Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 41840

1 Wednesday, 6 July 2005

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.03 a.m.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you may continue.


8 [Witness answered through interpreter]

9 Examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

10 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, General.

11 A. Good morning, Mr. Milosevic.

12 Q. We heard testimony here from a witness of Mr. Nice's, Beqe Beqaj.

13 He testified on the 29th of August, 2002, and the transcript is somewhere

14 from line or page 9116 to 9120. It's in that part of the transcript where

15 you'll find that passage. He was talking about the fact that in August

16 1998, the population of Racak and other villages left the village for the

17 first time when the army and the police arrived in both villages and other

18 surrounding villages in the valley.

19 And on the 14th of August, 1999, he says the army of Yugoslavia

20 MUP again arrived to the village of Raca, and the witness says that they

21 ordered the villagers to leave their homes. Also, that on the 27th of

22 April, five Serb policemen were killed after which the Serb forces

23 attacked the village of Dobrosh where a number of villagers were killed,

24 and the inhabitants fled from the village in the direction of Meja where

25 the Serb forces stopped the convoy at a checkpoint in Meja and then

Page 41841

1 separated 24 men that they sent to the fields as -- which was known as

2 Hasan's valley. They separated 30 of them there, and the policemen said

3 that they were responsible for the killing of the Serb policemen, and the

4 witness says that he never saw them again.

5 Tell me if you know anything about that and what all this was

6 about. I hope that you paid attention to the dates, the 27th of April

7 when five of our policemen were killed, and then it says our forces

8 attacked the village of Dobrosh.

9 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: They separated 13 of them,

10 not 30.

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When you mention 1998, the witness

12 probably made a mistake in stating the date because when dealing with 1998

13 ourselves, we had some orders linked to the return of the population to

14 those villages. That means that the inhabitants, in 1998, could have left

15 in the month of May, whereas in August when the witness and the witnesses

16 mentioning August, they were already back in their homes.

17 Now, as far as 1999 is concerned, this particular date, the 27th

18 of April that you mentioned, I said yesterday already or, rather, I

19 indicated on the map that on the 27th of April, the operations started in

20 that region and that the object of those operations was to break the

21 terrorist forces which had gathered in the immediate vicinity of the state

22 border. That is to say they are the villages that I pointed to yesterday

23 beginning with Smonica towards Junik. So it's a broader territory.

24 Q. Yes, I understand that, General, but what I'm asking you now is

25 this: What this witness stated, that some men were separated and then

Page 41842

1 nothing is known of their fate after that, is that true?

2 A. As far as the separation of men goes, it was often usual that the

3 terrorists together with the civilians, that they should mingle with the

4 civilians, take off their uniforms, because they were wearing civilian

5 clothing and uniforms. They'd just discard their uniforms and become

6 civilians straight away. So the police or, rather, the army couldn't do

7 that. The army didn't have that kind of information. So the police would

8 sometimes stop certain individuals to search them and to see if they were

9 indeed civilians or not. Otherwise, I don't know anything about that.

10 The killing of some policemen was mentioned. All I know is that

11 during those days four policemen were killed, in fact, and that one

12 policeman was seriously wounded and that he remained an invalid after that

13 wounding. That's what I know linked to that particular situation.

14 Q. Tell me, was it at all possible for somebody to set aside, to

15 separate these individuals, to search them, check them out, anybody, and

16 then to kill them? So to separate them, single them out, and kill them?

17 A. When people are singled out, separated, and in 1998 I was present

18 when that was -- that situation took place, when you separate a group of

19 people, what you do is you look for their names. You can't do that on the

20 spot. You can't check them out on the spot, but you have to ring up

21 headquarters, then you give the person's name, then this is checked

22 through the computer. You do a computer process check on them for the

23 individuals and so on.

24 Q. What I'm asking you is is it possible that some killing could have

25 taken place in that procedure, that checking procedure that you mention

Page 41843

1 now?

2 A. Well, during that procedure that is quite impossible because, had

3 something like that happened, it would have been a crime.

4 Q. Well, we're not contesting that, but do you know that anything

5 like that happened?

6 A. No, I don't know about anything like that happening.

7 Q. Okay, fine. Now, Nike Peraj, a Prosecution witness, said that at

8 the beginning of 1999 that the Serb artillery and army deployed in the

9 Djakovica municipality, Pec, Prizren and Orahovica, that they were there,

10 and he testified from the 9th to the 13th of May, 2002 and that is

11 mentioned in this fillbox of Mr. Nice's.

12 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers kindly slow down. Thank you.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic and the witness, there is a request

14 from the interpreter for you to both slow down.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. I'm interested, General, since these are large towns, or

17 relatively large towns, not to categorise towns and the size of them,

18 Djakovica, Pec, Prizren and Orahovac, he says that in 1999, the Serb

19 artillery and the army, without going into what he means by artillery and

20 what he means by army, but he says the artillery and army were deployed in

21 the Djakovica. Pec, Prizren, Orahovac municipalities and towns. Now in

22 those towns, were there any Yugoslav army garrisons located there?

23 A. In Pec there was a garrison, yes, in which there were several

24 units of the rank of a battalion, strength of battalion. In Djakovica,

25 there were two barracks, a garrison with two barracks, that is. In one of

Page 41844












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Page 41845

1 the barracks there was the Border Battalion and my own 2nd Motorised

2 Battalion, and in the other barracks there was the entire brigade put up

3 with five divisions, the PVO Brigade, and the command and all the units of

4 the brigade and the border battalions, as well as the command of the

5 military district of Prizren, which means -- which means that no units

6 were deployed, and they were always there in that garrison.

7 Q. That's where the barracks exist?

8 A. Yes, that's where the barracks exist, and they have existed there

9 since World War II.

10 Q. All right. Fine. He said that in April 1999, the KLA killed

11 Milutin Prascevic, who was the chief of the MUP in Djakovica, as well as

12 four other policemen, after which, on the 27th, 28th of April, there was a

13 large-scale operation in the valley north of Djakovica. He talks about

14 Serb forces, and he testified from the 9th to the 13th of May, and I've

15 already told you that, 2002.

16 What was happening? What happened? So we're talking about April

17 1999, the 27th and 28th of April, 1999.

18 A. In those observations by this witness, there is -- there are

19 untruths. I knew this man Milutin Prascevic. He wasn't the chief of MUP

20 at all. He could have been just a lower-ranking officer in the MUP of

21 Djakovica, and I've already said that four policemen were killed, one

22 among them was an Albanian, and one was seriously wounded. However, those

23 policemen, when they were called by some Roma, as far as I was informed,

24 some Roma called them up and they went out in the direction of Ponosevac

25 and Smonica to intervene and that's where four of them were killed and one

Page 41846

1 seriously wounded. But to bring that into connection, that is to say the

2 death of those policemen and this activity on this other territory has

3 nothing to do with one another.

4 Q. Well, the activity you've explained to us, that is to say the

5 defence of the border and the onslaught from -- coming from Albania, the

6 attack from Albania --

7 A. Yes. That was the greatest amount of fighting during the war.

8 120 of our soldiers were killed in defending our borders, and these were

9 supposed to be forces which would hit from the rear to join up with the

10 forces attacking from Albania, this other side.

11 Q. Thank you, General. Let's not dwell on that any longer, then.

12 The witness Xhevahire Syla said here -- she said here that on the 14th of

13 April, the Serb forces entered Novokaz, Djakovica municipality -- or

14 Djakovo municipality and they went into Albania houses, giving the people,

15 the inhabitants five minutes to leave, and this led to the formation of a

16 convoy moving to Djakovica, and that the police attacked the people in the

17 convoy, told them to go to Albania, and that the refugees were not allowed

18 to leave the route they had taken towards Prizren and which was a

19 circuitous route to the border, a roundabout way, and it says that the

20 convoy was stopped at the Bistrazin bridge, that the Serb forces separated

21 from -- the people from the convoy, that the convoy was later hit by NATO

22 bombs, and then three low-flying planes later on, carrying Serb flags,

23 flew over their heads and bombed the convoy seven times, killing 70 to 80

24 persons. And she testified on the 17th of July, 2002 and the transcript

25 is 8186, that page of the transcript. I hope that you listened to what I

Page 41847

1 read out and said carefully; so the NATO bombing, then our planes bombing

2 and then killing 70, 80 people. That's what she claimed.

3 A. That's quite nonsensical, ludicrous, because NATO -- on the first

4 day NATO didn't recognise this, but they did admit to it on the second or

5 third day, of having bombed on the 14th of April columns of refugees, but

6 not only in that area that the witness is referring to. The refugees were

7 bombed on -- in some five or six separate positions from the place that

8 the witness mentions, that is from Bistrazin right up to Prizren, and a

9 large number of civilians were killed as a result and especially large

10 number wounded. And there is footage, there is a film of that, film by

11 state television, and I also think that foreign journalists were later on

12 able to come to the spot and film the column the next day. But first of

13 all there was this state television footage, and it's quite nonsensical

14 that NATO planes bombed first and that our planes appeared later on. Our

15 planes absolutely never flew, did not fly at all from the end of March.

16 They were not airborne from the end of March to the end the war. Our

17 planes never took off during that period of time because they were

18 inferior, because they were not able to stand up to NATO planes, NATO

19 aviation, that had complete supremacy over the airspace of our country.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Did your planes also bomb? Generally speaking,

21 not speaking about in relation to that particular incident. During the

22 conflict, did your planes drop bombs?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, you should know first of all

24 the kind of air force that the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had. So as

25 far as fighter planes go, it only had 12 planes, MiG-29, the MiG-29 type

Page 41848

1 that were located in Belgrade, the -- a MiG-, which just before the war

2 was supposed to be overhauled, and seven of those 12 planes were destroyed

3 in the vicinity of Belgrade; Belgrade, Valjevo, in that general area. As

4 to the other planes -- and that was all in March.

5 As to the other planes, they were no longer flying. Now, the

6 other planes we had were the MiG-21, and that is the second generation of

7 aeroplanes which had absolutely no chance against the aeroplanes of the

8 fourth generation which NATO had in its possession. And then there was a

9 third plane, a third aeroplane in our possession. It was the Orao, or

10 eagle plane, which is a light plane for combat operations with very

11 limited capabilities, and it was a support plane, as we call it, for

12 support operations. However, as those planes had absolutely no chance

13 against the other side --

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: General, never mind that. What is the answer to

15 the question that I asked? You have this habit of not answering a

16 question. You go off on your own tangent. I asked you whether your

17 planes dropped bombs. Were they equipped to drop bombs? If they were not

18 equipped to drop bombs, then that would settle it.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Our aircraft never bombed a single

20 target during the war. You are now asking me if they were equipped to do

21 so. Of course they were equipped to do so, but only if there had been no

22 NATO supremacy in the airspace. Since NATO had supremacy in the airspace,

23 they could make no sorties in the first place.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]... that your low

25 flying planes dropped bombs on the convoy, and you're saying that didn't

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Page 41850

1 happen. What is the basis for saying that didn't happen?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Because I'm a military man. I know

3 my army. Although I'm a soldier of the ground forces, I also know the

4 aviation and to some extent its tactics, and at the end of the day I know

5 when our planes made sorties. NATO did admit to bombing this column of

6 refugees. What the witness is saying is pure nonsense.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: You say NATO admitted to this bombing.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Do you have evidence of this, this admission?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There was a well-known commentator

11 of the NATO, Jamie Shea. He was their spokesperson. I don't have this

12 evidence with me, I didn't know I would need it, because the entire world

13 knows that NATO bombed both this column of refugees and another column of

14 refugees a month later in Korishte.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Another witness, Merfidete Selmani stated on the 16th of July,

18 2002, that on the 14th of April - that is on the same day - Serb soldiers

19 entered the village of Dobros, making the villagers flee, and when they

20 passed Djakovica and came near the Bistrazin bridge the witness heard an

21 explosion and heard or, rather, saw smoke coming from a part of the

22 convoy. There were corpses around. A tractor was hit, et cetera.

23 Does this relate to the same event or something else?

24 A. I was there on the spot after it happened. What the witness is

25 talking about I saw with my own eyes. I saw the corpses. I saw

Page 41851

1 assistance being given in my military hospital after the incident, to the

2 wounded. From Bistrazin all the way to Prizren, the convoy was hit by

3 many bombs. There were many dead. There were many destroyed vehicles.

4 There were many dead people, people who were completely incinerated on

5 their tractor trailers. It was a very terrible sight to see.

6 We managed to lend some assistance to the wounded. We transferred

7 some of them to the hospital in Djakovica, some to Prizren. They were

8 taken care of there. There were many serious wounds and many amputations

9 of limbs. That is the same incident.

10 Q. Well, there are many witnesses who claim that it was our forces

11 who did that, and it's very important to emphasise this here.

12 A. We have a recording of the communication between NATO pilots. We

13 have it in our country. It has been published. One of the NATO pilots,

14 after receiving command to attack, says that he only sees tractors on the

15 road, he only sees red tractors, because all the tractors produced in our

16 country are red. But he received a command to attack. So that was an

17 attack on civilians, pure and simple.

18 If the Court needs this evidence, I can provide a transcript of

19 this communication. It has been published in our press.

