Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 42970

1 Tuesday, 23 August 2005

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 [The witness entered court]

5 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, continue with your --

7 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, to continue with your

9 examination-in-chief.


11 [Witness answered through interpreter]

12 Examined by Mr. Milosevic: [Continued]

13 Q. [No interpretation].

14 A. [No interpretation].

15 Q. [No interpretation].

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: We are not having any English translation.

17 THE INTERPRETER: It was the wrong channel, Your Honour. Sorry.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I was receiving it on the B/C/S

19 channel.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Proceed now.

21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. On Friday we left off with your visits to Kosovo in early 1999

23 when you and other deputy Prime Ministers spoke and toured several towns

24 of the province at the time, and I quoted to you, among other things,

25 several sentences from what your colleague Professor Ratko Markovic said,

Page 42971

1 and that was contained in tab 2. Tab 2 contains a special edition that

2 covered your visit to Kosovo and Metohija at the time.

3 The point of what I intend to ask you is in the passage that I'm

4 going to quote now. It's on page 606. That's where we left off last

5 time. Your colleague Professor Ratko Markovic says: "Kosovo and Metohija

6 is an ethnically heterogeneous area and has to stay that way. Anyone who

7 tries to ethnically cleanse this area will fail." And he added that:

8 "History made this area ethnically diverse and the structure cannot be

9 changed. The Albanians are those that have to prove that they wish

10 peaceful co-existence with other ethnic communities."

11 Tell me, in your public and political work, when did you first

12 come across this idea of ethnically pure Kosovo?

13 A. Well, that's a fairly old idea. It dates back to the time of

14 Tito's communist regime. After World War II, the communist regime banned

15 the return of all Serbs who had been expelled from Kosovo and Metohija

16 during the war, and there were more than 100.000 of them. At the time,

17 Italian occupants and quisling forces, so-called Ballisti, made up of

18 Albanian fascists, expelled Serbs and seized their property in order to

19 change the ethnic structure of Kosovo in an accelerated way for the

20 purpose of negotiations after the war, especially in the case of defeat by

21 their allies. That's an option they had in mind.

22 Before the war, the ethnic structure of Kosovo was even. There

23 was an equal proportion of Serbs, Gorani, Romas and others. They made up

24 about half, and the other half were Albanians. This structure was upset

25 after the war. The communists made this worse by banning the return of

Page 42972

1 the Serbs by law. Their property was never returned. After that,

2 communists invented a special autonomous area called Autonomous Province

3 of Kosovo and Metohija. That was a lower degree than Vojvodina had, all

4 the way until the constitution of 1963. Under the 1963 constitution, the

5 autonomous status of Kosovo and Metohija was made equal to that of

6 Vojvodina. The then regime under Tito gave absolute power to Albanians in

7 Kosovo and Metohija, and they started exerting pressure on Serbs and other

8 ethnic communities to leave Kosovo, whereas a large number of Albanian

9 immigrants were coming from Albania. Many of them were running away from

10 the communist dictatorship of Enver Hoxha, which was much harder to bear

11 than Tito's regime.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. Next question.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. With regard to this objective of ethnically pure Kosovo, various

15 public figures wrote about it in the 1980s. Do you remember at the time

16 in the SFRY there was a very renowned theoretical magazine called

17 Socialism?

18 A. Yes.

19 Q. Do you remember that in that magazine and in the broader public

20 the objective of Albanian separatists to create an ethnically pure Kosovo

21 was well known?

22 A. Until 1989, it was a forbidden subject that nobody dared to write

23 about in books, magazines, or newspapers. The regime punished anyone who

24 tried to write about it. We have a famous case of Dobrica Cosic who

25 raised the issue in 1968. He was then member of the Central Committee of

Page 42973

1 the Communist Party. He was immediately replaced, placed under

2 surveillance by the police, and harassed in all sorts of ways.

3 The regime tried to show on the example of Dobrica Cosic what

4 would happen to anyone if they only try to raise the issue of Albanian

5 separatism in Kosovo and Metohija. Later on, the communist regime showed

6 its intention in 1971 to grant Kosovo the status of a state. Some

7 professors at the law faculty led by Professor Djuric, Kosta Cavoski, and

8 many others, opposed the draft constitutional amendments publicly.

9 Professor Djuric was expelled from the law faculty, as well as his

10 colleagues, and until the change in government, they were unable to return

11 to their posts. So the regime punished anyone who tried to speak publicly

12 about the problems in Kosovo and Metohija all the way until 1981 when the

13 famous, notorious demonstrations happened in Kosovo. It was only then

14 that the Yugoslav public started to discuss the problem more publicly.

15 And then all sorts of facts started to emerge. We began to hear about the

16 personal experience of many expelled and persecuted Serbs, even persecuted

17 Albanians. There was Professor Halit Trnavci, a renowned professor who

18 had to flee from Kosovo and Metohija because he propounded the idea that

19 the future of Kosovo Albanians was to have a peaceful co-existence with

20 the Serbs because their life in Kosovo was better than in Albania under

21 Enver Hoxha.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Your colleague, professor of constitutional law from Slovenia,

25 Ivan Kristan, testified here before you. In 1981 -- and I have in front

Page 42974

1 of me the magazine called Socialism that I just mentioned, issue number 10

2 from 1981. In 1981 when, as you said very correctly, the discussion began

3 in Yugoslavia about this clearly expressed intention to have an ethnically

4 pure Kosovo, and I will quote from his article in the magazine Socialism.

5 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... quoted, the

6 appropriate course is for them to be made available to the Prosecution at

7 least.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, and Mr. Milosevic well knows that. Do you

9 have copies available, Mr. Milosevic?

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I do. I do, if you're interested,

11 several copies. It's the magazine Socialism from 1981, issue number 10.

12 I just have the article written by one of your witnesses, Ivan Kristan,

13 who wrote about this in 1981.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. I will quote to you, Mr. Seselj.

16 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreters would appreciate to have it on the

17 ELMO.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you are to wait until we have

19 received the document.

20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, but it's in the Serbian

21 language, so you will not be able to read it, but we can put this passage

22 on the ELMO.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Mr. Seselj, please find page 1733.

25 A. Yes.

Page 42975

1 Q. Look at the last paragraph.

2 A. "Albanian nationalist idea about the ethnically pure Kosovo and

3 the unification --"

4 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please slow down. We cannot

5 do this.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj, you're being asked by the

7 interpreters to speak more slowly.

8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have slowed down a little. "The

9 slogan about ethnically pure Kosovo offers, instead of real equality of

10 nations and nationalities, constant counting and chauvinism."

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Mr. Seselj, Was it clear already in the early 1980s that there

13 was very public discussion about this very public objective of ethnically

14 pure Kosovo that was held by Albanian separatists?

15 A. Yes. And in 1981, between Serbian, Croatian, Muslim, Slovene,

16 Macedonian, and all other politicians, there was absolutely no difference

17 in the assessment of the situation in Kosovo and Metohija. At least in

18 their declarations they were against Albanian separatism, against

19 non-observance of civil rights and freedoms, and it seemed in that 1981

20 all Yugoslav units will help to fight this Albanian separatism in its

21 purist form, and it had already begun to express itself in street

22 violence.

23 Another thing was clear: All Albanian separatists in 1981 come on

24 as Marxist-Leninist revolutionaries drawing their ideas from Enver Hoxha.

25 Even then, under the communist regime, that was untenable because the

Page 42976

1 regime itself had begun to give way under the pressure of the struggle for

2 basic rights and freedoms.

3 In the territory of the former Yugoslavia, consensus had already

4 been reached that there was no return to -- to Stalinism, and the

5 orientation was towards liberalisation. I personally think under

6 mono-party system that was impossible, but anyway, that was the thrust of

7 the thinking then.

8 Q. Now, look at another two passages that I wish to draw your

9 attention to, and you will see that Ivan Kristan gives us certain numbers

10 as indicators of ethnic cleansing.

11 A. Kristan says if Albanians in Kosovo are not equal because they do

12 not have a republic, the question has to be asked how would they then fare

13 with other nations and communities in that republic? When I say

14 nationalities, I mean ethnic minorities. That was socialist lingo for

15 minority. The answer is that other minorities would also have to get a

16 state, because the same criterion has to apply to everyone, not only to

17 Kosovo. And then we would have several autonomous republics.

18 He says ethnic head counts are especially fatal to such units as

19 these provinces. There is a lot of pressure and chauvinist incidents that

20 even lead some communities to leave because they cannot suffer it any

21 longer. That already happened in Kosovo out of where thousands of Serbs

22 and Montenegrins have already left. So that compared to 1971, in 1981

23 Serbs and Montenegrins are much fewer. And he gives specific data: In

24 1971, Serbs were 18.3 per cent; Montenegrins 2.5 per cent; whereas in 1981

25 these figures were 13.2 and 1.7. And even in absolute terms, the

Page 42977

1 percentage of Serbs and Montenegrins were much fewer; 8.1 per cent and 4.8

2 per cent, whereas the number of Albanians rose by 34 per cent.

3 At the time, Mr. Kristan behaves as a well-informed scholar and

4 provides real facts. However, later he changed his position by 180 per

5 cent [as interpreted]. He starts supporting Albanian nationalism and goes

6 against everything he said before.

7 Q. Let us go back to those terms "ethnically pure" and "ethnic

8 cleansing." Was there anyone in Yugoslavia at the time who did not

9 condemn such backward approach to the resolution of national problems?

10 A. I already said this. Politicians from Macedonia, Slovenia, Muslim

11 politicians, Serbs, Croatians, everybody came out in force against

12 ethnically pure Kosovo and the objective of ethnic cleansing that was held

13 by Albanian separatists.

14 Q. Have you given this any thought? How come ten years later it was

15 precisely the Serbs, who had faced that evil and fought against that evil,

16 in whose public opinion ethnic cleansing was considered to be a dirty kind

17 of behaviour, criminal conduct? How come it was the Serbs whose behaviour

18 was found objectionable and who were accused of ethnic cleansing?

19 A. Well, because later on the Western powers and the Vatican started

20 interfering in internal Yugoslav affairs with a view to breaking up

21 Yugoslavia, and that is when the Western services started working in terms

22 of conducting a psychological warfare. And they launched the most

23 terrible slogans in order to blacken the name of the Serbs as a people.

24 Because in the West it was thought that it was the Serbs who truly cared

25 about Yugoslavia and who were the only ones who were prepared to

Page 42978












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Page 42979

1 energetically fight for the survival of Yugoslavia, that all others could

2 be instructed in terms of pursuing the Western policy of breaking up

3 Yugoslavia. So everything that was negative in the past in different

4 parts of Yugoslavia was subsequently ascribed to the Serbs as their

5 intention, as their objective, as their will, as their plan, as their

6 design, et cetera.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: So you say there was a deliberate attempt on the

8 part of the West to demonise, blacken the name of the Serbs.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes. That plan existed first

10 in Vatican, in Germany, and then all other Western powers joined in.

11 Until 1991, America was vacillating, wondering whether to go for the

12 break-up of Yugoslavia or not. It seemed to me at one point in time that

13 America's objective was to -- to have Yugoslavia survive but to have the

14 communist system collapse. However, since Germany and Vatican had the

15 primary role of all political process in the Balkans at the time and since

16 they had prepared their agencies to carry out these plans, America

17 subsequently started pursuing this kind of policy, and they even played a

18 very prominent role in pursuing such a policy later on.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Just a general question, Mr. Seselj. If we look at this entire

21 decade from 1990 until 2000 in the territory of the Republic of Serbia, at

22 any point in time, even while the wars were raging in Croatia and

23 Bosnia-Herzegovina, during this crisis was there ever any idea, and in

24 particular was any idea materialised in terms of ethnic cleansing?

25 A. No.

Page 42980

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... feet.

2 MR. NICE: If the Chamber is happy to receive and interested in

3 receiving this highly generalised form of --

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: I was just about to bring that to the attention

5 of Mr. Milosevic. I have allowed this evidence because I know it's part

6 of your case, but in my judgement, we have had enough of it and you must

7 bring the witness now to evidence that more directly bears on the

8 indictment.

9 MR. NICE: I'm grateful for the Chamber's ruling. My two

10 observations would have been both that it verges on expert without the

11 advantage of a properly footnoted expert report in advance; alternatively,

12 if it's going to contain sweeping observations of the kind made at all,

13 those observations are valueless unless we know the evidential source.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Bring the witness, as I

15 said, to evidence that more directly relates to the indictment. We have

16 had enough general information.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Mr. Seselj, take a look at tab number 1 first. Tell me, what does

19 it contain?

20 A. That tab contains a conference or, rather, a broadcast that

21 Dr. Ratko Markovic, Dr. Milovan Bojic, and I -- Zoran Andjelkovic was

22 there too, president of the Provisional Executive Council of Kosovo and

23 Metohija. This is a TV programme on TV Pristina that we had on the 15th

24 of January. That was the same day when the government session was held in

25 Pristina. After the government session, since we were staying on in

Page 42981

1 Kosovo and Metohija as the rest of the government members returned to

2 Belgrade, we stayed at the police headquarters for a long time, then took

3 a stroll in the streets of Pristina also for quite awhile, about an hour,

4 hour and a half, and then we finally went to TV Pristina where we had a

5 live television programme, answering the questions of spectators.

6 There's a mistake in this tab. I don't think it exists in the

7 English translation. I think the English translation is complete as far

8 as I managed to see. However, in the original, every second page is

9 missing. I don't know whether I'm the only one who has this mistake here

10 or whether you have the same one.

11 Q. I have the same mistake here in my texts. They probably thought

12 that they could print on both pages. So the Serbian text is rather

13 useless.

14 Tell me, what was the point of your speech in public then as well

15 as of the other participants? You were politically active as deputy Prime

16 Minister, together with other members of the government. What was the

17 main message conveyed by what you were saying then?

