1 Wednesday, 13 October 2004
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice to continue, yes.
7 MR. NICE: Your Honour, we have been provided this morning with a
8 copy of the interview with Mladic. It's in German. And I propose to deal
9 with it a little later on, towards the conclusion of the relatively
10 limited number of questions I have to ask. I can just tell the Court and
11 thus inform the witness that we made every effort through the newspapers
12 he identified yesterday to get a published version of the article and
13 interview but were unsuccessful, and I think we even got the newspaper
14 concerned to search its archives, but we couldn't find it. But I'll raise
15 that with the witness when I come to deal with the interview. The copy of
16 the interview, we're grateful to the witness for providing. I think he
17 made some elaborate arrangements to have it copied from home or something
18 like that. We'll find out.
19 WITNESS: FRANZ-JOSEF HUTSCH [Resumed]
20 [Witness answered through interpreter]
21 Cross-examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]
22 Q. Mr. Hutsch, just a limited number of concluding questions. Some,
23 as I explained yesterday, to clarify what, if any, issues there are
24 between us.
25 You used the word "staged" yesterday, I think, twice in your
1 evidence, and I just want to identify how you use it and explain the
2 degree, if any, to which we are at odds. I think you used it in one
3 passage in relation to the horseshoe plan, and we've now disposed of the
4 horseshoe plan?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. The second possible use, and I don't think the word staging
7 appears in any of your articles that we've been able to find, but the
8 second possible use referring to the KLA directing people to go to the
9 woods or to stay in towns.
10 A. That's part of this stage. Sorry. [Interpretation] That is part
11 of this staging. I simply refer to, for example, the Stuttgarter
12 Nachrichten, I think, of 22 July 1998. They already spoke about ground
13 defensive plans within Kosovo to be undertaken by NATO. That was
14 discussed already at that time. Also when I talk about staging, I refer
15 to the activation order in October, what happened in the context of that
16 order, namely, Mr. Holbrooke was returning from Belgrade, saying he needed
17 this activation order in order to persuade Mr. Milosevic to agree to the
18 Holbrooke-Milosevic agreement. However, my research stated clearly that
19 the agreement was already signed when Holbrooke informed the NATO council.
20 There is also a note from the then German foreign minister, Klaus Kinkel,
21 confirming this as well. So that for me the whole thing was set for war
22 at a very early stage. And I mentioned yesterday the MPI [as interpreted]
23 story back in 1996. Already in Bosnia people had been recruited which
24 were then trained specifically in Turkey for a -- job capabilities the KLA
25 did not have at the time and could not have, namely the capability for
1 raging their own air war.
2 Q. That's going back to another topic. It's a new one, and I'm not
3 going to explore it. I'm simply concerned to deal with the second way in
4 which you use the word "staging" which you referred to yesterday when you
5 referred to KLA directing people to go to the woods or to stay in the
6 villages. You agreed with me yesterday that of course with Serb forces
7 approaching it would be sensible to leave your village.
8 A. Yes, of course.
9 Q. And unless you're able to -- you haven't pointed in either your
10 articles or in your evidence to any particular individual KLA or non-KLA
11 Kosovar Albanian who has given you this explanation of staging?
12 A. That was certainly not the intention of the KLA to tell me how
13 they would stage their war and what means they would employ in the
15 Q. You understand that it's the Prosecution's case - and this is what
16 I'm going to suggest to you - is that people moved and left their villages
17 because of real fear for what was going to happen to them, and that's what
18 you must have observed.
19 A. Oh, it is definitely true to say that particularly in the area
20 Malisevo, where I was, I can name people who I did not name in my
21 articles. I could name, for example, Ilijas Kaduli [phoen], I could
22 mention the name of a Special Forces unit, Eagles I, still active today,
23 by the way. They put active pressure on the civilian population to request
24 them to leave the villages, but also they actually went and forced people
25 to stay in their villages once these were under attack. I could name, for
1 example, Tahir Zenani. I could name Aljus Rama. And these are definitely
2 matters which occurred.
3 Q. That's obviously very helpful because as you know we prosecute the
4 KLA as well and we can take that information into account. But that
5 apart, it remains the Prosecution's case here that what you must have seen
6 was people acting, either wholly or in large part, in fear of attack that
7 was coming from the Serb forces. And I don't want there to be any doubt
8 about whether the issues are joined between us.
9 A. At any time of my statement, I made clear, and I think I gave you
10 the matter of a pebble being chucked into water with suddenly a big wave
11 coming back as a result. That's what I used to illustrate what I mean.
12 Often it was sufficient to have a very small provocation to cause a
13 totally out of proportion and also unjustified escalation. I made that
14 clear several times. And obviously people did play on both sides, I might
15 add, on these fears. And all this to the detriment of the civilian
16 population. I made that clear as well, and I also made it clear time and
17 again in my articles.
18 Q. This short exchange between us, another way of looking at the same
19 history is to say that the Serbs used comparatively small acts of
20 provocation to bring by vengeance huge suffering to the innocent villagers
21 of populations local to where the initial act occurred?
22 A. I have a problem, this term sort of small. If you have Serb
23 policemen being murdered as a result of an ambush, then that's not that
24 small a matter. So I have a problem with the word "small incident" or
25 provocation. Otherwise I would agree with you.
1 Q. Thank you. I think I used the word comparatively small and I
2 recognise your sensitivity on that point. Then we move to the next point,
3 where it may be necessary just to clarify what's between us, if anything.
4 That's the size of the forces of the KLA and the VJ. The evidence
5 in -- before this Chamber includes that the KLA rose from a handful of men
6 in 1995 to somewhere between 10.000 and 20.000 in about May of 1999.
7 Would you accept that?
8 A. I would accept that, yes.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I'd like to find out from the witness
10 what was the strength of the KLA in the area of Kosovo that he covered;
11 that's the central and southern parts.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] According to information I received
13 from the KLA General Staff, we would name between 18 and 20.000
14 permanently deployed fighters. Losses incurred by the KLA were made good
15 very quickly, so that that strength I mentioned could be maintained.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice. Sorry, Mr. Nice. I'm just
17 noticing that in answer to you, your proposition was that the KLA rose
18 from somewhere between 10.000 and 20.000.
