1 Wednesday, 11 February 2004
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.14 a.m.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Are we in open session?
7 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: There's a matter that I have to bring to the
9 attention of the Court and the parties. At the outset, I'd like to
10 apologise for the lateness, and the lateness is due to the fact that the
11 Chamber just received, before we were about to enter, a medical report
12 relating to the health of the accused. It informs us that the accused
13 returned from court yesterday very tired. And it's fairly lengthy, I will
14 not read it, the Prosecution will have it shortly. But it ends with a
15 recommendation that we adhere to the reduced hours of work per day for the
16 coming week, as was proposed by the cardiologist.
17 We are now on a longer schedule that takes us to 4.45. What the
18 Chamber has in mind is that for the rest of this week, today and tomorrow,
19 we would return to the original schedule, that is, working until 1.45, but
20 next week, which is just two days, and with the benefit of the weekend, we
21 believe that the accused would be able to sit for the longer hours for
22 next week. That's Wednesday and Thursday. So that the schedule now will
23 be today and tomorrow 9.00 to 1.45; next week, Wednesday and Thursday, the
24 longer hours, 9.00 to 4.45, with the two breaks that we had yesterday.
25 Any comments, Mr. Nice?
1 MR. NICE: No. I see the good sense of the course proposed and I
2 have no observations to make.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: May I ask the accused for any comments that he
4 has. Mr. Milosevic.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have nothing to say, Mr. Robinson.
6 You're very kind. I did not ask for any benefits, please, and please bear
7 that in mind, though.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Milosevic. As you know, we are
9 always sensitive to the question of your health, and indeed anybody's
11 MR. NICE: A short procedural matter in private session, if you
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes.
14 [Private session]
24 [Open session]
25 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
2 WITNESS: WITNESS B-1804 [Resumed]
3 [Witness answered through interpreter]
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.
5 Cross-examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]
6 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. 1804 -- I hope I haven't made a mistake in
7 terms of the number. When the JNA withdrew from Bosnia-Herzegovina, after
8 awhile the army of Republika Srpska was established, or, rather, the date
9 that was recorded in this context is the 15th of May, 1992.
10 A. Mr. Milosevic, I think that the army of Republika Srpska was
11 formed on the 12th of May, 1992.
12 JUDGE KWON: Pause, please. Pause. Bear the interpreters in
13 mind, please.
14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Then the army of Republika Srpska was joined by members of the JNA
16 but also by other citizens, citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Isn't that
17 right? And you're one of them.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Can we therefore conclude that you, as a former officer of the JNA
20 who joined the army of Republika Srpska, believe that its duty was first
21 and foremost to safeguard the freedom, interests, and equality of rights
22 that was jeopardised in the case of the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
23 Were those the objectives that you had in mind then?
24 A. Well, Mr. Milosevic, I would say that the task of the VRS was the
25 defence of the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
1 Q. In paragraph 15, when you referred to a few matters, you say among
2 other things that at that time the JNA believed -- I mean, this is
3 somewhat before the period we were discussing only a minute ago, the JNA
4 then considered "the extreme elements within the SDA and the HDZ and their
5 armed paramilitary formations as secessionist forces." I assume this is
6 not being contested, that they were in favour of secession.
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. In the same paragraph, you say: "Later on, I found out that the
9 JNA took out part of the military equipment and supplies from these
10 barracks in order to arm Serb reservists in villages that were with a
11 predominantly Serb population. In my opinion, these Serbs were armed in
12 order to protect the rest of Yugoslavia from secessionist elements as well
13 as their areas." That is to say their villages; right?
14 And then the quotation that I gave a minute ago follows.
15 So that was the time, as you said yourself in paragraph 12, many
16 members of the JNA who were ethnic Croats, Slovenes, Muslims, Albanians
17 left the JNA. Some of them joined the newly established armies and other
18 formations; is that right?
19 A. Yes, that's right.
20 Q. And the persons who were armed in various villages, as you had put
21 it, were reservists. They were members of the JNA reserve force; isn't
22 that right?
23 A. Our unit or, rather, the unit that I was in called upon all who
24 wished to join the reserve units to do so, and it was only then that they
25 were given weapons. Predominantly it was Serbs who responded to that.
1 Q. At the time when they were called up as reservists, the JNA still
2 functioned, and since they joined up as reservists, they became members of
3 the JNA?
4 A. That's right.
5 Q. And later on when the JNA withdrew, they became members of the
6 army of Republika Srpska.
7 A. You're right on that score too.
8 Q. And these arms were given in order to preserve the territorial
9 integrity of the country and also, as you had put it, to protect their own
10 villages and their own families from the armed paramilitary forces; is
11 that right?
12 A. Well, that is what I said.
13 Q. Was it well known to you, and I assume to others at that time,
14 that Serbs, civilians, were getting killed considerably before the war
15 broke out? Already on the 2nd of March in Sarajevo, one murder was
16 committed, the well-known murder at the wedding. You knew about that,
17 isn't that right? And later on it spread considerably. Do you know about
19 A. I read about it in the newspapers and at that time I saw it on
20 television, the killing of a priest called Gardovic in Sarajevo. So what
21 was in the media was what I knew too. I cannot recall everything now.
22 Q. All right. That is a generally known thing that happened, but
23 from that time do you know the names of - how should I put this? - some of
24 the leaders of paramilitary formations who were criminals for the most
25 part and who showed up in these hard times and committed violence? For
1 example, the name of Ramiz Delalic.
2 A. That was talked about quite a bit. That was talked about quite a
3 bit, yes.
4 Q. Then one of the leaders of these paramilitary formations, Ismet
5 Bajramovic -- do you know about him? Have you heard about him?
6 A. I've heard of Delalic. As for this Bajramovic, I really cannot
7 remember right now.
8 Q. What about Juka Prazina?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Have you heard of Samir Katovic Kruska [phoen], Musan Topalovic
11 Caco, Emin Kruskovic, Kerim Lucarevic, a doctor, and others? Do you know
12 those names?
13 A. The Caco -- the name you mentioned, Caco, is one I know but I
14 don't remember the others.
15 Q. Do you know that most of them were former criminals who started
16 terrorising first and foremost the Serb population?
17 A. That is what was said.
18 Q. That was before the war.
19 A. That is what was being said. I was not in Sarajevo, so --
20 Q. Are you aware of the attack that took place in the area of
21 Bosanski Brod from the village of Sijekovac where a massacre was committed
22 against Serb civilians on the 26th of March, 1992, when dozens of people
23 were killed?
24 A. Yes, Mr. Milosevic. A battalion went from my unit. It went
1 Q. After that happened?
2 A. After that happened.
3 Q. So this crime was committed by who? There was no war on at that
5 A. If you expect me to come up with some details, I don't know. I
6 cannot say precisely. It was being said that there was some Croat units
7 that came there together with some paramilitaries from the area of
8 Bosanski Samac, but I really do not know about any details.
9 Q. Do you know -- well, all right. That's fine as far as you're
10 concerned. Do you know about what happened between the 3rd and 6th of
11 April, 1992, in Kupres when 56 Serbs were killed? Not to mention all the
12 villages now. And that 168 of them were taken prisoner and so on and so
13 forth, all of them civilians.
14 A. Kupres was discussed extensively at the time by the media, and I
15 really don't know anything in greater detail except for what the media
16 carried at the time. There was also a report that Alija Izetbegovic went
17 there and the members of the Presidency, the Bosnian Presidency, although
18 I really do not know about the details.
19 Q. Are you aware of the massacre committed in the village of Kostres
20 at the Orthodox cemetery of the Serbs who fled from Barice and Kostres
21 after they were killed by armed members of the paramilitary formations?
22 The local people from the Muslim village of Korace and a four-member
23 Muslim group headed by Alija Selimagic, that they slaughtered and killed
24 in other ways 117 Serbs, including old men, women, and children?
25 A. Possibly it did happen, but I don't remember it.
1 Q. All right. I'm not going to ask you about it. So a general
2 question now. Do you know before the war became formal, before it
3 actually started, when at the beginning of April this Presidency of
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina made some decisions, of course excluding the Serb
5 members of the Presidency, even excluding Fikret Abdic when mobilisation
6 was declared and conflicts broke out, so that is to say before the war
7 broke out, do you know that dozens or even hundreds of Serbs had already
8 been killed in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
9 A. I can specifically talk about what happened in Bosanski Samac,
10 then also the killing of this priest in Sarajevo. Probably I could
11 remember some other details, too, but these are the first things that come
12 to mind right now.
13 Q. Did the Serbs kill anyone during that period of time? Do you know
14 anything about that?
15 A. Well, perhaps they did, perhaps they didn't. I really can't say
16 now. It was a long time ago. Well, perhaps on an individual basis.
17 Q. And tell me, the activation of the members of the reserve force
18 and their engagement for the purpose of protecting their villages and
19 their entire areas, was that a consequence of precisely such things that
20 happened, and was it based on truly justified fear that people could
21 indeed be in peril?
22 A. I think so. There was probably fear because the war in Croatia
23 had already started.
24 Q. All right, Mr. 1804. Tell me, in paragraph 16 you say that on the
25 28th of February, you were given a task - this was in 1992 - to go with
1 your unit to secure some of the key facilities such as the Karakaj and
2 railroad bridges, hydroelectric power plant, the Glinica factory, and
3 overhead railway bridge. Does this mean that there was a presence of
4 armed paramilitaries, the ones that we referred to just now, and that this
5 called for a greater degree of caution in order to prevent possible
7 A. Yes, among other things. The bridges on the Sava River had
8 already been destroyed, so that is specifically what we were told.
9 Q. Do you know about the case of Murat Sabanovic from Visegrad and
10 his attempt to blow up the hydroelectric power plant there?
11 A. Yes, I heard about that from the media.
12 Q. And this meeting with the local authorities in Zvornik that you
13 refer to in paragraph 16, the one that was attended by members of the Serb
14 Democratic Party and the Party of Democratic Action, that is to say the
15 top people of both the Serbs and the Muslims, you say that the JNA wanted
16 to maintain communications with all and tried to contribute to a peaceful
17 and stable situation to the greatest extent possible.
18 A. That's right.
19 Q. The JNA took a neutral stand, right, and it just tried to
20 facilitate agreement between them; isn't that right?
21 A. As for most of the things that were done by our unit are
22 concerned, the authorities in the entire area knew about what we were
24 Q. All right. In paragraph 17, you say that the SDA did not allow
25 you to use the barracks at Kuslat in Zvornik, so you had to be deployed at
1 Celopek and in Mali Zvornik. Mali Zvornik is in Serbia; is that right?
2 A. You're right.
3 Q. And all of this happened towards the end of February and the
4 beginning of March. That is to say while Bosnia-Herzegovina was still
5 within Yugoslavia. Is that right?
6 A. That's right.
7 Q. Now, this attitude towards the JNA after the war broke out or,
8 rather, the conflict between the two sides there in Bosnia, it escalated
9 in relation to the JNA, and that is when the barracks were blocked and
10 attacked; is that right?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Do you remember that after an agreement was reached on the
13 withdrawal from Bosnia-Herzegovina that the Muslim forces impeded the
14 withdrawal? The best known cases to that effect were attacks on the
15 column on Dobrovoljacka Street in Sarajevo. You know about that, don't
17 A. Yes, I do, that's right.
18 Q. A large number of JNA soldiers were killed then. You knew that, I
19 assume, as an officer.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And you also know that on the 15th of May, 1992, during the
22 evacuation of JNA members from Tuzla, from the Husinska Buna barracks,
23 there were ambushes that had been prepared earlier on and the column that
24 was getting ready to withdraw from the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina and
25 to cross over to Serbia was attacked. Many people were killed.
1 A. You're right. I know about that.
2 Q. Many people were killed.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Do you know that according to what Hasan Efendic said, who was at
5 that time commander of the Territorial Defence Staff of
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and he presented that in his book called "Who Defended
7 Bosnia," he said that then they killed 160 members of the JNA and that 200
8 were wounded.
9 A. Mr. Milosevic, I haven't read that book. I've never had it in my
10 hands. But I do know that a large number of soldiers were killed in this
11 column and that beforehand it was agreed that the withdrawal would take
12 place peacefully.
13 Q. The only activity of these JNA soldiers was departing from the
14 barracks in Tuzla and going from Bosnia to Serbia in a column.
15 A. Well, they started evacuation. It wasn't a breakthrough. It was
16 a withdrawal that was agreed upon by way of a column.
17 Q. In paragraph 19, you talk about the troops from the Serb
18 Territorial Defence in Mali Zvornik, and not to make any confusions, that
19 is the territory of the Republic of Serbia, isn't it?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And also on the territory of the Republic of Serbia, the
22 Territorial Defence and the JNA; is that right?
23 A. Yes, that's what I said.
24 Q. At the border there; is that right?
25 A. Yes, probably.
1 Q. In paragraph 20, you talk about the fact that before the war you
2 received intelligence about the Green Berets in the Zvornik region area
3 but that you never came across them yourself. Now, what did that
4 intelligence consist of?
