Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 42860

1 Friday, 19 August 2005

2 [Open session]

3 [The witness entered court]

4 [The accused entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Saxon.


8 [Witness answered through interpreter]

9 Cross-examined by Mr. Saxon: [Continued]

10 Q. Sir, yesterday can you recall that you described to the Trial

11 Chamber the fact that you as a forest ranger have a part of a tradition of

12 reporting crime to the police in Kosovo? Do you recall telling us that?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And I -- out of fairness to you, sir, and to the accused, I

15 learned something last night that I want to share with you. The Office of

16 the Prosecutor had a telephone conversation with Florim Krasniqi, one of

17 the Prosecution witnesses in this case, and Mr. Krasniqi confirmed that

18 forest rangers in Kosovo traditionally cooperated with the police. So

19 this is consistent with your testimony. So out of fairness to the

20 parties, I wanted to acknowledge that and put that on the record this

21 morning.

22 Yesterday, you also testified that sometimes -- when you saw

23 persons with illegal weapons or other illegal possessions sometimes you

24 would call the police. That's correct; right?

25 A. Of course. Everything that was illegal we informed the police of

Page 42861

1 that.

2 Q. So, for example, you might -- you would just use your mobile phone

3 to make a report; right?

4 A. No, we didn't have phones. But as I said earlier, the nearest

5 police station, I reported there, to the nearest police station. We

6 didn't have phones.

7 Q. All right. Well, one of the persons who you would have reported

8 to in the Urosevac SUP, the Urosevac police station, would have been Boban

9 Krstic, the inspector in charge of collecting illegal weapons in Urosevac;

10 right?

11 A. I know Boban Krstic as a traffic policeman. This is how I know

12 him.

13 Q. And you on occasion when it was convenient, you would have

14 reported crimes to Boban Krstic; right? Crimes that you were aware of.

15 A. This is not true.

16 Q. Boban Krstic had a serious problem back in 1994 regarding the

17 killing of a child by the name of Fidan Brestovci. Do you want you to

18 tell us about that incident? It was quite notorious in the Urosevac area.

19 A. I know of this incident because it happened in the terrain and

20 under my control where I worked as a forest ranger. It happened because

21 of a criminal, Halit Trstena, who raped many females, and the victim

22 happened to be in that same vehicle. Three days prior to this day, there

23 were regular controls and checks, and they didn't stop to any police

24 patrol. This incident occurred, yes. And I testified for this incident

25 before the trial in -- before the court in Pristina, and the perpetrator

Page 42862

1 was sentenced.

2 Q. Yes. And just so that we can make this clear for the Judges, sir,

3 because they're not familiar with this event, Fidan Brestovci was a

4 seven-year-old boy who was travelling in a car that was fired upon, right,

5 by Boban Krstic the policeman; right? Just say yes or no.

6 A. As I said earlier, I cannot answer the way you want me to answer.

7 I will give you an answer how things were in reality. Halit Trstena --

8 Q. Sir, we don't want the --

9 A. -- with a purpose was in the car with a weapon.

10 Q. Sir, we don't need -- sir, we don't need the entire story because

11 we don't want to take up too much time. I simply want to clarify that in

12 this incident a young boy named Fidan Brestovci was hit by gunfire and

13 killed; right?

14 A. It is true that he was killed, but the question is how he got

15 killed.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Fazliu, just answer the question. Just

17 answer the question.


19 Q. I'm going to ask --

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm asking your question. I'll

21 telling you how things were.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: If we want the additional detail we'll get it

23 from you, but for the moment just answer the questions directly. If we

24 want additional detail, then counsel will get it from you or the Judges

25 will ask you or Mr. Milosevic will ask you for those details, but for the

Page 42863

1 time being just answer the question that is put to you very directly.

2 MR. SAXON: For the Judges' benefit and for the other parties --

3 sir, can let me -- sir, can you let me make my submission, please.

4 For the benefit of the parties and the Chamber, this case is

5 mentioned in evidence already in Exhibit 188, which is a Human Rights

6 Watch report at footnote 14.

7 Q. Boban Krstic was prosecuted for the killing of this child and

8 sentenced to four and a half years in prison; correct?

9 A. It is correct, yes, that he was sentenced to four years and a

10 half.

11 Q. However, Boban Krstic was released on appeal and never served any

12 prison time because the police promoted him to a commander of the Kacanik

13 police station. Isn't that true?

14 A. I don't know about that. In 1995, I was in Prizren. I don't know

15 if he was a commander or something else. These are information from the

16 KLA.

17 Q. Well, no, sir, this is information from a Human Rights Watch

18 report that is in evidence in this case. What were you in prison for in

19 1995? In Prizren. Scratch that question. That was my mistake. That was

20 my mistake. I apologise.

21 Sir, were you present at this incident -- it was my mistake.

22 Sir, were you present at this incident when Fidan Brestovci was

23 killed in July of 1994? Were you there?

24 A. I was a witness. As I said earlier, I was performing my duty. I

25 was on duty, and this happened 50 metres away from me. I was a witness,

Page 42864

1 and Rexhep Lipovica [phoen] was a witness too. He is a friend of mine, a

2 civilian, and he was a witness to what happened. So whoever happens to

3 witness a case, it's his duty to give evidence.

4 I already said yesterday that I only speak the truth.

5 Q. You see, sir, let me make myself clear. Yesterday, you described

6 to us how you were a forest ranger, and you walked through the hills and

7 the mountains and the forests in Urosevac and other municipalities, and

8 when you saw illegal activity, you reported it to the police.

9 A. That's correct. Of course. For whatever was illegal.

10 Q. How is it, sir - can you explain - that you were present at what

11 effectively was the -- a police ambush of some Kosovo Albanian citizens?

12 How can you explain your presence there, sir? You were just a simple

13 forest ranger.

14 A. It wasn't against Albanians, an ambush against Albanians. It was

15 an ambush against a criminal who served a prison sentence, who is killed.

16 It's not against Albanians. It's not about Albanians in general. It's

17 about a criminal who raped many females, carried out thefts and did harm.

18 I know him from my childhood, this person, and now how they gave

19 you information as it suited them, I can't comment on that because I'm

20 speaking here before a Trial Chamber.

21 Q. Let me be a bit more specific, a bit more precise. Last evening,

22 both Witness Bajram Bucaliu and Witness Florim Krasniqi were contacted by

23 the Office of the Prosecutor. They were asked about the allegations that

24 you made against them yesterday. Both responded that there was not a

25 shred of truth in your allegations. But most interestingly, both of them,

Page 42865

1 both of these gentlemen independently told the Prosecution that you were

2 involved in the shooting of this young boy, Fidan Brestovci. How do you

3 explain that coincidence, sir?

4 A. It's not true that I participated in that. If I was a participant

5 in that act, I would have been tried for that. And secondly, Florim

6 Krasniqi is a good man, but he is a member of the KLA. And as for Bajram

7 Bucaliu, he is a man of double standards. I said this yesterday, and I

8 will repeat it today. His cousin was burnt about three months ago in his

9 vehicle. Those who work with drugs, those with double standards, I even

10 wonder how you can speak to me using their words.

11 Q. I'm going to move to another topic now. You mentioned that your

12 daughter --

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Saxon, I'd like the witness to answer the

14 question that you asked earlier, to explain why you were present or to

15 explain the circumstances in which you were present when this incident

16 took place.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. I was on duty.

18 We as forest rangers, as policemen or whatever they call it, we were on

19 duty and Halit Trstena was reported three days before because there was a

20 car attacked in Gnjilane municipality three days earlier. I want to

21 explain in details how things happened so that this question is clear.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let me just clarify what I want to know. Did you

23 just happen to be there or was it by -- by an arrangement with the police

24 that you were there?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, accidentally. I accidentally

Page 42866

1 happened to be there.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: All right. Okay. Thanks. Go ahead, Mr. Saxon.


4 Q. Sir, the point is and the truth is that you frequently cooperated

5 with the police, with their operations. Isn't that true?

6 A. I worked with the police only in relation to forests, to thieves

7 who would steal wood in the forest. For example, when groups of five or

8 six would set out to steal, I then reported this to the police because I

9 couldn't allow them to steal. And a simple forest ranger cannot intervene

10 with the matters of the state.

11 Q. Moving to another topic, the problem of your daughter. Yesterday

12 you told us that your daughter had been kidnapped shortly after you made a

13 decision to testify in this case. Do you recall that?

14 A. Yes.

15 Q. And yesterday afternoon, the Office of the Prosecutor contacted

16 UNMIK officials regarding your daughter's situation, and the deputy

17 commissioner for crime in UNMIK confirmed to the Office of the Prosecutor

18 that in April of this year there was a report filed in Ferizaj regarding a

19 kidnapping of your daughter but that upon further investigation by UNMIK,

20 UNMIK determined this to be what they call a missing person case with no

21 suspicious circumstances. Do you want to make any comment about that?

22 A. I would have agreed to your words, but I'm asking you where my

23 daughter is now. They know very well where my daughter is, those that

24 gave you this information. They know very well where my daughter is. If

25 I knew where she is, I would have completed this matter myself. I don't

Page 42867

1 need authorities or anything to solve this. I am a father, and maybe you

2 are a father as well, and you know how it feels. She is only a child.

3 She is only 17.

4 Q. Just to make sure that your position is clear, is it your position

5 that the representatives of UNMIK know where your daughter is but are

6 declining to share that information with the Office of the Prosecutor? Is

7 that your testimony?

8 A. No. UNMIK is working justly, but it uses the head of criminals.

9 Agim Ceku, Hashim Thaqi, they are all in UNMIK. But if you get your

10 information from Rugova's party then I would agree to that information.

11 As for Agim Ceku and other criminals who cooperate with UNMIK, these

12 people have committed crimes in Bosnia, in Croatia, in Kosova. They have

13 destroyed houses. And a court shall not collaborate with such persons.

14 Such persons should be brought before trial.

15 Q. Sir, I'm going to cut you off now. I think you've answered the

16 question.

17 A. Don't interrupt me, please. I just want to give you a broader

18 answer.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Fazliu, you have answered the question.


21 Q. Sir, is it possible, since your daughter disappeared a few days

22 after your decision to testify in this court that your daughter suffered

23 embarrassment because of your decision? Is that possible?

24 A. It is possible, yes.

25 Q. And is it possible that due to that embarrassment, given the

Page 42868












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Page 42869

1 community where your daughter has been living most recently, that that led

2 to her decision to leave home?

3 A. My daughter didn't leave home. She was taken from home, because

4 at that time when she was taken, abducted, she was alone in the house. My

5 wife had gone to visit her own mother, a 80-year-old woman who was ill.

6 So they knew exactly when to abduct her.

7 Q. Sir, I hate to correct you, but according again to the information

8 of UNMIK, your daughter left her home in Farizaj on the 14th of April of

9 this year without informing anyone and since then she has not been seen.

10 A. I already said yesterday my daughter hasn't been seen ever since.

11 When I came here to testify she called her mother, my wife, and told her

12 that she was alive. My father informed me about this. My wife is there

13 in Ferizaj and UNMIK can go and confirm this with my wife. But I would

14 suggest that UNMIK takes with them an interpreter from Rugova and not from

15 Thaqi or Haradinaj or others who are criminals and who try to cover their

16 own deeds.

17 Q. Sir, yesterday you told the Trial Chamber that until 1998, a

18 majority of Albanians, about 80 per cent of them, worked with the Serbs.

19 Do you recall that testimony?

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. Are you familiar with the work of the Special Rapporteur of the

22 United Nations for the former Yugoslavia, a man named Tadeusz Mazowiecki?

23 I may not be pronouncing the word correctly. Are you familiar with this

24 gentleman's work?

25 A. No, I don't remember this gentleman.

Page 42870

1 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, I'm referring to Exhibit 771, which

2 contains a number of reports of the Special Rapporteur.

3 Q. On the 5th of July, 1990, this is what the Special Rapporteur had

4 to say: "One of the major current problems brought to the Special

5 Rapporteur's attention concerns discrimination against Albanians in Kosovo

6 in labour relations. Since the administration in Kosovo was taken over by

7 the Serbian government on 5 July 1990, thousands of ethnic Albanian

8 workers in government and public enterprises have been dismissed from

9 their jobs, and many were replaced by workers from Serbia and Montenegro."

10 In a later report on the 26th of July, 1990, the Special

11 Rapporteur referred to dismissals based on -- dismissals of Kosovo

12 Albanians based on arbitrary criteria, forcing Kosovo Albanians to sign

13 loyalty oaths in order to keep their jobs, and a report from October 1992

14 describing the dismissal of 800 university staff. Is it still your -- and

15 I could go on. There are more instances here in Exhibit 771. These are

16 paragraphs 99 through 114.

17 Is it still your position, sir, that up until 1998, 80 per cent of

18 the Kosovo Albanian population was working with Serbs?

19 A. Not 80 per cent of Kosovo Albanians worked with the Serbs, because

20 the order to abandon work came in 1991, and those who refused to obey to

21 this order, those were killed, and there are examples of those who were

22 killed for this purpose. Avdi Musa and many, many others. Even policemen

23 were killed, those who did not want to abandon their jobs.

24 Nobody forced me to sign anything for Serbia. I continued my

25 work. This is a fantasy of someone, what you're saying, that we had to

Page 42871

1 sign something, a document.

2 Q. Sir, I think you've answered my question.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Saxon, tell me what you mean by worked with

4 the Serbs?

5 MR. SAXON: Your Honour, I can only go by what is in the LiveNote,

6 and that is -- that is simply how the translation came through, Your

7 Honour.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Worked with them in the sense of collaborating

9 with them or worked with them in an employer/employee relationship or

10 what?

11 MR. SAXON: On page 15 of yesterday's LiveNote: "The majority of

12 us Albanians socialised with Serbs and worked together with them until the

13 year 1998. The majority. Let's say 80 per cent." So it was that

14 testimony that I was referring to today.

15 Q. Sir, why did you tell us yesterday that 80 per cent of the

16 Albanian population was working with the Serbs until 1998?

17 A. It is true that 80 per cent of Albanians worked for Serbia, and

18 even today 80 per cent of Albanians are for Serbia, because even today 70

19 per cent of the population are unemployed. Let us imagine they didn't

20 like Serbia and that's why they were unemployed at that time, but now

21 Europe is there and they are still unemployed. We shouldn't deal with

22 fantasy here. We should speak the truth.

23 Q. And just one last question. Your position today, then, is that 80

24 per cent of the Kosovo Albanian population of Kosovo is in favour of being

25 part of Serbia? Is that your position today?

Page 42872

1 A. I will say this, and I will repeat that ever since Europe took

2 over, over 1.000 females have been kidnapped, and 200.000 Serbs moved from

3 Kosova. Let us not speak of Serbs alone. What about Turks, Romas?

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Fazliu, you're not answering the question.

5 Do you want to pursue it, Mr. Saxon?

6 MR. SAXON: No, I don't, Your Honour. I have nothing further.

7 JUDGE KWON: Just for the record, the page number of yesterday's

8 LiveNote should be 29, I guess.

9 MR. SAXON: I'm willing to be corrected, Your Honour. The version

10 I'm reading it's page 15. It may not be the -- it version I'm reading

11 it's page 15. It may not be the -- it may not be the appropriate number

12 from the machine.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think you should accept Judge Kwon's

14 correction.

15 MR. SAXON: I completely accept Judge Kwon's correction.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, any re-examination?

17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think so, yes. Just a few

18 questions, Mr. Robinson.

19 Re-examined by Mr. Milosevic:

20 Q. [Interpretation] Mr. Fazliu, yesterday Mr. Saxon asked you why you

21 stayed during the bombing and then left after that. Did you say yesterday

22 that after the 12th, when KFOR came, they looted and burned down your

23 house?

