Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 30947

1 Friday, 16 January 2004

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

6 JUDGE MAY: Yes, Mr. Nice.

7 MR. NICE: In one minute before the witness takes the solemn

8 declaration, administrative matters necessary to make the best use of our

9 time. It's obvious that at the present rate of progress we aren't going

10 to be able even to take all the witnesses I think on the schedule. I'm

11 having to make preliminary decisions about which witnesses we may drop,

12 and I will of course be assisted by knowing in due course what prospective

13 cross-examination the accused would want and would be granted in respect

14 of candidates for abbreviation.

15 It may help if I tell the Chamber the following: The witness

16 listed for next Wednesday, Sarinic, is on the list for four hours but that

17 was before the 89(F) ruling was made. We will seek for him to be dealt

18 with in a period of time less than that in toto. And then there are two

19 witnesses -- I don't ask for any indications at the moment. There are two

20 witnesses, General Vegh on the 5th of February, and Mr. Brunborg on the

21 4th of February, each of whom is experts and against whom substantial

22 periods of time are currently marked. In each case we will be asking for

23 them, if they are taken at all, to be taken more shortly. And were it

24 possible at some stage for the accused and/or the amici to accept, or the

25 Court to rule, that cross-examination need not be too extensive, that

Page 30948

1 would help us.

2 But I hope that these indications of where we are will assist the

3 Court because it would be preferable to plan rather than simply to run out

4 of time, and I want to be able to plan which witnesses properly should be

5 dropped and which should be taken.

6 JUDGE MAY: Which are the two witnesses again?

7 MR. NICE: Apart from Sarinic next week, it's General Vegh on the

8 5th of February and the expert Brunborg on the 4th of February.

9 JUDGE KWON: Did you say 4th of February?

10 MR. NICE: 4th of February I think, yes.

11 JUDGE KWON: Not 28th of January.

12 MR. NICE: He was the 28th and I think he's been moved. Maybe

13 there's a later version, but in any case, he's the expert, Brunborg.

14 That's all, Your Honour.

15 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. Yes. If the witness would take the

16 declaration, please.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

18 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

19 JUDGE MAY: Thank you. If you'd take a seat.


21 [Witness answered through interpreter]

22 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

23 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, if we could begin. The Prosecution will

24 be tendering two exhibits; one is the expert report of this witness

25 Dr. Zecevic, and the other is a binder of 30 exhibits. If we could ask

Page 30949

1 that numbers be assigned.

2 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the expert report will be marked

3 Exhibit 636 and the binder of exhibits will be 637.

4 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, in the interests of saving time, the

5 Prosecution wishes to withdraw three exhibits from the binder which is

6 now 637. Those are exhibits -- or tabs 6, 16, and 28. I apologise that

7 the curriculum vitae in tab 1 is also included in the expert report, so

8 the Prosecution will be withdrawing the second copy of that that was

9 included in tab 1.

10 Examined by Mr. Groome:

11 Q. Sir, can I ask you to begin your testimony by telling us your full

12 name.

13 A. Berko Zecevic.

14 Q. And the Chamber has a full record of your education and

15 professional background before it now. Could I ask you to summarise in a

16 sentence or two what your field of expertise is.

17 A. I specialised in two fields. Education; that is to say, teaching

18 at the faculty of mechanical engineering, and also my expert work in the

19 field of designing ammunition.

20 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, at this time, if it's acceptable to the

21 Court, I will read a summary of what it is that is contained in the expert

22 report and then proceed with my questions regarding some other matters of

23 fact that the witness has information regarding.

24 JUDGE MAY: Have you a copy of that document or is it your own

25 personal summary that you're going to read?

Page 30950

1 MR. GROOME: Just a summary that I have some speaking notes of

2 that. It's not an official document.


4 MR. GROOME: This witness, a mechanical engineer, is a highly

5 qualified expert in heavy weapons technology of the former Yugoslavia, and

6 prior to the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, he was involved in the design

7 of heavy weapons, including the 120-millimetre mortar for the JNA.

8 During the war, he assisted the Bosnian and Herzegovina government

9 with a weapons production industry. His full statement as an expert

10 pursuant to Rule 94 bis reports on the operation and effect of the

11 120-millimetre mortar round and the shelling of Markale market in Sarajevo

12 on the 5th of February, 1994. At that time, he had volunteered to

13 participate in the investigation of the shelling of the market and was

14 appointed by the local investigating judge as part of a team of engineers

15 who analysed the physical evidence and prepared a study on the shelling.

16 His analysis concluded, in part, the following: One, that the

17 120-millimetre mortar round exploded upon impact with the surface of the

18 ground in the market and that the tail stabiliser fin of that mortar was

19 found lodged in the centre of the crater created by the mortar; that his

20 analysis determined that it came from the north north-east direction in an

21 azimuth of 18 degrees plus or minus two degrees.

22 Third, that there were six possible locations from which the shell

23 could have been fired from.

24 Fourth, that of those six locations, only the closest one of those

25 sites was under the control of the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina

Page 30951

1 army at the time. The other five possible locations were in territory

2 controlled by the army of Republika Srpska.

3 Fifth, that UNPROFOR personnel interviewed -- stated that they had

4 not observed a single projectile fired from the area of controlled -- the

5 area controlled by the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina at a time relevant

6 and that it would be impossible to hide the sound of the firing of a

7 120-millimetre mortar in that area or in that controlled area; therefore

8 concluding that the round must have been fired from one of the other five

9 locations.

10 Six, that it is scientifically possible that one 120-millimetre

11 mortar shell was able to kill the large number of people that it did kill

12 on that day.

13 And finally, that the lack of colour on the tail stabiliser fin as

14 recovered indicates most probably that it was manufactured in the Pretis

15 arms manufacturing plant in Vogosca or Marko Oreskovic in Licki Osik in

16 Croatia, both of which were under the control of the army of Republika

17 Srpska at the relevant time.

18 This expert also reports upon and explains scientific research

19 that indicates that the tail stabiliser fin of the Yugoslav 120-millimetre

20 mortar round would not begin to lodge into the ground if fired on charges

21 1 and 2 and that it would be unlikely to lodge if fired with three charges

22 and would begin to lodge if fired with four, five, or six charges.

23 On the basis of this research, it can be concluded, or he has

24 concluded, that the round was fired from Bosnian Serb-controlled

25 territory.

Page 30952

1 Your Honour, I will now ask the witness regarding matters relevant

2 to his time working in the Pretis factory.

3 Q. Sir, could I ask you to summarise the number of years that you

4 worked in the Pretis factory.

5 A. I worked there for 17 years.

6 Q. And during the time that you were there, did you become familiar

7 with the paperwork of the Pretis factory as well as correspondence that

8 regularly transpired between Pretis, other munitions factories, and the

9 JNA?

10 A. I was in the department for research and development of the Pretis

11 factory. That is actually the nucleus in terms of the operation of that

12 factory. That is to say manufacturing ammunition.

13 There were 30 to 50 of us employed in that department, depending

14 on the year, and of course we all had the opportunity of seeing how our

15 colleagues developed. The most responsible people for designing, testing,

16 and introducing ammunition in the Yugoslav People's Army were us, and of

17 course we were present in the manufacturing phase, in the testing and

18 experimental stage, and since this was our very own country at the time,

19 we were all pleased if we could help the Yugoslav People's Army as much as

20 possible.

21 Q. Sir, can I ask you specifically regarding the paperwork that was

22 generated typically by the Pretis factory as well as written

23 correspondence between it and the Yugoslav People's Army and other

24 munitions factories. During the course of your employment there, did you

25 become familiar with such documents?

Page 30953

1 A. Since I was one of the constructors of the 128-millimetre rocket

2 M87, I went through all stages of its design and its introduction in the

3 Yugoslav People's Army, so it was only logical that I had to be --

4 Q. Just in the interest of time, if you're able to answer yes or no,

5 I would appreciate that. Were you familiar with the documents?

6 A. Yes, yes, yes, yes, fully. Fully.

7 Q. Over the course of the last several days were you asked to look at

8 some documents from the Pretis factory?

9 A. Certainly, yes.

10 MR. GROOME: Could I ask at this time, if it pleases the Court,

11 that the binder, 637, be placed before the witness so that he can tab

12 through the large number of documents I will ask him to comment on during

13 the course of his testimony.

14 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We'll get a number for that.

15 THE REGISTRAR: 637, Your Honour.


17 Q. Sir, can I ask you -- can I ask you to turn to tab 2 of that

18 binder, and my question to you: Is that a summary of your observations

19 regarding the documents that you were asked to look at while here in The

20 Hague?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. Before I ask you about any specific document, can I ask you in a

23 few sentences to describe for the Chamber what was the pre-war structure

24 of the munitions and weapons industry in Yugoslavia?

25 A. The military industry of the Socialist Federal Republic of

Page 30954

1 Yugoslavia was very well organised with clear competences of all the

2 participants involved. In the process of designing, there were two

3 possibilities; it was done either by the Military Technological Institute

4 in Belgrade or by individual factories. Ammunitions factories were mostly

5 located in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia. Ammunition was tested in

6 Nikinci in Serbia. Decisions on whether anything should be developed in

7 the field of ammunition was passed by the Military Technical Council of

8 the Yugoslav People's Army, the -- such a decision would be adopted by the

9 council too, and the technical division of the Federal Secretariat for

10 National Defence passed the further relevant decisions, and therefore, all

11 the competences were clearly outlined.

12 I have to point out one more thing: For a long time, the rule was

13 that there would be a clear division in terms of what each factory should

14 do. For a long time, there had been no parallelism in production. It

15 appeared only towards the very end, towards the 1980s. Before that, the

16 entire organisation was at a very high level.

17 Foreign trade was conducted by the SDPR. The factories themselves

18 did not have the right to sell their products on their own.

19 Q. Can I ask you to describe for us, what was the significance of the

20 Pretis factory itself? How large a factory and what quantity of munitions

21 did it produce?

22 A. The backbone of any army are the artillery units in addition to

23 infantry units, but the main strikes are carried out by the artillery

24 units.

25 The Pretis factory produced artillery ammunition from 76

Page 30955

1 millimetres to 155 millimetres, rocket ammunition of 128 millimetres, air

2 bombs of 250 millimetres. So this was a highly respectable factory,

3 perhaps among the largest such factories in Europe for the manufacturing

4 of ammunition.

5 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the witness kindly be

6 asked to speak slower.


8 Q. Sir -- Doctor, the interpreters are asking if you could speak

9 little bit slower.

10 Doctor, the Chamber has heard evidence about the withdrawal --

11 A. Sorry.

12 Q. -- of the Yugoslav People's Army from Bosnia-Herzegovina on the

13 19th of May, 1992. Did you discover a document dated after that time

14 which indicated to you an ongoing relationship between the Yugoslav army,

15 as it was then called, and the Pretis factory? And I'd ask you to turn to

16 tab 3.

17 MR. GROOME: And if I could ask that the first page of that

18 document be placed on the overhead projector.

19 Q. Sir, do you recognise the document that's contained in 637, tab 3?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Was that a document that you yourself located or found?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Can you summarise for the Chamber what is it is that is stated in

24 that document.

25 A. In this document, the president of the Community of Military

Page 30956

1 Industries of Yugoslavia, Mr. Jovan Jovicic, proposes that directors be

2 appointed for various factories, namely Rudi Cajavec, Pretis, and Famos,

3 special vehicles. All of these factories at that time were under the

4 control of the army of Republika Srpska.

5 Q. And what does this document purport to do?

6 A. It was customary in the former Yugoslavia that the appointment of

7 directors would be carried out or, rather, agreement would be sought from

8 the Federal Secretariat for National Defence, although it was the workers'

9 council that actually carried out the appointment. However, not a single

10 case was registered of appointing a director within the military industry

11 without having consulted the Federal Secretariat for National Defence

12 beforehand and without receiving their agreement.

13 In this particular case, objectively speaking, Bosnia-Herzegovina

14 had attained independence, so it would have been illogical to have this

15 done by the then-Federal Secretariat for National Defence. At that point

16 in time, this was proposed by an organisation that still operated, and

17 that was the Community of the Military Industries of Yugoslavia, and it

18 was headed by its president, Jovan Jovicic.

19 Q. Sir, does this document, through the mechanism you've just

20 described, propose a candidate to be the manager of the Pretis factory?

21 A. Yes.

22 Q. And who does it propose should be the manager of the Pretis

23 factory now located -- or located in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

24 A. Mr. Milorad Motika, with a degree in engineering, was proposed to

25 be director of the Pretis factory.

Page 30957












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Page 30958

1 Q. I now ask that you look at tab 4 of 637 and ask that page 1 of the

2 English copy of that document be placed on the overhead projector.

3 Sir, this is a document dated the 18th of June, 1992. Can I ask

4 you to summarise what this document is and can I ask you also to read the

5 conclusion or finding under Roman numeral I.

6 A. Under Roman numeral I problems are spelled out because -- those

7 problems were due to the fact that there was a conflict in the territory

8 of Bosnia-Herzegovina and also --

9 Q. Sorry to interrupt you. Are you sure that you're looking at tab

10 number 4? I believe you're referring to tab number 5 at the moment.

11 A. I'm sorry. I am sorry. Tab 4. This refers to the appointment of

12 the manager of the Vogosca Pretis holding. Jovo Vucic, the previous

13 manager, was dismissed and Milorad Motika, with a degree in engineering,

14 was appointed manager of the Vogosca Pretis holding, and this was signed

15 by Prime Minister, Professor Dr. Branko Djeric.

16 Q. Does this indicate that the recommendation for general manager of

17 Pretis, made through the mechanism of the Federal Secretariat, was adopted

18 by the management or by the Pretis -- or was it enacted for the Pretis

19 factory?

20 A. Yes.

21 JUDGE MAY: What is it?

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the question put by Mr. Groome

23 is unfair because he said the proposal was made through the Federal

24 Secretariat, and this is no proposal of the Federal Secretariat. This is

25 a proposal of a business association that is called the Community of

Page 30959

1 Military Industries and the Manufacturers of Military Equipment. This had

2 existed for years in Yugoslavia. It consisted of the managers of military

3 industry factories. So it has nothing to do with the government, and

4 therefore Mr. Groome is putting a question that is quite wrong.

5 JUDGE MAY: Let us have it clarified.


7 Q. Sir, can I ask you to clarify, what was the relationship between

8 the organisation that authored this document that's in tab 3 and the

9 federal organs having to do with the military in Yugoslavia?

10 A. The fact that the Military Industries Community for Yugoslavia

11 existed several years and that it had been established with a view to

12 resolving some of the common problems in the functioning of the military

13 industry, and it served the following purpose: When exports were made,

14 then joint positions were taken. However, it was not customary for this

15 business community to propose its head. It was always the Federal

16 Secretariat for National Defence that gave its approval. Also the

17 appointment of this director could not have been made on the basis of an

18 independent decision. It wasn't that the managers would meet and appoint

19 another manager. This had to go through the Federal Secretariat for

20 National Defence.

21 My opinion is, if I can put it that way, that at this point in

22 time, it was illogical for the Federal Secretariat for National Defence to

23 put forth a proposal again. So use was made of this community which still

24 existed, and they proposed Mr. Motika to be the general manager. My

25 opinion is there was no synchronisation in this process as there had been

Page 30960

1 before.

2 Q. Now, I want to draw your attention to April 1992. During that

3 month did you cease to work at the Pretis factory?

4 A. Yes, on the 17th of April I stopped working there.

5 Q. Can I ask you to briefly describe why it was you stopped working

6 on the 17th of April in 1992?

7 A. In the days before, there was great tension and shooting in the

8 area of Sarajevo. That week, factories resumed their work, and on that

9 day I came to the factory with a very small number of other colleagues

10 because I thought it impossible for a conflict to break out in Bosnia and

11 Herzegovina, so I came to work in the morning, to the factory. It was

12 around noon or 1.00 p.m., and all of a sudden there was complete silence.

13 This big complex, this factory, employed every day several

14 thousand people, and there was always hum and noise and you could feel it

15 working. However, this was complete silence. And looking through the

16 window of my office, I saw people leaving the factory en masse. I

17 remained there for another couple of hours, and at a certain point I left

18 my office because nobody, none of my colleagues arrived to work that day,

19 although the R&D department was the most important one in the whole

20 factory. There was no director, no senior staff. Nobody was there.

21 Then I left the factory and a couple of days later it was

22 impossible to go in the factory anywhere -- anyway because the JNA had

23 entered the complex.

24 Q. If I can now draw your attention to after the conflict did in fact

25 begin. Can I ask you to summarise for the Chamber the situation with

Page 30961

1 respect to munitions that would have been faced by the early army of

2 Republika Srpska?

3 A. The Pretis factory had in its production programme a continuous

4 process. At all times it was producing a significant amount of

5 ammunition. It is a huge complex and part of its storage facilities were

6 used for storing the reserves of the Yugoslav People's Army. It contained

7 a lot of semi-finished products, not ready-made weapons but parts of

8 assemblies that can easily be put together.