5 A. It consisted of information as I set it out, to the effect that
6 this paramilitary unit was being prepared, as it was called a paramilitary
7 unit at the time, and the locations where its members existed, and I think
8 there was speculation and guessing as to the numbers, how many of them
9 there were and where they were and things like that.
10 Q. Tell me, please, do you happen to know that the police, in fact,
11 in the Zvornik area immediately prior to the war also abused power and
12 authority by mistreating people, and in mid-March, 1992, without any
13 cause, five young Serbs were ambushed at Sokmani [phoen] and arrested?
14 They were interrogated by a policeman from the village called Abdul
15 Omerovic, and this caused great unrest and disquiet in the region. Do you
16 remember that?
17 A. Yes, I do, although I don't remember the details and the names,
18 but I do know that something similar happened, yes.
19 Q. All right. And do you know that the organiser of the Patriotic
20 League, the so-called Patriotic League in the area, was Samir Niskovic,
21 who otherwise was also known as Captain Almir?
22 A. Yes, I have heard of Captain Almir, and from the intelligence I
23 mentioned a moment ago his name came up.
24 Q. All right, and is it true that his headquarters or the stronghold
25 of those paramilitaries were at Kula Grad above Zvornik?
1 A. According to what our information told us and the intelligence
2 that reached us, yes, that would be right.
3 Q. Well, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, all this is written about quite
4 publicly. Karavelic was mentioned, and in 1997 the newspaper Slobodna
5 Bosna wrote about it too. But tell me, please, do you know that the
6 paramilitary unit in Zvornik was organised within the frameworks of the
7 reserve composition of the MUP in order to cover up its true existence and
8 activities, as a mask for them?
9 A. I don't know about the details surrounding that issue generally,
10 but I do remember that there was a lot of commotion there when the reserve
11 weapons of the MUP were handed out to the Muslims alone. If that's what
12 you have in mind, perhaps that's it. I don't know any of the other
14 Q. Yes, I have that in mind partially, but I'm also thinking about
15 another piece of information that exists, and that is that since January
16 1992, on the streets of Zvornik you could see evermore frequently
17 criminals wearing police uniforms and wheeler-dealers. So not Muslims but
18 criminals who had been mobilised into these paramilitary units, and they
19 were issued police uniforms.
20 A. Well, perhaps that was true, I don't know.
21 Q. And do you remember that the so-called fighters for the religion
22 cropped up, led by Midhat Grahic, a well-known Zvornik criminal, and the
23 unit that he led were the Mosque Doves, Dzamijski Golubovi.
24 A. Well, I do remember that unit and it existed throughout the war.
25 Q. And do you know that wherever their members turned up they would
1 leave dead people, burnt houses, looted premises, and so on. Did you know
2 any of that? Did you have occasion to see any of that?
3 A. Yes. Later on in the course of the war, I did see things of that
5 Q. Is it true that in the broader area around Zvornik there was
6 another paramilitary group called the Kobras that were established,
7 commanded by a certain Suljo, who used to be a teacher in Sapna before the
8 war and we believe that his real name was Sulejman Terzic, his full name.
9 A. Well, I don't know the name, it doesn't actually ring a bell, but
10 I do know that the Kobra unit did exist and it continued to exist
11 throughout the war.
12 Q. And do you know what they did, all the things they did?
13 A. Well, I really can't give you the details. I wasn't with them to
14 be able to tell you that.
15 Q. In paragraph 20, you say: "In March 1992, I did not hear any
16 combat shooting in Zvornik, and as far as I know, Zvornik was not at that
17 time attacked by Muslim forces." And that coincides with my own
18 information. Now, as far as the beginning of the conflict in Zvornik is
19 concerned, I would like to know whether you have any idea about the facts
20 that I'm now going to present to you, and that will be my question to you.
21 The conflict in Zvornik started on the 8th of April, on the day when the
22 Presidency of Bosnia moved a provision to remove the Territorial Defence.
23 A. What I know, Mr. Milosevic, is that the conflict began with the
24 killing of a soldier in Sapna, and on that very evening, the barricades
25 were set up, and to all intents and purposes -- actually, I don't remember
1 whether that was on the 6th of April or what the exact day was, perhaps
2 the 7th of April. So some of these paramilitaries in Sapna, I assume, did
3 that and killed the man they passed by that way.
4 Q. And was the Muslim militia immobilised [as interpreted] as ordered
5 by the SDA deputy, a former dentist named Abdulah Pasic and Nedzad Savac
6 [phoen] the commander of the municipal TO staff?
7 A. Yes, this mobilisation did take place, and the Serbs did leave the
8 MUP, but those names don't seem familiar to me.
9 Q. That mobilisation, who could it have been against, aimed at? They
10 killed a soldier, they proclaimed mobilisation, so what could the Serbs
11 have deduced from that?
12 A. Well, what they could have deduced, you ought to ask somebody from
13 the leadership of the day, but in view of the general mood that prevailed,
14 everybody was restless, there was a general negative atmosphere, and
15 probably they concluded that this was directed against them.
16 Q. And was it indeed against them or not?
17 A. What we could see from outside was that on the railway bridge or,
18 rather, the steel bridge between Velika and Mali Zvornik, a bus had been
19 positioned and a truck of some kind to block the way so that to all
20 intents and purposes Zvornik was blocked.
21 Q. Who set up this blockade?
22 A. Well, the Muslim police and their Territorial Defence, or I don't
23 know who.
24 Q. So is it true and correct that after all these events that came to
25 pass, the Serbs formed their own units in the village of Celopek several
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 kilometres downstream from Zvornik and at the same time evacuated women
2 and children across the Drina River, sending them into Serbia; is that
3 right, while your unit was stationed in Celopek, wasn't it?
4 A. Yes it was, but I don't know for sure when the Serb Territorial
5 Defence was set up. I don't know the exact date, but yes, you're right,
6 from Zvornik itself most people -- most of the Serbs had taken not only
7 their women and children but mostly the men too left the town.
8 Q. And the barricades that you mentioned were erected by the Mosque
9 Doves that you mentioned, that group. And at night Serb houses were
10 destroyed and damaged and looted.
11 A. I really don't know who erected those barricades, but they did
12 exist, that's true, and they were manned by some people there, some
13 members. I don't know who they actually were.
14 Q. All right. And is it true and correct that the fighting at Kula
15 Grad lasted for the next few days?
16 A. Yes, you're right. They lasted for several days and --
17 Q. According to my information, it says up until the 26th of April,
18 and this was written about later on by Bosnia newspapers Slobodna Bosna
19 and Dani.
20 A. Yes, you're right. Kula Grad was taken control of the 26th of
21 April, if I remember well. Whether it was the 24th or 26th, I can't
22 remember, but I think the 26th.
23 Q. Tell me now, please, you say yourself in paragraph 43, for
24 example, that the Muslim forces from Kula Grad shot at Zvornik, and you
25 also mention that they shot at Mali Zvornik as well. So across the Drina
1 River they shot into Serbia; is that right?
2 A. Yes, you're right.
3 Q. Therefore, is there anything unusual over the fact that the JNA
4 from the Serb side retaliated when this shooting came and targeted Serbia?
5 A. Well, I didn't say there was anything unusual in the first place.
6 Q. Well, is it quite clear then that any kind of involvement and
7 engagement by the JNA, shooting at a point from which it was being
8 targeted itself is pure self-defence?
9 A. Yes. Militarily speaking, that is logical.
10 Q. And do you know about the role in all these events played by
11 Captain Hajrudin Mesic, for example, the former commander of the police
12 station in Ugljevik?
13 A. The man you mentioned, the officer you mentioned, is no longer
14 alive. He was killed, I think in 1992 or the beginning of 1993, and he
15 was mentioned in the intelligence we received as having been the organiser
16 of the Muslim units in the area. I don't know what you have in mind
18 Q. All right, Mr. 1804. May we conclude, then, that the JNA
19 attempted throughout that time while it was present there until it
20 withdrew, so the whole time except when it was attacked itself, it
21 endeavoured to keep a neutral position and sent you personally, as you
22 describe in paragraphs 28 to 32, to attend as some sort of neutral
23 observer to the Serb-Muslim local negotiations; is that right?
24 A. I think that the JNA had a neutral position until the attack on
25 Kula Grad.
1 Q. I assume you mean until the attack from Kula Grad onto the
2 territory across the Drina River. Is that right?
3 A. Well, yes, you could look at it that way too.
4 Q. That is to say, when they started shooting and targeting territory
5 across the Drina River and from Kula Grad, then the JNA retaliated towards
6 Kula Grad; is that right? Is that right, Witness?
7 A. You could look at it that way.
8 Q. Well, in paragraph 38 you say that during the fighting for
9 Zvornik, the JNA guarded the facilities as they were ordered to do and did
10 not interfere in the fighting, as you yourself say in the statement.
11 A. Yes, that's quite true.
12 Q. So the fighting was going on after international recognition of
13 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and except in self-defence, the JNA had no right to
14 become involved there. That's quite logical, I assume. And it could not
15 have become involved in any of that.
16 In paragraph 37, you say that one or two days after Zvornik had
17 been taken control of, you saw a certain number of -- several dead
18 civilian bodies. Do you know if they were killed during the conflict or
19 in some other way perhaps?
20 A. I don't know that. I can't give you those details.
21 Q. In paragraph 39, you say that Dr. Zoran Stankovic, who was
22 otherwise a well-known professional, a well-known forensic expert, was
23 called to come from Belgrade to conduct an autopsy of the dead bodies who
24 were killed there, people who were killed there. Now, since you were a
25 soldier yourself, did you receive any of that information, that is to say
1 how those people lost their lives, because if somebody went to conduct an
2 investigation and he was the best expert in his field, then I assume you
3 would have had some feedback?
4 A. Yes, you're right. Dr. Stankovic is one of the leading experts in
5 that area, and he probably did report back to some of the superior
6 commands, but I wasn't at that level, I wasn't among the people he would
7 necessarily have informed.
8 Q. All right. Well, I suppose the information exists, and he must
9 have provided it.
10 A. Yes, I agree.
11 Q. I asked you about an investigation, because if somebody asked --
12 called in an expert to begin with, to come from Belgrade to establish the
13 cause of death, then I assume that that was within the frameworks of
14 general investigation that was conducted. But you say you know nothing
15 about an investigation.
16 A. No, I don't.
17 Q. In paragraph 42, you say that at a meeting of the Crisis Staff of
18 Zvornik that you attended, that you were given the task by your superior -
19 and I'm not going to mention his name not to disclose your identity - that
20 you were asked to convey, and I quote: "To communicate that the citizens
21 of Kozluk should not be attacked." So that was the position taken by the
22 JNA. Otherwise, Kozluk is a Muslim village, and it's a rather large
23 Muslim village, isn't it?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. You also say that it was at the request of the Serb authorities in
1 Zvornik that you went to assist in the handing over of weapons because
2 some members who were inhabitants of Muslim villages insisted that they
3 hand over their weapons to the JNA. They didn't wish to hand them over to
4 any other formation on the Serb side; is that right?
5 A. Yes. They didn't want to surrender their weapons to the Serbian
6 Territorial Defence, but they wanted to hand it over to the JNA, so one of
7 the people from the rear would come in and collect up the weapons.
8 Q. Does that clearly indicate that they, too, trusted the JNA in view
9 of the fact that the JNA never did anything -- endeavoured to behave
10 neutrally and was not violent towards them?
11 A. Well, from that particular case it would appear that way,
12 although --
13 Q. All right, Mr. 1804. Now, you also speak about the fact that the
14 Muslim citizens left the area who had surrendered their weapons, but they
15 also -- in paragraph 47, you say they also put up armed resistance. And
16 generally speaking, you speak about the atmosphere and mood that
17 prevailed, and you express that in paragraph 50 because you say that this
18 atmosphere was inflamed by what had happened during World War II, et
19 cetera, et cetera, and the casualties that the Muslims suffered; is that
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. So blind forces were at work in actual fact.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Did the JNA have anyone moved out, since that is what you're
25 talking about?
1 A. Not where I was.
2 Q. All right. In paragraph 50, you said that a considerable number
3 of Serbs also left the war area. "I myself did not receive orders to stay
4 in Bosnia-Herzegovina where I was born." So people were fleeing from the
5 war. You talk about refugees flooding in from the areas where they had
6 been subjected to crimes. You talk about ethnic cleansing of Muslims in
7 the Zvornik area. Let's just clarify one point. From the context of all
8 of this that you're talking about, this was organised by some local
9 leadership; isn't that right?
10 A. Well, probably.
11 Q. Do you have any more specific knowledge about that?
12 A. I heard about what happened in Kozluk, that these people there
13 wanted to move out and that then it was organised through the local
14 leadership there. They were allowed to leave.
15 Q. In paragraph 49, you say: "At the same time, Serbs were subjected
16 to similar procedure in other places where Muslims constituted a
18 Is that your personal insight in terms of what was going on, and
19 do you know about the way in which Serbs were expelled from areas that
20 were predominantly Muslim?
