1 Tuesday, 15 February 2005
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Before you begin, Mr. Milosevic, I'd like to
7 mention two matters. Firstly dealing with the admission of exhibits,
8 those tabs which were used during examination-in-chief which have already
9 been used in examination-in-chief will be admitted, but thereafter,
10 Mr. Milosevic, when you have used a tab, made reference to it, you should
11 apply for its admission, if you wish, into evidence as an exhibit. This
12 part of our proceedings is adversarial, and it is for the party to apply
13 for the admission of a document into evidence.
14 Secondly, at the beginning of the third session this morning,
15 we'll have a brief discussion of Serbia and Montenegro's motion for the
16 protection of diplomatic cables which will be used by the Prosecution --
17 or which may be used by the Prosecution in its cross-examination of this
19 I've set it for the beginning of the third session, Mr. Milosevic,
20 because that would then coincide with the completion of the time that you
21 had said would be spent in examination-in-chief. That's six hours.
22 Let us proceed.
23 WITNESS: VLADISLAV JOVANOVIC [Resumed]
24 [Witness answered through interpreter]
25 Examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]
1 Q. [No interpretation].
2 THE INTERPRETER: Can you hear the English?
3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
4 Q. Good morning, Mr. Jovanovic.
5 A. Good morning, Mr. President.
6 Q. Did the UN Security Council, with respect to the crisis in
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina -- rather, the armed conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina
8 ever qualify those conflicts as some sort of foreign aggression or said
9 that Serbia or the FRY was the aggressor?
10 A. No. The UN Security Council didn't, nor did any other organ of
11 the United Nations. The Security Council even -- what it did do in one
12 Resolution in which it referred to the conduct of the three parties in
13 Bosnia with respect to the peace plan of Vance and Owen pinpointed the
14 three warring sides, two sides accepting the proposal and the third side
15 that did not accept the proposal, and that third side was the Bosnian
17 Q. In point 47, and that's why I'm asking you about the Bosnian
18 indictment, it says throughout the time to which the indictment refers in
19 Bosnia-Herzegovina there was a state of international armed conflict and
20 partial occupation. And since this speaks against me, if I can put it
21 that way, it doesn't mean the partial occupation on the part of Croatian
22 forces, which was quite obvious.
23 Now, from the aspects of the FRY or Serbia, can this be considered
25 A. No, not at all. Not in any case, because Yugoslavia withdrew its
1 last units, the units of the Yugoslav People's Army, which were composed
2 of the citizens of Serbia and Montenegro. And on the other side, the --
3 on the other hand, the only foreign armed units that were in Bosnia were
4 the units of the Republic of Croatia, and I remember that you in a
5 conversation with the political director, Mr. Jacques Blot of the Quay
6 d'Orsay, that you discussed this matter and indicated that factor, that
7 his response to you was yes, we know all about that, we even know the
8 numbers of brigades of the Croatian army in Bosnia, but the general
9 perception is that you are to blame, and that's how things stand.
10 Q. Very well. Now, take a look, Mr. Jovanovic, at tab 8.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And, gentlemen, I would like to draw
12 your attention to the fact that this document is a report by the
13 Secretary-General -- a report of the Secretary-General dated the 30th of
14 May, 1992, and it is already in evidence as D91. I'm not sure that I
15 understood you correctly, Mr. Robinson. Do I have to ask for that
16 document to be admitted again?
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, not if it has already been admitted. If it
18 hasn't been admitted and you wish it to be admitted, then, yes, you must
19 request its admission after you have used it.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Now, with respect to the topic in hand -- Mr. Jovanovic, have you
23 found the report of the Secretary-General first?
24 A. Yes, I have.
25 Q. I'd like to ask you to answer several questions pertaining to that
1 report, and they are this: In paragraph 5, the General-Secretary says the
2 following: "[In English] The bulk of the JNA personnel who were deployed
3 in Bosnia-Herzegovina were citizens of that republic and were not
4 therefore covered by the Belgrade authorities' decision of 4 May to
5 withdraw JNA from Bosnia and Herzegovina. Most of them appear to have
6 joined the army of the so-called 'Serbian Republic of
7 Bosnia-Herzegovina'. Others have joined the Territorial Defence of
8 Bosnia and Herzegovina, which is under the political control of the
9 Presidency of that republic. Others may have joined various irregular
10 forces operating there."
11 [Interpretation] And then in paragraph 6 they say that according
12 to the information of the Belgrade authorities, that is to say those who
13 are not citizens of Bosnia-Herzegovina which are covered by that decision,
14 that they are barely 20 per cent of the total of that contingent, roughly,
15 words to that effect. And then it says and the sentence begins: "Most of
16 them are believed to have withdrawn [In English] already into Serbia or
17 Montenegro, some of them having been subjected to attack during their
19 [Interpretation] What do you know from that period of time about
20 the withdrawal of the JNA from Bosnia with respect to what the
21 General-Secretary -- Secretary-General says here and with respect to the
22 attacks on the UN JNA units who were withdrawing from Bosnia and all the
23 other matters mentioned in the report of the Secretary-General? And I'm
24 going to draw your attention to a few of those later on.
25 A. As far as I know, the Yugoslav People's Army or, rather, the JNA
1 units were leaving en masse. They were made up of citizens of the
2 republics that were breaking away from Yugoslavia, and that the same case
3 was repeated in Bosnia when it came to the soldiers and officers who were
4 there and who were not Serbs from that republic.
5 So what happened was that the majority of members of the JNA in
6 Bosnia were citizens of that republic, of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they
7 refused to carry on serving in the JNA and decided to stay on in
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina. And that was a general phenomenon that took place
9 given the present circumstances and the break-up of Yugoslavia.
10 Now, as far as the withdrawal of the JNA is concerned, I know that
11 this was stated by the vice-president of the Yugoslav state Presidency.
12 He made a statement to that effect. I think it was Mr. Kostic at the
13 time, and he said that the JNA units had withdrawn from Bosnia and that
14 what remained were just several smaller pockets. I think there were some
15 cadets that he referred to in Sarajevo, several hundred cadets in Sarajevo
16 and elsewhere, and their withdrawal was systematically prevented by part
17 of the leadership of the Bosnian Muslims.
18 Q. So those men who did not withdraw were in fact blocked in those
19 pockets, the few pockets, by the Muslim militia or police or, rather, the
20 so-called Territorial Defence, the Muslim Territorial Defence?
21 A. That's precisely it. And their goal was, I assume, to seize the
22 weapons these men had and to provoke them in order to be able to proclaim
23 the JNA as the aggressor in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Jovanovic, what is the source, your source
25 for that information?
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The source of this information is
2 not only this report, and you can see it right through the report, as well
3 as a series of other reports which were compiled by the United Nations
4 representatives. For example, General MacKenzie in his report or, rather,
5 in his memoirs spoke about certain of these facts, and I have the
6 impression that something similar was said by another British general.
7 What was his name? Michael Rose, I believe. So that you can read that up
8 there in several reports and also the reports by foreign correspondents
9 dating back to that period indicate that, indicate that matters evolved
10 along that course.
11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. All right. Thank you. Those are foreign sources. But what about
13 your own? Do you have personal knowledge from that period of time about
14 the withdrawal of the Yugoslav People's Army from Bosnia-Herzegovina, for
16 A. Yes, I do, because those statements were made by the top
17 leadership, the General Staff of the Yugoslav People's Army at the time,
18 and this was confirmed and borne out by the Presidency of the Socialist
19 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia itself. And in public statements and in
20 the press the difficulties were highlighted that certain units were
21 encountering during their withdrawal from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and even
22 that there were some bloody conflicts in certain areas.
23 Q. Do you know that the vice-president of the Yugoslav Presidency at
24 the time, Mr. Branko Kostic, had a meeting with the then president of the
25 Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Alija Izetbegovic, and proposed that the
1 Presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina, since that was after the international
2 recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, should take steps in order to take what
3 was theirs from the JNA on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina?
4 A. Yes, I am aware of that, and I do know that Mr. Izetbegovic,
5 afterwards, did not agree to attend another meeting to decide the
6 specifics of that matter.
7 Q. So there was no other way out, nothing else to do but for the JNA,
8 by order of the Yugoslav state Presidency, to withdraw from
9 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and that was done, and that is reflected in this
10 report; is that right?
11 A. Yes, it is.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.
13 MR. NICE: The last two questions have both been really
14 effectively leading questions. The witness is speaking unclear as to the
15 source of his knowledge and information, and I don't have any document or
16 65 ter summary to explain to me where it all comes from. So I'd invite
17 the Chamber to restrain these leading questions.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you've again been asking leading
19 questions. The Chamber has been fairly flexible with you, but I'm quite
20 satisfied that you can ask questions that are not leading, and the Chamber
21 expects you to do so.
22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I hope I'm not going
23 to ask leading questions, but bear in mind that this is not a witness that
24 learnt something from reading the papers. He was the former foreign
25 minister, so he had access to all kinds of information during the material
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's all the more reason why you should avoid
3 asking leading questions. He has the information. Let him present it.
4 And I think you have the technique.
5 MR. NICE: Your Honours, I have to say that if his answers are
6 going to be based on documents, then either he must produce them, or at
7 the very least he must identify them so that we can see if we have them;
8 alternatively, that we may be able to find them.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, it all goes to weight and the value that
10 will be attached to his evidence.
11 Mr. Milosevic, the rule against leading questions is particularly
12 relevant in areas of controversy, in matters of dispute. Proceed.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.
14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, I'd like to draw your attention to -- I'd like to
16 draw your attention to the middle of paragraph 9, one sentence there which
17 states the following: "[In English]... it is also clear that the
18 emergence of General Mladic and the forces under his command as
19 independent actor -- independent actors apparently beyond the control of
20 JNA greatly complicates the issues raised in paragraph 4 of Security
21 Council Resolution 752." [Interpretation] Then it says: "[In English]
22 President Izetbegovic has recently indicated to senior UNPROFOR officers
23 at Sarajevo his willingness to deal with General Mladic but not with the
24 political leadership of the 'Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.'"
25 [Interpretation] I would like to draw your attention to what it
1 says here. "[In English] ... forces under his command as independent
2 actors apparently beyond the control of JNA."
3 [Interpretation] Do you know -- do you know -- I'm trying not to
4 lead you. Do you know under whose control the forces of the Serb Republic
5 of Bosnia-Herzegovina it was known at the time, later Republika Srpska,
7 A. I do not have any direct knowledge about this, but my impression
8 was at the time that at least at that time the forces of Republika Srpska
9 were still in the making, and they were fully independent. They behaved
10 as such in the field as well. So that period of the establishment of the
11 forces of Republika Srpska was practically a period of their absolute
12 independence from any kind of external influence.
13 Q. All right. When you say "at that time," do you know perhaps
14 anything about a later time; namely, that the army of Republika Srpska was
15 under some kind of outside control, under the control of someone outside
16 Bosnia-Herzegovina, outside Republika Srpska? Do you have any information
17 to that effect?
18 A. I have no information to that effect that it was under anyone's
19 control, because quite simply I was not in contact with their top military
20 people. But my impression is from various discussions --
21 MR. NICE: That simply goes to show the reality of the previous
22 answer, or to be precise the complete lack of reality of the previous
23 answer. We hear something that is the witness's impression. He's asked a
24 question, Do you know under whose control the forces of the Serb republic
25 were? He says, My impression is this, then he gives knowledge of
1 something that is negative, and then he goes back to another impression.