20 Q. Very well. Thank you, General. Another witness of Mr. Nice's,

21 Martin Pnishi, who testified on the 29th of August, 2002, transcript 9216

22 and 17, says that on the 27th of April, around 9.30, he saw from his house

23 that Serb forces had set up a checkpoint about 200 metres from his house

24 in Meja. The checkpoint was set up by the army, police officers, and

25 armoured vehicles.

Page 41852

1 What happened in Meja on the 27th of April, 1999? Do you have any

2 knowledge of this?

3 A. I do have as much knowledge as I received from my subordinate

4 commanders' reports. I knew that this operation against terrorists was

5 being carried out in this area, and I knew that my unit or, rather, part

6 of the unit that had already been there defending the state border was

7 allocated in order to block the road about a kilometre from Meja towards

8 Ponosevac to prevent the overflow or withdrawal of terrorist forces. Over

9 those few days in the written reports of my subordinate commander, I saw

10 that his units were blocking, in blocking position, and that from one

11 column fire was opened at his unit and two of his soldiers wounded plus

12 another soldier the next day, and I have reports concerning this.

13 Q. Thank you, General. I already opened my binder while we were

14 dealing with these witnesses to deal with your document 438. It's a

15 command to support MUP forces in crushing and destroying Siptar terrorist

16 forces in Malisevo sector, strictly confidential, 455-90.

17 What is the substance of this order under your tab 438?

18 A. After the completion of operations in this area, Orahovac, Suva

19 Reka, Pirane, Krusa, and so on, upon orders of the corps command,

20 operations were moved to the other side of Malisevac Mountain towards

21 Krusevo because there was a larger concentration of terrorist forces

22 there.

23 The map under 439 goes together with this document.

24 Q. Precisely. The map is under the next tab. Does it indicate

25 everything that should, according to the order, be included in the

Page 41853

1 disposition of your forces?

2 A. Yes. This is the decision to crush Siptar terrorist forces in the

3 Malisevo sector, and it says an excerpt for the 549th Brigade. This is

4 just an excerpt showing the assignment for my brigade and the neighbouring

5 units, 243rd Brigade and 15th Brigade.

6 In this order we see information about terrorist forces, where

7 they are located, their strength. Then we see the assignment of the

8 corps, the decision of the commander, and towards the end, assignments of

9 particular units.

10 As far as my unit is concerned, my assignment was to support MUP

11 forces from this axis here where operations had been carried out earlier

12 on the 27th combat group 5, which near Dobrodeljane village acted towards

13 the north was now acting together with the others, across Mount Milanovac

14 to crush terrorist forces located here on the slopes of Mount Milanovac

15 and to use part of the forces to go area of Orahovac-Ostrozub-Dragobilje

16 road, and to act from the flank to support forces and act in coordination

17 with them in their attack from the direction of Suva Reka. And you see

18 the axes of operation on this map.

19 In the Dragobilje area, the terrorist headquarters were located.

20 Q. On the first page we even have an enumeration of these forces:

21 122nd KLA Brigade, around 300 terrorists; 115th Brigade, around 250 men;

22 116th KLA Brigade, around 250 men; and the Gani Pacarizi KLA Brigade,

23 there is no strength indicated, but that makes four brigades active in

24 this area.

25 A. Yes. This is the information we had at the time about those

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Page 41855

1 terrorist forces.

2 Q. General, under para 9, let me quote just the last line. Does it

3 say here: "In all situations, consistently comply with the provisions of

4 the international laws of war"?

5 A. Yes. This is under paragraph 9, Morale and Psychological Support.

6 Q. It says in another paragraph: "Escort captured terrorists to the

7 prison for prisoners of war and prohibit members of units from entering

8 villages, from looting, from entering enemy headquarters and bases prior

9 to the arrival of expert teams."

10 A. Yes. Those were the orders.

11 Q. We had -- we have already dealt with the map. Now under tab 440

12 -- my copy is very bad.

13 A. That is my order for the same operation.

14 JUDGE KWON: General, the map we just saw before, the map on the

15 easel, was it drawn at that time or drawn at a later stage?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, that was a contemporaneous map,

17 a map from that time. This is a copy, a section of the main map, and it

18 says here "Section or excerpt for the 549th Motorised Brigade." That is

19 my brigade.

20 JUDGE KWON: Thank you.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Very well. General, under tab 441, we see your decision, that is

23 a map indicating your decision. It says "Decision of the commander of the

24 549th Brigade for crushing and destroying Siptar terrorist forces in

25 Malisevo sector." This map is signed by you. In the upper left corner,

Page 41856

1 what does it say?

2 A. "Approved by Commander General Lazarevic."

3 Q. So it's the same technology that you described in your earlier

4 answers: You receive an order, then you prepare your own order, your

5 decision is shown on the map, the map is then approved by your superior

6 commander, head of the Pristina Corps. Is that the same technology that

7 is repeated on a day-to-day basis in operations on the ground?

8 A. Yes. I receive a map and an order, and then I develop my own map

9 and my own order.

10 Q. So you get an order and a map from the corps level and then you

11 make your own map and order.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. And then, as you described in your previous analysis of earlier

14 operations, after each and every completed assignment you prepare an

15 analysis. Do we see under tab 442 your analysis of what we have just

16 seen? The order, the map, your map, your order, and then your analysis?

17 A. Yes, this is a complete analysis of this operation. A very

18 detailed analysis of all the activities of the unit.

19 Q. It relies upon the same order, 455-90, of the 28th. Could you

20 please point out the main elements of this analysis. Let me just

21 emphasise the estimates towards the end of the first page, where you say:

22 "We estimate that the Siptar terrorist forces suffered the following

23 losses: Around 70 dead."

24 In the previous operation, your estimation was 85 dead. Here it's

25 70 members of the KLA killed. That's your estimate for this operation.

Page 41857

1 A. Here in Pagarusa area, which is just behind the first lines, we

2 found 30 terrorists buried. That is our estimate of their losses.

3 What is characteristic of this operation? Particularly on this

4 axis leading from Suva Reka, that is a part of the territory which we

5 never, in 1998 or 1999, entered. That is a well-fortified mountainous

6 terrain. It's called a multi-storey defence. From this area towards

7 Pagarusa our forces were unable to advance for several days, not even a

8 step forward. All the forces coming from Orahovac via Ostrozub and via

9 Milanovic village managed to hit the flank and the rear of the forces that

10 were defending themselves from the direction of Suva Reka. And only then

11 did the defence of the terrorists weaken.

12 Q. In conclusion, you say: "The assignment set to the unit was

13 successfully implemented. Terrorist forces were successfully crushed and

14 control was established over the territory, in particular over the

15 Pagarusa sector, for the first time since the start of the armed rebellion

16 of last year. Units of the 549th Motorised Brigade and MUP forces have

17 now been relieved from the provocations in this area. They are relieved

18 from the pressure by the Siptar terrorist forces on the town of Suva Reka

19 and Orahovac. While we were carrying out the given assignment, forces of

20 the NATO aggressor air force continuously performed reconnaissance flights

21 and on some occasions attacked our forces with no negative consequences

22 for them."

23 A. That's the analysis of this particular operation.

24 Q. All right. Well, in relation to what I've quoted from the order,

25 in tab 443 you have your own order?

Page 41858

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Which pertains to implementation of international law of war and

3 the army of Yugoslavia. And then you say: "I hereby order: Apply

4 international humanitarian law," et cetera, et cetera, "against persons

5 violating international humanitarian law, to sentence them to lawfully

6 prescribed sanctions." You particularly prohibit unorganised entry into

7 villages and any kind of arbitrary behaviour.

8 Is that your order, General?

9 A. Yes, that's my order which was written on the basis of the order

10 received from the Pristina Corps.

11 Q. All right. We've seen that already, we've dealt with that earlier

12 on. And we have here in tab 445 the order of the 30th of March of General

13 Lazarevic, Commander of the Pristina Corps.

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. He also says, inter alia -- he says: "With a view to protecting

16 the population leaving the jeopardised areas --"

17 THE INTERPRETER: Could the interpreters please have a reference.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, stop. Let us know where exactly

19 you're reading from.

20 JUDGE KWON: I think it is tab 444, not 445. Could you check it?

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have said 444, or at least I think

22 I said 444.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You said 445.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. I'm sorry, General. I opened 444, and I probably read the next

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Page 41860

1 tab number, although it is actually a document with the previous number.

2 So it's a technical error. 444 is the number.

3 A. This is an order of the commander of the Pristina Corps on

4 measures to protect the civilian population.

5 Q. It says: "Regarding the entire population leaving the threatened

6 areas, they should have unhindered passage towards the Republic of Albania

7 and the Republic of Macedonia.

8 "Secondly, use command measures to protect the population from

9 improper conduct of individuals and groups and enable their free passage

10 in the direction they choose. In dealing with the population, fully

11 comply with international law of war and the provisions of the Geneva

12 Conventions."

13 Paragraph 3: "The responsible officers have the duty to start

14 proceedings against persons violating the provisions of the international

15 law of war, to sentence them to lawfully prescribed sanctions."

16 Now, I assume and I'm going to ask you to give an explanation:

17 "The population leaving the threatened areas in convoys in motor vehicles

18 or on foot shall be directed along the routes leading towards the Republic

19 of Albania and the Republic of Macedonia and any improper conduct towards

20 it shall be prohibited."

21 You explained in one of your answers, since some witnesses

22 referred to this too, completely free, unhindered passage is referred to

23 here whereas you talked about some parts of the territory that were mined,

24 that there were mines along roads, et cetera. Why was it necessary to

25 indicate the exact direction in which people were supposed to move in

Page 41861

1 relation to what this order of General Lazarevic's also says?

2 A. Well, primarily this meant assist the population so that they

3 would know where they could move safely. In my area, there were only

4 three -- two directions or, rather, two border crossings; Cafa Prusit and

5 Vrbnica. For four or five days the population was leaving through Cafa

6 Prusit and they could only leave on foot. This is very difficult terrain

7 to negotiate.

8 Q. Please explain now since it was said here, not once, mind you,

9 that they had to leave their vehicles and then walk all the way to the

10 border. Why did they leave their vehicles and walk all the way to the

11 border?

12 A. In this direction everything was mined. There were anti-tank

13 mines and anti-personnel mines. Cafa Pruse makes it possible to use

14 armour, so all the way up to the village of Zup, that's about two or three

15 kilometres in depth, there were minefields. So up to the village of Zup

16 it was possible to ride on a motor vehicle, and from Zup there was only a

17 single path going through the minefields, and we used it at that time, but

18 it was so narrow you could only walk on foot. Therefore, those who wanted

19 to walk went that way on foot, or they took motor vehicles via Prizren and

20 then crossed into Albania through Vrbnica.

21 Some witnesses say that here, and it is considered that the army

22 assisted the civilians when they were leaving. Really here by Cafa Pruse

23 the army was helping them, but in the following sense: Women, children,

24 and the elderly were helped. They were brought through the border post of

25 Zulfaj closer to the Cafa Prusit border crossing and they helped them

Page 41862

1 negotiate the minefield and finally leave the territory of the country and

2 go to a safe area.

3 This has to do with transporting only women, children, or persons

4 who were weak and taking the road via Zulfaj, going all the way around,

5 because that was a better way of getting to the state border.

6 Q. I understand that but I'm going back to the order now. It says

7 here the population leaving the threatened area in convoys should be

8 provided free passage in the direction they choose. That is to say they

9 should be protected and enabled free passage in the direction they choose.

10 Does that mean that you are not allowed to stop the population, to

11 prevent them from leaving the war zones? Rather, you're supposed to help

12 them leave where they wanted to?

13 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... material to the

14 indictment, I suppose?

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: It is leading.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] First of all, I don't think this is

17 of marginal importance, because persecutions are referred to all the time

18 and it is due to persecutions that the population was leaving the area,

19 and obviously the territory is being left by the population --

20 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ...

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice was in fact suggesting that it is an

22 issue.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I'm quoting the order.

24 I'm quoting a document. If that is leading, quoting an order, then

25 probably my question is leading too.

Page 41863

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. General, had you not taken these measures, could the population go

3 through this area at all?

4 A. The population would have suffered terrible losses in the

5 minefields had we not followed them, escorted them. After the first day,

6 we had certain ribbons and small poles marking the path through which they

7 could move safely. So our task was to prevent the population from

8 suffering any losses due to the fact that our minefields were there.

9 Q. Since both of these routes were mined, you explained that a bit

10 earlier on, you said that you were expecting an armoured attack -- an

11 attack on armoured vehicles coming from Albania and that that is why the

12 minefields were there. Was anybody hurt or killed there in spite of the

13 minefields?

14 A. In Cafa Prusit there weren't any casualties, but there was only

15 one in Vrbnica. Perhaps 20 metres from the border itself. One vehicle, a

16 Lada vehicle, went out because only the right lane of the road had been

17 de-mined. Due to some lack of discipline he was trying to overtake a

18 vehicle in front of him and went to the left side therefor. The vehicle

19 was destroyed. The persons in that vehicle were seriously injured and

20 immediately transported to Albania. At one of these places, two policemen

21 who were also not strictly abiding by the signs by the road, they came on

22 the left lane and they wanted to turn around from Vrbnica to go back to

23 Prizren, and they got off on a small byroad and were both killed by an

24 anti-tank mine that was there.

25 Q. Those are the only two incidents that occurred in your zone of

Page 41864












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Page 41865

1 responsibility. All the rest you secured properly so that everyone had

2 safe passage.