21 A. I have some insight from the very beginning and then also during
22 the war itself because an enormous number of refugees came to Zvornik.
23 Q. An enormous number of refugees came to Zvornik; Serbs from the
24 areas they were expelled from, from the areas where they had been killed.
25 A. Well, probably.
1 Q. In paragraph 61, you say something about paramilitary formations
2 from Serbia. And you say: "It was difficult and almost impossible to
3 control. Most the paramilitaries who had come from Serbia, such as White
4 Eagles and Zuco's unit and the like. I am not aware of the responsible
5 Zvornik authorities carrying out any investigations into the atrocities
6 which some of them committed at Celopek and other places. Sometime later
7 Zuco's unit was arrested and allegedly some investigation was opened but I
8 do not know whether it had any results."
9 Well, do you know that it was in Serbia that they were arrested,
10 and they were the first to be tried for war crimes during the war?
11 A. I think, Mr. Milosevic, that this Zuco and his unit were arrested
12 by the protective regiment of the army of Republika Srpska. I don't know
13 exactly when this happened. It was in the summer of 1992. And that in
14 Serbia it was the brother of this Zuco or somebody else who was arrested.
15 Q. There was a trial before the district court in Sabac, in Serbia.
16 A. I heard about that trial, but I don't know more.
17 Q. Do you know that Drazen Erdemovic was also arrested in Serbia and
18 brought before a court for crimes committed in Srebrenica? He was tried
19 here later, and he was released, although it was established then during
20 the investigation in Serbia that he had killed over a hundred people, and
21 he did not deny it here either.
22 A. We heard about that. We were informed that somewhere in Serbia
23 Drazen Erdemovic was arrested, and what happened also in that connection,
24 I don't know.
25 Q. It is known here. You say -- just a moment. I will need more
1 time for -- well, I need to cut this short.
2 You say in several different places that members of the JNA who
3 were from Bosnia-Herzegovina transferred to the army of Republika Srpska.
4 Was that logical, since Bosnia-Herzegovina was becoming independent and
5 being established as a new state, that citizens from that state would live
6 in that state? And what was of primary importance for the Serbs was the
7 protection of the interests of their own people who were in danger.
8 A. If you mean the JNA people, it was only logical that those who
9 wanted to could come.
10 Q. Could somebody force someone else to join the army of Republika
12 A. Well, not really.
13 Q. Not really. For example, let me just add this one more example to
14 your answer. So I ask you to confirm this: You had the approval of your
15 superior - again I don't want to mention his name - to withdraw to Serbia
16 with the rest of the JNA troops although you personally were from Bosnia;
17 isn't that right?
18 A. That's right.
19 Q. Although this was discussed extensively on many occasions here,
20 this well-known 30th Personnel Centre, and you do say indeed in paragraph
21 56 that for administrative reasons it existed in Belgrade and had to do
22 with officers who were born in Bosnia-Herzegovina. And part of the
23 officers, even those in Bosnia-Herzegovina, went to the FRY; isn't that
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Paragraph 56, as you were explaining how come you ended up in the
2 army of Republika Srpska. I'm quoting you: "So I was under the
3 operational command of the VRS when I reported around the 15th of June,
5 So you were not under the command of the army of Yugoslavia in any
6 way. Isn't that right, Mr. 1804?
7 A. That's right.
8 Q. Is it correct that most officers who were treated in this way had
9 their families staying in Yugoslavia? So the money that was allocated for
10 salaries and other benefits, including health insurance and so on and so
11 forth, this constituted not only assistance to the army of Republika
12 Srpska but also this implied social welfare for part of the population,
13 taking care of part of the population; isn't that right?
14 A. From what I know, Mr. Milosevic, most of the officers who were
15 married, except for those who had worked in Banja Luka previously, had
16 their families somewhere across the Drina. Now, whether it was in
17 Belgrade itself, it doesn't really matter.
18 Q. In paragraph 66, you say, in terms of personnel, there was an
19 administrative and financial link between the VRS and the army of
20 Yugoslavia. And then you say that this is how you received your salary
21 and that this 30th Personnel Centre was seated in Belgrade, and it was
22 subordinated to the chief of the personnel department. So it was not in
23 the military line in terms of any military activities. Do you know that?
24 A. Yes. It was the personnel authorities.
25 Q. Are you aware of any order, that anyone ever from the army of
1 Yugoslavia addressed any kind of order, sent any kind of order in the army
2 of Republika Srpska?
3 A. I do not know of any such thing. I personally was never given
4 such orders.
5 Q. As you say yourself, you were under the operative command of the
6 army of the Republika Srpska; isn't that right?
7 A. Yes. I was commanded by my brigade commander, sometimes by the
8 corps commander.
9 Q. All right. Let me try to shorten this. You also say that your
10 salary was not paid out to you for six months because of the sanctions
11 against the army of Republika Srpska or, rather, the Republika Srpska.
12 A. That is what we were told, but I'm not aware of any details.
13 Q. Speaking of sanctions vis-a-vis Republika Srpska, in 1994 you say,
14 in paragraph 119: "I think that the aim was to discipline the leadership
15 of Republika Srpska to have them accept a truce offered at the time." It
16 was actually the plan of the Contact Group. Do you remember that?
17 A. I remember. I said quite clearly that this was my view, so ...
18 Q. You say in paragraph 76: "In view of my rank and experience and
19 personal knowledge of the capabilities of VRS, I believe that the army of
20 Republika Srpska could have survived without support of the army of
21 Yugoslavia but only with greater difficulty."
22 Doesn't this clearly show that this relationship of material
23 dependence vis-a-vis Yugoslavia was not such that the army of Yugoslavia
24 could impose something on the army of Republika Srpska, something that the
25 VRS would not agree with?
1 A. I'm not sure I understand your question, but I think that the army
2 of Republika Srpska would have survived without any assistance of the army
3 of Yugoslavia, if that's what you had in mind. I really don't know what
4 you asked me.
5 Q. In paragraph 86, you say: "During the conflict in
6 Bosnia-Herzegovina, I was aware that the VJ directly assisted the VRS in
7 combat operations on several occasions."
8 And then you say: "The area of Bratunac, Skelani in 1993, some
9 members of a special unit were there then." That's what you say.
10 A. I heard about that.
11 Q. Oh, you heard about that.
12 A. That's right.
13 Q. You say: "Their assistance was not that important but they made
14 it possible for us to complete our task more quickly." You heard about
15 that too?
16 A. No. That refers to the other part when I myself was in charge of
17 acting in concert with that unit, and I think that we could have done
18 everything we did with them without them too. Perhaps it would have taken
19 two or three days longer.
20 Q. All right. You say that these were these few small-scale actions
21 that took place. Was this the result of agreement on local level or were
22 there some orders coming from above?
23 A. I really don't know how this happened. We were given orders by
24 the corps command. Now, what stood behind that, my level at that time and
25 now, of knowledge and in any other way, is not such that I could answer
1 such a question.
2 Q. Very well. I'm not going to burden you with that. But tell me,
3 in these actions taken by your unit or the units of the Yugoslav army, was
4 any crime committed ever?
5 A. No.
6 Q. Tell me, do you know whether you remember at that time who was
7 acting minister of defence and who was Chief of General Staff of the army
8 of Yugoslavia at that time?
9 A. The Chief of General Staff was Zivota Panic, I think, and who the
10 minister of defence was I really do not know.
11 Q. Panic also, but not Zivota. Milan Panic, who was then Prime
12 Minister of Yugoslavia and who keep the portfolio of defence minister for
14 A. I really don't remember that.
15 Q. All right. It's the American of Yugoslav descent who came then.
16 A. I know who Mr. Panic is.
17 Q. All right. Now, tell me -- I'm going to skip a few things in
18 order to save time, because I will have quite a few other matters to deal
20 In paragraph 97, I'm going to quote you now: "In January 1993,
21 the units of Naser Oric of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina recaptured some
22 of the Drina area. Following the departure of VJ units from Bosnia, in
23 January or February 1993, I was personally involved in VRS military
24 operations concerning counter-attacks direction of Srebrenica in April
25 1993. The actions I was involved in did not include participation of VJ
2 So no one from Yugoslavia took part in driving Naser Oric to
4 A. At the time of the combat actions that you refer to that I
5 personally participated in, the answer is no.
6 Q. But the units of the army of Yugoslavia protected their border.
7 That's the only thing that you know; is that right?
8 A. At that time, probably so.
9 Q. Please, let's deal with this very specifically now. In relation
10 to the takeover of Srebrenica in 1995, you say in paragraph 91, and now
11 I'm quoting you: "I have no direct personal knowledge of any involvement
12 of the Serbian Ministry of the Interior in the attack on the United
13 Nations safe area of Srebrenica in July 1995." Is that right?
14 A. Mr. Milosevic, at the time of this offensive, if I can express
15 myself that way, against Srebrenica, I was not there. But everything that
16 I know in relation to that is precisely what I said, that nobody took part
17 in this.
18 Q. In paragraph 92, you say -- or, rather, paragraph 91 says that no
19 one from the police took part. However, in paragraph 92, you say: "I do
20 not know if the Serbian MUP was operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the
21 course of the war."
22 During the course of the entire war, you mean? You don't know
23 whether they were carrying out any operations; is that right?
24 A. That's right. I don't know about that. I haven't got any such
1 Q. You, an officer with a broad field of operations, you'd have to be
2 aware of such operations, even as far as the area that you covered is
3 concerned at least, the one that is along the border with Serbia.
4 A. Well, I could not agree with you that I was an officer who had a
5 broad field of operations and activity. In terms of the position I held,
6 the powers and responsibilities and duties are clearly spelled out, but
7 perhaps I could have heard stories or something like that.
8 Q. Well, I assume that you as a Serb know full well that nothing can
9 be hidden if something actually exists, that the truth will out, and
10 everybody gets to hear about it in an area where something takes place.
11 A. Probably you're right.
12 Q. So you have no knowledge about any involvement during the war in
14 A. No, I have no knowledge about that.
15 Q. In paragraph 120, you say that as far as you know, not a single
16 unit or member of the VJ took part in any direct combat action and the
17 takeover of the Srebrenica safe area in 1995; is that right?
18 A. Yes, that's right. I don't think that happened.
19 Q. So neither the police of Serbia nor the VJ had anything to do with
20 this operation; isn't that right, Mr. 1804?
21 A. Yes, I think that's right.
22 Q. And in paragraphs 94 to 97, you speak about the insufficient
23 demilitarisation of the Srebrenica safe area and also about the attacks
24 that -- of the 28th Division of the BH army on the surrounding villages
25 from the protected zone. So I think it's a very loose way of saying lack
1 of demilitarisation. Do you agree that full militarisation took place of
2 that safe area because the entire 28th Division under the command of Naser
3 Oric operated from that area, from that zone?
4 A. Well, to give qualifications, I don't know if I can do that. What
5 we did know is that the 28th Division did not hand over its weapons except
6 for some outdated specimens and I think two tanks for which they didn't
7 have fuel, and that they brought in helicopters. And we also know that a
8 military reorganisation had taken place. It was the 8th Operative Eastern
9 Bosnia group. That's what it was called beforehand. In the safe area
10 they reorganised themselves and set up the 28th Division. Now, how you're
11 going to understand that, I don't know.
12 Q. As you were in the area, I should like to ask you to tell me what
13 you know about the attacks on the surrounding Serb villages, because
14 according to the data that I have, they destroyed over 100 Serb villages
15 in the broader area round about, and they killed everyone they found, they
16 looted everything else, and all the rest was burnt down. So that is the
17 information that I have.
18 Now, you, as somebody who was there in place, tell me whether
19 that's true or not.
20 A. Well, in brief, I should like to define -- divide this into two
21 time periods. One was until the safe area was established and the second
22 was after its establishment.
23 Up until the safe area was established, they launched several
24 offensives on Srebrenica, and they mowed down everything that lay in their
25 path. After the establishment of the safe area, they launched operations
1 from within the safe area, the protected zone, with smaller units by
2 infiltrating them into our territory several times. I remember there was
3 a village called Visnjica, and throughout that time they had two corridors
4 running towards the 2nd Corps via our territory. One went from the rear,
5 Zvornik, Baljkovica, and Sprecansko Polje, and the other went from
6 Srebrenica towards Kladanj and Olovo. So that mostly would be it.
7 Q. Very well. Now, with respect to the objects of the attack on the
8 Srebrenica enclave, in paragraph 101 you say: "I found out in late June
9 1995 about the intention of the VRS to separate the territories of the
10 enclaves and to make them more narrow."
11 And in paragraph 104 you say something similar: "The objective of
12 the attack, as far as I know, was to separate Zepa from Srebrenica and to
13 narrow down the enclave to the urban part of Srebrenica."
14 In paragraph 106, you go on to say: "It was expected that if we
15 narrowed down the safe area, that the civilian population would have asked
16 to leave, and the 28th Division would have less room to manoeuvre. A
17 similar process had occurred in Srebrenica in 1993. Our intelligence
18 indicated that the civilians wanted to leave the safe area and that this
19 was due to the war activities and harsh conditions such as the shortage of
20 food, lack of water, et cetera. The 28th Division forces were preventing
21 civilians from leaving."
