Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 39592

1 Wednesday, 18 May 2005

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic to continue your examination.


8 [Witness answered through interpreter]

9 Examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

10 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General.

11 A. Good morning to everyone.

12 Q. We left off yesterday with you explaining the pressure that was

13 put on Albanian civilians by the KLA. You opened tab 138. Could you give

14 us a brief explanation now about the contents. Just let us go very

15 briefly through these things.

16 A. If I remember correctly, we started quoting yesterday from this

17 page 3 in the Serbian version, which is marked 2/346/98. This is in fact

18 the translation of a letter that KLA members sent to one of their fellow

19 villagers, putting pressure on him to leave something for them in a

20 certain spot because he had allegedly failed to comply with their earlier

21 demands.

22 The text begins with this sentence: "We have concluded that you

23 are ignoring our appeal!!!"

24 The second part of the text - we read the first yesterday - goes:

25 "The staff orders you to extend assistance to our units at risk -

Page 39593

1 otherwise you are in trouble. At 1930 hours on Thursday, 20 August, 1998,

2 you will park your Passat car in the Famipa factory parking lot. The

3 vehicle is to be unlocked, leave the keys in the vehicle and 5.000

4 Deutschmark on the driver's seat; leave your pistol on the other seat. We

5 know whom you took it from and why. If you do not hand it over, men from

6 SUP will come and confiscate it although Cerim has a buddy in SUP, but

7 this time luck won't be on his side."

8 Paragraph 4: "We in the KLA are involved in the abduction,

9 maltreatment and disappearance of several people, so don't be

10 surprised!!!"

11 Next paragraph: "Do not get into a situation where you could be

12 liquidated!!!

13 "Do not forget that we will pay you a visit at the end of the

14 month to talk about --"

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, General.

16 Mr. Milosevic, just extract what you wish from it. This is not a

17 reading class.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I only wanted us to see, since there

19 are very few documents about maltreatment of Albanians by the KLA, because

20 maltreatment is normally not accompanied by documentation. The reference

21 here is to abductions and blackmail. I want us to see what actually

22 happened, in which way they extorted money.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. This shows, General, that they are threatening the man with

25 liquidation if he fails to comply with his demands -- with their demands.

Page 39594

1 Is that what is written?

2 A. Correct. This just goes to illustrate one of my answers yesterday

3 about the pressure put by the KLA on their own fellow citizens and

4 villagers to donate vehicles, money, and other things for the needs of the

5 KLA.

6 Q. In this paper, 1/346, is also about demands, and it says they will

7 not acknowledge any excuse.

8 MR. NICE: Your Honour, while we're on these documents, which I'm

9 just about managing to identify in the collection of B/C/S versions, might

10 it be helpful to know what generation of original or copy we have here?

11 If the witness has brought the originals and if in due course the document

12 becomes an exhibit, then the original should become an exhibit, and I'd

13 quite like to have a look at it sooner rather than later. If we are only

14 being provided with copies, perhaps that can be made clear, with an

15 explanation of where the original may be found.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Okay. I'll ask the witness.

17 Is this -- General, do you have the original, the original version

18 of this document?

19 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the witness.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am not in possession of the

21 original, Your Honours. In my tab I have a copy of these documents. But

22 I'm absolutely certain that the original of this document exists in the

23 Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: Just one moment. Documents like this here, is that

Page 39595

1 not an original document? He's headed -- it's on paper that's headed

2 "Grafix Impex."

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course this is obviously a copy

4 of the original, a photocopy of the original which was written on the

5 agenda issued by a company, and the text is handwritten. All I wanted to

6 say is that I don't have literally the original of the document. I don't

7 know whether we interpret the concept of "original" in the same way.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: And could you remind me where this was found?

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This document was found after one

10 anti-terrorist action, if I remember correctly. And it is written on this

11 first page in the village of Leskovac, in the Prizren municipality, on the

12 3rd of September, 1998.

13 JUDGE KWON: As for the document we just referred to, which was

14 allegedly written by KLA, do you have any idea how the Ministry of

15 Interior was able to get the original copy of it? How did it come into

16 possession of this document?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Maybe I wasn't clear enough. This

18 original document was found after one anti-terrorist action in the place

19 which I already named in my previous answer, very close to the town of

20 Prizren. So it was found after the anti-terrorist action was completed

21 in this place, probably in one of the houses that had been used as

22 headquarters or something like that.

23 JUDGE KWON: But upon its face it is not clear by whom it is

24 written.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Of course you can view this document

Page 39596

1 in that way as well, but its contents are self-evident. It is obviously

2 written by a member of the KLA because you can see that from the text

3 itself and you can see what the purpose and the meaning of such messages

4 is.

5 This is a very large material. I just tried to quote from one of

6 the pages. In the rest of this material you can see many other details

7 speaking to the KLA, such as lists, rosters, et cetera. I quoted from

8 this page in connection with the previous question which related to the

9 pressure exerted by the KLA on their own fellow villagers, and I thought

10 this page well illustrated my answers.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: More correctly, it expresses sentiments that

12 would reasonably be attributable to the KLA, but it doesn't say

13 necessarily that it was written by a KLA person. The sentiments are those

14 that one would ordinarily attribute to the KLA.

15 MR. NICE: Your Honours, unless I'm mistaken in my attempt to sort

16 the papers, this page, 2346/98, and the previous page, 1346/98, are the

17 pages for which we have no translations in English.

18 JUDGE KWON: We have.

19 MR. NICE: If Your Honour has them, then I've mislaid mine or I'm

20 not following the papers correctly.

21 JUDGE KWON: Do you remember a one-page document was distributed

22 in advance.

23 MR. NICE: I've located it. Ms. Dicklich knew where it was all

24 along. Thank you very much.

25 JUDGE BONOMY: There does seem to be a wider problem, though. My

Page 39597

1 file of Serb documents is at least twice if not three times as thick as

2 the English translation file, so it doesn't look as though we have

3 translations of everything that's in this.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. General, as for this last question asked by Mr. Robinson, whether

7 this is indeed the KLA, can we see from this document which you quoted,

8 2-346/98, this quotation: "We from the KLA..."?

9 A. Correct.

10 Q. And after that follows the warning: "Do not get into a situation

11 where you could be liquidated!!!"

12 A. Correct.

13 Q. Now, look at the copy of the original with the handwriting in

14 Albanian. You can see dates. And in this Serb -- Serbian translation,

15 they begin with this 3/346 document and then follow other dates.

16 Can you just quote some of the most characteristic features of

17 this text.

18 A. I haven't read everything, but just for example, on the page which

19 is marked 3-346/98, it looks like an entry in a diary or in an agenda, and

20 we see an entry for the 17th of July. "Malic Shala was designated to go

21 and pick up the weapons. His father did not allow him to go. Today on

22 the 17th of July, he was taken to be interrogated together with his son

23 Shalam [phoen]."

24 We can also recognise here a sort of pressure on somebody to do

25 something for the KLA. Umer and Agim wanted to join him and go there, and

Page 39598

1 this other person says, "I don't have to go because I am not subject to

2 recruitment. I am exempted."

3 This document speaks to a number of other issues other than what

4 we discussed previously.

5 Q. Now, on that same page, after the line that was drawn, then we

6 have document 4-346. It says -- the staff is mentioned, and it says:

7 "The region of Has together with Djakovica asked to be linked up with the

8 same -- with the latter because their staff is near Rogovo, the staff from

9 Renovac [phoen]. In the meantime we worked with Petrocev's [phoen]

10 staff."

11 A. Yes, that's right.

12 Q. And then the explanation is that Mustafa and Shukrija talked to

13 the staff from Prizren.

14 A. That's right.

15 Q. And that they were interested in the way supplies were being

16 organised.

17 A. Yes, that's right.

18 Q. Now, does this document leave any doubt whatsoever, then, that it

19 is talking about the KLA?

20 A. I've already said that the circumstances under which this document

21 was found, as well as its contents and the contents of each of these

22 documents, indisputably show that they are documents belonging to members

23 of the KLA from this particular place.

24 Q. Take a look at document 4-346, two pages on, and the date is the

25 19th of July, 1998. And what is mentioned there -- or, rather, names are

Page 39599

1 mentioned, and then it says, "Last night there were conflicts during the

2 arrivals from Albania by persons who had taken up weapons."

3 A. That's right.

4 Q. Several of them were from the village of Vrbnica. The rest were

5 from other villages. Everybody returned to Vrbnica whereas the fate of

6 two of them is not known.

7 A. This is a topic we've already covered, and that is how weapons

8 were illegally brought in from the Republic of Albania and the problems

9 surrounding that as they saw it from their point of view. And then we can

10 see that the conflict lasted from two to five hours.

11 Q. Yes, but the last sentence says: "Of the 40 persons who took part

12 in the fighting --" so there was a group of 40 KLA members who clashed at

13 the border with organs of border security.

14 A. Yes, with the army.

15 Q. Is that something that we can see from this document?

16 A. Yes, it is.

17 Q. It says: "Of the 40 who fought, were able to flee --" and then we

18 have a cut-off there, and after the dotted line on the next page, it says,

19 "-- weapons in the forest, in the woods."

20 Yes. I've been asked to make a pause between question and answer.

21 So it said they left a quantity of weapons in the woods. The

22 number of persons from whom weapons were confiscated is unknown.

23 Then it goes on to explain about another group who crossed the

24 border. It's about this group who crossed the border carrying weapons,

25 and this group, when it crossed Vrbnica and the watchtower there, that

Page 39600

1 there was fighting along the border and that the fighting went on from

2 0200 hours to 0330 hours. And then it says, "Half the village moved

3 further away and the situation is insecure, unsafe."

4 A. And that confirms our thesis about villagers and citizens moving

5 away from the area they were in.

6 Q. "Udaljavanja" that we discussed earlier on, about people moving

7 away from, et cetera, et cetera. And then it says that half the

8 inhabitants took refuge in Prizren, Zur, and other places. And then it

9 says that 40 persons were armed. And then once again the next sentence it

10 says in Dobok [phoen] about 40 persons were armed. And then the following

11 sentence, that people in Muradem were partially armed. And then it talks

12 about mortars and hand grenades and so on at the end of that page, 27.

13 And shells. And it says that on the 20th of July, ten were sent and they

14 were all carrying weapons, and then the question is who sent the people in

15 the first place. That is to be found under the date 20th of July, 1998.

16 All the rest of it refers to or, rather, names names of the

17 members of the KLA who were being sent to certain locations. And then on

18 the following page, it says: "Vrbnica, two people remained in Brezne."

19 That is document 7-346/98. And then it goes to say -- on to say: "Of

20 this number, there were 11 automatic rifles, three rifles, five" et

21 cetera.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic. Mr. Milosevic, is it your case

23 that some of this evidence answers some of the allegations relating to the

24 forced movement of people, deportation? This relates to 1998.

25 I ask the question because one of the answers given by the witness

Page 39601












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Page 39602

1 was, "That confirms our thesis about villagers and citizens moving away

2 from the area they were in." So I'm seeking to find out whether you're

3 adducing this evidence as an answer to any specific allegations in the

4 indictment concerning the forced movement of people.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Certainly that is further proof.

6 When the general said that this confirms the assertion that the population

7 was fleeing from the area where the conflict was taking place, it is quite

8 clear that it wasn't the police that were expelling them.

9 Secondly, from this document, or from these documents, we can see

10 that the groups, and here for example a group of 40 individuals crossing

11 the border was mentioned. A group of armed persons crossing the border,

12 crossing the border in this way, violently, were clashing with the army.

13 So those groups and their conflict with the army of the neighbouring state

14 causes armed conflict which have as their consequence the fleeing of the

15 population. So there was no activity on the part of the --

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, what about the time element? This

17 is 1998, not 1999.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, due to force of circumstance,

19 these documents were seized, and they were seized at that time and

20 referred to 1998. But the events were the same. What was happening was

21 the same, because the population behaved the same. Where there were

22 conflicts, the population fled. And how clashes and conflicts broke out

23 you can see on the basis of this example. They were storming the border

24 armed, they clashed with the army, and it says half the population fled to

25 Prizren and Zur. The other half went somewhere else, in other directions.

Page 39603

1 So this is the same sequence of events throughout the whole time.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, I could see that it would have that kind of

3 evidential value as indicating a pattern, but I'm not sure whether it

4 requires being dwelt on in this detail. I think you have shown that this

5 kind -- let me finish. You have shown that this happened in 1998. You

6 should move more quickly to 1999.

7 I accept that there is a linkage, because the fact that it

8 happened in 1998 would make it more credible, more believable that the

9 same thing happened in 1999, on the basis of your case, but bring us to

10 1999.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, from this document -- of

12 course everything that the general is testifying about refers to 1999 as

13 well. Many of the areas covered refer to 1999. But if you look two pages

14 on, it is the translation of document 12-115, dated the 31st of March,

15 1999, you have it there. So we're talking about 31st of March, 1999, and

16 it says that the commander of the 2nd Battalion from Buda [phoen] decided

17 to launch an attack on the Serbian village of Muhovljani where there were

18 Serb forces.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm trying to find the document.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: The heading for these documents says they were all

21 found on the 3rd of September, 1998. So this must be a separate document

22 from the ones that are in the bundle I've been given.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: We are still trying to find the -- your last

24 reference to 1999, 31st of March, 1999.

25 Mr. Kay, have you found it?

Page 39604

1 JUDGE KWON: I found it, but it seems to be a separate document.

2 12-115.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 12/ or -115/99. That's what I'm

4 quoting. It's not from the diary, no.

5 JUDGE KWON: And we have no English translation of that document.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, don't proceed yet.

7 [Trial Chamber confers]

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, at this stage we'll not hear any

9 more evidence relating to 1998. Move to 1999.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. General, do you have document 12-115/99 of the 31st of March,

12 1999, in front of you?

