence is concluded. You're free to go.
23 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Mr. President.
24 [The witness withdrew]
25 JUDGE KWON: D number should be corrected as 214. Please check it
1 out during the adjournment.
2 JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn for 20 minutes.
3 --- Recess taken at 10.49 a.m.
4 --- On resuming at 11.14 a.m.
5 [The witness entered court]
6 JUDGE MAY: Yes. If the witness would take a seat. Witness
7 B-1097, you are, of course, still under the declaration which you took on
8 the last occasion. I remind the Court and for the record note that this
9 witness has given evidence in July. He was examined-in-chief,
10 cross-examined for some time. Nonetheless, there was half an hour's
11 cross-examination still outstanding when the witness fell -- the accused,
12 rather, fell ill, and it is, therefore, for the accused to continue his
13 cross-examination for that amount of time, and I thank the witness for
15 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
16 WITNESS: Witness B-1097 [Resumed]
17 [Witness answered through interpreter]
18 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]
19 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. 1097, did the first incident occur on the
20 31st of May when Omer Selimovic, who was one of the soldiers in the Muslim
21 army, clashed with other Muslim soldiers?
22 A. There was no incident on that occasion.
23 Q. Is it true that on the separation line there was very fierce
25 A. No, it is not true.
1 Q. In paragraph 14, you say: "Omer Selimovic, one of the soldiers of
2 the Muslim army, came to Klisa where we were staying for the night with
3 some relatives. He came with other Muslim soldiers and told the men to go
4 with them to the free territory. We set off with them, about 100 of us.
5 At the confrontation line, there were several machine-gun nests, and the
6 shooting was fierce," et cetera. So then how can you say that there was
7 no shooting along the confrontation line when you said quite the opposite
8 in your statement?
9 A. That is not true. Omer Selimovic had come to pull out the people,
10 to save the people. As we didn't manage to leave, he stayed and he pulled
11 out together with the army later on.
12 Q. So was there heavy shooting or not?
13 A. From the Serbian side, yes, whereas our Territorial Defence did
14 not shoot at all.
15 Q. You say that there was heavy shooting along the separation line.
16 A. Yes, but from the Serbian side.
17 Q. You're now explaining that it was from the Serbian side, which
18 means only the Serbs were shooting and you were not.
19 A. We were civilians. We didn't have any weapons. The few soldiers
20 there were didn't open fire. There was no shooting from our side.
21 Q. Mr. 1097, you explain -- you describe the people to whom you
22 surrendered. You say that they were wearing camouflage uniforms, and they
23 had no insignia; is that right?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And you personally recognised some people who were present when
1 they took you into custody. You mention quite a large number of people.
2 Were they all people from your area whom you knew and you knew their
4 A. Yes, of course. I knew these people from the neighbouring
5 village, but there were quite a number that I didn't know who were from
7 Q. How do you know they were from Serbia? Just because you didn't
8 know them? You listed many of those you knew.
9 A. Because this was -- these were active soldiers who were dressed
10 properly, whereas our local ones didn't have complete uniforms. They were
11 unshaven and disorderly, as opposed to those active soldiers who were very
13 Q. Let us clear up something. You say that the soldiers on the
14 bridge wore camouflage caps which you had never seen before, that they
15 took away Dzemail Djulic, and that the Serbs beat those people with
16 baseball bats and other objects. First let me ask you, where did those
17 baseball bats come from in Bosnia where no one over there has such an
18 implement as a baseball bat?
19 A. I hadn't seen them before. There were baseball bats, batons, iron
20 poles and other instruments they used to beat the men with.
21 Q. You insist that they used baseball bats to beat the people with.
22 A. Yes; baseball bats, iron poles and truncheons.
23 Q. Is it true that those who were beating could not have been regular
24 army members?
25 A. Certainly that among them there were active-duty soldiers, and
1 there were locals as well.
2 Q. How could active-soldiers get mixed up with these others in such a
3 disorganised manner?
4 A. I don't know whether it was disorganised or not, but there were
5 active-duty officers and soldiers mixed together with these others. I
6 don't know how to describe them. That's not a question for me.
7 Q. Very well. When you describe the people who took you to Karakaj,
8 is it true that the local Serbs had olive-green uniforms and camouflage
9 caps and wore various insignia?
10 A. Yes. There were some in olive-green winter uniforms though it was
11 summer. They were not all uniformly dressed.
12 Q. Doesn't that tell you at least that they couldn't have been JNA?
13 A. I've already said, Mr. Milosevic, that with them there were some
14 active-duty troops.
15 Q. But people wearing winter uniforms in July with no patches and
16 dressed in different ways certainly could not have been JNA members.
17 A. No, but there were JNA officers and soldiers there too.
18 Q. Is it true that you recognised the persons who were there? You
19 mentioned Vidovic and his father's name and a certain Arapovic and Pejic
20 and a number of others that you mention. Someone who had a house next to
21 the technical school in Karakaj and worked in Sperploca company, a machine
22 technician who had a house across the street. You mention his brother,
23 his mother. All these things that you mention seems to indicate that
24 these were local people. Isn't that right?
25 A. I can't talk about those that I don't know. I just know that they
1 were active duty officers. As for the others, they were my colleagues
2 from work and that's why I know them by name.
3 Q. And is it true that they released you, let you go?
4 A. Yes, one of them did.
5 Q. I don't know how many of them needed to release you, but anyway,
6 you were let free?
7 A. Yes. A man, a man I used to work with, released me, let me go.
8 Q. You say that you saw one soldier who was the only one who was
9 wearing a JNA uniform with a five-cornered star on his cap. So he wasn't
10 with any JNA unit. But regardless of the uniform he was wearing, he was a
11 local from Karakaj, and his name was Stevanovic. Is that right or not?
12 You say he had a house close to the cemetery.
13 A. Yes, yes.
14 Q. You say: "He was the only one I saw with a Red Star."
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. So is it clear, then, regardless of the uniform he was wearing,
17 you say he was the only one with such a uniform. So surely he couldn't
18 have been in any JNA unit but just a local who happened to be there and
19 was -- put on a JNA uniform.
20 A. That is true, Mr. Milosevic, but one of the active-duty soldiers
21 travelled with me to Novi Sad.
22 Q. Those who saved you?
23 A. No.
24 Q. Well, what then?
25 A. One of the officers or soldiers. I don't know exactly what rank
1 he had. He happened to travel with me from Sabac to Novi Sad.
2 Q. But Sabac is in Serbia as is Novi Sad.
3 A. Yes, Mr. Milosevic. I took a regular bus from Loznica to Sabac,
4 and that same bus was going from Zvornik to Novi Sad. He got in Zvornik,
5 so we travelled together in the same bus. He was sitting on the back seat
6 of the bus.
7 Q. So you concluded from that, from the fact that you were travelling
8 on the same bus, a regular public transport bus, what -- so you got on the
9 same bus and travelled together. What did you conclude from that?
10 A. That he was a soldier, that he was travelling to Novi Sad. He
11 spoke the Ekavian dialect, and I know that he was an officer. He was
12 wearing a uniform.
13 Q. So he was in uniform. He was travelling through Serbia. What
14 connection does he have with the events over there?
15 A. Of course he has when he was one of the security officers in the
17 Q. You say he was the only one in a JNA uniform, but he was also a
19 A. Yes. It says that he was wearing an old SMB uniform, whereas the
20 others, this gentleman, had a regular camouflage uniform of the JNA.
21 Q. I understand. Now, give me a direct answer. You didn't witness
22 any executions; is that right?
23 A. I did not.
24 Q. So you didn't see any executions.
25 A. No mass, large-scale executions.
1 Q. Did you see any individual executions?
2 A. No, I didn't. They didn't kill people in our presence except for
3 two killings.
4 Q. So you didn't see any executions?
5 A. That is true, Mr. Milosevic. I didn't see any group executions.
6 Q. But not a single one either?
7 A. They killed one man with an automatic rifle, who had taken an
8 electric cable to kill himself, they killed the man and took him out of
9 the room. That's the only thing I saw.
10 And I saw a man without his head. His brothers claimed that he
11 had been killed. His name was Emir Selimovic. I couldn't recognise him,
12 but his brothers recognised him by the clothing he was wearing.
13 Q. You say that one day a Chetnik duke called Rakic from the village
14 of Cer arrived who used to work in the engineering company in Zvornik; is
15 that right?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And he was known because he was making bricks at home, and they
18 called him Chetnik.
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And he said that he would kill the balijas. That is the
21 expression he used; is that right?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. He made you sing songs.
24 A. Yes. "Alija, if there's war, we will slaughter you like Milos
25 slaughtered Murat." Those were the words of that one song that we sang.
1 Q. [Previous translation continues...] didn't he?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And this man, the way you describe him, what he did, where he was,
4 where he came from, wasn't from Serbia nor did he belong to any of the
5 Yugoslav armed forces. Is that quite clear or not?
6 A. Yes, that's quite clear, Mr. Milosevic.
7 Q. So from that hell hole, you escaped to a safe place and that was
8 Serbia; right?
9 A. I had no choice, because they didn't let me go to Tuzla or where
10 my family lived. All they said -- he said was that I could go the other
11 way and asked me whether I had anybody in Serbia. And I said yes, I did,
12 my sister-in-law, in fact.
13 Q. All right. So you went to a safe place, and that safe place was
14 Serbia; right?
15 A. Well, I thought it was safe. I had no choice, because I don't --
16 Serbia wasn't too safe for me either.
17 Q. Well, didn't anybody mistreat you in Serbia?
18 A. Well, nobody know who I was or where I was from there.
19 Q. Nobody asked you at all, did they. Nobody stopped you or anything
20 like that.
21 A. No, I had no problems. Nobody knew who I was, I didn't have any
23 Q. All right. Then you crossed into Serbia to Mali Zvornik, Loznica,
24 Sabac, and went on to Novi Sad where you put up finally; is that right?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And then without any problems at all you asked for a passport
2 there, to be issued a passport. You received a passport and could go
3 wherever you wanted; is that right?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Well, is that then something that clearly indicates that not only
6 did you have no problems when you were in Serbia but somebody had to ask
7 you where you were from and who you were if you were issued a passport.
