1 Tuesday, 11 January 2005
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, begin the new year by calling your
7 Mr. Nice.
8 MR. NICE: May I just say two things, Your Honour. First, the
9 Court will recall that in respect of the next two witnesses, the
10 Prosecution raised as a potential argument that there should not be both
11 called, the one being duplicative of the other, and I know that the
12 Chamber has yet to announce any decision on that.
13 The second point that I'd make is that these witnesses are
14 speaking French, and in those circumstances, it will be the Prosecutor who
15 will be cross-examining them. I give notice to that effect.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice. We'll take up that question
17 later, the argument that you've raised.
18 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I call the next witness, Eve Crepin.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Is the witness journeying from France for this?
21 Will the Court Registrar seek to find out what has happened to the
23 [The witness entered court]
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak
1 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please sit.
3 WITNESS: EVE CREPIN
4 [Witness answered through interpreter]
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may proceed, Mr. Milosevic.
6 Examined by Mr. Milosevic:
7 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Ms. Crepin. Could you please tell
8 us about your professional qualifications and activities, but briefly,
9 please. Thank you.
10 A. Good morning, Mr. President. I have a diploma in nursing. It's a
11 vocation I chose. I decided to exercise this profession in the army in
12 order to intervene in humanitarian missions. The whole of my career was
13 dedicated to emergency services and reanimation services.
14 I have also other interests; i.e., literature and history. I have
15 a master's degree in modern literature and I am currently studying
16 history. I have written two books on the former Yugoslavia, and I am
17 currently preparing a paper on the Serb Republic of Krajina.
18 Q. How did it come about that you found yourself in the territory of
19 the former Yugoslavia?
20 A. I, first of all, worked with the Blue Helmets in Yugoslavia in
21 1994 in Bosnia and Sarajevo, and a second assignment the same year in
22 Krajina. I then returned on a number of occasions to Croatia and Krajina
23 in Bosnia and Kosovo as a member of a humanitarian association. I
24 committed to work with two humanitarian organisations, one entitled
25 Krajina, founded by Bucan, and the other called Teleobjectif, founded by
1 Marica Mathei. I helped the people as a nurse but I was full aware of the
2 fact that the material aid I was able to provide was totally insufficient
3 and as of 1994 onwards and throughout the year I want to clearly -- I
4 wanted to testify about what I had seen. I therefore took work for two
5 organisations, one which was a K organisation, humanitarian aid
6 organisation, one which was called Krajina, and a number of organisations
7 that were to assess the needs of the people on the ground and -- and write
8 down the statements and testimonies, which is the work I did for
9 Teleobjectif. I also worked for the representative office of the Serb
10 Republic of Krajina. I wrote, as I told you, two books about this, The
11 Serbs in Krajina, and A Testimony on Serbia, and a number of articles
13 I also conducted a number of visits with the French television
14 crew FR3, and we prepared a number of reports on Bosnia, a number of
15 information sessions. In France I took part in the Yugoslav central --
16 cultural centre in the 9th Arrondissement in Paris. I also took part in a
17 number of events in protest against the indifference which people were
18 demonstrating vis-a-vis the suffering of the Serb people, the Serbs being
19 at the time demonised. In the former Yugoslavia, I wanted to testify of a
20 number of the key moments of the war in Serbia, in Croatia and Serbia. In
21 1994 and 1995, Kosovo, before the NATO strikes in 1998, and Serbia in
23 Q. Thank you. So you were a member of the UN forces and you joined
24 up in 1994; is that right? And as far as I understand from what you have
25 said, that was not your first involvement within the frameworks of
1 UNPROFOR itself, was it?
2 A. Yes, you're quite right. I first of all conducted an assignment
3 in Bosnia in 1994 in Sarajevo. I arrived in Sarajevo just after the
4 bombing of the market square, Markale, and the commanding force of
5 UNPROFOR was under the command of General Rose. We were working with the
6 French forces, and we had to take care of sanitation questions on the
7 ground and also we were -- I was running the logistic supply of an
8 orphanage and we had to provide basic materials and they were lacking a
9 lot of these, the basic necessities. I also ensured that the patients
10 were being transported into hospitals and a number of centres, medical
11 centres, that had been set up. So I did take care of the people of
13 Q. Tell me, please, what made the greatest impression on you during
14 your stay in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
15 A. The attacks of Muslims on UNPROFOR. This had made quite an
16 impression on the military, and we knew that a lot of Blue Helmets had
17 been killed by Muslim snipers, and a lot of military in Sarajevo talked
18 about Serge Verdet and Marot that had been killed in 1992 by Muslim
19 snipers. All the military on the ground knew that these were -- this was
20 sniper fire from the Muslims, and this was covered by the media. And
21 their media deemed that the Serbs were responsible for these killings, but
22 the people on the ground, and given the ballistic expertise that had been
23 carried out, knew that these snipers were Muslim. And the same time,
24 Markale 1 marketplace was due to the Muslims calling to all the officers
25 on the ground and all the military spokesmen on the ground.
1 In the same vein, when I arrived in the BH pocket during my second
2 assignment, the Blue Helmets were quite indignated [sic] by the Muslim
3 sniper fires. In 1994, people had been killed and this had made a marked
4 impression on the soldiers.
5 Q. Tell me something about your mission now, please, within the
6 frameworks of the Blue Helmets in Krajina. Generally speaking, what were
7 your impressions during your stay in Krajina?
8 A. In 1994, I worked for the first infantry battalion in the Drina,
9 and I was running the surgical unit or part of the surgical unit. I was
10 working not so much for the French battalion. I did -- I visited a number
11 of people in their villages, and I also took part of the operating -- I
12 worked in the operating theatre in charge of anaesthetics on request of
13 Chinevic [phoen], the doctor. I also took part in all the information
14 meetings organised by UNPROFOR at that time, which meant that I was able
15 to meet a lot of French and other soldiers, and foreign soldiers that had
16 witnessed what had happened in the Medak pocket in 1993.
17 Q. Tell me, please, what do you base your knowledge on about the
18 situation in Krajina at that time?
19 A. During that time, I moved around a lot. In the whole of the Serb
20 Republic of Krajina and the BH pocket of Bosnia, Velika Kladusa with a
21 friend of Fikret Abdic. I also moved around in the whole of Croatia. I
22 met a lot of Serb refugees from Croatia, a lot of people who had run away
23 from what was happening at the hands of the Croats, and I discussed a
24 number of matters with the military, organised a lot of meetings and who
25 knew the situation in Krajina full well, they knew what was happening and
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 had a lot of information about it.
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: May I say that the manner in which the evidence
3 is being given is not very helpful to your case. This is a fact witness.
4 You must attempt to focus her on a specific fact situation and try to get
5 evidence that is relevant to your case. She's speaking fairly generally
6 about attacks by Muslims on Serbs, but there is no focus. There is no
7 specific focus. Could you attempt to focus her on some specific fact
8 situation in which she can provide evidence that is relevant to your case.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, the witness even
10 mentioned the names of some of the French members of the forces there who
11 were killed by the Muslim snipers. Therefore, I assume that that is
12 sufficiently concrete and specific. But yes, I will do my best in keeping
13 with your advice just now to focus my questions.
14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Tell me, please, what about the population? How did the
16 population of Krajina deal with the difficulties that it was faced with?
17 A. The Serbs in Krajina were terrorised. They were exhausted. They
18 were discouraged. They had been living for a number of years. They had
19 been experiencing this for a number of years. They were extremely worried
20 about the situation which had worsened over time and they really felt they
21 had been dropped by all and everyone, nobody was coming to help them. And
22 they had -- they all remembered the events of the Second World War which
23 had a play -- been extremely important to them. They talked on a daily
24 basis about the Dinac massacre which had taken place in the Dinac church,
25 and they had been massacred by the Ustasha so they were terrorised about
1 this at Glina. They were extremely worried and exhausted and really felt
2 that they had been dropped by the entire international community.
3 MR. NICE: Your Honours, can I perhaps reinforce the import of
4 what Your Honour said earlier. The witness is, I think, narrating
5 post-event rumour in a general way that simply cannot, in our respectful
6 submission, go to found any part of a judgement. She's simply saying what
7 a number of people said at a certain time, speaking historically.
8 Although there's no rule against hearsay, the Chamber really would, I
9 suspect, require something more particular than that before it could act
10 on the basis of what this witness says.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice. I have told Mr. Milosevic
12 that he needs to focus the witness on specific fact situations. It is
13 true that we admit hearsay, but if it is very far removed, then of course
14 the weight to be attached to it will be very, very minimal.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I should like to draw
16 your attention to the fact that the witness is not testifying secondhand
17 on the basis of hearsay. She is answering my question about how the
18 population experienced the difficulties, what she saw. So she is,
19 therefore, speaking about the situation, the mood that prevailed, the
20 fears that were there because she saw them personally, and they of course
21 go back to the past as well. But let me more specific and concrete in my
22 next question.
23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Tell me, please, what was it that could have intimated to the
25 population over there that a similar event such as the one that took place
1 in Glina could repeat itself? What might have given them that impression?
2 A. In 1990 Franjo Tudjman came to power and declared that Pavelic's
3 state was not due to the war but the expression of the secular aspirations
4 of the Croat people. He therefore escalated the events with a view to
5 terrorising the Serbs, and they came back to Zagreb, and they were
6 welcomed and honoured. The Ustasha were honoured. They set up militia
7 gangs in the region which were primarily populated by the Serbs, and those
8 events escalated with a view to primarily to terrorising the Serbs.
9 Q. Did you have a chance of seeing some violence towards the Serbs,
10 violent behaviour towards the Serbs yourself? Did you see it?
11 A. The Croat people in Zagreb where I went a number of times were
12 extremely aggressive vis-a-vis the Serbs. Also extremely aggressive
13 vis-a-vis the Blue Helmets who were accused of preventing the invasion of
14 Krajina. So our visits were conducted with extreme caution, and we were
15 deemed to be the enemy of the Croat people and preventing the Croats from
16 invading Krajina. So there was a degree of aggressiveness which I could
17 not understand, given the situation in Krajina where Serbs and Croats were
18 living quite happily together.
19 Q. And what kinds of attacks on the part of the Croats are you
20 talking about? What kind of attacks were they?
21 A. I'm talking about the 1992, 1993 attacks in Krajina when it was a
22 protected zone by the UN. Biljevaca Square, in June 1992, Ravni Kotor,
23 Rima [phoen] and Zenica in January 1993, and the Medak pocket in September
24 of 1993 where Serbs were tortured and executed by the Croat forces at a
25 time when this region was under UN protection. The Serbs in Krajina, of
1 course, remembered all these massacres. The military discussed this a lot
2 at their meetings, and they were hoping that their presence on the ground
3 would prevent new massacres from occurring, which was not the case, which
4 we would discover a little later.
5 Q. You worked in the hospital. Can you give us some examples to
6 illustrate the relationship between the non-Serb population in Krajina?
7 A. First of all, Serbs and Croats were working together as they had
8 been doing for a number of years and as they had been doing before the
9 war. They had changed nothing to their routine. Their mutual friendship
10 had not changed at all since the war. Everybody was working together in
11 the hospital. Everybody was working to help all peoples, whether they be
12 Serb, Croat or Muslims. All patients were taken care of in the same way,
13 in the same professional way, in the same dedication.
14 I remember one day when a pregnant woman, a Muslim woman, used or
15 was given the rest of the blood pockets or stocks that the hospital had
16 left and that was the last we had. I remember that day because the Serbs
17 clearly demonstrated that they were prepared to help all the patients
18 coming into the hospital. A lot of the Muslims from the Bihac pocket came
19 to the hospital, and all were treated in the same way. There was no
20 discrimination in any way vis-a-vis anybody.
21 Q. Which hospital are you referring to?
22 A. The Glina Hospital in Krajina.
23 Q. And how long did you work in that hospital?
24 A. I worked there for three months when I worked for the Blue
25 Helmets, and then I went back every two to three months for two weeks 'til
1 the Krajina fell in August of 1995. So I literally worked for a long time
2 in that hospital. I was living with the people there. I took part in a
3 lot of things that were happening to them on a day-to-day basis, and I was
4 really experiencing the war like they were at the time.
5 Q. Tell me, please, in view of the fact that you're talking about a
6 long experience there, do you know of any case of discrimination against
7 the non-Serb population or any case in which the Serbs from Krajina
8 expelled a Croat, for instance, or a Muslim, for instance, or anybody who
9 was not a Serb? You lived with the people over there. Can you quote any
10 example along those lines, an example of discrimination that you might
11 have encountered?
12 A. Never. Never. All what has been said about the hatred of Serbs
13 vis-a-vis non-Serbs is just a lie. I would like to state again that they
14 took care of Croats and Muslims and -- that came from the Bihac pocket in
15 the same way as the Serb patients. Everybody was treated alike. The
16 president, Milan Martic, had given very clear instructions to all police
17 officers: Any act of violence, even a small act of violence, should be
18 severely punished. So the government, the Serb government of the Republic
19 of Krajina, had stated this very clearly. There was no way this kind of
20 event could happen, and I would like to state this again. I never saw
21 anything of that kind. Even in the speeches made by Serbs, I never, never
22 saw even the slightest sign of violence, and their friendship had not been
23 tainted by the war. There were a number of mixed marriages in that
24 region, and the Serbs in Krajina had a lot of friends in the Bihac pocket
25 among the Muslim population, and nothing of that changed. We continued
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 visiting the Bihac pocket to help the friends of Serbs in Krajina and to
2 provide aid -- the aid and attention they needed.
3 Q. Tell me, please, when your mission within the Blue Helmets was
4 completed, why did you decide to go back to Krajina? You just mentioned
5 that, I believe. You completed your mission and then you went back. Why?
6 A. Yes, I did. I spent a number of months working for the Blue
7 Helmets in the Krajina region. I felt that the situation was going to
8 worsen, and the Serbs were being demonised and this was getting worse.
9 When I returned to France, the press, the media covered it in a particular
10 way, saying it was all black and white and the Serbs were in the evil
11 camp, and this is not what I had witnessed in Krajina.
12 The aggressiveness was increasing, and the Blue Helmets had
13 analysed the situation in the same way, and they thought that there would
14 be a imminent attack on the part of the Croats in the Krajina.
15 Also in 1993, a number of attacks had been conducted against the
16 Serbs even though that region was under UN protection. So they were quite
17 prepared for a fresh attack on the part of the Croats.
18 So I decided to go back in order to finish the work I'd started,
19 and I contacted -- there was no humanitarian aid organisation there, and
20 given that the events were worsening, as I have just said, I was convinced
21 that no humanitarian organisation would actually go into that region to
22 help the people, so I contacted the Krajina humanitarian organisation and
23 Teleobjectif, and it is with these people that I went back until August
24 1995. That I went back to Krajina, I mean.
25 Q. Tell me, please, what were your activities in that period of time,
1 that is to say from June 1994 until August 1995, and in what conditions
2 did you carry out these activities?
3 A. So from June 1994 to August 1995, I worked on a regular basis in
4 the Glina Hospital, in the operating theatre. I also made several visits
5 as a member of the humanitarian organisation, a hospital in Glina where
6 doctors and staff had been forced to identify the mutilated bodies that
7 had come from the Miljevac plateau. There were a lot of refugees, and I
8 was able to receive the testimony of many refugees and people who had been
9 victims of this abuse. And I made several visits over the whole territory
10 where I was able to discuss with many Serbs about the situation that
11 prevailed and had been prevailing for several years. I really lived with
12 the people there on a daily basis, and I received the testimony of many
13 people, many residents.
14 Q. And what does that testimony speak of? Everything that you saw
15 yourself too.