13 A. I have the translation of it.

14 Q. Does it talk about the attack of the KLA on the village of

15 Muhovljani where they say there are Serb forces located?

16 A. That is what it says in para 1. But in the one but last paragraph

17 it says something about the attack on the village of Recani.

18 Q. So that was taking place on the 31st of March, 1999, that is to

19 say six days after the bombing started.

20 A. Yes, that's right.

21 Q. Very well.

22 MR. NICE: Self-evidently we know nothing about the provenance of

23 this document, and I -- we don't have a translation either, but before we

24 can really go any further in considering these documents, the Prosecution

25 would need to know what is going to be said about its provenance.

Page 39605

1 JUDGE KWON: Yes. The index of this tab 138 says it is written

2 papers of KLA members. But this is not one of them.

3 MR. NICE: Your Honours, the whole thing is a mystery to me. And

4 of course in this considerable body of material, or for this considerable

5 body of material I have to decide what parts of it to deal with at all,

6 and if so, how.

7 JUDGE KWON: And from the next page on it is 1998. So this page

8 is inserted by some mistake, I guess.

9 MR. NICE: Inserted in some way, certainly. And I haven't yet

10 seen any report or other document that produces any of this material.

11 It's simply the words of this witness. So in making my decision as to

12 which parts of the material to respond to, I am always assisted by knowing

13 what's the best available evidence of its provenance, and at the moment

14 for this particular document none and for the rest of this tab very

15 little.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the first thing, there's no

17 translation. I'd like the document to be placed on the ELMO. And

18 secondly, I'd like evidence relating to its provenance.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I'll ask the witness

20 straight away. I'll ask him to tell us whether he knows anything about

21 where the document came from. However, this entire written text which has

22 been cut off with this document and then carries on talks about intensive

23 activity on the part of the KLA throughout the time this diary was kept,

24 which means that it spans a period in 1998, and without a doubt since it

25 was seized at that time it cannot contain documents dated 1999. But it

Page 39606

1 does show how the KLA worked, how it came by its weapons, how it attacked

2 the security organs at the border crossing, what their aim was, how they

3 were deployed, and so on and so forth.

4 Now, let's try and establish where this document came from.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: The document spans a period in 1998. The Chamber

6 has already ruled that we'll not hear any more evidence at this stage in

7 relation to 1998. So we'll hear no evidence on this particular document.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson --

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Unless it relates to 1999. It seems to be

10 unclear.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I'm going to ask you

12 just to take a look at something that was written in handwriting on the

13 document, although it does indeed refer to 1998, because in document

14 31/436, we see that it speaks about the constitution and functioning of

15 the executive organ of the local staff of the KLA for Prizren and it says

16 how the units were formed, were established. And we can see, for example,

17 that an execution platoon was being established, execution squad, and a

18 unit for abductions and kidnappings. So what it says -- assassinations

19 and kidnappings, in fact, and then it says what followed. So if in 1998

20 they established squads for execution and units for kidnapping and

21 assassinations and all the rest of it that it says here, and you can read

22 it and find it in handwriting on the document, then I assume it's clear

23 what these people were about.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Judge Bonomy and myself are trying to find the

25 document. The documents are not in any particular order, and it's very

Page 39607

1 difficult to find them. You must wait until we have found the documents.

2 MR. KAY: Top right-hand corner number as you go through the

3 Serbian.

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes. What -- the difficulty we have is in B/C/S

5 there's only one page, but there's a substantial content in English

6 version.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I assume that you are looking at the

8 English version. On 31-346/98.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Have you found it, General?

11 A. Yes, I have.

12 Q. Is there a prison police under C that they were establishing?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. On the following page is there reference to units that will be

15 established for assassinations and kidnappings?

16 A. Yes, but that is the following document, the next document, 32.

17 Q. Oh, all right.

18 A. And it says "Execution Squad" under number 4.

19 Q. And it says: "All of this with the approval of the commander and

20 the Chief of Operations of the local staff of the KLA."

21 A. That's right.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, what I'd asked you was to explain

23 the source, the provenance of the document which is now on the ELMO and

24 which has the heading 31.03.1999.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That's the previous document that

Page 39608

1 had to do with the attack.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. General, can you explain the provenance of this document 12-115,

4 the one that you quoted a few moments ago, the attack on the village of

5 Muhovljani and the village of Recani, where they torched a few houses,

6 made the Serbs suffer great losses, et cetera?

7 A. I've already mentioned that, but I'll try to be even more

8 specific. There is no doubt that this entire material was found in the

9 village of Leskovac near Prizren after a particular action, and there is

10 no doubt that it is included in the official archives documents of the

11 Ministry of the Interior. Of course, this document, 12-115/99, deviates a

12 bit from what I said just now because it bears the number 99 and 115.

13 Possibly it got into this bundle by accident. It, rather, belongs to a

14 different set of documents, because I see all the other documents have the

15 number 346/98. So I cannot say anything specific about this detail, but

16 I'm sure that this document is also part of the official documentation of

17 the Ministry of the Interior; otherwise, it would not have been here and

18 it would not have borne such a number.

19 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. -- registered and happened.

22 A. Yes.

23 Q. Does that mean that what they found here as a document was

24 verified from a factual point of view, and was it found to correspond to

25 the truth?

Page 39609

1 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... is simply putting

2 words into the witness's mouth.

3 While I'm on my feet, let us deal with this evidence a little more

4 generally. First, yet again the point can be made, and it must be made:

5 All this material should have been provided in advance with a report and

6 it would have been possible for our people to have taken time out of court

7 to read it and consider it. If that had been done, we wouldn't be

8 spending an enormous amount of time on this document of uncertain

9 provenance that we're dealing with now.

10 Second, if the accused wants to produce evidence like this, which

11 is secondhand, or it may be thirdhand in the sense that this witness only

12 produces it, he's got to be able to lay a proper foundation so that all of

13 us can know what, if any, weight to attach to it. I'm in no position at

14 the moment to take a view one way or another about any of this material.

15 And if I don't know more about its provenance, I may never be able to do

16 so.

17 So I would invite the accused, through directions of the Chamber,

18 to be more disciplined in his approach to this material, and possibly, if

19 he's going to carry on with documents of this kind through other

20 witnesses, to reconsider the appropriateness of preparation by reports and

21 by getting people to read this material in advance. It will save time.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: We're dealing with the provenance of the document

23 on the ELMO.

24 When you come to cross-examine, Mr. Nice, you may have one or two

25 questions and then it will be a matter for the Chamber to determine what

Page 39610

1 weight, if any, to attach to this evidence. That's the way the matter

2 will be dealt with.

3 Mr. Milosevic.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I don't know what can

5 be called secondhand or thirdhand evidence, but there is no doubt that

6 this is handwritten, that these were notes in Albanian that were seized,

7 as it says in the document, and it has to do with the series of terrorist

8 actions.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, let's move on to another area of

10 the evidence relating to 1999.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: I certainly don't have a handwritten copy of a

12 document written in 1999. And the witness himself says he doesn't. He

13 has simply a Serbian translation of the document, as I understand it. So

14 we don't have the original, and there's no point in spending any more time

15 on it.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I'm just dealing with

17 the handwriting, and we are going to establish where this one page comes

18 from, how come this one particular page got into this set of documents.

19 Tab 138 contains the translation of this entire handwritten document.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: You say tab 138 is a translation of the document

21 which is now on the ELMO?

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No. The witness explained that the

23 document on the overhead projector - as far as I can see, it's the one

24 that bears the number 31/99 - is a translation of the document that got in

25 from another set of documents. And as I look at it myself, as I go

Page 39611












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Page 39612

1 through these voluminous documents, this document cuts through. It

2 doesn't belong to it logically or physically. We are going to establish

3 where it comes from, from which exhibit.

4 I've been dealing with tab 138, which has a copy and a translation

5 of the document that I quoted. The execution squad, the unit for

6 abductions, different combat units, all of that is contained in the

7 handwritten note, everything that was quoted, except for this one

8 particular piece of paper that has to do with the attacks on Muhovljani

9 and Recani. All the rest is contained precisely in this document,

10 everything that was quoted.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: So you're taking us now to 138. What tab in 138?

12 Mr. Milosevic, if the Chamber decides to exclude this evidence, there is

13 nobody to blame but yourself, because the evidence is not being presented

14 in a proper fashion.

15 Where are you taking us to now?

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I really don't know

17 how to present this properly. If I give you a photocopy of a handwritten

18 document that was found and seized by the KLA, if I give you a Serbian

19 translation, and if I give you an English translation of the handwritten

20 note and the information where the handwritten note was found and when and

21 under what circumstances, I don't know how else I can deal with it, how

22 else I can present it to you.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let's move on.

24 JUDGE KWON: Let me understand the organisation again. The

25 handwritten part is written in Albanian. Is that right, General?

Page 39613

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right. Excuse me: For the

2 most part. Perhaps there are a few pages that are typewritten in

3 Albanian.

4 JUDGE KWON: Yes. And that part is followed by Serbian

5 translation, which is typed in Cyrillic letters and which has the same

6 numbers.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right.

8 JUDGE KWON: But among them, this 12-115 was put in by accident.

9 This is not a part of the document. Am I right?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Obviously it doesn't belong to this

11 set of documents because these documents from this voluminous case all

12 bear the number 346 after the actual page numbers. This document has 12.

13 JUDGE KWON: We will not spend any more time here. Let's move on.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. General, as for the consequences of what is contained in this

16 document in tab 138 and this organisation, what could you establish? When

17 I say "organisation," I'm referring to these armed groups, say about 40

18 men, the organisation of executions, abductions, et cetera. What did you

19 personally establish in Kosovo and Metohija in view of everything that is

20 contained in this document?

21 A. I've already explained that with regard to these quotations from

22 the text coming from this voluminous material that this corroborates some

23 of the things I stated yesterday in response to many questions. They

24 actually confirm the tables that we analysed and that show that the

25 consequences of terrorist attacks were greater for the civilian population

Page 39614

1 than the members of the police.

2 Some parts of the text quoted today from this material is -- can

3 also be linked up to one of my answers given to one of the questions put

4 yesterday; namely, that civilians are leaving villages after armed

5 conflicts. Of course, in the groups of civilians, the villages were left

6 by the terrorists, too, who had been fighting before that, and --

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: General, I'm stopping you because we have that

8 evidence already. We have that evidence already. Move on to another

9 area.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. General, just tell us, in conclusion as regards this particular

12 subject --

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, no. I said move on to another area. That

14 area has been exhausted.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. General, could you please take a look at tab 142. What does tab

17 142 contain?

18 A. Tab 142 contains a particular information on operations carried

19 out in order to curb terrorist activities in Kosovo and Metohija. The

20 date cannot be seen, but I hope that it will be ascertained from some part

21 of the text.

22 Q. Is this a document of the Ministry of the Interior?

23 A. Yes.

24 Q. In that document, is there an indication of terrorist attacks and

25 their consequences?

Page 39615

1 A. That is under I in page 1 -- on page 1.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: This is 1998 again. We're not dealing with that

3 now.

4 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now we're looking at it from the

6 point of view of the police. Before we looked at it from the point of

7 view of the KLA. It needs to be looked at from both sides.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: No. I had instructed you to move on. If we --

9 if the Chamber finds it necessary, we'll allow you to return to 1998.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, if you wish to address the

12 Chamber, you may do so.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I did wish to, Mr. Robinson,

14 in relation to what you decided, not to deal with 1998 at this point in

15 time. I just wanted to ask you to accept one exception, two points that

16 correspond directly to the answers given by the witness that had to do

17 with civilians, nothing else. I'm going to skip over everything else.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: You wish to put two questions to the witness.

19 Very well, two questions.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. General, on page 3, there is a paragraph that says: "Attitude

23 towards civilians in combat actions. When carrying out actions, members

24 of the Ministry of the Interior engage targets selectively. Only those

25 where Albanian terrorist gangs were attacking from. They took care to

Page 39616

1 protect the civilians as much as possible and in cases where the Albanian

2 terrorists placed women and children in front of them as a human shield

3 members of the ministry abstained from firing. The Albanian terrorists

4 generally took advantage of this and fired all their weapons from well

5 fortified ramparts and rifle slits that surrounded their houses and

6 villages."

7 As regards their attitude towards civilians, does this fully

8 reflect what you had said?

9 A. Absolutely. What you've read out just now fully corroborates my

10 answers to previously put questions.

11 Q. Another question related to this pertains to a chapter two pages

12 later: "Activities related to the return of civilians to their villages

13 and towns." Have you found that?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. I'm just going to quote very briefly. "Inhabitants who fled due

16 to terrorist attacks are now returning to their homes and daily chores.

17 The Albanian population that moved temporarily to quieter areas of the

18 province and towns after the terrorists expelled them, are returning to

19 their homes. Several thousand refugees are returning to their villages to

20 which sufficient quantities of food have been supplied by members of the

21 Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia and in which they are

22 guaranteed a quiet life and safety."

23 Then the number of citizens returning to their homes are referred

24 to or, rather, the number of those who have already returned home at the

25 time when this document was compiled.

Page 39617

1 General, does everything contained in this document correspond

2 fully to what you testified about in relation to the consequences of

3 terrorist attacks, the consequences in terms of the civilians and,

4 generally speaking, the position of civilians throughout that period?

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, Mr. Nice I anticipate will be

6 objecting. That is -- that's leading.

7 MR. NICE: While I'm on my feet, this is another document, and I

8 must raise these matters as they turn up because it would be unrealistic

9 to cover it in cross-examination where we've got, I think, 4, 5, 600

10 documents possibly to look at. As to this document, there is no

11 indication apart from the 15 - possibly 13.1 - on the top right-hand

12 corner of the front page written in hand of its date, of its precise

13 provenance, of its author, or of to whom it was addressed, and if the

14 accused wants to leave it like that or if the accused does leave it like

15 that, then I almost certainly won't be able to deal with it and will

16 simply have to invite the Chamber to set it at naught in due course. It's

17 a matter for the accused, but the Chamber may think that it would be

18 helpful to know more about documents like this than the bear fact of their

19 production as part of the Defence exhibit binder.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: If the assistant minister of the interior tells you

21 it's a document from the Ministry of the Interior, is that not something

22 to which weight is going to be given in assessing the position and is it

23 not a matter for you to cross-examine about when it comes your turn?