8 And once they had learnt that, nobody made any problems either?
9 A. Not for me personally but other people did have problems at this
10 private camp in Subotica, and I heard that people had problems over there,
11 but I personally did not.
12 Q. You heard people had problems?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. You say that at the technical school in Karakaj, your relations
15 were being held captive; is that right?
16 A. Yes. My entire family, Mr. Milosevic.
17 Q. And what happened to them then?
18 A. Well, I don't think that's a question for me to answer. It's a
19 question that you can ask the people, and I'm sure you know that a grave
20 has been discovered with 600 bodies at Crni Vrh and some of the bodies
21 have been exhumed, and they acknowledged that they killed some of them, my
22 father and cousins and so on, but their bodies were not all found, and the
23 DNA analysis is being conducted. Certain bodies were found but my
24 father's body was not found.
25 Q. Does that mean that you don't know whether they're alive or not
1 because they're listed as missing persons?
2 A. No. The authorities confirmed, of Republika Srpska, that they are
3 not among the living, and if he had just been on the missing persons' list
4 he wouldn't have been able to receive a pension and they recognised that
5 these people had been killed and a mass grave discovered and some 100
6 corpses have been identified to date.
7 Q. Mr. 1097, where was this mass grave uncovered, near Zvornik?
8 A. Precisely so. Crni Vrh, at Crni Vrh.
9 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Yes, the interpreters have asked me to slow down. I'll do so.
12 Now, you've just said that they owned up to killing them. Who
13 owned up to the fact that these were killed?
14 A. The authorities of Republika Srpska, and on television, the
15 president of the municipality personally attended the exhumation
16 proceedings, and it was acknowledged that they had been killed and that
17 600 corpses had been uncovered, and of those 600, 100 or so were from the
19 Q. Now, as I don't have any information as to what was going on
20 there, could you tell me now, since you're speaking about this matter and
21 say that the president of the municipality appeared on television and said
22 that these people had been killed and so on and so forth, whether anything
23 is known about who the perpetrators were? Who committed the crimes? Who
24 killed these people? Was that part of the information you were given too?
25 Did they tell you about that?
1 A. Are you not understanding me or don't you want to understand me?
2 The president of the municipality attended the exhumation, and one or two
3 years prior to that it had already been recognised on the part of the
4 authorities that these people had been killed, whereas the mayor, as a
5 mark of respect to the casualties, attended the exhumation procedure.
6 Q. I see. Well, I'm sure that when a mayor does attend an exhumation
7 ceremony it is out of respect for the casualties, but you said that these
8 people had been killed and that the authorities recognised that they had
9 been killed.
10 Now, can you tell us who killed those people?
11 A. I don't know. I can't say. The Serbs killed them. Now, whether
12 it was done by the active army or by the paramilitary formations or
13 whoever else, I don't know. I didn't see it happen, so I can't say, and
14 I'm not going to say something I didn't see happen.
15 Q. So are the perpetrators known or are you just saying that you
16 don't know who the killers are?
17 A. Well, I don't know. Probably those people do know, but I don't
18 know who the perpetrators were.
19 Q. All right, Mr. 1097. Now, answer this, please. I have a few more
20 questions for you relating to the events that took place in your region.
21 Already at the beginning of the conflict in your area, was the
22 Patriotic League active?
23 A. Yes, it was.
24 Q. And tell me this, please: Who was at the head of this Patriotic
25 League? Who led it? And what -- how many men did that formation number?
1 A. I don't know the exact number of men, but I -- and I don't know
2 the man personally. I've just heard his name and that his name was
3 Hajrudin Mesic and that this was his unit. I can't tell you any more than
5 Q. Well, was the League's headquarters at Kula Grad near Zvornik?
6 A. I don't know about that, Mr. Milosevic.
7 Q. Well, do you happen to know whether it is true and correct that as
8 of January 1992, along the streets of Zvornik, many criminals could be
9 seen walking around wearing police uniforms on the streets of Zvornik and
10 that the fighters for the faith, led by the well-known Zvornik criminal
11 Midhat Grakic, began to appear around that time?
12 A. That is absolutely not true.
13 Q. Well, do you know anything about the Mosque Doves, the Dzamijski
14 Golubovi unit?
15 A. No, I don't.
16 Q. You haven't heard about the Mosque Doves?
17 A. I've just heard it from you.
18 Q. Now, in the Zvornik area, in addition to this Patriotic League,
19 was there another Muslim paramilitary group called the Kobra commanded by
20 a man named Suljo who used to be a teacher before the war in Sapra
22 A. No. That's the first time I hear of it.
23 Q. Have you heard about that group called the Kobras at all?
24 A. No.
25 Q. And how about the Zvornik Brigade of the army of
12 Blank pages inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts. Pages 28764 to 28777.
1 Bosnia-Herzegovina? Have you heard of that?
2 A. No, I have not, Mr. Milosevic.
3 Q. Now, the immediate cause for the conflict in Zvornik, was it the
4 mobilisation of the Muslim militia, police, which was ordered by the
5 president of the municipality and Abdulah Pasic, a former dentist, and
6 Nedzad Sabic, the commander of the TO headquarters and staff?
7 A. I didn't understand your question, Mr. Milosevic.
8 Q. My question is the following: Was the immediate cause of the
9 conflict in Zvornik the mobilisation of the Muslim police which was
10 ordered by the president of the municipality and a deputy of the Party of
11 Democratic Action, a former dentist by the name of Abdulah Pasic and
12 Nedzad Sabic, commander of the TO headquarters, the Territorial Defence,
13 who was later on the commander of the 1st Podrinje Brigade of the army of
15 A. No, that wasn't the cause. At least I don't believe it was, but I
16 don't really know about things like that. And I haven't heard of those
17 names ever before.
18 Q. Well, my question as to the immediate cause and whether it was
19 caused by the mobilisation of the Muslim police, was it that?
20 A. No.
21 Q. You mean there wasn't any Muslim mobilisation?
22 A. Well, no, there wasn't.
23 Q. All right, then. Now, do you know this, that the Serbian village
24 of Boskovic in Zvornik, the Muslims on the 5th of May 1992 launched an
25 attack on which occasion they killed the majority of the Serbs there?
1 A. Nobody was killed, Mr. Milosevic, on that occasion nor was there
2 an attack. I've never heard of anything like that.
3 Q. All right. Now, do you happen to recall that the paramilitary
4 formations of the Muslims would attack the suburbs of Zvornik at night and
5 loot and attack Serb houses and ransack Serb flats? For example, of the
6 17th of April, 1992, there was an attack on the Serbian village of
7 Rastosnica, in the Zvornik municipality. And I have here a piece of
8 information telling me that Bogdanovic Zoran was killed, and his father's
9 name was Petar. He was born in 1971. Then another village that was
10 looted and burned --
11 JUDGE MAY: One at a time.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I don't know about that,
13 Mr. Milosevic, I never heard that having happened.
14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. What about the 5th of May, Boskovic, where nine Serbs were killed?
16 A. No, I'm hearing that for the first time. They killed hundreds of
17 people there in the Muslim village of Vitinci and they kept shelling the
18 village. That I do know. But that there were any attacks on the villages
19 you mention, I don't know about that. I'm hearing it for the first time.
20 Q. Now, what about the 9th of May, Gornja Baljkovica was attacked and
21 16 Serbs were killed and then the Serb village was looted and burnt. Do
22 you know about that?
23 A. That's absolutely not true.
24 Q. How do you know it's not true?
25 A. Well, I would have heard about it from someone and I've never
1 heard about it.
2 Q. You haven't heard about it? All right. Fine. Now, do you happen
3 to remember a May 1992 attack against the village of Rozanj, right up
4 until September when the locals were finally forced to leave the village,
5 and tens of people were killed during that attack, and the Serbian village
6 of Rozanj was completed looted and burnt?
7 A. No, I don't know about that, Mr. Milosevic.
8 Q. You don't?
9 A. No, I don't, Mr. Milosevic. It's 40 kilometres away from me, and
10 I had no freedom of movement so how could I know what was going on in that
11 part? It had nothing to do with me.
12 Q. You said that you don't know about it and then you said it wasn't
13 correct. What about the 1st of August in the Boskovici region when 26
14 Serbs were killed?
15 A. No. I'm hearing about that for the first time. All I do know is
16 that all the coordination kept from -- came from this village of
17 Boskovici. The attacks on the village of Bistrinici, that's where it was
18 coordinated. That's what I heard about, but I didn't hear about the
19 massacre there or anything else that you mentioned.
20 Q. All right. Tell me this, as time is running out: I don't want to
21 remind you of all the events that took place, but do you know about this
22 one at Snagovo, Kamenica, Crni Vrh, Novo Selo, Setici, Jusici, and so on
23 and so forth when major crimes were committed?
24 A. Yes, I did hear about the crime in Jusici where about 40 Muslims
25 were killed when the Serb army entered the village and killed about 40
1 civilians. That is what I did hear about.
2 Q. All right. Now, all the villages that I mentioned, I gave you
3 their names because my information tells me that the crimes were committed
4 against the Serbs in all these villages. Do you know anything about that?
5 A. Well, that's incorrect information, Mr. Milosevic.
6 Q. Do you mean to say that it wasn't Serbs who were killed in those
7 villages and that those villages weren't burnt or looted and that none of
8 that is correct?
9 A. I'm not claiming that. I'm saying I don't know.
10 Q. All right. Now, is it true that the forces of the Territorial
11 Defence, as they were called then, the Muslim forces under the command of
12 Hajrudin Mesic, in actual fact, arrived in your village in May 1992?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And you were there yourself, were you?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Well, through their conduct, did this lead to inter-ethnic
18 A. Well, the tension didn't arise because they came. They wanted to
19 protect us, to pull the people out, and people withdrew without incident.
20 But that wasn't the reason. So I think that answers your question.
21 Q. All right. Now, is it true that Alija Djulic and Ibrahim Majlovic
22 told you to hand over two official pistols to the Territorial Defence?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And is it also true that Captain Dzemal Spahic, the commander of
25 the TO from Handelici in Vitnica, brought in about 100 men to your
1 village? Dzemal Spahic, was he a former JNA captain? You've received
2 information to that effect? Well, is it true?
