Page 33668
1 Tuesday, 23 November 2004
2 [Open session]
3 [The witness entered court]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, before you begin, I understand that the
7 witness has to catch a plane at a certain time, which requires that he
8 leave here at about 9.30.
9 MR. NICE: I was alert to this yesterday. The loss of time this
10 morning means that I will reorganise my questions by priority. I won't be
11 able to cover everything.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I am to say to you that in future
13 it is your responsibility to bring to the attention of the Chamber any
14 particular logistical problems relating to your witnesses.
15 Proceed, Mr. Nice.
16 WITNESS: NIKOLAI RYZHKOV [Resumed]
17 [Witness answered through interpreter]
18 Cross-examined by Mr. Nice: [Continued]
19 Q. I am not going to deal with any of the documents you produced
20 yesterday because I do not have them in interpretation and cannot deal
21 with the rest of the context. However, one document you provided was
22 included in the documents provided to Ms. Del Ponte. We have a
23 translation of that.
24 MR. NICE: May the witness see it. It was tab 4 of his original
25 collection of materials, and it was the one item that was not produced.
Page 33669
1 Q. And I desire to read with you, Mr. Ryzhkov, only the second
2 paragraph of this document, which is described to be conclusions of the
3 first session of the commission for assessing the international legal
4 aspects of the situation regarding the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
5 And I trust on this occasion the interpreters have a translation before
6 them. I apologise to them for the fact that the book extracts we read
7 yesterday were not provided to them. Entirely my fault.
8 The second paragraph of this conclusion reads as follows,
9 Mr. Ryzhkov, please follow it in the Russian: "During a long period of
10 time, a radical part of the Albanian population of Kosovo undertook
11 actions aimed at separation from Yugoslavia. With this end in view, the
12 underground groups, parallel power structures, and illegal paramilitary
13 groups have been formed. To oppose efforts to separate Kosovo, the
14 authorities of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia did not use,
15 unfortunately, all the possibilities of a peaceful settlement. In a
16 number of cases, the reaction of the federal authorities was inadequate
17 and times unjustifiably rigid. Limiting the autonomy of Kosovo in 1989
18 jeopardised the rights of the Albanian population and led to the deepening
19 of conflict. During the active phase of the conflict, cases of violence
20 against different ethnic groups of the Kosovo civilian population took
21 place. The commission announced its readiness to consider objectively and
22 impartially any evidence of such facts."
23 The simple point then, Mr. Ryzhkov, that even the commissions with
24 which you were involved, and there were many commissions, recognised that
25 limiting the autonomy of Kosovo in 1989 had jeopardised the rights of the
Page 33670
1 Albanian population and deepened the conflict; correct? I would be
2 grateful for short answers this is morning, please.
3 A. I will try, Mr. Nice, to answer very briefly. I did not take part
4 in the work of this commission. Therefore, to say that this is my
5 opinion, I cannot. It was an independent commission. It worked in
6 St. Petersburg in 1999, and in this document on page 8, you will find the
7 signatures of all those who signed this document. My name is not among
8 them. Thus I cannot be held responsible for the opinion of the people who
9 drafted this document.
10 Q. Very well.
11 MR. NICE: May this be given an exhibit number. It may be Exhibit
12 788 tab 4, suggests Ms. Dicklich.
13 THE REGISTRAR: That's correct.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That document has nothing to do with
16 this witness. How can it be tendered through my witness? It has nothing
17 to do with him.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: He has commented on it.
19 MR. NICE: And it was provided as one of the pieces of material
20 that this witness was expected to deal with.
21 Q. It's right, is it not, Mr. Ryzhkov, that President Yeltsin at the
22 time held a critical or negative view of the Duma and in his book
23 described the Duma as "issuing one resolution after another, the
24 communists" - which would include you - "establishing active communication
25 with Milosevic, planning a military union of the two governments." Do you
Page 33671
1 recall his taking that view about you?
2 A. In the document that we submitted, there is a list of documents,
3 background documents. You took only one of them, one among the documents
4 that were appended to our report. It was the opinion of the commission
5 that met in St. Petersburg, and we thought it was our duty to submit it as
6 a document in an annex. It is a different matter how it should be
7 interpreted. I, for instance, cannot agree with that particular point.
8 But you are not asking me.
9 And second, Mr. Prosecutor, I should like to clarify one point.
10 Maybe I didn't understand your question correctly, but to a certain
11 degree, you seem to be maybe not accusing but hinting that some people
12 cooperated. I, for instance, cooperated with the leadership of
13 Yugoslavia. Maybe I misunderstood you. But I would like to state before
14 this Honourable Court that I have nothing to do today with the Communist
15 Party of Russia, absolutely nothing to do with them. I used to be a
16 member of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which ceased to exist in
17 1991. I have my convictions. As a citizen I have my civic position,
18 which I expressed yesterday, but I can say that --
19 Q. Mr. Ryzhkov --
20 A. -- it is absolutely wrong to say that I am a mediator between the
21 Communist Party of Russia and Mr. Milosevic.
22 Q. I've given you an opportunity to deal with Mr. Yeltsin's comment.
23 There is one other fact relating to Mr. Yeltsin. It's right, is it not,
24 that throughout the time that it would have been possible for Mr. Yeltsin
25 to accord the accused Milosevic a formal visit to Russia he declined ever
Page 33672
1 to afford him such a visit and indeed expressed the view of this accused
2 that he was a most cynical politician. Do you remember his doing that,
3 your president?
4 A. I do not know of such an expression of opinion by Mr. Yeltsin or
5 anyone else from the leadership of Russia. I do know that Mr. Yeltsin did
6 meet with Mr. Milosevic in Moscow, and they discussed precisely the issue
7 of a peaceful resolution to that entire problem. There was a statement
8 issued after that meeting, and we all read it. I have never heard words
9 to the effect that you just read.
10 Q. The materials that you provided to Mrs. Del Ponte were recorded as
11 having been considered in the public document that recorded the decision
12 of the Office of the Prosecutor of this Tribunal not to pursue the inquiry
13 into alleged NATO crimes further. Do you accept that?
14 A. I did not quite understand your question, but I will try to answer
15 nevertheless. I spoke yesterday, and I will repeat today: On the 20th of
16 October, 1999, in keeping with the decision of the state Duma, the state
17 parliament, our commission, which I chaired, drafted a document which I
18 signed addressed to the Chief Prosecutor, Carla Del Ponte. And on the
19 23rd of December, my deputy in that commission, Professor Tamara Pletneva
20 and the secretary of that commission, Mr. Tetyorkin, arrived in The Hague
21 and handed that document in. The document was quoted from by Mr.
22 Milosevic yesterday. You did not allow me to quote a couple of paragraphs
23 myself, but you heard it from him.
24 I told you yesterday, and I am repeating today that she stated
25 that the demands contained specifically in paragraph 5, if you read the
Page 33673
1 document, which raised the issue of holding to account the head of NATO
2 and head of states' members of the NATO who unleashed this war --
3 Q. I think I'm going to stop you --
4 A. -- was answered by her to the effect that she did not have the
5 competence. She gave us that answer two months later, to the effect that
6 she did not have the purview to prosecute this. And I have submitted the
7 document to you that we received from Mrs. Carla Del Ponte.
8 Q. Have you read the public document that records the decision of the
9 OTP.
10 A. I read the answer that we received from Madam Del Ponte. I have
11 read no other document.
12 MR. NICE: Your Honours, time does not permit me to put the
13 document in nor am I sure that it is a relevant document, but it is a
14 public document, and if the accused wishes it to go in or anybody else
15 wishes to see it, it's available.
16 Q. Mr. Ryzhkov, have you read and considered either Lord Robertson's
17 report in relation to the civilian casualties and other events that
18 happened as a result of the NATO bombing titled "Kosovo One Year On"?
19 It's not an exhibit.
20 A. I heard that such a document exists, but I never read it.
21 Q. Have you read and considered the Human Rights Watch report, which
22 is an exhibit in this case, Exhibit 206, titled "Civilian Deaths in The
23 NATO Air Campaign"?
24 A. Certainly I'm not very familiar with the forensic practices of
25 this Tribunal, but I do believe that such documents should be shown to me
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Page 33675
1 in order that I can give a qualified answer. Just from hearing it read
2 out as a title from you, I can say nothing.
3 Q. I can show you what the document looks like, and we don't have
4 time, because of your departure, to do more than ask and have answered the
5 question, Have you read and considered it?
6 A. It should be translated into Russian. Here. Here are the
7 photographs which are familiar to me. I see here many photographs that I
8 know. You see, Mr. Prosecutor, I would be very grateful indeed if you
9 could ask me questions as you would a person who represented the Russian
10 parliament or, alternatively, as a man who was on site and an eyewitness.
11 I cannot testify on the basis of documents you are showing me so
12 perfunctorily now. I can only give you my opinion --
13 Q. Mr. Ryzhkov, please help us with this, which is why I've asked you
14 the preliminary questions: In this report, reflected also in Lord
15 Robertson's report, civilian casualties in Kosovo numbering between 488
16 and 527 are allowed for. You visited the area, and I want to know if you
17 have any material that is eyewitness, hard material to show that the
18 conclusion of that report is other than correct.
19 A. Mr. Nice, I'm repeating once again: I did not deal with these
20 issues. I never participated in exhumations. I know people who did, I
21 know people who pulled out corpses, made conclusions. I know the Finnish
22 team. But specifically, specifically I repeat once again, I did not deal
23 with these issues myself. This did not fall within the purview of my
24 missions. I went there as a politician and a public figure, not as an
25 expert who has to determine what kind of shots caused death to those
Page 33676
1 people.
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Ryzhkov, would you just confirm for me that
3 the latest time that you can be here is 9.30 if you are to make your
4 flight.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I appreciate it very
6 much that you are reminding the Court for the second time that I really do
7 have to leave within three minutes in order to make my plane. There is a
8 session of the senate tomorrow to which I am reporting, and I therefore
9 have to be in Moscow by that time in order to make that trip. Therefore,
10 I would be grateful if you could give me the possibility --
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you very much.
12 Mr. Nice.
13 MR. NICE: I've got about two more questions in the time,
14 Mr. Ryzhkov. The first is this: Greater Serbia. You only spoke to
15 Karadzic twice and obviously had limited contact with him. You spoke to
16 the accused more often. Do you accept that the overall plan of the Serbs
17 and the Bosnian Serbs would have involved the linking of lands dominated
18 by Serbs to Serbia, making for a larger territory than the present or then
19 existing Serbia? Do you accept that?
20 A. That was not my impression. As I said yesterday and I repeat now,
21 I met twice in my life with Mr. Karadzic, in 1993 and 1994, and after that
22 I never saw him again. In the past ten years, I did not see him. And I
23 repeat once again that at that time I had the impression that Karadzic was
24 unhappy with the position held by Mr. Milosevic, President Milosevic. And
25 answering specifically your questioning whether I had the impression that
Page 33677
1 everything was being done to annex a part of Bosnia and Herzegovina to
2 Serbia, I had absolutely no such impression. And to the best of my
3 understanding of all these issues, I believe this is pure fabrication.
4 Q. Very well.
5 A. There was a civil war in one of the former republics, and what you
6 are saying I absolutely cannot confirm. I believe it is untrue.
7 Q. I've got two more questions, actually. Your first meeting with
8 the accused was in March 1993. We have evidence from stenographically
9 recorded notes of his explaining only a couple of months earlier how he
10 intended through the process of negotiation to maintain de jure, in law,
11 what he'd already obtained on the ground in fact. Did he explain his plan
12 to you in those terms, that he wanted to keep by negotiation what he'd
13 already got?
14 A. Mr. Nice, Your Honours, please take into account the following:
15 Yesterday, when I testified before you all about my activities over 11
16 years when I cooperated and had contacts with Yugoslavia, I said at the
17 outset I never was directly involved with issues concerning Bosnia and
18 Herzegovina. I did not deal with it, and I cannot give you a qualified
19 answer as to what whose position was, whether I agree with Vance and Owen
20 or not, because I didn't deal with it. It wasn't my job. You asked me
21 whether I met with Karadzic. Yes, I did. What kind of questions were
22 raised in that discussion I have already told you. I can't you tell you
23 any more and please don't ask me any more questions about Bosnia and
24 Herzegovina because I can't answer them.
25 MR. NICE: In light of that answer, I don't think I need trouble
Page 33678
1 the witness any further.
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, any re-examination? I would
3 encourage you not to re-examine in light of the logistical problems with
4 which the witness is faced.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course. Of course I do not have
6 any intention of detaining Mr. Ryzhkov any further. I just wish to thank
7 him for his testimony.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Ryzhkov, that concludes your testimony, and
9 you may leave.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you very much, Your Honours.