19 MR. NICE: Somewhere to between 10.000 and 20.000, yes.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: But he has just said to me that in the southern
21 parts and the central parts, the areas that he covered, he would have
22 estimated the strength to be between 18.000 and 20.000.
23 MR. NICE: Thank you.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I mean the figure I mentioned
25 referred to the Kosovo as a whole, not just to the area I covered. So it
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 was information I was given by General Staff members of the KLA.
2 MR. NICE:
3 Q. To follow His Honour's question: I think we've had evidence from
4 Witness Buja that zone 6 had about 1.400 KLA, probably at the relevant
5 time. Would you accept that?
6 A. No, I would not accept that at all. The figures for manpower in
7 defence zone 6 after the spring offensive was less than the figure given.
8 We're talking about Nerodimlje. There were with brigade 162 just about
9 800 men. I mentioned yesterday that in defence zones 6 and 7, manpower
10 had been reduced considerably to an overall strength of four brigades. 162
11 in defence zone 6, 171, 173, 174, in defence zone 7, that means Vitina,
12 Gnjilane, and in both taken together I would estimate the manpower to be a
13 maximum of 2.000. I had tried to explain that because the supply routes
14 from Macedonia went through these aforementioned defensive zones. The
15 situation was one of no fighting in that area. On the contrary; there --
16 they tried to reduce what -- their activities to, for example, the area of
17 mine sweeping, and I have photographs showing it. So there was no
18 stronger force in the area.
19 Q. Turning to the Serb forces, by April, or the end of April 1999,
20 the evidence before the Chamber suggests that there were some 20.000 VJ
21 soldiers and some 30.000 paramilitary or militarised police, say 50.000 in
22 all. Would you accept that as broadly accurate?
23 A. The VJ strength, I would agree with. As far as the paramilitaries
24 are concerned, I have a slight problem which I indicated yesterday. Some
25 of the policemen who talked to me made clear that during the day or during
1 the night, depending on when your shifts were, you wore the MUP uniform,
2 and then the other time, the other shift, you then wore the paramilitary
3 uniform, or you took leave and during your leave you joined the paras.
4 And your superiors tended to see this with a very benevolent eye.
5 Q. Turning to the weaponry available to each side, the Serbs had such
6 things as armoured carriers, helicopters and tanks which were completely
7 unavailable to the KLA?
8 A. Absolutely.
9 Q. The KLA, although their weapons increased over time, they were
10 lightly armed, frequently at the beginning under-armed?
11 A. I don't see it like that. The terrain in the Kosovo actually
12 allows the KLA, with the arms they had, to have an excellent, highly
13 flexible, highly mobile form of waging war which is highly effective. And
14 the Serb armed forces and security forces were therefore forced on the
15 defensive because the equipment they had which you mentioned could not be
16 used effectively. Compare that to southern Germany where we have an
17 alpine unit specifically trained for mountainous use with the same
18 equipment as the KLA and they are very successful, and they would have
19 been very successful in the Cold War. The Austrians still have the same
20 precepts in some of their groups. If we assume that a state of the art
21 modern equipped army with armed equipment, where there is already a
22 problem going through forests, moving through mountainous areas, cannot
23 really bring this strength to bear, and there are very few areas in Kosovo
24 where they would bring that particular strength to bear and so that's a
25 problem we had here. Very mobile guerrilla army, flexibly lead with small
1 units, in a rigid hierarchy, but operating with a high degree of
2 flexibility, particularly as far as the tactical level is concerned, and
3 for the system which the VJ was using, the KLA was clearly superior to
4 them. And that I would have thought was the reason why the Serb General
5 Staff decided later on to use the VJ only for border guard duties and to
6 put the artillery systems together to mass them into strategically
7 important areas so that the paramilitary and other units, who as -- at the
8 strength of infantry groups, tried to do what the KLA also did. So the VJ
9 was just providing logistical support. That's how I would see that
11 Q. And there maybe not much between us and it will be for the Judges
12 to decide as necessary where success lay, but to this extent I think we're
13 certainly in agreement that the completing nature of their armaments and
14 their numerical strength made a hit-and-run type approach almost
15 inevitable, didn't it?
16 A. I think the hit-and-run tactics is not something which was chosen
17 the basis of available weapons. There was certainly sufficient money
18 within the KLA and still is to acquire the necessary weaponry. No, they
19 adapted their tactics to the terrain. Use Afghanistan as an example. Why
20 the alliance decided in Afghanistan to use primarily special forces and
21 special operations forces there against the Taliban. That was done for
22 that very reason because the terrain was not suitable for the use of
23 armoured vehicles, heavy immobile forces. And of course the alliance was
24 very successful in that approach they adopted. And there are sufficient
25 examples of military history even from the most recent military past
1 showing clearly that the approach adopted by the KLA was clear that it was
2 the terrain which determined tactics and weaponry. Choice of weaponry in
3 the KLA was excellent in doing that because of Agim Ceku, I suppose.
4 Q. Very well. Last point on this general topic, either -- see first
5 of all if you agree with me, otherwise I'll show you two documents. So
6 far as Pristina Corps Command is concerned, do you accept that between
7 December 1998 and April 1999 the number of brigades - I think they're
8 called combat arms brigades - doubled from six to twelve?
9 A. I would agree with you on that. And I personally would say on the
10 situation maps of the KLA, it was only immediately following the OSCE
11 Verification Mission observers withdrawal that I observed that particular
13 Q. Yes.
14 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I needn't.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Sorry. I hadn't quite finished. I
16 just wanted to give you time to deal with your papers.
17 So it was very clear that the reinforcement forces only arrived
18 after the KVM people had left. This is supported by situation reports
19 made by the German defence ministry in Bonn and foreign ministry, and also
20 NATO documents confirm this.
21 MR. NICE: First of all, Your Honour, the exhibits that show the
22 doubling - I needn't trouble you with them - are Exhibits 319, tabs 31
23 and 77, and it's the address lists on those two documents that show the
24 doubling up of brigades.