22 Therefore, in any way on the Serb side were there any attempts to
23 prevent the civilian population from passing across Serb territories
24 safely and going to wherever they wanted to go?
25 A. As far as I know, no.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Q. Were you ever asked to let through certain civilians, to let them
2 pass by and that you allowed them to do so?
3 A. I think that in the winter of 1993, the UNHCR or some other
4 international organisation organised taking the civilians out of
5 Srebrenica. And this went on for some time, and we didn't interfere.
6 Q. So from the quotations that I read out to you, it would emerge
7 that neither the leadership, that leadership of yours over there, that
8 nobody in it had any plans for any kind of liquidation; is that right?
9 A. Yes, that's right.
10 Q. You say in paragraph 109: "Given what I have said," and I'm
11 quoting you on this, "and as well as given the mass suffering of the Serb
12 population and given the violence of the 28th Division that was not
13 disarmed, it could have been foreseen that if the VRS took the protected
14 zone of Srebrenica, the revenge would follow." That's what you said.
15 A. Yes, I did.
16 Q. And you concluded that on the basis of the fact that there were
17 many crimes committed on that side, that a revenge would take place, they
18 would take their revenge. And you know that precisely because of this
19 fear and trepidation that there could be a great deal of bloodshed, that
20 in 1993, efforts were made to make the area a safe area because there were
21 too many crimes that had been committed and tragic consequences could have
22 resulted, so that those were the reasons to protect the area, to prevent
23 any conflict of that kind.
24 A. Well, yes, probably that is why the safe areas were established in
25 the first place as protected zones.
1 Q. Now, according to what you say and judging by what happened,
2 nothing helped, not even direct orders that were issued by the state and
3 military top authorities on the Serb side as to how to -- as to the
4 conduct towards prisoners of war, et cetera, that international
5 humanitarian law must be respected, and so on. And in paragraph 148, you
6 comment on the order of the Main Staff of the army of Republika Srpska
7 along those lines, and it was signed by General Zdravko Tolimir; is that
9 A. Yes, I did comment that particular order.
10 Q. And it related to protection and respect for the laws of war as
11 provided by the Geneva Convention.
12 A. Yes, that's what it says there.
13 Q. And we're talking about the command of the Main Staff of the VRS
14 as it was signed by the assistant commander for the Main Staff; right?
15 A. I think it was General Tolimir's signature, if my memory serves
17 Q. I should now like to ask you to take a look at some other orders
18 that were issued you that I have here.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I'm going to take the break now
20 even though we started late, and we'll make up for the time by working
21 until 2.00. So we'll take the break now.
22 MR. NICE: Your Honour, one point. When we were dealing with
23 administrative matters this morning, I hadn't reviewed the position of the
24 forthcoming witnesses. The witness Brunborg, an expert, could not be here
25 either conveniently or at all next week, and therefore to avoid the risk
1 that he would not be concluded, I will need, in order to fit in with the
2 reorganised timetable, to take Brunborg next. Then it will be Morillon
3 starting first thing tomorrow morning, with 235 to follow. I fear that's
4 an inevitable --
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: By next, you mean immediately after this witness.
6 MR. NICE: Yes, yes.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: So, Mr. Milosevic, you're hearing that, and you
8 would have prepared for Brunborg.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, I did hear that. I'm going to
10 collect my documents together.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Witness 1804, we're going to take the break now.
12 During the break, you're not to speak to anybody about your evidence.
13 We break for 20 minutes.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Tell me, please, how much time do I
17 have left for this witness, if you've done your arithmetic?
18 JUDGE KWON: You have a bit more than an hour.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Thank you.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: If you want more time, then you can make an
21 application and we'll consider it on our return.
22 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.
23 --- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we expect you to complete your
25 cross-examination within the scheduled time. If there is to be an
1 extension, I am to tell you it will not be anything very significant.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll do my best, Mr. Robinson, and I
3 understand your reasons, but please bear in mind the fact that it was only
4 yesterday that I received certain documents having to do with this
5 witness, in the different tabs, that is. For example, his second
6 statement is dated the 4th of February, which means last week, and I
7 received it yesterday as I did some other documents in the various tabs.
8 So I had to go through those too.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: The legal officer.
10 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I'm told that you would have
12 received the second statement some days before yesterday, but let us not
13 argue the point. Go ahead with the cross-examination.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. As we were saying, Mr. 1804 -- actually, we had taken note of the
17 fact that there were several direct orders by the state and military top
18 echelons giving instructions as to how prisoners of war should be treated,
19 and civilians and so on, and I assume that you commented on the order
20 given by the assistant commander of the Main Staff, General Tolimir, which
21 he signed, in fact. And it's not very legible, but it does say that this
22 was July 1995 and that it was sent to the president of the Republika
23 Srpska and the forward command post of the Drina Corps, that it was
24 brought to their attention, the command of the Drina Corps, and relates to
25 combat operations around Srebrenica.
1 I'm just going to quote from the order, and I assume you are well
2 acquainted with the order, and it reads as follows: "The president of the
3 Republika Srpska was informed that units of the Drina Corps had been
4 successfully carrying out combat operations around Srebrenica and that the
5 results achieved lead to a position in which they are able to take the
6 town of Srebrenica itself. The president of the republic is satisfied
7 with the results of the combat operations and agrees that operations
8 continue to take control in Srebrenica by disarming the Muslim terrorist
9 bands, gangs, and complete demilitarisation of the Srebrenica enclave."
10 This demilitarisation of the enclave was in fact a precondition
11 while it was a safe -- still a safe area, a protected zone.
12 A. We expected that to happen in 1993, in actual fact.
13 Q. And to continue, it says: "The president of the republic has
14 ordered that in continuation of the combat activities, full protection
15 should be provided for the members of UNPROFOR and the Muslim civilian
16 population and that they be guaranteed their security and safety if they
17 cross over onto the territory of Republika Srpska. In keeping with the
18 order of the president of Republika Srpska, issue orders to all combat
19 compositions taking part in the combat activities around Srebrenica to
20 give maximum protection and safety and security to UNPROFOR members and
21 the Muslim civilian population and order the subordinate units to refrain
22 from destruction of civilian targets unless forced to do so because of
23 strong enemy resistance. Ban the torching of residential buildings and
24 treat the civilian population and prisoners of war in accordance with the
25 Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949."
1 That is that order. And you had the order, did you not?
2 A. No, Mr. Milosevic. I saw the order for the first time when it was
3 shown to me by the OTP. The order is addressed to the people you see.
4 You can see who it's addressed to.
5 Q. And it says: "In accordance with the order of the president of
6 Republika Srpska, the order issued to all combat units participating in
7 combat operations around Srebrenica."
8 A. Quite obviously, yes.
9 Q. Next I have another order here by the president of Republika
10 Srpska, and it was written by Dr. Radovan Karadzic himself on the 11th of
11 July, 1995, and he refers to the article of the constitution and orders as
12 follows: First, after the establishment of control of Republika Srpska in
13 the area of Serbian Srebrenica to set up a public security station of
14 Srpska Srebrenica. The work of the station would move in conformity with
15 the laws and legal provisions of Republika Srpska. Special attention
16 should be paid to the protection of public law and order, personal
17 protection for citizens and their property and preventing all crimes from
18 taking place and uncovering the perpetrators should crimes like that take
19 place and also to provide protection and security to industrial
20 facilities. All participants taking part in the struggles against the
21 Serb army should be treated as prisoners of war and be treated within the
22 spirit of the law and international conventions and to enable everybody
23 else the free choice of where they wish to live or move to."
24 And the fifth point is: "Close cooperation to be established with
25 Miroslav Deronjic, the civilian commissar of the municipality of Srpska
1 Srebrenica and other organs and authorities and organisations in the
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, the previous order has
4 already been tendered as an exhibit, and I should like to have this
5 subsequent order exhibited as well. The witness can, of course, take a
6 look at it first. And it is the order --
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness see the order.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think, Mr. Milosevic, that this is
9 a copy of the order issued by President Karadzic and addressed to the MUP
10 of Republika Srpska or, rather, the Minister.
11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Yes, that's right.
13 A. I saw the order in the set of documents provided by the OTP.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: And it has not been exhibited before. Mr. Nice?
15 MR. NICE: I'll check that --
16 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours --
17 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Tapuskovic.
19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] At my proposal, it was exhibited.
20 I don't remember through which witness. The two orders, the one from
21 Mr. Karadzic's book and -- actually, both have been exhibited.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let us not delay the proceedings for that. I'll
23 ask the registrar to check on that and we'll come back to that later.
24 JUDGE KWON: Please check court Exhibit 22.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Continue, Mr. Milosevic. We'll deal with the
1 exhibit later.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.
3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Since this is by and large in the context of what you refer to in
5 your second statement when you deal with various documents, it has to do
6 with combat in that area, I have here a decision on the proclamation of a
7 state of war in the municipality of Srebrenica Skelani, which on the basis
8 of the constitution of Republika Srpska was adopted by a president of the
9 republic, Radovan Karadzic, on the 14th of July, 1995. Where it says a
10 state of work is being proclaimed, declared on the territory of -- the
11 municipality of Srebrenica Skelani; item 2, the objective is to engage all
12 human and material potentials in the defence and in order to reach
13 ultimate victory over the enemy; 3, all available potentials will be used
14 in order to take necessary measures in order to achieve the set
15 objectives. In accordance with constitutional and legal provisions, the
16 government, the ministries, and all other state authorities are duty-bound
17 to strictly observe the decision on general mobilisation; 4, the
18 organisation, composition, and the functioning of state authorities in the
19 municipality shall be carried out in accordance with the regulations that
20 are applied in a state of war; 5, the armed forces and the authorities
21 will observe international law and international conventions which
22 regulate the behaviour of a state in a state of war.
23 And then this will be made public, sent to the Assembly, and so
24 and so forth.
25 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note that they did not have the
2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. So there was combat with the units of the army of
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time; is that right?
5 A. Yes. There was fierce fighting.
6 Q. Oh, fierce fighting. So there is no doubt that it is said quite
7 clearly that the armed forces -- or, rather, this has to do with a
8 declaration of a state of war in Srebrenica Skelani and provisions of
9 international law and international conventions will be observed, and the
10 president of the republic recalls this in his document.
11 A. I don't have the document, but I assume that that's what it says.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is also a photocopy of the
13 original, but it is quite legible. The number and the date and the
14 signature and the stamp are quite evident here, like on the previous one,
15 so I would like to have this admitted into evidence, too, please.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: And just for the record, Mr. Milosevic, the
17 document to which you referred earlier, the second order, had already been
18 exhibited as Court Exhibit 22.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I assume that this one
20 has not been exhibited yet.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll have the same exercise. The registrar will
22 make a check and inform me. Continue with the cross-examination.
23 [Trial Chamber confers]
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Not exhibited before. We'll exhibit it.
25 THE REGISTRAR: Defence Exhibit 238, Your Honours.
1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Also, there is an order of Radovan Karadzic's, dated the 22nd of
3 July, 1995, in which he orders, number one, strictly prohibit the
4 distribution of any material goods from the territory of the municipality
5 of Srebrenica without explicit approval of the Government of Republika
6 Srpska; and secondly, in order to have this order implemented, it is the
7 General Staff of the army of Republika Srpska that is responsible as well
8 as the Ministry of the Interior and the War Presidency of the municipality
9 of Srebrenica.
10 Also, there is an order dated the 14th of July that was signed by
11 Dr. Radovan Karadzic. The decision on the appointment of the War
12 Presidency of the municipality of Srebrenica and Skelani, where the War
13 Presidency is being established consisting of nine persons among whom,
14 number one, as president of the War Presidency, Miroslav Deronjic. And
15 then president of the Executive Council of the Municipal Assembly,
16 Katanic, the commander from the Bratunac Brigade Zekic, then Petrovic
17 deputy commander, Pavlovic head of the public security station, Rankic
18 president of the board of the local community of Sase, then Canic the
19 director of PB Zvornik. That is probably some company from Bratunac.
20 Ilic head of DP Gradac, and finally Cvjetinovic president of the Municipal
21 Board of the SDS. The War Presidency was established. These orders were
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, could this please be
24 admitted into evidence, and if the witness wishes to have a look at it
25 first, he is free to do so.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Show them to the witness first.
2 JUDGE KWON: And I would ask the registrar to check whether this
3 is identical with Court Exhibit 21.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Both of these orders have the usual
5 form, and they seem to be copies of original documents.
6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Could you please have a look at one particular order. It has to
8 do with your testimony about what happened in 1993, and yesterday there
9 was a witness who gave evidence here, and he said that this is not the way
10 things were done. This is the order of the 16th of April, 1993, that was
11 signed by president of the republic, Radovan Karadzic. In view of the
12 constitution, he issues the following order on the 16th of April, 1993:
13 "Cease all operations of the VRS in and around Srebrenica except for those
14 that constitute necessary defence.