11 Thank you very much indeed.
12 [The witness withdrew]
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Your next witness, Mr. Milosevic.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hereby call witness Leonid Gregori
15 Ivasov.
16 [The witness entered court]
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak
19 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit.
21 WITNESS: LEONID GREGORI IVASOV
22 [Witness answered through interpreter]
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
24 Examined by Mr. Milosevic:
25 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General Ivasov.
Page 33679
1 A. Good morning.
2 Q. Could you please state your full name.
3 A. My name is Leonid Gregori Ivasov.
4 Q. Please give us a few main facts from your biography.
5 A. I was born on the 31st of August, 1943, in Kyrgyz Republic in the
6 Soviet Union. When I was 17, I entered military school. I served in the
7 army, following which I completed the military academy. Once again
8 following that, I continued serving in the army, and from the December of
9 1976, I worked in the central administration of the Ministry of Defence of
10 Soviet Union. I was at the head of the Ministry of Defence, was chief of
11 the international affairs section within the Ministry of Defence, and once
12 the Soviet Union fell apart, I was at the head of the department dealing
13 with the newly independent states. And starting in 1996, I was appointed
14 head of the main directorate of international military cooperation of the
15 Russian Federation. At the same time, I dealt with military analyses and
16 military sciences. I hold a Ph.D. in the field of military sciences. In
17 2002, I left my post within the Ministry of Defence, and since then I have
18 been with the Academy of Geopolitical Problems. I am a vice-chairman
19 there, and at the same time I teach in various military academies.
20 While I was the head of military department within the newly
21 independent states, I dealt with contacts, meetings, organised with the
22 Ministries of Defence of many countries. I took part directly in various
23 negotiations, including negotiations in Yugoslavia, specifically in
24 Kosovo. I had numerous contacts with NATO, with American military
25 representatives, and I also took part in numerous international
Page 33680
1 conferences.
2 Is that sufficient, Mr. President?
3 Q. Yes, General Ivasov, that's right. And let me just clarify that
4 you're first vice-chairman of the Academy of Geopolitical Issues; is that
5 right?
6 A. Yes, that's right. I'm first vice-chairman of the Academy of
7 Geopolitical Issues of Russia.
8 Q. And you're a colonel general?
9 A. Yes. My military rank is colonel general in reserve.
10 Q. Were you intensely involved in issues dealing with Yugoslavia and
11 the Balkan region for a period of time?
12 A. Yes, absolutely. Starting in 1996, I, within my military duties,
13 was involved in the situation in the Balkans. To be more precise, I dealt
14 with the situation developing in Kosovo and around Kosovo. And as such I
15 had multiple contacts with all countries which were interested or perhaps
16 not interested in resolving the problems there.
17 Q. Did you receive detailed information on all events in Kosovo?
18 When I say "detailed," I'm referring both to confidential and secret
19 information.
20 A. Yes. I received various types of information which was based on
21 intelligence sources of intelligence services. It was also based on my
22 continuous meetings with high military and political officials of various
23 countries including NATO Member States. I received that information
24 through the work of analytical centres within Russia and other countries,
25 and in addition to that I received my information from the international
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Page 33682
1 conferences in which I took part or my subordinates did.
2 I also received information directly from my contacts with
3 President Milosevic, from Chief of Staff, and high officials, military
4 officials of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I also received information
5 from the Verification Mission in which my subordinate officers took part.
6 Q. Were you involved in any analysis? Did you take part in drafting
7 any documents and the like?
8 A. Yes. That was my duty; namely, to analyse the situation unfolding
9 in Yugoslavia, to make conclusions, and to report to the minister of
10 defence and the president. In early 1998, in order to analyse the
11 situation around Kosovo, a special analytical centre was established in my
12 directorate, and it dealt specifically with those issues. And the
13 documents generated were sent to the Main Staff and the president of
14 Russia.
15 Q. In order to clarify, General Ivasov, you've already told us that
16 you had regular and numerous contacts with the military leadership of
17 Yugoslavia. As far as I know, you and I met seven times. We had seven
18 various meetings.
19 A. Yes, Mr. President. You and I met seven times with the delegation
20 of the Minister of Defence, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and while I was
21 in Yugoslavia as the head of military delegation, we had constant, almost
22 daily contact with the leadership of the Main Staff of the Federal
23 Republic of Yugoslavia. This was both telephone contact and direct
24 personal contact. We exchanged views on the situation, we attentively
25 listened to your military officials and ours, and we conveyed results of
Page 33683
1 our analysis and other information to the Main Staff of the Yugoslav
2 People's Army.
3 Q. Please tell me, did you have frequent contacts with the military
4 officials of NATO countries?
5 A. Yes, these contacts were also regular, and as the situation in
6 Kosovo and in Federal Republic of Yugoslavia became more tense, the
7 contacts became more frequent. I took part in the meetings between Russia
8 and NATO. I took part in bilateral meetings between minister of defence
9 of Russia and ministers of defence of NATO countries. I personally met
10 with ministers of defence of those countries and with top military
11 officials of those countries. I also had frequent contact with
12 Mr. Solana, with Mr. Robertson, who were general-secretaries of NATO. In
13 addition to that, with the chairman of military committee of NATO and
14 other officials of the alliance.
15 Q. Now let us be more precise about the time period I want to refer
16 to now. Could it be said that the Russian side very closely followed the
17 events in Kosovo in 1997, 1998, and 1999?
18 A. Yes, that's right, Mr. President. We intensified information
19 activity in that region. We also intensified our staff within the Russian
20 embassy in Belgrade and gathered information from various sources in order
21 to have an objective picture of what was going on, in order to conclude
22 what were the intentions of all sides involved, especially the terrorist
23 organisation KLA, in order to define what were the channels of weapons
24 entering Kosovo, in order to locate camps and training bases where
25 terrorists were trained, and also in order to locate what were the sources
Page 33684
1 that provided military, political, and financial source -- support to the
2 KLA.
3 Q. Before I put a question related to what you've just told us,
4 please describe briefly the then-situation in Kosovo.
5 A. The -- at the end of 1998, we had a full picture of what was going
6 on in Kosovo. General Staff of Russia and my directorate analysed the
7 situation, and based on the information obtained, based on consultations
8 with various military experts from various countries, we concluded that as
9 far as Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was concerned, there was a broad
10 plan to destroy the country, to discredit military and political
11 leadership of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia aimed at seceding Kosovo
12 from Serbia and Yugoslavia, separating it from those two countries.
13 We also saw the interaction of various forces. First of all, we
14 saw that in the process of establishing KLA and destabilisation of the
15 situation, a Mafia was established, an international Mafia and a Caucasian
16 Mafia, which wanted to establish its strongholds in Pristina and Albania
17 in order to distribute drugs throughout Europe.
18 Analysing the information, we also concluded that the National
19 Security Council of the United States, back in 1997, adopted a decision to
20 carry out a military operation against Yugoslavia. The plan of that
21 operation was aimed at conducting a very powerful psychological war
22 against Yugoslavia aimed at disrupting the negotiations and inform the
23 international community about what was going on in Kosovo as well as to
24 prepare the international public for the impeding military operation.
25 This plan and these conclusions were reported by us to the
Page 33685
1 leadership of our country, and we also warned the leadership of
2 Yugoslavia.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm stopping you because the narrative has gone
4 on too long. It's time for more specific questions to be put.
5 I wanted to ask you whether information that you received which
6 led you to these conclusions, was that gathered exclusively from the
7 Russian embassy in Belgrade?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. I will be
9 brief. This information originated not only from the Russian embassy. We
10 received it through daily contacts with NATO representatives. We also
11 received that information through our contacts with other states which
12 were not NATO Member States, and also from open sources.
13 After analysing this information, we reached this conclusion that
14 there was a broad plan to carry out this operation against Yugoslavia, the
15 operation that I've just described.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, please ask specific questions to
17 elicit answers. The narrative approach is probably more understandable
18 with a witness as to fact. I think for this witness you need to ask
19 specific questions to elicit answers. Yes.
20 Mr. Nice.
21 MR. NICE: Your Honour, may I make an observation about the last
22 long answer of this witness, which came out in a very coherent way,
23 probably - no objection to this - prepared. I intentionally didn't object
24 midway, although I think it's obvious that this evidence or evidence of
25 this kind is extremely problematic and probably inadmissible in -- under
Page 33686
1 many approaches, which is one of the reasons I rise now. By letting this
2 answer be given, it shouldn't be assumed that I'm accepting its
3 admissibility.
4 It's problematic for the following reason or reasons: First, it's
5 clear that the witness, in his conclusions, has relied on a whole range of
6 material, including secret material, which hasn't been provided to us,
7 presumably isn't available to us, and upon which I'm quite incapable of
8 cross-examining.
9 Second, connected to the first point, in reality, the witness is
10 giving an expert opinion, because he is saying, without specifically
11 holding himself out as an expert, he's saying, "I and my team have
12 analysed a large amount of material, and this is our conclusion."
13 Now, amongst the conclusions that he has reached is the very
14 strong conclusion, whether it has any relevance to the case being another
15 matter, the very strong conclusion that the plan of the operation was
16 aimed at conducting a powerful psychological war against Yugoslavia, and
17 this is accredited or discredited to the United States.
18 I -- even if I had a report in advance or a statement in advance
19 of detail, I wouldn't necessarily have been able to do any more than I
20 will be able to do later today, because only with the supporting material
21 and the opportunity to analyse it could one make any sensible approach to
22 this type of evidence.
23 I didn't stop it, and I -- intentionally because I wanted to see
24 what it was the witness intended or wished to say, but I must invite Your
25 Honours to say that we are in very difficult territory. Obviously the
Page 33687
1 easiest way to deal with the problem is to say that evidence of this sort
2 simply isn't admissible for a range of reasons, including the two I've
3 identified, but I am in the Chamber's hands. What I can say is that my
4 ability to cross-examine on this sort of conclusion is pretty well nil.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice.
6 Mr. Milosevic, you heard two objections made by Mr. Nice. Let me
7 hear from you and then we will consider it.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do not agree with these
9 objections. This is a very competent witness whose job it was to be aware
10 of all the information. As you could see, he prepared information and
11 analysis for the president of the state and the General Staff, and all
12 secret, confidential federation passed through his hands, all information
13 available to the Russian Federation. This is a highly credible witness,
14 both in view of his entire career and the post he held and the information
15 he had at his disposal.
16 General Ivasov, precisely because he knew all of the information,
17 was unable to leave Russia for quite a long time, and this is the first
18 time that he was able to leave the country and come here to testify,
19 excluding various official visits. So this is a highly competent witness,
20 a witness that is very well-informed.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: What do you say about the point that he's giving
22 evidence as an expert? The point being that if he's -- I'm not finished.
23 The point is that, as you know, expert evidence has to be notified
24 beforehand.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that he's a fact witness,
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1 and the fact that in addition to that he's also very competent in his job
2 is not his fault, but he is a fact witness.
3 [Trial Chamber confers]
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, we think the evidence is -- is
5 admissible. You make the point that some of it is based on confidential,
6 secret material to which you have no access. That's a matter which you
7 would raise in cross-examination, and it would then be for the Chamber to
8 determine how to deal with that issue. There's a whole regime of law
9 relating to access to confidential material. But the mere fact that
10 evidence may be based on confidential material doesn't make it
11 inadmissible.
12 We do not believe the witness to be an expert witness. He's -- he
13 has not been examined to suggest that he has expertise in any -- in any
14 particular area. So in conclusion, we'll admit it.
15 MR. NICE: As Your Honour pleases.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: But, Mr. Milosevic, I do not want this long
17 narrative. It becomes meaningless after awhile. You must ask specific
18 questions, the witness will give a short answer, and then you move on to
19 another -- another question.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right, Mr. Robinson.
21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. General Ivasov, you've mentioned 1997 and the conclusion of the
23 National Security Council of the United States concerning the attack
24 against Yugoslavia. Does that mean that you can confirm here that you had
25 information at your disposal concerning the fact that way back in 1997
Page 33690
1 there was intention to attack Yugoslavia?
2 A. Yes, Mr. President, I confirm this. Firstly, my affirmative
3 answer is based on the analysis of the strategic of national defence of
4 the United States, especially of 1993, in which a bet was placed on the
5 military force in order to establish and not to protect the US interests
6 in the world.
7 I refer to the military charter of the United States army and
8 those documents which were in force at the time when these decisions were
9 passed. And I also base my conclusions on those materials and that data
10 which I have at my disposal.
11 Yes, indeed, at the end of 1997 a wide scale, coordinated plan was
12 being implemented, targeted at the destruction of the Federal Republic of
13 Yugoslavia. There is an analysis of political, economic, and military
14 reasons for that, and that plan was being implemented in a stage-by-stage
15 basis. In the light of the duration of that plan, I will refer only to
16 the plan of the informational and psychological warfare.
