Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 33475

1 Wednesday, 17 November 2004

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, do you have any questions of the

7 witness?

8 MR. KAY: No, Your Honour.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: And if you have questions of witnesses in the

10 future, I assume you'll let us know.

11 MR. KAY: Yes.


13 MR. NICE: Yes. Before I ask questions of this witness, a general

14 observation. With the Defence witnesses to date and under the regime then

15 operative involving the assigned counsel, there was never any time

16 pressure because there was always either only one witness for several days

17 or something of that sort, and indeed it wasn't known how many witnesses

18 were going to come in all.

19 The present situation, of course, is different, and I am very

20 aware of the expectation that my cross-examination of witnesses will be

21 substantially shorter than the examination-in-chief of the accused. A

22 witness like this is a witness who I could without any difficulty question

23 for many hours and probably days because he covers a wide territory of

24 potential evidence, but I will endeavour to confine my evidence and to

25 compact it.

Page 33476

1 There are two inevitable consequences of that. First, that I

2 won't necessarily with every witness be able to cover every topic and some

3 that could be raised with a witness; and secondly, that if a witness is

4 prone to give extensive answers beyond that which is responsive to the

5 question, and although it may seem to the witness to be unfair and even

6 unfriendly, it isn't, I shall have to step in to stop them, which is

7 something I haven't done with earlier witnesses. I thought it only fair

8 to explain both not my problem but my reality and the reason why I shall

9 be expecting short answers of witnesses.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. And I think you have an absolute right to

11 stop the witness when you have had the answer that you want.


13 [Witness answered through interpreter]

14 Cross-examined by Mr. Nice:

15 Q. Professor Markovic, as an intellectual and a politician, you knew

16 and know that words uttered publicly may have real political effect. It

17 may also create states of mind in others that can have unforeseen

18 consequences; correct?

19 A. Yes. With the proviso that I'm not a politician but a scientist.

20 But I do, of course, delve in politics from time to time.

21 Q. Praksis, of which you were a member, came to a conclusion in 1990

22 because of an article that you wrote; correct?

23 A. I'm not aware that that was the case. I don't know what article

24 you mean. Because, quite simply, the circumstances changed, and the

25 people who continued to work and lead Praksis -- I was the editor-in-chief

Page 33477

1 from 1981 to 1986 myself. Afterwards, I was replaced by my junior

2 colleague Svetozar Stojanovic and someone else from America. They were

3 the editors-in-chief. And afterwards they came to the conclusion that,

4 given the circumstances in 1990, Praksis no longer had any reason for

5 existing.

6 Q. In 1990, you wrote an article describing the Albanians of Kosovo

7 as a backward, clannish people incapable of lifting themselves from

8 poverty; correct?

9 A. No. No, I'm not aware of that article. What article is it, in

10 fact?

11 Q. May I remind you of some other passages, and if you don't remember

12 it, we will have to deal with it in another way. Do you remember

13 describing them as having -- in an article in Praksis, do you remember

14 describing the Albanian nationalists of having adopted a rapid birth rate

15 as a demographic weapon against Serbs?

16 A. You mean non-Albanians. You're mentioning Albanian nationalists.

17 That's what you said. I don't know what the article is that you're

18 referring to since you didn't tell me the heading and title of the

19 article, and I think that in 1990 Praksis was not being published any

20 more.

21 Q. I'll ask you a few more points about the article that I suggest

22 you wrote, and I'll produce the article in due course.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Yes.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I consider that Mr. Nice would be

25 duty-bound to place the article before the witness if he is in fact

Page 33478

1 claiming that it is his article, which is very probable, but it would be a

2 good idea if he placed the article in front of the witness for him to be

3 able to answer the question.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Getting to that.

5 MR. NICE: Unfortunately, I don't have the article itself with me

6 today. I will be able to produce it in due course. I'm reading a summary

7 of the article at the moment by Laura Secor, in an article published under

8 the Belgrade Circle banner. And I would hope to be able to have the

9 article itself for the Court but not until the end of the week.

10 Q. Professor, was it your opinion that there had been fiscal

11 [Realtime transcript read in error "physical"] mismanagement by corrupt

12 Albanian leaders?

13 A. Fiscal [Realtime transcript read in error "physical"]

14 mismanagement by the Albanian leaders? I never wrote about anything like

15 that. I know nothing about their fiscal [Realtime transcript read in

16 error "physical"] mismanagements, and I especially didn't write about

17 them.

18 Q. And then finally for these purposes, do you remember writing an

19 article where you raise as --

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a correction. The transcript has "physical

21 mismanagement."

22 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters note: Fiscal.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please proceed.

24 MR. NICE:

25 Q. Was it your view and did you write to the effect that throughout

Page 33479

1 history Albanians had had great powers on their side while Serbia had

2 limped along on her own two feet?

3 A. No, I never wrote that because that is simply not correct. The

4 Albanians were on the superficial -- on the opposite side in the wars, on

5 the wrong side, fascist Germany and Italy, whereas all the highly

6 developed democratic countries of the West were on the other side, so they

7 weren't with them.

8 Q. And finally, have you proposed -- or not proposed, have you raised

9 for discussion the possibility of partitioning Kosovo so that the north

10 would have stayed with Serbia and the south, poorer half would have gone

11 -- or part, would have gone to Albanian?

12 A. I don't know, Mr. Nice, where you get this information from. I

13 was opposed to that position, and that position was advocated by my

14 colleague from the academy, Dobrica Cosic. That was his idea about the

15 division of Kosovo. I was never in favour of that and I even criticised

16 the president of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, Mr. Despic,

17 when he listened to Cosic and went on to write an article in the 1990s in

18 which he set out this idea of the division. So I was never an advocate of

19 this division of Kosovo myself ever.

20 Q. Professor, I will -- if the questioning goes over the first break,

21 I will arrange for you to be provided with a copy of the article by Laura

22 Secor which comes in parallel columns in English and in B/C/S or Serbian

23 and would ask you to have a look at it over that break. Shall we --

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I have to say that I would have

25 expected you to have had that article here.

Page 33480

1 MR. NICE: If it had been possible, we would have done, and I'm

2 sorry that we've had to proceed on second-tier material for it. I'll try

3 and make efforts to secure it by e-mail or fax today, if I can, but I'm

4 not optimistic. But in any event, the report of the article is a document

5 that I would ask the witness to read.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: One possibility as a result of all this, Mr. Nice,

7 of course is that you've simply wasted the time you've had so far in the

8 cross-examination by not having the document to clarify the point. The

9 evidence so far is absolutely valueless in the --

10 MR. NICE: Quite understandable, but, Your Honour, that's the

11 position in which I find myself.

12 Q. Can I now turn to the memorandum. There was a question from His

13 Honour Judge Kwon yesterday about the very first edition and what part a

14 priest called Mihajlo Mikic played in it. Do you know anything yourself

15 about the first publication by St. Savo's library in English of a version

16 of the memorandum by the priest Mikic?

17 A. I never heard about the priest called Mikic. All I do know is

18 that the memorandum was published first in Croatia in two journals,

19 whereas I've never actually heard of this man Mikic. And I don't think he

20 is of any particular importance.

21 MR. NICE: And, Your Honours, I haven't been able to obtain any

22 more detail overnight about that beyond what's contained in Mr. de la

23 Brosse's report.

24 Q. Professor, can you -- there are various versions of the

25 memorandum. We have a number here, and I don't want to burden the record

Page 33481

1 by producing all of them or indeed any more of them. Can you please

2 confirm this from your knowledge, that in September 1986, a version of the

3 memorandum was sent by the committee of the Serbian Academy of Sciences

4 and Arts to the federal secretary of the interior, Dobrislav Culafic.

5 A. When do you mean? When was this? Because the Serbian academy did

6 not recognise this memorandum as being its own and a complete integral

7 version from the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, in those first

8 years, which would make it 1986 to the early 1990s, considered that it was

9 an incomplete document, unfinished, and it wasn't adopted by the

10 commission as a whole, the commission working on it. Neither did the

11 presidency of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences.

12 Q. I'm showing you a document which we can lay on the overhead

13 projector, if necessary, and which we can copy and produce, if necessary,

14 purporting to be a version sent to the federal secretary of the interior

15 on the authority of Mile Puzovic, dated the 26th of September, 1986. Does

16 that assist you at all, looking at the document?

17 A. Well, this does not have anything to do with the academy, which

18 means that the handwritten version of the memorandum, which was

19 incomplete, the manuscript which was published in the press, that the

20 Ministry of the Interior came by it and this man Mr. Puzovic of course has

21 nothing to do with the academy itself. It is the republican, as it says

22 here, the Republican Secretariat for Internal Affairs, which means the

23 intelligence services came by this document and forward it on to the

24 federal secretary. The academy never forwarded any document to the

25 Ministry of the Interior.

Page 33482

1 Q. It was rumoured at the time, was it not, Professor, that the

2 leaking of the memorandum was not accidental but intentional. Do you

3 accept that or not?

4 A. Well, I cannot accept that because the academy wished or, rather,

5 those of us who worked on the text, after great deal of discussion and

6 amendments and corrections that we made to it, wished to complete it, and

7 so it was in none of our interests or in the interests of the academy

8 indeed for the text to be sent out to the papers incomplete and unfinished

9 all the more so because it had dire consequences for the academy because

10 this publication of an incomplete text in the papers had as a consequence

11 that there was a witch hunt against the academy for months afterwards,

12 and the top leaders - for example, Ivan Stambolic, the president of the

13 republic - attacked the academy very violently, saying that a knife was

14 being thrust in the back of Yugoslavia, and responsibility was sought for

15 and people that were held accountable, people that were responsible. And

16 they asked for the dismissal of Antonije Isakovic, the professor -- the

17 president of the academy, for his dismissal.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: I believe Mr. Nice had the answer.

19 MR. NICE:

20 Q. The repeated suggestion that the document was only ever a draft

21 needs to be considered, does it not, Professor, beside this: The academy

22 published the version that we have as an exhibit in 1995, didn't it,

23 together with an answer to criticisms -- yes, an answer to criticisms.

24 A. Nine years later --

25 Q. The answer, I think, is yes?

Page 33483

1 A. -- the academy did publish it, yes. In 1986, it did not publish

2 it and could not publish it because it was incomplete, unfinished, and not

3 accepted by the academy, but afterwards the document was highly abused and

4 was represented in that way, and in 1995, the decision was made to publish

5 it. Well, you have to let me -- allow me to answer your question. It's

6 not a long answer.

7 Q. The question is this, though: On analysis, the differences

8 between the first released versions in 1986 and the final version produced

9 by the academy in 1995 were extremely limited, were they not?

10 A. Well, the text had passed through a number of versions because the

11 discussion around it lasted for more than a year with the corrections,

12 amendments, and so on. So there were several versions. There was the

13 version that was published in the papers, that was one of the latest --

14 last versions, and afterwards it was that version, I think, that was

15 actually published in 1995.

16 Q. I'm going to suggest, but I'm not going to take time on the detail

17 now, that there were a total of about six differences, two deletions and

18 four additions between those two versions. I have an analysis for you to

19 look at later if that becomes helpful. Do you accept that the number of

20 changes may have been as limited as six?

21 A. No. No. I don't know what number there were, how many changes.

22 Quite simply, what was published in the papers was not accepted by the

23 academy as being its version, its authentic version. Once it decided to

24 go ahead and publish, it published its own version. So the version that

25 was actually stolen and leaked was not one that was accepted and adopted

Page 33484

1 by the academy embraced as its own.

2 Q. May we look now at the version produced yesterday in the bound

3 form, Exhibit D --

4 JUDGE KWON: 250.

5 MR. NICE: 250. Thank you very much. If the witness can have it.

6 Q. And, Professor, I hope you're happy to follow it in English. It

7 will assist us if you -- I know you speak English, having degrees from

8 London and having lectured in -- having held academic posts in North

9 America, but it would help us if we can go through it in the English

10 version.

11 On page -- and I'm going to look at the thing in some detail to

12 see what it constitutes. Starting at page 10, where on the top it says:

13 "Although the largest Yugoslav republic in territory and population,

14 Serbia has been dispossessed of its attributes of statehood by the new

15 constitution promulgated in 1974."

16 That was the principal concern of Serbia and of the intellectuals

17 of whom you were a member; correct?

18 A. The 1974 constitution, under that constitution, Serbia, unlike the

19 rest of the republics, did not gain the status of being a sovereign state

20 because Serbia remained divided into three parts; Serbia proper, Kosovo,

21 and Vojvodina. And that's what this passage refers to and that's what

22 caused it --

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Professor. Professor, let us look at the

24 question, which was fairly simple. The question was whether the principal

25 concern of yourself and your fellow intellectuals is what is stated in the

Page 33485












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 33486

1 passage starting at page 10, that: "Although Serbia was the largest

2 Yugoslav republic in territory and population, it had been dispossessed of

3 its attributes of statehood by the constitution of 1974." What is the

4 answer to that?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That was one, although not the

6 principal reason for concern. As I've already said, the proposal to draft

7 this memorandum was given by Maksimovic, who was an economist, and he

8 played a very important -- Mihajlovic, and the very serious economic

9 crisis was at the root of it and the fact that Yugoslavia was divided into

10 six states -- well, even eight, and that everything was disintegrated, as

11 it goes on to say. But, yes, this was one of the reasons where the need

12 for equality was raised. So Serbia did not enjoy the same status as the

13 other republics.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that Mr. Nice's questions

16 are creating confusion, because I'm reading from this book in English, the

17 one he's using now. He's not quoting the actual text of the memorandum.

18 The text of the memorandum begins only on page 90 of this book, and in

19 front of that we have a series of articles. It is Kosta Mihailovic and

20 Vasilije Krestic who are the authors and who provide different

21 explanations and the history that led up to the memorandum, the reasons

22 and so on and so forth. So what Mr. Nice is quoting from is not the

23 actual text of the memorandum but explanations by Professors Kosta

24 Mihailovic and Vasilije Krestic who wrote a book. So it was not corrected

25 in order to be published but because the memorandum was -- there were

Page 33487

1 mystifications around it, people decided to publish this text to explain

2 what it was all about. So on page 10, the passages quoted by Mr. Nice are

3 not in fact the passages from the memorandum itself. It is the heading of

4 why the memorandum was written, and that was written itself nine years

5 after it.


7 MR. NICE: Your Honour --


9 MR. NICE: I think we're all aware of that. I think we made this

10 point very clearly yesterday in explaining what the document was.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: But you're still asking the question.

12 MR. NICE: I'm still asking the question.

13 Q. And this was, of course, Professor, a document published by the

14 academy itself, with the authority of the academy, wasn't it, this version

15 that you're looking at?

16 A. Mr. Nice, I really am very surprised that you don't distinguish

17 between the memorandum proper and the additional commentaries. Yes, this

18 was published by the academy, but it is additional commentary. But the

19 memorandum does indeed begin on page 93. So I will be happy to answer any

20 of your questions but please don't do that.