3 A. Yes, it is.
4 Q. Mr. 1097, I apologise if I repeat my questions again to you once
5 I've already asked you, but you testified rather a long time ago, so I
6 might have got this mixed up.
7 A. Mr. Milosevic, I'm fully aware of what I talked about and the
8 questions you asked me, and I think that I've answered most of those
10 Q. So he was a JNA captain, was he, this man who came in with 100
12 A. Yes, he was.
13 Q. Well, was it -- he sent by the JNA to go there?
14 A. No.
15 Q. Well, how come you think that this other man you saw who was a
16 Serb was sent by the JNA, then, if this man of yours -- if for him you
17 claim that the JNA did not send him, why do you claim that the JNA sent
18 the Serbian who was outside this military formation?
19 A. Because he -- the man came to protect the people, to save them and
20 pull the people out of the area. Now, the other men who came to escort us
21 killed all the people in the camps. Nobody left the camps alive. So if
22 you claim something to the contrary, you have a list of 700 men. There
23 were even more men. There were about a thousand people, and none of them
24 except for four men left the camp alive. Even ten years later.
25 Q. I'm not claiming anything about the events that went on there,
1 because quite simply I don't know anything about those events, and they
2 have nothing to do with Serbia.
3 A. Of course you do, sir. You watched it all on television. You saw
4 the incidents take place. It was televised by Serb television and Serb
5 television studio Sabac in fact filmed the camps and the whole of Serbia
6 was able to watch it on television. It seems that just you,
7 Mr. Milosevic, weren't able to see it.
8 Q. Now the fact that what you're claiming, that the whole of Serbia
9 saw it on television --
10 JUDGE MAY: This must be your last question.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Is it true that that formation later attacked Cilovo Brdo, which
14 is close by your village?
15 A. Where you got that piece of information, Mr. Milosevic?
16 Q. I'm asking you whether it is true or not.
17 A. Yes, it is.
18 Q. Is it true that the attack was launched at 9.00 in the morning and
19 you and half the other men from the village took part in the attack?
20 A. I don't know how many times you want me to repeat what I've
21 already said. You're asking me about something that happened a long time
22 ago. You got an answer from me three times.
23 JUDGE MAY: Yes, that's quite correct. The witness has dealt with
24 this particular attack once already.
25 Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic.
1 MR. KAY: No, it's Mr. Kay.
2 Questioned by Mr. Kay:
3 Q. I'm just dealing with some questions, Witness, that Mr. Milosevic
4 has been asking you about Hajrudin Mesic, who was the Muslim TO commander.
5 I'm looking at paragraph 4 of your Rule 92 bis statement.
6 MR. AGHA: Your Honour, is it possible that the witness may be
7 provided with a copy of that statement?
8 JUDGE MAY: Yes, of course.
9 MR. AGHA: Thank you.
10 MR. KAY: Thank you.
11 Q. Now, the time that Hajrudin Mesic came to your area was in May of
12 1992; is that right?
13 A. Yes, that's right.
14 Q. Before then, there had been no fighting in your area; is that
16 A. Yes, that's right.
17 Q. Hajrudin Mesic came with a group of armed people from the Muslim
18 TO. What was the exact status and position of Hajrudin Mesic? Who was
20 A. As the Crveni Mulj dam and the Glinica factory refuse was
21 collected at the dam, there was speculations that it would be blown up, so
22 they took positions for this not to happen and provided security for the
23 Glinica factory. The Territorial Defence took up pistols and protected
24 the dam to prevent it from being blown up and to protect the civilian
25 population, because they weren't able to leave the area.
1 Q. What I asked you was: Who was Hajrudin Mesic? Was he a commander
2 of the Muslim TO before the conflict? Was he from that local area?
3 A. No, he wasn't from the local area. I think he was from Teocak or,
4 rather, that's where he was born.
5 Q. Before he arrived in your area with the Muslim TO, do you know
6 what he was doing earlier?
7 A. Could you repeat that question, please? I didn't hear it
9 Q. Hajrudin Mesic arrives in your area with a group of armed people
10 from the Muslim TO, and there had been no conflict in your area before he
11 came. What I want to find out from you was how it was that he came to
12 that area, what his authority was. And as part of that background, can
13 you tell us, if you know, what he did before. Was he in the JNA? Did he
14 have any specific functional role in the military?
15 A. I don't know what functional role he had and what he did before
16 that, and I don't want to guess. As to what people said, well, I really
17 don't know what role he had in the army or the police or wherever. All I
18 know is that he came with the purpose of protecting the people and to
19 protect the Crveni Mulj dam, to prevent an ecological catastrophe from the
20 industrial waste that was collecting there. So that's it.
21 Q. As it was, then, some members of his armed group asked you to
22 surrender your pistols to them; is that right?
23 A. Yes, that's right. And that's what we did.
24 Q. Why didn't you resist giving up your pistols to this group of
25 armed people?
1 JUDGE MAY: We appear to be having some technical problems. Just
2 a moment.
3 Yes. If you would repeat the question, please.
4 MR. KAY:
5 Q. Why didn't you resist giving up your weapons to this group?
6 A. It was the regular Territorial Defence, and it never entered my
7 head to refuse doing what they had asked us, because the entire village
8 handed over the weapons to the Serbs, and they said that we should hand
9 over these official pistols. And they were returned once they had
10 withdrawn from the area. The pistols were returned afterwards.
11 Q. As far as the dam is concerned, was it the Muslim TO who made the
12 threat to blow up the dam and said that they had mined it?
13 A. The dam was not mined. The pipes bringing in the silt below the
14 dam was what was mined. The dam was not mined. But later on over
15 television, the Republic of Serbia showed that the dam had been mined, and
16 that was not correct. It was just the pipes to the -- at the entrance to
17 the dam that were blown up -- that were mined. I don't know what actually
18 happened --
19 Q. Could you answer the first part --
20 A. -- as a preventative measure.
21 Q. Could you answer the first part of the question: Was it the
22 Muslim TO who made that threat to mine the dam?
23 A. I wasn't present. I didn't hear about that. But I did hear from
24 others that threats were made to the effect that they would blow up the
25 dam. And the information media had already broadcast that, but it wasn't
1 true. What could we mine it with when we handed over the weapons and
2 there wasn't any explosive? Possibly some threats were made but it never
3 came to anything. And I know that to be true 100 per cent. The dam was
4 not mined. It was just these entrance pipes that were mined, entrance to
5 the dam. For you to blow up the whole dam you would need a whole lot of
6 explosives and that would be all nigh impossible.
7 Q. I'm looking at paragraph 7 of your statement and I'll ask the
8 question just one more time. If you could answer it, please. Was it the
9 Muslim TO who made the threat to blow up the dam? Yes or no.
10 A. I didn't understand your question. Could you please repeat it.
11 Q. Was it the Muslim TO who made the threat to blow up the dam?
12 A. I didn't hear about that. I don't know. All I heard is what I
14 Q. If we look at your statement, it says in paragraph 7: "One day,
15 the TO telephoned one of the officers, I cannot tell who he was, in the
16 Glinica factory and threatened that the TO would blow up the dam which had
17 previously been mined."
18 The question was: Was that a threat from the Muslim TO?
19 A. It was the people threatening, the people from the village, from
20 that village. And we didn't hand over Hajrudin Mesic to his people but to
21 the locals of the village, and those official pistols Ibrahim Majlovic and
22 Djulic. That's who we surrendered our pistols to. Now, which of those
23 people spoke over the phone, I really can't say, I don't know, to the
24 effect that the dam was mined and all the rest of the things you said.
25 But Hajrudin Mesic and his people, they're not the ones we handed
1 this over to. The local president of the local community and some other
2 man holding another post, that's who those pistols were handed over to,
3 and that's what it says.
4 Q. If the dam had been blown up, what damage would it have caused?
5 A. There would have been a terrible ecological disaster. The silt
6 would flow into the river. That was not the aim. They realised what
7 would happen. Maybe some people were not aware of the grave danger, but
8 they took up positions precisely to protect that dam.
9 I'm not an expert for these things, and I can't claim anything. I
10 just know that the acids are very dangerous, and these would probably
11 provoke an ecological disaster.
12 Q. Is that in this same period of May of 1992?
13 A. Yes.
14 MR. KAY: Thank you. No further questions.
15 Re-examined by Mr. Agha:
16 Q. Witness, with the permission of the Chamber I'd just like to ask
17 you a couple of points for clarification.
18 Very briefly, my learned friend has raised quite a number of
19 points about the alleged mining of this dam. Now, can you kindly tell the
20 Chamber whether this alleged mining took place before or after Zvornik had
21 been attacked by the Serbian forces.
22 A. The Serb side had already attacked Zvornik and taken control of
23 it. Zvornik had been taken control of by paramilitary units and the army
24 of Republika Srpska and the active troops from Serbia. They had already
25 captured Zvornik and looted it, and the population had already moved out.
1 So this happened afterwards.
2 Q. And was the dam, in the event, blown up?
3 A. No. No. Nor did they have anything to blow it up with. Where
4 would it come from? We had handed over all our weapons. How could we
5 blow it up? We were promised safety if we handed in our weapons. The
6 weapons were surrendered, and afterwards they told us that we would be
7 exchanged, and then what happened, happened; only four or five people
8 survived this exodus.
9 Q. Thank you, Witness. I just now want to bring you back to the
10 Karakaj Technical School where you say that you were detained. Now, in
11 your statement, you say that 50 to 80 or maybe a hundred people were seen
12 by you dead there. Who was guarding this facility?
13 A. I don't know the name of the formation, nor did it ever occur to
14 me to ask. You didn't dare ask. I don't know what that unit was called
15 or who they were, those men. There were locals, there were others; now,
16 how the formation was called, I really don't know.
17 Q. But in your view, it would have been this formation that would
18 have been responsible for the people who died in the technical school?
19 A. Of course. They were responsible. You can imagine there were
20 about 1.000 men in a small area, and they would turn on the heating. And
21 I don't know how many people died, but -- I didn't count them, but up to
22 80 were left there.