9 The stockpile was enough for about five or six months of

10 production.

11 Q. Can I ask you perhaps to simply list what, if any, problems the

12 munitions industry at that time in the Republika Srpska would have faced.

13 A. I can say what problems -- what were the potential problems in

14 Pretis in Republika Srpska, because it was the main factory in that area.

15 First of all, there was the problem of supply with energy, power,

16 supply of steam and coal, because that was necessary for the production.

17 And since the military industry was a unified body, no single factory

18 could work alone so that the factory of rockets and rocket fuels in Vitez

19 was under the control of HVO at the moment. The factory of igniting

20 devices in Bugojno was under the control of HVO, and that created

21 significant problems in putting together the production. And then also

22 there occurred problems in providing inputs for the production of

23 ammunition.

24 Q. Sir, could I ask you now to turn to tab 5 of 637. This is a

25 document entitled -- it's from the Republika Srpska Ministry of Industry

Page 30962












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Page 30963

1 and Energetics, and it's titled information on current problems of

2 military industry of the Republika Srpska, and it's dated the 26th of

3 November, 1992. Have you had an opportunity to review this document, and

4 does it fairly and accurately represent some of the problems that would

5 have been faced by the military and munitions suppliers in the

6 Republika Srpska during this early part of the war?

7 A. I have seen this document, and I agree completely that this is a

8 realistic assessment.

9 Q. I'm now going to ask you to turn to tab 7 of 637. You made some

10 mention of raw materials. Can I ask you to describe in a little greater

11 detail what types of materials did the Pretis factory depend on that would

12 become -- or did become unavailable in the latter part of 1992 and

13 continuing on into 1993?

14 A. In the production of ammunition, there is a series of raw

15 materials that are necessary. One of the important components is steel

16 that was supplied from Slovenia, Croatia, or from Niksic and Zenica, which

17 means Bosnia-Herzegovina. Furthermore, rocket fuels for rocket artillery

18 systems are very important as well. Such fuels could be supplied from the

19 Vitez factory, which was then under the control of HVO, or from the Lucani

20 factory in Serbia. I have to emphasise that fuels from the Vitez and

21 Lucani factories were not compatible but were used for only certain types

22 of ammunition.

23 A special problem were fuses and capsules for the production of

24 cartridges. One needs brass. Copper is needed from Serbia. And bearing

25 in mind the overall situation, production in Pretis was made very

Page 30964

1 difficult unless we could complete the supply of all the inputs.

2 Q. Now --

3 A. Explosives were a special problem. They were also supplied from

4 Serbia.

5 Q. Now, I asking you to draw your attention to the tab 7 of 637.

6 This is a document dated the 20th of September, 1994, and it's signed by

7 Mr. Motika, the director of the Pretis company. Does this document

8 describe the types of munitions that are being produced in 1994, and does

9 it summarise the situation in 1994 with respect to the supply of the raw

10 materials necessary for their production?

11 A. Yes. This enumerates practically the entire span of Pretis's

12 production before and during the war, and this overview specifies the

13 factories which supplied raw materials to our factory, indicating the

14 current problems.

15 Q. And according to this document, have some or many of the problems

16 that existed in 1992 been resolved at this stage in November 1994?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. If I could now draw your attention to tab 8 of 637 and ask that

19 the first page of the English translation be placed on the overhead

20 projector.

21 This is a document dated the 6th of November, 1992, signed once

22 again by Mr. Motika. Can I ask you to summarise in a sentence or two what

23 it is that this document is referring to.

24 A. This is a communication between two factories, one being Pretis

25 from Vogosca, Sarajevo, and the factory of Lucani. And the subject of

Page 30965












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Page 30966

1 this letter is production of projectiles for a 125-millimetre tank, M84.

2 The factory in Blagovici produces ammunition for this weapon and produces

3 fuel for this weapon.

4 Q. Could I ask you to now look at tab 9 of 637 and once again ask

5 that the first page be placed on the overhead projector.

6 This is a document dated the 11th of August, 1995. Can I ask you

7 to describe what is contained in this document.

8 A. In this document, Mr. Milorad Motika requests from the Ministry of

9 Defence of Republika Srpska to secure the transport into Republika Srpska

10 from Republika Srpska -- from the Republic of Serbia TNT in the amount of

11 12.000 kilos and copper tubing in the amount of 8.000 kilos.

12 Q. Now, during this time period were there agreements or barter

13 agreements where raw materials and partially finished products were traded

14 between the factories that now existed in the Republika Srpska and

15 factories that existed in the Republic of Serbia itself?

16 A. I think it would have been a natural effort, because they would

17 not have been able to function one without the other, just as today

18 factories that belong to the military industry in various territories are

19 trying to establish cooperation. It is a natural way out.

20 Q. Can I ask you to look at tab 10 of 637. That's a contract dated

21 the 24th of July, 1995. Is that one such example of a barter agreement?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Then if you would please look at tab 11. It's a document dated

24 the 10th of November, 1992, once again signed by Mr. Motika. Is this --

25 does this document also indicate the existence of an agreement to barter

Page 30967

1 materials?

2 A. I could not say that this document speaks of -- speaks to barter

3 agreements. This document reflects the request of Mr. Motika, addressed

4 to the Institute for Technical Repairs, which is an organisation of the

5 Yugoslav army, to supply a certain amount of elements needed for the

6 production of ammunition -- or, rather, I'm sorry, I'm sorry. I didn't

7 notice at first the second page. It does reflect exactly what you said.

8 Both these documents reflect barter deals. I did not pay attention at

9 first to the heading.

10 Q. And finally, could I ask you to look at 637, tab 12, and ask you

11 to comment on this document and what it says.

12 A. In this document the Krusik factory from Valjevo, Serbia, sells

13 fuses TK-M71 and AU-18 as well as ammunition M74 to the Pretis factory

14 with the price being fixed by one of the departments of the Secretariat

15 for National Defence. These are the most important elements of this

16 communication, this document, I would say. And that ties in with what I

17 said before, namely that the Federal Secretariat, even before the war,

18 would make estimates of the value of an hour of work, an hour of labour,

19 or the price of a certain type of ammunition on the market.

20 Q. If I could now draw your attention to tab 13 of 637. Is this one

21 of the documents that you were asked to review here in The Hague?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. And my question to you with respect to this document is: Does

24 this document indicate that the Republika Srpska Ministry of Defence was

25 directly involved itself in some of these barter agreements?

Page 30968

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Now, if I could ask you to please turn to 14 of Exhibit 637 and

3 ask that the first page be placed on the overhead projector.

4 Have you had an opportunity to review this document; and if so,

5 can you please describe what this document indicates? And this is a

6 document dated the 29th of January, 1994.

7 A. I did have occasion to review it. In this document, the Main

8 Staff of the army of Republika Srpska, the logistics sector, informs via

9 the Ministry of Defence of Republika Srpska, informs the Pretis factory

10 that it is unable to provide 2.000 tons of steel from the Niksic steel

11 works, needed for normal operation, due to lack of funds. And at the same

12 time, they emphasise that in the process of securing 100 tons of

13 explosives in exchange for 125-millimetre ammunition for M84 tanks, it was

14 approved, and that we see in item 3, that the Krusik enterprise would

15 provide mines for the Pretis factory, mortar shells in fact.

16 Q. Can I draw your attention to the first sentence under the CC where

17 it says: "Notification on the allocation of technical equipment and

18 material by the Yugoslav army." Do you see that portion?

19 A. Just a minute, please. I can't see that.

20 Q. Can I ask you to check the tab at the front of the document. It's

21 the number at the front of the document.

22 A. Tab 14 you say?

23 Q. Yes. Okay. I'll move on and perhaps look at your binder during

24 the break.

25 I want to now ask you to turn your attention to tab number 15.

Page 30969

1 Could I ask that the original -- a copy of the original be given to the

2 witness so he can check that it is the same one that's in his binder, and

3 could I please ask that the English be placed on the ELMO.

4 Sir, to ensure that there's been no confusion or mix-up in your

5 binder, could I ask you to just compare what you have in your binder as

6 tab 15 with the three -- with the pages that are to you right now? Are

7 they the same?

8 A. Okay.

9 Q. Can I ask you to describe what this document is.

10 A. In this document, director Milorad Motika is addressing a request

11 to General Mladic at the Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska,

12 asking him to urge the chief of General Staff of the army of Yugoslav,

13 General Perisic, to make sure that 1.000 pieces of rocket engines of

14 122-millimetre rocket engines be forwarded to Krusik Holding in Valjevo to

15 meet the needs of Pretis Holding, and to do this through the assistant

16 Defence Minister of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

17 Q. Thank you.

18 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, in the interests of time, the

19 Prosecution is withdrawing tab 16 of this exhibit.

20 Q. Sir, you've been discussing Pretis and its manufacturing capacity

21 during the period of 1992 to 1995. In the documents that you were asked

22 to examine here in The Hague, did you find indications of where a large

23 number of the munitions that were produced were eventually sent from the

24 Pretis factory?

25 A. You mean during the war?

Page 30970

1 Q. Yes.

2 A. The largest part of that ammunition was used in the theatre of

3 operations around Sarajevo by the army of Republika Srpska, namely the

4 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

5 Q. During the war, because of your expertise, were you called upon to

6 sometimes visit the scenes of where shells had landed in the city of

7 Sarajevo?

8 A. I was involved twice, the first time when there was an explosion

9 in the Markale market, and the second time when a rocket projectile was

10 fired on the Sarajevo television.

11 Q. Did you ever come to know from your personal knowledge that shells

12 bearing a manufacturing date of 1993 had been discovered in Sarajevo?

13 A. At that time, I was still head of the research and development

14 sector attached to the Main Staff, and one of my responsibilities was to

15 find an alternative way of supply, and among the detected unexploded

16 shells was a shell with a manufacturing date of 1993. It was produced in

17 the Krusik factory in Valjevo.

18 Q. And where are those two factories located, in what republic?

19 A. That factory is located in Serbia.

20 Q. So within the city of Sarajevo, you found an unexploded shell that

21 had been manufactured in 1993 in Serbia; is that correct?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. I'm going to now ask you to look at the document in 637, tab 7.

24 MR. GROOME: I'm going to ask that page number 7 of that -- of the

25 English version of that be placed on the overhead projector.

Page 30971

1 JUDGE KWON: 7 or 17?

2 MR. GROOME: My apologies; tab 17, page 7.

3 Q. My question to you is: This document dated 11th of February,

4 1993, does it include an accounting of where some of the munitions

5 produced at Pretis were sent, to what units of the army of Republika

6 Srpska?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. I know that you do read some English. Can I ask you to take the

9 pointer and point to the column on the English version of that document on

10 the overhead projector to your left. Can I ask you to point to the

11 columns that refer to munitions. And you need to do it on the original at

12 your left hand.

13 A. [In English] Uh-huh, okay.

14 Q. Can you point to the columns that indicate the munitions that were

15 sent to units involved in the Sarajevo area.

16 A. [Interpretation] Column 4, column 5, column 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11,

17 15, 18, 19, 20.

18 Q. Thank you. Can I now turn your attention to tab 18 of 637. This

19 is a report dated 5th of December, 1993. My question to you is: Does it

20 indicate the amounts of ammunition supplied between the 1st of January,

21 1993 and the 30th of November, 1993?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. If you would now please turn to tab 19 of 637. This is a document

24 dated the 6th of July, 1995. Can I ask you to summarise what is contained

25 in this document.

Page 30972












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13 English transcripts.













Page 30973

1 A. In this document, the logistical sector of the technological

2 department of the Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska addresses a

3 request to the Pretis factory, to the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps command, and

4 to the forward command post of SRK to deliver certain ammunition including

5 100-millimetre, 105-millimetre, 122-millimetre mortar shells, the previous

6 two rounds, and in the fourth position 122-millimetre rounds.

7 Q. If you would now turn to tab 20 of 637. If I could ask you to

8 describe what is contained in that document.

9 A. In this document, which is certified by the seal of the Pretis

10 factory, we see a list of certain amounts of ammunition that was delivered

11 to various brigades active in the area of Sarajevo.

12 MR. GROOME: I will withdraw, in the interests of time, tab 21.

13 If I could ask you to turn to tab 22 of 637. And I ask that the

14 first page of the English be placed on the overhead projector.

15 Q. Sir, does this document, entitled a "Review of the ammunition,

16 explosive ordnance and other armament and military equipment delivered for

17 the period of the 1st of January to the 31st of September, 1993," does it

18 indicate the total quantity in percentage of the output of the Pretis

19 factory that was forwarded to the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps?

20 A. Yes. Out of the total quantity, 67.3 per cent was delivered to

21 the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps.

22 Q. Now, based upon your experience, were you -- were there some types

23 of armaments that could only be produced in the Republic of Serbia itself?

24 A. All guided means were produced in Republic of Serbia; mortar

25 shells, 120, 122, and 60-millimetre; ammunition for anti-air guns;

Page 30974

1 ammunition for infantry weapons. That is what I know. And probably some

2 more complicated systems that may have started to be developed during the

3 war.

4 Q. I'm going to now turn your attention to tab 23 of 637. And I ask

5 you what is indicated by this document, the document dated the 30th of

6 March, 1993.

7 A. In this document, the technical testing centre in Nikinci, this

8 document, which is addressed by the director of the control of the Pretis

9 enterprise, request is made to test five 125-millimetre projectiles for

10 the -- for two tanks, T72 and M82. This is a standard process. When a

11 certain number of ammunition has been manufactured, a certain number of

12 samples be selected to be tested in the technical testing centre, and if

13 the ammunition corresponds to the standards set, then that ammunition is

14 delivered to the units.

15 Q. And where is this testing centre located?

16 A. The testing centre is in Nikinci, which is close to Sabac, the

17 town of Sabac in Serbia.

18 Q. Would you now please turn your attention to tab 24 of 637, and I

19 ask that the first page of the English be placed on the overhead

20 projector.

21 This is document dated the 21st of May, 1994, also signed by

22 Mr. Motika. Does this document also indicate that some munitions were

23 sent to Nikinci for testing?

24 A. Yes. It says here that two modified 128-millimetre M63 rockets

25 are being sent to the technical testing centre in Nikinci. In this case

Page 30975

1 signed by the Pretis Holding manager, Milorad Motika.

2 Q. Thank you. I'm finished with that document.

3 Sir, I'm now going to ask that you turn your attention to the

4 topic of fuel air explosives. Are you familiar with what that munition

5 is; and if so, briefly describe what it is for the Chamber.

6 A. Air explosives, or thermobaric, or full air explosives are

7 explosives that we used in the Vietnam War, in Chechnya, and these are

8 devices for massive destruction of a certain region. They don't affect

9 the individual targets but they affect the whole surface, and by their

10 effects they have greater consequences regarding manpower and light

11 armoured vehicles than when using solid explosives. Their effect is

12 particularly dangerous in closed areas and urban centres when there are --

13 when there is a considerable increase in the effect of the explosives.

14 These explosives were developed for the air force in the 1980s.

15 And in the Pretis factory before the war, we were about to complete the

16 development of a 250-millimetre bomb filled with this explosive.

17 Q. Sir, did you recently obtain a photograph of such bombs that were

18 deployed by the Sarajevo-Romanija Corps?

19 A. Yes.

20 MR. GROOME: Can I ask that tab 30 of 637 be placed on the

21 overhead projector.

22 Q. Can I ask you to describe what it is we're looking at and just

23 generally about this type of bomb.

24 A. This couldn't really be called a bomb. It's a rocket projectile

25 which contains a warhead equivalent to a 250-kilogramme bomb. This

Page 30976

1 projectile consists of three rocket engines, a warhead, which is the body

2 of the air bomb, 250, and a stabilising fin attached to the back part of

3 the rocket engine. This is a relatively simple manufacture of a Russian

4 system which consisted of four racket engines used close to Sarajevo in

5 1994.

6 This rocket system is not precise, but what I did have occasion to

7 analyse during the use of one such system against TV Sarajevo building, it

8 has a very considerable destructive effect.

9 Within the warhead there is liquid explosive, propylene oxide, and

10 the solid explosive is inside and its task is to destroy the body. The

11 fuse at the tip, upon impact, it penetrates the obstacle and with a delay

12 of four, seven, or 15 seconds, it activates the cover, the cartridge, the

13 liquid evaporates, mixes with air, and an explosion occurs, and the whole

14 system has a blast effect on the surroundings.

15 Q. Sir, can I now ask you to look at tabs 25 -- look at 25 first and

16 just --

17 JUDGE KWON: Where was this picture taken, the picture of this

18 bomb?