18 A. We spoke in unison, although we had different ideological

19 orientations. First of all, we wanted the general situation in Kosovo and

20 Metohija to calm down. We want dialogue between the Serbian and Albanian

21 political representatives and the representatives of the other ethnic

22 communities in Kosovo and Metohija. We want all forms of terrorism to be

23 brought to an end. We were persuading Albanians that terrorism was not in

24 their interests, that the interference of Western powers was not in their

25 interest. We were saying that the Western powers are trying to take

Page 42982

1 advantage of the situation and of them for their own purposes and that

2 finally they will be deeply harmed in their national interests, just like

3 the Serbs. At any rate, our mission was a mission of calming the

4 situation down and one of persuasion. We were promising various

5 representatives of the government that we would invest more in Kosovo and

6 Metohija and --

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. We now have the point of tab 1. Move

8 to the next tab, Mr. Milosevic.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Tell me, Mr. Seselj, the members of the government of Serbia, did

11 they have a press conference on the 17th of January at the end of their

12 visit?

13 A. Yes. We had a press conference at the Pristina media centre. We

14 presented our view of the overall situation, our experience after our

15 visit to Kosovo and Metohija. We explained to journalists from home and

16 abroad what the point of our visit was. We presented our view that we

17 would come again, that we would have government sessions held in different

18 towns in Kosovo and Metohija. However, at that press conference there was

19 reference to the action in Racak that had just happened. We explained

20 what had happened in Racak. We already had information.

21 Q. Mr. Seselj, in tab 31 is there a transcript of the press

22 conference that was published in the newspaper Velika Srbija under the

23 headlines "The CIA is Operating Through William Walker"?

24 A. Yes, that is the complete transcript.

25 Q. So the press conference was held on the 17th of January.

Page 42983

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. Two days after the events in Racak. What did you conclude then?

3 A. We concluded that our police had set out in action to break up a

4 terrorist gang that had previously killed one or two policemen, I cannot

5 remember exactly now. Previously, our police had informed the OSCE

6 Verification Mission that they were setting out on this action. The OSCE

7 verifiers were present while this action was being carried out. Of course

8 they were not on the actual site where they could get killed, because they

9 were always trying to spare themselves, but they were close enough to see

10 that there was fierce fighting and that shooting was coming from both

11 sides.

12 In this action, our police sustained small losses, and they

13 managed to overcome the Albanian terrorist gang. The Albanian terrorists

14 had greater -- a greater number of casualties. It kept changing from 40

15 to 50, all the way up to 80 and so on. At any rate, it was a resounding

16 defeat of the Albanian terrorists. Only terrorists got killed. Not a

17 single civilian was killed. Of course, there were terrorists who fought

18 in civilian clothing.

19 When the fighting was over sometime in the evening, our police

20 collected the weapons --

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I don't see how Mr. Seselj's

22 evidence about Racak is going to help your case. You have other witnesses

23 who can testify and who have testified more directly to the events in

24 Racak. The provision of mere general information is not going to advance

25 your case. His views on Racak I don't find very -- very helpful. I'm

Page 42984

1 sorry.

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] But, sir --

3 JUDGE BONOMY: There is, however, one specific question I would

4 like to ask you about Racak, very specific. You said that by the time of

5 the press conference you had certain information. Now, what was the time

6 of day at which the press conference took place?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, it could have been around

8 midday. I don't know exactly. I cannot remember exactly now. Noon, 1.00

9 p.m., around that time day. Around midday. I don't know the exact hour.

10 But this is the 17th, whereas the action in Racak took place on the 15th.

11 JUDGE BONOMY: My specific question is what was the source of your

12 information?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Our police. General Vlastimir

14 Djordjevic, General Sreten Lukic. During my previous testimony --

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Did you speak to each of these gentlemen prior to

16 the 17th of January on the subject of Racak?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. I can give you the details,

18 which will be very telling evidence about this. I've already said that on

19 the 16th of January, a day after the action in Racak, General Vlastimir

20 Djordjevic, Vojislav Zivkovic, Sonija Stjepanovic, and I travelled on a

21 police helicopter from Pristina to Prizren. When we came to Pristina

22 again, General Vlastimir Djordjevic told me that as a matter of fact on

23 the following day, after returning from Prizren to Pristina by helicopter,

24 he flew over Racak, that he saw a lot foreign journalists there,

25 verifiers, et cetera. That's one more detail.

Page 42985

1 I've already told you that during lunch at police headquarters in

2 Pristina we received our initial information about fighting with

3 terrorists in Racak. But Mr. Milosevic's question has to do with what I

4 stated at the press conference. You will see this on page 50 in the

5 original. I don't know where it is in the English translation, but it's

6 towards the end.

7 I talk about the action in Racak there as something that is called

8 trigger event, a trigger event in US military terminology. You understand

9 it probably better than I do because my knowledge of English is not that

10 good.

11 You know that the CIA organised massacres in the market of Markale

12 in Sarajevo, in Vasa Miskin Street, at the Partizan cemetery. That's what

13 I say here.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: Please remember the question that was asked. You

15 say that you mention this towards the end of your press conference.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

17 JUDGE BONOMY: And you use the word "trigger." Can you show me

18 where that is?

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, no. I didn't use the word at

20 the press conference but I'm explaining the phenomenon to you so that it

21 would be clear to you. I'm trying to explain to you the deception with

22 the Markale market in Sarajevo because already by then --

23 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Seselj, I've got a very specific matter I want

24 to deal with and I would be grateful if you would concentrate on it. I

25 simply wanted to know the source of your information. You've answered it,

Page 42986

1 and we can now move on.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, in relation to your

4 objection as to why I'm asking Seselj about Racak, you should bear in mind

5 that, since he was deputy Prime Minister at the time, he received all

6 information that was topical in the area. What he knew was what the

7 government knew. And what he knew and what the government of Serbia knew

8 had to be correct.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, very well, put your questions and

10 let us hear the evidence which he has on Racak.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. So you had all information about Racak. In view of regular

13 practice, in view of your position, in view of government behaviour, in

14 view of the overall situation, could it have happened at all that you

15 would not receive accurate information about this but that you'd receive

16 wrong information?

17 A. I think this would have been absolutely impossible. I am a person

18 who is so well-informed that --

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Don't answer that. Could it have happened that

20 you would not have received wrong information? That really is not a

21 useful question, Mr. Milosevic.

22 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Mr. Seselj, this event in Racak was taken advantage of in order to

25 try to ascribe a crime to our state, a crime that had not been committed.

Page 42987












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Page 42988

1 A. Yes. Even while we were in Kosovo and Metohija --

2 JUDGE BONOMY: That's again a leading -- ridiculous leading

3 question, Mr. Milosevic.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- Mr. Milosevic.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Mr. Seselj, this practice and this event in Racak, was this a

7 solitary example of a special interpretation of events in the territory of

8 the former Yugoslavia? I'm not describing it at all now.

9 A. Even while our -- us three deputy Prime Ministers were there in

10 Kosovo, the Verification Mission and William Walker spoke up, saying that

11 this was a massacre. We had information that this was fighting. The

12 Verification Mission knew about that fighting. Despite the facts, they

13 immediately started accusing the Serbs of a massacre. That is why at the

14 press conference I said that this was not the first time that this

15 happened to us; that similar things happened at the Markale market in

16 Sarajevo, at the Vasa Miskin Street in Sarajevo, and so on, that various

17 events were staged in order to condemn the Serb side in all these

18 situations of war or in all these incidents.

19 Then I say that the situation was similar with the CIA agents and

20 proteges in Iraq and that it had been exposed in the UN at that time.

21 Then I talk about Walker's behaviour in Kosovo and Metohija in general.

22 And you know what the role of this Walker was in Latin America. You know

23 all the dirty things he took part in.

24 MR. NICE: Obviously insofar as the accused and the witness regard

25 it as in his or either of their interests to advance these generalities

Page 42989

1 and the Court doesn't wish to stop them, that's their choice, but really,

2 this can't help us in our inquiry into the events to hear these general

3 views of this man about the CIA.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Move on, Mr. Milosevic. We have had enough of

5 this general information.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I could give you some very concrete

7 information, Mr. Robinson, if you wish, and it has to do with this --

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... in response

9 to questions from Mr. Milosevic or from the Bench.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Mr. Seselj, you mentioned a particular expression of staging

12 events, when you were giving various examples. As deputy Prime Minister

13 of the government of Serbia, did you know anything about some kind of

14 transport of corpses from Kosovo to other parts of Serbia?

15 A. There was no transport of corpses that would involve the

16 government or any other government body. I can guarantee that. Corpses

17 were transported by those who wanted them to be found at a certain moment,

18 who wanted to find them in the place where they buried them in order to

19 use this for their own political ends.

20 As the deputy Prime Minister, a document came into my hands dated

21 the 12th of August, 1998. The Republican Committee in the US Congress

22 submitted a report to Congress saying that in Kosovo and Metohija this

23 trigger event was needed, something like what the Muslims had done in

24 Sarajevo, in order for public opinion to turn against the Serbs. This is

25 mentioned in the report submitted to Congress on the 12th of August.

Page 42990

1 MR. NICE: I regret having to intervene more than is my wont, but

2 first of all, the question was interestingly leading by asking about

3 staging an event and then asking about something else, but passing on from

4 that, if the witness is going to raise as a proposition that the

5 transportation of bodies was other than by those acting on the accused's

6 behalf, I'm sure we'd all be very interested in knowing what the hard

7 evidence for that proposition is. But it doesn't seem to me that the

8 trigger event referred to in the document of the 12th of August, 1998, is

9 going to get us much further. What we'd all like to hear is what the hard

10 evidence is that other parties unknown, who have been rather obliquely

11 referred to thus far, actually moved these bodies. Very interested in

12 that.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, it's a matter that you could raise in

14 cross-examination, but I'll ask it now from the Bench.

15 Mr. Seselj, what is the source for your claim that there were

16 other persons or other bodies that were responsible for the transportation

17 of bodies and that they had particular purposes in mind? What is the

18 evidential basis for that? This is an important part of the case, and if

19 you have evidence on that, then give it us to.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I do have evidence. As deputy Prime

21 Minister of Serbia, I received information that the CIA had formed a

22 special operations group, the aim of which was to topple Slobodan

23 Milosevic and his party. This group was headed by John Deutsche, the seat

24 of the group was in Vienna. As deputy Prime Minister of Serbia, I learned

25 that leaders of the pro-Western opposition political parties were going

Page 42991

1 there to receive instructions. As deputy Prime Minister of Serbia, I

2 learned from our own intelligence agencies that the CIA had recruited

3 Jovica Stanisic and Momcilo Perisic. They were the chief of intelligence

4 and the Chief of the General Staff respectively, and they joined in this

5 activity in toppling Milosevic.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: You have not yet given us information about the

7 transportation of bodies. Are you coming to that? This is what I asked

8 you about.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I'm giving you this

10 information now. I'm telling you now, and I'll come to it, certainly I

11 will, Mr. Robinson. I will tell you everything I know. I'll be very

12 happy to tell you. If I speak too broadly, I do apologise. It may be a

13 professional --

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, you are speaking too broadly. Just give us

15 the information you have about the transportation of bodies by other

16 persons and the specific ends that they had in mind. Forget the

17 introduction. We don't want the introduction, just give us the hard

18 evidence if there is any.

19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson --

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let Mr. Seselj answer.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Listen, my answer can be correct

22 only if it's complete. So I ask you to bear with me for a minute and I

23 will give you a complete response to this question, which is very

24 important.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: We have background. The background, as you say,

Page 42992

1 is a conspiracy by the USA to subvert Mr. Milosevic. You also mentioned

2 certain persons in Yugoslavia who were being instructed by the CIA. We

3 have -- we have the background, now give us the evidence about the

4 transportation of bodies by other persons.

5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] On the 5th of October, during the

6 pro-Western Mafia putsch, several generals of the police reveal themselves

7 to be on the side of those perpetrating the putsch. They were given

8 positions in the new pro-Western regime. No one held them responsible,

9 but had there been any transportation of bodies, they would have had to

10 have direct responsibility for that.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: I see. That's your own interpretation and

12 assessment of the event. You have --

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have more evidence.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's not evidence. That's just an opinion.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Secondly, another piece of evidence

16 is that no one in Serbia has been tried for transporting bodies.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Well, I do have specific evidence,

19 Mr. Robinson.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, let us hear it.

21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] There is a corpse belonging to

22 Dibran Dani. He was buried by our authorities on 5th of June, 1999. And

23 there is complete documentation about how he came to be killed. His

24 photograph was taken. All information was taken, samples and so on,

25 everything was done according to the law. And he was buried near Izbica

Page 42993

1 in Kosovo and Metohija. Later on he was found in Petrovo Selo in Serbia,

2 near the Danube. Why would it be in the interest of our government that a

3 corpse that was buried once along with documentation, photographs, and so

4 on - and there are photographs, you can get them from the police in

5 Belgrade - why would this body be disinterred and transferred to Petrovo

6 Selo near the Danube? There's no logic in it. This man's name is Dibran

7 Dani. He was exhumed in Izbica. The cemetery where was he found was

8 photographed. There was a visual inspection of the body. A post-mortem

9 was carried out, and he was then buried in the Muslim cemetery in the

10 village of Nevoljane. There is a photograph of his grave. There are

11 official records and photographs of all this. This body was buried on the

12 5th of June, 1999, just before the arrival of KFOR, the occupiers.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj, I take it, then, that your answer is

14 merely to raise the question as to why would these bodies have been

15 transported. You have raised the question. That is the question which we

16 are investigating, and I had gathered that you had some evidence on it,

17 but you don't appear to.

18 Mr. Milosevic, move on to the next issue.

19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. Mr. Seselj, in connection with this I will put a few questions to

21 you. What do you know about these refrigerator trucks with corpses and

22 the unearthing of corpses in Batajnica and other places in Serbia?

23 A. The story about the corpses was first launched by a certain Oskar

24 Kliper from Zajecar, and he was working in the state security service, he

25 and his son. They worked in Kosovo and Metohija and they stole some gold.

Page 42994

1 For this reason, they were expelled from the service. This Oskar Kliper

2 changed his name. He took a Serbian name officially and started

3 publishing a magazine dealing with crime, and he launched this story of

4 corpses, and this was something that was very interesting for the Serbian

5 public.