21 Q. The 1974 constitution remained the law of Yugoslavia until it was

22 itself lawfully changed; correct?

23 A. At the time, the 1974 constitution was in force, and since it was

24 in force, the memorandum criticised it. Otherwise, there would be no

25 sense in doing so, in referring to the 1974 constitution in the first

Page 33488

1 place.

2 Q. And we move on, to save time, to page 13. We can then see how the

3 academy itself sets out the history of the project -- not the academy,

4 your colleagues Mihailovic and Krestic, set out the history of the work on

5 the memorandum. In the second paragraph they identify the Assembly's

6 resolution. And then in the second to last paragraph they identify you as

7 one of the working group.

8 We can turn over to the page 14, where it is set out, again to

9 reflect your evidence in part, that the committee meeting on the 19th of

10 September was still at an editing stage, and the work came to an abrupt

11 end with an appearance of an article in Vecernje Novosti; correct?

12 A. Yes. Yes. An article did appear in Vecernje Novosti, and attacks

13 were launched at the academy. This went on for weeks. And of course all

14 further work was interrupted at that point.

15 Q. Page 15 on the right-hand side and at the bottom, it says

16 "Minutes kept of the meetings." The first portion of the text up to about

17 page 30 can be considered to have been approved by the committee and deals

18 with the remaining editing. So on any reckoning, the first 30 pages were

19 thought to have been approved; is that right? This is of a version that's

20 the 74-page version.

21 It's to help the Judges. You can see the history of it in this

22 record.

23 A. Yes. The first 30 or so pages dealt with the economic situation

24 that Yugoslavia was in only. That is the section that Kosta Mihailovic

25 worked on as well as our other colleagues from the field of economic

Page 33489

1 sciences. That was the least controversial part of all. It was among the

2 first to be finished, and it had to deal with the state of the economy

3 only.

4 Q. Page 16, if you please, under the heading Serbian Academy and

5 Political Establishment At Daggers Drawn, identifies statements by Milos

6 Macura, president of the party chapter, Antonije Isakovic, Dusan Kanazir,

7 and identifies some of those.

8 Now, did those become members of the Main Board of the accused's

9 SPS party, those academicians?

10 A. In 1990, that is to say four years later, they became members of

11 the Main Board, that's correct. Kanazir, who was president of the Serbian

12 Academy of Sciences and Arts, and Antonije Isakovic, who was

13 vice-president of the academy. At that time, Isakovic was particularly

14 held responsible because he headed the working group, and his resignation

15 was sought on the basis of the fact that he was responsible for the

16 elaboration of the memorandum.

17 Q. At page 18, please, Professor, and at the foot of the page. We

18 see reference, about 12 lines up, to Professor -- President Stambolic's

19 reaction to the memorandum, which he said had upset previously good

20 relations. President Stambolic's attitude to the memorandum is set out in

21 a book he published before he was killed; correct?

22 A. I don't know. I never saw that book written by President

23 Stambolic.

24 Q. You're unaware of his taking the view, perhaps either in the book

25 or elsewhere, that the memorandum was really an in memoriam for the former

Page 33490

1 Yugoslavia. That's the way he described it. Do you recall that?

2 A. Yes. He headed this very fierce campaign against the Academy of

3 Sciences. There were attacks in the newspapers, calls to responsibility,

4 and the following year the academy was supposed to celebrate its

5 centenary, the centenary of its establishment. The state, the government,

6 denied the academy any assistance for celebrating the centennial. We had

7 to write to other academies from other countries in the world, telling

8 them that we cannot cover their expenses at all when they come to

9 celebrate our centenary with us because the government has denied us all

10 support, but Stambolic did have the position that you explained just now,

11 a very negative one towards this. If we have got time --

12 Q. Can we go to page 39, please. Does the -- this part of this

13 document, before we come to the memorandum itself, sets out an account of

14 the involvement of the accused.

15 At page 39 we see this in the second paragraph: "The cessation of

16 the official smear campaign and normalisation of relations with the

17 Serbian academy occurred after the removal of Ivan Stambolic and other

18 officials in the League of Communists who had been the ringleaders of the

19 attack. The change in Serbia's political leadership signalled a change of

20 heart towards the Serbian intellectuals, freedom of the press, and

21 responsibility for public pronouncements."

22 What it amounts to is that under the accused's leadership, the

23 academy and its memorandum were treated better; correct?

24 A. The memorandum was no longer referred to, but the attitude towards

25 the academy had changed completely. The attacks -- the attacks ceased,

Page 33491

1 the constant criticism stopped and calls for responsibility. The new

2 state leadership and the leadership of the then League of Communists

3 established normal relations with the academy as they could have been

4 earlier on as well, respecting their freedom of speech and freedom of

5 deciding on their own.

6 During those years, almost all Serb intellectuals gave the accused

7 major support when he became president of the republic and when a new era

8 started. For the first time we did not have political prisoners. For the

9 first time people could freely write whatever they wanted to, and normal

10 relations were established with the Serbian Academy of Sciences. And then

11 everything --

12 Q. The accused had made either no or only muted criticisms of the

13 memorandum. Would that be correct?

14 A. The accused did not voice any explicit criticism of the

15 memorandum, although the party that he headed did establish a commission

16 to investigate what it was that was going on in relation to the

17 memorandum. It was headed by a person called Milenko Markovic, but the

18 commission did not finish its work, so it was actually dissolved without

19 having completed anything.

20 So the accused did not explicitly refer to the memorandum

21 anywhere. He did not support it, but he did not condemn it either.

22 Q. And on page 41, we see a reflection of the accused's public

23 position where in late 1989 he was reported as saying: "As regards the

24 Serbian Academy of Sciences, I really do not see why it should not have a

25 say in politics in Serbia." Do you remember that?

Page 33492

1 A. Yes, of course. Well, the accused established the freedom of

2 thought and the right of the academy to present its views without

3 restraining it and without punishing it, and that was very well-received.

4 Q. Shall we go to page 80. Because in fairness to the accused, in

5 this document we should see the way his overall position was reflected --

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In order to be fair, in order to be

8 fair, this article that was quoted just now by Mr. Nice is entitled The

9 Witch Hunt Dies Down. Just to make things clear, that a witch hunt died

10 down.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. --

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] These were the last remnants --

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: You will have an opportunity to re-examine, and

14 you may introduce matters that arise out of cross-examination like that.

15 MR. NICE:

16 Q. We come to page 80. There's a chapter or part headed The

17 Memorandum and Slobodan Milosevic. I'm going to read half of it, or read

18 with the witness half of it, I hope not doing it a disservice, unless the

19 Chamber has already had an opportunity of reading this in full itself.

20 But this is the published position, Professor. If we start towards the

21 bottom of page 80, and I'll read, I hope, slowly enough for the

22 interpreters.

23 "The insinuation that Slobodan Milosevic was carrying out a

24 national agenda contained in the memorandum is a pure fabrication. This

25 claim was inspired by the course of events and the anti-Serbian

Page 33493

1 propaganda's need to keep the official and unofficial organs of Serbia

2 under a constant barrage of accusations. This fabrication is untenable,

3 because the memorandum is not a national programme at all. It would seem

4 that this fact must be repeated many times, since the anti-Serbian

5 propaganda, without any grounds whatsoever, is continually trying to

6 convince the world of the opposite.

7 "Another charge against the memorandum is that it served as a

8 springboard for Slobodan Milosevic's policies. There is nothing strange

9 in the fact that he may have seen some of the problems and solutions in

10 the same or similar light as the document in question. It is more likely

11 that he did not learn about the existence of these problems for the first

12 time from the memorandum, but that he found in it confirmation for some of

13 his personal -- his own personal observations. The Yugoslav crisis was so

14 acute that such a coincidence is very probable. It is quite certain that

15 even without the memorandum, he would have had to put an end to further

16 abuse of autonomy in Kosovo and to the autonomism in Vojvodina, all of

17 which stood in the way of establishing the normal prerogatives of

18 statehood in the Republic of Serbia."

19 Miss the next sentence.

20 "Milosevic was in favour of preserving Yugoslavia, as was clearly

21 seen at the last, 14th Congress of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia,

22 among other things because the Serbian people were then living in one

23 single state."

24 Pausing there. This document thus sets out, as it were, a defence

25 of the independence of the memorandum, doesn't it?

Page 33494

1 A. Yes, certainly. Milosevic had nothing to do with the memorandum.

2 People didn't know him. They didn't have contacts with him.

3 Some of these positions were so generally accepted. These

4 problems were so big. I said yesterday that the Slovenes decided at the

5 time that they did not want to live in that kind of state any longer that

6 was in such disarray and chaos, where there was no equality of rights any

7 longer and where there was no proper economic policy.

8 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... just focusing on the last

9 sentence I've read. Were you present at the 14th Congress of the League

10 of Communists?

11 A. No. No. No. I was not a member of the League of Communists, not

12 since 1968. In 1968, I was excluded from the ranks of the League of

13 Communists, together with the entire party organisation of the faculty of

14 philosophy.

15 Q. Are you aware - yes or no - that this was the Congress at which

16 the Slovenes through Kucan tried to effect a number of constitutional

17 amendments to the League of Communists, all of which were defeated by the

18 accused and that on Kucan's account it was that that led him to lead his

19 delegation out?

20 A. I cannot give just a mere yes or no answer. Just one sentence,

21 please. It was indispensable for this very loose association of republics

22 to be strengthened, to have more regulation within it rather than to have

23 it weakened further. Kucan and the Slovenes had by then already decided

24 to leave Yugoslavia, and they needed to leave the League of Communists

25 first. And that is why they proposed these amendments, that it should be

Page 33495

1 turned even looser and that it should become even more fragile in that

2 way, and of course no one in his right mind could accept that.

3 Q. Well, we'll go back to page 81, please. The same part of the page

4 but the next paragraph. Third sentence.

5 "However, some facts suggest that he was critical of the authors

6 of the memorandum more out of compliance with party discipline than out of

7 personal conviction. During the political witch hunt in Serbia, it was

8 noted that his criticisms were rare and relatively mild. After assuming

9 the key political position in Serbia, finding himself able to influence

10 the direction of political action, he stopped the campaign against the

11 memorandum."

12 It picks up on one of my earlier questions: Do the views of

13 Mr. Mihailovic and Mr. Krestic accord with your recollection, Professor,

14 on this topic?

15 A. They do. They do. I can just say one thing, though. I don't

16 know whether Mr. Milosevic expressed any kind of criticism of the

17 memorandum anywhere, although, as I said, he did send this party

18 commission to investigate how it was written in the first place. It is

19 true that he stopped the campaign, because that was the only democratic

20 thing to do. That was the last remnant of this communist intolerance that

21 Stambolic carried out by starting a full-fledged war against the Academy

22 of Sciences and Arts. That was very unpopular and no intellectual could

23 accept that, so it was quite fortunate that Mr. Milosevic stopped the

24 campaign, or the witch hunt, if you will.

25 Q. Just for the assistance of the Court and for one very small

Page 33496












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Page 33497

1 question, we can see on page 85 that the -- this part of the document

2 covers in one page the thesis of a Greater Serbia, which I may be able to

3 ask you about if I have the time, but we can see locked in here the fact

4 that the notion of a Greater Serbia certainly goes back to the 19th

5 century, doesn't it, Professor? You'll know that independently.

6 A. Yes, but it comes from Austro-Hungary. Austro-Hungary in this

7 way tried to discredit the aspirations of the Southern Slavs to become

8 free and to become united.

9 Q. With that --

10 A. Part of a Greater Serbia.

11 Q. With those preliminary observations from this document can we look

12 at some passages of the memorandum itself. And I would like to save time

13 to cover two issues simultaneously but I'll see how I fare.

14 On page 104, we see that the -- at the right hand -- at the top of

15 the page, about four lines down, after dealing with disintegration

16 generally: "... the first post-war -- the first decades of post-war

17 development into a kind of confederation, which became institutionalised

18 in the most recent constitution of 1974. There have been many cases in

19 history of a confederation turning into a federation, but there is not a

20 single example of the opposite occurring."

21 And then at the end of this paragraph: "Eleven years have been

22 more than enough time for the enormous difficulties caused by all the

23 consequences of confederalism in the social order to become clear, as a

24 result of which even the constitution itself has found itself in the focus

25 of criticism ...

Page 33498

1 "The most important element of confederalism consists of the

2 requirement that the assemblies of all the republics and provinces must

3 first give their consent before ... amendments ..."

4 Objection to the arrangement described as confederation came from

5 Serbs, but the confederation was not the subject of any such similar

6 criticisms from the other republics. Would that be correct?

7 A. Those republics that wanted to secede took that course, to have

8 the federation first turn into a confederation, recognising the sovereign

9 republics and their borders, and then the actual step of seceding from a

10 confederation would be easy.

11 It is true what it says here, that usually confederations turn

12 into federations. For example, the Swiss confederation is not a

13 confederation by any standard, or in the United States --

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: You must discipline yourself to answer the

15 question that was asked. I think that question was fairly simple.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's what I'm doing.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: No. The question -- the question was whether

18 objection to confederalism came from republics other than Serbia, and that

19 could have been answered far more simply.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I could have, but it would not have

21 been clear why the other republics sought a confederation. I explained

22 why.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thanks for the tutorial.

24 MR. NICE: And I'm not going to at the moment pick up on that

25 answer - not that I necessarily accept it - because of time.

Page 33499

1 Q. On page 104 still, the last paragraph begins: "The affirmation of

2 republican and provincial attributes of statehood alongside the

3 simultaneous disappearance of the coordinating functions vested in the

4 federal government have opened the doors wide to the promotion of local

5 interests at the expense of national interests."

6 Now, which particular local interests were you identifying or was

7 the memorandum identifying? Just list them, if you will, please.

8 A. Of course there are very many local interests. If I were to refer

9 to all of them, we'd need a great deal of time. It is sufficiently clear

10 when it is said that local interests were placed above general interests.

11 Q. Did these local interests, in the view of Serbs, find expression

12 in the autonomous provinces? Is that what was meant?

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There is no point in any of this,

15 Mr. Robinson. This is an intellectual text that talks about the

16 destructive effect that this division into republican economies had on the

17 overall development of Yugoslavia at a time when the entire world was

18 moving towards economic integration. This has nothing to do with

19 anything. I think that Mr. Nice does not understand the text of the

20 memorandum or that he did not read it properly. He is putting questions

21 that are simply confusing the witness. The witness can explain everything

22 that is actually written here, but this is such a low level of examination

23 that it is pointless. This was written by academicians, after all, and

24 please bear that in mind.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think you're right; the witness can answer the

Page 33500

1 question.