16 A. Well, the testimony spoke about all the abuse of the Croats in the
17 past years and told everything that people had lived before, as early as
18 1990 or 1991 regarding the refugees coming from Croatia. They had been
19 harassed, they had lost their jobs, they had been thrown out of their
20 flats, they had been forced to leave Croatia. Losing their jobs was not
21 justified in most cases. They received no benefits, no unemployment
22 benefits. They were persecuted and they were really forced to leave
23 Croatia in order never to return.
24 It is true. All the signs of the power, of Tudjman's power, were
25 there. There were all the war criminals. And also in school curriculum,
1 you had new programmes that were introduced, marked by the Ustasha
2 ideology. In Zagreb, street names were changed, like the Square of
3 Fascism became the Square of Great Croats. In the army, Ustasha ranks
4 were taken over, so there were new signs appearing on uniforms of the old
5 chessboard, which was the symbol for the Ustasha regime. All these signs
6 terrorised people because they'd lived through the Second World War, so
7 they were afraid of that reappearing, plus there was all that was done by
8 the Croat forces. Mercep had ruled in a lot of the areas where Serbs
9 lived, so this was really contributing to the terror felt by people. And
10 they were horrified by what they'd seen.
11 The doctors of the Glina Hospital were really horrified by what
12 they saw on the bodies of the people, on the corpses that were brought to
13 the hospital for identification purposes.
14 Q. How many refugees did you see in Krajina, who came from different
15 areas, that is? How many refugees were there that you saw?
16 A. I saw scores of refugees. I didn't really count them precisely,
17 but I saw scores of them. About 120.000 came to Krajina. They were not
18 all refugees, but I saw -- I didn't see them all, but I saw scores of them
19 during my visits.
20 Q. During your stay in Krajina, you were in contact with Muslim
21 refugees, weren't you? What was the attitude of the authorities and
22 citizens of Krajina like vis-a-vis the Muslim refugees? How many of them
23 were there in the first place, and what was the general attitude towards
25 A. These Muslim refugees had been thrown out of the Bihac pocket
1 during the fighting between Fikret Abdic and the 5th Bosnian Corps. They
2 were faithful to Abdic and they had been welcomed to Krajina between June
3 1994 and January 1995, and the Krajina Serbs did what they had always done
4 before; they welcomed them, and in spite of the misery they found
5 themselves in. They tried to help these people with medicine, with food,
6 and all the refugees were taken into the Glina Hospital if there was an
7 emergency for surgery or otherwise, there was around-the-clock service.
8 Bread was being served to the refugees around the clock as well, and they
9 were supported for several months without any kind of discrimination. The
10 Serbs did what they had always done before; they supported the Muslims as
11 though these had been Serbs or Croats, without any form of discrimination.
12 Q. What is your knowledge concerning the events that are usually
13 called Operation Flash?
14 A. The Operation Flash took place early May 1995 in Western Slavonia.
15 The Croat forces bombed Pakrac, Okucani and Jasenovac. The people from
16 these towns fled the area to go to Bosnia, and they were bombed as they
17 were going through Stari Gradiska bridge to go to Nova Popola, among other
18 places. They were bombed by the Croats and I met them fleeing as they
19 were fleeing the bombing.
20 These refugees had been terrorised by the bombing and by the high
21 casualties among the civilian population. And I stress this. In May
22 1995, the Western Slavonia was a UNPA, which did not prevent these people
23 from being bombed. And 5.000 Serbs had to flee through Bosnia, and this
24 did not prevent either the fact that these people, whilst they were
25 fleeing, were bombed. So everything was allowed to happen, and these
1 people had to leave their homes forever, and they were civilians.
2 Q. All right. You were among the UN protection force. How come
3 UNPROFOR did not manage to carry through its mission of protection? What
4 did you learn about this from contacts with your own colleagues, members
5 of the French forces or other forces that were within UNPROFOR?
6 A. In Western Slavonia, the Croat forces blocked the Blue Helmets in
7 their barracks, which meant that the Blue Helmets were unable to protect
8 the population. And in doing so, it was easy to carry out the ethnic
9 cleansing they had planned and to force all these people, all the
10 civilians, to leave, because the forces present on the ground were not
11 able to protect the population due to the force exerted. So the Blue
12 Helmets were unable to protect the civilians.
13 Q. What did the Blue Helmets tell you, that is to say, those that you
14 talked to?
15 A. The Blue Helmets were convinced that this was unfair towards the
16 Serbs. They knew perfectly well that all these operations had been
17 planned in higher circles. They had been organised, and all this could
18 not have been done, the bombing and all the violence could not have been
19 carried out if it had not been decided higher up. And it went on for
20 several years. So the Croat forces could not have continued the ethnic
21 cleansing of the population if it had not been decided and agreed higher
22 up. Of course with the tacit agreement of the international community,
23 which never, never reacted, never did anything.
24 Q. Tell me, where were you during Operation Storm, as it was called,
25 and what is your personal knowledge regarding that particular event?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 A. The Operation Storm took place in August 1995. It drove the
2 Krajina Serbs. I was in Banja Luka in Bosnia in order to assess
3 humanitarian needs regarding Western Slavonian refugees because there had
4 been an action in May 1995.
5 Therefore, in August 1995, Krajina was bombed for several days by
6 the Croat army, and 200.000 Serbs from Krajina were driven out. MiG 21s
7 bombed the refugees leaving the country and refugees were victims of
8 stones being thrown at them, and a thousand people died, there were
9 200.000 people driven out, and in August 1995, the AFP press agencies was
10 taking about 10.000 people who had been reported missing. It was not
11 confirmed, but that was the figure announced then. Houses were bombed,
12 property was seized, property belonging to Serbs, and the Serbs had to
13 leave towards Bosnia in the hope of finding shelter there.
14 There again, the international community failed to do anything.
15 The media did not see anything of the suffering endured by the Serbs. It
16 was absolute silence. And this did not move at all various human rights
17 associations which suddenly forgot what it meant to be a civilian
18 population being bombarded or bombed. So whilst they were protected
19 areas, this bombing, this ethnic cleansing was very quickly forgotten
20 about in the following weeks.
21 I even saw journalists claiming victory during the bombing,
22 forgetting the women, the children, the old people who had died during the
23 bombing. And the 5th Corps, the 5th Muslim Corps had used this
24 opportunity to get into the Krajina territory. Everybody was very happy
25 about this. The civilians being bombed did not move anybody.
1 Q. You were there at the time, weren't you, and you saw all of this
2 with your very own eyes.
3 A. Yes. I saw this exodus of the Serbian population with my own
4 eyes. They were on tractors, deprived of everything, in utter terror.
5 They were moving towards Bosnia. I saw the wounded coming as a result of
6 the bombing. Yes, I saw everything.
7 Q. And what did you do after the fall of Krajina in 1995?
8 A. After the fall of Krajina in 1995, I continued trying to help the
9 refugees through these humanitarian organisations I mentioned earlier on.
10 I made several visits to Bosnia, to Kosovo, and to the rest of Serbia in
11 refugee camps, in hospitals, there where they might have been evacuated.
12 As of August 1995, I went to some regions in Bosnia. I went to
13 Banja Luka, Prijedor, Derventa, Brcko, Bijeljina. In Eastern Bosnia I
14 went to Pale, Zvornik, Bratunac and Srebrenica because I was on the
15 lookout for refugees. I met church authorities and political authorities
16 who might have been able to help me assess the humanitarian needs of the
17 Serb population, of all these refugees.
18 I met with Mr. Pavle, I met with President Martic, with Karadzic,
19 with Mladic, and later on with Mrs. Plavsic and Mr. Krajisnik.
20 Q. You mentioned many towns that you were in. Tell us briefly, what
21 was the position of the population like, the population that you saw in
23 A. The Serb population in Bosnia was suffering from the war. This
24 embargo had been imposed on the area, and this could be felt in everyday
25 life. Everything was missing. Basic commodities were missing. There
1 were no hygiene products, which was a real problem for hospitals. It was
2 therefore difficult for hospitals to operate properly. They did not have
3 any pain-killers, any anaesthetics, any medicine. There was no work.
4 There was no money, basically. And the most tragic thing is that there
5 was no humanitarian aid. All these people were abandoned and they knew
6 that they were demonised. They knew that too, and they were very worried
7 about their future because they knew this demonisation was responsible for
8 the lack of humanitarian aid and that the situation was not likely to get
9 any better for them.
10 Of course, psychologically speaking, they were very hit by the war
11 as is true of any population, because most families had lost children,
12 relatives, brothers and sisters. They had been separated. Many did not
13 know anything about the fate of their relatives.
14 So it was the Serb population suffering as any population suffers
15 during the war. But that was not said by the media. That was quite
16 obvious. If you worked in the field with the population, you noticed that
17 very clearly.
18 Q. You mentioned the media a few times. Tell me, what is your
19 impression regarding the writing of the media? For example, in France or
20 the Western media in general, those that you followed. I mean their
21 attitude towards the reality that you saw with your own eyes throughout
22 this period of time.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the question that you just asked
24 is indicative of the problem with this evidence, this kind of evidence.
25 "What is your impression regarding the writing of the media?" The witness
1 is really giving impressions, and we are not particularly concerned with
2 general impressions. And so I would like you to try to focus the witness,
3 if it is possible, on something which is beyond general impressions,
4 because general impressions are not very helpful.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness mentioned that the media
6 did not attach any -- did not pay any attention whatsoever to the crimes
7 that were committed against the Serbs. And these were mass crimes at
8 that. So I asked her how this was portrayed in the media, I mean the
9 reality that she saw with her very own eyes where she lived and worked.
10 She's a humanitarian aid worker. She was on the spot, she met thousands
11 of people, she worked in hospitals, helped there; she was a participant in
12 all these events. On the other hand, she said a few minutes ago that she
13 saw that the Western media kept quiet about this.
14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. So my question is: What is the balance between the situation on
16 the ground and the writing of the media on the other hand?
17 A. These are not impressions. That was stated by the media, by the
18 press. The media were very simple. It was a black and white presentation
19 with two sides; the evil one, the Serb aggressor that had unleashed the
20 war, according to the media. And the media were very clear the Serbs did
21 not suffer from the war; there were no refugees, there were no detention
22 camps for the Serbs. And then on the other side, on the good side, you
23 had all the victims, therefore all the other ethnic groups, the Croats,
24 the Muslims. That was a very black and white presentation. And all press
25 news was saying that -- denying any suffering by the Serbs, by the
1 civilian population in refugee camps, in detention camps, denying any
2 torture, and you had populations that were the victims of these barbaric
3 Serbs that were throat-cutters and criminals.
4 So starting on this basis, the most enormous lies were propagated
5 by the press, by the media, without any people questioning it, and there
6 was utter silence as to the suffering by the Serbs.
7 Q. Tell me, did you learn anything about the fate of the Serbs who
8 found themselves in Croat prisons? If you have any such knowledge, what
9 is it?
10 A. I met families who had some of their relatives gaoled in Croat
11 prisons. There were scores of detention camps created in Croatia as early
12 as in 1991. In Western Slavonia, for instance, in October 1991 already
13 Serbs were executed. In Marino Selo and Pakracka Poljana next to Marino
14 Selo, detention camps were set up. There was Stara Ciglana in Pakracka
15 Poljana and Rivaska Poljana [phoen] in Marino Selo. In those camps,
16 hundreds of Serbs were detained, mistreated and tortured.
17 Also in the Lora camp in Split already in 1992 and until 1997,
18 thousands of Serbs were detained. Journalists, some journalists wrote a
19 lot about this prison, and some 70 people died, according to them, in the
20 camp. All the UN officials, International Red Cross, other humanitarian
21 organisations knew of those camps but nothing was done, obviously.
22 Toni Manic [phoen], who is now the president of Human Rights in
23 Dalmatia worked a lot with the Veritas organisation from Belgrade but also
24 with Vojin Babic, who did a lot about the camps, and they gave a lot of
25 evidence regarding the victims to the ICTY, with autopsy reports in order
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 to show that those camps had existed and that there were victims who were
2 mistreated in those camps.
3 I also want to stress that regarding the Lora camp, the ICTY had
4 the files, but the former guards of the camp were not prosecuted by the
5 ICTY. They were prosecuted and tried by the Croat system in Split, and
6 they were all acquitted.
7 Q. Tell me, in Krajina you saw many Serb refugees and many Muslim
8 refugees, isn't that right? Where did all these refugees come from?
9 A. Many of refugees from Croatia had been driven out as early as in
10 1990 or 1991. I told you that Serbs had been harassed, humiliated, and
11 driven out of their homes, and they suffered from the special forces of
12 the MUP, especially the forces under Tomislav Mercep. In Eastern
13 Slavonia, the Serbs had to leave their homes already in April 1991 because
14 in some villages the Croat mayors had put notice on all the Serb homes
15 saying that they had to leave within the next 48 hours without taking
16 anything with them. Those who didn't want to go away, to leave, were put
17 in gaol. And everybody, all of them suffered from such measures because
18 they had to leave their homes without any money, without any property.
19 And a lot of them went towards Krajina where there was already a majority
20 of Serbs.
21 Already during summer 1992, in Zagreb and the surrounding area, in
22 areas where there was a majority of Serbs, the Serbs had to leave and
23 sought refuge in Krajina.
24 MR. NICE: Your Honours.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
1 MR. NICE: I can't help but observe, although the point can be
2 made in cross-examination, that this is -- these are events years before
3 this witness was ever on the territory that she's speaking about, and the
4 value to the Chamber is, in our respectful submission, limited or nil.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you heard that.
6 [Trial Chamber confers]
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. Milosevic, much of this evidence I
8 don't think we will be able to attach much weight to it. The case is not
9 about Serb detention or Serb deaths unless Serb deaths or Serb detention
10 is specifically related to one of the charges. Otherwise, you open
11 yourself up to the submission that it is tu quoque evidence, which is not
12 -- which is not relevant.
13 I haven't stopped you because some of the evidence, arguably, is
14 relevant, and I want to be absolutely fair to you, but I must say that
15 much of it is bordering on not being very helpful to the Chamber. And I
16 hope that this is not an example of the way your fact witnesses will
17 testify. And much of it comes across like a conversation over a cup of
18 tea on a veranda, and I don't find it very helpful but I haven't stopped
19 you because it is related in a general way to the case, but I don't think
20 that you will derive much help from evidence of this kind. And we will
21 have to address the question raised by the Prosecutor in relation to the
22 other witness if the evidence will be of this kind.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, Mr. Nice's comment is
24 not in order, because the fact that somebody became a refugee before the
25 witness came to Krajina does not mean that the witness, once she arrived,
1 did not come across and find those refugees and was not able to establish
2 how those refugees came to be there in the first place. So she is
3 testifying not about the events that took place before, but she is
4 mentioning the causes of this phenomenon that she witnessed.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: I did not support Mr. Nice's comment. My comment
6 was quite independent of that.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I didn't hear that part. Very well.
8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. You were in Kosovo a little before the NATO bombing took place
10 there. What was the situation like during that period of time when you
11 arrived in Kosovo? Could you give us a brief description of what you
12 found when you arrived.
13 A. Yes. I was in Kosovo in 1998, where I spent a lot of time in
14 Pristina and Pec. The atmosphere there was particularly tense. As in
15 Pristina it was quite impossible for Serbs and Westerners who might have
16 been suspected of helping Serbs to move around freely. In Pec it was
17 easier to move around during the day, but at night it was not recommended
18 to move around and leave your house. So the situation was particularly
19 tense vis-a-vis the Serbs.
20 Q. And how long did you spend in Pristina and Pec? During what
21 period? When were you there?
22 A. I went to Pristina in June of 1998 where I met Popovic, the dean,
23 who strongly advised me not to go to Pec because the KLA was blocking the
24 roads and had organised war operations. In 1998 I worked a number of
25 months in the hospital of Pec. I had got to know about the situation in
1 Kosovo at that time and I wanted to help as I was a professional nurse, so
2 I contacted the Orthodox church. Their members were the only people who
3 could move about freely in the region. I met the Patriarch Pavle who gave
4 me a letter so that I could go to Pec. So I went to Pec and, given the
5 fighting at the hands of the KLA, there were a number of injured people
6 that needed to be attended to.