6 If someone wants to hide corpses, and if it's the state who wants

7 to do this, the state has many means at its disposal. We have crematoria

8 in many cemeteries, and in Serbia many deceased are cremated. This can be

9 done at any cemetery.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj, why would Oskar - I don't have the

11 last name - this gentleman, why would he have launched this story about

12 corpses? What was his purpose?

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] He launched this story in order for

14 the Serb public to be amazed and to justify the kidnapping of Slobodan

15 Milosevic and his transfer to The Hague. After this was done, the story

16 died down. There are no results of the public investigation as to who

17 transported the bodies. The corpses were identified and taken back to

18 Kosovo and Metohija and so on. However, the people who organised the

19 transport of these bodies later remained in the top of the regime.

20 It's impossible that there is no proof of this. Who transported

21 these bodies in a refrigerator truck? Had somebody done this and taken

22 the bodies out, that could be explained, but for someone to push a whole

23 refrigerator truck into the Danube, which has a variable water level,

24 that's beyond any logic.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, this kind of evidence isn't

Page 42995

1 helping your case at all. It's just speculation. Anybody can come here

2 and offer you their views as to why bodies were transported. If

3 Mr. Seselj doesn't have any evidence on the subject matter, then move on

4 to another area. You can make those points in your closing address, the

5 points that he's making. Make them in your closing address to us. That's

6 the proper place.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have no intention of burdening

8 myself with this nonsense that Mr. Nice is trying to stage here.

9 Mr. Seselj mentioned Dibran Dani --

10 MR. NICE: [Previous translation continues] ... observation to be

11 sanctioned. It's not an appropriate course for an accused like this

12 accused to make the suggestion that I am staging evidence. I am

13 presenting evidence. He knows it and it's up to him to produce evidence

14 that deals with it.

15 Can I make another point which I was going to defer until

16 cross-examination, but I understand from the projected time that this

17 witness is going to take that we are going to be listening to him in chief

18 before I get to cross-examination for another three days or thereabouts.

19 He's speaking at a very high volume. It's not necessary. It actually

20 makes the process of attending to his words very much more difficult, and

21 I would invite the Chamber to invite him to use a more moderate level of

22 voice in order to assist us. It will not do to say he can't do that. He

23 can.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Two matters first, Mr. Milosevic. Your comment

25 about the staging of evidence by the Prosecutor was inappropriate.

Page 42996












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Page 42997

1 Secondly, Mr. Seselj, it is true your decibel level is a little

2 high. When Mr. Nice raised that matter the first day you gave evidence, I

3 remarked that in my view it was your natural tone of voice, but it is a

4 little difficult to follow the evidence because you speak so loudly. So

5 I'm going to ask you to speak a little more softly so that we can attend

6 more closely to the interpreters, because your decibel level is colliding

7 with the transmission of the interpretation. So please speak a little

8 more softly.

9 And, Mr. Milosevic, let us move to another area and see whether we

10 can have evidence that is more directly related to the indictment.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, first of all in

12 connection to Mr. Nice's observation, Mr. Seselj speaks loudly. It's a

13 habit he has. I have never heard him speak softly. Asking him to whisper

14 now I think is completely inappropriate. As you know, "consuetudo quasi

15 altera natura." It's his nature. It's his habit. He's speaking in a

16 natural way for him. He is not speaking especially loudly for your sake.

17 As for the other observation, I'm asking him whether he has any

18 evidence that our state organs did not conceal bodies but that on the

19 contrary, official records were left, photographs and so on and so forth.

20 This contradicts what Mr. Nice has said. Mr. Seselj mentioned the case of

21 this man --

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Put the question to him.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. In tab 24, Mr. Seselj, if you would be kind enough to look at it,

25 there is a report about the forensic report of the site, and here you have

Page 42998

1 the case of Dibran Dani in tab 24. You also have a report on the forensic

2 inspection of the site.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's not translated. If you have a short

4 passage, then you know our procedure. It's to be placed on the ELMO.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. This cumulatively shows that the state left traces about people

7 who were killed. There is a report of the on-site investigation.

8 Mr. Seselj, look: First you have the report in this tab. Then you have a

9 form, and then you have a diagram showing the disposition of the graves,

10 and then you have photographs.

11 I assume the diagram and the photographs need not be translated.

12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I am just being shown the index

13 which indicates that this document was already admitted in the evidence,

14 testimony of Stevanovic.


16 MR. NICE: Your Honour, we recognised this yesterday and

17 Ms. Dicklich invited the accused's associates to make the document

18 available to you and was informed that it had been available to you in

19 English, or was available to you in English, and in those circumstances we

20 haven't re-copied it for you. I have got an English copy myself but I'm

21 afraid I haven't got enough copies for all of you at the moment. We can

22 make one more available, if that will help.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, thanks.

24 MR. NICE: If we can have it back at the end so that our documents

25 can be ...

Page 42999

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: In the meantime, Mr. Milosevic, if you have a

2 particular passage, then bring that to the attention of the witness so

3 that it can be interpreted.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Mr. Robinson, no

5 specific passage is necessary here. Tab 24 shows that there is complete

6 documentation pertaining to this person. It was compiled in Kosovo and

7 Metohija. It contains the details of his burial. So the question is how

8 can it be in the interest of any state organ to unearth man who was buried

9 on the 5th of June, 1999, and rebury him in the north of Serbia? It makes

10 no sense. Mr. Seselj just spoke --

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Is that a question you're asking me? Because

12 that would be an inversion of the process here. If you have a proper

13 question to put to the witness on this point, then put it to him, but

14 don't make a speech.

15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Robinson, I will put

16 a question to the witness.

17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

18 Q. Does this set of documents show, for example, that the state

19 officially and in accordance with the regulations left precise traces as

20 to when someone was killed, with all the necessary elements prescribed by

21 the legislation?

22 A. In the documentation of the government of Serbia, the Republic of

23 Serbia, and the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia, there

24 has to be a multitude of documents that would show that we as a government

25 on several occasions insisted with all police authorities that all corpses

Page 43000

1 be treated with utmost care regardless of whether we are talking about

2 terrorist casualties, killed terrorists in fighting, civilians killed in

3 the bombing, et cetera, that all corpses should be dealt with in

4 accordance with the law, that they should be buried properly, that every

5 corpse be marked properly by a card with indestructible material

6 containing all their particulars. That exists in the Republic of Serbia.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. We have your answer.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Mr. Seselj, just a few more concrete questions. This tab 24 has

10 already been admitted. It gives a concrete example and I hope it's clear.

11 You are from Batajnica.

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. How often was this suburb bombed by NATO? Did you live in

14 Batajnica throughout the war?

15 A. I spent two-thirds of all those nights in Batajnica, and

16 approximately every third night I was the duty deputy Prime Minister of

17 the Republic of Serbia, and I was in the republican centre. Also

18 following the NATO sorties. So I spent two-thirds of all those nights at

19 my home in Batajnica. Batajnica was bombed every night, because one of

20 our most important military airfields is in Batajnica. Along with the

21 airfields, civilian buildings were bombed as well. There were many

22 casualties. Among others, Milica Rakic, a three-year-old girl, was killed

23 by an air bomb.

24 Q. Thank you. And what about the training grounds of the special

25 anti-terrorist police where those corpses were buried? I read about that

Page 43001

1 in the newspapers when I was already in prison. And generally speaking,

2 this centre of the anti-terrorist units, was it ever bombed during the

3 NATO aggression?

4 A. The centre of the SAJ, of the special anti-terrorist unit, is at

5 the very entrance into Batajnica. Throughout the war not a single bomb

6 and not a single rocket hit that centre. The unit itself had been

7 relocated before the bombing started. It was engaged the most in

8 anti-terrorist activities in Kosovo and Metohija, but no one stayed behind

9 at the centre. So the centre could have been targeted without involving a

10 single casualty. However, the centre was never targeted. And in the yard

11 of the centre, after the war and after the change of government, an

12 enormous quantity of corpses was found.

13 Q. Mr. Seselj, I'm asking you now in view of this great attention

14 that was paid to Batajnica and the daily bombing of Batajnica and the fact

15 that only this centre of the anti-terrorist unit was not bombed.

16 A. Hospitals and schools were targeted in Belgrade because their

17 suspicion was that soldiers were hidden there. That's what the NATO

18 propagandists said. It is amazing, incredible that the centre of the

19 anti-terrorist unit was not targeted. The empty building of the Ministry

20 of Defence, the empty building of the General Staff was targeted, but the

21 headquarters of one of our most important police units was never bombed.

22 Q. All right. That part of the terrain, that is to say Batajnica

23 including that centre, was the object of attention and surveillance. Was

24 it possible for someone to bury hundreds of corpses in the training

25 grounds of that elite police unit and NATO surveillance does not realise

Page 43002

1 that at all?

2 A. That was impossible because we were surveyed on a day-to-day

3 basis. NATO could see every vehicle, everything in the country. AWACS

4 were all over Serbia. We couldn't even speak over mobile phones. So we

5 were under surveillance all the time of NATO. It was impossible for these

6 corpses to be transported without filming the trucks that transported

7 them.

8 Q. When was the first time that you heard about some corpses from

9 Kosovo and Metohija being transported to other parts of Serbia?

10 A. I first heard of that when it was published in the beginning of

11 2001. First, I made some statements perhaps these corpses were from the

12 Second World War or from the Huns, their Emperor Atilla of the 6th

13 century, he was fighting in the Panonian plain at that time. It was

14 incredible. Why would this be done? What would be the motive for

15 transporting corpses from Kosovo to the centre of the elite police unit?

16 There is no motive. No one is in a position to indicate a motive.

17 Q. Well, Mr. Nice claims that we did it in order to cover up

18 purported crimes that, as he said here, the forces of the FRY and Serbia

19 committed here.

20 A. Well, we compiled complete documentation about different victims

21 among the civilians, among the terrorists, bombing victims, et cetera.

22 Complete documents, and then when we compile all these complete documents,

23 then we hide corpses. What kind of an idiot would do that? Why would we

24 conceal corpses? It is in our interest to have everything fully

25 clarified.

Page 43003

1 Q. All right.

2 A. Well, wait a minute. There is not a single shred of evidence that

3 has been presented by the regime until now that these were corpses of

4 civilians, that this is the result of crimes, et cetera. Corpses were

5 collected from different sites, brought in so that at a given moment, a

6 favourable moment, they would be found in Batajnica.

7 Q. Thank you, Mr. Seselj. Let us move on now to the next topic.

8 In paragraph 16, it is stated that this so-called joint criminal

9 enterprise that I took part in, and some other officials, as it says here,

10 "other persons known and unknown," that it had the following objective,

11 so 16 says that: "The purpose of this joint criminal enterprise was,

12 inter alia, the expulsion of a substantial portion of the Kosovo Albanian

13 population from the territory of the province of Kosovo in an effort to

14 ensure continued Serbian control over the province."

15 As the then deputy Prime Minister of the government of Serbia, do

16 you know anything about this? Do you know about me or other officials or

17 anybody in the authorities of Serbia and the Federal Republic of

18 Yugoslavia had that kind of an alleged purpose? Also, please answer the

19 following question: Do you understand this explanation here that the

20 objective was to ensure Serbian control over the province?

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Before you answer, this is the kind of question

22 that in the past you have answered in a very lengthy fashion. I want a

23 specific answer. I want short answers. When you have given an answer

24 that is short, then Mr. Milosevic comes back into the picture and asks

25 another question. The first question he asked was whether you know

Page 43004

1 anything of his involvement in the -- in this joint criminal enterprise.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] No, Mr. Robinson, you did not

3 understand the question properly. I'm not talking about my participation.

4 I'm asking him about whether he knew of any kind of joint criminal

5 enterprise at all. How can somebody take part in an enterprise if the

6 enterprise never existed?

7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, there was no criminal

8 enterprise. There was no plan or intention to expel a considerable part

9 of the Albanian population from Kosovo and Metohija. Even if there had

10 been such an intention, what does that mean? You expel them today, you

11 have to return them tomorrow. It was absolutely illogical to design such

12 a plan.

13 Thirdly, I first heard about this from the Washington Post in

14 April --

15 THE INTERPRETER: The speaker says 1992.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] -- when I read as deputy Prime

17 Minister an article that refers to Action Horseshoe, and then it says that

18 when General Clark was in Belgrade towards the end of 1988, Momcilo

19 Perisic said to him that that was in the making, and we already knew at

20 the time that Momcilo Perisic was a CIA agent, and he was removed a few

21 days later. So it was the CIA that planted all of this.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm going to stop you. You have given the

23 answer. You did not know of any joint criminal enterprise as alleged in

24 the indictment.

25 What's the next question?

Page 43005












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Page 43006

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have to add something,

2 Mr. Robinson: That had it existed by any chance, it would have been

3 impossible, absolutely impossible for me not to know about it.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well, yes. We hear that as well.

5 Next question, Mr. Milosevic.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. In paragraph 53, it says, and I quote to you: "After the joint

8 criminal enterprise started, from the 1st of January, 1999, onwards, or

9 around that date and continuing until the 20th of June, 1999, Slobodan

10 Milosevic -" not to mention all the other names - "and others known and

11 unknown, planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and

12 abetted in a deliberate and widespread or systematic campaign of terror

13 and violence directed at Kosovo Albanian civilians living in Kosovo in the

14 FRY."

15 This kind of deliberate and widespread or systematic campaign of

16 violence could not have been carried out without the top echelons of

17 government, including yourself, being informed about this. Tell me, was

18 there such a campaign? Please give us your comments on what I've read out

19 to you just now, what I quoted from number 53.

20 A. There was no such a campaign. We had reliable information that

21 Albanian terrorists resorted to various resources, propaganda, and

22 intimidation in order to force the largest possible number of their own

23 people to leave Kosovo, going to Macedonia or Albania.

24 During the war, our forces intensified their anti-terrorist

25 activities. Many Albanian terrorists changed into civilian clothing and

Page 43007

1 used their own people who they had forced into being refugees, and they

2 left our territory, mingling with the other refugees. We had information

3 that in Albania they were being rearmed and involved in border skirmishes

4 with our forces again. Our forces had strict authorities, first of all,

5 to persuade the Albanian population not to move out. If they cannot

6 persuade them not to move out, then they should ensure that their movement

7 is safe, that they should not come across minefields.