2 MR. NICE: Your Honour, yes. These interruptions by the accused

3 aren't going to help the timetable or anything else. The answer -- the

4 question was clearly one that the witness was capable of answering, and I

5 would ask him to, with Your Honour's leave indeed, to answer the question.

6 Q. Do these local interests relate to the autonomous regions?

7 A. No. Local interests are even pettier than that, and they do not

8 pertain to autonomous regions, only. For example, local interest in

9 Slovenia was that the citizens of Slovenia can travel without a passport,

10 without a visa, to Italy and bring goods back without paying customs.

11 That was the local interest of Slovenia and the bordering regions along

12 the border with Italy. So this is an example of a local interest.

13 What would happen if the USA decided that each and every one of

14 its regions can independently trade with the rest of the world? And this

15 was travelling without visas and importing goods without paying customs,

16 duty free.

17 So this has to do with all the municipalities as well. There were

18 hundreds of them in Yugoslavia.

19 Q. We go to page 117. At the top of the page we see: "Unless there

20 is a change in this constitution and the political and economic system

21 based on it, it will be impossible to resolve any of the basic problems in

22 our society ..."

23 There is no doubt that the purpose of this memorandum, or at least

24 its conclusion, was that there had to be a change in the constitution;

25 correct?

Page 33501

1 A. It was necessary to change the constitution because this

2 constitution actually buried Yugoslavia. I already said that yesterday.

3 Not a single state could have survived that kind of constitution that says

4 that special laws, particular laws, are more important than general laws,

5 and that says that every one of the integral parts can veto any decision.

6 Under those conditions, life together became impossible, and I mentioned

7 that is one of the reasons why Slovenia decided to secede. So it was

8 indispensable to change the constitution, yes.

9 Q. Professor, as I think you've agreed, the other republics were not

10 dissatisfied with the constitution, and the constitution was the law of

11 the land at the time, and it was only from Serbia that there was the

12 demand coming for constitutional change of this kind; correct?

13 A. No. No. It's the other way around. All the republics were

14 dissatisfied with the constitution, but Serbia proposed to make a step

15 towards federalism, whereas the other republics, for example Slovenia,

16 Croatia, et cetera, proposed to move in the opposite direction, to

17 disintegrate even more, to disintegrate this federation that had already

18 turned into a confederation even further. But all the republics were

19 asking for changes, though in different directions.

20 Q. Did the constitution of 1974, in your opinion, reflect Tito's

21 famous belief that a weak -- for a strong Yugoslavia you needed a weak or

22 weakened Serbia?

23 A. It was believed at the time that Tito and some others in other

24 republics believed it was necessary to have a weak republic.

25 However, I have another explanation with regard to this

Page 33502

1 constitution. Tito believed that while he was alive, with the strength of

2 his own authority and his control over the army and intelligence services,

3 he will manage to keep Yugoslavia together as a whole. On the other hand,

4 in order to be as popular as possible throughout the country, he did not

5 oppose these demands for a further confederalisation of Yugoslavia that

6 were coming from the Slovenes and the Croats. He allowed that because he

7 thought that while he was still alive, he will manage to keep the country

8 together. It became obvious that once he was no longer there, that became

9 impossible. The country fell apart or was broken apart.

10 Q. The first steps of reform with which the Chamber is familiar were

11 those that, of course, led to strengthening of Serbia by the withdrawal of

12 the autonomy of Kosovo and Vojvodina; correct?

13 A. I spoke yesterday of the reform of the political and economic

14 systems, referring to various other things as well. This, however, refers

15 to the change of the Serbian constitution in 1990, which strengthened this

16 integrative factor within the country and turned Serbia into the same sort

17 of state that other republics already were.

18 So inside Serbia, it became possible for the government and the

19 organs of Serbia to enact laws valid throughout Serbia. That is the

20 change that you described.

21 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... because the question I asked

22 was quite simple: Did the reforms by the withdrawal of autonomies lead to

23 a strengthening of Serbia? Yes or no.

24 A. By the very fact that the elements of sovereignty -- mind you, I'm

25 not speaking of autonomy -- elements of sovereignty of provinces were

Page 33503

1 removed, they remained autonomous, Serbia as a whole was strengthened.

2 Q. And so whatever the accused's involvement or not with the academy

3 and its memorandum, in the reforms of constitutions that he effected, he

4 met the demand or requirement of the memorandum that we've been looking at

5 on page 117 where there was the requirement for a change in the

6 constitution.

7 A. It was the common belief of all the intelligentsia, all the

8 leading intellectuals and people involved in the public life of Serbia.

9 It was not only the opinion or the demand of the accused.

10 Q. And if we can look forward to the speech at Gazimestan, do you

11 accept that one way and another the revocation of Kosovo's autonomy was

12 dealt with there and reform of the constitution was covered? It may be in

13 oblique language, but it was covered in those speeches -- in that speech?

14 A. That speech was not on that subject. However, a year later, in

15 response to a general demand, the constitution was amended without - I

16 repeat, without - revoking the economy, because you keep talking about the

17 revocation of the autonomy, which didn't happen, but elements of the

18 sovereignty of the provinces were removed in the constitutional amendments

19 of 1990.

20 Q. See whether we can have in mind if we turn it up or not, right at

21 the beginning of the Gazimestan speech, which is Exhibit D251, the accused

22 said of the very year 1989 that Serbia had, after many years and many

23 decades, regained its state national and spiritual integrity. Later in

24 the same paragraph, "through the play of history and life, it seems as if

25 Serbia has precisely in this year, 1989, regained its state and its

Page 33504

1 dignity and thus has celebrated an event of the distance passed which has

2 great historical and symbolic significance for its future."

3 Professor, was the accused referring there effectively to the

4 reintegration of Kosovo into the state of Serbia itself?

5 A. Well, one could not talk about reintegrating Kosovo, because

6 Kosovo had already been a part of Serbia even under the 1974 constitution.

7 It was a constituent element of Serbia and the federation, including

8 some elements of sovereignty. So it was not reintegrated. It remained a

9 part of Serbia. It only lost some elements of sovereignty. And the

10 Serbian institutions, the institutions of Serbia as a whole, had purview

11 as of that time over the whole territory of Serbia rather than only Serbia

12 proper.

13 Q. It may be my mistake; I didn't make it clear. Was the accused, in

14 his speech at Kosovo Polje, to a million or a million and a half people,

15 speaking of the constitutional changes?

16 A. No, he did not.

17 Q. What was he talking about to you, then?

18 A. He didn't.

19 Q. What was he talking about?

20 A. Well, we discussed that yesterday. He spoke of the need for

21 unity, because disunity had, centuries before that, led to the defeat of

22 Serbia. He spoke of the need for national equality, about tolerance. He

23 didn't breathe a word about Kosovo, Albania, or Albanians.

24 Q. Have you got the document of his speech in front of you?

25 A. Yes, I do. I'm sorry, I don't.

Page 33505

1 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... following in English or

2 Serbian. I'm content with either. The second line says -- let's just

3 read both lines: "By the force of social circumstances this great 600th

4 anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo is taking place in a year in which

5 Serbia, after many years, after many decades, has regained its state,

6 national, and spiritual integrity."

7 What was he referring to? Nobody could be better placed than an

8 intellectual and academician to interpret Mr. Milosevic's words.

9 A. Everyone knows what "integrity" means. That means being one whole

10 application of laws throughout one's territory, equal socio-political and

11 other human rights throughout the territory. You do not see reintegration

12 mentioned anywhere here. You see references to being one whole.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Nice, can you remind me of the date of the

14 constitutional amendments?

15 MR. NICE: March of the same year, 1989. The speech in June.

16 Q. And can you just help us with this, Professor: We've heard a

17 little bit of evidence about the constitutional changes that came in two

18 stages in March in Kosovo itself. Do you recall the presence of tanks

19 being around the building of the Assembly when the constitutional changes

20 were brought in in Kosovo? Do you recall that?

21 A. No. No.

22 Q. Could you explain why it might be necessary to have a show of

23 force in Kosovo for constitutional change?

24 A. Well, if I'm telling you that that -- I don't remember that it

25 happened, then of course I can't explain why it happened.

Page 33506

1 Q. Can you help us with this as well, and you'll remember that

2 yesterday His Honour asked some questions -- His Honour Judge Bonomy asked

3 some questions about contemporaneous newspaper reports, and we'll come to

4 that a little later, but can you help us with this: This speech delivered

5 in Kosovo by the accused makes no single reference to a Kosovo Albanian.

6 Can you interpret that for us? Can you explain --

7 A. I can. It was the general expectation, among the people who

8 gathered there, of course, that he would, speaking of Kosovo Albanians,

9 criticise what had been going on in the previous years. And we know what

10 had been going on. However, in order to avoid uttering any criticism, he

11 didn't mention it at all. He spoke of the region as a whole without

12 mentioning any of the ethnic communities. He mentioned Serbs a couple of

13 times, but otherwise he didn't mention in particular any community.

14 Q. The Gazimestan speech was for Serbs and it was attended by Serbs.

15 It wasn't at all for Kosovo Albanians, was it?

16 A. Quite the contrary. He said, and it was widely quoted, that

17 Kosovo was inhabited not only by Serbs and that all of them, not only

18 Serbs, were at issue.

19 Q. Is it the case, do you recall, that indeed at the very time of

20 this meeting for Serbs there was a state of emergency in Kosovo which

21 would have restricted or forbidden public gathering by Kosovo Albanians?

22 A. There was no state emergency whatsoever at the time, although it

23 is true that in that year I was not involved in politics and I was often

24 away abroad, in America and other countries, but I'm not aware of any

25 state of emergency in Serbia.

Page 33507












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Page 33508

1 I told you yesterday that you can qualify as a state of emergency

2 the situation in 1968 when Tito brought two divisions in Kosovo, as well

3 as 1991, when another insurgency by Kosovo Albanians occurred. But in

4 1989 and in 1990, there was no state of emergency. This time, the

5 Assembly met and decided in a democratic way about constitutional changes,

6 and we all witnessed the result of that decision-making.

7 Q. If you look back to the memorandum, please. If we go to page 118,

8 at the top on the right -- at the top, we see the memorandum saying: "Not

9 all the national groups were equal: the Serbian nation, for instance, was

10 not given the right to have its own state. The large sections of the

11 Serbian people who live in other republics, unlike the national

12 minorities, do not have the right to use their own language and script;

13 they do not have the right to set up their own political or cultural

14 organisations or to foster the common cultural traditions of their nation

15 together with their co-nationals. The unremitting persecution and

16 expulsion of Serbs from Kosovo is a drastic example showing that those

17 principles which protect the autonomy of a minority (the ethnic Albanians)

18 are not applied to a minority within a minority (the Serbs, Montenegrins,

19 Turks, Roms in Kosovo)."

20 Setting out in -- first of all, this is the view you all held at

21 the time, is it?

22 A. That is the view that not only I held. It was held, indeed, by

23 all those who participated in drafting this document. It can be

24 substantiated and proven correct.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: That's not a matter of opinion, Mr. Nice, is it?

Page 33509

1 That's a question of fact.

2 MR. NICE: Yes.

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can explain. May I? There was a

4 difference between the rights of minorities and the rights enjoyed by

5 constituent peoples. In Yugoslavia, it was considered that constituent

6 peoples were those who had a republic - Serbs, Macedonians, Croats, and

7 others - whereas those parts of a nation which had their mother state

8 elsewhere, such as Hungarians and Albanians, were another category.

9 Our constitution dealt specifically with the rights of minorities.

10 However, constituent peoples, for instance, Serbs living in Croatia, did

11 not enjoy the rights that were explicitly given to Albanians at Kosovo.

12 It was absurd, but it was the way it was. So Serbs in Croatia did not

13 enjoy all the rights that I earlier said were enjoyed by Albanians in

14 Kosovo; the right to their own university, to their own publishing house,

15 the right to free publication of their own magazines in their own

16 language. That, therefore --

17 JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues] ... can I

18 interrupt you, Professor. Did that also apply to Croats living in Serbia?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct. Even their rights were not

20 explicitly stipulated, and all the constituent peoples were in the same

21 position. Their minorities living in other republics were not governed by

22 any law. It was a huge loophole in the constitution.

23 MR. NICE:

24 Q. I think the -- you said something yesterday about the definition

25 of Serbia as a nation of citizens -- not a nation of citizens, I beg your

Page 33510

1 pardon. As a state of citizens, not of Serbs. Is the position that from

2 the 1974 constitution right through and beyond the 1989 revocation of

3 autonomy in Kosovo, the Serbian constitution referred to a state of Serbs

4 and other nations or Serbs and other groups; is that right? And it only

5 became a state of citizens later on in 1990?

6 A. Correct. In 1990, the constitution stipulated that Serbia was a

7 state of all the citizens living in it, whereas before that, under the

8 1974 constitution, it was stipulated that republics were primarily states

9 of their primary nations and then only all the other citizens.

10 Q. I mentioned that because I think you said yesterday that the

11 change happened in 1989. It happened in 1990. But now let's deal with

12 this question of the expulsion of Serbs from Kosovo.

13 You gave a figure yesterday, and I think it's a figure that

14 matched a figure given by an earlier witness, Professor Avramov. I must

15 deal with this point of detail. How many do you say were expelled from

16 Kosovo?

17 A. The number of Serbs expelled from Kosovo mentioned somewhere in

18 the memorandum is 200.000 for the period from late 1960s to the 1990s.

19 That means 200.000 in 20 years.

20 Q. Have you checked these figures against the Yugoslav survey,

21 statistical survey itself, ever?

22 A. Well, one of the authors of the memorandum is our leading

23 demographer, Professor Milos Macura. He knows these things and he's

24 responsible for these figures.

25 Q. Because the statistical survey from Yugoslavia might suggest much

Page 33511

1 lower figures up and until 1989, 40.000 and thereafter some 20.000; 60.000

2 in all. Do you accept that those figures might be as right as the figure

3 of 200.000, or do you simply not know?

4 A. That is a controversial issue among experts, demographers. What

5 we can establish here is that indeed a large number, a very large number

6 was expelled, in the tens of thousands, and we can leave the exact figure

7 open for further exploration and determination. Even if it's only the

8 tens of thousands, it is a lot.

9 Q. And by expulsion, are you including economic migration, for

10 example where people found that they were offered attractive prices for

11 their homes by Kosovo Albanians and finding it preferable to leave and

12 move to Serbia? Are you including that in your notion of expulsion?

13 A. It happened occasionally that some people, seeing how the general

14 circumstances of living were insecure, getting a good price for their

15 house and land indeed accepted and left, but that's not something that

16 happens under normal circumstances. At least, it shouldn't.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Are they included in your figure of 200.000?

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That includes everyone who left

19 Kosovo and moved to Serbia. Maybe -- there are some different

20 assessments. Maybe the figure of 200.000 includes those who sold out

21 voluntarily, and the figure of 40.000 refers only to those who were

22 violently expelled. Maybe that's the difference.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

24 MR. NICE: Your Honour, by not taking that any further, I'm not

25 accepting in any sense the answer given.