17 In the United States, there is such a rule FM33-5, which
18 prescribes the operations of informational and psychological warfare, and
19 everything which was being implemented in Yugoslavia is fully in line with
20 the provisions of that rule.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Ivasov, may I ask you whether you have
22 brought any documents that evidence this plan.
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have brought with me documents of
24 the General Staff, analytical documents of the General Staff of the
25 Russian Federation which were, in 2000, declassified and which were made
Page 33691
1 available to the public under the title "The Balkans Today and Tomorrow."
2 This was published by the edition of the General Staff of the Russian
3 Federation. It includes all the specific data and conclusions, including
4 the description of the scenario plan of those things which were being
5 applied with regards to the -- to the former Yugoslavia.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: You don't have a plan emanating from the United
7 States?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I drafted this scenario by hand,
9 this scenario plan, but it was included into the publication which I just
10 referred to.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, before allowing the witness to go
12 any further with this, explain how this is relevant to the issues with
13 which we have to deal in this case.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, it is relevant because
15 this witness, in addition to others, points to the fact that the decision
16 to attack Yugoslavia, to commit an aggression against Yugoslavia, was
17 adopted several years before the pretext for attack was specified. So
18 therefore, this confirms that there was an intention to commit an
19 aggression, and then through various mechanisms, including Verification
20 Mission, Rambouillet negotiations, they came up with a pretext to
21 implement this.
22 This is absolutely clear. Something was decided upon back in
23 1997, and then later it was presented as though Racak and Rambouillet in
24 March of 1999 were used as pretexts. So it is clear that those were just
25 pretexts, false reasons, and that the real reasons date back to the time
Page 33692
1 when the decision was made.
2 In addition to that, General quoted the document FM33-5 is the
3 document specifying those preparations to carry out informational and
4 psychological warfare on the ground. The details are contained in that
5 document.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll consider the question -- Mr. Milosevic, you
7 are not to continue. The Chamber is going to consult on the question of
8 relevance.
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we'll allow you to carry on. Does
11 the witness have this -- the last document to which he referred, which I
12 think is an American document, a document emanating from the United
13 States.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The documents are in the United
15 States, but such documents as the strategy of the national security, the
16 military doctrine of the US army, those documents get published in open
17 press. As far as the field manuals are concerned and the instructions in
18 psychological warfare, I can say that I had them at my disposal, but I
19 believe that it would be feasible to request those documents directly from
20 the United States, because I do not have them with me at the moment. I
21 have some paragraphs or excerpts from those documents but not the full
22 texts.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, this is only tangentially and
24 marginally relevant. I allow it because part of your defence is that the
25 JNA and others were acting in self-defence against the NATO attack, and
Page 33693
1 this may be related to the NATO attack. It's on that very slim basis that
2 it is allowed. But you will appreciate that the evidence will not be of
3 much value to your case if the witness cannot substantiate what he's
4 saying. If there is no evidence of this plan, it's of very little -- very
5 little value.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, many things are logical here.
7 This witness knows this information, and this information was known in
8 autumn of 1997, and this is what this witness was testifying about. In
9 addition to that, you've already heard some other witnesses, and you will
10 hear new witnesses who will testify about how troops were recruited for
11 war in Kosovo back in 1996. These are facts. Therefore, it will not be
12 difficult to establish a factual basis indicating that already back in
13 1996, conflict in Kosovo was predicted and supported by those who wanted
14 Yugoslavia to fall apart.
15 But let us continue further.
16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. In addition to this informational and psychological warfare,
18 General Ivasov, is it true that in addition to that, in parallel, a
19 military structure was being created? You knew that airports and military
20 bases were being prepared in Hungary, Macedonia, and neighbouring
21 countries in order to be used for operations against Yugoslavia. This is
22 not informational and --
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: That is -- that is clearly leading. "You knew
24 that airports and military bases were ..." That's putting evidence in the
25 witness's mouth.
Page 33694
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Then I will reformulate
2 my question.
3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. What did you know about physical preparations being carried out
5 for attack against Yugoslavia?
6 A. Yes, I was aware of this. The preparations were done in a complex
7 way. I already mentioned the information on psychological preparations,
8 but in parallel to that, certain military operations were being prepared.
9 Starting from January 1998, there was an escalation of grouping of
10 intelligence satellites of the United States, and military infrastructure
11 was being prepared. In particular, ten airfields of NATO Member States
12 expanded their operational capabilities. They were getting closer to the
13 borders. Infrastructure was being brought closer to the Yugoslav borders.
14 In particular, the military infrastructure was being set up in Macedonia,
15 in Hungary, and partially in Albania. In parallel to that, additional
16 preparations were taking place in the NATO troops.
17 All this can be characterised as the preparation for a major
18 military campaign. All these issues in particular Marshal Sergeyev and
19 myself raised at the meetings of the Russian NATO Council in particular on
20 the issues of the military pressure on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
21 Q. When did you, General Ivasov, together with Mr. Sergeyev, raise
22 the issue of military pressure on Yugoslavia at the session of the
23 Military Council?
24 A. For the first time this issue was raised by Marshal Sergeyev in
25 May 1998, but in December 1997, at the meeting of the ministers of defence
Page 33695
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Page 33696
1 of Russia and NATO countries, General Rodionov - in those days he was
2 minister of defence - also raised this question.
3 Moreover, we transmitted some information to members of the
4 Russian NATO Council. Marshal Sergeyev offered a concrete plan of
5 settlement of the situation in Kosovo within the framework of the
6 Russia-NATO operation. And this plan included the building up of the
7 peaceful initiatives and peaceful ways of conflict settlement. However,
8 there was no unity in NATO. When minister of defence of Italy agreed with
9 the proposal of Marshal Sergeyev at the meeting of the Russian NATO
10 Council that indeed it would be -- it will be possible to concentrate on
11 the ways to seek the settlement of the Kosovo issue in a peaceful way and
12 through the establishment of a collective security model in Europe, he was
13 interrupted by the US representative, Mr. Cohen, and as a sign of protest
14 he abandoned the meeting hall.
15 So we always raised these issues. Moreover, in December 1998,
16 General Kvashnin, general of the army and Chief of the General Staff of
17 Russia, at the meeting of the military staff committee of the Russian
18 Federation, transferred to General Clark our intelligence data regarding
19 the composition of the Kosovo Liberation Army and the training camps for
20 terrorists and the routes of passage and transit and trafficking of
21 weapons through Macedonia and Albania, and suggested to concentrate the
22 joint effort on the cessation of the terrorist training activities and the
23 supply of weapons to Kosovo. He also offered a plan of joint activities
24 between Russia and NATO with the participation of the armed forces and the
25 security forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Page 33697
1 Mr. Clark took this with acknowledgement and gratitude, but
2 sometime later he informed us that the NATO intelligence is extremely weak
3 and is unable to confirm that data.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Before you go ahead with your next question.
5 Mr. Nice, is the question of the NATO air attacks on Yugoslavia,
6 is that an issue that is being challenged by the Prosecution?
7 MR. NICE: In what -- I'm sorry, I shouldn't be asking a question,
8 but I seek clarification: In what sense challenged?
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm trying to ascertain whether there is an issue
10 between the parties as to the attacks by NATO.
11 MR. NICE: Judging from the evidence of the last witness, although
12 he subsequently acknowledged he knew nothing of any detail, it would seem
13 that there may well be an issue between the parties. Whether it's
14 relevant or not is for you ultimately to decide, but issue would seem to
15 be what was the true motivation, and indeed what was the real targeting.
16 So at the moment, it would appear on the Defence case that there is an
17 issue.
18 As you will appreciate with the last witness, and indeed with an
19 earlier witness who gave some evidence that was found to be confirmed, for
20 example, in the Human Rights Watch report, we've been happy to live with
21 what we would say are neutral, independent assessments and happy to live
22 with that history, but it seems to be being challenged by the accused, so
23 I can't say there is no issue.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Go ahead.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I really have to make
Page 33698
1 a comment. There is a Latin saying, "difficile est saturam non scribere."
2 I can really not believe that somebody on this planet can possibly
3 challenge the fact that there was a NATO aggression against Yugoslavia.
4 Let me ask everybody in this room if they could possibly disagree. I am
5 just presenting you data.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ask your next question.
7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. So, General Ivasov, you not only knew in 1997 and 1998 about the
9 preparations of attack on Yugoslavia, but you also had talks about it with
10 NATO representatives at the sessions of the joint Russia-NATO Council; is
11 that correct?
12 A. Yes, Mr. President, this is so. And in NATO, we saw different
13 opinions and different approaches to this issue. In particular, the
14 majority of ministers of defence of NATO Member States did not manifest
15 any initiative or even objected against the preparation of a military
16 operation. The most active part was played by the minister of defence of
17 that United States and the minister of defence of the United Kingdom. The
18 rest were just taking a passive role, objection. And only by February
19 1999, General Zavarzin, the representative of Russia to NATO, reported to
20 me that all the ministers of defence of NATO Member States have been
21 broken and support the military aggression.
22 Q. Thank you, General Ivasov. What do you know about foreign
23 participation in the support and financing of KLA? Sorry. Sorry. I made
24 a slight mistake.
25 Before that question, I would like to ask you this: How would you
Page 33699
1 qualify KLA?
2 A. In all Russian official documents which were being developed by
3 the Ministry of Defence and which were reported to the leadership, the
4 Kosovo Liberation Army was referred to as an illegal military formation
5 carrying out terrorist activities; and the president of the Russian
6 Federation, the parliament and all the official ministries, were in
7 agreement with that definition.
8 The same definition was accepted, at least it was not objected
9 against, also in the Russian-NATO Council and also at the bilateral level
10 between the ministers of defence and other military and political leaders
11 of NATO Member States. And I'm not even mentioning the non-aligned or
12 neutral countries such as Finland or Sweden. Hence the definition of the
13 illegal military formation is the official -- is an official and legal
14 term or definition in Russia which we use.
15 And moreover, we believed that the leadership of the Federal
16 Republic of Yugoslavia had not only the right to combat illegal military
17 armed formations --
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm going to stop you, Mr. Ivasov. You've
19 answered the question.
20 Move on to another question now, Mr. Milosevic.
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. Very well, General Ivasov. You qualified the KLA as a terrorist
24 organisation. Do you know that in the West, too, it was long considered
25 to be a terrorist organisation as well?
Page 33700
1 A. This can be confirmed by the bilateral meetings in our contacts,
2 but this can be also confirmed by the conclusions of international
3 organisations, and I can quote here the examples both of the Contact
4 Group, which in the beginning of 1998 defined the activities of KLA as
5 terrorist activities. And the same definition, in fact, was also present
6 in our discussions with NATO. They did not refer to KLA as a terrorist
7 organisation in their official documents, but terrorist activities were
8 recorded as such. Hence, this was an international understanding or
9 recognition of the fact that KLA is an illegal terrorist organisation.
10 Q. Tell me, General Ivasov, what do you know about foreign
11 participation in the support and financing of the KLA and the activities
12 of outside sources, and the activities of the KLA?
13 A. Yes. I'm aware that support to KLA was being provided from
14 different structures, primarily from the Caucasian-Albanian-Turkish drugs
15 Mafia. This was a broad network, and in accordance with our data at the
16 initial stages of the establishment of KLA, from the funds of drug
17 trafficking, there was up to 45 per cent of the financing for the
18 procurement of armaments and supplies.
19 I also know that such an international organisation as the
20 People's Movement for the Republic of Kosovo, established as early as
21 1982, had a broad network in such countries as Germany, Switzerland and
22 other European countries and in the United States. This organisation was
23 engaged in the collection of funds for the procurement of armaments and
24 the training of terrorists.
25 We were also aware that before the commencement of the military
Page 33701
1 action or by the beginning of 1990 -- by the end of 1998 --
2 THE INTERPRETER: Correction by the speaker.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- the KLA had in its possession the
4 modern type of equipment and armaments that could be supplied only by the
5 Western countries. And the main armaments were procured in 1994-1996 in
6 Northern Albania when the Albanian people and Albanian rebels basically
7 managed to defeat them, and there were some weapons taken in battles and
8 there were cases of sales of weapons in Macedonia.
9 So I can confirm the participation in the -- such support being
10 accorded to the financing and procurement of arms for KLA.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, it's --
12 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivasov, in connection with the idea of a
13 psychological campaign against Yugoslavia, you mentioned a document which
14 was FM33-5. What is that document and where is it?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a document of the US army.
16 It is called "Manual on the Information and Psychological Warfare." I can
17 quote some passages from that document if Your Honour leaves me to do so.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: No. That's a matter for Mr. Milosevic or Mr. Nice
19 to take up. I just wanted to be clear about the identity of the document.