7 Q. Tell me, what was the situation like in the Pec hospital?
8 A. The Glina and the Pec hospital likewise, the communities were
9 working together. There were a lot of Albanian nurses and doctors in the
10 hospital. Everybody was working together, and everybody was working
11 together in the same way with the wounded, whether they be Serb or
12 Albanian. They were -- had close ties and there were no particular
13 tensions, and it was all very friendly.
14 Q. So in Pec, in the hospital there, there were doctors and nurses
15 working there who were Serbs, Albanians, and others, too. That's what you
16 yourself saw, is it; is that right?
17 A. Yes, that's quite right.
18 Q. Now, when it comes to the patients themselves, were there any
19 wounded among the patients; and if so, who were they wounded by? What did
20 you learn about that, in view of the fact that you worked there
21 throughout? What insight did you have into things like that?
22 A. There were a lot of injured people coming in and a number of Serb
23 victims who had been injured by the KLA. Injuries: They had been burnt,
24 they had had bullet wounds, and there were a number of Albanian patients.
25 These were moderate Albanians who had been beaten up by the KLA people and
1 also sometimes because they were just simply friendly with the Serbs. So
2 they had bruises, they had broken limbs, and these people had been beaten
3 up by the KLA militia.
4 Q. Tell me --
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ms. Crepin, were there any Muslim patients who
6 were victims of Serb violence?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Never. I never saw a single Muslim
8 having been injured by a Serb. The Muslims who came into the hospital had
9 been injured by the KLA militia, and the KLA militia also attacked some of
10 the Albanian civilians because they were close to the Serbs. I never saw
11 a single Muslim being attacked by a Serb. There was no hatred of Serbs
12 vis-a-vis Albanians, contrary to what has been said.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: How were you able to ascertain that the Muslim
14 patients had been attacked by the KLA?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Because that's what they said.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Since you were both in Pec and Pristina, tell me, please, what
19 about the presence of the police in those two towns, the ones you were in?
20 They're large towns after all, both Pristina and Pec. So were the police
21 there? What was the police presence like there?
22 A. What was quite striking was that in Pec and in Pristina alike, the
23 presence of the police or the military was no more important than
24 elsewhere. In Paris, for instance. If you remember the Vigie Pirate in
25 Paris, which had been set up in order to forestall terrorist attacks.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 Police presence was no greater than in Paris at that time.
2 Q. And what was your experience with regard to international
3 relations in Pec, for example? Because you spent a relatively long time
4 working in the hospital, you worked with the doctors of different ethnic
5 groups and with patients of different nationalities, so what would be your
6 impressions of the attitude and relationship between the different ethnic
7 groups in Pec?
8 A. In the hospital itself, there was no problem whatsoever between
9 the Serbs and the Albanians any more than in Glina where medical care and
10 surgical intervention protected us from that kind of thing. However, in
11 the streets and the shops of Pec, the Albanians were very aggressive
12 towards the Serbs, where the Serbs were not, conversely. And the
13 Albanians were, which was quite surprising because, according to what I
14 saw and after the number of weeks I spent there, the Albanians were living
15 in quite satisfactory conditions without suffering from any kind of
16 discrimination. They were not fired from any administrative jobs. They
17 were running most of the shops. But there was a lot of underlying
18 aggression, and when I spoke in Serb, people picked me up on that one and
19 I was told that in Kosovo one spoke Albanian and not Serb.
20 So the violence was really directed at the Serbs and they were
21 very worried about it because this materialised in a number of ways.
22 Sometimes acts of physical violence. The Serbs were living quite happily
23 with the Albanians, but Albanians were very aggressive and this was very
24 difficult to understand for the Serbs.
25 Q. In either Pec or Pristina, throughout the time you were there, did
1 you ever see any police intervention or the army intervening against the
2 Albanians, for example?
3 A. Never. I never saw any mistreatment, arrest either from the Serb
4 military or the police. I never saw mistreatment at the hand of Serbs
5 vis-a-vis the Albanians, never, during all the time of my -- during the
6 time of my stay there.
7 Q. And did you see any violence on the part of the Albanian militants
8 towards the Serbs, for instance, during your stay in Pec and in Pristina?
9 A. In the streets, one could not see any physical violence per se. I
10 could sense the aggressiveness. I saw physical violence in the hospital
11 itself when the Serbs came in and were brought in and were injured, but in
12 the street I could only sense the aggressiveness. I never actually saw an
13 act of violence in the street.
14 Q. In Kosovo and Metohija, were you able to see some refugees from
15 Krajina, for example? Did you ever see them, ones that you had previously
16 been in contact with while you were in Krajina?
17 A. Pec -- in Pec during the offensive of 1994, a refugee camp for the
18 Serbs in Krajina had been set up. I met these people, and like all the
19 other Serb refugees, they were suffered from shortage of all and
20 everything and had received no aid, had no money, and survived in these
21 refugee camps. They were often attacked by the KLA terrorists. This is
22 what they feared first and foremost. They wanted to leave Kosovo but
23 didn't have enough money and had no visas, and nobody was prepared to
24 welcome them in Europe, so they literally could not leave these refugee
25 camps where they were only struggling to survive.
1 Q. You were in Serbia during the bombing, the NATO bombing. What
2 period of time were you in Serbia actually?
3 A. I was in Serbia in March and April of 1999. During the NATO
4 bombing campaign, there were tens of thousands of bombs that fell on the
5 town. There were a lot of collateral -- there was a lot of collateral
6 damage. That's how it was coined at the time. A lot of residential areas
7 and homes were shelled and they were responsible for the deaths of
8 civilians where, in the building of Serb television, 16 television crew
9 died, and a lot of industrial sites and petrochemical -- Novi Sad,
10 Kragujevac, these industrial sites were completely destroyed and had very
11 adverse effects for the neighbouring population because the whole area as
12 a result of this is polluted. The groundwater tables, the ground,
13 everything was polluted and this has adverse effects on the population.
14 If the region -- I personally believe that this bombing campaign which was
15 decided in the name of human rights, in the name of freedom and the name
16 of democracy are war crimes and crimes against humanity. They first and
17 foremost hit or targeted civilians.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ms. Crepin, we don't need to hear that from you.
19 We'll make our own determination about the nature of the crimes.
20 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
21 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Crepin, you said you were in Pristina in June
22 1998, and when was it you stayed in Pec? Because you said you were in
23 Serbia in March 1999. So you stayed the whole period in between in Pec,
24 or can you identify the period you stayed in Pec?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was in Pristina in June of 1998,
1 and in Pec during the summer of 1998.
2 JUDGE KWON: "Summer" meaning? Could you identify the months.
3 How long did you stay there; from when until when, in Pec?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In July and August of 1998.
5 JUDGE KWON: Please proceed.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Kwon.
7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Now, you were an eyewitness of the exodus of the Serbs from
9 Krajina, and you were also an eyewitness to the exodus of the Serbs from
10 Kosovo in 1999; right?
11 A. Yes, you're quite right. Let me remind you that at this time the
12 Serbs were victims of this massive exodus in Krajina where 200.000 Serbs
13 were driven out of their homes in a few days. The second exodus in
14 Kosovo. But I'd like to remind you that the NATO bombing campaign caused
15 the exodus of approximately 1 million people. 800.000 Albanian people had
16 to flee their homes, and 200.000 Roma and Gypsies had to run away from the
17 NATO bombing. Most of them returned to Kosovo, but -- so a lot of them
18 have returned, but in total over 400.000 Serbs in Yugoslavia were driven
19 out of their homes.
20 Q. During your activities, you had contacts with non-governmental
21 organisations, I take it. Can you tell us something about your experience
22 about the activities engaged in by the non-governmental organisations.
23 Or, rather, let me be more specific: Did you come into contact with
24 Western non-governmental organisations?
25 A. No, I never met any Western NGO. Most Western NGOs worked for the
1 Croats and the Muslims. In 1992 and 1993, Medecins du Monde launched a
2 campaign against the Serbs and against you, Mr. Milosevic, where you had
3 been compared to Hitler. And Medecins du Monde then helped the Croat
4 population in Dubrovnik. Medecins sans Frontieres went to Vukovar to
5 provide relief there to the population, and I did not meet any NGO on the
6 side of the Serbs.
7 In Bosnia, likewise, the Western NGOs did not even mention the
8 suffering of the Serbs, and for obvious reasons, because they were not
9 helping them. The NGOs were only helping the Muslims and the Croats in
10 Eastern Bosnia where they provided relief to Muslim population in Gorazde
11 and Zepa, and they exaggerated the suffering of the Muslims. Not that I'm
12 saying this wasn't the case, but I'd just like to stress the fact that
13 they exaggerated this, talked about cannibalism, famine in these pockets,
14 that hospitals were overwhelmed by the number of people coming in. And
15 when we went to visit these enclaves, we realised that all and everything
16 had been said. Of course it was -- there was a war, but people were not
17 dying of hunger and the streets were not full of corpses. In the same
18 way, Medecins sans Frontieres exerted a lot of pressure, so -- for a
19 parliamentary commission to take -- to deal with the Srebrenica question.
20 In Kosovo, Medecins du Monde released witness reports or -- on the
21 number of refugees and casualties which were the way of substantiating the
22 bombing campaign, and Medecins du Monde was MSF International -- MSF
23 France was in Greece, worked in Greece but was not entitled to work with
24 MSF International because they had helped the Serbs.
25 So during this entire war, the Serbs were never helped by any
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 Western NGO of any kind.
2 Q. Very well. So not a single Western NGO, non-governmental
3 organisation, during all that suffering, came to the assistance of the
4 Serbs. Who did help the Serbs, then, from your experience?
5 A. Well, even today the Orthodox dioceses, which is humanitarian aid
6 which was run by Marica Mathei, that always helped the Serb population
7 without actually talking about it and doing as much as she could to help
8 the Serb people. As there was an embargo placed on Serbia, these people
9 did all they could to help the refugees and the injured people but it was
10 very difficult to provide relief to all and everyone because they were
11 lacking a lot of resources. So the dioceses tried to help these people as
12 best they could.
13 The Yugoslav Red Cross also helped the Serbs but did not have the
14 same resources as Medecins du Monde or Medecins sans Frontieres in the
15 Krajina which had been created by Bucan that is no longer in existence did
16 help the Serbs in Krajina for a number of years. There were a number of
17 volunteers working from them. Serbs from France and Friends were
18 providing help to these people. The International Red Cross has been
19 helping the refugees in Serbia and Montenegro since the end of the bombing
20 campaign. But in 2002 --
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm stopping you on that. I think we have heard
22 enough, and I'm not satisfied that the question as to who helped the Serbs
23 is relevant to any of the charges. So please ask another question.
24 JUDGE KWON: Ms. Crepin, you said earlier that NATO bombing caused
25 the exodus of approximately 1 million people. I expected Mr. Milosevic to
1 elaborate on that issue, but he didn't, so I'm asking -- I have to ask
2 this. What is your basis for that assertion, first in terms of number,
3 and second, the cause of the exodus?
4 Did you get the question?
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You are asking me, if I've
6 understood you correctly, what enables me to state these figures and the
7 reason for the exodus; is that right?
8 JUDGE KWON: Yes. How are you able to ascertain the cause of the
9 refugees moving out, the cause of the exodus, and what is your basis for
10 that number, 1 million people?
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as the reasons are concerned,
12 I base my assertion on the report which was drafted by the OSCE as of
13 October 1998 onwards. An observation mission, KVM, was set up in Kosovo,
14 and they left Kosovo in March 1999, a few days before the NATO bombing.
15 This is a report in two volumes which quite clearly explains that no
16 ethnic cleansing had taken place before the bombing campaign, and the
17 exodus and mistreatments started at the time of the bombing. So the
18 report is very clear on this particular point. This is the OSCE report
19 which was published at the end of 1999.
20 Now, as far as the figures I quoted, I base my assertion on all
21 the reports provided by the International Red Cross, UNHCR, and these
22 figures have not been challenged by anybody so far.
23 JUDGE KWON: So the cause, as you understand it, is sort of an
24 assumption or guess on your part? What you are saying is that because
25 there is no mention of -- I'm not sure about that, but there's no mention
1 of ethnic cleansing or the discrimination before the NATO bombing began,
2 so the cause should be the NATO bombing? Am I right in so understanding?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, not at all. I quote the OSCE
4 report. So this is not an impression or my understanding of this. I base
5 this on the OSCE report. The exodus started when the bombing started, and
6 the observation mission of the OSCE, there was no ethnic cleansing or
7 violence before. I'm just quoting the OSCE report, and I'm not
8 interpreting this in any way.
9 JUDGE KWON: That will be pursued by the Prosecutor later, I see.
10 Please proceed, Mr. Milosevic.
11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Ms. Crepin, I know that you went back to Yugoslavia after the
13 bombing, that you returned, and you mentioned members of the non-Albanian
14 minorities in Kosovo, and as a member of various humanitarian
15 organisations, did you have a personal insight into the situation of those
16 members of non-Albanian communities in Kosovo and Metohija?
17 A. Yes. You're quite right. The non-Albanian minorities in Kosovo
18 for a number of years now since the end of the bombing have been the
19 target of attacks and humiliation. Most Albanians have returned to Kosovo
20 after the bombings, but to date only 3 per cent of the minority groups or
21 members of these minority groups have returned to Kosovo. A lot have gone
22 back to see what was happening there.
23 Samir Rifati, Voice of Roma, who is in charge of the Roma refugees
24 around the world was shocked when he saw the gap that existed between what
25 he saw on the ground and what the international community was saying. The
1 international community was proud of setting up an interethnic community,
2 but the Romas were still having to leave their houses and were still being
3 attacked by the Albanians. Their homes have been destroyed, they had to
4 flee their homes, so those people that have stayed, all those who have
5 returned, are living in enclaves, receiving a small stipend from the UN,
6 and nothing has been done, neither by Munich or KFOR to protect this group
7 of people. So much for the fate of the Romas in Kosovo.
8 Q. And finally, tell me just this, please: Are you referring to the
9 Romas or do you include there the Serbs, Montenegrins, and other
10 non-Albanian communities in Kosovo and Metohija?
11 A. I talked about the Romas, but the Serbs are in exactly the same
12 situation. Since June 1999 when KFOR entered that territory, the Serbs
13 are living in fear. Since the end of the bombing and the setting up of
14 KFOR and UNMIK --
15 THE INTERPRETER: I didn't hear the figure, somebody coughed, I'm
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- thousand five hundred people were
18 injured and one million people had been abducted. Tens of thousands of
19 acts of violence vis-a-vis the Serbs, 50.000 homes have been burnt, a
20 hundred or so monasteries have been destroyed, and a lot of Albanians have
21 returned to Kosovo, attracted by the trafficking which is currently taking
22 place. UNMIK and KFOR are currently powerless vis-a-vis the situation.
23 March 1994 was -- clearly testified this absence of protection and
24 violence against in March 2004, JJP, where they say that UNMIK is not
25 responsible for not protecting the Serbs. And they also say that UNMIK is
1 responsible for the lack of protection.
2 For the time being, the Serbs are not being protected, and a few
3 Serbs are coming back to Kosovo. It's important to know that the
4 protection of Kosovo mission comprises a number of Albanians, a lot of KLA
5 members, so one can imagine how biased these people can be when it comes
6 to inter-ethnic violence. The events of March 1994 clearly demonstrated
7 that the Serbs were at the hands of the terrorists without any protection
8 provided to them whatsoever.
9 And in 2004, March 2004, I would like to also specify that in
10 Orahovac, the last of the 12 Serbs still living there - there were 10.000
11 before the war - died of hunger on the 15th of October, 2003 in the
12 hospital of Kiskovgel [phoen]. He hadn't eaten for a month. His
13 neighbours could not help him any more because they feared the violence at
14 the hands of the KLA militia.