24 MR. NICE: Of course that's -- both of those are possibilities.

25 The problem with that is that my ability to prepare for this is

Page 39618

1 substantially different in the circumstances Your Honour outlines and in

2 the position we find ourselves than if, for example, the witness says this

3 was part of a report prepared at the request of so-and-so for so-and-so,

4 whatever it is, because then I can start the process of deciding whether,

5 and if so how, to investigate the matter to check on what requests we may

6 have made for such documents to which no responses have been made in the

7 past and so on, but if it just comes in the bear form, there's very little

8 I can do.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: I agree with you entirely that all of this evidence

10 could have been presented with a covering note from the ministry

11 certifying the position and explaining what all these documents were. It

12 could have been presented in five minutes here and dealt with properly

13 with time out of court, and we're being faced with a -- with a ridiculous

14 situation which is not at all working to the benefit of the accused in the

15 conduct and use of his time.

16 I want to ask one question of the witness also in relation to this

17 document that we're looking at.

18 Does it anywhere, Mr. Stevanovic, contain information about the

19 number of Albanian terrorists or Albanian civilians who were killed in the

20 operations which are described here as operations to crush the Albanian

21 terrorists?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour Judge Bonomy, I would

23 need some time to be able to establish whether this particular report

24 contains that information, but it would be logical to find it here.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Bonomy, on -- already on page 1

Page 39619

1 we have references to terrorist attacks, and in paragraph 2 of this

2 chapter headed "Terrorist attacks and consequences," it says that a total

3 of --

4 JUDGE BONOMY: My question --

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- so-and-so.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: My question relates to the consequences for

7 Albanians. I see that there's plenty of information about the

8 consequences for the Ministry of the Interior staff, but what I want to

9 know is when you're preparing a report which is all about operations aimed

10 at eradicating terrorist activities, do you not at least try to assess

11 success of these operations by putting in numbers of people killed,

12 whether they were terrorists or civilians? And I'm trying to find that in

13 the document and I was looking for assistance from the assistant minister

14 for that purpose.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Certainly. Certainly, Mr. Bonomy.

16 Of course. I will help you find it in this document. Already on page 1

17 -- I was not able to read through it in great detail, but I know what the

18 truth is.

19 On page 1, and let me draw your attention to the fact that this

20 document speaks about citizens -- civilians, but it also specifies their

21 ethnic background. So in this chapter "Terrorist attacks and

22 consequences," it says in paragraph 2: "Abducted: 156 Serbs and

23 Montenegrins, 42 Albanians, 9 Roma, et cetera."

24 Two paragraphs below, it says: "102 terrorist attacks were

25 carried out against citizens and other facilities in which 74 citizens

Page 39620

1 were killed out of whom 10 Serbs and Montenegrins, 29 Albanians --

2 JUDGE BONOMY: There is a section dealing with this which is

3 headed "Consequences for the enemy," and it's a simple matter and it seems

4 to me there is no reference to the numbers killed. You'll see the --

5 there's even a sentence -- I was trying to test the witness's familiarity

6 with the document, but there's even a sentence in the document that says,

7 "The Albanian terrorist began had about - blank space - killed and

8 numerous wounded."

9 Now, is that it? There's nothing more in this document about the

10 consequences for the terrorists, apart from the fact that some were --

11 there are details of those that were captured?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Precisely in this chapter, Your

13 Honour, we can see some of those consequences for KLA members. I cannot

14 find a number that would designate the number of those killed, but we can

15 see figures reflecting measures taken against members of terrorist gangs.

16 It says, among other things, from the 1st of January to the 29th

17 September.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Is the answer to my question that it doesn't tell

19 us how many terrorists were killed and how many Albanian civilians who

20 might have been human shields or collaborators were killed?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Until this moment, I haven't managed

22 to find this figure here, which of course doesn't mean that there either

23 weren't or were civilians and terrorists who were killed.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: There is some information about people detained,

25 244 detained. It's in the second paragraph.

Page 39621












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Page 39622

1 But let's move on, Mr. Milosevic.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Correct.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: I had given you permission to ask two questions.

4 We have to move on now. Those questions have been asked.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. General, we have just gone through certain topics that reflect

8 intensive violence. Since you spent rather a long time in Kosovo, can you

9 tell us whether the use of weapons was preceded by a period when members

10 of the separatist movement tried to achieve their goals by peaceful means?

11 A. It is common knowledge that before they began to use violence to

12 attain their objectives, members of the separatist movement did not try to

13 achieve these goals by peaceful political means.

14 Q. In which way did they avoid political and peaceful means?

15 A. It is also well known that they boycotted the work of state and

16 other organs. And what is even more important, they ignored and boycotted

17 parliamentary and other elections in the Republic of Serbia for many

18 years.

19 Q. Did you have occasion to establish if this phenomenon of boycott

20 was represented in one, several, or all cases as expulsion of Albanians

21 from the authorities?

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... unless I'm

23 mistaken, we have had evidence on this particular issue already,

24 boycotting and the general attitude of the separatists. Move on to

25 another topic, Mr. Milosevic.

Page 39623

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. General, you commented yesterday on a whole series of tables

3 showing how violence escalated, in which periods, and what it looked like

4 in the period just before the war, during the war, and after the war, that

5 is after our forces withdrew from Kosovo and Metohija. I would like to

6 ask you now: What did the events after the arrival of international

7 forces show? And those things that happened that you have information on,

8 do they support --

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. -- the theory of Albanian separatists that the aim of their

12 struggle --

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you appear to be reaching that

14 stage in your examination-in-chief where diminishing returns are setting

15 in. I will not allow that question. It is repetitive.

16 There is no need to manufacture questions. The witness has been

17 -- has been here for over two days, three days. If you have no more

18 questions, we'll conclude the examination-in-chief and Mr. Nice will begin

19 his cross-examination.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have many more questions,

21 Mr. Robinson.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: You will be allowed to ask them if they are

23 relevant, if they are not repetitive.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson. That's

25 very kind of you indeed.

Page 39624

1 I will now ask the witness to open tab 108. This is a very

2 informative, I would say, analysis, a very edifying one. On the first

3 page we read September 1999, Republic of Serbia, Ministry of the Interior,

4 public security sector.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: We do not appear to have a translation of this,

6 and it's a long document, running to 20-odd or 30 pages. Was this

7 submitted for translation?

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, it was. It was submitted for

9 translation. It seems that you haven't got that translation yet. But if

10 you agree, I can go through certain parts of this document. The witness

11 will speak to them and you will receive the translation eventually if you

12 think that is a possibility.

13 JUDGE KWON: However, it seems to be dealing with the events in

14 1998, isn't it?

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This document was done in September

16 1999, and it deals with the terrorism by Albanian separatists in Kosovo

17 and Metohija and their methods. And I suppose it also refers to 1998, but

18 it includes information up to and including September 1999. You have seen

19 a lot of information related to that period, and I will not stop to deal

20 with any particular piece of information, but this is an extremely useful

21 document for understanding terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the document is not translated.

23 We already have enough evidence relating to 1998.

24 If you can point us to areas of the document that relate to the

25 indictment or, more specifically, to 1999, then we can have those areas

Page 39625

1 placed on the ELMO.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, already on the first

3 page of the text, which is after the cover page, we see the contents, and

4 I can note -- that is, the document notes that terrorism escalated in the

5 second half of 1998 and the beginning of 1999 with cruel murders,

6 killings, and assassinations of men, women, and children on their

7 doorstep. And it also says MUP members were killed perfidiously, usually

8 from ambush, while they were going about their regular duties. It deals

9 later with the escalation, noting the fact that there were 14 times more

10 attacks in 1998 than in the entire previous seven-year period. And then

11 after the KFOR arrived --

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, by this time it is possible to

13 detect a pattern in the way you present your Defence. You're charged by

14 the Prosecution with the commission of certain acts. In relation to

15 Kosovo, the precise date is January 1999 to June 20th, I think, 1999. But

16 you have a passion for evidence that relates not to that period but to the

17 period leading up to it. I have said that that may not be irrelevant to

18 the extent that you may be seeking to show a pattern, but you must come to

19 the charges in the indictment. The Chamber will not allow you in

20 perpetuity to lead evidence in 1998 unless you have some evidence relating

21 to 1999, because that is the only way in which it becomes relevant. It

22 would then lead one to believe, if you are not going to deal with 1999,

23 that your purpose is not forensic.

24 So what we want here is to find evidence, if you have any, that

25 relates to the allegations in the indictment touching upon the relevant

Page 39626

1 dates that I have identified. Otherwise, the exercise becomes

2 non-forensic and appears to serve some other purpose.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, when I present a

4 document as it was written, as it stood in the original, you must bear in

5 mind the fact that none of these documents were compiled with a view to

6 anything regarding what you call the indictment. They are just official

7 documents written by the authorities from the times that they relate to.

8 The one that you have before you on the table now states quite

9 clearly in the period from the 1st of January, 1998, until the 28th of

10 September, 1999. So the date is clearly stated, and it is a period of

11 time which incorporates 1998 and in and including September -- 28th of

12 September, 1999, when the document was compiled.

13 Now, I cannot think up an artificial cut-off date.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well. Very well, Mr. Milosevic. Take us to

15 the relevant areas in the document, bearing in mind that it is not

16 translated.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, I ought to make clear my reservations about

18 hearing further general evidence about the conduct of KLA terrorists

19 rather than hearing evidence about the specific incidents which are

20 referred to in the indictment. It would appear to me to be relevant to

21 look at this document if it deals with incidents which are features of the

22 indictment or behaviour during the period of January to June 1999, which

23 is referred to in the indictment. And short of that, the document appears

24 to me to be repetitive of material we've already heard.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Take us to the relevant areas.

Page 39627

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll indicate the relevant material,

2 but you insisted on 1999, and I fully respect that. However, I'm quoting

3 point 17, which says that this joint criminal enterprise occurred in

4 October 1998 at the latest and went on throughout the period that crimes

5 -- when the crimes alleged in counts 1 to 5 of this indictment occurred,

6 beginning on or about the 1st of January, 1999. So there's reference to

7 joint criminal enterprise here and the functioning of the state. And you

8 speak of the functioning of the state and its attempts to defend

9 themselves from terrorism. You refer to that as joint criminal

10 enterprise, and that's the crux of what we're discussing here.

11 I cannot bring evidence to show who hit whom with -- and whose

12 hand hit somebody and how that somebody fell and things like that. What I

13 can talk about is what I'm doing, that what is stated here is that the

14 police committed crimes, whereas here we have a very competent witness, a

15 police general, with 500 documents brought with him, testifying to the

16 conduct of the police, what orders the police received, what the police

17 did, and whether that can in any way be claimed to be what is alleged

18 here.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I don't want a speech. I've

20 already told you to take us to the relevant areas of the document.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. General, please, would you set aside or do you want me to quote

23 portions from this document?

24 A. Well, perhaps I could be of assistance if I were to say that this

25 is an official analysis conducted by the Ministry of the Interior which

Page 39628

1 incorporates both 1998, but of course the entire period of 1999 up until

2 the date that is stipulated, September, if I remember correctly.

3 September 1999. So it refers for the most part to that period of time,

4 but of course it does deal with the period that goes before and the period

5 after the war as well. Some of the facts stated here have already been

6 presented at the previous sessions.

7 Q. To shorten matters, on page 3 it says that up until September

8 1999, 5.527 terrorist acts were carried out.

9 A. That's right.

10 Q. And then it goes on to say how many persons were killed, and that

11 number is 945 persons, 654 citizens. So 654 citizens of which 291 Serbs

12 and Montenegrins, 243 Albanians, and 19 members of other ethnic groups.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: Are these -- are these different statistics from

14 the ones we have already had?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, they aren't different.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They should be the same.

18 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Bonomy, this is just an analysis

20 which deals with the same facts and information. So the figures cannot be

21 different, but it supplies exact information as to what happened and how,

22 and that is why it is very useful.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: What's the point? We've heard it already.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, the point is that since this

25 is a comprehensive analysis, that it be admitted into evidence, because if

Page 39629

1 you read everything it says in that document, then of course what is --

2 what you're trying to explain as some kind of criminal enterprise against

3 Albanians would be completely nonsensical. And it's not only this

4 analysis that bears that out but other documents as well, because what is

5 stated here is not founded upon any evidence whatsoever.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic. Mr. Milosevic, if there is any

7 part of the document that relates to the period January to June 1999 and

8 that relates to allegations in the indictment, we'll hear it.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I asked, since it is a comprehensive

10 document of the Ministry of the Interior, to be admitted into evidence.

11 I'd like to tender it. I'm not going to quote it any more, quote from it

12 any more. We have presented the relevant data with respect to terrorist

13 attacks and we analysed them in detail yesterday.

14 MR. NICE: Your Honours, obviously as to other exhibits there may

15 be need to argue the position later, but if that's the limit of evidence

16 the accused brings for this document that is not translated and is not

17 available for us to read, I'd ask the Chamber to rule here and now that it

18 is not admitted into evidence.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, what we have said is that we'll

20 consider this at the end of the -- end of the evidence, all questions

21 relating to admissibility.

22 MR. NICE: As Your Honours please.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: What's the next area of your evidence,

24 Mr. Milosevic?

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I wanted to ask the witness what he

Page 39630

1 knows about the attacks carried out on religious sites, cultural

2 monuments, schools, health centres, humanitarian workers, and so on and so

3 forth.