8 Also, they had instructions to help them by giving them food.

9 Most often it was bread, but they did give them aid in food. Then to give

10 them drinking water, medical assistance, and a few times it happened that

11 columns of Albanians who were flooding towards the border were targeted by

12 NATO Air Force and that is when they sustained a great many casualties.

13 Q. In paragraph 55, it says: "The forces of the FRY of Serbia, in a

14 deliberate and widespread or systematic manner, forcibly expelled and

15 internally displaced hundreds of thousands of Kosovo Albanians from their

16 homes across the entire province of Kosovo. To facilitate these

17 expulsions and displacements, forces of the FRY and Serbia intentionally

18 created an atmosphere of fear and oppression through the use of force,

19 threats of force, and acts of violence."

20 So, to your knowledge as deputy Prime Minister, who I assume has

21 to be active with regard to such matters, were there any expulsions? Were

22 there any internal displacements of Kosovo Albanians, as is referred to in

23 this quotation?

24 A. No, absolutely not. There were no expulsions or displacements.

25 There were individual incidents when certain soldiers or policemen tried

Page 43008

1 to take advantage of the atmosphere of war, to loot, to steal things from

2 these Albanians. And in these cases, our state authorities urgently

3 intervened, and they practically prosecuted all these people. As far as I

4 know, there are a couple of hundred such cases, and I think that they were

5 all prosecuted. But the republican government, the federal government,

6 the Ministry of Interior of Serbia gave instructions that all these cases

7 should energetically be prosecuted and brought to justice. There were a

8 great many trials of soldiers or policemen who had violated regulations.

9 Q. All right. Then the other part of this quotation, intimidation,

10 threats of force, acts of violence, oppression, was there any such thing?

11 A. Yes, but by the Albanian terrorist organisation. When they could

12 not persuade their own countrymen, civilians, to leave Kosovo and

13 Metohija, there were even liquidations, killings, uses of threat of force

14 and actual force.

15 Q. Mr. Seselj, in paragraph 56 of the Kosovo indictment, it says:

16 "Throughout Kosovo, forces of the FRY and Serbia engaged in a deliberate

17 and widespread or systematic campaign of destruction of property owned by

18 Kosovo Albanian civilians. This was accomplished by the widespread

19 shelling of towns and villages, the burning and destruction of property,

20 including homes, farms, businesses, cultural monuments and religious

21 sites, and the destruction of personal property. As a result of these

22 orchestrated actions, villages, towns, and entire regions were made

23 uninhabitable for Kosovo Albanians."

24 I've finished the quotation, and I'm asking you, was there such a

25 campaign of destroying property in the way mentioned here or in any other

Page 43009

1 way? You as deputy Prime Minister of Serbia would have to know about

2 that.

3 A. There was absolutely no campaign whatsoever to destroy the

4 property of Kosovo Albanians on the part of the government of Serbia or

5 any other Serbian or FRY authorities. If partial destruction of property

6 actually happened, then it could have only occurred in the legal, lawful

7 clashes between the authorities and Albanian terrorists. But we need to

8 compare what portion of Albanian property was destroyed by NATO action as

9 opposed to the portion destroyed by our authorities in their struggle

10 against the terrorists. I claim that much more property was destroyed by

11 NATO bombs.

12 On the other hand, if certain villages, towns, and whole areas

13 became uninhabitable, then it was because -- because of NATO bombs

14 containing depleted uranium. That is why certain places are

15 uninhabitable. That is why to this day the soldiers who took part in this

16 action keep dying of cancer. We can read about this in Italian press all

17 the time.

18 Also used were cluster bombs that are banned by international law

19 of warfare. There are many such unexploded cluster bombs in Kosovo and

20 Metohija and in central Serbia. After the war, we had cases of Albanian

21 children dying because of those unexploded cluster bombs that they run

22 across while playing.

23 Q. Is it the case that towns, villages, and entire areas in Kosovo

24 and Metohija became uninhabitable for Serbs and other ethnic communities?

25 A. Yes, because survival became impossible for Serbs in every area

Page 43010

1 where Albanians remained as a majority after the entry of the occupiers.

2 Another proof of that is that hundreds of thousands of Albanians from

3 Albania came to Kosovo and Metohija after the occupying forces entered

4 Kosovo because life was better there. They would not leave Albania that

5 had never been destroyed by war to go to Kosovo if there had not been a

6 lot of property that they could seize, the property left behind by Serbs

7 and other ethnic communities. That is the area that they filled in.

8 Q. Is it true that a lot of property was destroyed?

9 A. Yes, it was, but by NATO bombing. You will see that in Pristina

10 even the cemetery was bombed and skeletons flew about the place after NATO

11 airstrikes. What kind of military target can you find in a cemetery?

12 Q. Did you see the bombing of the centre of Pristina?

13 A. I did, only on television, but it is abundant proof of the

14 barbarian means used by the NATO alliance. I also saw the bombing of

15 Belgrade every night by NATO rockets and bombs.

16 Q. In paragraph 57 we read: "In addition to the deliberate

17 destruction of property -" deliberate meaning intentional - "destruction

18 of property owned by Kosovo Albanians, forces of the FRY and Serbia

19 committed widespread or systematic acts of brutality and violence against

20 Kosovo Albanian civilians in order to perpetuate the climate of fear,

21 create chaos and a pervading fear for life. Forces of the FRY and Serbia

22 went from village to village and, in the towns and cities, from area to

23 area, threatening and expelling the Kosovo Albanian population. Kosovo

24 Albanians were frequently intimidated, assaulted or killed in public view

25 to enforce the departure of their families and neighbours."

Page 43011

1 This is the end of -- of a quotation. Please do not think this is

2 the way I speak Serbian, because this is pretty illiterate.

3 "Many Kosovo Albanians who were not directly forcibly expelled

4 from their communities fled as a result of the climate of terror created

5 by the widespread or systematic beatings, harassment, sexual assaults,

6 unlawful arrests, killings, shelling and looting carried out across the

7 province. Forces of the FRY and Serbia persistently subjected Kosovo

8 Albanians to insults, racial slurs, degrading acts and other forms of

9 physical and psychological mistreatment based on their racial, religious

10 and political identification. All sectors of Kosovo Albanian society were

11 displaced, including women, children, the elderly, and the infirm."

12 This is a rather long paragraph, 57. Now, please tell me - and

13 you should be informed, in view of the posts you held - is it the case

14 that the police and the army of our country actually carried out those

15 widespread and systematic acts of violence against Kosovo Albanian

16 civilians in order to perpetuate a climate of fear and a pervading fear of

17 death?

18 A. That is absolute fabrication. You have to look at the statistics

19 about the number of Serb casualties and Albanian casualties during the

20 NATO airstrikes. This is pure invention.

21 I do not rule out the possibility of incidents, because there was

22 the element of revenge. People recognised somebody as a relative of

23 terrorists who had done something to their family, but those are lone

24 cases that cannot be, should not be generalised. But the total numbers of

25 casualties speak very clearly that the situation was not like some tried

Page 43012

1 to represent it. After so much bombing and so much terrorist and

2 anti-terrorist action, there was an improbably low number of casualties

3 among Albanian civilians.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Time for the 20-minute break. We will adjourn.

5 --- Recess taken at 10.32 a.m.

6 --- On resuming at 11.03 a.m.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Mr. Seselj, is it true that, as it says in this paragraph 57, many

10 Kosovo Albanians fled because of the climate of terror created by

11 widespread and systematic beatings, harassment, sexual assaults, unlawful

12 arrests, killings, shellings, and looting?

13 A. Of course not. The main reason for this mass movement of

14 Albanians was the bombing. And it made not only Albanians flee; it had

15 the same effect on Serbs, Romas, Goranis, et cetera.

16 Second, a great part of Albanians did not rush for Albania. They

17 went to Serbia, Macedonia, and Montenegro. They were fleeing American

18 bombs and rockets. Also, the Albania terrorist organisation led a

19 campaign to force their own civilians to leave Kosovo and Metohija. They

20 distributed a huge number of leaflets to civilians which contained threats

21 and incentives, all in order to make them leave their homes. We are in

22 possession of a great number of these leaflets.

23 We did not, therefore, lead a policy of persecution and expulsion

24 but tried instead to persuade the Albanian population not to go. We were

25 mainly unsuccessful because the fear of the bombing was too great. And as

Page 43013

1 I said, there were individual incidents and there were individual

2 policemen and soldiers with dishonourable intentions. Maybe there were

3 some sexual assaults. We in the government of Serbia did not have such

4 information. But in any case, we gave strict instructions to state

5 authorities to prosecute all cases of flagrant violation of the law.

6 Q. You said Albanians were fleeing, Serbs were fleeing. Could you

7 tell us on a very general level, why did Albanians flee and why did Serbs

8 and others flee?

9 A. You know, Mr. Milosevic, that I live in Batajnica. The main

10 reason was the same. Even I put my family up with my in-laws. I didn't

11 want my children exposed directly to the bombs, and I thought my house

12 could become a target just as yours did. If there had been an atmosphere

13 of fear created by us, it would have been evident before the bombing, but

14 it wasn't there. In all Kosovo towns the atmosphere was peaceful. It was

15 even idyllic, I could say. There were no incidents in towns. Incidents

16 happened in villages where Albanian terrorists were active.

17 Just before the bombing, all roads in Kosovo and Metohija were

18 completely passable and free. Not a single road was cut off by the

19 terrorists. It was to that extent that our police were successful in

20 suppressing terrorism.

21 You know that in 1998 you couldn't go through from Pec through

22 Drenica to Pristina. Here in prison, another accused, Limaj, told me that

23 they had heard my statement on the radio and organised an ambush on the

24 road that goes through Drenica. Of course I took another road and they

25 missed me. But before the war, all the roads were passable.

Page 43014












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13 English transcripts.













Page 43015

1 Q. Was there anybody creating an atmosphere of terror?

2 A. Absolutely. It was the Albanian terrorist organisation the KLA.

3 They killed many of their own compatriots whom they suspected of being

4 loyal to Serb authorities all because those people did not obey their

5 orders to leave their homes and go God knows where.

6 Q. Is it true, as it says in this paragraph, that Kosovo Albanians

7 were constantly exposed to insults, racial slurs, degrading acts and other

8 forms of physical and psychological mistreatment?

9 A. There was no such thing on the part of the authorities certainly.

10 Incidents happened, sometimes involving civilians. Look, just before the

11 war Albanian terrorists threw a bomb at a cafe in Pec which was a

12 gathering point for Serb high-school students. These activities certainly

13 deepened ethnic or inter-ethnic mistrust. There was a large dose of

14 inter-ethnic mistrust but there was no organised activity of this kind

15 that you mentioned here, especially not organised by the authorities.

16 Q. Let us move on to paragraph 58.

17 A. Just tell me which tab it is.

18 Q. No, no. I mean this so-called indictment, paragraph 58. Do you

19 have it here?

20 A. I don't have it with me, but I can follow you very carefully.

21 It's not a problem, Mr. Milosevic.

22 Q. I hope somebody can provide you with a copy so you have it in

23 front of you, but I will quote, in any case, paragraph 58. It says:

24 "Thousands of Kosovo Albanians who fled their homes as a result of the

25 conduct of the forces of the FRY and Serbia and the deliberate climate of

Page 43016

1 terror that pervaded the territory of Kosovo joined convoys of persons

2 that moved towards Kosovo's borders with the Republic of Albania and the

3 former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Along the routes to the border

4 crossings, forces of the FRY and Serbia manned checkpoints where the

5 displaced Kosovo Albanians were subject to further beatings, extortion,

6 robbery, harassment, assaults, illegal arrests, and killings. At other

7 times forces of the FRY and Serbia escorted groups of expelled Kosovo

8 Albanians to the borders. By these methods, the forces of the FRY and

9 Serbia maintained control over the movement of displaced Kosovo Albanians

10 to the borders. Displaced Kosovo Albanians often arrived at the borders

11 of Kosovo on foot, in convoys of several thousand persons, or carried by

12 tractors, trailers and trucks, as well as on trains, buses or trucks which

13 were organised and provided by the forces of the FRY and Serbia."

14 Is it the case that Albanians who went to Macedonia and Albania

15 were forced to do so by the forces of FRY and Serbia?

16 A. There was no terror perpetrated by the authorities. Whenever we

17 failed to persuade Albanians to stay in their homes, then we tried to help

18 them. If we were trying to instil fear, why would we distribute thousands

19 of loaves of bread to those Albanians who were forced by the terrorists to

20 leave? Why would we be organising water supply to them?

21 Those convoys of Albanians that were moving towards border

22 crossings were really creating a huge problem to our authorities.

23 Nevertheless, we tried to help them. Means of transportation were

24 provided to them at their request. I don't know of a single case when a

25 tractor or a trailer was taken away from them.

Page 43017

1 There were certain individuals who took advantage of those

2 unfortunate people to rob them, but those individuals were arrested by the

3 police, and it was in such cases that some harassment occurred. But look

4 at how many people travelling in these convoys were killed by NATO bombs

5 and how many were killed in such incidents. The difference in numbers is

6 huge. So this theory from the indictment absolutely does not stand up to

7 scrutiny. Where are the figures to support it?

8 Q. And how about the passage that I quoted to you where it says that

9 at checkpoints manned by the forces of FRY and Serbia displaced Kosovo

10 Albanians were subjected to further beatings, extortion, robbery,

11 harassment, assaults, illegal arrests and killings.

12 A. Just try to imagine that. Hundreds of thousands of Albanians were

13 moving in those convoys, and now somebody standing at a checkpoint,

14 stopping them in order to beat them and harass them. Do you know what it

15 means to stop such a convoy? Do you know it from rallies when we tried to

16 keep order and to avoid sudden movements of those masses? Now, can you

17 visualise those hundreds of thousands of Albanians moving and our police

18 stopping them?