24 A. Yes. I said that not only my family but others, 80 per cent of

25 the population from the village of Mirash, Shativje [phoen], Tasli [phoen]

Page 42873

1 and so on, we were all together. Not only my close family. We were all

2 staying together until NATO entered. We kept guard duty from criminals

3 all night long. We were all together. I'm speaking of my own

4 municipality.

5 Q. Mr. Fazliu, what happened at that time when these so-called

6 protection forces of the UN came and the KLA? What happened to Albanians

7 who did not support the KLA, who did not work for them --

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Saxon, you say that didn't arise?

9 MR. SAXON: That is what I would like to say, Your Honour.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: You know, the issues are so interlocked I think

11 it's very difficult to say it doesn't arise.

12 But, Mr. Milosevic, you might want to consider whether it's

13 necessary for you to pursue that line. You have pursued it with -- with

14 other witnesses, and perhaps to far greater effect and with more success

15 than you will have with this witness. You have to assess your witness.

16 And I find your re-examination too long. If this trial were a trial with

17 a jury, you would lose many points through the way you conduct your

18 re-examination. It shouldn't be more than ten minutes, five, ten minutes.

19 So consider whether you wish to pursue this line with this witness.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, yesterday the question

21 was raised of how come Mr. Fazliu was there during the bombing and left

22 afterwards. So the reason should be clear why he left, why people were

23 leaving, what happened to those people who didn't cooperate with the KLA.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Put it to him, then. Put it to him.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 42874

1 Q. Did you understand the question, Mr. Fazliu?

2 A. Yes. On the 12th, as soon as they entered, Avdi Musa was killed.

3 This is my first example. And they began to torch houses, Serb houses,

4 Albanian houses, houses of Albanians who didn't follow their orders. And

5 KFOR, not UNMIK, helped them in this. I heard with my own ears when two

6 persons came to kill me in my own house. We caught one of them. One of

7 them managed to escape. So when KFOR came, the police, I don't know if it

8 was KFOR police or UNMIK police, when they came, the interpreter was

9 Albanian, and she said to him, "Don't be afraid. We will release you

10 immediately." She thought that I was a Serb and that person came to kill

11 me. She didn't know I was Albanian. And this is what I heard with my own

12 ears when she told me, "We will release you immediately." His name was

13 Fadil Krasniqi from Grnijsa Evijeter [phoen], and his friend managed to

14 escape. This is true what I am saying.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, yes.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Were many Albanians killed after KFOR came to Kosovo?

18 A. Only from my circle of friends five were killed, Naser Haziri,

19 Isuf Sakica, Avdyle Trstena, Islam from Belince is also killed, and Ismajl

20 from Godance. I don't know their last names now. It's been six years.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: What is the relationship between their killing

22 and KFOR coming, and KFOR?

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] KFOR didn't kill them. The

24 criminals killed them, the KLA criminals, because they did not follow

25 their rules and orders. The criminals wore KLA uniforms. The day KFOR

Page 42875

1 entered, both thieves and bad men, they dressed themselves in KLA

2 uniforms. They were thieves from Albania, Italy, Macedonia, and so on.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Let's just clarify one more question that Mr. Saxon insisted upon.

6 When you said 80 per cent of Albanians worked and socialised with Serbs -

7 socialised, that's what you said - did you mean that they worked for the

8 government or that they socialised and worked in the fields with their

9 livestock, a regular type of life so to speak? So what did you mean when

10 you said 80 per cent? Did you mean that they worked for the government or

11 are you talking about normal relations in regular life, depending on who

12 was in what line of work, a farmer, a forester, whoever?

13 A. I tried to be brief and spoke in general terms. And being brief

14 is that there were Albanians in SUP, in forest ranging, and so on. We

15 worked together. We lived together. We attended each other's weddings.

16 And you can prove this today. If you go out to the border and record the

17 truth there, you will see how they greet each other, how they hug each

18 other. They still do business together but illegally from the criminals.

19 I can record this, film this, and I can guarantee that on a daily basis

20 you will find 1.000 Albanians and Serbs greeting each other, kissing each

21 other, hugging each other. But they come to the border between the two

22 zones secretly without the knowledge of the criminals. This is the

23 truth.

24 And also, an Albanian should go and escort someone who goes to the

25 border to meet someone else because otherwise criminals are following

Page 42876

1 them. Even myself when I go to see my own family, my brothers come and

2 escort me.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. Just one more question, Mr. Fazliu. Albanians being dismissed

6 from work in 1998 and 1999 is something that was mentioned here. Who

7 ordered Albanians to leave their work? You lived there all the time.

8 Tell us very briefly who was it that issued this kind of order?

9 A. The KLA leaders, the KLA. As I said earlier, they told everybody,

10 not just me, whoever doesn't abandon their work with the Serbs, they will

11 be killed, and this is proved.

12 Q. Thank you, Mr. Fazliu. I have no further questions.

13 I don't think I went beyond your ten minutes, Mr. Robinson.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: No. Well, try and maintain that in future.

15 Thank you, Mr. Fazliu, for coming to give evidence, and your

16 evidence is now complete and you may leave.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you for listening to my

18 evidence with carefulness. Have a good day.

19 [The witness withdrew]

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Your next witness, Mr. Milosevic.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The next witness is Vojislav

22 Seselj.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let the witness make the declaration. Give the

24 witness the declaration so that he can make it.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak

Page 42877












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Page 42878

1 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit.


4 [Witness answered through interpreter]

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may begin, Mr. Milosevic.

6 Examined by Mr. Milosevic:

7 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Mr. Seselj.

8 A. Good morning, Mr. Milosevic.

9 Q. Tell us, please, where were you born and when?

10 A. I was born on the 11th of October, 1954, in Sarajevo.

11 Q. What schools have you completed?

12 A. I completed elementary school and high school there, and the

13 Faculty of Law in the record time of two years and eight months. After

14 that, I enrolled in the constitutional legal department.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: What's the normal time for completing law?

16 THE WITNESS: Normal time is four years.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

18 Mr. Milosevic.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] After that, after that, I enrolled

20 in a graduate source at the Faculty of Law in Belgrade, the stream for

21 constitutional law. And after less than two years, I got my masters

22 degree.

23 After a year, I defended my doctorate as well and became a doctor

24 of law.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 42879

1 Q. Where did you work and what are the positions you held?

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just before that, Mr. Milosevic.

3 What was your doctoral thesis?

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My doctoral thesis was the political

5 essence of militarism and Fascism.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Was that in law, then, or in politics?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It had a legal aspect, but the

8 political aspect was predominant. Actually, I critically dealt with the

9 basic forms of totalitarianism, right wing totalitarianism that is. In my

10 scholarly work after that, I dealt with the subject matter of left wing

11 totalitarianism as well, criticism of the communist variant of

12 totalitarianism.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You asked where I worked.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Tell us briefly. What were all the places where you worked, and

17 what are the positions you held?

18 A. After completing the Faculty of Law, I was appointed assistant

19 professor at the faculty of political science in Sarajevo. After

20 defending my doctorate and after having completed my regular military

21 service, I was elected lecturer in international relations. When I

22 asserted myself as an anti-communist dissident in 1981, I was expelled

23 from the only political party that existed then, and then I was proclaimed

24 an ideologically and politically inappropriate person, to work with

25 students, that is, and I was unlawfully removed from teaching. I was

Page 42880

1 transferred to an institute, the institute for social research, and my

2 status was that of a scholarly associate. I remained there until 1984,

3 which was arrested because of a manuscript I had not published. The

4 police discovered it before I had showed it -- shown it to anyone. And I

5 was sentenced to eight years in prison, and that is how I became jobless.

6 When I was released from prison in 1986, I moved to Belgrade where

7 I lived as a freelance writer. I published --

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: You served four or five years in prison.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was sentenced to eight years in

10 prison for the counter-revolutionary threat to the fundamentals of the

11 social-political system. The Supreme Court of Bosnia-Herzegovina reduced

12 my sentence to four years and re-qualified the crime that I was sentenced

13 for. Enemy propaganda was ultimately the crime I was sentenced for. And

14 the Federal Court of Yugoslavia further reduced my sentence to one year

15 and ten months, and that is the time I spent in prison.

16 After I got out of prison, I had nothing to live on in Sarajevo,

17 and that's why I moved to Belgrade. I worked in Belgrade as a freelance

18 writer. I published my books privately until 1989. I published a total

19 of 14 books. All of these books were for the most part from the domain of

20 political and legal theory and political critique. Seven of these books

21 were banned by courts of law. Seven were not banned.

22 At that time, not a single periodical, not a single newspaper

23 under the communist regime did not publish my texts.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Thank you, Mr. Seselj. Tell me, when did you go into politics,

Page 42881

1 although you have partly dealt with that field already.

2 A. Well, let me tell you two more things, Mr. Milosevic, that have to

3 do with my professional work.

4 Q. Please go ahead.

5 A. In 1991, I was appointed associate professor at the Faculty of Law

6 in Pristina. That is the university in Kosovo and Metohija. And I

7 regularly taught there for a year. Introduction to law was the subject I

8 taught or, rather, the general theory of the state and law was the

9 alternate name of that subject that I taught.

10 A year later, my assistant professor who I found there, Mr. Zizic,

11 obtained his Ph.D., and I decided to leave my professorship so that I

12 would not hamper his own advancement. I was already in politics very

13 intensively. Politics was my basic preoccupation, whereas he fully

14 devoted himself to scholarly work.

15 Then in 1999, I was elected full-time professor at the Faculty of

16 Law in Belgrade teaching the subject Political System. After the seizure

17 of power by the Mafia on the 5th of October, 2000, the new traitor

18 government unlawfully threw me out of the law school. I thought I should

19 say that so that my CV could be complete.

20 Q. Would you also say that when you were unlawfully thrown from the

21 law school you were a deputy in the parliament?

22 A. Yes. At that time I was a federal MP of the Federal Republic of

23 Yugoslavia.

24 Q. Could you tell us when you became involved in politics?

25 A. Well, one could say that I became politically involved already in

Page 42882

1 high school. I was a youth activist. I was the commandant of youth

2 brigades in various labour actions, labour drives. I held some of the

3 highest titles in the youth organisation. I was president of the

4 association of students in my school, president of the youth association.

5 And when I was a student at the university already in my freshman year --

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: The more appropriate question might be when you

7 were not involved in politics.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's very difficult to say when I

9 was not politically involved. I would paraphrase a friend of mine, a

10 former friend of mine by saying that politics became my fate very early

11 on.

12 So as I said, I was president of the students' association at law

13 school, and I was the first student to be an assistant to the dean. But I

14 have always been some sort of local dissident. I was not a rebel against

15 the communist regime as a whole, but I incessantly rebelled against

16 injustice, against crime, against unlawful conduct.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

18 Mr. Milosevic.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Tell us very briefly in which political parties have you ever been

21 a member.

22 A. I was a member of the League of Communists at the time when it was

23 the only political party in the former Yugoslavia. I was admitted into

24 the party before I turned 17, as a good student, as a prominent

25 participant in so-called labour actions. And it was, in fact, during one

Page 42883

1 of those labour drives in Banja Luka in 1971 that I was admitted into the

2 party, because I had bloody, bleeding blisters on my hands that I earned

3 working on the reconstruction of Banja Luka after a catastrophic

4 earthquake.

5 Communism was then the only possible world view in our educational

6 system.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: The question was in which political parties or of

8 which political parties were you a member. Just tell us that briefly.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have said -- I have mentioned one

10 party I was a member of, and the second party of which I am a member to

11 date and over which I preside is the Serbian Radical Party. Those are the

12 only two parties of which I have been a member. But to avoid all

13 confusion, from the day of establishment of the Serbian Radical Party, it

14 was first called the Serbian Freedom Lovers Movement, then the Serbian

15 Movement of Renewal, later the Serbian Chetnik Movement, and then the

16 Serbian Chetnik Movement united with the greatest number of councils of

17 the Radical Party to form, on the 23rd of February, 1991, in Kragujevac,

18 the Serbian Radical Party.

19 So for the uninitiated who might understand this as transfer

20 between parties, let me make it clear that this is one single party which

21 changed names several times.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Tell us very briefly and very concisely, if you can, what does the

24 Serbian Radical Party advocate?

25 A. The Serbian Radical Party is very clearly nationalist as a

Page 42884

1 political organisation, patriotic in its orientation, and it has its

2 national, political, economic, social, and cultural programme.

3 On the political level, the Serbian Radical Party works for the

4 Greater Serbia, and that is the only Serbian political party advocating

5 the Greater Serbia, where as the idea of Greater Serbia implies a united

6 Serbian state including all Serb lands and the greatest majority of the

7 Serb people, regardless of their faith, which means brotherhood and unity

8 of Orthodox Serbs, Catholic Serbs, Muslim Serbs, Protestant Serbs and

9 atheist Serbs.

10 Second, in the political sphere, the Serbian Radical Party is a

11 clearly democratic party. From the outset, we have advocated a

12 multi-party democratic system, full observance of all civil rights and

13 duties, rights and freedoms, in fact, complete respect for the rights of

14 national minorities, and a modern legal order that would be based on the

15 rule of law.

16 From the economic point of view, the Serbian Radical Party is of a

17 liberal nature. We advocate freedom of private initiative and free market

18 competition.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj --

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In social terms, on the social

21 level --

22 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the Judge, please.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let me just take you back to your comment that

24 the Serbian Radical Party is the only Serbian political party advocating

25 the idea of a Greater Serbia. Are you saying none of the other parties

Page 42885

1 advocated that idea?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. No. After the Second World

3 War, there was no other political party in the entire Serb people, apart

4 from the Serb Radical Party, that advocated the Greater Serbia. Maybe for

5 a very short while the Serbian Renewal Movement of Vuk Draskovic advocated

6 it as well, but Vuk Draskovic abandoned this orientation. When in 1991 he

7 came under the control of the US ambassador in Belgrade, Mr. Zimmerman

8 until -- in fact, at that time he turned coat completely, changed his

9 national orientation by 180 degrees.

10 I would like to give a complete answer to Mr. Robinson,

11 Mr. Milosevic, if you don't mind.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. I don't mind, of course. I just wanted to draw your attention to

14 the fact that this issue, as a very special issue, has to have its own

15 place in your testimony. You must bear in mind that we are still dealing

16 with the introduction, with general issues where you are presenting a

17 picture of yourself, your party, and the positions you advocated.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic is right. Let him conduct his

19 examination-in-chief. It is an issue which he will come to, the question

20 of a Greater Serbia. So let him deal with it at that time. I just

21 thought I would raise that question with you.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, with your leave, I

23 would like to say very briefly in two sentences something to complete my

24 answer to your question, and I hope that I will have opportunity later on

25 to explain what the concept of Greater Serbia means.

Page 42886












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13 English transcripts.













Page 42887

1 As for other political parties, I would say such as the Socialist

2 Party of Mr. Milosevic, not only never advocated Greater Serbia but worked

3 strongly for the former Yugoslavia.

4 The Serbian Democratic Party of the Republika Srpska and the

5 Serbian Democratic Party of Krajina were also in favour of Yugoslavia

6 alone. And later on when it was clear that Yugoslavia could not survive,

7 they advocated a union of Serb lands.

8 It is very important for me to emphasise now that it was the

9 Serbian Radical Party alone who has been for Greater Serbia from the

10 outset. It's the only one who advocated Greater Serbia. And the idea of

11 Greater Serbia is the raison d'etre of the Serbian Radical Party. If by

12 chance at some point in the future the Serbian Radical Party should

13 abandon the idea of Greater Serbia, there would be no longer any reason

14 for it to continue existing.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: I see. Thank you very much.

