Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 36043

1 Monday, 14 February 2005

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.07 a.m.

5 [The witness entered court]

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

8 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please sit.


11 [Witness answered through interpreter]

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: I understand that there is an exhibit from the

13 previous witness, Mr. Balevic, which, for the purposes of the record,

14 should be number D274. Is that it? D274.

15 Mr. Milosevic.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I ask you to admit

17 into evidence the document proffered by Mr. Nice about what happened in

18 Kosovo Polje. Generally speaking, everything that happened when there was

19 a clash between the police and the demonstrators. I would like this to be

20 in evidence so that it would be obvious how facts are being manipulated

21 and how they are being presented upside down.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let us deal with those documents presented by the

23 Prosecution during cross-examination, at a later time. Please begin your

24 examination-in-chief.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

Page 36044

1 Examined by Mr. Milosevic:

2 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Jovanovic.

3 A. Good morning, Mr. President.

4 Q. At the very beginning could you just say very briefly a few words

5 about your career.

6 A. I was born in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia 71 years ago. I have a

7 degree in law. I was in the diplomatic service for 43 years. Four of

8 those years I was the minister of foreign affairs of Serbia and then the

9 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I served in several different countries;

10 in Belgium, Turkey, London, and I was ambassador to Turkey and the Head of

11 Mission of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, in the United Nations. In

12 the beginning of 2001, I retired.

13 Q. You mentioned now, inter alia, that you were minister of foreign

14 affairs of Serbia. I'm going to deal with that briefly. The Ministry of

15 Foreign Affairs of Serbia, did it in any way take over any of the powers

16 vested in Yugoslavia?

17 A. No. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Serbia just took care of

18 the interests of Serbia in the field of foreign relations, those that it

19 could develop but only within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

20 Everything else was done by the Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

21 Q. At that time, you were, for example, at a meeting that took place

22 in Prague in August 1991. You attended a meeting of the Conference on

23 Security and Cooperation in Europe. Could you tell me what your position

24 was there and who you represented.

25 A. This was a high officials meeting of the CSE, and the delegation

Page 36045

1 of Yugoslavia consisted of members of the Federal Ministry for Foreign

2 Affairs. As minister of foreign affairs of Serbia, I was attached to that

3 delegation, but I did not take part in its work, and I was not present in

4 the conference hall itself. I spent time in front of the conference hall,

5 together with journalists.

6 Q. So in a way you accompanied the delegation of the SFRY at that

7 meeting; isn't that right?

8 A. Yes. I was there in that capacity at our request but the CSE rule

9 was observed, namely that only members of the CSE could attend, and Serbia

10 was not a member, and that is why the delegation consisted only of

11 representatives of the Federal Foreign Ministry.

12 Q. Did you have the same position in Helsinki in autumn of 1991 when

13 the federal delegation went?

14 A. It was the same. This was a meeting that was at a somewhat lower

15 level. This was a meeting devoted to the so-called humanitarian dimension

16 of the CSE. I was in the conference hall at that time, but I did not have

17 the right to speak. Instead of me, it was Dr. Vladimir Pavicevic, head of

18 the delegation, who spoke.

19 Q. Vladimir Pavicevic represented Yugoslavia?

20 A. Yes. He was an ambassador, a high official of the Federal Foreign

21 Ministry.

22 Q. On the basis of everything you know, were there any collisions

23 anywhere between the functions that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had

24 or, rather, its Foreign Ministry and on the other hand the functions that

25 you exercised in Serbia?

Page 36046

1 A. Practically, we did not have a very notable cooperation except

2 that from time to time some documents were sent to me, but not all

3 documents, not all the time, and not the most sensitive documents. So the

4 foreign policy of Yugoslavia was exclusively pursued by the Federal

5 Foreign Ministry. Serbia was on the sidelines to a large extent.

6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, I'd like to get the year during which

7 Mr. Jovanovic was minister of foreign affairs for Serbia and for the

8 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and I would find it very helpful if you

9 would include a CV of the witness, in the future, for this purpose.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Kwon. The CV of

11 witnesses is usually provided, but there will be no problems with the CV

12 of this witness. Mr. Jovanovic was in 1991 the minister of foreign

13 affairs of Serbia, and practically, he worked within the foreign policy

14 activities of Yugoslavia, but it's best to ask him.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. When did you become foreign minister of Yugoslavia?

17 A. On the 1st and 2nd of August, 1991. And I held that position all

18 the way up to July 1992, when I was appointed minister of foreign affairs

19 of Yugoslavia in the government of Mr. Milan Panic, and I remained in that

20 position until mid-September the same year, when I resigned as foreign

21 minister in the federal government, and I again became the foreign

22 minister of Serbia. I remained there all the way up to the summer of

23 1993, when I became minister of foreign affairs of the Federal Republic of

24 Yugoslavia in the government of Mr. Radoje Kontic. I held that position

25 until I went to New York to head the permanent mission of the Federal

Page 36047

1 Republic of Yugoslavia to the UN.

2 Q. When was that?

3 A. That was at the end of September. To be more precise, on the 19th

4 of September, 1995.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Jovanovic, you said you were in the

6 diplomatic service for 43 years. When did you join the diplomatic

7 service?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I joined the diplomatic service as

9 soon as I graduated from university and did -- as soon as I did my

10 military service. That was in March 1957.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Would it be correct, then, to say that you were a

12 career civil servant in the diplomatic service of your country?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Milosevic.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, in order to look at the broader context of events

17 that you're going to be testifying about, tell us, please, what do you

18 know about the following: How was it that the International Peace

19 Conference on Yugoslavia was held?

20 A. The International Peace Conference on Yugoslavia came as a

21 consequence of the position taken by the European Union on the 27th of

22 August, 1991, to have this kind of conference held because the European

23 Community could help the quarreling republics of the Socialist Federal

24 Republic of Yugoslavia and could assist them in finding a political

25 solution. It is from that point of view that the European Community

Page 36048

1 decided to send special envoys to the representatives of all the republics

2 and to the top federal authorities.

3 As far as Serbia is concerned, this task was given to President

4 Mitterrand. He invited President Milosevic to come to Paris on the 29th

5 of August. Of course I accompanied President Milosevic, and President

6 Mitterrand represented this conference to us in a very likable way, in a

7 very benevolent way, so from his words we got the impression that this

8 conference was really supposed to give its good offices and with the best

9 of intentions, and that was all. He told us that the European Community

10 wished to offer these good offices without any ulterior motive, that

11 they wanted to bring together to the same table the representatives of all

12 the quarreling republics and to help them find a common tongue. It this

13 were to be a success, the European Community would be pleased. And if

14 not, nothing would happen. Everybody would go home as if nothing

15 happened, as if the conference never took place. At the same time, he

16 said that the conference would have an arbitration commission as an

17 auxiliary advisory body which could consist of the presidents of five

18 constitutional courts of five member states. Their opinions would not be

19 compulsory in any way or binding. They would only be of an advisory

20 nature.

21 He was trying to tell us that Serbia had nothing to fear at this

22 conference, and he pointed out that the president of that commission would

23 be Mr. Robert Badinter, who was his personal friend, and he particularly

24 pointed out, "If he is my personal friend, then --"

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic.

Page 36049

1 Mr. Milosevic, as you know that I do not have a predilection for

2 very long narratives, so try to ask questions and elicit shorter answers.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Jovanovic, could you help me with one thing:

4 You said that you became the foreign minister of the Federal Republic of

5 Yugoslavia at the beginning of August 1991. This meeting was in -- on the

6 27th of August, 1991; is that correct?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The 29th of August. This meeting

8 took place at President Mitterand's.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Just one correction --

11 JUDGE BONOMY: But you went as a representative of Serbia,

12 although by this time you were the foreign minister of Yugoslavia. Have I

13 got the picture correct?

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You didn't.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I was foreign minister of

16 Serbia from the 1st or 2nd of August, 1991, and the minister of the

17 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia is what I became only the following year,

18 in July 1992. So I was in Paris only in my capacity of foreign minister

19 of Serbia.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, the transcript certainly doesn't reflect that

21 and no doubt will be corrected.

22 JUDGE KWON: So you were appointed as minister of Serbia two

23 times; in 1991 and 1993?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Once, but my position of foreign

25 minister of Serbia was not extinguished when I became federal minister --

Page 36050

1 federal foreign minister. So then I simply resumed my former duties

2 afterwards as foreign minister of Serbia.

3 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: So you held the two posts at the same time?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In a way, but effectively I worked

6 in the first position, and the second one was in a state of freeze.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. In relation to this question put by Mr. Robinson, did you take any

9 activities while you were foreign minister of Yugoslavia? Did you take

10 any activities in Serbia?

11 A. In the initial period, that is to say between the summer of 1992

12 and September 1992, formally I was foreign minister of Serbia, too, but at

13 that time I was not exercising that function at all because, quite simply,

14 I could not attend two different government sessions, I could attend the

15 sessions of only one government. So this position of mine as foreign

16 minister of Serbia was practically in a state of freeze.

17 Q. I hope we can go on. Tell us, Mr. Jovanovic, is there anything

18 characteristic or special that you remember from that meeting with

19 President Mitterand, who advocated this conference on Yugoslavia?

20 A. President Mitterand, in addition to saying that Badinter was his

21 friend and, therefore, our friend, too, he assured us that the members of

22 that commission would be the presidents of the constitutional courts of

23 Greece, France, Britain, and Germany; that is to say that there would be

24 at least three who would be sympathetic to our cause. And he pointed out

25 that Serbia has such strong political and historical arguments that there

Page 36051

1 was absolutely no reason for fear that they not be upheld at the

2 conference itself. On the other hand, he pointed out that the conference

3 would only offer good offices and there would be no danger of it growing

4 into anything else.

5 Q. All right. Tell me, please, how did this develop further? As the

6 conference evolved, did it result in good offices only or something that

7 could not be called that?

8 A. Regrettably, from the very first days it abandoned that approach

9 of offering good offices only. It started behaving in an engaged manner,

10 and it was engaged at that on one side; the republics that had proclaimed

11 independence or those who were prepared to follow the secessionism of

12 Slovenia and Croatia. It is for that reason that from a conference

13 offering good offices this conference very soon started openly interfering

14 in the internal affairs of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

15 and giving open support to the secessionist republics.

16 Finally, the conference ended in a dictate, in a

17 take-it-or-leave-it form. The federal units, the republics that did not

18 accept this dictate, those that wanted to preserve the Socialist Federal

19 Republic of Yugoslavia were punished. Sanctions were imposed against

20 Yugoslavia, and that was the beginning of a long path that Serbia and

21 Montenegro -- rather, Yugoslavia had to take over the next ten years. It

22 was constant isolation and ultimately bombs.

23 Q. Let's just go back to one thing, Mr. Jovanovic. What about the

24 meetings of the expert groups that were established then, especially where

25 you took part in this directly? What do you know about this?

Page 36052












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Page 36053

1 A. At first we had meetings of ministers of foreign affairs. First

2 two groups were formed and later on a third one. They dealt with

3 constitutional matters, economic matters, and human rights issues. As for

4 foreign ministers' meetings --

5 Q. Can you tell us specifically which two groups and which three

6 groups?

7 A. The third -- the first one was foreign ministers. This was a

8 plenary meeting. And after that there was a group for constitutional

9 matters and a group for economic matters. A few weeks before that, a

10 group for economic questions was set up. These were expert groups, and

11 foreign ministers meetings were of a political nature. I attended only

12 meetings of foreign ministers. And in the work of these groups, it was

13 obvious that there was a total divergence between the republics that

14 wanted to preserve Yugoslavia and that wanted to resolve the crisis in

15 Yugoslavia peacefully and, on the other hand, the republics that rejected

16 this legalist approach and insisted on the right to secession. It was

17 Slovenia and Croatia that figured most prominently in this effort, whereas

18 Bosnia and Macedonia for a while had an ambivalent position. But as the

19 conference progressed, they became closer and closer to the positions

20 upheld by Croatia and Slovenia.

21 Q. Very well. Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic. Now, do you happen to

22 remember the first meeting, the first plenary session in The Hague, on the

23 7th of September, 1991?

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. At that meeting, if I may be allowed to explain, the heads of

Page 36054

1 delegations presented their platforms, their positions and views about the

2 work of the conference, and you, in your capacity as President of Serbia,

3 presented your own views in a speech that was not a very lengthy one but

4 which contained the principled stands and positions and legalistic

5 positions necessary and indispensable for resolving the Yugoslavia crisis.

6 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, in your binder, tab 3, you have my speech there,

7 the one that I delivered at The Hague Conference on the 7th of September,

8 1991.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Gentlemen, I have provided it in

10 both the English and the Serbian versions.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. And in view of the fact that you yourself were fully informed of

13 the problems at hand --

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, where are we to find it in the --

15 tab 3?

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, it is tab 3. And you have

17 exhibit description here, tab 3, Statement by the President of the

18 Republic of Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic, the Conference on Yugoslavia.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I answer?

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Well, let me ask you questions and then you can answer, several

22 questions with regard to the positions and stands taken. And I should

23 like to ask you to comment and respond.

24 At the very beginning, I am going to quote, actually, the first

25 paragraph. It says: "The Yugoslav crisis, which is the reason for the

Page 36055

1 convening of this Conference, is the result of a unilateral secessionist

2 policy, first of Slovenia and then of Croatia. By so doing, they have

3 jeopardised the Yugoslav constitutional order."

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. Now, please, was that absolutely clear or can you confirm that or

6 challenge it as a fact?

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: What is he being asked; whether it was a fact

8 that you made that statement, or whether it was a fact that the Yugoslav

9 crisis, which is the reason for the conference, was the result of a

10 unilateral secessionist policy of Slovenia and Croatia?

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Precisely that, Mr. Robinson. I

12 assume we're not challenging that I --

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: And you're also asking him to say whether -- why

14 that secessionist policy of the Yugoslav constitutional order was

15 jeopardised. I wouldn't allow the latter question.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, how did the Yugoslav crisis come about?

19 A. The Yugoslav crisis was caused by the gradual, slow, and then

20 measures which came to a head taken by Slovenia and Croatia to secede, to

21 break away from Yugoslavia on one side, and in a violent manner. They did

22 this, especially Slovenia, over longer period of time. It lasted some

23 five years before the Conference on Yugoslavia was actually held. And the

24 upshot of it was, came in 1991 - 1990 and 1991 - when successively measure

25 were made for unilateral secession by amendments of the constitution,

Page 36056

1 illegal arming, and the proclamation of sovereignty first and independence

2 second. And it was these measures that rocked Yugoslavia and brought into

3 question its constitutional order, because Yugoslavia never prevented the

4 right to self-determination and secession for anyone but this was always

5 linked with the rights and interests of the other republics making up

6 Yugoslavia and general stability and peace in the country. So these

7 republics could have succeeded through a constitutional channel and

8 peaceful channels but they did not want to do that because that would have

9 then constituted secession, whereas they wanted to break away in the form

10 of disassociation and the disbanding of Yugoslavia. Now, unfortunately,

11 they have an enormous support from certain members of the European

12 Community, particularly Germany and Austria on one hand and on the other

13 side the Vatican too.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, bear in mind we already have

15 evidence on this question.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am bearing that in mind,

17 Mr. Robinson, but Mr. Jovanovic was a direct participant in the events and

18 knows the facts very well, the facts that relate to the development of the

19 Yugoslav crisis.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. And in September, that is to say the beginning of September 1991,

22 was it contentional at all that secession had already at the time led to a

23 conflict and bloodshed?