20 Thank you.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Is that -- is that a general manual to which
22 you're referring? It's not specifically related, is it, to Yugoslavia?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. This is a general
24 instruction manual or operational manual which is to be used for guidance
25 by political and military people. And when we were considering the
Page 33702
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Page 33703
1 situation and I had this manual available to me, it was quite obvious that
2 all the technological activities were being implemented in accordance with
3 the guidelines outlined in that manual.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. We'll take a break now for 20
5 minutes.
6 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.
7 --- On resuming at 10.59 a.m.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson. Thank you.
10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. General Ivasov, are you aware of the political objectives that
12 this terrorist organisation, KLA, held?
13 A. Yes, Mr. President, I am. First of all, the leaders of the KLA
14 never concealed their separatist ambitions, and always pursued secession
15 from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. In this ambition, they received
16 international or, rather, foreign support. That was their objective and
17 the tactics of their struggle.
18 Their second objective, and in this they were influenced by
19 foreign powers, was to destabilise the situation in the province, to carry
20 out terrorist activities in the territory of that province.
21 Therefore, I can confirm that their political objectives were
22 separatist and terrorist, and the methods for attaining those goals were
23 illegal activities against the law enforcement agencies.
24 Q. What do you know about the link between the KLA and NATO?
25 A. I know about such links. They existed on the official level when
Page 33704
1 representatives of NATO officially received representatives of this
2 separatist movement and had contacts with KLA leaders. There were also
3 informal secret meetings that took place with the mediation of NATO
4 special services. With the development of the Verification Mission,
5 Mr. Walker, too, immediately met with --
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Could you tell us a little more about the
7 meetings that you said took place between the representatives of NATO and
8 the KLA leaders. When was this and where?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Most of these meetings took place
10 after the establishment of the Verification Mission. Our representatives
11 to the Verification Mission reported about the contacts of Mr. Walker,
12 starting with October until January, as well as the meetings of
13 representatives of NATO member countries to the Verification Mission. And
14 we received information that in that period intelligence operations were
15 carried out in the territory of the province involving jointly the
16 representatives of NATO and representatives of the KLA. They passed on
17 information about the location of police posts, army deployment, and
18 military facilities in the province, and our people also reported to us
19 about the establishment of special radio transmission devices by NATO.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: What date? Do you know the date?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This happened from the summer of
22 1998 up until the beginning of the aggression against the Federal Republic
23 of Yugoslavia. The most frequent meetings took place in the period from
24 January to March. We also know that Mrs. Albright passed on to Hashim
25 Thaci this piece of information; namely, if the KLA agrees to the
Page 33705
1 deployment in Kosovo of NATO troops, then she would guarantee to them the
2 implementation of a referendum.
3 I met with Mr. Walker and also raised this issue. I asked him why
4 he was meeting so often with KLA representatives, naming names, while not
5 meeting with the representatives of Serbian authorities and Serbian law
6 enforcement authorities.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: So the meetings between NATO officials and the
8 KLA were taking place before the airstrikes?
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes, I can confirm that, Your
10 Honour.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.
12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Simultaneously, as just mentioned, NATO troops built up on our
14 borders.
15 A. Yes, that is so. I have already said that the military
16 infrastructure was being developed for a major military operation.
17 Intelligence activities were being stepped up against the Federal Republic
18 of Yugoslavia. Specifically, a regiment of special purposes of the United
19 Kingdom was transferred before the aggression to the territory of
20 Macedonia and established 80 intelligence units for radio surveillance and
21 implemented activities to gather intelligence and organise provocations.
22 The representatives of this regiment frequently met with KLA
23 representatives and jointly tried to infiltrate the territory of Kosovo.
24 Q. Is the build-up of these military activities the reason why we
25 increased the presence of our forces in that area?
Page 33706
1 A. In NATO plans, as the General-Secretary of NATO, Mr. Solana, said
2 more than once, it was included to implement a ground operation with broad
3 use of aviation and ground forces. To carry out a ground operation on the
4 territory of Macedonia and Albania, a powerful group of NATO forces was
5 organised, including the deployment of operative and tactical missiles, a
6 deployment of launches, and fighter helicopters as well as other powerful
7 military equipment. That also included the deployment of two groups of
8 special forces.
9 So when the representatives of NATO officially announced the
10 readiness for an airstrike and ground operation, the armed forces of
11 Yugoslavia were simply obligated, as the armed forces of any country
12 would, to prepare for defence against the aggression. And I believe that
13 the deployment of their forces and increase of their presence in the
14 province was, in my opinion, completely in conformity with the
15 constitution and with their own obligations.
16 Q. I just wish to emphasise one thing: Airstrikes, you said, plus a
17 ground operation. That means both.
18 A. Yes, that means both. And indeed, NATO was preparing for both,
19 including the ground operation. However, the ground operation didn't
20 happen for three reasons. First, there was no consensus within the NATO
21 to carry out this ground operation. There was a number of countries which
22 refused to participate. Second, by that time, major losses were inflicted
23 on the KLA by the Serb police and armed forces. And third, this ground
24 operation didn't happen because, as a result of the airstrikes, the ground
25 forces of Yugoslavia preserved their combat readiness.
Page 33707
1 Q. General Ivasov, is it clear, then, that our forces were mounting a
2 defence of the country? They were busy defending the country?
3 A. Yes, yes. I confirm that. Moreover, the Russian military,
4 including the Defence Minister of Russia, Marshal Sergeyev, myself, and
5 the General Staff proposed the adoption of even more extreme measures for
6 the defence of Yugoslavia's territory and the defence of the territorial
7 integrity and inviolability of its borders. That is a prerogative of
8 every country.
9 Q. I'm asking you this because claims are being made here that we
10 were building up forces in order to expel our own citizens of ethnic
11 Albanian ethnicity from the province. So was the reason for this build-up
12 our own defence or, as they allege, the expulsion of Albanians?
13 A. I assert and affirm that the Serb police and the Serb security
14 forces were forced to eliminate KLA terrorist activities in their own
15 territory. And this is something that Russia pressed the Yugoslav
16 leadership to do, because the terrorist activities of the KLA first
17 destabilised the situation in Yugoslavia. Second, it spread to the
18 territory of the neighbouring countries. And third, it caused massive
19 flows of refugees.
20 Furthermore, any terrorist act, any skirmish or shooting involving
21 both parties caused panic among the citizenry who fled for cover. And I
22 can confirm that it was precisely KLA leaders who conducted psychological
23 operations and exerted pressure on the civilian population to either join
24 the KLA or to leave the area.
25 I met in Greece with Albanian Catholics, with a family of Albanian
Page 33708
1 Catholics who told me that one of KLA field commanders, Adem Jashari,
2 forced Albanian Catholics to join the KLA, and anyone who refused was
3 simply physically liquidated. Therefore, failure to act by the Serbian
4 authorities was not the reason for this flow of refugees. It was the
5 terrorist activity of the KLA.
6 JUDGE KWON: General Ivasov, in an answer to the previous
7 question, you said that you and defence minister and the General Staff
8 proposed the adoption of even more extreme measures for the defence of
9 Yugoslavia. Could you give some examples of such more extreme measures.
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Way back in December 1997, the
11 defence minister of Russia, General Rodionov, suggested both to President
12 Milosevic and the Chief of General Staff to increase the presence of
13 security forces and police forces in the province in order to isolate
14 terrorist groups, detect their leaders and organisers, and to stop the
15 supply of weapons and recruits across the border. We were aware that it
16 was necessary in order to avoid engaging the army of Yugoslavia in these
17 operations. However, according to our information and the information
18 available to the General Staff of Yugoslavia, it was insufficient to use
19 only the security forces. Because the situation in the country caused
20 deep concern, it was necessary to protect the borders and simultaneously
21 conduct constant operations against terrorist activity.
22 Furthermore, Marshal Sergeyev also pressed for a greater
23 engagement of police forces and even the army. I saw many military
24 reports and overviews where the main order for the army was to prevent the
25 escalation of combat operations. Always those orders included - and we
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Page 33710
1 criticised them for it - but they always included the clause that in case
2 of attack by terrorists, they should be called upon first to stop combat
3 and warn them that in case of failure to do so, the army would use force.
4 We, on the other hand, thought that in case of attack, one should
5 immediately open fire on the terrorists.
6 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.
7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Do you know about the links between the KLA and the al Qaeda?
9 A. Yes. We knew that from our intelligence reports but also from the
10 information we got from representatives of Islamic countries. I had
11 regular contacts with the ambassadors of Islamic countries in Moscow,
12 including the ambassador of Iran and other officials from Iran. They
13 confirmed the links between Taliban and al Qaeda on the one hand with the
14 representatives of the KLA on the other hand. They even indicated
15 specific routes along which terrorists and weapons were infiltrated into
16 the territory of the Balkans. However, they denied any official
17 involvement of Iran or other Islamic countries in such actions except for
18 Turkey.
19 Q. As far as I know, Ambassador Seferi of Iran denied the involvement
20 of Iran but confirmed the links of Taliban and al Qaeda in his discussions
21 with you.
22 A. That's correct, Mr. President.
23 Q. Do you have any knowledge about the activities of an organisation
24 called MPRI, an American organisation including war veterans, military
25 professionals?
Page 33711
1 A. Yes, I know about the activities of that organisation, and I know
2 that it recruits mercenaries into different countries of the world. We
3 also located earlier recruited instructors from the USA and other
4 countries. We observed them in the northern areas of Albania, including
5 the populated areas of Tropoja and Kukes. So I can confirm that fact,
6 yes.
7 Q. When you say that you had talks with the ambassadors of Islamic
8 countries, how many ambassadors would that be; two, three, five, ten?
9 A. At least 15 ambassadors from Arabic and other Islamic countries.
10 They all agreed in the opinion that a terrorist war was going on in
11 Kosovo. Some of them did not actively take part in the discussions, just
12 tacitly agreed. However, the general opinion was that it was a terrorist
13 operation in Kosovo, that a major military operation of NATO was being
14 prepared against Yugoslavia, and the majority of the representatives of
15 the Islamic countries I spoke to confirmed this.
16 Q. Does that mean that the representatives of Islamic countries, the
17 ambassadors you spoke to in Moscow, also knew about the preparation of the
18 NATO aggression against Yugoslavia?
19 A. Yes. I hope they were aware of it, but we received this
20 confirmation also when we met with the highest officials of various
21 countries, including the president of Syria, Hafez Assad, receiving
22 Russia's Defence Minister Marshal Sergeyev, and discussing this issue
23 named the example of how they dealt with the separatists who carried out
24 an insurgency in the town of Homs with the use of heavy artillery and army
25 troops that prevented the spread of terrorism and separatism in the
Page 33712
1 territory of Syria.
2 Q. Tell me, what was the NATO plan? What did the top echelon of
3 Russia's military know about the NATO plan?
4 A. I would say that the complete plan of the aggression against the
5 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was known by the highest officials of the
6 USA. A lot of information was available to the defence ministry and the
7 political leadership of the United Kingdom and other defence ministers of
8 NATO member countries who had less information, so they gladly received
9 the information that we gave them.
10 The essence of this was the following: The plan was to discredit
11 the political and military leadership of Yugoslavia with the aim of
12 conducting psychological and media warfare. For that purpose, the 193
13 Aviation Squadron of the national army of the US - those were propaganda
14 aircraft - were deployed in Macedonia. So a media war was started.
15 Second, in the Military Committee of NATO, preparations were made,
16 starting with 1998, of a military operation. Every defence minister knew
17 on a need-to-know basis only a certain portion involving their own
18 participation. This plan involved a relationship of alliance with the KLA
19 and the opposition in Kosovo, the build-up of intelligence gathering
20 activities, and the preparation of specific military actions. The plan
21 envisaged that in case Mr. Milosevic and the Yugoslav leadership failed to
22 accept the ultimatum involving the introduction of NATO troops, then this
23 objective would be attained by military means, which is exactly what we
24 saw.
25 Mr. Walker, too, and Mrs. Madeleine Albright and other
Page 33713
1 representatives of the US and NATO tried, through military pressure and
2 expansion of terrorist activities in the province of Kosovo, tried to
3 coerce the leadership into accepting this ultimatum which would violate
4 the integrity, the sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of the
5 republic and an occupation of Yugoslavia by NATO forces.
6 The Yugoslav leadership did not agree to this, and that is why the
7 plan of military strikes was carried out.
8 Q. Tell me, General Ivasov, in very specific terms, what happened in
9 summer 1998 between NATO and Yugoslavia? What do you know about major
10 military manoeuvres organised at that time on our borders?
11 A. I know about that, Mr. President, indeed. Way back, early in May
12 1998, in the Russian NATO Council, the topic of Kosovo was discussed.