25 Q. Let's turn on now then -- and just one other point that I must
1 clarify as between us, rather than leave things unresolved. You spoke
2 yesterday towards the end of your evidence of two particular areas which
3 were cleared of their populations by the KLA because they were needed as
4 command centres; is that right?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. So there may have been other places where areas were cleared for
7 command centre purposes, but this was what you saw in your area? Thank
8 you very much.
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And it's right that the VJ had a unit, the 72nd Special Brigade;
11 is that right? And the 63rd Parachute Brigade together with some military
12 police units that were dedicated to counter-insurgency, to hit and run
14 A. Absolutely, yes.
15 Q. Very well. Then just a couple of points on things you've already
16 spoken about. We dealt with refugees. Velika Krusa was one site you
17 spoke of where the Serbs attacked in a way that you found particularly I
18 say memorable, but unforgettable, I think, and you've told us a bit about
19 that. Were you aware of and did you see some 10.000 villagers in the
20 forest there?
21 A. No. 10.000, no. I spoke of 10.000 in the Kacanik area and I did
22 localise them in certain areas. Velika Krusa specifically I wouldn't say
23 10.000. I would estimate that number to be between 1.000, 1.500. But
24 they did leave quickly and not all of these people were from Velika Krusa
25 but also from other surrounding villages and had left there earlier.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 Q. And at Velika Krusa there was shelling by the VJ; is that right?
2 A. I stated that there was mortar taking position, and I could not
3 quite make clear whether that mortar belonged to the MUP or the VJ. But
4 we could see from the uniform that it was pretty untypical for
5 paramilitaries to have mortars in the first place. So there was
6 cooperation between MUP/VJ. What specifically that cooperation was and in
7 that specific case, I can't say, and cooperation with the Frenki boys, the
9 Q. You've described the horror of what you saw yesterday. Vitina,
10 another village of which you spoke, was a site where you saw forced
11 expulsion or where you were aware of forced expulsion of the population?
12 A. I saw looting is there, particularly when the forces were
13 withdrawing. What I saw here more, I don't know whether we would have
14 that map again, the atlas of maps.
15 Q. Page?
16 A. 12. Near Vitina, near Smira, what I saw there. Smira is the
17 place I'm pointing at. What I observed there was VJ, MUP, with armoured
18 vehicles, with tanks, and the relevant crews were in the houses, in the
19 buildings where some Albanians still lived. The passages and the rooms in
20 the lower storeys were used by these fighters, and the upper floors were
21 still inhabited by Albanian citizens. In one of my articles I call them
22 human shields the way they were used there. And a similar thing happened
23 that was over here between Kabas and Benac and near Begunovc [phoen].
24 There were two artillery positions where the ammunitions in Begunc
25 [phoen] - not Begunovc, Begunc - and the other aforementioned villages,
1 munitions were stored in buildings where it was very clear that there were
2 still Albanians living in the upper floors of these buildings.
3 Q. In the course of this, were you aware of them being exhumed and
4 then reburied by the VJ and MUP?
5 A. I did not see that. Not in the rooms I saw. All I did see was
6 perhaps most striking and something which stuck most in my mind was the
7 ten people in Velika Krusa, where there were clear attempts at burning the
8 bodies. They had been interred in place, had been such an attempt, and I
9 took numerous photographs, where the people were not a stone's throw away
10 from the very areas where they had been massacred and been dug in.
11 Q. Thank you very much. Interviews. You've interviewed a number of
12 people. We'll turn to the one with Mladic almost immediately. But did
13 you by any chance ever interview Seselj?
14 A. No.
15 Q. So far as the Mladic interview is concerned, as I've explained,
16 we've been unable to get it.
17 MR. KAY: I've got copies here of the interview, which can be
18 distributed. I've got here one for the witness as well, which he needed.
19 MR. NICE: May it be distributed. I think it's still in German.
20 It's only a side and a half. And I hope it won't be an abuse of the
21 in-court interpreters if I simply ask the witness to read the German and
22 then we'll have straight on the --
23 MR. KAY: Can you distribute that?
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
25 MR. NICE: While it's being distributed:
1 Q. Mr. Hutsch, can you explain to us what is the document we're
2 looking at because it doesn't come from a newspaper article, and we have
3 simply been unable, even with the newspaper searching for it, to find the
4 article concerned.
5 A. I asked my son yesterday to go to the CD where I burnt CDs from my
6 articles from that time, and I asked him to mail me the material from that
7 CD. I then assured Mr. Kay that later last night he would receive that
8 interview. Because I live in Buxtehude near Hamburg. It was a problem
9 for me to find this myself and in the middle of the night get all the
10 material. I would need to check my accounts and work out which media
11 printed which bits and I'd have to prefer this to my accountant. However,
12 that's not a problem. That's an interview I offered to several different
13 media and it was published.
14 Q. Previous -- which paper?
15 A. I think that the Neue Osnabrucker Zeitung at the time printed it.
16 I'm also fairly certain it would have appeared at least in excerpts for
17 the broadcast in NDR armed forces and strategies.
18 Q. You say that this --
19 A. That was 1996. I did the interview in 1996 and I would have used
20 it then.
21 Q. You say that this interview happened in Sarajevo.
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. [Previous translation continues]... itself or ...
24 A. No. Of course it was in part of the suburbs which were
25 characterised by hearses, the area belonging to Republika Srpska.
1 Q. You said yesterday - and I meant to say this - that that's where
2 Mladic still is. I don't imagine you're suggesting that you know where
3 Mladic is now.
4 A. Let's put it like this: There are more than rumours on where he
5 is staying, and I think NATO and SFOR has detailed information. However,
6 this is probably not the matter for these deliberations here.
7 Q. Let's move on from that, just make this point: Even if in the RS
8 part of Sarajevo, in the spring of 1996, you were aware, of course, that
9 Mladic had already been indicted?
10 A. I knew that on the one hand. I mean, you see when you read my
11 first question that I'm asking about that exact matter and I provoked him
12 with that very question.
13 Q. And were you aware at the time of the degree of support he had
14 already received from the accused?