23 Q. No further questions, Witness.
24 MR. AGHA: That concludes my examination-in-chief. Thank you.
25 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Thank you. Witness B-1097, that concludes your
1 evidence. Thank you for coming to the Tribunal. Thank you for coming
2 back. I'm sorry you had to make two journeys, but your evidence is now
3 over, and you're free to go, but would you just wait until the blinds are
4 turned down.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, and it was an honour for
6 me to come here.
7 [The witness withdrew]
8 JUDGE MAY: We could make a start with the blinds down, although
9 they will be turned up in a moment. There were various administrative
10 matters you wanted to deal with.
11 MR. NICE: Only a few but they're designed to help.
12 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
13 MR. NICE: Might it be convenient to take them now rather than at
14 the end of the session?
15 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
16 MR. NICE: The Chamber is, of course, aware that there is our
17 final application of the 21st of October to add further witnesses.
18 There's been a corrigendum to that which has been filed. I don't know if
19 the Chamber is going to want it any more rapidly than coming through
20 Registry in the normal way, and I have to say that I'm grateful for having
21 been alerted to one of the needs to correct the earlier document by a
22 member of the Court staff who spotted an error that we had, I'm afraid,
23 let slip through, for which, of course, I take full responsibility.
24 We've now received the motion from the amicus, and I had to some
25 degree already forecast or acted in anticipation of their response,
1 because it seemed to me that we should recognise the realities of the time
2 constraints we're under, and although there was once a time when it looked
3 as though we would be able to get very nearly all our witnesses in, we
4 were down to a margin of about five days, that margin has grown over
5 recent weeks because of the time that has been taken, principally in
6 cross-examination, and it's therefore appropriate that I should alert the
7 Chamber, the accused, and the amici to the witnesses whom we realistically
8 hope to be able to fit into the available time, thus to identify those who
9 we do not expect to be able to fit into the available time.
10 There are now a sufficiently limited number of weeks left before
11 the end of our case that we can move, I think, in order to help you from
12 the chart that we've become familiar with, which has an arithmetical way
13 of calculating whether we can get the witnesses in or not, to a chart that
14 really - it will be with you tomorrow - simply sets out exactly the
15 remaining days by date and day of the week and identifies, so far as we
16 can, which witnesses we want to take on any particular day. That chart
17 should be -- it's pretty well complete now but I want to finish the 92 bis
18 witnesses we have yet to deal with and from whom we will be making certain
19 deletions. That chart will be with you, at the latest, tomorrow morning.
20 So I hope that will meet the it seemed to me understandable
21 request of the amici to have more detail of the witnesses who it is likely
22 to be called and meets what they were going to ask to be dealt with in 48
23 hours on a voluntary basis.
24 The Chamber will recall that we are under an order to list
25 exhibits. For the time being, I'm going to list exhibits within the 21
1 day allowed -- 21 days allowed for all witnesses on our list because
2 although of course this is what we hope to be able to fit into the
3 remaining few weeks of our case, unforeseen events can lead to witnesses
4 not being available and, therefore, if they have to be substituted by
5 other witnesses, we would of course give notice that we would seek to call
6 those other witnesses from the list, but it's important that their
7 exhibits are already notified.
8 It may also be the case that there are exhibits from witnesses we
9 -- or exhibits linked to particular witnesses who we won't have time to
10 call but we'll nevertheless think are sufficiently important that they
11 should go in through other witnesses.
12 The list that you will have tomorrow has been prepared on the
13 basis of the final application to add witnesses, i.e., it's been prepared
14 on the basis of all witnesses we would wish to call. We recognise that we
15 don't have yet any ruling on that, but that's the basis upon which we've
16 done it. And the list of witnesses to be prepared and indeed of witnesses
17 who -- for whom there will not be time probably to call includes, as it
18 were, selections from both the old list and the additions. So it covers
19 all of that.
20 Can I, with that very brief explanation of where we are and how
21 I'm hoping to help and map out the way to the end of the case, make a
22 couple of points, I hope without incurring the Court's displeasure in any
24 In the three-day week that we are now working, and with focused
25 preparation, with the ability to use written witness statements in the way
1 that we now are, it is possible for examination-in-chief, of course, to be
2 conducted very short, very swiftly indeed. The Court may also think that
3 in the same three-day week, with the accused now very well experienced in
4 the common law skill of cross-examination, he can explore the heart of his
5 case in cross-examination swiftly as well. And the third point I would
6 make, general point, is the Court may have thought that the experience
7 with Lord Owen as a witness showed the advantages in several ways of some
8 types of witnesses. He would be perhaps one, coming to court without any
9 preparation and yet being dealt with, I hope, succinctly and efficiently,
10 a couple of hours by us, and it would be our submission the heart of the
11 cross-examination similarly actually dealt with, drawn from that witness
12 in a couple of hours.
13 And I mention that because the chart will show the Chamber
14 tomorrow morning just how tight things are for us to get in evidence that
15 you will see and you'll see why we think to be particularly important.
16 And with this chart in mind, the Chamber may want to have in mind that
17 there will be several witnesses, important witnesses, who it looks as
18 though we simply won't have time to call.
19 Now, the Chamber may want to have some of those in mind as
20 possible people we can't call. Perhaps I can go into private session just
21 for a couple of sentences.
22 [Private session]
12 Page 28794 – redacted – private session.
1 [Open session]
2 MR. NICE: There are some high-level witnesses in the schedule
3 that will come tomorrow, perhaps not unlike Lord Owen and General Naumann
4 and people like that in the most general terms, who thus far have
5 typically taken part of the second day at least. The Chamber will see
6 from the schedule when it's available that these witnesses, if they do
7 take that sort of period of time, are likely simply to knock out our
8 possibility of calling other witnesses -- and I've made the point before
9 of necessity, and I make no complaint of this, it's a matter ultimately of
10 course for the Chamber -- if such witnesses take longer, then we may have
11 to make the decision against calling some of them at all because of the
12 knock-on effect they have. And so my request to the Chamber is perhaps if
13 it has the time to think about this as a problem, to consider giving very
14 strict timetables limited for all sides on some of these witnesses,
15 bearing in mind that which I say is clear, namely that focused
16 examination-in-chief and cross-examination can in fact draw the heart of
17 the evidence of these witnesses in a short period of time.
18 Three last time-sensitive witness issues that I'd be grateful for
19 the Chamber and my learned friends and indeed the accused to consider as
20 follows, advanced notice really: Witness 110 is a witness who it is
21 suggested in your witness list is not a witness at all. It's a person who
22 could produce the commission of experts report, schedule 6, which deals
23 with Sarajevo. The whole issue of the commission of experts report is one
24 we ought to address at some stage. It may be a self-propelling document.
25 It may not be a document acceptable to the Chamber, but I would be
1 grateful for an opportunity a little later to discuss it.
2 Witness 141 is an in-house witness we've identified as somebody
3 who could assist with interpretation of intercepts and possibly other
4 documents of the type that we know are still being considered in dealings
5 with Serbia and Montenegro, if interpretation is necessary. My
6 time-sensitive concern about this witness is as follows: If the
7 proposition underlying calling such a witness is that interpretation of
8 documents is appropriate in general, then cross-examination of such a
9 witness would be very hard to limit, and I would be very anxious before
10 calling such a witness for there to be an understanding of the limitations
11 upon both examination-in-chief and cross-examination in order that it
12 simply doesn't do damage to the very tight timetable. And my suggestion
13 at this stage is that if such a witness is appropriate, and for intercepts
14 such a witness is probably essential, we should tabulate the interpretive
15 evidence that the witness would give and that cross-examination should be
16 limited to that or to something very closely linked to that so as not to
17 be too extensive.
18 And finally, Witness 146 is the witness who can produce either the
19 tapes or the transcripts of The Death of Yugoslavia and The Fall of
20 Milosevic television programmes. The Chamber will recall that there were
21 several interviews longer than those which were broadcast which will be
22 available. I would hope that they can be accepted as evidence without any
23 time being taken in court because they are essentially just written
24 records, and I'd like to be able to address you about that in due course
25 but I give notice that that's my position now.
1 So, Your Honour, thank you for the time. The chart tomorrow first
2 thing will set out a plan to the end of the case subject to the inevitable
3 variations of witness availability, and at some stage I'd be grateful for
4 the opportunity to consider those other few issues I've raised with you.
5 JUDGE MAY: Very well. The next witness, there's a matter in
6 private session I want to raise.
7 [Private session]
12 Page 28798 – redacted – private session.
24 [Open session]
25 JUDGE MAY: The Chamber is going to adjourn now for 20 minutes.
1 --- Recess taken at 12.27 p.m.
2 --- On resuming at 12.52 p.m.
3 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Let the witness take the declaration.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak
5 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
6 JUDGE MAY: If you'd like to take a seat.
7 WITNESS: WITNESS B-1399
8 [Witness answered through interpreter]
9 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Waespi.
10 MR. WAESPI: Thanks, Mr. President.
11 Examined by Mr. Waespi:
12 Q. Witness, good morning.
13 A. Good morning or, rather, good day.
14 Q. You have been granted protective measures by the Court, image
15 distortion and you have been assigned a pseudonym, B-1399. So I would
16 like you to look at the piece of paper in front of you and tell us whether
17 that's your name.
18 A. Yes, it is.
19 Q. Thank you very much.
20 MR. WAESPI: Your Honours, the Prosecution would offer his
21 statement and the related exhibit as evidence.
22 JUDGE MAY: We don't have them at the moment. It may be they're
23 just there to the right. Yes. If we could have those.
1 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit number is 583, tab 1 to be kept under
3 MR. WAESPI: Thank you very much. If the pseudonym sheet also
4 could be given a number, please.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Exhibit number is 584, under seal.
6 MR. WAESPI: If I could, Mr. President.
7 JUDGE MAY: Yes.
8 MR. WAESPI: Thank you very much. I'll read out a brief summary
9 of the witness's evidence.
10 The witness is a Bosnian Muslim born in Kamenica, in the Zvornik
11 municipality. He was in Belgrade for 18 years and returned to Bosnia. On
12 13 March 1993 he moved to Srebrenica. After the fall of Srebrenica on 11
13 July, the witness decided with many other people, about 10 to 15.000 men,
14 to go through the woods towards Tuzla. He decided to go through the woods
15 because he feared that they would be killed when they would go to the UN
16 base at Potocari.