15 This is the fate of the Serbs in Kosovo, and I fear that the
16 situation will be the same as the one in Krajina where the international
17 community will let the cleansing of the Serb population to take place
18 without anybody reacting, and nobody will speak out. It will be the same
19 situation in Krajina. In other words, the region will be totally cleansed
20 of all Serbs.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Ms. Crepin.
22 We are going to take a break now for 20 minutes.
23 Mr. Milosevic?
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I just have one more question, one
25 more question, and then I will be over -- I will have finished with
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 Ms. Crepin.
2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. So what were the reasons that you decided to come here to testify?
4 A. I first of all wanted to testify how the Serb people have been
5 unjustly treated and here their president has been unjustly treated also.
6 I would like to testify and talk about the suffering of a number of
7 people, and I hope I have done this adequately.
8 Q. Thank you, Ms. Crepin.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: We will now take a break for 20 minutes.
10 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.
11 --- On resuming at 10.57 a.m.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Madam Prosecutor.
13 Cross-examined by Ms. Del Ponte:
14 Q. [Interpretation] Ms. Crepin, on my own behalf and also for the
15 Judges' sake, I'd like to know precisely when, in which period, you were
16 in Yugoslavia, and first and foremost whether you were in Yugoslavia
17 always as a nurse.
18 Let's start with March 1994. You stayed in Yugoslavia until June
19 1994, didn't you? You were in the military hospital in Glina.
20 A. In the surgical service in Topusko.
21 Q. Yes. But if I understood you rightly, you first were in Sarajevo
22 under -- within UNPROFOR.
23 A. Yes, in February and March.
24 Q. First let me put on my headphones, because otherwise I can't hear
25 you very well.
1 So all in all, how many months did you spend?
2 A. Four months for the two missions.
3 Q. Fine. So this was officially for the United Nations?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And then you went again and very often to Yugoslavia, but then on
6 a private basis.
7 A. That's right.
8 Q. Do you remember -- I'm merely interested in the periods because I
9 have October 1994, then you returned to the Glina Hospital for a short
10 stay. What is a short stay?
11 A. I went back for about a fortnight every two or three months. I
12 stayed either two or three weeks except for the Kosovo, where I stayed
13 much longer, but otherwise I spent two or three weeks there each time.
14 Q. So that's always -- that was always in the Glina Hospital. And
15 then you also made a visit to the Topusko hospital; is that right?
16 A. No. That was as a military person. I was based in Topusko, I was
17 working in the Glina Hospital, and when I returned on a private basis and
18 no longer as a helmet to the Krajina area, I worked in the Glina Hospital.
19 Q. For two weeks?
20 A. Two or three weeks each time.
21 Q. And you were working as a?
22 A. Nurse.
23 Q. And what were you doing as a nurse? Because -- were you working
24 in the anesthetics purposes?
25 A. No, the operating theatre.
1 Q. I see. And that lasted until 1995?
2 A. Until the fall of Krajina in 1995.
3 Q. In 1995, so you also became a citizen of the Krajina Republic?
4 A. The Krajina people recognised and acknowledged my help and as
5 thanks they gave me an identity card of the Krajina.
6 Q. Did you not -- you and Dr. Barriot did you not require citizenship
7 as a token of your solidarity?
8 A. No. It was really by way of thanks. People were so surprised
9 that we were coming to help that they thought it was normal to welcome
10 them in their fold as Krajina citizens.
11 Q. And you also spent some time for the French television.
12 A. Several times.
13 Q. I see. Because I saw in the documents that we were given that you
14 had received some authorisation for which channel?
15 A. FR3.
16 Q. Not as a nurse, then.
17 A. But yes, because there were several of us and I was going there to
18 work, and once I was on this pass, I would go and see people, as I said
19 earlier on, representatives who might help us work with the refugees. And
20 by the same token, they allowed journalists to cover the situation. So
21 the main objective was to work as a nurse or to go and see the refugees,
22 and the second purpose was to go and see these people who very often gave
23 interviews to journalists. And that made it possible for journalists to
24 meet with these people.
25 Q. So they were Serb victims.
1 A. Serb victims or leaders, as I said earlier on.
2 Q. So the French television was giving reports on the real situation,
3 because before you said that Serbs were practically ignored, were not
4 considered at all, but here you are telling us the opposite. You are
5 telling us that the French television was accompanying you to film the
6 victims, the refugees.
7 A. Yes. But these recordings were not used, because the authorities,
8 television authorities, would not broadcast them, so they stayed on the
10 Q. You said four or five times, then, because you said you went
11 several times.
12 A. No, I went several times. The documents were not broadcast. In
13 the same way, I wrote a few articles for the press but there were hundreds
14 of articles that were ignored. Only a few articles were published in the
15 space of ten years whilst hundreds of them were not accepted.
16 Q. Regarding the victims, you mentioned the Serb victims. Did you
17 have an opportunity to meet with victims from other ethnic groups, from
18 Croat, Muslim victims? There were also victims among them.
19 A. I never denied that there were victims in the three ethnic groups,
20 because it was a civil war; therefore, per se, there were victims among
21 all groups. I was very well positioned to see that so because I was in
22 Sarajevo for several weeks and it's very unfortunate that all ethnic
23 groups suffered from the war. I never said the contrary. I merely said
24 that the Serbs, too, suffered. This is something nobody says.
25 Q. But if I heard you well this morning, you mainly mentioned Serb
1 victims. I didn't hear you speak about Albanian victims, for instance, in
2 Kosovo, because there were Albanian victims in Kosovo. There were victims
4 A. I mentioned Albanian wounded in the Pec hospital this morning.
5 Q. You were in Yugoslavia in 1994, and this goes until 1998.
6 A. 1999.
7 Q. So 1999 even. And you read the indictment against Mr. Milosevic.
8 Therefore, you know that regarding Croatia, mention is made of facts going
9 back to 1991 and 1992. But at that time you were not in Croatia. You
10 were not in Krajina, were you?
11 A. That's right.
12 Q. So everything you say -- because, you know, you brought us back to
13 the periods of 1991 and 1992, but that's only as a hearsay response.
14 A. Yes. That's what the refugees experienced.
15 Q. But this is not what you yourself saw as a nurse.
16 A. Yes. What I saw is the aggressive Croats, which is very right.
17 Q. That's what you say.
18 A. No, I saw it myself. I spent months in Croatia, and I can tell
19 you that I experienced this type of aggressiveness.
20 Q. You said that Milan Martic, the president, had said or written
21 that any act of violence would be severely punished. In other words,
22 there were acts of violence?
23 A. Well, this is called prevention, pre-empting. He was trying to
24 warn all police forces that if they were to commit any acts of violence,
25 they would be punished. So that was by way of prevention.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 Q. But if it is a kind of prevention or pre-empting, that means that
2 that happened, or was it just said like that?
3 A. Just -- just to warn people. It was an interethnic conflict.
4 Therefore, there was an aggressive behaviour by Croats which could have
5 triggered, quite legitimately so, some reaction by the Serbs.
6 Q. You probably remember that in May 1995, President Milan Martic
7 attacked Zagreb, that there were strikes on Zagreb.
8 A. I remember Western Slavonia in 1995. Hundreds of people died.
9 Q. No, I mentioned Zagreb.
10 A. Yes, but you don't understand Zagreb if you don't know what
11 happened in 1995 in Western Slavonia. Croat forces relentlessly bombed
12 civilian populations that were protected by the UN. There were hundreds
13 of casualties, and President Milan Martic asked the international
14 community to help. The community did not react, and therefore, in
15 desperation, there was a reaction and the bombing of Zagreb was ordered,
16 causing four or five casualties.
17 So on the one hand you have unarmed civilians that were attacked
18 in an UNPA, causing hundreds of casualties, and facing that you have a
19 desperate reaction by a president calling the international community to
20 the rescue and this call was left unanswered. Therefore, there is the
21 bombing of Zagreb, causing four or five deaths.
22 Q. Very well. From June 1994 to August 1995, you were, as you said,
23 again in the Glina Hospital. Were you there on a regular basis? Does
24 that mean that you were there all the time or only for the two or three
25 weeks you mentioned?
1 A. It was regular, because I went there regularly every two or there
2 months for two or three weeks.
3 Q. Now that's clear, because otherwise I had failed to understand.
4 The Flash and Storm operations, you were not there as an UNPROFOR
5 member but privately.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Where were you?
8 A. In Bosnia, in Banja Luka.
9 Q. You spoke about the Serb population. Do you remember what
10 happened to the other minorities that were still in Banja Luka? There
11 were still Croats and Muslims there. What happened to them?
12 A. I mainly saw the refugees leaving Western Slavonia for the Flash
13 operation and Krajina for the Storm operation. So I looked after the Serb
14 refugees that had to leave in a hurry.
15 Q. But in Banja Luka there were also Croats and Muslims that had to
17 A. In Western Slavonia.
18 Q. You were in Banja Luka.
19 A. I don't know.
20 Q. They had to leave Banja Luka because the Serbs were coming.
21 A. As I said throughout my testimony this morning, the two
22 communities, the Croats and the Muslims, were supported and helped by
23 NGOs. I looked after people who were totally left abandoned, nobody cared
25 Q. You said that nobody looked after them.
1 A. Yes. That's unfortunately so. I took care of them, and I did my
2 best to help people that nobody helped. There's no point in having ten
3 NGOs look after one group whilst there is one group left totally alone.
4 It's better to spread the help and support so everybody can be helped and
5 aided fairly.
6 Q. In August 1995, you said that you met with Mladic, Karadzic,
7 Plavsic, Krajisnik.
8 A. Starting from the fall of the Krajina area.
9 Q. Regarding Karadzic, did you maintain contact with him?
10 A. No, I didn't.
11 Q. Especially not now, I suppose.
12 A. No, that's not connected with that. I never had an opportunity to
13 meet with him again.
14 Q. Did you meet Mladic?
15 A. Yes, I did.
16 Q. Because one of the books you wrote together with Dr. Barriot,
17 which is A People is Being Murdered --
18 A. Yes, the people of Krajina.
19 Q. You left some space for Karadzic, who wrote a chapter, for Mladic,
20 who wrote a chapter of the book, for Martic who did the introduction, and
21 we were lucky enough to read it all, but in this book you wrote nothing
22 says anything as to your sources. Where do you get those -- this
23 information from, because it is a book, a comment on history, but there's
24 no footnote stating your sources.
25 A. This is a bibliography towards the end of the book.
1 Q. That's right.
2 A. Mentioning the sources.
3 Q. But there is no real mention, and I'm not going into details here.
4 A. But if you have the bibliography, you can see all the books we
6 Q. Yes. But precisely there are some points where I can't agree with
7 you. But I'm not going to delve into this.
8 In the course of your meetings with Mladic, with Karadzic, and
9 other people, this is now August 1995, did you mention Srebrenica? Did
10 you mention what happened in Srebrenica?
11 A. We talked a lot about the refugees, and together with Patrick
12 Barriot, they talked indeed about Srebrenica.
13 Q. Because I was somewhat amazed to note that there is no mention
14 whatsoever of Srebrenica whilst that, Srebrenica, is one of the most
15 serious, most egregious acts. Did you mention this with Mladic?
16 A. Yes, we talked a little about it.
17 Q. A little? 8.000 Muslims?
18 A. There is no evidence of that and so far investigators, in ten
19 years' time, in their reports mention 2.500 bodies that were exhumed. So
20 there's no evidence so far so I can't tell you anything about something
21 that has not been tried yet.
22 Q. I didn't want to really discuss Srebrenica with you. I just
23 wanted to know from you whether you spoke about Srebrenica with the people
24 you met, with Karadzic and Mladic. Do you think that they are heroes?
25 A. You mean heroes?
1 Q. Yes.
2 A. I think that they're people who looked after their people and made
3 sure that that population could stay alive in the face of an aggressor who
4 was doing everything to eradicate them and in the face of an international
5 community that was trying its level best to worsen the conflict prevailing
6 in the former Yugoslavia. I think that these people looked after their
7 population. They did their best to protect their people.
8 Q. And do you know that we hold them as criminals and that they're
9 being indicted?
10 A. Yes, I do.
11 Q. Do you also know that in the Flash and Storm operations other
12 people were indicted who were non-Serbs?
13 A. Well, Tudjman died without being indicted.
14 Q. I don't want to give names here.
15 A. I know that all the people who are responsible were not indicted.
16 Tomislav Mercep was even elected in Eastern Slavonia, I believe.
17 Q. I prefer not to mention names. I'm just telling you right now
18 that people who are responsible for the Flash and Storm operations were
20 Now, let's talk about Kosovo. How long you were in Kosovo?
21 A. I spent June 1998.
22 Q. In Pristina.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. As a nurse?
25 A. Yes.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 Q. Where did you work as a nurse?
2 A. I'm a nurse and I was a member of the steering group for the
3 Krajina Serbs. I paid a first visit in the hope that I will be able to go
4 to Pec as a nurse, and as I explained this morning, I -- it was not
5 possible because the dean, Popovic, said I shouldn't go because the KLA
6 fighting and the blocking of roads. So I couldn't go to Pec as a nurse.
7 And then I was in Pec in July and August 1998, where I worked as a nurse.
8 Q. So if you worked as a nurse, you were working in a hospital?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. In which hospital?
11 A. In the Pec hospital.
12 Q. There's only one?
13 A. I don't know. Well, I was in Pec, but I don't know how many
14 hospitals there are.
15 Q. Yes, in the Pec hospital. You speak about the exodus of Serbs.
16 Were you able to see that there was an exodus of other ethnic groups or
17 communities from Kosovo?
18 A. I was in Serbia during the bombing campaign, but during the
19 bombing campaign, the Albanians fled from Kosovo, as did the Roma, the
20 Gypsies, the Serbs. The NATO bombing caused the exodus of all groups in
21 the population, sparing nobody. And among the casualties you can find
22 Albanians, Serbs. There are convoys or columns of Albanians who were
23 bombed because they sought refuge. There were a hundred thousand
24 Albanians who were taken in by Serbia. And Serbia is the only
25 multi-ethnic country to have welcomed Albanians. Unfortunately, Albanian
1 convoys were targeted as were Serb convoys.
2 Q. So there was no discrimination?
3 A. Yes, there was no discrimination by the NATO bombing. There is no
4 difference when you bomb from 5.000 metres high up in the sky.
5 Q. I'd like to ask you this: Did you also go to camps, to refugee
6 camps where there were not only Serbs, because there were refugee camps of
7 other ethnic groups? What I'm trying to hear from you is whether you were
8 truly independent or whether you were only concerned about the situation
9 where Serbs were regarded as victims.
10 A. Forty thousand Muslims were taken in the Krajina.
11 Q. You went to visit them?
12 A. Yes. Well, I risked my life, madam, for the Muslims in Sarajevo.
13 I helped an armoured convoy of the population. There were Serbs and
14 Muslims all together. So I risked my life for those people.
15 Q. Did you go to camps where there were Croats?
16 A. No, I didn't, but I risked my life during those missions for Serbs
17 and Muslims alike. I was in the field.
18 Q. Nobody doubts that.
19 A. Yes, but I wanted to say it. I experienced it, and I took risks,
20 and I did not mind my own life in order to save other people or to help
21 them, whether they be Muslims or Croats.
22 Q. Well, that's what I wanted to know from you. I wanted to know
23 whether you were only focused on the Serb victims. There are or there
24 were victims in all camps.
25 A. I'm a humanitarian person before all, and there's no politics in
2 MS. DEL PONTE: [Interpretation] Mr. President, Your Honours , this
3 is an exhibit in the file of this case. I just want to mention in page 6
4 -- it is Exhibit 145. I just want to quote one single sentence. I could
5 quote several --
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Madam Prosecutor, what is the document?
7 MS. DEL PONTE: It's the report, OSCE. The report OSCE, Exhibit
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Under Orders. Yes, proceed.
10 MS. DEL PONTE: Page 6. Page 6.
11 Q. I quote: "Deliberate and unlawful killings of civilians,
12 extrajudicial executions were a key part of the cleansing campaign.