15 A. No. On the one hand, he refused this support [as interpreted],
16 and I gave you this, as the interview took place in the same form. When
17 speaking to me, Mladic never admitted any connection. I have been looking
18 to find out that there was a connection, and our colleague Andreas Suma
19 has made this clear. He also in the Vibis [phoen] report mentioned the
20 phone tapping protocols which are said to exist. Phone calls between
21 Perisic and Mladic were supposed to be intercepted. And also said to be
22 in existence intercepts between Milosevic and Karadzic conversations.
23 These intercepts seemed to have vanished from the face of the earth.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, could you just let us clarify this.
25 You asked him if he was aware at the time of the degree of support he had
1 already received from the accused. And the transcript has his answer: No.
2 On the one hand, he refused this support. I'm not sure whether that is a
3 translation problem. Was that what the witness -- was that what you
4 intended to say?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. There was no recognisable
6 support. And he said to me: No, there was no support.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
8 MR. NICE:
9 Q. You told us about what Andreas Suma and others have been
10 investigating and I'm not going to go into that. In your observations
11 such as they may have been of this trial, have you learnt now of efforts
12 made on Mladic's behalf to free him from ever being surrendered to this
13 Tribunal? Just yes or no.
14 A. That is his intention, yes. He intends to avoid capture.
15 Q. Were you aware that between the events in Srebrenica and the time
16 of your interview, efforts had been made to free him from ever being
17 surrendered to this Tribunal?
18 A. That is a question I would like to answer in a more intimate
20 Q. I'm not going to pursue it, because it's only really the setting
21 for the interview and I can make the arguments about this later. I'm
22 going to ask you, please, because we don't have an English translation of
23 the interview, to read it, all parts of it, but please to bear in mind
24 that once reading a document, the temptation to go faster than is fair on
25 the interpreters is almost overwhelming. You have to go very slowly.
1 A. [In English] I'll try my best. [Interpretation] General, how can
2 you live as an alleged war criminal, who many people would prefer to see
3 in front of the Tribunal in The Hague today, even tomorrow? Why war
4 criminal? Do you know more than I do? For example, because of the more
5 than 7.000 dead Muslims in Srebrenica. Response: Figure which is --
6 which I'm completely unaware of. The truth is that in Srebrenica, there
7 was heavy fighting. On both sides people were killed. That is for me not
8 a war crime but the risk of the life of a soldier. Question: That is a
9 part of what people are telling. Another part is that men were separated
10 from women and that men were shot under the eyes of the UNO Protective
11 Forces: Answer: These are only fairy tales. The fact is, and it has
12 been confirmed by TV reports, that I myself went through the town after it
13 was taken and ensured the inhabitants they would be treated according to
14 the Geneva Convention. I talked and negotiated with their leaders. We
15 provided vehicles to bring the inhabitants to the Muslim areas. The UN
16 did not manage to do that. Do you call that a war crime? Question: Why
17 did you attack the protected zone and conquer it at all? Response: Do
18 you seriously think that there would have been peace in my country if this
19 Turkish patchwork had continued to exist? The enclaves had to fall to
20 give peace a chance. It's as simple as that. Question: An action which
21 was only certainly possible with the agreement of Belgrade? Response:
22 Don't you think that we Serbs could solve our own problems in Bosnia?
23 Question: For such complex problems, like the attack on protective zones,
24 the support of President Slobodan Milosevic is certainly helpful.
25 Response: Let me put it in other words. I do not accept orders from
1 Milosevic. We are grown up enough to solve our own problems. Question:
2 Also, those to provide your army with the weapons munition and fuel in
3 spite of the embargo, logistic service which the Serbian armed forces
4 would better response. I'm amused by this that you don't think that we
5 are capable of providing for ourselves, and you think that at the same
6 time we had massacred 7.000 Muslims. How does this go line in line with
7 each other? This is a contradiction in itself.
8 Q. I'm not going to seek any of your comments on his answers about
9 arming, about the 7.000 dead, people being killed in fighting and fairy
10 tales. I'm only going to seek your answers on one or possibly two parts.
11 On the first page, where he speaks of the safe areas having to
12 fall in order for peace to be given a chance, his answer is consistent
13 with his acting according to an understanding that already existed that
14 the safe areas would have to fall; would you accept that?
15 A. Yes, absolutely.
16 Q. By whomsoever conveyed to him, it's as if he's saying there was an
17 understanding they had to fall?
18 A. Absolutely.
19 Q. And so far as his particular answer about the accused, he says
20 nothing about whether the accused spoke to him at the time, whether the
21 accused gave him instructions or sought to give him instructions. He
22 simply maintained at that time that he would be independent?
23 A. Precisely. This is what I also emphasised yesterday, I believe.
24 Q. I'm not going to ask you any more about the interview than that.
25 Thank you very much.
1 You also interviewed General Lazarevic of the Pristina Corps. I
2 think the day before NATO bombing started. Do you remember that?
3 A. I had a co-worker who spoke to General Lazarevic, yes.
4 Q. So it wasn't you who spoke to him yourself?
5 A. I didn't do it myself, but this conversation was done by a Kosovo
6 Serbian co-worker.
7 Q. And did Lazarevic acknowledge on the day before the NATO bombing
8 began, on the 23rd of March, did he acknowledge that the VJ were already
9 operational in the Drenica area?
10 A. Yes, he did confirm that.
11 Q. Second of, I think, two or three remaining points about what
12 you've published. In Hamburger Abendblatt on the 21st of October of 2000,
13 you wrote an article where you characterised the accused and his
14 relationship with Karadzic and Mladic. First of all, do you remember that
16 A. I don't remember the details of it, no.
17 Q. One of the quotations from the article is as follows: "Slobodan
18 Milosevic let off the leash his blood hounds Karadzic and Mladic."
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Can you explain, please, what sources of material you relied on to
21 set that phrase in writing, please.
22 A. Here I was relying on sources within the Western European secret
23 services, and two things were made clear: That in a phase in 1992 to
24 1993, there was a clear cooperation between Belgrade, on the one hand, and
25 Pale [phoen] on the other, between Karadzic, Mladic, on the one hand, and
1 on the other hand, between Milosevic; that from 1994, we had a phase where
2 directives were issued and pressure was exercised on Karadzic to agree to
3 peace in Bosnia. And in various meetings with officers of NATO, in May
4 1994, it was established that NATO presented comprehensive peace
5 proposals, a large number of maps, and it was clear that negotiations
6 would cover every aspect, with the exception of the Drina Valleys and the
7 electricity works.