15 "Secondly, stop the forces of the army of Republika Srpska at the
16 positions that they achieved already and do not allow them to enter
18 "Thirdly, facilitate the passage of all humanitarian convoys both
19 into Srebrenica and also when exiting town.
20 "Further, make sure that the town will be pacified, because the
21 Muslim forces should surrender their weapons to UNPROFOR, and UNPROFOR
22 will have a double-key system with the Serb forces.
23 "Five, after handing over weapons, all Muslim fighters should be
24 treated like other civilians. Protect all civilians and give them freedom
25 of choice to either leave or stay.
1 "Do not carry out any war crimes investigation until the situation
2 calms down in Srebrenica.
3 "Seven, this order should be carried out immediately, and I
4 should be informed about its implementation."
5 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note that again they did not have
6 the document.
7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. I assume that you know about this, and you know about this order
9 in terms of what was going on in 1993?
10 A. Mr. Milosevic, this order of President Karadzic was probably
11 addressed to the Main Staff. The units there near Srebrenica got an order
12 from the commander of the Drina Corps with similar content, and it is true
13 that we were stopped on the very outskirts of town and that all actions
14 were stopped.
15 Q. Were you there then?
16 A. Yes. We were stopped at the fort above Kula -- no, rather, above
18 Q. All right. And what about all the other paragraphs from the order
19 of Radovan Karadzic? Was all of this carried out? Were you a witness of
20 the humanitarian convoys that came to Srebrenica?
21 A. What I was an eyewitness of was that we stopped, that we stopped
22 combat operations, that we no longer went on towards Srebrenica, that
23 armoured vehicles of UNPROFOR came and were deployed at various positions,
24 and then we returned to positions that we were supposed to go back to, and
25 then we started fortifying ourselves there. And we go not go into the
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, could this order
3 please be admitted into evidence as well.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, it may be exhibited. Separate exhibits.
5 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honour, the order dated the 22nd of July,
6 1995, will be Defence Exhibit 239. The order dated the 14th of July,
7 1995, will be Defence Exhibit 240. And the final order dated the 16th of
8 April, 1993, will be Defence Exhibit 241.
9 MR. NICE: Your Honour, we haven't, of course, seen these exhibits
10 at any great length, and can't be in any position to accept them other
11 than as documents produced in this way at this stage. We have to reserve
12 our position -- or might have to reserve our position on them when we
13 examine them.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well, yes.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In these papers that were provided
16 to me, Mr. Robinson, I would just like to have certain matters clarified,
17 because these materials accompanied this witness.
18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Tab 2 there's a document of the 2nd Military District operations
20 team on duty, the 2nd of April, 1992. So Yugoslavia is still in
21 existence, and the JNA is still functioning.
22 Can you please have a look at this tab, Mr. 1804.
23 A. If it is brought to me.
24 Q. At that time the JNA is in existence, and also there are attacks
25 launched against the JNA, because paragraph 1 is entitled The Enemy, and
1 it says: "During the 1st and 2nd of April, 1992, the enemy carried out
2 combat operations on several occasions on the positions of our forces
3 using infantry, artillery and rocket fire. The overview of the violations
4 is in the annex to this report."
5 At that time there was supposed to be a cease-fire, and it can be
6 seen from this that they were even using rocket and artillery fire against
7 them, not only infantry fire. Is that uncontested?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Also, sabotage groups are present. They are setting mines on
10 travel routes and carrying out combat activities on vehicles and men
11 participating in traffic.
12 A. That's what it says here.
13 Q. And then paragraph 2, Situation Regarding Combat Readiness in the
14 2nd Military District, that there is full combat readiness and they are
15 carrying out regular activities with the emphasis on territory control and
16 "preparations to take in UN forces as well as preparations for the
17 relocation of our units to new sectors."
18 So new UN forces should be brought in. And it can be seen here
19 that the cease-fire is violated by the Muslim forces and that they, on the
20 other hand, are preparing to take in UN forces.
21 A. Mr. Milosevic, this is the 2nd Military District. This is the
22 second army. It is probably Slavonia on the other side of the Sava River.
23 It's probably correct if that is what is written here.
24 Q. Not Slavonia. It doesn't refer to Slavonia. It says the
25 situation in the territory. And you will see all of this is here on
1 page 1.
2 "Situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina is extremely tense and critical
3 with serious armed conflicts in Bijeljina and Bosanski Brod. And
4 reference is also made to paramilitary formations taking measures in order
5 to close the communication directions which are leading from Bosanski Brod
6 and Zvornik and on the north-west from Travnik, Vitez and Zenica, to
7 Sarajevo. Obviously the intentions for communication and other isolation
8 of the freed territories are present."
9 And then he talks -- there is reference to increased number of
10 communication devices. There is reference to the Green Berets on the
11 other page. Do you know about that?
12 A. For the most part, yes.
13 Q. And then it says -- it is said that the delegation of the
14 Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina which set out to Bijeljina in order to
15 have the situation calm down could not get close to the war area so it
16 landed in a helicopter near Tuzla, and reference is made to the engagement
17 of the Republic of Croatia and that that is more than obvious.
18 Aggressively engaged towards the single objective of causing an
19 inter-ethnic conflict and war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and offsetting the
20 role of any JNA in this context.
21 Is that a report that is in line with what the situation was then?
22 A. For the most part.
23 Q. The 4th Corps, it says: "Paramilitary formations of the SDA, the
24 Green Berets, are especially active."
25 The 17th Corps situation in this corps is the most complex one.
1 I'm skipping the corps that I cannot deal with right now. So the
2 situation on the territory of this corps is the most conflict,
3 inter-ethnic conflicts in Bijeljina escalated and are now in full swing.
4 And then it says party leaders are not in control of the situation and
5 cannot provide for a cease-fire. MUP authorities are refusing to have
6 joint patrols with the JNA. So the JNA proposed to the authorities of the
7 MUP of Bosnia-Herzegovina to set up joint patrols in order to be able to
8 control the situation and to have it calm down, but the MUP of
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina refused to have these joint patrols with the JNA.
10 It says the corps commander Major General Jankovic is personally
11 engaged in Bijeljina in attempts to stop the armed conflict, and he is
12 working on this with political party leaders and the Council for National
14 That's part of the report, isn't it?
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Time to put a question now, Mr. Milosevic.
16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Well, my question is as follows: Can we see quite clearly from
18 all this a very constructive position taken by the army, because this is a
19 report of the command of the 2nd Military District and refers precisely to
20 those territories, that is to say to the events that we're discussing, a
21 constructive attitude on the part of the army, then, towards calming down
22 the situation and efforts to have all conflicts cease. Can one see that?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Fine. Now, at the end, Forecasts and Conclusions, he says that we
25 can expect an expansion of the situation with attacks on the facilities
1 and units of the JNA, widening of the conflicts with tendency of attack on
2 objects and JNA units to be expected. Then it says that General Nambiar
3 crossed in the Karlovac region. General Morillon is also mentioned, who
4 conveyed Nambiar's impressions, and so on and so forth. And the tendency
5 was to attack JNA facilities and units.
6 Does that correspond to your own experience from that period?
7 A. Yes. By and large it does.
8 Q. I'll do my best to get through this quickly and to skip some
10 This is interesting, to look at the situation in Srebrenica as it
11 was, and it is contained in tab 8. Would you take a look at tab 8,
12 please, which is the command of the Drina Corps to the commands of et
13 cetera, et cetera, via brigades, and it is an order for activities. And
14 it refers to enemy forces, and it is dated the 2nd of July, 1995.
15 The facts set out in this order, are they known to you, Mr. 1804?
16 A. Yes, they are.
17 Q. So this is information relating to the enemy and especially active
18 Muslim forces are mentioned from the Zepa and Srebrenica enclaves,
19 infiltrating sabotage groups which are attacking and burning undefended
20 villages, killing the civilians, and smaller areas around the Zepa and
21 Srebrenica area mentioned too. Is that how it was, is that what happened?
22 A. Yes, that's right.
23 Q. And then it goes on to say that according to information
24 available, the forces of the 28th Division were engaged in the following
25 manner: The 280th Brigade, then the 281st Brigade, 282nd Brigade, 283rd
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Brigade. All this relates to the enemy forces. Of course the 284th
2 Brigade is mentioned next, and then it says that the corps has the task of
3 launching offensive action within the area of the Drina Corps to separate
4 the Zepa and Srebrenica enclave and to reduce them to their urban areas.
5 And then, under point 3, it says the Eastern Bosnian corps of the
6 SRK -- I assume that's the Romanija Corps.
7 A. Yes, the Sarajevo Romanija Corps.
8 Q. And HK, what's the HK?
9 A. The Hercegovina Corps.
10 Q. Right, the Hercegovina Corps are still breaking the enemy
11 offensive in their areas of responsibility, so they're informing them
12 about that and says that that was an important offensive that the Muslim
13 forces were launching at the time; is that right?
14 A. Yes. It went on throughout the spring.
15 Q. And then he goes on to say that he -- "I have decided that an
16 active defence be set up to separate the enclaves of Zepa and Srebrenica
17 as soon as possible by attacking with a part of the free forces for the
18 above-mentioned reasons. The object of the attack is to narrow down the
19 Zepa and Srebrenica enclaves to improve the tactical position of the
20 forces in-depth and to create --" I've been asked to slow down. And then
21 it goes to enumerate the tasks of the units to narrow down the enclave
22 using fire support to fight any armoured units, et cetera, and it is
23 written by Major General Milenko Zivanovic.
24 Now, is that then a completely -- well, you've been to military
25 academy, you've graduated from it, you're an educated officer. Is this
1 order in conformity with all the rules of service in the army an order
2 that can be issued by the corps commander and does it in any way indicate
3 any possibility whatsoever of somebody behaving contrary to the law,
4 unlawfully, irregularly, or to perform crimes of any kind?
5 A. Mr. Milosevic, this order was written according to all the rules
6 and regulations that prevailed at the time governing orders of this kind.
7 Q. Thank you. We have very many tabs here that have been attached.
8 I don't have time to go into all the different tabs, although Mr. Nice
9 always takes note of the fact that I am being granted a lot of time
10 generously, but just looking at these tabs, I would need several days to
11 go through them all.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: At tab 2, to which you referred earlier, had been
13 withdrawn by the Prosecution.
14 MR. NICE: It had. I don't know whether the accused now wants it
15 to be reinstated.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Perhaps it should. Let it be reinstated.
17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Mr. 1804, this is tab 30. I'm going to skip over the rest of the
19 tabs in this binder because I simply don't have time to go into them, but
20 this is tab 30, and --
21 MR. NICE: Private session, I think, appropriate for tab 30.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Private session, yes.
23 [Private session]
12 Pages 31898 to 31904 redacted, private session
23 [Open session]
24 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.
25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. So, Mr. 1804, in paragraph 17 of your statement that you gave last
2 week, you say that on the morning of the 14th, your brigade engaged in the
3 first combat with part of the column of the 28th Division. Again, this
4 has to do with Srebrenica for those who could not bring things together
5 due to the interruption. And then you say: "Fighting became fiercer in
6 the early evening of the 14th. On the morning of the 15th, an all-out
7 attack started on a battalion," et cetera, et cetera, not to go into all
8 of that now.
9 So there was fighting, fierce fighting at that, in the area at the
10 time; is that right?
11 A. That's right.
12 Q. And then you say that they became even more intensive during the
13 night of the 15th and even more on the morning of the 16th, and the area
14 of Baljkovica was under constant artillery fire from both sides. And
15 then -- I don't want to mention any names now so that I would not identify
17 Then a commander's name is mentioned, and he was negotiating with
18 a commander from the other side, an officer from the command of a division
19 for the 2nd Corps of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina in order to establish
20 a corridor for the 28th Division.
21 A. That's right.
22 Q. Naser Oric's troops, a corridor in order to have them pull out.
23 A. Yes, the 28th Division.
24 Q. And then you say on the 16th of July, 1995, an agreement on a
25 temporary truce was reached that would allow for a corridor to be open for
1 hours. A large number of Muslims were able to pass through the corridor
2 while it was open; is that right?
3 A. Yes, that's right.
4 Q. That shows that there was no intention involved to carry out any
5 kind of crime?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. That that was a military operation.
8 A. That was a military operation.
9 Q. Even on the 16th of July. In paragraph 20 you say: "I think many
10 Muslims were killed during the fighting and that the corpses had been
11 removed." And you say that the Zvornik Brigade buried the corpses at
12 Motovska Kosa on the 19th or 20th of July. So these are persons killed in
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Is that right, Mr. 1804?
16 A. That's right.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the time allotted to you will be
18 up in about four minutes.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. How much more time will
20 you give me, Mr. Robinson.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Another five minutes.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Oh, then I have to hurry up. Then I
23 really have to hurry up.
24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. I think I can say this in open session too. In paragraph 33 you
1 say in relation to the events of Srebrenica: "I am not aware of any
2 investigations made by the army of Republika Srpska into these events, nor
3 was I questioned by anybody about my involvement except by the OTP.