13 Throughout the province civilians who were clearly non-combatants,
14 including women and some children, were murdered by Serbian police,
15 Yugoslav army soldiers, and associated paramilitary forces in
16 execution-style killings."
17 [Interpretation] I just quoted this one sentence to challenge what
18 you just said regarding the OSCE report. Of course, you said something,
19 and I quote the report, so this is the reason why I'm telling you that the
20 OSCE report is very different from the conclusion you draw from the
22 A. This sentence doesn't specify when the acts were committed.
23 Q. Quite --
24 JUDGE KWON: Madam Prosecutor, is that an OSCE report or the Human
25 Rights Watch "Under Orders"? Is it not written by Human Rights Watch?
1 MS. DEL PONTE: I hope it is the -- no, it's Human Rights Watch.
2 I'm sorry. OSCE. I have in my hands the OSCE report, but it was the
3 Human Rights Watch report, I'm sorry. It had been passed on to me as
4 though it was the OSCE report. I'm sorry.
5 I have another report, and this time I hope it is the OSCE
6 report. It is, yes. [In English] October 1999. [Interpretation] But of
7 course I did not have time to look into it.
8 Q. I have another question for you, Ms. Crepin. You were in touch
9 with authorities. Who did you have contact with? Which were the national
10 authorities you were in contact with?
11 A. Milan Martic, the president of Krajina; Mr. Karadzic; General
12 Ratko Mladic.
13 Q. Yes, you said so. But under which -- what circumstances?
14 A. When we made trips trying to find refugees to see how they were
15 looked after, whether they were looked after or not, what they needed.
16 And we were also during Vidovdan Day in 1995 together with Karadzic and
17 Mladic because we happened to be there and we were invited. You know,
18 there were so few people helping the Serbs, and the former Yugoslavia
19 being a very small country, it was a matter of fact that we were invited
20 to certain events.
21 Q. Well, you spoke about -- you spoke about politics, of course.
22 A. Yes, about politics, about the situation of refugees, about the
23 fact that France has abandoned the Serbs. We mentioned all that. There
24 was also the regret that French would no longer help the suffering Serbs.
25 Q. Yes, we mentioned all that. So your experience is one, as you
1 stated earlier on, that prompted you to ask to be a witness in the
2 Milosevic case?
3 A. Yes. My testimony was very important to me, because I wanted at
4 long last to voice the suffering by the Serbs. And I promised all these
5 people to testify to their suffering, and this was an opportunity for me
6 to say what happened really on the ground.
7 Q. Very well. So you want to testify to the suffering by the Serbs.
8 A. Yes, absolutely.
9 Q. But you are not in a position to testify as to the guilt or
10 innocence of Mr. Milosevic.
11 A. I'm testifying to say what I really saw on the ground in Krajina,
12 in Kosovo, about the NATO bombing campaign, about what I was able to see.
13 Q. I have another OSCE report, Exhibit 106.
14 MS. DEL PONTE: And it is again page 6, Mr. President. There is
15 one paragraph of page 6 dealing with, but I didn't have time to read it,
16 [In English] "special security forces in January 1998." [Interpretation]
17 They reacted to the KLA attacks, and they arrested people. I'm not going
18 to read this out. I just wanted to quote this paragraph to be found in
19 page 6 - it is the second paragraph of this OSCE report - just to mention
20 the fact that this is different from the conclusions drawn by the witness.
21 I have no further questions. Thank you very much.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Madam Prosecutor.
23 Any re-examination, Mr. Milosevic?
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Ms. Crepin, just one simple question. Prior to
25 1993, had you been to Serbia?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Never.
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Ms. Crepin, that concludes your evidence, and you
3 may leave.
4 [The witness withdrew]
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, we have considered your submission
6 about the next witness. We're of the view that we'll have to hear the
7 evidence. If during the course of the witness's testimony anything arises
8 that you wish to comment on, then of course you may do so.
9 Mr. Milosevic, your next witness.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Patrick Barriot.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: I understand the next witness was scheduled to be
12 here at 11.45, so we're running ahead of time. So we'll take the break
13 now for 20 minutes and then return.
14 --- Recess taken at 11.29 a.m.
15 --- On resuming at 12.01 p.m.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak
18 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please sit.
20 WITNESS: PATRICK BARRIOT
21 [Witness answered through interpreter]
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
23 Examined by Mr. Milosevic:
24 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Barriot.
25 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Thank you. Just briefly, could you tell us something about your
3 professional career, your CV.
4 A. Good day to you, Mr. President. My name is Patrick Barriot, I'm a
5 colonel in the French army. That's my rank. I'm a doctor, and I'm a
6 specialist in emergency services and emergency toxicological diseases.
7 I've been working for 25 years in the French army and I'm also an
8 anaesthetist. I have been working for the French Fire Brigade, the 11th
9 Paratrooper Division, civil intervention unit, and a surgical mobile unit
10 in the former Yugoslavia.
11 When I left the army, I was the head doctor of the civil security
12 unit and in charge of intervention operations and advisor to the prefect
13 and in charge of Civil Defence, and I was working for the minister of
14 defence and I held the rank of colonel. When I left the army in 1998, I
15 was appointed expert on hospital matters, and I'm also a lecturer in a
16 number of medical facilities, institutes and a number of schools in France
17 or universities. I'm part of a number of association of scientists. I've
18 written ten or so books on emergency medical care, and I have written a
19 hundred or so articles that have been published in international reviews
20 and the international journal of medicine. I'm also an expert on any
21 matters relating to non-conventional armament systems and terrorism.
22 I therefore have speciality in civil security and civil protection
23 area. As I told you, I was the head doctor of the civil security in the
24 French armed forces. I also attended the training course of the UNHCR to
25 become an expert on emergency situation in Lausanne, and I was also in
1 charge at that time of the coordination of Aid Relief, a non-governmental
3 In the emergency units I'm also an expert on unconventional arms.
4 I have been involved in a number of military conflicts in the Middle East,
5 in Africa, in a number of countries in the world. I've just written a
6 book on massive destruction arms with a preface by Pierre-Marie Gallois,
7 who is the leader in the nuclear deterrence programme.
8 In 1986 I took part in the RER protection, the terrorist attack,
9 in 1995 in particular, the attack on the B Line of the Paris underground,
10 the Saint Michel underground station. I was part of an expert group of
11 civil security group in France that went to Tokyo at the time of the
12 attack on -- the gas attack in the underground in Tokyo, and I'm also a
13 member of a number of research groups working on risk assessment and
14 terrorist risk assessment. More specifically, bioterrorist programme and
15 response provided, which is funded by a strategic research group Centre
17 I would like to finish off by saying that I've never been indicted
18 nor suspected of anything. I am -- have the title of Order of the Merit,
19 and I have received four medals from the prefect of the French police and
20 three letters from the Ministry of Defence of the armed forces and
21 Ministry of Cooperation for operations undertaken abroad with a view to
22 protecting the civilian population.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: For what did you receive the title of Order of
24 Merit, and from whom?
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I received the national Order of
1 Merit, assigned by President Francois Mitterand for those actions
2 undertaken abroad in Albania, in Kurdistan, the Iraqi part of Kurdistan
3 and other regions in the world.
4 I'm 49, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: And you had your medical degree before you went
6 into the army?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes -- no. I became a doctor when I
8 joined the army. I joined the army when I was 18, so I conducted my
9 medical studies whilst I was in the army.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Milosevic, yes.
11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Dr. Barriot, tell us briefly what experience you have with respect
13 to the conflicts on the territory of the former Yugoslavia or, rather,
14 where were you in the former Yugoslavia?
15 A. Yes. I shall briefly underline this in three parts. So as far as
16 Croatia is concerned, I was a Blue Helmet in the former Yugoslavia, in
17 Krajina more specifically, in Topusko, close to Glina, in the southern
18 sector of UNPROFOR for a number of months. I moved around to -- I went to
19 Banja Luka, Northern Dalmatia, and also I moved around the rest of
20 Croatia. I went to Zagreb, and I went to the Bihac pocket, Velika
21 Kladusa, more specifically, because that was very close to Glina and
23 I then, in the years 1994, 1995, went back to Krajina, working
24 there for two humanitarian aid organisations, more specifically
25 Humanitaire Krajina, which was created by Bucan, and Teleobjectif, the
1 humanitarian aid organisation which was created by Marica Mathei. And I
2 was present in the region at the time of the Storm and Flash operations
3 launched by the Croat forces.
4 I was, in 1995, appointed by Milan Martic official representative
5 of the Serb Republic of Krajina in Paris. I wrote a book entitled The
6 Murder of a People, the Serbs in Krajina. This book was prefaced by the
7 President Milan Martic, who also wrote an entire chapter on the history of
9 In addition, I went on assignments with the French television crew
10 FR3, Christian de Garnet [phoen], Mourad Tabouche, who wanted to conduct
11 interviews of Milan Martic. So I enabled them to organise these
12 interviews. In addition, I wrote ten or so articles on the history of
14 So much for Croatia. As far as Bosnia is concerned, I went many
15 times to Bosnia in 1994 and 1995. On the one hand as a representative of
16 the Serb Republic of Krajina, I was in charge of assessing the needs of
17 the refugees there. I met Radovan Karadzic several times. I also met
18 other key personalities like Ratko Mladic whom I met on several occasions
19 in 1995.
20 I wrote a number of testimonies during those years at the -- The
21 Devils Are Let Loose, which is published at L'Age d'Homme and another
22 testimony on Serbia which was also published by the publishing house L'Age
23 d'Homme, A Murder of a Nation, a Murder of a People, the Serbs in Krajina.
24 I published a paper by Radovan Karadzic and a paper by General Ratko
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 So I enabled a television crew, FR3, a French television channel,
2 to conduct interviews of Radovan Karadzic and General Ratko Mladic,
3 particularly an interview which took place in September of 1995 and which
4 was broadcast in France at the beginning of October 1995.
5 Now, as far as the third part is concerned, Kosovo and Serbia, I
6 was in Kosovo in 1998, in the summer of 1998, where I visited Kosovo and I
7 moved around from the north to the south of the Kosovo. I also went to
8 Serbia. I went to Belgrade, in the Belgrade area, and during the NATO
9 strikes, March and April of 1999.
10 So I was in the former Yugoslavia, in Croatia, in Bosnia, in
11 Kosovo, and in Serbia at crucial times, at moments -- at a moment when
12 these very important events were unfolding and -- between that time until
14 Q. What were your motives for coming here to testify today?
15 A. Well, my motivation is largely due to this large gap I noticed
16 between what was happening on the ground. I was a member of the military,
17 I was a member of humanitarian aid organisation, I was a representative of
18 the Serb government in Krajina. And I realised that there was this huge
19 gap between what was happening on the ground and what the media was
20 broadcasting or talking about, and the press, the print press. So I would
21 like to testify about this. I felt that greater injustice had been done
22 to the Serb people, and I wanted to testify about what the Serb
23 experienced during this war. This suffering has been overlooked entirely
24 and I have come to testify in the name of the Serb people because I feel
25 that it is the Serb people, and I say it with a great deal of emotion, I
1 would like to talk about what I have seen, what I have heard throughout
2 this period of time.
3 I would like to say that I do not belong to any political party,
4 whether it be in France or abroad. I would like to make this clear,
5 because very often members of the military who have sided with the Serbs
6 have been accused of belonging to extremist groups. Rene Bachelet, in
7 December 1995, took pity on the Serbs in Sarajevo, in the Tivica areas,
8 Kravica and Vogosca, and he said that he had to choose between luggage and
9 a coffin, and he was accused of having sided with Serb extremists.
10 I'd like to say that overall the French extreme right is much
11 closer to the Croats than it is to the Serbs. And Ante Gotovina has many
12 more friends --
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: You've answered the question about your
14 motivation. Next question.
15 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Barriot, while you were in the Balkans, were you
16 always accompanied by Ms. Crepin?
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In most cases, yes, we were
18 together. I can't say that we were always together, but we were more
19 often than not together.
20 JUDGE KWON: And if you could tell me what a representative of the
21 Serbian Krajina is. I heard the same thing from Ms. Crepin as well. So
22 both of you are representatives of that entity, and what were you doing in
23 that capacity in France?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, in my capacity as
25 representative of the Serbian Krajina, I undertook a number of things. I
1 tried to get the attention of the media. This was one of our primary
2 objectives. This is the objective outlined by President Milan Martic. It
3 was important that the media understand what the situation actually was on
4 the ground and the Serbs in Krajina and Croatia were suffering. And this
5 had been -- as this had been totally overlooked by the media. So to begin
6 with it was a matter of clearly explaining the situation on the ground and
7 to make sure that a clear picture was provided because it was not in the
8 press at the time.
9 The second objective was of a humanitarian nature. We had to
10 coordinate aid relief, because nobody was interested in the Serbs of
11 Krajina. Nobody came to help them. They were -- had been provided with
12 no outside help. It was for us to assess their needs and, if possible,
13 provide some aid relief, some basic commodities and some medication and
14 medical supplies.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Who appointed you a representative of the
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] President Milan Martic. And I think
18 I indicated in the documents the official letter signed by President Milan
19 Martic. These are part of the documents I provided to the Tribunal which
20 I can give you if you so wish.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Where is that in the documents, Mr. Milosevic,
22 the letter of appointment?
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm trying to find it. Yes, here it
24 is. It's tab 4. Tab 4. Decision signed by President Milan Martic, "[In
25 English] Opening of representative office of the Republic of Serbian
1 Krajina in Paris."
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: At that time you were still a member of the --
3 you had a post in the army at that time?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I did. I was a senior officer
5 in the French army, and I was nevertheless appointed by President Martic
6 to represent the Serbian Republic of Krajina. This was indicated in an
7 Agence France Presse dispatch. Mate Granic, as a result of it, was
8 extremely angry. He was the Croat minister of foreign affairs, and he --
9 he filed a complaint officially. I was insulted in the Vjesnik newspaper
10 that called me a fascist for having been appointed a representative. They
11 stated in any case that the Serbian Republic of Krajina did not exist.
12 But as far as I'm concerned, it did exist and does still exist.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: No question arose of a possible conflict between
14 your being in the French army and being a representative of the Krajina?
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, a conflict arose at that time.
16 The -- my commanders asked me to refuse this. They said that I had been
17 manipulated by the Serb authorities, but this was not the case at all. So
18 I refused to take that back, and I refused to sign that document, because
19 I was doing it knowing full well what I was doing. And that is why I left
20 the army shortly afterwards. But if I had accepted to take that back, I
21 would have still held my rank, but I did not want to do this because I
22 wanted to be honoured by this nomination.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Did you describe all the difficulties that you encountered when
1 stating your views about the situation in Yugoslavia? Did you have any
2 other complications or difficulties?
3 A. Yes. I would like to emphasise that -- the fact that all other
4 people who wanted to interpret this conflict different ways or express
5 what they had seen on the ground was in contradiction with what the media
6 was saying and stating at the time. Admittedly, the military were in the
7 forefront and have applied these repressive measures over other issues
8 that came up, of course. Our telephones were tapped and I received a
9 number of death threats. But I was not the only person to be in that
10 situation, because all the military who tried to understand what was
11 actually happening on the ground, and whenever they tried to establish a
12 closer contacts with the Serbs -- Sir Michael Rose, for instance, his
13 telephone conversations were also tapped because there was -- all the
14 contacts he tried to establish with the Serbs had been obstructed. I also
15 mentioned the case of Jean-Rene Bachelet, who was insulted for having
16 defended the Serbs in certain areas of Sarajevo in 1995.
17 So in general terms, all the French military or military of other
18 countries who tried to explain what they actually saw on the ground were
19 asked to hold their tongues, and sometimes in a rather violent manner.