4 A. Well, answers to that question --

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Does that relate to any specific charge in the

6 indictment? And if so, please direct us --

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it's all in one --

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please direct us to the paragraph in the

9 indictment to which it relates.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'll get to the paragraphs in the

11 indictment, but what we're discussing here is a general situation, a

12 general situation in which the police acted.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we are not discussing a general

14 situation. This is a trial. You're charged with specific charges, and

15 your evidence must relate to those charges. In a way I'm glad you said

16 that, because it shows that you're moving in the wrong direction. It's

17 not a general situation. You are not at large. You must bring evidence

18 that is relevant to the charges in the indictment, and I will not allow

19 evidence unless it relates to specific charges in the indictment or to

20 specific paragraphs, because we are wasting time.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson --

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: If you have -- if you have a non-forensic purpose

23 in mind, this is not the platform for it. Evidence about attacks on

24 religious sites, cultural monuments, schools, may be relevant, but the

25 evidence must relate to the indictment.

Page 39631












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Page 39632

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, you've just said that

2 I am charged with concrete counts. Could you tell me which concrete act

3 contained in the indictment it is that I committed and whether it is in

4 there, because they, too, say that it doesn't exist --

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: I have -- I have stopped you. I have stopped

6 you. The indictment was read to you at the beginning of this trial, and

7 you are familiar with it. Let's move on.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'm not as clever to be able

9 to know which act it was that I committed since you have to tell.

10 Otherwise, I think it's time for the break, so I suggest that if you have

11 nothing against that, we go ahead with that.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We have passed the time for the break.

13 We'll adjourn for 20 minutes.

14 --- Recess taken at 10.34 a.m.

15 --- On resuming at 11.00 a.m.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, continue your

17 examination-in-chief.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. General, we heard here as a witness Paddy Ashdown, British

21 politician. In tab 40, you will find a brief extract from the transcript

22 of that testimony. I'm going to quote from it briefly. I'm going to read

23 out a portion of what he said, and then I'm going to ask you to respond

24 or, rather, to answer my question.

25 It is on page 27 of 84 pages of the testimony of Paddy Ashdown.

Page 39633

1 Towards the bottom of the page he says the following in answer to my

2 question. My question had to do with that it was a well-known fact that

3 they were terrorists --

4 JUDGE KWON: Tab 40 is a different one.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes, it's not tab 40.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Tab 140.

7 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please. Microphone. Microphone.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Maybe I made a slip of the tongue,

9 maybe I wasn't heard properly; I'm talking about tab 140.

10 JUDGE KWON: It is not an authentic transcript.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This was what I was given. It says

12 ICTY at the top, Friday, the 15th of March, page 27 of 84. I assume the

13 daily record or transcript, the LiveNote.

14 May I be allowed to continue, Mr. Robinson?

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, this does not appear to be the

16 transcript of the evidence. Where does it come from?

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I asked my associates to extract

18 this from the transcript of the testimony of Paddy Ashdown. So I assume

19 that is what they did, that they took it from the transcript that we have

20 here. I don't know where else they could have got it from.

21 MR. NICE: In case it's of any assistance, on the version of

22 LiveNote that I have, this part of the evidence starts at the foot of page

23 2398, and the -- I'm looking at the very first full question: "Please

24 show both -- please show both. You can see here both -- both the charts

25 and also the consequences involved." That's word-for-word the same that

Page 39634

1 appears on the LiveNote transcript.

2 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I confirm I found it.

3 MR. NICE: So we can readily enough check the accuracy of what

4 seems to have been taken off a website against the transcript.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Very well, Mr. Milosevic, proceed. If

6 there is any inaccuracy, we'll be able to check it.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Of course.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. The answer of Mr. Ashdown reads as follows: "[In English]

10 Mr. Milosevic, I never denied that it was a terrorist organisation. I

11 have never in any sense sought to excuse the suffering, the pain, the

12 murder of innocent Serbs or Serb civilians by this organisation. I took

13 steps, indeed, to make recommendations as to how that could be ended. I

14 have never denied, either in my evidence or so far as I know in any other

15 speeches or articles that I've written, that there was KLA activity, that

16 innocent Serbs were suffering. But none of this, none of it justifies or

17 excuses the use of excessive, outrageous force by your armed forces under

18 your control in an indiscriminate, punitive manner, across the whole of

19 civilian population in direct --" That's -- [Interpretation] And so on.

20 There's a dash in the transcript.

21 So I hope that that completely coincides with the transcript that

22 you have in front of you.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. I remember that very well, yes.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Fine.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 39635

1 Q. Now, General, Paddy Ashdown, as you've heard, said that he never

2 denied that it was a case of a terrorist organisation but that here they

3 were -- there was the use of excessive force. Now, we're going to deal

4 with some questions which give an answer to whether it was in fact use of

5 excessive force or not. But before I go on to that, I'd like you to tell

6 me, what you think about this observation made by witness Paddy Ashdown?

7 A. It is rather a lengthy observation. I think I have understood it

8 correctly. I can absolutely agree with two points that he made in his

9 assertion, Mr. Paddy Ashdown made. First, it is incontestable that it was

10 a case of a terrorist organisation, the name of which was the KLA. And

11 the second point is that I absolutely express regret for all the victims

12 of the armed conflict, not only in Kosovo and Metohija and regardless of

13 which side they were on. But of course I cannot agree with the

14 observation that he made when he said that the police, generally speaking,

15 as has been translated here excessive, outrageous and disproportionate

16 perhaps to force. That is just not true.

17 That, of course, does not mean that there were not individual

18 cases where this was overstepped and that authorisation was abused in the

19 application and use of weapons, of official weapons in the police force as

20 a means of coercion.

21 Q. Now, since this is an essential substantive question, so we're not

22 challenging that it was an outrageous, that it was a terrorist

23 organisation but that it was a case of excessive and outrageous force, how

24 can you characterise the circumstances in which the police had to act in

25 Kosovo and Metohija in this critical period of time, that is to say 1998

Page 39636

1 and 1999?

2 A. Well, quite obviously from everything I have said thus far, it is

3 quite clear that the police in the second half of 1998 and the first half

4 of 1999, that the police acted in highly complex situations in Kosovo and

5 Metohija, and more specifically, they could be characterised by saying

6 that there was an excessive supremacy of threats, that is to say that all

7 the members of the police, and of course citizens, too, were under great

8 threat, excessive threat from the KLA terrorist organisation as well as

9 from airstrikes, NATO airstrikes, far above all the measures of the police

10 and citizens of trying to protect themselves against threats of that kind.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, it's good that you referred to a

12 particular statement by Mr. Paddy Ashdown, which I remember very well,

13 because in my view that in large measure is the case against you and the

14 case that you have to face. There's no contest that the KLA was an

15 organisation involved inflicting pain and suffering and even murder. The

16 question was the response and the excessive nature of the response. But

17 you will not meet that charge by adducing evidence of the very general

18 nature which the assistant minister is now giving. You will meet it by

19 adducing evidence that relates to specific charges in the indictment.

20 I have given you this advice before, and I know that your

21 characteristic response is to suggest that I am saying that there is a

22 burden on you, and I want to clarify that. The burden remains on the

23 Prosecution. But to the extent that you are putting forward a Defence, my

24 suggestion is that you concentrate the evidence on the specific charges.

25 If the general is able to give evidence about any of these

Page 39637

1 charges, and there are many in the indictment, that is what you should be

2 doing, not leading evidence from the general where he gives his general

3 impression about the KLA and about the conduct of Serb forces.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I fully understand what you said,

5 Mr. Robinson. However, you said at the very beginning that the question

6 of this allegation and accusation of excessive use of force is a very

7 important one. That is why I intend to put a few questions to the witness

8 that give answers precisely to those allegations related to excessive use

9 of force, questions that have to do with the working conditions of the

10 police in Kosovo and Metohija, the way in which the police operated, the

11 use of force by the police, and the legality of use of force by the

12 police. I hope that you will agree that these are four subjects that have

13 to be dealt with in order to have a clear picture as to whether there

14 could have been excessive use of force and whether there was any excessive

15 use of force. Because if you do not take into account the way in which

16 the police operated, the use of force by the police, the legality of use

17 of force by the police, I assume that you cannot reach an answer to that

18 question, and I assume that that is what you're interested in.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, by what standard are you judging the

20 legality of the use of force by the police? Whether the -- whether the

21 police operated in a lawful manner is not judged by domestic standards.

22 It will be judged by the standards pertinent to international humanitarian

23 law, international criminal law. But the evidence which you say you will

24 lead now is not irrelevant, but I do hope you will be able to -- you will

25 be bringing evidence that relates to the specific charges.

Page 39638

1 So let me hear the first question.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. I asked you about the conditions of work of the police, and you

4 said that these conditions were extremely difficult, and you explained

5 that there were KLA attacks and that NATO was bombing and that that made

6 the situation very difficult. Was that the core of your answer?

7 A. That was the core of my general answer, but of course I could say

8 a few more words by way of detail, if necessary.

9 Q. As briefly as possible, please.

10 A. As briefly as possible. The complexity of these conditions, in

11 addition to what I've already said, was characterised by the fact that

12 part of the territory of Kosovo and Metohija was under KLA control to a

13 degree. When the first NATO strikes came, there was quite a bit of

14 confusion within all structures and at all levels. Also, roads could not

15 really operate because of NATO threats. And as far as I know, the police

16 and the military had to protect their own command posts by changing them

17 very frequently.

18 In addition to that, during the first days of NATO strikes in

19 Kosovo and Metohija the main telephone exchange in Pristina was hit. This

20 made it impossible to have efficient communication between the eastern and

21 western parts of Kosovo and Metohija.

22 All of this put together made it impossible for the police to

23 function as it does in normal situations and keep under its control

24 territories, settlements, and even its own units.

25 Q. General, when you say that the situation was very difficult, that

Page 39639

1 the conditions were very difficult, already in tab 141 can we not see in

2 what kind of conditions the police were operating in the field and what

3 was going on?

4 This is a dispatch --

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's not translated.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: This also relates to July 1998.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. In tab 149, is there an order dated the 22nd of May, 1999?

11 A. Yes.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope it has been translated.


14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, this is translated.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Since this has been translated, we have the opportunity to see --

17 would you please be so kind as to --

18 A. This is an order for taking concrete anti-terrorist action. The

19 date is the 22nd of May, 1999, but I think that we've already been through

20 this.

21 Q. This has to do with the involvement of MUP forces to act in

22 concert with the army, and it's only from that point of view that we

23 looked at this order. But now when we talk about the conditions of work,

24 on the first page, when the enemy is described --

25 A. Yes.

Page 39640

1 Q. -- is it established that on the 22nd of May, "Over the past 10 -

2 15 days, there has been an increase in the concentration and combat

3 activities of the STS in the general Palatna region," and the other

4 villages?

5 A. Yes. And that is the kind of information usually contained in

6 combat orders.

7 Q. And then, "Ambushes and raids on individual vehicles and supply

8 convoys have been intensified"?

9 A. That's right.

10 Q. "The objective of the Siptar terrorist forces is to use surprise

11 attacks to inflict troop and combat hardware losses, cause uncertainty

12 among members of the VJ and MUP and hinder road traffic"?

13 A. That's right.

14 Q. And then there is reference to increased presence and

15 concentration of the KLA?

16 A. Yes.

17 Q. In which areas and in which directions. All of this is on the

18 22nd of May, 1999. Then there is reference to weapons.

19 A. That's right.

20 Q. In addition to standard infantry weapons, there are machine-guns

21 that are referred to, semi-automatic machine-guns, hand-held rocket

22 launchers, and 60 and 82-millimetre mortars.

23 A. That's right.

24 Q. Then it says they have laid obstacles on the approaches to and

25 inside populated areas by mining approach roads and abandoned houses.

Page 39641












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13 English transcripts.













Page 39642

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. So all of that was done by the terrorists?

3 A. Yes, that's right.

4 Q. And then it says how they have been successfully inflicting

5 casualties on the VJ and MUP, and then it says that their defence will

6 probably be supported by NATO aircraft fire and cruise missiles from

7 airspace.

8 A. That's right.

9 Q. All of what has been described here --

10 JUDGE BONOMY: Can I ask, what's your connection with this

11 document, Mr. Stevanovic?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My connection with this document is

13 only based on the fact that it is contained in the documents of the

14 Ministry of the Interior. Certainly according to this order, it is

15 probably --

16 JUDGE BONOMY: This wasn't issued to you as part of an order?

17 This is just something that was --

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, of course.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Can I then ask, Mr. Milosevic, what is the

20 objective of the questions that are being asked at the moment? Assist me

21 to identify what it is that this evidence will demonstrate that we haven't

22 already had a great deal of evidence about from this witness.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, that's the question I just

24 put, if you heard it, Mr. Bonomy. In what conditions did the police work

25 at this critical point in time? And I read part of the order that has to

Page 39643

1 do with action taken by the enemy side. I'm asking the witness, because

2 he was in Kosovo and Metohija too, was that --

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Are you trying -- are you accepting that the police

4 acted brutally and are you trying to justify it with this evidence? I

5 mean, what is it that is the relevance of the conditions under which the

6 police were operating? Did they behave improperly because of these

7 conditions or are you saying that they behaved properly? What is your

8 case?

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Bonomy, my case is quite clear:

10 En masse and generally the police behaved properly. Only exceptionally

11 and individually some behaved improperly. Generally speaking, the

12 behaviour of the police was in accordance with regulations and orders,

13 whereas individuals did behave brutally but then were prosecuted by the

14 same police. That is the truth.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: So why don't we get to the facts that show that?

16 Why do we keep looking at orders about what should be done or what has

17 been happening rather than get to the conduct of the officers themselves?

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, that's what I'm moving

19 towards, that particular conduct, but it's necessary to find out in what

20 conditions all of this was happening and whether it was possible in those

21 conditions. You heard the witness's answer: Sometimes in these

22 conditions it was not possible to keep each and every individual within

23 the armed forces under control, even within the police force. And then in

24 such conditions there is a greater likelihood of excessive behaviour. It

25 does not justify excessive behaviour, but it describes what the police did

Page 39644

1 in dealing with this excessive behaviour.