24 A. Unfortunately, that's what happened, yes. First in Slovenia and

25 then in Croatia where the new authorities in Croatia immediately

Page 36057

1 proclaimed a political war against the Serb people in Croatia, provoking

2 the Serb people, dismissing people from their jobs, engaging in selective

3 killing and selective storming of the police force in areas that were

4 populated by a Serb majority, and that led the Serb people in Croatia --

5 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... very much or at

6 all, I hope, with this witness's evidence. I've been provided with a 65

7 ter summary that is so general I have no real idea of the detail of what

8 he's going to be speaking about, but for the avoidance of any doubt or

9 uncertainty, I don't expect to be cross-examining on generalities of the

10 kind he's just given, speaking of crimes and dismissing people from their

11 jobs, unless he's going to give direct evidence about it himself, which I

12 rather doubt. It's a matter for the accused if he wants to spend his time

13 eliciting evidence of this kind, but it doesn't seem to me that it's very

14 helpful to the Chamber.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Nice, I certainly for one am increasingly

16 concerned about the way in which the accused is utilising the time

17 available to him to deal with matters which don't have a direct - direct -

18 bearing on whether he was criminally responsible in any way for the crimes

19 that may or may not have been committed during the period that we're

20 concerned about, and this sort of tit-for-tat exchange about who started

21 it all seems to me to take us nowhere in answering the question that we

22 really have to answer at the end of the day.

23 MR. NICE: And Your Honour, obviously I echo that, but more

24 materially, I think this witness's experience does cover the time and does

25 cover events and meetings which may be material in due course in

Page 36058

1 cross-examination, and that's what I'll be focusing on --


3 MR. NICE: -- but I can't deal with this sort of material.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you have heard the observations of

5 Mr. Nice, also the remarks of my brother Judge Bonomy. Much of this

6 evidence is repetitive and may not be directly relevant to the charges. I

7 have no doubt that the witness can give evidence that is vital and

8 important to the matters at hand, so you must move to an area of the

9 information available to him which is more directly relevant. But I will

10 not allow any further questions on these matters that you have -- that

11 have been raised. They are not sufficiently relevant.

12 JUDGE KWON: And before going further, in tab 3, we have two

13 versions of your statement, one being with some editorial notes, taking

14 out only phrases or inserting some phrases, the other one being a clean

15 version which seems to be a translation of the Serb version. How are they

16 different and who was it that put some English editorial notes?

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I shall have to take a look

18 first.

19 JUDGE KWON: If the witness can help us.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] These changes in the English text

21 were done by me. That is my handwriting. And the following version is

22 the version in Serbian compiled by Mr. Milosevic. So this was done for my

23 own needs, for me to be able to know exactly what was uttered, and what

24 was uttered is what you have in the Serbian version, the Serbian language.

25 MR. NICE: Your Honours may want to know, if it's not apparent

Page 36059

1 already, that what appears in my tab is the second version, with ERN

2 number ending 5341, is the document already produced as 776. Your Honour

3 is obviously ahead of me on that.

4 JUDGE KWON: As noted here.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Thank you.

6 Mr. Milosevic, move to another subject area within the witness's

7 knowledge and that is directly relevant to the charges in the indictment.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, this witness is

9 testifying about what actually happened, and as far as the indictment is

10 concerned, everything there is completely unfounded. Now, I can ask the

11 witness a question and say what he knows about it all and move on, so he

12 needn't testify at all. But I would like us to clear matters up here so

13 that you can see the truth about what actually took place.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, in paragraph 3 of this speech of mine, I quote

16 here: "No one is challenging the right of the Croatian people to

17 self-determination." Is that what it says? So was that the position

18 taken by Serbia at the time in 1991, September, in The Hague, that nobody

19 questions or challenges the right of the Croatian people to? It says:

20 "This policy culminated in unilateral proclamation of Croatian

21 independence, which thus the right of the Croatian people to

22 self-determination, which no one challenges or denies, has been abused in

23 the legal acts of the Croatian government to the detriment of that same

24 right of the Serbian people to self-determination."

25 So was that the key problem, the crux of the matter that was

Page 36060

1 raised, and it was clear -- clearly presented to the conference in The

2 Hague on Serbia's part?

3 A. Yes. That was the key problem in the Yugoslav crisis, because the

4 constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia guaranteed equal rights

5 to self-determination to all the constituent nations of Yugoslavia, and

6 this position was expressed by the constitution of the Federal Republic of

7 Croatia and the new authorities in Croatia amended the constitution

8 hastily and deprived the people in Croatia the rights of a constituent

9 peoples and reduced them to the status of a minority. Therefore, this

10 position taken in the speech is a position of great importance because it

11 emphasised and reiterated once again the fact that the proper approach to

12 the right or equal right of all the constituent peoples in Yugoslavia, the

13 right to self-determination, would enable us to solve the Yugoslav crisis

14 in a legal, democratic manner. The new Croatian authorities abused the

15 right to self-determination that they had, and nobody challenges that

16 right, as was set out here, and at the same time it challenged the right

17 of the Serb people.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Jovanovic, I'm stopping you.

19 [Trial Chamber confers]

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I think you have scheduled six

21 hours for this witness. At the rate that you're going and on the basis of

22 the kind of questions that you're asking and the subject areas of the

23 question, I think you will take 12 hours to conclude.

24 This particular matter that he's dealing with, secession and so

25 on, while not irrelevant is a matter on which we already have evidence.

Page 36061

1 At this stage I would almost say it is close to being peripheral to the

2 central issues in this case. So deal with the matter quickly. You're

3 going round and round and round in circles, and you're consuming a lot of

4 time. Get to the point very quickly and bear in mind, as I said, we

5 already have evidence on this matter.

6 You have a specific in number of days in which to present your

7 case, and you must utilise your time more prudently. It is not the most

8 efficient use of the Court's time, and that is the point.

9 We have heard evidence from several witnesses on this question,

10 and I never thought this witness was coming here to give more evidence on

11 this issue. So if you have to deal with it, if you want to deal with it,

12 since it is your case, then deal with it, but deal with it very shortly,

13 very quickly and move on to something that is more central and more

14 directly relevant to the issues that we face on the basis of the

15 indictment.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Robinson. Let me

17 just finish what I was saying.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. I'm just going to quote a portion and then ask you a question, ask

20 you why I quoted that. The question I wish to ask you, in fact, is this:

21 Was it Serbia -- was Serbia a participant in the conflict? And before you

22 answer, I'm going to read what I said on the occasion, and then you'll be

23 able to correct me or agree or explain what this was all about, because

24 this is what it says here, that: "The authorities were demonstrating by

25 armed attacks, demonstrating sovereignty and independence by constant

Page 36062












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Page 36063

1 armed attacks on the territories inhabited by Serbs. Over 100.000

2 refugees from Croatia to Serbia are a direct effect of this policy. On

3 the other hand, there is no single Croat who fled from Serbia to Croatia

4 because of national discrimination. Evidently, it is the actual Croatian

5 government which has forced the Serbs in the Republic of Croatia to

6 organise and defend themselves in order to prevent the repetition of

7 genocide performed by the former Independent State of Croatia during the

8 Second World War.

9 "Since the Serbs in the Serbian Autonomous Province of Krajina

10 and Slavonia and Baranja and Western Srem, being one part in the armed

11 conflicts in Croatia, and according to the documents signed in Belgrade, a

12 participant on equal footing in cease-fire monitoring, I deem the presence

13 of their legitimate representatives in the procedure initiated today not

14 only necessary but actually indispensable."

15 So let me repeat my question to you now: Was Serbia a participant

16 in the conflict, and what was the essence of the strivings made for the

17 representatives of SAO Slavonia, Baranja and Western Srem, SAO Krajina, to

18 become included into the work of the conference?

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Can I just make my position clear on this before

20 it's answered: I regard any answer that's given to this question as

21 valueless because it's the most leading question, I think, that's ever

22 been addressed in the course of this trial; an absolutely pointless way of

23 conducting this examination.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, please answer my question, which was: What was the

Page 36064

1 role of Serbia in that conflict? The most general question that I can put

2 to you.

3 A. Serbia was not involved in any way in armed conflicts in Croatia,

4 for two reasons. The first reason is a factual one: Serbia did not have

5 its own army. The only armed force in Yugoslavia was the Yugoslav

6 People's Army.

7 The second reason is that the federal organs had competencies over

8 the federal army, and Serbia could only have the political influence to

9 the extent that it participated in the federal government and it

10 represented only one-sixth of the federal government. The parties in the

11 conflict were Croatian paramilitary units and the military formations of

12 Serbs in Croatia. This can be seen in the various agreements and appeals

13 where precisely these parties are called upon to implement cease-fire.

14 There was one agreement between President Tudjman and General Kadijevic

15 dated 22nd September, 1991, if I remember correctly, and such an agreement

16 is a direct result of the understanding of the situation, namely, that the

17 parties to this conflict are Croatian paramilitary formations and Yugoslav

18 People's Army, and the military formations of Serbs in Croatia also figure

19 in that context.

20 JUDGE KWON: Excuse me. Mr. Jovanovic, take your case, for

21 example. You are the minister of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia retaining

22 the status as a minister of Serbia. Can you not say that Republic of

23 Serbia has a say in relation to the matter of Federal Republic of

24 Yugoslavia in one way or another, given your situation?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, let me make a

Page 36065

1 clarification. At the time, I was only foreign minister of Serbia. It

2 wasn't until one year later that I became foreign minister of Yugoslavia.

3 The events in Croatia unfolded only in 1991 because the Vance-Owen Plan

4 came into being in 1992 -- or, rather, the Vance Plan.

5 As I said, Serbia could have a political say in the same share

6 that was allotted to other federal units, not more and not less. Even in

7 the Main Staff of the Yugoslav army, Serbia was the least represented

8 republic. It had only a few generals out of a total of 16 generals. So

9 we cannot, based on this, draw a conclusion that Serbia had an influence

10 that was at all relevant in what was going, especially in what was going

11 on in Croatia.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Now that we're dealing with this topic, Mr. Jovanovic, you

14 participated in the meeting which took place in Igalo on the 17th of

15 September, 1991. We can see that in tab 2, Statement by Lord Carrington,

16 The Presidents of the Republic of Croatia and Serbia, and The Minister of

17 National Defence at Igalo, Yugoslavia, on 17 Sep 91."

18 Please be so kind and explain to us the following -- we have this

19 document in Serbian here as well. Please explain to us what was the

20 course of that conversation, that discussion, and what was the role of the

21 president of Serbia within that conversation and within this agreement as

22 a whole? You were a direct participant.

23 A. Lord Carrington called that meeting because he was concerned,

24 seeing that the conflict in Croatia was intensifying. Therefore, a text

25 was drafted which was supposed to be signed by warring parties, namely

Page 36066

1 President Tudjman and General Kadijevic. When he asked President

2 Milosevic to sign it as well in view of his political standing and

3 influence that he had, he later on agreed to insert into text "under

4 political and not only military influence." Therefore, at the request,

5 special request of Lord Carrington and after the insertion of this text,

6 President Milosevic agreed to sign this as a sign of support to peace and

7 cease-fire in Croatia. He did not do that representing any warring side

8 but as a political personality who wanted to add his weight to

9 establishing peace.

10 Q. All right. Let us take a look at tab 5, which is a report of the

11 Conference on Yugoslavia. This is a foreign document.

12 Could you please explain to us, what is this document about?

13 This is a document I received from the other side. Therefore, the

14 document provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, I suppose of the

15 Netherlands, which at the time was the country presiding the European

16 Community.

17 A. I first have to take a look at this, because this must be a

18 document from The Hague Conference on Yugoslavia, but there were a number

19 of such documents. Therefore, I need to take a very brief look at this,

20 with the Court's indulgence.

21 As far as I can see, this is an appeal sent by the Presidency of

22 the SFRY to reach cease-fire agreement in Croatia.

23 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, is this a document coming from one of the European

24 ministries of foreign affairs, informing about the Conference on

25 Yugoslavia?

Page 36067

1 A. Yes. This seems to be a document of the foreign affairs of the

2 Netherlands, which produced this document to be used by the chairman,

3 Mr. Van den Broek.

4 Q. Very well. In relation to what you just explained about the

5 agreement in Igalo, please take a look at the bottom of the first page of

6 this dispatch. I will quote just three lines: "[In English] The

7 collective Presidency of SFRY and President Tudjman, in the presence of

8 President Milosevic, agree to give the following instructions to their

9 respective forces immediately."

10 [Interpretation] Therefore, the collective Presidency of

11 Yugoslavia and President Tudjman. And then it says, "in the presence of

12 President Milosevic..." So who agreed here to issue instructions to their

13 forces?

14 A. What is repeated here are precisely the words uttered in Igalo.

15 So this document repeats what was stated in Igalo and later implemented in

16 the agreement between Tudjman and General Kadijevic as representatives of

17 the warring sides in the cease-fire agreement. Just like at Igalo,

18 they're counting on the presence of President Milosevic. At Igalo they

19 did that for his political influence. And based on this, we can see who

20 the warring sides are, and also see that the presence of President

21 Milosevic was needed in order to show his support for peace and in order

22 to make it more binding on the warring sides. So I don't see any

23 difference between this text here and the text from Igalo.

24 Q. It says here "collective Presidency of Yugoslavia and President

25 Tudjman..." Therefore, they agreed to issue instructions to their forces.

Page 36068

1 Are there any forces of Serbia that need to be given instructions? Which

2 are the warring sides here?

3 A. No. There are no military forces in Serbia. Serbia did not have

4 any military forces. But as is known, what we are dealing with here are

5 the Croatian forces, the JNA, and the Serbs in Croatia who organised

6 themselves in order to defend themselves. And those were ad hoc

7 established units.

8 Q. Very well. Please take a look at the following page, which deals

9 with the plenary session. This is the well-known session at which Serbia

10 did not accept the Carrington document. This document here explains it

11 very briefly, although we have my speech from that session.

12 It says here: "President Milosevic made a formal reserve [In

13 English] on the first chapter of the proposed text of the Chair since the

14 paper started from the premise that an internationally recognised state

15 should be abolished."

16 [Interpretation] Therefore, what was this all about,

17 Mr. Jovanovic? This is a question that has been put here frequently. You

18 were present at this occasion, so you have everything you need to have in

19 order to explain this.

20 A. The conference was called in order to preserve Yugoslavia, as the

21 European Community in its declaration dated the 8th of August, 1991,

22 stated that precisely. So this was not a conference that was supposed to

23 be fatal to Yugoslavia. This is why this is the cornerstone for

24 everything else that was to happen afterwards. They are starting from the

25 premise that Yugoslavia must disappear, and instead of Yugoslavia, there

Page 36069

1 should be new republics constituted. This was a way to avoid calling

2 secession a secession. They opted for calling this process a

3 disintegration of Yugoslavia. Unfortunately, this political position was

4 later implemented through the opinion of Badinter's commission, veiled

5 under the legal veil.

6 President Milosevic insisted on this position here because he

7 believed that they needed to discuss everything else contained in this

8 paper. Without that, there was nothing else to discuss.

9 We kept insisting on the position that, yes, some republics can

10 avail themselves of their right to self-determination. However, what was

11 a problem, that that same right to self-determination was denied to Serbia

12 and Montenegro and to Serbs living in Croatia. So that was the key issue.