20 But this applied not only to the military but also applied to diplomats.
21 When the Storm operation was launched and Mr. Carl Bildt said the
22 Knin massacre was extremely -- extremely serious offence that could lead
23 to the indictment of Tudjman, Zagreb and Washington told him to hold his
24 tongue. When criticism was levelled at UNMIK, Mr. Kouchner, what he was
25 doing with Kosovo, he was told to be quiet. Mr. Bisbier [phoen] told him
12 Blank page inserted to ensure the pagination between the English and
13 French transcripts correspond
1 to shut up, which was a rather language used by rogues. Nevertheless,
2 every time somebody tried to provide a different view of the situation, a
3 view which was objective and which was in line with what was happening on
4 the ground, were told to hold their tongues.
5 The case of Mr. Regis Debre, for instance, a French intellectual
6 who was called a revisionist, or a journalist like Jacques Merlinot who
7 lost his job, just about, for having talked about what he saw.
8 So I'd like to stress this, and I'm very happy to be able to
9 express myself freely on this count because this is something quite
10 unusual, and we have always been asked to hold our tongues when we wanted
11 to speak out the truth and describe what was actually happening on the
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, you can express yourself freely, but
15 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I hope, Mr. Robinson, that
17 what the witness said a moment ago is quite relevant, I would say.
18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. Mr. Barriot, in view of the fact that we see that you were a
20 high-ranking officer of the French army, frequently abroad on missions, I
21 would like to ask you the following question: Did you have any links with
22 the French intelligence services?
23 A. Yes. I was in close contact with the French intelligence services
24 largely due to the fact that the job I had in 1994, I was the head doctor
25 of civil security and moving about all the time abroad in very sensitive
1 areas. I was in touch with the DGSE agents, the external security units
2 which are the equivalent of the Military Intelligence Services in France.
3 As of 1995 onwards, I was also in touch with DST agents, Direction
4 de la Surete du Territoire, which is the equivalent of civil intelligence
5 services in France. And I would like to specify how this happened.
6 At the end of 1995, as I was in Pale, in the presence of
7 Mr. Mourad Ay Tabouche, who was the TV French reporter, I was accosted by
8 Mr. Jugoslav Petrusic, also known under the nickname of Dominik.
9 Mr. Jugoslav Petrusic came up to me and quite clearly knew me well, or at
10 least knew a lot about my personal life and my professional life, and he
11 told me he was working with the French DST, the Direction de la Surete du
12 Territoire, and gave me the names -- gave me the name and number of his
13 employer, in other words, his boss at the DST.
14 He also stated that there had been plans to do away with me and
15 that a contract had been signed to that effect, and to liquidate me. So
16 at that time, the French reporter was present, and he can confirm this --
17 this is important, because it's the first time that Mr. Rene Tabouche met
18 with Jugoslav Petrusic. I mention this because it is important for the
19 following events. Mr. Tabouche conducted reports in Bosnia thanks to
20 Mr. Jugoslav Petrusic, with the help of this gentleman.
21 Q. Tell me, please, do you know anything about the freeing of the
22 French pilots in 1995?
23 A. Yes. This is a sensitive issue and an important one. And
24 Mr. Jugoslav Petrusic played an important part in this release. I'd like
25 to say that Tabouche made a report on the liberation of the French pilots
1 in 1995, and it so happens that this report was censored by the French
2 authorities because in this report you see that an important sum of money
3 which was to be used as a ransom - I would like to state that the Serb
4 authorities had not ransomed anybody - but they stated in this report that
5 the large sum of money had been embezzled by French politicians on this
7 Let me explain. Pilots were held by the Serbs in Bosnia. They
8 were held prisoner. The French DST, in November of 1995, sent two
9 negotiating teams to ensure the release of these two pilots. What I am
10 about to say is very important. The first negotiating group was headed by
11 Raymond Martre [phoen] and Pierre-Marie Gallois was to head this
12 negotiating team. Pierre-Marie Gallois went to Bosnia where he met
13 General Ratko Mladic on the 17th of November, 1995. When he came back to
14 Paris, General Pierre-Marie Gallois described his mission and said that
15 General Mladic had not asked for any ransom. All he wanted was a
16 handshake with the Chief of Staff, General Dwynne [phoen] of the French
17 armed forces in exchange of the release of the prisoners.
18 Strangely enough, a second negotiating team was sent there a few
19 days later. Jean-Charles Marchiani was academie de marquois [phoen] in
20 charge of this. They -- these two people met General Mladic on the 25th
21 of November, 1995; i.e., eight days after the first meeting with
22 Pierre-Marie Gallois, and back in France they said that General Mladic
23 doesn't mind freeing the pilots but in exchange of a ransom of a couple of
24 thousand euros.
25 So at the end of the day, our French pilots were released on the
1 12th of December, 1995, after General Mladic had shook hands with the
2 Chief of Staff of the French air force. But I would like to state that
3 General Mladic did not receive a single cent and --
4 MR. NICE: I'm sorry to interrupt. I perhaps ought to have
5 interrupted earlier. I know that this evidence is likely to feature
6 within the case, and it may be from the accused's list of witnesses there
7 is another witness who has direct evidence on it, but it's not clear to
8 me, it may be my mistake, whether this witness is relating his own
9 personal knowledge or if he's relating an account from someone else. And
10 it may be helpful to the Chamber before we move any further on this topic
11 to find out what his source of knowledge of all this is, because I'm not
12 entirely clear myself.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Did you lead evidence about this?
14 MR. NICE: There's evidence before you about the French pilots,
15 and their history is not unimportant. It's not particularly important,
16 but it's not totally unimportant. You will recall it was first mentioned,
17 I think, by Lilic, but -- perhaps not first by certainly mentioned by him.
18 The way it integrates in the case as a whole is somewhat complicated and I
19 certainly don't want to go into it now, but it would be helpful to know
20 whether this is first, second, or third-hand evidence.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Barriot. Mr. Barriot -- are you hearing me?
22 Mr. Barriot, I'm asking you, the information that you have given, how did
23 you get it?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, the information I've just
25 conveyed was given to me directly by various sources, be they French
1 intelligence services or Pierre-Marie Gallois, or Mr. Jugoslav Petrusic
2 whom I met personally on several occasions, or yet Mr. Mourad Ay Tabouche.
3 So I didn't quite understand the reservations expressed by Mr. Nice. I
4 think this is a very important problem, because I think it shows once
5 again the way information is manipulated and the way in which the honour
6 of General Mladic was tarnished by saying that he asked for a ransom
7 whilst he never asked anything of the kind. And I want to stress once
8 again that the report by Mr. Tabouche was censored by the French
9 authorities, not without reason. So I think that we are in the very heart
10 of the matter, and this is a major problem.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...
12 Mr. Milosevic.
13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Did you remain in touch with Jugoslav Petrusic?
15 A. I met Mr. Petrusic some months ago. He lives in Paris, and he
16 told me that he had been interviewed at length by ICTY people. So I met
17 him. He came to see me following a public meeting in which we spoke about
18 Serbia. He came up to me and again he talked for a long time on this
19 report regarding the release of the French pilots which he had done with
20 Mr. Tabouche. He gave me his mobile number and his other telephone
21 number, asking him -- asking me to call him again, which I did not do. I
22 did not get in touch with him since.
23 Q. Very well. Let's move on. I'll try to deal very efficiently with
24 a host of issues. You said yourself that you headed the medical sector of
25 civilian security and you are now a member of this government expert group
1 that is charged with trying to see whether there would be any terrorist
2 attacks launched against France. So I imagine this is a subject that is
3 close to you.
4 A. Yes, Mr. President.
5 Q. Now, bearing that in mind, owing to the fact that you spent a long
6 time in the territory of the former Yugoslavia, you learned a lot about
7 what happened there. Do you know anything about the presence and activity
8 of any terrorist groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
9 A. Yes, of course. As early as in 1994, the Western intelligence
10 services, even though they underestimated the threat, were perfectly aware
11 that there were in Bosnia terrorist groups connected to the GIA from
12 Algeria and also connected with al Qaeda.
13 MR. NICE: Your Honours, can I again respectfully suggest that
14 before we allow this evidence in, even subject to whether it's relevant,
15 we establish what his source of knowledge is. The Chamber will recall
16 that with witnesses who have sought to rely on intelligence material that
17 they were not then in a position or willing to disclose, the evidence was
18 sometimes blocked before it was given or indicated as evidence that
19 couldn't be accepted.
20 Now, I'm not sure if this witness is speaking --
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Or of very little value.
22 MR. NICE: Or of very little value. I'm not sure whether this
23 witness is speaking from his own knowledge or whether he's speaking of
24 rumour or whether he's going to say that he had direct access to some
25 intelligence, and if so, if he's going to identify the intelligence and
1 enable us to see it, but at the moment it's very hard to get a grip on
2 what it is we're being told about.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Barriot, can you help us with the reference
4 that you've made to "Western intelligence services"? What specific source
5 did you have for this information?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I -- I want to say this once again.
7 I said that in the beginning when I introduced myself precisely in order
8 not to have to repeat it all the time, and I say this again to Mr. Nice:
9 The knowledge I have of the problems is not something that I learned from
10 newspapers. I take this from my work, from what I did. I was the head
11 doctor for civilian security, and this position is connected to the
12 Ministry of the Interior. And when you have such a position, you have a
13 connection with the prefect of civilian security and, therefore, also with
14 the minister of the interior. When I was dispatched abroad, for instance,
15 to Tokyo as a specialist regarding terrorism, I say it once again and I'm
16 sorry I have to repeat this, I had to work during the numerous terrorist
17 attacks there were in France and in Paris. I am part of many research
18 groups on the matter, and I think that I have proved that I have contacts
19 at the highest level in intelligence services. So you should maybe wait
20 until you've heard me out before you doubt my credentials.
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Barriot, what is the specific source for this
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I have to repeat
25 this: I spent entire years within emergency units in specialised units in
1 the fight against terrorism, and I have gathered all the information I now
2 have in course of those activities. I can't give you a signed paper,
3 papers signed by the director of intelligence services in order to prove
4 what I say.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: This is just information, then, that you have
6 picked up generally through the discharge of your functions?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Exactly so. During the start of my
8 activities as an individual, as a senior officer in charge of public
9 security in France.
10 MR. NICE: Your Honour, it would seem to me that this is unlikely
11 to be of any value. We're not going to be able to see documents, it would
12 appear. We're not going to be able to cross-examine to the documents and
13 the witness doesn't appear to be saying that this is material that he
14 received firsthand. Beyond that, the material may in any event be
16 So I would invite the Chamber to require the accused to move on to
17 another topic.
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, let me hear from you on this point
20 before ruling.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, we have established
22 that Colonel Barriot headed the medical sector of the civilian security of
23 France, and that he is still even now a member of a government group in
24 charge of forecasting possible terrorist attacks against France. So he is
25 in a position to have access to the kind of information that we're talking
2 The only question Mr. Nice can put is whether this witness is
3 telling the truth or lying.
4 As for all the documents we have here, they can only confirm that
5 everything the witness has been saying is true, that this is an honourable
6 man, that this is a man who is completely honest on the one hand, and on
7 the other hand that he has access to information that he did not obtain by
8 reading the newspapers or hearing rumours, as was put here, but he was a
9 former senior military officer and now a member of a governmental group.
10 And I imagine that if somebody is head of the civilian sector, I
11 imagine he gets information in order to be able to carry out the job he
12 has been entrusted with.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: And what would be the relevance of the evidence?
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The relevance is in the fact that it
15 is indubitably correct that certain governments in the West supported
16 terrorism in Bosnia-Herzegovina which produced fatal consequences.
17 When the previous witness testified, you were wondering whether
18 this was a crime above all crimes or whether it was a kind of tit for tat.
19 There is no way of -- this is no way to deal with this. This was a
20 conflict that was tragic for all sides, but within a context we have to
21 view the causes and the consequences of everything that happened in the
22 territory of the former Yugoslavia. I think that this picture is going to
23 become increasingly clear to you as the proceedings go on. I'm not
24 referring only to this witness but also other witnesses so that we can see
25 things in their true light, not in this distorted light, as has been the
1 case so far.
2 MR. KAY: Your Honours, if I could add a point to this.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
4 MR. KAY: The witness is entitled to speak to his own knowledge.
5 He can cite the support of sources for that knowledge, which may be
6 documentary or may be from his own experience because of the role which he
7 carried. The witness may be cross-examined as to the validity of that
8 source of his knowledge, and indeed it may be a matter of weight at the
9 end of the day as to how supportive and how the Trial Chamber is convinced
10 about the validity of the testimony of the witness on various issues
11 contained within it.
12 JUDGE KWON: Any observation on relevance?
13 MR. KAY: There seem to be issues within this trial that the
14 accused is genuinely advancing in contradiction of the case against him by
15 the Prosecutor. We know that his case against the Prosecutor is that this
16 is a manufactured trial against him, that there are sources who were
17 involved in this Prosecution who have been against him and his country for
18 a period of time, who have been acting for his downfall. Therefore, if
19 such sources, if such influences, if you like, are revealed to have had
20 power within events and matters in relation to this prosecution, it may
21 well be then that the accused is able to establish one of the tenets of
22 his defence in relation to aspects of the case against him.
23 JUDGE BONOMY: If that's correct, Mr. Kay, then it's all the more
24 important that the evidence is given in a way which would enable the Trial
25 Chamber to assign some weight to it. And the way I understand the
1 witness's response so far, it is to say, "You guys up there don't need to
2 bother about the source of my knowledge. I'm an honourable man, I've got
3 a wide range of experience, it's the year 2005 now, and therefore I've
4 accumulated even more and therefore I'm even more reliable," when we're
5 dealing with what he says specifically is the knowledge by Western
6 intelligence services at a particular time in the fairly distant past. So
7 it seems to me he ought to be able to give us an indication, even in
8 fairly broad -- he hasn't even given it in fairly broad terms of the
9 source of that particular piece of information. That's my difficulty.
10 MR. KAY: I understand that entirely, and in many respects parties
11 run the risk of losing their points if they don't put the best evidence
12 forward and evidence that they might reasonably anticipate a Tribunal, the
13 triers of fact, to want to hear. It doesn't diminish from the point
14 that's being made. But the weight, which is a word Your Lordships -- Your
15 Honours have used in relation to this issue, is another matter, and that's
16 something that the litigant in person must bear in mind in trying to
17 convince on a particular point.
18 I hope those are helpful observations.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's weight, not admissibility.
20 MR. KAY: Yes.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: We may not be able to attach much weight at all
22 to the evidence if we don't have a source revealed and if the Prosecutor,
23 in particular, is not able to cross-examine on it.
24 MR. KAY: I'm sure that's been -- been heard, and it's useful that
25 Your Honours have intervened to make that point now as it does give the
1 option, then, in relation to this party producing evidence, that the Court
2 has said it would like to hear, to have more substantiation.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let me ask Mr. Barriot for the last time. Can
4 you give us more specific details on the source of the information, quite
5 apart from the fact that you may have acquired this information through
6 the discharge generally of your duties?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, you put the question again to
8 me, and I'll answer in the same way: I was a military man, I was a
9 colonel in the French army, I was a Blue Helmet in the former Yugoslavia.
10 I was in charge of civilian security. In fact, I took part in all the
11 meetings regarding the fight against terrorism in 1994 and 1995. What
12 else can I tell you? It seems to be obvious. It is obvious I had
13 first-hand information and that I was directly involved in the events.
14 There again, I mean, terrorist attacks I was there. I was on the ground.
15 I experienced them and I intervened on the ground with the wounded but
16 also in the crisis units and the expert groups. I'm one of those who is
17 most published and written about non-conventional techniques and
18 bioterrorism. If that's not enough for you, of course you can then
19 challenge my credibility.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: Dr. Barriot, we may be getting closer now, but when
21 you talk about taking part in the all the meetings regarding the fight
22 against terrorism in 1994 and 1995, terrorist attacks, I was there, I was
23 on the ground, are you talking about terrorist attacks in the Balkans?