20 Q. Dr. Zecevic, do you know where this picture was taken?

21 A. I couldn't really tell you, but I know who took the picture. This

22 photograph in this form -- or, rather, the appearance of this projectile I

23 didn't have occasion to see until this photograph was obtained, because on

24 the spot when it was used against the television building, I only found

25 the rocket engines with the stabiliser. The warhead had exploded, so I

Page 30977












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13 English transcripts.













Page 30978

1 couldn't find it in its original form but only parts of it.

2 A year and a half ago I had occasion to meet with a Dutch officer

3 who was in charge in Bosnia for -- of efforts to find unexploded

4 ammunitions, and during a conversation, I asked him whether he had

5 occasion to come across such a system. And he said that he did several

6 times, and then he sent me these photographs.

7 I'm afraid I don't know his name, but I do have his visiting card,

8 and I can provide it for you. He also has photographs of Russian systems

9 that -- on which this system was modelled. So such examples were found in

10 Bosnia-Herzegovina in unexploded form.

11 Q. Can I ask you to turn your attention to tab 25 of 637, and if you

12 would just in a sentence or two describe what it is that is indicated by

13 this document dated the 16th of June, 1995.

14 A. In this document, the logistics sector of the technical department

15 of the Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska is addressing to the

16 command of the 35th logistics base and of the 27th logistic base and the

17 Pretis factory an announcement that the 35th base will transport to Pretis

18 aerial bombs, FAB100 kilogrammes, 15 pieces of 250 kilogrammes, I think it

19 says here 14 or 11 pieces, and rocket engines of 128-millimetres, 57

20 pieces, which will be completed, 500 with one engine each --

21 Q. Can I ask you just in the interest of time, can I ask you to look

22 at tab 26 of 637. Is that also some correspondence with respect to Pretis

23 and these fuel or explosives?

24 A. Very similar. Very similar.

25 Q. And once again, to tab number 27?

Page 30979

1 A. Yes, very similar.

2 Q. The motors for some of these bombs, where did they come from in

3 your opinion?

4 A. In view of the fact that Pretis was unable to get hold of rocket

5 fuel, it could no longer manufacture 128-millimetre rockets that were

6 standard, nor could it obtain fuel for 122-millimetre rockets which it

7 started to develop just before the war. These had to be imported, which

8 means purchased abroad and then transported to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

9 Q. And based on your experience, what avenues would have been used

10 for the purchase of such necessary components?

11 A. Normally they could be purchased in Romania, Bulgaria, Russia,

12 Belarussia. In June 1993, a platoon started acting on the urban part of

13 Sarajevo, and I was close to the point of impact. I went there and found

14 parts of rocket motors with inscriptions indicating repair institute --

15 technical repair institute Kragujevac, and the year was 1991. Later on

16 when TV Sarajevo was shelled, I also saw engines with inscriptions

17 indicating that those 122-millimetre rockets were prepared in the

18 technical repair institute in Kragujevac in Serbia. And in my report, you

19 can find photographs of this.

20 Q. After Serb forces left Vogosca in the Sarajevo area in February

21 1996, did you find drawings related to the launching of such bombs or such

22 rockets?

23 A. Yes, there were some designs for the launching devices for such

24 systems.

25 Q. Sir --

Page 30980

1 A. I just had a chance to look at them.

2 Q. Without going into the technical details of these launching

3 systems, were you able to determine where these drawings were created and

4 at what time they were created?

5 A. It said VTI on them, Military Technical Institute of the ground

6 forces.

7 Q. And that would have been from what republic?

8 A. In Bosnia and Herzegovina. You mean the Military Technical

9 Institute?

10 Q. The drawings that you discovered that had to do with launching,

11 methods on how to launch these rockets, what are you able to tell us about

12 who authored them and at what time they were authored?

13 A. They were authored by the Military Technical Institute in

14 Belgrade. When, I don't know.

15 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, in the interests of time I will not play

16 an intercept, which is now Exhibit 613, intercept number 244, but I would

17 draw the Chamber's attention to it in relation to the next question that

18 I'll ask the witness.

19 Q. Sir, can you -- how were these bombs commonly referred to during

20 this time period?

21 A. They were known as FAB 100 or FAB 250. The first weighed 100

22 kilogrammes and FAB 250 indicated 250 kilogrammes, so the code number

23 indicates the weight of the air bomb.

24 Q. Thank you.

25 MR. GROOME: I have no further questions, Your Honour.

Page 30981

1 JUDGE MAY: How long -- I don't think you've said anything so far,

2 have you, as to how long you were going to be.

3 MR. GROOME: I'm sorry, Your Honour, about this examination?

4 JUDGE MAY: Yes, your examination. I don't think we had any

5 discussion about it.

6 MR. GROOME: Not with myself, Your Honour.

7 JUDGE MAY: No, and I don't think as far as anybody's concerned,

8 but obviously we must recognise the time which is available, and at the

9 same time, of course, it must be a fair examination. Have you any other

10 matters you have to deal with today, the Prosecution, for instance?

11 MR. GROOME: I know that Mr. Tieger is anxious to resume the

12 cross-examination and, if possible, complete that today.

13 JUDGE MAY: Well, thank you.

14 [Trial Chamber confers]

15 JUDGE MAY: Yes. We've considered coming to a fair decision as

16 far as the ability which the accused must have to be able to present his

17 case in cross-examination, at the same time, having regard to all parties.

18 What we will do is this; that we will allow the rest of the day for

19 cross-examination by the accused but leaving some minutes, if there is

20 time, to allow the amicus to ask some questions if that's going to be

21 possible.

22 So, Mr. Milosevic, start, make a start.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. May.

24 I really do wish, first of all, to thank Mr. Groome for bringing

25 such a witness here, and especially for producing so many documents. And

Page 30982

1 now, after two years, we can see in this courtroom the enormous quantity

2 of ammunition that was manufactured in the territory of the former Bosnia

3 and Herzegovina, including Republika Srpska, and it can even be seen that

4 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia or, rather, the army of Yugoslavia

5 purchased certain devices and ammunition there. Until here, it was -- the

6 prevalent view was that everything came from the Federal Republic of

7 Yugoslavia.

8 JUDGE MAY: It's not time for speeches, it is for examination.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I received a voluminous

10 amount of documents for this witness. He was first announced as an expert

11 for the Markale explosion, but I see now that many other elements have

12 been produced, and I shall do my best to focus on them, leaving time, of

13 course, for his expert report regarding the Markale shelling.

14 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

15 Q. [Interpretation] I would like to cover quickly some of these tabs

16 that Mr. Groome produced. First of all, we saw a report on the

17 possibility of manufacturing in special-purpose factories.

18 Mr. Zecevic, this Community of the Industry of Ammunition and

19 Military Equipment is a business association, is it not, and it has an

20 economic nature?

21 A. Not just of an economic nature. It couldn't function, as all

22 military factories were under the direct control of the Federal

23 Secretariat for National Defence, in view of the fact that the prices of

24 products were set by the Federal Secretariat. Therefore, they were not

25 independent economic entities. Therefore, the Community of the Military

Page 30983

1 Industry could not be an economic entity only. It was up to a part.

2 Q. Mr. Zecevic, as you worked in a company and I worked for many

3 years in a company, the nature of the product certainly requires a certain

4 measure of control when we are talking about military equipment - control

5 of the military authorities - but when talking about enterprises as such,

6 they functioned with their own account. They had their own expenses and

7 balance sheets, they had their own profit, they made contributions to

8 various funds, they paid out incomes from their own earnings, they paid

9 for their manufacturing components; therefore, they functioned on the

10 basis of an economic account such -- like any other company in a market

11 economy; is that right?

12 A. No. Every military factory in Yugoslavia constituted part of a

13 system. It couldn't operate independently. There was the so-called

14 principle of a common product, a joint product, which meant that within a

15 product, the price of which was fixed by the Federal Secretariat for

16 National Defence, every factory had a percentage share in this. This was

17 as regards manufacturing for the needs of the Yugoslav People's Army.

18 As for exports, not a single factory could act on its own in

19 exports. Sales were again done by one of the institutions of the Federal

20 Secretariat for National Defence. The distribution of funds in those

21 factories was also controlled. So these military factories cannot be

22 viewed as fully independent entities because they didn't decide on many

23 things. It's rather complicated for those who don't understand it.

24 Q. Yes, for those who don't understand the process. But as you have

25 just explained that not a single factory produced a complete product, let

Page 30984

1 me ask you, do you know how many factories took part in the production of

2 an ordinary passenger car? Who produced the measuring instruments, the

3 plastic parts? Who manufactured the tyres and bumpers? And it was very

4 hard to find a factory in Yugoslavia that produced the whole -- the fixed

5 -- the finished product on its own.

6 A. Yes, but the difference is that the prices of military products

7 was fixed and not for Crvena Zastava products. Who fixed the prices? The

8 market.

9 Q. You worked in Pretis, didn't you? When you have a loss, when you

10 work with a loss, who covered those losses?

11 A. We couldn't have a loss for one simple reason that Pretis always

12 had billings up to 50 to 70 million dollars and exports accounted for 60

13 per cent. These were high-profit companies.

14 Q. So Pretis was a high-profit firm, and it acted like any other firm

15 on the market.

16 A. A high-profit firm but under direct control, which means that

17 incomes, the salaries, were fixed. Personal incomes could not be

18 increased with the increase of profits.

19 Q. So they never got the surpluses within Pretis?

20 A. Rarely.

21 Q. I'm surprised by that, because I think in most companies in

22 Yugoslavia, people did receive bonuses if they worked with a profit.

23 So this report by the Community of the Military Industry, like any

24 kind of business association, of course this is military production, no

25 one is denying it, but let me just read the first paragraph. "Under

Page 30985

1 conditions of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, there is still a possibility

2 through organised cooperation with facilities in the Federal Republic of

3 Yugoslavia to organise production in Rudi Cajavec..." which manufactured

4 electronic components; isn't that right?

5 A. Yes. They also manufactured TV sets and radio sets and all kinds

6 of things, Rudi Cajavec, Pretis, Famos.

7 Q. Famos produced engines, isn't that right, motors?

8 A. Yes. This is a reference to special vehicles.

9 Q. Yes, but engines from Famos were also used for the Priboj factory

10 of trucks in Serbia. Then there was an association called Famos. They

11 cooperated with Mercedes. Don't you remember that?

12 A. Yes, you're quite right as far as automobiles are concerned.

13 Q. Then Pobjeda. Pobjeda is in Gorazde, isn't it? So with other

14 enterprises in Bosnia-Herzegovina cooperation is possible upon prior

15 stabilisation of political circumstances, should that occur. So we have

16 here an opinion, I would say an expert opinion of business people, and I

17 emphasise under certain conditions, as it says, upon prior stabilisation

18 of political circumstances should they occur. And that is all.

19 And then there is an indication of the need for business people

20 working in the area to focus on economic issues, and after that you were

21 given a document on the appointment of the manager of Pretis Holding,

22 Vogosca, and he was appointed by the government of Republika Srpska or,

23 rather, by the Prime Minister, Professor Dr. Branko Djeric, which is also

24 quite logical as the Republika Srpska has already been formed and Pretis

25 was within Republika Srpska. Isn't that right, Mr. Zecevic?

Page 30986

1 A. No. Republika Srpska hadn't been formed then.

2 Q. Well, how come the Prime Minister, Professor Dr. Branko Djeric --

3 as far as I know he was Prime Minister of the Republika Srpska. He was

4 never -- It says up there the government of the Serbian Republic of

5 Bosnia and Herzegovina is issuing this decision.

6 A. We can discuss this at length, but I would like to draw your

7 attention to something else. If the president of the Community of the

8 Military Industry of Yugoslavia is proposing the establishment of

9 relations, why doesn't he mention the factory in Bugojno?

10 Q. But it mentions Pobjeda, which is in Gorazde.

11 A. It was thought that Pobjeda would be under the control of the Serb

12 forces, but unfortunately, it was not possible at the time.

13 I would like to draw your attention to the fact, could the

14 president of an economic association such as this one, should he say the

15 appointment with the corresponding military authorities? It is in short

16 to coordinate security conditions and to coordinate ammunitions

17 production, et cetera. If we're trying to say that he was just the

18 president of an economic association, then why should he suggest that

19 military authorities should be engaged to ensure security conditions in a

20 factory? He should have dealt with professional matters and not military

21 security matters.

22 JUDGE MAY: In fact, I'm going to adjourn this for a moment

23 because the time is now up. We're going to adjourn for 20 minutes, and

24 Mr. Zecevic, would you be, please, since you're giving evidence, to bear

25 in mind not to speak to anybody about the evidence until it's over. Thank

Page 30987












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13 English transcripts.













Page 30988

1 you.

2 Twenty minutes. We'll continue then.

3 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

4 --- On resuming at 10.57 a.m.


6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. I will try to move on as fast as possible because we haven't got

8 much time, Mr. Zecevic, so I'm going to ask you to give me the shortest

9 possible answers. Of course, not to the detriment of what you're trying

10 to say, but let's keep things within sensible proportions.

11 So as far as I can see, a series of documents indicates that the

12 Republika Srpska was being formed and thus regulated its own economy,

13 including the military industrial complex. This shows this document

14 related to the appointment of the director of Pretis Holding, where it can

15 be seen that the government of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina

16 adopts this decision on the appointment of the manager of Pretis Holding

17 and then this is signed by the Prime Minister. I assume that this is not

18 in dispute.

19 A. Absolutely; it is not in dispute.

20 Q. Along with a comment of what was going on there, Mr. Groome asked

21 you what Pretis had to obtain from elsewhere and then you said it was

22 electricity, coal, steam, explosives manufactured in Vitez, and that was

23 under HVO control, then fuses in Gorazde. That was a factory that was

24 also under the control of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the rest.

25 So this was a dispersed production of elements that you spoke of. That is

Page 30989

1 not in dispute either; right?

2 A. It is not in dispute.

3 Q. All right. Further on, you were shown a longish document from the

4 26th of November, 1992 about the current problems of the special purposes

5 production Republika Srpska.

6 A. Could you please give me the tab number so that I can follow you

7 easily, more easily?

8 JUDGE KWON: Tab 5.


10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. And then what is discussed here are primarily economic and

12 financial issues.

13 A. I have to intervene at this point, I'm sorry.

14 Q. It's all right.

15 A. It's not only economic issues. For example, on page 5 of this

16 particular tab, it says that the overall claims of the special purposes

17 factories of Republika Srpska vis-a-vis the SDPR are a certain number of

18 dollars. $100 million. So this includes factories that at that point are

19 under the control of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

20 Q. Mr. Zecevic, I'm not going into the actual correctness of the

21 information. However, the SDPR is a company that dealt with exporting the

22 product of the specialised industry from all of Yugoslavia. Isn't that

23 right?

24 A. Precisely. But it did not have any authority at the time.

25 Q. No, but the outstanding dues remain as such; isn't that right?

Page 30990

1 A. Absolutely. But until things were legally regulated in

2 Bosnia-Herzegovina the SDPR or anybody else, the community of the military

3 industry, did not have the right to interfere in the internal affairs of

4 the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina which legally did exist at that time.

5 Q. All of that is well and fine, but the SDPR is not interfering in

6 any way here. This is information about current problems of the special

7 purposes industry of Republika Srpska and presented to the Government of

8 Republika Srpska.

9 A. Yes, precisely. But it seems as if nothing had changed in the

10 sphere of influence. That's the difference.

11 Q. But I am going to tell you that they do show what was different.

12 Towards the end of page 7, they say: "As we are geared towards them,

13 inevitably they are in a position to blackmail us." So obviously this

14 refers to the economic relations among different enterprises.

15 A. That's right.

16 Q. And they are asking for settled -- claims to be settled, for old

17 debts to be paid. So they are talking about companies and the SDPR, about

18 companies in the territory of Yugoslavia. They say they are a position to

19 blackmail us, and they are asking for the payment of old debts, and in

20 parentheses it says: "At the same time the Federal state does not wish to

21 pay them." That is to say, the outstanding dues to our enterprises, our

22 companies, but they are trying to put this into the general balance that

23 will have to be struck between the federal republic of Yugoslavia and

24 Republika Srpska and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and so on and so forth, because

25 there has to be a division of assets. And they ask for cash advance

Page 30991

1 payments for new orders.

2 So this is a reality that is referred to in this particular

3 document.

4 A. That is exactly what is written here.

5 Q. Further on, there is information about the production capacity of

6 Pretis, and then the development of Pretis is geared in eight directions,

7 and then it is explained that it's a special purposes and for military

8 purposes, tool production, overhaul, machinery, dishes, then for the train

9 car industry, transportation services, and other market-oriented

10 programmes. This also includes some information --

11 A. Could you please give me the tab number. I simply cannot follow

12 you, and therefore, I cannot answer your questions.