16 Mr. Milosevic, yes.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Mr. Seselj, for us to have a complete picture of your party called

19 the Serbian Radical Party, you said that it has a clearly national

20 orientation. Please supplement this with a couple of clarifications.

21 What is the national structure of the party, of its leadership? What is

22 the ethnic make-up of the body of people from the party occupying various

23 public offices?

24 A. As nationalists, we are extreme patriots. We are self-effacing in

25 our struggle for national interests, but we are very strict and consistent

Page 42888

1 in our respect for the rights of all other nationalities, and what we wish

2 for our people we wish for other peoples too.

3 In our party, due to such a consistent national policy, we have a

4 large number of representatives from other ethnicities. Hungarians,

5 Slovaks, Romanians, Bunevci people, Bulgarians, the Gorani, even

6 Albanians. Our membership includes people of all faiths, Muslims,

7 Catholics, Protestants, Jews as well.

8 On the other hand, the leadership of the Serbian Radical Party

9 also includes members of other ethnicities. In the central fatherland

10 administration, we have Slovaks, Romas. The first representative of the

11 Roma people who has been persecuted throughout Europe for centuries, the

12 first Roma man who became a minister was minister Jovan Damjanovic from

13 the Serbian Radical Party. Even now we have an MP, Mehmed Spaho, a

14 Muslim, from a well-known Muslim family, one of the most respected Muslim

15 families in the entire former Yugoslavia. One of the vice-presidents of

16 the national assembly of the Republic of Serbia from the Serbian Radical

17 Party is a Bulgarian. We had Hungarian MPs from our party.

18 This is a consistent policy of ours that has never been

19 questioned. We never waivered about that because we believe that within a

20 political system that is democratic, all ethnicities should take part in

21 all political processes and have access to all public functions.

22 We demand only one thing from members of national minorities: To

23 be loyal to their country and not to work for its secession, its break-up,

24 its destruction.

25 Q. To wrap up this general description of your party, what public

Page 42889

1 offices did you personally occupy as well as members of your party?

2 A. I used to be deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of Serbia, and

3 in the coalition government of national unity, established on the 24th of

4 March, 1998, and it lasted until the end of 2000 or thereabouts. Out of a

5 total of 36 members of the government, the cabinet, 15 were from the

6 Serbian Radical Party, 15 from the Socialist Party of Serbia, and six from

7 the Yugoslav left.

8 And somewhere towards the end of 1999 or the beginning of 2000,

9 the ministers from the Serbian Radical Party became members of the federal

10 government of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. That lasted all the way

11 until the elections in September 2000.

12 Q. Mr. Seselj, to lay a foundation, you held all these posts. Your

13 party, in all municipalities throughout Serbia, and it also existed on the

14 territory of other republics, you were the deputy Prime Minister, members

15 of your party were ministers in the republican government. What was your

16 position -- what is the position of the Serb Radical Party today with

17 respect to its participation in political life and political institutions?

18 MR. NICE: Your Honours, there does come a point at which the

19 present political orientation of any party may be of limited or nil

20 relevance. I hesitated to interrupt so far but I can't immediately see

21 the value to your inquiry of the last question and its possible answer.

22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I'm not receiving an

23 interpretation of this.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: No interpretation? Mr. Nice, perhaps you would

25 raise your point again and then we can have interpretation.

Page 42890

1 MR. NICE: I'll simply repeat what I said before that there does

2 come a point at which the present political orientation of any party may

3 be of limited or nil relevance. I hesitated to interrupt so far but I

4 can't immediately see the value to your inquiry of the last question and

5 its possible answer.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, explain the relevance.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The question is relevant because it

8 doesn't illustrate only the present position but the overall position of

9 the Serb Radical Party which is the largest party in Serbia today with the

10 greatest number of MPs, which is --

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: How is it relevant to the issues in the

12 indictment?

13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It is relevant because --

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: I have only seen one area of relevance in

15 relation to the issue of a Greater Serbia.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very good. I will establish the

17 relevance through a question I will put to Mr. Seselj.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Do you have any direct knowledge of the crisis and the war on the

20 territory of the former Yugoslavia, and by this I mean the territory of

21 Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and especially that

22 part of Serbia which is called Kosovo and Metohija? Have you any direct

23 knowledge in view of the positions you held?

24 A. Yes. I have the most direct kind of knowledge in view of the fact

25 that the Serb Radical Party very early on developed its party

Page 42891

1 infrastructure throughout Serbia, and this includes Kosovo and Metohija,

2 throughout Montenegro, throughout Republika Srpska, and Republika Srpska

3 Krajina. Currently, we are the largest political party in Serbia. We

4 have almost a third of the deputies in the national assembly. In

5 Montenegro, at the relevant time mentioned in the indictments, we had

6 eight deputies in the parliament without after total of 75 or 73.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Seselj.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But, Mr. Robinson, it's very

9 important to mention the Republika Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina

10 where we had a highly developed party infrastructure. At the first

11 elections in Republika Srpska in 1996, we had ten deputies, and in Srpska

12 Krajina we had 16 out of 82 members of parliament. In every municipality

13 in Serbia, including Kosovo and Metohija, Montenegro --

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Thank you very much.

15 [Trial Chamber confers]

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Mr. Seselj --

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic. Mr. Milosevic, I think there is

19 some relevance but that has been established and you should move on to

20 another issue now.

21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Robinson.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Mr. Seselj, according to paragraph 87 [as interpreted] of the

24 so-called Kosovo indictment against me, I and a group of high-ranking

25 functionaries of Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

Page 42892

1 participated in a joint criminal enterprise which, as it says here, arose

2 at the latest in October 1998 and continued throughout the time period

3 when the crimes alleged, I'm quoting from what it says here, alleged in

4 counts 1 to 5 of this indictment occurred, beginning on or about the 1st

5 of January --

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, let's have the correct citation.

7 Paragraph 87 you said. That's not the correct paragraph.

8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, no. I didn't say paragraph 87.

9 I said 17.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: 17. It came across as 87.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. And I am quoting this paragraph which says that this joint

13 criminal enterprise came into existence no later than October 1998 and

14 continued throughout the time period until the 20th of June, 1999.

15 My question to you, Mr. Seselj, is: What position did you hold in

16 this period?

17 A. In this period, I was the deputy Prime Minister of the Republic of

18 Serbia, and I can testify that there was no joint criminal enterprise and

19 that in every possible way we tried to find a peaceful political solution

20 for the problem of Kosovo and Metohija and to prevent the aggression of

21 the NATO pact.

22 Q. Mr. Seselj, did your position as party president and deputy Prime

23 Minister make it possible for you to gain direct knowledge of events in

24 Kosovo and Metohija in that period?

25 A. Yes.

Page 42893

1 Q. As well as the policies of the government of Serbia in which you

2 participated and the other bodies and organs of Yugoslavia in which your

3 collaborators participated, and the entire set of issues arising from the

4 Kosovo crisis and the NATO aggression against the Republic of Yugoslavia.

5 A. Yes. Apart from the daily information which I received as deputy

6 Prime Minister, including reports from ministers who belonged to the Serb

7 Radical Party, as well as the information which as the president of the

8 Serb Radical Party I received from every Municipal Board of our party in

9 Kosovo and Metohija. In this period I made trips to Kosovo and Metohija

10 myself in order to get firsthand information on the actual situation on

11 the ground. Therefore, I feel that my information is as full as can

12 possibly be available to a single individual. I don't think that anything

13 could have happened without my knowledge.

14 Q. Thank you. To put this aside for a moment, did you deal with the

15 issues of Kosovo and Metohija theoretically as well?

16 A. Yes. I wrote an extensive study about this which I published in

17 my book "The Serbian People and the New World Order."

18 Q. Mr. Seselj, you have before you -- I can see a large file. These

19 are. These are the exhibits that I wish to tender through your testimony.

20 Could you please open tab 25. Everything has been marked for you. I

21 assume this is the first time you have encountered this way of marking

22 material?

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, sorry to interrupt you. We are

24 going to take the break before you come to the exhibits.

25 [Trial Chamber confers]

Page 42894

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: We'll take a break now. 20 minutes.

2 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.

3 --- On resuming at 10.56 a.m.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj, as we're moving into the substance of

5 your testimony, I will give you the general warning which will be

6 applicable to all of your testimony that you are not obliged --

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Can the volume be turned up a

8 little.

9 THE INTERPRETER: And microphone, please, for Mr. Seselj.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Can you hear me now?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't hear you very well. I can

12 hear you, but not loud enough. Can the volume be turned up.

13 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters note that Mr. Seselj's microphone

14 is not on.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Your microphone is not on.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's better now. I can hear now.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: I was saying, Mr. Seselj, that as we're now going

18 to move into the substance of your testimony, I will give you the general

19 warning which will be applicable to all of your testimony that you are not

20 obliged to answer any question that might tend to incriminate you. That

21 is pursuant to the provisions of Rule 90(E).

22 Mr. Milosevic, you are going to move now to the binders.

23 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Milosevic, please.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's on now.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 42895












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13 English transcripts.













Page 42896

1 Q. Mr. Seselj, in answer to my question, you confirmed that you dealt

2 with the issue of Kosovo and Metohija theoretically as well. In tab 25,

3 there is a part of your book entitled "The Serb Nation and the New World

4 Order: Current Legal-constitutional and Political-theoretical

5 Discussions."

6 You are the author of this work; is that correct?

7 A. Yes.

8 Q. Could we go briefly, please, because a detailed analysis would

9 detain us too long.

10 In the first part, you deal with the historical approach, and in

11 the second part with the crisis and the involvement of the international

12 community. Would this be a general description of your work?

13 A. Yes, that's correct.

14 Q. Tell me --

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just for the record, Mr. Milosevic, the book is

16 entitled "The Serb Nation and the New World Order, Current

17 Legal-Constititional and Political-Theoretical Discussions." Yes,

18 continue.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. How were your theoretical and professional investigations

21 reflected in your work in practice as regards Kosovo and Metohija?

22 A. Well, it was certainly very important. I analysed the historical

23 background of the entire issue of Kosovo and Metohija, which has been

24 ongoing for more than 300 years. The problem dates from the Viennese wars

25 when the Turks were defeated before Vienna in 1683 and the Austrian army

Page 42897

1 penetrated the pin [phoen] to Serbia. It then raised a rebellion among

2 the Serb people. This rebellion was widespread. It was headed by

3 Arsenije III Carnojevic, the Serb patriarch, and thanks to the Serb rebels

4 the Austrian general, Pikov Lemini [phoen], penetrated as far as Skopje

5 and took Skopje in 1690. There he became ill of the plague and died in

6 Prizren soon afterwards. His successor was not an able military man, and

7 the Austrian army started to withdraw. The Serb people continued --

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj, I'm going to stop you. We have had a

9 lot of evidence in this trial on historical matters. The question was how

10 were your theoretical and professional investigations reflected in your

11 work in practice as regards Kosovo and Metohija. Bring us to the present.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I was about to. I think I've

13 been brief in all my responses so far, Mr. Robinson. However, without a

14 historical background, one cannot provide a correct response. The

15 political standpoints of all those involved in the Kosovo and Metohija

16 crisis depended on this history. The essence of the crisis was in the

17 change of the ethnic make-up of the population of Kosovo and Metohija,

18 which started changing after the Viennese wars, and the methods by which

19 these changes occurred are extremely important.

20 How did it come about that Kosovo and Metohija, which had been

21 populated by a hundred per cent Serbs became a territory on which the

22 Serbs were a minority? This did not come about spontaneously or

23 peacefully. It was always done by violence. But until 1878, the Serbs

24 were the absolute majority regardless of all the persecutions to which

25 they were exposed.

Page 42898

1 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... intervene often,

2 and I can see that with the --

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Unfortunately I can't get my microphone to work,

4 Mr. Nice, but I would -- now it is working. Thank you.

5 MR. NICE: But I notice the nature of the witness's response to

6 judicial rulings is sometimes somewhat forceful.

7 There are clearly limits that must be put, in our respectful

8 submission, on background and on general answers as well as on modern

9 political answers, and the last answer that the witness gave despite the

10 Court's warning is outside the confines that the Court expected.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice, I understand the comments that you

12 make. I must say that I have not found the witness's answers to be

13 forceful. It's his manner of presentation. I don't find it in any way

14 objectionable at all.

15 Mr. Milosevic, bring the witness to the present, and that's my

16 clear instruction. We have had enough evidence on history.

17 And I appreciate the point, Mr. Seselj, that you make, that it is

18 important to know the background, historical background. I appreciate

19 that very well, and I don't mind your spending a little bit of time on it

20 but we have to move to the indictment.

21 And that is what you will now deal with, Mr. Milosevic.

22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

23 Q. Mr. Seselj, you pointed out that the changes in the ethnic make-up

24 occurred as a rule pursuant to violence and pressure from the outside.

25 A. Yes. That is the essence of my reply. That's how I understood

Page 42899

1 it.

2 Q. Let us deal briefly now with your theoretical treatise in tab 25.

3 You -- I will pass over the general historical background, the beginning

4 of the Serb exodus and what you say about it, and especially in this

5 treatise of yours, on page 115, you deal with a document which you call

6 the Bonn annex. That's in chapter 14.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: We have to find it in the English because it's

8 obviously not 115 in the English text. Mr. Nice is usually very helpful

9 in that regard.

10 MR. NICE: Yes, Your Honour. I'm afraid we haven't prepared the

11 document for these purposes at this stage, and it would help if the

12 accused would have this in mind. We will do the best we can, but it will

13 take some time, I expect.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: To help us to find it in the English text,

15 Mr. Milosevic, by giving us some guide. Maybe Mr. Seselj can find it.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The guide would be that it is

17 chapter 14.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I do not like to use

19 the English language, especially over the past few years I've been

20 reluctant to use it, but it's somewhere around the third, the third of

21 this text, and the title is the Bonn annex.

22 JUDGE KWON: 27.


24 JUDGE KWON: But before that, can I ask when this was published?

25 What date in 1999?

Page 42900

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] This was published, it can be seen

2 from the contents, immediately after the NATO aggression against the

3 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. You will see that in this study I deal

4 with Resolution 1244 of the Security Council of the United Nations and the

5 so-called Kumanovo agreement. I end with an analysis of the consequences

6 of the NATO occupation of Kosovo and Metohija and the continued mass

7 killing of members of the Serb people.

8 So I could not give you the exact date, you see. You know what

9 it's like with printing presses. But it could have been, say, the end of

10 the summer of 1999, the beginning of the autumn.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Perhaps sometime in the month of

13 October.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Seselj.

15 Mr. Milosevic.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Mr. Seselj, so we have found this chapter. Why did you deal with

18 it in particular? But try to answer my question bearing in mind the need

19 to say what your assessment was of the positions of the Contact Group

20 which are also attached here, because the Bonn annex has to do with these

21 positions. However, there were several such documents that came from the

22 Contact Group. What conclusions did you reach on the basis of the

23 positions of the Contact Group? All of this preceded the NATO aggression

24 against Kosovo and Metohija.