13 Russia eyewitnessed the preparation of a major wide-scale military
14 operation, and Russia's military marshal stated this at the Russia-NATO
15 Council meeting and insisted that NATO should implement the provisions of
16 the founding act governing the relations between NATO and Russia which was
17 signed in 1997. They wanted assurances from Mr. Solana, from Mr. Clark,
18 and General Shelton that Russia would participate in the analysis of the
19 situation and that NATO should not take any decisions involving military
20 pressure and even less military operations.
21 However, during the visit of Marshal Sergeyev to Greece in
22 September 1998, we saw wide-scale military drills of NATO air and ground
23 forces, and that was an unpleasant surprise for our marshal. Our
24 government recalled Marshal Sergeyev to Moscow because it was expected
25 that these drills and exercises would grow into an aggression and our
Page 33714
1 marshal indeed went back to Moscow, although the Greek representatives
2 assured him that there would be no aggression. Nevertheless, such conduct
3 by NATO violated not only the UN charter concerning threat of aggression
4 but also ran counter to the founding act governing the relationship
5 between NATO and Russia.
6 Q. Just to clarify, General Ivasov. Pursuant to this founding act
7 and also in accordance with the specific conversation which took place
8 between representatives of Russia and NATO representatives, NATO was
9 duty-bound to consult Russia and to inform it on any military activity so
10 that there would be no surprises such as those that Marshal Sergeyev and
11 others eyewitnessed in Greece?
12 A. Yes, that's right. That was observed in NATO. Regarding these
13 military exercises, Marshal Sergeyev sent a protest letter to ministers of
14 defence of all NATO countries. He proposed to establish a joint working
15 group in order to come up with proposals on peaceful resolution to the
16 crisis in Kosovo. Some ministers replied to that, and some ministers
17 didn't.
18 In addition to that, if Your Honour would like me to, I can give
19 you the names of the ministers of defence of NATO countries who complained
20 to Marshal Sergeyev because military pressure was exerted upon them
21 regarding a military operation.
22 Q. At the time, did you speak to NATO officials? What I have in mind
23 is Mr. Solana, Cohen, Clark, and the others.
24 A. Yes. Every time a minister of defence visited NATO, or I myself,
25 also involved meetings with general-secretary, also General Clark, and
Page 33715
1 other officials in Europe. All of these visits and meetings took place
2 regularly, both in Brussels and in Moscow.
3 Q. Is it true that minister of foreign affairs also put similar
4 questions within the group of eight where Russian side pointed out to the
5 Helsinki principles, UN Charter, and other international treaties?
6 A. Yes, that's right. This was done both within the NATO and Russia
7 contacts, and ministers of -- ministers of foreign affairs discussed the
8 crisis in Kosovo within the Contact Group and other groups.
9 The position of Russia was always the same. Russian
10 representatives always proposed a very complex plan for peaceful
11 resolution of the crisis in Kosovo. Russian representatives, especially
12 Russian foreign ministers, pointed out that not all peaceful and political
13 measures were used in order to resolve the situation, and they were
14 strongly opposed to the military operation.
15 Some people agreed with this position, and some people objected to
16 it, trying to blame Belgrade for everything, Belgrade and the leadership
17 of Yugoslavia. So the opinions varied. However, this was a very firm,
18 uniform position that Russia always advocated, and it was approved by
19 President Yeltsin.
20 Q. General Ivasov, please tell me, since you had at your disposal
21 various information that you've mentioned here on specific points where
22 conflicts broke out, where there was a build-up of the KLA, what routes
23 were used to bring in weapons, what assistance was received from the
24 outside, your then-Chief of Staff, General Kvashnin, in December of 1998,
25 did he convey all of this vast information to General Clark?
Page 33716
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Page 33717
1 A. Yes. Russian General Staff had such information, information on
2 several camps. I think there were a total of 11 camps where terrorists
3 had training in Northern Albania and in Kosovo.
4 He also reported on warehouses where ammunition and weapons were
5 kept. He also quoted five routes used for supply of weapons, narcotics,
6 and also routes used for troops in order to move in from Albania and
7 Macedonia. All of these routes led to Kosovo.
8 This information was conveyed to General Clark. This was specific
9 military information conveyed to him.
10 We decided to convey this information to NATO so that through
11 joint effort we could put an end to terrorist activity of the KLA and
12 disrupt the support routes for the KLA. This was unprecedented measure
13 taken by the Russian General Staff.
14 Unfortunately, General Clark referred to weak information of NATO
15 intelligence which was not true and refused to discuss this issue.
16 Intelligence services of NATO were quite powerful. Intelligence
17 satellites of USA were increased from ten to 30. And in addition to that,
18 they also established various new information -- intelligence groups. So
19 therefore, the fact that -- the claim that NATO intelligence was weak was
20 not true.
21 Q. As far as I know, it took one month from the minute this
22 information was conveyed to General Clark for him to answer that, despite
23 all resources at their disposal, they could not confirm that information.
24 A. Yes, that's right. However, General Zavarzin, Russian
25 representatives in NATO, tried to cooperate with the representatives of
Page 33718
1 the Military Committee of NATO based on this information to have some
2 bilateral context. And it turned out that Klaus Naumann and other
3 generals within that committee knew nothing about this information,
4 whereas General Clark confirmed what I previously told you.
5 Q. Therefore, not -- even those who were within the inner circle knew
6 nothing about that information.
7 A. Yes. We did not receive any information telling us that Russian
8 information was analysed and discussed.
9 Q. Through your representatives within the Verification Mission, were
10 you able to find out whether the information given to General Clark was
11 passed on to Verification Missions so that it could verify what was going
12 on in Kosovo?
13 A. No. We did not receive any such confirmation. Our officers who
14 worked within the mission had this information, and they tried to convey
15 this information to representatives of other countries within the mission.
16 However, they received no support from them.
17 Moreover, representatives of NATO countries in Verification
18 Mission first of all reported to the Verification Mission staff the data
19 that was not objective. In addition to that, they conducted intelligence
20 activities aimed at establishing coordinates of police forces, military
21 facilities, and so on. And we knew that they had the equipment needed to
22 establish such information.
23 There were many honest people in the mission, both from NATO
24 countries and neutral countries, but there were also others who conducted
25 intelligence activities that would assist the future NATO air raids.
Page 33719
1 Q. General Ivasov, these exercises in Greece, if I understand your
2 explanation well, were seen by Russian top military leadership as a clear
3 intention of NATO to enter Yugoslavia, and that was obvious back in the
4 middle of 1998, wasn't it?
5 A. Yes, that's right. Reports of the Ministry of Defence of Russia
6 and Ministry of Foreign Affairs were conveyed to President Yeltsin, and he
7 agreed with such reports. That was the information at the disposal of
8 Russian authorities, and based on that they defined their positions. The
9 negotiations taking place and the deployment of Verification Mission was
10 just a smokescreen needed to conceal the preparations for the aggression.
11 In addition to that, I would like to point out that Yugoslav
12 leadership, when conducting negotiations with Holbrooke, with Clark, with
13 Solana and others, made serious concessions detracting from their
14 sovereignty. Instead of increasing political activities, NATO and the
15 international community did nothing about the intensification of KLA
16 terrorist activities which became even more intensive when OSCE mission
17 was deployed to the area. Therefore, we concluded that Verification
18 Mission agreements signed in October by Holbrooke and Milosevic, as well
19 as other agreements, were made just in order to conceal the preparation of
20 aggression.
21 In negotiations, Mr. Solana and Mr. Clark more and more frequently
22 indicated that military operation was unavoidable. Mr. Walker, in late
23 1998, publicly stated that Serbs have no business in Kosovo.
24 Q. The threats were increasing, troops were building up, Yugoslavia
25 was under UN sanctions when it came to weapons procurement. Was that what
Page 33720
1 the situation was?
2 A. Yes. That's exactly what the situation was. General Ojdanic,
3 Pavle Bulatovic, minister of defence of Yugoslavia, they criticised us
4 Russian officials for the fact that the KLA was increasing its forces
5 whereas Yugoslav army could not even receive spare parts for its
6 equipment. We discussed these issues within NATO, and we pointed out that
7 there was no equality of arms there. On one hand, we had illegal
8 terrorist organisation which was becoming stronger by the day, training
9 its forces, whereas on the other hand, Yugoslav People's Army was not
10 allowed to do the same. We considered this to be one element of the
11 aggression preparation aimed at weakening Yugoslav armed forces.
12 Q. Did the leadership of Yugoslavia apply to Russia for military
13 assistance?
14 A. There were no such applications made at the official level.
15 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia complied with the sanctions which, in my
16 view, were not grounded. And these were sanctions imposed by the Security
17 Council of the United Nations.
18 The officers of the Yugoslav People's Army blamed us for
19 facilitating the aggression and the KLA, which was NATO's ally.
20 Q. When the aggression commenced, what was the position of the
21 Russian Ministry of Defence and the Russian military leadership?
22 A. First of all, I will tell you that the president of Russia, Boris
23 Yeltsin, on the 25th of March, called NATO strikes an act of aggression.
24 And this was the position to be taken by all other ministries. Ninety per
25 cent of Russian population also saw this as an act of aggression. Whereas
Page 33721
1 the head of Russian Orthodox church, Patriarch Alexei II, on the 25th of
2 March, 1999, called this a sin before God and a crime which was a
3 violation of international law.
4 We carefully studied the legal provisions of the UN Charter and
5 the provisions of the General Assembly from 1974. I even carefully
6 analysed the documents of Nuremberg trials. All of those documents
7 indicated that an aggression was being carried out against an independent
8 state. That was the only position taken by Russia.
9 Q. At the time, did the build-up of NATO forces in Macedonia
10 continue?
11 A. Yes. The build-up of forces in Macedonia and Albania continued
12 from the beginning of the aggression, and they were creating an attack
13 group to commence an attack against Yugoslavia. We were able to observe
14 that.
15 In the second phase of airstrikes starting in May, the build-up
16 slowed down. We received information from the ministers of defence of
17 NATO countries indicating that there would be no ground operation as there
18 was no consensus among NATO states.
19 Armed forces of Yugoslavia, except for air forces, did not suffer
20 major losses. Therefore, plans were made not to go ahead with ground
21 campaign, but up until that time, the build-up was increasing, yes.
22 Q. Could you tell us briefly, what did you discuss with Walker when
23 he came to see you, based on my information, on the 12th of February,
24 1999?
25 A. On the 12th of February, I did see Mr. Walker, and the first
Page 33722
1 question I put to him was why Russian representatives within the mission
2 were not allowed to present objective information. Why is it that in the
3 mission reports only opinions of NATO representatives were including --
4 included, disregarding Russian, Ukrainian, Swedish, and Finnish opinions?
5 Mr. Walker replied that it was difficult to work because the only unarmed
6 people in Kosovo were the mission members, and the rest of those present
7 there were armed. And when I asked him who was it that armed the KLA, Mr.
8 Walker said that there were various, numerous sources, and he wouldn't
9 detail them.
10 The second question we discussed was what were the perspectives of
11 political solution to the problem in Kosovo. Mr. Walker replied that by
12 springtime of 1999, the situation in Kosovo would collapse and that
13 military operation was unavoidable. And this is when he told me what I
14 have described earlier, that Serbs have no business being in Kosovo.
15 Q. So that was his position, that Serbs should leave Kosovo. You
16 understood him quite well, didn't you?
17 A. Yes. That was the position stated publicly somewhat earlier by
18 him, and then after that he confirmed it to me.
19 The third issue I discussed with him had to do with intelligence
20 activities of the representatives of several countries within the mission
21 which was undertaken in the territory of Kosovo. He refused to confirm
22 that, claiming that he was not aware of the situation.
23 Q. You have just mentioned that you asked him how the Albanian
24 terrorists in Kosovo armed themselves and that he didn't know what to
25 reply, he didn't know how that was done.
Page 33723
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Page 33724
1 A. Yes, that's right. He mentioned weapons from the Second World War
2 which allegedly had been left there. He also mentioned some other sources
3 that he knew nothing about, but he firmly denied that NATO countries and
4 the United States supplied the weapons, and those were the countries that
5 he represented.
6 Q. Did you have information indicating that they did supply weapons
7 to them?
8 A. Yes. Yes. This was indirect information. In the territory of
9 Kosovo in Northern Albania, sniper rifles were discovered, mortars, also
10 night vision equipment, and also portable missile launchers manufactured
11 by NATO countries.
12 I don't have direct information, I only have indirect information
13 that at least from the territory of Turkey these weapons were supplied
14 either through official or unofficial channels. Certain weapons could
15 have come from Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, as these
16 countries started using new NATO weaponry.
17 Q. The same question on arming terrorists in Kosovo were put by
18 Marshal Sergeyev on the 18th of February to Minister Scharping, the
19 minister of defence of Germany. What was his reply?