13 JUDGE KWON: Tab 7 and the following.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. I just quoting all of this, yes. Then, of course, the main

16 cooperation partners, the Vitez, Duk [phoen], Nepsavic [phoen], Vlasenica,

17 Bistrica, et cetera. All of that pertains to - how shall I put this? -

18 the economic aspect of the manufacturing facilities of Pretis.

19 A. No. Military cooperation. That is a significant difference.

20 This -- if the final product is aimed at killing people in Sarajevo, then

21 that cannot be a very good business.

22 Q. Please. This is provisional information by the Pretis Holding

23 Company to the Secretariat of the Economy of the Serb Municipality of

24 Vogosca; isn't that right? So that's the document involved. And it

25 explains what the capacities of Pretis are and this explanation is given

Page 30992

1 to the municipality of Vogosca?

2 A. I don't see why anything would be in dispute in terms of this

3 report except for the absolute substance.

4 Q. The substance involves the overall activity of Pretis, the one it

5 had before the war. And it says what can be used now from among all these

6 facilities.

7 A. Everything is fine as far as this report is concerned.

8 Q. All right. Then there is the letter of the director of the

9 holding, Mr. Milorad Motika, to -- addressed to the factory in Lucani, and

10 then he says to them that they have provided them with casings and sets

11 and so on, and they are asking for deliveries. This has to do with the

12 relationship between two different companies, and it shows that,

13 inter alia, the Lucani factory is buying something from them and selling

14 something to them.

15 A. No. According to international law, when explosives are

16 concerned, there is a special procedure involved, and such things cannot

17 be exported from one country to another without abiding by these rules. So

18 this has nothing to do with business itself. They can reach an agreement,

19 but once they agree on this, they have to abide by the regulations

20 involved in such particular procedures.

21 At this moment, there was a war going on in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

22 If munitions were exported from Serbia or if parts of munitions or

23 ordnance or fuses or cartridges were sent to Bosnia-Herzegovina, since

24 there was an embargo, that means that that country was directly taking

25 part in the killing of people who were unarmed. This shows the two

Page 30993












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Page 30994

1 companies agreed to provide components to one another. One firm -- one of

2 the two firms is eight kilometres away from Sarajevo, and they were

3 supposed to manufacture munitions which were supposed to be used against

4 the citizens of Sarajevo and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

5 Q. And what about the things that they sell to the firm in

6 Yugoslavia? This was there war in Yugoslavia, so what was done about

7 that? They were selling this to the Yugoslav company?

8 A. At that point, Yugoslavia could not produce T72 and M84

9 components, and of course it was the objective of the Yugoslav army to

10 have this kind of ammunition for these resources. These tanks, T72 and

11 M84, are tanks that the Serb army in Bosnia-Herzegovina had very few of in

12 comparison with the Yugoslav army.

13 Q. Thank you very much for explaining this. So the Yugoslav army was

14 obtaining the munitions it needed from Pretis; is that right?

15 A. That's right.

16 Q. So they purchased from Pretis the things that Pretis manufactured

17 and that Yugoslav companies could not manufacture.

18 A. And at the same time they sold to Pretis what Pretis could not

19 obtain in Bosnia.

20 Q. Well, that is the very nature of any business deal. I'll go

21 through this very quickly because I have to move on to your expert

22 opinion.

23 You mentioned the Kragujevac overhaul factory. It also functions

24 as a proper enterprise, a proper company.

25 A. I beg your pardon. It is not a company. It has a military post

Page 30995

1 code. That is a unit within the Yugoslav army. So it is not an

2 independent economic entity.

3 Q. But it is most certain that they collect payments for the services

4 they render.

5 A. They collect payments.

6 Q. And this is done on a commercial basis.

7 A. Well, generals also have their services paid for by receiving

8 their salaries.

9 Q. Well, this is a bit different. Please look at tab 10, I think.

10 It says "barter deal." Precisely between the Kragujevac maintenance and

11 repairs depot and Holding Pretis, and the two are represented by their

12 general managers, and it is the exchange of goods between the parties that

13 is regulated in this contract, and that is what is said -- what is

14 provided here.

15 A. It is interesting if you look at Article 2, timber and iron and

16 Golf engines are supplied from Bosnia, and what is imported are mines,

17 ammunitions and fuel for 120-millimetre shells. So it's barter.

18 Q. Everybody is buying and selling what they have or what they do not

19 have; is that right?

20 A. There was an embargo on the import of weapons in

21 Bosnia-Herzegovina.

22 Q. There was an embargo on all of that and there were sanctions

23 against the entire Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

24 A. I'm talking about the killing of people. People were killed in

25 Bosnia. They were killed through this barter contract in part.

Page 30996

1 Q. As far as I know, all countries trade in weapons and military

2 equipment, all of those who have a military industry of their own, and you

3 know that full well since you were employed by such an industry.

4 A. However, there are special situations when there is a crisis.

5 Then there are special rules on the import or export of weapons.

6 Q. Mr. Groome asked you about this telex. I see that it was typed as

7 a telegram and it refers to 125-millimetre ammunition for the M84 tank and

8 so on and so forth. Isn't it clear that the Federal Republic of

9 Yugoslavia is buying this from Pretis?

10 A. Yes, it is clear on the basis of this they are buying munitions of

11 125 millimetres, and they are sending to Bosnia-Herzegovina what is

12 required to kill people.

13 Q. And before that, 2.000 tons of steel were sent from the Niksic

14 steelworks.

15 A. They cannot do it because they do not have the financial resources

16 required.

17 Q. But that is what is being sought; right?

18 A. Yes. Again for the body of projectiles in order to kill people.

19 Q. Well, when somebody orders steel from a steel plant, then that is

20 the production of steel --

21 A. No.

22 Q. -- not projectile bodies.

23 A. I'm sorry, Mr. Milosevic; there are special types of steel used

24 for special purposes and made according to special standards with

25 appropriate mechanical and physical and chemical characteristics that are

Page 30997

1 used for projectiles. In this case the steel plant in Niksic is a

2 specialised factory that was built for producing this special kind of

3 steel, but it provides high-quality steel, very expensive, which is only

4 used for manufacturing ammunition and very sophisticated parts.

5 Q. It is true that, inter alia, the Niksic steel plant does

6 manufacture such steel, but it is a steel plant like any other steel

7 plant, and it makes steel. So in this tab 18, I believe, again you can

8 see, and I just wish to make this point here, I'm not interested in the

9 quantities at all, this is a report on issued ammunition from the Holding

10 Pretis according to instructions issued by the Main Staff of the army of

11 Republika Srpska, and then the information is that in the period from the

12 1st of January, 1993 until the 31st of November, 1993, according to

13 instructions issued by the Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska, the

14 following resources were issues from Pretis. And then there is a list

15 several pages long showing how much was manufactured and what was sent to

16 various units.

17 A. It doesn't refer to the manufacture. It only refers to the

18 quantities received by the army of Republika Srpska.

19 Q. From Pretis.

20 A. Yes, from Pretis.

21 Q. So that's the difference. And then further on also, since there

22 are many tabs, you have tab 19 where again reference is made to the fact

23 that from Pretis for the needs of the army certain quantities of munitions

24 are being issued; is that right?

25 A. Yes.

Page 30998

1 Q. And then in tab 20, there is a survey of the munitions provided in

2 the period between the 1st of February and the 28th of February, 1993.

3 Then the name of each and every item, and then how much is received by

4 individual units.

5 You put on the ELMO the survey of Vogosca, Ilijas, Rajlovac,

6 Sokolac, Das [as interpreted] and so on, these Pale -- these are all the

7 different brigades that received these munitions. So what can be seen

8 here is - how should I put this? - a continuous regular activity of the

9 military industry of Republika Srpska, in this case Pretis, which is quite

10 logical in a state of war; is that right, Mr. Zecevic?

11 A. That is not being brought into question. This production could

12 not have functioned without support from Yugoslavia. That's the problem.

13 Q. Well, you see, Mr. Groome put a question to you. Certainly they

14 received supplies from Yugoslavia. That is not being contested. The

15 question that Mr. Groome put to you is where parts or components were

16 imported from, and you mentioned Romania, Bulgaria, Russia. You could

17 have mentioned all the countries of the Warsaw Pact that had similar types

18 of weapons and from where these purchases could be made. You mentioned

19 these countries.

20 A. I just have to correct you in one respect. This observation of

21 mine only had to do with the 122-millimetre rocket projectiles GLAD M21

22 [as interpreted]. That was the specific question in terms of the

23 markings, the cold markings on parts of projectiles that I found. They

24 were later overhauled by the technical depot from Kragujevac. That is

25 what I spoke of, because there are different ways of making these markings

Page 30999

1 with different colours or by carving this in metal. That's the only

2 reference I made. I did not mention any other munitions. 122 millimetres

3 could not be manufactured in Pretis or in Yugoslavia because there wasn't

4 any. It was imported. We even have photographs of this. We see the

5 markings, and it was repaired, overhauled in Kragujevac, and then Sarajevo

6 was targeted with these munitions. This is the whole truth. There is no

7 dilemma, and that is what my observation referred to.

8 Q. All right, Mr. Zecevic. Munitions or components from munitions,

9 or components for these rocket projectiles and so on and so forth, that

10 was purchased in the market wherever it could be purchased; isn't that

11 right?

12 A. I don't know. I don't know. I was not abreast of that.

13 Q. All right. Since Mr. Groome asked you about some drawings,

14 schematics and so on that had remained in Pretis and that you had the

15 opportunity of seeing, and you say that this was designed at the Military

16 Technical Institute. There is a single Military Technical Institute in

17 the territory of the former Yugoslavia; isn't that right?

18 A. There are two. There is the air force Military Technical

19 Institute and the ground forces technical institute.

20 Q. All right. So let me correct myself. There is only one Military

21 Technical Institute of the ground force is in the territory of the former

22 SFRY?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. It was in Belgrade

25 A. Yes.

Page 31000












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Page 31001

1 Q. And in it all systems were designed for the special purposes

2 industry of Yugoslavia?

3 A. Until 1976. From 1976 onwards, in Bled, the military council

4 decided that factories also had the right to be involved in R and D.

5 Q. So factories had their own development sectors, and apart from

6 them was the military engineering institute?

7 A. Correct.

8 Q. Therefore, these drawings, designs for rocket projectiles were

9 made at the time when these rocket projectiles were designed, were

10 constructed.

11 A. No. These 122-millimetre rocket projectiles were never designed

12 in the military engineering institute until 1992.

13 Q. What did these drawings that you saw refer to?

14 A. They referred to a launching ramp for rocketised bombs.

15 Q. That means that the engineers from the military institute did

16 their professional job and manufactured certain components for launching.

17 A. Yes, but for another country.

18 Q. So you think they were not doing it for their own country but for

19 another country?

20 A. According to the information I have, that system was not

21 introduced in the army of Serbia and Montenegro, nor has it ever been

22 publicly displayed within a unit of the Yugoslav army.

23 Q. But you know very well that many systems are manufactured, tested,

24 and later either introduced or not into the system of weaponry. But in

25 any case, the military institute had sufficient designing capacities and

Page 31002

1 designers to design various things, and it was then up to the competent

2 authorities to decide whether to introduce it or not.

3 A. The military engineering institute is a professional institution.

4 It does not have that in its purview.

5 Q. I will not ask you any more about the military complex in

6 Republika Srpska. I think this issue has been covered sufficiently here.

7 I would like to ask you to focus on issues of your expertise regarding the

8 Markale incident.

9 But before I begin with specific issues, specific questions, in

10 your statement of 1996, in paragraph 8 on page 2, you say that you

11 volunteered to work in the investigation regarding the shelling of the

12 Markale market; is that correct?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. That was on the 5th of February, 1994?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. And you volunteered when you heard that General Smith of the

17 UNPROFOR said it was impossible to establish where the shell had been

18 fired from?

19 A. Yes.

20 Q. And until the moment when you heard this, as you say, you were not

21 involved in the investigation of this incident.

22 A. I was not.

23 Q. At the moment when you heard this statement of General Smith, you

24 were not aware of all the elements that were established or were not

25 established by UNPROFOR teams. Isn't that obvious?

Page 31003

1 A. I had no access to UNPROFOR investigation teams.

2 Q. Tell me first one tangential thing. Do you know at what time

3 General Smith was in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

4 A. I think I was mistaken about his name anyway. It doesn't matter.

5 Information was broadcast over the television that it was

6 established -- it was impossible to establish where the projectile came

7 from. I called a colleague of mine in a technical service. He invited me

8 to come the next day. I came on site. There was a judge there. I

9 introduced myself. I brought two of my colleagues who were ballistics

10 experts, and the two of us were appointed competent experts who were

11 supposed to give their report.

12 Q. Just let me go through the events as they went until your report.

13 The explosion happened on the 5th of February, 1994, around noon.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. Is it established that three UN teams came to the site of the

16 explosion immediately after it happened?

17 A. I don't know about that. I was in a different part of Sarajevo

18 when it happened. Only that evening I was able to hear on the radio and

19 television and see the footing of their reports.

20 Q. There were various teams, including Major Russell, Fairbud

21 [phoen]. Did you see various documents?

22 A. No. I didn't see these documents until then. At the time when I

23 joined, I was not in the army, I did not have an official position, I was

24 simply a person who was employed in the Unis Institute, according to

25 orders.

Page 31004

1 Q. But at that time did you know that these teams had established

2 that the shell had probably been fired from the Muslim side?

3 A. No.

4 Q. So it was only -- and I will acknowledge what you said about

5 making this mistake, because General Smith was not in Bosnia at the time.

6 Anyway, when you heard this on television, that it was impossible to

7 establish where the shell had come from, it's only then that you

8 volunteered.

9 A. It was my duty. I'm a professional.

10 Q. And then you reported to the security centre?

11 A. Not the security centre but the criminal investigation service

12 because I used to work with them in 1992, 1993.

13 Q. And you asked them for permission to get involved?

14 A. No. They were not in a position to give me permission. I did not

15 ask permission from the security centre. I addressed the judge.

16 Q. So it was the judge who appointed this team of experts, including

17 you and two of your colleagues.

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. And thus you and two of your colleagues received an official

20 status.

21 A. Yes. We were entitled to gain access to the site and make certain

22 analyses that we thought we were able to do.

23 Q. And that's when you started your investigation which included

24 inspection of the site, the necessary measurements, filming, et cetera.

25 And then you reviewed television footage.

Page 31005

1 A. No. I reviewed part of the television footage when you see a

2 soldier of the UNPROFOR retrieving the stabilising fin from the ground.

3 Q. And then you made computer simulations and your own assessments,

4 plus/minus 2, 5 per cent. You calculated the azimuth or the bearing, and

5 you describe this on page 3 of your statement, and finally you make your

6 expert report.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Now, this report, this expert finding, is dated 7 February 1994.

9 A. Correct. It took me 30 hours to complete it. If you think it can

10 be done faster --

11 Q. No, I don't think anything of the kind. I think, on the contrary,

12 that you set out to investigate events of the 5th of February as a

13 volunteer expressly appointed by the investigating judge and then produced

14 a full report on the 7th of February. I find this almost impossible,

15 because UNPROFOR experts, which I suppose are as qualified as you, had a

16 much longer deadline to make and publish their own findings.

17 A. Will you please stop here, because you made several assertions

18 which are not quite appropriate.

19 First of all, UNPROFOR teams that came on site were composed of

20 officers who were already on the territory of Sarajevo. The technical

21 officer, an engineering officer, does not necessarily know the technology

22 of firing. He is only trained to use weapons and ammunition, whereas my

23 colleagues and I were professionals who have spent their entire lives

24 designing weapons and ammunition. We had behind us years of experimental

25 work, testing. We attended dozens of explosions of projectiles. We know

Page 31006












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Page 31007

1 how munitions were produced and what they are capable of achieving. I

2 used to teach at the mechanical engineering faculty. I was aware of the

3 design of warheads.

4 Don't interrupt me, it's important.

5 The results of the technical team I was part of cannot be compared

6 to the results and findings of the UNPROFOR experts.

7 Also, I was aware that I had to produce a report within 24 hours.

8 That means I had to submit it the next day, within 30 hours. And that's

9 the difference. And if my memory serves me well, the town was under

10 siege. It had no electricity, no water. At that particular time there

11 was no shooting, but there was shooting the previous day when I was

12 working. So to turn on my computer in Sarajevo, I had to use a generator

13 to effect this computer simulation of the trajectory. Those were

14 impossible conditions for work.

15 Q. All right, Mr. Zecevic. What I'm asking you now has nothing to do

16 with the structure of explosives or - how shall I put it? - shells or any

17 of the things you enumerated.

18 Can you comment on this: Captain Verdi, who arrived on site much

19 earlier than you did, established a much greater bearing or azimuth and a

20 much greater angle at which the shell had to make its impact without

21 hitting the building nearby, and that's the basis on which he thought it

22 was fired from the Muslim side.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, can I make a very

24 brief presentation, a graphic presentation of this event which will

25 provide clear answers to these questions?