13 And this was the key reason for what happened afterwards, namely the

14 intensification of Yugoslav crisis and conflict in Croatia. It introduced

15 Yugoslav people to new conflicts.

16 We insisted on the position that those republics who wished to do

17 so could leave Yugoslavia as a joint state. However, there had to be a

18 proviso; namely, that those republics and nations which wished to stay in

19 Yugoslavia as their state, which would be a legal successor and which

20 would be -- which would have international -- status of an international

21 subject, should be allowed to do so.

22 So this initiative started by Lord Carrington was not seen through

23 its end, no. An end was put to it, an end that was to the detriment of

24 those republics and nations who wished to stay in Yugoslavia. As a result

25 of that, consequences ensued which can be felt to this day.

Page 36070

1 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Jovanovic, what do you mean when you say that

2 the same right to self-determination was denied to Serbia and Montenegro?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I said that because the right to

4 self-determination does not contain only the right to secession. It has

5 its internal and external aspect. Therefore, it contains also the right

6 to remain in the common joint state. As the survival of Yugoslavia --

7 JUDGE BONOMY: You're distinguishing Serbia and the position of

8 Serbia and Montenegro and its rights from those of any other republic.

9 Now, what was the difference? I quite accept that you take the view that

10 Croatia had no right to secede. Does it follow that Serbia and Montenegro

11 would have no right to secede either? So what is the difference you're

12 trying to make or identify between the positions of these two republics --

13 or indeed three republics, rather?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Because Serbia and Montenegro

15 proposed a joint amendment, specifying that those republics who wished

16 could remain in Yugoslavia as a joint state.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: You either don't understand the question or you're

18 not answering it.

19 You seem to be suggesting there's some difference in the status of

20 Serbia and the status of Montenegro from that of Croatia that was

21 prejudicial to these two republics, and I may have misunderstood you, but

22 I was trying to clarify the point.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Is it -- Mr. Jovanovic, before you answer, is it

24 that you're saying that Serbia and Montenegro wanted the right to remain

25 as the FRY, as the legal successor, and that right was denied, was being

Page 36071

1 denied?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Precisely that. That was a

3 legitimate right that they had. Lord Carrington kept challenging that and

4 denying that to the very end. He used to say, "You, Serbia and

5 Montenegro, can create a new statement. You can call it Yugoslavia, even,

6 but it has to be a new state."

7 With your indulgence, Your Honours, I would like to remind you of

8 a meeting that took place between Prime Minister Panic and Prime Minister

9 Major and Junior Minister Hurd in London. I was present there as well.

10 We explained the same issue to them. We insisted on legal succession and

11 the status of international subject that was to be granted to FRY, and

12 Mr. Douglas Hurd stated the following: "You can have your arguments, but

13 you must, you must accept our position." And this was the verdict that

14 was taken with respect to the existence of Yugoslavia and legal secession.

15 Unfortunately, this position was taken by other members of the EU and then

16 adopted by the Security Council, and this explains precisely the suffering

17 that we had to endure for the following ten years within the UN and within

18 the international community as a whole.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm not sure if it explains that. That may be an

20 overstatement. But continue, Mr. Milosevic.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. The next paragraph in this same telegram says - I quoted the

23 preceding one to you before - I am saying that this abolishes Yugoslavia,

24 and they explain it very briefly here. "[In English] President Milosevic

25 indicated that a final decision on the future arrangements between the

Page 36072












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13 English transcripts.













Page 36073

1 Yugoslav components could only be taken by the Yugoslav peoples..."

2 [Interpretation] Was that something special?

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, do we need to go over this again?

4 Aren't you beating this point to death?

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Robinson. If that is

6 sufficient -- well, I wanted to go through these dispatches because they

7 confirm the truthfulness of that which I'm saying.

8 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, for the sake of time, can I remind you

9 that we have -- we dealt with exactly the same tab when Professor Avramov

10 was here. This exhibit was admitted into evidence already. Its number is

11 778.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have that in mind, but I also have

13 in mind that Mr. Jovanovic was present and that he can give truly

14 authentic explanations.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation].

16 Q. Please, Mr. Jovanovic, could we now have a look at tab 6. That is

17 also a report from the seventh plenary session.

18 JUDGE KWON: Which is Prosecution Exhibit 779.

19 MR. NICE: I believe so, Your Honour.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: As usual, Judge Kwon is ahead.

21 MR. NICE: On this occasion it was because we were temporarily --

22 we had temporarily surrendered our binder with the record. We've now got

23 it back.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. On the first page, where it says that the meeting is attended by

Page 36074

1 the presidents of all the republics and by Mr. Mesic and Mr. Tupurkovski

2 from the Federal Presidency; and Ante Markovic, Prime Minister; and

3 Loncar, foreign minister, also attended on behalf of the federal

4 government.

5 Now, towards the end of this last paragraph on this page, it says

6 -- or, rather, Lord Carrington explains that he condemns the attacks on

7 Vukovar and Dubrovnik, and then he says -- he said, Lord Carrington, "[In

8 English] ... President Tudjman had given assurances that the blockade on

9 the JNA barracks would be lifted as undertaken on October 18th."

10 [Interpretation] So as Carrington says here, Tudjman promises to

11 lift the blockade of the barracks.

12 Do you know what the main problem was at that time in the conflict

13 between the JNA and the Croatian forces?

14 A. The main problem in the conflicts throughout Croatia was the

15 decision of the new Croatian government to place military facilities, that

16 is to say barracks, under full blockade, to deny them water and food and

17 other assistance, and to compel them in this way to surrender or, rather,

18 to render them incapable of carrying out their duties. That is something

19 that not a single army in the world would allow itself to do, but

20 President Tudjman precisely did that in order to provoke the JNA and, as

21 he explained later, to have a war and in this way attain the independence

22 of Croatia. Regrettably, that was the case in Vukovar and in other towns,

23 and various agreements concluded between President Tudjman and General

24 Kadijevic in relation to cease-fires and lifting the blockade of these

25 military barracks were not observed because that did not suit President

Page 36075

1 Tudjman. He knew that only by extending the conflict it would be easier

2 and faster for him to attain independence. After all, Chancellor Kohl and

3 Minister Genscher persuaded him of this through their own statements that

4 the continuation of hostilities would speed up the recognition of Croatia

5 as an independent state.

6 Q. This entire conflict in Croatia between the JNA and the Croatian

7 forces, is there any mention of Serbia at all? Does Serbia figure in this

8 at all?

9 A. It cannot be seen anywhere and it is not mentioned anywhere except

10 in the words of condemnation uttered by President Tudjman. Of course and

11 it is in his interest to portray things differently.

12 Q. All right. Now that we're dealing with this document, that is to

13 say tab 6, that is a very long dispatch, it has to do with many issues,

14 and I cannot really deal with all of that, but I would like to draw your

15 attention to page 4. All these events were mentioned here. This is

16 paragraph 2.3: "[In English] President Milosevic (Serbia).

17 "President Milosevic indicated that he had asked -- that he had

18 asked General Kadijevic and Vice-president Kostic if it was true that JNA

19 was shelling the city of Dubrovnik. They said that this was untrue.

20 Whatever the situation was, he, Milosevic could not accept the shelling of

21 Dubrovnik, which could not be justified."

22 [Interpretation] Do you remember all of this that had to do with

23 Dubrovnik, generally speaking, and my position and the position of Serbia

24 in relation to what was going on there?

25 A. I remember that this was discussed and that you made this

Page 36076

1 statement or, rather, the assurance -- that you gave these assurances that

2 Serbia had nothing to do with Dubrovnik and that it cannot condone its

3 bombing.

4 In addition to that, there were several statements made by Serbia

5 condemning the shelling of Dubrovnik. For example, the Serbian government

6 made a statement. The Presidency of the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia

7 also condemned that action. I think that I had also made a statement to

8 that effect.

9 So as far as Serbia is concerned, there were no indications

10 whatsoever that Serbia was behind that or that it could have any interest

11 in it.

12 Q. All right, Mr. Jovanovic.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Could I again just clarify something. If you were

14 being assured that there was no attack or bombing by the JNA of Dubrovnik,

15 what was it you were condemning?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] President Milosevic says in this

17 statement, "And if there is indeed shelling of Dubrovnik, he wishes to

18 point out that Serbia does not condone that and does not stand behind it."

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, I'm going to quote this once again so that it would

21 not be unclear. The second part only. I asked whether it was correct,

22 and the answer was no, that it was not correct. "[In English] Whatever

23 the situation was, he, Milosevic, could not accept the shelling of

24 Dubrovnik, which could not be justified."

25 [Interpretation] Our attitude towards that was totally clear, not

Page 36077

1 ambivalent at all, and it says so here. That is what is written here.

2 After all, Dubrovnik is --

3 MR. NICE: I hesitate to --

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's a comment that you're making,

5 Mr. Milosevic. I imagine that you adduced this evidence saying that it

6 goes to your state of mind, that you had a state of mind, but that's for

7 us to evaluate.

8 [Trial Chamber confers]

9 MR. NICE: Your Honours. Your Honours, while I'm on my feet,

10 having risen to object to the last question, I just draw to your attention

11 something that I had in mind to mention to you a few minutes back where

12 the witness made very sweeping observations about Chancellor Kohl and

13 Minister Genscher and about how they persuaded Tudjman to continue

14 hostilities. It's not likely to be something I'm going to have the time

15 or inclination to deal with myself, and I'm not here to defend politicians

16 or government ministers of any country, nevertheless it may be that in

17 material that is largely, in my submission irrelevant, if a statement like

18 that is going to be made, it ought to be supported by detail.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we hear the submission.

20 Continue, Mr. Milosevic.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, you heard Mr. Nice. What do you know about the

23 then-activities and the relations that were established between the new

24 Croatian authorities and Germany and other political factors in Europe?

25 A. The new Croatian authorities had very close contacts, and they

Page 36078

1 enjoyed very strong support in their policy of secession from several

2 politicians from different countries. I mention two politicians from

3 Germany but Austria was there, especially its minister Alois Mock. Then

4 Cardinal Sodano of the Vatican, and the Pope himself. I think that this

5 was on the 17th of August that in Pecs in Hungary he stated that the

6 aspirations of Croatia for independence are legitimate. This was before

7 the beginning of the Conference on Yugoslavia. So this was the Conference

8 on Yugoslavia, not against Yugoslavia.

9 As for the relationship between Germany and Croatia, they were the

10 closest possible along all lines; not only political, also in terms of

11 intelligence.

12 As for what Mr. Nice said, that is not something that is unknown

13 because these are statements that were made in public. I can also add

14 that two days before Croatia was declared independent country, the 25th of

15 June, 1991, that Minister Genscher asked the members of the European

16 Community to recognise a Croatia that will soon declare its independence.

17 So even before its declaration of independence, he was advocating its

18 independence. And Chancellor Kohl, about 10 days later, at a meeting of

19 the European Community, I think it was in Strasbourg, he raised the issue

20 of recognising the independence of Slovenia and Croatia. So that was in

21 July. And the Conference on Yugoslavia started on the 7th of September.

22 If there was goodwill to have this conference held in order to preserve

23 Yugoslavia, then these statements favouring the independence of Croatia

24 and Slovenia should not have been made. As a matter of fact, the CSE in

25 its declaration from August the same year, 1991, asked for the

Page 36079

1 preservation of Yugoslavia and for meeting all legitimate interests and

2 requests of all the peoples of Yugoslavia, not only some of them.

3 There are also other confirmations to that effect, that the

4 aspirations of Slovenia and Croatia for independence were strongly

5 supported even before the conference. For example, Cardinal Sodano --

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think you have answered the question. What is

7 the CSE? What is the CSE in your reference to a declaration from August

8 of the same year?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] CSE is the Conference on Security

10 and Cooperation in Europe. It is nowadays calls the OSCE. Then it was

11 called the CSCE. It became an organisation, OSCE, and it worked

12 hand-in-hand with the European Community at the time. Together they

13 expressed their interest in resolving the Yugoslav crisis --

14 JUDGE BONOMY: May I observe that I don't think you did answer the

15 question. The question was about persuading Croatia to continue

16 hostilities.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: We have now come to the time for the break. We

18 will break for 20 minutes.

19 --- Recess taken at 10.29 a.m.

20 --- On resuming at 10.57 a.m.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please continue, Mr. Milosevic.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, take a look at tab 41 now, please, and look at what

24 it says there. It says "JNA-Croatia Cease-fire Agreement of September the

25 22nd."

Page 36080

1 We're not going to go into all the details but it says: "Federal

2 Defence Ministry Announcement," and then it goes on to say: "Pursuant to

3 the statements signed at Igalo on 17 September [In English] 1991, an

4 arrangement was made with the leadership of the Republic of Croatia at

5 1150 hours today to adopt and proclaim mutual orders for an absolute

6 cessation of fire --"

7 JUDGE KWON: I wonder where we -- what tab?

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's tab 41.

9 JUDGE KWON: It's in binder 1.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: And, Mr. Milosevic, proper decorum requires that

11 you don't proceed with the question until you are sure the Judges have

12 found the section in the document in the particular exhibit, because we

13 have to follow it.

14 MR. NICE: Your Honour, while that's being done, I observe without

15 making a position one way or the other that we had pursued a policy of

16 producing exhibits as they're dealt with. I have no objection to the

17 existing exhibits -- sorry, the exhibits that have already been referred

18 to being produced but it looks as though if we're going to be jumping

19 about the binder it might be prudent to deal with them one by one.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Thanks for reminding. I think we had

21 actually determined that we would proceed to admit the exhibits on an

22 individual basis.

23 Those that have already been referred to, does the court registrar

24 have a record of them?

25 JUDGE KWON: We can give a separate exhibit number to the whole

Page 36081

1 binder.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, a number for the entire binder.

3 THE REGISTRAR: That will be D275.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: So we have that exhibit number.

5 THE REGISTRAR: D275 for four binders.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: For the four binders.

7 THE REGISTRAR: And I will keep a record of each tab.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

9 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

10 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone for the accused.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Microphone, Mr. Milosevic.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation].

13 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, at the beginning, it says this: "The Federal

14 Secretariat for National Defence," and it says: "Pursuant to the

15 statement signed at Igalo on [In English] 17 September 1991, an

16 arrangement was made with the leadership of the Republic of Croatia," et

17 cetera. [Interpretation] And then it says that there should be an

18 absolute cessation of fire. Then the Croatian representative Tudjman

19 orders that all attacks should be suspended, National Guard Corps and MUP,

20 and that they would establish normal supplies of water, electricity, food,

21 et cetera.

22 And then he goes on to say, in the Croatian part: "[In English]

23 After the implementation of this agreement on a genuine cease-fire,

24 negotiations will be commenced on the discharge of all the obligations

25 stemming from the agreement signed in Igalo on 17 September 1991 and on

Page 36082












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13 English transcripts.













Page 36083

1 the disengagement of the armed forces of SFRY and the Republic of

2 Croatia."

3 [Interpretation] So who are the parties? Then we have the

4 implementation of the Igalo agreement. Who are the parties in the

5 conflict according to agreement? What can you see on the basis of this

6 agreement?

7 A. We can see that the parties in conflict, on the one hand you have

8 the JNA, and on the other the military formations of the Republic of

9 Croatia. But I think this can be seen in all the other agreements on

10 cease-fire and cessation of hostilities because they were the ones to

11 conclude such agreements. And this is the realisation of a previous

12 agreement that was reached and signed in Igalo upon which Lord Carrington

13 insisted. And I've already explained that at the time President

14 Milosevic, at his insistence, signed the agreement and gave his support to

15 peace in view of the political influence he wielded as president of one of

16 the republics.