Page 33512

1 Q. Can we move on to page 122 of the memorandum. And we can see,

2 about a third of the way down the page, in a paragraph headed "Serbia's

3 economic subordination," the next sentence: "This ideological platform

4 gave rise to opinions and behaviour which were to have a crucial influence

5 on subsequent political events and intercommunal relations. Before the

6 Second World War, the Slovenes and Croats set up their own national

7 communist parties, and they gained a decisive voice in the Communist Party

8 of Yugoslavia's Central Committee. Their political leaders became

9 arbiters on all political issues both during and after the war. These two

10 neighbouring republics shared a similar history; they have the same

11 religion and aspirations for greater independence, and as the most highly

12 developed, they also have common economic interests, all of which prove --

13 provided sufficient grounds for a permanent coalition in the endeavour to

14 achieve political dominance. This coalition was cemented by the long

15 years of collaboration between Tito and Kardelj, the two most emminent

16 political figures in post-war Yugoslavia, who enjoyed inviolable authority

17 in the centres of power."

18 This is really a description, would this be fair, of the Serbian

19 state as a victim of the supremacy of others; is that right?

20 A. We can speak of inequalities. I have already mentioned yesterday

21 that it was the opinion of the Comintern that in Serbia, for reasons that

22 I stated, Serbian hegemony prevailed, and that is why the Comintern was

23 seeking to break up Yugoslavia.

24 Tito, however, a Croat, and Kardelj, who was a Slovene, believed

25 from the outset that a faster development of other republics should be

Page 33513

1 favoured. According to the five-year plan, it was determined that Serbia

2 should develop at a lower rate than other republics although Croatia and

3 Slovenia were even then economically more developed than Serbia. So that

4 was the initial situation in which Tito decided, as early as 1940, that

5 separate communist parties of Slovenia and Croatia should be established,

6 while denying that right to Serbia. So we had the Communist Party of

7 Slovenia, Croatia, and Yugoslavia, but we did not have the Communist Party

8 of Serbia.

9 Similarly, Tito did not allow, at the time when organs of national

10 liberation were established playing the role of assemblies, did not allow

11 them to be set up in Serbia but only in Slovenia, for instance. So in

12 Serbia it was forbidden, in 1940, and it was only in 1945 that its leading

13 Communist Party was established.

14 In the meantime, major decisions were made without the

15 participation of a Serbian representative who could advocate one or

16 another opinion on behalf of the Serbian people, and it was precisely the

17 time when certain boundaries were decided, boundaries that became later

18 the basis for secession.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Professor.

20 MR. NICE:

21 Q. In the balance of letting you answer and cutting you off, I must

22 seek to bring you back to the question, which I'll amplify. The question

23 was whether this was -- this passage of the memorandum is setting Serbia

24 as a victim of the supremacy of others, and I'd like you to answer that,

25 please. And is it indeed a recurring theme in the developing politics of

Page 33514

1 Serbia that it does see itself as a victim? Can you help us?

2 A. Well, I would not use that language such as the victim, because of

3 course if it had been a victim, there would have been great resistance and

4 insurgency in Serbia from the beginning. Serbia was simply less equal.

5 It had less rights than Slovenia and Croatia. And as I said, the first

6 five-year plan from 1945 to 1950 determined that Serbia should develop at

7 a less speedy rate than Slovenia and Croatia, and even entire factories

8 were moved from Serbia to the other two republics.

9 Q. Did it occur to the academy that publishing -- and of course it

10 eventually came out, publishing this interpretation of Serbia against the

11 rest might have an adverse effect on relations between the republics?

12 A. The truth had to be told, and the truth was that Slovenia and

13 Croatia had their communist parties; Serbia did not have one. It was also

14 true that the development rate of Croatia and Slovenia were faster than in

15 Serbia. All that was necessary to be told in order to normalise

16 relations.

17 Q. Go to the top of page 123. You see a summary in the second line:

18 "The vindictive policy against the Serbs began before the Second World

19 War, in the sense that a communist party was deemed unnecessary for a

20 'nation of oppressors.'" .

21 So again -- and if we look at the next paragraph: "These

22 historical facts show that during the war Serbia was not even formally and

23 certainly not genuinely in an equal position when decisions of far

24 reaching importance for the future ... were taken."

25 I realise you don't like the word or don't adopt the word

Page 33515

1 "victim," but doesn't this all show the perception through the memorandum

2 of Serbia as a victim?

3 A. Well, a situation of fact can be described in -- by using stronger

4 language or weaker language. The term "victim" is too strong, I think, to

5 describe it, but it was a certain amount of inequality, yes, and that was

6 fact. And of course if you tell the truth, it shouldn't hurt anybody,

7 especially the people who had based their whole involvement and engagement

8 on the truth.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: But you prefer the term "inequality" to "victim"?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, inequality, unequal.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, it's time for the adjournment.

12 MR. NICE: May I, through the Court, invite the witness, if he

13 doesn't require complete rest in the period of the adjournment, to review

14 the article that summarises the article I was raising with him at the

15 beginning. If he could take that away with him and read it, I'd be

16 grateful.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Does he have it?

18 MR. NICE: No. I can make it available.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Make it available to him.

20 We will adjourn now for 20 minutes.

21 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

22 --- On resuming at 10.58 a.m.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please continue, Mr. Nice.

24 MR. NICE:

25 Q. Professor, I'm happy to say that the article of which I asked you

Page 33516

1 it read a summary has I think now been identified, and I'm hopeful to

2 having it produced to Court within the next half an hour, so I will come

3 back to the document that you read in the break in some minutes' time.

4 A. I will not be able to say something about it?

5 Q. Absolutely, of course you will, but a little later.

6 A. Did you say?

7 Q. Can we go back to memorandum. We were on page 123, and I suggest

8 it's helpful to explore the documents fairly deliberately today, I will

9 try to accelerate the last few pages by taking several entries together.

10 Can we go to page 125, where we see, three lines down: "Serbia's

11 politicians proved to be unprepared for the historical task which was

12 posed for them by the extremely adverse internal relationships within the

13 Yugoslav state."

14 Then paragraph 7: "The attitude taken to Serbia's economic

15 stagnation shows that the vindictive policy towards this republic has not

16 lost any of its edge with the passing of time. On the contrary,

17 encouraged by its own success, it has grown ever stronger, to the point of

18 genocide."

19 And then we see, six lines beyond, a reference to the

20 Tito-believed policy: "And yet not even here is Serbia equal, because of

21 its special legal and political status, which reflects the desire to keep

22 the Serbian people constantly under control. The watchword of this policy

23 has been 'A weak Serbia ensures a strong Yugoslavia' ..."

24 Did it occur to you as one of the authors of this memorandum,

25 Professor, that the language used generally, both in description of

Page 33517

1 Serbia's position and in the characterisation of other parts of the former

2 Yugoslavia as being genocidal in intent and actions were bound to have

3 consequences of an adverse kind?

4 A. To seems to me that the word "genocide" is too strong, too,

5 although they had in mind what was happening in Kosovo; the expulsion of

6 people, their mistreatment, the destruction of cultural monuments, et

7 cetera.

8 Now, as for the rest, if we leave behind that particular word, I

9 would say that this is a fairly exact description, accurate description,

10 and that Serbia really was, from the beginning, under some special

11 treatment, because just as the Comintern had explained, it enjoyed

12 hegemony and oppressed others between the two world wars, and then this

13 had to be suppressed at that time.

14 Take this example, for example: In Serbia alone there was this

15 kind of supervision about what intellectuals felt and wrote, and you could

16 only have it in Serbia where several of us, just for publishing and

17 editing a journal like Praksis, that we were on the verge of being

18 arrested. Our passports were taken away from us, we were expelled from

19 the university, and so on.

20 So taken as a whole, I would say that this is accurate and correct

21 except where it says that a weak Yugoslavia shows a strong -- a weak

22 Serbia shows a strong Yugoslavia. That was by Tupurkovski and Kolisevski.

23 They stated that. Two Macedonians who represented Macedonia and the

24 Yugoslav state Presidency. That's what they took note of and said that a

25 policy of that kind was indeed waged during those years.

Page 33518












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13 English transcripts.













Page 33519

1 Q. Page 127, paragraph numbered 8. I'm really still on the topic of

2 the language and the way that this document describes events.

3 "The expulsion of the Serbian people from Kosovo bears dramatic

4 testimony to their historical defeat. In the spring of 1981, open and

5 total war was declared on the Serbian people, which had been carefully

6 prepared for in advance of the various changes of administrative,

7 political and constitutional reform. This open war has been going on for

8 almost five years. It has been waged with the skilful and carefully

9 orchestrated use of various methods and tactics, with the active and not

10 just tacit support of various political centres ..."

11 Now, you're here describing the war by -- by whom, Professor?

12 A. Well, this passage talks about the war in Kosovo, and the war is

13 being waged by the organisation, secret clandestine organisations that

14 existed in Kosovo. I mentioned one such one, the Balli Kombitar

15 organisation, and another one was called the Prizren League, and yes

16 indeed, there was violent expulsion of people that took place and cultural

17 monuments were toppled and all the rest of it, all the other details

18 mentioned here. So that's it.

19 Q. If we go to page 128 the first new paragraph: "The physical,

20 political, legal, and cultural genocide of the Serbian population in

21 Kosovo and Metohija is in a worse defeat than any experienced in the

22 liberation wars waged by Serbia in the First Serbian Uprising in 1804 to

23 the uprising of 1941."

24 And if you'd be good enough, just so that we can stay with

25 genocide, to go over to page 139 for these purposes, and about eight lines

Page 33520

1 down: "Admittedly, the first article of the constitution of the Socialist

2 Republic of Serbia contains a clause declaring that Serbia is a state, but

3 the question must be asked what kind of a state is denied jurisdiction

4 over its own territory or does not have the means at its disposal to

5 establish law and order in one of its sections, or ensure the personal

6 safety and security of property of its citizens, or to put a stop to the

7 genocide in Kosovo and halt the exodus of Serbs from their ancestral

8 homes."

9 This language, repeated language in this document, Professor, was

10 bound to have a significant effect, was it not?

11 A. Well, yes, but the language expressed the factual situation. And

12 you must bear in mind that Kosovo was once completely Serbian territory

13 during the Middle Ages, and the Serb state. Then the Turks populated

14 Kosovo with their loyal Muslim followers, and in the Turkish books, defkas

15 [phoen] as they're called, with the results of the census, there were no

16 Albanians, practically no Albanians in Kosovo in the 15th century. And

17 then more and more of them came in after that. There was a balance that

18 had been struck after that at one point, but --

19 Q. Forgive me, Professor. You as academicians must have realised you

20 were dealing with the 20th century demographic distribution and that you

21 were accusing your fellow countrymen of committing acts of genocide on the

22 Serbs. Do you think that might have had an alienating effect on those

23 people?

24 A. It didn't lead to their alienation. They had been organised since

25 1988 to create a Greater Albania, and what they wanted to do was to take

Page 33521

1 Kosovo and attached it to Albania. This was a very conscious aim. We

2 know who did it and how this was done. All the facts exist. So this was

3 going on for one and a half centuries before our very eyes, without any

4 power to stop it or do anything about it because the Yugoslav 1974

5 constitution took away any right that the Serb institutions had to meddle

6 in Kosovo. So this was a process, an ongoing process that went on and on,

7 became worse and worse, and nobody was able to do anything about it. So

8 that must be taken in account.

9 Q. As an intellectual and person of broad learning, Professor, are

10 you aware that if you create a culture where one segment of society is

11 categorised as an outsider, it's going to be easier to commit crimes

12 against that outsider group? Are you aware of that?

13 A. No, no. Don't you hold lectures here asking me whether I'm aware

14 and whether I know this and that. They weren't outsiders. They were

15 recognised. They had all human rights accorded them, more rights than

16 minorities enjoy in other states, for example, and nobody did anything bad

17 to them at all. But they wanted to achieve their goal, liberate Kosovo

18 from Serbia and attach it, conjoin it to Albania. That's the context.

19 Q. At the time that you were publishing this Serb view of Kosovo

20 Albanians, the Kosovo problem was a federal problem, because the

21 constitution was intact, and the federal authorities were dealing with it,

22 weren't they, and in a tough way?

23 A. Well, the problem was of the Republic of Serbia and of the

24 Yugoslav federation too. And I've already said whenever these uprisings

25 took place, rebellions took place, Tito would send in the army to restore

Page 33522

1 law and order. The first took place in 1945, the second in 1968, and the

2 third in 1991 -- I'm sorry, 1981, if we disregard what was happening in

3 the 1990s. So there were three rebellions, three uprisings, and while

4 Tito was still alive he was very energetic in dealing with them, in

5 preventing any disturbance of law and order. But the status quo remained,

6 because the agreement had been reached with the Albanian leadership dating

7 back to the war years whereby Albania would enter into the Yugoslav

8 federation and Kosovo would be linked to Albania. Enver Hodza reminded

9 Tito of that agreement that had been reached, and Tito expected or wanted

10 to see whether Albania was ready to enter into Yugoslavia with Kosovo, and

11 when all relations were severed and when the bloodshed took place later

12 on --

13 Q. That's probably responded to the question. Can we just look at

14 one more passage on page 138. By spending time with you on this document,

15 I, of course, save time so far as any future memorandum-related witnesses

16 are concerned.

17 On page 138, in the middle: "The acquisition of equal rights and

18 an independent development for the Serbian nation have a more profound

19 historical significance. In less than 50 years, for two successive

20 generations, the Serbs were twice subjected to physical annihilation,

21 forced assimilation, conversion to a different religion, cultural

22 genocide, ideological indoctrination, denigration and compulsion to

23 renounce their own traditions because of an imposed guilt complex.

24 Intellectually and politically unmanned, the Serbian nation has had to

25 bear trials and tribulations that are too severe not to leave deep scars

Page 33523

1 in their psyche, and at the close of this century of great technological

2 feats of the human mind, this fact must not be ignored."

3 And then at the beginning of the next paragraph: "The present

4 state of depression of the Serbian people, against a background of

5 chauvinism and Serbophobia which are gaining in intensity in some milieux,

6 provides fertile soil for an ever more drastic manifestation of the

7 national sensibilities of the Serbian nation and reactions which might be

8 inflammatory and dangerous."

9 Professor, looking at the language and the context, did it not

10 occur to you academicians that this document itself would be inflammatory

11 in reaction it may have stimulated in those described in adverse terms and

12 in the approach that Serbs themselves might take to their own dilemma if

13 such it was?

14 A. All I can do is repeat what I've already stated, and that is that

15 the truth had to be told once and for all, what was actually going on.