Page 31008

1 JUDGE MAY: Let's just go on a bit longer. We'll look at the

2 time, and if possible, you can do that.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. I will try to answer

4 your question now.

5 I had not seen that report, but I will try to explain briefly in

6 which way I arrived at the direction from which the shell came and to

7 assess the angle at which the shell impacted the ground.

8 First of all, when the shell hits solid ground, activating the

9 fuse, in the course of explosion there is a natural fragmentation of

10 components. The splinters impact and damage the ground. In this case, we

11 had clear scrapes of the fragments of the projectile on the ground. These

12 scrapes are axially symmetrical. So the traces of these scrapes, the

13 shapes of the scrapes show the direction from which the projectile

14 arrived. On that basis, we were able to conclude that the direction was

15 18 degrees north north-east. That's one.

16 Second, the projectile fell into an area between two lines of

17 stalls, shopping stalls. The width of this corridor between stalls is on

18 the order of about a metre. I don't have the exact figure, I can look it

19 up later. And the height of the stalls is about two metres. And if we

20 use simple geometric arithmetic that we know from primary school - you

21 don't need high education - you can realise that the minimal impact degree

22 is 55 degrees. That is the lower -- lowest estimate, because if the angle

23 had been lower, the projectile would have hit the roof of the stall.

24 If we approach directly the place of the -- the spot of the

25 explosion and if we look at the recording, the video, we see an opening in

Page 31009

1 the ground where the stabiliser fin was sticking from. I asked for the

2 stabiliser fin to be brought, and without any effort I put it back in the

3 ground to the depth of 250 millimetres. I used a quadrant, which is an

4 instrument for measuring elevation, and I measured the angle of

5 inclination of this stabiliser fin. It was about 60 degrees. Since this

6 stabiliser fin had been retrieved from the ground before, I thought as a

7 professional that it would be unprofessional of me to determine the angle

8 at exactly 60 degrees. I took a margin of error of plus/minus 5 per cent,

9 and I thought it was fair to admit I could have made a small margin of

10 error.

11 Those are purely technical discussions. Based on these findings,

12 I determined that the angle of impact was around 60 degrees, the direction

13 was from -- of the trajectory was 18 degrees north north-east, and I took

14 into account the structure of scrapes on the ground. On that basis, I saw

15 that the traces on the ground were not axially symmetrical, which shows

16 that the projectile hit the ground at a certain angle. As I said, around

17 60 degrees. The very finding that when the projectile hit the ground,

18 after the explosion the stabiliser fin was stuck into the ground means

19 that the projectile had a very high velocity.

20 Q. Very well, Mr. Zecevic.

21 A. Sorry. I have to finish.

22 On that basis, it was very easy to determine the location at six

23 possible points. If you take into account that the stabiliser fin is

24 stuck into the ground, that is only possible at velocities higher than 100

25 metres/second. And based on ballistic analysis, it could have been at

Page 31010

1 velocities of 4.900, 5.000 or 6.600 metres/second. So the nearest

2 distance between VRS and the Muslim side was 1.900 metres.

3 Q. Is it in dispute that Major Russell determined that the projectile

4 fell at a degree of 67 to 73 degrees?

5 A. I didn't see his report, so I can't say whether it was in dispute

6 or not.

7 Second, I don't know on what basis he determined that. All that I

8 presented in my then report and in my subsequent reports used during the

9 trial of General Galic is clear as to what basis it is founded on. You

10 can only tell me on what the findings of the major are based.

11 Q. In any case, Mr. Zecevic, it seems logical that you should look at

12 the reports of other teams and the team of the UNPROFOR who made all the

13 other measurements in addition to making your report, because you must

14 admit that you have a conflict of interest. You immediately volunteered

15 to be one of the investigators in this incident with a prejudice that it

16 must have been fired by Serbs, whereas the UN had several teams whose

17 findings differ from yours. How do you explain this discrepancy?

18 A. Mr. Milosevic, I volunteered because 68 of my co-citizens were

19 killed and 274 were wounded. My children, my sister, my brother and their

20 children could have been among them. My friends were there. And that is

21 why I volunteered to establish that. I didn't volunteer to give any

22 publicity to myself.

23 Let me finish, please. There's something else I wish to say.

24 Why would I look at reports of any of the UN officers if that

25 report was never shown to me? Secondly, my position in Sarajevo was not

Page 31011

1 such for me to be given a report or someone to call me to read the report.

2 If the Prosecutor asked me to provide an additional report, they never

3 felt it necessary to give me those reports, so I'm saying that I didn't

4 have a chance to look at them.

5 Thirdly, I think that it is better as an independent author

6 without looking at what others had written to write my own report. And

7 whoever reads it will find that there's absolutely not a single error in

8 it in terms of the physical description of the event. There are no

9 fabrications nor any subjective opinions but very exact and precise facts.

10 Q. Doesn't your subjective opinion -- isn't it reflected in the text

11 of the report when the army of Republika Srpska is referred to as Chetnik

12 forces, aggressor forces, et cetera? And yet you're an expert who is

13 called upon to establish professionally the trajectory of the shell.

14 A. Mr. Milosevic, TV Pale took pride in calling themselves Chetniks,

15 and I was just repeating that.

16 Q. If they thought that, you will agree that you didn't believe that?

17 A. Mr. Milosevic, I was a patriot who loved Yugoslavia during Tito's

18 era, let me tell you. And I couldn't believe that there could be a

19 trained armed unit that could be capable of killing women and children in

20 a Sarajevo under siege.

21 Q. That is not in dispute that that was tragic. We are talking here

22 about your expert report regarding a shell.

23 A. But Chetniks have nothing to do with it.

24 Q. But then there are reports of other teams. And my question was

25 why you didn't compare their results, and you said that was not necessary.

Page 31012

1 A. No, I didn't have access. That's the point. I didn't know about

2 them.

3 Q. Very well. I'll go on to very concrete questions and please give

4 me brief answers because you are spending a lot of time, and I have been

5 very patiently listening to you.

6 The area of the Markale market, was it in the same condition as it

7 was immediately after the explosion, when you went there?

8 A. No, for one reason, because 24 hours had gone by. Sixty-eight

9 people had been killed. There was a lot of blood, and the area had been

10 cleaned.

11 Q. So the area had been cleaned, and only then did you start your

12 investigation. Do you believe as an expert that the main conditions for a

13 reliable finding did not exist because the area had been cleaned before

14 you started your expert investigation?

15 A. At the time, it had no substantive impact on the nature of my

16 report. It could affect the number of people killed, where they were

17 killed, et cetera, but the actual point of impact, no. If you go to

18 Sarajevo, you can have a look. You can see the imprints of fragments and

19 shells all over Sarajevo. In Markale, certainly not, because it's been

20 reconstructed?

21 A. I must say unfortunately so. I don't know who did that.

22 Q. In addition to UNPROFOR, the police authorities in Sarajevo

23 carried out an investigation and took away the elements found, fragments

24 and pieces. So the area was cleaned, the pieces taken away, and then you

25 and your team start your investigation.

Page 31013

1 A. I didn't need any fragments. I only needed the stabiliser. The

2 opening that this stabiliser was lodged into was quite undamaged.

3 Q. So the basis for your expert opinion regarding this whole event

4 was the stabiliser which had been taken away and then given to you.

5 A. One of the bases. Not the only one.

6 Q. Well, what was the basis for your expert report if it was not just

7 the stabiliser?

8 A. Mr. Milosevic, I explained at the beginning. If necessary, I

9 shall repeat myself but that will take a lot of time. I told you. The

10 angle of descent is the basis, the appearance, et cetera, et cetera.

11 Q. I see. You've already explained that, so there's no need to

12 repeat it. And what was the condition of the actual point of explosion

13 when you arrived?

14 A. What do you mean?

15 Q. Well, as pieces had been taken out, the area cleaned, what was the

16 condition of the place? It wasn't dug over. Of course it was when you

17 can see on the video that knives were used to pick out the pieces and

18 fragments of the mine, of the shell.

19 A. I apologise. Digging in our language implies the use of a pickaxe

20 or a spade. But this is a fine tool, a knife that was used to delicately

21 pick out the stabiliser.

22 Q. Tell me, what was the damage on the ground, on the spot?

23 A. I can show you the photographs. I have them here for you to see

24 if you wish. I can't describe them to you.

25 Q. Mr. Zecevic, in your earlier testimony at General Galic's trial,

Page 31014

1 you said that on the spot you only found two pieces of the explosive

2 device, and that the stabiliser was given to you by the police which you,

3 after your study, returned to the police; is that right?

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. So on the spot of the explosion, apart from damage on the ground,

6 you didn't have any material evidence of the explosive device on the spot

7 of the explosion itself when you arrived?

8 A. No.

9 Q. Very well.

10 A. Except for the video shots of the moment when the stabiliser was

11 taken out and the whole process, but that is quite unimportant for my

12 subsequent analyses.

13 Q. You wrote, on page 25505, that on the basis of the video recording

14 you said that, "The frontal surface of the stabiliser in our assessment

15 had an angle of 20 to 30 in relation to the surface of the ground," and

16 then there's picture 3 in brackets.

17 So tell me, please --

18 A. Just a moment. Let me find it.

19 Q. You wrote that on the basis of the video recording.

20 A. Let me find it, please. Having insight into the video recording

21 made immediately after the explosion, it can be noted -- it can be noted

22 that the stabiliser of the projectile penetrated 20 to -- 200 to 250

23 millimetres into the ground.

24 Q. I have a quotation here that, "The stabiliser formed an angle of

25 20 to 30 degrees in relation to the surface of the ground (figure 3)."

Page 31015












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Page 31016

1 A. I see. The frontal surface, yes. And then by reconstructing the

2 position of the stabiliser, the angle of its frontal surface in relation

3 to the ground was about 30 degrees, and in relation to the mortar shell

4 about 60 degrees.

5 Q. Tell me, how is it possible on the basis of a picture given to you

6 by the police, without knowing the angle of filming and the position of

7 the camera, how can you determine the angle between the stabiliser fin and

8 the ground?

9 A. If you don't see the photograph, it's difficult for me to explain.

10 I am a technical expert, and angles for me are quite normal. I can easily

11 assess whether it's 20 or 30 degrees. It is easy to establish that. That

12 was what I was trained to do.

13 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, may I suggest, Dr. Zecevic does have a

14 very clear photograph of the scene as he saw it. It may be of assistance

15 to the Chamber if it's placed on his ELMO. He has it in his possession.

16 JUDGE MAY: Yes, let's do that.

17 JUDGE KWON: And since it's mentioned, I think the Chamber also

18 needs the original copy of the pictures which appear in his report. It's

19 very difficult to follow in this circumstance.

20 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour. I'll get better pictures.

21 THE ACCUSED: [No interpretation]

22 JUDGE MAY: Just a moment. We're just going to look at the

23 photograph.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When I placed the stabiliser into

25 this opening - there's a difference of quality in the image - there's no

Page 31017

1 major difference.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Did you make those photographs? Who took these photographs?

4 A. I didn't make any of these, of course.

5 Q. Were they taken by the Sarajevo police?

6 A. Yes, yes, the Sarajevo police.

7 Q. I think this is a very important fact. You say, "Having insight

8 into the video recording made immediately after the explosion, it can be

9 noted that the stabiliser of the projectile entered the ground to a depth

10 of 200 to 250 millimetres." That's what you wrote, isn't it?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. So on this basis you were not able to exactly measure the depth of

13 the opening.

14 A. I didn't determine the depth on the basis of the photograph. I

15 just said that when I reconstructed the event and placed the stabiliser

16 into the opening, I was able to measure exactly the depth as we know what

17 the length of the stabiliser fin is.

18 Q. So you say 200 to 250 millimetres.

19 A. Yes. Logically so. That can be seen from this first photograph.

20 You can see the front of the stabiliser is almost on a level with the

21 asphalt. And in view of the length of the stabiliser being about 200

22 millimetres, then that is it.

23 Q. But you can see on both photographs that the angle is large,

24 because the shell fell almost vertically.

25 A. When I said an angle of 20 degrees, it's an angle between the

Page 31018

1 front of this stabiliser. The front. This front. And when you apply it

2 to the axis, that is 90 minus 20, which makes it 70 degrees, or 90 minus

3 30, making it 60. So technically you didn't read my report carefully.

4 Q. I did read your report very carefully, but you should know that,

5 for instance, Captain Verdi at 1500 hours on the 5th of February - which

6 means before you - determined that the minimum angle at which the mine --

7 the shell could have flown over the nearby building is about 80 degrees in

8 relation to the surface of the ground at the marketplace.

9 Major Russell, on the same day at 1630 hours, measured 1.200 to

10 1.300 degrees, that is, the angle was 48 to 73 degrees. So 80, 73

11 degrees, and the pitch itself that you have shown when you reconstructed

12 it, that the shell fell almost vertically, which is an indication that it

13 was fired from the Muslim side.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, can I show you some

15 new photographs to respond to this question?

16 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Yes.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is the site of the event, and

18 that is why I consider it to be very important. These stories that a

19 mortar shell should have hit a building are ridiculous for one simple

20 reason: The point of impact of the projectile was 4.16 metres from the

21 closest building, which is not higher than six metres, and the right hand

22 building, this building, this is this building, this is the angle of

23 descent, is 11.1 metres away.

24 If we proceed from the fact that the projectile arrived at an

25 angle of 45 degrees, which is absurd, then the height of the building

Page 31019

1 would need to be about 11 metres, and that building has three or four

2 stories. And in view that the angle of descent was about 60 degrees, this

3 is this angle, then there's no chance that the projectile could have hit

4 the building. And if you have forgotten, I said that the projectile fell

5 into a space between two stalls. This is an absolutely narrow, limited

6 area about one metre wide. So that is an angle of -- a minimum angle of

7 55 degrees. So that is why I said 60 degrees plus/minus 5 degrees. So

8 there's no question of a mortar shell hitting a building. The main

9 purpose of mortar shells is for them to act -- to be used behind

10 obstacles, behind buildings. They have a broad spectrum of action. It

11 was clearly shown that the -- that the angle of impact was 60 degrees.

12 There's no discussion over that. The fact that a major or captain said

13 something else, he doesn't tell us how he obtained that angle. My report

14 states clearly how I calculated that angle.

15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Zecevic, is that picture or drawing included in

16 your expert report?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is in a somewhat different form.

18 It's the same picture, actually. These are very important -- this is a

19 very important photograph I would like to say.

20 JUDGE KWON: If you could tell -- if you could tell us what are

21 the same pictures as that. Picture 1 and picture 3?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a picture showing the area

23 immediately surrounding the point of impact.

24 JUDGE KWON: We have difficulty, because the picture does not

25 appear in the English translation. I've got it, thanks to the registrar.

Page 31020

1 Yes, please go on.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] [no translation].

3 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. You say that the tail fins -- between the tail fins and the ground

6 is 20 to 30 degrees, and then on the same page you say that the angle is

7 about 60 degrees, and you consider it more reliable than those measured by

8 UNPROFOR officials immediately after the explosion.

9 A. Mr. Milosevic, I'm talking about the angle of the front surface.

10 If we consider this to be the body of the stabiliser, I said -- and this

11 was dug into the ground. So I could only measure this angle. And let me

12 say that the angle is 20 to 30 degrees. Whereas this other angle is 90

13 minus this one. This is simple mathematics. This is something you learn

14 in secondary school.

15 Q. Surely you're not going to tell us, Mr. Zecevic, that these UN

16 experts did not have absolutely any qualifications to carry out any

17 measurements and investigations. I assume that the UN also sent trained

18 officers who are able to establish what happened. The point of impact of

19 a shell is no great science.

20 A. Mr. Milosevic, I have no idea who the UN sent, nor am I interested

21 in that. I am just commenting on the report -- nor should I comment on UN

22 reports. I can only comment on my own report.

23 Please don't attribute to me something that I didn't say. I'm

24 just not interested in that. If I need to explain something from my own

25 report, I will do so, but I didn't see those reports, nor can I comment on

Page 31021

1 them. And I don't want to comment on them.

2 Q. All right. Well, then don't. I see that you're all worked up.

3 A. No, I'm quite calm.

4 Q. It doesn't look that way. But I'm not going to ask you whether

5 you read the report. But in the UNPROFOR report, on the 5th of February,

6 1994, paragraph 6, it says there are reasons to believe that at that time,

7 the authorities dug through the crater in detail. Is that your opinion

8 too or do you think they did not?

9 A. No.

10 Q. So they did not dig through the crater?

11 A. It was not dug. What does it mean in detail or superficially? I

12 told you what it means to dig. I showed you here the actual place where

13 this happened, what I found on site. I put the stabiliser here. And if

14 you look at the damage, the damage shows that the mortar projectile was at

15 an angle between 55 or 65 degrees when it originally fell. And vertically

16 it was close to 90 degrees. Had it been vertical, then the damage would

17 have been on various sides. However, most of the asphalt damage is in the

18 area where the mortar shell came from, and that corroborates what the

19 expertise said.