17 Q. To the best of your knowledge, was this agreement ever implemented

18 or not?

19 A. Unfortunately, it was not realised because the JNA was truly

20 interested in saving its military personnel, to pull them out of the war

21 danger, whereas that was not in the interests of the other side. And I've

22 already explained that it was their interest to prolong the hostilities in

23 expectation of speeding up the process of recognition for Croatia on the

24 part of other states, third countries.

25 And if the Honourable Trial Chamber will allow me to answer Judge

Page 36084

1 Bonomy's question, it was erroneously understood that I said that German

2 politicians asked for the promulgation of hostilities. All I wanted to

3 say was what was said by Chancellor Kohl, for example, when he threatened

4 to recognise Croatia if the hostilities persisted, and that is the message

5 that can be understood as a message to the JNA and a message to President

6 Tudjman as well. Minister Genscher, in the course of that summer, made

7 public statements to the effect that a single day of promulgation of armed

8 conflicts in Croatia would make Croatian independence come closer. That

9 was also a message to the JNA but it was also encouragement to the

10 Croatian side, that they could expect speedy recognition if the

11 hostilities went on for any length of time.

12 Thank you.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] May we now, since this follows on

14 from what we were discussing, see a videotape, a tape between Tudjman and

15 Kadijevic. It's an intercept, actually, in tab 35. Intercept between

16 General Kadijevic and Tudjman. I don't know whether it has been

17 translated properly. We interviewed a witness - I don't want to mention

18 his name now - however, in view of the fact that Mr. Jovanovic was at

19 Igalo himself and contacted President Tudjman and General Kadijevic, he

20 will be able to tell us that the tape is authentic and the event.

21 May we have the tape played, please. It is an audiotape of a

22 conversation between President Tudjman and General Kadijevic.

23 [Audiotape played]

24 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] Hello, good morning.

25 "Is the general there?

Page 36085

1 "Yes, he is.

2 "Would you put him through, please."

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: We're not seeing it on the video. It's a tape?

4 It's audio.

5 MR. NICE: What we don't have, at least what I haven't yet located

6 is the -- well, tab 35 --

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Tab 35 is headed "... Cross-examination of Milan

8 Babic."

9 MR. NICE: I think we're probably going to find a form of

10 transcript in what was read into evidence.

11 JUDGE KWON: From some eighth or ninth lines, "Intercept played"

12 and we have the transcript.

13 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note that the transcript states

14 that the interpreters said on the occasion they did not have the text and

15 that the sound was very bad. And we say that again today.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, can the text be passed on to the

17 interpreters?

18 THE INTERPRETER: We do have a text, Your Honour.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Okay. Well, let it be played.

20 [Audiotape played]

21 THE INTERPRETER: "[Voiceover] Hello. Good morning.

22 "Good morning.

23 "The president is here.

24 "Put him through, please.

25 "Is the general there?

Page 36086

1 "Yes, he is.

2 "Would you put us through, please.

3 "Yes, go ahead.

4 "Hello?

5 "Hello?

6 "Hello. Yes.

7 "Franjo?

8 "Yes.

9 "Good morning.

10 "Morning.

11 "What's the result?

12 "Well, I don't really know. I don't know what was definitely

13 decided.

14 "I can't hear you very well. Can you speak up, please.

15 "Listen, as I was saying, I don't know what is definitive.

16 "Hello? Yes.

17 "They said that peace would be established there.

18 "Where? Hello?

19 "They were discussing Sibenik, but then news came that the planes

20 were bombing again during the night.

21 "THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters seek the Court's instructions.

22 "THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] What?

23 "They asked for his -- tendering his resignation, but he said he

24 -- you had agreed to that.

25 "No, I didn't talk to him at all. Leave Markovic alone.

Page 36087

1 "Well, do what you like.

2 "Fire was opened at Sibenik once again this morning, and in other

3 places there was sporadic gunfire, but it was very intensive in Sibenik,

4 and I don't want to beat about the bush any more or the underhand role

5 played by anybody, including Markovic. He says that you and I and

6 Milosevic, as he put it, the hooligans or something to that effect, that

7 they should be hanged, and they shouldn't be the ones to create peace,

8 that he would create peace, because he blames everybody else for the fact

9 that his policy fell through. So I'm not talking about that. That's got

10 nothing to do with it. If you did anything along those lines, then you

11 did so wrongly.

12 "I didn't know anything about that. And Markovic was defeated

13 because he's a charlatan. He doesn't know anything about anything. He's

14 an ignoramus and he failed all the tests and always sought to blame

15 somebody else for his wrongdoings. But let's get back to what we were

16 discussing. Can peace be established or not? I don't have time to wait.

17 I can't wait any longer. If you can stop the firing, the firing that's

18 still going on in Sibenik. And secondly, can you deblock the barracks,

19 the military barracks? If you can, do so by 12.00. If that is done,

20 Franjo, than after that, tomorrow, we can agree to carry on the process we

21 started at Igalo. If you cannot do that, then the two of us will not talk

22 to each other any more. So that's quite clear.

23 "Yes. You know what? Maybe we should try to -- or, rather,

24 before we meet we could do this by fax, confirm this both because of

25 Croatia, to confirm a written truce, which means an agreement that would

Page 36088

1 deal with the army in the way that suits sovereign Croatian authorities.

2 And it's also in the interests the army, to protect the interests of the

3 army, to protect the lives of the members of the army.

4 "So does that mean, Franjo, that you place the second point first

5 and the first second or vice versa?

6 "No. We have agreed with the wise old man Carrington as to the

7 order of how things should be done. So if we continue along those lines,

8 we can continue to negotiate. If not, then we can break off all contacts.

9 "What are we going to do if we can't achieve that?

10 "Well, if things get worse in Sibenik -- well, I can guarantee

11 that not a single bullet will be fired, but let them cease their fire. We

12 have a deadline up until 1000 hours. So let the fire stop. Let there be

13 the deblocking by 12.00 noon and we'll continue the conversation tomorrow.

14 A solution must be found. If you agree to that. If you're not capable of

15 doing that, then say so. If you don't want to do it, then that's it.

16 We'll each go our own ways and see what happens. Then there will be a

17 disaster.

18 "Of course there will.

19 "I'm doing this for the last time. This is my last effort, and I

20 state with great responsibility, a responsibility that I bear, and you

21 also bear a great responsibility. We must try to avoid the worst. You

22 can avoid it by fulfilling each of these points, freeing each of the

23 barracks because the army will not fall. Today is a turning point, and

24 Veljko, I'll do what I can to stop this, to effect a cease-fire in Sibenik

25 by 12.00 noon. And let them provide us with food, water, and free passage

Page 36089

1 by 12.00 noon and then we can sit down to the negotiating table tomorrow,

2 and all possibilities are open. Now, if we can't find a solution, then

3 we'll go back to war, and you know what that means.

4 "Well, I think it will be terrible. This would be disastrous, and

5 I think we will be able to find a solution at the negotiating table. If I

6 didn't believe that, then I wouldn't have talked to you three times. And

7 I do believe that we'll be able to find a solution.

8 "Let's try, and let's try and avoid the worst, because it would be

9 a catastrophe, great destruction. So let's have a cease-fire. Stop the

10 firing in Sibenik, Franjo. Order a cease-fire, Franjo. Or if you're not

11 able to do that -- well, you can do what you like. If Letica is there,

12 well, he's worse than that man Spegelj that made things much worse. You

13 can do what you like. Not only him. Everything's like that.

14 "You said that Ljubicic hadn't returned either; is that right?

15 "Yes, but Ljubicic is not -- Grubisic is not Letica. I know that

16 he didn't come back. That's up to him. When he left, I knew he wouldn't

17 come back. And that's his business. It's his face that is on the line.

18 So we can conclude that it's a general mood.

19 "Well, if there is a general mood for war, then okay, go to war.

20 All I'm asking you for is a cease-fire, nothing more than that, what we

21 signed for, and then we can negotiate later on, nothing else.

22 "Very well.

23 "So you give it some thought, think about it, whether we can find

24 a way out of all this. So let there be an absolute cease-fire by 1000

25 hours. Absolute cease-fire so that people can continue living. They must

Page 36090

1 be given water. Otherwise, I'm going to tender my resignation. Well, not

2 me, but you are. So don't let them die like that. I would not allow them

3 to die in that way. And everything that Ante Markovic is preparing --

4 "Yes, it's a dangerous business that business.

5 "He's a son of a bitch and you know that very well. He came to

6 see me many times and I told you about that many times. So we must get

7 the better of those two and then we've solved the situation; right?

8 "Yes.

9 "Because he wasn't there when the signature was required because

10 nobody took him seriously. Nobody has any respect for him and that's it.

11 "Okay. Goodbye."

12 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters apologise, but they were not able

13 to read the text as it stood.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, did you recognise General Kadijevic's voice?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. General Kadijevic said he was talking to Tudjman for the third

18 time that night and was advocating an absolute cease-fire. That's

19 something that we were able to hear on the tape; right?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Now, was that respected? Was the agreement respected? Did they

22 abide by the agreement that was signed in Igalo through the mediation of

23 Lord Carrington?

24 A. From this conversation we can see that it was not respected and

25 that there a roundabout intention to avoid it and to continue the

Page 36091

1 hostilities, and that is why later on a new agreement was reached on the

2 cessation of hostilities. I think that was on the 1st of September or

3 thereabouts. But of the 13 or 14 cease-fire agreements, the total number

4 of cease-fire agreements, as far as I know that's how many there were, and

5 as far as I know all of them were interrupted due to the Croatian side.

6 Q. And what can we see from all these elements here, everything we

7 heard? What are the -- what were the parties to the conflict over there?

8 A. That's quite obvious, because the two parties in the conflict

9 discussed, had a conversation and dealt with the military situation on the

10 ground, in the field. Nobody else could have resolved that situation

11 because they had the power and authority over the armed forces that were

12 there in the field. Nobody else was mentioned on either side.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I'm sorry to interrupt you, but

14 let us just consider the admission of the audio tape, because we're

15 dealing with the exhibits individually.

16 Mr. Nice, let's hear from you.

17 MR. NICE: There was, of course, no written version of the first

18 part of the tape which covered assertions about an important witness, Ante

19 Markovic, in some detail. And as to the balance of the intercept, the

20 transcript was very imperfect. No complaints. It was simply obviously

21 being read out by the accused in cross-examination from some document.

22 The accused should probably have in mind that intercepts produced

23 by the Prosecution have been according to a pretty clear form or formula,

24 namely questions and answers carefully divided up and transcribed, and it

25 may be appropriate for the accused and those assisting him to have this

Page 36092












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13 English transcripts.













Page 36093

1 tape properly transcribed in full.

2 That would be my only observation. I don't object to its

3 admissibility.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: It had been marked as D62 for identification.

5 MR. NICE: Yes. It's already in as an exhibit, I think, whatever

6 it is, D62, but what we really need is a proper transcript of it.

7 I'm grateful, of course. Your Honours will have seen that Judge

8 May asked for a transcript on the second page, a third of the way down.

9 [Trial Chamber confers]

10 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters in the English booth rendered a

11 simultaneous interpretation of the tape as they heard it. Thank you.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... for the tape

13 to be transcribed.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Could I ask for --

15 JUDGE KWON: The interpreters made a note.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: I said we'll renew the order made by Judge May

17 for the tape to be transcribed.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Milosevic, could I have clarification of the

19 date of the interception of that communication.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't know the date exactly, but

21 it must be immediately after the meeting at Igalo, because General

22 Kadijevic says "This is the third time that we're talking about this," in

23 order to have this implemented.

24 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm not sure if the observations by the

25 interpreters working for us today reflect any sensitivity that I might

Page 36094

1 have been dissatisfied with what was provided. I was, of course,

2 extremely grateful to the interpreters here for what they provided, no

3 complaints of them at all, simply noting that for good order we really

4 need a written version, prepared at more leisure, but I understand the

5 difficulties and I'm grateful for what they did.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: They did very well in the circumstances.

7 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, we've covered several conferences. We've heard

10 explanations of the reasons for the conflict that erupted, the cease-fire

11 agreements, and we also saw the reports of the Dutch ministry on the

12 events taking place at the conference as well as the agreements between

13 the JNA and Croatia.

14 So now, having all those facts in mind, I will read out to you

15 item 6 -- or, rather, count 6 from Croatian indictment, which reads as

16 follows -- I hope that you have count 6. That's on page 2 in Serbian

17 version. It says: "Slobodan Milosevic participated in the joint criminal

18 enterprise," and then it explains various paragraphs and says: "The

19 purpose of this joint criminal enterprise was to remove by force Croatian

20 and other non-Serb population from approximately one-third of Croatian

21 territory."

22 Please pay attention to what's coming: "The territories which

23 under his plan were to become part of new Serb state under the domination

24 by perpetrating crimes" and so on.

25 Mr. Jovanovic, these events, this series of events, including

Page 36095

1 cease-fire agreements and events reflecting the situation in Yugoslavia at

2 the time, does all of that confirm or deny this claim, or to be more

3 precise, what plan, either plan created by myself or by Serbia, does it

4 deal with? Was there a plan to remove the Croat and other non-Serb

5 population from the approximately one-third of Croatian territory?

6 A. I was not aware of such plan ever, and I don't think that such

7 plan existed. Based on the facts that we heard, I don't think that one

8 can conclude that there was such a joint criminal enterprise to achieve

9 those goals.

10 Moreover, it could be said that President Tudjman wanted not only

11 to achieve independence by means of war but also wanted to get rid of the

12 extra population, meaning Serbs, in Croatia by means of war. After the

13 victorious operation called Storm in which several thousands of Serbs

14 perished and which represented the greatest ethnic cleansing --

15 MR. NICE: Objection. It's quite interesting to observe that the

16 answer now being given is to a question that wasn't asked. It came out

17 with remarkable facility, but it was not asked.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, it wasn't asked, but it is still evidence.

19 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can Mr. Jovanovic continue or need I

21 put some additional questions to him?

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... and short

23 answers.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Therefore, based on all the events that we covered very

Page 36096

1 superficially in your testimony so far, who was involved in the conflict?

2 Who was the victim? Who fought? Who perished? What was the origin of

3 refugees and so on? Therefore, I put this question to you and read out

4 this count of indictment, and based on that, please tell me, was there any

5 plan on the Serb part to expel Croat and non-Serb population or did

6 something else happen there?

7 A. All facts point to something quite contrary, not what is stated in

8 the indictment. Back in The Hague in September, at the time you stated

9 that until that time, several thousands of Serbs fled from Croatia to

10 Serbia, not only in the towns but also in other parts of Croatian

11 territory where their lives were threatened. The conduct of Croat

12 authorities had a very clear goal, namely to intimidate Serbs and to

13 encourage them to flee. This mass expulsion, this mass exodus of Serbs

14 culminated in the Operation Storm. President Tudjman, shortly after that,

15 said in a gathering that Serbs will not constitute more than 3 to 5 per

16 cent of Croatian territory ever in the future, which shows that this was

17 an additional goal of Croatia in addition to achieving independence.

18 Q. What you just stated, is it related to the speech of Franjo

19 Tudjman at a rally in Zagreb where he stated there would be no war had

20 Croatia not wanted one? We've already seen this speech of his on a tape

21 here. Do you remember him uttering those words, "There would be no war

22 had Croatia not wanted one but we decided that was the way to achieve our

23 goals"? Can you tell us what goals he referred to?

24 A. Yes. I remember that. And it is a bit unusual that President

25 Tudjman so openly admitted that he favoured the war option in order to

Page 36097

1 achieve his goals.