20 A. Yes. I can confirm that this question was put to Minister
21 Scharping. Minister Scharping also avoided answering it. He confirmed
22 the fact that the weaponry was reaching terrorists in the area in large
23 numbers, but he did not confirm that the source of those weapons was in
24 NATO countries. He advised that channels originating from Middle East and
25 Caucasus Mountains should be carefully monitored.
Page 33725
1 Q. In view of the fact that Russia was a member of the Verification
2 Mission, that Russian representatives worked within that mission, could
3 you please tell us what you think is most important and has to do with the
4 work of that mission and the position of Russian representatives within
5 that mission.
6 A. Russia agreed to establish that mission, bearing in mind that the
7 activities of that mission should facilitate the peaceful resolution.
8 When over 1.000 members of that mission were deployed to the region, it
9 turned out that they were unarmed, that they had no protection, that their
10 freedom of movement was limited, and that it was very difficult to gather
11 objective information. However, despite that, Russia undertook all
12 measures aimed at ensuring that its representatives would be able to
13 collect objective information, and this is what they did.
14 But let me point out once again that the representatives sent
15 their reports both to the headquarters of the mission and to Moscow. To
16 our surprise, we learned that in interim reports and the final report, the
17 objective mission of Russian, Finnish, Swedish, and Ukrainian
18 representatives was disregarded. Therefore, we sent these documents to
19 the OSCE directly and to various legal organisations, and in December of
20 1998, I discussed this with our representatives in the mission,
21 Mr. Ivanovski. I asked him why our opinion was disregarded. On the 12th
22 of February, the same question was put to Mr. Walker, and on the 18th of
23 February, minister of defence of Russia put that question to Minister
24 Scharping as well. Therefore, we pressured, trying to ensure that the
25 information in Kosovo was presented unbiased.
Page 33726
1 We asked Mr. Walker how come he met mostly with the
2 representatives of the KLA, representatives of Albanian population. We
3 asked him why only refugees in Albania and in Macedonia were interviewed,
4 and the opinion of various other organisations were disregarded, and how
5 come Mr. Walker rarely met with the representatives of Serbs and other
6 ethnicities in Kosovo. He blamed it on the fact that he had very little
7 time.
8 Q. From what you're saying, General Ivasov, can I conclude that it is
9 based -- that based on the results of research and investigation by your
10 services, Walker's reports were not objective?
11 A. Yes, I can confirm this. Moreover, when we suggested to him to
12 strengthen the mission and to ensure security and to activate the
13 activities, Mr. Walker would not agree to that.
14 Q. What can one say, then, about the reports of Human Rights Watch if
15 the reports of the KVM, the Kosovo Verification Mission were not
16 objective?
17 MR. NICE: There is a limit to --
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: He hasn't said that, Mr. Milosevic. Your
19 previous question was whether Ambassador Walker's reports were objective,
20 and he confirmed that they were not objective.
21 MR. NICE: Your Honour, what I'm --
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: And you're not asking about the reports of Human
23 Rights Watch on the basis that the reports of the KVM, the Kosovo
24 Verification Mission, were not objective. I think Mr. Nice is objecting
25 that's --
Page 33727
1 MR. NICE: Your Honour, yes. I haven't take any point with the
2 range of opinion evidence coming in. The immediate -- the preceding
3 question was, of course, leading in form, but the latest question would
4 appear to be a request for an opinion. Whether that's admissible at all,
5 derived by the process of deduction from his previously expressed opinion,
6 and I would invite the Chamber to say maybe the time has come to draw a
7 limit, to draw a line.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I refer not only to my own opinion,
9 but I -- but I can also quote the OSCE report. Kosovo, as it was seen, as
10 it was also described in the October 1998, 1999, I will quote: "Before
11 the operation, many of the Serb authorities and the law enforcement bodies
12 were acting rigidly only in the areas of the location of the KLA military
13 bases. The punitory operations were directed only against terrorist and
14 separatist organisations openly advocating --"
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm stopping you, General.
16 Mr. Milosevic, if he is to give evidence about the objectivity of
17 the KVM, and we have heard evidence here from the KVM, it's a matter of
18 some importance. You would have to establish basis for that analysis, for
19 that evaluation by him.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, General Ivasov has
21 told you clearly here that the Russian members of the Verification Mission
22 were subordinated to him. So at the top of the military pyramid in the
23 chain of command there was General Ivasov himself, precisely over the
24 Russian members of the Verification Mission. So he's basing his testimony
25 on the reports of his subordinates who are directly located in Kosovo and
Page 33728
1 who told him that Walker did not take into account their reports and that
2 they could not find their information in the collective reports that went
3 to Vienna.
4 I hope that it is beyond reasonable doubt in anyone's mind that
5 this was a manipulation.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Put to him the question about the KVM. Mr. Nice
7 will be able to cross-examine on it.
8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. The reports of the Russian members of the Verification Mission,
10 were they taken into account and treated equally as others by William
11 Walker and his associates?
12 A. The main issue with which we could not agree, to which the Russian
13 officials and other members of the verification mission could not agree
14 was who was the initiator of the terrorist activities, the aggressive
15 terrorist activities? We believe that the initiators were the KLA, some
16 political opposition forces in Kosovo, and some external forces. The
17 representatives of NATO states tried to prove the opposite; that they
18 wanted to prove the KLA and to say that they were illegal formations they
19 -- which were trying to oppose the infringements from the side of the
20 Serbian police forces.
21 We were showing to them the fact that the Serb law enforcement
22 bodies and the army were undertaking only activities to rebuff those
23 actions and were only acting in retaliation. And they were trying to
24 prevent the spread of instability and terrorist activities.
25 Unfortunately, Mr. Walker, in his report, blamed everything on the
Page 33729
1 Yugoslav authorities and the Serbian population. This is the main
2 contradiction.
3 I can quote here --
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, your next question.
7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. So the findings of your members of the Verification Mission,
9 Mr. Ivasov, if I understood correctly, was that the forces of our country
10 only reacted to terrorism.
11 A. Yes, I confirm that.
12 Q. Let us move on then.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: Before doing so, are you saying there are documents
14 that demonstrate this?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, there are documents, and
16 primarily this will be the orders of the General Staff of the Yugoslav
17 People's Army, the orders to the Pristina Corps, and other official
18 documents where the armed forces and the police forces were tasked to
19 prevent the escalation of the conflict, to isolate terrorists, and to
20 protect the peaceful or civilian population. We have such orders.
21 JUDGE BONOMY: I understand that, but what I was thinking of, were
22 reports prepared by your representatives within the KVM which were then
23 not transmitted to the OSCE headquarters?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Such reports were oral, transmitted
25 by telephone or in writing in the form of documents, and some of those
Page 33730
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Page 33731
1 documents and some of that information was also transmitted to the OSCE
2 directly. And in the report which I already mentioned, we also reflected
3 our position.
4 Moreover, the international human rights organisation Human Rights
5 Watch also may draw a conclusion that the conclusions of the OSCE
6 commission were biased, and we agreed to that. Our representatives also
7 participated in the work of that commission.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, are you bringing any evidence to
9 support what the witness has confirmed in response to your question, which
10 is that your forces only reacted to terrorism or, rather, that the Russian
11 members of the Verification Mission reported that your forces, the
12 Yugoslav forces, only reacted to terrorism? Are you going to bring any
13 evidence to support that?
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Naturally. Naturally. I also have
15 in mind witnesses, officials of our police and our army, as well as
16 witnesses from Kosovo. I cannot enumerate all the others now, but this is
17 a very important witness we have here because he represents the military
18 leadership of Russia, which is the spot where all the information was --
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- gathered, especially during these
21 events in Kosovo.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: I was saying that you might have been able to
23 adduce that evidence through this witness, but it's a matter for you.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As regards the evidence of this
25 witness, I hope that it is entirely clear. I don't know if you seek proof
Page 33732
1 indicating whether General Ivasov is speaking the truth. Is that what you
2 want me to prove here?
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, it's a matter for you how you conduct your
4 case, but he has made an important statement, and the Chamber will have to
5 assess to determine the weight to be attached to it, and naturally the
6 Chamber will give greater weight to it if it is backed up by documentary
7 evidence.
8 We're going to take the break now, Mr. Milosevic. We'll break for
9 20 minutes.
10 --- Recess taken at 12.18 p.m.
11 --- On resuming at 12.47 p.m.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. General, you want to say something?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I would like to say
14 that I will be brief, because tomorrow I need to fly to Moscow. I have
15 international commitments to be this week in Copenhagen, in Denmark, and
16 therefore I would like to plead with you to bear this in mind.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: What time tomorrow?
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My flight is scheduled for 11.00
19 a.m.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.
21 MR. NICE: If it assists the Court, this is a witness who
22 obviously I could apply to have put back for another day for
23 cross-examination and make all the inquires that I'd like to make, and I
24 would forecast that I'd have a fairly strong application if I chose to
25 make that application. Experience of doing that in earlier parts of trial
Page 33733
1 shows how extremely inconvenient it is, how difficult it is to remember
2 the evidence on the second session, and so on, and my intention is to
3 prepare myself this afternoon to the degree I can to bring the
4 cross-examination of this witness to a conclusion tomorrow, because I'm
5 sure that will be satisfactory. I can't guarantee that I shan't make an
6 application to have him brought back on another day, but I'll do my best.
7 There is, of course, absolutely no way he can -- I can finish with
8 his cross-examination today.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, I have much sympathy for what you have
10 said.
11 Mr. Milosevic, you cannot run your case like this. You must bring
12 to the attention of the Chamber any difficulties that your witnesses have
13 in terms of transportation and getting back to their homeland. This
14 witness, in my view, is an important witness, and I would expect
15 cross-examination to be fairly lengthy.
16 What was the times that you had scheduled for this witness?
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] A bit more than three hours, but I
18 obviously need more time than that.
19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. General Ivasov, is there any possibility for you to fly to Moscow
21 tomorrow evening? There must be a flight in the evening so that we can
22 continue working tomorrow.
23 A. Yes, if the staff of the personnel assists me to rebook my tickets
24 for the evening flight, this would be possible.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We'll ask the Victims and Witnesses Unit to
Page 33734
1 look into that, yes.
2 Mr. Milosevic, please continue.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.
4 [Trial Chamber confers]
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: I was just raising the question with my
6 colleagues as to whether indeed his testimony will be finished tomorrow.
7 It was pointed out to me that tomorrow is the last day, in any event, so
8 that in that case, he would have to return if his testimony is not
9 concluded.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Robinson, I will
11 bear your suggestion in mind, that as many documents need to be prepared
12 in advance and distributed as possible, although I think that the evidence
13 given by Mr. Ivasov is authoritative enough, but I would like to ask
14 General Ivasov whether he has any documents on him --
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Since you are representing yourself, I'm going to
16 make this intervention. His evidence is important evidence. He has
17 touched upon what I consider to be a very important point, that is the
18 objectivity of the reports of the Verification Mission, because a lot of
19 the Prosecution case is based on that. He has come here to say that the
20 reports are not objective, and he says that on the basis of the fact that
21 the Russian soldiers who were part of the Verification Mission reported to
22 him that their reports were not taken into account in the overall report
23 from the mission to the OSCE. Now, I consider that to be very important.
24 The Chamber would be able to attach much more weight to this
25 evidence if you were to bring evidence to support that, either documentary
Page 33735
1 evidence or evidence from any of the -- any of the Russian officers who
2 were a part of that mission to establish that their reports were not taken
3 into account. Because in my view, the objectivity of the KVM is a very
4 important factor in this case.
5 So that -- don't rely entirely on his evidence on this point. If
6 you have other evidence to bring, it will boost your case, if you can, to
7 confirm the point that you are making.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I understand what you're saying,
9 Mr. Robinson. I have every intention to call several other Russian
10 witnesses, and I just asked General Ivasov whether he has now with him any
11 documents which can be used to support what he has been saying here. If
12 not, we can get those documents subsequently. And I will have other
13 witnesses who will give similar evidence.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] A number of my arguments were
15 reflected in the publication of the General Staff of Russia, which I have
16 here with me. I also have copies of two orders of the Pristina Corps
17 which I could tomorrow tender in, or even today after this session.
18 However, those are copies, those are not the original documents.
19 I could do this, bearing in mind that today I'm -- that today I'm
20 not in military service, I need time in order to have the official
21 authorities confirm the reports of our representatives in the mission.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Continue, Mr. Milosevic.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.
24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Please tell me very briefly, General Ivasov, why did the
Page 33736
1 Verification Mission leave Kosovo?
2 A. I believe that as far as the imitation [Realtime transcript read
3 in error "invitation"] of the peace-making process, and I would like to
4 outline the imitation [Realtime transcript read in error "invitation"] of
5 the peace-making process, I believe that that mission managed to fulfil
6 its tasks in that area, and it also provided a reason for the
7 implementation of the plan for the military operation against Yugoslavia.