2 Are impressions of any value to this Chamber? I would invite the
3 Chamber to say that without clear exposition of what the impression is
4 based on, the answer must be no.
5 MR. KAY: Can I just raise some matters here? This is a witness
6 who was present at the time, involved essentially in many of these
7 important issues. He may not have been in place so that he was aware
8 directly and through his own contact with what was going on, but he was in
9 a part of the events that he was aware that things were happening
10 elsewhere because of his positioning and place, and for him to give his
11 impression from where he was is important evidence that the Trial Chamber
12 can attach what weight it feels fit to eventually, but bearing in mind
13 where he was.
14 I was reading the transcript of Mr. Nice's questioning of
15 Mr. Bakalli yesterday, and exactly the same objection he is making now
16 could be levelled directly at him on page 516 of the transcript. The
17 impressions of Mr. Bakalli concerning tanks outside the Assembly building
18 in Pristina, the impressions of Mr. Bakalli about Gazimestan. All these
19 issues were ways that Mr. Nice built his case, but we have here exactly
20 the same kind of witness for the Defence who had a role to play and is
21 able to give information of what he was aware was happening elsewhere.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Kay.
23 Mr. Milosevic, in my view -- in my view, the passage that you have
24 cited from the Secretary-General's report is very, very important to your
25 case. It's very, very strong evidence. Although it says that the forces
1 under his command, that is General Mladic, were apparently beyond the
2 control of the JNA, the word "apparently," of course, is significant, but
3 I would suggest that you try to get a witness other than this witness who
4 can substantiate what the Secretary-General says in his report. Even
5 without that substantiation, as a report from the Secretary-General, I
6 would attach great weight to it, but I think your case would be immensely
7 strengthened if, for example, you could secure the authors of the report.
8 I mean, you very well know that it is not the Secretary-General himself
9 who wrote it, but the person in the UN who would have received specific
10 information on this issue and who would have compiled the report might be
11 able to give valuable evidence in relation to your case. But I don't
12 think this witness can take it much further beyond his impressions, and we
13 can't rule that evidence out, but the weight that we will be able to
14 attach to it is a matter that we'll have to determine.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, Mr. President, in
16 relation to that, may I add just one sentence, please?
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, briefly. Yes.
18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I know that on the occasion of later
19 attacks of the army of Republika Srpska at some targets in
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina, President Milosevic was very surprised and very
21 bitter. For example, the mountain of Igman and Bjelasnica near Sarajevo
22 in 1993, then the shelling of Gorazde in 1993, then the attack on
23 Srebrenica in 1993. He was embittered when he learned that that happened,
24 and he was outraged that it happened. That, in my opinion, is proof that
25 the forces of Republika Srpska were not under his control.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, please. When I put a question to you, could you
3 tell me what your actual knowledge is.
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, you yourself said that
5 Mr. Jovanovic is obviously a career diplomat. You learned that from his
6 CV. So his language is rather diplomatic. So what other people would say
7 that they know of, Mr. Jovanovic says it is his impression. It is simply
8 the way he speaks. But it is a fact that he knew about, so there is no
9 denying that.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's for him to clarify whether it's his
11 impression or whether he's speaking from actual knowledge, Mr. Milosevic,
12 it's not for you.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have a degree of understanding for
15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. But, please, Mr. Jovanovic, would you clarify.
17 A. If we're talking about Article 9 -- we are talking about Article
18 9, are we -- or, rather, paragraph 9. It is quite clear that the forces
19 of the army of Republika Srpska and General Mladic were not under the
20 control of the JNA or Serbia at that time at all, because everything that
21 happened there was news from the outside that were coming to Serbia and to
22 its leadership as something that is new and something that we were not
23 aware of.
24 Q. In order to clarify this a bit more, could you please look one
25 paragraph up, that is to say paragraph 8, where it says: "[In English] A
1 senior JNA representative from Belgrade, General Nedeljko Boskovic, has
2 conducted discussions with the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency, but it
3 has become clear that his word is not binding on the commander of the army
4 of the 'Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina,' General Mladic."
5 [Interpretation] I think that there is yet another element there
6 which leads to a particular conclusion. What is the conclusion that you
7 draw on this basis or, rather, what did you know at the time?
8 A. I knew that General Mladic was defiant, and he was challenging
9 General Boskovic. He didn't want to cooperate with him, and he didn't
10 want to take his advice. So he acted in total independence, without
11 taking into consideration what the JNA representatives were telling him or
12 advising him to do. This report reflects that.
13 Q. Could you please have a look at paragraph 10 now. "[In English]
14 As regards the withdrawal of elements of the Croatian army now in
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina ..." [Interpretation] Is this a statement that there
16 are elements of the Croatian army in Bosnia-Herzegovina now? Just say yes
17 or no.
18 A. Yes, by all means. Yes. As I said a few minutes ago, what Mr.
19 Blot told me.
20 Q. And then the sentence continues: "[In English] ... information
21 currently available in New York suggests that no such withdrawal has
22 occurred. UNPROFOR has received reliable reports of Croatian army
23 personnel, in uniforms, operating within, and as part of, military
24 formations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Croatian authorities have
25 consistently taken the position that the Croatian soldiers in Bosnia and
1 Herzegovina have left the Croatian army and are not subject to its
2 authority. International observers do not, however, doubt that portions
3 of Bosnia and Herzegovina are under the control of Croatian military
4 units, whether belonging to the local Territorial Defence, to paramilitary
5 groups, or to the Croatian army. It is unclear in the circumstances how
6 their withdrawal or disbandment, as required by the Council, can be
8 [Interpretation] Mr. Jovanovic, isn't this report clear? Does it
9 not clearly show a contrast between the information in the report of the
10 Secretary-General about the attitude of the JNA towards this matter and
11 the attitude of the Croatian army? What kind of information is provided
12 about one and what kind of information is provided by the other?
13 A. The difference is obvious. The presence and withdrawal of the JNA
14 are referred to in a positive sense as a process which is practically
15 completed except for a few pockets which made it impossible for them to
16 withdraw completely, whereas the presence of Croatian regular forces - I
17 mean the Republic of Croatia - is spoken of in a very unequivocal manner.
18 Some soldiers of the army of the Republic of Croatia voluntarily joined
19 their brothers in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but then there were also regular
20 forces there of the Croatian army with the presence of certain brigades by
21 numbers, Mr. Blot said.
22 Q. Do you know about this report of the Secretary-General? It was
23 supposed to be debated before a decision was passed on imposing sanctions
24 against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
25 A. Yes. This report came with a delay. The members of the Security
1 Council, had they received it on time and read it on time, I'm sure that
2 they would not have voted in favour of the Resolution for imposing
3 sanctions against Yugoslavia. There would not have been any factual
4 basis, or any legal basis or political basis for it. However, it came
5 with a delay. According to what we learned later, this was no accident,
6 this delay. Allegedly, it was done by an administrative officer who was
7 allegedly instructed to drag his feet on this.
8 So this was a manipulation, to the best of our knowledge, of the
9 Security Council in order to have a particular decision pushed through.
10 The Security Council certainly would not have passed such a Resolution had
11 it known about this report.
12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Jovanovic.
13 MR. NICE: Obviously if we can have the name of the administrative
14 officer or matters of that sort, we can put matters, start inquiries
15 straight away, but without particulars it's all a bit vague.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Nice.
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Does it really matter, Mr. Nice? Is that really
18 the point of this evidence?
19 MR. NICE: I don't know whether it matters or not, but we find
20 ourselves recurringly in the position of having these very broad,
21 sometimes very serious, allegations made, and I hope to be able to leave
22 cross-examination, which I hope to be brief, having identified issues
23 where they should properly be identified.
24 Now, to say that the -- the Secretariat of the United Nations
25 hasn't been free of criticism thus far. There's been criticism indeed
1 coming from a witness called by me. But nevertheless, if allegations of
2 this kind, really rather serious allegations are going to be made, it is
3 better that we should have the detail, if it's available, straight away.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: But as Judge Bonomy said, nothing might turn on
5 it, because the report is nonetheless there and it does contain, in my
6 view, information which is quite helpful to the case of the accused. The
7 fact that it wasn't presented to the Security Council or that it may have
8 been, by some alleged manipulation, kept from the Security Council is
9 really neither here nor there.
10 MR. NICE: I think the problem there, Your Honour, is I think the
11 accused will rely on the alleged manipulation, but I've probably taken
12 enough time.
13 JUDGE BONOMY: He may rely on the fact that it didn't go to the
14 Security Council. I understand that. But why it didn't go doesn't really
15 seem, for the purposes of this trial, to be terribly important.
16 MR. NICE: Very well.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: The point is that we have the report.
18 Mr. Milosevic, it has occurred to me that hopefully we're not far away
19 from the -- too far away from the close of your case, and I just wonder
20 how you're managing your case. For example, when you come to make your
21 closing submissions, I think you need help. You will need technical help
22 to isolate matters of importance to your case and to highlight them, like,
23 for example, this report. And you should really be utilising the services
24 of the assigned counsel. I mean, you may want to use your closing address
25 for other purposes, but there is a lot of material in the case which could
1 be helpful to your case and beneficial for your case, and it would be a
2 pity if you are not utilising your closing address in a meaningful way.
3 And you have a wealth of material before you. There's just so much
4 information, so much material in this case, and it is my view and I think
5 the view of the Chamber that you should be utilising the services of the
6 assigned counsel to assist you in matters of that kind. But I just make
7 that observation.
8 Continue with the examination-in-chief.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, let me just clarify
10 something, what you said in relation to the report. This report did reach
11 the Security Council. The point is that it did not arrive on time. It
12 was one day late. But this report did reach the Security Council, and the
13 Security Council did debate it, did have a look at it. It's not that it
14 did not reach it at all, it was just delayed through this manipulation.
15 But it is a document that was looked at by the Security Council. But let
16 me proceed, as you said.
17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, now let us move into the political arena which is
19 very familiar to you. Why is it that Serbia or, rather, the Federal
20 Republic of Yugoslavia supported the Serb people in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
21 and what were the real goals of that support that was provided?
22 A. Serbia supported its own people in Bosnia and Herzegovina just as
23 any other state would do in relation to its people in similar situation,
24 because the Serb people were denied their constituent rights by the
25 referendum that was organised and through the decisions of Badinter's
1 commission and later the decisions of EU which turned that nation into a
2 minority. Therefore, its constituent rights, its safety, its normal,
3 regular life were endangered. That's why Serbia supported its people, its
4 right to self-determination, to equality, and to freedom.
5 Once that was achieved, and that was done through Cutileiro's plan
6 on the 17th of March, 1992, Serbia supported that. Serbia supported the
7 idea of independent Bosnia and Herzegovina organised on the basis of
8 cantons. This is another fact showing that Serbia did not support Serbs
9 in Bosnia-Herzegovina as a result of its territorial ambitions but,
10 rather, because their existential rights, their rights to freedom were
12 Q. As for the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the course of the
13 conflict, you took part in many meetings. You had numerous contacts that
14 we had at the time with international mediators and so on. What do you
15 know about the demilitarisation of the airport in Sarajevo?