2 What I tried to do was to show that he had several parallel goals.

3 Independence was one goal, and then the other goal was to get rid of a

4 large number of Serbs. And the events showed us in precisely what way he

5 worked on achieving this.

6 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, all right, let us go back to the Conference on

7 Yugoslavia. In tab 25, we have a letter by the vice-president of the

8 Presidency of Yugoslavia sent to the chairman of the Conference on

9 Yugoslavia, Lord Carrington. This is a long letter which mentions that

10 the Presidency of Yugoslavia on its session held on the December -- on 8th

11 of December, 1991, examined the opinion of the Arbitration Commission sent

12 by the conference secretary to the members of the Presidency and that it

13 reached certain positions.

14 Would you please elaborate on those positions.

15 A. As far as I can remember, this letter represented a challenge to

16 this thesis from the second document of Lord Carrington to the effect that

17 Yugoslavia ceased to exist and that it was in the process of

18 disintegration and that therefore federal units had to be taken care of by

19 placing them under a roof of newly independent states. And this letter

20 states the facts showing that Yugoslavia still exists because more than

21 half of its population continues to live in that country and that it is

22 only the peoples of Yugoslavia who by way of referendum can decide whether

23 their joint state can continue to exist. This was not an issue to be

24 decided by any international forum.

25 Furthermore, it states that Serbia and Montenegro, as well as

Page 36098

1 Serbs living in other republics, remain loyal to their country, to their

2 state which would continue to exist and that they do not wish to leave it,

3 nor did they ever express a wish to break away.

4 Further arguments --

5 Q. All right. You don't have to interpret the entire letter. The

6 letter is quite long. Please tell us, does it show an orientation towards

7 conflict or an orientation towards peace? Does it favour violence or

8 peace?

9 A. This shows positions which favour a peaceful political, democratic

10 solution, not a continuation of unilateral secessionist acts on the part

11 of any republic. Prior to this -- I think that just prior to this the

12 European Community urged all Yugoslav republics to seek independence

13 without mentioning Yugoslavia, because they had already erased Yugoslavia

14 from the political map of the Balkans in Europe.

15 Q. All right, Mr. Jovanovic. In relation to this appeal sent by the

16 European Community to the republics in Yugoslavia to opt for independence

17 and to choose that path, we see under tab 27 a letter of yours. It is

18 stated here that this is a letter sent by Minister Jovanovic, minister of

19 foreign affairs and that that was in connection with the urging to seek

20 independence. Please take a look at this letter. It's in tab 27.

21 A. I've found it.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I hope that you have

23 this letter as well.


25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 36099

1 Q. So this is a reply sent by Serbia following this appeal to seek

2 independence, and it's stated here Republic of Serbia, Ministry of Foreign

3 Affairs, Belgrade. This was sent on the 23rd of December, 1991 to Hans

4 Van den Broek, minister of foreign affairs in the Netherlands who at the

5 time -- or, rather, the Netherlands at the time chaired the European

6 Community.

7 Since this is your letter, Mr. Jovanovic, I think it would be

8 wiser for you to explain what this letter pertained to and what positions

9 it expressed.

10 A. This letter is not simply a response to the offer extended to

11 Serbia to seek independence and to seek recognition as a newly independent

12 state, but it rather summarises our basic principles and positions in

13 relation to the Yugoslav crisis.

14 In this letter, I immediately highlighted the fact that Serbia had

15 a statehood and was internationally recognised back at the Berlin Congress

16 in 1878 and that Serbia invested its statehood into the Kingdom of

17 Yugoslavia when it was established, which enabled this newly created

18 country to be internationally recognised, and that it had never occurred

19 to Serbia nor did it ever express a wish to break away from Yugoslavia,

20 therefore, this appeal, this urging sent to Yugoslavia was sent to the

21 wrong address. Serbia did not want it.

22 In addition to that, I pointed out to the abuse committed by the

23 conference and the European Community, because they abused the process.

24 They abused various good proposals and turned them into a dictate which

25 broke apart a state that was a founding state of the League of Nations, of

Page 36100

1 the United Nations, and which was a leading country in the nonalignment

2 movement at that time.

3 In addition to that, I pointed out that Serbia remained loyal to

4 all of its international obligations, committed to its international

5 obligations, human rights, and that it would continue legal continuity and

6 maintain its status of an international subject even after the secession

7 of other republics.

8 I also pointed to his attention that despite of all the troubles

9 that Serbia experienced at the Conference on Yugoslavia, despite the fact

10 that it supported the implementation of Vance's plan in Croatia, that it

11 supported Cessation of Hostilities Agreement concluded in Geneva, despite

12 all of that, contrary action was taken by other factors. Therefore, this

13 is a summary representing all the positions adhered to by us at the

14 conference and showing our opposition to the principle or to the situation

15 where somebody wanted to bring our country to an end.

16 The right to self-determination was denied to some nations in

17 Yugoslavia --

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Jovanovic. Are you finished? Because what

19 we really wanted was --

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mostly yes, I am finished.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]... letter. And

22 in future, try to keep your answers as short as possible.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Very will. We can proceed. Mr. Jovanovic, in cross-examination

25 of one of the previous witnesses, Mr. Nice produced a report here saying

Page 36101

1 that he had received that report from a ministry. This is one of the

2 Dutch ministries. We can find that document in tab 4. You see that this

3 is Conference on Yugoslavia, Summary of Developments.

4 I'm not going to cover the entire document, Summary of

5 Developments, because it starts from the first opening of the first

6 plenary session, and then the second, the third, and so on. However, let

7 us now focus on what Mr. Nice tried to prove through this document,

8 namely, item 5, paragraph 5 --

9 MR. NICE: Prosecution Exhibit 812 for cross-reference purposes.


11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Paragraph 5, which was quoted here states as follows: "In the

13 margins of the Fourth plenary, a meeting was held on the 4th of October

14 chaired by minister -- by the minister for foreign affairs of the

15 Netherlands, assisted by Lord Carrington and Ambassador Wijnaendts,

16 between Croatian President Tudjman, Serbian President Milosevic, and

17 minister of defence General Kadijevic." [Interpretation] And then it goes

18 on to explain that Mr. Nice said that at the time, at this meeting which

19 was in the margins of the fourth plenary session, as is stated here,

20 actually accepted Carrington's plan. This is what he informed the press

21 about, so this was nothing secret.

22 It says here: "A statement was read out subsequently by the

23 Netherlands minister at a press conference, reflecting the agreement of

24 the Yugoslav parties involved..."

25 Now, about what? Then it goes on to say: "This included the

Page 36102












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13 English transcripts.













Page 36103

1 principle that a political solution should be sought on the basis of the

2 perspective -- [In English] of recognition of the independence of those

3 republics in Yugoslavia wishing it," [Interpretation] and then there's a

4 comma there, and then it says, "[In English] at the end of a negotiating

5 process conducted in good faith and involving all parties."

6 [Interpretation] Therefore, could it be said that I gave here a

7 prior consent consenting to Carrington's proposals if we take the entire

8 sentence into account, especially this part that comes after the comma,

9 "at the end of the negotiating process conducted in good faith and

10 involving all parties"?

11 A. In my view that cannot be defended, that position, because this

12 paragraph says quite the opposite. It says that independence can be

13 granted to those republics who wish it, which does not exclude the

14 possibility that some republics would want to remain in Yugoslavia as a

15 common state. And that was essence of the conflict between us, our

16 delegation, and Lord Carrington on the other hand, who wanted simply to

17 support the secession but not the possibility for Serbia and Montenegro to

18 remain in Yugoslavia and for Yugoslavia to have legal continuity.

19 In addition to that, it is stated here that recognition would come

20 at the end of negotiating process if it is conducted in good faith and if

21 it involved all parties. This good faith, as we were able to see, was not

22 abided by, was not implemented, because negotiating was soon succeeded by

23 dictate and a conclusion that Yugoslavia was in a process of

24 disintegration and that the only act that needed to be done was to give

25 independence to all of its federal units.

Page 36104

1 It is mentioned here that there should be no unilateral change of

2 borders, towards the bottom. Recognising that there could be no

3 unilateral changes of internationally recognised borders in Yugoslavia,

4 because those were the only borders. The internal borders were internal

5 administrative lines.

6 So this text both in its substance and its form cannot be accepted

7 or seen as acceptance of Lord Carrington's proposal in relation to the

8 solution to Yugoslav crisis.

9 Q. All right. Now I would like you to pay attention to a very brief

10 passage that continues. It's the last one in item 5, and it reads as

11 follows: "[In English] As a first step, it was agreed that

12 representatives of the Serbian communities in Croatia should be invited to

13 meet the conference coordinator and the deputy chairmen to discuss

14 possible future arrangements."

15 [Interpretation] What does this passage mean, Mr. Jovanovic?

16 A. In my opinion, it means two things. First, that Serbs in Croatia

17 were compelled to defend themselves, and that is why they were one of the

18 parties to the conflict. And the other thing is that they were the victim

19 of the policy and right to self-determination, because as I said, that

20 right was reserved only for Croats, not for the Serb people there as well.

21 Therefore, the proposal put forth to the conference to invite the

22 representatives of the Serb community in Croatia to join the process of

23 negotiations is something that is positive and that reflects the

24 legitimate interests and aspirations of the Serb people in Croatia.

25 Q. All right, Mr. Jovanovic. We don't have time to deal with this

Page 36105

1 entire summary of developments.

2 MR. NICE: Your Honours, I'm anxious not to deny the accused the

3 opportunity to deal with a matter that we've advanced as important and he

4 plainly finds important himself, but that last matter of interpretation by

5 a witness on a document was extreme really in -- was extreme, it may be

6 thought, and I just don't see how it can assist to have the three lines

7 there interpreted as broadly as it was by this witness.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: We may see it as a non-sequitur.

9 MR. NICE: It's up to the accused how he spends his time, I

10 suppose.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Do you know that the Yugoslav leadership addressed three questions

13 to Lord Carrington that were actually addressed to the Badinter

14 Commission? What was the fate of these three questions, and do you

15 remember them, by any chance?

16 A. I do remember them although some of them are a bit lengthy so

17 perhaps it would be better if I read them out. These three questions were

18 the following: Was there secession in Yugoslavia, and is it allowed

19 according to international law? That is one thing. The second is: Is

20 the right to self-determination a subjective right, the right enjoyed by a

21 people or by a republic or, rather, by a territory? And the third

22 question was about the so-called internal boundaries. According to

23 international law, can they be considered international boundaries?

24 Q. All right. So you know what the questions were, those that were

25 addressed to Lord Carrington or, rather, to the Arbitration Commission

Page 36106

1 through the chairman of the conference.

2 Did the chairman of the conference forward these questions to the

3 Arbitration Commission or did he rephrase them?

4 A. He rephrased them. And how can I put this? He changed the order

5 of questions. He put the question related to secession first, and that

6 was not the case originally. And he rephrased the others in such a way

7 that they lost quite a bit of their original meaning, and they were rather

8 leading questions in respect of the Arbitration Commission.

9 If the Honourable Trial Chamber allows me, I can read these

10 rephrased questions. They are quite lengthy, so I could not quote them

11 from memory.


13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] May I read them out?

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: What document are they in, would we find these

15 questions?

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm asking the witness about this.

17 These questions are contained in numerous documents. I haven't presented

18 them here specially. I don't think I did.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] By your leave, Mr. President, Your

20 Honour --

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... which you

22 say operated to the detriment.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is the way it was.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: What are you reading from?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am reading the questions that I

Page 36107

1 got out of two books, because we do not have any archives. They are now

2 in a ministry that is not accessible to us, so this is from the book of

3 Professor Smilja Avramov and the book of Professor Milenko Kreca,

4 Badinter's Arbitration Commission. That's the title of the book.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. We have that in tab 11, Milenko Kreca's book. It was exhibited

7 here. Tab 11.

8 Please go ahead, Mr. Jovanovic.

9 A. As for our question that had to do with secession, whether

10 secession is a legally permissible act from the point of view of the UN

11 Charter and other relevant documents, Lord Carrington rephrased that as

12 follows: "Serbia believes that republics that proclaimed independence or

13 wished to proclaim their independence or sovereignty have left or will

14 leave the SFRY, which would otherwise continue to exist. Contrary to

15 that, other republics believe that this is not secession but, rather, that

16 this is disintegration or the breakdown of the SFRY as the result of the

17 will of these republics. I asked the arbitration to look at this question

18 so that I could formulate an opinion or recommendation that might be

19 useful."

20 So that has to do with the question related to secession. It can

21 be seen here -- please go ahead.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: The question should have been?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The question was phrased by us in

24 the following way: "Is secession a legally permissible act from the point

25 of view of the UN Charter and other relevant regulations?"

Page 36108

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: And you say that this reformulation was to the

2 detriment --

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] To the detriment, yes, because in

4 the reformulation, the Badinter Commission was not asked the question

5 directly whether secession is a legally permissible act from the point of

6 view of the UN Charter and other documents. And this was done

7 intentionally, because the answer would have had to be that secession is

8 not a permissible right from that point view. And then in the

9 reformulated --

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Nice, are the questions posed not a matter of

11 public record?

12 MR. NICE: Well, we're having some difficulty about that, because,

13 for example, the source that the accused, I think, has relied on at tab 11

14 comes from somebody who's a participant and who fills the document with

15 commentary, and I'm not yet in a position to accept the accuracy of the

16 way things factually are recited by that author.

17 As to other matters, I'm not sure quite what it is that the

18 witness says he's reading from that is otherwise not available to him from

19 a ministry. If he identifies the prime source from which he's reading, it

20 may be that I'll be able to agree on things. I hope so.

21 JUDGE BONOMY: He's told you he's noted down what the contents of

22 two books which have stated what happened, but are the documents that

23 passed in the course of this inquiry of the commission not public

24 documents that are available?

25 MR. NICE: They're not literally public documents. They certainly

Page 36109

1 should be available and we should be able to find them, and this should be

2 a matter of agreement, I think. You've had a number of documents on this

3 commission in any event. But I'm afraid I haven't been able to track this

4 down immediately while I've been sitting here.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: But are you challenging the accuracy of the

6 questions? You're not?

7 MR. NICE: Not yet in a position. I'll deal with it when I can.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. So that's the first question that you say

9 was reformulated to the detriment of Serbia. What's the next question

10 which was reformulated? Give us the original version and then the

11 reformulation.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. The original version is:

13 "Who is the title holder of the right --"

14 THE INTERPRETER: Could the witness please be asked to slow down.

15 The interpreters do not have the text and he's reading.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Could you please read more slowly so the

17 interpreters can follow because they don't have the text.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm going to repeat it. "Who is the

19 titular to the right to self-determination from the point of view of

20 international law, a nation or a federal unit? The right of a people to

21 self-determination, is it a subjective collective right of a people or is

22 it a right enjoyed by a territory?" That is the original question.

23 The rephrased question reads as follows: "The Serb population

24 from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, as a constituent people in

25 Yugoslavia, do they enjoy the right to self-determination?"

Page 36110

1 The third question --

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Would you explain to us how in your view that

3 operated to the detriment of Serbia, the reformulation.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is detrimental because the right

5 to self-determination in all international legal documents is formulated

6 as the right of a people, a nation, not a territory, and the question

7 asked the Arbitration Commission to give an unequivocal answer to that.