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm speaking about terrorist attacks
25 in France and in the Balkans. In France in 1995, I remind you of the fact
1 that there was this attack against Line B of the RER train in the Saint
2 Michel station, and I just mention in passing that the minister, the
3 French minister of the interior had mentioned some Serbian cause as the
4 source of the attack. So we are in the middle of the problem of terrorist
5 attacks in France with terrorist networks connected to the Algerian GIA
6 and to al Qaeda, to groups that were in Bosnia, attacks and -- where too
7 hastily the Serbs were accused. I think that we are in the very heart of
8 the matter.
9 [Trial Chamber confers]
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: We will allow you to proceed on this,
11 Mr. Milosevic. It does go eventually to weight, not admissibility. But
12 the question as to whether we'll be able to attach much value to it is
13 going to be very much in doubt, particularly after cross-examination.
14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. You mentioned, Colonel Barriot, that the French minister of the
16 interior said, as a matter of fact, when this terrorist attack was
17 launched against Paris, that Serbs may have been involved in it. And what
18 was ultimately established? Who had done it?
19 So here we are referring to this wave of terrorist attacks in
20 France in 1995, in particular to the 25 July 1994 attack on Line B of the
21 RER train.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... this is not
23 relevant to the case at all.
24 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Presiding Judge, please.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: This is not relevant to the case. Ask another
1 question, please.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. All right. All right.
3 It's not relevant. But it shows what the propaganda at the time was like.
4 Whenever something would happen, they'd say it's got to be the Serbs, and
5 then it would ultimately be established that it wasn't the Serbs. But
6 never mind. Let's move on.
7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Do you have any knowledge regarding the following: To which
9 extent were these terrorist cells embedded in Bosnia-Herzegovina thanks to
10 the hospitality of the Izetbegovic government?
11 A. These terrorist cells were perfectly embedded in Bosnia and
12 Herzegovina. You didn't give me the time. You didn't allow me to speak
13 about the attacks in 1995. I'll mention the second group of terrorists
14 that started working, operating in France in 1996. This Roubaix gang. It
15 was disbanded, dismantled following the attack police station in Lille.
16 It was directed by Christophe Caset. Christophe Caset fought in the
17 Islamist legion in Zenica.
18 There were another two members of the Roubaix gang. Lionel Dumont
19 and Mouloud Bouguela. They, too, fought in Bosnia in the legion of
20 Islamist fighters. They were even detained, gaoled in Bosnia because they
21 raided a petrol station in order to fund their terrorist group. The
22 electronic organiser of Mr. Bouguela showed that he was connected to the
23 Algerian GIA but also to al Qaeda.
24 There is, therefore, an obvious link between the terrorist groups
25 operating in France in 1995 and 1996 and the Islamist fighters especially
1 of Central Bosnia and of the Zenica area. This seems to me a crucial
2 problem, showing that the Bosnian terrorism was feeding outposts towards
3 France, especially in 1995 and 1996. It cannot be ignored as a fact.
4 The problem is that the Western countries realised that the
5 Bosnian terrorism existed and was a problem when they were hit, just as
6 happened for the Americans. It didn't disturb the Americans until they
7 were hit themselves in September 2001. So it shows that these Bosnian
8 forces were at work. Only in September were surveillance teams
9 dispatched. Charitable organisations, Islamic charitable organisation was
10 only then searched. There's also the relief agency. And Islamist
11 charitable organisations were now proved to have supported and funded
12 terrorism, but even after the Dayton agreements, all these structures
13 remained operational and active --
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm stopping you.
15 Mr. Milosevic, just explain the relevance. Assuming that what the
16 witness is saying is true, what is the relevance of this terrorism to any
17 specific charge?
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, we're talking about a series
19 of conclusions which were drawn, deduced, if I can use the term, by the
20 international community, a series of acts for which the Serbs were accused
21 and which were actually perpetrated by such groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
22 And not only such groups but by the regular forces of the army too. Of
23 the Muslim army, that is, of Bosnia-Herzegovina, just as --
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: In answer to me, then, are you saying that one of
25 the crimes of which you have been charged in the indictment was, in fact,
1 or may have been committed by these terrorists?
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't know what it is that you are
3 charging me with all here because it's all nebulous, but those terrorists,
4 or even if they were regular forces, they perpetrated a whole series of
5 crimes, both when it comes to sniper fire from -- by which civilians were
6 killed and when it comes to bombs in the Markale 1 and 2 incident, and
7 when it came to the Riclar [phoen] explosion after which sanctions were
8 introduced, although it wasn't the Serbs in Bosnia who perpetrated that
9 but it said in a report filed by the international forces how this
10 actually came about and happened. So we're talking about a series of
11 crimes that were perpetrated in order to accuse the Serbs and demonise
12 them. So it is a far broader context for the demonisation of the Serbs.
13 And it was on the basis of this demonisation of the Serbs that a series of
14 accusations and counts were brought here, including the charges and counts
15 that those people over there are trying to prove here, of course without
16 any evidence and proof.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] A series of crimes.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, I'm asking you for assistance on this
20 because I think it's going to feature throughout the Defence, how the
21 accused is able to establish the relevance of much of the evidence that
22 he's seeking to lead, particularly when he seeks to lead evidence about
23 Serb suffering, Serb detention, if it is not to be categorised as "you
24 also" evidence, tu quoque evidence.
25 MR. KAY: In relation to attacks by other parties, and the
1 previous witness referred to being in Sarajevo and being the -- aware of,
2 I'm not sure if she made herself the actual target of, but aware of Muslim
3 attacks on the UN by sniper fire, and we've had the issue in the case
4 concerning the Markale massacre and the challenge by the Defence of the
5 Prosecution expert who indicated that there may be blame on the Bosnian
6 Serb side in relation to that particular incident. So there is, if you
7 like, a continuum of allegation and counter allegation in relation to
8 certain incidents that feature within the indictment.
9 I am aware since the end of the Prosecution case and the ruling
10 under 98 bis that in fact a great deal of the Sarajevo evidence, sniping
11 evidence, was in fact not to be proceeded with further in the trial
12 because there was no evidence adduced about it, so there has been a
13 greater restriction of certain allegations against the accused.
14 It -- in many respects one has to see how this develops and where
15 it goes to and what specific information is eventually available that can
16 support the contentions of the accused --
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: But strictly speaking, to be relevant it must
18 relate in a material way to one of the charges in the indictment.
19 MR. KAY: If it be established that there were forces, if you
20 like, who were committing attacks for which the Serbs were being held
21 responsible and that those are charges within this indictment, then of
22 course the accused is advancing a positive case on such an issue. If that
23 is established. In many respects we have to see where this goes, and
24 where this might be general evidence that the witness is giving, but if
25 there is any specific evidence that's later to flow from the Defence case
1 in relation to charges. One anticipates that he was not an actor in
2 relation to those events but is giving information that was available to
3 him from intelligence sources, and in many respects there has to be a
4 linkage now with what has happened in relation to this witness's evidence
5 with perhaps specific matters within the indictment.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: What Mr. Milosevic has to be aware of is that we
7 don't have any interest in your telling your story unless that story is
8 relevant to the indictment. If you want to tell a story, to tell your
9 story, then -- in a manner which is not relevant to the indictment, this
10 is not the forum for it. The evidence that is to be led must relate in a
11 material way to one of the charges. And I am going to be quite strict in
12 that regard and to ask you to explain, when you deal with fact witnesses,
13 how the evidence relates to a specific charge, because that really is the
14 test of relevance.
15 Let us not -- Judge Bonomy.
16 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Kay, one of Mr. Milosevic's points of criticism
17 of your involvement at all in his case has been that you don't know what
18 his case is, and that presupposes that he knows what his case is, and on
19 that basis are the Trial Chamber not entitled to expect him to be able to
20 identify the relevance of any evidence he leads; in other words, identify
21 what charge on the indictment that evidence may be relevant to?
22 MR. KAY: Yes, of course. And questions may be asked of the
23 litigating party to explain themselves in that way, as the Bench is doing
25 I'm using my knowledge and experience of what has gone before in
1 piecing together parts of this with -- I mean, I have had an involvement
2 in these matters, as the Court knows, on many different levels and been
3 able to look at many different things in that time, as to where this
4 evidence is particularly going, looking at the time period that he was in
5 the region of Bosnia as well as the Krajina.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm simply suggesting that you're perhaps being
7 unduly generous when you say we have to wait and see where the evidence
8 goes, that in fact the accused ought to know when he leads a witness where
9 the evidence is going to go.
10 MR. KAY: Yes, I understand that. Thank you.
11 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Yes, Mr. Milosevic, continue.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, just one comment on my
14 part, very briefly, if I may. We're not dealing here with proving tit for
15 tat or saying, "You did that to us as well." What we're talking about
16 here is showing that the Serbs defended themselves, and that is a
17 substantive difference.
18 You have the facts that this paramilitary formation in Bosnia, the
19 so-called Patriotic League was formed on the 31st of March, 1991, for
20 instance, and that date is celebrated there today now, and that was one
21 year before the war, and that at the beginning of the war they had some
22 100.000 men under arms, and you have proof of that. And then you go into
23 various details whereas we're exclusively discussing the fact and it is a
24 matter of the Serbs defending themselves, and everything that is being
25 presented here and now shows that the Serbs defended themselves and were
1 defending themselves both in Croatia and Bosnia. That's the essence, the
2 crux of the matter, not you did this to us and tit for tat. Of course, in
3 the conflict that ensues you have crimes committed on all sides but the
4 crux of the matter here is that the Serbs were defending themselves.
5 So we are creating a mosaic here of the different elements about
6 the facts that have otherwise been distorted and erroneously interpreted.
7 But yes, I will try and speed up --
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let me say, Mr. Milosevic, you're on very solid
9 ground there if you can show that the Serbs were defending themselves in
10 relation to a particular charge in the indictment. You're on very, very
11 solid ground there, and I would certainly agree that that evidence is
12 relevant. That's not tu quoque evidence at all.
13 So if in relation to a specific charge in the indictment your
14 answer is it didn't happen the way the Prosecutor said, the Serbs were
15 defending themselves, and in defending themselves 100 Serbs died, that
16 evidence is relevant, certainly relevant. Or a hundred Serbs were
17 detained, that evidence can be led in that way. That evidence is
19 Yes, continue.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, you know full well
21 that you had that man there of yours, one of your experts or Mr. Nice's
22 experts, a military expert in fact, and you know full well that what
23 happened, what took place and the things written down in the indictment
24 have nothing to do with me at all. And I am endeavouring to have the
25 truth out about the whole matter.
1 Now, the fact that I have been charged here and counts have been
2 brought against me --
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... the case, so
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Colonel Barriot, do you have any knowledge about the links and
8 contacts between the nests of violence and terrorists in Kosovo and the
9 terrorist groups working in Europe?
10 A. Yes. I do have some information about that as far as the links
11 between the terrorist networks operating in Bosnia and those networks
12 connected to the GIA and al Qaeda, which I've mentioned before, also
13 connected with the terrorist networks in Kosovo and Albania, because it's
14 an Albanian and Bosnian terrorist group which is based in Tirana and
15 extends or reaches out to Sarajevo and also has a base in Pristina. So
16 this is a terrorist network which has links with the Algerian GIA and al
17 Qaeda and largely funded thanks to drugs trafficking which crosses the
18 Albanian frontier. And Mr. Geurin Javier [phoen] clearly demonstrated
19 that drug trafficking, which has increased to five million tonnes a year
20 as opposed to 2 million beforehand is something which I'm sure you will
21 get back to.
22 I'd also like to stress the fact that in the north of Albania
23 there are terrorist training camps in the former home of Sali Berisha, the
24 ex-former president of Albania. And all these terrorist training camps in
25 Northern Albania led to frequent intrusions across the border, direction
1 of Kosovo, and in the years 1990 -- 1998 and 1999.
2 I'd also like to stress the fact that we were quite sure that
3 Osama bin Laden was present in the north of Albania from October -- in
4 October 1998 when Richard Holbrooke and Madeleine Albright were supporting
5 the KLA in Kosovo and providing arms to them. So we know full well where
6 these training camps are located, we know how these camps have been
7 funded, we know how they are organised, and clearly we understand there is
8 a link here.
9 Thanks to the Islamic charities - I have mentioned two of these -
10 this is an important factor, relief agency and Saudi High Commission
11 Relief, organisations which organised the entire logistic support of these
12 terrorist networks throughout the Balkans, and I'd like to stress this:
13 That as far as Bosnia is concerned, the SDF, Alija Izetbegovic was
14 coordinating the trafficking and coordinating all these terrorist
15 networks. As early as in 1992 the Islamic fighters arrived in Bosnia, in
16 Sandzak, and we also have proof of the arrival of the Afghan Mujahedin, of
17 the Iranian fighters, and all these Islamic fighters who were supported by
18 Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, or Sudan. So these networks are
19 perfectly well coordinated and very efficient.
20 The major difficulty was that we had to wait for the September
21 11th attack for people to start looking into it seriously. For instance
22 searches which were conducted in Bosnia which enabled the arrest of ten or
23 so terrorists, six of which were members of the Algerian GIA, Mr. Bensaya
24 Belkassem, who was one of the members of al Qaeda. So I don't know what
25 additional evidence you need. We can ask Mr. Osama bin Laden to sign a
1 paper to clearly state the facts of the matter. I think things are clear
2 enough. I don't think one can question the presence or the organisation
3 of these terrorist networks. The training camps of Terry Bosilja [phoen]
4 were -- remained opened whilst the Stabilisation Force was present in
5 Bosnia, with 10.000 soldiers deployed in the region. That the training
6 camps were not closed down; they could hold the Bosnian nationality, they
7 had false paper, they had drug money, and could go to the training camps,
8 and had money from Islamic charities that was funding them and supporting
10 And if you question all of this, I think you question the entire
11 Islamic terrorist groups and entire networks of al Qaeda.
12 Q. Mr. Barriot, as far as your immediate knowledge of concrete
13 events, I'd like to proceed in chronological order and be as efficient as
14 possible, so let's take Krajina and Croatia in 1994 and 1995 first. And I
15 should like to emphasise this, because this is -- there's always a
16 question mark as to whether you know something about previous events or
17 not, but I would like to link this up with the knowledge you have of the
18 previous period which you gained as an officer and UNPROFOR member and
19 must necessarily have had.
20 So first of all could you tell me please whether you, before you
21 arrived in 1994 officially, in your official capacity, and at
22 corresponding official meetings that -- were you informed as a
23 professional and expert about the forerunning events to the actual
24 situation as it was when you arrived?
25 A. Well, I think it's important to establish a distinction between
1 those ideas I might have had before arriving as a Blue Helmet in the
2 former Yugoslavia. I believed in those ideas which had been broadcast by
3 the press, fairly simplistic views, black and white, in other words, the
4 Serbs are the aggressors and the Croats are the people being aggressed.
5 Once I arrived there and I was working as a Blue Helmet and joined
6 the French Glina Battalion and I saw with my own eyes the situation as it
7 stood, and when I was able to hear the Blue Helmets of other nationality,
8 Canadian Blue Helmets, for instance, who had been working in the Medak
9 pocket in 1993, a number of other Canadian soldiers who were based in
10 Sarajevo and other areas, we had meetings, we held meetings within
11 UNPROFOR every day and each soldier, each officer, each military talked
12 about his experience and imparted to us the conclusions they reached.
13 So during this period, I -- while I was in Krajina, I realised
14 that the military were well aware of the situation which had nothing to do
15 which was being described by the press, by the media and by the print
17 Would you like me to expand on this? Would you like me to
18 describe the situation as it stood in 1994?
19 Q. There's no need. We'll come to that. But we're not talking about
20 the press alone but official positions with respect to the conflicts in
21 the former Yugoslavia. So what you are testifying about is this: That
22 the officers who were on the ground knew full well how the facts stood but
23 that the picture that was presented in public was distorted. Is that what
24 you're saying?