16 A. I know that this problem came about rather early because the
17 airport was quite important for the functioning of the town and for the
18 functioning of UNPROFOR. Therefore, the request to demilitarise the
19 airport, which was put in by the international community, is something
20 that you and other organs from the SFRY supported and supported
21 continuously from the very beginning. In that sense, you used your
22 political influence over the political leadership of Republika Srpska to
23 urge them to accept that request. You did that in all of your contacts
24 with international mediators and other interlocutors.
25 Q. Well, was the airport finally demilitarised and was it taken over
1 by UNPROFOR?
2 A. Yes, that's right. That did come about after a certain delay, and
3 from that time on the airport was in use except when there were -- there
4 were combat activities in the vicinity of the airport and the airport had
5 to be closed because of that.
6 Q. Do you remember what was our position with respect to the shelling
7 of Sarajevo?
8 A. Yes, I remember that. From the very beginning, at all levels we,
9 the Presidency of SFRY, the government of the republic, you personally and
10 I, in numerous statements condemned the shelling and demanded that the
11 authorities of Republika Srpska cease that activity. You did that
12 publicly and also in all of the discussions you had with representatives
13 of international community mediators and everybody else who came to see
14 you and talk to you about that.
15 Q. Very well. You were present when the discussions with Douglas
16 Hurd took place in Belgrade in July of 1992. I think that it was on the
17 18th of July, 1992.
18 A. Yes, about that date.
19 Q. Do you remember that conversation?
20 A. There were a number of conversations or meetings covering same
21 topics. However, I remember that even at that time the issue of the
22 shelling of Sarajevo was raised and that on that occasion you yet again
23 presented your attitude to Mr. Hurd, namely, saying that you were opposed
24 to it and that you condemned that kind of behaviour.
25 Q. Yes. Our views, positions were quite public. It's not that they
1 were expressed just in the conversation with Mr. Hurd.
2 Was the London conference in progress then?
3 A. It was held in August of 1992.
4 Q. So just a month later.
5 A. Yes. And I think that before that representatives of warring
6 sides concluded a cease-fire agreement, if I remember well. You supported
7 that agreement, and reiterated that in your contacts with Mr. Hurd.
8 Q. Do you remember, Mr. Jovanovic, how did the news about some camps
9 reach us, and how did we react to those news?
10 A. We received those news through the foreign media, and we were very
11 critical with respect to that. However, later on when we asked that that
12 be verified and when we approached the authorities of Republika Srpska, we
13 received an answer that those were not concentration camps but, rather,
14 collection points, holding centres for the soldiers of the opposing side,
15 and that they were of a temporary nature. We asked that those facilities
16 be disbanded even though they were not concentration camps as we were
17 assured and as the foreign media claimed.
18 Naturally, there were some abuses in certain parts, but it's also
19 quite natural that the political leadership of Republika Srpska could not
20 have known about everything that was going on in the entire territory of
21 the entire country in view of the fact that there was war going on, that
22 communications were disrupted, the corridors were blocked, the corridors
23 that would enable them to have contact with that part of
24 Bosnia-Herzegovina where it was said the camps existed.
25 Q. All right. In order not to use diplomatic language,
1 Mr. Jovanovic, did I understand you well, namely, did you say that based
2 on what we received, the information that we received, it seemed that the
3 leadership of Republika Srpska didn't know about those facilities? At
4 least, that's what they told us. Is that what you're saying?
5 A. Yes. When we asked them whether it was true what the foreign
6 media reported about, they denied it. They said it wasn't true, that
7 those were not camps but, rather, collection points, collection centres.
8 And based on that, we had an impression that they themselves knew nothing
9 about the existence of such sites.
10 Q. I'm not going to refer now to previous times and to Kosovo, but
11 please tell us, do you know about the term "ethnic cleansing," and do you
12 know what we in Serbia, what I personally, our leadership in Serbia
13 believed about the persecution of population that was driven by racial or
14 ethnic considerations and so on?
15 A. The term "ethnic cleansing" was first used in the 1980s, in early
16 1980s, during the demonstrations organised by Kosovo Albanians when they
17 used slogans "Kosovo Republic" and "Kosovo for Albanians only." We at the
18 time publicly condemned any activity that would resemble ethnic cleansing
19 or anything similar. You stated that publicly yourself. For example,
20 after the conference in London, you declared that you strongly condemned
21 any activity, any kind of ethnic cleansing, any forcible moving out of
22 population from one place to another. And you said that if there was any
23 such activity going on, it needed to be halted immediately. And this is
24 something that was frequently repeated at all levels by representatives of
25 the Serbian government, federal government; you yourself stated this on
1 numerous occasions, as did I.
2 Q. Did I say that should it be established that such activity was
3 committed by somebody, those people needed to face justice?
4 A. Yes. You said that if there was ever a crime that could never be
5 condoned or accepted, if such crimes were committed at any point of time,
6 then those people needed to be held accountable for that. You stated that
7 publicly on many occasions, including immediately after the London
8 conference at a press conference.
9 Q. You were present when we met with Carter in December of 1994.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Do you remember what were the main points? Do you remember
12 anything particular from that occasion?
13 A. I remember that he said that during his previous meeting with
14 Mr. Karadzic there were a number of points discussed, perhaps six points,
15 and that you supported all peace efforts, including the peace initiative
16 of President Carter. However, you pointed out that you had very poor
17 contacts and communication with the leadership of Republika Srpska and
18 that you could not influence their position much. Mr. Carter applauded
19 your position, and he stated that he was expecting his mission to Bosnia
20 and Herzegovina to bear fruit. Unfortunately, that did not happen.
21 Q. Very well, in 1994 and in 1995, we had poor communication or,
22 rather, we were on rather bad terms with Republika Srpska. Do you
23 remember, why was that?
24 A. It was due to, first of all, their refusal to accept Vance-Owen
25 Plan and then Owen-Stoltenberg Plan. And as a result of that, our
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 relations were strained. Occasionally we had no contact whatsoever with
2 them. So there was no cooperation, state cooperation or any other
3 cooperation. Our meetings were mostly devoted to the disputes and
4 disagreements we had rather than any kind of cooperation.
5 These strained relations escalated at the time when the Contact
6 Group plan was circulated and when the leadership of Republika Srpska
7 consistently refused, for various reasons, some convincing, some not, to
8 accept that plan. This led to increasing difficulties in our relations,
9 even to disruption of any communication. And finally, the decision of
10 government of Republika Srpska was adopted on the 4th of August, 1994, I
11 believe, to halt all contacts with the leadership of Republika Srpska and
12 also all economic contacts, to ban their leadership from residing in
13 Serbia. Only food, clothing, and medication was exempted from this
14 embargo. This is what the situation was up until the beginning of the
15 Dayton negotiations.
16 Q. I didn't think that we would turn to this, so my recollections are
17 not that fresh, but did you attend that fateful meeting where the
18 patriarch of the Serbian Orthodox Church was present as well and when
19 finally an agreement was reached to establish one single delegation for
20 negotiations in Dayton?
21 A. No, I wasn't present. I was in New York at the time.
22 Q. All right, then we will not put any further questions about that.
23 Do you remember the hostage crisis and the reactions of Serbia and
24 myself personally to that crisis?
25 A. Yes. I certainly remember. This involved 282 hostages, members
1 of UNPROFOR, which were taken hostage by the forces of Republika Srpska in
2 order, as they alleged, to protect themselves from the bombing by NATO
4 When we heard about that, we were shocked. We were surprised. We
5 condemned that action, and through contacts with the international
6 community and the leadership of Republika Srpska, we did our best to
7 ensure safety for the hostages. But despite strained relations with the
8 leadership of Republika Srpska, we managed to give a major contribution
9 towards releasing hostages and ensuring their safe return to their units.
10 Q. Please tell me, do you remember Stoltenberg's visit to Belgrade in
11 late July 1995? I have a note here that it took place on the 29th of
12 July, 1995. Stoltenberg came to visit, and as far as I can see here, you
13 attended that meeting as well.
14 A. Yes. I think that I did, although there were numerous meetings
15 with Mr. Stoltenberg, and I'm sure that I was present if I was in
17 Q. Do you remember that discussion with Mr. Stoltenberg?
18 A. I can't remember it precisely because a lot of these discussions
19 were very similar, resolving around similar topics. It had to do with the
20 Contact Group plan, and I can't remember whether we discussed anything
21 else. Can you remind me about that?
22 Q. Well, in order to avoid putting leading questions, let me just
23 tell you that at the time, attempting to ensure that the plan is accepted,
24 we tried to recruit some members of the parliament of Republika Srpska to
25 support the plan. Do you remember that?
1 A. Yes, yes. You informed Mr. Stoltenberg and then other
2 representatives who came later about that. You worked tirelessly on
3 ensuring that there was an increased number of the members of parliament
4 of Republika Srpska who would support the plan and vote in favour of it.
5 And you did that through various channels, various intermediaries, and I
6 think you told us that that number increased to 36 or 38 MPs who were
7 already ready to vote in favour of that proposal, and I think that the
8 total number of MPs were 70 or 78 in their parliament. And when asked
9 when you expected this number to reach an absolute majority, you stated
10 that you expected that very soon. I think that Dr. Owen put that question
11 to you.
12 Unfortunately, that didn't happen. But at the time, you were
13 convinced that this number would be able to reach a number over 50.
14 Q. Yes. The number was supposed to exceed 50, but afterwards, the
15 chance fell through.
16 Let me just have a look at my notes here.
17 Do you remember when a whole brigade of the Muslim army, after I
18 gave approval, crossed the Drina River to save themselves from the
19 offensive and the fighting that was going on at the time in Eastern
20 Bosnia? Or, rather, this is a fact, there is no need for you to confirm
21 it, but do you remember the letter I addressed to Alija Izetbegovic on the
23 A. Yes, I do remember the crossing of that unit, and I think it was
24 deployed at Mount Tara or Mount Zlatibor until they were taken over by the
25 International Red Cross. And I remember that you sent a letter to Alija
1 Izetbegovic and a letter with similar contents was also sent to Ratko
2 Mladic, asking both these two men, in the interests of peace, to put a
3 stop to all the fighting immediately. And you also said that there was no
4 justification for increasing the number of victims and killing people when
5 we already had a plan in place which would lead to a peaceful political
6 and democratic settlement to the crisis. And you informed Mr. Izetbegovic
7 that you had sent a similar letter to General Mladic with similar
9 Q. Do you remember the visit by Malcolm Rivkin? You were present, I
11 A. Yes, I do remember.
12 Q. Do you have anything that you remember that would be
13 characteristic from that visit?
14 A. Well, he gave recognition to you personally for everything that
15 you had done and were doing for the Contact Group's plan, to further the
16 plan. And I know that later on, when the Dayton agreement was signed, he
17 also made a public statement in which he emphasised your great
18 contribution to the entire peace process and especially the Dayton
19 agreement coming about through your good offices.