16 And in uttering that truth, you couldn't have had the effect that you are

17 talking about because those facts had existed for decades before that. So

18 nothing new had actually happened because of the memorandum. The

19 memorandum just brought into the consciousness of people what was really

20 going on and what was being hidden in the interests of maintaining the

21 whole. And under Tito, for example, this was hidden. For example, the

22 1968 uprising was never noted in the media. Tito sent two divisions to

23 deal with the situation, and none of that was written about in the papers.

24 So people ran out of patience and finally had to state the facts.

25 Q. One thing that does emerge is that although the federal body had

Page 33524

1 dealt and was dealing with Kosovo problem, following the rise of the

2 accused and the changes in the constitutions, the problem became entirely

3 a Serbian problem, did it not? The Kosovo problem became entirely a

4 Serbian problem?

5 A. Well, the Kosovo problem became a Serbian problem because already

6 in 1991, Slovenia and Croatia declared their secession from Yugoslavia.

7 Up until then, it was a Yugoslav problem.

8 Q. And that inevitably sharpened the crisis and led eventually to the

9 problems in Kosovo that are reflected in the third indictment here;

10 correct?

11 A. It led to the fact that in 1998, in Drenica, another up -- we were

12 witness to another uprising. And it also led to the fact that all sides

13 in -- that stocks of weapons were set up all over Kosovo, underground

14 channels dug, police forces constantly attacked on a daily basis. People

15 were killed. So that brought the situation to a head in 1998, when what

16 happened was armed action from both sides.

17 Q. Before we turn then from the memorandum, may I display on the

18 overhead projector one page from Mr. de la Brosse's expert report, Exhibit

19 446, tab 2, to invite the witness's comments on two footnoted quotations.

20 Page 40.

21 Professor, I hope you will be prepared to either read it on the

22 overhead projector or it can be brought up on the screen for you by the

23 usher. This is page 40 of an expert report prepared by an expert on

24 political propaganda, and I trust on the screen is the footnote 75, which

25 -- if it's working.

Page 33525



3 Q. I'll read the quotation, Professor, and I expect the audiovisual

4 booth will manage to make it display in a minute, but you can have it in

5 front of you until such time as they get that working.

6 MR. NICE: Perhaps you could make the page available to the

7 witness, please, Usher.

8 I'm sorry the Court doesn't have it; I expected to display it in

9 this way.

10 Q. Footnote 75 says that: "Although the accused didn't adopt a

11 stance in --"

12 A. [In English] Wait a minute. Which footnote?

13 Q. Footnote 75.

14 A. [In English] 75. This is 85.

15 MR. NICE: May I have it back just to check. The page numbers may

16 be different. Page 37. My apologies. The documents get

17 re-page-numbered. Thank you very much.

18 Q. "Although Slobodan Milosevic himself did not actually adopt any

19 stance when the memorandum extracts were published and he managed to avoid

20 being condemned by the League's Central Committee, he would publicly

21 acknowledge several years later that the academy had acted legitimately in

22 intervening in Serbian politics." And then there's the quotation we've

23 seen from the 1995 document.

24 It goes on: "This complicity with the academy was reciprocal. At

25 its general assembly in May 1989, the academy would declare: 'As a result

Page 33526

1 of the praiseworthy struggle and unity of its people which required

2 daring, bold and honest decisions, and as a result of the unity of the

3 party and state's new leadership, headed by Slobodan Milosevic, Serbia has

4 recovered its sovereignty, statehood and unity and has become an equal

5 member of our socialist, federative, and multinational community. The

6 academy has supported and still supports today the efforts and programme

7 of the new Serbian leadership.'"

8 Is that a view with which you agree?

9 A. That's right. At the time the entire academy and all the

10 intellectuals lent their support to these new efforts on the part of the

11 new leadership with respect to freedom of public opinion, freedom of the

12 press, and freedom of speech and with respect to the reforms that were

13 implemented. Only later, in the 1990s, were there rifts amongst the Serb

14 intelligentsia, and I can explain that too if you want me to.

15 Q. Just looking down the page to the middle of it. "In January

16 1992, the academician and Serbian parliamentary deputy for Milosevic's

17 Socialist Party, Antonije Isakovic stated: 'The fundamental thing is that

18 the memorandum had its impact - some accepted it, whilst anti-Serbs were

19 mostly against it.'"

20 And the author of this report says: "There would be another

21 indication of the collusion between the Milosevic group and the people

22 behind the memorandum when some of the academicians would have the

23 misfortune to demand Milosevic's recommendation." And he goes on to make

24 a quote by Mira Markovic, the accused's wife, saying: "The members of the

25 academy do not have the right to harm this institution's place in the life

Page 33527

1 of the nation by signing a petition for the president to resign. The

2 academicians cannot call for one thing in the memorandum and the absolute

3 opposite now."

4 Do those passages, Professor, reflect again that there was indeed

5 a connection between the memorandum and the rise to power of this accused,

6 even if at a later stage there was a change of heart on the part of some

7 academicians?

8 A. No. At that time, at the time that Milosevic came into power,

9 right up until 1991, the academy fully support the changes that were

10 taking place in the country, because we had a process of democratisation,

11 freedom, and the paragraph was rescinded which saw verbal crimes as crimes

12 to be punished. But I mentioned a moment ago that in 1991, there were

13 changes that took place in the academy itself when a portion of the

14 intellectuals and a portion of the academicians came to realise that we

15 were faced with a great danger, because already at that time Serbia was

16 being cautioned, threatened with sanctions and even bombing. This was in

17 1991. And that was expressly stated by Lord Carrington himself.

18 And then some of the academicians took the view and stance that

19 the original country, that is to say Serbia, should be saved, that we

20 should give up giving assistance to the Serbs the other side of the Drina

21 River, and this brought about an internal conflict between the two

22 factions or groups of academicians, and that was when some members of the

23 academy asked for dismissals and were asked to retire and so on. That was

24 1992, when the request was made for Milosevic himself to tender his

25 resignation. Some of the academicians signed the request, others were

Page 33528

1 opposed to it, but the academy did not take a stance as a whole because

2 there were differing opinions within it.

3 Q. You made I think two or maybe three references to the accused not

4 really being well known at the time the memorandum was being written,

5 coming to prominence later. Would this be fair: That the memorandum

6 identify a political strategy for the way forward, and in Milosevic found

7 the leader to execute it, and that Milosevic was happy to lead on the

8 basis of policies as advanced in the memorandum?

9 A. You keep insisting upon that here in Court. I've noticed that

10 several times. And I've also said several times what actually happened at

11 the time. Not the memorandum which the people didn't really know about.

12 What happened was that there were democratic changes taking place in

13 society itself. The two commissions were set up to -- and they guaranteed

14 pluralism, the freedom of thought. Political prisoners disappeared or

15 were released. There was a unity on the part of the people, and that is

16 what gave and lent great prestige to President Milosevic at the time. And

17 in his speeches, he was very fresh in his manner of speaking, without the

18 old cliches dating back to the communist days. And by speaking like that

19 he was able to attract the masses. So the memorandum did not play any

20 role there at all. It had no role to play in the fact that he gained mass

21 support.

22 Q. The changes of which you speak did not happen at the time of the

23 memorandum. If they happened, they happened later.

24 A. Well, of course, yes. Certainly. And that is why the memorandum

25 did not leave its imprint, nor did it contribute to President Milosevic's

Page 33529












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13 English transcripts.













Page 33530

1 popularity and his -- its relationship towards Milosevic was something

2 that wasn't known. There was a party commission that had been set up to

3 investigate the academy, to try and find the culprits, but a series of

4 moves on his part, his steps towards the country's democratisation and the

5 realisation of a modern market economy in Serbia, that's what led to

6 boosting his reputation and having the entire people and the

7 intelligentsia stand by him and support him right up until the later

8 divisions in 1991 and 1992, the rifts that took place then.

9 Q. I'm not going to deal with your observations about the market

10 economy because I understand we're going to have an economist, probably

11 the other writer of the document on the memorandum, and I'll deal with

12 those through him, but it mustn't be thought I'm accepting your

13 observations on that.

14 I must move to Gazimestan again, but quite briefly because the

15 document's been gone through extensively.

16 You say that this last and famous observation, that we perhaps can

17 put up -- have you got a copy? In English, I know. I hope you'll accept

18 that, Professor. Where, in the paragraph that I hope's displayed: "Six

19 centuries now we are being again engaged in battles and are facing

20 battles. They are not armed battles although such things cannot be

21 excluded yet. However, regardless of what kind of battles they are, they

22 cannot be won without resolve," et cetera. We know the quote.

23 You gave an explanation for that yesterday. I think, if I

24 understood it correctly, that spoke of battles with forces entirely

25 outside the former Yugoslavia. Is that your interpretation of the

Page 33531

1 passage?

2 A. First and foremost, this is a celebration of the 600th anniversary

3 of the Battle of Kosovo. The Battle of Kosovo, of course, took place

4 against forces from outside Serbia, the forces of the Turkish Ottoman

5 Empire.

6 In the defence, the entire aristocracy of Serbia was killed. This

7 was a decisive battle in our history. We spent centuries as slaves after

8 that. When you are commemorating the anniversary of that battle, it is

9 only natural that you speak about defence from an external enemy.

10 On the other hand, you have a situation in the country itself.

11 There are growing forces fighting for secession, and you do not know what

12 can happen so you cannot preclude the possibility of defence. However,

13 that is not what had been accentuated but, rather, the economic, cultural,

14 and political battles. Indeed I think that this half sentence was abused

15 when it led to such far-reaching inference that Slobodan Milosevic was

16 trying to push the Serb people into a war. I think that is very far

17 reaching.

18 Q. You remember His Honour Judge Bonomy asking yesterday about

19 contemporaneous newspaper reports of the Gazimestan speech. Can you

20 remind us, please, because I was a little unclear as to what you were

21 saying, can you remind us, please, whether you accept that the speech drew

22 contemporaneous anxiety or not?

23 A. No. Yesterday, I stated unequivocally that at that time, the

24 speech was assessed very favourably in the Western media, including those

25 that did not resort to agency reports, those who had their own reporters

Page 33532

1 on the ground, including the London Independent. The assessment was that

2 it was a peaceful, peace-loving, reasonable speech and Independent even

3 wrote at that time that Milosevic in this way promoted himself as a

4 statesman and as an undoubted leader of the Serb people.

5 Yesterday, I did have these excerpts and it wasn't necessary to do

6 it yesterday, I wanted to offer them yesterday, but now I can't find them.

7 The point is that ten years after that, the London Times, the Independent,

8 the Washington Post, the BBC, everybody wrote in unison that this was a

9 fiery, firebrand speech that galvanised the Serbs who were then battle

10 ready out of their minds. All of that was simply invented later on.

11 Yesterday I could actually quote these newspapers because I had brought

12 the excerpts.

13 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Nice, please.

14 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... has been done. I

15 don't have all the material available. Some has been prepared, some has

16 not. That which has been made available can be made available shortly but

17 probably not today.

18 Q. But tell us, please, Professor, are you aware of a Slovenian

19 newspaper called Delo?

20 A. There is a Slovenian newspaper called Delo, yes.

21 Q. Do you allow for the possibility that that may have interpreted

22 the speech in an anxious way?

23 A. There is another fragment of the Slovenian press speaking about

24 how the battle for people's minds and souls was won, because this fear was

25 being nurtured all the time, and hostile feelings were being fanned

Page 33533

1 towards Serbs, towards Yugoslavia, towards the Yugoslav army. I have that

2 text, but that was the situation in Slovenia. Slovenia was getting ready

3 to secede.

4 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... was at the time an

5 independent paper published in Belgrade; correct?

6 A. Well, Borba was always the organ of the Communist Party of

7 Yugoslavia.

8 Q. Subsequently - is this right - it passed into the influence or

9 control of the accused and was replaced by a paper called Nova Borba?

10 A. I don't know how it was that Borba succumbed to the influence of

11 the accused. There were newspapers in our country that supported the

12 government of the time and those that were of an opposition point of view,

13 and they were free to publish their criticism. They even said that

14 Milosevic was a dictator.

15 I can say that no leader of any state was insulted, offended, and

16 criticised in the press as much as he was in his time.

17 Q. The scrap of newspaper to which you refer, contrary to what you

18 told us yesterday, was Borba reporting on what the newspaper Delo had said

19 of Gazimestan. And there was indeed reporting of great concern of the use

20 of the words about battles, was there not, at the time? Whatever the

21 Independent may have said, the local perception was of anxiety.

22 A. Just as I did not read Delo, I and most other people did not read

23 Borba any more. It had lost the role it had had before that. They had a

24 very small circulation, and I don't know what they really wrote.

25 MR. NICE: Well, Your Honours, what I think's the best course, if

Page 33534

1 I can suggest this, partly responsive to the question from the Bench and

2 partly as something I was going to do in any event, if I prepare a clip of

3 newspaper extracts from the time with appropriate English translations,

4 and I can say in light of the last answer by the witness, who didn't read

5 Delo, that there are reports on the 29th, the 30th of June from Delo and

6 from Borba.

7 Q. Vjesnik, the newspaper from Zagreb, do you accept, Professor, that

8 that would be publishing reports of anxiety?

9 A. Well, you know what? We're talking about 1989, aren't we, or

10 later?

11 Q. 1989.

12 A. That's very important.

13 Q. 1989, Vjesnik in Zagreb --

14 A. Vjesnik in Zagreb, like Delo, were already preparing for

15 secession, and it was in their interest to attack everything that was

16 going on in Serbia, and that's exactly what they did. It was unheard-of,

17 this extremely high level of chauvinism that manifested itself in the

18 press.

19 Q. The reality, Professor, is whatever may have been the

20 international perception, there were expressions of concern there, the

21 national perception in local newspapers or in other republics' newspapers

22 was of great anxiety at what the accused had said, wasn't it? And you

23 know that.

24 A. But we had the text, and we can still study it, the text itself.

25 But then we also had the reactions of the foreign journalists who were

Page 33535

1 impartial. Now, why do you want to rely on the reactions from Croatia and

2 Slovenia? Although I do not know what they were like. There was an

3 interest, a partiality there, because that can be monitored, the

4 Serbophobic writing of the Croatian press in the 1980s. These were

5 already the last days of our life together in a single state. So that's

6 not relevant at all.

7 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, have you also tried to find a news clipping

8 of the Albanian press?

9 MR. NICE: Albanian press? No, we don't have yet. We have some

10 Western press. We certainly have an observation by Ibrahim Rugova

11 reported on the day before the Gazimestan speech of his anxiety as to how

12 it was going to be. I'll just get the quote for you. He described the

13 forthcoming event as a Serbian chauvinist celebration and described it as

14 a provocation. There's a newspaper report of that. I'll just ask the

15 witness about that.

16 Q. You've heard what I said, Professor, that this enormous gathering,

17 at very great expense, conducted without Kosovo Albanian presence, was

18 seen by Ibrahim Rugova, if the newspaper report is accurate, as a

19 provocation. It was a provocation, wasn't it, on any view?