2 JUDGE KWON: We dealt with tab 148, which is similar to this one.

3 We can move on quickly. Go on.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Under those circumstances, General, was it regular practice that

7 Albanians would report to the police all the criminal acts committed

8 against them by members of the KLA?

9 A. I omitted that important detail from my previous answer. Of

10 course an important fact in relation to police conduct in that period is

11 the fact that Albanians to a very large degree did not report security

12 related incidents to the police, including the most serious ones. First

13 and foremost out of fear from revenge, and also they were afraid to

14 communicate with the police at all.

15 That is certainly one of the reasons why the police could not

16 record each and every incident and take action with regard to each and

17 every incident.

18 Q. All right. In that situation, did the police try to use all means

19 available to find out as much as possible with regard to all these

20 incidents?

21 A. That's right. Even in the most difficult of circumstances, the

22 police did its best to act the same way it acted in peacetime, as it

23 usually does today, for instance.

24 Q. All right. Can we look at an example contained in tab 56. The

25 date is the 23rd of May, 1999, Pristina. That is a dispatch, again the

Page 39645

1 MUP staff.

2 A. Sorry, what was the tab?

3 Q. 56. MUP staff.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: 156 you mean?

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, 56.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right. I have the dispatch.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. All right. The beginning of the last week in May, 1999. It's

9 addressed to all the MUPs from 1 to 7, sent by the Staff. It says: "It

10 is essential that you inform the directors of hospitals and other health

11 care institutions to which killed and injured persons are taken that

12 without exception and regardless of who they are (members of the MUP, the

13 Yugoslav army, citizens) that they must immediately and without exception

14 inform SUP duty operations services about this, and they will dispatch

15 crime investigation inspectors to record basic details regarding these

16 persons, the place, time, and manner in which the injury was caused and

17 other details and submit them to the MUP staff."

18 General, I asked you whether all available means were used in

19 order to obtain information about any consequence that had to do with

20 injured persons, killed persons without any discrimination whatsoever;

21 citizens, MUP, army, et cetera.

22 A. That's right. The police used all information possible to take

23 measures within their jurisdiction. This has to do with my previous

24 answer when I said that Albanians to a large extent did not report any

25 incidents, including those resulting in loss of life.

Page 39646

1 So the aim of this dispatch was probably to refer to a particular

2 way of finding out about these incidents involving wounding, loss of life,

3 et cetera, that is to say through health institutions where it is expected

4 that these persons would be taken in first of all in order to receive

5 treatment. The objective was, of course, to have as many such incidents

6 as possible recorded so that the police could work on the further

7 processing of such cases.

8 Q. Did the police do any planning in advance when the danger of

9 bombing was intimated? Did they consider how policework would be carried

10 out in these new, different, difficult circumstances, and did they treat

11 all citizens the same way from that point of view?

12 I would like to draw your attention to tab 53, dated October 1998,

13 and that has to do with measures and activities to prevent and remove any

14 consequences in the event of NATO bombing of targets in Kosovo and

15 Metohija. This was adopted by the staff of the ministry.

16 A. The police, like any other state institution, has certain

17 obligations in terms of preparations in case of aggression or of war.

18 This document shows what the police planned to do in order to prepare for

19 adequate reaction and adequate measures in a situation of aggression by

20 NATO. It seemed quite certain at that time, obviously.

21 Q. I would like to draw your attention to B, during the bombing,

22 referring to everyday bombing. And point 3 says: "Administer first aid

23 to casualties immediately on the spot until it becomes --"

24 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: "Administer first aid

25 to casualties immediately, secure socially owned and private property

Page 39647

1 against looting and theft."

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. And take steps to clear roads and streets for normal traffic?

5 A. Yes, that's right. You can see that all these measures have to do

6 with the period before the bombing, during the bombing, and after the

7 bombing respectively.

8 Q. In tab 55, dated the 18th of February, 1999, this document speaks

9 of increased pressure and all the measures taken by the police to continue

10 performing its duties under those new, difficult circumstances.

11 A. This dispatch was written to notify the competent units of the

12 ministry or, rather, to instruct them to take certain measures related to

13 the aggression.

14 Q. Thank you, General.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I note in the first paragraph a

16 reference to significant movement of the population from the border areas

17 towards the central areas.

18 Would the witness be able to comment on that? Why would that have

19 been anticipated?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, this particular

21 segment is related to the logical assumption that in case of aggression by

22 ground forces citizens from border areas generally tend to move towards

23 the central territory, central part of the country, and this is just an

24 assessment that this might happen. It doesn't relate, of course, to

25 Kosovo and Metohija alone, it refers to all border areas of the republic.

Page 39648

1 Because at that moment the aggression had not started yet, and all the

2 information available to the police and the state authorities boiled down

3 to assessments as to what might happen in case of aggression. Of course,

4 a specific situation is always different from an assessment.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. General, you mentioned that the police was working under

7 aggravated circumstances in terms of possibilities for movement,

8 communications, and every other way. How did the police act in those

9 aggravated circumstances, especially when something would happen that you

10 in your official terminology would call a security related event?

11 A. I already gave a general answer to that question. I can only be

12 more specific as to the sequence of steps that the police would take after

13 receiving information about such an incident.

14 So first, after receiving a report, the police would try to go out

15 into the field to the site and check the accuracy of the report. If the

16 report proves to be correct, the police would then take measures to secure

17 the site and to inform the competent judicial organs. After that

18 notification, the police would generally continue to act upon orders of

19 those competent judicial authorities. That means they would perform an

20 on-site investigation, with an investigative judge or alone but only if

21 instructed to do so by the investigative judge.

22 Also, the police would also conduct exhumations, perform certain

23 logistical work related to post-mortems. They would also take steps to

24 open a criminal forensic case file that is normally opened in every

25 proceedings, especially judicial proceedings. And again upon orders of

Page 39649

1 the investigative judge, they would assist in burying the dead persons who

2 might have been killed in such an incident.

3 Q. Thank you for this. Tell me, in what situations was it impossible

4 to document security related incidents?

5 A. Developing a file, developing the documentation of an incident

6 would be impossible only if there was no report in the first place, when

7 the police had no information about an incident, or in cases where it was

8 impossible to find any trace of the incident that had been reported, so

9 the police could not verify it, or the third possibility would be a

10 situation when for security reasons it was impossible for the police to go

11 on the site and check. Such cases in the time of the bombing were

12 numerous.

13 Q. Just one question about the method of work of the police. We

14 could understand from your previous answers what the key tasks of the

15 police were, both in 1998 and in 1999. You have explained generally what

16 the key tasks were.

17 Now, did the police discriminate in any way on religious, ethnic

18 or other grounds against any individuals or groups?

19 A. Of course not. The police undertook measures aimed solely against

20 terrorists and criminals of any kind absolutely irrespective of their

21 ethnic or other background. Their action was only dictated by the kind of

22 acts committed.

23 Q. And how about the people they were protecting? Was there any

24 discrimination there?

25 A. Absolutely not. The police took the same measures of protection

Page 39650

1 for all persons regardless of their ethnic or other affiliation, only

2 depending on the kind of threat they were under.

3 Q. Tell me, then, what kind of measures did the police take in

4 combatting terrorism in Kosovo?

5 A. I think I've already spoken about this. Policework in this case

6 can be divided into preventive work, reaction after terrorist acts, or

7 planned action.

8 Q. What were the preventive measures?

9 A. Gathering information about the activity and movement of terrorist

10 organisations, protecting roads and population centres. In fact,

11 preventive types of work were geared at not allowing incidents to happen,

12 not allowing incidents that would make it impossible for the police to

13 react.

14 Q. Did you have any requests for protection from villages where an

15 attack was expected and which you paid no attention to?

16 A. There were certainly many such cases, especially at the lower

17 level. I can recall one particular example where I myself went to the

18 village. I think it was Istok village in the Crkolez municipality. It

19 was a very small, purely Albanian village. The population was terrified

20 and wanted to leave. But after we sent a small unit there and managed to

21 convince them that they would be protected, they stayed, and I believe

22 they still live in that small village.

23 Q. You told me that in other cases the police reacted and carried out

24 anti-terrorist actions. What was more frequently the case, reaction to

25 attacks or anti-terrorist attacks?

Page 39651












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13 English transcripts.













Page 39652

1 A. Of course more frequently the police reacted. Until July 1997, I

2 believe, the police more frequently only reacted to attacks and tried to

3 avoid the critical, high-risk roads and villages. In August and September

4 the police undertook planned anti-terrorist actions, but even they, these

5 anti-terrorist actions, were reactive in nature because they were a

6 response to a series of attacks in various high-risk areas. In most cases

7 the police only reacted to terrorist acts if such acts -- or, rather, the

8 police reacted with prior notification to verifiers.

9 However, in 1998, there were anti-terrorist actions --

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm interested in the -- let me wait for the

11 transcript. I'm interested in the category of planned actions by the

12 police. You just said that in most cases, even in relation to planned

13 action, their action was reactive. But there must have been cases, I

14 imagine, where planned action took place which could not be characterised

15 as reactive. Would you wish to comment on that?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, when I said that even

17 planned anti-terrorist actions can be considered as a reaction, I

18 explained the kind of reaction I meant as a response to a series of prior

19 terrorist acts. Of course in such actions the planned element exceeds the

20 reactive element, but it is again linked to action against specific groups

21 in a specific area. So it can be explained as a reaction to the activity

22 of such groups in certain periods. But mostly when planning is involved,

23 it is an active operation.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: In the case of a planned action, if the police

25 were to go to an area where they had information that the KLA was present,

Page 39653

1 how would they conduct themselves? Would they engage the KLA first or

2 would they wait on the KLA to do something?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The goal of every anti-terrorist

4 operation was to detect and arrest members of terrorist gangs, to bring

5 them into custody. Every such action is preceded by the gathering of

6 information and operative data about that group, its membership, the

7 weapons they have, their bases, et cetera.

8 When the operation begins, the police goes to the village in a

9 unit of adequate numbers and structure depending on the resistance they

10 expect. The police never opens fire first. The clearest difference

11 between the police and the terrorists is, of course, that the terrorists'

12 aim is to kill, and the police could not have had such an objective prior

13 to the proclamation of the state of war or at any other time, for that

14 matter.

15 So the police goes towards that particular group, and they

16 sometimes even know the names of the individuals, sometimes not.

17 The police is authorised to use weapons as means of coercion in

18 ways that are regulated by the laws and bylaws of the Republic of Serbia.

19 Only undesirable consequences of the use of weapons as means of police

20 coercion can be the death of a person, including a terrorist. The

21 objective of the police is not to kill. Their objective is to detect and

22 to detain. The aim of the terrorists, however, is to kill, from ambush

23 usually.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, General. Can you give me an example

25 of a planned action which would not be reactive.

Page 39654

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, we were looking at one of the

2 tabs - I can't remember which ones now - I think the number was 40, from

3 40 -- or, rather, 140 to 149, those tab numbers and the orders therein.

4 So those orders speak about planned anti-terrorist operations, and each of

5 them conditionally speaking can be termed active with the proviso that I

6 explained and the caveat I made, that as such it had something to do with

7 the previous activity and existence of specific terrorist groups, which

8 can always be seen in point 1 of the order that we looked at.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. Milosevic, continue.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. General, to continue on from what Mr. Robinson was asking you,

12 what is reactive and what is active, you mentioned the tabs, and in tab

13 149, for instance, in point 1, it says: "In the last 10 - 15 days there

14 has been increased concentration and combat activity of the Siptar

15 terrorist forces in the broader region around the village --" and then it

16 says the villages.

17 A. Yes, that's right.

18 Q. So does that speak about the reactions in fact to the increased

19 activities of the forces in the area?

20 A. Yes, that's right. Anti-terrorist activity would have no sense

21 unless in the area there was a terrorist group and that the terrorist

22 group was active and had been active in the previous period, for example.

23 Q. It says here that they --

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic --

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 39655

1 Q. -- engage in surprise action, surprise operations to inflict, et

2 cetera.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- the question that I asked has been answered.

4 Move on to another area.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. General, did the police then work to secure documents on all

7 security related issues?

8 A. Yes, all security related issues about which it had any knowledge

9 whatsoever and information.

10 Q. Does that mean independently of the circumstances, that is to say

11 regardless of how the incident and event took place?

12 A. Yes, irrespective of the circumstances. Just on the basis of the

13 possibilities that were there, and I mentioned them in my response to the

14 previous question.

15 Q. So independently of any affiliation on the part of the victim, the

16 perpetrator, and so on?

17 A. Yes, independently of who the victims were and who the

18 perpetrators were.

19 Q. Fine. Now, in tabs 76, 78, and 79, do we have a review of the

20 security related events which resulted in death according to the dates as

21 registered by the police on the basis of each individual case, the records

22 the police kept for each individual case? Is that right? So take a look

23 at those three tabs.

24 A. This is tab 76 that I have in front of me. And there it is an

25 overview of security related events.

Page 39656

1 JUDGE KWON: We have a translation of tab 78, so can we use that

2 tab 78?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I apologise, but I wasn't following.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Mr. Kwon indicated to us that they have the translation of tab 78

6 and he asked whether that could be used, and since we have that

7 translation, we might --

8 A. The structure isn't the same.

9 Q. Well, the document that we are addressing -- or, rather, document

10 78 is a schedule of registered crimes committed against Serbs and

11 Montenegrins in the area of Kosovo and Metohija. And the previous one,

12 number 77, is a summary of crimes against Albanians in the area of Kosovo

13 and Metohija dating from the 1st of January until the 20th of June, 1999.

14 1st of January, 1998.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: We have had this before, Mr. Milosevic. We have

16 had this before.