3 A. As far as mining is concerned, those are the only incidents that

4 occurred.

5 Q. All right. In tab 445 there is an order of commander Krsman Jelic

6 that pertains to the rules of international law of war and the army of

7 Yugoslavia. What kind of order is this?

8 A. No. This is an order of mine, too, but you couldn't read it well.

9 It's also the 549th Brigade.

10 Q. All right.

11 A. Again this is based on the order of the commander of the Pristina

12 Corps. Again this is a warning to commanders how to act in terms of

13 observing the provisions of international laws of war and humanitarian

14 law. In particular, there is a warning because in the field there were

15 already many explosive devices that were thrown from NATO aircraft, and

16 there is a ban on walking up to these explosive devices at all. They were

17 supposed to be reported only and it was only experts who were supposed to

18 deal with this.

19 Q. I really cannot deal with this because it's a totally illegible

20 copy. I hope you have a more legible copy. And you yourself this is your

21 own order?

22 A. Yes, yes. It's my own order.

23 Q. Paragraph 1 is act in accordance with the international

24 humanitarian law.

25 A. Chapter VII on the wounded and sick, and chapter VIII on the

Page 41866

1 prisoners of war.

2 Q. But there's also reference to 1998, the document from 1998 that

3 remains important. So what do you say here? Who is responsible to you?

4 A. The commanders of combat groups and the leaders of all units, as

5 well as the commander of every brigade.

6 Q. All right. You say here in paragraph 3, as far as I can see, that

7 against all persons violating the rules of international law on war --

8 A. Yes.

9 Q. -- proceedings shall be started immediately.

10 A. Yes.

11 Q. And what else?

12 A. On violations of international humanitarian law committed by the

13 enemy, NATO forces as well, and that this should be done on prescribed

14 forms.

15 Q. All right. You also made an order on the 31st of March -- no, on

16 the 29th of March, to rationalise the use of resources in carrying out

17 combat assignments. What does that refer to, General?

18 A. Since war was expected and the military industry had already been

19 seriously damaged by then, I was issuing an order to rationally use

20 ammunition, especially those calibres that were insufficient in the

21 reserves.

22 Q. All right. And then there is an order issued on the 31st of March

23 that has to do with the relocation of units from basic to reserve

24 positions, or the relocation of units at the basic positions and reserve

25 positions. That's what you signed.

Page 41867

1 A. Yes. In order to prevent losses from attacks, air attacks, every

2 unit were supposed to have several areas, and after nightfall they were

3 supposed to relocate to other positions so as not to suffer losses due to

4 NATO airstrikes.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you must tell us the tab numbers.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This was tab 447. At the same time

7 I wanted to say, Mr. Robinson, that you should admit into evidence those

8 exhibits that I've already quoted from. Mr. Kwon said yesterday that when

9 we finish this set of documents you should look at the exhibits involved.

10 I've just completed a set of documents of this kind, so I ask that this be

11 admitted into evidence, this set that I've dealt with now, in accordance

12 with what Mr. Kwon said.

13 JUDGE KWON: You haven't dealt with tab 436 and 437, which will

14 not be admitted, according to our practice.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] 436? Let me have a look.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. 436 is an order of yours, General?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. You talk about taking measures to protect manpower and technical

20 equipment and materiel.

21 A. Yes. It's a short telegram.

22 Q. In the first sentence, it says: "A strong NATO attack is expected

23 on our units in the area," and then you stipulate measures to protect your

24 men.

25 And in 437, a change in the area for the unit's base just before

Page 41868

1 dusk. You explain that you changed the deployment of the unit to protect

2 them from airstrikes.

3 A. Yes.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So that is what those two tabs are

5 about, Mr. Kwon. In order to save time, I thought I could gloss over

6 them.


8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson. Now, I'm

9 going to ask you, Mr. Robinson, to agree, as you did last time, to having

10 this set of documents from tab 448 to tab 469, that is to say 21 documents

11 in all, go over this in express form, express procedure, because they

12 relate to the Verification Mission in March. So just to indicate some of

13 the characteristic features of the events that took place as expressed in

14 the documents.

15 So this is a set of documents, and they all relate to the

16 Verification Mission for the entire month of March.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, you may do that.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. General, you have heard what has been said, that we should try and

20 get through those tabs quickly. So as to not to have to discuss each one

21 in turn, I'd just like to ask you to point out some of the characteristic

22 features in those documents, please.

23 A. Tab 448, for instance, that is the first document, and I should

24 like to focus on point 3.

25 On the 1st of March, following a report by someone, by an

Page 41869












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Page 41870

1 inhabitant, the OSCE mission with liaison officers toured the village of

2 Gornje and Donje Ljubinje, the aim of which was to see whether the report

3 was true that the army had occupied the school in the village and that

4 there was no tuition in the school. On the spot in the school the

5 teachers and representatives of the village said that, if necessary, at

6 all times they would be happy to provide the army with accommodation, that

7 it was their army. Then they said that tuition was following its normal

8 course, that they didn't need the assistance of the mission to regulate

9 relations with the army because that's something they could do themselves.

10 The liaison officer said that his stay on the school premises was

11 of a provisional character, and the representatives of the mission were

12 not satisfied -- were satisfied that the previous report was proved wrong.

13 So then another place was toured on the 2nd.

14 Q. All right. Fine. Now, here we have a complaint by a farmer from

15 the village, saying that some people stormed his house with socks over

16 their heads, asking for cigarettes and brandy.

17 A. Yes, that's right.

18 Q. And then -- well, he says that they were looking for brandy and

19 cigarettes. All right.

20 Now, General, let's --

21 A. This is tab 451 that I'm looking at next, and there we have

22 observations from a meeting and the questions that were asked by the

23 mission or, rather, questions which were asked by the liaison officers

24 where once again it is stated that Mr. Walker said that there were two

25 streams, one which wanted to reach agreement and the other that did not,

Page 41871

1 but they said that they knew -- they proposed daily contacts and believed

2 that the army would never open fire first and launch provocations. But he

3 says the Siptars always, through their mobile telephones, report things

4 like this first of all, that is to say that the army was attacked.

5 Q. He explained that. He said that the army would not engage in

6 provocations but that they report the incidents and then the first people

7 to get there would be proved right. That was the kind of principle they

8 worked on.

9 A. Then that same tab, towards the very end, it says: "He also said

10 that one of the commanders of the KLA said that the KLA had decided to

11 create a crisis and provoke the MUP and the army to react and that in less

12 than five days something was bound to happen so as to create conditions

13 for NATO intervention. And with respect to this Mr. Richard, and that was

14 Mr. Ciaglinski that was referred to, said that the efforts of the OSCE

15 mission were geared towards calming down the KLA and asked the army forces

16 not allow themselves to be provoked and not to react to great strength.

17 Q. And did you do your best not to be provoked and not to react too

18 strongly?

19 A. Well, the mission always observed that. That was their

20 conclusion, that the army always did its best to avoid being provoked and

21 that it even dealt with provocation -- was even too tolerant towards

22 provocations. And on 452, page 2, it says under point 3 that the threats

23 to the KLA that it would launch large-scale operations in novi Racak or

24 Markale, of that type --

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: You said that the verifiers always concluded that

Page 41872

1 the army always did its best to avoid being provoked and that it even

2 dealt or, rather, was even too tolerant towards provocations. Could you

3 be more specific about that? Is that in this report or is that your own

4 assessment?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The first part that you read out or

6 mentioned, the former portion, was what the verifiers say. The latter was

7 my response to the question put by Mr. Milosevic. That is to say whether

8 we restrained ourselves from reacting. We restrained ourselves, held

9 ourselves back too much, not to give cause for intervention on the part of

10 NATO.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: I thought you said in response to Mr. Milosevic

12 that the mission observed that the army was even too tolerant towards

13 provocations. Is that what you intended to say, that the observers said

14 that the army was too tolerant towards provocations, or is that simply

15 your own assessment?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is my own assessment. Here is

17 what the observers said: It says they proposed daily contacts and they

18 believe that the army would never open fire first and launch provocations.

19 But then it says the Siptars have mobile telephones and always manage to

20 call up OSCE representatives first and say we're being attacked by the

21 army and police. And since the mission does not know who opened fires

22 first, it tends to believe the person who called up to report the incident

23 first.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Where is that? Where is that in the report?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is tab 451, the fourth page, at

Page 41873

1 the beginning, top of the fourth page.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm just trying to find it to make a note of it.

3 I don't know whether Mr. Kay has found it, or Mr. Nice.

4 MR. KAY: Page 3, and it's the bottom paragraph there, if you --

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. The end of page 3, and page 4.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: I don't think so. No, Mr. Kay. Is this tab

7 451?

8 MR. KAY: Yes. It's just above paragraph 2, at the bottom there.

9 Five lines above: "The Siptars have mobile phones..."


11 MR. KAY: So about ten lines up from the bottom on page 3.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Mr. Milosevic, move on.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. So the verifiers say that they are certain that the army would not

15 open fire first. Does that mean and imply, since they say they're sure

16 the army will not do that --

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, when you start like that, that is

18 -- that's going to end up as a leading question. You're telling the

19 witness the answer.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Robinson.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. How did the verifiers, in contacts with representatives of the

23 army, assess the behaviour and conduct of our forces, of our army?

24 A. The army was a state institution, highly organised, had very

25 proper relations with the verifiers, and they always stressed on the whole

Page 41874












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13 English transcripts.













Page 41875

1 that they were satisfied with their relationship with the army, but they

2 stressed, and we mentioned this last time, in February, speaking about

3 February and throughout that time, they said what some of the problems

4 that they encountered were between the OSCE and the army, but generally

5 speaking, their relationships were proper.

6 Q. Very well, General. Now, let's move on and get through this set

7 of documents relating to the verifying mission. And it goes up to

8 document 462.

9 A. 452, at the very beginning, as I've already said at that

10 particular meeting at -- two KLA threats that they would launch

11 large-scale operations, massive operations near Racak or Markale, of a New

12 Racak or Markale, several sources have put out information that the

13 terrorists have six huge explosive devices that they intend to use in an

14 urban area, possibly in Pristina. And mention is made of two markets, two

15 markets are being mentioned. The OSCE mission representatives said that

16 everything would be done to prevent this from happening.

17 So on the 4th of March, point 4, straight after that one it says

18 that the verifiers spent time in the border belt, that they talked to the

19 locals of the villages of Kusmin and Damjane and that they did not have

20 any complaints, the residents had no complaints about the behaviour of the

21 army, the VJ members.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we haven't found it.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Would you repeat, General, what tab that was.

25 A. I said tab 452 --

Page 41876

1 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... tab 452, top of.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] At the top, yes. And the next

3 passage I read out is point 4, paragraph 4.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. May we proceed, General.

6 A. I'd like to look at tab 454 now, please, point 4 of that tab.

7 "Through conversations with OSCE mission representatives, we found out

8 that the US policy towards Serbia regarding airstrikes had been partly

9 altered, that is that there would be no rocket strikes even if a political

10 agreement on Kosovo and Metohija was not signed. Strikes might be

11 launched in case of a major incident or a major humanitarian disaster.

12 There are indications that airstrikes should not be expected before the

13 15th of April, when NATO will be celebrating its 50th anniversary."

14 Q. All right, General.

15 A. Now tab 455 next. The 8th of March is the date. It is a meeting

16 where the verifiers were present when the incident took place or, rather,

17 when fire was opened at the army, when the army was fired at. But as they

18 were present directly themselves, they had an office opened in Zur, they

19 were able to verify this, the attack by the terrorists against the army,

20 because they were personally present during that attack.

21 Q. Do you have anything else that you would like to highlight as

22 characteristic in the documents?

23 A. Yes, towards the end. Once again touring the villages where the

24 locals had no complaints with respect to the army's conduct. And I just

25 wanted to highlight one more point. Once again an attack near the border

Page 41877

1 on the 13th of March where a team of verifiers verified the attack on the

2 army, which was there doing its regular duties in the region of the

3 village of Zur.

4 Q. All right. Fine. May we proceed, General?

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: What number is that one?

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is 461.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, this is becoming more like a local

8 rather than an express train service.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, yes. We are getting through

10 these documents fairly quickly. The general has already reached tab 461.

11 So we just have another eight documents.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. Is there anything else characteristic there, General, in these

14 next few documents?

15 A. In document 463, for instance, we have several incidents. On the

16 17th of March, that is to say three days before the mission left the

17 territory of Kosovo and Metohija where they talked to the locals of the

18 villages about their needs, the village of Vrbnica, they talked to the

19 deputy leader and a member of the mission, Mr. Trevor confirmed that he

20 had verified for himself that fire had been opened from their village on

21 the army and that no army would have tolerated it. He advised them to

22 stop such provocations of the army. He inquired -- he asked why the

23 school was not working, and they said that it had not been working for

24 just a few days, until Monday. And they asked -- when he asked them about

25 any other problems they had, they asked the OSCE to provide them with a

Page 41878

1 doctor and medicines. So that is to be found in tab 463.

2 Q. Do we have anything else?

3 A. I'm now looking at tab 464, and the date of that is the 19th of

4 March, and a meeting with General Drewienkiewicz where we learnt that at

5 1400 hours it was decided to evacuate the verification mission because the

6 mission considered that to be necessary with respect to the extraordinary

7 situation and in conformity with the decision at the mission between the

8 OSCE and signed on the 16th. The OSCE is calling for cooperation with the

9 MUP in pulling out. The MUP to provide security for the mission and its

10 facilities and equipment. And as General Drewienkiewicz says, "We are

11 leaving for a short while and we will be back." And he said that

12 withdrawal will begin at 4.30 on the 20th of March.