4 However, later I heard about some investigation that was instigated by
5 Karadzic in the spring of 1996, but I was not involved in that, and I
6 don't know the result of that."
7 So the president of Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadzic, in the
8 spring of 1996, started an investigation in relation to what happened in
10 A. I heard about that.
14 MR. NICE: The accused must know that should not have been said.
15 Can the --
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: That will be redacted and we move to private
18 [Private session]
12 Pages 31909 to 31913 redacted, private session
24 [Open session]
25 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, we're in open session.
1 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I'll do my best to
2 be as concise as possible in my questions to this witness.
3 Questioned by Mr. Tapuskovic:
4 Q. [Interpretation] I'd like to start off by asking the following:
5 Witness, in response to questions from Mr. Milosevic, you gave some
6 answers, and I won't be going back to that, and it had to do with some
7 paragraphs, paragraph 101, 104, and 106 of tab 1. You spoke about the
8 introductory plans for Srebrenica and the objective of the attack, and
9 you've already explained all that to us, but my question to you is as
10 follows and linked to that: In all the things you talked about and said
11 in response to the introductory plans and objects of attack, you make no
12 mention anywhere of the existence of any kind of plan which would be
13 linked to widespread, systematic destruction or harming of civilians.
14 A. No, I did not.
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Into private session.
3 [Private session]
24 [Open session]
25 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Open session, yes.
2 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Witness, in tab 8, you were shown an order. You saw that order.
4 And it was dated the 2nd of July. Could you take a look at it once again,
5 please. This order of the 2nd of July contains nothing directed against
6 civilians, that is to say that they should be jeopardised in any way. So
7 could you take a look at that order once again. I can't quote a
8 particular point, but there's no mention of civilians at all.
9 A. Yes, Mr. Tapuskovic, this is indeed an order of the 2nd of July,
10 1995. It is an order for active combat activity by the Drina Corps
11 command. It is a combat document.
12 Q. So it just relates to combat assignments, no mention of civilians.
13 A. Yes, it's a classical order stipulating the tasks and assignments
14 for active combat, and the rules provide for what such an order should
16 Q. In paragraph 148, and this is something that Mr. Milosevic dealt
17 with so I don't want to go back to that, but it is the 9th of July, 1995
18 order, and the Prosecution showed you that, and that particular order says
19 that all necessary measures should be undertaken in order to protect the
20 civilian population.
21 A. Yes, I read that out when I was shown that.
22 Q. And finally, you were shown another document, from tab 23 this
23 time. That, too, is an order, and point 3 says what you do with disarmed
24 -- captured and disarmed Muslims, but no mention is made that even towards
25 disarmed Muslims anything should be done, something that perhaps happened
1 in certain areas, but at any rate, there's no mention made there of
2 undertaking any measures towards civilians.
3 A. Yes, this is General Zivanovic's order, dated the 13th of July,
4 and no civilians are mentioned at all in that order.
5 Q. And one more point in open session. If you take a look at your
6 statement, the one of the 3rd and 4th of February, in paragraph 18 -- you
7 said -- under point 16, or under point 18, that on the 16th of July, the
8 15th and 16th of July, in fact, the Baljkovica area was constantly under
9 artillery fire from both sides. Is that what happened, that there was
10 artillery fire on both sides during those two days?
11 A. Yes, that's right.
12 Q. According to that same statement, on the 13th, you yourself learnt
13 about the tragic events that had started and that certain persons were
14 deprived of their lives.
15 A. On the 13th in the evening.
16 Q. Right, the 13th in the evening. But as far as I can see from this
17 statement, you were not in Srebrenica at all during those days.
18 A. Yes, you're quite right. I wasn't there at all.
19 Q. You were at your combat positions throughout?
20 A. Generally, yes.
21 Q. You didn't attend any execution?
22 A. No.
23 Q. Especially not civilians.
24 A. Civilians or soldiers neither.
25 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Now I'd like to wind up in
1 private session, please.
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Private session.
3 [Private session]
12 Page 31922 redacted, private session
12 Page 31923 redacted, private session
4 [Open session]
5 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.
6 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Since you participated in the fighting and were constantly up at
8 the positions and you weren't in Srebrenica during these critical events
9 for the most part --
10 A. No, I was not.
11 Q. -- could you tell the Judges something about the conflicts that
12 quite obviously didn't exist? How many victims were there amongst the
13 soldiers on your side, and how many wounded on your side in that conflict,
14 and whether you can tell us roughly at least how many Muslim soldiers lost
15 their lives in those conflicts to the best of your knowledge.
16 A. Yes, I can, Mr. Tapuskovic. First of all, let me say where I
17 myself was personally, and that is on the 14th in the fighting there, and
18 later on on the 15th. The losses suffered by the army of Republika Srpska
19 or the units I was with on the 14th, we had five persons killed and two
20 disappeared and several men wounded. I can't give you an exact figure.
21 On the 15th and 16th, we had several tens, perhaps 39 or 40
22 soldiers who were killed belonging to the army of Republika Srpska and
23 perhaps 150, let's round off the figure, they're not of course exact
24 figures, and this only relates to the units of the Zvornik Brigade in the
25 fighting from the 14th to the 16th from Snagovo to Baljkovica is the area
1 in question. Of course there were losses that the units suffered that
2 were more southerly towards Srebrenica and the corridor towards the 28th
3 Division was breaking through but I haven't got those figures. There were
4 MUP forces and other units.
5 Q. All right. And how many casualties among the 28th Division? They
6 scattered mostly.
7 A. As far as I was able to hear, the 28th Division column, in
8 breaking through, most of the casualties were between Konjevic Polje and
9 Kasaba [phoen]. They are breaking through that line. There was heavy
10 fighting there, and they suffered heavy losses. But the first fighting
11 began at Ravni Buljum, the former position of the Bratunac Brigade where
12 they started their breakthrough, and they had a lot of losses from
13 artillery fire. And those are the facts that I heard about, although I
14 wasn't there.
15 Q. Could you give us a rough estimate, please? Roughly how many?
16 A. Well, I read the witness statement supplied to me by the OTP, the
17 statements of the Muslims who were there. Some of them said 500. Some
18 mentioned the figure of 1.500, et cetera. But where I myself was located
19 at Snagovo, on that day, the 14th, they suffered quite a number of losses,
20 that is certain, because we used heavy weapons, and then we stopped, but
21 they had enormous losses at Baljkovica too when there was fighting, an
22 all-out attack from both sides.
23 Q. Well, what about this figure of 1.500, is it realistic or not?
24 A. Well, the column of the 28th Division had enormous losses,
25 suffered enormous casualties in its breakthrough at least as far as I'm
1 able to deduce from the reports.
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice. Re-exam?
3 MR. NICE: Could we start in closed session.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Closed session.
5 MR. NICE: Private session.
6 [Private session]
25 [Open session]
1 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session.
2 MR. NICE:
3 Q. Go on to deal with some of the exhibits you've been asked about.
4 You've been asked about tab 8 in the bundle. The Chamber may wish to
5 refresh their memory of which it is. You've been asked about it by both
6 the accused and by Mr. Tapuskovic on the basis that it's a mere and normal
7 military order.
8 Would you now please turn to tab 9, which was the earlier order of
9 the 17th of March. And if the Chamber would be good enough to go to page
10 10 in the English, the paragraph headed "Drina Corps."
11 Do you see in the passage "Drina Corps" an order of which you were
12 aware to the effect: "By planned and well-thought-out combat operations
13 create an unbearable situation of total insecurity with no hope of further
14 survival of life for the inhabitants of Srebrenica and Zepa." Help us
15 please, Witness, once you've reminded yourself of that. Does the order --
16 A. I have found it, Mr. Nice.
17 Q. Does the order of the 2nd of July have to be seen in the context
18 of its following on from that order of the 17th of March instructing that
19 the life should be made unbearable?
20 A. This document dated the 8th of March, 1995, is a directive, I
21 think, of the Supreme Command. How should I put this? It is a broader
22 document issuing more extensive assignments for a longer period of time,
23 and it is correct that in this particular paragraph that has to do with
24 the Drina Corps that is precisely what is referred to in relation to
25 Srebrenica and Zepa. This combat document of the Drina Corps dated the
1 2nd of July practically issues assignments to separate units, and all of
2 them are mentioned specifically, in order to divide the territories of
3 Zepa and Srebrenica respectively and that the enclaves be reduced to the
4 urban areas only, respectively.
5 Q. That was the next question to which I was going to --
6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Nice, please.
7 MR. NICE:
8 Q. That's the next question to which I turn, with the instructions of
9 the March document about making life intolerable in mind. By the July
10 order, in what area would the 30 or 40.000 inhabitants of Srebrenica then
11 be confined?
12 A. I think that the population lived throughout the enclave. Most of
13 them were in the town of Srebrenica itself and a refugee camp up there
14 towards Zeleni Jadar, although there were villages there as well that were
15 within the enclave that were inhabited too.
16 Q. But if there was to be further confinement of the area to the
17 urban area described, can you help us, please, with an estimate of what
18 space the 30 or 40.000, if it was, were to be confined? Can you help us,
20 A. Well, in this order, reference is made to the urban area, as you
21 had also put it. It is not stated specifically what this means in the
22 narrower sense of the word. Perhaps the town of Srebrenica itself or
23 perhaps Srebrenica and Potocari. It is not spelled out precisely here,
24 but anyway it is an area that is smaller than what the enclave was before.
25 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for Mr. Nice.
1 MR. NICE:
2 Q. The rest of that, I think, will be for argument.
3 You were asked several questions about orders seemingly regular in
4 form. In your second statement, please, at paragraph 27. Without saying
5 anything that will identify you in any way, just yes or no, is it the case
6 that there were instructions about the writing down or not writing down of
7 matters in orders, please?
8 A. There was such an order.
9 Q. Incidentally, and before I part from it, Mr. Tapuskovic, in his
10 line of questioning about those in Srebrenica, spoke of certain people
11 being deprived of their lives. Just yes or no to this, please. Not yes
12 or no. In one sentence, how were people in Srebrenica deprived of their
13 lives? Was it in combat or was it by other methods?
14 A. In different ways.
15 Q. And in the ways that weren't in combat, what ways were there?
16 A. That means that those are illegal ways.
17 Q. In your first statement, please, at paragraph 66, we find the
18 passage in respect of which you were asked questions by the accused
19 dealing with the 30th Personnel Centre based in Belgrade and what it was
20 and what it wasn't. However, the second sentence of that paragraph was
21 not read out. It says this: "In fact, I considered myself to be a member
22 of the VJ." Is that sentence still correct, please?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. You made an observation in answer to a question about the VRS
25 survival without assistance of the army of Yugoslavia. Two questions.
1 First, do you know yourself what in financial terms the level of support
2 was or is that for others to deal with?
3 A. I really don't know that.
4 Q. Second, dealing with the particular unit of which you were a
5 member without identifying it in any way, can such a unit survive without
7 A. What officers do you mean?
8 Q. Its officers, those who lead it. Can a unit survive without them?
9 A. Not a single unit, not a single military unit can survive without
10 officers leading it.
11 Q. Were the officers in your unit paid from Belgrade?
12 A. This one group -- I mean, the figure varied during the war, but
13 roughly it was between 50 -- 15 to 22 at the most. Officers, including
14 commissioned and non-commissioned officers, who were receiving their
15 salaries from the 30th Personnel Centre.
16 Q. I needn't take the Chamber to it, but you will find I think at
17 paragraph 76 the way the witness first expressed this proposition.
18 You were asked questions in relation to paragraph 92 about your
19 knowledge of Serbian MUP involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the
20 course of the war. What you said at that paragraph was: "I do not know
21 if the Serbian MUP was operating during the course of the war in
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina." Does that remain your position?
23 A. Yes, I have no such knowledge.
24 Q. So far as Arkan is concerned, and you deal with him at
25 paragraph 93, saying how he came in September 1995 to Manjaca and Kljuc,
1 do you know by which organ of government, if any, he was supported and
3 A. In one of preceding paragraphs in this statement, I said that I do
4 not know specifically, but it seemed that he was in a way an extended arm
5 of the MUP, although I do not have any more detailed information about
6 this. Probably they financed him too in one way or the other.
7 Q. At paragraph 148, you dealt with the Tolimir order that we've
8 looked at, which deals with required respect for the Geneva Conventions.
9 At the time of events in the middle of July of 1995, to your knowledge
10 were those Conventions respected or not?
11 A. No.
12 Q. As to MUP --
13 A. In the specific period that you are referring to.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: In what way were they not respected? Would you
15 like to give us some examples. Are you in a position to give us examples,
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, afterwards in the
18 evening of the 14th, these killings started, and then it went on. Now we
19 know that some were committed earlier on as well. I mean, the mass
20 killings. For example, Orahovac, Petkovci, and the like.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.
22 MR. NICE:
23 Q. You've been asked about the Pandurevic combat report of the 15th
24 of July, the additional number or burden of people who would have to be
25 let go. Were they let go to freedom? If not, what happened to them,
2 A. They were not let go to freedom, Mr. Nice. They were executed
4 Q. Finally, in light of the generality of the questions asked you by
5 the accused and also indeed by implication by Mr. Tapuskovic, before the
6 war, to your knowledge, who were the majority occupants -- who had a
7 majority in Srebrenica; Serbs, Muslims, who?