20 Q. On page 002531, you -- "However, the fact that there are no

21 colours on the stabiliser shows that this was probably recent war

22 production." I'm going to omit some parts. Never mind. "And this

23 indicates that it was probably manufactured in one of the two factories

24 that made this kind of thing before, Marko Oreskovic, Licki Osik, or

25 Vogosca." Is that right?

Page 31022












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 31023

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Please try to answer my questions now without going into lengthy

3 speeches.

4 Do you know that UNPROFOR officers, when they toured the 105th

5 Brigade of the 1st Corps - that is the 1st Corps of the army of

6 Bosnia-Herzegovina, is that right - on the 9th of February, 1994, at the

7 ammunition depot saw 120-millimetre mines that had not been coloured, and

8 they saw the same ones -- this is page 0303831, and this is an UNPROFOR

9 report of the 15th of February, 1994. Do you know that?

10 A. No. There's no reason for me to know that.

11 Q. Such shells that you claim were made in Vogosca or Licki Osik were

12 seen by UNPROFOR controllers on the positions of the 105th Brigade of the

13 Sarajevo Corps.

14 A. I don't know. I could not discuss the matter.

15 Q. All right. If you don't know that, I'm just indicating it to you.

16 But this part of your report is under a question mark then, because this

17 is absolutely the same thing that they saw in your case.

18 A. At this moment it does not affect the conclusions of this report

19 at all.

20 Q. All right. Can we move a bit faster then. What's the altitude of

21 the Markale market?

22 A. About 550 metres.

23 Q. About 600 metres? According to the information I have, it's about

24 600 metres. On the basis of which estimate did you conclude --

25 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please slow down; the

Page 31024

1 interpreters cannot follow at this pace. Thank you.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. On the basis of which estimate did you assess that 400 metres is

4 the distance between the point of impact and the point of firing?

5 A. Just a moment, please. This is the area above Sarajevo.

6 Q. Yes.

7 A. The point of impact.

8 Q. We're not talking about the altitude of the Markale market. It is

9 600 metres.

10 A. I've already said to you that we looked at 200 metres and 400

11 metres, and we worked with 400 metres because, of the six possible places

12 from which this projectile could have been fired, five were at an altitude

13 close to 400 metres above the Markale market.

14 Q. All right. Do you know that in this trajectory of 18 degrees

15 north-east plus/minus 5, as you established this, the highest altitudes

16 and elevations are up to 1.086 metres? That is 23496 or, or rather, in

17 the Serbian language, page 02115548.

18 So if what you are claiming were correct, somebody would have to

19 put this mortar on the top elevations in order to have this 400 metre

20 difference, which had to be there.

21 A. It did not have to be there. You misunderstand this difference.

22 This 400 or 200 or 300 or 500 metre difference is only a very small

23 segment in terms of determining the actual point more precisely. It could

24 have been 00. It has nothing to do with it. I did not know from which

25 position this projectile was fired. I only knew the direction, the

Page 31025

1 trajectory. And in order to carry out a ballistic analysis, it was

2 necessary for me to be able to estimate the point where it was potentially

3 launched in order to take into account the correction factors in terms of

4 the altitude between the point where it was launched and the point where

5 it impacted. It doesn't matter. Both of us can say that there is a

6 difference between the point of impact and all the five possible places

7 from which the projectile could have been launched.

8 I tell you once again, there are six possible points for a mortar.

9 Five points are directly under the control of the army of Republika

10 Srpska.

11 Q. Mr. Zecevic, don't you know that a 120-millimetre mortar, as you

12 know better than I do, is a bulky weapon? It is not put on the very top

13 of an elevation but at someplace to which one has access. And in this

14 direction that you are describing, there was no possibility for the army

15 of Republika Srpska to place a mortar at such a high altitude as you had

16 established.

17 A. I don't understand.

18 Q. Physically this is impossible.

19 A. Somebody gave you the wrong kind of information, Mr. Milosevic.

20 There is no summit. There is no elevation. It is not mentioned at all.

21 It could have been a meadow. These are hillocks there.

22 Q. Oh, so you don't even know the distance. You cannot even

23 determine the distance from which it was fired. The only important thing

24 is that it came from Serb positions, then it had to be there. Six, five,

25 four, you can just go on guessing.

Page 31026

1 A. Mr. Milosevic, you need three square metres in order to position a

2 mortar. If you're trying to put it on top of a building, then people are

3 going to do that if they deem it necessary. But if you tell me that a

4 120-millimetre mortar cannot be put at any such point, then the advisors

5 who are giving you advice are not giving you the best type of counsel, are

6 not the best possible counsellors.

7 Q. All right. Tell me, is it of any significance to you that the

8 military observers of the UN reported that there was no report concerning

9 the opening of fire from the Kosevska Brigade on the 5th of February,

10 1994? "The explosion in the market was registered by military observers

11 on the Bosnian side as incoming fire but the point where it came from was

12 not registered." I quoted the UN report to you directly now.

13 A. Mr. Milosevic, the UN observers register the firing of audio

14 systems. So they either hear it through an audio system or with their

15 very own ears. As sound moves through space, it involves a very complex

16 process. Now, it depends on whether there are buildings, whether there

17 are forests, whether there is fog, whether there is humidity. So you can

18 place a mortar in a valley surrounded by woods. So people who are four

19 kilometres away will not be able to feel the difference in terms of the

20 firing of such a projectile. Or if you put it out in an open clearing,

21 then there is going to be an amazing difference in the noise levels.

22 So this is not in contrast with my report. The projectile came

23 from the direction that was 18 degrees north or north-east. I showed that

24 it had to have sufficient energy, at least at the impact moment, of 200

25 metres/second so that the stabiliser could be placed this way. That is

Page 31027

1 the key point, and that is how these first three points are eliminated

2 from where the firing could have taken place.

3 So it is possible, because the stabiliser was sticking into the

4 ground, that is sufficient proof that the projectile had to have a greater

5 velocity of impact and that it had been launched from the -- with the

6 fourth, fifth, or sixth charge, and that is a distance of 4.900, 5.000

7 something, and 6.400 metres. No one can establish through any kind of

8 expertise from which of these three points it happened.

9 Q. But why did you change the attitude [as interpreted] in respect of

10 the Markale altitude?

11 A. Well, look. Above the market are hills. So 30 metres above the

12 market there is a hill. Whoever looked at this place could see that. I

13 can show it to you here. This is it. This is it. In relation to this, I

14 looked at 200 metres to 400 metres. I can also make an analysis with

15 200 metres that will show you that the distance is not 4.900 metres but

16 4.800 metres. It doesn't mean a thing in terms of its precise

17 determination.

18 Q. It is important that we should get answers, your answers in this

19 respect, because of course I'm going to challenge this, given adequate

20 expert support.

21 And also tell me, if a mine stabiliser of 120 millimetres has a

22 fin and is to fall into ground, asphalt, and you give the figure of 200 to

23 250 millimetres in your report, there was asphalt there and then

24 underneath there was sand --

25 A. Please don't simplify matters.

Page 31028

1 Q. What should be the velocity of impact of that mine so that it

2 would remain the way you had put it?

3 A. I told you that the minimum had to be 200 metres/second.

4 Q. And what is the average radius of operation of such a mine?

5 A. According to available data, about 17 metres. That would be the

6 radius.

7 Q. All right. Tell me, what is more precise when the angles are

8 smaller when a mine is fired, as you say in paragraph 3 of your previous

9 report? It says that if the mortar crew has the possibility of choosing

10 the angle -- my question is actually does this angle imply greater

11 precision?

12 A. 45 -- 40 degrees and above.

13 Q. 40 degrees and above.

14 A. That means when they are on the same plane, the objective and the

15 point from where the mine is fired.

16 JUDGE MAY: The time has come to take the adjournment.

17 Mr. Milosevic, we will have to finish this at quarter to 2:00 in

18 order to finish with this witness. Perhaps, if you look at

19 Mr. Tapuskovic's position, if you can provide some time for him, I'm sure

20 he'd be grateful.

21 Yes. We'll adjourn now. Twenty minutes.

22 --- Recess taken at 12.15 p.m.

23 --- On resuming at 12.38 p.m.

24 JUDGE MAY: Yes.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please take into account the time

Page 31029

1 needed for Mr. Tapuskovic. I will leave that much time for him so that we

2 are able to finish within this session.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. Mr. Zecevic, what is the probability for one shell, one

5 120-millimetre shell to hit a target of --

6 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please slow down. Could we

7 have the question repeated.

8 JUDGE KWON: Sorry to interrupt you, but Mr. Milosevic, could you

9 repeat the question again.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. I asked what is the probability of one 120-millimetre shell

13 hitting a pre-planned target sized 23 by 28 metres at a distance of 2.000

14 metres from the artillery position?

15 A. I cannot tell you without looking at the firing table, because I

16 have to point out certain dilemmas you have to face. If you are trying to

17 hit a target for the first time, and if you are just positioning the

18 mortar on the position for the first time, then the probability is lower.

19 It is less likely that you will hit the target. But if you have several

20 attempts and if you had the benefit of previously making adjustments as

21 was the case here because the war had been going on for some time, people

22 were familiar with their weapons, there are so-called standard and

23 accidental mistakes. Standard mistakes, standard errors are typical of

24 certain weapons, where accidental, occasional mistakes are due to the

25 weather, et cetera.

Page 31030

1 So if you take occasional mistakes, you have to take into account

2 whether the position is familiar to you, whether you are targeting a

3 target that is familiar to you, that you tried to hit before regardless of

4 whether it is Markale or some other target. In any case, I cannot give

5 you a precise answer without consulting the firing tables.

6 Q. All right. Artillery officers and UNPROFOR officers claimed that

7 the probability of hitting the Markale market with one shell without

8 adjusting fire is very small when firing from a great distance. Do you

9 agree that the probability of hitting the target is much higher from a

10 smaller distance?

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Don't you think it was the case indeed that the market was hit

13 from a smaller distance?

14 A. It has nothing to do with it, Mr. Milosevic. You are forgetting

15 certain physical factors. We cannot change the nature, we can only try to

16 understand it. Nature is very clear here. The shell exploded. The angle

17 of impact is around 60 degrees. The stabiliser fin was buried in the

18 ground. It couldn't have been buried in the ground 200, 250 millimetres

19 unless the velocity of the impact was more than 200 metres/second.

20 Mr. Milosevic, I heard you out. Please hear me out too. You

21 asked me a question, and give me time to answer. I'm telling you again,

22 you cannot introduce arguments into science without any basis in fact.

23 These are exact facts that are not subject to discussion. We have

24 exact facts that point to the origin of fire. Mortars are among the most

25 precise artillery weapons. Both you and I know that the most dangerous

Page 31031

1 weapon in the Second World War for the partisan forces were mortars. In

2 the war in Sarajevo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, most victims were killed by

3 mortars.

4 Q. All right. Tell me, what is the possible error, in metres,

5 regarding the target?

6 A. I am telling you again, Mr. Milosevic: Without knowing the

7 parameters, what kind of crew we have, what the corrections are, et

8 cetera, I cannot answer you. You can look up the textbook on the theory

9 of firing.

10 Q. All right. Answer one question for me regarding outside

11 observations. Is it possible from a distance of over 2.000 metres, based

12 on the possible sound, can you determine the point of origin of a shell?

13 And you -- if you as an expert cannot determine it, can a simple ordinary

14 citizen do that who doesn't have any familiarity with mortars?

15 A. Mr. Milosevic, the problem of spread of sound is very well

16 studied.

17 Q. I'm not asking you about the spread of sound. Is it possible to

18 determine the origin of fire if something was fired from a distance of

19 2.000 metres?

20 A. Look, modern systems for determining the origin of fire were --

21 are based on sound, audio equipment. You need three localisers of sound

22 in order to determine the origin of fire. These are well-known systems in

23 the world.

24 Q. I asked this because we had here a citizen, a witness who claimed

25 that he had heard a mortar shell being fired. Thank you very much for

Page 31032

1 providing this explanation about the three localisers of sound.

2 Now, tell me, how many shells need to be fired in order to make an

3 adjustment to the target?

4 A. I think you're talking to the wrong man if you want an answer to

5 this. I am not operating or running a battery of mortars to be able to

6 answer this. Without consulting firing tables or textbooks, I cannot give

7 you a precise answer.

8 Q. That is enough. Regarding the video where we see an UNPROFOR

9 soldier digging out the stabiliser fin, do you agree that it is clear in

10 this video that at the moment when the UNPROFOR soldier is beginning to

11 work the stabiliser is not visible? We can only see it after the soldier

12 has removed a layer of what looks like debris, using a knife.

13 A. I can't tell you now. You must have seen this video. It was a

14 long time since I saw it, maybe ten years.

15 Q. What was the composition of the ground on the market?

16 A. There was a layer of asphalt 1.5 to 2 centimetres thick, sand and

17 earth.

18 Q. All right. If the shell detonated upon impacting the ground upon

19 asphalt, in what direction does the impact wave act, in depth or in

20 width?

21 A. Mr. Milosevic, may I show you this picture? It is an x-ray of a

22 detonation of a projectile very similar to the one we're talking about.

23 Q. Is it the same one?

24 A. It doesn't matter. The physical process is the same. This is a

25 122-millimetre projectile, so the calibre is very similar. The picture is

Page 31033

1 not upside down. It is sitting on the ELMO very well. You don't have to

2 read the text, it doesn't matter.

3 This is the moment when the projectile is hitting an obstacle or

4 when the fuse is activated, and this white spot you see is the beginning,

5 the activation of the detonation wave, and then a reaction and burst

6 begin. And on the following picture you can see that the projectile is

7 growing wider. It is now almost double the size. And the flow of the

8 products of detonation has begun towards the ground. The flow is at a

9 velocity of 10.000 millimetres/second. It is those products of detonation

10 that create the damage.

11 Q. My question was: What is the direction of the impact wave, in the

12 width or in the depth?

13 A. When the projectile bursts, the impact wave is directed on all

14 sides.

15 Q. From the detonation of the fuse, is the detonation, the impact,

16 determined by --

17 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't hear the question.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You cannot see this on the picture.

19 When the detonation happens, fragments start moving through space.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. So both up and laterally?

22 A. Yes, on all sides. All over the place. There are various

23 estimates, depending on the velocity of impact. Various deviations in the

24 distribution of fragments are possible, and we can arrive at certain

25 values.

Page 31034

1 I'm showing you this example. Let us take this case. When the

2 greatest number of fragments are in this lateral part, the lowest speed of

3 fragments are in these two parts, and the lowest mass is also in these two

4 parts, although on the side you can still find a significant number.

5 Q. This impact wave rejects fragments all over; is that correct?

6 A. That's not what I said. I said the products of detonation during

7 explosion destroy the structure of the body of the projectile. Cracks

8 appear. And as a result of pressure inside, which is 250 to 300.000 bars,

9 and a very high temperature of about 3.000 degrees Celsius, these

10 detonations accelerate metallic fragments and they can move about 1.500 to

11 2.000 metres/second depending on their mass.

12 Q. All right. Is it possible for this material that is propelled by

13 explosion to be found again on the spot where it was propelled?

14 A. From which part of the projectile?

15 Q. Any part. The projectile hit the ground, exploded, propels

16 material all over. As you said, is it possible for this propelled

17 material to be found again on the spot?

18 A. Yes. Some parts can be found here, for instance fragments of the

19 fuse. And these scrapes, if you had occasion to see them on the asphalt,

20 they were propelled. They hit the asphalt. They had no energy to bounce

21 further, and they fell again on the asphalt or perhaps they hit somebody

22 who was nearby.

23 Q. All right. Tell me, is it then probable, precisely according to

24 this video where you see the stabiliser covered by pebbles and earth, and

25 it is not actually visible, doesn't it prove that the stabiliser fin did

Page 31035

1 not lodge in the ground? It was put there.

2 A. The process described is on the order of the 30 millionth part of

3 a second. There is no stabilisation there involved. Why don't you start

4 from the premise that after detonation, when this cylindric part of the

5 projectile fell apart, this part of the stabiliser continued to travel

6 through space and entered this area and penetrated 250 millimetres into

7 the ground.

8 Q. Wasn't it propelled?

9 A. No, it couldn't have been.

10 Q. It wasn't propelled? You're saying that it was buried? How come

11 it wasn't propelled by explosion?