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Those documents, Mr. Robinson, were

18 dealt with when we had another witness here, Mr. Paponjak, I believe, so

19 you're quite right, during the chief of the Secretariat of the Interior of

20 Pec, Mr. Paponjak's testimony. But then that review, summary of crimes

21 against Albanians and against Serbs, Montenegrins and the rest referred to

22 the area of his Secretariat of the Interior, that is to say the territory

23 of four municipalities covered by the Pec secretariat, whereas this

24 summary and overview, which has an identical title and which we put

25 forward when General Obrad Stevanovic testified, when this general

Page 39657

1 testified, relates to the entire area of Kosovo and Metohija, and the

2 information and facts there relate to the entire territory, but we didn't

3 dwell on that during General Stevanovic's testimony.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: I see. This relates to the entire territory.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, that's right. You now have the

6 possibility of seeing how one secretariat compiled this covering four

7 municipalities and how this was done for the overall territory of Kosovo

8 and Metohija, the area as a whole.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, as you heard, 76 and 77 are not translated.

10 JUDGE KWON: 77 is translated.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: 77 is translated.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 77 and 78 have been translated.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Would you please comment on those two, 77 and 78, then. 77 are

15 crimes against Albanians --

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Before he does that, just lay a foundation.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. General, is this an official document of the Ministry of the

19 Interior?

20 A. Yes, it is.

21 Q. All the statistical data contained therein, are they based on

22 concrete cases which the Ministry of the Interior has, the files it has?

23 A. Yes, that's right.

24 Q. Would you now please give us your comments on the summary we find

25 in tab 77 and explain to us the methods used, what the vertical columns

Page 39658

1 represent, what the horizontal columns represent.

2 A. I will do so, but I'd just like to mention that tab 76 is a better

3 illustration of what we're discussing, although we can, of course, show

4 that same thing using this tab. As we were saying, in tab 77, which is a

5 statistical overview of the crimes committed against Albanians in the

6 entire area of Kosovo and Metohija, the period is between the 1st of

7 January, 1998, to the 20th of June, 1999, taken by the different periods

8 of time. Yes, 77. That's right.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's translated.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As I was saying, if we look at the

11 horizontal column, 1A, we are dealing with reported and registered crimes,

12 as it says under 1A. Unfortunately, we don't have the total column, but

13 we can add up. So the total number of registered crimes, reported and

14 registered crimes in Kosovo and Metohija, with known perpetrators, the

15 figure is 823; with unknown perpetrators, the figure is 2.603; and other,

16 136.

17 Of course, if we look at the vertical columns you will be able to

18 see the different periods. Column 3 is 1998; column 4 is up until the

19 war, 1999; and column 5 is the wartime period of 1999.

20 In A/2, the total number of reported and registered crimes has

21 been broken up according to types of crimes and specific crimes committed.

22 Q. All right. Well, we won't go into all the specific crimes

23 committed, but what are the most characteristic points here?

24 A. Article 125, which is terrorism. Of course, it is more important

25 and -- to answer your question, what is on page 2, that is to say what the

Page 39659

1 police undertook pursuant to the crimes committed. And if you look at

2 page 2, for example, A3 of the horizontal column, we can see that a total

3 of 1.563 on-site investigations were carried out by police pursuant to

4 judge's authorisation. There were 1.240 of those; by the investigating

5 judge, 287 is the figure there; by the investigating organs of the army of

6 Yugoslavia, 8 cases of those; partially carried out investigations, 11;

7 investigations not carried out, 1.014; forensic documentation was compiled

8 for 804 cases.

9 JUDGE KWON: General, if you could tell me, what is Article 166?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Just a moment. Let me have a look.

11 I'm not quite sure now, but we will find an explanation of the articles at

12 the end of tab 78. 166 is theft.

13 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Aggravated burglary or theft.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. General, when we say uncovering the perpetrators and throwing

17 light on the case, we see that the number of perpetrators was 2.788,

18 number of detected perpetrators of crimes, and that 2.623 were civilians,

19 that the active police force numbered 36, the reserve police force came to

20 22, military personnel 2, active servicemen and from the reserve force,

21 105.

22 A. Yes, that's right.

23 Q. And then we can see the number of criminal and other reports

24 filed, 3.614 in the total. This whole table refers to crimes against

25 Albanians; is that right?

Page 39660

1 A. Yes, that's right.

2 Q. Are there any other characteristic traits that you'd like to

3 highlight here?

4 A. I don't think that there is anything that would be of special

5 importance here.

6 Q. Except for the fact that it says that it was sent to the

7 judiciary, judicial organs, the public prosecutor and the courts, and

8 there were 3.691 of those, referred to the army 116, and others in

9 progress, the number there is 465.

10 A. And tab 78 was compiled according to those same methods, except

11 that in that case it is a summary of registered crimes committed against

12 Serbs and Montenegrins and other non-Albanians in the area of Kosovo and

13 Metohija from the period stipulated.

14 Perhaps it is especially important for me to say that since there

15 is no translation of tab 76, that of all these crimes committed, crimes

16 resulting in death are to be found in tab 76. So that is especially

17 important because of the consequences themselves. So that's tab 76.

18 Q. Now, although the tab has not been translated, could you please

19 indicate to us now --

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let it be placed on the ELMO.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, tab 76, please.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Since there is no translation, I'm

23 going to read out the title. It is a "Summary of security related events

24 resulting in death that occurred in connection with armed conflicts in

25 Kosovo and Metohija in the period from the 1st of January, 1998, to the

Page 39661












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13 English transcripts.













Page 39662

1 1st of June, 2001 in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija, broken up

2 according to the periods of time."

3 The structure of the table, vertically speaking, is also divided

4 into periods, as I've already said, like the other ones, and I'd like to

5 draw your attention to vertical column number 6, for example, because it

6 relates to the period of the war.

7 And now looking at it horizontally, point 1 is the number of

8 events and number of persons that were killed. So the total number of

9 events resulting in death during the war was 1.030, and for the entire

10 period it is 1.879. The number of persons killed in these events during

11 the war, we see 2.990, and a total of 4.419.

12 Of course after that, we see the structure according to ethnicity.

13 Albanians killed during the war or who lost their lives during the war is

14 1.614. The rest, 958 - I'm talking about the wartime period - and unknown

15 ethnicities, there were 418 cases that resulted in death there.

16 So in response to the question, I can say that the police just

17 during the wartime period registered and recorded 1.030 events which

18 resulted in death in which 2.990 persons were killed, and the police

19 compiled the corresponding documents for those cases and took steps under

20 its jurisdiction within the limits of its capabilities given the

21 circumstances, the prevailing conditions.

22 I considered that to be important. I wanted to tell you that. If

23 need be, we can go on to analyse the table further, and it is a table

24 comprising several pages.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 39663

1 Q. Yes. This is a very important survey and summary because it

2 refers to the whole of Kosovo and Metohija. And as insistence here is on

3 1999, it stems from the 1st of January, 1999, and then we have the 23rd

4 and the 24th of March, up until the 20th of June.

5 And in the second chapter of the summary, we have the number of

6 persons, ethnicity, sex, status, and so on.

7 Now, status, when you have Albanians first.

8 A. Right. We have terrorists, civilians, members of the MUP, and

9 unknown, according to their status.

10 Q. Albanians, 1 member of the MUP died, that is to say one member of

11 the MUP who was an Albanian who died, 538 terrorists, 700-odd civilians.

12 That is during the war.

13 A. Yes. 539 and 783.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: General, does the list -- or do the statistics

15 indicate the circumstances in which the various persons here mentioned

16 were killed?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think they do include that, but

18 let me take a look, because it should be found on one of the following

19 pages. Yes. It's in point 3 on page 2. Number of persons killed per

20 event and per national structure or ethnicity, and the first part of that

21 table relates to terrorist attacks. So if you're able to follow, page 2,

22 number 3, it says "terrorist attacks" in the column, vertical column, and

23 then of the terrorist attacks there were 412 during the war, under 6; 567

24 under number 6, Albanians 43, others 524, unknown none.

25 What it says here, if you can see it on the ELMO, relates to the

Page 39664

1 anti-terrorist actions, ATA. The number of events 92, the number of

2 casualties - and I'm just relating to the war period - 564; Albanians 517,

3 others 42, unknown ethnicity 5.

4 In the NATO bombing, the next column, the number of events was

5 156, the number of casualties was 617, of which Albanians 305, others 253,

6 unknown ethnicity 59.

7 In crimes, that is to say other crimes, the number of events

8 during the war was 143, the number of casualties was 300 and -- or,

9 rather, 328, of which Albanians 228, others 59, unknown 41.

10 And other cases, miscellaneous, the number of events was 203, the

11 number of casualties 914, of which 521 Albanians, others 80, unknown 313.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

13 JUDGE KWON: General, you said these numbers only refer to the

14 number of dead people; right?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right, yes.

16 JUDGE KWON: Casualties being the deaths.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's right.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Kwon, I'd like to draw your

19 attention to the fact that the title of the summary says a review of

20 security related issues which resulted in death. So the title of that

21 summary tells us that it refers to deaths, deaths incurred.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. General, these, then, are the facts and figures that the Ministry

24 of the Interior has, and each of them, as you said, is based on a concrete

25 case and case file, document, record, and so on that the Ministry of the

Page 39665

1 Interior disposes of; is that right?

2 A. Yes, that is right.

3 Q. Did you assess in the Ministry of the Interior whether the work of

4 the police was effective and efficacious in Kosovo or not during the war?

5 A. The assessments and appraisals boiled down to the following: That

6 it was commensurate to the conditions in which the police had to act. And

7 all levels of leadership, all the leaders, in my personal opinion,

8 according to my personal knowledge, did everything in their power to

9 ensure that the police functioned under such difficult conditions to the

10 maximum possible effect.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we're coming up to the time for

12 the break, and I want to raise a question of the length of this witness's

13 testimony. You had scheduled him to testify for 12 hours. By the end of

14 today, that time will have been reached. He will have been here for three

15 days, and that's a little over 12 hours.

16 When we return after the break, I'd like you to outline to the

17 Chamber the structure for the rest of the examination, because we just

18 received another 17 binders, which is an intimidating number in any

19 circumstance, and I'd like you to give us an outline of the rest of the

20 witness's evidence, and we intend to follow the rules quite strictly in

21 terms of relevance of the evidence.

22 We will adjourn now for 20 minutes.

23 --- Recess taken at 12.15 p.m.

24 --- On resuming at 12.40 p.m.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, just give me an outline of the

Page 39666

1 rest of the evidence that you wish to adduce. I want to get a time frame.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Robinson, in the best wish

3 to use time as rationally as possible, to a maximum, I wish to point out

4 that this witness, in view of the volume of his testimony, his competency,

5 and the fact that many of these documents are an official nature, he will

6 practically be worth ten witnesses or so, and I think that that is very

7 rational use of time.

8 As for the subjects I intend to deal with with this witness, the

9 remaining topics, that is, that will briefly have to do with the degree of

10 information from the MUP staff downwards towards Kosovo and Metohija

11 upwards toward the ministry itself. Just a few questions in relation to

12 that. Then I'm going to put some questions to him that have to do with

13 the use of force by the police.

14 You mentioned that the question was whether these standards that

15 apply in my country differ from standards that apply in other countries.

16 The questions will be very concrete. They will not be --

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: No. Let me -- not whether the standards in your

18 country differ from standards in other countries but whether they are the

19 same as the standards required by international law. Proceed.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do hope that that goes without

21 saying.

22 Then, further on, questions that have to do with the legality of

23 policework, then questions pertaining to incidents involving loss of death

24 that are from this indictment, questions that have to do with the work of

25 police involving incidents resulting in death and --

Page 39667

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Incidents mentioned in the indictment. Yes.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes. But also incidents not

3 mentioned in the indictment, in order to show the work involved. Then

4 questions that have to do with clean-up and mop-up, mentioned here several

5 times; crimes against personal dignity and morality and how they were

6 treated. Rape cases were mentioned here, among others, and that belongs

7 to that group of criminal acts. And then questions related to refugees,

8 displaced persons. All of that has to do with allegations against Serb

9 forces, as it is put here.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: What kind of evidence that is not of a very

11 general nature can this witness give about rape, allegations of rape in

12 the indictment?

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] There are some documents here. I

14 cannot quote the exact tabs to you now, but there are some documents here

15 that can indicate what kind of action police took with respect to these

16 criminal offences.

17 Yesterday, I showed you a document that had to do with the

18 activities of the local police where an Albanian, a local policeman,

19 reported the conduct of three persons in army uniforms.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. It is Article 7(3), responsibility.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Further on, the alleged shellings of

22 different facilities. The general will be able to give an explanation in

23 that respect. Then questions related to paramilitary groups and

24 volunteers, and some questions that have to do with the presence of MUP

25 forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia.

Page 39668

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: How long do you anticipate it will take to

2 conclude all these areas?

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope that the examination on all

4 these topics could be concluded during the first working day next week,

5 and I won't be using all of it up.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Those to which I personally attach the greatest

7 importance would be the incidents resulting in death that are mentioned

8 specifically in the indictment, the evidence on paramilitary groups and

9 volunteers, and you said something about evidence relating to the movement

10 of information upwards and downwards. That has to do with the line of

11 command?

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I talked about information going

13 downward to the secretariat of the MUP in Kosovo and from the staff of the

14 MUP towards ministry headquarters, vertically upwards, that chain of

15 command. We have documents in these tabs about that as well.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well, Mr. Milosevic. So we expect to

17 conclude in the first working day of next week. Proceed.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. General, how did information flow down the chain from the staff of

21 the MUP in Kosovo towards units in the field?

22 A. The ministry staff provided daily information at least once a day

23 to all subordinate units about everything that was going on in Kosovo and

24 Metohija; namely, information that they considered important for the

25 subordinate units. In the same way, the ministry staff issued specific

Page 39669

1 orders to take specific measures regarding all questions belonging to the

2 purview of the staff.

3 Q. I'm sorry for interrupting.

4 A. In addition to that, in Pristina at the ministry staff, meetings

5 were held every now and then with heads of the secretariats and the

6 leaders of units sent to Kosovo and Metohija. At these meetings the

7 security situation was analysed directly as well as the situation in the

8 area, and specific assignments were given in relation to the situation.