8 A. I think that the majority population before the war in Srebrenica
9 was Muslim, although I do not know the percentages involved in the actual
11 Q. And after the attack and after the events of the massacre, to your
12 knowledge were there any or many left there?
13 A. You mean in the town of Srebrenica?
14 Q. Yes.
15 A. I think that most of them were no longer left there.
16 Q. Thank you very much. Can I ask, in fact, one supplementary
17 question. You gave a figure for those on your side, casualties on your
18 side by particular dates, and I think you said that five had been killed
19 by what date? Five casualties on your side by what date? I think you
20 said the 14th. I need to check it just for later purposes.
21 A. Yes. Yes. I was talking about the morning fighting at Snagovo,
22 on the 14th in the morning. So in the group of those units where I was,
23 there were five casualties and two men went missing.
24 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
25 MR. NICE:
1 Q. You say in the morning fighting.
2 A. On the 14th. On the 14th at Snagovo.
3 Q. And that fighting with those casualties was concluded - it may be
4 important - by what time in the day?
5 A. Late into the night. I don't know. Roughly speaking, the
6 fighting ended as we broke through the 28th Division. It could have been,
7 say, 2100 hours, 2200 hours.
8 Q. On the afternoon/evening of the 14th?
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson?
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness said that this fighting
12 ended by breaking them up and by the breakthrough of the 28th Division.
13 So you were broken up, and the 28th Division broke through, whereas the
14 transcript I says "as we broke through the 28th Division," so I assume
15 that the interpreter could not hear it well, and obviously it is the way
16 the witness put it now, that his brigade of the army of Republika Srpska
17 was broken and that the 28th Division managed to break through.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It wasn't the Zvornik Brigade that
19 was --
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute. I'm going to ask the witness to
21 repeat that answer. Would you repeat the answer.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, on the 14th, in the
23 evening, the 28th Division broke up this unit of the brigade that was at
24 Snagovo. There was a total of 300 soldiers. They split us in two, and
25 they passed through our position further on to Baljkovica.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.
2 MR. NICE: I was only concerned in the time by which five were
3 casualties, and I think we have that now as the evening of the 14th. No
4 other questions of this witness. Thank you.
5 JUDGE KWON: We need to wrap up the documents raised by
6 Mr. Tapuskovic, two of them.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let us deal first with the documents that were
8 passed to Mr. Nice and which were being tendered for identification.
9 MR. NICE: I have no objection to their being produced.
10 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, there are six documents, monthly
11 plans of work for the command of the Zvornik Brigade, and it would be
12 Court Exhibit 28 marked for identification.
13 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Tapuskovic, did you not present an interim combat
14 report other than the six monthly work plans?
15 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes. I think that should be
16 admitted too. They sent that combat report at the moment when they were
17 broken up. That's the telegram; isn't that right?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's right.
19 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] I think that should be included
20 too. I have a copy and I can hand that over to the Court.
21 JUDGE KWON: That should be given a separate number.
22 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, that would be Court Exhibit 29.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: The documents that you tendered for
24 identification were identified by the witness, and it appears to us that
25 they could be exhibited.
1 MR. NICE: It's probably easier and we have no objection.
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll exhibit them.
3 MR. TAPUSKOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes.
4 MR. NICE: I think the Chamber -- the Chamber wanted to know from
5 me - I'm helpfully reminded by Ms. Dicklich - of which exhibits should go
6 under seal, and our calculation at the moment, it may be prudent to check
7 it again, is that it's numbers 1, 6, 7, 30, 31, and 32. We remind
8 ourselves that withdrawn tab 2 has been reinstated.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
10 MR. NICE: So the bundle is now complete. So the file is now
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: So that wraps up the exhibits.
13 Witness 1804, thank you for coming to give your evidence. You're
14 now free to go.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE KWON: Just wait until the blinds have been lowered.
17 [The witness withdrew]
18 MR. NICE: Mr. Brunborg, please. I shall continue to be assisted
19 by Mr. Waespi, and I believe Ms. Graham will be joining me.
20 [The witness entered court]
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.
22 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
23 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit.
25 WITNESS: HELGE BRUNBORG
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.
2 Examined by Mr. Nice:
3 Q. Your full name, please, sir.
4 A. My first name is Helge, my last name is Brunborg, B-R-U-N-B-O-R-G.
5 Q. There is a file of exhibits for this witness. May they be -- may
6 it be allocated a number?
7 THE REGISTRAR: 647, Your Honours.
8 MR. NICE:
9 Q. The first tab of Exhibit 647 contains the curriculum vitae of this
10 witness who produces a total of four expert reports which I can take very
11 briefly -- I mean the reports I can take very briefly. The curriculum
12 vitae even more shortly.
13 Your area of expertise, Mr. Brunborg?
14 A. It's demography.
15 Q. You've set out your qualifications, your extensive range of
16 activities, and your publications in your curriculum vitae.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just as a matter of information, under Education
18 and Training, University of Oslo, the second reference, "Cand.mag," what
19 is that?
20 THE WITNESS: It's a degree. It's a similar to a master's degree
21 in economics.
22 MR. NICE:
23 Q. It says here it's similar to a bachelor's degree. I don't know if
24 it fits between two but...
25 A. Sorry, I was misunder -- yeah, there are two Cand degrees.
1 Q. This one was a bachelor's, was it?
2 A. That's correct.
3 Q. Mr. Brunborg, your evidence falls into two entirely discrete
4 parts, and dealing with them chronologically, can we go first to tab 4 of
5 the exhibits, which is the first of your reports on the number and -- of
6 missing and dead from Srebrenica to which there is a short addendum.
7 MR. NICE: If the usher would be -- we will be asking the usher
8 perhaps to show a few of these items on the overhead projector.
9 Q. Mr. Brunborg, in summary your conclusions as to the number of
10 missing and dead in Srebrenica?
11 A. We found through an extensive analysis of missing persons that
12 there were at least 7.481 persons who went missing after the fall of
13 Srebrenica in July 1995.
14 Q. You set out the various material that you relied upon and how you
15 reached your conclusions, but just for those viewing and who haven't read
16 the report, what's the primary source of information for this conclusion?
17 A. The primary source are missing lists from the International
18 Red Cross, the ICRC, and from PHR, Physicians for Human Rights, an
19 American organisation, and we merged and checked and validated those lists
20 and came up then with the number of -- total number of missing persons.
21 Q. May we look at the chart on page 7 of your report on the overhead
22 projector which sets things out conveniently.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. We see that there were on both of these lists are missing persons
25 from the two organisations where 5.712 persons. On the ICRC list only,
1 1.586, and on the PHR list only, 192. These represent different persons.
2 Added to together, 7.490.
3 We merged this list with a voters' list from 1997 and 1998 to be
4 absolutely sure that there were no survivors. We found nine names on that
5 list as well. They need not be missing persons, but they could also be
6 misuse of missing persons' identities, but to be absolutely sure we
7 deleted them. We also deleted six persons or -- a number six because we
8 were told by the ICRC that since January 1997, six missing persons were
9 found to be living. They did not want to reveal their identities to us,
10 but to be again on the safe side, we subtracted them and ended up with
11 7.475. The six could actually be included in the nine.
12 Q. Can we go to the summary and conclusions which can be displayed on
13 the overhead projector, first at page 10. You set out that -- the figure
14 of 7.475 is according to conservative criteria. Please explain what you
15 mean by "conservative criteria."
16 A. We wanted to be absolutely certain that the persons on the missing
17 lists were persons who were reported as missing after the fall of the
18 enclave, that they were last seen after the 12th of July, 1995, and that
19 they were last seen or listed as disappeared in places near Srebrenica.
20 If in doubt, if inconsistency between the two sources, we dropped them.
21 Q. You observed how this figure differs from estimates of 8 to 10.000
22 persons killed coming from other sources and maybe other experts. Your
23 comment on the difference between your lower figure and their figure?
24 A. Well, I say in the report that this higher figure need not be
25 wrong, but we have not found sufficient evidence for it. Personally, I
1 think that it could be several hundred more but not several thousand more.
2 Q. We look at the next page of your report. You set out in the
3 second paragraph how all of the missing -- almost all of the missing
4 persons are men, but many of them are young boys under the age of 16 or
5 old men over 60. Only 48 of the missing persons are women. The youngest
6 female being, I think, 8 years old at the time of disappearance; correct?
7 A. That's correct.
8 Q. As to ethnicity and so far as this was established, all bar one
9 were Bosniaks. The single exception being a Serb.
10 A. That's correct.
11 Q. Can we turn, then, to the graphs in the annex, which are the two
12 following pages, where we can see some things represented graphically.
13 The first shows the -- the first chart at the top shows the
14 distribution of men by age at disappearance, and we can see a peak between
15 the age of late teens or late teens and early 20s; correct?
16 A. That's correct.
17 Q. With a second peak between 40 to 45.
18 A. That's correct.
19 Q. And then what looks like a third peak between 55 and 60.
20 Significance of any of that?
21 A. Well, men of military ages were singled out, that is, men in their
22 20s, late teens and early 20s, but it's also interesting, as you
23 indicated, that so many men in their 50s and 60s are missing.
24 Q. You have done a similar chart, or you had prepared a similar chart
25 for women. Before we focus if at all on that, what was the overall sample
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 number again? Remind us.
2 A. Women 48, out of almost 7.500. So it's a very small number.
3 Q. We go to the third chart which may be more valuable. Explain it
4 for us, please, and the significance we can find in the shapes of the
6 A. The left bars show the age distribution of the missing persons,
7 the 7.500. The right bars show approximate ages of exhumed bodies which
8 at that time, I think, were less than 2.000. These are not identified
9 bodies. Their ages have been estimated through anthropological methods,
10 and this is far of from an exact science, but nevertheless the
11 correspondence between the two age distributions is very good, which
12 indicates that these come from the same population, that these exhumed
13 bodies come from a sample of missing persons.
14 Q. It's not terribly -- it's not terribly --
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.
16 MR. NICE: Sorry.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Doctor, sorry not to have asked you before in
18 relation to the first figure, and the significance of the peaks, you say,
19 is that it indicates that the men in that age group were singled out.
20 What allows you to say that they were singled out in contradistinction to
21 saying quite simply that they were killed?
22 THE WITNESS: Well, I'm presenting here a list of missing persons.
23 At the outset I don't know whether they were killed or not. Now, all
24 indications, all available evidence indicates that they were in fact
25 killed, but these are really lists of missing persons which are
1 distinguished between these two, and then later look for evidence on
2 whether they were killed or not.
3 And the singled out, well, it just shows the peak and that they
4 were over-represented in the group of missing persons.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: I just wondered if there was anything in your
6 science, in your discipline, rather, which enables you to say that a
7 particular group was singled out because they appear at a peak in your
9 THE WITNESS: Well, this is an approximate expression and it just
10 means that there is a peak. That's all I meant.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
12 MR. NICE:
13 Q. If we stay with His Honour's question and remind ourselves of what
14 figure 1 shows, should we notionally contrast that with what distribution
15 of males by age you would find if you just took a random population or the
16 population of a town such as Srebrenica had been? Would you see the
17 similar distribution; that is to say a peak of people between the ages of
18 18 and 21 and then tailing off in this way or would you see a different
19 distribution or can't you say?
20 A. We would not see that short peak because there would also be many
21 people -- many boys below the age of 20 and 18. But of course it will
22 peak until the higher ages.
23 Perhaps a graph in the addendum might illuminate this more.
24 Q. Very well. But just before we do, can I -- and I hope this is not
25 unhelpful, just conclude what I was dealing with with figure 3 on the
1 overhead projector to make sure we all understand that.
2 And the two -- the two figures, the left-hand one relates to the
3 people between 13 and 24 years of age. The left-hand half of that says
4 that 26.4 per cent of those were found --
5 A. No. 26.4 per cent of the missing persons are in age group 13 and
7 Q. Whereas 73.6 are in the next age group, and when you go to the
8 exhumations, 17.5 per cent are in the earlier age group and 82.2 are in
9 the higher age group, I suppose the balance being accounted for in the
10 left-hand very low figure.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Shall we then, as you advise us, turn to your addendum report,
13 which is at tab 5. The reason for preparing an addendum report,
14 Mr. Brunborg?
15 A. We did some additional work after the report was concluded in
16 February 2.000. We merged or we matched the missing persons with the
17 pre-war census, the population census of 1991, on an individual basis,
18 especially to find out where the missing persons lived, because nobody
19 knows the number of people in Srebrenica before the fall. And we found
20 then --
21 Q. The chart you wish us to look at, is it on the fourth sheet and
22 it's the bar chart?