20 Q. Do you remember how intensive -- or, rather, it doesn't matter if
21 you remember - I'm sure you do - but do you recall our intensive
22 cooperation with the special UN Secretary-General representative for
23 Yugoslavia, Mr. Akashi?
24 A. Yes, I remember he was a very frequent visitor to Belgrade and
25 that we always had concrete, constructive talks on matters that he raised,
1 and he raised a number of issues, and he was different from the
2 international mediators, Stoltenberg and Owen. These questions were
3 relatively lesser questions relating to various incidents, so they were of
4 a lesser order. But he always appealed to Vance for support and efforts
5 to overcome the problems. He appealed to you to overcome the problems,
6 and you did help, and he said that at the end of his mission during a
7 press conference in assessing his cooperation with you throughout his
8 sojourn in Yugoslavia. And he dealt with Bihac, for example, Republika
9 Srpska Krajina, the shelling of Gorazde, and so on and so forth, many of
10 these incidents that took place on a daily basis as the war developed and
11 as the crisis in Bosnia-Herzegovina developed. And I think it was -- he
12 was extremely grateful to you, at least that's what he said, for all the
13 assistance you had given to help solve those issues. And sometimes during
14 those conversations Mr. Martic would be present, especially towards the
15 end when the situation around Bihac developed, and you answered in front
16 of him that all matters, all issues must be resolved by peaceful political
17 means and not by force of arms.
18 Q. Since you mentioned Mr. Martic just now, do you remember that at
19 that time we had a very positive process going on to regulate relations
20 between Knin and Zagreb, for instance, and what our attitude towards that
21 process was, the process of mutually regulating relations between Knin and
23 A. This was a process which incorporated regulated cooperation or,
24 rather, having the basic life system restored between Knin and Zagreb,
25 which means the gas pipeline, the water pipeline, and all other means of
1 cooperation between Croatia and the Republic of Srpska Krajina. And I
2 don't know where the agreement was actually signed, whether it was in Knin
3 or Erdut, but I do know that this question was often on the agenda of your
4 meetings, both with the representatives of Republika Srpska Krajina and
5 with the representatives of Serb Croatia as well and of course with
6 international representatives, too, and that you always insisted upon very
7 detailed and expedient undertaking of responsibilities that were taken on
8 on the basis of your agreements.
9 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, do you know that in the conflict in
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina which went on, you know that there were large numbers
11 of refugees, but do you know how many Muslim refugees fled to Serbia, fled
12 from the conflict that was going on in Bosnia-Herzegovina and fled to
14 A. I think there were between 50 and 70.000 of them and that they
15 fled during the war operations and when there weren't, when they expected
16 another onslaught. I personally met some Muslims who worked in the
17 Belgrade Circus and other places who talked to me about that and said that
18 they wanted to get out fast in order to avoid the war conflict in Bosnia
19 and Herzegovina. The treatment of these refugees was equal to the
20 treatment of Serb refugees from Bosnia-Herzegovina, and indeed from
21 Croatia as well. Everybody was treated equally. We had a total of 700 or
22 800.000 from Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. The largest number were, of
23 course, Serbs but there were Muslims and Croats among them. And there was
24 no difference in our treatment of them, although this was an enormous
25 financial burden for us because we were under sanctions and isolated at
1 the time.
2 Q. Do you remember November 1994 and the meeting with the Contact
3 Group in Karadjordjevo? That is to say the full composition of the
4 Contact Group was there visiting us.
5 A. I do remember that. They were experts, I believe, at the level of
6 the political directors of the Member States of the Contact Group, and
7 they reviewed the plan of the Contact Group. And the leadership of
8 Republika Srpska was the problem, because they refused to accept the plan
9 despite assurances that it was a good idea and smaller amendments to the
10 plan. But the group expressed its thanks to you for the efforts you had
11 invested to bring it to a successful close. And you asked them to do what
12 they could for their part and to offer assurances to Republika Srpska,
13 particularly with respect to a future confederation between the future
14 entity and Serbia, just like the assurances that were given that the
15 Croatia entity in Bosnia would have the right to confederation with
16 Croatia. That was not a clear point. So that was the general gist of
17 those negotiations.
18 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, you took an active part in all these events, and
19 I'm now going to ask you to take a look at tab 9. Let me just find your
20 text, a short quotation, a short quotation.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope, Mr. Robinson, that you have
22 found tab 9.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's not translated -- the translation is here.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I didn't have the translation here.
25 MR. NICE: Before -- before we embark on this --
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
2 MR. NICE: -- the Chamber is, I know, considering the basis of
3 admissibility of exhibits in respect of a previous witness. I haven't had
4 a chance, of course, to consider this in English. I understand that this
5 is a collection of items provided by various individuals. It may be that
6 we're only going to be taken to something that this particular has
7 written. The basis of admissibility ought to be explored, in my
8 respectful submission.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, this document in English, on the
10 first page, has the name of the -- of the witness. Is this an article by
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes, Mr. Robinson. And to
13 save time, I'm not going to go through the entire text. I'd like to save
14 time, and all I'm going to ask the witness is what the reason was for him
15 to write what I'm going to quote from his text. It's at the very end of
16 the text.
17 Might the text be placed on the ELMO, please? Thank you. The
18 English version. Thank you.
19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, this is from your text.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let us find out when it was written. When was
22 this written?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 2001. As a contribution to a book
24 devoted to the Nacertanije by Ilija Garasanin. Many authors wrote texts
25 to accompany that work, and I was one of them.
1 MR. NICE: Is this a work of expertise? If so, what expertise?
2 Is there some other basis for admissibility, because at the moment I can't
3 see why in principle a witness should be allowed to read out something
4 that he's written on a topic unless it has expertise.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Why not? I can't understand the basis for that
6 objection, Mr. Nice. Let us hear what use will be made of it.
7 MR. NICE: This is the first time I've seen it in English, and it
8 appears to be a historical analysis of some kind. Is this man an
10 I'm doing my best to cope with a very large amount of material
11 provided, as in this case, frequently without translation, without any
12 statement indicating the relevance of the material, and I'm expected to,
13 and I hope to, deal with matters in cross-examination swiftly. But the
14 more that the gates are opened broadly to evidence of this kind, the
15 greater it's going to be -- the harder it's going to be for me to meet
16 those objectives.
17 JUDGE KWON: It is for the Chamber to determine the weight of
18 evidence, but he hasn't come as an expert. I don't see the point of your
19 objection at all.
20 JUDGE BONOMY: But it's important, Mr. Nice, that we tackle the
21 issue you're raising to see if in fact there is an issue, because behind
22 the objection is a complaint that you're not being given adequate notice
23 of what's being presented.
24 Now, all that's intended here, apparently, is a brief quotation
25 from this document which is a statement by the witness which presumably he
1 could be asked to make without the document in front of him, for that
2 matter. This is a tactic similar to one that you've adopted a number of
3 times so far and which we are considering the significance of at this
4 moment. And it's really impossible for me to identify a basis for
5 opposing this course of action at this moment. It may be there's no
6 weight to be given to what's said at the end of the day, but I myself
7 can't see a basis for objecting to this.
8 MR. NICE: I think I said at the beginning I was interested to
9 know the basis of admissibility.
10 JUDGE BONOMY: Has it not got to be a basis for inadmissibility
11 that we have to seek out if there is an objection taken to evidence?
12 MR. NICE: Where I have no notice of what's coming, I have to be
13 careful. That's my position.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, your caution is noted, Mr. Nice.
15 Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.
16 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone, please, for the
18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
19 Q. The last paragraph, you say, "With the burgeoning of the -- the
20 demonisation of the peoples of individual nations was introduced most
21 often as --"
22 THE INTERPRETER: Could Mr. Milosevic start again, please.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the interpreter is asking you to
24 start again, because she wasn't able to grasp it.
25 THE INTERPRETER: Yes. Thank you. The interpreter has found it.
1 Yes, they do. The interpreters have it now.
2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. It's the last page, the second half of the last paragraph, and I
4 shall repeat: "As sense of invulnerability grew in the victor in the Cold
5 War, the practice whereby a people in a country would be demonised was
6 introduced, most often as a precursor to unlawful armed actions launched
7 against them. There have been several such cases, but nowhere has the
8 demonisation reached such total scale as in the case of Serbia and the
9 Serbian people. A new and dangerous form of racism has appeared, no less
10 than the kind that was manifest in colonial times. The UN should not
11 hesitate any longer to expand its list of prohibited acts by including the
12 prohibition of the demonisation of a country or a people. The Federal
13 Republic of Yugoslavia has an absolutely legitimate and justified reason
14 and full moral basis to launch such an initiative as soon as possible and
15 to mobilise other countries to give their support in this effort."
16 So this, then, is what you yourself wrote, Mr. Jovanovic. What
17 did you have in mind in writing this?
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Please don't answer that.
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 JUDGE BONOMY: You have no objection to that question, Mr. Nice?
21 MR. NICE: I rather thought that --
22 JUDGE BONOMY: You see, it's the timing that matters here. I find
23 it very difficult to adjudicate on the objection to something in the
24 abstract on the sort of basis you tried to formulate, but I wonder, I just
25 want to be sure that you have no objection to that question.
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 MR. NICE: Can I deal with things in order, please. It will take
2 me a minute or so.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, why don't we ask the accused what is the
4 relevance to the indictment of the so-called demonisation of the Serbian
5 people? Deal with it as a question of relevance.
6 MR. NICE: Your Honours, just to deal with His Honour Judge
7 Bonomy's concern, I opened this very cautiously at line, whatever it is,
8 28 or something. I said, "Is this a work of expertise? If so, what
9 expertise? Is there some other basis for admissibility, because at the
10 moment I can't see why in principle a witness should be allowed to read
11 out something he's written on a topic unless it has expertise."
12 There are exceptions to that, of course, if the article has been
13 written in the course of the conflict itself and is some way a
14 contemporaneous document, but my observation was, as I said later,
15 cautious, and I simply wanted to know the basis of admissibility.
16 Reading --
17 JUDGE BONOMY: Can I cut through that then, Mr. Nice. Politicians
18 or diplomats who write their memoirs of events that have occurred seem to
19 have material which from time to time you've relied on, and indeed the
20 accused is relying on. Now, is that not the category we've got here as a
21 broad category? And the real question is whether the material relates to
22 an issue that's relevant to the case.
23 MR. NICE: Certainly diplomats who use their books as aid memoirs
24 and diary records and so on, that's a different category. What I was
25 looking at was the passage to which we were referred which gave rise to my
1 concern and cautious opening of this debate. What I now see as read out
2 as the last ten lines would appear to be a summary and opinion. I don't
3 understand, A, its relevance, particularly to these matters at all; B, if
4 it's based on expertise, it hasn't come as part of an expert report and
5 the expertise is not identified. So, Your Honour, it is certainly my
6 submission, since you invite me to make it, that this material can be of
7 no value to the Chamber. In light of my earlier observations which had
8 taken quite a lot of time, and I'm always aware that if I sometimes take
9 time to try and save time it has the contrary effect and that's why I'm
10 very restrained in the number of objections that I make. I wasn't going
11 to object, I was going to wait and see what the answer was and deal with
12 it in cross-examination, but since you asked me do I object, yes, I do
13 object. It doesn't seem to me he can take it any further.
14 JUDGE BONOMY: Just so my position on this is clear, I just do not
15 understand the concept that is being described in this piece and,
16 therefore, the question is, as far as I can see, not aimed at anything
17 that's relevant in the case.