8 Q. A long answer, and it may help the Court and I don't want to stop
9 you, but my question was narrowly focused on your sources of material for
10 the observation that Karadzic and Mladic were the accused's bloodhounds,
11 clearly, therefore, under his control. You've identified the sources of
12 information to that. It was the sources of information in which I was
13 interested. Is there anything else you need to add by way of sources?
14 A. Okay. I maintain my statement that this was from people belonging
15 to the secret services of Western European nations to characterise them.
16 They were extremely plausible and their statements had been corroborated
17 by documents.
18 Q. Finally, an article on the 17th of January of 2000, which I have
19 in German not translated, so, Your Honours, at most it could be marked for
20 identification at the moment. But I'll see whether we can deal with it by
21 asking the witness about it, producing it and having it available for
22 production if necessary.
23 This article referred to an interview that you had had with Arkan.
24 Do you remember that interview?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. And in the interview, you made it clear that Arkan had explained
2 to you that everything he did, he did under the command of the Serbian
3 army and under the command of this accused.
4 A. That is what Arkan said, yes.
5 Q. And he went on to explain that he, Arkan, was, in the vernacular,
6 dumped by this accused because he knew too much.
7 A. That is what Arkan said.
8 Q. And you went on in your article to explain that after the accused
9 had dumped Arkan, the accused appointed Frenki as commander of the
10 paramilitary forces in Kosovo.
11 A. Yes. This is precisely what I said, yes.
12 Q. And of course, you've given your own account of what you saw at
13 Velika Krusa committed and unforgettably committed by Frenki. Your
14 article goes on to make it quite clear that, as you understood it,
15 Frenki's boys were the principal paramilitary offenders in Kosovo.
16 A. Yes. This is precisely what I wrote in several articles,
17 especially in the introduction to the horseshoe plan.
18 Q. You also made reference to White Eagles and Arkan's Tigers, I
19 think; is that right?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And under whose control were they?
22 A. The Arkan Tigers certainly were still under the control of Arkan,
23 and the White Eagles under the command of Seselj.
24 Q. But the principal offenders or principal actors on the
25 paramilitary side under the control of this accused?
1 A. Well, they were at least in contact with him. What I didn't do in
2 my article, because I had no evidence, was that Milosevic had given an
3 order to use these paramilitaries. This would have been a journalistic
4 approach to say I need evidence for this, that is, a document with a
5 signature or a witness saying that Milosevic said: Let the paramilitaries
6 off the line. So for me, it wasn't clarified 100 per cent whether the
7 instruction to use the paramilitaries came from Milosevic or from
8 paramilitary leaders who had become independent.
9 Q. Your interview was based on what Arkan had told you and you've set
10 out or I've set out and you've agreed with what Arkan told you about it?
11 A. Would you believe Arkan?
12 Q. That's a matter, of course, we won't have the opportunity of
13 testing here. But that was the information he gave you?
14 A. Yes, absolutely.
15 Q. Thank you.
16 MR. NICE: Yes. That's all. Thank you.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay.
18 JUDGE KWON: Before the re-examination, I'd like to clarify one
20 MR. KAY: Of course.
21 JUDGE KWON: Just a minor thing.
22 Mr. Hutsch, you referred to MPRI yesterday three times, or two --
23 a couple of times. And I note it was -- you mentioned that also today,
24 which was wrongly translated as MPI. So I think I heard that several
25 times before. If you could explain it again to me today.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. It is MPRI in all cases.
2 JUDGE KWON: For the sake of translation, the transcript is
3 appearing on page 2, line 21. Yes. Could you remind me of what it is
4 about. I think it is a --
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, exactly. That is the
6 abbreviation. To give you an impression, it is a company, a private
7 company of ex-officers of the US armed forces, established by them, a
8 company which, according to their home page, offers all kinds of military
9 training. For example, MPRI gave the -- trained the Macedonian army in
10 2001 and also the KLA in 2002. So they trained both sides of the war at
11 the same time. MPRI trained the KLA to a high degree. At the moment they
12 are training the Albanian army, I believe. If you try to penetrate this,
13 like blackwater, for example, you are met with a wall of silence. What
14 is clear, however, is that officers of the US -- were able to leave the US
15 forces. They went over to MPRI. They are working there for one, two, or
16 three years and can usually return to the US forces at a higher rank and
17 be reintegrated.
18 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
19 MR. KAY: Yes. Just following on from that passage of your
20 evidence, Mr. Hutsch.
21 Re-examined by Mr. Kay:
22 Q. Do you know anything about the financial structure of MPRI, how
23 it's funded?
24 A. Showing it in a classic way in terms of the training support for
25 the Macedonian army, the finance was certainly provided by the Pentagon.
1 In other cases, one says that this has been taken over by the CIA. MPRI
2 has the reputation of doing the dirty jobs of the American secret services
3 and to bring them to completion.
4 Q. The level of competence and efficiency of this organisation?
5 A. Extremely high. In the training camps that I saw in 2001 in
6 Macedonia or in the south of Kosovo, where American trainers were
7 operating, I have to say that they did a first-class, excellent job, which
8 left nothing to be desired in terms of professionality.
9 Q. The access to resources that MPRI has?
10 A. Of course, let me give you another example. During the Oluja
11 offensive 1999 [as interpreted], the American English was used as from a
12 certain rank and there were American consultants available, though there
13 was a UN resolution preventing this. The Croatian army had been -- was no
14 longer relevant. It had been conquered. And then a couple of months
15 later they were able to launch an offensive fully equipped in terms of
16 manpower and equipment. The Oluja Serbs were driven from a position
17 within 72 hours, in which they had been well prepared for this case for
18 three years. So this gives you an idea of the MPRI, the quality of their
19 training, their resources. In spite of the weapons embargo, they were
20 able to launch these offensives.