25 A. I would like to draw your attention to the preceding three pages

Page 42901

1 of the study. The previous chapter number 13 which has a different title

2 retrospective of past Western interference into Serb internal political

3 relations. I deal with foreign interventions in the internal affairs of

4 Serbia after the signing of the Dayton agreement. You may remember,

5 Mr. Milosevic, that the Americans promised that after the signing of the

6 Dayton Paris agreement Serbia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia would

7 have all sanctions lifted. However, like many times before that, the

8 Americans were deceitful. Immediately after the signing they proclaimed

9 the so-called outer wall of sanctions, a category which had been

10 unrecorded until then in international public law, and they said that this

11 outer wall of sanctions would go on until the question of Kosovo and

12 Metohija was resolved and the cooperation between the Federal Republic of

13 Yugoslavia with The Hague Tribunal. That is the beginning, the real

14 beginning of the interference of Western powers in internal affairs of the

15 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia.

16 I refer to a few meetings of the Contact Group here that consist

17 primarily of the Western powers but Russia as well, although Russia didn't

18 did not play any major role in this context. Sometimes they made the

19 Western sword against Serb national interests a bit more blunt, but they

20 do not bring into question the integrity of the Federal Republic of

21 Yugoslavia, but tendentiously in the documents of the Contact Group they

22 do not refer to Serbia. They talk about guaranteeing the territory and

23 integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but they ask for autonomy

24 for Kosovo and Metohija without mentioning that Kosovo is an integral part

25 of Serbia, which is very tendentious because they think that in the future

Page 42902

1 there is no more Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, that this would be a

2 completely pending issue if the borders of Serbia are not guaranteed. So

3 that is the first question that I analysed here, and the Trial Chamber has

4 it as -- at its disposal in the English translation too. If necessary, I

5 can go into this in greater detail.

6 Then we get to the Bonn annex dated 1998 when the Contact Group

7 more decidedly and more clearly presented its views. The Bonn annex is

8 preceded by the meeting held on the 8th of July when the basic elements

9 were clearly spelled out to resolve the status of Kosovo within the

10 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as is emphasised. Then the Contact Group

11 started putting forth certain pre-conditions, thus bringing into question

12 the state integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and of Serbia.

13 The Bonn annex already calls for a special status of Kosovo and Metohija.

14 That's what they called it. And in paragraph 4 of this annex, it says

15 that the Security Council, the OSCE, and the neighbouring states would

16 welcome an agreement. However, before that neighbouring states would

17 participate as signatories, witness signatories which presupposes a type

18 of interference and foreign intervention which had been impermissible

19 until then in international relations.

20 Now, what is called for in the Bonn annex. The Bonn annex seeks a

21 status which until then was unheard of in international relations.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj, I find what you are saying quite

23 interesting, but it is going to be very difficult to follow the evidence

24 if we have answers as long and as lengthy as this one has been. My

25 preference in conducting trials here is for short questions and short

Page 42903

1 answers. It's more difficult to follow a long narrative, and we have to

2 appreciate the evidence.

3 So, Mr. Milosevic, I want you to direct Mr. Seselj to a particular

4 area in the book where you want a particular question answered. And you

5 give as brief an answer as possible. I know in your background,

6 Mr. Seselj, you have been a professor and a lecturer, but we don't want

7 lectures here. So try to make your answers as brief as possible. If you

8 look on the transcript page before you, when you get beyond one page and

9 you're running over, the answer is generally, in my view, too long to be

10 appreciated as evidence.

11 So, Mr. Milosevic, put another question to the witness now, and I

12 want the witness to follow my guidelines and make the answers as short as

13 possible.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Mr. Seselj, you looked into the Bonn annex here in particular, and

16 you presented some reasons for doing so. What are these important reasons

17 why you dealt with the Bonn annex in particular, as well as the other

18 documents of the Contact Group that was dealing with the crisis in Kosovo

19 and Metohija?

20 A. Well, because already in the options paper of the Contact Group,

21 which immediately preceded the Bonn annex, I saw what the Western powers

22 really wanted, actually.

23 Q. Let's just be very specific and practical. What conclusions? You

24 mentioned the word "options" now. What did you infer on the basis of

25 these options of the contact group?

Page 42904












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13 English transcripts.













Page 42905

1 A. The Contact Group attacks the constitutional solution concerning

2 autonomies in the Republic of Serbia, invoking the communist institution

3 from 1974. Something that is a product of a totalitarian communist system

4 cannot be a guideline in a democratic state in order to find a legal

5 solution to a particular problem, because if this constitution from 1974

6 were a good one, then one must bear in mind that there was no

7 parliamentarianism. There was no multi-party system. There was no

8 freedom of the press. For their political beliefs people were taken to

9 prison. Private property was not guaranteed. They are taking us back to

10 something that we wanted to escape from, we as a people and we as a state.

11 This formulation from the 1974 constitution was legally impossible.

12 Kosovo and Metohija at that time was an integral part of Serbia, but

13 practically it -- they took part in governing Serbia whereas Serbia itself

14 had no powers in Kosovo.

15 We did not bring into question the autonomy of Kosovo and

16 Metohija. However, we asked that this should be an autonomy according to

17 world standards, to see what autonomy really meant. The Contact Group

18 here in the Bonn annex asks us to give an autonomy state insignia,

19 including a flag, a coat of arms, an anthem, et cetera. That is

20 unheard of even in the case of Aland Islands and Altoadige in Italy and

21 other examples. We cannot find such precedents that the Contact Group

22 insisted upon. And that is the essence of this annex.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Next question.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Mr. Seselj, when we look at the Bonn annex and in terms of what

Page 42906

1 you said just now, can we link this up with the documents of the Contact

2 Group that are contained in tabs 13 through 18? Can we say that what can

3 be seen here is the same approach that you indicated in the Bonn annex in

4 terms of their attitude towards autonomy, their attitude towards the facts

5 of life in Kosovo and Metohija, and the clarity of the intentions that can

6 be seen in the approach of the Contact Group?

7 A. Their intentions were highly obvious, and that is what I dealt

8 with. They were not interested in the real situation in Kosovo and

9 Metohija at all. They kept insisting on negotiations, but they did

10 nothing in order to contribute to these talks actually taking place.

11 On the other hand, the Western powers instruct Albanian political

12 representatives to persistently avoid a dialogue with the Serbian

13 authorities. On the one hand, we have Serbia which does want a dialogue,

14 which is constantly calling for a dialogue and is prepared to conduct a

15 dialogue on all questions except for the territorial integrity of the

16 state. On the other hand, we have the Western powers which are constantly

17 threatening, which are constantly insisting, but actually instructing

18 Albanian political representatives to reject dialogue as such. That would

19 more or less be the essence of the matter.

20 Q. Very well. Let us look at two elements that are a red thread

21 through these elements and these documents. Let's see how correct this

22 is.

23 What is being said all the time is that there is some kind of

24 violence exercised against civilians. That can be seen in the documents

25 of the Contact Group. And another element is that we do not want to have

Page 42907

1 a dialogue. Are any of these two assumptions true, that there is violence

2 against civilians and that Serbia does not want dialogue?

3 A. First of all, there was no violence against civilians. It can be

4 said quite freely that civilians in Kosovo and Metohija lived in optimal

5 conditions. As a matter of fact, they were not even in a position to

6 strictly abide by legal norms which is unheard of in other countries and

7 in Serbia itself. Civilians for the most part did not pay for their own

8 electricity, water, public utilities. They didn't pay any taxes. And the

9 government tolerated that wanting to secure their goodwill and to effect

10 the political dialogue in that way, to make it possible. The authorities

11 intervened only when there was violence.

12 On the other hand, you have the Western powers, members of the

13 Contact Group, and no arguments are good enough for them. They keep

14 telling their own story, they're persistent in this. You can do your

15 utmost in terms of giving them any kind of arguments that you have

16 available. They are quite simply blind and deaf to all these arguments.

17 That is the core of the matter.

18 On the other hand, as for the possibility of starting a dialogue,

19 there absolutely was none, because somebody from the West promised the

20 Albanian political representatives strictly carry out all these

21 instructions. Your time will come and we are going to materialise your

22 interests as we planned together. Somebody keeps asking you for dialogue

23 and in practice keeps impeding that dialogue all the time.

24 Q. Mr. Seselj, tell us, what did you know about political and

25 intelligence preparations carried out by the West and the KLA in

Page 42908

1 Kosovo -- for war in Kosovo and Metohija?

2 A. I had a great deal of knowledge about this, and it culminated when

3 a High Representative of the US, Gelbard, came to visit sometime in the

4 end of February 1999. He came to Pristina. Truth to tell, he had a press

5 conference and he presented rather neutral positions there but parallel to

6 that he had confidential contacts with the representatives of Albanian

7 political parties and terrorist organisations, and he incited them to

8 start armed actions.

9 Then the village of Prekaz happened. Adem Jashari had built a

10 house that resembled a true fortress. He locked up many members of his

11 family in it. He met the police patrol that was chasing after him there

12 because he had killed two Serbian policemen a day before that, and that

13 was supposed to be a signal for all other terrorist groups in Kosovo and

14 Metohija that they should start an armed rebellion against the Serbs.

15 That was actually the motive of us, the Serb radicals, to accept a

16 coalition government with you, although you were our ideological

17 opponents, in order to rally together all the national resources of the

18 country and to defend the country.

19 We realised whose fingers were there. Gelbard said it himself.

20 That is very basic information, and I know from before that the Western

21 powers persistently, patiently armed Albanian terrorists with special

22 weapons, that they helped them financially, that they organised them, and

23 on top of all of that the OSCE and the OSCE mission were instrumentalised

24 in order to contribute to organising this terrorist uprising.

25 Q. Let us just establish one fact that you mentioned just now. When

Page 42909

1 you entered the national unity government this was primarily motivated by

2 the Kosovo and Metohija problem?

3 A. Yes. Otherwise we would not be caught dead in the same government

4 with our ideological opponents from the Socialist Party of Serbia if it

5 were not for the defence of Kosovo and Metohija and opposing the looming

6 aggression of the Western powers and NATO. That was our main motive to go

7 into the same government with parties that were our ideological opponents.

8 Q. All right. So we've established that.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, this document from

10 tab 25 is something that I would like to have admitted into evidence, also

11 the documents that I referred to that pertain to the Contact Group

12 contained in tabs 13 through 18, including 17, the Bonn annex that

13 Mr. Seselj described and wrote about.

14 MR. NICE: Your Honour, so far we haven't actually been taken to

15 any item of detail --

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

17 MR. NICE: We haven't been taken to any of the other exhibits and

18 the witness has simply given his evidence. I don't see to what extent

19 it's necessary to have or helpful to have this additional printed

20 material. It may or may not emerge in cross-examination. That's another

21 matter.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think the book, yes, can be admitted. But,

23 Mr. Milosevic, you haven't really led the witness to tabs -- was it 13

24 through 18?

25 MR. NICE: Ms. Dicklich tells me, and I'm grateful to her, that 13

Page 42910

1 to 18 are already in exhibit --

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: They're already in evidence. I already

3 understand they're already in evidence, Mr. Milosevic, Exhibit 791.

4 JUDGE BONOMY: Yes. They are in. I have to say I don't see the

5 need to go to these directly. We can read them for ourselves. It's

6 obvious what they are. If they want to be -- if the Prosecution want to

7 take them up in cross-examination they can, but there's no need to delay

8 proceedings by going through these in detail. I think the witness has

9 dealt with them adequately.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, they're already in evidence. Well, we'll

11 admit the -- tab 25. Please give a number to the binder.

12 THE REGISTRAR: Your Honours, the binder will be Exhibit D303.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: And the book, chapters 13 and 14, Mr. Milosevic,

14 will be admitted.

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. Let us clear something up, Mr. Seselj, because I asked for these

17 exhibits regarding the Contact Group to be admitted and of course I don't

18 mind if some of them have already been exhibited. I would like to know

19 your answer and your assessment, however.

20 The contacts contained in the options of the Contact Group that we

21 see in these documents, did they indicate the preparations of the West for

22 the secession of Kosovo and its intentions?

23 A. Yes. It was obvious that the West insisted on interfering in our

24 internal relations, one, and later on we would see that the West also

25 insisted on a ground invasion into our territory, including the territory

Page 42911

1 of Kosovo and Metohija, and that those were the real aims of the Western

2 powers. They were looking for a pretext for stationing their troops

3 there. We Serbs with our independent and sovereign state simply did not

4 fit into our strategic designs, and they were looking at any cost for an

5 outcome that would give them a ticket to come in.

6 The war was imposed on us in order to provide a pretext for the

7 stationing of American troops.

8 Q. Thank you. You mentioned the incident in the Prekaze village a

9 moment ago. Do you think you need to add anything to the explanations

10 you've already given about this incident that ultimately did serve as a

11 pretext to increase pressure on Serbia?

12 A. When the police conducted an investigation about the murder of two

13 policemen, they found out that Adem Jashari, a well-known criminal in

14 Kosovo and Metohija until then, was also the organiser of the terrorist

15 group that attacked and killed those policemen. So the policemen went

16 into pursuit.

17 Several years before, Adem Jashari built his house as a real

18 fortress in reinforced concrete with towers for rifle fire, with loop

19 holes, and that's something I found out while I was deputy Prime Minister.

20 After this operation -- prior to this operation, 30 civilians left

21 the house, women and children and elderly men. Of those who remained in

22 the house, there was some women who wanted to stay with the men and some

23 male minors who were minors according to the law and not fit to serve in

24 the army yet, but they were quite fit to fight according to their views.

25 There was no other choice for our police in dealing with them but

Page 42912

1 to destroy the house. This was later used in the propaganda war against

2 the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. They claimed that we had used

3 excessive force. That was a very disingenuous misrepresentation. Adem

4 Jashari wanted to sacrifice himself in the same way that al Qaeda

5 terrorists do nowadays. He wanted to sacrifice his life in order to cause

6 an international scandal that would be used by the Western media.

7 Our authorities had to come to terms and clash with the

8 terrorists, and they had to prevent similar cases from happening again in

9 Kosovo and Metohija. It was a sort of test for our police organised by

10 the Western powers. They wanted to see whether we would react

11 energetically or not. If we didn't, they would see it as a weakness and

12 attack with all their might. Since we did react energetically and

13 forcefully, there was a certain delay in their later operations and

14 cooperation with terrorist organisations.

15 We learned at the same time that trenches and communicating

16 trenches were being dug in many villages. Preparations were being made.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: What is -- what is your basis for saying that

18 Adem Jashari wanted to sacrifice himself?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The way in which he conducted all

20 this, he released some of the civilians from his family prior to this.

21 The family, closely knit, remained locked in this powerfully equipped

22 fortress determined to fight to the last the police who came to arrest

23 him. By the same token, people who are capable of killing their own

24 compatriots -- I'm saying this because the police during their

25 investigation later found out that some of the bodies found inside were

Page 42913












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13 English transcripts.













Page 42914

1 killed by the weapons of Adem Jashari, post-mortems were conducted, and

2 the Albanians didn't even want to take over the bodies. So our

3 authorities buried them. They were undug several days later and reburied

4 where they wanted them interred. They wanted a scandal at any cost.

5 Those are the facts that I know as a deputy Prime Minister at the

6 time based on the documentation that I received.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. Mr. Seselj, several minutes ago you confirmed that you joined the

9 Serbian government primarily because of the Kosovo issue. Here in tab 3

10 we have an excerpt from your book, one of your books, and it includes a

11 transcript of your interview to Radio Metohija of the 4th of July, 1998

12 you published this in a book titled "Government of National Unity." Is

13 that correct?

14 A. Yes. In the course of July 1998, as deputy Prime Minister, I

15 toured many areas of Kosovo and Metohija. On that occasion I visited all

16 the municipalities of the district of Pec, which means Pecani, Decani,

17 Djakovica, Istok and Klina. And I toured the villages that were

18 jeopardised by Albanian terrorists at the time. I inspected the units of

19 the army of Yugoslavia guarding our border crossings and certain police

20 units that were stationed at the most inflammatory points. I visited one

21 village that was surrounded entirely by Albanian villages and Serbian

22 civilians were being targeted. Killings were frequent.