8 With the rephrased question, the Serb population in Croatia and

9 Bosnia-Herzegovina is practically in advance turned into a minority, not a

10 constituent people, although the question says, "As a constituent people

11 do they enjoy the right to self-determination?" That was done because a

12 concept had already been made to protect the so-called internal borders as

13 future internationally recognised borders. Therefore, the Serb people who

14 lived in those two republics could not exercise their right as a

15 constituent people. They could only expect protection as a minority.

16 The third question --

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... and that

18 will be the last, although there --

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The last one, yes.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... the point

21 that you're making.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The last question: "The demarcation

23 lines between the constituent part of the federal state (provinces,

24 cantons, states, countries, republics and the like) are borders from the

25 point of view of international law."

Page 36111

1 The rephrased question reads as follows: "According to

2 international law, the line of delineation between Serbia and Croatia on

3 the one hand and Serbia and Bosnia-Herzegovina on the other hand can be

4 considered to be borders." In our conviction, the Arbitration Commission

5 was in this way given a suggestion to consider internal delineation lines

6 to be borders from the point of view of international law.

7 So finally, one of the opinions of the Arbitration Commission was

8 that internal boundaries were boundaries from the point of view of

9 international law, invoking a decision of the International Court of

10 Justice in The Hague in relation to the Burkina Faso-Mali case concerning

11 a border that was drawn by colonial forces, colonial powers, and --

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: The possidetus juris doctrine.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. But that rule pertained to all

14 former colonial territories in Latin America and in Africa precisely to

15 avoid conflicts and unnecessary casualties. But that only has -- that

16 only pertains to colonial territories where colonial power was exercised.

17 But Yugoslavia was not such a case. It was the result of agreement

18 reached amongst equitable peoples, and it could not be treated the same

19 way the way borders in former colonies were treated.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

21 MR. NICE: Your Honour, returning to Judge Bonomy's concern, I

22 observe that the witness has not only spoken of the change in formulation

23 of the questions but has been specific, certainly in relation to the

24 second question, that this was done with a purpose. Now, if I know by

25 whom it is said the change was effected, then I can make direct inquiries

Page 36112












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13 English transcripts.













Page 36113

1 of the person before the conclusion of this witness's evidence, both to

2 establish the change and also to see what might be said about the purpose.

3 I observe that the defendant's -- the accused's witness list

4 includes Mr. Badinter.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: I think, Mr. Nice, the suggestion is Lord

6 Carrington altered the terminology before submitting the matter to the

7 commission.

8 MR. NICE: If that's the point, I can probably contact him

9 directly.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's my understanding.

11 MR. NICE: If that's clearly what's being said, and as to the

12 purpose, I'll deal with it.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, in relation to what

15 Mr. Nice just said, may I just state two facts. The letter containing the

16 questions was sent to the chairman of the conference, Lord Carrington, by

17 the Yugoslav leadership. Lord Carrington forwarded the questions,

18 rephrased in such a manner, to the Arbitration Commission. So there is no

19 doubt about any of that. Mr. Jovanovic has just explained this.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Did he have the power to rephrase the question?

21 Was that within his authority? Was it understood that it was a matter for

22 him to ultimately decide on the phrasing of the question? Mr. Jovanovic?

23 I'm not asking you. Let the witness, who was there.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] We objected to Lord Carrington

25 because of what he did, in the belief that he should have informed us at

Page 36114

1 least beforehand about his intention to change the question, which would

2 own be natural if there were any kind of fair play. But his answer was

3 that, as chairman, he had the right to rephrase the questions. That was

4 not an answer that we found satisfactory because this was then a right of

5 subordination that was involved, and it was not true negotiations then.

6 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Jovanovic, have you read the book by Milenko

7 Kreca which deals with these things, which is tab 11? Does the book deal

8 with such rephrasing of questions? If yes, could you lead us to the point

9 -- to the parts which deal with that matter?

10 MR. KAY: Page 28.

11 JUDGE KWON: Thank you very much.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, is it on page 28 we can see matters that

13 are dealt with?

14 MR. KAY: Yes, mentioning the changing there in relation to the

15 second question, I think it is.


17 MR. KAY: You'll see in the second paragraph, if I can just assist

18 the Court: "Lord Carrington, acting as chairman ... asked the Commission

19 to reply to what he described as 'the following question put by the

20 Republic of Serbia.'"

21 The question is set out, and then the next paragraph: "As we see,

22 the chairman of the Conference -" that's Lord Carrington - "not only

23 altered the question which..." was sent "... to the Arbitration Commission

24 but, at least judging from the wording of the Commission's opinion, he

25 inaccurately stated that the rephrased question was sent by the Republic

Page 36115

1 of Serbia."

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: I see, yes. Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Please

3 continue.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, from that period -- or, rather, at that period, the

6 term that was used fairly often was "premature recognition." Do you

7 remember that?

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. So who used this term "premature recognition"? Was that the Serb

10 definition perhaps or, that is to say the definition of the Republic of

11 Serbia, or was this an expression and term that was broadly used at that

12 time, common usage?

13 A. The term "premature recognition" was used even before the offer

14 that was made by the European Community and sent to the republics asking

15 for independence, as well as later on, afterwards, throughout the duration

16 of the Yugoslav crisis. That means right up until 1995. So before the

17 offer for independence, there were warnings and cautions made that no

18 hasty acts should be undertaken and that recognition should come at the

19 end of the negotiating process. And I should like to mention in that

20 regard the appeal that was launched by Lord Carrington to the European

21 Community, for example, and then we have a letter sent by the

22 Secretary-General --

23 Q. Just a moment, please. Let's pause there for a moment. What was

24 there in that appeal to the European Community? What was the contents of

25 that appeal, the gist of the appeal by Lord Carrington?

Page 36116

1 A. According to what he himself said later on, he appealed, I assume

2 at the meetings held in the European Community, that no premature

3 recognition should be made because this would hinder the successful work

4 and completion of the conference but that the recognition given to the

5 independent republics should be done at the end of this process, that it

6 should come at the end of the negotiating process, at the end of the work

7 of the conference, and the General-Secretary -- Secretary-General of the

8 UN, de Cuellar at the time, concerned himself because of this indication

9 of premature recognition, sent two letters, one to Minister Genscher and

10 the second to Mr. Van den Broek, in which he extends his cautions to them

11 and said that premature recognition would hinder and harm the work of the

12 conference and appealed that this should not be done. And I think that a

13 similar appeal was made by Mr. Cyrus Vance, so that there were a number of

14 these cautions issued before the actual act of recognition took place.

15 And later on during the Yugoslav crisis, there was not a single important

16 and serious politician in the West who did not find that the premature

17 recognition was too hasty and called the act a catalyser of the crisis and

18 everything else that went on, so they regretted this premature

19 recognition.

20 MR. NICE: Your Honour, it seems to be very a long answer on

21 something that may be of no relevance. I'm very hesitant about

22 interrupting because I don't want to be seen or even thought to be

23 stopping the accused calling in evidence what he wants to call, but with

24 tangential matters like this, might it from time to time be helpful to

25 establish with the accused to what legal or factual issue on the

Page 36117

1 indictment this all relates? Because we explored secession and, with an

2 earlier witness, I hope, revealed that even an illegal secession doesn't

3 affect the Prosecution's case that relates to matters that come

4 subsequently. And really, the view of the international community about

5 premature recognition is hardly likely to be central, I would have

6 thought, to the Trial Chamber's conclusion, but it's a matter for the

7 Trial Chamber.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: The accused would be able to point to paragraphs

9 in the indictment, no doubt, that deal with secession. And it is true

10 that we have heard evidence on these matters, and I have indicated to

11 Mr. Milosevic that he's in danger of beating the point to death.

12 Mr. Milosevic has, in response to an earlier question from me

13 about this approach to the evidence, explained that as this witness was

14 present, he wants to reinforce the points made earlier, and it is in that

15 sense that I think the -- he's asking these questions. I do agree that it

16 is repetitive. We have heard evidence, but evidently Mr. Milosevic

17 believes that this witness can reinforce his case on these points.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, just something I'd

19 like to say with respect to Mr. Nice's observation a moment ago. Mr. Nice

20 would be right if it were correct that the Serbs had planned an armed

21 secession of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that does have

22 a lot to do with what he claims, because he says that the Serbs or,

23 rather, I planned how to expel the Croats or Muslims from certain

24 territories, which is absurd. So he would be right if that were the case,

25 if that were correct, that the Serbs -- that it was the Serbs who had

Page 36118

1 planned the armed secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia, which I

2 assume is clear to one and all that that is just not true, and the events

3 bear that out and so do the documents.

4 And my second point is this: Mr. Nice also says that the question

5 of premature recognition is not relevant. Well, all the politician -- all

6 politicians throughout the world on both sides of the Atlantic spoke about

7 the fact that premature recognition torpedoed the peace conference and

8 made it impossible for the peace process to go forward because the

9 Croatian leadership as well as the Bosnian leadership had lost their

10 motives to sit down to the negotiating table any more because they had

11 gained recognition.

12 So we're talking about acts and actions that had enormous negative

13 repercussions on the Yugoslav conflict. And if that isn't relevant as far

14 as Mr. Nice is concerned, then I have nothing to add. But tell me now,

15 please --

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I haven't -- I haven't stopped

17 this line of examination because it does have some relevance, although it

18 may be of a peripheral character, but I don't believe you have to deal

19 with it in the detail that you have done so far. I think the matters can

20 be taken much more quickly, and I believe you probably have more points

21 that are more centrally and directly relevant to the matters in the

22 indictment.

23 It's now time for the 20-minute adjournment. We are adjourned.

24 --- Recess taken at 12.16 p.m.

25 --- On resuming at 12.40 p.m.

Page 36119

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, the Serbs in Croatia, was it them who planned, they

4 who planned the garrisons, attacked JNA garrisons, organised a blockade

5 and the expulsion of over 100.000 refugees before the beginning of the

6 conference? Did the Serbs do that?

7 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I question either the ability of the

8 witness to answer a question like that intelligently, but more I question

9 whether the accused is not already aware of the impropriety of such

10 questions. And if he is aware of the impropriety of them, why on earth is

11 he asking them? Perhaps the answer to that question is obvious.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. There is, of course, merit

13 in the objection. The question is just too general. From that broad

14 generality, identify a specific issue that the witness can deal with.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, in that year 1991, who launched attacks on the

17 garrisons of the Yugoslav People's Army on the territory of the Republic

18 of Croatia?

19 A. To the best of my knowledge, this was done by the paramilitaries

20 of the new Croatia or the new Croatian authorities.

21 Q. What about the Yugoslav People's Army? Did it provoke these

22 attacks in any way on the barracks and garrisons of the JNA?

23 A. To the best of my knowledge, no, because it kept a barracks, and

24 at the beginning of the armed conflicts between the paramilitary

25 formations of the Republic of Croatia and the armed parts of the Serb

Page 36120

1 people in some portions of Croatia, the JNA endeavoured to separate the

2 two sides and to prevent the escalation of the conflict.

3 Q. Do you know, Mr. Jovanovic, that in the course of the Conference

4 on Yugoslavia, that is to say in those first few months, that there was

5 mention or, rather, that there were proposals from the Presidency of the

6 conference, that is to say the international negotiators, about the fact

7 that a special status should be accorded to the Serb regions in Croatia?

8 A. In the course of the conference, the first document by Lord

9 Carrington envisaged, among other things, special status for areas within

10 Yugoslavia where -- which was populated by minority. Later on during the

11 conference, as work progressed, upon our insistence it was decided that

12 special status should be accorded to parts of Croatia inhabited by a

13 majority Serb population only, because Macedonia and the other republics

14 did not agree to it being established on their own territory. So this is

15 what we asked for, precisely to stop the conflicts and to ensure the basic

16 existential security and safety for the Serb people in those areas under

17 international guarantees and with the demilitarisation of those areas.

18 Q. Very well. That is what I wanted to ask you in a separate

19 question, actually. Was it the idea of the leadership of the conference

20 itself, that is to say the representatives of the international community?

21 Did they come up with that idea?

22 A. What do you mean?

23 Q. The idea about special status.

24 A. Yes. The idea came from the conference itself.

25 Q. Very well. Now, did that idea imply the demilitarisation of the

Page 36121

1 areas inhabited by a majority Serb population on the territory of the then

2 Croatia, the Socialist Republic of Croatia, in fact?

3 A. As far as I remember, it did mean demilitarisation.

4 Q. Did it also mean and imply international guarantees?

5 A. Not quite but through negotiation they arrived at that and that

6 was our position. That was the position we took, and we explained that a

7 special status could be established with a demilitarisation, international

8 guarantees, free life for one and all, and recognition of the rights of

9 that ethnic group to later decide who they wished to live with.

10 Q. All right. Fine. Now, the recognition, the premature recognition

11 that came for the Republic of Croatia, did it put a stop to all further

12 negotiations that had been started at the conference to discuss those

13 matters?

14 A. Yes, that's right. Croatia was no longer morally bound or

15 politically bound to accept something like that, like a special status on

16 its territory.

17 Q. Why wasn't it bound to do so any more?

18 A. Because it had gained what it wanted. That was recognition by the

19 international community, the European Community, and some other states,

20 and also because it considered that the Serbo-Croatian question could be

21 settled in some other way.

22 Q. All right. Now, the Vance Plan was assessed at the time as the

23 first positive step in the direction of a peaceful political settlement to

24 the political crisis in the then Yugoslavia. Tell me now, please, how did

25 it come about?

Page 36122












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13 English transcripts.













Page 36123

1 A. It came about at the initiative of the Presidency of the SFRY, and

2 they sent a letter to the president of the Security Council to that

3 effect, asking that the Security Council discuss the question of sending

4 peace forces to the area in Croatia which was populated by a majority Serb

5 population, which is where the conflicts where. And in that way, by so

6 doing, to put an end to the war conflict and to issue guarantees to people

7 living there that their lives would not be further threatened and in

8 jeopardy and that a political process should be allowed to evolve for a

9 final political settlement to the situation.

10 Q. Now, at that time, was special emphasis made to the fact that

11 Vance's plan, or the introduction of protected zones, UN protected areas

12 did not preempt a political solution?

13 A. Yes. That was expressly stated. Quite right.

14 Q. Why, then, was the process for seeking a political settlement

15 stopped?

16 A. Because the Croatian authorities, the Croatian government, was not

17 interested in any other solution except for a military solution. It asked

18 those zones to be incorporated into the constitutional and legal system of

19 Croatia. They set that ultimatum. Or to be considered adversaries, which

20 Croatia would one day have to deal with. And those people were disarmed,

21 all heavy weapons were withdrawn or placed in warehouses and locked away

22 in depots, and at the same time, they enjoyed UN protection and,

23 therefore, there was no military action vis-a-vis Croatia. All military

24 action that took place was on the part of Croatia, and very often with

25 considerable casualties, including members of the international peace

Page 36124

1 mission as well.

2 Q. Please tell us, what was the role of the then Yugoslav leadership,

3 and what was the position of Serbia in relation to the introduction of the

4 UNPAs and the acceptance of Vance Plan?

5 A. Serbia was in favour of that from the very beginning, and it was

6 very active in that field. You were very involved yourself. They wanted

7 the Vance Plan to be drafted as soon as possible and to be as acceptable

8 as possible to all sides. I think that due to your efforts, you received

9 recognition by the late Cyrus Vance, who was very pleased with your

10 cooperation and the success of his initiative which at the time was,

11 unfortunately, one of very few peace initiatives that was successful in a

12 brief period of time. In just a few months, this plan was put into action

13 and the peace mission was sent to the field very soon.