20 A. How can you say it was a provocation? The Serbs assembled to

21 commemorate a great historical event like other people do, like other

22 nations do. For example, now there's going to be a commemoration of

23 liberation.

24 The French celebrate every year on the 14th of July when they

25 commemorate the anniversary of the French Revolution.

Page 33536

1 I found what the BBC had written then in 1989, and I'll read it in

2 English: [In English] "Milosevic said that whenever they were able to,

3 the Serbs had helped others to liberate themselves, and they had never

4 used the advantage of they being a large nation against others or for

5 themselves. He added that Yugoslavia was a multinational community which

6 could survive providing there was full equality for all the nations living

7 in it."

8 [Interpretation] That was on the 29th of June, sections part 2,

9 Eastern Europe. And now I'm going to say what the Independent wrote on

10 the 29th of June, 1989. Mr. Edward Stein and a Mr. Tanner were there in

11 Kosovo, and this is what they wrote: "[In English] Yesterday he assumed

12 the mantle of a statesman and Yugoslavia's natural leader. He gave an

13 unexpectedly conciliatory speech without any aggressive reference to

14 Albanian counterrevolutionaries in Kosovo province. Instead, he talked of

15 mutual intolerance, building a rich and democratic society and ending the

16 discord which had, he said, led to Serbia's defeat here by the Turks six

17 centuries ago." And go on: "I think people were a little disappointed.

18 It became very quiet after the beginning. An educated looking woman from

19 Belgrade said, everyone seemed a little stunted."

20 That's it from 1989, and the comments from 1999 are quite

21 different.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's from the Independent English newspaper.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's the Independent, the English

24 newspaper, and also I have the BBC, The New York Times, and the Times of

25 London. If you wish, I can read that out too.

Page 33537

1 MR. NICE: Your Honour, what I suggest is -- I don't want to stop

2 the witness, of course, but what I suggest is that if I put together a

3 collection of contemporaneous extracts I'll include these if I can get

4 them from the libraries of the newspapers concerned, although, obviously,

5 it's our case the more important ones are the local ones which would more

6 readily understand what was the text, but that's a matter for Your Honours

7 in due course.

8 Q. Professor, so far as you're concerned, you've obviously been

9 published widely in various places, interviews, and so on and so forth. I

10 just want to ask you about a few positions I may suggest that you'd taken.

11 Did you yourself ever refer to the genocide term in liberating

12 Serbs from the terror and fear of genocide?

13 A. Possibly in the sense that there had been forcible expulsions,

14 killings, and destruction of cultural monuments, but I cannot recall.

15 Which interview of mine are you referring to? Which particular text?

16 A. It's a British Broadcasting Corporation broadcast, I think on

17 September 2nd of 1991, but I'm happy, for the time being, to go on your

18 recollection. You said you may have said such things. And were you

19 concerned at the time that with the independence of Croatia there would be

20 Serbs in Croatia who would be -- and/or in Bosnia who would be completely

21 surrounded by non-Serbs, not capable of thus being connected to Serbia

22 itself? Was that your concern?

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Please, it is unfair to put that

Page 33538

1 kind of question to the witness about something that he said 15 years ago

2 or so. This is 1991. It would only be proper to put the text before the

3 witness so that the witness can read it, so that he can see whether

4 something was taken out of context. He absolutely cannot. I cannot, and

5 I'm considerably younger than he is. And probably you yourselves, who are

6 younger than I am, cannot remember your exact words of 15 years ago. If

7 Mr. Nice wants the witness to confirm something or deny something, he

8 should show the particular section to him. I believe that this is only

9 appropriate.

10 MR. NICE: Certainly, and I rather agree that it would be helpful

11 if I can and if I'm dealing on reported speech I can only deal with the

12 matters in the way I am.

13 Your Honour, I'm also concerned to save time. Can we move --

14 Q. We haven't yet got the article that I asked you to see the review

15 of over the break. I still hope to have it, but I also hope to conclude

16 my cross-examination of you shortly.

17 Do you have some observations you'd like to make about the

18 reported article straight away? And then if we get the article we can

19 contrast it or we can give you a chance to look at it.

20 A. Well, Mr. Nice, you asked me about a position of mine that I

21 published in Praksis. I said that I never said any such thing or

22 published any such thing. Then you gave me this, what I have in my hands

23 now, and I simply cannot believe my eyes. This is not my text at all, or

24 perhaps you think that this Laura Secor is some kind of secret name that

25 I'm hiding behind. This was not published in Praksis, it's published in

Page 33539

1 Lingua Franca, and this is Testaments Betrayed, Yugoslav Intellectuals and

2 The Road to War. It looks like propaganda material to me that is compiled

3 by intelligence services.

4 Q. I can cut you short to this extent: If you don't accept that the

5 article is yours --

6 A. Well, of course you have good reason to interrupt me, yes.

7 Q. If you don't accept it's yours, then we will take the matter no

8 further until we have the article itself to lay before you.

9 A. This is not my article. This is Laura Secor's article.

10 Q. You may be at cross-purposes. Through that article she gives an

11 account of the article she says you did author, and it was to that that I

12 was asking you to turn your attention.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness has headphones on his

16 ears and he is probably following the Serbian interpretation, but -- and

17 the interpretation he received was if you accept that this is your

18 article, but then I see the transcript stating that Mr. Nice said if you

19 do not accept it. And the interpretation said if you do accept it. That

20 is what I heard, and I believe that created some confusion.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's clear that the witness does not accept it.

22 Mr. Nice suggested that they were at cross-purposes. Mr. Nice had put the

23 article, as I understood it -- no, let me speak.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's somebody else's article. It's

25 not mine.

Page 33540












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 33541

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice had put it as Ms. Secor's summation of

2 his article. But I think -- I don't think Mr. Nice is pressing ahead with

3 it, so we can move on.

4 MR. NICE: No, not at the moment. Thank you very much.

5 Q. Can I just deal with one other matter in general terms at the

6 moment and possibly in general terms only. The notion of Greater Serbia,

7 you explained, derived from the 19th century but from Austro-Hungary. It

8 still exists, doesn't it? There are still those who espouse the notion of

9 a Greater Serbia.

10 A. In the 19th century, this idea was engendered by the effort made

11 by Austro-Hungary to present everything that the Serbs did, and the Serbs

12 were in Bosnia, for instance, and they invented this term a Greater

13 Serbia. Not a single government, not a single state until the present day

14 did not espouse this project of a Greater Serbia, although all the other

15 neighbouring countries did have such projects; a Greater Croatia, a

16 Greater Slovenia, a Greater Hungary, a Greater Romania, et cetera.

17 Individuals and groups were still talking about a Greater Serbia. For

18 example, during the Second World War the Chetniks of Draza Mihailovic even

19 had a map in terms of what a Greater Serbia should be like, but no

20 government ever officially supported this as an official project.

21 This Greater Serbia, if it refers to the earlier days like of

22 Ilija Garasanin, for instance, the Nacertanije, the first draft

23 constitution, was written by Czartorysky and Zach, who were Poles. It was

24 never written by Ilija Garasanin.

25 Q. There was and there still is a notion of the Greater Serbia as a

Page 33542

1 possibility. Is that something that Seselj's party has espoused?

2 A. I've already said: Individuals and individual groups spoke about

3 it, but I have to remind you of something else, of the words of a man who

4 established the idea of socialism in Serbia, that is Svetozar Markovic.

5 He decisively criticised the very idea of a Greater Serbia and the very

6 idea of creating a state consisting of Serbs only. He advocated a Balkan

7 federation. Not a single socialist ever advocated a Greater Serbia. No

8 government ever advocated a Greater Serbia.

9 Q. Seselj's party has been associated with Greater Serbia; yes or

10 no. Has Seselj's party been associated with Greater Serbia? Yes or no.

11 A. Seselj's party, that is to say one of the opposition parties,

12 believes in the idea of uniting all Serb lands, and they call that a

13 Greater Serbia, yes. Yes. Seselj's party, yes.

14 Q. Have you yourself, as a matter of fact, been associated recently

15 at all with Seselj's party?

16 A. No. No way. No. I was never associated with Seselj's party, no.

17 Q. You produced, or you were going to be producing as an exhibit a

18 book -- I beg your pardon, an article of yours that produced a number of

19 maps. We were provided in advance by the accused with a number of maps

20 contained in an article of yours, and I want to take it shortly, if I can.

21 One of those maps was the map of the London agreement of, I think,

22 1914. Are you familiar with that map? 15, is it? 1915.

23 A. I never published any maps, and I never resorted to any maps,

24 because I'm not an historian or a geographer.

25 As for the London agreement, it was an agreement concluded in

Page 33543

1 London with the representatives of Italy. They were given an offer.

2 Italy was given certain parts of Dalmatia in order to get into the war on

3 the side of the great powers. So that has nothing to do with the Greater

4 Serbia. It was an offer made to Italy.

5 MR. NICE: Your Honours will perhaps have seen this as Exhibit 8A

6 as listed in the accused's list of exhibits, and I don't know if you have

7 a bundle in the same form that we do.


9 MR. NICE: Can we just lay that map on the overhead projector, and

10 perhaps the accused could be good enough to provide the original of the

11 article concerned. I was expecting to deal with it.

12 Q. If you'd take your time, Professor, to see if this is an article

13 with which you're familiar.

14 A. There's no beginning here. The beginning of this article is not

15 here. Well, look, this is probably a publication of the Serb Radical

16 Party. Once they organised a meeting of scholars and I participated in it

17 and spoke there, but this map is not mine, and I did not talk about a

18 Greater Serbia at all at that meeting.

19 Q. I want your help, Professor, at the moment --

20 A. So this is a publication of the Serb Radical Party. Although we

21 cannot see very well from here, whose is this? You see, there's no

22 beginning here. See? See, the beginning is not here.

23 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... provided to us.

24 But if the usher would be good enough to place on the overhead projector

25 the first map. The pages aren't numbered, but it's the -- I'll hold it

Page 33544

1 up. It looks like that. It's got two maps on it.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We don't even know whose maps these

3 maps are.

4 Q. Do you recognise this map? It's said to be the London agreement

5 map. This is the 1915 map showing an enlarged Serbia, I think including

6 Macedonia. Would that be correct?

7 A. No. No. The map of the London agreement can only include what is

8 given to Italy, nothing else.

9 Q. But it shows a much enlarged Serbia, doesn't it, going to the

10 north and west?

11 A. I don't know what is being expanded here, but in any case, the

12 London agreement did not deal with Serbia at all. There were, as a matter

13 of fact, some British offers in view of the fact that Austria-Hungary

14 would lose the war, and in case it loses the war, and if all the nations

15 involved express their right to self-determination, then Southern Slavs

16 would be able to unite. So these lands are Southern Slav. And indeed, it

17 was the allies who created Yugoslavia in 1918, the state of Serbs, Croats,

18 and Slovenes. This, therefore, does not refer to Serbs, it involves

19 Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] To avoid any confusion, this is a

22 set of historical maps. Not a single map here represents anybody's

23 proposal. You see here maps dating from the 11th, 14th century, maps of

24 what was approximately Yugoslavia between two wars. But if you read the

25 legends below, you will realise that this is a set of historical maps, and

Page 33545

1 that is why the professor included this set into his exhibits.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did not include anything. I have

3 no idea what this is.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I thought this was coming from you.

5 This -- one of the maps here shows the territory occupied by the Serbian

6 people in the 10th century. Dusan's Empire in the 14th century. The

7 Dukja [phoen] state, Ruska [phoen] in the Bosnian district where Serbs

8 settled in the 11th century.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Serbia, Austria-Hungary,

10 Austria-Hungary reaches up to the Drina River.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Put the map in the appropriate context, and that

12 is necessary if it is to be of any benefit.

13 MR. NICE: Yes. I'm going to put it in the context --

14 JUDGE KWON: And, Mr. Nice, there are keys or footnotes on the

15 page, but it's very difficult to follow with this moment.

16 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... I entirely accept

17 that.

18 JUDGE KWON: And for clarity.

19 Professor, if you follow the map in B/C/S, the fourth page but the

20 actual -- it's paginated as 13, there appears a picture. It may be a

21 picture of yours.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, there is a photograph of me in

23 this paper. I thought it was in relation to a gathering I attended. And

24 there is a question here saying, "Another element of the national

25 programme according to you is a concept of relations with neighbouring and

Page 33546

1 other countries," and then follows my answer. There is nothing about

2 Serbia. I talk about our relations with neighbouring countries such as

3 Greece and Hungary.

4 MR. NICE: I'm grateful for the answer, but I'm only interested in

5 the map itself, the London map, Your Honour, which is slightly better

6 shown in the Serb version a few pages further on as I have it. The

7 legend, I think, is the same probably.

8 Q. The point simply is this, Professor: We have an exhibit in this

9 case. It's Exhibit 613, tab 103, and there's another one which is 613,

10 tab 101, and the first of those exhibits is a transcript of an intercepted

11 telephone conversation between Radovan Karadzic and the accused following

12 the breakdown or conclusion of the talks here in The Hague, where they

13 talk of talks continuing and where Karadzic says, "Maybe we should engage

14 in international activity prior to the 5th. Do the Rapalo and London

15 accords apply?" And the accused says he doesn't know, he'll ask somebody

16 called Vladan and go through the documents. And he says, "I think London

17 includes Macedonia." Karadzic replies, "All right, but London can be

18 revised." And the accused says something about they would interpret that

19 as our pretensions against Macedonia. And Karadzic says, "We can revise

20 the London accord."

21 And then on the other intercept a couple days later, on the 26th

22 of October, the accused, again in conversation with Karadzic says, "Did

23 you consider the possibility with Avramov" - that's Smilja Avramov - "if

24 there is no Yugoslavia, should we go to the London agreement?" That's

25 Karadzic speaking. And the accused says, "I didn't consider that

Page 33547

1 possibility, but we can also --" Karadzic says, "It would be a great

2 thing because there are the signatures of France, I think, and England and

3 everyone." The accused says, "Yes, we need to see what it is." And

4 Karadzic goes on and they press on with that idea for a little bit further

5 before the accused says he's due to meet some Americans.

6 We can see from the London agreement map, whatever its exact

7 history at the time was, that it would be a much enlarged Serbia, and my

8 interest is this: You as an intellectual moving in these circles, this

9 sort of enlargement of Serbia was a common theme and a common ambition

10 right the way through the 20th century among some Serbs, wasn't it?

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, has the witness agreed that the map

12 depicts an enlarged Serbia?

13 MR. NICE: He said, in fact, it was about Italy, but the legend --

14 Your Honour is right to check on that, or get me to check on that, and the

15 boundaries incorporate Serbia and show a single territory.