23 Q. Already in your answer to my first question or, rather, the first

24 question in the interview, you mentioned the interference of great powers.

25 I hope, Mr. Robinson, you will find it easily. This is Dr. Seselj's rely

Page 42915

1 to the first question of the anchorman. You say, I quote: "It is not a

2 great danger to us, this Siptar terrorist gang. What is dangerous for us

3 is the great powers interfering with our internal affairs and their

4 efforts to suppress Serbian national interests. All the more reason to

5 warn the Siptars that the Americans are prepared to fight the Serbs until

6 the last Albanian."

7 MR. NICE: The second -- the first paragraph of the first reply.

8 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, for Mr. Nice.

9 MR. NICE: Sorry about the microphone. Four lines down on the

10 first reply or thereabouts.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: I see it.

12 MR. NICE: Four or six lines down, "What is dangerous for us."

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Yes. I did tell you that it was the first answer.

16 So you put the stress here on what is really dangerous to our

17 country. You say the danger lies not in the terrorist gangs but in the

18 interference of great powers.

19 A. Yes. Would I like to clarify certain terminological differences.

20 Alternately, I call Albanians as Siptars and Albanians. I don't want the

21 Trial Chamber to understand the term Siptar as something derogatory.

22 Siptar is the term Albanians call themselves by. I am call -- I am trying

23 as deputy Prime Minister to send a message to the Albanians that they

24 should not fall prey to American manipulations, that the Americans were

25 prepared to fight the Serbs to the last Albanian. They don't care how

Page 42916

1 many Albanians would die in the conflict, just as they don't care as many

2 Iraqi people will die in any other part of the planet where they are

3 fighting their own wars for their own interests.

4 I am telling Albanians you are being manipulated by Americans,

5 they don't care if you die. We will both suffer and they will be the only

6 ones to profit from our conflict. So that was my attempt to discourage

7 the Albanian population from following the terrorist policies that could

8 not possibly have been in the interests of the ethnic Albanian community

9 in Yugoslavia.

10 Q. Very well, Mr. Seselj. Now, look two paragraphs down from the

11 previous passage. It says: "With regard to the political situation in

12 Kosovo and Metohija we support dialogue. All three political parties that

13 entered the coalition government of national unity constantly offer

14 dialogue to ethnic Albanian parties."

15 So you are saying this as deputy Prime Minister. You are speaking

16 on behalf of the government. You are speaking on radio Metohija, and you

17 are saying the dialogue is being offered to all Albanian parties.

18 A. Yes. It was a standing policy of the Serbian government.

19 Let me say one more thing. We did not intend to deny the

20 national, human, and civil freedoms and rights, but they had to be the

21 citizens of our country, and those who were acting from the standpoint of

22 terrorism and separatism would have to leave. This was addressed to a

23 great number of those who had come to Kosovo and Metohija from Albanian

24 and from other countries, and even greater numbers of them came after the

25 NATO occupation.

Page 42917

1 So we were using every opportunity as a government to encourage

2 members of the Albanian community to accept dialogue with the Serbian

3 authorities, to find a peaceful solution that would not jeopardise the

4 territorial integrity of our country. That is the essence of our policy.

5 Q. And you are stating it here in the interview that --

6 A. Radio Pec was the radio station concerned.

7 Q. On the 4th of July, 1998. I am stressing the date when this was

8 being discussed and when you were saying all these things on behalf of the

9 government.

10 Tell me, to what extent and what measures was the government

11 taking to resolve the Kosovo problem?

12 Let me just quote another passage where you say the Republic of

13 Serbia was making great efforts to help the Kosovo population in

14 political, humanitarian and other issues, issues concerning the

15 educational system. What measures was the Serbian government taking to

16 resolve the Kosovo problem?

17 A. We had would types of measures. On the one hand, we wanted to

18 suppress terrorism, and on that level all our police and army efforts were

19 geared towards that objective. When I was visiting the area, I met with

20 an army unit on a border crossing that had just crushed a column of

21 illegal contraband of weapons, mounted smugglers. On the other hand, in

22 the very difficult economic situation that Serbia itself was in, we were

23 making great financial efforts to help the Kosovo population, regardless

24 of ethnic background. Albanians, Turks, Egyptians, Roma, and others. So

25 this was a two-pronged approach that we were taking.

Page 42918

1 I often met with members of the Albanian community to convince

2 them that we shared a common national interest to live in peace, not to be

3 jeopardised by anything or anyone. And I say that somewhere here, to be

4 equal before all authorities and to have autonomous rights. Which

5 autonomous rights? Those autonomous rights of the highest international

6 standard that they -- that exists in any other state in the world. We

7 never ran away from that. If their children didn't want to go to our

8 schools, they were free to open private schools. Nobody denied them that

9 right.

10 Prior to that, you, Mr. Milosevic, you reached an agreement with

11 Mr. Rugova for their schools to be able to open.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Remember to keep the answers as short as

13 possible.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. I were asked in the course of this interview to comment on the

16 meeting of Richard Holbrooke with members of the KLA. On page 303, that

17 is two pages later, you say: "Of course this meeting of Holbrooke's with

18 Albanian terrorists indicates that Western powers were directly inciting

19 and encouraging terrorism, playing into the hand of Albanian separatists,

20 increasing their already exaggerated appetites, leading into a vicious

21 circle, that we would not be able to leave --

22 MR. NICE: I think it's on -- I haven't found it exactly yet.

23 JUDGE KWON: It's on the foot of page 5.

24 MR. NICE: That's what I thought. But I couldn't find the passage

25 that the accused had been reading from.

Page 42919

1 MS. HIGGINS: It's page 6, line 10.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Milosevic. You must wait. You

3 must ensure that the Chamber finds the passage before you proceed.

4 Otherwise, it may be lost on us.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I suppose you found it now. I

6 quoted this passage already.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. You say, of course Holbrooke's meeting with Albanian terrorists

9 indicates that the Western powers directly supported terrorism and

10 instigated it.

11 A. You see what happened there? Until Gelbard's arrival in Pristina

12 in end of February 1992, the American administration called Albanian

13 terrorists terrorists. The KLA was proclaimed by the American

14 administration to be a terrorist organisation. This is a watershed.

15 Holbrooke comes to Kosovo and meets with members of the KLA. He meets

16 with them in some house, God knows where, and he even took his shoes off

17 before entering. We remember that TV footage.

18 So at that moment, America openly sides with an organisation that

19 it called terrorists until then, and it shows its cards. I said also that

20 thereby Americans increased their already exaggerated appetites and led

21 them into a vicious circle. We had until then several open clashes with

22 their organisations in Kosovo and Metohija.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just tell us the significance of Mr. Holbrooke

24 taking off his shoes.

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, you see, he's playing up to

Page 42920

1 them in a way. He's respecting their customs, suggesting a dose of

2 intimacy with them. When you enter somebody's house, you respect normal

3 civic rules. When you go a step further, observing the national customs

4 of your host, you are doing something more. If he hadn't take his shoes

5 off, nobody would have held it against him, but he did, trying to show

6 something.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

8 Mr. Milosevic.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Mr. Seselj, we heard several times here something that I'm not

11 able to find right now in this interview. I hope you will assist me. It

12 was mentioned that you advocated expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo and

13 Metohija. However, from what I heard from you, you advocated expulsion of

14 immigrants from Albania under two cumulative conditions, that they were

15 Albanians, foreign citizens, and that they were behaving in a way that

16 instigates separatism. Can you help me find this in your interview?

17 A. Well, perhaps it wasn't in this particular interview but in some

18 other interview, but this was the essence of everything I said in public.

19 As you know, I published the texts of all my interviews whether on radio

20 or television in all my books. I have nothing to be ashamed of. I'm not

21 ashamed of anything I said on any occasion on any topic, and I have no

22 reason to deny anything I said.

23 What is the essence here? For decades, Albania was under a

24 typical Stalinist regime headed by Enver Hoxha. This regime was

25 intolerable for the Albanian population. Frequently Albanians fled from

Page 42921

1 Albania into Serbia. The Serb authorities throughout Serbia and in Kosovo

2 and Metohija welcomed all these Albanian refugees, and they never

3 questioned the need to provide them with protection and everything they

4 needed to survive. However, what happened was that a certain number of

5 these refugees, perhaps a large number, as soon as they were welcomed in

6 Serbia began working against Serbia from separatist positions. They found

7 asylum in Serbia and yet they wanted to annex a part of Serbia to Albania.

8 There is no country in the world that would tolerate foreign immigrants on

9 its territory who are acting against their own vital interests.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Seselj. Your answers tend to be a

11 little long. So when I think you have answered the question, I'll stop

12 you.

13 Mr. Milosevic.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I want my answers to be as clear as

15 possible, Mr. Robinson. That's what I'm trying to achieve. I'm sorry if

16 I go into too much detail on occasion.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. This is what I wanted us to establish, because very often it was

19 alleged that someone was advocating the expulsion of Albanians from

20 Kosovo. In your response to the first question, could you please turn to

21 page 300. That's only three paragraphs below the first paragraph we

22 quoted in answer to your first -- to the first question.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... of the book,

24 and you are not to begin until we have found --

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, 300 of the book, but it's in

Page 42922












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 42923

1 his reply to the first question, so you will find it easily. And it's in

2 the fourth paragraph. I quoted the beginning of paragraph 4 in which you,

3 Mr. Seselj, say: "We support" --

4 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... still on tab 3,

5 and I've got a sneaking suspicion it will be at the bottom of the first

6 page.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: At the bottom. Thank you, Mr. Nice.

8 Mr. Milosevic, all of this should have been done by you.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I told you --

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: You should have for us the corresponding page in

11 the English text so that the proceedings can move very quickly and as

12 smoothly as possible.

13 Well, let us proceed.

14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It's in the first paragraph of the

15 first response -- in the fourth.

16 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction, in the fourth

17 paragraph.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] We have already quoted the first

19 sentence of that paragraph in which, Mr. Seselj, you say: "We support

20 dialogue. All three political parties that entered the coaliton

21 government of national unity are constantly offering dialogue to ethnic

22 Albanian parties."

23 And this is what I wanted to clarify. It goes on to say: "We

24 have no intention of denying them their democratic and human and civil

25 rights and liberties, but they have to be loyal to the state they live in,

Page 42924

1 and if those who are not our citizens, those who are not our citizens take

2 action in support of separate views, they have no business staying in this

3 country and will have to leave."

4 That was the purpose of my question. You are putting forward two

5 cumulative conditions, that they are not our nationals and secondly that

6 they are acting from separatist positions and that our hospitality should

7 be denied them. Is this usual in international practice?

8 A. Yes. We cannot expel our own citizens even if we want to. What

9 happened recently in Montenegro, Djukanovic handing over one of his own

10 citizens to another country, this is unimaginable. We cannot expel our

11 own nationals, our own citizens. If they violate the law, they have to be

12 tried, they have to be sentenced and imprisoned, but whether they are good

13 or bad they belong to us. So there is no so of all those Albanians, even

14 if they are terrorists, being expelled. If they are our nationals, they

15 cannot be expelled. That's clear to everyone. Until you were kidnapped

16 in Belgrade and handed over to The Hague Tribunal, there was no citizen of

17 our country who was extradited to anyone. It was sacred to us this

18 principle that our own citizens cannot be extradited or expelled. If they

19 were found guilty, they had to serve their sentence and so on. Even

20 during the communist dictatorship, no one was expelled from Yugoslavia.

21 Other communist citizens expelled their citizens but Yugoslavia never did.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: It's not only communist countries that extradite

23 their citizens though. It's a quite common practice throughout the world.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] For a country to extradite its own

25 citizens to someone, Mr. Bonomy, do you know of any case where England

Page 42925

1 either extradited one of its citizens or expelled one of its citizens? I

2 know of no such cases. And I deeply respect the British legal system.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj, it's quite a common practice in

4 common law countries. Very ordinary practice in many common law

5 countries.

6 JUDGE BONOMY: Even for economic crime.

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] To expel its own citizens.

8 JUDGE BONOMY: No, you're perverting my comment to extradite its

9 citizens for trial. That's a common practice. If a citizen of one

10 country commits a crime in another, then he may be tried in that country.

11 There are many international instruments providing for that.

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't know of any case where

13 Great Britain extradited one of its citizens to a foreign country to be

14 tried in that foreign country. If you can inform me of this, I would be

15 happy to receive this information. But what we are discussing here is

16 expulsion, Mr. Bonomy, expulsion of our citizens.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: I practised in extradition law quite a lot, and

18 for your own education I'll send you later a list of the cases.

19 Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Mr. Seselj, four pages further on -- I hope that when I say four

22 pages further on you will be able to find the passage. You speak of

23 international humanitarian organisations. That's on page 304 of your

24 book.

25 A. Yes, I found that part.

Page 42926

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, have you found it?

2 "International humanitarian organisations have requested access to this

3 area saying that they wish to help release the abducted."

4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

5 Q. So the reason they give is that they wish to help release those

6 who have been abducted.

7 A. This is what happened: The Albanian terrorists abducted a large

8 number of Serbs, but they also abducted quite a large number of Albanians.

9 It turned out later that they liquidated most of those whom they had

10 abducted. They abducted them, blackmailed them and so on. Then some

11 international humanitarian organisations offered their services to mediate

12 with the Albanian terrorists in order to get them to release the abducted.

13 These were Serbs, Albanians, Roma, Goranies and so on.

14 My attitude to this was negative because I felt that these were

15 organisations who were spying on us and they were spying for the enemies

16 of Serbia. They were working against Serbia. They were launching

17 fabrications in the international media. This is how these so-called NGOs

18 acted in Kosovo and Metohija. They were ostensibly engaged in

19 humanitarian work but this concealed other interests.

20 Our practice was -- what we saw in practice was that foreign spies

21 were sent in the guise of religious missionaries. One much them was

22 called David. I can't remember his last name. He was the chief of the

23 CIA in the American embassy in Belgrade, and the first time he arrived on

24 our territory he was a missionary of the Pentecostal church. And he tried

25 to get Momcilo Perisic to work for him and there was a huge affair about

Page 42927

1 this in Belgrade.

2 Our experience with these humanitarian NGOs were mostly negative.

3 There were indeed some such organisations that were really engaged in

4 humanitarian work, but these were in the minority. I personally never

5 trusted these international humanitarian organisations.

6 David Neighbour. That was his name. I recall it now.

7 JUDGE BONOMY: There are two different issues, I think, in what

8 you've just been saying. One is misinformation; in other words, issuing

9 publicly or in the international community information about events in

10 Serbia that's not true; and secondly, spying. Now, can I ask you about

11 the second one? What sort of basis do you have for suggesting that there

12 were international humanitarian organisations involved in spying in

13 Serbia? That means undercover, secretive work.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It happened very often, for example,

15 that the army of Republika Srpska would search members of some

16 international humanitarian organisations, and they would find weapons that

17 were being illegally sent on to the opposite side.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: Let's not confuse the issue. Let's stick to

19 Kosovo. That's what we're dealing with.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I am telling you what my political

21 standpoint was in July 1998, before the war, as a deputy Prime Minister.

22 JUDGE BONOMY: I don't want to know your political standpoint. I

23 want to know what is the factual basis for saying that in Kosovo

24 international humanitarian organisations were involved in spying. It's a

25 very specific question.