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, explain the relevance of the
20 import of these ten lines, which is the demonisation of the Serb people.
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The relevance, Mr. Robinson, and
22 gentlemen, lies in the fact that this entire indictment for the most part
23 is an expression and consequence of the demonisation of the Serb people,
24 just as the aggression against Yugoslavia is a consequence of what was
25 done in order to justify crimes against the Serb people. So if there is
1 anything that is relevant and related to what you call the indictment,
2 that is the phenomenon of the demonisation of the Serbs and the Serb
4 I want to ask Mr. Jovanovic, who was a diplomat and foreign
5 minister for many years, he formulated a proposal that the United Nations
6 should ban all such activities, explaining --
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
8 [Trial Chamber confers]
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay.
10 MR. KAY: Yes. And I'm grateful to Ms. Higgins who has put this
11 into a context. Rather quite emotive language is used in the passage, but
12 it comes down to the issue of one of bias, and this witness having been a
13 foreign minister, a diplomat, and involved in international circles may
14 well have had experiences and the opportunity to judge, as international
15 events were faced by the FRY and before that the SFRY, as well as Serbia,
16 and come to certain conclusions based upon his own personal experience,
17 and it may well be that is what is at issue here in this particular
18 passage and the reason why the evidence is being adduced in this manner,
19 because there are issues here as to why steps were taken by NATO and the
20 UN against Serbia, against the FRY, why Resolutions were passed more
21 condemnatory of them than others.
22 JUDGE BONOMY: But he seems to be saying that the motive for the
23 indictment is the demonisation of the Serb people, and is the motive for
24 the indictment an issue here?
25 MR. KAY: The passage doesn't deal with the indictment, and that's
1 what we have been considering. It may be that the accused has expressed
2 his reason, having been asked to give it in that particular way, but of
3 more importance is actually the witness's own evidence on the issue, and
4 it may be that he's expressed it this particular way as being the pinnacle
5 of the bias against him. But as I see it and in my submission, there are
6 wider issues here which this witness is probably more able to be -- more
7 able to deal with than an issue such as the indictment. I mean, that's
8 plainly not his province to comment on the indictment, but on other
9 issues, yes.
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's not the first time that this issue of
12 demonisation has occurred and the accused has presented it as a part of
13 his case. He's seeking to say that this explains why certain actions were
14 taken against his country. And since it is a part of his case, we will
15 allow it. This is a majority decision, I should say.
16 So we will allow it, but we want to have it controlled,
17 Mr. Milosevic. I don't want any exploration of non-forensic issues. I
18 just want a very brief explanation from the witness as to what was said in
19 this passage, just a very brief explanation.
20 Well, we are now at the time, but I think let us have the
21 explanation and then we'll break.
22 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Before the witness answers, I wish
24 to intervene in relation to what Mr. Kay said a few moments ago.
25 Mr. Kay said verbatim that the explanation was why NATO and the UN
1 took measures against Yugoslavia. I think that that is quite wrong. NATO
2 carried out an aggression against Yugoslavia in contravention of the UN
3 Charter, without approval of the United Nations, so no one can say "NATO
4 and the UN." That is quite in contravention of the entire system of the
5 UN. And linking NATO action and the UN is quite inappropriate.
6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation].
7 Q. Please go ahead and answer the question, Mr. Jovanovic.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very briefly.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This article and its end is a
10 consequence of my conclusion that over a long period of time not only
11 Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia but the people as such were
12 exposed to terrible insults, and they were portrayed in the worst light
13 possible. Practically there were no bounds in this anathema against the
14 Serb people by prominent political personalities. Serbs were mentioned as
15 a -- referred to as a subspecies, as people who had criminality in their
16 nature, that this was an endemic thing. Also, they were referred to as a
17 people who should be put into a cage so that not even a bird could fly
19 During the war, during the aggression against Yugoslavia, the top
20 politicians of NATO countries danced ballet with figures. They were
21 saying that 500.000 Albanians, 10.000 Albanians, 100.000 Albanians
22 disappeared. This was all aimed at creating this aura of the
23 unacceptability of the Serb people.
24 The point was in writing this to say to the UN that in spite of
25 all this hatred and xenophobia and everything else, that demonisation
1 should be included in such phenomena so that at least in the future other
2 people would be protected from the kind of terrible treatment that the
3 Serb people were subjected to.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you for the explanation. We will now take
5 the break for 20 minutes.
6 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.
7 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.
10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, please open tab 15.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay.
13 MR. KAY: The exhibit --
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. Milosevic, do you want to have this
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: So it would be tab 9 exhibited. Yes. Thank you.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Tab 15 is a brief excerpt from a
19 book, The New Totalitarian Society and The Destruction of Yugoslavia, by
20 Emil Vlajki. Could you please open this. I'm just going to read a very
21 brief quotation. Look at page 103, and this is what it says here -- tab
22 15, have you found it?
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes.
24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. At the very beginning of the page he says: "[In English] This is
1 a clear case of the bad cop/good cop game: Germany wants dissolution of
2 Yugoslavia and the US allegedly wants the Yugoslav territorial integrity.
3 The US 'economic' policy towards Yugoslavia proclaiming it not independent
4 any more, ordering not only the separate 'free elections' for each
5 republic but also the necessity of the election of political parties
6 'suitable' to the US standards, cutting all aid, suspending duty-free
7 treatment, provoking the economic, political and social collapse in this
8 country, led directly to war in the Balkans.
9 "Moreover, in January 1991, the US warned the Yugoslav army
10 against trying to prevent the separation of Croatia; the US --"
11 [Interpretation] and then Susan Woodward says: "[In English] ... the US
12 '... would not accept the use of force to hold Yugoslavia together.
13 ... The United States was in affect telling the Yugoslav army that, in
14 addition to its abandonment of Yugoslavia on the international front, it
15 would consider illegitimate the army's definition of its constitutional
16 obligation to defend the borders from the state from internal threats.'"
17 [Interpretation] So was this good cop/bad cop approach serving
18 political goals?
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I'm also linking this
20 to the testimony of the witness who came from the US senate, and he said
21 here before you and before the public that things had to be portrayed
22 black and white; the Serbs were black and the others were white in
24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, was this just prejudice or bias, or was this a
1 deliberate policy that was aimed at conflict and disintegration of the
3 A. This is just one illustration, but there are other illustrations,
4 too, that show that the policy of the United States of America towards the
5 former Yugoslavia was rather hypocritical. There was a secret CIA report
6 that they released in November 1990 that Yugoslavia would disappear within
7 18 months' time and that this would end in bloodshed. Then towards the
8 end of 1990, they imposed limitations on credit and other forms of finance
9 for the federal government for a six-month period. Then they passed a
10 decision towards the end of 1991 to delete the name of Yugoslavia from the
11 Most Favoured Nation list. And they also passed a few other decisions on
12 the basis of Congress resolutions.
13 Mr. Baker was in Yugoslavia sometime in the first half of 1990 or
14 1991 - I can't remember exactly just now - he had a position which was one
15 of equidistance at first glance but it was actually in favour of Croatia
16 and Slovenia that had intended to secede. He said that if these two
17 republics seceded, they would not be recognised by us. That's what he
18 said. And the federal organs cannot use force to keep them in Yugoslavia.
19 So basically this position was in favour of secession because he
20 guaranteed that they would not be prevented from leaving unilaterally and
21 by force.
22 So the US changed its -- so when people say that the US changed
23 its position towards Yugoslavia only when the Bosnian crisis emerged, it's
24 not true, because basically they coordinated their position with Germany
25 and some other countries that were working to the detriment of Yugoslavia.
1 May I also recall one more thing: That the last US ambassador to
2 Belgrade, Mr. Zimmerman, as soon as he arrived, I think it was in 1987 or
3 1988, he said to all his interlocutors at federal and republican level
4 that Yugoslavia no longer has the importance that it had before in the
5 United States, that his country had lost strategic interest in Yugoslavia,
6 because at that time it was quite clear that there would be no Eastern
7 bloc any longer so it was no longer needed as a buffer state between the
8 East and West blocs. And it really no reason to exist any longer, even
9 more so because it was chairman of the nonaligned movement and because it
10 had a long tradition of independence and fighting for its freedom.
11 Q. In relation to that and in respect of the behaviour of the
12 military, please look at tab 13.1.
13 MR. KAY: May this be an exhibit.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. Milosevic -- yes.
15 MR. NICE: I didn't interrupt at the time in view of the time
16 consumed by my last observations, but I am not sure of the basis of
17 admissibility of this document, but I see that the opening passage
18 identifies the writer in terms that would suggest that the writer is an
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, we don't know whether it is being sought to
21 be admitted. No. Mr. Kay didn't seek it. He was just reminding us.
22 Mr. Milosevic, are you seeking the admission of this?
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: On what basis?
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Precisely on the basis of the fact
1 that this clearly shows a deliberate attitude of discrimination towards
2 the Serb side in Yugoslavia and a position that shows that it was in
3 favour of breaking up Yugoslavia, not preserving its territorial
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: The witness has given his own evidence on this
7 matter, and there is no need for its admission. We will not admit it.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. In that case, please take a look at tab 13.1. This is the book by
11 Russian historian Jelena Guskova, The History of the Yugoslav Crisis
12 from 1990 to 2000, where on page 244 it says as follows. I'm just going
13 to quote a small passage: "In the spring of 2001 [as interpreted], the
14 Yugoslav People's Army was still present in all republics. Its national
15 composition was still multinational. There were still a lot of Croats,
16 Slovenes and Macedonians in its leadership. It was led by Veljko
17 Kadijevic, half Croat, who considered himself a Yugoslav. His deputies
18 were a Slovene, Admiral Stane Brovet, and a Croat Josip Greguric. Heading
19 the aviation were Croats Antun Tus and later Zvonimir Jurjevic, commander
20 of central military district --"
21 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: In the spring of
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is -- yes, tab 13.1.
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Page 244.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] However, this is in Serbian.
1 JUDGE ROBINSON: We don't have 244. We have pages 3, page 4, 5,
2 and 6.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. I think that you just have the
4 translation, which has been previously marked. Unfortunately, I don't
5 have that bit translated.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: There is no translation of what you were just
7 reading, Mr. Milosevic.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The passage which begins, "In the
9 spring of 1991, the Yugoslav People's Army was still present in all
11 JUDGE BONOMY: It's in 13.2. You may find it's in 13.2 at page 4.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 13.2 is the second volume of a
13 different book. Yes. You have it on page 4 of the translation. You're
14 right. That's right. "In the spring of 1991 ..." The last passage on
15 that page, the last translated passage. That's what I just read out.
16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. Therefore, Mr. Jovanovic, the Yugoslav People's Army was present
18 in the entire territory of Yugoslavia. That is clear. And for how many
19 decades prior to that?
20 A. At least four to five decades if we do not take into account the
21 period of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia when a joint army also existed.
22 Q. In this bit that's translated, at the very beginning of the
23 translation, which can be found on page 202 -- no, 212 of this book of
24 Jelena Guskova --
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Gentlemen, you have the translation,
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 the beginning of this page 4, which has a sub-heading "War."