21 Q. We have on the transcript here at line 17 on the LiveNote 1999.
22 Was that the date you gave or is that incorrect?
23 A. The Croatian offensive was 1995, August 1995. Oluja.
24 Q. I was just checking the correct translation. Yes. And in
25 relation to the MPRI set-up at that time, in 1995, do you know where it
1 was established?
2 A. MPRI was available in the entire Krajina and available to the
3 entire Croatian army, as they were available to the KLA in 1999 and also
4 in Macedonia 2001, in Presheva [phoen].
5 Q. Before I continue with your questioning, Your Honours, there's one
6 matter I want to make entirely clear, or have the Prosecution make clear,
7 and that is: Is it the case that the report of this interview with
8 General Mladic is being challenged as given by this witness by the
9 Prosecution? Because there's been slightly ambiguous remarks, and I want
10 to be satisfied as to exactly what the nature of the issue is, if there is
11 an issue, between the Prosecutor and this witness on this recorded
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I didn't understand you to be --
14 MR. NICE: No. I was of course mystified that we couldn't get it
15 from the Internet. I think actually a different newspaper was referred to
16 today from the one referred to yesterday. And it may have been published
17 anonymously. If I was going to challenge the account of the interview, I
18 would have made it clear. No, no challenge.
19 MR. KAY: I'm grateful for that.
20 Q. And Mr. Hutsch, you've given evidence, you're a freelance
21 journalist; is that right?
22 A. That's correct, yes.
23 Q. And we get the impression from your evidence you have a vast
24 amount of materials which is your work over the last eight to ten years.
25 A. Well, in the nine years I've been working as a journalist, of
1 course, a great deal of material has come up. I would consider it to be
2 the extent of three removal cartons, round about.
3 Q. And I appreciate you'd have to go into your records, but it may be
4 of help to the Court: If you were able to produce a schedule of where
5 this particular article was published and the dates, is that possible for
6 you to do that?
7 A. Well, all of the articles I have written and that have been
8 published, it's an agreement between the client and the author that these
9 publications are also returned in manuscript form and it's stated where it
10 appeared or a copy of the newspaper or the newspaper itself. I've
11 collected all of them, and all of the articles I've written and have been
12 published have been duly archived.
13 Q. If you could over the period of the next week, say, if you have an
14 opportunity, would you be able to provide a table listing where and when
15 this was reported?
16 A. Yes, of course.
17 Q. And forward it to me.
18 MR. KAY: And if Your Honours' consent, if I could then distribute
19 it, and if anything arises, that matter can at least be considered as a
20 way of dealing with this matter perhaps once and for all.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
22 MR. KAY: Thank you.
23 Q. You were questioned about the increase in volume of the Serb
24 security forces, dates were given such as April, largely concentrating on
25 1999. At that time, we know from evidence in the case that NATO was
1 building up around Serbia, in various locations, the evidence has been
2 from witnesses such as General Clark that there was to be the
3 establishment of forces in various locations around the borders of Serbia.
4 Considering this as an investigative journalist, as well as your knowledge
5 of military matters, would it be sensible or reasonable for a state to
6 accept and face the build-up of troops around its territory without taking
7 any of its own steps for its defence and protection? What would you do as
8 a military man?
9 A. Well, we've established that my assessment of military situations
10 deviates from that of General Naumann because he thought that the Serbian
11 forces needed three to four months' time of preparation, although they
12 were already fully in operation. My opinion is that, in particular, with
13 the introduction of Leopard 2 tanks of the Bundeswehr in March 1999 to
14 Macedonia, it was clear that as Naumann feared, an air offensive alone was
15 not a solution to the conflict of Kosovo. Politically - and don't hold
16 me to the date - I believe it was the 24th of April. In a meeting of the
17 German Defence Committee, German Defence Minister Sharping defined the war
18 targets. And one of the targets he defined was to isolate Milosevic. He
19 did this. The protocol or the minutes of the meeting of the Defence
20 Committee have been made available to me. It was not simply to avoid the
21 humanitarian catastrophe in Kosovo, but the war target was to bring down
22 Milosevic. We have parallels to the Iraq war. And this was the problem.
23 This is what they were preparing for. And this is why troops were brought
24 in, the extraction force was not in a position to do this extraction job
25 because they didn't have the capacity in terms of airspace. So it was
1 transformed into fighting troop to march into Kosovo with armed vehicles
2 and tanks.
3 Q. In your discussion with General Naumann, this campaign wasn't
4 viewed as just being a bombing campaign, which is the phrase that we use
5 most commonly; this was also prepared as a ground attack campaign?
6 A. General Jackson, in an interview, told me that to start a ground
7 offensive, in spite of the political reservations of all of the NATO
8 member countries, one would need about three weeks. So a ground offensive
9 from the military point of view would have been the first -- would have
10 been possible on the 5th -- the 1st or the 5th of July. Of course,
11 subject to the approval of the individual NATO states.
12 Q. And in these interviews that you've had with these particular
13 figures who were involved in the planning of the NATO campaign, their
14 position was that this was a -- or capable of being an aerial bombardment
15 as well as a land attack?
16 A. Yes. Jackson was prepared for this, and this is expressed in the
17 telephone call he made from the airport in Pristina, I think it was on the
18 evening of the 10th, when the Russian SFOR forces had occupied the airport
19 in Pristina, when he said clearly: I am not going to start the third
20 world war for you, when Clark was asked to have the Russians removed from
21 the airport.
22 So this shows the strength of KFOR, on the one hand, but also it
23 shows that there were plans to enter Kosovo from the ground and the fact
24 that the German contingent went in through Albania showed that there was a
25 long-term preparation of these operations in terms of logistics. From the
1 bilateral negotiations to a status of forces agreement and so on, apart
2 from that which had to be coped with on the diplomatic level.
3 Q. When you were in the region at this time, were you aware of this
4 build-up that was occurring around Serbia?
5 A. Yes. That could no longer be hidden, especially since the Leopard
6 tanks, the Marder type came from Thessaloniki, through Tetovo [phoen], and
7 it was clear that this was going beyond what the extraction force would
9 Q. You dealt with the strength of the KLA and several questions were
10 asked about particular zones. Zone 6 and zone 7 you referred to. Just so
11 that we've got it clear and we can pinpoint this evidence when this
12 material is looked at at a later stage: Can you identify on the map again
13 those particular areas, zone 6 and zone 7, which you said were relatively
14 inactive areas for the KLA, where there was not so much happening. Is
15 that right?