Page 42928

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, but you're forgetting,

2 Mr. Bonomy, that I'm testifying here about my statement, not about

3 evidence that they were really engaged in spying, because as deputy Prime

4 Minister, I had general information.

5 JUDGE BONOMY: Again you misunderstand. You're not here just to

6 recite a statement. Indeed, it would be quite inappropriate for that

7 course to be followed. You are here to answer specific questions in this

8 case, and I am asking you a specific question and I would like a specific

9 answer.

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, and I'm replying to you. My

11 political standpoint in 1998, in July, was that these Western NGOs

12 ostensibly humanitarian in character were spying on us, and you are now

13 telling me to give you specific facts as if I was testifying about this in

14 court in 1998. I was not testifying in court. I was talking about this

15 in a radio interview as my standpoint. It was my standpoint then, and

16 it's my standpoint now. If you want evidence, it will take me a few

17 months to collect it, Mr. Bonomy.

18 JUDGE BONOMY: So that means you have no factual basis to present

19 to this Tribunal to support the allegation that international humanitarian

20 organisations were involved in spying activities in Kosovo.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, it doesn't mean that. I do have

22 a factual basis, but in order to show it, I would need to have contact

23 with my legal advisors and have it sent to me from Belgrade. Mr. Bonomy,

24 you may not be aware that for the past two months I have been prevented

25 from having these contacts maybe because of this testimony here now, but I

Page 42929

1 am telling you that this was my position in 1998 as deputy Prime Minister.

2 JUDGE BONOMY: Very well. We can take the matter no further at

3 this stage. Thank you.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, yes.

5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I hope that during the course of

6 Mr. Seselj's testimony I will be able to present him with such evidence so

7 that he can explain it, because he really is in a very difficult situation

8 as he has no possibility of establishing contact and collecting such

9 documents.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Mr. Seselj, I hope you remember the case of the Australian in the

12 Care organisations who was a spy and this was discovered by our police.

13 A. This was during the war, during the bombing?

14 Q. I don't recall the date now. Sali Beqa [phoen] who was carrying

15 weapons for the KLA. There are documents to this effect.

16 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ...

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, that's a very leading question. You are

18 making a statement and providing answers to the question which you will

19 eventually put, Mr. Milosevic. Move on.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson --

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm stopping you. We have dealt with this point

22 sufficiently.

23 Move on, Mr. Milosevic.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Robinson.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 42930

1 Q. In this interview and in many other statements you made in public,

2 and this is not only about you, it has to do with policy that was pursued

3 at that time vis-a-vis Kosovo -- actually, what I'd like to establish now

4 is the following: The efforts made by the government of Serbia and,

5 generally speaking, of the political establishment in Yugoslavia,

6 including myself and the Yugoslav authorities or, rather, the attempt to

7 negotiate with the political representatives of the Kosovo and Metohija

8 Albanians, was that not a reaction to the request that was made by the

9 Security Council Resolution in that respect that had to do with Kosovo and

10 Metohija or were all of these simply an initiative of the government of

11 Serbia? Do you remember that? Do you have any clear knowledge about

12 this? What can you say about this?

13 A. I remember that very well, because before this request was made

14 from the outside the government of Serbia established a group consisting

15 of its prominent officials, and they were a negotiating team for talks

16 with Albanian and all other political parties in Kosovo and Metohija and

17 several times these talks were called. Perhaps they went there about 20

18 times. I cannot recall the exact figure.

19 We insisted on these talks all the time but the response was

20 rather poor. Many political parties in Kosovo and Metohija accepted this

21 political initiative. The Turkish party, the Romani party, even two

22 Albanian parties. But these were not mass political parties. Two

23 Albanian political parties did accept this initiative, but not the main

24 ones though. The main ones, upon instructions from the West, rejected all

25 initiatives for talks. Well, that's what happened to us in Rambouillet as

Page 42931












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13 English transcripts.













Page 42932

1 well. Under the pressure of the Western powers, the national assembly

2 passed a resolution that a delegation would go to Rambouillet. The

3 Serbian Radical Party was against this. We didn't want our delegation to

4 go because we knew that it involved some kind of deceit. Our delegation

5 went, an Albanian delegation went, and they never met themselves. There

6 was never a single meeting between two actually.

7 Q. Or rather there were no negotiations?

8 A. There were no negotiations. It is only Western representatives

9 who exerted pressure against the Serb delegation to accept absolutely

10 unacceptable things.

11 Q. All right. In tab 20 there is Resolution 1160 of the Security

12 Council. I don't want to go into it now because we don't have any time

13 and it's not really of any major importance, but it is in here in order to

14 establish when it was that the international community asked for talks to

15 take place and in order to establish that this Resolution was passed on a

16 particular date, that is to say, the 31st of March, 1998. That is

17 Resolution 1160.

18 A. And our delegation was in Pristina before that seeking talks.

19 Q. That's what I wanted to establish.

20 A. I don't know the exact date. Perhaps it was the 28th or

21 something. They were already in Pristina.

22 Q. Do you remember when I signed my agreement with Rugova about the

23 normalisation of the school system?

24 A. That was two years before that, maybe even three years before

25 that. It was through the mediation of that Vatican organisation.

Page 42933

1 Q. Sant'Egidio.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. It was all over the newspapers.

4 A. It was two or three years before that.

5 Q. So my question, Mr. Seselj, was whether the efforts made by our

6 authorities to negotiate with the representatives of the political

7 representatives of the Kosovo and Metohija Albanians were the result of

8 the request made by the UN or did this happen much earlier? Have we

9 established that now? What is cause and what is consequence and what

10 happened when?

11 A. All political factors in Kosovo for years wanted to stabilise the

12 internal situation, the solution of these urgent problems. It did not

13 suit anyone in Serbia the fact that Albanians boycotted political

14 processes, elections. We all felt that this was a problem that could

15 escalate in the future. We incessantly insisted that Albanians take part

16 in political elections because they were so numerous they could have had

17 many MPs in the republican assembly, in the federal assembly. Very often

18 as such they could be part of the government, republican and federal, and

19 on the other hand, we were prepared to establish a quota of ministers that

20 would be ethnic Albanians so that we would resolve the whole problem in

21 the best possible way. It didn't suit anyone in Serbia that the Albanians

22 were not taking part in political processes because we knew that thus they

23 were subject to manipulations coming from abroad and we knew that they

24 were involved in the plans of America. Somebody learned about it sooner,

25 someone later. It's not that I want to blow my own trumpet, but I was one

Page 42934

1 of the first who realised what was going on.

2 Q. Mr. Seselj, we mentioned this agreement with Rugova, my agreement

3 with Rugova, that had to do with the school system. And you mentioned

4 negotiations with the political representatives of the Albanians and the

5 political representatives of other ethnic communities. Since ethnic

6 communities there are the Turks, the Muslims, the Gorani, the Egyptians,

7 that is to say, apart from the Serbs, Montenegrins, and Albanians, what

8 about the other ethnic communities? Did they respond positively to this,

9 that is to say, to the initiatives of the government of the Republic of

10 Serbia to seek a political solution and to resolve problems by way of

11 negotiations?

12 A. All other ethnic communities whole-heartedly embraced the idea of

13 negotiations, talks, and dialogue. Many overlooked the fact that it

14 wasn't only Albanians and Serbs who lived in Kosovo and Metohija. Before

15 the NATO occupation, about 150.000 Muslims lived there who spoke Serbian.

16 Then about 50.000 Turks. Turks. Aborigines who were there for centuries

17 in Prizren and around Prizren for the most part. Then about 60.000

18 Gorani. These are people of Serb origin, the Islamic faith, but they have

19 Albanian names. The process of Albanisation was not completed in their

20 case, so they had their own ethnic and national awareness. They belonged

21 to a separate community. Then there was over 200.000 Roma living there.

22 There was this major mystification in terms of the actual number of

23 Albanians because the Albanians boycotted the census of 1991. Before when

24 they themselves were in charge of the census, they forced members of other

25 ethnic communities to declare themselves as Albanians, especially if they

Page 42935

1 were of the Islamic faith. So many Roma, many Turks, many Gorani had to

2 declare themselves as Albanians. Later on when the situation changed, all

3 of these who belonged to certain ethnic groups did not wish to be

4 pressured into representing themselves as something that they actually

5 were not. The Western powers incessantly ignored the existence of other

6 ethnic communities. There was even a group of 7.000 people who declared

7 themselves as Egyptians. It was part of their own lore that their

8 ancestors centuries ago came from Egypt, and it is their right to declare

9 themselves as Egyptians.

10 Obviously all national interests were ignored there. All groups

11 that were not prepared to be instrumentalised by the Western powers

12 against Serbia. They were totally ignored. Afterwards, they basically

13 shared the fate of the Serb people.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: You have answered the question.

15 Mr. Milosevic, we'll take a break now. We will adjourn for 20

16 minutes.

17 --- Recess taken at 12.15 p.m.

18 --- On resuming at 12.40 p.m.

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic, continue.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Mr. Seselj, please let us go back briefly to your book the Serb

22 people and the new world order, which has already been admitted in

23 evidence here. It is in tab 25.

24 A few moments ago, you mentioned the decisions of the national

25 assembly of Serbia. I would like to draw your attention --

Page 42936

1 JUDGE KWON: Just for the record, part 13 and 14 are admitted

2 only, not all of tab 25.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It was my understanding that you

4 admitted tabs 13 and 14, not only these chapters. Now I'm dealing with

5 chapter 19, and those are the resolutions of the national assembly.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Let us briefly deal with the main points contained in this chapter

8 since it has to do with the efforts to have negotiations conducted, to

9 achieve results by peaceful means. So in chapter 19 you say --

10 JUDGE KWON: Page 60.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. You say at the very outset that the decision for the government of

13 the Republic of Serbia to send a delegation to Rambouillet made by the

14 national assembly on the 4th of February, 1999, based on the discussion

15 about the acute problems in Kosovo and Metohija and the aggressive threats

16 by NATO as well as the initiative of the Contact Group. Then it adopted

17 conclusions with which it condemned most seriously the NATO threats to the

18 Serb state and nation concluding that they serve as direct support to

19 separatism and terrorism and are contrary to the declarative commitment

20 for finding a peaceful solution to the problem. Have you found that?

21 A. Yes. I would just like to remind you of something, Mr. Milosevic.

22 Before that, we had a joint document of all the political parties in

23 Serbia that also had to do with the way in which the Kosovo and Metohija

24 issue was to be resolved. It preceded the session of the national

25 assembly. All political parties in Serbia took a single view with regard

Page 42937

1 to this problem and started their own initiative. One of the key points

2 of this initiative was within the democratic resolving of the problem

3 itself that Kosovo and Metohija should in the future have a bicameral

4 assembly seemably. The chamber of citizens where there would be

5 proportionate election and the Albanians would always constitute a

6 majority because they were the majority population in Kosovo and another

7 chamber, a chamber of ethnic communities, where every ethnic community

8 from Kosovo and Metohija would have an equal number of representatives so

9 that there would not be any outvoting. So it's Albanians, Serbs, Turks,

10 Gorani, Roma, Egyptians, et cetera.

11 Q. That was actually the approach as passed by our delegation in

12 Rambouillet as well.

13 A. Yes. But our delegation did not have a chance of seriously

14 presenting this over there because there was no meeting with the

15 representatives of the Albanian political parties in Rambouillet. In

16 Rambouillet the Western powers only exerted pressure on our delegation to

17 accept, what was it, annex B of the agreement from Rambouillet if I

18 remember correctly ensuring the free movement of NATO troops throughout

19 practically all of Kosovo and Metohija which no one in Serbian political

20 life could dream of accepting.

21 As far as this session of the national assembly is concerned, the

22 one that you mentioned, views were taken unanimously there as well. The

23 governing party and the opposition parties. And in this initiative it was

24 the governing and opposition parties that were involved. In addition to

25 the national unity government parties, there were representatives of

Page 42938

1 various parties of Kosovo and Metohija, the Serbian Renewal Movement, the

2 New Serbia Party, and then it was the Hungarian parties from Vojvodina

3 that were practically the only opposition at the time. So there was

4 consensus among all the relevant political factors in Serbia at that time

5 with regard to this issue.

6 Q. Please look at the end of chapter 19, the fourth paragraph from

7 the end of the chapter, actually, and then we're going to move our way

8 back. It says: "Albanian separatism and terrorism, at its highest

9 stadium, --

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... until we

11 find it. Page 62, the next one.

12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The fourth paragraph from the end of

13 this chapter. It starts with the following words: Albanian separatism

14 and terrorism.

15 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, we have it.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. "As its highest stadium have caused the current crisis in Kosovo

18 and Metohija and they are..." and you quote here --

19 A. The conclusions of the national assembly.

20 Q. Yes. "... the main hindrance to achieve a political solution. To

21 all the efforts, offers and goodwill of the state to join the political

22 dialogue and together with others to search for a solution, the Albanian

23 separatist parties and their leaders have responded by rejection and

24 obstruction. Such a standpoint on their part has motivated and encouraged

25 the continuation of crimes by the terrorist gangs. They have abused the

Page 42939

1 respect of the agreement by our state and the presence of the OSCE

2 Verification Mission and continued with crimes."

3 Then you say that the Albanian state is also involved in

4 aggressive action against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the

5 Republic of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija.

6 What is highlighted here towards the end of the paragraph is that

7 "Western powers never reacted to this and the OSCE has not yet completed

8 its Verification Mission even though in the meanwhile there has been an

9 escalation of terrorist actions. In international dealings there is

10 policy of double standards and any serious condemnation by the UN Security

11 Council of the terrorist activities of the Albanian separatists is

12 efficiently prevented."

13 At that time was a generally known fact?

14 A. Yes. Mr. Milosevic, you signed an agreement with Hill, a US

15 representative as far as I can remember correctly, sometime in October

16 1998. On the basis of this agreement, the observer mission of the OSCE

17 was installed in Kosovo and Metohija with very specific tasks. It was

18 headed by an American, William Walker.

19 Q. Just a correction for the transcript. You probably misspoke. You

20 said Hill, but the agreement was with Holbrooke.

21 A. Yes, yes, Holbrooke. But it is the essence that matters. Perhaps

22 I may make a mistake in terms of names sometimes but this mission very

23 soon showed its true face. Instead of supervising matters, monitoring

24 them, the mission started from day one renewing the Albanian terrorist

25 organisation which our police had previously defeated almost completely.

Page 42940












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13 English transcripts.













Page 42941

1 In the summer of 1998, our police took action and practically all

2 terrorist groups were suppressed, broken up, scattered around, et cetera.

3 The mission of the OSCE led by William Walker from day one started

4 rallying them together, placing them under their protection, and preparing

5 them to be used as the NATO infantry in the coming aggression. We had

6 reports from our intelligence agencies at that time. As deputy Prime

7 Minister, I received daily information in my office as to what was going

8 on in this respect. In this way, our state authorities following the work

9 of the mission of the OSCE established that their basic objective was to

10 re-establish the Albanian terrorist organisation, and that proved to be

11 true, that they did manage to re-establish it to a large extent.

12 Q. Look at the next passage. No, not the next paragraph. It is now

13 the third paragraph from the -- from the end of chapter 19.

14 "Such conduct of Western countries is open support to Albanian

15 separatism and terrorism, assistance and support to criminal activities.

16 Besides this, with constructed and incorrect assessments that the army and

17 police used excessive force efforts are made to prevent the legitimate

18 defence forces of the nation and the state to react against the terrorists

19 the terrorists in an appropriate manner in the way this is done by the

20 army and police in all states in the world which are faced with this

21 evil."

22 Were you -- were you familiar with this refrain about excessive

23 force being used by our army and police?