2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. This passage reads as follows: "However, Croatia had a different
4 goal, which was in the end achieved after all: An independent Croatia
5 without Serbs." So that was a goal, to have independent Croatian without
7 "Tudjman spoke about that on the 24th of May, 1991, in Ban
8 Jelacic Square." I think that this date is wrong, 1991. This must be a
9 misprint. This is a speech that we had played before in the videotape.
10 "'A war could have been avoided but Croatia did not want that. We
11 assessed that the independence of Croatia could be won only through war.
12 Therefore we led a policy of negotiation while creating our own armed
13 units by ourselves. Had we not done that, we would not have achieved the
14 targeted goal. That means, war could have been avoided, but we would not
15 have achieved our goal and that is the creation of our independent
17 Jelena Guskova writes here: "An independent Croatia without
18 Serbs." Is this in sync with what you knew about the intentions, the
19 goals, and the achievement of those goals by means of war? So the first
20 goal was an independent Croatia and the second one without Serbs.
21 A. I've already said yesterday that these were two parallel strategic
22 goals of Croatian leadership under President Tudjman.
23 MR. NICE: That was a leading question, but I rather give up.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Reformulate the question, Mr. Milosevic.
25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, what were the goals of Croatian policy?
2 A. The goals of Croatian policy, both analysing what was quoted here
3 and also other indicators, were to achieve by violent means a secession of
4 Croatia from Yugoslavia. That meant causing a war because that was the
5 only mechanism by which secession could be implemented. They were
6 counting on foreign assistance in that endeavour.
7 The other goal was to use intimidation, pressure, and various
8 other means in order to force Serbs to leave Croatia, if possible
9 immediately. And when that wasn't possible, the entire project was
10 completed through the Operation Storm when a large number of Serbs had to
11 leave Krajina. And as I said yesterday, Tudjman at a gathering expressed
12 joy at the fact that from now on, Serbs would not constitute more than 3
13 to 5 per cent of the total population of Croatia. That was a public
14 acknowledgement of ethnic cleansing which had been carried out with the
15 use of the army in Krajina.
16 Q. Now, the following passages that have been translated, in the
17 original they can be found on page 215. It says as follows: "In August
18 1991, Tudjman admitted to the US ambassador that 'An all-out attack
19 against the JNA and the Chetnik separatists' was beginning." Who were
20 Chetnik separatists?
21 A. All Serbs who refused to accept to live under Tudjman's rule in
22 the way that it was implemented in a very intolerant manner were
23 considered Chetnik separatists, especially those who had to resort to arms
24 in order to protect their lives and lives of their families and their
1 Q. I will continue the quotation. "When Ambassador Zimmerman
2 proposed to Tudjman that he consider the other option, that is, giving the
3 Serbs autonomy and thereby also abandoning war intentions, Tudjman refused
4 to even discuss the matter."
5 A. Yes, that was the beginning of the war in Croatia and Tudjman was
6 over confident. He did not want to make any concessions to the Serbs
7 living in Croatia. As we have heard, first he got rid of the Serbs from
8 the constitution as a constituent nation and then he did everything that
9 he was able to do in order to reduce the numbers of that minority and to
10 reduce it to the percentage that Croatia could tolerate as Serb presence
11 in Croatia.
12 Q. In the following passage, we can see: "In late 1991, according to
13 Tudjman's words, the Croatian armed forces numbered around 200.000 men,
14 350 tanks, 400 artillery pieces, 30 crop duster planes remodelled for
15 combat operations. (85) According to other sources, the total number of
16 Croatian armed formations reached 110.000 men, or 2.3 per cent of the
17 population of Croatia. The largest part of the armed forces consisted of
18 the ZNG, National Guards Corps units (about 70.000), MUP forces (around
19 30.000), Territorial Defence units, and finally, paramilitary formations.
20 Also available were the armed formations of individual political parties,
21 such as the ruling HDZ and the Croatian Party of Rights, which in 1991
22 began actively with ethnic cleansing in Slavonia, organised incidents and
23 provocations and carried out the dirty work which the official structures
24 did not want to get directly involved in."
25 Do you know of any of these events or are you familiar with this
1 based on the events that you know about?
2 A. The unfolding of these events was very painful for Serbs living
3 there. Already hundred thousand of Serbs had already left Croatia and
4 fled to Serbia or some other countries, and not only from the areas which
5 were exposed to the attack of these units but even towns where there were
6 no conflicts. There were -- therefore, I don't know whether these figures
7 about the Croatian formations are correct or not. Maybe they inflated
8 this in order to impress the JNA. However, the fact is that a general
9 mobilisation was carried out in contravention of the provisions whereby
10 the only forces in Yugoslavia that were legal were the JNA, the police,
11 and the Territorial Defence. So that was another violation committed by
13 Q. All right. On page 211 --
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.
15 MR. NICE: I'm having trouble finding the translation, if I've got
16 it. I'm not sure that I have. I'm having trouble finding the original
17 pages. I don't know if the protocols of the court require the accused to
18 be satisfied that I can also find my way around the papers, especially --
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we do. Mr. Milosevic, I've already said
20 that you must ensure that we have the pages before us before you proceed.
21 It also goes for the Prosecutor.
22 MR. NICE: I also owe it to the Court to check at this stage in
23 any event on what's happening, because what's happening --
24 JUDGE BONOMY: Can I make two observations before you say
25 anything, and these are directed to Mr. Milosevic.
1 I find these questions and answers quite unhelpful. It's a clear
2 example of leading questions to read someone else's words to a witness and
3 then ask him if he knows anything about it.
4 And the second comment I have to make is that with this witness,
5 who was personally involved in matters, it seems such a waste of time to
6 go through this exercise, especially when he's just indicated he can't
7 actually confirm some of the material that's been put to him.
8 MR. NICE: I'm grateful. I have nothing else to say on the
9 question of admissibility except I have now found the translated pages.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we're not being helped very much
11 by these questions, and you should move on to something else, something of
12 which the witness has more specific and direct knowledge.
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, this is precisely what
14 this witness gave evidence about based on his direct knowledge. Here, in
15 a book written by an historian, we can see that his words are confirmed.
16 This is not something that somebody else said. No. These are words of
17 Tudjman and Izetbegovic.
18 I assumed that Mr. Nice had the translation, because Mr. Bonomy
19 said that he did. So if Mr. Bonomy has the translation, then Mr. Nice
20 must have it too. And it is --
21 JUDGE BONOMY: Just one comment for the interpreter. At the end
22 of the last intervention, I said it seems such a waste of time to go
23 through this exercise especially when the witness can't - cannot -
24 actually confirm some of the material that's been put.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think that the witness can confirm
1 what is being read out, because this is something that he knows as well,
2 and I asked him about what he knew.
3 So please take a look at the last translated excerpt, page 311.
4 Facts are stated here, and I think that the witness has already mentioned
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: I don't think we have that pagination.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's on page 5 of the translation.
8 There's just one single passage on page 5, in that tab, at the top of the
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Does the Prosecutor have that? Yes, he
11 does. Yes.
12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. So this is a book written by an historian, and the facts are
14 stated here. It says: "In February 1991, the SDA and the Croatian
15 Democratic Union of BH submitted to the parliament a 'Declaration on the
16 Sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina.' Izetbegovic stated at the time:
17 'For the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina, I would sacrifice peace.
18 For peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I would not sacrifice its
20 Mr. Jovanovic, we have Tudjman's statement given at a rally where
21 he said there would have been no war had Croatia not wanted one, and then
22 we have Tudjman's statement in the parliament saying that for sovereign
23 Bosnia and Herzegovina, he would sacrifice peace. So what do you know
24 about the intentions to wage war in the former Yugoslavia, both in respect
25 of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina?
1 A. Both of these leaders, Mr. Tudjman and Mr. Izetbegovic, were aware
2 that they could not accomplish their goal of violent break-away with
3 Yugoslavia without a war. So they counted on this war and accepted it
5 I would like to add to the statement of Izetbegovic presented here
6 another one that he uttered in discussion with Lord Carrington, where he
7 said that he knew that in order to achieve independence of
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina, it will be necessary to -- to -- to go to war, to a
9 civil war.
10 We have already mentioned the Belgrade initiative here, and
11 together with Momir Bulatovic, you invited the then leadership of
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina to come to Belgrade and to discuss the current
13 situation. You received only a response from the then-speaker of the
14 parliament, Mr. Momcilo Krajisnik, whereas Mr. Izetbegovic did not reply
15 at all. Therefore, he did not want to find a peaceful solution to the
16 existing situation through consensus with other leaders, which meant that
17 he had opted for the other possibility, which led to war. That means that
18 the intention for causing war in Bosnia and Herzegovina cannot be
19 attributed to Serbia and Montenegro at all but, rather, to those who
20 planned to carry out a violent break-away with the then Yugoslavia.
21 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, you explain in rather precise terms during your
22 testimony here what the positions of various Western politicians were. I
23 mentioned the positions held by politicians on both sides of the Atlantic.
24 Now, please take a look at tab 13.2. This is the second volume of
25 the history written by Jelena Guskova. Page 24.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope you have the translation.
2 Let me just make sure that you do.
3 JUDGE KWON: Read out the first passage and let's check whether
4 it's in 13.1 or not.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Very briefly. I was
6 confused by the name of the publisher. Just a second. Yes, you have the
7 translation. I hope all of you have it.
8 "The Secretary-General of the UN, Perez de Cuellar, in December,
9 1991..." In the English translation it starts "In December 1991..." In
10 December 1991.
11 JUDGE KWON: Yes, page 4 of 13.1.
12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. "... wrote to Hans Van den Broek, the president of the European
14 Community Council of Ministers, as well as to German Foreign Minister
15 Hans-Detrich Genscher, that selective recognition of the Yugoslav
16 republics could 'contribute to a spread of the present conflict and the
17 intensification of the explosive situation.'"
18 With respect to recognition, an active role was taken by the
19 Vatican. The Vatican also took an active role in connection with the
20 recognition of Croatia and Slovenia, and you mentioned that yesterday,
21 Mr. Jovanovic. "On 26 November 1991, Cardinal Sodano invited the
22 ambassadors of the United States of America, France, Great Britain,
23 Belgium, Italy, Germany and Austria, accredited in the Holy See, and
24 informed them of the Vatican's stand, insisting that their countries
25 recognise Slovenia and Croatia in the same month. Describing that
1 meeting, US Ambassador Melady said he was convinced that there had been
2 prior consent between the Vatican, Germany, Austria and Italy, because the
3 ambassadors of those countries enthusiastically supported the Vatican's
5 Then he goes on to say: "In Lord Carrington's opinion, Europe
6 made two mistakes. 'I think it would have been better,' he noted in the
7 fall of 1992, 'had Europe accepted the break-up of Yugoslavia earlier.
8 According to the plan that I proposed in the summer of 1991, six republics
9 committed, on the one hand, to have more or less close mutual relations,
10 while on the other, the centre would survive. Some of them claimed they
11 were ready for such an alliance. But the European Twelve did not listen
12 to me, because they were afraid that such a plan would serve as a
13 precedent for the break-up of the Russian Federation. Europe's second
14 mistake was to recognise Croatia and Slovenia. The goal of convening the
15 European conference, which I chaired, was to postpone the recognition of
16 the independence of these two republics until global consent of the six
17 Yugoslav republics was achieved. Their recognition undermined the basis
18 of our work, which was reduced to simple bilateral negotiations, all the
19 more so as it was later considered necessary to also ask Bosnia about its
20 desire for independence. Of course, Alija Izetbegovic could only respond
21 in the affirmative. I warned the leaders of the European Community that
22 such a scenario, unacceptable for the Serbs in Bosnia, would lead to civil
23 war. That was a tragic mistake.'"