12 A. Because the process of detonation was on the order of 170

13 plus/minus 20 metres/second. If the velocity was minimally 200

14 metres/second, in order for the stabiliser to lodge it should have a

15 residual kinetic energy of, let's say, 40 to 60 metres per second and then

16 it gets buried. In such cases, depending on velocity of the projectile at

17 the time of impact, we can have three possibilities. When it is launched

18 with the first, second, or third charge, or let's say just first and

19 second charge, then the speed of fall is lower than the speed of

20 propelling, and then it goes back in the direction from which it was

21 fired. However, if the speed of impact is around 170, 160, 150

22 metres/second, we will find the stabiliser fin lying somewhere in the

23 vicinity. If the speed of impact is 200 or more metres/second, then the

24 stabiliser fin will get buried in the ground. So these are three

25 possibilities.

Page 31036

1 Operating with these three possibilities, we can decide from which

2 possible area it was fired.

3 Q. Some ballistics experts, and I saw some among UN experts, claim

4 that it should been propelled, rejected. It wouldn't have been buried

5 under pebbles and sand. It must have been put there later.

6 A. Mr. Milosevic, the experts I knew at the military engineering

7 institute with whom I worked for 17 years had occasion together with me to

8 determine -- to determine whether stabilisers were involved in such cases

9 or not. There is no dilemma here, whatever some experts may say.

10 In my follow-up report, you have findings of an American

11 laboratory for ballistical analysis which give you precise data for

12 determining the velocity of this stabiliser.

13 Q. It was not rejected or propelled. It was buried, as we saw in

14 that video.

15 A. Mr. Milosevic, I didn't say that. You also have the velocity of

16 descent of at least 100 metres/second. If you take into account that

17 speed of descent, you have the residual kinetical energy with which it

18 lodged into the ground. I'll repeat this to make it clearer.

19 When the velocity is smaller than the speed of impact, then the

20 projectile lodges into the ground. When the speed of descent is equal to

21 the speed of impact, the stabiliser is found in the area. When the speed

22 of descent is higher, then it will be buried in the ground.

23 For instance, with 60 or 82-millimetre shells, you will almost

24 never find them buried in the ground because the speed of descent, the

25 speed of firing, is lower than the speed of impact on the ground.

Page 31037

1 Q. Can we now conclude that your expert report, as it is, and I don't

2 agree with it, did not remove a reasonable doubt that the shell was fired

3 onto Markale by Serbs, because you found also one possible origin of fire

4 in the Muslim territory as well. So that reasonable doubt was not removed

5 even by the findings of other experts?

6 A. In my report, it says explicitly that there are six possible

7 origins of fire for this mortar projectile that correspond to the

8 conditions of impact that we are faced with. But as I said earlier, for

9 the stabiliser to be lodged in the ground, it had to have a velocity

10 higher than 200 metres/second. That inevitably means that the projectile

11 was launched with fourth, fifth, or sixth trajectories higher than 4.900

12 metres. That means more elevated positions.

13 Q. So the higher velocity of firing, the greater the distance.

14 A. No. The angle of impact, the velocity of penetration of these

15 stabilisers are the parameters which point out to three possible origins

16 of fire; at 4.900 metres, around 5.000, and 6.300 metres.

17 Q. Your conclusions are clear, but let us look at this diagram. Is

18 it possible for the projectile to have been fired from this vehicle?

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Will you place it on the ELMO,

20 please.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] What are you telling me with this

22 vehicle? What has it got to do with this firing of the shell?

23 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Yes, go on.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is not clear to me. It's quite

25 unimportant whether it came from a vehicle or a mortar. The question is

Page 31038

1 where the mortar was.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Well, that's precisely it. The mortar could be on this vehicle,

4 and forces of the BH army had such a vehicle which they used to fire

5 shells, and it is possible that it was fired from this vehicle.

6 A. I'd rather not go into that discussion. My study clearly showed

7 that the direction was 18 degrees north north-east, six possible firing

8 positions. Later on, I indicated three firing position, fourth, fifth,

9 and sixth charge. If this vehicle could have been 4.900 metres away in

10 territory held by the army of Republika Srpska, then it's possible, if

11 they wanted to let this vehicle be placed in that position, but I won't go

12 into that.

13 Q. But that is what I'm claiming, and this coincides with the

14 findings of the UN experts, that it is possible that the shell was fired

15 from territory controlled by the BH army.

16 A. The farthest position held by the BH army was 1.900 metres away.

17 And I am telling you all three locations from which these effects could

18 have been produced is 4.900, 5.400, and 6.400 metres away.

19 Q. But I have another sketch here which shows the original damage on

20 the asphalt and the subsequent made, handmade, damage on the asphalt,

21 which are indicated by dotted line and the original ones in a straight

22 line. And this is what could be deduced from UN experts' reports. Would

23 you like to comment on these, please?

24 In your opinion, is it possible that these two directions, called

25 confusions because of subsequent damage that was hammered into the

Page 31039

1 ground --

2 A. Mr. Milosevic, this is a sketch made by hand and not a photograph.

3 Q. Of course it is a sketch. How can you on a photograph indicate an

4 arrow?

5 A. But what you're talking about, mechanical intervention on the site

6 of the explosion? Here is the site of the explosion. Now, give me a

7 photograph like this - you have the video recording in the presence of the

8 UN officer - and tell me whether there's any difference.

9 Now, a drawing made like this could be that of an artist. As you

10 see, the dotted line indicates the damage hammered in subsequently --

11 you're showing us a sketch. There is no subsequent intervention on these

12 photographs. I'd like your experts to come to Sarajevo. No one will stop

13 them nowadays. They can have a look at the point of impact and see

14 whether there is any additional intervention done.

15 Q. But as you said yourself, the Markale marketplace has been

16 completely reconstructed.

17 A. Yes, but there are other places.

18 Q. But the traces have been destroyed once and for all now. But you

19 said generally that an elementary school is sufficient to understand this,

20 and I assume that the UN officers who made these reports had at least

21 elementary training.

22 A. I'm telling you again I never saw a single UN officer report.

23 Q. I should just like to draw your attention to one further point.

24 You testified in the Galic case as well, didn't you?

25 A. Yes.

Page 31040

1 Q. And in this document that has to do with General Galic, entitled

2 "Judgement and Opinion," in Chapter 7, separate and dissenting

3 opinion --

4 A. I can't follow because I don't have the document.

5 Q. The dissenting opinion of Judge Nieto-Navia --

6 JUDGE MAY: I'm not necessarily going to stop you saying what the

7 objection or any other other form of judgement may have been, but it's not

8 necessary -- it may or not be the case that it's necessary for a witness

9 to know anything about this. So he may well not be able to answer it, but

10 you can and you can put something provided you put it very briefly and

11 it's relevant.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. May, this dissenting opinion

13 consists of many pages and I will read out only a few lines from it, so I

14 will be extremely brief. Don't worry, please.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. So point 97. It says: "[In English] For the above reasons, I am

17 not satisfied that the Prosecution has established beyond a reasonable

18 doubt that the SRK fired the shell which exploded in Markale market on 5th

19 February, 1994. I do not reach this conclusion idly because the ABH as

20 well as SRK had access during the conflict to 120-millimetre mortars which

21 are weapons which can be transported with relative ease. Finally, I know

22 that my conclusion about the origin of fire also finds support in the

23 special UN team's official finding communicated to the UN Security Council

24 that there --" [Interpretation] then a quotation -- "[In English] is not

25 sufficient physical evidence to prove that one party or the other fired

Page 31041

1 the mortar bomb."

2 [Interpretation] That is all I wanted to quote from this

3 dissenting opinion.

4 JUDGE MAY: Very well. I haven't stopped you doing it, but

5 normally, of course, that is a view. It's a matter which we have to take

6 into account and it's not a matter for comment. Now, if you'd like to go

7 on.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. May. I will continue

9 with my questions.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Mr. Zecevic, is it true that it was only six days later on the

12 11th of February that an investigation was started by the so-called

13 special UN team consisting of Captain Jose Grande, Commander John Hamill,

14 and Major Sajis Arkan [phoen]? Do you remember that?

15 A. Mr. Milosevic, I don't see how I could remember. I have

16 repeatedly said that I haven't seen a single report of the United Nations

17 regarding this incident. I did not take part in their work. I did my

18 work and completed it in two days' time during the war on the 6th and 7th,

19 and since then I was not consulted up until 1995 when there was an

20 explosion in TV Sarajevo building. And throughout that intervening

21 period, no one contacted me, so I don't know anything about it.

22 Q. Well, let me tell you then. Four days after they conducted an

23 investigation, they produced a report, and I'm asking you how do you

24 explain that this special UN team needed four days to compile their report

25 whereas you, in such a short time, having heard on television that the

Page 31042

1 point of firing cannot be established, you were appointed, completed your

2 study, and had a report ready already on the 7th. Are they that much less

3 capable than you or perhaps are there any other reasons to explain this?

4 A. Mr. Milosevic, if you read my report and what I wrote in it

5 together with my colleagues, and it was completed in two days, we just

6 estimated or indicated six possible locations, and we said that only one

7 of them was in the territory held by the BH army.

8 My subsequent studies over the past two years, at the request of

9 the Prosecution, I carried out more detailed analyses, and on the basis of

10 what I have repeatedly said today, I showed that out of those six

11 locations the fourth, fifth, and sixth are those that fulfil the necessary

12 requirements. I had an order from the investigating judge that I had to

13 complete my report within 24 hours, and in accordance with that order,

14 because he was the person who appointed me, I completed my work in a

15 professional manner within the time available and the facts given.

16 Through subsequent analyses, the results of which I have given to the

17 Prosecution, produced what I have testified about today. Therefore, I am

18 not calling in question at all the ability of UN officers. You have your

19 own opinion. I have my own technical opinion. It is up to Their Honours,

20 the Judges, to assess which documents they will rely on.

21 Q. If on the 15th of February they stated that it was impossible to

22 establish who fired the shell --

23 A. That is their right.

24 Q. But their first reports, initial reports indicate that it had been

25 done by the Muslim side.

Page 31043

1 A. I have no idea, Mr. Milosevic. I haven't read those reports. I

2 can only talk about what I did. I'm no official person in

3 Bosnia-Herzegovina. I'm an ordinary citizen, a university professor, and

4 that's all.

5 Q. And is it true that your engagement has nothing to do with the

6 statement of the UNPROFOR representative to the effect that it cannot be

7 established because they produced their final report on the 15th?

8 A. Surely there's no need for me to repeat what I said in my

9 statement. I heard on television and the radio that they had stated that

10 it cannot be established, et cetera.

11 Q. Very well. In your statement in 1996, in paragraphs four and

12 five, I quote: "As a member of the team of experts at the beginning of

13 the war, I organised in Sarajevo the production of weapons, the production

14 and development of weapons."

15 I will slow down for the interpreters. You said: "As a member of

16 a team of experts at the beginning the war, I organised in Sarajevo the

17 production and development of weapons. We worked in cooperation with the

18 staff of the BH army. I worked there until the 14th of December, 1993,

19 when the team was disbanded."

20 Is that right, Mr. Zecevic?

21 A. That's right. I was replaced.

22 Q. So you stopped working in that area one month and 20 days prior to

23 the explosion at Markale?

24 A. No. I was replaced in July 1993 when the head of the staff of the

25 BH army, General Sefer Halilovic, was replaced. Then the entire unit of

Page 31044

1 which I was a member was also dismissed. For six months, I was at their

2 disposal. They didn't know what to do with me. And then on the 14th of

3 December, they gave me the order to go to the UNIS Institute. I was under

4 military obligation, and I went there. Therefore, my engagement as head

5 of the department for research and development attached to the Main Staff

6 of the BH army lasted from June 1992 until July 1993. When my unit was

7 dismissed and disbanded I was put on hold, and I was at their disposal.

8 They didn't know what to do with me.

9 Q. In your CV, on page -- it says that from 1st of June until the

10 18th of December, 1993, you were employed in the General Staff of the BH

11 army and the mechanical engineering faculty in Sarajevo.

12 A. In the centre for special purpose industry, the department for

13 research and development, attached to the Main Staff.

14 Q. The Main Staff of the ABiH army?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. But that is the General Staff of the army.

17 A. No, no. It's a unit attached to the staff. I was not a member of

18 the General Staff.

19 Q. I'm not saying that you were a member of the General Staff, but

20 you were employed by them.

21 A. All soldiers are, in a sense, employed by the General Staff. So

22 please don't attribute what you're saying to me.

23 Q. I'm not doing that, I am just quoting what you said, that you were

24 employed in the General Staff of the ABiH army as head of the department

25 for research and development.

Page 31045

1 A. No. In the centre for special purpose production and research

2 department, working attached, not in the Main Staff.

3 Q. Okay, attached to the Main Staff. And you worked on the design of

4 projectiles.

5 A. Yes. Under conditions when there were no manufacturing components

6 and spare parts, I had to find ways of the BH army ensuring for itself

7 within Sarajevo the process of production of munitions, and this

8 engagement lasted one year.

9 Q. In paragraph 37 in your statement of July 2002, you described how

10 you used unexploded shells that you collected in the territory of Sarajevo

11 to make appropriate lethal devices.

12 A. Yes, because 60 per cent of our needs for explosives were solved

13 in that way. Every kilogramme of explosive in an unexploded shell would

14 be worth one bomb, and so people, at the risk of their lives, found these

15 unexploded ordnances, I had the explosives extracted for it to be

16 reprocessed for defence purposes.

17 Q. So I did perhaps -- one of the possible findings of the

18 investigation could have been that a device exploded in Markale that you

19 yourself may have participated in making.

20 A. In Pretis, yes, but before the war.

21 Q. And not out of what you described that you made out of unexploded

22 devices.

23 A. We made hand grenades and rifle grenades for personal defence, not

24 those that could be used by larger units. We were unable to produce

25 120-millimetre mortar shell.

Page 31046

1 Q. Is it quite clear that you have a direct interest in not

2 establishing that the BH army fired the shell?

3 A. I don't wish to comment.

4 Q. But you were working for the staff of that army.

5 A. I was working for the defence of the citizens of Sarajevo, my

6 friends and relatives. The unit I was in command of, 30 per cent were

7 Serbs, 21 per cent were Croats, the rest were Bosniaks.

8 Q. I'm not asking you that.

9 THE INTERPRETER: Could there be pauses, please. It is impossible

10 to follow at this speed.

11 JUDGE MAY: You're making it very hard for the interpreters, for

12 everybody. So would you both make a pause. Yes.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Very well. I did not ask about other members of your unit. I was

15 saying isn't it clear that it was more than evident that you had an

16 interest involved in order not to have it established that it was the BH

17 army who fired at Markale?

18 A. Mr. Milosevic, I worked in a professional manner. In my report

19 there is not a single thing that is partial in any way. You can send this

20 report to my colleagues from the Military Technical Institute and let them

21 try to find anything that would be false there.

22 Q. I am bringing this all into question because in your findings, you

23 allegedly established that the shell was fired by the Serb side, although

24 there were findings by UN experts that indicated that this came from the

25 Muslim side. And although on the 15th of February the special team

Page 31047

1 established that this was impossible.

2 A. Mr. Milosevic, if you want to read my conclusion, and I have to

3 say this to you, in my report it says quite clearly 18 degrees north

4 north-east. The direction is there too. And also the angle is between 50

5 and 60 degrees.

6 Q. Sir, please.

7 A. No, no. Listen. Please listen. I listened to you, and I want to

8 answer now.

9 I said that there are six areas from where the projectile might

10 have been fired, and this is on a military topographical map. And five of

11 them -- there is one area that is on ABiH-controlled territory and five in

12 Serb-controlled territory; nothing else. And that is my conclusion. So

13 please do not put words into my mouth, especially not things that are not

14 written in my report.

15 Q. Mr. Zecevic, is it possible that all the UN experts who took part

16 in the investigations, and none of them had any grounds for being partial,

17 as opposed to you, how come they established something that was completely

18 different? Because only your report established that it was fired from

19 the Serb side. And you were the only one who had a direct interest in the

20 results of the finding. You were the only one who was professional enough

21 to establish that the shell was fired by the Serb side.

22 A. I don't know what to say to you, Mr. Milosevic. I never said

23 anything derogatory about any UN report. I have never seen any one of

24 them. There is nothing good or bad I can say about them. I first have to

25 see these reports. I'm telling you for the umpteenth time that I have to

Page 31048

1 see the report first. I don't know how professional they are and whether

2 they are professional.

3 But let me tell you, Mr. Milosevic, you will hardly find a person

4 in -- anywhere in the world who worked on designing ammunition for 17

5 years and taught at university and was for three and a half years the

6 target of projectiles and who had the opportunity of feeling himself what

7 the combat effect of a projectile is. So I can tell you I have

8 considerable experience, positive and negative. I know a lot of

9 theoretical models that go into the phenomenon of fragmentation as far as

10 projectiles are concerned, and I follow the research of American experts

11 in this area.

12 So I really am a good expert in this field. And as for the UN

13 experts, I cannot say. I have told you very nicely, I've provided my

14 report, you have my CV, and now you're telling me about some kind of

15 experts that I never heard of, that I never read of. So I'm not

16 quarreling about them. I never said anything about them, positive or

17 negative.