17 In the beginning of that journey, around the second day, the
18 Muslims responded to loudspeakers and surrendered to the Serbs. The
19 surrendering place was close to the road between Bratunac and Konjevic
20 Polje, and they were received by about 50 Serb soldiers. They were
21 ordered by the Serbs to sit down and hand over any money and personal
22 belongings. There were about 2.000 to 2.500 people sitting on the meadow
23 together at Sandici.
24 The witness was alerted that troops from Arkan's men would be
25 coming. They were also told to lie down and put their -- on their
1 stomachs, and they had to shout, "Long live the King." Around half past
2 seven in the evening, Mladic arrived at the meadow and told the people,
3 the Muslim men, that they would be exchanged.
4 Some women and children were allowed to go away from Sandici
5 meadow towards Tuzla. After Mladic's speech, the Serbs ordered the men to
6 board buses and trucks, and they were taken into the direction of
7 Bratunac, where they eventually arrived around half past nine in the
9 Throughout the night, the witness had to spend the night together
10 with his fellow people on the trucks. Serb soldiers came and asked
11 specific people, Muslim men, from villages around Srebrenica out. They
12 were taken to a nearby garage. The men in the vehicles could hear thuds
13 and screaming and fire from automatic weapons, and then everything would
14 go quiet.
15 In the morning, the witness and all the other people on the
16 vehicles were taken to Zvornik in a large convoy of about 30 vehicles.
17 Eventually, the vehicles arrived at a schoolyard in Grbovci, close to
18 Zvornik. There were about 30 soldiers outside the school. The gym where
19 the witness entered was almost -- was already filled with about 700 to 800
20 people, some of them from Potocari. At the end, there were about 2.000
21 people in that gym and it was very hot.
22 When the Muslim men would address the guards as soldiers, they
23 would answer, "We are not soldiers. We are Karadzic's young Chetniks."
24 At one point two soldiers and one Serb woman brought a pile of
25 rags to blindfold the men. The witness was then forced, with about 30
1 other people, into a Tamic truck. The registration plates, the witness
2 says, were either police or military in Cyrillic.
3 The witness was brought in the truck to a very nearby location,
4 was ordered out, lined up, and the firing started. One of the men fell on
5 the witness and covered him. The witness himself, he was not hit. When
6 one of the injured men begged, "Finish me off," a Serb soldier said,
7 "Slowly, slowly." Later a Serb came and fired single shots at people.
8 The witness assumed they were moving. Another truck came and the witness
9 again heard shots. At this point the witness was still blindfolded and
10 lying on his stomach. Trucks kept arriving and the gunfire continued late
11 into the night.
12 The witness also heard machinery around, an excavator and a
13 loader. He also heard the Serbs talking to each other, calling each other
14 by names. He specifically recognised the voice of a Gojko Simic who was
15 the leader of that group, and this Gojko Simic told his people to go to a
16 different location nearby and said, "Let's go to the meadow and kill the
18 At one time in the evening, another person who survived jumped up
19 and tried to escape. He caught the attention of the Serbs, and the
20 witness himself used that moment and himself stood up and escaped,
21 crawling out from the bodies. He followed a nearby railway track to a
22 railway station, returned back again to the location where the executions
23 took place. Now he saw from a distance of about 20 metres in the
24 moonlight a lot of bodies and clothes. After about ten days of walking,
25 the witness made it into the free territory.
1 This concludes the summary, Mr. President, and I do have a few
2 additional questions. It shouldn't take more than five minutes.
3 Q. Witness, we heard that you were in Belgrade for some time, in fact
4 18 years. Now, when you came back, to which village did you come?
5 A. The village of Kamenica.
6 Q. Now, was there a time when you left this village again?
7 A. I left at the end of February, 1993.
8 Q. And can you tell us why you left this village?
9 A. Because we were forced out by the Serb forces, the army from
10 Republika Srpska with the help of Serbia.
11 Q. Now, can you tell us what the population was of this village? Was
12 it inhabited --
13 A. Between 5 and 6.000.
14 Q. And were they Muslims or Serbs?
15 A. Mostly Muslims.
16 Q. Now, where did you flee to from Kamenica?
17 A. We fled towards Konjevic Polje.
18 Q. And did you leave Konjevic Polje at one time?
19 A. Yes, we did. When General Morillon arrived with the APCs. Then
20 an order reached us from somebody who had been negotiating with him that
21 we were to move towards Srebrenica.
22 Q. Now, we heard that you were at a gym in Grbovci and that there
23 were about 30 soldiers.
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Do you remember a specific soldier who had a beret wearing?
1 A. Yes, I do. A soldier did have a red beret with a cross and the
2 sign of the four Ss in Cyrillic, and that's when they started taking
3 people off to be shot.
4 Q. Did he follow the people who were shot?
5 A. Well, probably because when the truck was full, it would be empty
6 when it returned while I was in the hall, before I'd left.
7 Q. Two questions to finish: Why did you leave Srebrenica? Why did
8 you decide to go through the woods rather than to Potocari?
9 A. Well, because we were afraid of retaliation from the Serbs,
10 because the Serbs retaliated everywhere without exception. Not only
11 Srebrenica but everywhere else. They didn't spare any civilian or
12 military-able man.
13 Q. And my last question would be: Do you remember giving a witness
14 statement to the MUP in Tuzla on 1st of August, 1995?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And do you remember saying that you were surrendering at Sandici
17 on the 19th of July?
18 A. No. We surrendered on the 13th of July.
19 MR. WAESPI: Thank you very much, Mr. President.
20 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
21 MR. WAESPI: I'm sorry, Mr. President. I have one additional
22 point to mention, and we should go private. Just a reminder to everybody.
23 [Private session]
10 [Open session]
11 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session. Thank you.
12 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
13 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It seems to be switched on now.
15 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:
16 Q. Mr. 1399, up until April 1992, you lived in Belgrade?
17 A. Yes, that's right.
18 Q. Which means for almost two decades; right?
19 A. Well, not two decades. I as a worker lived there, but my family
20 stayed on in my native village.
21 Q. So how long did you live in Belgrade as a worker?
22 A. About 15 years, but my company was from Belgrade, and I first
23 found employment in Cacak and the head office was in Belgrade, and I think
24 I arrived in 1987 in Belgrade and found a job there.
25 Q. That means that after a series of years spent working in Belgrade,
1 when the war broke out you went to Kamenica, which is the Zvornik
2 municipality; is that right?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Now, while you were living and working in Belgrade, did you ever
5 feel you had any problems because of the fact that you were a Muslim?
6 A. No. I had no problems then at all.
7 Q. And from -- you left Belgrade because the war started; is that
9 A. No. It was our Bajram holiday. The Bajram holiday was on the
10 Saturday, the 4th of April, and we left Belgrade on the 3rd of April, and
11 at the Ruma crossroads, one bus was returned back to Belgrade. We started
12 off a little later, but they turned us back from Soca, and afterwards we
13 took the Obrenovac road. When we were in Obrenovac we were stopped by the
14 Serb police. There were just three policemen. One of them was in a
15 container and two of them had automatic rifles on them, and we were told
16 to wait while the one in the container called up Avala 6. And I assume
17 you know who Avala 6 was, better than me. I don't know who it was, but
18 they told the driver and the man sitting next to the driver who was a
19 representative because it was a privately owned coach, he said come over
20 here, take lists of passengers in the bus with you. And our driver left.
21 He was a private entrepreneur from Zemun, and when he came back he said
22 they won't allow us safe passage, they won't allow us to go through. And
23 the bus was stopped. However, the passengers asked that we carry our
24 journey on foot because we thought if they won't let the buses through
25 perhaps we could go through on foot. The policeman from the container
1 called up again and then they allowed us to pass through and we didn't
2 have any more problems until we reached home.
3 After that, the war broke out in Zvornik. Zvornik fell on the 7th
4 of April and I wasn't able to go back to Belgrade after that any more.
5 Q. Yes, I understand that. So were you not a witness for the other
6 side, you would be proof and evidence of the fact that the people from
7 Serbia or, rather, those living in Serbia during the war went to Bosnia.
8 So that I assume is proof of Serbia's aggression against Bosnia.
9 A. What do you mean?
10 Q. Well, I'm saying you lived in Belgrade and then you were able to
11 go to Bosnia.
12 A. I lived in Belgrade, but my family members were always in Bosnia.
13 Q. All right, Mr. 1399. Now, were you in your village when at the
14 beginning of April 1992, without any reason whatsoever, five Serb young
15 men were arrested precisely in your village, the village of Kamenica, and
16 they were interrogated by a policeman from the village by the name of
17 Avdija Omerovic. And in view of the fact that this incident triggered off
18 great unrest amongst the Serb population in the municipality, do you
19 happen to recall the event?
20 A. Mr. Milosevic, Avdija Omerovic was not a policeman in Kamenica and
21 those five Serb young men were never taken prisoner in Kamenica.
22 Q. All right, excellent. So we can move on.
23 A. Yes, we can.
24 Q. And is it true that at the time the paramilitary unit in Zvornik
25 and the surrounding parts were organised in the form of a reserve
1 composition of the police force itself?
2 A. No. Kamenica remained under siege in an encirclement. We had no
3 contacts with Zvornik after the 5th or 6th of April. We had no contacts
4 with Zvornik at all. It was just our village and the surrounding villages
5 in the direction of Sarajevo that were encircled.
6 Q. All right. Now, tell me, is it true that the conflicts in your
7 region started on the 8th of April, 1992?
8 A. No. On the 26th of April, we were first attacked by the army
9 because a Serb came and told the Muslims of Sekovic, he said, Brethren
10 Muslims -- people say he actually cried. I don't know the man very well.
11 I know his name but I don't want to give it. He said, flee, run, because
12 there's the army in Pavlovic with some tanks, and those tanks actually did
13 attack us after that. That's what he said to us.
14 Q. All right. Fine. Now, do you happen to remember that the Mosque
15 Doves and the other Muslim formations acted from fulcrums at Kamenica,
16 points of support and strongholds?