24 A. Yes. We were constantly faced with this reaction by the West.

25 All our -- every action of ours was called excessive use of force, and

Page 42942

1 nobody actually clarified what that means. When you are face-to-face with

2 terrorists, then you have to use adequate force that is sufficient to

3 destroy them, not the kind of force that would be only equal to them and

4 lead to an impasse. On the other hand, terrorist acts were not called by

5 their proper name. They were called provocations. Murders, attacks and

6 other things were called provocations, even the killings of Albanians,

7 because one has to bear in mind that the terrorist organisation known as

8 the KLA killed a great number of Albanians. All such attacks, murders and

9 kidnappings were called provocations. They were not provocations. They

10 were the gravest crimes.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: I believe you just made an important point when

12 you spoke of adequate force, because that is to be distinguished from

13 excessive force, and the claim is that excessive force was used.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think, Mr. Robinson, that I am

15 saying important things all the time here. I don't think I have said one

16 unimportant thing in my testimony so far.

17 Second, we have to determine what is excessive or inappropriate

18 force. Is it measured by the number of bullets or what? We never used

19 bombs in dealing with terrorists. The force used was always adequate to

20 the objective. In each case that resulted in civilian casualties, the

21 Albanian side was to blame because they were using them as human shields.

22 Our authorities never put civilians in the line of fire. They never put

23 them in unnecessary danger.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Go ahead, Mr. Milosevic.

25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

Page 42943

1 Q. In the course of 1998 and the beginning of 1999, did you go to

2 Kosovo and Metohija?

3 A. I have already said that in 1998 I toured most places in Kosovo

4 and Metohija including some police and army units. I talked to civilians.

5 I also met with Albanians, not only Serbs. And then, it was sometime in

6 January, as deputy Prime Minister of Serbia I participated in a cabinet

7 session, a session of the government of Serbia that was held in Pristina.

8 The Serbian government scheduled a session in Pristina. I think we have a

9 report here among the documents.

10 Q. We'll establish that easily. Tell me, which areas did you tour?

11 A. Mostly I went to the Pec district because the terrorist actions

12 were the most intensive there. I was Decane, in Djakovica, in Orahovec

13 municipality, but also other places.

14 Q. Did you go to police station, police units?

15 A. Yes.

16 Q. How did they act?

17 A. They acted strictly in compliance with the regulations of the

18 Republic of Serbia and their own internal regulations. I didn't come

19 across a single case of violation. They had the task, in other words, to

20 protect civilians regardless of ethnicity, to maintain public law and

21 order, and to destroy terrorists wherever they might appear. Of course,

22 it was always our aim primarily to detain them and arrest them, not to

23 kill them. But of course clashes were so violent that there were many

24 casualties, but there were also many casualties among policemen.

25 Q. We have data about this. Tell me, how did the army behave, the

Page 42944

1 army units that you toured in Kosovo?

2 A. They stood on the border and they clashed with gangs who tried to

3 smuggle in arms. I toured several block houses, border posts, and I saw

4 personally the army dealing with mounted groups carrying in weapons.

5 Q. What was the situation in towns that you toured?

6 A. Life was completely normal. I walked freely the streets of many

7 towns including Pec and many other towns. There were no provocations.

8 There were many Albanians in the street. Many passed me by pretending not

9 to see me. Some smiled.

10 On one occasion I met a very honourable man, Xhafer Djuka, I

11 believe. He was some sort of municipal official. I later heard that he

12 was killed by terrorists. I remember it like it was yesterday. I walked

13 with him the streets of Pec talking to him. We were approached

14 occasionally by citizens of all ethnicities.

15 In towns, the situation was almost completely peaceful without a

16 single incident. Incidents mostly happened in villages, in mountains, in

17 woods where terrorist gangs operated.

18 Q. You said Xhafer Djuka, member of the leadership of the Yugoslav

19 left was killed. Do you know that his throat was slit?

20 A. Yes. After the NATO troops came in, terrorist gangs got hold of

21 him and slit his throat.

22 Q. Did you attend any sessions at that time?

23 A. I didn't miss a single one.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Xhafer --

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Xhafer Djuka was an Albanian from a

Page 42945

1 very renowned Albanian family, a very renowned and numerous family

2 infrastructure.

3 Q. So you attended all cabinet sessions. Did you miss one?

4 A. Not that I can recall.

5 Q. What was -- what were the positions and instructions of our

6 government regarding appropriate conduct in Kosovo and Metohija?

7 A. The republican government was in charge of the police and the

8 federal government was in charge of the army. The republican government

9 provided guidelines mainly through the Ministry of the Interior for the

10 police, and they were irreproachable as far as civilians are concerned.

11 Civilians were to be protected regardless of ethnicity, walk of life,

12 gender, anything, and that's how the police acted in effect. If any

13 violations happened, appropriate disciplinary and other measures were

14 taken.

15 Q. What was the attitude of the authorities in Serbia and the FRY

16 concerning the lawful conduct of our police, army, and other agencies

17 during the NATO aggression?

18 A. The same. Offenders were apprehended, handed in to appropriate

19 authorities, and many were tried. I don't know the exact number, but

20 trials took place. If somebody robbed, stole, or killed civilians, they

21 were tried.

22 The instructions were very clear and strict. Nobody was to be

23 robbed, tortured, or killed. Civilians were not to be abused. Of course

24 during a war you can't avoid it completely, but if anything of that sort

25 happened, our authorities had strict instructions to detain offenders and

Page 42946

1 arrest them.

2 Q. You said that you have extensive and detailed knowledge about

3 everything that happened at the time as deputy Prime Minister and

4 president of the Serbian Radical Party which had an extensive network

5 throughout the territory of the country. And since this indictment here

6 speaks of discrimination against Albanians in many instances, I would like

7 you to tell us if you can give us a single instance of discrimination

8 against a Kosovo Albanian. Is any of this true?

9 A. It's not only that I can't give you a single example. Even those

10 who claimed that there was discrimination cannot give you an example of

11 specific discrimination. Albanians were even privileged in a way because

12 the government refrained from taking appropriate measures against them

13 when they failed to pay their electricity, water and other utility bills,

14 and even when the military service is concerned, if an Albanian would

15 refuse to go and serve in the army, they were not arrested, whereas a

16 member of any other ethnic community would be arrested for the same

17 offence.

18 The state did not only not discriminate, it was tolerant in cases

19 where it wouldn't be tolerant with regard to anyone else. The state was

20 trying to mollify Albanians in order to avoid conflict and avoid the war

21 that was already looming. We could see that from the west.

22 Q. Tell me, did the authorities in Serbia and the FRY invest efforts,

23 especially during the NATO aggression, to protect Albanians against

24 possible retaliation and reactions to the attack -- attack of the NATO

25 alliance?

Page 42947

1 A. The authorities helped establish local security to people who were

2 supposed to maintain law and order in their own villages. The state paid

3 for their uniforms and other equipment. They didn't even wear any

4 insignia to distinguish them so that they would avoid stigmatisation by

5 their compatriots.

6 If you look at the total number of casualties during the NATO

7 aggression, you would see that the casualties among the military and

8 damage to military equipment was minimal. It was the civilians who

9 suffered the most. Why were Albanian casualties the greatest? Because

10 they were the largest in number. We had to deal with the terrorist

11 organisation that planned in advance a migration of its own population so

12 as to present it in the international media as a massive problem, as an

13 exodus. Our authorities had the task to maintain law and order as much as

14 possible in the conditions of war, to provide humanitarian supplies, to

15 try to convince Albanians not to move out, and when that was impossible

16 the police had the task to give them free passage, safe passage.

17 Sometimes they had to prevent them from walking into minefields, because

18 of course mine feeds were laid in anticipation of the NATO attack.

19 Q. Where were you on the 15th of January, 1999?

20 A. In Pristina attending a session of the Republic of Serbia

21 government. We decided to hold this session in Pristina, to demonstrate

22 our commitment to keep Kosovo and Metohija as an integral part of the

23 country, on the one hand; and on the other hand, to make another appeal to

24 the Albanian population to accept peaceful life and dialogue.

25 Q. So on that 15th of January, 1999, when you were attending a

Page 42948

1 cabinet session in Pristina, that incident in Racak happened.

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. How long was your visit on that occasion?

4 A. We had this cabinet session and then General Sreten Lukic, who was

5 then commander of all our police forces in Kosovo and Metohija, in the

6 headquarters of the Ministry of Interior in Pristina organised a luncheon

7 that was attended, among others, by late Vlatko Stojiljkovic. I was

8 seated next to a police general, Vlastimir Djordjevic.

9 Q. That was on the 15th of January.

10 A. That was immediately after the cabinet session. The ministers

11 started leaving for Belgrade, and some of us were invited to this

12 luncheon, to the police headquarters.

13 Q. It says Vlastimir Djordjevic was in Racak at the time.

14 A. Well, he couldn't have been in Racak at the same time as he was

15 seated next to me. I talked to him during that entire luncheon. He

16 received during the luncheon information, a report that there was fighting

17 in Racak. I can confirm that, and all the others who attended that

18 luncheon. Ratko Markovic and Milovan Bojic and other deputy Prime

19 Ministers were there as well.

20 The next day, on the 16th of January, I flew on a police

21 helicopter with Vlastimir Djordjevic, Vojislav Zekovic who was then your

22 president of the party for Kosovo and Metohija, and Sanja Scepanovic from

23 Pristina to Prizren. We stayed in Pristina until the evening of the 15th

24 of January, after that cabinet session, and in the evening we walked -- we

25 took a walk in the streets of Pristina.

Page 42949












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Page 42950

1 The first Vlastimir Djordjevic told us about that was that there

2 was intensive fighting between a terrorist gang and our police units in

3 Racak, and I know that a large number of Albanian terrorists were killed

4 then.

5 Q. Look at these documents that you have before you. In tab 2, do

6 you find an article from the Zemun newspaper? It's called the government

7 of national unity exists because of Kosovo and Metohija. And we see a

8 text here. It's dated 15th of January, 1999. The government of Serbia

9 and Kosovo and Metohija is the title. It is a report that says the

10 government is holding a session in Kosovo and Metohija. And we can see

11 statements of various vice premiers, your own, and the statements of other

12 vice premiers related to the situation in Kosovo at the time.

13 A. Let me draw your attention to the photographs here. These

14 photographs come from many towns of Kosovo where you can see Dr. Milovan

15 Bojic, Dr. Ratko Markovic and myself walking unhampered. We did not even

16 need police escort. You can see from this how peaceful the situation was

17 in towns in Kosovo and Metohija. Maybe you would find a policeman here

18 and there in the streets but there were no armoured specially equipped

19 police units, specially trained policemen anywhere armed to the teeth.

20 We were accompanied wherever we went by journalists, and this is

21 how this report came about.

22 Q. Very well. And what places did you visit?

23 A. Pristina, Prizren, Pec, Gnjilane, Podujevo, and some other

24 places. To be quite honest, I can't recall them all at present, but these

25 were the district seats, Prizren, Pec, Kosovska Mitrovica and Gnjilane.

Page 42951

1 We were in Podujevo where there were about a thousand Serbs residing and a

2 hundred thousand Albanians, and in Podujevo we walked freely about the

3 city streets. There were no provocations. Nobody said a bad word to us.

4 You know, when I walk around towns in central Serbia, people

5 belonging to other political parties sometimes shout insults at me, and

6 nothing like this happened there. I can't say that the Albanians actually

7 welcomed us, but there were no incidents. It was so peaceful that we

8 didn't even need police escorts.

9 Q. As far as I can see in the first part of this article, there are

10 some important points from the government statement issued at the session

11 of the 15th of January.

12 A. Yes, I think that the most important conclusions are listed here.

13 Of course as interpreted by journalists.

14 Q. Yes. This is a newspaper report. If we look at the fourth

15 paragraph.

16 I hope, Mr. Robinson, you can find the fourth paragraph. That's

17 where I want to quote.

18 On the 15th of January, 1999, the government says: "The

19 avoidance of a political dialogue by part of the representatives of the

20 Albanian national community, who do not want a political solution and who

21 are obstructing the political process, directly fuels the crimes of

22 terrorist gangs. The government emphasises, as reported by the Ministry

23 for Information of the Republic of Serbia, that the calming down of the

24 situation would create conditions for the renewal and acceleration of the

25 political process in the interest of all the citizens in Kosovo and

Page 42952

1 Metohija and stresses that all perpetrators of terrorist acts have to be

2 punished for the crimes they have committed."

3 Have you found this?

4 A. Yes. And then what follows are the conclusions of the government.

5 Q. Yes. The government goes on to say that terrorism is an evil for

6 all and the whole world is saying that now. "The government of Serbia

7 demands that the international community end its policy of double

8 standards, that it condemn terrorism and prevent external support to

9 terrorists. The government expects the Verification Mission to inform,

10 during its mandate, the world public of the truth about the real causes of

11 the problems in Kosovo and Metohija, of the crimes committed by terrorists

12 and the efforts of Serbia and Yugoslavia to find solutions to the problems

13 by political means and, thus, to discharge fully its obligation under the

14 agreement between the government of Yugoslavia and the Organisation for

15 Security and Cooperation in Europe."

16 Was there any deviation or any exception made from the continuity

17 of our efforts to resolve peacefully the problem of Kosovo and Metohija,

18 to achieve a consensus and to solve the problem based on principles of

19 national equality as contained in the two-house assembly that you

20 mentioned and the principles adopted then?

21 A. No, there were no deviations from that. The conclusions as

22 interpreted here mark -- or actually they are typical of the behaviour of

23 the overall government activity in attempting to resolve these issues.

24 The government was always unanimous and always insisted on a peaceful

25 solution. We were aware that there was a problem and we wanted to solve

Page 42953

1 it in a civilised and democratic manner. We could not accept terrorism,

2 but we were ready to discuss everything and to search for solutions that

3 would not bring into question the territorial integrity of Serbia. The

4 territorial integrity of Serbia was the only point we were not prepared to

5 sacrifice. Everything else was open to discussion.

6 Q. All these ten points are important, but in order to save time I

7 will pass over the next one and I will quote the one after that.

8 "The government reiterates its commitment to solving the problems

9 in Kosovo and Metohija exclusively through political dialogue, respect for

10 the territorial integrity and sovereignty of Serbia and Yugoslavia and the

11 full equality of citizens and ethnic communities. The government once

12 again calls upon representatives of Albanian parties to join in the

13 political dialogue with the representatives of all ethnic communities

14 living in Kosovo and Metohija, to condemn and renounce terrorism, and

15 together with all to seek political solutions which will ensure equality

16 and rule out majority outvoting and discrimination on any grounds

17 whatsoever."

18 What is the essence of this approach, Mr. Seselj?

19 A. Well, first of all a peaceful solution of the overall problem, a

20 democratic solution to the problem, the elimination of terrorism, and the

21 prevention of any kind of discrimination.

22 You know, when we struggle against discrimination we cannot

23 struggle only against discrimination against Albanians. We have to

24 struggle against discrimination against Serbs, Gorani, Roma, Muslim,

25 Turks, Egyptians, all those living in Kosovo and Metohija at the time,

Page 42954

1 many of whom no longer live there unfortunately. So the struggle against

2 discrimination implies the abolishing of all forms of discrimination and

3 the protection of all potential victims of discrimination.

4 How can discrimination arise? Well, one way is through majority

5 outvoting. One of the main forms of discrimination taking place in Kosovo

6 and Metohija after Second World War occurred in this manner, by majority

7 outvoting. If the Albanians were in the majority, it was as if the others

8 didn't exist, and they were then forced to become Albanians to declare

9 themselves as Albanians and so on. However, what is required is full

10 freedom and the preservation of everyone's identity. That's why we

11 insisted on preserving the identity of every ethnic community.