8 That is why it was evacuated in advance prior to the commencement of the
9 aggression. Hence, the mission managed to fulfil its objectives; namely,
10 to create a cover-up and to create the reasons for aggression. It also
11 conducted its intelligence part of the mission; it managed to outline the
12 objects which could serve as targets for the assaults, and hence the
13 mission was disbanded prematurely.
14 JUDGE KWON: For the record, it is invitation of the peace-making
15 process, or imitation of the peace-making process?
16 THE INTERPRETER: Correction by the interpreter: Imitation.
17 JUDGE KWON: It should be "imitation."
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This was the creation of the reason
19 for a military operation under the cover-up of peaceful diplomatic
20 conditions. So they were creating a pretext for a military operation.
21 This was part of the overall plan of the military operation with a view to
22 shape the public opinion that the peace process is furthermore not
23 possible, and the Verification Mission fulfilled those tasks.
24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. What happened in Racak, General Ivasov? What was Racak?
Page 33737
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Page 33738
1 MR. NICE: I think it might be a good idea to establish first the
2 level of hearsay that we're going into and the nature of witness's source
3 of information.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, by this time -- yes.
5 Mr. Milosevic, by this time, you should have gathered that you have to lay
6 a foundation for these things. It is true that we accept hearsay here,
7 but you have to establish some foundation.
8 He wasn't at Racak, presumably, so how did he come by this
9 information about Racak? You have to get that from him.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the basis for acquiring
11 information on Racak was also, among other things, the Verification
12 Mission plus the Observers Mission --
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I've stopped you. We've been
14 through this before. It's a technique. You have to elicit through the
15 witness information which shows the basis for the evidence that he's going
16 to give. You're not to tell me, to tell the Court. I'm not asking you to
17 tell me, because you're not a witness. You have to ask him questions
18 which establish the foundation for the evidence that he's giving. So I
19 don't want to hear it from you. I want to hear it from the witness.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I did ask the witness what was
21 Racak according to the knowledge acquired by his Verification Mission in
22 Kosovo and other information he obtained.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, let me ask the witness. Let me ask the
24 witness.
25 Do you know anything about what happened in Racak?
Page 33739
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes or no.
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: How did you come by this information?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I obtained this information from the
6 Russian embassy, from the observers from Russia to the Kosovo Verification
7 Mission, and the substance of that information was that, firstly, the
8 official conclusion of Mr. Walker was --
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Stop. Stop. Did you speak with these observers?
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I spoke to the observers, and
11 I can name names among the leaders of the Russian observers. I spoke with
12 them two or three, maybe, days after we got the information.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Were these observers present at Racak?
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We simply had doubts about the
15 conclusions of Mr. Walker.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just answer the question. I want to find out if
17 the observers to whom you spoke were present at Racak during this event.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. They were not allowed into
19 Racak.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Then how would they have gotten the information?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They acquired information by
22 analysing combat activities in the area. And later on, we used
23 information from independent forensic experts from Finland, as well as the
24 local population who did not see police raids aimed at arresting large
25 numbers of people and did not testify that they were rallied, rounded up
Page 33740
1 into one location in order to be executed. We did not have such
2 testimony, and that's why we have doubts about Walker's conclusions.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, continue.
4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. So, according to the assessments you reached, what did Racak
6 represent?
7 A. We have information to the effect that armed skirmishes and combat
8 took place there between terrorist organisations and police and army units
9 of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. We have evidence and testimony to
10 that effect. There is, however, no evidence that they conducted arrests
11 specially. That's why we were very surprised, indeed, by the conclusions
12 of Mr. Walker, which were not based on thorough investigation and which
13 did not involve Russian expertise or participation.
14 Q. Thank you, General Ivasov. When the war operations began, from
15 that time on, what do you know about the cooperation between NATO and the
16 KLA?
17 A. We concluded that they were allies. As a result of NATO
18 airstrikes, the KLA activities intensified at the time, and coordinated
19 work was conducted. Terrorist operations were better organised and
20 intensified in the territory of the province.
21 Some representatives of the KLA acted together and in collusion
22 with intelligence units of NATO deployed in Macedonia. So there was
23 coordination and intensification of activities under the cover of
24 airstrikes and a build-up of intelligence-gathering activity. All that
25 confirmed the existence of an alliance between NATO and the KLA. The
Page 33741
1 international contacts between political representatives of the KLA with
2 the high officials of NATO confirmed this.
3 Q. I will now put to you a series of questions about your own
4 knowledge regarding the movements of population. I will read to you from
5 para 104 of this document that indicts me. It says that on the 24th of
6 March, 1999 - that's para 104 - NATO began its airstrikes. And then later
7 on, it says: "After the beginning of airstrikes, the forces of the FRY
8 and Serbia started their wide-scale and systematic campaign and forcibly
9 expelled hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians from Kosovo."
10 Thus a campaign started. You described a moment ago that in
11 collusion with NATO, KLA attacked our army and the police, whereas here it
12 is alleged that our forces stepped up the campaign to expel the civilian
13 population.
14 A. I hereby confirm that no information to the effect that the armed
15 forces or the police of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia conducted
16 actions to expel civilian population was available. I can confirm that I
17 had discussions with Albanians who had left Kosovo at the time of the
18 bombing, including some meetings that I had here three days ago with
19 representatives of the Albanian diaspora who confirmed that bombing marked
20 the beginning of panic among the population, including various ethnic
21 groups, and everybody suddenly wished to leave the area where the war was
22 being waged.
23 In Brussels, the representative of Russia confirmed that by May
24 1999, the number of refugees who had fled to Macedonia had doubled. So
25 the main source and the main cause of the exodus of refugees, which
Page 33742
1 increased relative to the previous period by three times, according to our
2 information and the information available to the High Commissioner for
3 Refugees, it reached 600.000. There was also the threat of the ground
4 operation, and people were leaving the area of war operations. That was
5 the main reason for the mass flow of refugees.
6 And I repeat that under the threat of the ground operation and the
7 airstrikes, the armed forces of Yugoslavia was conducting its own defence,
8 and that explains the movement of their armed units and troops.
9 Q. Does that mean that people were naturally anxious to leave the
10 risk zones? I suppose that you have a plausible explanation.
11 A. Yes. That was the main reason. And let me add that people were
12 leaving that place not only to go to foreign countries. They also fled to
13 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Among refugees, there were Serbs,
14 Albanians, Gypsies, both Muslims and Catholics. It was a natural reaction
15 of people who were looking for cover. And they went to Montenegro,
16 Vojvodina, Sandzak and, of course, Serbia.
17 Q. You said a moment ago something about the time line. Does it mean
18 that the exodus of refugees began precisely at the time when NATO began
19 its airstrikes on Yugoslavia and primarily on Kosovo?
20 A. Yes. Yes, I confirm that.
21 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... I'm not taking the
22 point every time, but this is a leading question and shouldn't have been
23 asked.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Rephrase the question, Mr. Milosevic. And before
25 you rephrase it, Mr. Milosevic, here again you're dealing with an
Page 33743
1 important point, and your case will obviously be strengthened considerably
2 if you bring evidence which is more direct than this witness is able to
3 give on this point.
4 If, for example, you're able to bring evidence from any of the
5 persons who lived in the risk areas to say why it was that they fled, I
6 mean that would considerably boost your case.
7 So rephrase the question so it is not leading.
8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. You heard the term "humanitarian catastrophe," Mr. Ivasov, did
10 you?
11 A. Yes, Mr. President.
12 Q. What caused this phenomenon that was later named "humanitarian
13 catastrophe"? What was the cause?
14 A. Primarily it was the threat to the lives of all the civilians
15 there. Second, it was the threat to the entire system of public utilities
16 and infrastructure. And third, it was the absence of any normal supply of
17 food and basic necessities. We also had information that members of the
18 KLA army, even before the bombing, and especially after the bombing
19 started, took their large families away from the province. And I can
20 quote the High Commissioner of the UN for Refugees who said that in June
21 1998, there was only 10 to 12.000 refugees. In March 1999, there were
22 200.000. And until the end of the bombings, the number reached 600.000.
23 So the previous conflict and clashes in the province did not cause such a
24 mass flow of refugees as the airstrikes did.
25 Speaking of the humanitarian catastrophe, the entire population,
Page 33744
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Page 33745
1 not only of Kosovo and Yugoslavia but of the neighbouring countries as
2 well, feel today that there is a real humanitarian catastrophe. Seventy
3 per cent of Kosovo's population are unemployed, 30 per cent are starving,
4 and so on and so forth. Life support systems are not working.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: I was asking what is the relevance of the
6 evidence that there is a humanitarian catastrophe today. That's not the
7 issue. Move on to something else. In any event, I think you have
8 answered the question.
9 Next question, Mr. Milosevic.
10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. If I understood you correctly, this affliction and this exodus of
12 refugees was caused by the NATO aggression. Am I right in saying that
13 that was the conclusion you made in Russia?
14 A. Yes, I confirm that. Yes. That is the official stance of the
15 Russian government and my personal conviction.
16 Q. General Ivasov, since you had very frequent contacts indeed with
17 the top echelons of the Yugoslavia military leadership, do you have any
18 information to the effect that any orders were planned or given to
19 endanger the lives of peaceful citizens in Kosovo and Metohija regarding
20 deportation, forcible transfer, or anything like that?
21 A. No, I have no such information. I have seen many orders, indeed,
22 that were issued by the Yugoslav armed forces. Moreover, the Russian side
23 exerted pressure both on the diplomatic and the military levels to prevent
24 the Yugoslav forces from overstepping the measures of necessary security.
25 And the Yugoslav officials continuously showed us their documents,
Page 33746
1 including orders given to the Pristina Corps. Such orders included points
2 saying that prior to attacks against terrorists, civilian population
3 should be warned of impending combat activities. And these orders were in
4 effect even during the airstrikes against Yugoslavia. And particularly
5 important to the mass exodus of refugees were NATO strikes on civilian
6 targets, including the columns of refugees.
7 Q. Did you perhaps have information to the effect that the military
8 leadership and I personally ordered that every crime committed there
9 should be investigated and that every perpetrator should be brought to
10 justice?
11 A. General Ojdanic, Chief of the General Staff, submitted to our
12 military leaders, including myself, orders to investigate the activities
13 of certain servicemen who went beyond the necessary measures of security
14 and overreacted emotionally in their activities against terrorists. We
15 are aware of such measures, and we know that some servicemen were
16 convicted.
17 During meetings with President Milosevic, I heard as Marshal
18 Sergeyev and Prime Minister Primakov heard, terms like impermissibility of
19 rising ethnic tensions. We constantly heard words to the effect that it
20 was necessary to restore peace to Kosovo, and we heard nothing that would
21 discredit Kosovo Albanians as such or any other ethnic group. The
22 approach to all ethnic communities was equal.
23 JUDGE KWON: General, were you aware of the paramilitaries that
24 had been operative during that time? Were they under control of the
25 military leadership or not?
Page 33747
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] For the most part, I knew the
2 military leadership in the defence ministry and the General Staff. I can
3 name Mr. Ojdanic, Perisic, Galic and others, and I knew corps commanders.
4 Of course, I saw junior officers, but I didn't know them closely.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: You haven't answered the question that the --
6 JUDGE KWON: My question is about the paramilitaries.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, certainly. We were aware of
8 that, and we monitored the activities of such leaders as Hashim Thaci and
9 others. Maybe there is -- maybe we are at cross-purposes here, I'm not
10 sure.
11 JUDGE KWON: Are you also aware of the paramilitaries on the Serb
12 side?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I understand you, Your Honour, now.
14 We checked out this information, and it was not confirmed. There were
15 occasional sporadic attempts of the Serb inhabitants in Kosovo to organise
16 self-defence units, but this was not kindly looked upon by the military
17 command, and there was no organised establishment of such paramilitary
18 structures. There were attempts, rather, of the local population to
19 protect themselves from terrorist acts and violence, but there were no
20 major large paramilitary structures, and I don't know anything of their
21 leaders, if any.
22 JUDGE KWON: Thank you, General.
23 Mr. Milosevic, proceed, please.
24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. General Ivasov, did you have any information about the crimes
Page 33748
1 committed by the KLA against peaceful citizens, not only non-Albanians but
2 Albanians as well?
3 A. Yes, we had such information. And I even have some numbers of
4 casualties on various sides. We received such numbers both from NATO and
5 from the leadership of Yugoslavia. Terrorist acts took a toll on
6 Albanians, both Catholics and Muslims, the Romas, and other ethnic
7 communities, but certainly there were more casualties among the Serbs,
8 including policemen and troops. The number of their casualties exceeded
9 all others.
10 Q. And do you know anything about the organised activity of the KLA
11 aimed at expelling civilians from Kosovo, or more specifically, sending
12 them to Macedonia and Albania?