13 The next document is dated 19 March, tab 465. In the beginning,

14 it says, that: "We have learned that OSCE verifiers in the field are

15 carrying out their intelligence and reconnaissance activities by using

16 original maps (WGS-84 from the M-709 series). Using them together with

17 electronic and satellite photo transmitters, they locate features,

18 facilities and the positions of forces, especially the army of Yugoslavia,

19 in the LAB operations zone and on the general territory. In a situation

20 that might be created, NATO forces would use the established positions for

21 guidance and to bomb targets, that is VJ positions."

22 Then in paragraph 3: "On the 18th of March, the head of Mission

23 William Walker visited Skopje, where he met with the Supreme Allied

24 Commander of the NATO forces Wesley Clark. According to Walker, the

25 evaluations could be completed very quickly, if dislocation and moving out

Page 41879












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Page 41880

1 were to begin today, all of which will depend on the instructions from and

2 the views taken at the headquarters of OSCE in Vienna."

3 Then the next paragraph, the penultimate one, is this: "We have

4 the information that Fernando del Mundo, an UNHCR official in Pristina,

5 recorded an alleged humanitarian catastrophe, with numerical indicators,

6 and forwarded the TV recordings to well-known international news

7 agencies..."

8 And there is one last report, that is one but last, tab 466,

9 saying that in the course of the 20th of March planned relocation of the

10 OSCE Verification Mission began at 0420 hours, that the mission was

11 provided full security, and that no problems occurred during relocation.

12 On the 21st of March we have another report saying that after

13 departure of OSCE from the 20th onwards, about 200 to 300 members remained

14 on the territory of Kosovo, including 30 to 50 officers "who will take on

15 the role of forward air control officers and artillery reconnaissance,

16 guiding and directing artillery fire.

17 "According to our estimate, the marking of the targets and

18 establishing of coordinates was mostly completed within the framework of

19 verification tasks on KiM territory."

20 In tab 468, towards the middle of the page, it says that with the

21 help of the interpreter, who is still active, a message -- here it is:

22 "Through the interpreter still working for the OSCE mission, the office of

23 the federal government's commission received a message from General

24 Drewienkiewicz that we should issue a denial on the telephone to the OSCE

25 mission and General Drewienkiewicz that after their departure no

Page 41881

1 humanitarian catastrophe had occurred on the territory of Kosovo and

2 Metohija as Siptar extremists stubbornly insisted in numerous telephones

3 calls and appeals for help.

4 "They claimed that security forces had intensified combat

5 operations against the Siptar population, that they were continuing to

6 torch houses, that great numbers of people were moving out, that there

7 were many civilian casualties, and that there was an exodus of the

8 population. All this was calculated to bring about and force a NATO

9 intervention.

10 "All of this is clear to us in the mission; we just need your

11 denial, said General Drewienkiewicz.

12 "Our denial was sent to General Drewienkiewicz over my telephone,

13 in direct contact with his official interpreter - Mrs. Marina."

14 And the last tab, 469, is about the following: Humanitarian

15 missions. The date is the 23rd of March. Humanitarian missions too left

16 the territory of Yugoslavia using the border crossing Djeneral Jankovic,

17 and Macedonia closed off the border with the Federal Republic of

18 Yugoslavia. "A group of around 300 to 500 Siptar refugees who wished to

19 go to Macedonia was held at the Djeneral Jankovic border crossing."

20 Q. You just mentioned that mission members took down some coordinates

21 on the map. What was that about?

22 A. Yes. The mission had global positioning system devices of the

23 type called Magellan. I can speak about my specific zone. Only once did

24 members of the mission enter my barracks directly and visit my office. My

25 office was directly hit from the air. Only once did members of the

Page 41882

1 mission visit the installation of Ceja [phoen] where they viewed tanks,

2 took photos against the background of tanks, et cetera. This installation

3 Ceja was hit during the first airstrike and after that it was bombed

4 another 700 times.

5 Q. All right, General. Did members of the Verification Mission

6 collect intelligence on our forces and their deployment in order to

7 prepare the NATO aggression?

8 A. I cannot speak of all members of the mission, and I cannot tell

9 you now which of them did and which didn't, because certainly there was a

10 great number of them who did their work in all honesty. But there were

11 also some members of the mission that did collect intelligence on our

12 forces. And at the end of the day I can give you specific examples, a

13 number of them, showing direct communication between members of the

14 mission through satellite telephones with KLA commanders.

15 Q. You have data about this, you say.

16 A. Well, that is my personal experience, and I was there on the spot.

17 So, yes, it is the case.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I would now like you

19 to admit these exhibits, ending with 469 inclusive.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We'll admit them. I'm not sure if all of

21 them are translated. If there are any that are not translated, then those

22 will be marked for identification pending translation.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. General, you issued an order on the 2nd of April that relates to

Page 41883

1 the adoption of certain measures to protect personnel in your area of

2 deployment. That's tab 470. What is it about?

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, give us an estimate now as to when

4 you will conclude your examination-in-chief.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I hope it will be today,

6 Mr. Robinson. I'm really trying to go as fast as I can. There are very

7 many documents. During the preparation of this witness we used 10.000

8 documents, which means that I'm presenting only 6 per cent of this amount

9 through these binders. But it is necessary to see the conduct of the

10 army, how it operated. You see that we are going through events which are

11 very pertinent, because they are referred to in a completely different

12 light both in the indictment and in witness statements and testimony.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This order was based on an oral

14 order --

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's 10.30, and I have a meeting now. We'll

16 resume in 20 minutes.

17 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

18 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, please continue.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. General, in document 471, we have an order to smash and destroy

22 the Siptar terrorist forces in the Jablanica sector. Could we go through

23 it quickly, please.

24 A. The Jablanica sector is to the north-west of Djakovica. This

25 territory, too, held a large concentration of Siptar terrorist forces

Page 41884












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Page 41885

1 precisely on the axis that emerges towards Junik and the block house of

2 Kosare and where some of the fiercest fighting during the war took place.

3 So this is an order of the superior command to crush and destroy the

4 Siptar terrorist forces in the Jablanica sector. It was sent to all units

5 of the corps that were to be involved. This is the traditional type of

6 order specifying the assignments for all the brigades. The assignment for

7 my brigade was to act from Crmljane and Raskoc and to support MUP forces.

8 Q. In paragraph 7, it says: "Escort captured terrorists to the

9 prison for prisoner of war collection centres."

10 And: "Prohibit the uncontrolled entry of unit members into

11 populated areas, looting of property and military equipment belonging to

12 the enemy, the robbing of bodies and entering into enemy shelters prior to

13 the arrival of the specialist organs."

14 A. Yes, just as in previous orders.

15 Q. Is there anything particular that we should dwell on here?

16 A. No.

17 Q. All right. Then in document 474 we have a map showing the 125th

18 Brigade and 252nd Motorised Brigade and the 549th Motorised Brigade, which

19 is yours.

20 A. Along with this order of the superior command, this map is given

21 which indicates in graphic terms the assignments of various units,

22 including my brigade.

23 Q. Very well. And in tab 473 we have another map. What does it

24 relate to?

25 A. That is also a map from the superior command. It pertains to the

Page 41886

1 assignment that has already been given but it also pertains to the control

2 of the territory where the forces of the terrorists had already been

3 crushed, that is the Malisevo sector in particular. This came down from

4 the superior command.

5 Q. Very well. In document 474, you made a report that describes the

6 situation in your area of responsibility, and you sent this to the command

7 of the Pristina Corps. Could you please dwell on it a little bit.

8 A. Yes. This is my report to the corps command about what is going

9 on in our territory.

10 Q. In the beginning you say, in line 3, a particular problem is the

11 large number of refugees.

12 A. Yes. That is line 3 in tab 474.

13 Q. Yes. And then you go on to say how many refugees there are. You

14 say the very incidence of refugees, especially in that number, came as a

15 surprise. "The position of the authorities in the first days was not to

16 allow the refugees to leave the country but for everybody to return

17 instead to their homes; however, that was not feasible, because the

18 refugees were coming in ever greater numbers from the remotest parts of

19 Kosovo and Metohija."

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Then you go on to say: "In those first days from the 24th to the

22 31st, the refugees were allowed to enter Albania unhindered, whereafter

23 they were refused entry first into the Republic of Macedonia and then into

24 Albania as well." Was it our authorities that prohibited them from

25 entering Macedonia or -- and Albania or theirs?

Page 41887

1 A. No. It was the Albanian authorities and Macedonian authorities.

2 Something was going on at the border so that for two or three days they

3 couldn't cross over. And after entry was finally allowed, the flow of

4 refugees was slowed down.

5 We noticed that a registration process had begun, and that was

6 what slowed them down.

7 JUDGE KWON: Here in this report you said that the position of the

8 authorities in those first days was not to allow the refugees to leave the

9 country. Have you seen this kind of document?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. It says here, by the way, that

11 I found this out in my contacts with the MUP, with the head of the

12 Secretariat of Internal Affairs, who was my counterpart on this territory.

13 He was in command of the MUP.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. So it says not to allow the refugees to leave the country but

16 instead to return into their homes.

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And then it says it was not feasible because the refugees were

19 coming in ever greater numbers from the remotest parts of Kosovo and

20 Metohija.

21 A. Well, my explanation would be this: If all the refugees had been

22 stopped and if nobody else would be coming in, we would have been able to

23 deal with the current column, but they were coming in from all directions.

24 There were alternate routes, for instance from Prizren or the road between

25 Prizren and Djakovica, and they were constantly coming in by that road.

Page 41888

1 Q. And then you go on to describe what you concluded from your talks

2 with the refugees. You say: "Based on the talks we had with individuals

3 in the columns of refugees, the following conclusions can be made as to

4 their reasons for leaving our territory:" And then you say: "a) Fear of

5 major fighting that is expected to follow between our forces, on the one

6 hand, and the KLA and NATO forces on the other."

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. "They are saying that fighting will probably take place everywhere

9 on our territory, with great intensity, and that they will have nowhere to

10 hide. In response to our offer to go to Serbia, they say it is realistic

11 to expect a less than warm welcome there because it is their fellow

12 countrymen who had caused the war."

13 A. Yes. That is this paragraph.

14 Q. Then goes paragraph b): "A certain number of Siptars say that

15 they are leaving the country to avoid forced mobilisation into KLA ranks

16 and that it is current practice for every family to send a certain number

17 of its members to the KLA or, alternatively, to pay a large amount of

18 money."

19 A. Yes. That was the practice in 1998 and 1999.

20 Q. Paragraph c): "A large number of refugees say that they fear the

21 army and the police, and they are particularly afraid of 'Arkan's troops.'

22 Asked whether they have seen any 'Arkan's troops,' none were able to

23 confirm, saying only that they had heard about them from others. This is

24 probably KLA's psychological propaganda, aimed at getting as many of the

25 populace as possible to leave." That is your estimate.

Page 41889












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13 English transcripts.













Page 41890

1 Then you go on to say: "Asked whether they fear us, the army, and

2 whether we have ever done anything to harm them, everyone promptly replies

3 that they do not fear the army and that it is their army and they would

4 stay if only there were army troops where they lived."

5 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please slow down.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. "However, despite these statements, we believed -- we believe

8 their fear of the army and police is justified since many families had

9 members in the KLA and were therefore afraid of how we might react when we

10 learn about it.

11 "d) Fear of NATO bombing was emphasised by all groups as the

12 primary reason, because in their words they do not distinguish between

13 troops and civilians and do not look where they are striking."

14 And then you say most of them have enough food.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you are reading from the document,

16 and the interpreter is asking you to do that more slowly. In any event,

17 it is time for you to put a question to the witness.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. General, you say that all of these are reasons that you

20 established on the basis of conversations with refugees from these

21 columns.

22 A. Yes. I talked to them several times, not only once.

23 Q. Did you personally talk to them?

24 A. Yes, I myself talked to them. And on several occasions I even

25 helped some individuals or groups of people.

Page 41891

1 Q. You say here: "d) That fear of NATO bombing was emphasised by

2 all groups as the primary reason, because in their words they do not

3 distinguish between troops and civilians and do not look where they are

4 striking." Is that what they told you personally?

5 A. Yes, that's what they told me personally.

6 Q. We've already dealt with the other reasons, and now you say on

7 page 2, at the beginning of page 2, so I'm going to ask you about what the

8 attitude of the police and the army was towards persons in these columns.

9 A. I can say that on the whole it was correct, proper. However, our

10 officers stated that a small number of MUP members and a small number of

11 army members tried to take property away from refugees, primarily money or

12 vehicles. All these cases that were reported to us by MUP patrols or

13 military police patrols were resolved. So eight persons, that is to say

14 two privates and six conscripts, were disciplined, and criminal reports

15 were filed against another six conscripts who were arrested. They were

16 members of my unit.

17 JUDGE KWON: General, for this interview, do you remember how many

18 Albanians you met at that time? Your report is based on how many

19 interviews?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Albanians -- these were endless

21 columns. I did not talk to them only on one day but at different

22 localities, on the road between Prizren and Djakovica. I talked to them

23 about ten times. Sometimes I would stop with my vehicle because I would

24 see, for instance - that was on three occasions - that vehicles belonging

25 to these Albanians had broken down and that they were standing by the

Page 41892

1 road. I stopped to ask them why they had stopped, what the problem was.