17 A. No. I heard about that in Tuzla. I heard about this dove unit,
18 but there weren't any men from that unit where we were.
19 Q. What did you have then?
20 A. We just had the TO, because we had to defend ourselves if anybody
21 attacked us, but we didn't have the means to defend ourselves with. We
22 didn't have a BH army, and the army had to be formed in the course of the
23 war, and it was all on our backs and through the people that had been
25 Q. So you called it the Territorial Defence, did you?
1 A. Yes, that's right.
2 Q. And is it true that at the time, regardless of what these units of
3 yours were called, that you would attack the suburbs of Zvornik during the
4 night? You would topple Serb houses, burn them, loot them, and so on?
5 A. No. None of us dared go to Zvornik.
6 Q. I'm not talking about Zvornik, I'm talking about the environs of
7 Zvornik. Do you remember that on the 24th of August, for example, 1992,
8 you attacked the village of Gornje Kamenica in the Zvornik municipality
9 and on the occasion you set fire to all the houses, you desecrated the
10 Orthodox cemetery in the village, destroyed all the houses?
11 A. Yes, the Serb village, Mr. Milosevic, was attacked when they
12 provoked us too much. We had no way out other than to do that. Now,
13 you're saying all this, whereas how many Muslim houses after the fall in
14 1992 were mined and blown up, including two Serb houses? Kukoj Velja's
15 [phoen] house and Velja Tomic's house. They were neighbouring houses and
16 I think that Tomic Velja's wife is now prosecuting the army for having
17 destroyed her house.
18 Q. Now, all right. Is it true that your particular unit at that time
19 attacked Gornje Kamenica and that in the attack a number of Serbs were
20 killed, Serb houses set fire to, destroyed, and looted? Is that true or
22 A. I don't know whether they killed anyone or not, but I do know that
23 this operation did take place. Now, what actually happened I can't say,
24 but we never heard of any civilians being killed. Perhaps some soldiers
25 were, I don't know about that.
1 Q. Well, do you remember for example Ljubomir Tomic, Dragomir Tomic,
2 civilians and others who were killed during that attack, other Serbs
3 skilled in Gornje Kamenica?
4 A. They were not civilians.
5 Q. They weren't civilians?
6 A. No, they weren't.
7 Q. Did you take part in the attack?
8 A. No, I didn't. This man Velimir Tomic, he wanted to strangle a
9 woman when he raised the Serb flag on the mosque, on the minaret of the
10 mosque. And I can give the woman's name. She was a Muslim woman. She
11 took down the flag because she said it's -- there's -- it's not the right
12 place for that flag. You take the flag to its rightful place.
13 Q. And this other man that was killed, was that the house?
14 A. No. I don't know when any of these people were killed, either of
15 them. I don't know when they were killed. But this man, Velimir Tomic
16 was not a civilian. He was a military man, a soldier.
17 Q. I'm talking about Ljubomir Tomic and Dragomir Tomic, not Velimir
19 A. There is no Ljubomir Tomic as far as I know Kamenica. There's
20 nobody by that name.
21 Q. So you know all the inhabitants?
22 A. Yes, I do because it's a small village.
23 Q. Well, how many Serbs were killed in that small village, then?
24 A. I don't know, I can't say. I'm just saying that I've heard of a
25 man called Velimir Tomic and that he was killed, but I haven't heard of a
1 Ljubomir Tomic at all.
2 Q. Now, why did your forces attack this small Serbian village?
3 A. Well, it's not a small village.
4 Q. You've just said it was.
5 A. No, it's not a small village. You said small village. Those Serb
6 forces killed our own people, and people had had it -- had as much as they
7 could take. You don't know our region. You had the artillery. The Serbs
8 had artillery. We didn't even have rifles. And if we had a few bullets
9 we just had a few bullets in our hands. Nobody gave the Bosnian Muslims,
10 our army, any ammunition and tanks. You gave tanks to the Serbs. They
11 had aeroplanes, they had everything; we had nothing, sir.
12 Q. All right, Mr. 1399. Well, what did you use to kill all those
13 Serbs with?
14 A. Well, just rifles.
15 Q. All right. So rifles. Is that a mitigating circumstance, killing
16 them with rifles?
17 A. Don't say me. I didn't kill anybody. You're saying "you." I
18 didn't kill anybody.
19 Q. All right. Tell me this, please: Do you remember the conflict
20 that took place on the 5th of November, 1992, precisely in the Kamenica
21 area when your forces captured and then killed a large number of Serbs?
22 A. They did not capture them. Whether they killed them, I don't
23 know. I saw several dead Serbs but they didn't capture them anywhere.
24 Q. So they didn't first capture them and then kill them?
25 A. No, no.
1 Q. Well, how many Serbs did they kill on the occasion?
2 A. I didn't count them. I saw several Serbs, and they were all
3 soldiers wearing uniforms.
4 Q. Very well. Now, is it true and correct that the defenders of the
5 Serbian village of Kamenica were forced to withdraw precisely in the face
6 of your attack, your onslaught, and that afterwards, the ones who were
7 captured were killed in the most brutal way?
8 A. No, that's not true and correct.
9 Q. All right. Now, do you know that when the bodies were uncovered,
10 some of the bodies had their heads severed, or armed or legs, and they
11 were mutilated bodies cut into pieces? There is documentation about that.
12 A. That's just fabrication. I don't believe any of that happened
14 Q. Well, some of the bodies had chains on them. They had been tied.
15 Some had holes made with nails and poles.
16 A. I don't know about any of that. I guarantee that never took
18 Q. Very well. Since a moment ago you said that you knew all those
19 people over there who were living there, I have here some information that
20 the bodies of Uros Kozanovic [phoen], Radislav Grabovic, his body had one
21 leg and one arm missing. Vlado Grabovic, a beheaded body. Jokic Savo,
22 also he was beheaded and there was a chain on one of his legs. Radoslav
23 Matsanovic [phoen], who was slaughtered. Radomir Pavlovic with his head
24 cut off, Miladin Asteris [phoen] was in a state of decomposition.
25 Vladimir Bozic, his body was mutilated and his head cut off, and his skull
1 broken apart with a blunt object. Slavko Tijanic, a head without eyes,
2 ears, or nose, and crushed, and in his chest there was a 6-millimetre
4 A. Mr. Milosevic, don't make those things up. That didn't happen.
5 Only the Serbs could have done that. No one else. Don't waste your time
6 with that.
7 Q. I'm a Serb and I'm telling you these things. You're claiming it's
8 not true?
9 A. It's not true.
10 Q. Those people were not killed?
11 A. They may have been killed but --
12 JUDGE MAY: We're not going to make much progress with this.
13 Mr. Milosevic, these are a series of allegations that you're making, a
14 series of allegations. The witness knows nothing about them. In due
15 course, you will have the opportunity, as you've been told often enough,
16 to call your own witness. Meanwhile, let us move on to something which
17 the witness can deal with. You've heard the evidence which he's given.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I have, Mr. May. He has
19 testified about where he was all that time, and he also testified that the
20 army that he calls the Territorial Defence carried out an attack which he
21 himself mentions.
22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Now, tell me please, Mr. 1399, do you know a single one of the
24 names that I have listed?
25 A. No, not one of them. Not one of them is an inhabitant of
1 Kamenica. You can check that out through people who really know the
2 people from Kamenica. There are no such surnames in Kamenica.
3 Q. So not a single one of these persons was killed in Kamenica?
4 JUDGE MAY: This is a waste of time arguing with him. He's told
5 you he knows nothing about what you're talking about. No point going over
6 it again.
7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Apart from these names that I have read out, do you know the name
9 of Radan Pavlovic, Savo Kazanovic --
10 JUDGE MAY: No. You're wasting your time. Let's move on to
11 something else. I don't know what the purpose of this cross-examination
12 is at all. You've heard what this witness has told the Court. You've
13 heard his evidence. You're not challenging that at all, simply trying to
14 put up some sort of counter-case.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll come to that too, Mr. May,
16 don't worry.
17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Tell me, please, are you familiar with the name Muhamed
19 Ibrahimbegovic from Kamenica -- Kemal Ibrahimbegovic from Kamenica?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Were they in command of units?
22 A. No, not one of them were in command. They were drivers in
23 Drinatrans. Both of those men I don't believe ever took a rifle into
24 their hands.
25 Q. Very well. Now, tell me, please, when did you go to Srebrenica?
1 Was it at the time a protected area?
2 A. When we arrived in Srebrenica, Srebrenica was supposed to be
3 proclaimed a safe area. The Canadian Battalion came a couple of days
4 later. I don't think it was at that moment, but shortly afterwards it was
5 proclaimed a safe area.
6 Q. Very well. And when did you go to Srebrenica?
7 A. On the 13th of March, 1993.
8 Q. Very well. Do you know who were the commanders of the Muslim
9 forces in Srebrenica?
10 A. I don't know who were the commanders. Everyone knows that there
11 was Naser Oric as the previous commander, and when it became a
12 demilitarised zone, there were no commanders. Who would be the commander
14 Q. Do you know of the crimes committed from Srebrenica in that area,
15 in the surrounding area, in the villages? You know the village of Gniona,
16 Bijeceva, Skelani, Ciceva, Vigora --
17 JUDGE MAY: What is the relevance of this questioning?
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is relevant, Mr. May, because it
19 was from this safe area, from Srebrenica, that the most horrific crimes
20 were committed against the Serbs. I have a half a page listing just the
21 names of the villages that were attacked from Srebrenica.
22 JUDGE MAY: What is the relevance of that in relation to the
23 crimes committed at Srebrenica and the massacre that took place there?
24 Are you saying that somehow what happened was justified or are you saying
25 it is an excuse of some sort? Otherwise, it doesn't seem to have any
1 relevance at all. The fact that the other side may have committed crimes
2 is totally irrelevant.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, not a single crime can be
4 justified by another crime. I'm just speaking of the need for us to see
5 the context within which this was happening, the circumstances under which
6 these events took place, and the terrible suffering that happened in the
7 area and which was characteristic of all those years which involve great
8 suffering of the people in the area. And of course, one crime does not
9 justify another.