13 A. Yes, I know about that. It was precisely the KLA that organised
14 two itineraries, two routes for refugees across the border to Macedonia.
15 That was one route, and another was to Albania. In addition to that, they
16 spread information to the effect that in European countries, refugees have
17 a good life, and that only helped the mass exodus.
18 I know that even Albanian Catholics who refused to join the KLA
19 became victims of violence or were forced to flee. We also have evidence
20 that after forced recruitment of certain men into KLA units to prevent
21 their desertion, their families were taken hostage.
22 Q. And do you know anything about civilians being used as live
23 shields in various activities in Kosovo?
24 A. Yes. We received such information from our Serb colleagues, from
25 the military attache at our embassy in Belgrade, and also from our
Page 33749
1 intelligence services. This issue was also discussed by the
2 representatives of the Yugoslav army at our joint meetings. They showed
3 us convincing documents confirming that during combat operations
4 terrorists would go into populated areas and use the local inhabitants as
5 shields. And even in their military bases they held citizens as human
6 shields. I can confirm that, yes.
7 Q. General Ivasov, do you know that there were orders issued both to
8 the army and police not to shoot even at the KLA if there was any danger
9 that civilians would be injured?
10 A. Yes. I was shown such orders at the General Staff of the Yugoslav
11 armed forces. Yes, I was shown such orders. And there was even a
12 provision in those orders that civilian population ought to be warned
13 about potential military activities. There were such orders, and this was
14 reiterated by President Milosevic during various meetings. They wanted to
15 ensure that the number of victims would be reduced to the minimum during
16 action against terrorist organisation.
17 Q. A specific question pertaining to you, General, and your work. On
18 the 22nd of December, 1998, if my information is correct, you gave a
19 statement concerning the policy that was implemented against Yugoslavia.
20 So that was on the 22nd of December, 1998. If I'm wrong, then I will not
21 press this issue. You gave a statement on behalf of the Russian military
22 leadership, top leadership.
23 A. Yes, there was such a statement. I was authorised to give an
24 official statement on behalf of the Ministry of Defence of the Russian
25 Federation. Previously I stated that by December 1998, Russian military
Page 33750
1 leadership had the full plan of the preparation and implementation of the
2 aggression against Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. Following the analysis
3 and consultations within the Ministry of Defence of Russia, we came to
4 conclusion that the aggression will take place and also what were the
5 objectives of the aggression.
6 President Yeltsin was briefed on this conclusion, and pursuant to
7 orders from the Minister of Defence Marshal Sergeyev, I issued a
8 statement, a statement to the effect that Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
9 would be broken apart, that the current regime in Yugoslavia would be
10 toppled, and that Kosovo would secede from Yugoslavia.
11 I also made a statement to the effect that after the aggression
12 NATO forces would enter the area and establish their military base there.
13 Q. Thank you, General Ivasov. Now a few words about the conference
14 in Rambouillet. You followed the conference in Rambouillet, didn't you?
15 After the first phase of the conference, did the Russian
16 Federation Ministry of Defence believe that there would be an aggression
17 carried out against Yugoslavia?
18 A. Yes. I have this information. On the one hand, we Russian
19 representatives believed that the international community in Europe would
20 prevent the escalation of the crisis and, therefore, proposed various
21 mechanisms in order to ensure that the conference in Rambouillet would
22 lead to a peaceful resolution. We were convinced that not all peaceful
23 mechanisms were used.
24 On the other hand, we also were against military operation,
25 because that threatened not only the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia but
Page 33751
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Page 33752
1 the entire system of international security. We believed that that would
2 lead to the destruction of the standards of international law and disrupt
3 the system of collective international security in Europe concerning which
4 we negotiated with various structures in Europe.
5 However, we also felt that military preparation for the aggression
6 was quite far gone. It was difficult to put an end to it. And although
7 there were many diplomats who believed that it was still possible to stop
8 it, we, the military, believed it was not possible to stop it any more
9 because all of the preparations were completed and the only remaining
10 thing that was needed was a pretext.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Milosevic, next question.
12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. In one of your statements - if I'm wrong, please correct me -
14 mentioned humanitarian reasons as a smokescreen. What were the real
15 reasons for the NATO activity against Yugoslavia?
16 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... statements or
17 reference to them in some detail, it really isn't very satisfactory to
18 have the question posed in the way it's been posed, "You mentioned
19 humanitarian reasons as a smokescreen." Either the witness can remember
20 his speech or there will be a printed copy of it or some other record, or
21 questions shouldn't be asked like that.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. There is merit in that
23 objection. Does the witness have the statement? Do you have the
24 statement at hand?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I don't have it with me.
Page 33753
1 However, I do remember that. I can confirm the conclusions of the Russian
2 military leadership to the effect that the objectives for the NATO
3 operation against Yugoslavia were complemented by the following: During
4 NATO air raids, we were able to see that the entire territory of the
5 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was turned into an exercise field for
6 testing new weapons.
7 In that territory, they tested more than 40 types of ammunition of
8 the US manufacture. The entire American military industry participated in
9 it, and I can give you some of the names of some of the types of
10 ammunitions used there.
11 Therefore, based on that, we concluded, on the 5th of May, 1999,
12 that Kosovo and the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was
13 used as a testing ground. New ammunition was used there, as well as such
14 ammunition as depleted uranium. So this is just another reason --
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Next question, Mr. Milosevic.
16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Please tell me, General Ivasov, whether at the time the organisers
18 of Rambouillet and NATO really wanted to ensure a political resolution and
19 protect innocent population, or were -- they simply wanted to provoke
20 Yugoslavia, to make Yugoslavia accept the deployment of NATO troops in
21 their territory?
22 A. Yes, I believe that that was a provocation. Should Your Honours
23 want me, I can give you the name of the Minister of a NATO country who in
24 February 1999 stated the following: He said that Mrs. Albright was
25 travelling to Rambouillet and, therefore, the likelihood of reaching an
Page 33754
1 agreement was very little. Therefore, even within NATO, there was a
2 belief that Rambouillet would not be likely to lead to a political
3 solution.
4 That same minister of defence stated that even should one side
5 agree to the terms of the US document, the other side would refuse to
6 agree because that was an ultimatum. And therefore, failure to reach an
7 agreement would be a reason for beginning the war.
8 Q. I have an impression that there is a problem with interpretation,
9 but I have a feeling that General Ivasov did not hear my question.
10 My question was whether NATO truly intended to protect innocent
11 Albanian population, as they claimed, or their purpose was to force
12 Yugoslavia to allow the entry and deployment of NATO forces in its
13 territory.
14 A. Yes, I can confirm that there was such objective to deploy NATO
15 troops in the territory of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This was
16 contained both in requests given by Mr. Holbrooke, that was also contained
17 in statements of Mr. Solana and General Clark, and that same objective was
18 present in Rambouillet; to disrupt negotiations, to blame the Serbian side
19 for everything, and to find a pretext for commencement of operation which
20 had been prepared in advance. The planes were standing ready at their
21 airports.
22 Q. General Ivasov, do you believe that during NATO aggression against
23 Yugoslavia the armed forces of Yugoslavia overstepped the bounds of
24 necessary defence?
25 A. No.
Page 33755
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's a legal question for the Chamber. Ask
2 another question.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, this witness is
4 Colonel General, who is very familiar with the action of Yugoslav army
5 during the war. Therefore, he is fully competent to evaluate whether the
6 conduct of Yugoslav army overstepped the bounds of necessary defence
7 during aggression. I don't know who would be more competent to answer
8 this question, more competent than General Ivasov.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Necessity is one of the elements which go to
10 self-defence, and that's an issue which the Chamber will have to address.
11 What you could do is ask the witness questions which relate to factual
12 situations. But I won't allow a question like that, which is an issue
13 ultimately for the Chamber.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I will reformulate my
15 question.
16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. What were the actions of the Yugoslav army at the time?
18 A. I believe that the actions of Yugoslav army were the way they had
19 to be. They carried out manoeuvres, changed their structuring in order to
20 respond both to airstrikes and ground aggression. Therefore, there could
21 have been some faults in organisation of the troops. However, the army
22 and the state are duty-bound to act in precisely that manner in order to
23 defend their state.
24 Q. Well, this might be interpreted as a leading question, so I will
25 turn to the following. General Ivasov, what do you know and what have you
Page 33756
1 heard about the concept of Greater Serbia?
2 A. Yes, Mr. President. I only heard about that from the mass media
3 of some Western countries. This issue was never heard by me in my
4 contacts with the top leadership and with the Ministry of Defence of
5 Yugoslavia. I had no evidence of any such topic being ever discussed
6 there.
7 In my contacts with NATO, that question was never raised by NATO.
8 We discussed the issue of Greater Albania. However, in our contacts with
9 NATO, we also were not able to agree on the fact that that was a realistic
10 concept, Greater Albania. Our NATO colleagues always assured us that that
11 was the concept that existed only in the heads of certain radical
12 individuals. My Russian colleagues also never received such information
13 and, therefore, I also cannot confirm that such a project ever existed.
14 Q. General Ivasov, this will be my last question. As you've said
15 yourself, you had seven meetings with me.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Please tell me, on the basis of all those meetings, can you tell
18 us, what was I mostly committed to? What was my policy? What was the
19 policy of Yugoslavia throughout that time when the meetings were held?
20 What was the main issue that you can tell us about now? Both positive
21 issues and negative ones.
22 A. Yes. I can confirm that we had seven meetings, and as I pointed
23 out, these meetings were not brief but, rather, lasted from three to six
24 hours, each of them. Therefore, we had ample opportunity to discuss
25 various aspects.
Page 33757
1 I can confirm that there was no aggressive sentiment in relation
2 to violating the rights of Albanians or oppressing them. There was no
3 discussion of repression or limiting the rights of Albanian population.
4 To the contrary. President Milosevic discussed his plans.
5 Perhaps his plans were somewhat idealistic, but they referred to
6 establishing peace in the region. These plans also entailed the
7 development in that region. He quoted documents which were adopted
8 concerning the education in the area where priority was given to the
9 education of Albanians. He spoke about the rights of Albanians to a
10 certain level of autonomy, and also said that all of these issues need to
11 be discussed in order to avoid any misunderstandings. He also spoke at
12 every meeting that the main objective of the government, at the helm of
13 which he was, was to prevent any violence in the area and to encourage
14 development.
15 He put limits on the military in their fight with terrorist
16 organisations. When NATO aggression against Yugoslavia commenced, a group
17 of Russian military experts who were not in active service at the time --
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: I stopped you, General. I think you have
19 answered -- you have answered the question.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe that the general started
21 speaking about a military operation.
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I just have one sentence. May I?
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We -- the Russian military proposed
25 to expand to repel the aggression in the territory of other states where
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Page 33759
1 NATO forces were deployed. For example, Macedonia. This is the right of
2 every state. President Milosevic refused to take such action which would
3 spread the combat to other states such as Macedonia.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Ivasov --
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I did say that that
8 was my last question but that was a mistake and I wish to put another
9 factual question just to clarify an event to ensure that we can know
10 enough about this event. I am following the translation. This is why I'm
11 pausing.
12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. General Ivasov, you were a member of the delegation which came to
14 Yugoslavia together with Chernomyrdin when, together with Atasari on
15 behalf of the G8 group, he proposed the term of armistice?
16 A. Yes, that's right. I was a member of the delegation with the
17 special representative of the Russian president, the objective of which
18 was to find a peaceful solution.
19 Q. As you probably remember, that was a proposal of G8 guaranteeing
20 Yugoslavia sovereignty and territorial integrity --
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: I am going to have to stop. I'm told that we are
22 delaying the start of the next hearing in this courtroom. That's not
23 proper.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just need one more minute to
25 conclude.
Page 33760
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, Mr. Milosevic. You will have it tomorrow
2 morning.
3 MR. NICE: And, Your Honour, can I make one point: Although it's
4 obviously likely that cross-examination will consume tomorrow morning, it
5 must be at least possible that we will reach the position of it being
6 preferable to ask the witness to go away and come back on a later date,
7 maybe with documents, and with that in mind, I would invite the accused to
8 keep his other witness ready so that he can make the best use of his time,
9 because, of course, if I land up -- if - I hope not - but if I land up
10 applying to adjourn the cross-examination of this witness, it will be on
11 the grounds that he was brought here without adequate documents to be
12 cross-examined and therefore it would be the accused's responsibility and
13 the whole day would therefore count against his allocation.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: If you make an application of that kind, we will
15 have to consider it.
16 We should not delay. We are going to adjourn.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We have a witness for tomorrow?
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, yes, we have a witness
20 for tomorrow, but as I understand, General Ivasov will continue giving
21 evidence tomorrow.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: We are going to adjourn until 9.00 tomorrow
23 morning.
24 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.56 p.m.,
25 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 24th day of
Page 33761
1 November, 2004, at 9.00 a.m.
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