23 A. Yes, figure 1.
24 Q. Thank you. Please explain.
25 A. And here we have looked at the -- the proportion of the number of
1 mean in each age group in 1991 who were later recorded as missing and then
2 probably killed. We see the peak is now not early 20s. There is a peak
3 but the highest peak is in the 50s where more than 50 per cent of the men
4 who lived in Srebrenica in 1991 were reported as missing and probably
6 Q. It's over -- it's just over 50 per cent.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. For 46 to 50, it's just under 50 per cent on either side?
9 A. Yes, and on average it's about one-third of the men.
10 Q. Your conclusions at the second report we can find on the
11 penultimate page, paragraph 6, to the effect that 87 per cent of the
12 persons on the list have been documented as living in Srebrenica or the
13 surrounding areas. In what way documented?
14 A. Because their names were found in the census. They were
15 enumerated in the 1991 census. So these are not made-up names. These are
16 real persons who were enumerated before the war started.
17 Q. Total number of missing persons is probably not much higher, you
18 concluded, than the number you found at your earlier report, 7.475. And
19 then you say something about the fatality rates.
20 A. That was the graph that we just saw which shows that approximately
21 one-third of the men were missing and probably killed.
22 Q. You make your comments on arguments to the contrary effect. You
23 may or may not be asked such questions in cross-examination. You can deal
24 with them then.
25 Can we turn now to the next of your reports, not necessarily the
1 next in time but the next in sequence for us, which we can find at tab 3.
2 Beg your pardon. Tab 2. The Kosovo report. We have some charts for
4 So far as Kosovo is concerned, the purpose of your report,
5 Mr. Brunborg, was what?
6 A. I asked to write a report on the population size and population
7 distribution in Kosovo before the outbreak of the violent conflict. That
8 is at the end of 1998. The date I focus on was 1st of October 1998, so I
9 was not concerned with events after the conflict started.
10 Q. On the first page of your report, if that can be displayed. We
11 see a summary. And your summary conclusion?
12 A. Is that the -- in Kosovo, before the conflict started, there were
13 -- well, the population was about 2.1 million, between 2 and 2.2 million,
14 and that the proportion of Albanians was -- Albanian Kosovars was 83 per
15 cent, of ethnic Serbs about 10 per cent, and of persons in other ethnic
16 groups about 7 per cent.
17 Q. Do we have to deal with migration when looking at Kosovo?
18 A. That is, of course, a very important issue, but unfortunately we
19 do not have any migration figures or we have very poor estimates of the
20 migration, so these figures were estimated in more indirect ways.
21 Q. How? By what method did you estimate outmigration from Kosovo?
22 A. I looked at all available sources, including lots of statistics
23 from the Federal Statistical Office in Belgrade. They did not have any
24 migration data but there was a study, a survey conducted in Kosovo in
25 November 1999 and February 2000 headed by a group of French demographers
1 and a household survey, and they asked if there were any absent household
2 members and when they left and so on. So that gives an indication of how
3 many people left Kosovo. They also, starting in 1981, added births and
4 subtracted deaths for every year up to 1998, and in that way found the
5 population size if there had not been any migration and compared it with
6 other estimates of the population in Kosovo in 1998, 1999.
7 Q. Can we turn briefly to the chart on page 10. I think we have
8 colour versions of this but maybe my version will do.
9 This shows, does it, the population of Kosovo by ethnicity
10 according to the censuses of 1948 to 1991. And we can see throughout a
11 majority of Albanians and it looks as if their figures are rising
13 A. That is correct.
14 Q. The Serb figure, is it constant or is it growing or declining?
15 A. It was growing until 1971, and then declining slightly since then.
16 Q. We move next, please, to page 14 and the figure 2. A word about
18 A. Well --
19 Q. This shows the total population according to official censuses and
20 I think mid-year estimates.
21 A. Yes, most of these dots and crosses are made by the Federal
22 Statistical Office in Belgrade except for a few which have been indicated,
23 including the one made by French demographers Blayo et al., 1998, UNHCR,
24 1998, and Islami 1995. They're not very far off from the other figures.
25 And this one that is far off which is an estimate made and published by
1 the Federal Secretariat of Information.
2 Q. That's the single figure in the middle of the right-hand side of
3 the page. Is the information published in 1998 but it relates to
4 mid-1995, it would appear?
5 A. No. As far as I know, it's both made for 1998 and published in
7 Q. And supported or not and subsequently to be relied on or not?
8 A. When I wrote this report, I did not have that source, but I later
9 got it and read how they made it, and there's very little, if any, sound
10 basis for that estimate.
11 Q. We then turn, the following page, to figure 3. Calculation of
12 fertility rates. Serb ethnicity on the bottom. We can see a linear
13 decline from 1950 to -- or shows a linear decline from 1950 to the
14 mid-1960s, with a similar downward slope in the fertility rate for Kosovo.
15 Was that Kosovo or Kosovo Albanians?
16 A. No, it's all Kosovo, and the other one is all of Serbia excluding
18 Q. Following that similar decline, we see a difference in the rate of
19 decline from Kosovo to Serbia overall, and then we see the dotted lines
20 between 1980 and 1990. Any comment you wish to make on those?
21 A. This shows that Kosovo is lagging behind the fertility trends or
22 what we call demographic transition that has happened in all of the
23 industrial world, and it took, even at the end of the 1980s, they had
24 almost four children each, on average. And this explains the very high
25 population growth of Albanians in Kosovo.
1 Q. Figure 4, please, next, on page 16. Is this the proportion of
2 Albanians and Serbs of the Kosovo population according to the censuses
3 you've relied on?
4 A. That is correct.
5 Q. And so we can see that the Albanian percentage declined just a
6 touch between 19 -- late 1940s and very early 1950s and then has been
7 steadily increasing whereas the Serbs' has been declining from the late
8 1940s, appearing on the graph to level off at the late 1980s.
9 A. That's correct. I should add, though, that the figure for 1991 is
10 more unreliable as there was -- as the Albanians boycotted the 1991
11 census. The figure for 1991 has been arrived at from projecting the 1981
12 population forward.
13 Q. Figure 5, please, next. Projected total population of Kosovo.
14 A. It's basically the same as figure 2, except that we have included
15 some projections made by the Federal Statistical Office to show how they
16 viewed the prospects of future population growth in the mid 1990s, with a
17 low variant and high variant, that is with and without migration. So they
18 did not foresee a very large outmigration but a small outmigration.
19 Q. And even with that small migration, we reach a figure
20 substantially in excess of two and a half million by two thousand and
21 whatever it is, fifteen; is that correct?
22 A. Yes, because of through the high age structure caused by high
23 fertility, there would be high population growth for many years, even
24 without some net outmigration.
25 Q. There is a short addendum to this report, tab 3. The reason for
1 the addendum and your comments on it, please.
2 A. The OTP requested the government of the Federation of Yugoslavia
3 for some additional material and they got that material, some of it
4 submitted by the Federal Statistical Office. I was asked to review that
5 material, and they did not change my conclusions. Most of it I knew
6 already. They point out the uncertainty of the population estimates,
7 including the lack of information on migration and the boycott of the 1991
8 census by the Albanians.
9 Q. So your conclusions remained the same. Can we check, please, what
10 the exhibits are that are before the Chamber? We have your curriculum
11 vitae, your four reports which take us to tab 5. Tab 6, please, the
12 missing persons on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Tell us about
14 A. Excuse me. Ah, that is the list published by ICRC.
15 Q. Yes.
16 A. Which is a public list of -- for all of Bosnia published in the
17 1998 by ICRC in Sarajevo.
18 Q. Part of your source material; correct?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. At tab 7, described as an example of a false match. Just lay that
21 on the overhead projector to show what it is that you would be taking
22 account of.
23 A. When we compare the list -- the missing persons with the post-war
24 voters' list, we wanted to be very strict and include strict criteria for
25 including, and we had to make sure that the person, the records found that
1 looked similar, that they were actually representing the same persons. So
2 if a person -- persons had the same first name and last name, like in this
3 example Abdulah Delic, they were born in the same year, but it -- the
4 father's name was only given in the ICRC -- the ICRC list as Husein. When
5 we checked in the census, 1991, we found two persons with the name of
6 Abdulah Delic, one whose fathers name was Husein and the other one was
7 Kemal. So these Abdulah Delic records do not represent the same person
8 but two different persons. So this is an example of a false match.
9 Q. Whereas tab 8 - we can see that - is the alternative, a true
10 match, where Mensur Gabeljic shows up in two different formations.
11 A. Yes. First we noticed there was a misprint in the voters'
12 register and the "LJ" became a "Q" due to optical scanning, and when
13 searching we found no other person with that name. We found in the census
14 a person whose father's name was "Avoo," which is obviously a misprint for
15 "Avdo," born in '71, 28th of November, so we concluded this is a correct
16 match, although the year of birth in the two other above the line you see
17 were different but nevertheless we concluded that this was a correct
19 Q. So therefore that would count as one person missing, not two.
20 A. Uh-huh.
21 Q. Tab 9, persons reported missing after the takeover of the
22 Srebrenica enclave by the Bosnian Serb army on the 11th of July. Tell us
23 about this.
24 A. I don't have that in front of me.
25 Q. The ICTY's document.
1 A. Okay, yeah. This is the list by name of all the 7.481 lists --
2 names on our lists. So this is the merging of the ICRC and PHR lists.
3 Q. And on your calculation, that is the people who are missing.
4 A. Exactly.
5 Q. And finally, two short tabs. 10. I think this is another
6 example, something you've seen before, same chart or similar chart to that
7 in your report; correct?
8 A. Excuse me. Where is tab 10? That is -- yeah, this is the same as
9 the one we saw recently where it's just a graph showing age at -- age of
10 the missing person at disappearance. The same peak as we saw previously.
11 It's a bar graph instead of a line graph.
12 Q. Then finally tab 11, still dealing with people missing from
13 Srebrenica by sex and age.
14 A. And this is a break-down by age and sex, showing the 48 women by
15 age group, and the 7.433 men by age group.
16 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I think that's all I wish to ask this
17 witness. The Chamber will remember that -- will recall that tomorrow
18 morning's witness is one who is time tabled to start tomorrow morning, and
19 to be interposed in whatever other evidence, with Your Honour's leave,
20 that there is. I don't know how long the accused will wish to ask
21 Mr. Brunborg questions, but it is very important, given the expectations
22 and the changed timetable that Mr. Brunborg is able to leave at the end of
23 tomorrow if that may be at all possible.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We'll bear that in mind.
25 MR. NICE: As to what happens to Mr. Brunborg hereafter,
1 typically, of course, a witness would be asked or told not to discuss his
2 evidence. So far he hasn't been cross-examined. I don't think there's
3 anything I need to ask him but we've had to take him rather swiftly. If
4 there is any correction that he wants to draw to my attention it may be
5 that on this occasion there wouldn't be a need to restrict him from
6 talking to us because he's said nothing but go through his reports. He
7 hasn't yet been cross-examined. It's a matter entirely for the Court.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Confine it to corrections.
9 MR. NICE: Very well.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Brunborg, we are going to adjourn, and we
11 will resume for -- we will resume tomorrow morning at 9.00. You're not to
12 discuss your evidence subject to the exception that I just mentioned.
13 [Trial Chamber confers]
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Tomorrow morning we'll begin with General
15 Morillon --
16 MR. NICE: Your Honour, yes.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- is that correct?
18 MR. NICE: Yes.
19 JUDGE KWON: We refer to him still by number?
20 MR. NICE: As far as I know, there is no restraint on our
21 referring to him by the name he was given.
22 JUDGE KWON: Okay.
23 MR. NICE: I've just been sent a note raising as a possibility a
24 different ordering of witnesses but I need to discuss that with Mr.
25 Brunborg. I don't know if the Chamber would be available informally this
1 -- not informally, but available this afternoon through its offices if I
2 seek to apply to change -- for a change of order but I don't want to do
3 something on the hoof here really, because I'm not quite sure what it
4 amounts to.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. You can communicate with the legal clerk.
6 Mr. Brunborg, then the Prosecutor will let you know when you are to
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Does that mean that I actually don't
11 know who will be the witness after General Morillon? Tell me what the
12 plan is for tomorrow then, please. Is it General Morillon first, and who
13 is after him?
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. -- that will be Mr. Brunborg.
15 MR. NICE: Probably Mr. Brunborg, yes.
16 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
17 MR. NICE: If it's to be another witness -- if it's to be another
18 witness, it be B-235, but we'll make our position clear through the
19 Chamber as soon as we can.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: And to the accused.
21 MR. NICE: Yes, indeed.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: In view of the fact that you say Mr. Brunborg
23 needs to leave tomorrow, I would presume he would come immediately
24 after --
25 MR. NICE: Because the problem is that all our witnesses need to
1 be elsewhere, and with the changed timetable we have to juggle their
2 priorities, treating them with as much courtesy and care as we can but
3 without the infinity of time that would make it possible to accommodate
4 everyone. But, Your Honour, I think it will be Mr. Brunborg tomorrow
5 because I know he has other commitments elsewhere next week.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. That should be clear to the accused. We
7 are adjourned until tomorrow morning.
8 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 2.03 p.m.,
9 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 12th day of
10 February, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.