10 JUDGE MAY: That is the point, and this is a very central point in
11 the trial. Whether there were or were not other crimes is really beside
12 the point. The central matter we're dealing with are the crimes alleged
13 in the indictment, and at the moment, the context does not appear to have
14 any particular relevance as far as the commission of the crimes are
15 concerned. It may -- if it were true, it may explain why the crimes were
16 committed. It may provide, if it's said, provocation, but that of course
17 is no defence at all. You should understand that, and there is a limit to
18 the amount of time that we can spend upon these matters.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, I truly have nothing to
20 defend myself against here. What I'm trying to do is to establish the
21 truth, and I really have nothing to defend myself against when it comes to
22 the crime in Srebrenica or anything else, because Serbia and I personally
23 struggled to achieve peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina rather than war.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Don't you, Mr. Milosevic, say that.
25 You kept saying throughout the war you Serbs should be in one state.
1 JUDGE MAY: Let us avoid -- no, if you wouldn't mind. Let us
2 avoid a free-for-all.
3 Mr. Milosevic, I'm not going to stop you specifically asking these
4 questions, but you ought to bear in mind that they are of peripheral
5 relevance at best. Your case appears to be that what happened at
6 Srebrenica was nothing to do with you. That's what you seem to be saying.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It can't seem to be. I believe you
9 know full well that what happened in Srebrenica has nothing to do with
10 Serbia or me.
11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Mr. 1399, is it true that all the Serb villages except for the
13 immediate vicinity of Bratunac and Skelani were burnt and destroyed and
14 razed to the ground?
15 A. When I came to Srebrenica, the villages had been left by the
16 Serbs. Who chased them out, I don't know.
17 Q. You don't know?
18 A. They either went on their own or I don't know what. I arrived in
19 1993 when it was to become a safe area. There was no fighting around
20 Srebrenica at that time when I got there.
21 Q. And do you know that out of 52 settlements of Srebrenica
22 municipality inhabited by Serbs there were Serbs only in Srbica, Jaska --
23 JUDGE MAY: We're just wasting time with these questions. Now,
24 move on to something else that the witness can deal with.
25 MR. WAESPI: Mr. President, in relation to time, we would suggest
1 that if the accused doesn't put relevant questions to this witness in
2 relation to what his evidence is, that this witness would be free to go
3 after today and doesn't need to stay overnight.
4 JUDGE MAY: That will be a matter for us to determine. Is there
5 any particular reason why he has to go today?
6 MR. WAESPI: No, I don't think so, Your Honour. I'm sorry,
7 Mr. President. It's merely the rest of the timetable. We have, as you
8 know, more witnesses tomorrow.
9 JUDGE MAY: Yes, of course.
10 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Since you lived in the safe area of Srebrenica for a time, do you
13 remember that the 8th Operative Group, which was later renamed the 28th
14 division, was actually formed and enlarged in that very safe area?
15 A. No. The 28th Division was formed when the people who survived
16 reached free territory.
17 Q. Very well. Now, tell me, please, is it true, and I will respect
18 the requirement to ask you certain things in private session, but I will
19 refer to what is known as the statement, that your brother was a member of
20 that unit?
21 A. Yes, he was a member, but he was only a cook. Because you know
22 when a zone is demilitarised, no one can carry weapons except UNPROFOR.
23 Q. Mr. 1399, are you claiming that Srebrenica was the demilitarised
24 zone and that there wasn't a strong Muslim formation in Srebrenica, people
25 who were carrying weapons?
1 A. Only UNPROFOR. No one could carry weapons. If they were to be
2 seen by UNPROFOR, the weapons would be seized from him. That is what
4 Q. Is it true that the numerical strength of the people under weapons
5 in Srebrenica was 10.913 fighters as of the 1st of January, 1994?
6 A. Who could say that with accuracy?
7 Q. What was the numerical strength?
8 A. When we headed towards Tuzla, there may have been 200 or 300,
9 maybe 500, but not 10.000. We didn't have 10.000 pieces of weapons even
10 if we hadn't surrendered them to UNPROFOR.
11 Q. So this figure is not correct?
12 A. No.
13 Q. And is it true that this 28th Infantry Division consisted of five
15 A. I don't know exactly how many brigades it had. I just know that
16 when we reached free territory - I don't know which month it was when the
17 28th brigade was formed. It consisted of the men who were in Tuzla who
18 had left before, who hadn't gone to Srebrenica but had gone from Kamenica
19 and other villages to Tuzla.
20 Q. That's another matter, Tuzla. Is it true that in July 1995 when
21 these events in Srebrenica occurred, there were between 12 and 13.000
22 combatants in the Muslim forces in the area?
23 A. I don't think there were that many able-bodied men. As for
24 weapons, never did one in five have a weapon.
25 Q. Very well. Do you recall that on the 21st of January, 1995, the
1 army of Bosnia and Herzegovina introduced restrictions on the freedom of
2 movement of the UN in the area known -- the triangular area known as
4 A. No, I don't know about that.
5 Q. They held at the time about 100 soldiers of the Dutch Battalion as
6 hostages from the 27th to the 31st of January, 1995.
7 A. That never happened, I guarantee.
8 Q. And is it true that before these events in Srebrenica the army of
9 Republika Srpska was only responding to attacks by the BH army coming from
10 that safe area of Srebrenica?
11 A. I didn't hear that.
12 JUDGE MAY: Don't even bother to consider it. It's not for the
13 witness to answer that sort of question.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May.
15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Do you know anything at all? Were you in a military unit when you
17 were in Srebrenica or not?
18 A. No.
19 Q. Do you know that offensive sabotage operations were launched from
20 Srebrenica in territories outside the safe area inhabited by Serbs?
21 A. No, I don't know that. I wasn't a member of the army, and if
22 anyone did that, it wouldn't be known. I don't know about it.
23 Q. Of course it shouldn't be known, but it was covered up.
24 A. I'm not sure about that, so I can't say anything.
25 Q. Do you have any idea as to the number of people who were killed at
1 the time as a result of these operations launched from the safe area?
2 A. Which people?
3 Q. In the surroundings, Serbs.
4 A. I'm telling you, in 1993 when I arrived, it was a demilitarised
5 zone. So I don't know anything about the situation before that. If
6 somebody did conduct any act of sabotage, I don't know that.
7 Q. Very well, Mr. 1399. So you're claiming that Srebrenica was
8 demilitarised, that the Muslims in Srebrenica didn't have weapons, and
9 that there was no combat there.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Very well. And do you know that there are many documents showing
12 that there was no respect of the safe area principles?
13 A. Maybe the Serbs didn't respect it, but we had to respect it
14 because our weapons were seized from us. You were the ones who didn't
15 respect it.
16 Q. Mr. 1399, please don't speak in the second person plural.
17 A. The Serbs wouldn't do anything without Serbia. That's beyond
19 Q. Tell me, there's a document, a letter from April 1995 whereby
20 Lieutenant Colonel Karremans, the commander of the Dutch Battalion, writes
21 to Osman Suljic --
22 JUDGE MAY: No. I'm going to pay attention to what the
23 Prosecution suggest. If you do not ask this witness relevant questions,
24 questions which he can answer, not questions about the commander of the
25 Dutch Battalion -- he is not here to give that sort of evidence. He's
1 giving evidence about what he saw and heard himself. Unless he's asked
2 relevant questions, then your cross-examination will have to be brought to
3 an end.
4 Now, if you've got any relevant questions for him, now is your
5 chance to ask him.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May.
7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. From what is called your statement, one can see that you saw quite
9 a number of men with arms after the fall of Srebrenica.
10 A. I saw about 200, 300 men.
11 Q. You saw them with your own eyes, 200 or 300 men under arms of the
12 Muslim forces after the fall of Srebrenica?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And do you have any knowledge regarding the internal inter-Muslim
15 conflicts, rebellions, lootings, clashes between the civilian and military
16 structures, attacks on UN members?
17 A. No, no. There may have been some minor incidents, some minor
18 clashes. Nobody knew about them anyway, if any.
19 Q. Was there a battle against these disbanded force -- Muslim forces
20 after the attack on Srebrenica?
21 A. What disbanded forces?
22 Q. You say 200, 300, and so on. Hundreds of men who were armed and
23 who you saw after the attack on Srebrenica.
24 A. When we left Srebrenica, when we were leaving Srebrenica, I don't
25 know, I was in the last column on the 12th. Maybe 4.00 or half past four
1 we left the territory of Srebrenica. I don't know where those men with
2 weapons were, whether there were any ambushes anywhere. I didn't know
3 anything about that. It was a large column, there were lots of people.
4 Some were ten kilometres ahead. So I didn't know at all what was going
6 When we were captured, we were surrounded. The Serbs asked us to
7 surrender, they guaranteed our safety, and you know what happened when we
8 surrendered, you know what happened to us. Everyone knows.
9 Q. Now, just tell me, please: Was there fighting when you were
10 breaking through the encirclement, that is, the armed formations when they
11 were leaving Srebrenica?
12 A. Probably, yes. I wasn't involved. The people had to get out
13 because the Serb army would not allow them to leave in a negotiated
15 Q. And do you recollect how long prior to these events in Srebrenica
16 had Naser Oric and a large group of commanders and leaders leave
17 Srebrenica? Do you remember that?
18 A. I don't know exactly.
19 Q. And do you remember that after Srebrenica was captured, do you
20 know anything about measures taken by the army of Republika Srpska? I'm
21 not talking about the group that carried out the executions. I'm talking
22 about the army of Republika Srpska.
23 Did it undertake any measures to ensure the evacuation of all
24 those who wished to leave and to assist in the removal of the civilians
25 from Srebrenica?
1 A. As far as civilians are concerned, the civilians were seen off,
2 but they separated a large number of men, elderly people, and middle-aged
3 men, because one of my brothers, thanks to some good luck, his leg hurt
4 him. He wasn't wounded. He had to carry two crutches, and he was
5 released. And he said that Serbs were separated, and I just happened to
6 be lucky. A soldier told me to get on the truck and I said I can't climb
7 on, my leg hurts. And he said, Can you get on a bus? And I said I could,
8 he showed me the bus. And that is how he crossed over.