25 A. Yes. Without any doubt whatsoever that's exactly what I'm saying.
1 And I had stated this in my evidence. The military were analysing the
2 situation which was radically different from what was being broadcast by
3 the media, but they could not express themselves, and they could not have
4 broadcast this. So -- if they were to incur any penalties, and serious
5 penalties, because this was not the general political consensus at the
6 time. But I would like to repeat this: The military, in general terms,
7 had analysed the situation in the same way which has been perfectly
8 described by generals like MacKenzie, also Michael Rose or a number of
9 other French generals.
10 I think that the -- the opinion of the military, I don't think, is
11 a thing which they doubt. They had a very clear picture of the situation.
12 Q. All right. Let's try and be very practical. I was just waiting
13 for the interpretation. Let's be practical about this. A moment ago you
14 described the situation and said that you had later on become a
15 representative of Republika Srpska Krajina in France. I assume that you
16 explained to the people in France what was going on during that first
17 year, 1990 and 1991. So on the basis of what were you able to report to
18 them on what was happening in 1990 and 1991 during the course of your work
19 since you were not there, since you hadn't arrived before 1994? How were
20 you able to do that, then?
21 A. Yes. That's quite right. The information I had stemmed from
22 different sources. As we mentioned earlier on, the discussion and
23 briefing sessions which were held by UNPROFOR, because briefing sessions
24 were held on a daily basis, and during these meetings, we outlined the
25 conflict from the beginning.
1 Q. I apologise for interrupting, but at those meetings you spoke
2 about the conflict since it started. So at how many briefings with the
3 other -- how many briefings did you attend with the other UNPROFOR
5 A. Personally, I took part in ten such briefing sessions. Within
6 UNPROFOR, we outlined the history of the conflict at these meetings, and
7 we anticipated what had happened as early as 1994.
8 I remember during these UNPROFOR meetings things were quite clear,
9 and all the military were saying that the conflict is going to resume in
10 Croatia and more specifically in Krajina, and the Croatian army is going
11 to attack again in the next few months. So the analysis conducted by the
12 military was dead right. They were not only trying to understand what had
13 happened beforehand but they had anticipated on what was actually going to
14 happen a few months down the road. So much for the military sources. But
15 as I was a doctor and, as I told you, canvassed the whole region, the
16 Krajina, the Bihac pocket and Croatia, I met a great number of victims in
17 1990 and 1991. So I am able to talk about what these people have
18 experienced. And as I was the official representative of the Serbian
19 Republic of Krajina, I was in contact with the authorities of this region,
20 and a lot of my information stemmed from there.
21 Let me remind you also that I have written one of those rare books
22 written on the Serbs of Krajina.
23 For all these reasons, I hope Mr. Nice is not going to question my
24 testimony. I am able to talk about those events which took place in 1990
25 and 1991, those that preceded my arrival in Krajina.
1 If you have no objection, I shall begin with this first part, the
2 1990s and 1991, those years in Croatia. I will try to be as brief as
3 possible, but certain things should be told because it would help us to
4 understand what happened afterwards.
5 Now, on the -- when Franjo Tudjman came to power in May of 1990,
6 the HDZ was created and had been created --
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Barriot, this method of giving evidence is
8 novel to me. You must answer questions that are put by Mr. Milosevic.
9 So, Mr. Milosevic, he's now going to testify, I understand, about
10 the years 1990, 1991 in Croatia, on the basis of information that he
11 gathered. Please put some questions to him. I don't want to just hear a
12 long narrative from the witness which doesn't proceed in any particular
14 MR. NICE: Of course, fundamentally, Your Honours, is a narrative
15 from this witness based on what he was told by a range of other people of
16 any real value to this Chamber?
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, but we do take in hearsay. I say it's a
18 question of the weight to be attached to it, yes.
19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. What you know about everything that happened from the very outset,
21 from the very beginning of the conflict or, rather, the deployment of
22 UNPROFOR in Krajina, is all of that based on facts that are official facts
23 that were heard at UNPROFOR briefings that you took part in?
24 A. Yes, indeed.
25 Q. In addition to all the other facts that you compiled. So these
1 are analyses that you had with the UNPROFOR officers. So it implies full
2 competence; isn't that right?
3 A. That's quite right.
4 Q. Tell me now, please, since later on as the representative of
5 Krajina, as you said, you endeavoured to provide objective information in
6 the West, who did you say was responsible for the bloodshed at that time,
7 in the period that you were talking about. Who did you say was
8 responsible for the conflict and on the basis of what?
9 MR. NICE: This is different from narrating hearsay from entirely
10 anonymous sources. This is now seeking to form a judgement that I dare
11 say is the judgement ultimately for the Court on the basis of anonymous
12 hearsay, and on behalf of the Prosecution we must protest that this has
13 gone quite as far as it should go and these questions should neither be
14 asked nor answered.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's not for him to speak to the responsibility.
16 That's a matter ultimately for the Chamber. He can say what he was told.
17 Then it is for us to determine what value, if any, to attach to it.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.
19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Tell me, please, and quite briefly, without going into any kind of
21 political pre-history, what is the knowledge that you have, since you were
22 an active-duty officer and since you took part in these briefings. What
23 is the knowledge that you have about what happened in 1990 and 1991, in
24 the briefest possible terms?
25 A. Yes, I shall be brief, because the knowledge I have is very clear
1 and is not confusing. For all UNPROFOR officers, it is quite clear that
2 those events started in 1990 and were conducted by the Croat authorities
3 because the Serbs had been set aside. And this was part of the programme
4 of Franjo Tudjman as of 1990 onwards.
5 Franjo Tudjman and the HDZ brought out all the coat of arms and
6 all the insignia of the World War II and glorified Ante Pavelic,
7 introduced Mile Budak's plan, changed street names, replaced the dinar
8 with the kuna and the Ustasha army was established. All of this can be
9 checked out. This can be verified. And there was -- all of this was
10 established by way of symbols, and the tools and instruments were
11 provided. Special units were created by the home affairs ministry or the
12 Jesenje Kise, headed by Tomislav Mercep. Then there were National Guard
13 units which were established, the military police units. A whole series
14 of illegal organisations were set up. Croatia at the time was not
15 independent and was not entitled to have its own army because there was a
16 federal army at the time.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, a question. Mr. Milosevic, are
18 you not going to bring evidence from other witnesses about that period in
19 Croatia? Are you not going to bring witnesses who can testify more
20 directly about these events? Because if you are, I mean, why are you
21 bothering to get this from this witness when the evidence is not going to
22 be of much value?
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, taking everything into
24 account, you should bear in mind that at the same time, this witness is an
25 UNPROFOR insider. He is speaking about things that were quite clear,
1 things that UNPROFOR officers in the field had to know about. So there is
2 no doubt that there could have been any kind of confusion. So the
3 confusion that was created was created intentionally, because if it was
4 clear to the witness as it was to other officers what was going on and
5 conclusions were drawn to the contrary, then it is quite clear --
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think you have offered what I consider to be an
7 explanation. He's speaking as an UNPROFOR officer, yes, on the basis of
8 information that he gathered.
9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. All right. Tell me, now, what is your knowledge regarding what
11 happened in 1992 and 1993?
12 A. Just in a very -- in a few words, I'd just like to finish off what
13 I started. In other words, after those of -- instruments of physical
14 repression were established, the constitution was changed and in March of
15 1992 Pakrac, Plitvice and Borovo Selo attacks, these were physical attacks
16 of the troops of the Ministry of the Interior, levelled against the Serbs,
17 and as soon as -- as early as 1992, Mercep and his ministers were in
19 I think that is very important to stress this, because one tends
20 to cut everything up in different periods, and this is what people do when
21 they talk about this war, and this is not logical any more.
22 Vukovar started in November 1991 -- sorry. Vukovar fell in 1991,
23 and Tomislav Mercep started mistreating people already then. So we can't
24 start talking about historical facts when it suits us. We have to put it
25 into perspective and make sure that the events are consistent.
1 So just what I would like to say is that as far as all UNPROFOR
2 officers are concerned, Serbs in Croatia had been deprived of their
3 constitutional rights and were being attacked physically by the troops of
4 the Ministry of the Interior, which were illegal. So much for those years
5 1991, 1992.
6 Now, if I'm to talk about 1992, 1993, in 1992 UNPROFOR and the UN
7 Security Council decided to establish protected areas. And if the UN had
8 decided to set up these protection areas, it was because the Serbs had
9 been attacked and it was a matter of protecting them. This is why the
10 Serb protected areas were established.
11 So in those years 1992, 1993, those protected areas, and primarily
12 the Southern sector where I was in 1994, were attacked on several
13 occasions by the Croatian forces and UNPROFOR was unable to protect the
14 people as they had committed to.
15 What comes to mind in particular is the plateau of Miljevac which
16 in June of 1992 was attacked by the Croatian forces, the Ravni Kotor and
17 Maslenica in January 1993 were also attacked by the Croatian forces.
18 Attacks launched against the Medak pocket in September of 1993, and I
19 would like to stress this, with the Medak pocket has been talked a lot
20 about in UNPROFOR circles. There were -- the Canadian observers were on
21 the ground in 1994 in Glina, and the General Janko Bobetko admitted that
22 this operation had been planned, and he wrote this in a book. All the
23 military knew this at the time. Which means that during those years 1992,
24 1993, on three occasions the UN protected areas which were designed to
25 protect the Serbs were not, and the Serbs were not protected, without
1 UNPROFOR being able to do anything.
2 This is very important. It's very important to emphasise this.
3 As early as 1992, 1993, the UN protected areas were quite clearly being
5 Q. And in that period, did the Serbs ever attack any area outside
7 A. No. This is a very important point. When we talk about the war
8 in Croatia which lasted from 1991 to 1995, which ended by and large by the
9 Storm operation which I witnessed this war, which lasted five years, these
10 Serbs fought for six months only, in other words, in the second half of
11 1991, whereas they had been attacked for the last five years by the
12 Croatian forces. I think that's the first important point.
13 The second point is that the Serbs fought in the second half of
14 1991 for six months. They didn't fight in Zagreb or Rijeka or in Croatia.
15 They fought in Krajina only. They fought on their own ground, and they
16 fought in that region where they had been made martyrs in World War II.
17 The Ustashas of Ante Pavelic and an independent Croatia. So it's easy to
18 understand when the Serbs saw all these symbols of the Ustasha emerging in
19 those regions where they had been massacred in World War II, where there
20 was a genocide, they of course defended themselves. This was a legitimate
21 self-defence situation. They were defending their own territory. And
22 this happened -- this did not occur anywhere else in Croatia. It's very
23 important to stress this point. And the military of UNPROFOR did time and
24 time again emphasise this point.
25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Barriot. Please tell me something about Krajina
1 and Bosnia now in 1994 and 1995, as briefly as possible, about Operation
2 Storm against Western Slavonia and Operation Flash against Krajina. You
3 were there, so what can you say about Operation Storm?
4 A. So as far as 1994 and 1995 are concerned, in 1994 I was a Blue
5 Helmet in Krajina. The fighting took place in the Bihac pocket
6 essentially, which is very nearby between the 5th Corps of the Bosnian
7 army and the Muslims, moderate Muslims who had been -- remained loyal to
8 Fikret Abdic. I was in contact with a close friend of Fikret Abdic at the
10 As far as 1995 is concerned, it is true to say that the fighting
11 took place primarily on two occasions. These were two additional attacks
12 launched by the Croatian forces against the UN protected areas I talked
13 about, the three attacks in 1992 and 1993. In 1995 there were two
14 additional attacks. The first one took place at the beginning of May
15 1995, which is the Flash operation, Operation Flash, where the Croatian
16 forces were supported by the US army and attacked Slavonia, and Western
17 Slavonia. They attacked Pakrac, Okucani and Jasenovac and there was a
18 deluge of fire on this region. Something like 5.000 refugees fled the
19 area in the direction of Stari Gradiska harbour where the MiG 21, which
20 were Croatians, started shelling them. They moved in direction of Banja
22 Then let me repeat: On this occasion several hundred Serbs died.
23 Milan Martic had asked me to appeal to the French press agency Agence
24 France Presse, which is what I did, but these appeals were not broadcast
25 by the French press agency. So much for the Flash operation.
1 As far as the Operation Storm is concerned, let me repeat I
2 witnessed these events with my own eyes. This started at the beginning of
3 August 1995. I'd like to emphasise that this started with US strikes
4 against the -- the Serb position, and the US army was directly involved in
5 this particular instance. The -- the Operation Storm was terrible and
6 caused the deaths of more than a thousand Serbs and caused the largest
7 exodus ever in the former Yugoslavia. Two hundred thousand Serbs had to
8 flee Krajina. And I stress this, that this was a well-accomplished ethnic
9 cleansing operation, because the Serbs never returned to their homes after
11 So these were massive massacres, destruction on a large scale of
12 all the farms, expulsion of some 200.000 Serbs, whereas the Krajina was
13 entirely disarmed.
14 I would like to stress an important point here. At the beginning
15 of May, I was in Knin. I met General Loncar, the Serb general, who told
16 me, "I thank you to be on the side of the losers," and the Serbs in
17 Krajina in May, at the time of Operation Flash against Western Slavonia,
18 knew that their turn would come and knew that they would be unable to
19 defend themselves because they were not armed and were confronted with a
20 very powerful army which had been supported and armed by the US [Realtime
21 transcript read in error "Croatian"] and the international community so
22 that it didn't stand a chance.
23 When I said they had been disarmed this was confirmed afterwards.
24 When the Croatian troops arrived in Krajina, they discovered a few tanks
25 that had run out of petrol, a few rocket launchers here and there, but no
1 heavy weaponry and no means and ways of defending themselves against the
2 Croatian army, particularly as it had been so well equipped by the US army
3 and military profession -- Military Professional Resources Incorporated, a
4 private company.
5 JUDGE BONOMY: May I clarify one thing? It's because of something
6 that didn't appear in the transcript although it seemed to be said. Did
7 you say that in relation to Operation Flash that the Croatian army were
8 supported by the army of the United States?
9 JUDGE KWON: Yes. The transcript says that it is supported by the
10 Croatian army but it should be corrected. And if you could clarify the
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I talked about Operation Flash
13 against Western Slavonia. In May of 1995, and I said that the Croatian
14 army had been equipped by the US, by the private company MPRI, and as far
15 as the operation, Storm operation in August 1995 against Krajina, I
16 stipulated that the Croatian forces had been equipped by the US. I also
17 emphasised that the US army intervened directly outside the framework of
18 NATO by attacking the Serb positions in Knin to enable the Croatian forces
19 to move in freely.
20 I'd like to say that military from the Military Professional
21 Resource Incorporated company intervened directly on the territory of the
22 Krajina. Of Canadian officers, UN Canadian officers stated this quite
23 clearly. They stated having seen these American military in Knin in
24 August of 1995.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. Milosevic, we have to break now. We're
1 going to break --
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Just -- I understand that we have to
3 break now and that our time is up, but let me just try to understand
4 something. I'm listening to the Serbian interpretation. I don't know
5 what the witness said, or in this transcript, rather, 49.18 it says
6 "outside the framework of NATO." Did the witness say that, outside NATO
7 or outside the United Nations? The interpretation I received was that
8 they intervened without approval of the United Nations. So now I don't
9 know what the witness actually said.
10 JUDGE KWON: If you could indicate the number of lines and page
11 and line number. The clock differs.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We have it on the transcript right
13 in front of us now. 14.13 -- no. No. It changes all the time.
14 126.96.36.199. The interpretation I received was the UN.
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let me read what is on the transcript to the
16 witness. It says here, Mr. Barriot: "I also emphasised that the US army
17 intervened directly outside the framework of NATO by attacking the Serb
18 positions in Knin, et cetera." Is that what you said?
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I wanted to emphasise that
20 this was a deliberate initiative by the United States outside --
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Outside the framework of NATO, that's what you
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] United Nations.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: United Nations. Then that's corrected.
25 We'll take the break now and resume tomorrow morning at 9.00 a.m.
1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.52 p.m.,
2 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 12th day of
3 January, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.