12 Q. From the smallest to the largest.

13 A. Yes. Because this was the only way to abolish all

14 discrimination. If the largest ethnic group is able to discriminate

15 against all the others, what have we achieved?

16 Q. Let's go on through this text. After the next subtitle it says

17 the government of national unity a befitting name. I hope you can find

18 that easily, Mr. Robinson.

19 They quote you, and here is what you say about the agreement, in

20 paragraph 4 you say: "Commenting on the agreement between the president

21 of FR Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, and American ambassador, Richard

22 Holbrooke, Seselj pointed out that given the threats it is exposed to and

23 wishing to avoid war numerous victims and large-scale devastation, the

24 state made certain concessions to the potential aggressor but that they do

25 not encroach upon the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the

Page 42955

1 country."

2 A. Yes. We actually did make concessions to the potential aggressor

3 by agreeing to the arrival of the OSCE mission and by agreeing to accept

4 foreign interference in our internal affairs. These were concessions. No

5 other country in the world would have agreed to that.

6 Q. Very well. But in spite of this, matters escalated. You go on to

7 say that the number of policemen was reduced to the number that had

8 existed in peacetime and that they were able --

9 A. Mr. Milosevic, you agreed to this in your agreement with

10 Mr. Holbrooke, that the number should be reduced to 90.000 policemen. I

11 remember that very well.

12 Q. Thank you for reminding me, Mr. Seselj.

13 And in tab 25 in your article, in chapter 19 which we quoted a

14 little while ago where it speaks of the false and trumped up conclusions

15 that there is an excessive use of force, and there is a sentence there

16 which reads in the third paragraph from the end of chapter 19. It reads

17 as follows: "In this way they're wishing to go back on the agreement with

18 the international community," and you go on to quote from the

19 agreement, "The state retains the right to respond adequately to any form

20 of terrorist activity which might imperil the security of citizens and

21 representatives the government."

22 A. Well, who could ask us to capitulate to the terrorists? What kind

23 of state would we have been?

24 Q. Yes. We retained that right, and in accordance with that we

25 responded to the terrorist attacks? Was there any other form of

Page 42956

1 violence?

2 A. No, absolutely not. We were exclusively responding to terrorist

3 attacks and dealing with the terrorists.

4 Q. Going back to tab 23 in this article from the Zemun newspaper

5 describing the stay of government representatives in Kosovo on the 15th

6 and 16th of January, they continue to quote you, and this is three

7 passages further on from the paragraph we have just quoted about the

8 agreement between Holbrooke and me. And they say that as the Americans

9 are making it more difficult for us to deal with terrorism, Seselj says

10 that we are in fact waging a fight with America because the Siptars would

11 never have risen had it not been for US support.

12 A. This is true. And they would certainly have tried to find a way

13 of reaching an agreement with us and that we could all live normally in

14 Serbia had they not been inspired by foreign powers which made them great

15 promises which they are still unable to fulfil, because the Western powers

16 are now endangered by terrorist actions in Kosovo and Metohija. They were

17 promised full independence, and the Western powers do not know how to give

18 them that independence because it cannot be made to fit into international

19 law, however much globalism may have diluted that law.

20 Let me remind you, Mr. Milosevic, at the time - and I'm certain of

21 that because I was deputy Prime Minister - we had a total of 25.000

22 policemen in all of Serbia, and out of these 10.000 were active in Kosovo

23 and Metohija. Today, Serbia, without Kosovo and Metohija, which is under

24 NATO occupation, has over 30.000 policemen. And I think this piece of

25 information is very important. Today Serbian has more policemen. I'm

Page 42957

1 speaking of authorised officials. I'm not referring to secretaries,

2 clerks and so on. I'm speaking of officers who have the power to arrest

3 people. And during the crisis in Kosovo and Metohija, just before the

4 bombing, there were only 25.000. You can check these figures.

5 Q. Out of these 25.000 there were only 10.000 in Kosovo and Metohija.

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. Mr. Nice here said that Serbia was a police state.

8 A. These are fabrications. These are frivolous statements. You

9 cannot have a police state with such a small number of policemen in

10 relation to the numbers of the population.

11 On the other hand, you cannot speak of a police state if the

12 police do not persecute political opponents. I was such a victim of the

13 police and I can testify to that. You need to have arguments to support

14 the claim that Serbia was a police state. Serbia was not a police state.

15 Serbia did have some deficiencies in the development of a democratic

16 political system as it was still then in a state of transition, but no one

17 can seriously contend that it was a police state.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... ratio of

19 policemen to the population.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Kosovo and Metohija? You mean all

21 Serbia or Kosovo and Metohija? Ten million, 25.000, it's easy to

22 establish.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let's deal with Kosovo first.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] In relation to the population, do

25 you mean the numbers or their attitude in the way they behaved? You mean

Page 42958












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Page 42959

1 numbers. In Kosovo and Metohija, there were perhaps 1.5 million

2 inhabitants. As the Albanians boycotted the census we cannot be

3 absolutely sure, but in our estimation there were between 800.000 or a

4 million Albanians. There were over 200.000 Roma, about 150.000 Muslims,

5 between 200 and 300.000 Serbs, and then there were others, Goranis and

6 others.

7 In any case, this is a rough breakdown and this cannot be

8 established precisely. And for all these numbers there were only 10.000

9 policemen under conditions where there were terrorist activities going on.

10 You have to bear in mind that any country undergoing a threat of terrorism

11 has to increase the number of its policemen, but there were only 10.000

12 policemen in total in Kosovo and Metohija, and this was agreed between

13 Milosevic and Holbrooke.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

15 Mr. Milosevic.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. Your colleague, the Deputy Prime Minister Milovan Bojic, said on

18 the next page that it is no accident that what happened in Kosovo and

19 Metohija happened when the -- pointed out that under such pressures the

20 government of national unity was even more resolute.

21 What is the connection between the fact that we were already

22 exposed and had been exposed to pressures, sanctions, that we were

23 exhausted.

24 A. The aggression of Yugoslavia happened -- against Yugoslavia

25 happened in stages. First of all, foreign powers helped the Slovenian

Page 42960

1 separatists. After a clumsy intervention by the JNA, and it was not the

2 Serbs who were behind this but the Croats, Ante Markovic, Stjepan Mesic,

3 Veljko Kadijevic and others, after this unhappy intervention by the JNA

4 where there were casualties among the young soldiers, we had several

5 secessionist wars. The Western forces aided Croatia until they led to the

6 exodus of almost the entire Serb populations from there. Then they helped

7 Bosnia and Herzegovina up to the Dayton agreement. When this stage was

8 completed, it was Kosovo and Metohija's turn, and the Contact Group had

9 already hinted that they would open up the issues of Sandzak and

10 Vojvodina.

11 The aggression against the former Yugoslavia took place

12 step-by-step. When one item on the agenda was achieved, the anti-Serbian

13 agenda, then they proceeded on to the next until they brought -- they

14 cornered Serbia, because in Rambouillet we realised that we had been

15 cornered.

16 Q. In the middle paragraph on this page they mention Ibro Vait and

17 Maliq Maliqi, a Goranac and an Albanian, who sent a request to the state

18 organs to deal with the terrorists urgently and fully irrespective of any

19 pressures from the West so that the war they announced in the spring would

20 not come about.

21 When you were there what were people saying about war in the

22 spring?

23 A. The Albanians didn't want a war either but war was expected. The

24 Western powers had let the Albanian terrorists know that war was

25 forthcoming. They were preparing them for that war. The Albanian

Page 42961

1 terrorists were to act as the NATO infantry because the Western powers

2 were not prepared to send their ground forces into the war because they

3 knew the kind of soldiers that the Serbs were and that many of them would

4 be killed, so they wanted others to be bleed for their interests and they

5 achieved this by organising and arming the Albanian terrorist formations.

6 But the population was afraid of the war. The Albanians in general did

7 not want war. Who wants war? Who wants bombing? Who wants destruction,

8 famine, killing? No one normal can desire that and neither about the

9 Albanians, but the war was imposed on them so they could be instruments in

10 the hands of the NATO alliance against Serbia.

11 Q. Please look at the other section, destiny and the ancestors. It

12 says there that the vice premier of Serbia visited Pec.

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. All of this was on the 15th and the 16th?

15 A. And the 17th.

16 Q. On the 17th. And then they quote your colleague Ratko Markovic

17 who as you know testified here, and he says that the government was in

18 favour of a political dialogue, a peaceful and just solution to the

19 problems in Kosovo and Metohija and the humane co-existence of the

20 inhabitants of the province.

21 Can you tell us whether you were together all the time with the

22 other vice premiers? Ratko Markovic led the delegation of the Republic of

23 Serbia at these negotiations, at these 20 attempted negotiations in

24 Pristina.

25 A. Yes. And Tomislav Nikolic, the deputy president of the Serbian

Page 42962

1 Radical Party, was there too. He was presents during every one of these

2 attempts to negotiate. So he told me about everything that happened after

3 all, we in the government of Serbia gave instructions to this negotiation

4 delegation of ours.

5 Q. Let us see what the journalists quote from that day. Destiny and

6 ancestors. The second paragraph: "Kosovo and Metohija is an ethnically

7 heterogeneous area and must remain so. Anyone who tries to ethnically

8 cleanse this area will not succeed in doing so, said Markovic, adding that

9 history had made this area ethnically diversified and that this ethnic

10 structure could not be changed."

11 A. Well, Mr. Milosevic, look at what is going on now with the remains

12 of the former Yugoslavia. From all the former Yugoslav federal republics,

13 it is only Serbia that has remained a multi-ethnic and a multi-religious

14 society. Bosnia-Herzegovina was split up because of the civil war and

15 Croatia practically expelled all the Serbs from the territory of the Serb

16 Krajina, so they all had to move out. They all had to flee for their

17 lives. It is only Serbia that remained multi-cultural, multi-ethnic and a

18 multi-religious society in the true sense of the word.

19 I just wish to inform the Trial Chamber of the following because

20 the Zemun -- Zemun newspapers appear on one page and then a Greater Serbia

21 on the other page and then they alternate. This was a special edition of

22 these two newspapers that was a joint edition so that you do not think

23 that these are separate newspapers. Since the same people sat on both

24 newspaper desks this is one of their joint editions. It is a single

25 newspaper -- a joint edition of two different newspapers. That's what I'm

Page 42963

1 trying to say.

2 Q. This is a useful explanation --

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Seselj, before I lose track of this completely,

4 remind me of the objective or the purpose that you say that NATO had in

5 seeking a foothold or a control of an area in Serbia.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] NATO has geostrategic interests in

7 the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. There are several reasons for that.

8 First of all, you know, Mr. Bonomy, that NATO has strategic interests in

9 fully diluting Russia and therefore they need a foothold in the Balkans,

10 in the Ukraine, and in central Asia. Their ultimate objective is to break

11 up all of Russia. It wasn't enough for them to break up the Soviet Union.

12 They do not want to have a single factor in the background that is not

13 reliable in their intentions of this nature.

14 So why were we Serbs always subject to NATO attacks and why did

15 NATO always support our enemies in all the civil wars that were waged?

16 They see us as potential Russian allies in all wars in the Balkans and

17 they want to destroy us as the only nation, the only army, the only force

18 that would not subject itself to a dictate. They want to have bases in

19 the Balkans and they want to have oil coming in, but they want to go

20 around Bosnia. Because they need oil for their tankers and they want to

21 have a completely clear situation.

22 On the other hand, soon they will have to withdraw all of their

23 soldiers from Germany. Where will they send them unless it's the

24 Balkans? And what will their pretext be to bring their soldiers to the

25 Balkans? This is a neuralgic area of Europe. So many troops have to be

Page 42964

1 there. All of this is old hat. Perhaps there is no point in discussing

2 it any further.

3 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, so there are six different reasons, I think,

4 in there for -- according to you for this happening. The very first one

5 seemed to be a strategic objective of having a place in Serbia. Can you

6 tell me what use NATO has been making of the fact that according to you

7 they now have control over a part of Serbia?

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, no, Mr. Bonomy. NATO now has

9 control over all of Serbia. First they took Kosovo and Metohija in order

10 to weaken the authorities --

11 JUDGE BONOMY: Please concentrate on the question. Tell me what

12 use, according to you, they are making the fact that they have control of

13 Serbia.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Firstly on the basis of their

15 control over Serbia they have one problem less in their further march to

16 the east and that is the main form in which they use this. So this is

17 from a strategic point of view.

18 Secondly, they have an economic interest. There are vast natural

19 resources in Kosovo and Metohija. Zinc, coal, nickel, millions of tonnes

20 of resources as far as I can remember. Lead as well. Although they are

21 not authorised to do so by Resolution 1244, they have started selling

22 Serbian state property in Kosovo and Metohija.

23 But what is the core of the matter? I've already told you. They

24 helped the Croats against the Serbs, the Muslims against the Serbs, the

25 Albanians against the Serbs so that the Serbs would be as weak as possible

Page 42965

1 as the only state-building factor in the Balkans. They invent new

2 nations. The Muslims are a new nation, an invented nation. They are the

3 descendants of Serbs who under Turkish occupation took Islam. They speak

4 Serbian. And even this Tribunal of yours is inventing new words and new

5 languages. They call it Bosnian/Croatian/Serbian, and it's only the

6 Serbian language according to linguists.

7 And under the influence of the Vatican they helped the Croats.

8 The Croats were destroyed during the Turkish conquest, and they were a

9 small people at the part. What you call Croats nowadays are basically

10 Catholic Serbs. They speak Serbian as well. That is the core of the

11 matter.

12 There is another thing. With the assistance of the Turkish

13 conquerors, Albanians were moved to Kosovo and Metohija. They served the

14 occupiers, and then they served the Austrians and the Germans in the First

15 World War, and then they served Hitler in the Second World War. Hitler

16 formed an entire SS division out of Albanians. It was called Skendgerbeg.

17 Now they serve NATO against the Serb people. In Bosnia Hitler formed

18 another SS division that was called the Handzar Division and that

19 consisted of Muslims. Croats under the Ustasha regime waged war at

20 Stalingrad. There were 10.000 of them there. We are reliving our tragic

21 history yet again today. That is the basis for all the questions that are

22 being discussed.

23 JUDGE BONOMY: I'm simply -- I'm trying to understand the great

24 strategic, economic significance of Serbia, and I'm grateful to you for

25 your answer. Thank you.

Page 42966

1 MR. NICE: Your Honour, before we move on, I've got a matter that

2 I'd be grateful for two minutes to raise with you at the end of the

3 session.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I'm going to stop now because

5 there is a hearing here at 2.15, and we can't encroach on the time. So

6 I'll just hear Mr. Nice and then we will adjourn.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

8 MR. NICE: Private session and after the witness is withdrawn I

9 would be grateful. It has nothing to do with his evidence at all.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: I see. You are excused, Mr. Seselj. You will

11 return next Tuesday, 9.00 a.m..

12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Tell me, please, when I'm supposed

13 to come next time. When I come to this courtroom next time?

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Next Tuesday, 9.00 a.m.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm asking you that because

16 yesterday I waited all day in vain. So I want to know for sure when I'm

17 supposed to come next time. Thank you.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: You will not wait in vain again, Mr. Seselj.

19 [The witness stands down]


21 MR. NICE: If we can go into private session very briefly.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, private session, please.

23 [Private session]

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

Page 42967












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Page 42968

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Page 42969

1 (redacted)

2 (redacted)

3 (redacted)

4 (redacted)

5 (redacted)

6 (redacted)

7 (redacted)

8 (redacted)

9 (redacted)

10 (redacted)

11 (redacted)

12 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,

13 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 23rd day

14 of August, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.