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I sincerely hope that your

20 evidence from Mr. Seselj on other matters will be different from the

21 evidence that we have heard so far. So far there is nothing in his

22 testimony, in my view, that assists your case. All he's doing is giving a

23 general comment on passages in the indictment. The other witnesses that

24 you have called, some of them have information, albeit hearsay, but they

25 have information about incidents in the indictment. All Mr. Seselj is

Page 43018

1 doing is saying how incredible the allegations are. That's a matter that

2 you can comment on. In fact, I even wonder whether evidence of this

3 nature is a proper use of the Tribunal's time, and it's a matter that I

4 will raise with my colleagues during the next break.

5 I thought Mr. Seselj had specific information about some of the

6 matters in the indictment. Take, for example, his last answer. He hasn't

7 said anything at all. He's just raising a question as to whether the

8 allegations in the indictment could have taken place in the manner set out

9 in the indictment. He finds it incredulous, but that doesn't help your

10 case.

11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, it's correct that

12 these are general questions, but they pertain to general counts in the

13 indictment, to allegations that there was some kind of joint criminal

14 enterprise, some kind of plan, some sort of -- and I quote here. I'm

15 quoting from what Mr. Nice and his office, and Mrs. Del Ponte wrote. They

16 say that there was some sort of plan, some sort of joint criminal

17 enterprise, and here we have a deputy Prime Minister, the president of the

18 Serb Radical Party, who would have had to know about such a plan. He

19 would have known had there been a plan. And he is testifying that this is

20 not true, that what I'm quoting is completely untrue, and that's the case.

21 Things have been turned upside down here. Mr. Nice has not put forward a

22 single shred of evidence as to the existence of a plan except for the

23 so-called Horseshoe Plan, and that's nonsense.

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: I can't say that it is irrelevant because it does

25 relate to the matters in the indictment, but I really question whether

Page 43019

1 this is the best use of the time that is available to you. Proceed.

2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] If Mr. Nice wishes to withdraw his

3 allegation about a joint criminal enterprise, then I don't have to put

4 these general questions. But as far as I was able to understand, due to a

5 lack of evidence, there was this phantom joint criminal enterprise that

6 was invented, and the intention of the Serbian authorities to expel the

7 Albanians and kill them. I'm quoting from what it says here.

8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

9 Q. Mr. Seselj, did the army, the police, and the civilian authorities

10 try to influence the Albanians not to leave their homes and not to leave

11 the country?

12 A. Yes.

13 Q. By what means? What means did they use to try to influence the

14 Albanians to stay?

15 A. Persuasion and offering material aid, providing guarantees of

16 safety and promising them that they would be protected by our police and

17 army.

18 Q. Did the Serb authorities --

19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, stop. Now, that's a pertinent

20 question. That's a matter that is in dispute. So let us find out from

21 him the basis for the information that he has.

22 Mr. Seselj, what is the basis for the answer that you just gave to

23 Mr. Milosevic?

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] First of all, we had almost daily

25 sessions of the cabinet. At least three times a week I had meetings with

Page 43020

1 Mr. Milosevic during the bombing. I was directly familiar with everything

2 that was taking place in Kosovo and Metohija, and I participated in the

3 creation of these events, in the creation of the government policy.

4 Without the Serbian government, nobody could have done anything down there

5 without the government knowing about it. It was the policy of the Serbian

6 government to dissuade the Albanians from leaving Kosovo and Metohija.

7 The Serb government policy was to protect the Albanians, both from the

8 terrorists and from the NATO pact.

9 On the other hand, there was fear among us. If a terrorist

10 organisation was moving all the Albanians out of Kosovo and Metohija, then

11 the NATO bombing would be even worse. Why would we want to be left

12 without a civilian population in Kosovo and Metohija? We needed a

13 civilian population there. The territory had to be inhabited.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Next question.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, what it seems to me we need is specific

16 examples. If there was persuasion, if material aid was offered, if there

17 were guarantees of safety, if they were promised that they would be

18 protected by the police and army, then it's concrete examples of these

19 that would assist the case.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I'm telling you about specific

21 examples. The interim Executive Council of Kosovo and Metohija was

22 constantly out on the ground. I was in charge of the economy and

23 finances, and I know that we gave enormous material aid to the population

24 there regardless of their ethnic affiliation. Enormous funds were set

25 aside for this purpose, and this was distributed on the ground. All the

Page 43021

1 resources of a government serve this purpose. And if we were unable to

2 persuade them to stay, what else could we do but assist them to reach the

3 border in safety?

4 JUDGE BONOMY: There's absolutely no factual content in the answer

5 you've just given.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] My answer is based on facts. And as

7 for documentation, you have it available in the archives of the interim

8 Executive Council of Kosovo and Metohija. It would be very easy for you

9 to gain access to it. I cannot do that because I'm in prison. My hands

10 are tied. I'm telling you about the facts, and these facts have been

11 documented. The documents are in the archives of the Serbian government

12 and of the interim Executive Council of Kosovo.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj, we are not running the Defence of the

14 accused. The Chamber is not running the Defence of the accused. If he

15 has information, then it is for the accused. It is for him to get the

16 information and present it before the Court. It's not for the Court to

17 get the information.

18 Next question, Mr. Milosevic.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I am not here to

20 defend the accused. I came here at the request of the accused to testify

21 to events as I know them and according to my participation in them. It is

22 my wish and intention to tell the truth. If what I say does not fit into

23 the case either of the accused or the Prosecution, well that's nothing to

24 do with me.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: I've stopped you. What would be helpful is when

Page 43022

1 you provide an answer to the accused, let us know the basis, the source of

2 the information. If you got it from somebody who worked with you, a

3 subordinate, then say so, because that makes the evidence more credible.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson --

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: No more of that. Next question. Mr. Milosevic,

6 next question.

7 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, in connection to what

8 you said, you probably don't remember that there was a large number of

9 witnesses through which -- through whom we introduced the evidence

10 Mr. Seselj is referring to. He is testifying about his own experience and

11 his own activity in the government in connection with these events and

12 this conduct. For example, Vukasin Andric testified here. He was the

13 secretary for health in Kosovo and he showed films about the assistance

14 and the aid distributed to the displaced Albanians, about how efforts were

15 made to persuade them to return home, how there was no discrimination when

16 aid was being distributed, and so on and so forth.

17 You saw many orders during the testimony of General Stevanovic.

18 You heard the testimony of General Delic about the assistance offered to

19 the population by the army. Mr. Seselj is speaking about the conduct of

20 the government, and you have already had witnesses providing specific

21 evidence as to behaviour.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, I understand you to be saying that

23 his evidence is by way of confirming other evidence that has been given by

24 some of your witnesses, but the manner in which he's giving it, in my

25 view, does not add much to that evidence. I question whether it adds to

Page 43023












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13 English transcripts.













Page 43024

1 that evidence at all, because he's merely making general statements

2 without providing any -- any basis for the information that he says that

3 he has received. And Mr. Nice no doubt will question him on those

4 matters.

5 Yes, next question, please.

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.

7 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

8 Q. The authorities attempted, as you said, to persuade Albanians to

9 provide them with humanitarian aid and so on and so forth. Did the

10 authorities of Serbia and Yugoslavia try to prevent anyone, including

11 Albanians, from leaving Kosovo and Metohija by force?

12 A. First of all, they would not have been allowed to do that under

13 our constitution and our legislation. Freedom of movement was guaranteed,

14 and no one had any legal basis to forcibly prevent this.

15 On the other hand, when this huge convoy appeared, it was

16 impossible to stop them. The problem would only have been made worse. To

17 stop people on the roads - they would have been there in large groups, the

18 concentration of people would have built up - and what would have

19 happened? It was impossible to control this.

20 Q. Very well. The authorities did not prevent this, which is

21 logical. Did they provide means of transport?

22 A. Whenever it was necessary and whenever the government was able to

23 do so, it provided means of transportation, especially for women,

24 children, the elderly, the sick.

25 Q. Only for the Albanians or for others?

Page 43025

1 A. For everyone, whoever needed that. We had cases where our

2 authorities provided transport for a group of Serb civilians and civilians

3 of other ethnicities, and they were all killed in the bombing. They were

4 of various ethnic origins, but most of them were Serbs. We have seen that

5 NATO bombed a passenger train.

6 Q. I assume that this passenger train was not intended specifically

7 for Serbs or Albanians but for all citizens.

8 A. Yes. We never checked the ethnic affiliation of citizens entering

9 trains or buses.

10 Q. In connection with this alleged expulsion of Albanians, the

11 alleged persecution of Albanians, during the cross-examination of

12 Professor Ratko Markovic, Mr. Nice played an excerpt from a speech you

13 made in Zemun on the 27th of February, 1999, for the Serb Radical Party.

14 This was a brief excerpt where you said that if there is NATO bombing and

15 if there is American aggression, we Serbs will suffer greatly, but there

16 will be no Albanians on Kosovo any more. Would you please explain what

17 you meant by those words. And I will ask you especially to explain the

18 context in which you said this.

19 A. Mr. Milosevic, I handed over to you the text of the entire speech.

20 First of all, it makes no sense to pull a few sentences out of the context

21 of a long speech. You can see from the speech that everything said there

22 was intended to dissuade potential aggressors, to deter aggression. I

23 know that where the Americans helped Muslims, Croats, or others, it was

24 mostly the population in question that died. Where Americans bombed from

25 planes, there has always been large-scale killing of civilians. And I was

Page 43026

1 bearing in mind the case in Hadzici where the Americans were bombing

2 Republika Srpska, used the bombs with depleted uranium. After the Dayton

3 agreement, the population of Hadzici moved to Bratunac, and many of them

4 immediately began to die. There was a real epidemic of cancer caused by

5 this depleted uranium. And you can see now how the Americans have

6 affected the Albanians, especially in those areas targeted with depleted

7 uranium.


9 MR. NICE: I am having trouble following the way in which or the

10 degree to which the answer is responsive to the question. While I'm on my

11 feet, if there is a full version of the speech, it may well be available

12 to us in another way, if it's been provided to the accused, perhaps it

13 could also be provided to us.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: I understand the witness to be saying, Mr. Nice,

15 that you took out of context the passage that was put. I also understand

16 him to be saying that, in his experience, where Americans had helped

17 Muslims and Croats, it was mostly the population in question that died.

18 And I understand that he is saying in effect that his speech -- in his

19 speech what he meant was that --

20 MR. NICE: Fine. Can we have a copy in full?

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: That they would -- let me finish. What he meant

22 was that Kosovo Albanians would suffer as a result of aggression and not

23 as a result of action by the Serbian authorities.

24 JUDGE BONOMY: Well, the problem with that -- the problem is that

25 the words are, and he was asked to define these words, "There will be no

Page 43027

1 Albanians on Kosovo any more," and I so far haven't been assisted by the

2 explanation.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, let me ask you, in light of the controversy

4 -- let me finish. Let me ask you to say exactly what you meant by the

5 phrase, "There will be no Albanians in Kosovo any more."

6 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, before Mr. Seselj

7 answers your question, as this comes in the middle of my series of

8 questions about what Mr. Nice said here, let me draw your attention to the

9 fact that in tab 30 you have the whole text of this speech, the entire

10 speech where Mr. Nice pulled out half a sentence out of context.

11 Secondly, in tab 30 you also have a complete English translation

12 of this speech which Mr. Nice is asking to see, and it is included in

13 these documents. Tab 30, then, contains both a photocopy from the special

14 edition of Velika Srbija where this speech was printed and the English

15 translation done by your service here.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, thanks for that information. It's

17 in tab 30.

18 Now, Mr. Seselj, answer the question. What did you mean by the

19 phrase "There will be no Albanians ... any more"?

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I meant, first of all, that because

21 of the consequences of the bombing, they would suffer grievously.

22 Secondly, I was bearing in mind that their mass exodus was being

23 prepared under the control of the Albanian terrorist organisation.

24 The only threat I made in this entire speech was against those

25 Albanians who were disloyal and cooperating with the Albanian terrorist

Page 43028

1 organisation.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm stopping you for a minute to ask you to point

3 to passages in the speech that support your conclusion as to the meaning

4 to be attributed to that statement that it was the bombing that would

5 result in no more Albanians being in Kosovo.

6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Look at the whole speech.

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: No, don't say the whole speech. That's not

8 helpful at all. You say that it was taken out of context. Then point to

9 a passage in the speech that puts it in context, that makes more credible

10 your statement that --

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I'll read that

12 passage.

13 THE INTERPRETER: Could the interpreters please have a reference.

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just a minute. The interpreters are asking for a

15 copy of the speech.

16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I cannot look at it in English. I

17 can't find it for you.

18 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues]... provide.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It's on page 11 of the Serb.

20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj, the interpreters need a copy.

21 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters have a copy and have found the

22 reference. It's on page 4. Thank you very much.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Proceed now. What is the passage to which

24 you are directing our attention?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is the first passage of the third

Page 43029

1 column on page 11 of the original.

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just say how it begins so we can try to find it

3 in English.

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "We Serbs are a people with a marked

5 democratic tradition --"

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let us try to find it in the English text.

7 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: The bottom of page 4.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, yes.

9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] "We have ideological differences, we

10 have political differences, we have all sorts of differences, but when the

11 homeland is at stake, there are no differences. We yet have to see a Serb

12 ready to sign approval for foreign troops to come to our territory, we

13 have yet to see a Serb ready to sign the separation of Kosovo and Metohija

14 from the legal system of Serbia. We, Serbs, as a democratic people, have

15 offered the Albanians time and again the highest level of autonomy, of

16 cultural autonomy, for them to live as loyal citizens, for them to

17 regulate their own school, health, information systems, and so on. They

18 do not want that. The only thing they want is secession, and they are

19 unable to secede unaided. They are aware of that, so they are reckoning -

20 the Americans will fight a winning battle for them in the Balkans. From

21 this place I say to them, and this is not only a message from the Serbian

22 Radical Party, I'm convinced of that, it is a message from the entire

23 Serbian nation: The Albanians will have a chance only if they opt for a

24 peaceful, democratic, political way of dialogue."

25 I'm trying to avert aggression and I'm calling for a democratic

Page 43030

1 settlement to the dispute.