16 A. That is correct.
17 Q. If you could tell us the page of the map.
18 A. That would be Roman numeral VI. The defence zone 6 and 7 comprise
19 primarily the areas Strpce, Kacanik, Vitina, Gnjilane, Kamenica. Defence
20 zone 2 comprised primarily the areas of Dragas, Prizren, Suva Reka,
21 Malisevo, Orahovac. And zone 1 was the region of Drenica. Zone 3 was the
22 area around Pec and Djakovica, Decan. Zone 4 was Pristina. And zone 5
23 was Podujevo, Kolap [phoen], the area just outside of -- in the eastern --
24 anything east of Pristina, Lipljan.
25 Q. Just checking the transcript that we got all the numbers there.
1 Yes. Thank you very much.
2 You were asked about numbers around Velika Krusa, when that
3 incident occurred in March of 1999. You challenged a figure of 10.000
4 that was put to you, saying you thought 1.000 to 1.500 people were in the
5 woods. How were you able to observe the numbers that were there?
6 A. With all these figures, we speak of estimates. And there is
7 always a question mark behind them. UNHCR has the same approach, because
8 nobody could possibly ever give accurate figures. So all these figures
9 are estimates. One has to trust one's own feeling and observation that
10 the number given is not too large. But obviously, I cannot say that this
11 is a scientifically proved number where I could say for every individual
12 number here I've got the face to fit the figure. These are estimates
13 based on experience.
14 Q. Your experience, then, in judging numbers, that comes from where?
15 A. I'm a footballer, and I always looked at the football stadium,
16 seeing how many people were watching and that gives you a good idea of how
17 large a particular group is and you try to use these impressions as a
18 yardstick. That's always how I've done that. I think it's what many
19 policemen do too.
20 Q. Some of us support teams which have very few in numbers following
21 them, so it becomes easier.
22 Murdered policemen. There was an issue there whether it was small
23 or comparatively small in the terms of incident. Just to give us an
24 impression from what you saw and what you were aware of in this period
25 that you were giving evidence how many murdered policemen did you come
1 across or see? How many such incidents? So that we can understand the
2 background of your evidence.
3 A. I myself saw about 20 murdered Serb policemen. OSCE people have
4 told me for the period from December to the withdrawal, there was a case
5 of about 120 to 150 murdered policemen throughout the area of Kosovo.
6 These are figures very similar to those General Laukweier [phoen] has
7 listed in his two books on the Kosovo war. To that extent, I do not doubt
8 that these figures are at least extremely close to reality.
9 Q. Any other public officials, people who were murdered, who
10 represented the government in some form, civic leaders?
11 A. There are publications made by the Serb government in that time.
12 There are also Serb government press releases. However, they are not
13 always entirely trustworthy, because many things were put in a very
14 confused manner there. For example, murders which had inter-ethnic
15 reasons but were then purported to be ethnic murders. I mean, at the time
16 there was a lot of anarchy within the Albanian group of the population
17 there. They sort of paid reckonings which dated back 80 or a hundred years
18 or so. And these murders were then also purported as ethnically motivated
19 and they were added to the Serb figures in order to raise the numbers
20 given. So personally, I always refer to what the OSCE or later
21 Mr. Laukweier wrote in his book. I thought their figures were more
22 realistic, particularly because it tallied with what I myself observed.
23 Q. One last issue again going to your journalism. The word "staging"
24 was used by you in evidence to describe or characterise that which you
25 were informing the Court about. You were questioned about that. Have you
1 used that word or a similar word in any of your articles?
2 A. I think particularly in 2001, I would have used that term several
3 times. On the one hand, in order to describe the development in Kosovo,
4 the transfer of the Kosovo protection corps into an army of the Kosovo,
5 the result was basically the result of a staged process. And I also used
6 it to describe the MPRI, the American company's involvement, where I
7 always used the word of the staged Kosovo war.
8 Q. Yes. Thank you. That's all I have to ask you.
9 MR. KAY: Does any of Your Honours have further questions or the
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, you will have exhibited the --
12 MR. KAY: Yes. I'm grateful for Your Honour reminding me about
13 that. I believe the next number is D248.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: This is the interview with Mladic.
15 MR. KAY: Yes. And perhaps the month could be given again. That
16 was in which month of 1996?
17 A. The interview was conducted in March 1996.
18 MR. KAY: And if the witness could forward the schedule to me of
19 the relevant publication.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, during cross-examination, you made
22 some comments, and I intimated that you would have an opportunity in
23 re-examination to put some questions to the witness. Do you wish to do
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, this examination has
1 nothing to do with my defence. I'm going to call the witness when my
2 right to conduct my own defence is given back to me. Whereas your lawyer
3 is quite obviously representing the opposite side.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: I've heard you, Mr. Milosevic.
5 Mr. Hutsch, your evidence is concluded. The Chamber thanks you
6 for coming to give it, in particular, for returning today. It is in
7 keeping with the best tradition of cooperation with the Tribunal. You may
8 now leave.
9 [The witness withdrew]
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, yes.
11 MR. KAY: We're just coming up to the break at 10.30, Your Honour.
12 We have under ten minutes, but it's probably an opportunity just to deal
13 at this stage with the position of the next witness. Filed with the Court
14 is the next witness. This witness has attended The Hague. He has been
15 interviewed by me. He had not been interviewed previously by the defence
16 team of Mr. Milosevic. As part of the materials that were put together as
17 Defence exhibits, there was included a list of names relevant to people
18 who were kidnapped or missing in Kosovo. The next witness has a personal
19 history concerning a relative who falls within that category, but he is
20 also a person who is a leading figure of an association for the missing
21 and kidnapped in Kosovo. And he is here in two capacities. The first
22 capacity being the fact that he has a personal issue, but also, more
23 importantly for him, as he does not seek to put his personal circumstances
24 above those others within this association, he has, with others, compiled
25 figures and information concerning those people who are victims, who have
1 had -- come within the category of missing or kidnapped during this period
2 of conflict in Kosovo.