9 It was customary to draw up conclusions after every meeting, and then they

10 would be sent on in writing.

11 Q. All right. Let's take a few examples in terms of how this

12 actually worked. For example, in tab 58, if you take a look at it, the

13 ministry staff is addressing this to the chiefs of Secretariats of

14 Internal Affairs, to the commanders and all persons concerned in Pristina,

15 Prizren, Pec, Djakovica, Kosovska Mitrovica, Gnjilane and Urosevac. Then

16 it says that all commanders of police stations are required to familiarise

17 themselves with these dispatches. Is that the usual way of doing it?

18 A. This is one example of such a dispatch that was sent from the

19 ministry staff to the Secretariats of the Interior and to the commanders

20 of special police unit detachments. There are many more such detachments.

21 They were the everyday form of communication between the staff and their

22 subordinate units. It can be put that way.

23 Q. So that was the regular everyday mode of communication. And in

24 tab 59, you have information on the bodies found in the Kosovo and

25 Metohija autonomous province?

Page 39670

1 A. That's right. This is topic-specific information that has to do

2 with corpses found during a certain period of time in Kosovo and Metohija.

3 Of course, it is not in the form of any order. This is an analytical

4 presentation of what had happened in the previous period, namely, the

5 corpses found in the previous period.

6 Q. Does all of this have to do with bodies found as a result of

7 activities carried out by terrorists?

8 A. Yes, at first glance I can conclude that that is correct.

9 Q. This has to do both with Serb and Albanian victims; isn't that

10 right?

11 A. Yes, that's right.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I note that this is October 1998.

13 I am aware that the indictment does make allegations or, rather, contains

14 certain charges which may be said to relate to this period, but only in a

15 very general sense. The real body of the charges covers the period, as

16 you know, January to June 1999. So when you're dealing with 1998, you

17 have to justify it.

18 What is the precise relevance of this?

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The relevance is to show how

20 information flowed downward from the MUP staff to the secretariats and

21 units in the field. If you think that these examples from 1998 are not

22 sufficient, then, for example, in tab 61 you have 1999. That is the 26th

23 of March. That is three days into NATO operations.

24 A dispatch, an order of General Lukic to all the organs in the

25 area, in Kosovo and Metohija, in tab 61. I hope you have this.

Page 39671












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13 English transcripts.













Page 39672

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we have that.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation].

3 Q. General --

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: I will not ignore what is in tab -- is it 58 or

5 59? What is the tab we are now dealing with, 59? Tab 59.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We are now dealing with tab 61.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, but I was telling you that I will not ignore

8 what is in tab 59, the one previously. Tab 61 now deals with 1999?

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It refers to the time at the very

10 beginning of the NATO aggression against Yugoslavia.


12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. General, can you see this? This is also a dispatch of the staff?

14 A. That's right. Obviously this is a dispatch of the staff of the

15 ministry in Pristina, and the head of the staff is addressing this to his

16 subordinates, the chiefs of secretariats and commands of all PJPs,

17 measures that should be taken during a state of war.

18 Q. General, can we just look at this passage where it says, "I hereby

19 order, take the greatest effort to cover the area in order to detect and

20 take measures against all perpetrators of the crimes," et cetera.

21 And then para 2: "Prevent all crimes committed against persons of

22 different ethnicity. Arrest perpetrators and file criminal reports."

23 A. Correct.

24 Q. Para 2, item 2, of this dispatch dated 26 March, it says:

25 "Prevent all crimes committed against persons of different ethnicity.

Page 39673

1 Arrest perpetrators and file criminal reports."

2 This term literally sounds, in Serbian, "deprive of freedom," but

3 it means to arrest.

4 In para 3, I don't want to read everything. It says, among other

5 things, strictly adhere to the Geneva Conventions regarding the civilian

6 population and stock materiel and equipment in certain locations, et

7 cetera.

8 Is this one of the dispatches that was sent down to subordinate

9 units particularly drawing their attention to these types of conduct that

10 I quoted?

11 A. Yes. This is the typical method of issuing orders and

12 instructions to subordinate units. Those subordinate units, in their

13 turn, are expected to pass these orders on to the units directly

14 subordinated to them so that the orders reach everyone.

15 Q. The same dispatch received by teletype in another unit was -- is

16 to be found under the next tab.

17 A. Yes, we just see a different type, depending on the communications

18 equipment in various units.

19 Q. In any way, we can see that this is received by all units.

20 A. Correct.

21 Q. Then in tab 62, we find a dispatch dated 2nd of April, 1999.

22 A. Correct. Yes. It is a similar dispatch, but this one is a copy

23 of an original document.

24 Q. A copy of an original document that was sent on by teletype to

25 subordinated units.

Page 39674

1 A. Correct.

2 Q. This one has a signature, then. May I draw your attention to para

3 4 of this document, where it says: "All persons, regardless of the unit

4 they belong to, which are found in the course of perpetrating the said

5 serious criminal acts are to be arrested and turned over to civilian and

6 military courts accompanied, by criminal reports, whereas criminal reports

7 are to be filed to civilian and military prosecutors' offices, with prison

8 sentences meted out to all such persons."

9 A. Yes, military and civilian courts, depending on the case, have

10 jurisdiction according to the regulations we looked at in the previous

11 days.

12 Q. Very well. Next we have another order issued by the Chief of

13 Staff, dated the 6th May, which says: "In this connection in the

14 following period take all measures to prevent paramilitary groups and

15 individuals from committing violence, murders, rapes, and other criminal

16 acts against the civilian population regardless of their ethnicity, any

17 acts that would jeopardise the property or lives or other -- of

18 civilians." This is the 6th of May.

19 A. Which tab? You said tab 65.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: 65. You must tell us the tabs. This is not a

21 private dialogue between the witness and yourself.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I said tab 65.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: You did not. Let us proceed.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Here, along with this dispatch, there is a text -- the text of an

Page 39675

1 article from the Politika newspaper, where it says in the beginning: "We

2 are sending you an article from the daily newspaper Politika on the

3 submission of reports to the president of the FRY by the head of staff of

4 the MUP in Kosovo and Metohija, Major General Sreten Lukic, and the

5 commander of the 3rd Army, Colonel General Nebojsa Pavkovic."

6 This text ends with the words, "said the statement from the

7 Supreme Command."

8 General, what can we see from this press release?

9 A. May I first say that this is a document issued by the staff in

10 Pristina, which was made available to subordinate units in a way I

11 described before. It is accompanied by the text of the press release

12 published by -- after reports were made by Major General Sreten Lukic and

13 Colonel General Nebojsa Pavkovic to the president. We see from this

14 document that the entire personnel in the secretariat and all members of

15 special police units must be familiarised with the text.

16 In the next paragraph, attention is drawn to the necessity to

17 prevent paramilitary formations and individuals from committing crimes

18 against civilians, as you said in your previous question. This is another

19 copy of an original document.

20 Q. It also says that in parallel with performing these defence tasks,

21 numerous criminal acts involving violence, murders, rape, looting, et

22 cetera, have to be controlled, and it also mentions the arrests of

23 numerous criminals who posed a significant threat to the civilian

24 population.

25 Is that what is written in the press release?

Page 39676

1 A. Yes. And it goes without saying that special attention should be

2 paid to such conduct and appropriate measures taken.

3 Q. The press release says: "In the interest of all the population of

4 Kosovo and Metohija regardless of their ethnic and religious background."

5 Is that what is written in the press release?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Very well, thank you.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: General, at the very end of the newspaper article,

9 it refers to a statement from the Supreme Command.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honour, do you mean the last

11 paragraph of this copied text?

12 JUDGE BONOMY: The very last words.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "A precondition for proper operation

14 of public services and social functions of the state in the interest of

15 all the population of Kosovo and Metohija regardless of their national

16 affiliation." That is the last part of my text.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: The final English -- the final English words are

18 "said the statement from the Supreme Command." Does that expression not

19 appear in that paragraph?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Yes. The last words are

21 "said the statement from the Supreme Command." That is correct.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: What do you understand by the expression "the

23 Supreme Command"?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, the Supreme Command is defined

25 by the constitution of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.

Page 39677

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Bonomy, let me just try to avoid

2 misunderstanding. This entire text is a press release by the Supreme

3 Command, and it concludes with the words, "as reported by newspapers," and

4 ends with the words, "according to the statement from the Supreme

5 Command." This entire text is from the Supreme Command.

6 And let me just point out one passage where it says that in

7 Belgrade -- "In Belgrade, the president of the Federal Republic of

8 Yugoslavia and the Supreme Commander, Slobodan Milosevic, heard reports

9 from the commander of the 3rd Army, Colonel General Nebojsa Pavkovic, and

10 the commander of the staff of the police of the MUP of Serbia for Kosovo

11 and Metohija, Major General Sreten Lukic."

12 JUDGE BONOMY: I would be grateful not to be interrupted when I'm

13 asking questions of a witness.

14 What do you understand by the Supreme Command that would issue

15 such a statement?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, let me be very specific: We

17 in the police were not concerned with form. What was most important for

18 us was what positions were taken and what policies were adopted, and the

19 policy was to enforce the regulations lawfully.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Is the answer that you don't know? Or do you have

21 an answer to my question?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You could say that.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Thank you.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I did not understand the question

25 you asked, Mr. Bonomy. I don't know if the witness understood it

Page 39678

1 properly.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: The question was very simple. Please carry on with

3 your own examination.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Bonomy, it seems to follow from

5 this that the witness does not know what "Supreme Command" means, which

6 should not be the case. He must know that.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, you can possibly clarify it in questioning

8 him, but as far as I'm concerned, at the moment he's indicated he doesn't

9 know.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. General --

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Did you say earlier, General, that the Supreme

13 Command was established by law?

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's what I said. In keeping with

15 the constitution, I think my words were.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: But you don't know who or what it is?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I do know. It is a body, but

18 obviously I misunderstood the earlier question, because I thought I should

19 explain in which way this press release was issued, who issued it, who

20 drafted it. Of course I know what the Supreme Command is and how it

21 operates.

22 What I know is that the Supreme Command consists of the president

23 of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, presidents of member republics, and

24 of course I know that the president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

25 issues orders based on the decisions of the Supreme Command. That is my

Page 39679

1 understanding of this concept.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. In tab 73, General, we have another example of this communication,

5 where it says: "At meetings held on the 7th and 11th May, 1999, at the

6 MUP staff in Kosovo and Metohija with chiefs of Secretariats of the

7 Interior and commanders of detachments of special police units, the

8 following tasks were decided on and the following conclusions made."

9 One of them is: "Ensure stability and security for everyone in

10 the province, conduct sanitisation of the terrain with appropriate

11 accompanying documentation." These are items --

12 A. These are items 5 and 6. Thoroughly clear up the terrain and duly

13 record it, in keeping with all prior orders. May I just add that these

14 are conclusions from two previous meetings, and I'm sure that these

15 conclusions were duly transmitted to all subordinate units for them to

16 apply.

17 Q. Item 10 says prevent violence, killings, looting and other crimes

18 and immediately issue a criminal report and bring in all people for whom

19 there are grounds to suspect that they have committed a crime.

20 A. Correct.

21 Q. Request the relevant judicial organs to expedite legal proceedings

22 to the utmost in order to punish the perpetrators of these crimes.

23 A. Correct. This refers to the way in which the police should work.

24 Q. It says make sure that police officers carry out all said tasks

25 lawfully, correctly, consistently and fully. Those responsible for this

Page 39680

1 shall be chiefs of the SUP and detachment commanders.

2 A. Item 12 regards general crime.

3 Q. So these are then --

4 A. These are then specific measures that follow from the meetings

5 held on the 7th and 11th of May, and they are listed here in proper

6 sequence covering a number of areas, including item 16, which regards the

7 conduct of the police including the wearing of uniforms, et cetera.

8 Q. And para 19 refers to the RPO.

9 A. Reserve police units.

10 Q. It says: "Members of reserve police units cannot wear police and

11 military uniforms if they have not been mobilised and engaged in the

12 reserve MUP or VJ formations."

13 A. Correct.

14 Q. Why is this emphasised specially?

15 A. It is specially emphasised because reserve police units were

16 established to protect specific villages and towns, and as long as there

17 is no specific danger, these persons should not wear uniforms unless they

18 are mobilised by a concrete order. So these persons concerned are members

19 of the reserve police force, but they have not yet been engaged in a

20 specific task.

21 Q. All right. Fine. Now, General, I think that we have spent enough

22 time quoting examples and documents testifying to information from the

23 staffs downwards, down the chain. Can we now take a look at how

24 information was realised from the staffs of the Ministry of the Interior

25 in Kosovo upwards towards the top of the ministry, up the chain.

Page 39681












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Page 39682

1 A. In keeping with the provisions governing information and

2 information for the Ministry of the Interior, the staff informed the

3 ministry, and the minister specifically, the heads of departments and from

4 time to time the other assistants by way of daily reports, daily

5 information, and urgent reports. Of course there were periodical reports

6 as well that we were able to see when we discussed this issue earlier on.

7 Q. Now, would you take a look at tab 60, please. It is a document

8 dated the 1st of May, 1999.

9 A. That's right.

10 Q. It has its number. There's no need for me to quote it. But can

11 we see in this document precisely what you've said, that it was addressed

12 to the ministry, the chief of public security, the public security

13 department, the chief of the analytical administration, and so on.

14 A. Yes. This is a sample copy of a daily report which is titled

15 "Summary of events, phenomena and information with a bearing on the

16 security situation recorded between 0600 hours on the 30th of April to

17 0600 hours on the 1st of May, 1999." In this way the staff of the

18 ministry would report on a daily basis to the headquarters of the

19 ministry, or specifically the persons mentioned here, and from time to

20 time other persons as well. The contents of this summary were compiled

21 once again on the basis of daily reports coming into the staff from all

22 the subordinate units over the past 24-hour period.

23 Q. But this is information or the manner which information was sent

24 up the chain.