9 Q. Please, 1399. I want to make one thing clear: There is no
10 question regarding condemnation of the crime in Srebrenica. I just wish
11 to separate what is obvious; that is, did the official army of Republika
12 Srpska in those days protect the civilian population and provide for their
14 A. Yes. The women and children and some elderly. But all the
15 others, older and younger ones, were taken away. And wherever there were
16 executions, this mass genocide that was committed involved the elderly as
17 well as younger people from the woods.
18 Q. From the information I have - please confirm or deny them - some
19 sort of an agreement was reached and signed by representatives of
20 Srebrenica on their behalf, a certain Nasib Mandzic, a civilian
21 representative of Republika Srpska, and the commander of the Dutch
22 Battalion regarding the evacuation of the population.
23 A. They may have. I'm not guaranteeing that they didn't, but the
24 Serbs did not respect that.
25 Q. And do you know that a representative of the Dutch Battalion later
1 signed a statement saying that the evacuation had been carried out in
2 accordance with the plan?
3 A. Mr. Milosevic, why were the Dutch Battalion not allowed to make
4 statements for four days? And in those four days the genocide was
5 committed. That was my question. That was the question addressed to the
6 Dutch generals by representatives of the BH, especially by a Serb general
7 who remained in the BH army.
8 Q. I want to check out certain facts that I was able to get hold of,
9 because I care very much about those events in Srebrenica being fully
10 discovered and revealed and for those responsible to answer for it and not
11 those who are not.
12 So I'm not asking you about the document, as you were not in a
13 position to know about documents, but there are documents, and I'm asking
14 you of your knowledge. I also have the number and everything else, 19th
15 of July, 1995, where it says that the commander of the Drina Corps unit
16 were cooperating with UNPROFOR to protect the Muslim population to
17 guarantee their security --
18 JUDGE MAY: No. This witness can't deal with Drina Corps
19 documents. He had nothing to do with that at all. You could call the
20 appropriate witness to deal with it in due course, but it's no good asking
21 this witness, who was a survivor of what happened, of the detailed
22 documents there may have been.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May, but I would like
24 to separate the behaviour of the regular forces of Republika Srpska from
25 the behaviour of these groups who perpetrated the crimes, because it is
1 very important to find out who perpetrated those crimes and who stands
2 behind them.
3 JUDGE MAY: Yes. You would perhaps ask him about the men he saw.
4 Perhaps ask him about that and to describe them.
5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Do you know that General Ratko Mladic personally ordered the
7 medical evacuation from Bratunac so that the wounded, the elderly, the
8 sick should be evacuated in a safe manner?
9 A. I don't know about that. Some of the wounded reached free
10 territory, some didn't. There was a man with me who had a wooden leg. A
11 shell took away about 2 centimetres of his foot. All the wounded were not
12 protected. Some were; some were not. When he was just about to reach
13 free territory, he was killed. One person -- some women saw that
14 particular person.
15 Q. Very well. Left me ask you, I have here the text of an original
16 article from Slobodna Bosna dated the 14th of July, 1996. Ibrahim
17 Mustafic, a Republican and federal deputy founder and former president of
18 the SDA in Srebrenica and the captain of the Serbian army after the fall
19 of the city. He speaks about the events there, so I'm just asking you is
20 what he said true.
21 A. I don't know.
22 Q. Wait a minute. I'll read it out to you and then you'll tell me
23 whether that concurs with your own knowledge. He was asked: "Who were
24 the people that you are accusing and who you no longer trust?
25 "Mustafic: The scenario for the betrayal of Srebrenica was
1 consciously prepared. Unfortunately, the Presidency of BH was directly
2 involved in this as well as the General Staff. If you want the names, you
3 know who those people are. I understood the situation in Srebrenica, and
4 rest assured that there would be far many people of Srebrenica alive if a
5 group of Mafioso did not oppose me. If I had been told to fire from the
6 demilitarised zone, I would not have obeyed that order, because I would
7 tell those people who had their wives and children there to do it."
8 And then they ask him: "What were the consequences of operations
9 from the demilitarised zone?" Mustafa said: "It was conscious, giving
10 justification to the Serbian forces to attack the demilitarised zone."
11 And then he goes on to say that through some people who were close
12 to the Croatian intelligence and who have contacts with the Serbs, he had
13 heard that there were another 5.600 living people from Srebrenica and Miss
14 Maholica Tomalica [phoen] told me recently that she had some information
15 from the human rights committee that there were 4.500 such people, et
17 Was it ever established in these regular proceedings engaged in by
18 the army of Republika Srpska, that is to evacuate and to protect the
19 population, how many people were evacuated and protected and how many were
20 killed in all in those crimes committed in Srebrenica?
21 A. I think about 7.000 or 8.000 people were killed. I don't know how
22 many were evacuated. Women, children, and men. I know until the command
23 came to separate the men, men passed through and some younger men could
24 pass. And when they started separating, they separated all the men, and
25 they didn't hurt children under 15.
1 Q. Very well, Mr. 1399. That prisoners of war were separated, that
2 is one thing. Now, tell me, who, to the best of your knowledge, committed
3 that crime?
4 A. The Serbs. The army of Republika Srpska with the assistance of
5 paramilitary units or the JNA. And anyway, the JNA was just the same as
6 the paramilitary units.
7 Q. So you have nothing more precise to say regarding your knowledge
8 as to who committed those crimes.
9 A. I'm telling you, when the crime was about to be committed, when we
10 were detained, some soldiers came, and they first lined up the people, the
11 elderly people who were at the other end of the hall. They had to get up
12 on their feet. The order was about turn to the right and to turn their
13 back to the door. And when they were taking people out and blindfolding
14 them, they told the others to turn their back to the door so that they
15 wouldn't see what was going on.
16 Q. Mr. 1399, that was not my question. You said just now in this
17 brief examination-in-chief, and I noted it down, that there were 2.000
18 people in the hall at Potocari.
19 A. No, not in Potocari.
20 Q. What do you mean?
21 JUDGE MAY: No. He said -- he said specifically they didn't go
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. I assume I'm quoting you correctly when I say that you said that
1 some armed people turned up and that they said they were not soldiers but
2 some young Chetniks. That's how they introduced themselves.
3 A. No, they were the soldiers who were on duty at the door while we
4 were in the hall. They were very young guys, and if anybody were to
5 address them by saying, "Comrade Solider," they would say, "We're not
6 soldiers, we're Karadzic's Chetniks without a beard."
7 Q. Is that what they said about themselves?
8 A. Yes, that's what they said about themselves.
9 Q. Tell me now, were those the people that carried out the executions
10 or not, or somebody else?
11 A. No. Those people stayed where they were. Other people probably
12 carried out those orders.
13 Q. Now, do you have any knowledge as to who those others were?
14 A. Well, there was a colleague of mine who worked in Belgrade. We've
15 known each other for 15 to 18 years, Gojko Simic. He's my own age, from
16 that village around Orahovac.
17 Q. Well, is he one the perpetrators?
18 A. Yes, and he was one of the main ones, the chief ones.
19 Q. How many other perpetrators were with him?
20 A. Well, I would say there were at least six or seven people, because
21 where I was, where the execution took place and where there was no more
22 room, this man Simic Gojko said, now, let anybody of those people that
23 they thought were killed speak up. Gojko, Vojo, Risto. They called out
24 to those people. And when they were supposed to leave, the man digging
25 the pit with the excavator stopped the excavator and told him, "If you all
1 leave I'll switch the engine off and I'll leave too."
2 Q. Let's just try to be more efficient. When you surrendered on the
3 road at Sandici you saw a young man who said you were going to be
4 exchanged; is that right? You saw Mladic who said you were going to be
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. So there was no other mistreatment of your suffering?
8 A. No. Mladic didn't say that we would suffer. He just said we
9 would go to some hangars and be given water, although not dinner, but the
10 other man said we would be getting dinner too.
11 Q. So there was mention of some regular type of exchange; is that
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And then you mention the school in Grbovci, that that's where they
15 took you, and then took you to the execution site.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. And you say your eyes were tied.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Well, how were you able to see corpses along the way?
20 A. Not along the way. We didn't see them along the way. When they
21 lined us up for execution, I was looking down, looking down in front of
22 myself and all you could do was see underneath you. I happened to see a
23 dead man. Otherwise, when we were going along in the truck under
24 tarpaulin, you weren't able to see anything.
25 Q. And you say that they -- there was a burst of gunfire. At what
2 A. I don't know, my eyes were tied. Probably they shot at our backs.
3 How far away, one or two metres they were, I don't know.
4 Q. Now, all right. You say yourself that this group of people that
5 perpetrated the crime, the crime we're discussing, numbered six or seven
6 men; is that right?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Tell me, do you have any knowledge whatsoever as to who that group
9 of men were?
10 A. I don't know. All I know that Gojko Simic was there. Vojo,
11 Risto. I don't know the others except for Gojko Simic. One of them was
12 called by nickname but when they went to another location and this man
13 with the excavator didn't want to stay, then this man Gojko left three
14 soldiers there and said let's go to the meadow to kill the people, and
15 they went down there and that's when the shooting started, while the
16 people were there.
17 Q. Tell me, please --
18 JUDGE MAY: This must be your last question today.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May.
20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. Apart from those six -- you said six men?
22 A. Six or seven.
23 Q. All right, six or seven men. Did anybody else take part in that
24 execution, the one that you survived?
25 A. I don't know. How should I know? All I know is that when they
1 gathered together there and when Gojko left with that group of men, that
2 three men stayed on, which means three or four others could have been
3 there because one or two wouldn't have been enough to carry that out.
4 JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn now. You've got ten minutes left,
5 Mr. Milosevic, for tomorrow.
6 Witness 1399, we're going to adjourn now. Could you please come
7 back tomorrow at 9.00 to complete your evidence, and could you also
8 remember during the adjournment not to speak to anybody about it, about
9 your evidence, that is, until it's over, and that does include the members
10 of the Prosecution team.
11 We will adjourn.
12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.59 p.m.,
13 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 12th day of
14 November, 2003, at 9.00 a.m.