2 And then another sentence: "In the event of a NATO bombardment,

3 in the event of an American aggression, we Serbs shall perish in quite

4 large numbers, but there will be no Albanians in Kosovo!" I'm simply

5 expecting Kosovo to be the main theatre of war. We are going to defend

6 Kosovo with major military equipment. Without bombing Kosovo with their

7 bombs, Americans cannot take Kosovo. And who is going to suffer the

8 most? Those who are the majority population.

9 And then I say: "Surely the Americans do not believe that if they

10 attack us we will allow armed bands and disloyal citizens behind our backs

11 who can hardly wait to stab us in the back." So who is not loyal? Those

12 who support terrorists. And any aiding and abetting of terrorism is a

13 crime according to our law, and even those who are giving aid and food to

14 terrorists are committing a crime, according to our law. And then I warn

15 neighbouring states.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Seselj.

17 Mr. Milosevic.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. All right, Mr. Seselj. I think that you quoted this quite

20 correctly. However, I would like to ask you to quote yet another part.

21 This is on the last page of the transcript of this speech or, rather, the

22 photocopy of the newspaper where this was presented. It starts in the

23 middle paragraph, at the very end.

24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And for you gentlemen it is on page

25 6, the third or fourth paragraph from the top. It starts with the

Page 43031

1 following words: "We Serbs do not want war."

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. You end with this, so could you please read your own speech so I

4 don't read it.

5 A. I say in that speech: "We Serbs do not want war. We Serbs never

6 wanted war. We Serbs have not set out to conquer the territories of

7 others for a thousand years, we only defended what is ours and we managed

8 to defend most of the Serbian lands with utmost effort and difficulty. We

9 shall never renounce restoring what has been temporarily occupied. That

10 is a pledge of the Serbian Radicals that cannot be departed from."

11 Q. And the following paragraph, I consider that to be important too:

12 "Now, when we are weighed down by the burden of economic crisis and

13 social poverty, when we should focus on addressing our internal problems,

14 they are again beating the war drums --"

15 A. "... and sounding the war bugles in the West. New attacks are in

16 the making. They are building up troops and wondering how come Serbia is

17 not scared and how come Serbia is getting ready for a defence. They have

18 satellite imagery. They can see it. Well, of course Serbia is getting

19 ready to defend itself, because Serbia is a state worthy of defending and

20 Serbia has not --"

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, we have heard enough from that

22 passage.

23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Just the highlight when the microphone was turned off: "And we

25 are going to do everything we can in order to avert war, but if there is

Page 43032












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13 English transcripts.













Page 43033

1 war imposed on us, we shall have no option but to fight."

2 A. Yes.

3 Q. So that is the speech that Mr. Nice used in order to show that it

4 was against Albanians.

5 Is any further comment needed in addition to what we've already

6 quoted, Mr. Seselj?

7 A. Obviously the entire speech was aimed at averting aggression. I

8 would even say that it was a desperate attempt to avert the aggressor who

9 was already ready and who could strike any moment.

10 Q. All right. Let us move on. You have paragraph 59, which says,

11 and I'm going to quote it: "In addition, thousands of Kosovo Albanians

12 who fled their homes --" I hope you have received a copy of this blue

13 book.

14 A. Well, they're persistent in not giving it to me but I'm listening

15 to you carefully and I can remember. Just tell me what's the paragraph.

16 Q. 59.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Sir, can you sit down? Can you not

18 stand behind my back? It has a bad psychological effect on me. I'm not a

19 dangerous man. There is no need for you to stand behind my back. Just

20 sit down, will you.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: The usher is there for a purpose and he will

22 remain there. Your comment is entirely out of order.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Then I withdraw my comment,

24 Mr. Robinson.

25 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.

Page 43034

1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

2 Q. Could you read paragraph 59 out yourself.

3 A. "In addition, thousands of Kosovo Albanians who fled their homes

4 and were thereby forcibly transferred as a result of the conduct of the

5 forces of the FRY and Serbia and the deliberate climate of terror that

6 pervaded the territory of Kosovo, were forced to seek shelter for days,

7 weeks, or months in other towns and villages and/or in forests and

8 mountains throughout the province. Some of these internally displaced

9 persons remained inside the province of Kosovo throughout the time period

10 relevant to this indictment, and many persons died as a consequence of the

11 harsh weather conditions, insufficient food, inadequate medical attention,

12 and exhaustion. Others eventually crossed over one of the Kosovo borders

13 into Albania, Macedonia, Montenegro, or crossed the provincial boundary

14 between Kosovo and Serbia. Forces of the FRY and Serbia controlled and

15 coordinated the movements of many internally displaced Kosovo Albanians

16 until they were finally expelled from Kosovo."

17 Well, in the indictment it is admitted that many of these

18 Albanians went into Serbia, and Montenegro is within the same state. So

19 their only objective was to get away from where the NATO airstrikes were

20 the strongest or where they were being jeopardised by terrorists. And it

21 is due to those circumstances that they moved to the areas where the war

22 operations were lesser, and that will happen in any part anywhere in this

23 world of yours. It is quite inappropriate to mention some kind of climate

24 of terror or torture or forcible expulsions or whatever.

25 MR. NICE: I would like the Court to note where it has reached.

Page 43035

1 The witness is being invited to read out and then to comment on passages

2 of the indictment pretty well freely. It doesn't match Your Honour's

3 general expectation that questions should be focused and answers should be

4 brief, and I would forecast that this is not a pattern of examination that

5 the Chamber would want to repeat, either with this witness or with others.

6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic, I've already made it clear

7 that the Chamber has clear predilection for short answers in response to

8 short and direct specific questions that relate to the issues raised by

9 the indictment, and let us follow that course.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, in order to be able to

11 put a short question, I would have to have a short quotation.

12 Unfortunately, you see that this which Mr. Nice has honoured with the name

13 of indictment, time and again there is --

14 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'm cutting you off. Just follow the direction.

15 I'm not allowing a speech.

16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

17 Q. So you read half a page, and that is paragraph 59. Did the

18 internally displaced persons leave their homes because of terror and

19 because of being forced out by our forces or our authorities?

20 A. A categorical no. It was either due to the NATO Air Force or

21 pressure by the Albanian terrorist organisation.

22 Q. You have spoken about our attitude toward the civilian population;

23 Albanian, Serb, and of all other ethnicities. You have spoken about the

24 need to help them, how they were helped, what the government policy was,

25 and what the government did in this context. Since an objection was

Page 43036

1 raised that you had to document it further, please give me answers to the

2 following few questions: Since you were a deputy Prime Minister, you know

3 how it functioned, does a government pass general decisions or does it

4 deal with concrete situations in every village, in every hamlet, or in any

5 territory in particular?

6 A. In principle, a government passes general decisions. However, in

7 order to pass these general decisions, it has to be very familiar with the

8 situation and the most important details comprising that situation.

9 Q. All right. How was this spelled out in concrete terms, these

10 government decisions? Were you regularly informed about the

11 implementation of government decisions?

12 A. Yes. We had daily reports about everything that happened in

13 Kosovo and Metohija and all the problems encountered by the local

14 authorities, either the local self-government or the local posts of the

15 central government.

16 Q. In paragraph -- in paragraph 60, it says, and I hope you can see

17 it, I hope it follows immediately after paragraph 59: "Throughout Kosovo,

18 in a deliberate and widespread or systematic effort to deter expelled

19 Kosovo Albanians from returning --" this is very strange Serbian. The

20 language is very strange. "... from returning to their homes, the forces

21 of the FRY and Serbia looted and pillaged the personal and commercial

22 property belonging to Kosovo Albanians. Forces of the FRY and Serbia used

23 wholesale searches, threats of force, and acts of violence to rob Kosovo

24 Albanians of money and valuables, and in a widespread or systematic

25 manner, authorities at FRY border posts stole personal vehicles and other

Page 43037

1 property from Kosovo Albanians being deported from the province."

2 I am sorry. It looks as if I were putting the same question all

3 the time, but if you look at it you will see that these are all different

4 paragraphs in the same document. I keep repeating the paragraphs of what

5 is called an indictment here, and does the deputy Prime Minister have to

6 know about all these things? Did you have any knowledge about widespread,

7 systematic lootings and other such things mentioned in paragraph 60?

8 A. No. The forces of the FRY and Serbia did not loot and steal. If

9 there were cases of looting, these were individual incidents, and in every

10 case the state authorities reacted. They prevented this or held the

11 perpetrators answerable before law. There is hardly a single case that

12 went by unpunished. I've already said that several hundred cases were

13 prosecuted of crimes committed there; killings, lootings, theft, and so

14 on.

15 So our forces did not do that in an organised fashion. They did

16 not do it at all. But there were individual cases that even members of

17 those forces did that sometimes, but the state authorities reacted in each

18 and every case, and that is documented in the state archives. All crimes

19 were prosecuted, those committed during the bombing.

20 Q. Well, a great deal of evidence has been presented about that. So

21 if I put this question to you: Were there cases where the members of the

22 military and the police or other persons that looted and stole from

23 Albanians in Kosovo, on the basis of what you're saying now, the answer is

24 yes?

25 A. Yes, there's no doubt about that. No one can deny, but these are

Page 43038

1 only individual cases, but almost all such cases have been prosecuted.

2 Perhaps there were some omissions, but very few. A vast majority were

3 prosecuted.

4 Q. So can this be referred to as systematic and widespread crimes?

5 A. No. That is nonsense, and I categorically claim that there was no

6 organised looting and stealing.

7 Q. Do you know how the authorities reacted to these crimes, all the

8 authorities from the lowest level to the highest level?

9 A. There were always arrests, investigations, and criminal reports,

10 regardless of whether these were soldiers or policemen or civilians.

11 Several hundred such cases were dealt with, were prosecuted.

12 Q. All right. In 61, it says -- or, rather, read it out yourself,

13 please.

14 A. "In addition, throughout Kosovo, forces of the FRY and Serbia

15 systematically seized and destroyed the personal identity documents and

16 licenses of vehicles belonging to Kosovo Albanian civilians. As Kosovo

17 Albanians were forced from their homes and directed towards Kosovo's

18 borders, they were subjected to demands to surrender identity documents at

19 selected points en route to border crossings and at border crossings into

20 Albania and Macedonia. These actions were undertaken in order to erase

21 any record of the deported Kosovo Albanians' presence in Kosovo and to

22 deny them the right to return to their homes."

23 There was one single case --

24 JUDGE ROBINSON: I predict you will say nothing like that

25 happened.

Page 43039

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, your assumption is wrong,

2 Mr. Robinson. I want to confirm something else.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let us hear the --

4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Only one single such case happened,

5 at the border crossing near Prizren, where the police organs, individuals

6 among the police at the border crossing demanded from the Albanians that

7 they hand over their personal identity documents when crossing the border.

8 When the chief of police in Prizren found out about this, he

9 immediately reacted and prevented this from happening again.

10 As for the consequences of taking these documents away, they

11 certainly could not have been as mentioned in the indictment here because

12 in Serbia there are centralised records, computerised records for the

13 entire republic. There are books, registers. If any Albanian, like any

14 other citizen, loses his documents, he can get them again. He can get new

15 copies from the central computer. There is not a single shred of evidence

16 stating that we intervened from the centralised computer by --

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj, I recognise that you normally speak

18 at a high level, but there are times when I'm convinced that you are

19 shouting. Don't get excited.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's not true. I'm not excited.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Try to speak a little more softly because the

22 high decibel level interferes with the transmission of the interpretation.

23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, maybe you could turn

24 down the volume in your headset or you can organise an examination by a

25 doctor, and you will see that my blood pressure is normal, my pulse is

Page 43040

1 normal, and I'm not excited. I speak the way I'm speaking now ever

2 since --

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...

4 JUDGE BONOMY: The problem is it's your volume we need to turn

5 down, not our volume. And we would be greatly assisted, as would the

6 presentation of evidence, if you could try to tone your voice down

7 slightly.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Next question.

9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

10 Q. Mr. Seselj, when you say one case, you don't mean a case involving

11 one person whose documents were taken away; you mean one case of a single

12 border crossing when it happened.

13 A. Yes. I don't know the exact number involved.

14 Q. And when you say that when the chief of police of Prizren heard

15 about it --

16 A. Intervened and put a stop to it.

17 Q. Put a stop to it. You explained that it wouldn't matter anyway

18 because there is a central computerised system of personal data, and we

19 heard that from General Stevanovic as well. We will not dwell on it any

20 more.

21 Now, there are many paragraphs in the indictment. One of them

22 will take us to an earlier period. Please read paragraph 75.

23 A. "During the 1980s, Serbs voiced concern about discrimination

24 against them by the Kosovo Albanian-led provincial government while Kosovo

25 Albanians voiced concern about economic underdevelopment and called for

Page 43041












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 43042

1 greater political liberalisation and republican status for Kosovo. From

2 1981 onwards, Kosovo Albanians staged demonstrations, which were

3 suppressed by SFRY military and police forces of Serbia."

4 Q. Thank you, Mr. Seselj. Now, will you answer this: Is it the case

5 that during the 1980s, Kosovo Albanians voiced concern about

6 discrimination they were exposed to from the Kosovo leadership?

7 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's correction: Is it the case that

8 Serbs voiced concern about being discriminated against by the Kosovo

9 leadership?

10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Serbs were exposed not only to

11 discrimination but to systematic persecution and expulsions by the

12 Provincial Government, and that was attested to by the leadership or

13 members of the leadership from other republics who came to visit;

14 Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, et cetera.

15 On the other hand, Kosovo has the fastest economic development

16 from 1945 until 1990, and the entire Yugoslavia set aside special funds

17 into a fund for the development of Kosovo and Metohija. You should

18 compare the economic development of Kosovo with that of Albania, using the

19 period before the Second World War as a baseline. I think that during

20 those several decades the economic development of Kosovo was the fastest

21 in Europe.

22 Second, not a single Albanian party asked for economic

23 liberalisation. From 1981 to 1990 Kosovo Albanians formed exclusively

24 Stalinist, Marxist-Leninist parties and it is impossible to expect such

25 parties to voice demands for economic liberalisation. Our military and

Page 43043

1 the police suppressed only violent demonstrations, whereas peaceful

2 demonstrations that were conducted in keeping with the law, and we had a

3 law on public gatherings, were never suppressed by anybody. The only ones

4 to be suppressed were violent demonstrations.