24 And furthermore he says: "US Secretary of State Warren
25 Christopher wrote in June 1993 that responsibility lay in particular with
1 the Germans, because they managed to convince their partners in the
2 European Community to recognise Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.
3 Using an illogical approach, Germany claimed that non-recognition of --"
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: You have read such a long passage. What
5 meaningful question can you now ask of the witness?
6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. Well, the meaningful question is this: Is what is being quoted
8 about Carrington's stand, Perez de Cuellar's views, the Vatican's views,
9 Sodano and the ambassadors of the countries I've quoted, does it coincide
10 with your knowledge of what happened at the time? Is this in collision
11 with what you know? Is something incorrect here, or is it correct? Is
12 what they say here true? And you spoke about that yesterday.
13 A. Yes, I did mention something about that yesterday.
14 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... formulation of the
15 question reveals the need to get round of the problem of its being leading
16 in nature. At the moment we're not interested in the accuracy or
17 otherwise of what the author says. It may happen when the author comes to
18 give evidence, if she does or he does.
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: He's now going to testify as to facts within his
21 MR. NICE: In which case then it's just because it's entirely
22 leading that the question is objectionable.
23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Mr. Jovanovic --
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: The point being made, Mr. Milosevic, is that when
1 you read out a passage like this and then ask the witness whether his
2 experience coincides with that, you have actually given him the answer
3 from the passage. And so it is -- it is --
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I'm not going to ask
5 him. Well, Mr. Jovanovic is an adult, an experienced man. He's a
6 politician. I don't assume he needs me to explain to him what happened.
7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. But I read out these passages -- well, I'm asking you now,
9 Mr. Jovanovic, whether what I read out, what it says there is correct or
11 A. It is correct, because it was repeated several times on several
12 occasions in different books and newspapers, and I should like to add to
13 that this: Mr. De Michelis, for example, a high-ranking official of the
14 European Community, before the conference stopped work during the summer
15 of 1991, issued warnings of the danger of premature recognition of
16 Slovenia and Croatia by Germany and that the Security Council in three of
17 its Resolutions at that time issued warnings of the danger of premature
18 recognition and appealed to all states, especially members of the European
19 Community, to refrain from any act or step which could lead to an
20 escalation of tensions and make the successful conclusion of the
21 conference difficult.
22 After that, more or less all the statesmen of repute and renown in
23 the East and in the West presented their critical views on the issue, and
24 I should like to mention in particular Kissinger, Baker, and the rest.
25 Mr. Baker, for example, expressly stated that Germany's actions in
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 the European Community with respect to the premature recognition of these
2 two republics and later Bosnia-Herzegovina was a direct cause of war, and
3 he said it was the trigger of the war. And there were similar statements,
4 and with hindsight, of course, they spoke critically about this wrong
5 step, wrong move that was made in December and January, December 1991 and
6 January 1992 when the three republics were recognised through this speedy
7 accelerated process and thereby a long and bloody war was unleashed,
8 especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
9 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Jovanovic, Lord Carrington said there were two
10 mistakes. You've dealt with one of them, which was premature recognition.
11 The other one, he says, was that Europe should have accepted the break-up
12 of Yugoslavia earlier than it did. Do you accept that also?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That break-up was not done earlier
14 for it to have been accepted. It was started immediately prior to the
15 conference, and at the conference the process was accelerated, because two
16 documents were presented to the conference. One was an arrangement for a
17 general solution, and the second was a contract for a general solution in
18 which Yugoslavia was not mentioned any more, just its federal units with
19 their interest in breaking away or, rather, others remaining within
21 So I think that Lord Carrington's remark was and criticism of the
22 European Community was that it made it impossible for the political
23 process led by the Conference on Yugoslavia to be rounded off and
24 completed and then those who wished to secede be recognised.
25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Furthermore, it says the following -- De Michelis's explanation,
2 he says: "We were facing Maastricht. Nobody could allow a split in the
3 alliance --" and he is referring to the European Community of the day --
4 "but it was more than clear to me with that decision, we spurred the fire
5 in Bosnia, and maybe also in Kosovo" wrote Gianni De Michelis, former
6 Italian Foreign Minister.
7 A. Is that a question?
8 Q. Yes, that is a question. What was Italy's position at the time,
9 or De Michelis's position specifically with regard to the events in
10 Yugoslavia? He came to visit. I assume you met him on the occasion.
11 A. No, I didn't meet him, but Italy, according to Mitterand's words,
12 was handicapped by the position taken by the Vatican, which tied its
13 hands. And so for a long time in a way it was a silent participant in
14 this process until De Michelis and Genscher met in Venice, and that was in
15 the autumn of 1991 - I forget the exact date - when they expressed their
16 support to the intentions of Slovenia and Croatia to secede. And as far
17 as this hindsight on the part of De Michelis is concerned, he could have
18 done that earlier. He could have prevented it all earlier.
19 As far as Maastricht is concerned, let me point one thing out:
20 Maastricht was an agreement by others at the detriment of Yugoslavia. To
21 calm down Germany and Austria, it was decided to abolish Yugoslavia and to
22 recognise the two republics that wished to secede. So that was also
23 stated in Mr. Vedrine's book. And he said that Great Britain had managed
24 to convince France to accept the German demand in exchange for the fact
25 that Germany had agreed to the conditions of the monetary union and
1 because some political concepts were rejected with respect to the
2 integration into the European Union. That is to say, Germany gave up on
3 some of its other conditions.
4 Q. Fine. Very well. Now, on page 28, and now we're going through
5 what you mentioned partially yesterday, Guskova has a brief quotation
6 here. It is also translated, and it is this: "Many politicians later
7 understood the negative consequences of the hasty recognition of the
8 former Yugoslav republics. Cyrus Vance said how the Hague Agreement
9 should have been adhered to, which did not permit recognition of the
10 former Yugoslav republics until a political solution acceptable for all
11 was found. James Baker was even more downright: 'Slovenia and Croatia
12 are responsible for the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. Their
13 forcible secession, contrary to the acts of the Helsinki agreement, pushed
14 Yugoslavia directly into settling accounts by military means. It is a
15 fact that Slovenia and Croatia proclaimed their independence unilaterally
16 in spite of our warnings, that they used force in order to capture border
17 posts, which provoked civil war.' In Henry Kissinger's opinion, "Western
18 democrats should have thought twice before they recognised a Balkan state
19 whose borders in the ethnic, linguistic and historical sense did not
20 coincide with the traditional concept of a nation and a state. How could
21 Western politicians even imagine that the Serbs, Croats, and Muslims -
22 whose mutual hatred led to the break-up of Yugoslavia - could co-exist and
23 live together in an even smaller Bosnian state?'"
24 Now, Mr. Jovanovic, do you have an example of any serious world
25 politician who did not indicate the fatal mistakes that were made by the
1 international community in the Yugoslav crisis? Can you quote me a single
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I'm not allowing that. It's not
4 the international community that is on trial. So I won't allow that
6 But I wanted to ask you, it is part of your case, isn't it, that
7 the secession of Slovenia and Croatia and the premature -- their premature
8 recognition was what led to the conflict and not any act on your part. Is
9 that part of your -- is that your case?
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, quite obviously there was no
11 act on Serbia's part which could have caused the conflict and war. If you
12 take a look at the chronology of events and everything that happened, you
13 can see that for yourselves. You have access to all the exhibits,
14 evidence, and proof. You have proof how fast Serbia -- what Serbia did to
15 avoid war, and what it did to establish peace in areas where war did break
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the passage you just quoted from
18 James Baker, he said: "Their forcible secession, contrary to the acts of
19 the Helsinki agreement, pushed Yugoslavia directly into settling accounts
20 by military means." So he's there saying that as a result of their
21 secession, Yugoslavia was obliged to settle accounts by military means.
22 And do you accept that? That's the passage you cited.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I don't think you interpreted that
24 in the proper manner. They didn't interpret Baker properly. When Baker
25 says "Yugoslavia" he doesn't mean the federal authorities, he means the
1 country as a whole, within its borders within which armed conflicts had
2 begun, because that happened as a result of that. And Baker knew full
3 well how the military conflicts began. The Yugoslav People's Army
4 certainly didn't begin them. So he refers to Yugoslavia, not the federal
5 authorities or federal institutions but the country Yugoslavia as a whole.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's a nice distinction.
7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And that's a very vital difference.
8 [Trial Chamber confers]
9 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Milosevic, it's -- you seem to take it for
10 granted everything written in this history book is true. They may be, but
11 they are not legally so unless the Prosecution agrees to it. So you have
12 to establish, first of all, whether it is true that such people said such
13 things to the knowledge of this witness.
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You mean the politicians? Is that
15 what you're referring to? Well, what these politicians said was public.
16 They were public statements, and as far as I remember, I quoted some of
17 those politicians, referring to the source. But you can establish that --
18 we can establish that once again if need be. And I'm not taking things
19 for granted. It's impossible that everything is true and correct in a
20 book written by an author, but I assume that the author did his best or
21 her best to present the truth.
22 JUDGE KWON: Take the advantage of the presence of this witness.
23 Establish those facts with the assistance of this witness, as far as you
25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, what, out of all these observations, do you think
2 might be incorrect with respect to the causes of the conflict on the
3 territory of Yugoslavia? We always speak about conflicts, armed conflicts
4 on the territory of the former Yugoslavia. That's what we're talking
5 about, are we not?
6 A. I think these quotations have been taken in their correct form,
7 taken over in their correct form because they are to be found in the books
8 of other authors. For example, in Hubert Vedrine's Les mondes de Francois
9 Mitterrand, there are a lot of quotations there.
10 Q. Yes, we have that book. It is an exhibit. We'll go through it,
11 not all the quotations, we won't have time for that, but we shall go into
12 some of them.
13 A. Then we have Mr. Gumper [phoen], who was a high-ranking official
14 in the National Security Council of President Bush, for example, Bush and
15 Clinton. And he was quoted -- quotes from his speech at the Council of
16 Foreign Relations in New York, and he said that this was a trigger. This
17 triggered the war in Yugoslavia, the recognition.
18 And we have the books of other authors, French author Bauzin
19 [phoen] and Daniel Danage [phoen], Jean Gonan [phoen], for example, which
20 -- where you will find quotes from other statesmen including the ones
21 here. So it's not the quotations that can be challenged. We can ask
22 ourselves whether the people who saw the situation as being such, whether
23 the situation was actually like that, but you can't question the quotes
24 because it is a fact that that is what they said and they said that in
25 public forums. For example, the American Congress in 1995. So he did
1 have some responsibility before Congress in presenting observations of
2 this kind.
3 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, who said what in the American Congress?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] James Baker said that in the US
5 Congress sometime in 1995.
6 JUDGE BONOMY: The quotation that's on the page that we're reading
7 was said in the US Congress, was it?