2 On two occasions these were tractors. Their tyres had a problem and they

3 couldn't resolve them. I said that they could freely use the abandoned

4 tractors on the roads. There were a great many of those, because there

5 was something wrong with those tractors, and I said that they could take

6 off their tyres and continue their journey. And I asked them where they

7 were from and why they were going to Albania.

8 The third time, I helped a man. His engine had broken down. It

9 was no longer working. I talked to him. He had a rather numerous family,

10 and I asked him how I could help him. He said, "Well, you can help me if

11 you would stop a vehicle and order them to trail me to Albania." I waited

12 for the first vehicle that I thought could do that. I stopped that

13 vehicle, and I asked the driver, the owner, whether he'd want to help this

14 man, and he said, "By all means. There's no problem. I want to help

15 him." So he attached the vehicle that had broken down to his own and

16 that's how they continued their journey.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. So --

19 JUDGE KWON: Excuse me. This report is a result of your personal

20 contacts with the refugees.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You're asking how many refugees

22 there were on that road? There were many of them.

23 JUDGE KWON: No, no. I'm asking how many interviews did you have

24 with the refugees. You said about ten times.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] About ten times I talked to them.

Page 41893

1 JUDGE KWON: Thank you. Yes, proceed, Mr. Milosevic.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. General, you say here further on towards the end that what is

4 interesting are the views of the bodies of local self-administration on

5 the reasons why Siptars are leaving for Albania. "In addition to the

6 reasons we have stated, they also underline the following:

7 "1. They are leaving the country in line with the pre-arranged

8 scenario of a 'humanitarian catastrophe' in order to justify the bombing

9 and the aggression.

10 "2. They are leaving and abandoning the territory so that the

11 'NATO alliance' could bomb all targets indiscriminately in the future,

12 with only Serbs and their supporters remaining in Kosovo and Metohija."

13 A. That was the view of the local administration, of the Serbs for

14 the most part.

15 Q. All right.

16 JUDGE KWON: Did you find it persuasive at that time?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I've already mentioned my own

18 reasons, but their reasons were of interest too. That's why I put them

19 down here. Certainly today, after all this time, I believe that there was

20 a prepared scenario.

21 JUDGE KWON: Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: General, may I ask, what prompted you to carry

23 out these interviews?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Quite simply, I know that there are

25 refugees in every war, but there were many refugees. These columns were

Page 41894












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Page 41895

1 endless. I saw that there were refugees from other places too. Most of

2 the refugees were from my territory, but they also came from other

3 territories too. Quite simply, as a person I wanted --

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: What prompted you to carry out interviews in

5 which you asked the kinds of questions that you did as to the reasons for

6 their leaving?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, precisely because I wanted --

8 actually, I was thinking about reasons from my point of view as commander,

9 but I wanted to hear from these people directly, from the individuals who

10 were leaving, what the reasons for their departure.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. General, you brought some video footage here, people leaving

14 Kosovo to Albania. That is from the Vrbnica border post, and the date is

15 the 13th of April, 1999. Can we see this video? It's called The Border

16 Post of Vrbnica, the 13th of April, 1999. I'm saying this for the sake of

17 the technical people involved, and it is actually tab 475.

18 [Videotape played]

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is Albania. This is our border

20 post.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Tab 476 are Albanians from Prizren and released Albanians from

23 Prizren, the 14th of April, 1999.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: You should tell us about the provenance of that

25 video.

Page 41896

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is video footage of Radio-TV

2 Serbia, the studio in Prizren.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. If I remember correctly, it was Vrbnica.

5 A. Yes, the border post of Vrbnica.

6 Q. You said that is 14 kilometres away from Prizren.

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. And this studio from Prizren actually filmed this.

9 A. Yes.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we see the next one. That's

11 tab 476.

12 [Videotape played]

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. All right. So for a while they were under KLA control until the

15 army came and drove away the KLA. That's what they're saying here.

16 A. This is to the west of Prizren, Ljubizda Has, that is to say under

17 Mount Pastrik. That's it. This is the locality. And I know that there

18 was a terrorist group there consisting of a couple of dozen of terrorists.

19 Q. Can you explain why they kept those citizens there?

20 A. Well, these were groups that were getting ready from the in-depth

21 territory to try to break into Albania, and this population from the

22 village of Ljubizda was in the woods and they kept them as a kind of

23 security, so as a kind of hostages, actually.

24 Q. All right, General. You brought some video footage from the road

25 between Prizren and Djakovica on the 14th of April, the NATO bombing of

Page 41897

1 civilians.

2 A. That's it.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we have a look at this. That is

4 tab 477.

5 MR. NICE: Could we have the provenance of the previous exhibit?

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, let the witness tell us about the

7 provenance of the last one.

8 MR. NICE: And do we know the name, as a the matter of interest,

9 of the presenters or interviewers on either of these?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Like the previous one,

11 Radio-Television Serbia, studio Prizren, Borivoje Ugrinovic is the name of

12 the editor who filmed this footage. Sanjevic is the name of the cameraman

13 who actually did the recording.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I hope that is

15 sufficient information from the general.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They still work for Radio-Television

17 Serbia.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. All right. Let us now watch the next video clip.

20 [Videotape played]

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is the hospital in Prizren.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. There was no translation in a portion of this videotape. Did you

24 hear what was said about that, how many projectiles fell?

25 A. Yes. This footage -- I said, actually, that the column was bombed

Page 41898

1 in several places, stretching from Djakovica to Prizren, and this

2 particular location was closest to Prizren, which means it was between

3 Pirane and Landovica, by the tile factory.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... video when?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It says here on the images when it

6 was filmed. The 14th was when the bombing took place. It was filmed on

7 the 14th, and you were able to see the individual that I said was the

8 editor. I mentioned him. He was there holding the microphone, and I can

9 recognise his voice. It was Borivoje Ugrinovic. So it was

10 Radio-Television Serbia, studio Prizren.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. General, you brought some footage with you from the place that was

13 bombed by NATO. It is Podrimska Street in Prizren, and the bombing took

14 place on the 30th of April. Let's take a look at this video. It's tab

15 478, in actual fact.

16 [Videotape played]

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] During this bombing, four persons

18 were killed and a number of people injured.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. That's the street.

21 A. Yes, that is that street.

22 Q. Are there any military facilities nearby?

23 A. No. This is a Roma settlement.

24 Q. Is this your medical corps, General?

25 A. Yes. Three languages are being spoken here; Serbian, Albanian,

Page 41899












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13 English transcripts.













Page 41900

1 and the Roma language, Romany. So they are all working together to dig up

2 and uncover people; the police, the army, the fire brigade, all of them

3 together.

4 Q. Mention is made here -- they're talking about digging out somebody

5 here.

6 Were you in Prizren on that day, General?

7 A. Yes. And the soldiers from my medical corps could be seen,

8 medical company, and the regular policemen, the firefighters who also

9 belong to the police, the Roma, the Albanians, and you could hear them

10 talking in three languages, so they were all working together to deal with

11 the situation.

12 Q. In the part of the footage where you can see the whole street, can

13 you see the whole area that was bombed, in fact, or it was a broader

14 region that was bombed?

15 A. About 50 houses were destroyed in that particular location.

16 Q. Just in that one strike?

17 A. Yes, just in that one strike.

18 Q. All right. Very well. Thank you, General.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now, may we take a look at the next

20 video segment, also of Prizren and Korisa on the 14th of May. It is tab

21 479. The 14th of May, 1999, is the date.

22 [Videotape played]

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] These are people who were burnt to

24 death.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The hospital in Prizren.

Page 41901

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: How much longer is this? How much longer is

2 this, General?

3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 30 seconds perhaps.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. General, were you at that place, in that location?

6 A. Yes, the next day. This happened early in the morning. People

7 are mentioning different times here, but I think at 1230 hours on the 14th

8 of May. It was the worst night of bombing of Prizren and the surrounding

9 parts. The bombing went on throughout the night, and my barracks was

10 bombed that night 47 times.

11 Q. But the barracks was empty?

12 A. Yes, it was empty. Only the equipment and various installations

13 within the barracks were destroyed.

14 Q. Very well. All this footage that we have just seen, what does it

15 represent in its totality?

16 A. They show NATO strikes on civilian targets.

17 Q. Thank you, General.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Were there casualties on the 14th of May?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] These people here say that

20 casualties number over 100. However, the losses although --

21 JUDGE BONOMY: [Previous translation continues]... position.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Between 80 and 85. Because some

23 people were completely incinerated so that the exact number could not be

24 established. And over 100 were injured.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 41902

1 Q. General, we will now move to our next subject. The document I

2 would like to look at is in tab 480. Could you tell us what kind of order

3 is this to the military police company to initiate proceedings between

4 Pristina military court. It was issued by you on the 3rd of April.

5 A. Yes. This is an order specifically pertaining to the military

6 police company, which was duty-bound to ensure that members of the army

7 act lawfully, because the military police also has personnel dealing with

8 combatting crime, performing on-site investigations, and other jobs.

9 Q. You say: "The examples of a great number of members of the VJ as

10 a whole and of a great number of members of our unit ... are shining ones.

11 Despite such results achieved and the high moral values which are a credit

12 to the members of our unit, there is a certain number of members who with

13 their impulsive conduct are causing harm to the VJ as a whole and damage

14 to our unit in particular.

15 "In order to prevent the instances of crime, I hereby order..."

16 and so on and so forth.

17 A. Then follow eight bullet points.

18 Q. Were your men familiar with this entire order?

19 A. Well, commanding officers had the obligation to familiarise their

20 troops with this order and every other order and information that came

21 down from the superior level, down to the last man.

22 Q. Very well.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I have already moved

24 to another subject. I request that the documents we have gone through be

25 admitted into evidence.

Page 41903

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we'll admit them.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. You have drawn up a report of sorts. It's in tab 481. What is it

5 about?

6 A. It's a brief report dated the 4th of April, intended for all

7 members of the unit whereby they are informed that the defence of their

8 homeland, that is Yugoslavia; is being carried out successfully. The NATO

9 expectations to bring Yugoslavia to its knees within two days were not

10 proven right, that the army had suffered minimum losses: In Kursumlija

11 11, Urosevac 3, Djakovica 1, that they are about to crush Siptar

12 terrorists forces in Jablanica, Istok and Pec, that Siptar terrorist

13 forces are moving with the support of NATO forces from the air, that a

14 court-martial was established in Pristina and it was operational. Several

15 members were already court-martialed in Pristina for offences perpetrated,

16 that it was necessary to prevent looting, that the basic tasks of

17 individuals is to organise defence on assigned routes and directions, to

18 take anti-aircraft protection measures, and to boost combat morale, to

19 prevent defeatism and panic.

20 Q. Now, tab 482. You are writing about the data available to the

21 NATO force intended for guiding their airstrikes.

22 A. This is information we got from our superior command, namely that

23 within the ranks of the KLA there were members of foreign intelligence and

24 security services, mainly of the US and other NATO member countries, and

25 that according to our information, there had been about 100 SAS members

Page 41904












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13 English transcripts.













Page 41905

1 with the task of marking and guiding NATO aviation during their attacks on

2 our forces present on the ground.

3 Q. Thank you, General. In document 483; which deals with military

4 equipment and prisoners, point 4 says, let me not quote everything:

5 "Detention of prisoners, their interrogation by non-specialists or

6 physical threats to them are most strictly prohibited."

7 A. Yes. This order pertains to both prisoners and to any collection

8 of pieces of aircraft or equipment. It says that pilots who have been

9 shot down or taken prisoner should be handed over to the security organs.

10 And it says also that various objects or intriguing items found in the

11 area may not be collected because they could well be lethal.


13 MR. NICE: Before we move on, a matter of clarification. You'll

14 see at page 52, line 20, the witness gave an answer about a hundred SAS

15 members, whereas if we look at document 482, paragraph 2, the identified

16 100 people appear to be US special forces. It would obviously help me to

17 know what is being said and of which country's forces at this stage.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was saying that they were members

19 of special forces of the United States, in the first paragraph. That's

20 the first paragraph of this report. And in paragraph 2, it says that for

21 a while there have been about 100 members of the SAS force present. SAS,

22 it is well known, belongs to the United Kingdom, not the United States.

23 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is clearly written in the

25 document.

Page 41906

1 MR. NICE: I can see it in the original, in which case then there

2 is a clearly an error in the translation of 482A, and we ought to note

3 that there is an error there, because --

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, that's noted.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. General, let us just try to work as expeditiously as possible.

7 What were the tasks related to defence organisation that you yourself set

8 in the form of an order dated the 7th of April in document under 484?

9 A. This order was written again pursuant to an order from the

10 Pristina corps command, and we see from this order that we were to further

11 intensify work on organising the defence of the area in terms of

12 fortification and engineering and the putting up of obstacles in

13 particular.

14 Q. Does the next document pertain to the same thing, 485? It says

15 related to combat documents, the control of various routes and

16 infiltration of Siptar terrorist forces.

17 A. "At all levels of command --" that's the beginning, paragraph 1 --

18 "draw up the necessary combat documents, conduct a command reconnaissance,

19 and ensure that all officers know their task and that of the neighbouring

20 units."