5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Regarding this paragraph 75 to which you answered covering several

7 points about what they voiced concern over, among other things you said

8 whether it was true or not that Kosovo Albanians voiced concern about

9 economic underdevelopment and called for greater liberalisation. I wish

10 to return to that article written by Mr. Kristan. I hope you still have

11 it.

12 A. Yes, I do.

13 Q. Please look at what he wrote in 1981, because this paragraph 75

14 speaks about the situation that prevailed during the 1980s.

15 A. Which page?

16 Q. Page 1731. Will you please just quote the fourth paragraph --

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let it be placed on the ELMO.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. This passage in paragraph 4, where it says: "Regarding the claim

20 that Albanians in Yugoslavia are not equal..."

21 A. I have found that.

22 Q. Now, put it on the ELMO and read it from the ELMO, just one

23 sentence.

24 A. "Regarding the claim that they are not equal, that they are

25 oppressed as a nation, one can only say that it is an example of

Page 43044

1 nationalist and political propaganda."

2 Q. That's enough. So what they say in paragraph 75 is qualified by

3 Kristan as an example of nationalist propaganda, hostile nationalist

4 propaganda.

5 A. Yes, but in order for the Trial Chamber to understand, we have to

6 mention here that Kristan later became one of the main proponents of

7 ideological separatism.

8 Q. That is not essential. But the essence of paragraph 75 is

9 qualified by Kristan as propaganda. He says it is an example of hostile

10 nationalist propaganda.

11 Now, turn the page and read from paragraphs 2 and 3 on page 1732.

12 A. "Regarding the demand for Albanians to get a state, that is a

13 republic, instead of autonomy, the slogan 'Kosovo Republic' is

14 revolutionary and hostile because its objective is to upset the

15 constitutional order of Yugoslavia, to change its borders, and to achieve

16 annexation to Albania. Why does propaganda from Albania insist that

17 Kosovo has to become a republic? Of course every nation has interest to

18 have which state, not two. The same goes for Albania and Kosovo. We see

19 why when we look at the demand for Kosovo to secede. It is only the first

20 step towards its annexation towards Albania. We can read that from the

21 Albanian daily Zere [phoen] and Popullit, which says that there was

22 discussion about all topics except one, and that one topic was annexation

23 of Kosovo to Albania.

24 Q. So what was the ultimate purpose of achieving the status of

25 republic for Kosovo?

Page 43045

1 A. Secession and later annexation to Albania, because according to

2 the Yugoslav constitution, republics were set up as states, although we

3 had a federal state. But this state was made up not of units that had

4 statehood to begin with; it was made up of units that formed a state. And

5 if somebody had a status of republic, then it was implied that through the

6 principle of self-determination, they would have the right to secede and

7 ultimately become a part of something else.

8 Q. You see on page 1736 Kristan suggests in the last paragraph: "The

9 leading idea in all this has to be the preservation of the Socialist

10 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the consolidation of its internal

11 strengths and international reputation." That's what Kristan writes.

12 So it was obvious for everybody at the time where the solution

13 lies, and those who orchestrated the war in the former Yugoslavia tried to

14 destroy precisely that. Is that your conclusion?

15 MR. NICE: We're moving into a kind of debate where the accused is

16 advancing his propositions again. It's not question.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: What's the precise objection, Mr. Nice?

18 MR. NICE: Well, a question that says, "So it was obvious for

19 everybody at the time that the situation lies, and those who orchestrated

20 the ..." We move imperceptibly to that kind of proposition partly because

21 it's very difficult to follow the evidence and I suspect concentration

22 lapses, but there it is. It shouldn't be a question.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Mr. Milosevic, just reformulate that

24 question. It's leading.

25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Nice frequently makes a speech

Page 43046

1 ending it with "Isn't it?"

2 JUDGE ROBINSON: "So it was obvious for everybody at the time," et

3 cetera; that's a leading question.

4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. All right. No leading

5 questions.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. I will just repeat this quotation, and without any leading

8 questions, I want your answer.

9 "The leading idea in clearing up these relations has to be the

10 preservation of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the

11 consolidation of its internal strength and international reputation." Was

12 that the prevailing position in Yugoslavia at the time?

13 A. Yes. All political elites in all federal units held that position

14 all the way until 1989; that is, for a full five years after those

15 anti-state violent demonstrations broke out in Pristina which led to the

16 engagement to army and police units from all federal units, not only from

17 Serbia.

18 Q. Did anything -- could anything that happened in Kosovo or in

19 Serbia lead other federal units to change their opinion suddenly?

20 A. No. They could only change their position following the dictat

21 from the West when the action to break up Yugoslavia began.

22 Q. We heard another witness here, Mr. Ibrahim Rugova. He stated that

23 I did not want a political solution to Kosovo but that I wanted instead a

24 war for the next ten years with the intention of expelling the population.

25 A. First of all, there was no expulsion of Albanian population from

Page 43047

1 Kosovo. The number of Albanians constantly rose. It didn't drop.

2 Second, you constantly tabled initiatives to find a solution and

3 an agreement about this problem. And with the mediation of some Vatican

4 organisation, you did reach an agreement with Rugova in 1995, and that

5 agreement that concerns schooling was in fact implemented. The state

6 provided several buildings for Albanians to set up their own schools and

7 universities because they did not wish to attend the existing ones. There

8 was no limit to the number of students; they were absolutely free to run

9 those schools. Nobody questioned the right of Albanians to express their

10 individuality and their collective consciousness as long as it all fell

11 short of jeopardising the integrity of Serbia. Anything else could be a

12 matter for discussion and was a matter for discussion.

13 Q. I understand your answer. Thank you for that answer.

14 Now, regarding his assertions that violence became ever-worse,

15 with the intention to expel them from Kosovo.

16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] For your benefit, gentlemen, it is

17 on page 4982 of the transcript of the 3rd of May.

18 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. Rugova also stated that in Rambouillet there was no willingness to

20 negotiate on the Serbian side. "[In English] Was the LDK delegation

21 serious in its attempts to negotiate or not?"

22 [Interpretation] I am now reading from the transcript which is,

23 unfortunately, provided only in English. "Yes, we were serious," is the

24 answer, [In English] "and we went in with the conviction that an agreement

25 must be achieved. And this was the stand of the international community

Page 43048

1 too, after the massacre at Racak. The situation was deteriorating in

2 Kosova. And of course the Kosova delegation consisted mainly of the LDK,

3 including myself and other political groups. There was the movement for

4 democratic unity, and the KLA, and other civil societies, and there were

5 two other members. So there were about 15 members in this team. So the

6 other key position was that an agreement --"

7 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker read more slowly, please.

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, the interpreters are asking you to

9 read more slowly.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. So you heard what Rugova said. Is that correct?

13 A. No, it is not correct, because in Rambouillet there was not a

14 single meeting that was actually held between the delegation of Albanians

15 and the delegation of the government of the Republic of Serbia. Not a

16 single meeting, because the Albanians were resolute in their refusal to

17 hold it. How can there be dialogue between sides if it is never started?

18 We could never meet. We kept asking to meet them, and they were

19 persistent in refusing to talk. There was not a single meeting.

20 Q. You see what he says, speaking about the Serbian side. He says

21 most of them were not serious. "[In English] It appeared to me that they

22 were not there in order to reach some agreement. That was our impression,

23 given the way the talks were being held, or the process, in fact. Because

24 we didn't have many contacts, but these negotiations -- the process

25 continued for three weeks and we didn't see any willingness on their part

Page 43049

1 to reach some agreement."

2 [Interpretation] He says there was not much contact. Was there

3 any contact at all?

4 A. There was no contact and that's why they couldn't see anything.

5 They even avoided casual, accidental contact during walks in the yard in

6 Rambouillet. How could we achieve anything if they kept running away from

7 talk? All positions can be only expressed during dialogue. They kept

8 avoiding to meet us and surmising what our position could have been,

9 whereas on our side there was willingness to discuss everything as long as

10 the territorial integrity of our country was not jeopardised. We were

11 prepared to talk about any form of autonomy that existed in the world, not

12 only from the viewpoint of international law, but we were even willing to

13 look at making a precedent leaning towards greater autonomy and greater

14 rights.

15 JUDGE BONOMY: Mr. Seselj, remind me, were you there throughout

16 the Rambouillet arrangements?

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. We, the Serb Radicals, had our

18 standpoint, and it was that these talks were a manipulation by the Western

19 forces and that they would yield no results. We told our coalition

20 partners this in advance, but as members of the government, we did not

21 oppose the forming of this delegation. However, there was no member of

22 the Serb Radical Party in the delegation because we simply did not trust

23 the Americans or the other Western forces. We knew that they would lie to

24 us, manipulate us, try to trick us, but we did not oppose this attempt as

25 a final attempt to avoid war.

Page 43050












12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and

13 English transcripts.













Page 43051

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you. It's time for the 20-minute break.

2 We will adjourn.

3 --- Recess taken at 12.16 p.m.

4 --- On resuming at 12.39 p.m.

5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj, I have observed that you do not stand

6 when the Chamber enters and leaves the courtroom. I will hear from you,

7 but I am bound to say that this appears to be disrespectful not only to

8 the Chamber but to the International Tribunal as a whole. A witness who

9 comes to give evidence here must abide by the Rules, the conventions, and

10 the protocols of the Tribunal. One course that is open to the Tribunal,

11 if you maintain this and there is no acceptable explanation, is that the

12 Chamber will not hear any more evidence from you.

13 Let me hear what you have to say.

14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I am aware that it is

15 the practice of this International Tribunal for a witness to address the

16 Chamber sitting.

17 Secondly, I have read all the Rules and all the documents of the

18 Tribunal put at my disposal, and nowhere have I read that either the

19 accused or a witness has to rise when the Chamber enters, the Trial

20 Chamber enters.

21 The third reason is of a religious nature. I was told by priests

22 of the Serb Orthodox Church before arriving here that the uniforms worn by

23 the Judges here resemble the uniform worn by the former Catholic

24 Inquisition, and this is something I do not respect. The way you bow when

25 you enter the courtroom reminds me of a satanic ritual. I have tried to

Page 43052

1 find a para-psychological explanation for this. I'm afraid that should I

2 bow to your ceremonial, my consciousness might be affected by forces I

3 cannot control.

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let me deal with the three explanations that you

5 have given. You say that it is the practice of the Tribunal for a witness

6 to address the Chamber sitting. We are not dealing with that. You can

7 sit when you address the Chamber. The situation we are dealing with is

8 the convention, the practice, the protocol of everybody rising when the

9 Chamber enters the room.

10 You say that you have not read anywhere where this is required.

11 This is a protocol. It is a convention, and you hear the usher say words

12 to the effect "All rise." You are to abide by it.

13 The third reason that you give I reject entirely. That is

14 nonsense.

15 So you think it over and decide what you are going to do, and it's

16 a matter that affects the interests of Mr. Milosevic.

17 Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, under your threat that

19 you will sanction my failure to rise by interrupting my testimony, in

20 future I will rise, but only before this particular Trial Chamber. Under

21 this threat that you will bring my testimony to an end, I will rise when

22 you enter.

23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, please continue your

24 examination-in-chief.

25 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for Mr. Milosevic, please.

Page 43053

1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] It was turned off.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Mr. Seselj, Knut Vollebaek testified here, the Norwegian minister

4 of foreign affairs, who at the time when the Verification Mission was

5 established and at the time of the crisis in Kosovo was chairing the OSCE.

6 He stated here that at one of our meetings I told him about my commitment

7 to a multi-ethnic Kosovo but that the Albanians had to abide by Serb laws

8 and that I did not wish to discuss greater autonomy.

9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I believe, Mr. Robinson, it would be

10 pointless for me to quote from the transcript now of Knut Vollebaek's

11 testimony because it would take up too much time, but this is the gist of

12 what he said.

13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

14 Q. First of all, was there ever any doubt that Kosovo was part of

15 Serbia?

16 A. No. This was never in dispute. And according to the constitution

17 and the legislation, no representative of Serbia had the right to bring

18 into question the status of Kosovo as part of Serbia. Had you agreed to

19 discuss a Kosovo outside the bounds of Serbia, you would have been subject

20 to sanctions under our criminal legislation.

21 Q. Well, that was not the reason. The reason was that Kosovo is part

22 of Serbia. But when he says I told him that Serbian laws had to be in

23 force in Kosovo, is it logical for the laws of the state called Serbia to

24 apply all over its territory?

25 A. Yes, logically. This is the case in every country. There has to

Page 43054

1 be a unified legal order, a single legal order, and nothing can deviate

2 from it. You cannot say that the legal order of a certain state does not

3 apply on a certain part of its territory unless that territory is

4 occupied. As long as there is a single state, there has to be a single

5 legal order.

6 Q. Were these Serbian laws or were they the laws of the Republic of

7 Serbia which applied equally to Serbs, Albanians, Hungarians, Muslims

8 Ruthenians, Slovaks, Romanians, and all other ethnic groups; that is, all

9 citizens? Did anyone draw up legislation that was favourable only to the

10 Serbs or did laws apply equally to all citizens living on the territory of

11 the state called the Republic of Serbia?

12 A. Our laws were never ethnically based. They were always state laws

13 applying to all citizens, and all citizens had to comply with them. The

14 state protected the interests of all citizens equally regardless of their

15 ethnic or religious affiliation.

16 Q. Did the state also protect the ethnic identity of members of

17 ethnic minorities through legislation guaranteeing the use of their

18 languages, education in their own languages, the ability to communicate

19 with government authorities in their own language, including being tried

20 in their mother tongue before the courts?

21 A. The right to be tried in the mother tongue of the accused was an

22 absolute right that nobody could bring into question. The state not only

23 protected such right for ethnic minorities but also financially supported

24 their implementation. Every year in the budget of Serbia certain funds

25 were set aside to assist media in the languages of ethnic minorities,

Page 43055

1 their newspapers, radio and television stations, and so on and so forth.

2 Many ethnic minorities did not have the funds to finance all this, and

3 they were aided by the state. If the funds provided by the state did not

4 always meet their demands, that's because the state itself was short of

5 funds, but the principle was never encroached upon.