16 Q. Professor, you hear His Honour's question. Do you accept that the

17 London agreement shows or could be taken as showing an enlarged Serbia?

18 A. First of all, I think I -- I'm not the right person to ask. Why

19 would I comment on intercepts between Karadzic and Mr. Milosevic? What I

20 can say with regard to the London accord is that in 1915, Austria-Hungary

21 being an enemy state, an offer is being made to Italy with no Serbian

22 representative involved. There are talks between the British and Italy.

23 They're making plans to do -- as what to do about the war.

24 Austria-Hungary even had to pay indemnification after the war.

25 So the British are entering into an agreement with Italy to give a

Page 33548

1 part of their Austro-Hungarian territory to Italians, whereas the rest

2 would go either to Serbia or to that Serb, Croat, Slovene state, but Serbs

3 had nothing to do with it. They did not participate, and especially I

4 didn't.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, even these quoted

6 intercepted conversation were inappropriately used. Professor Avramov

7 testified about that. It was a time when all our international experts

8 were collecting all documents relevant to The Hague Conference. Any trace

9 at any time in history of any such plans needed to be presented. There is

10 a professor -- there was Professor Avramov and other competent professors

11 who were substantiating our point of view at the conference in The Hague.

12 It was not about territorial divisions.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic --

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This material is being used

15 inadequately.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let me explain to you again: You will have a

17 chance to re-examine. It's a new exercise for you, but one of the

18 classical functions of re-examination is to rehabilitate your witness. If

19 you believe that your witness has been attacked or weakened in his

20 presentation, then you are allowed in re-examination to rehabilitate him.

21 And the comments that you were just making would fall into that -- into

22 that category.

23 MR. NICE: Thank you.

24 Q. Professor, another map is the Moljevic map of the Second World

25 War. Are you familiar with that map? And if we can -- I can probably

Page 33549

1 find that in --

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Can you just find that --

4 A. Yes. I mentioned yesterday it is a map that the Chetniks and

5 Draza Mihailovic made. Moljevic was the Chetnik ideologist and the fact

6 doubtlessly stands that the movement of Draza Mihailovic, which was

7 supported in for a while in the West and then they withdrew that support,

8 was interested in creating a Greater Serbia and Moljevic made the map.

9 That is what I covered when I said that the Greater Serbia was a plan of

10 individuals and individual groups, but it was never a state plan.

11 Moljevic was not a state official.

12 MR. NICE: Take this opportunity by the overhead projector to show

13 this map to the Judges. If we can just lay it -- it's this one here, in

14 fact. If you bring it to me, I'll select it.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If this is a trial of Draza

16 Mihailovic, then it's fine.

17 Q. Now, the important point about this is that it shows, again, a

18 substantially larger Serbia, but as the legend at the bottom shows -- this

19 is the Koljevic [sic] map, isn't it?

20 And as this -- this Second World War map shows the ambition of the

21 people you identified was to have a north or north-western territory that

22 ran along the Karlobag-Karlovac-Virovitica line about which we've heard a

23 lot about in this trial. And that's the Koljevic map.

24 A. Correct.

25 Q. And the Koljevic map was --

Page 33550

1 A. You mean Moljevic.

2 Q. Ms. Dicklich was trying to correct me and I was wrong. The

3 Moljevic map - thank you so much - was created before any question of the

4 completion of the genocide against the Serbs in the Second World War. It

5 was before and independent of that terrible and serious event, the

6 genocide of the Serbs; correct?

7 A. That map was made during the Second World War, certainly after the

8 genocide committed against the Serbs in Croatia. It was made after,

9 because the genocide took place in 1941 and the beginning of 1942, whereas

10 the map was made a bit later. There are many similar maps, I can tell

11 you. King Aleksandar has a map depicting the rest of Yugoslavia on the

12 condition that Croatia secedes.

13 Q. You're aware of a magazine called Epoha, I think, yes?

14 A. Epoha.

15 Q. Yes.

16 A. If that is the same magazine that was published for a while by the

17 Socialist Party of Serbia, I do. I don't know which one you mean.

18 Q. So that's the accused's party. Can you look, please, at this copy

19 of Epoha for the 22nd of October, 1991, just after the refusal of the

20 Hague conference proposals. And if you display just the first page of it.

21 I'm afraid a copy is all I can have. And then the map, please.

22 There's the magazine. If we go over to the next page, there is a

23 map.

24 MR. NICE: We've got an English translation for this, Your Honour.

25 If we can put this in as an exhibit.

Page 33551












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 33552

1 Q. Now --

2 A. I don't know. Where is the map?

3 Q. You're looking at that map.

4 A. Whose is the map?

5 Q. It comes in Epoha, doesn't it? And if you now go to the B/C/S

6 version, you'll see -- if the witness can have the B/C/S version of the

7 map. It's on there now, is it? Oh, yes, that's right.

8 The legend reads as follows: The three lines which we can have in

9 an English translation are republic borders, new borders with the Republic

10 of Croatia, and then the thicker line at the top left is the optimal

11 western borders of Serbian countries.

12 And if you look at the map, Professor, that line is again the

13 Virovitica-Karlobag line, is it not?

14 A. Yes, but I don't know who the author is. In any case, I'm not

15 aware that this has ever been accepted as a map. It reflects the opinion

16 of some individual, but which individual, I have no idea. Whose map is

17 this?

18 You see, a magazine can publish maps that authors have a negative

19 attitude to, negative views on. They are being published for the purpose

20 of criticising them. Who is the author of this?

21 Q. I'll hand in the translations if we've got them.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I find there is merit in what the

23 witness says. If we are to be helped by these maps, we must know --

24 MR. NICE: Certainly.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- who --

Page 33553


2 Q. Zoran Rakic is the author of the article. Do you know him?

3 A. I have no idea who Zoran Rakic is.

4 Q. If you'd be good enough, in the English translation, which doesn't

5 have the map reproduced, go to what is page 2. The text in the magazine

6 of the SPS is headed -- and we must find the original of this for the

7 witness -- yes -- it's the top of the page that the witness has got on the

8 overhead projector at the moment, but the translation reads as follows,

9 Professor: "How are we going to draw new borders? Desirable possibility

10 of territorial demarcation between the third Yugoslavia and Croatia," then

11 it sets out the various areas identified on the map by number. One,

12 Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina; 2, Western Slavonia; 3, Serbian

13 region Slavonia, Baranja, and Western Srem; 4, Western Herzegovina; 5,

14 Samac Posavina; 6, Dubrovnik Republic; and 7, optimal western border of

15 Serbian countries.

16 So that -- and this is where I want your help if you can. Do you

17 recall following the conclusion and failure of The Hague conference that

18 this plan was being advanced and discussed by the accused's party with,

19 and in particular, with borders stretching to the Karlobag-Virovitica

20 line?

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: You mean the plan as evidenced by the map?

22 MR. NICE: Yes, indeed.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is not something that the

24 Socialist Party of Serbia discussed. As you rightly said, it was

25 something published in a magazine where various people were entitled to

Page 33554

1 publish their own opinions.

2 Second, this is not a plan for demarcation between Serbia and

3 Croatia. This is a depiction of Yugoslavia from which Croatia seceded,

4 and the question was if Croatia seceded, where should the border be. So

5 this was nothing to do with Greater Serbia. You see, Macedonia is

6 depicted here, Bosnia, Montenegro. That means Slovenia and Croatia

7 seceded, Yugoslavia remained. The year is 1991. And the question now is

8 how to draw the border between Croatia and Yugoslavia.

9 Q. And do you accept that amongst your group, amongst the political

10 party, and amongst the political leadership there was an intention to take

11 Serbia up to that Karlobag-Virovitica line?

12 A. There was absolutely never any mention of that. Not a word. The

13 question was where the army were deployed if, for instance, Croatia

14 secedes, one. Second, the issue arose of those territories, the Serbian

15 Krajina where the peacekeeping forces of the United Nations arrived under

16 the agreement reached at The Hague conference in 1991.

17 So the peacekeeping force arrived, and it was expected that after

18 the war was over, those people -- in fact, that people would be able to

19 self-determine where they would continue to live, that is the area where

20 the UN force was deployed.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, it's time for the adjournment. We will

22 adjourn for 20 minutes.

23 JUDGE KWON: And during the adjournment could you check whether

24 the name of the magazine is Epoha or Epoka.

25 MR. NICE: It's H, Epoha.

Page 33555

1 JUDGE KWON: The previous transcript says that it's Epoka. Could

2 you check it.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is Epoha with an H, in Serbian,

4 at least.

5 --- Recess taken at 12.23 p.m.

6 --- On resuming at 12.47 p.m.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please continue, Mr. Nice.

8 MR. NICE: May the two exhibits we've been looking at be labelled

9 as the maps have provided in some way by the accused. Either the two

10 single maps could be selected or the whole collection of maps could be

11 turned into an exhibit, I'm neutral as to that.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the maps be numbered.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There's a mistake probably. I

16 didn't tender any maps myself, because there were thousands and thousands

17 of similar maps at the time. They were published in the newspapers.

18 Everybody wrote articles about Yugoslavia, producing maps of one sort or

19 another. So this has no probative value for Mr. Nice from his point of

20 view. It has nothing to do with state policy, it has nothing to do with

21 the Socialist Party, it has nothing to do with the subject of his

22 examination.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Their being tendered as exhibits is not

24 dependent, as I understand it, on their having been introduced into

25 evidence by you.

Page 33556

1 MR. NICE: Yes.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: So they will be exhibited. What are the numbers?

3 JUDGE KWON: Prosecution exhibits.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Prosecution exhibits, yes.

5 THE REGISTRAR: They will be 785.

6 MR. NICE: And then may the Epoha magazine be exhibited, please.


8 MR. NICE: Thank you.

9 Q. Professor, I'm coming to the end, and we still don't have the

10 original of the article so I shan't be -- unless it comes in the next few

11 minutes, shan't be troubling you with that, the article that we started

12 off with today. As we move then, a few tidying up matters, just this:

13 The problem for Serbia was that Serbs lived in other states, didn't they?

14 They lived in Croatia and they lived in Bosnia.

15 A. Yes, that was the problem. And Serbs, as opposed to other

16 peoples, withdrew in the face of conquerors. They went to other

17 territories, and that is why it was difficult to create a state. And so

18 the Serbs wished to have Yugoslavia where they could live together with

19 their kindred peoples. That's why Yugoslavia was so important to them,

20 that they could be in the same country and stay as their brothers, with

21 their brothers.

22 Q. Slovenia having gone and such part of Croatia being accorded its

23 independence as Serbia was content for it to have, the rest of the Serbs

24 could all have remained in a single body, whether described as a new

25 Yugoslavia or described as something else, but that was the only way in

Page 33557

1 which all the Serbs could remain in a single body?

2 A. That's right. And that's why it was thought that once the peace

3 forces, the UN peace forces leave, that the Serbian Krajina -- in the

4 Serbian Krajina the people could have a referendum for everybody to state

5 their views and say where they wished to live. And then one part would

6 remain in Croatia, according to that, the other would remain in

7 Yugoslavia, but nobody knew what was going to happen to Bosnia and

8 Macedonia at that time because we're talking about 1991.

9 Q. Although this is all very well covered before the Judges already,

10 just to round it all off, the general plan, put neutrally, and the general

11 intention was that Serb-occupied territories should have some connection

12 with Serbia itself so there should be a contiguous or continuous

13 territory; correct?

14 A. If the population would come out -- were to come out in favour of

15 wishing to live in Serbia, and if the problem of the different corridors

16 were resolved, because it wasn't easy to have a uniform united territory

17 because the population was mixed. There were Croats in Bosnia, for

18 example. There were Muslims in Bosnia. And we didn't know how Bosnia and

19 Herzegovina would vote, whether they wanted to remain in Yugoslavia or

20 whether they wanted to break away.

21 Q. Can we look at one BBC broadcast of yours that sets out the

22 position -- or you're being interviewed, sets out the position at the end

23 of the Hague conference.

24 MR. NICE: Lay it on the overhead projector and provide it to the

25 Court, please.

Page 33558

1 Q. This is on the 6th of November, 1991, the time we've just been

2 concerned with with the map and so on.

3 MR. NICE: The bottom part of the page, please, Usher, a bit

4 further down.

5 Q. "This was said at a press conference today by Dr. Mihailo

6 Markovic, vice-president of the Main Committee of the Socialist Party of

7 Serbia, Milosevic's ruling party. In an explanation of the standpoints

8 adopted today by the SPS Main Committee at a session lasting several

9 hours, Markovic said that the party outlined the following three points as

10 a minimum which Serbia will agree upon at the negotiations in The Hague.

11 "First - it can accept that the existing regions of Serbian

12 Krajinas in Croatia come under international trusteeship, that the

13 Yugoslav army withdraws from the region only after international forces

14 are installed there, and that the population of the region is allowed to

15 decide in which state and where to live in a referendum under

16 international auspices.

17 "Second - the SPS insists that the people who wish to stay in a

18 common Yugoslav state and perpetuate that state will be given an

19 opportunity to do so.

20 "Third - the SPS cannot accept that national minorities such as

21 Albanians and Hungarians, should enjoy the same rights in a future

22 community as those given to the Serbian people in Croatia, because the

23 latter are not a national minority. National minorities will be

24 guaranteed only the rights national minorities enjoy in other European

25 countries."

Page 33559

1 And it was in that way that you and those with whom you worked

2 distinguished between the rights of Kosovo Albanians, who, despite their

3 majority, should never have independence, and the rights of Serbs who

4 should be allowed to cut out part of Croatia and attack it -- and attach

5 it to Serbia; correct?

6 A. Well, there was a distinction there between Serbs and Albanians.

7 The difference was between the minorities and constituent peoples. So the

8 Albanians had their own country already, their own state of Albania. They

9 were a minority in Yugoslavia. Whereas the Serbs in Yugoslavia, in a

10 state of their own, were the -- a constituent peoples. And as I said a

11 moment ago, the mistake had been during Tito's time for not ensuring two

12 constitutive nations the fact that their minorities have minority rights,

13 enjoy minority rights. And now if the Serbs were to opt to live in

14 Serbia, and if this were decided to have this become a joint territory,

15 then they would have greater rights as a constituent nation than national

16 minorities. National minorities have the universally accepted minority

17 rights. And we have already enumerated those. Whereas these are both,

18 the constitutive nations and peoples, are part of a whole, part of an

19 entity, which means a nation, a peoples constituting that particular

20 state.

21 Q. If we look, please, at two programmes of the Socialist Party of

22 Serbia, you were looking at one that you drafted yesterday. This is a

23 part of Exhibit 469, tab 3, the programme for the 16th of July of 1990.

24 I'll just lay it on the overhead projector to save time. I'll read it

25 from there.

Page 33560

1 The political philosophy that lay behind the memorandum and lay

2 behind the Socialist Party of Serbia of this accused can be seen.

3 Top extract first, please, in red. Bit further down. Thank you.

4 "The Serbian diaspora.