14 Q. Do you know after the Vance Plan was implemented, after the Blue

15 Helmets were sent to the area, did the members of the army of Krajina

16 attack Croatian forces during any period of time?

17 A. As far as I know, no, they didn't ever, because they were very

18 scrupulous in relation to that plan. They tried to protect it for any

19 kind of jeopardy that would come from Croatian side. They were very happy

20 with that plan, so there was no need for them to try to undermine it.

21 Q. Do you know anything about the attacks of Croatian forces on the

22 UNPA zones; and if so, can you tell us what particular attacks you can

23 remember?

24 A. I think that the first attack was in Maslenica. The second one

25 was in the so-called Medak pocket, or in Medak. The first one was already

Page 36125

1 1992, and then the Medak pocket, I think, was in 1993.

2 In both of these cases, Croatia was condemned by the Security

3 Council and criticised, and under the pressure of the Security Council, it

4 had to retreat. Unfortunately, there were casualties in those attacks,

5 both on the Serb side and on the side of the Blue Helmets.

6 After that, in 1994 or perhaps 1995, there were operations Storm

7 and Flash, which means the zone in Western Slavonia was attacked, and

8 during the Flash operation the Krajina was attacked.

9 Q. You mean it was Operation Storm?

10 A. Yes, that's right. I made a mistake.

11 Q. Do you know why is it that the UN did not react to the invasion of

12 these zones protected by the UN by Croatian army? So those zones were

13 protected by the UN and were attacked by Croatian forces.

14 A. That was because Croatia throughout that entire period had a very

15 strong political support, first of all by Germany and then by the United

16 States, and that in itself was sufficient to prevent any efficient action

17 on behalf of the UN. I know that when the Medak pocket was attacked, the

18 Czech commander of the Blue Helmets who was exposed to risk himself as a

19 result of Croatian attack asked for NATO assistance. However, NATO

20 assistance was denied to him. I don't know whether he received any

21 explanation, but at any rate, he did not receive any support during this

22 attack on positions of Blue Helmets.

23 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, you were an active participant when the

24 constitution of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was adopted in late

25 April 1992.

Page 36126

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Is that right or not?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. At the same session when the constitution of the FRY was adopted,

5 another declaration was adopted as well, the declaration pertaining to the

6 then-existing political situation and the position of the Federal Republic

7 of Yugoslavia with respect to the open question of Yugoslav crisis. Do

8 you remember that?

9 A. Yes.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Gentlemen, in tab 35, you can find

11 this declaration in English. It has already been presented here. I

12 apologise. Not 35. It is tab 36. It has already been admitted as P526,

13 and we're bringing it here under tab 36.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, did you find the declaration?

16 A. Yes.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, were you able to find

18 the declaration? I want to be sure that you have it.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, I have it, and I think my other colleagues

20 have it. And thanks for following the proper decorum.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, why is it that on the 27th of April, 1992, in

23 addition to the new constitution of the FRY a separate declaration was

24 adopted as well?

25 A. It was adopted in order to explain to the world, to point it out

Page 36127

1 to them that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was not a new state but a

2 reconstructed old state existing in the territories of the republics which

3 did not opt for independence. At the same time, we wanted to stress that

4 this state was the legal successor and would continue to have the status

5 of international subject that Yugoslavia had from its inception in 1918

6 onwards.

7 In addition to that, we also wanted to express that the Federal

8 Republic of Yugoslavia not only did not resist the independence of certain

9 republics --

10 Q. All right. We will explain that separately. But please tell us,

11 were those mainly the reasons for adopting the declaration at the same

12 session when the constitution was adopted as well?

13 A. Yes. That was the main reason. And there were also other

14 reasons.

15 Q. Now, please tell us, what was the position taken in that

16 declaration with respect to the republics that had seceded?

17 A. The position was that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia respected

18 those republics and was prepared to recognise them as independent states

19 at the end of the Conference on Yugoslavia, at the end of the negotiating

20 process. At the same time, we stressed that the FRY had no territorial

21 claims with respect to any of those republics and that it would not oppose

22 their admission into the UN or other international organisations.

23 As for the citizens residing there, our consular services offered

24 to provide all services that the people needed, meaning passports and

25 everything else.

Page 36128

1 Q. Here in item 1 where the continuity of Yugoslavia is mentioned, it

2 is stated: "At the same time, it shall be ready to fully respect the

3 rights [In English] and interests of the Yugoslav republics who declare

4 independence. The recognition of the newly formed states will follow

5 after all the outstanding objections [sic] negotiated on within the

6 Conference on Yugoslavia have been regulated."

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: I suppose you meant "commitments," not

8 "objections."

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, no. Not "objections." Here in

10 this English translation it is stated "all the outstanding questions." So

11 the word is "questions negotiated on..."

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. What position, if any, was taken with respect to the obligations

14 that Yugoslavia had taken over? So from its inception in 1918 to the

15 adoption of that constitution in 1992.

16 A. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia publicly declared that it

17 considered itself bound to apply and respect all international treaties

18 and obligations which had been undertaken by the previous Yugoslavia and

19 which Yugoslavia in its other forms had, including the Kingdom of Serbia,

20 who participated in the drafting of The Hague Conventions in 1905 and so

21 on. Therefore, legal succession necessarily meant being bound by all

22 previous obligations undertaken by the previous Yugoslavia.

23 Q. Very well. Item 4 says: "The FR of Yugoslavia has no territorial

24 aspirations against anybody in its surroundings."

25 Was the position entirely clear as far as the territorial

Page 36129

1 ambitions, claims, aspirations are concerned, and everything else that is

2 being claimed here that Yugoslavia had?

3 A. I think that it is stated absolutely unambiguously here, very

4 precisely, very clearly. This is a very clear obligation to respect

5 territorial integrity of other republics which became independent states.

6 This obligation and this statement was contained in previous public

7 declarations given by representatives of Serbia. Therefore, on a number

8 of occasions we assured the world that we had absolutely no territorial

9 aspirations or claims in relation to the former Yugoslav republics.

10 Q. We had Ambassador Okun testify here. If you remember, he was the

11 secretary of Mr. Cyrus Vance during the negotiations and his mission to

12 Yugoslavia. He read out from his diary written by hand, and it was

13 obvious, even in the initial meetings that we had, that Serbia had no

14 territorial claims whatsoever. Do you remember those meetings held with

15 Cyrus Vance, accompanied by his secretary or his aid Ambassador Okun?

16 A. Yes, I remember that very well. I remember them, and I

17 participated in almost all of them, if not all of them.

18 Q. From the very beginning of the communication we had, the contacts

19 we had with Cyrus Vance in his capacity as special envoy of the UN

20 Secretary-General, did Serbia make its position clear as far as our

21 interests are concerned, and was it clear that the position of Serbia was

22 that it had no territorial claims, no territorial aspirations?

23 A. There were no doubts whatsoever in that regard. It was stressed

24 on a number of occasions, both to Mr. Cyrus Vance and to Mr. Okun.

25 Q. Based on what your recollections are in view of the office you

Page 36130

1 held at the time, can you tell us, what was the response to this

2 declaration within the UN and also among the states with which we had

3 diplomatic relations at the time?

4 A. This declaration was very well accepted. Certain countries -- or,

5 rather, it was registered as the UN document, and it was referred to as a

6 document by the Under-Secretary, the legal advisor of the UN when he

7 responded to letters of the two former Yugoslav republics which became

8 independent states and which objected and pointed out that Yugoslavia was

9 no longer a member of the UN.

10 As for the other states, they all continued to have their

11 diplomatic missions to Yugoslavia, and we continued to have diplomatic

12 missions in their countries. Some of them, such as Great Britain, openly

13 declared that all bilateral agreements signed previously between Great

14 Britain and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would continue to be in

15 force and would be applied with respect to the new Yugoslavia. Other

16 states accepted this with understanding. They showed understanding in

17 this issue, so that there was absolutely no doubts as to what was the

18 position of Yugoslavia with respect to other former Yugoslav republics.

19 Q. In view of the fact that you have stated a number of things here

20 that have to do with the development of events in Croatia in the course of

21 1991, I'm not going to quote everything to you, but please take a look at

22 one of the counts of Croatian indictment. This is count 26, and the last

23 one in it.

24 It is stated here that: "He controlled, contributed to, or

25 otherwise utilised Serbian state-run media outlets to manipulate Serbian

Page 36131

1 public opinion by spreading exaggerated and false messages of ethnically

2 based attacks by Croats against Serb people in order to create an

3 atmosphere of fear and hatred among Serbs living in Serbia and Croatia.

4 The propaganda generated by the Serbian media was an important tool in

5 contributing to the perpetration of crimes in Croatia."

6 Mr. Jovanovic, we're still dealing with 1991. You participated in

7 all of the events. Please tell us, what is it from the propaganda view

8 that Serbia did in order to spread ethnic hatred, fear, and contribute to

9 the perpetration, to the commission of crimes? Also, do you know anything

10 about what manipulations I was responsible for in order to create hatred

11 and perpetrate crimes?

12 A. I think that this is a very arbitrary claim that is contained in

13 this indictment. There is no greater hatred and no greater fear. Nothing

14 could be greater than the hatred and fear spread by Croatia and its

15 paramilitary formations. What our media did was only to broadcast what

16 was happening to the Serbs in the areas where they were threatened.

17 As for the ability to influence the international community in

18 general, we should remind everyone that the government of Serbia could

19 have, could wield influence only over one outlet of electronic media and

20 perhaps several newspapers, whereas the entire remaining media was under

21 the influence of the opposition and was very critical with respect to the

22 government. Therefore, to claim that all media outlets were used by the

23 government in Serbia in order to spread hatred and animosity felt by Serbs

24 in relation to Croats and Croatian authorities is unfounded, because that

25 does not reflect the factual state in Serbia.

Page 36132












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13 English transcripts.













Page 36133

1 Q. Very well, Mr. Jovanovic. Now let us turn to some other questions

2 which have to do with the events in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Let us not deal

3 with what came before those events but, rather, focus on this: Do you

4 know whether the Republic of Serbia - and this was the subject matter of

5 some of the conferences organised by the international community and the

6 Conference on Yugoslavia - so do you know whether the Republic of Serbia

7 supported the plan known as Cutileiro's plan? Do you remember whether at

8 the plenary meeting of the international Conference on Yugoslavia

9 Cutileiro's plan was discussed and what was the position taken by the

10 Republic of Serbia with respect to that plan at that conference?

11 A. I was present when the special envoy of the EU, Mr. Cutileiro,

12 informed the conference on the results of his negotiations with three

13 sides in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and he gave us a pleasant news that there was

14 an agreement reached on principal points and that there were also some

15 finishing touches, as he said, that needed to be done, and he asked for

16 another two or three weeks to complete that before he could inform about

17 the successfully completed business. This was very happily -- this caused

18 a lot of pleasure among Lord Carrington and everybody else who

19 participated in that conference. You yourself expressed very positive

20 thoughts about that news and said that Mr. Cutileiro should be given some

21 more time to conclude that task. And when addressing Mr. Izetbegovic, you

22 said that for future independent Bosnia and Herzegovina, it was much more

23 important to be recognised by all of its citizens and ethnic communities

24 than by other states. And then you added and highlighted that Serbia was

25 prepared to be among the first to recognise Bosnia-Herzegovina as an

Page 36134

1 independent state after Mr. Cutileiro concluded his mission.

2 I think it was a very important statement, but Mr. Izetbegovic

3 insisted on instant recognition. He did not accept this position that

4 Bosnia and Herzegovina should be first recognised by all of its citizens

5 but, rather, demanded that that be done by other states first.

6 When he returned to Sarajevo, it is well known that the US

7 ambassador, Mr. Zimmerman, had a meeting with him, and he inquired about

8 how this happened that this plan was signed. And when he heard from

9 Mr. Izetbegovic that he affixed his signature reluctantly, he asked him,

10 "Why did you do something that you didn't want to do?" And allegedly

11 that's --

12 Q. But you're not testifying about that.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. Because you were not present during Zimmerman's meeting with

15 Izetbegovic.

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. I think that we are going to have someone who can say something

18 about that.

19 Tell me, as for the process of negotiations, Serbia did not take

20 part in it at all as far as the Cutileiro plan is concerned.

21 A. It is a well-known fact that we did not take part in it at all.

22 The only participants were the representatives of the three ethnic

23 communities; Karadzic, Izetbegovic, and the late Mate Boban, and of course

24 Ambassador Cutileiro on the other side.

25 Q. Was there anyone from the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, from

Page 36135

1 Serbia, Montenegro, who at that time took part in the negotiations among

2 the three Bosnian sides in any way?

3 A. No.

4 Q. And what about the representatives of the Serb people in

5 Bosnia-Herzegovina? Did they accept the Cutileiro plan?

6 A. They accepted it, of course, as a compromise because it satisfied

7 their minimum requirements, and that is that they should be free, that

8 they should enjoy their constituent rights, that they be given the right

9 to consensus, and that this state which would be based on cantons would be

10 a state of equitable, equal peoples, not a state in which one or two

11 peoples would be above the remaining people.

12 Q. Around that time when these negotiations on Bosnia were taking

13 place, you were with me on an official visit to Turkey. Do you remember

14 that?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. Do you remember what Sulejman Demirovic asked me about this? And

17 also the then president of Turkey, Turgut Ozal? That is to say the Prime

18 Minister and the president of Turkey who I talked to then?

19 A. They expressed their support to Yugoslavia and to preserving

20 Yugoslavia. They said that that was their long-term interest, to have a

21 stable country of all these republics. And at the same time, they gave

22 their assurances that they would not recognise these republics before all

23 outstanding issues were resolved. However, only a few weeks after that

24 there was a collective recognition of all four states, not only Slovenia

25 and Croatia. So from that point of view, the then leaders of Turkey were

Page 36136

1 rather insincere.

2 Q. To keep this as brief as possible, this stage of your testimony

3 about developments in Bosnia-Herzegovina, since you were following all of

4 this all the time, how many international peace agreements and proposals

5 were there in relation to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Perhaps

6 this is too lengthy a question, but how many proposals were there and what

7 was the position of Serbia -- rather, what was my position towards these

8 peace proposals?

9 A. There was a total of five, if we include the action plan of the

10 European Union towards the end of 1993. First, there was the plan of

11 Ambassador Cutileiro; then there was the Vance-Owen Plan; then the

12 Owen-Stoltenberg Plan. In the meantime, there was the action plan of the

13 European Union, and finally of the Contact Group.

14 From the very outset, we had a positive attitude towards this, and

15 we supported this not only in nominal terms rhetorically but very actively

16 as negotiators as well. We endeavoured, in our contacts with the

17 representatives of the Serb people in Bosnia and the representatives of

18 other people in Bosnia, too, to seek common points on which the future

19 independent Bosnia-Herzegovina would be based.

20 Q. All right. From the point of view of that experience and that

21 practice, you attended many of these meetings. Why did they invite me as

22 President of Serbia to take part in these meetings? When I say "they," I

23 am referring to Lord Owen, Thorvald Stoltenberg as the co-chairmen of the

24 conference, before that Vance and Owen. So why was I invited to take part

25 in these meetings that had to do with Bosnia-Herzegovina?

Page 36137

1 A. Because all international intermediaries saw in you a useful

2 negotiator who always gave preference to political solutions rather than

3 military solutions, and a person who always advocated solutions that would

4 secure the minimum interests of all the three constituent peoples. You

5 always highlighted that and everywhere, especially in your contacts with

6 the representatives of the Serb community there who could not always find

7 their way easily in all these complicated negotiations. And often they

8 reacted emotionally, which hindered the results that were required and not

9 to talk about how emotionally charged the other two communities were too.