18 Q. I'm not talking about them at all, sir. I'm talking about you.

19 Isn't it evident that there is a conflict of interest that disqualifies

20 you as an expert in this case because you were employed, attached to the

21 General Staff of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina? You have a direct

22 interest involved to have the Serbs blamed for this. Even in this

23 professional expert report, you use derogatory terms for the Serbs. And

24 for you, this -- this conflict of interest disqualifies you as an expert.

25 A. No, way. Mr. Milosevic, when I wrote this report, I was not

Page 31049

1 engaged by the military. That is one point.

2 Secondly, the term "Chetnik" is not a derogatory term.

3 Q. You said "the aggressor side."

4 A. Well, yes. If somebody is throwing projectiles at me --

5 Q. Did anybody -- did you target projectiles at them? There was the

6 Sarajevo-Romanija Corps and there was the Bosnian Army Corps and there

7 were two corps that were clashing. So didn't they exchange projectiles?

8 A. Rifle grenades with 150-metre range.

9 Q. You say that you did not have artillery pieces.

10 A. I'm telling you what I did, Mr. Milosevic.

11 Q. All right, Mr. Zecevic. But you know that the Serb positions were

12 observed from other UN observation posts. And no firing of shells was

13 observed from there either. Do you know that?

14 A. How can I have that kind of information? I was an ordinary

15 citizen in Sarajevo.

16 Q. Wait a minute. There is an UNPROFOR statement that it was

17 impossible to establish who fired the shell, and you attach great

18 importance to that. You only know of that statement. You don't know of

19 any other statement of UNPROFOR, and you don't know about any other

20 information provided by UNPROFOR. The only thing you know is that you

21 don't know who fired the shell and that it is impossible to --

22 A. Mr. Milosevic, if you read my report, I said that it was an

23 announced over the radio, on the 6th, on the radio. It's not that I got a

24 report. It was broadcast over the radio. The UN spokesperson said that

25 from the positions of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina on that day - this

Page 31050

1 can be checked - not a singe projectile was fired, and that is what my

2 report says and nothing else. There is no special report that came to me

3 from the UN.

4 Q. All right. So you took from the UN only that which had to do with

5 this statement that it was impossible. I hope that you're aware of the

6 fact that the only report so far that claimed that the Serb side fired the

7 shell is your report.

8 A. I don't know that. I did not look at any other reports except for

9 my own.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I promised Mr.

11 Tapuskovic to leave him 15 minutes, so I thank you, Mr. May.

12 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I would like to thank

13 Mr. Milosevic too.

14 Your Honours, I would like to put a few things to the witness,

15 things that he stated and documents that he alone used when providing his

16 findings.

17 Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:

18 Q. [Interpretation] So, Mr. Witness, I would like to start with the

19 statement that you gave on the 13th of December or, rather, in July of the

20 -- to the investigators of the Tribunal. It's a lengthy statement. I'm

21 interested in only one paragraph. It is paragraph 37 of that statement of

22 yours. Let me show you what you said there, please.

23 Mr. Zecevic, please look at paragraph 37. You say here, and I am

24 reading this now so that you wouldn't have to read it. "From April/May

25 1993, mortar shells and projectiles that were fired by the Serb side

Page 31051

1 against Sarajevo were manufactured in Serbia. I know that because from

2 August 1992, I had introduced the practice of collecting unexploded mines

3 and projectiles, and the -- so that the explosives taken out of them could

4 be used for the needs of the army of BH." Is that correct?

5 A. Yes.

6 Q. "Furthermore, I was looking for volunteers --" so you were a

7 volunteer too; right? "-- to go around Sarajevo to collect these

8 unexploded explosive devices." Is that right?

9 A. Yes.

10 Q. "That was practice which, in normal circumstances, would not be

11 carried out, but since the government forces had a critical lack of

12 weaponry, there was no alternative." And then you used "...each and every

13 kilogramme of explosives to make..." and so and so forth.

14 A. Ten rifle grenades.

15 Q. Ten rifle grenades. Never mind. But what I'm interested in is

16 that you collected these unexploded explosive devices; is that right?

17 A. Logically.

18 Q. And one sentence further down you say: "This was customary

19 practice in Yugoslavia, namely these explosive devices that were brought

20 to me by people had their manufacturer's name and the year of manufacture

21 marked"; is that right?

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. So you were collecting these bodies of the projectiles, and you

24 had them among your own weaponry.

25 A. No. We just used the explosives, because nobody would be crazy

Page 31052

1 enough to put into a mortar the body of a mortar shell that had already

2 been fired.

3 Q. All right. But in your statement of the 7th of September, I will

4 show you if necessary --

5 A. Please do show it to me.

6 Q. All right. Here it is. I'm have to show it to you again. Here

7 it is. Again, it was given to the investigators.

8 You say here in paragraph 7, the one but last paragraph, that you

9 and Sarajevo made shells at Alipasino Polje, the foundry there?

10 A. Not I.

11 Q. Was this done under your control?

12 A. No. Under my control it was only hand grenades and rifle grenades

13 that were made. This was done by the Pretis factory, but it did not fall

14 under me. I was a military unit and they were an economic entity.

15 Q. Now look at the statement that you received today and that was

16 presented to the Judges awhile ago. Mr. Milosevic showed it to you a few

17 minutes ago too. It has to do with what you said were the security

18 services centre. You said that you did not ask them for anything, but I

19 am reading your statement of the 26th and 27th of February 1996 to you.

20 On page 1 in the middle you say: "I decided to establish contact with the

21 security services centre and to ask them whether I could conduct an

22 investigation in this respects. They agreed."

23 So it was not expertise you sought?

24 A. No, no, wait a minute. I have to have a look at this. I cannot

25 say anything. Give me the page number, please.

Page 31053

1 Q. Here it is, and it was underlined as a matter of fact. It had

2 already been presented to the Judges. Here it is on page 1. Page 1,

3 paragraph 7. You said quite literally what I said to you. "I contacted

4 the security service centre and asked if it was possible for me to conduct

5 an investigation." So you were conducting an investigation. You were not

6 giving an expert opinion.

7 A. No, no. Wait a minute. It was a judge who engaged me. They just

8 made it possible for me to come to the site.

9 Q. Did you state what it says here in this statement or not?

10 A. Look, I cannot conduct an investigation within the centre when I'm

11 not a member of the security centre -- services.

12 Q. But that's what you said.

13 A. It's a mistranslation.

14 Q. All right. Look at what you said: "I did not agree with the

15 opinion of General Smith because there is a difference in shells used by

16 the Chetniks and by the ABiH. The shells produced in Sarajevo were not

17 made of wrought steel but from pieces of steel or cast steel." Is that

18 right?

19 A. This is, again, a misinterpretation. I used a different word, a

20 different kind of iron.

21 Q. Wait a minute. You corrected it later in your September from --

22 in your September statement you say, on page 1 in paragraph 4 --

23 A. It's steel.

24 Q. This is what you said in 1996, that it wasn't made of -- now how

25 did you put it. That it wasn't made of wrought steel.

Page 31054

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. But made of cast steel. That is what you said. Of pieces of

3 steel, not of wrought steel. Would you like to explain it to the Judges?

4 A. Yes. Because of technological differences, because there were no

5 presses, et cetera, a number of projectiles, not in my unit but at the

6 Pretis factory in Sarajevo, so I did not take part in this, I just know

7 about it, I have nothing to do with it, they would use a block of steel

8 and then they would mechanically cut this steel, and they would make mines

9 out of it. Afterwards, they managed to develop their own technology of

10 founding -- casting.

11 Q. So in September 2000, you corrected yourself.

12 A. No, no, I did not correct myself. It's the very same thing. For

13 a technical person, it's the very same thing.

14 Q. Please, look at what you said in paragraph 4 of your statement in

15 September.

16 A. It is not contradictory.

17 Q. Please explain it to the Judges.

18 A. I'm asking you what to explain to the judges.

19 Q. Well, I've put the question to you. I always seem to be in a

20 hurry because the time, and I know I'm speaking too fast. So I'm reading

21 this: "In relation to this statement made previously, shells made in

22 Sarajevo were not made of wrought steel but from pieces of steel or cast

23 steel."

24 A. I've just tried to explain this to you.

25 Q. Well, please hear me out. Please hear me out so that you could

Page 31055

1 give the Judges the explanation that is necessary. And you say: "My

2 sentence was not interpreted properly. Shells of the BH army were made of

3 cast iron, rolled iron." So did you understand that you had made a

4 mistake and that you wanted to correct it when you saw what the shell had

5 been made from?

6 A. Distinguished colleague, have you seen my report? There is no

7 reference in it whatsoever what kind of steel it is, cast or rolled. The

8 question here had to do with external ballistics, determining the

9 locality. If you look at my report, no reference is made to pieces of

10 steel. What the Prosecution asked me about was whether I as an expert

11 could explain to them how the development of ammunition manufacturing went

12 in Sarajevo. That is what I said in my statement to them. But in my

13 expert report, there is no reference absolutely to any technologies that

14 were involved in this.

15 I did not call them -- I did not analyse these pieces. I analysed

16 the external ballistics of the projectile and the stabiliser. So for this

17 expert opinion, this is totally insignificant. Why would it be

18 significant whether the material was cast or rolled? And whether the

19 pieces will be in the shape of a blade or irregular shapes, if a

20 projectile is --

21 Q. Witness, we don't have time for this.

22 A. I don't know if you have time or not. Now because you do not have

23 time you are going to bring me in a position that would make it seem that

24 I stated something that I didn't state.

25 Q. You say that as opposed to what Smith found.

Page 31056

1 A. No. Well, his first statement was that the projectile did not

2 have a fuse.

3 Q. We will have to go back to the absolute core of the matter.

4 In item 2 of your conclusions --

5 A. Just a moment. Let me find the conclusions.

6 Q. You say: "There is no possibility of an explosion caused by a

7 stationary explosive device."

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. And in the statement you have before you, the one given in

10 September, look at the penultimate paragraph. You said: Professor

11 Zecevic handed over to the team of investigators a photocopy of the report

12 of the Serb expert, Miroljub Vukasinovic, in which he speaks about the

13 mortar action in Markale in Sarajevo."

14 And look at the last sentence now: "Professor Zecevic said that

15 although these are two different incidents, the information from the

16 reports are relevant to the incident that occurred on the 5th of February,

17 1994."

18 From the Office of the Prosecutor, I got this -- these findings

19 that you handed over to the OTP. I believe that it is relevant, and I

20 would like to indicate something in it to you.

21 What is stated in para 2, does it mean that you are in fact

22 contesting the contents of this report you yourself submitted to the

23 investigators?

24 A. Where are you exactly?

25 Q. And this is consistent with what you said about the angle: "The

Page 31057

1 analysis made of the position of the crater, the place of impact, the

2 angle of the stabiliser, and the numerical measurements of impact on the

3 target, it can be concluded on this basis that the shell fell under static

4 conditions under an angle of 55 to 60 degrees." That is precisely the

5 angle that you spoke about all the time. They seem to be identical. What

6 can you tell us about this finding? Is it relevant?

7 A. I hold Mr. Vukasinovic in high esteem. He is a good expert but he

8 has no practical experience. He is a good expert when it comes to

9 simulations.

10 This whole theory is based on very good concepts. But in my whole

11 report, I never say that I accepted his conclusions. You cannot call

12 these conclusions identical. I said, however, that the methodology of

13 Mr. Vukasinovic is interesting. Is can be debated opinion. And we have

14 other pieces of information here. But generally speaking, it is an

15 interesting concept that can be usefully involved in analysis.

16 However, the report of Mr. Vukasinovic is useful because it

17 provides one possible concept: He tried to explain this phenomenon. He

18 did not explain it in fact, because he made several errors, but this is

19 not important for our case.

20 Q. So you accept it from that point of view?

21 A. No. You cannot have me say what I never meant to say. People

22 from the Prosecution asked me what can be done. I told them here is the

23 report of Mr. Vukasinovic, he is a good expert, a young man whom I

24 respect, his conclusions are not completely correct, but his theory is not

25 unfounded, and some concepts from his theory I used in my own analysis.

Page 31058

1 And it says in my expert opinion given to the Prosecution that I did not

2 accept his conclusions, I just said that his theory was interesting.

3 Q. What I'm interested in and what you have to explain to the Judges

4 concerns this angle. If it -- we are talking about a statical instrument,

5 the angle established is consistent with the one that you measured, not

6 the angle measured by the UN investigation team.

7 A. Look, the angle has nothing to do with it. When you fire a

8 projectile, depending on the distance, on the angle of elevation, you will

9 have completely different angles. To make this clearer, I will show you

10 this example.

11 Here is a mortar. It's important for understanding what angles

12 are all about. This 55 angle has nothing to do with Markale 1994.

13 Markale 1994 and 1995 are two different cases. This is the mortar from

14 which the projectile was fired. It can change elevation from 45 to 65

15 degrees. The shell has additional charges. The more charges inside, the

16 higher the velocity of firing.

17 Now, take two teams. Take two crews and give them the task of

18 firing from two different positions, two different shells --

19 JUDGE MAY: Yes. Time is rather against us.

20 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Just one more question, please,

21 if I can complete my examination.

22 Q. Mr. Zecevic, what is interesting is that the radars operated by

23 the representatives of the international community did not record the

24 firing of any rockets, and there are no witnesses who seem to have seen

25 them. Radars did not register the -- any rockets flying over the area

Page 31059

1 where the projectile was supposed to have been fired over. How can you

2 explain this? Because you say in your report that a projectile can be

3 seen by the naked eye.

4 A. First of all, a mortar shell is not the same as projectile.

5 Second, the radars were positioned in the Sarajevo airport, and they were

6 not turned on. Therefore, the projectile that flew in was completely on

7 the opposite side in relation to the radars. So that doesn't mean

8 anything.

9 JUDGE MAY: We are going to finish now. Thank you very much.

10 Yes. I'm afraid that's going to include --

11 Questioned by the Court:

12 JUDGE KWON: Please wait a minute. It's not clear to me. It's

13 about the raw material of the shell. Is it true, as you suggested in your

14 statement in 1996, there is a difference in shells used by the Serbs and

15 by the Bosnian army?

16 A. The difference was in the quality of material used for the body of

17 the projectile. They had presses and could manufacture the body --

18 JUDGE KWON: That being the case, apart from the analysis of

19 ballistics of projectile, why did you not analyse the fragments found in

20 the Markale place at that time?

21 A. They were completely irrelevant to determining the position of the

22 origin of fire. Fragments are important if you want to establish how many

23 people could have been killed. One mortar shell had 3 to 5.000 fragments

24 that fly at a speed of 1.000 to 1.500 metres/second. They are important

25 to ballistic experts, not to somebody trying to find the origin of fire.

Page 31060

1 What mattered to me was the stabiliser fin and the point of firing. On

2 the basis of that, you could draw certain conclusions.

3 JUDGE KWON: Very well. Thank you.

4 JUDGE MAY: Thank you.

5 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, if there's no time for re-examine could

6 I at least ask that the photographs that we used in cross-examination be

7 exhibited.

8 JUDGE MAY: Yes, certainly.

9 MR. GROOME: Thank you.

10 JUDGE KWON: And they can be included. And we should exhibit the

11 Defence Exhibit also later.

12 JUDGE MAY: We will deal with that next week formally.

13 Yes, Mr. Nice, we've really got to end, I'm afraid.

14 MR. NICE: Your Honour, can I cut across the evidence simply to

15 say this. The project on showing relevance of the intercepts that we seek

16 to have admitted has been completed. Files are available for you now.

17 This deals with the Bosnian intercepts which have been reduced to what the

18 Prosecution has reduced to a minimum, every one being relevant but they've

19 been grouped two ways for your assistance. First chronologically with

20 themes identified. The themes are then set out, and then the intercepts

21 have been regrouped according to the themes so that you can see them in

22 that context. A list of dramatis personae is added at the end.

23 There are three more potential intercept collections all much

24 smaller than this, two of them depending on decisions about particular

25 witnesses, either identified or being identified by, amongst others, the

Page 31061

1 Prosecutor. At least one and probably two of those fall for collation in

2 a similar way. There's a final collection of intercepts which would be

3 admitted in an entirely different way and probably wouldn't merit this

4 particular form of collation. But the project has been completed by, as I

5 indicated, the in-house expert, together with others of the team who are

6 identified on the footer of the first page.

7 JUDGE MAY: Mr. Zecevic, that concludes your evidence. Thank you

8 for coming to the Tribunal to give it. We are grateful, and you are now

9 free to go.

10 [The witness withdrew]

11 JUDGE MAY: We will adjourn now until next Tuesday.

12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.50 p.m.,

13 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 20th day of

14 January, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.