3 He falls into that category of witness more importantly, rather
4 like Fred Abrahams, a witness for the Prosecution. I think there was a
5 lady called Sandra Mitchell. There have been others who have been able to
6 produce evidence before the Court of information that has been compiled.
7 He has, in fact, met the Prosecutor on an occasion, or maybe more than one
8 occasion. One I notice from a news report on the 5th of September, 2001.
9 He has told me that he in fact filed his association's report with the
10 Prosecution and expected that there would be some development of those
11 issues on behalf of him and the other people concerned with his
13 During my interview with him, it became clear that the document
14 that had been filed was not his document and was not actually the kind of
15 material that they present. I don't know where that document came from,
16 but he said it was inadequate in detail and it did not provide the kind of
17 information that he would expect to testify upon, and having spoken to
18 him, I sympathised with that point of view, because his role and his
19 position is such that it is obviously of great importance that evidence
20 concerning victims is put before the Court in an appropriate and proper
22 Over the last two days, I have contacted the Prosecution, who have
23 searched their records to find the report that was handed over. There has
24 been no success in relation to that, and I have no identifying
25 characteristics that may help them within what are probably vast archives
1 to find such a document.
2 In those circumstances, he does not want me to call him as a
3 witness in this case now, as he feels that his position is not properly
4 prepared, and he did not bring the report with him from Serbia. And it is
5 obviously an important document. He would also like to discuss the issue
6 of giving evidence about his personal circumstances with those other
7 members of the victims' association whom he represents, because he would
8 not want them to feel that he was using this opportunity to give evidence
9 before this Tribunal as a way of elevating his personal circumstances
10 above theirs. And in that regard, I have sympathy with him, having
11 discussed the terms of his evidence, that this is not a self-promotion by
13 In those circumstances, I would -- or I advise the Court that his
14 reluctance to give evidence at this stage should be respected. He has
15 cooperated with assigned counsel. He was extremely cooperative in our
16 interview and was wanting to give evidence. So I do not feel this is any
17 case where there is a difficulty over his future testimony. However, the
18 most important aspect of his evidence concerns other factual information
19 that he should give, and this should be properly disclosed on the
20 Prosecutor so that they're able to review it and it may indeed link up
21 with other researches or materials that they have, which to date has not
22 been able to be found.
23 His personal testimony is of a reasonably short level, but the
24 substance of his testimony concerning the association of missing and
25 kidnapped people in Kosovo is probably the major issue so far as his value
1 as a witness is concerned.
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: So what is your request?
3 MR. KAY: That he not be called, that we adjourn the defence case
4 at this stage, in those circumstances, and that we have a Status
5 Conference concerning witness issues perhaps this morning, if the Court is
6 able to do that.
7 [Trial Chamber confers]
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, would this witness be available next
10 MR. KAY: Next week we have an appeal --
11 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
12 MR. KAY: Sorry. Next week I believe there's an appeal hearing on
13 the 21st of October, in relation to the representation issue concerning
14 the accused. Therefore, we have two sitting days next week. And
15 arrangements -- there is a witness coming from a foreign country. There
16 are two other witnesses whom steps are being taken to be produced at this
17 court, but it requires the assistance of a ministry from a foreign
18 government. That has to go through diplomatic channels, and although
19 we've made inquiries, we're told as yet there is nothing that can be
20 produced. But if that information is produced by the foreign government,
21 then those people are able to be used. I'm in a difficult position here,
22 because I'm relying on agencies that are out of our control, and the
23 cooperation of a ministry of a foreign government, and the Registry of the
24 Tribunal are being very cooperative in relation to these matters, but once
25 it leaves their hands, it then goes to the hands of another.
1 I need to speak to the witness to see if he's available next week,
2 but there are problems then in the witness list, and maybe I could move
3 him. He was moved to this week.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: I noticed that, yes.
5 MR. KAY: Because of a difficulty.
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Next week we are due to sit Monday to Wednesday.
9 I think that change was made to accommodate the Appeals Chamber's hearing
10 on Thursday.
11 MR. KAY: I don't have that information. If dates are moved like
12 that, I have all sorts of agencies asking me to produce people on certain
13 dates with -- and it becomes an extremely complicated exercise, probably
14 another 30 e-mails of correspondence.
15 [Trial Chamber and legal officer confer]
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: The information was passed on, but there appears
17 to be some miscommunication.
18 Mr. Nice, were you informed?
19 MR. NICE: I was aware of it informally, yes.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Informally?
21 MR. NICE: Yes.
22 MR. KAY: The Court will appreciate the logistics of getting
23 witnesses to this building and the number of people that it involves, all
24 of whom have a stake in a particular stage, all of whom require a decision
25 by me, because they're reluctant to make decisions. And it takes -- it's
1 a fairly extensive process to book people.
2 JUDGE BONOMY: It is, though, possible, Mr. Kay, is it not, that
3 Monday, the day you were not aware of, could be used for this witness, if
4 what he has to do is return home, get the right report, intimate it to the
5 Prosecution and discuss the sensitive issue you mentioned with the other
6 members of the association?
7 MR. KAY: Yes. I agree. But I've got to speak to him about that,
8 and I'm not sure these people live in circumstances and places where
9 things are that easy to get off the ground.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: That point, though, must always have been in his
11 mind. That's not a point that's suddenly developed. It's the missing
12 report that's the issue that has developed, rather than the sensitivity of
13 giving evidence about his own personal circumstances.
14 MR. KAY: Yes. All I can do is my best with him. If the Court
15 will give us some time -- I'm not sure that he's at the building yet.
16 There are procedures that have to be gone through, and I don't have easy
17 access to the witness. And I would have to communicate to him. Would the
18 Court allow us to set that in train?
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Would half an hour be adequate?
22 MR. KAY: I'm sure that would help.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Okay. We'll adjourn for half an hour, return for
24 the Status Conference. We're adjourned.
25 --- Whereupon the proceedings adjourned at
1 10.37 a.m., to be followed by a Status Conference