21 In paragraph 2, it says: "Organise complete control of possible

22 routes by which Siptar terrorist forces may be infiltrated, and ensure

23 effective use of anti-tank devices throughout the defence depth on the

24 routes that are difficult to traverse.

25 "3. Construct two or three positions and installations for the

Page 41907

1 entire combat equipment, relying on populated areas and on dominant

2 features within reach of roads and lateral to the direction of movement of

3 enemy personnel."

4 Q. In document 486, cluster bombs are mentioned. This is a report

5 dated the 8th of April. Were cluster bombs used in the way that you

6 envisaged?

7 A. There was massive use of cluster bombs, not only in the border

8 belt but throughout the depth of the territory. It is well known that

9 they were used in attacks against Nis and other cities.

10 As far as my area was concerned, cluster bomb attacks were almost

11 a daily occurrence.

12 Q. In tab 487, it says "Working map of the commander of the 459th

13 Motorised Brigade. "

14 A. Yes, this is my working map. It says "Commencement on the 9th of

15 April."

16 Q. You also drew up a brief covering the period from the 30th of

17 March to the 7th of April. Is it under tab 488?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Is there anything of particular interest here? Does this document

20 reflect current activities?

21 A. This document is sent to units almost on a daily basis. In the

22 introductory part, activities in a broader area are described, that is the

23 general situation in the country, then in our immediate surroundings, and

24 then it goes on to describe activities in the territory of the corps, and

25 finally, towards the end, follows a description of activities of our own

Page 41908

1 unit.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: General, each time a map has come out it seemed

3 very neat. Are we seeing the maps that were actually used in the course

4 of the war or are these maps that are copies of what were actually used?

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is a map from the war, and this

6 map here is a copy made in the Military Geographical Institute. This is

7 my working map. It indicates the commencement as the 9th of April,

8 because it was our estimate that at this time a ground offensive of the

9 NATO forces would begin. It shows the deployment of my units. It shows

10 the routes in Albania where Albanian army forces and terrorist forces were

11 concentrated, and this working map of mine was to be marked every day by

12 various symbols depicting activities for that day.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: That particular one that is now on the board is the

14 one that you -- that's the actual copy you used, is it?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is a photocopy of my map.

16 JUDGE BONOMY: So where --

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You see my signature on it and all

18 the rest.

19 JUDGE BONOMY: Where is the original, the one you actually used?

20 Where is it?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is in Belgrade, in the archive.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: All right. Thank you.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. General, in document 490, you report something that we could

25 partially see in some of the video footage here, namely a dispatch signed

Page 41909












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Page 41910

1 by you on the 14th of April. And you say: "The work of intelligence

2 organs observed in the Ljubizda Has village sector a group of armed men

3 (10-15) was observed in the village holding local people - women, children

4 and the elderly - as hostages." Is that something that we could see in

5 one of those video recordings? Is that the same incident or something

6 similar?

7 A. That is precisely the event we saw.

8 Q. And this is your dispatch?

9 A. Yes. It's practically a report from my intelligence body that was

10 forwarded to the assistant commander of the Pristina Corps for

11 intelligence.

12 JUDGE BONOMY: Remind me --

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. Thank you, General.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Remind me, General, what did we see on the video

16 relating to this?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On the video we saw the woman and

18 the man talking, that in Prizrenski Has they were staying in a forest and

19 that they held them there for two weeks without giving them water or food.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. Let's just go through this information. Is it necessary to dwell

23 on the information of the 15th of April where you inform the command about

24 what happened on the 13th and 14th?

25 A. All of this is information that goes from my command to my units.

Page 41911

1 Q. You say that there are facilities marked by the OSCE where there

2 had been longer stays.

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. That is on the last page. What does this pertain to, General?

5 MR. NICE: Tab 491, I think.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 491. During the night between the

7 15th and the 14th, the border post of Stojanovic and Liken were attacked

8 by the Apache. Eight persons were killed. And now I say here that these

9 losses could have been prevented had the officers abided by the given

10 instructions, namely that personnel had to be in shelters all the time and

11 that all units should move away from the facilities that had been marked

12 by the OSCE before that. That is to say their standard facilities; border

13 posts, barracks, and so on.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. All right. In document 492, support of the Supreme Command to the

16 courage and the morale of the army. Is it necessary to dwell on this in

17 particular?

18 A. This is a letter of support that goes all the way down to the

19 basic units.

20 Q. In tab 494, you give an order that prevents -- that is aimed at

21 preventing surprises in terms of threats to the state border.

22 A. This is an order to take immediate measures to completely close

23 axes leading from the territory of Albania into the battalion zones of

24 responsibility and to occupy suitable features and settlements in order to

25 organise defence of the state border and to focus engagement on defence

Page 41912

1 forces in the border area, to fortify defence zones completely in terms of

2 engineering, mass laying of obstacles along the forward defence line,

3 junctures and flanks, make preparations for demolition and third-level

4 fortification.

5 Q. In document 495, you indicate that some omissions were made in the

6 implementation of ordered security measures, and in paragraph 6 you say in

7 particular: "React more quickly and more determinedly against those

8 responsible for looting, crime and indiscipline, and take criminal

9 liability measures against them."

10 A. Again this order was written on the basis of --

11 Q. This is your order?

12 A. Yes, that is my order.

13 Q. Thank you, General. Is it necessary to dwell on document 496

14 where you give an order to leave peacetime location features?

15 A. That is for the sake of preventing any losses. In part of the

16 barracks there was some quartermaster's -- there was some quartermaster's

17 equipment left, and sometimes personnel would go to get them, and this

18 order is aimed at not doing that any more.

19 Q. In tab 497, you provide information about important political

20 landmarks.

21 MR. NICE: No translation.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. You point out that NATO is trying to prevent the return of Siptar

24 refugees to their homes. Otherwise, the engagement of NATO forces in the

25 heralded, under quotation marks, humanitarian effort would be senseless.

Page 41913

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Is this what your colleagues, what your comrades knew, and those

3 that you were in contact with?

4 A. This was written right after the last bombing of the column, which

5 took place on the 14th of April, and after various statements, because

6 Jamie Shea, when they admitted that this column of Siptar refugees was

7 bombed by NATO - he was the spokesman of NATO - he said sacrifices had to

8 be made in order to achieve one's ends.

9 Q. All right, General.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, it's time for the break. I'm

11 forming the view that much of this is just general information about the

12 conflict and may not be sufficiently specifically related to the

13 indictment. So when we return from the break, I'd like you to address

14 briefly that question.

15 MR. NICE: Your Honour, also one other point related to the last

16 series of documents. In the time I shall take, it obviously won't be

17 possible to explore even a fraction of these documents at all or in

18 detail, and where documents have been skipped over or haven't been

19 referred to, I would ask the Chamber to say they shouldn't be produced.

20 It's not realistic. It may not be realistic to spend any time with the

21 others but it would certainly not be appropriate to produce documents that

22 we haven't looked at at all in the present circumstances.

23 MR. KAY: Well, in the Prosecution case when we had large

24 collections of documents that was a procedure that was often frequently

25 used and Mr. Nice regularly used the phrase that the Court could look at

Page 41914












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Page 41915

1 it in their leisure and refer in a collective term to numbers of

2 documents. When it's clear what the sense of the collective is, that

3 would be, in my submission to the Trial Chamber, a useful and economic way

4 of employing Court time without being too pedantic over the information

5 that's being put before the Tribunal.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Kay. And we have, in fact,

7 sanctioned that approach in relation to Mr. Milosevic. Unless we are

8 persuaded otherwise, I think we'll continue to follow it.

9 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm simply not sure that I ever did this

10 with this type of document. I'm not particularly concerned to thrash the

11 point out now. I am concerned about the fact that there's plainly a

12 quantity of material here that neither I nor probably the Chamber will

13 ever be able to deal with in detail. Had it been served in advance and

14 had it been the subject of some kind of report, things might have been

15 different, but as it is, the Chamber has to decide for itself whether it

16 wants this material in when it will almost certainly not be explored by

17 either side at all.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm much more concerned about the relevance.

19 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, are you referring to the -- those two tabs

20 which were skipped or the other tabs which were briefly touched upon?

21 MR. NICE: I think I have to restrict it to those that were

22 skipped.

23 JUDGE KWON: Yes. I understand that.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: We will adjourn for 20 minutes.

25 --- Recess taken at 12.18 p.m.

Page 41916

1 --- On resuming at 12.40 p.m.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, before the break I was asking you

3 to tell us the relevance of this evidence, which seems to me to be more

4 generally telling the story of the conflict rather than to be specifically

5 relevant to the indictment.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I am presenting this

7 because I do consider it to be relevant, precisely because it shows a

8 completely different type of behaviour of the army, which fully denies

9 what is contained in Mr. Nice's positions in terms of what the conduct of

10 the army was throughout this time.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: We're only interested in conduct of the army

12 insofar as it touches upon a charge in the indictment.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, all of these charges are

14 contained in the indictment, all of it together. I think that's obvious.

15 How else can we establish what it was that the army actually did, why they

16 were at certain locations, how they moved around? You have orders,

17 analyses every time. Their attitude toward the civilian population, also

18 their attitude towards international humanitarian law, the functioning of

19 the army itself, everything else.

20 Now we are to deal with an entire set of criminal reports.

21 Fortunately, there aren't that many of them. The incidents are described

22 in detail, but you can also see exactly how the army acted. Mr. Mice made

23 some assertions --

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... tabs also

25 deal with that issue?

Page 41917

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. For example, from tab 500

2 onwards. I'm going to ask the general to try to go through this as

3 quickly as possible, through these orders of his and the documents that

4 have to do with April and May, to dwell only on some essential elements.

5 Let us move on faster, if you agree, through a certain set of

6 tabs, the one that follows right now, dwelling only on --

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay. Perhaps Mr. Kay can refine the

8 relevance.

9 MR. KAY: In relation to what we've been looking at, the effect of

10 the NATO bombing on the infrastructure of the country, on the migration of

11 the people, is highly relevant. The Trial Chamber will know that in the

12 indictment there's only, in paragraph 104, one line about the NATO bombing

13 in the indictment. The rest of the indictment concerns the responsibility

14 of Serb forces for the refugees and people crossing the border.

15 In the accused's case, the presentation which shows the effect of

16 NATO bombing, the climate of fear, the concern of the people, its effect

17 upon the movement of peoples, in our submission, is highly relevant to

18 that issue because it was over a sustained period of time. It's not only

19 just the bombing, it's the fact of the overflying aircraft, the number of

20 flights, number of missions leading to that climate of fear that might

21 cause people to leave their homes, which is of course an issue in the

22 Defence case.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well, Mr. Milosevic. Let us continue as --

24 proceed as quickly as we can.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Robinson. But before

Page 41918

1 I continue, I wanted to ask you what happened to my request to make it

2 possible for me to talk to Mr. Seselj who will be a witness here. For

3 three days in a row now -- I mean, if I'm prevented from seeing him today

4 as well, this is going to be the third day that I will lose in terms of my

5 preparations, without any justification. You know how much you gave me,

6 and now this time that I do have, which is very short, I cannot use very

7 efficiently, and why? Because I simply cannot see the witness for reasons

8 that I'm not going to go into now.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yesterday I instructed the

10 Registrar to present a report on this matter, and I expect that report

11 shortly, perhaps by tomorrow. I will not take any action before I get the

12 report from the Registrar.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] That means that I'm going to lose

14 three days because of the wait for this report, and maybe a fourth day,

15 too, tomorrow.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: What it means is that the issue that you have

17 raised will not be resolved before the Chamber has the report from the

18 Registrar. That's what it means. Continue.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. General, in relation to the question pertaining to the

22 authenticity of maps that was put to you by Mr. Bonomy, I wish to say here

23 for the record that I want you to give me a clear answer: Did you

24 personally make these photocopies and did you compare them to your

25 original? Do you claim that these photocopies are fully identical to the

Page 41919












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Page 41920

1 original?

2 A. Absolutely.

3 Q. You're quite sure of that?

4 A. Absolutely sure. There are only the additional maps that are

5 called Retimlje that were made in 2002 and that give a more detailed

6 explanation from the 25th until the 28th of March, 1999.

7 Q. All the maps are original?

8 A. All are identical.

9 JUDGE BONOMY: When you say a photocopy, do you mean that that is

10 a photocopy, at least the two that we can see at the moment, are

11 photocopies, including the writing, of the originals, or are these

12 photocopies onto which the writing has been placed by someone?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] They are absolutely copied in their

14 original size and the way they were originally. The Military Institute of

15 Geography has the possibility of making photocopies of this size. So in

16 terms of their size and everything else, they exactly match the original.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: And that includes the writing. The writing is a

18 photograph of the original writing.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, absolutely.

20 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Absolutely. These four maps were

22 submitted to the Office of the Prosecutor in the beginning of 2003, these

23 four maps here called "Working map of the commander."

24 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm not clear now what you are mean by four now.

25 We've certainly seen more than four.

Page 41921

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But just four maps which relate to

2 the working map of the commander, it says, and they begin from March or

3 April 1998, and end - and this is the last map - in April 1999, which

4 shows the incidents on the territory. So there are four such maps. And

5 those maps were sent in at the beginning of 2003 to the Prosecution, and

6 the Prosecution has had them in their possession since that time.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: That also is a photocopy?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. But at the time, the

9 investigators of the OTP had the originals in their hands in Belgrade.