5 "The Socialist Party of Serbia will regularly monitor the living

6 conditions and development of Serbs living in the other republics and

7 abroad, and maintain intensive relations with their political, cultural,

8 and other organisations, believing it to be only natural for other nations

9 to maintain such relations with their fellow countrymen living in Serbia.

10 She will extend material and moral assistance to them, help improve their

11 living conditions, preserve their national identity and cultural

12 traditions and ensure more intensive cultural development."

13 And at the bottom of the page, please.

14 "The new Yugoslav constitution should allow for the forming of

15 autonomous provinces in Yugoslavia on the basis of the expressed will and

16 population -- of the population and national, historical, cultural and

17 other specificities."

18 Well, that applied, didn't it, to the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia;

19 autonomous provinces? Was that the intention?

20 A. The intention was to enable the original state to be able to hold

21 cultural and other ties with that portion of the people that were

22 separated and lived elsewhere, just as it was possible for the state of

23 Albania, for example, to send to Kosovo its professors and all other

24 manner of cultural ties that it maintained, ties between the state of

25 Albania and Kosovo in the 1970s and 1980s, and that was not possible with

Page 33561

1 the Serbs in Croatia, for instance. That was not possible. So this was

2 designed to facilitate and enable that, that the mother country or

3 original country can maintain ties with that portion of its populace

4 living elsewhere.

5 Q. Autonomous provinces in Yugoslavia, was that intended to justify

6 the creation of Serb territories in Croatia and Bosnia? Did you draft

7 this one, by the way?

8 A. How do you mean Croatian territories in Croatia? What do you

9 mean?

10 Q. Serbian territories in Croatia is what I meant to say.

11 A. Yes. It was about this, the fact that the Serbs in Croatia, in

12 the area stretching in today's Lika, Banija and Kordun, that area, that

13 region, they had lived there for many years. They were historically

14 there. They were a separate Krajina enjoying separate rights under

15 Austria, for example, and the Croatian rulers never had control over that

16 area. Those rights were abolished, and now we wished to revive them, to

17 give them back their rights and the -- for Serbs living on the territory

18 of Croatia, yes, that's right.

19 Q. You wished, by your Socialist Party of Serbia, to change the

20 established 1974 rights of Croatia, and in particular of the Croatian

21 Serbs. That was your intention.

22 A. Yes. The Croatian Serbs enjoyed no rights, and now they were

23 supposed to win rights.

24 MR. NICE: Next page, please, Usher, on this one.

25 Q. Did you draft this document yourself, Professor? Did you draft it

Page 33562












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 33563

1 yourself? Did you write this one yourself?

2 A. The foundations of the programme, well, I wrote the initial draft

3 and then we held discussions, and it was accepted, corrected, but the

4 basic draft, yes, I did write that.

5 Q. And then we see here highlighted apart from that Kosovo should be

6 an inseparable part of Serbia, we see: "The Socialist Party will invest

7 determined efforts to stop Serbs and Montenegrins from moving out of the

8 province and secure their return and the moving in of citizens who wish to

9 live and work in Kosovo and Metohija. We shall do our utmost to tell the

10 world the full truth about Kosovo and Metohija, and to tell them about the

11 causes and grave consequences of the actions of Albanians, chauvinists,

12 and separatists."

13 So here was an expressed intention to reverse the demographic

14 changes and to repopulate Kosovo, correct, with Serbs?

15 A. No. Let's be precise here. The Albanians in Kosovo had an

16 exceptional rate of demographic growth, a large growth rate, and this

17 couldn't be -- you couldn't, of course, stop them having this population

18 increase, but one wanted to enable that those people who had been expelled

19 from Kosovo to have the right to go back to their own homes and houses.

20 Now, as to the demographic growth, the birth rate was so high with

21 the Albanians that you couldn't compare anything with them, the growth

22 rate in Serbia or other ethnic communities.

23 Q. Well, that form preceded The Hague conference. If you just look

24 at this one passage from the 1992 document for the party, Exhibit 469, tab

25 4. We see again an absolute reflection of your party's clear ambition in

Page 33564

1 the red highlighted part, please.

2 "The option for Yugoslavia is based on a variety of grounds. It

3 makes a community with the Montenegrin nation possible. By maintaining

4 Yugoslavia, the Serbian nation preserves its homeland, an essential

5 guarantee of the protection of all the remaining parts of the Serbian

6 nation. It enables legitimate concern for the Serbs outside Serbia and

7 creates the institutional possibility for the Federal Republic of

8 Yugoslavia to be joined in future by Krajina and the Serbian Republic of

9 Bosnia-Herzegovina."

10 So just pausing there. That sentence makes clear that which I

11 suggested to you earlier. There was a clear intention to have contiguous,

12 to have joined-up Serbian territory carved out of Bosnia and of Croatia,

13 true?

14 A. No.

15 Q. Well, what does that --

16 A. It's not true.

17 Q. -- sentence mean?

18 A. That's not correct. It was about this: That all human beings had

19 basic human rights, and one of their basic human rights was to have

20 freedom of movement, freedom to live where they wished, and to enjoy all

21 their cultural rights and freedoms. So that was what this was about, that

22 the territories where the Serbs were in the majority had the right to

23 state where they wished to live, just as the Croats had opted for living

24 in a separate state. The Slovenes themselves had said they wanted to live

25 in a separate state. So quite simply, it was the equal right enjoyed by

Page 33565

1 all people. No special intention where the Serbs were concerned.

2 Q. Forgive me. The sentence we've just reached says, in terms "...

3 for the Serbs outside Serbia and creates the institutional possibility for

4 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to be joined --"

5 A. [In English] I don't see this.

6 Q. Sorry. It's on the screen.

7 Now I don't see it because I haven't got another copy. Can it go

8 back on the overhead projector.

9 A. I don't see this. It is quite blurred.

10 Q. Okay. I'm sorry.

11 A. With this red, red pencil. I don't see that.

12 Q. Another version coming your way.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: You have overhighlighted, Mr. Nice.

14 MR. NICE: I'm afraid so, yes.

15 Q. Here's coming a version in Serbian, because I don't want to run

16 any risk of there being an error of translation. You've got the paragraph

17 that begins: "The option for Yugoslavia is," and then further down it

18 says: "The possibility for the future -- for the Federal Republic of

19 Yugoslavia to be joined in future by Krajina and the Serbian Republic of

20 Bosnia-Herzegovina." That's what it says, doesn't it?

21 A. Yes. On the basis of the self-determination of the people,

22 because all nations must be equal and have the same right to the

23 self-determine of nations, according to which the Slovenes, Croats,

24 Bosnian Muslims, Macedonians decided to secede from Yugoslavia, by the

25 same token the Serb peoples, where they are the majority, may opt to

Page 33566

1 remain in the same state. So you can't give one right to one and not to

2 the other, to have one people able to secede and the others not to be able

3 to stay in the same state they wished to.

4 Q. You said yesterday -- I'm just going to turn very briefly to a

5 totally different topic. You said yesterday there had been no expulsion

6 of people from Serbia. I'd like you, please, to reflect upon that. Is

7 that, strictly speaking, accurate? Would you like to think about

8 Vojvodina and think about what happened there?

9 A. That's absolutely correct. The ethnic structure of the people

10 remained unchanged solely in Serbia. In Vojvodina you still have the

11 ethnic groups living there who had -- living there who had lived there

12 before; the Hungarians, the Slovaks, the Croats, and so on. Certain

13 Croats and certain Serbs did happen to exchange houses and property, but

14 these were individuals, individuals who decided to swap properties and go

15 and live in the other person's. But the national structure of Vojvodina

16 and Serbia has remained intact, and I categorically state that nobody

17 whatsoever was expulsed.

18 Q. We've had evidence from C47, C48, in considerable detail about

19 what happened at Hrtkovci. Hrtkovci was also the subject of official

20 reports of one kind or another, including one by the Humanitarian Law

21 Fund. Are you telling us that you're entirely unaware of the existence of

22 compulsory movement of non-Serbs from Vojvodina?

23 A. There was never any coercion, duress brought to bear. I said that

24 individuals, including Hrtkovci, had exchanged houses with Serbs living in

25 Croatia and who had taken over their houses. So the fact is that only in

Page 33567

1 Hrtkovci there was an incident that broke out and provoked by the

2 president of the then-Radical Party who issued some threats, but this was

3 a negligible opposition group, and you didn't have the state powers

4 standing behind them. The state never expulsed anybody from Hrtkovci or

5 anywhere else in Vojvodina. Of course, this can be established and

6 investigated, the Hrtkovci case, but I claim that there were exchanges.

7 Houses were exchanged, that's all, on an individual basis, not in an

8 organised fashion.

9 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... Professor. You're here to

10 help the Judges. Were you there at the time of the exchange of houses?

11 Did you supervise them, or are you relying on something else for your very

12 firm assertion that there was no such thing as what we've heard of in

13 evidence from witnesses?

14 A. Well, I'm claiming that. I was never myself in Hrtkovci, but

15 everything that I heard went along those lines, and I will withdraw my

16 opinion or change my opinion if it is proved otherwise. And then it will

17 be just the case of Hrtkovci. It wasn't a general policy that was waged

18 throughout Vojvodina province or throughout Serbia. You're just taking

19 Hrtkovci as a case in point where Seselj arrived and issued some threats

20 to the Croats. And this was an incident that was condemned by the Serbian

21 authorities.

22 Q. So you are aware of the threats he issued, are you?

23 A. There were, yes. I know about that. But I do not know that the

24 state took any steps against the Croats, for example. Quite the reverse.

25 Q. And I'm not restricting it to Hrtkovci. There's also Golubvci.

Page 33568

1 Mr. NICE: Your Honour, that's all I'm going to ask this witness,

2 there are a couple of exhibit issues that -- may that extract from the BBC

3 be given an exhibit number?



6 MR. NICE: We are in a position to, but not particularly anxious

7 to, produce a sequence of some memoranda, unless they're already all in

8 evidence. Would you just give me one minute, please.

9 [Prosecution counsel confer]

10 MR. NICE: Perhaps I'll start again, I think. Can I tell you what

11 are the exhibits numbers for the memorandums, as I understand it. There's

12 446.28, which is the one that we've referred to earlier associated with

13 the priest Mikic. There's, I think, 446 and --

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This has nothing to do with this

17 witness whatsoever. He said himself that he had no idea as to whether a

18 priest published the memorandum somewhere. It was in the newspapers.

19 Anybody could have published it anywhere, and this has nothing to do with

20 this witness.

21 I tendered the memorandum as it was printed, and I believe that

22 that is sufficient. The witness said that he had nothing to do with this

23 whatsoever and that he had not heard of this priest. Neither have I.

24 Never heard of him.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may be right, Mr. Milosevic, but the weight

Page 33569

1 to be attached to it is a matter for the Chamber.

2 MR. NICE: We've now got the one that's been --

3 JUDGE BONOMY: I take it what you're doing, Mr. Nice, is answering

4 the question I asked about the exhibit numbers for --

5 MR. NICE: Yes.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: -- various examples of the memorandum that had

7 previously been produced, and it's purely a technical exercise.

8 MR. NICE: Purely a technical exercise, yes, and I think in fact

9 we've probably only previously had 446.28. We've now got the present

10 version, which has got its number, 350 whatever it is, which contains the

11 answers to criticisms. There is the one other version that I showed to

12 the witness earlier today dated the 26th of September, 1986, sent to a

13 minister that he says necessarily obtained following the leak. Unless

14 anybody particularly wants us to produce that, I don't think there's any

15 particular need to, but if you do want it or anybody else wants it, we can

16 produce that.

17 I asserted to the witness and didn't wish to take the time

18 establishing it that there were a limited number of changes between the

19 first 1986 version and the 1995 version. I can provide a very short

20 one-side schedule of those variations, and it may be that if I provide

21 those and if the assigned counsel and/or the accused are so disposed, they

22 could check it for accuracy and then the Chamber would be able to know to

23 some degree the history of changes if it ever becomes necessary.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Is 446.28 a 1985 version?

25 MR. NICE: As far as I know, that's the --

Page 33570

1 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Nice, please.

2 MR. NICE: 1986.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: So is that the one that would be compared with --

4 MR. NICE: 1995.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

6 MR. NICE: Yes. That apart, I have nothing else to ask this

7 witness.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Professor, I would like to ask you a question.

9 Questioned by the Court:

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Professor, you have been asked many questions --

11 you have been asked many questions by Mr. Nice about the memorandum

12 directed at showing that the memorandum, by reason of its content, in

13 particular the language used, would have influenced people, presumably in

14 Serbia. What I wanted to find out from you is what is the -- generally is

15 the kind of influence that other memoranda, quite apart from this one,

16 other memoranda prepared by the academy has in Serbia? When you produced

17 other memoranda, other documents, other learned documents, what kind of

18 circulation, what kind of influence do they have?

19 A. [In English] This is the last document which Serbian Academy of

20 Science produced as a whole. Academy became divided later, and it was

21 never possible to prepare another collective text. There were a number of

22 academicians who expressed one position, and then this would be opposed by

23 another group of academicians. So this was the last moment when Serbian

24 Academy of Science was a united, scholarly institution.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, I understand that, but prior to this

Page 33571

1 memorandum, did the academy produce other works, other publications on

2 other subjects?

3 A. This was not a custom in academy that they will publish such

4 memorandums, so I don't remember that there was any other similar

5 document. But at this moment, there was a sense that there was such a

6 deep depression, that things in Yugoslavia became so terribly bad that it

7 was high time for intellectuals to express their critical views about

8 that.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: I see. I see.

10 A. We mentioned last time how the Slovenes, seeing what is going on

11 in Yugoslavia, decided to -- to secede. That was one of the reasons.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. I'd like to find out your age.

13 A. I am 82.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Professor.

15 Mr. Milosevic, now it's your time to re-examine. You're not

16 obliged to re-examine. I mentioned one of the classical functions of

17 re-examination, to rehabilitate the witness, and sometimes it is better to

18 let things lie as they are.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I think, Mr. Robinson, that in

20 this case, you are quite right. The witness has not been brought into

21 question at all through Mr. Nice's cross-examination, so there is nothing

22 I can do in terms of rehabilitation. Nothing was really challenged by the

23 cross-examination. So thank you. No further questions.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Milosevic.

25 And thank you, Professor, for the evidence that you have given.

Page 33572

1 You may now leave.

2 [The witness withdrew]

3 [Trial Chamber confers]

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I just wish to remind you we are

5 resuming on Monday afternoon at 2.15, and you have the weekly obligation

6 to produce your list by Thursday, and I imagine you'll be doing that

7 tomorrow.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have already done that.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Oh. Well, so much the better.

10 We are adjourned until next Monday at 2.15 p.m.

11 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.22 p.m.,

12 to be reconvened on Monday, the 22nd day of

13 November, 2004, at 2.15 p.m.