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. That's the way it was
9 put. Along with other sentences, but of course this excerpt is
11 JUDGE BONOMY: You accept that that quotation, if it's accurate,
12 means that America wasn't behind Slovenia and Croatia proclaiming their
13 independence, that America was against it? That's what the statement
14 says. And it seems to be Mr. Milosevic's case that America was one of the
15 conspirators encouraging that.
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have already said -- if you are
17 putting the question to me, I beg your pardon. I hope I can answer it
18 now. I already said that the real American policy was the one that
19 followed from concrete action; the statement made by Ambassador Zimmerman
20 that Yugoslavia lost its strategic importance for America, and then also
21 intentionally releasing the secret CIA report that Yugoslavia would
22 disappear within 18 months' time, and in blood at that. Then also denying
23 the federal government assistance for six months but also not denying any
24 assistance to the federal republics -- federal units. Then also deleting
25 Yugoslavia from the list of Most Favoured Nations. That was done in
1 December 1991.
2 There is also a decision that had to do with the so-called
3 repressive policies in Kosovo and Metohija.
4 JUDGE BONOMY: Let me interrupt you, Mr. Jovanovic. I remember
5 your evidence about these various matters, but basically are you saying
6 Mr. Baker was being hypocritical, saying one thing and doing something
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I just wish to recall the
9 facts, what was happening in 1990 and 1991, including the visit paid by
10 Mr. Baker to all the Yugoslav republics and to the federal government
11 sometime in the first half the 1991 where he set up this well-known
12 equidistance. In my opinion, it was not real equidistance, it was
13 actually a signal to the federal units that without fear from any use of
14 force or from the federal government, they could secede from Yugoslavia.
15 His statement in 1995 is probably due to the need to shift at least part
16 of the blame for the violent, bloody break-up of Yugoslavia elsewhere.
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Continue, Mr. Milosevic.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I'll have to shorten
19 this because I'm not going to be able to quote everything, especially
20 because there's no need for me to quote Clinton here saying that I played
21 a key role in Dayton. That is a generally known fact, and I hope that you
22 are sufficiently aware of it, too, that I played that kind of role in the
23 attainment of peace. However, there will be opportunities, and I hope
24 that we will have the opportunity of hearing and seeing Jelena Guskova,
25 who has been dealing with the Yugoslav crisis for many, many years now.
1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, you mentioned the French foreign minister, Hubert
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. I wish to draw your attention to tab 10, Les mondes de Francois
6 Mitterrand by Hubert Vedrine, a close co-worker of President Mitterrand's.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Tab 10?
8 MR. NICE: Does the Chamber want to decide about tab 13 in
9 accordance with its practice? It would seem to me it should not be
10 admitted. The author, in any event, is coming to give evidence.
11 MR. KAY: Tabs 13.2 and 13.1 have generated a great deal of
12 discussion as well as inquiry from the Bench. In my submission, they
13 should be exhibits.
14 [Trial Chamber confers]
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Consistent with past practice, the witness has
16 given evidence himself, so we will not admit that tab.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I did not understand this right,
18 Mr. Robinson. Why are you refusing these quotations on the basis of which
19 I put so many questions to Mr. Jovanovic and he testified about that? Why
20 can that not be admitted into evidence?
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Because we are not helped by it. I mean, the
22 witness has given the evidence himself, so it doesn't really add anything
23 that is useful.
24 JUDGE KWON: You can call Jelena Guskova to exhibit this document.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. If that applies to all
1 books, then no books should be admitted into evidence. You can always say
2 the author of the book has to be called. You have introduced many
3 quotations from many books into evidence, admitted them.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: We have ruled on that, Mr. Milosevic. Please
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. All right.
7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
8 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, please, Vedrine's book. I'm going to ask you to
9 read these quotations, since you speak French, and a few quotations have
10 been marked here, the ones that I want you to read out. First on page
11 618, Maastricht is the sub-heading, and after the second paragraph it
12 says: "[No interpretation]".
13 Could you please read it out for us.
14 A. You want me to read it in French or in English?
15 Q. Please read it in French because the book is written in French.
16 You don't have the English translation.
17 A. But do I have the English translation.
18 Q. But you please read out the original. The book is written in
19 French. The author is French, and he wrote the book in French.
20 A. "After Maastricht, the talks among the 12 made rapid progress.
21 On the 14th, Javier Perez de Cuellar regretted the move to recognise the
22 former Yugoslav republics in a premature, selective and uncoordinated
24 That's the first quotation.
25 Q. The author is Hubert Vedrine, the French foreign minister, and
1 he's talking about Mitterrand.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope that this can be taken as
3 authentic, Mr. Robinson?
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: To what end? It just seems to me that you're
5 repeating. We have been over this matter.
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, Mr. Robinson, but you --
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: On the premature recognition of these countries.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. Mr. Robinson, you always point
9 out that you seek additional evidence to support some assertion. You now
10 believe that all of this is proven and that there is no need for me to
11 give any additional evidence. I'll only be too glad to stop at this
12 point, then.
13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, you have only a few more quotations from the book
15 -- from the book marked here about the years of Francois Mitterrand that
16 Vedrine wrote. Could you please be so kind as to read the next paragraph
17 that is marked here, and it says, "That seemed fair." It's not readily
19 A. Yes, yes. "This seemed fair, but calling for a referendum even to
20 provide guarantees was, nevertheless, dangerous. Even under Tito, the
21 assent of the three communities of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Muslims, Serbs, and
22 Croats) appeared so essential to the proper functioning of the republic
23 that it was required, as I mentioned, for almost all decisions. A
24 majority of votes was not sufficient since, in terms of numbers, two of
25 the three Bosnian communities could easily impose on the third a decision
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 that would be unacceptable to it. Therefore, a referendum in the specific
2 case of Bosnia only appeared to be a good idea, an apparently democratic
3 move which was actually explosive. Unless it were to crown successful
4 negotiations, which would not be the case, quite the contrary, Robert
5 Badinter commented that the members of the commission primarily had in
6 mind --" there is no sequel to this. That's where it ends. Let me just
7 see where this is. It's the end of the passage. There is no end to this
9 Q. Well, now what Badinter said is --
10 A. Yes, yes. That doesn't matter.
11 Q. Yes. Whoever may be interested in this can look it up.
12 A. It's the last passage.
13 Q. Tell me, Francois Mitterrand himself is being quoted here, the
14 23rd of February, 1993.
15 A. "On the 23rd of February, 1993, recalling that period, Francois
16 Mitterrand told Andreas Papandreou: 'It was all a sequence of errors:
17 The German move, the American ignorance, the hesitation of the Italians as
18 Italy was paralysed by the statements of the Holy See. In fact, Germany
19 sees itself as the legitimate heir of the Austro-Hungarian Empire and has
20 taken on Austria's old grudge against the Serbs.'"
21 Q. As far as I can understand, this is from Hubert Vedrine's book,
22 but he directly quoted Francois Mitterrand in this book about Mitterrand?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Because he was present at the meeting with Papandreou?
25 A. Yes. This is a quotation. The third bit I read out is a
1 quotation from the book.
2 Q. What you read out just now, what Mitterrand said, is that correct,
3 since you also know about this behaviour of Germany and its activities?
4 A. Unfortunately, this is correct. I have already referred to this,
5 but a lot can be said about this. Throughout the Yugoslav crisis,
6 especially at the very outset, it behaved in a highly partial manner and
7 it boldly and openly supported one side, that is say the secession of
8 Slovenia and Croatia. As I said yesterday, Minister Genscher, as a matter
9 of fact, only a day or two before these two republics proclaimed their
10 independence, he within the European Community raised the question of
11 their independence, as he said, "that would soon be proclaimed." So he
12 even acted in advance of the actual proclamation.
13 Q. Mr. Jovanovic, please, in relation to the nature of the conflict
14 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, could you please quote Vedrine, what he says on
15 page 634. That is the very beginning of the passage. That is what we're
16 looking at.
17 A. "The main reason lies in the nature of the conflict. In Bosnia,
18 let me say it again, there is no invader and invaded, as was the case in
19 Kuwait. There are three Bosnian communities which, with foreign aid, are
20 fighting for land, valleys and mountains throughout the country, one of
21 those communities being more aggressive than the others."
22 Q. In your opinion, what was the nature of the conflict in
24 A. It was a conflict among the three communities. And a typical
25 example of a civil war that was started for the reasons I referred to
1 yesterday, because two communities joined up against a third one and they
2 only took part in the referendum that was imposed. Many other assessments
3 made by foreign statesmen also indicate the fact that this was a civil
4 war. Not only Vedrine. Even President Clinton twice, when he was under
5 pressure to intervene in Bosnia-Herzegovina and at the time he was not
6 willing to do so, he said twice publicly that in Bosnia there was a civil
7 war going on. He said that in public. And later on, he changed that when
8 he was prepared for military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina through
9 NATO. So the three sides were waging a fratricidal civil war, a religious
10 war at times, and there was also a separate civil war that was going on
11 between two different Muslim sides. On the secessionist side was Abdic
12 and on the other side was the leadership of the Muslim people. So if the
13 three sides were engaged in incessant conflict there and if one of the
14 three sides was split up in two and was engaged in its own conflict, one
15 cannot speak of an international conflict. It is certain that all three
16 sides had their aiders and abettors from the outside because there is no
17 civil war without any such external aid.
18 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Jovanovic, one part of that quotation at the
19 end was that one of the three communities was more aggressive than the
20 others. Which community was Vedrine referring to?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I assume he meant the Serb
22 community, because that community was a victim of these political
23 manipulations in relation to organising the referendum. Both
24 constitutions of Yugoslavia and Bosnia and Herzegovina guaranteed
25 constituent status to all constituent nations in Yugoslavia, and this
1 insolent aim at reducing them -- to reduce them to a minority brought this
2 about. This was to be expected when Bosnia and Herzegovina was instructed
3 to organise a referendum as a precondition for gaining independence.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, are you bringing your
5 examination-in-chief to an end now?
6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have a number of questions
7 outstanding, so I cannot complete immediately. If you are to ask for a
8 break now, I wouldn't mind that.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: How much longer do you have?
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope not more than half an hour.
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: We're going to take the break now.
13 Mr. Nice, the discussion we were going to have, which I haven't
14 really characterised as a hearing, we'll call on you first to address us.
15 MR. KAY: Exhibit status of tab 10.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes.
17 MR. NICE: Or non-status, as I would urge.
18 [Trial Chamber confers]
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: We will admit this one.
20 We'll break for 20 minutes.
21 --- Recess taken at 12.14 p.m.
22 --- On resuming at 12.39 p.m.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: As I indicated earlier, we're going to have a
24 brief discussion of this motion. Mr. Sasa Obradovic is here. Would you
25 please sit. He's the representative of the government of Serbia and
2 Mr. Nice, the first issue is are we to be in private session or
3 in open session for this?
4 MR. NICE: Your Honours, I would have thought, given the nature of
5 the underlying concern of Serbia and Montenegro, it would be preferable to
6 be in private session for the time being, with the liberty -- not liberty,
7 with the facility to open up the hearings at a later stage.
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We'll do that. We'll start in private
10 [Private session]
11 Pages 36227-36257 redacted. Private session.
1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.44 p.m.,
2 to be reconvened on Wednesday the 16th day of February, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.