10 JUDGE BONOMY: And does that apply to the ones on the other side

11 of you?

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This is quite a different type of

13 map.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Indeed, but the ones on your left-hand side, they

15 also are copies, are they, of what had been used during the conflict,

16 including the writing on the maps?

17 Sorry, I didn't hear the answer.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Everything on these maps. This is a

19 photocopy and everything is completely identical. There is absolutely no

20 difference both in terms of format and --

21 JUDGE BONOMY: That's not the question. The question is is it a

22 photocopy of everything that was written on the map or is it a map onto

23 which other things have been copied by someone else?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. It is a copy of everything

25 existing on the original map. Everything that exists on the original map

Page 41922

1 exists on this photocopy map too.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Is there any reason why we can't see at least one

3 of the originals?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] As far as I am concerned personally,

5 there is no reason, but the maps which are located in the archives are not

6 given out, as far as I know, in the original. That has never been the

7 practice. They are not issued in the original. They are issued either

8 photocopied or photographed and then done to scale.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic, continue.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. We left off discussing document 498, and you talk about

12 cooperation with the court authorities, with the authorities in general,

13 taking care of the population, and so on and so forth. You said that

14 humanitarian conduct should be applied where the civilian population is

15 concerned pursuant to all the provisions of the army of Yugoslavia and

16 international humanitarian law, and you also say that any possible

17 violations will take the most stringent liability measures against anyone

18 in violation of this order. Is that right, General?

19 A. Yes. The superior command is requesting that in all units a

20 separate element of combat order should be introduced to take care of the

21 civilian population at the level of the battalions and artillery

22 battalions.

23 Q. General, we have here a whole series of documents relating to

24 April, May, and so on, and they are contained in tabs 498 onwards, right

25 up until tab 627, I believe. May we try and go through that material as

Page 41923

1 efficiently and quickly as possible?

2 A. Well, as far as I'm concerned, there are no problems there. We

3 can do that.

4 Q. Fine. Then I'm going to ask you to focus on the most important

5 documents and give us your comments, and I'd like to start off with the

6 document contained in tab 500. And we have a criminal report against

7 three individuals, members of your unit from Djakovica.

8 A. Yes. I said that in my area of spot there were two rapes, and

9 this is a criminal report for rape against three soldiers. One was the

10 perpetrator and two assisted the perpetrator, aided and abetted. And

11 these are not men from my unit but from the brigade in Djakovica. And

12 since my military police was territorially responsible, then it compiled

13 the criminal report, and this whole series of documents from the criminal

14 report, the Official Note, the various statements, and later on dating to

15 2001, we have the military court from Nis which is writing to the district

16 court in Pec with respect to the -- uncovering the perpetrators so they

17 can appear at the military court in Nis. So we had the statements of the

18 women concerned, the injured party.

19 Q. All right. So we have a rather long set of documents here,

20 including statements.

21 MR. KAY: Can we just observe that the date is wrong in the

22 English translation. 17th of April 1999, it should be.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Thank you, Mr. Kay.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The criminal report is indeed the

25 17th of April, 1999, yes.

Page 41924












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Page 41925

1 I suggest, Mr. Robinson, that we don't dwell on the individual

2 documents which are attached to this criminal report. I think it's all

3 quite clear, quite clearly set out, so I suggest that we move on.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Before you move on, Mr. Milosevic, I'd like to

5 find out, what was the outcome of this case, the charges against these

6 three soldiers. Is that revealed --

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, let's ask the General.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, you can see that. You can see

9 the indictment from the military court dated 1999. And my last piece of

10 information is that the military court, in 2001, in August, appealed to

11 the district court in Pec on the territory of Kosovo and Metohija.

12 Therefore, they contacted them via the Ministry of Defence, the sector for

13 international military cooperation, in order to, through UNMIK, uncover

14 and find these two women. After that, I don't know what happened, what

15 was done after that.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: You don't know the result of the trial?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. It was my job to apprehend the

18 perpetrators, to bring them to court and to be handed over to the court

19 with a criminal report. The rest is up to the court.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. General, please let's move on now. I have indicated the documents

23 that refer to April and May. Would you please take a look at those

24 documents and draw our attention to what you consider to be important

25 features.

Page 41926

1 For example, in tab 502, there's another criminal report with

2 respect to a theft; and then 503, once again criminal reports relating to

3 theft.

4 A. That's what I was talking about. It is linked to soldiers who

5 from these columns of refugees took mostly money, and they are criminal

6 reports against them for having perpetrated that act.

7 Q. All right, General. Now, would you be so kind as to go on to the

8 next documents and to do that as efficiently as possible. You have the

9 documents before you, so once again just indicate what you consider to be

10 the most important.

11 A. I think that tab 504 is especially important because it talks

12 about NATO sorties, NATO flights --

13 THE INTERPRETER: Oh, sorry, NATO leaflets, interpreter's

14 correction.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] NATO leaflets that were thrown out

16 in Kosovo and Metohija, and we know that leaflets are classical forms of

17 psychological warfare and propaganda activity. So these leaflets were

18 distributed not in thousands of copies but probably in millions of copies.

19 For each square metre in my area, at least one leaflet was dropped.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. All right. Fine.

22 A. So there were about 15 different types of leaflets that were

23 dropped. Here we have two types, examples of two types, and I have with

24 me original copies, the original leaflets that were dropped, and if

25 necessary, we can have them placed on the overhead projector.

Page 41927

1 Q. Well, I don't think we need waste time on that. I don't think

2 there is anything contested.

3 A. Well, I would say there was, in my opinion, because these leaflets

4 were dropped on the territory and the population read them. Let me just

5 show you. May I place one leaflet on the overhead projector?

6 Q. Yes. Please go ahead.

7 A. Here is what it says: "A terrible death," is the title.

8 "Projectiles with explosive chambers, such as the Apache rockets known as

9 hell fire and mini bombs of multi-barrel rockets spray the air with metal

10 falling on the population, and usually there is complete combustion that

11 takes place. Return to your families alive. Leave your units and your

12 military equipment. Leave Kosovo and Metohija before it is too late."

13 Another leaflet, for example, or on one of the leaflets you will

14 find my name. There's my name there and the name of the commanders, and

15 on this particular leaflet we have a drawing of the B52 bomber, and it

16 says: "Thousands of bombs."

17 JUDGE BONOMY: We don't appear to have copies of these.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The heading there is "Thousands of

19 bombs."

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: You say that one had your name on it, General?

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Here it is. That's where my

22 name is. That's the leaflet with my name on it.

23 In all these leaflets, all these leaflets say the same thing:

24 "Leave the territory of Kosovo and Metohija." The leaflets were geared

25 towards soldiers, directed at soldiers, but they had a fantastic effect on

Page 41928

1 the civilian population, a fantastic impact on them because, as I say,

2 they were dropped in such large numbers, enormous numbers, that at least

3 one leaflet dropped on every square metre of territory. And it says:

4 "Don't wait for me. NATO will attack you continuously from all sides."

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation].

6 Q. However, despite those leaflets, in tab 505 where this piece of

7 information is contained about the situation, on page 2 you say that the

8 combat morale of the forces was very good, and so on and so forth.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I observe that the leaflets that

10 were just placed on the ELMO are not included in the tab. Or at any rate,

11 one of them is not.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have here -- I looked at this a

13 moment ago, is a leaflet which is contained in this tab. Tab 504 contains

14 a leaflet or, rather, there is a piece of information, and attached to it

15 at the end are two or three leaflets. "Don't wait for me," warnings to

16 the forces of the Yugoslav army, NATO, et cetera. All that is contained

17 in tab 504 as an attachment.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Is that the one with the general's name?

19 MR. KAY: Tab 622 also has this in B/C/S form. I don't know, of

20 course, whether it's the ones that have been shown, but there is the

21 similar with the photograph of the NATO bomber.


23 MR. KAY: I think there's a collection of them there.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In 622, we have several photocopies

25 of the leaflets.

Page 41929












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Page 41930

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let's move on, Mr. Milosevic.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. May we move on, General, please. Shall we try and go through the

5 documents. Would you do your best, please. We left off doing 506 and

6 505, those were the tabs. But now let's look at the more important ones.

7 A. Document 505 is an information, piece of information, a report

8 talking about important political events in the country and in the world

9 and the situation linked to the army and the unit, and it is a report sent

10 out or piece of information that is sent out right down through the

11 battalions, units, and individual companies, down the line to the lowest

12 level.

13 Tab 506 is the next one, and it is procedure for engaging

14 investigative judges on the facilities that were bombed by NATO planes,

15 and recording those, the effects of that operation.

16 507 is a document for taking additional unit vigilance and combat

17 readiness measures.

18 508, the next document, is information sent out to the units and

19 linked to the equipment that the NATO pact has in its possession.

20 Q. All right. You showed us a leaflet a moment ago with the B52

21 bomber. According to the combat deployment of your forces, were B52

22 planes used?

23 A. Yes, at the end of May 1999, 25 times. Those strategic planes

24 bombed 25 times.

25 Q. That bombing that you were exposed to by the strategic aviation

Page 41931

1 planes in the border belt, to all intents and purposes, was it in

2 cooperation with any ground attacks?

3 A. Yes. It was in cooperation with the aero-ground attack that

4 started at the end of May, and it was direct support and reinforcement to

5 the forces of the terrorists.

6 Q. And how many forces, how many men were engaged in that ground

7 attack, that ground operation, when you had these attacks from the

8 strategic air force and planes as well?

9 A. Well, throughout the Pastrik Mountain zone, there were about 4 to

10 6.000 terrorists, and the strategic planes, after the ground attacks were

11 refuted, the ordinary standard air force would come into play and then the

12 strategic air force would be deployed.

13 Q. These were all-out massive ground force attacks, 4 to 6.000

14 strong, on your positions. Did your units manage successfully to repel

15 all those ground attacks?

16 A. Only in one -- on one occasion were they able to break through in

17 depth between 50 -- 500 metres and one kilometre, and we managed to deal

18 with that attack the same day, so those attacks were not successful

19 attacks.

20 Q. I'm asking you this, General, because it was claimed in certain

21 reports and statements by NATO leaders that there were no ground force

22 attacks across our border, that is to say on our territory.

23 A. There were ground attacks with the direct participation of the

24 Albanian army. The army of the Republic of Albania took part in them

25 directly.

Page 41932

1 Q. So the KLA and the army of the Republic of Albania and the

2 strategic planes of the NATO pact; is that right?

3 A. Yes.

4 Q. And all that was in May against our own forces; is that right?

5 A. It all lasted up until the 7th or 8th of June inclusive, 1999.

6 Q. Thank you, General. Could we go on through these other documents.

7 We have finished with 508.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: May I just ask either Mr. Kay or Mr. Nice, are

9 there any charges arising from the attacks in the Pastrik Mountain?

10 MR. NICE: I'm reluctant to identify an area generally, but I

11 don't think it appears as a name. We'll check.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: That would be my conclusion too. This was rather

13 like a full-scale battle between two armed forces.

14 Yes, proceed, Mr. Milosevic.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. General, we left off on tab 510. Should we deal with it in

18 detail? It is a warning.

19 A. I don't think there's any need to do that. This is a warning

20 related to general conduct and prevention of unlawful conduct. The same

21 as tab 511. It speaks of incidents involving loss of life in ambushes and

22 attacks, and members of the units are instructed to be more careful to

23 prevent that sort of thing.

24 Q. Follows a document concerning measures for boosting morale and

25 psychological preparation and improving combat readiness. Tab 513, taking

Page 41933

1 measures to protect units and prevent penetration by enemy forces. Tab

2 14, description of the general political situation.

3 A. Yes. This is the sort of daily brief that was sent to all units.

4 Q. Then another warning to raise the level of security, 515. And in

5 516, the Chief of Staff Colonel Vladimir Stojiljkovic sent this

6 intelligence report to the command of the 549th Motorised Brigade.

7 A. Yes. This is about information collected by intelligence organs

8 primarily about events in the territory of the Republic of Albania,

9 information that was collected by observation from our territory.

10 Q. What about 517? What does this report contain?

11 A. This is a report that was made available to all members of the

12 unit. In the introduction, as usual -- the focus is actually on the fact

13 that a large number of volunteers signed up in various towns of Serbia.

14 Q. Very well.

15 A. It says that among the volunteers there were people who had come

16 from abroad.

17 Q. Now, tell me, what's in these criminal reports in 518, 519? These

18 are criminal reports against conscripts who had perpetrated certain

19 criminal offences.

20 A. Yes, that's the case with 518. 519 is a criminal report against

21 an unidentified perpetrator, and it concerns the kidnapping of five of my

22 soldiers on the 11th of April on the road between Prizren and Suva Reka.

23 That is why this is against an unidentified perpetrator. These soldiers

24 were kidnapped by Siptar terrorists. It was a group of five, and two of

25 them were escorting the kidnapped men to a court-martial. Their fate --

Page 41934












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Page 41935

1 they have never been heard from again.

2 Q. So this procedure -- these measures were taken in the course of

3 abiding by the law.

4 A. Yes. We know that they were kidnapped somewhere on the road. We

5 know it was done by a group of terrorists based in the area of Budakovo,

6 but as for what happened to these people, we don't know anything yet,

7 although new and new graves are being found in the territory of Kosovo and

8 Metohija.

9 Q. This next document under 520 is your order, which, as a follow-up

10 to this incident, instructs which measures should be taken to prevent such

11 incidents.