25 A. Yes, that's right.

Page 39683

1 Q. So this is a collective information or summary from 0600 hours on

2 the 30th to 0600 on the 1st of May. And that's for a period of 24 hours.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. Is that the type of daily information report that would be sent

5 out?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. What is the -- what are the contents? The first paragraph deals

8 with attacks of NATO armed forces.

9 A. Yes, that's right.

10 Q. And they describe what happened in the space of 24 hours.

11 A. Paragraph 2 or, rather, point 2 refers to terrorist attacks,

12 compiled according to the same methods. Then we come to point 3, serious

13 crimes committed; point 4, persons who fled the territory of Kosovo and

14 Metohija; and point 5, miscellaneous.

15 Q. All right. Point 4 is the longest portion, persons who fled the

16 territory, and so on. Or, rather, single crimes are noted here, the

17 crimes that were committed in the space of 24 hours.

18 A. Yes, that's right. And of course in this summary we can see the

19 very different perpetrators, different types of perpetrators and the

20 different damages incurred with the crimes perpetrated.

21 Q. Yes. You have Serbs and Albanians there.

22 A. Yes. And policemen, reserve policemen, and so on and so forth.

23 Q. So all of that is one information, one summary relating to a

24 period of 24 hours; one day, that is.

25 A. Yes, that's right.

Page 39684

1 Q. Now, point 4 of this report, it says persons who fled the

2 territory of the autonomous province of Kosovo and Metohija.

3 A. Yes, that's right.

4 Q. Tell us about that.

5 A. We can see that on that particular day to which this summary

6 refers, and it is the 30th of April, that at the border crossing of

7 Djeneral Jankovic 4.764 persons left the area, of the Siptar ethnicity.

8 Yes, that's right. And 11.400 persons belonging to the Siptar ethnic

9 group left the territory via Vrbnica. Then we have, on April the 24th, a

10 total leaving the country 715.158 of the Siptar ethnic minority, and it

11 stipulates the border crossings they crossed over.

12 Q. General, was it customary and usual that this kind of summary

13 report should provide an overview of all the important security related

14 incidents and events?

15 A. Yes, that's right. All important security related events. They

16 did not include events of lesser importance.

17 Yes, Mr. President.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: In relation to item 4, persons who fled the

19 territory of Kosovo, there is no mention of the circumstances in which

20 they fled. Wouldn't a report such as this --

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: I was asking whether a report such as this would

23 comment on the circumstances giving rise to persons fleeing.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, the title of the report itself

25 is a summary of important security related events. And you will see that

Page 39685

1 on the previous pages they don't enter into an in-depth analysis of the

2 events themselves, but they just set out the facts that a crime had been

3 committed and then, in point 4, how many persons left crossing each of the

4 border crossings. Of course, this is a question of method, of

5 methodology. There could have been a comment accompanying this, but I

6 assume that this was common knowledge from previous summaries of this same

7 nature.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. When you say that it was common knowledge, generally known, do you

11 mean that it was generally known and common knowledge why persons were

12 fleeing Kosovo and Metohija? Is that what you meant?

13 A. Well, for those of us who were in the police force in Kosovo and

14 Metohija, it was common knowledge to us why they were leaving, why they

15 were leaving Kosovo and Metohija. We knew that too.

16 Q. What was generally known to you? What was common knowledge, your

17 common knowledge?

18 A. We knew, generally speaking, that the trend of persons leaving

19 their villages and homes had precipitously increased with the start of the

20 aggression and the period that I said was a very difficult situation in

21 which the police had to function, which was especially the period at the

22 start of the aggression when, to all intents and purposes, there was

23 general chaos, confusion. People were leaving, people didn't know what to

24 do and all the problems that that gave rise to.

25 Q. Very well, General. Now we're going to deal, as I said in the

Page 39686

1 beginning in response to a question by Mr. Robinson, with issues that

2 we're going to focus on briefly, and they are the use of force and

3 firearms.

4 General, the police along with the army was the only element of

5 power and authority who had authorisation to apply force, to use force.

6 Now, how was the use of force as you -- as used by the police prescribed?

7 A. The right of the police to use force is one of the most sensitive

8 rights that the police enjoy. In the Republic of Serbia, the manner in

9 which vehicles of force are used, including official weapons, is regulated

10 by the law governing internal affairs and the rules and regulations

11 following that law and pursuant to that law.

12 Q. Just tell us briefly, what do the provisions say? I don't want to

13 go back to all these provisions individually, but what were the general

14 principles governing the use of force?

15 A. From the rules and regulations, we have clear-cut principles that

16 emerge, and they could be explained in the following way: First of all,

17 we're talking about the principle of the legitimacy of the goals. So

18 firearms and every other means of coercion can be used only in cases which

19 are prescribed in the law. After that, we come to the principle of

20 graduality, the gradual application of the use of force, which means that

21 an authorised person is duty-bound, when using force, to go from lighter

22 weapons to more heavy weapons. And the third principle is the principle

23 of necessity. And according to that principle and the provisions that

24 prevailed it could be resorted to only when dictated by necessity, only

25 when the need arose and when an assignment couldn't be carried out in any

Page 39687

1 other way and the assignment was legitimate, of course. And the fourth

2 principle was the principle of proportionality or, rather, a principle

3 that implies that the force should be commensurate to the threat which

4 that force is used to suppress.

5 Q. Very well, General. Now, all these principles in very precise

6 ways are of course defined, but the ones you mentioned, are they to be

7 found in the rules and regulations on the methods of the use of force

8 which is a component part of tab 7?

9 A. Yes, of course. They are to be found in those rules and

10 regulations. They are not -- I did not quote them literally, of course,

11 word-for-word, but the provisions contain what I just explained.

12 Q. I don't think we need read out the rules and regulations and

13 provisions. It is part of the evidence to be found in tab 7, so we won't

14 waste time on that, but I assume that it is pursuant to the law governing

15 internal affairs given in tab 1. Is that true?

16 A. Yes. The important provisions governing of use of force is to be

17 found laid out in the law and they are set out in detail in the supplement

18 in tab 1.

19 Q. Yes. I just wanted to draw your attention to the fact that we

20 have the law governing internal affairs in tab 1, and in tab 7 the rules

21 and regulations of -- on the use -- governing the use of force. We won't

22 lose any more time in quoting the exact wording from those.

23 But tell us, though, please, the leadership of the MUP, the

24 leadership of the state, the local leaders as well, in practice, what was

25 their attitude toward these provisions, the law governing internal

Page 39688

1 affairs, for instance, and the rules and regulations for the use of force?

2 A. At all the important meetings that I attended and that I mentioned

3 in part during my testimony, I personally gained the conviction that all

4 the competent leaders insisted upon the fact that provisions governing the

5 use of force, especially firearms, be followed to the letter. Not only in

6 Kosovo and Metohija but generally in the whole country.

7 Q. Tell us now, please, what about the weapons that were used by the

8 terrorists when they attacked the police?

9 A. The terrorists in their attacks on the police used all types of

10 weaponry which they had at their disposal. That is to say rifles,

11 anti-armour devices, anti-aircraft weapons, anti-tank mines, and

12 everything else that they had at their disposal. And the consequences of

13 the use of such devices are quite clear to one and all.

14 Q. Very well. Now the police: From the very beginning, was it

15 capable of responding in adequate terms to conduct of the terrorists in

16 this way, and did they -- were they able to match those weapons?

17 A. The beginning of 1998, the police was not able to do that,

18 principally because the terrorists chose their location, the target of

19 their attack and the place of their attack, and as we said, their goals

20 were to kill, and therefore they used ambush and brutal attacks on the

21 police and the citizens while they were moving along the roads.

22 Q. Was the police forced to use protective devices and weapons which

23 matched the weapons used by the terrorists?

24 A. Yes, of course. The police was forced to change the type of

25 weapons it used and to include those protective devices that could

Page 39689

1 adequately -- and other weapons that could adequately respond to the

2 situation.

3 Q. I have one question now, and I'm sure that you're professional

4 enough to answer it because I'm not quite clear on this point. For

5 example, the police had an armoured transporter, APC; is that right?

6 A. Yes, that's right.

7 Q. And the terrorists did not. They didn't have an APC?

8 A. No, they didn't.

9 Q. So would you say that the police was using heavier weaponry than

10 used by the terrorists in that case?

11 A. No, because the police had the APCs as a protection device, a

12 protection vehicle, because the APCs have incorporated into them weapons,

13 but the weapons on an APC cannot, of course, prevent terrorists waiting in

14 ambush and opening fire against an armoured device like an APC from a

15 hand-held rocket launcher, for example, or a recoilless gun or anything

16 like that, even using ordinary more sophisticated weapons. Among other

17 things, we found certain rockets produced, the Armbrust type produced by

18 Germany, modern weapons.

19 Q. Now, as far as calibre is concerned, what was the calibre on an

20 APC? What does an APC have, for example?

21 A. An APC has an anti-aircraft machine gun 12.7 millimetres, or

22 sometimes 14.5 millimetres in exceptional cases.

23 Q. So that is practically the same calibre that we were able to see,

24 according to the list, that the members of the KLA had?

25 A. Absolutely identical, yes. With the proviso that the calibres

Page 39690

1 that the terrorists had against an armoured device were bigger and

2 different, and the intention was different, of course; the purpose of it

3 was different.

4 Q. Let me just take a moment to look through this.

5 Can you explain to us, please, what we find in tab 143, for

6 instance, where there is a dispatch, a telegram by the staff of the MUP to

7 the ministry in Pristina, where it says that plan, organise and undertake

8 actions from a distance targeting terrorist forces.

9 A. I apologise, but what tab number did you give us?

10 Q. Tab 143. In these instructions, in point 3, does it say during

11 the activity exclusively target -- targets outside settled areas or where

12 you know for sure where there are no civilians, no civilian population,

13 where it is established with certainty that there is no civilian

14 population.

15 A. That is what it says in point 3 of the document.

16 Q. And in point 1 it says activity against terrorist forces.

17 A. That's right.

18 Q. So if in point 1 it says that targeted should be terrorist forces

19 exclusively and in point 3 that they underline that targets should be in

20 areas where there is -- are no civilians, what can we draw -- what

21 conclusions can we draw from that?

22 A. Well, we can clearly deduce from that that this dispatch relates

23 to preparing all the elements necessary for acting against terrorist

24 groups exclusively outside inhabited settled areas and exclusively where

25 there could be no consequences on the civilian population, so once the

Page 39691

1 conditions are ripe. And as we can see in continuation, the positions are

2 clearly defined and determined, positions at which such targets exist, and

3 those positions have been established on the basis of intelligence data or

4 information supplied by the police.

5 Q. Very well, General. Thank you. You already pointed out in your

6 answer to a question that was put to you by Mr. Robinson or by Mr. Bonomy,

7 I cannot say exactly now, that in principle the police were never the

8 first to open fire.

9 A. That's right, that's what I said.

10 Q. Now, since we've gone through these questions related to the use

11 of force, after everything that is -- that you said, can it be stated that

12 the MUP forces resorted to disproportionate use of force? I bear in mind

13 the principle of proportionality that you quoted as one of the principles

14 involved in the use of force.

15 A. I've already given that in my answer related to Mr. Ashdown's

16 transcript.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: General, can we go back to paragraph 3, just the

18 instruction that fire must be directed solely at targets outside populated

19 areas or where it is reliably known that there is no civilian population.

20 What would happen if KLA personnel were intermingled with civilian

21 population?

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. President, I have given a

23 partial answer to that question already. The police always refrained from

24 taking any kind of active measures against groups that might have included

25 civilians, even if there were -- was any shade of doubt. Such action

Page 39692

1 could be taken only if it can unequivocally be proved that a group

2 includes terrorists only.

3 I can say with reliability that this order was never carried

4 through because it was impossible to determine ever that a group included

5 terrorists only. This was used during planned terrorist actions when the

6 target could clearly be discerned, that is to say that it could be

7 established there were no civilians there, of course honouring the

8 principle I've already explained.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. General, just a few questions that have to do with legality in the

12 work of the police. Since you were there yourself, you saw for yourself

13 how the police operated. You were at the MUP staff several times, at

14 meetings as instructed by your minister, as you already mentioned. Tell

15 us, during 1998 and 1999, did the police and army act lawfully or not?

16 A. During 1998 and 1999, the police in general acted lawfully. When

17 I say "in general," I'm saying that there are exceptions, isolated

18 individual cases when certain individual policemen did not abide by

19 regulations. That is why I'm saying "in general."

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: I allow the witness to answer that question

21 because it arguably relates to fact issues as well, but ordinarily it will

22 be a legal question on which he is not competent to comment.

23 We have to stop at 1.43. There is another case here. So the last

24 question.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, in relation to this.

Page 39693

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Do you know of a case, any case, of an unlawful order or carrying

3 out an unlawful order or any other kind of unlawful action that was not

4 punished, or, rather, of any unlawful action with regard to which criminal

5 proceedings were not instituted?

6 A. I'm going to give a very precise answer: I'm not aware of a

7 single case of anyone issuing an unlawful order or that anyone carried out

8 that kind of order. I am also not aware that anyone planned or instigated

9 or tolerated anyone's behaviour in terms of unlawful conduct. Also, I'm

10 not aware of a single case of anyone having carried out an unlawful deed

11 without having measures taken against him.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: We are going to stop here, but I must say that in

13 assessing the weight to be attached to that question, we will take account

14 of the fact that no evidence has been given to show that this witness has

15 any competence to comment on the lawfulness of an order.

16 We are adjourned until tomorrow --

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, as a high official of

18 the police who was authorised and who is one of the authorised officials

19 in terms of implementing the law, he has to know exactly what is lawful

20 and what is not lawful. Otherwise, he could not carry out his official

21 duty. His official duty was to implement the law.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: No evidence has been given to support that.

23 We are adjourned until tomorrow morning at 9.00 a.m.

24 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.42 p.m.,

25 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 19th day

Page 39694

1 of May, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.