10 And that is why the international intermediaries, starting from Cyrus

11 Vance all the way to the US representatives Holbrooke and others, that is

12 what they appreciated the most as far as you were concerned, that you

13 always preferred a peaceful solution, not a military solution or war.

14 Q. You have very clear information about our support to these peace

15 plans. In the light of this continued support to peace plans, can one

16 speak of the existence of some territorial aspirations of Serbia or

17 Yugoslavia vis-a-vis Bosnia-Herzegovina, any aggression against

18 Bosnia-Herzegovina or any kind of act of aggression towards

19 Bosnia-Herzegovina or the like?

20 A. No, neither politically nor mathematically. If you and, through

21 you, Serbia supported all five peace plans and if you insisted on their

22 further development and on their acceptance by all, that can only be

23 looked upon as a positive factor. On the other hand, these insinuations

24 about the existence of some secret territorial pretensions or aggressive

25 intentions are a propaganda effect, and this propaganda was required

Page 36138

1 precisely because the conflicts in Bosnia-Herzegovina went on. Let us not

2 forget that the leadership of the Muslim people there were interested in

3 having foreign military intervention, and that was possible only with the

4 continuation of the conflict rather than if it abated.

5 Q. Tell me, in your opinion, how can this interest of theirs be

6 explained, that they wanted to have a foreign military intervention in

7 Bosnia-Herzegovina?

8 A. This concept of a so-called unitary Bosnia was behind it, where

9 the most numerous community would dominate over the others. That is

10 something that was not concealed in any way, and of course that could not

11 be accepted by the other communities. So that was the stumbling-block

12 that was a constant impediment to all the activities taken by the

13 peacemakers aimed at finding a joint view.

14 Unfortunately, the leadership of the Muslim people were spurred on

15 from the outside to continue along these lines. So they really needed a

16 raison d'etre because they no longer had an external enemy.

17 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, many assessments were heard here, a lot of

18 information was shown, and many documents were shown that have to do with

19 the Vance-Owen Plan. The Athens conference and then the session of the

20 Assembly of Republika Srpska held in Pale with the -- with the presence of

21 Bulatovic and myself and Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis. I'm not going

22 to dwell on that issue now, but if you wish to say something special in

23 this regard, I will be pleased to ask you about that too. However, it is

24 hardly known that before the meeting in Athens where the Vance-Owen Plan

25 was accepted there had been another attempt at the session of the

Page 36139

1 parliament of Republika Srpska in Bijeljina. I'm going to ask you

2 something about that because you personally attended that session of the

3 Assembly of Republika Srpska. I'm going to ask you to say something about

4 that, because this, in a way, was not part of --

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...

6 Mr. Milosevic. It's time for a question.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Before I put the question,

8 Mr. Robinson, I'm going to ask the witness, and I'm going to draw your

9 attention to the following: That is tab 38. There is a photocopy there

10 of the Politika daily newspaper dated the 27th of April, 1993. This is a

11 report from the session of the Assembly of the Republika Srpska and the

12 presence of Mr. Jovanovic at that session and his efforts to have the

13 peace process sustained. I hope that you have a translation of this.


15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There are two pages here.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Mr. Jovanovic --

18 MR. NICE: The interpretation hasn't found its way to me yet.

19 Sometimes there's a difference in the time it reaches the Bench to the

20 time it reaches us, but I'm not aware of one net. Looks as though

21 Ms. Anoya can provide one, whether first time or because we mislaid the

22 one we had. Thank you very much.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Just briefly let us deal with this. The conference in Athens

25 about the Vance-Owen Plan was held on the 1st of May. Isn't that right,

Page 36140

1 Mr. Jovanovic?

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. Now we are just ascertaining the facts.

4 A. Yes.

5 Q. So I hope that these are not leading questions, because these are

6 facts that can easily be checked out.

7 This Assembly of Republika Srpska was held in Bijeljina on the

8 26th of April, I think, a few days before the conference in Athens.

9 A. Yes, yes.

10 Q. Why did you go to this session of the Assembly of Republika

11 Srpska?

12 A. I went there as an envoy of the three presidents; you, President

13 Bulatovic, and of course the president of the Federal Republic of

14 Yugoslavia, Dobrica Cosic.

15 Q. Let me just interrupt you at this point. On page 2 of this

16 photocopy from Politika there is a text in a box and these three

17 signatures, Dobrica Cosic, Slobodan Milosevic, and Momir Bulatovic. You

18 can see that in the middle paragraph. That is the letter that we sent to

19 the Assembly.

20 The fact that you went to attend the Assembly session, was its

21 purpose to have you acquaint the Assembly of Republika Srpska about the

22 positions of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro

23 concerning the Vance-Owen Plan?

24 A. Yes. That letter was a major effort, a desperate effort, I should

25 say, to convince the Republika Srpska MPs that this plan was acceptable

Page 36141

1 and that they should vote in favour of it. The letter contains arguments

2 that are a strong support in favour of the plan, although the plan, like

3 any other plan, is less than perfect and it contains certain sections that

4 do not really suit any one of the three peoples, including the Serb

5 people, in Bosnia-Herzegovina. You particularly explained here the

6 progress that was made in the talks with Lord Owen and Stoltenberg in

7 respect of some of the pending issues where they indicated the course that

8 would be taken in terms of finding final solutions to these issues. At

9 the same time, you pointed out that this paper, this document, the

10 Owen-Stoltenberg Plan, actually met all the minimum requirements of the

11 Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is to say appropriate territory.

12 It guarantees the fact that it is a constituent people, also guarantees

13 the right to consensus and ensures their freedom so they would not be

14 threatened from any one of the other two sides in case they were to change

15 their minds and show some ill intent.

16 As for the support that Serbia had given until then to its people

17 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is political and material support, it was

18 indicated it was said that this support is so great that the Serb people

19 in Bosnia-Herzegovina had to bear in mind the fact that the burden on the

20 shoulders of Serbia and Montenegro are so great that they were hard to

21 bear, especially in the situation when there were sanctions imposed and

22 that that was why they were supposed to accept this plan and to discuss

23 further all pending issues after the plan was accepted and after

24 hostilities were ceased, because in this way, the possibility was open of

25 finding final solutions. At the same time, the Assembly was asked

Page 36142












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13 English transcripts.













Page 36143

1 categorically to accept the plan and that they should not allow that

2 because of that, Serbia and Montenegro or, rather, the Federal Republic of

3 Yugoslavia should become yet again the victim of sanctions that had

4 already been planned to be reimposed if the Assembly of Republika Srpska

5 Krajina were to reject the plan.

6 Q. You mean the Assembly of Republika Srpska.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Now, tell me, what was your task at this meeting of the Assembly?

9 You took this letter of ours and I assume that you read it, as far as I

10 can remember now. I can't remember exactly now.

11 A. Yes.

12 Q. Tell me, now --

13 A. Yes, that's right. It was my task to read it out, and I went to

14 Mr. Krajisnik and explained to him that I wanted to do this. He agreed

15 and at one point during the discussion he gave me the floor, and after it

16 was read out there was silence and then other people asked for the floor.

17 Karadzic, although he wasn't satisfied with all the elements of the plan,

18 did propose that the Assembly adopt the plan.

19 Q. All right. But let's just take things step-by-step. Radovan

20 Karadzic, at that meeting of the Assembly, came out in favour of accepting

21 the plan; is that right, and proposed that the Assembly do the same; is

22 that right?

23 A. Yes, despite certain elements that he was dissatisfied with in the

24 plan he thought that the plan was a plus and ought to be supported.

25 Q. Right. So Karadzic supported the plan. What was the president of

Page 36144

1 the Assembly, Momcilo Krajisnik's, view? How did he behave?

2 A. Mr. Krajisnik, president of the Assembly, behaved like the Speaker

3 of the House. He didn't state his own views too much, but he showed that

4 he was in favour of the plan and asked the deputies to take a positive

5 view because he didn't have a negative stance towards it, although in

6 official terms and formally he never actually came out in favour of it.

7 Q. All right. The president of the Assembly presiding over the

8 Assembly session on that occasion didn't have a negative stance, negative

9 position. He asked you to read out our letter, and the President of

10 Republika Srpska, Radovan Karadzic, had a positive stance and advocated

11 the adoption of the plan, so why wasn't the plan accepted, then, by the

12 Assembly at its session that day?

13 A. Because there were certain speakers who criticised it in no

14 uncertain terms, and they used very harsh language. One of those people

15 was the member of the Presidency, that is to say Mrs. Biljana Plavsic, and

16 she was a fervent advocate in criticising the plan. And even myself who

17 just conveyed the message in the letter, she said that I was not a

18 sufficiently conscious Serb. So she didn't spare my either. The others

19 kept quiet. Some people, as I said, criticised it openly and early

20 towards dawn the plan was rejected. It was not accepted and it was

21 regrettable for all of us who had done our best to have the plan prepared

22 as well as possible and go through. Unfortunately, sanctions against

23 Serbia and Montenegro followed, and they were not to blame for the failure

24 of the plan, the fact that it wasn't accepted.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, a housekeeping matter. The

Page 36145

1 Chamber was again criticised for about the tenth time for encroaching on

2 the time of the trial that follows. Consequently, I've decided that we

3 will stop at 1.43, seventeen minutes to two.

4 MR. NICE: And, Your Honours, since there's been a short break in

5 the giving of the evidence, by Your Honour's observation, may I in

6 forecast of something I'm going to do tomorrow, alert the Chamber and,

7 through the Chamber, the witness to this: I will ask him I think

8 tomorrow, at the end of tomorrow's session, if he would be so good, to

9 take with him documents that I propose to deal with in cross-examination

10 in order that he may, if he so chooses, read them or peruse parts of them

11 in order that we may save time in cross-examination. Of course, it's

12 entirely a matter for the witness whether he's prepared to make that time

13 available to us by working outside the court tomorrow afternoon, but

14 that's my present plan.


16 [Trial Chamber confers]

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice. That's for tomorrow.

18 Continue, Mr. Milosevic, and remember, we are stopping at 1.43.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Robinson, I shall

20 bear that in mind. But I'm not quite clear on one point and I don't

21 assume Mr. Jovanovic is clear on that either: Does Mr. Nice intend to

22 give him those documents today to read or have I misunderstood that? Will

23 he provide him with them tomorrow for the day after?

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: He will do so tomorrow.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

Page 36146

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Mr. Jovanovic -- the letters are rather small here. Small print.

3 But on the right, the report on policy and politics, the letter that

4 Cosic, Bulatovic, and myself sent to the President of Republika Srpska, we

5 state in that document that, "We wish to tell you -" and we address the

6 deputies - "at a time when equality is guaranteed you and the right of

7 decision-making via consensus as constituent peoples and the territory

8 you're being offered, you do not have the right to endanger and subject to

9 international sanctions 10 million citizens of Yugoslavia for the sake of

10 unresolved issues that are incomparably more trivial than the results

11 achieved. Put simply, we want to tell you that you must take care with

12 your demands."

13 And then I go on to say at the end: "We will allow ourselves as

14 much right to make you important decisions for the Serbian people and what

15 is good and what is bad for our country and the entire Serbian people.

16 This is a matter of war and peace and we are therefore choosing peace.

17 This peace is not just peace for Serbia and Montenegro but also for all of

18 us. This peace is an honourable peace which guarantees your equality and

19 freedom. The alternative is an unnecessary war which cannot bring

20 anything but ill, suffering and violence to both us and others," et

21 cetera, et cetera.

22 So you read out all this and Radovan Karadzic suggested that the

23 plan or, rather, proposed that the plan be supported.

24 A. Yes.

25 Q. Did you say anything else at the Assembly session except for

Page 36147

1 reading out the letter?

2 A. No, I did not because it didn't come under my competence and

3 authority to do so.

4 Q. I see here that in between the paragraphs we have a statement by

5 you about the peace process. "Keep the peace process going."

6 A. Yes. I made that statement early in the morning after the

7 agreement was not voted on. I thought that the peace process was

8 jeopardised, but I said that we mustn't lose hope and we must continue our

9 work to achieve peace and a political settlement.

10 Q. Very well. Now, since you didn't take the floor to say anything

11 else and you said that Biljana Plavsic attacked you and said you weren't a

12 good enough Serb, why did she attack you if you didn't take the floor at

13 all, didn't make any other statements?

14 A. Because I was the conveyer of that joint message and for having

15 read out the message myself. She probably concluded on the basis of that

16 that I wasn't a sufficiently good Serb just like the other presidents

17 weren't, and she adopted a very harsh tone, an angry tone.

18 Q. Do you remember the results of the voting? Which deputies voted

19 aye and which voted nay?

20 A. I can't remember exactly. I just remember that there were

21 considerable votes against -- for --

22 Q. Or you mean that it was rejected?

23 A. Yes, that's right, it was rejected. So they voted against.

24 Q. So is it clear that there were rigorous sanctions that were

25 enforced towards the Republic of Yugoslavia and farther afield, in

Page 36148

1 Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina?

2 A. Yes, that was clear that this would be enforced but they passed

3 over that, glossed over it because they considered that their interests

4 came first and everything else was secondary and subservient to that. So

5 when I say "their interests," in the very narrow sense of the word.

6 Unfortunately, these sanctions were expanded to include Serbia, Montenegro

7 or, rather, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as well, although they were

8 completely unmerited, unwarranted, because as I say, the people who should

9 have been commended were put down.

10 Q. In Athens several days later, as we can see on the basis of the

11 calendar just four days later, a conference was held with Vance and Owen

12 and the host of the conference was Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis. Did

13 you take part in that conference?

14 A. Yes, I did. I was there.

15 Q. Just in very brief terms, very briefly, please, because we just

16 have two minutes left, as Mr. Robinson told us a moment ago, what were

17 your impressions from the conference? Radovan Karadzic accepted the

18 Vance-Owen Plan there and put his signature to it. So what were your

19 impressions? How long did the discussion go on for; what happened?

20 A. I did not actually take part in the discussion and debate myself

21 but I was close by. It lasted a long time. It was a difficult

22 negotiation and discussion, a lengthy one, and Radovan Karadzic wouldn't

23 have agreed had you not advocated this. And this is something that

24 Mr. Mitsotakis himself recognised, and finally he placed his signature to

25 it but conditioned it with the proviso that there should be a referendum

Page 36149

1 in Republika Srpska. And as we know, the referendum was -- also went

2 against the plan so that this whole good idea fell through.

3 JUDGE KWON: Excuse me, Mr. Milosevic. The decision of the

4 Bosnian Serb Assembly, was that a unanimous one or not? This report of

5 Politika said it has unanimously rejected the Vance-Owen Plan. If you let

6 me be clear about -- as to whether Mr. Karadzic supported the plan or did

7 he reject the plan as well?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When he took the microphone, he

9 asked the deputies to adopt the plan, although he said that the plan was

10 not satisfactory and didn't meet all the expectations and interests that

11 it should have done because there were unsatisfactory solutions but that

12 it was good on the whole and that it favoured Serb policy. That was his

13 appeal.

14 Now, as a guest myself I was sitting in the first row, and I

15 didn't consider the votes behind me. So those who were in favour of the

16 plan did not dare state this publicly during the voting, because the

17 general mood was going against the acceptance of the plan.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: That has to be the last question, and we are

19 going to adjourn now, and we will resume 9.00 a.m. tomorrow.

20 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.43 p.m.,

21 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 15th day of

22 February, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.