12 A. Yes. It instructs people never to leave their area of deployment

13 unauthorised and to take all measures of security required to avoid such

14 situations.

15 Q. I would like to go through the most important documents.

16 A. 521 is my report to the command of the Pristina Corps to the

17 effect that the territorial military organs, military sections, in other

18 words, relocated from population centres.

19 522 says that all the materiel collected, such as food, fuel, and

20 other materiel collected from private persons should be properly recorded

21 and stored.

22 Q. General, tell me, what does this order refer to? It was taken

23 pursuant to an order from the Pristina Corps command. In 525 it mentioned

24 defence stabilisation measures in the zone of your command, control over

25 the territory. In paragraph 2 it says: "In receiving, dispersing and

Page 41936

1 providing security for the civilian population act in line with the

2 previously issued orders of the brigade command. Prevent any

3 undisciplined behaviour on the part of commanding officers in relation to

4 the civilian population."

5 A. This is in line with the previous order concerning civilians where

6 paragraph 1 deals with control over the territory, paragraph 2 treatment

7 of civilian population and their accommodation, paragraph 3 clearing of

8 the territory, paragraph 4 organisation of administration and

9 self-government and organisation of some sort of Crisis Staffs.

10 It says that units of labour obligation should be set up to clear

11 the territory, sanitise the territory, clear the rubble left by airstrikes

12 by NATO, measures to combat crime and maximise the lawfulness of conduct.

13 THE INTERPRETER: Please slow down when reading.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Measures of logistical support. It

15 says that this is a standing order and that commanders of immediately

16 subordinate units are directly responsible for its implementation.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Please go on.

19 A. 526 also describes the situation generally in the world and in our

20 country and our specific situation within the unit. 527 --

21 MR. NICE: Some of these are not translated. I gather they're

22 going a bit fast for the interpreters. Frankly, it's fairly fast for

23 somebody who hasn't got a text to read. It's quite fast even when you

24 have got a text to read.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic and the witness, please bear that

Page 41937

1 in mind. Some of the documents are not translated, and you must observe a

2 pause between the question and answer for the benefit of the interpreters.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Let us go through the most important of these documents, please.

6 A. So 527 is an intelligence report from my intelligence body to the

7 intelligence body of the corps. It says that still on the border crossing

8 of Vrbnica large groups of journalists with cameras are still present, and

9 that there are also vehicles with satellite aerials which beam their

10 reports from the border crossing immediately.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: What is the relevance of this, Mr. Milosevic,

12 this intelligence report, to the indictment?

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, it is indirectly linked to the

14 departure of refugees from our territory. You can see that the various

15 bodies in our army were fully conscious that everything was being done

16 within the system of propaganda to create a humanitarian catastrophe, and

17 we know what kind of reports were sent and why allegedly Albanians left

18 Kosovo and Metohija. You can see the organisation and the linkage of the

19 war machine with the media machinery.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's 528.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a second. We will consult on the relevance

22 of this particular item.

23 [Trial Chamber confers]

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: On the basis that it relates to the question of

25 refugees, we will allow it, but I must say that a lot of this is only

Page 41938

1 marginally useful.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Are there likely to be Albanian witnesses coming

3 here to tell us that they left because of NATO bombing?

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, they said so many times, but

5 there will be.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Sorry, the answer's incomplete on the --

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] You asked whether I will call them.

8 I said yes.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: You're nearing the end of your Kosovo case.

10 Please bear in mind what I said yesterday, that you have now used up about

11 half of the time allocated to you, and you're still dealing with first of

12 three parts of the case.

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, as you know, you are

14 in control of the time. I told you that my time is insufficient, and I do

15 not have the impression that I am disposing of it irrationally. I didn't

16 call God knows how many witnesses testifying, as this witness is, about

17 the totality of the operation of the army with these documents which

18 account for only 6 per cent of all the documents that General Delic could

19 bring, that is over 10.000 documents. We have --

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, let us proceed. You are in charge

21 of the use of your time. You must manage your time as efficiently as

22 possible.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] In view of the extremely difficult

24 and totally groundless allegations that we heard here about the conduct of

25 the army --

Page 41939












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13 English transcripts.













Page 41940

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I do not want a speech. I do not

2 want a speech. Proceed.

3 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

4 Q. General, beginning with the tab 530 onwards, we have a series of

5 documents covering the month of May. Could you please give us only the

6 most pertinent highlights. Just the most important things that you can --

7 A. 532 is another report not unlike the previous ones sent to my

8 units.

9 533 is an order, an order to improve the system of command in

10 order to ensure complete control over personnel, and an uncompromisingly

11 proper appearance of all members of the brigade.

12 534 is another intelligence report which says: "During the day on

13 many occasions groups of refugees crossed the border. Once they crossed

14 the border, foreign journalists gather them immediately, interview them,

15 and then bus them or transport them in trucks further on. It has been

16 observed that better quality cars were taken to the side by men dressed in

17 black suits."

18 Q. These were your observations of what was going on on the other

19 side of the border?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. 535 is another intelligence report, where it says in paragraph 2:

22 "The armed forces of Albania in the areas of their bunkers continue to

23 clear them and to build shelters for their personnel. After airstrikes by

24 NATO against the town of Prizren, large migration of the population has

25 been observed."

Page 41941

1 Tab 536. On the 29th of April, 1999, two cluster projectiles were

2 aimed at personnel from the block house of Krstac, hurting one commanding

3 officer and three soldiers.

4 537, again an intelligence report that was sent to the Pristina

5 Corps, and it records what was observed on the Albanian side.

6 Q. All right, General. Will it hurt a lot if we just skip the next

7 few tabs which deal with those daily incidents and your daily activities

8 in order to dwell a little on 552, which mentions cluster bombs and

9 various types of charges and the use of prohibited weapons?

10 A. Yes, that would be all right. Perhaps would I like at another one

11 before that. You said 552?

12 Q. In 552 it says that: "So far NATO Air Force has been using

13 different projectiles, cluster bombs with different charges as of late,

14 and charges that are vibration activated," and so on and so forth.

15 A. This is information to all members of the unit. Since as the end

16 of April was nearing, as well as the month of May, every day many cluster

17 projectiles were used. Even some new bombs were used. That is not stated

18 in this document, but it is in others. CBU-99, and we did not have any

19 information about that. So we would therefore -- or, rather, we did

20 therefore caution that these objects should not be touched. 15 to 20 per

21 cent of all cluster bombs were not activated. They remained there, and

22 later on they could be activated if somebody walked up to them or touched

23 them.

24 Q. General, in document 555, you have documentation about crimes,

25 criminal offences, signed by your assistant commander, Lieutenant Colonel

Page 41942

1 Vlada Milankovic.

2 A. Yes. That is my assistant commander for information and moral

3 guidance.

4 Q. Yes. And you say: "At the very outset, and particularly as the

5 war operations in Kosovo and Metohija gain momentum, the number and type

6 of criminal offences subject to more severe sanctions in wartime has seen

7 a sharp rise; some of them were qualified as war crimes and treated in the

8 most stringent way, especially since there is no statute of limitation for

9 this type of crime.

10 "Then the activation of judicial organs is concerned and the work

11 of investigation and security organs in the units, the perpetrators have

12 been investigated, prosecuted and convicted more promptly and efficiently

13 for crimes relating to military service..." Is that what it says here?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And then there is further mention of the percentages. "By far the

16 highest percentage in the report of criminal offences involve the

17 following..." It says murder, and then aggravated theft, stressing the

18 sentence that is envisaged, then taking a vehicle, and wilful abandonment

19 and desertion of the VJ.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. And then two paragraphs down, it says: "Criminal reports against

22 297 individuals were filed with the military prosecutor attached to the

23 PRK command; the military court received 95 indictments; and requests for

24 investigation of 109 individuals were submitted. Of the total number of

25 criminal reports filed, 22 involved officers, 30 non-commissioned

Page 41943

1 officers, 227 privates, 15 civilians, and 3 unidentified persons."

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. So this is the 12th of May. Is this the time when the operations

4 against our forces were the fiercest?

5 A. The fiercest fighting was in the area of Kosare, between Djakovica

6 and Decani.

7 Q. At the time when the fiercest fighting was going on involving

8 several thousands of persons attacking your units, you are acting lawfully

9 and prosecuting criminal offences. This is the 12th of May when this

10 information is being provided.

11 A. Yes. On page 2 of this information there is reference to the

12 corps and also to my own unit, the criminal reports that were filed up to

13 then from the 24th of May until the 10th of May.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, this is very relevant. Do we know

15 the kind of offences for which the soldiers were charged?

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have a survey. On page 2, if you

17 look at page 2, these are my soldiers. There is an exact reference here

18 as to why, what the type of criminal offence charged was.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: I see. That's theft, wounding, rape, negligent

20 performance, illegal crossing of the state border, wilful abandonment of

21 duty during combat, desertion, terrorism, infliction of bodily injury, and

22 failure to discharge one's duty during combat.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. General, in your area of responsibility, was there a single

Page 41944

1 criminal offence that your organs had learned about and that legal action

2 was not taken about? Rather, had the perpetrator not been arrested in any

3 case if committing an offence for which arrests are envisaged? Is there a

4 single case?

5 A. There is not a single case that we did not act in accordance with

6 the law if we knew of any particular case. Even after the war, on the

7 basis of subsequent knowledge, certain criminal reports were filed.

8 Q. Very well. In tab 562 -- I'm trying to deal with this as quickly

9 as possible, but you draw my attention to anything that I may have omitted

10 that is of capital importance.

11 In 562, you talk about Tusus, the KLA headquarters there.

12 A. 559. Tab 559 is something I would deal with. It speaks of a

13 visit by foreign journalists during the war.

14 Q. They visited Prizren?

15 A. Yes, yes.

16 Q. I can see that from this paper which is sent to the command of the

17 Pristina Corps, the 3rd Army.

18 A. Yes. They recorded NATO airstrikes at certain locations; the

19 village of Jablanica, then two residential areas in town. It says here

20 that they talked to random passersby because they were interested in

21 statements primarily of ethnic Albanians. Foreign journalists were

22 surprised by how lively the town was, as opposed to Pristina. They

23 emphasised that Pristina was a dead city, and they also commented on the

24 ethnic diversity of the town, the population of the town, in spite of all

25 the troubles.

Page 41945

1 The Italians visited the monastery and spent some time there

2 recording and taking pictures. Other foreigners recorded mosques, and yet

3 others interviewed two politicians who lived here; the president of the

4 Democratic Reform Party of Albania, Sokol Qusha, and the president of the

5 Roma Democratic Party, Ljuan Koka, who were also members of the state

6 delegation of Serbia during the political talks in Rambouillet.

7 The essence of the statement has to do with a halt to the NATO

8 bombing, resolution of the problem by peaceful and political means, and

9 equal respect for the interests of all the ethnic communities.

10 When touring the border, as they moved towards the border, they

11 saw 80 to 100 people moving in a refugee column. Then NATO aircraft

12 bombed right next to this column.

13 Q. All right.

14 A. Let me just go on here. The refugees stated that nobody had beat

15 them, that they were afraid of bombs. If they could, they would return to

16 their homes straight away, that some Albanians went from one of their

17 houses to the other, ordering them to go to Albania. The Rai Uno

18 journalist asked the man who was leading the whole group whether he stood

19 by these statements and whether he would give his name, at which the

20 mentioned person took out his ID card without a word and gave it to the

21 journalist so he could take down the necessary details, and so on.

22 Q. All right, General.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: There's a reference, General, to heaps of

24 registration plates removed from vehicles and to a heap of personal

25 documents. Can you tell me what that's about?

Page 41946

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I was with this group and I

2 was at the border myself at the time. I noticed that at the border there

3 were quite a few registration plates that were taken off. That is what I

4 noticed primarily. I didn't see the documents.

5 After returning, I went back to the head of the Secretariat of the

6 Ministry of the Interior, and I asked him whether he knew about this and

7 why this was being done. He said that he had no knowledge about this,

8 that it came as news to him, and that he would take measures immediately.

9 After this, it did not happen again.

10 I think that this was simply arbitrary behaviour on the part of

11 the persons working at the border crossing. The border post continued to

12 function, and the border policemen and customs officials were there.

13 JUDGE BONOMY: There's also reference to film of the events being

14 broadcast on foreign television stations. That's at the end of the --

15 very end of the document. Can I take it that that's a reference to

16 genuine --

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: -- objective reports of these events?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, you see, these were

20 journalists who came to the zone and who filmed what they wanted to.

21 These were journalists from -- from Brussels. There was a Belgian TV

22 crew, and Rai from Italy. And then Frans De Smit (de Standaard), probably

23 journalists in the evening. "At 10.00 p.m.," it says, "on foreign news

24 broadcasts (especially the BBC, Sky, and others) there were reports filmed

25 by these journalists at the border crossing."

Page 41947

1 It's interesting that these journalists who were on our side of

2 the border met the journalists who were on the Albanian side of the border

3 at the border itself and that they spent a short period of time talking to

4 each other because they came from the same media.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Thank you.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Milosevic, we are going to adjourn now.

7 We will adjourn and resume tomorrow morning at 9.00 a.m.

8 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,

9 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 7th day

10 of July, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.