6 Before the aggression against Yugoslavia, there were about 40

7 newspapers and magazines published in Kosovo in the Albanian language.

8 After our government was formed, as far as I can remember we never banned

9 a single publication. And there was full freedom for the editorial policy

10 of all of these publications. We never interfered with respect to their

11 political standpoints. All that mattered was that they should not

12 perpetrate violence.

13 Q. Witness Ratomir Tanic stated here that the Serb authorities

14 attempted to prolong the conflict with the NATO pact in order to increase

15 civilian victims and declare a moral victory. What do you say to this

16 statement?

17 A. It makes no sense. I have facts at my disposal to destroy Ratomir

18 Tanic's credibility. He used to be a collaborator of the state security

19 service of Serbia. He spied on his friends and colleagues for our secret

20 police. After this, he became an agent of foreign intelligence agency and

21 he never denied this. Therefore, any statement made by Ratomir Tanic is

22 questionable because he was an agent of the secret services.

23 Q. It's true that they are in dispute, but I wish you to comment on

24 another statement made by him. He said here that we knew that the

25 building of Radio-Television Serbia would be bombed but that we

Page 43056

1 intentionally did not evacuate the employees.

2 A. This is an absolute fabrication. We as the government did not

3 know that the state television building would be bombed. In the night

4 when it was bombed, one of the journalists of the state television was

5 Angelina Vucic, the mother of the Minister of Information, Aleksandar

6 Vucic, a high-ranking functionary of the Serb Radical Party. Had we known

7 that the building would be bombed, the minister would have told his mother

8 to flee and to get out of the way on time.

9 Q. Witness Fred Abrahams stated here that the Human Rights Watch

10 report of 1993 describes Kosovo as a police state where the Serb

11 authorities are attempted to move Albanians out of Serb-populated

12 settlements. What do you say about this and can you agree with it?

13 A. Absolutely not. There is no evidence to show that the Serb

14 authorities tried to move out any Albanian settlement, especially not in

15 1993. There is not a shred of evidence. Of course, Serbia had

16 significant police forces in Kosovo, but their purpose was to preserve

17 public law and order. The Albanians had far greater liberties on Kosovo

18 than existed in other parts of Serbia or the Federal Republic of

19 Yugoslavia. Many of them did not pay for their utilities, they did not

20 pay taxes, they did not pay their rent, and the authorities never even

21 tried to enforce these claims in order to avoid unpleasant situations.

22 The Albanians, as an ethnic minority, did many things that were

23 illegal, and this was tolerated, and it would not have been tolerated in

24 any other part of Serbia.

25 Q. It wouldn't have been tolerated had the person in question been a

Page 43057

1 Serb?

2 A. No.

3 Q. Mr. Nice, during the cross-examination of General Obrad

4 Stevanovic, dealing with the same topic that Abrahams dealt with in his

5 testimony, Mr. Nice claimed that all of Serbia was a police state in which

6 the population lived in fear. For example, on page 40115, I quote

7 Mr. Nice: "I return, as we look at things chronologically, to the

8 proposition that [In English] this was indeed a police state and the

9 police state becoming even more extreme as the '90s passed. ... Do you

10 accept from your knowledge of the world generally and from the knowledge

11 of the state in which you operated that where the police or any other

12 otherwise authorised user of force acts with impunity two things follow:

13 The population lives in fear."

14 [Interpretation] Is what Mr. Nice said true, that Serbia was a

15 police state and that the people lived in fear?

16 A. No. By definition, a police state is a state with no legal order

17 in which the self-will of the police rules. Serbia was never in such a

18 situation in all of its history. Of course this doesn't mean that our

19 democracy was perfect. There were certain defects in that respect, but

20 from 1990 to 2000, we had many more civil rights and liberties than after

21 2000, and we kept increasing these civil rights and liberties.

22 In 1990, we had a situation where the police could arrest a

23 suspect and hold them in custody for three days. After a few years, this

24 was changed and the police could hold an arrested citizen for only one day

25 before handing him over to the investigating judge.

Page 43058

1 When citizens were arrested, a citizen could be detained for a

2 maximum of six months. This has now been extended to two years. I mean,

3 before an indictment is raised.

4 So all kinds of changes have been made. And we used to have the

5 highest international standard ever achieved in that respect.

6 Furthermore, in Serbia, political opponents were very rarely

7 arrested, and I can testify to that because I was practically the only one

8 ever arrested. Mr. Milosevic, you never arrested anyone from those

9 pro-Western parties except Draskovic once or twice when he was causing

10 mayhem on the street, and then you pardoned him, and yet you held me in

11 prison until the last day. To be sure, I never begged you to release me.

12 Q. Well, in view of this experience of yours, Mr. Seselj, during the

13 1990s you dealt with the -- you had business with the police, and does

14 your experience show that it was a police state?

15 A. No. All the procedural rights were strictly respected. Perhaps a

16 false witness could be brought to bring false accusations against me at a

17 trial, but as for procedural rights, none of these were ever violated in

18 my case, as would have happened in a police state. Where no procedural

19 rights are violated, one cannot speak of a police state. A police state

20 is a state with police self-will ruling, and in our case the police was

21 always subordinate to the authorities. And as I said, we used to have far

22 fewer policemen than are there now in Serbia. We used to have 25.000, and

23 many of these were in Kosovo and Metohija. Now without Kosovo and

24 Metohija, there are 30.000 policemen in Serbia with special powers which

25 they didn't have before to arrest and bring people in.

Page 43059












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Page 43060

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: How long were you in prison, Mr. Seselj?

2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I was in prison more than once,

3 Mr. Robinson, as I told you when describing my CV. I was convicted to

4 many years in prison. In Belgrade I was arrested seven or eight times and

5 spent brief periods in prison. The first time I was arrested was while I

6 was attending Milovan Djilas's lecture at the Free University in 1984 and

7 I was held for three days. During the time Mr. Milosevic was in power --

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: And in all cases when you were arrested and

9 subsequently tried and imprisoned, you say that your rights were

10 respected?

11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Procedural rights were respected.

12 It happened once that two false witnesses from rival political parties

13 were brought to say that I had assaulted the speaker of the Assembly

14 physically, and I had not assaulted him physically but only verbally, and

15 I was sentenced to a month.

16 On one occasion one of our deputies threw water on the speaker of

17 the National Assembly and the majority in the Assembly decided that he be

18 taken out. The police came to take him out and we protected him bodily,

19 and I was then sentenced to two months in prison. And the person who

20 threw the water wasn't convicted at all.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Seselj, that was your experience, but I

22 suspect the Prosecution is relying on a wider range of evidence, looking

23 perhaps at the experience of minorities, Kosovo Albanians. Are you in a

24 position to say whether their rights were respected? Is it reasonable to

25 jump from your personal experience to a general conclusion?

Page 43061

1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. Until Milosevic came to power,

2 Mr. Milosevic, in the 1980s there were arrests of Albanians for verbal

3 crimes, as happened to people of every ethnic affiliation. After

4 Mr. Milosevic came to power, I guarantee that no Albanian was ever

5 arrested for a verbal offence. They were arrested only for violence or

6 terrorism.

7 And my case is unique in Serbia. As I said, there is no other

8 leader of the opposition who had a fate like mine. And I have to admit,

9 Mr. Robinson, that through frequent provocations on my party -- on my

10 part, I practically forced Mr. Milosevic to take such measures. Sometimes

11 I provoked an incident in order to be arrested because then the strength

12 of my party grew.

13 JUDGE ROBINSON: I see. Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

15 Q. Let us proceed with this topic about the police and about the

16 state. During the cross-examination of the same witness, Obrad

17 Stevanovic, General Stevanovic, who testified recently, Mr. Nice said that

18 killings of important persons were not unusual, were not an unusual thing

19 in Serbia. Or, rather, he says: [In English] "I mean in this sense, to

20 be specific: That over the years between 1997 and 2000, in particular,

21 assassination of significant people was a not uncommon event."

22 [Interpretation] Is that correct?

23 A. At that time there were assassination attempts against -- against

24 members of the regime, Bosko Perosevic, a high official of your party.

25 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please be asked to speak one

Page 43062

1 at one at a time.

2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

3 Q. Who was Bosko Perosevic?

4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let's stop a minute. If you look at the

5 transcript, you will see that the interpreters are asking you to speak one

6 at a time. You speak the same language, so there is the tendency to --

7 not to observe the pause between question and answer. Please observe the

8 pause between question and answer.

9 Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.

10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. Mr. Nice gave as examples of such killings the killing of Radovan

12 Stojicevic Badza; Slavko Curuvija; Kelmendi, the lawyer; Fehmi Agani;

13 Arkan; Pavle Bulatovic; Ivan Stambolic. I think that he also mentioned

14 the murder of Zoran Djindjic. Are you aware of any other cases?

15 A. I have a lot of knowledge about these murders. As for Fehmi

16 Agani, he was killed during an incident while the war was still on. I'm

17 not aware of exact circumstances. But it was said that he was killed

18 during an incident as he was trying to leave Serbia. I don't know the

19 exact circumstances.

20 As for the other killings, I personally dealt with this a great

21 deal. You know that I was president of a committee of the federal

22 parliament that was trying to resolve the case of the killing of the

23 Minister of the Interior, Pavle Bulatovic. Our committee came to the

24 possible name of a killer and the possible motives, and then the

25 propaganda machinery of the then government of Zoran Djindjic opened fire

Page 43063

1 at me, saying that I was disclosing secrets, et cetera. And Ivan Delic,

2 who we proved had killed Pavle Bulatovic, was never even questioned. He

3 is well known for different criminal activities of that nature.

4 As for the murder of Radovan Stojicic Badza, he was a colonel

5 general of the police and assistant minister of the interior of Serbia. I

6 learned when hearing Radomir Markovic, also a general, head of the state

7 security service who was then in prison, that Radovan Stojicic Badza was

8 killed because of some links with tobacco smuggling. I directly suspected

9 the well-known Stanko Subotic, Stane Zabac, the frog, who is the king of

10 this Mafia in the Balkans. And the then president, now Prime Minister of

11 Montenegro, Mile Djukanovic, was involved as well.

12 As for the murder of Ivan Stambolic, it has not been resolved yet.

13 Ivan Stambolic was killed a month before the elections of 2000, and the

14 opposition pro-Western parties immediately started accusing you, but at

15 that time Ivan Stambolic was not a political factor at all. No one from

16 government could have had any interest in his murder.

17 Awhile after the killing of Ivan Stambolic, when there had already

18 been a change of government in Serbia, the new government, led by Zoran

19 Djindjic, systematically tried to hush up this murder. It was only when

20 Zoran Djindjic was murdered the authorities stated that they had found the

21 place where the bodily remains of Ivan Stambolic had been buried and they

22 had allegedly found his killers. However, it seemed that the alleged

23 killers were the people who in the putsch of the 5th of October actually

24 brought Djindjic to power. Obviously, Djindjic was killed by the same

25 people who brought him to power because he tried to turn against them at

Page 43064

1 one point.

2 I was also a suspect in terms of Djindjic's assassination. There

3 was an indictment issued against me. A special prosecutor came here to

4 hear me in Belgrade. A year later, the indictment was withdrawn.

5 A minister -- the minister of the interior from Djindjic's government,

6 Dusan Mihajlovic, for a year kept saying that I was behind Djindjic's

7 murder, and now when he published his book of memories in two volumes, he

8 says that I was not involved in any way in Djindjic's killing.

9 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...

10 Mr. Milosevic.

11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

12 Q. Do you know anything about these other killings; Kelmendi, Slavko

13 Curuvija, Arkan?

14 A. I did not deal with the Kelmendi killing in great detail. There's

15 nothing special I'd have to say except that I heard that this was an

16 inter-Albanian settling of accounts but I don't know anything else.

17 As for Slavko Curuvija, I publicly called upon the organisers and

18 killers. The regime of Zoran Djindjic did not react to that at all, and

19 in the meantime, those that I had publicly accused of having committed the

20 killing were subsequently killed.

21 As for Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan, he was killed in the beginning of

22 the year 2000, and it is well known who killed him and how. The motive

23 was to take over control over the Belgrade underground so that everything

24 would be ready for the next take-over of government in Serbia. Since it

25 was well known that Zeljko Raznjatovic Arkan was indicted by The Hague

Page 43065

1 Tribunal, he had to stay in Serbia. He could not leave, and due to The

2 Hague Tribunal indictment. So he had to stay in Serbia, thus in charge of

3 the underground. Those who liquidated Arkan took over the underground and

4 instrumentalised the underground in the coup d'etat of the 5th of October.

5 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers please be asked to slow down.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. You said that --

8 JUDGE ROBINSON: The interpreters - look at the transcript -

9 they're asking you to slow down, both of you.

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I didn't hear them.

11 They probably said it on your channel.

12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

13 Q. In what capacity did you deal with the investigation of the murder

14 of Pavle Bulatovic?

15 A. I was a federal MP at the initiative of the Serbian Radical Party.

16 Committees were set up of the two chambers of the federal parliament to

17 solve the case of the killing of Pavle Bulatovic, since the Federal

18 Assembly was dissatisfied with the police investigation involved. This

19 committee included representatives of all political parties in parliament,

20 both from Serbia and from Montenegro.

21 Q. Tell me who it was that you heard. When I say "you," I'm not

22 referring to you only but also other members of the committees.

23 A. I was primarily in charge of the hearing. We heard many

24 ministers, army and police generals, and other state officials.

25 Q. You were in charge of these hearings?

Page 43066

1 A. Yes.

2 Q. But I assume that you did not do this on your own. I assume that

3 you were there with a few other members of the committee.

4 A. All members of the committee participated and put questions, but

5 my questions were the most intensive.

6 Q. You also mentioned that you heard the former head of state

7 security, Radomir Markovic.

8 A. Yes. By then he was already in the central prison. We sent a

9 request to the president of the district court where he was held in

10 prison, we went to the district prison, and we heard him.

11 Q. Did he tell you anything about any kind of torture that he had

12 been subjected to?

13 A. Yes.

14 Q. And the reasons why he had been subjected to it?

15 A. Yes. He told us about this, and this was included in the

16 stenographic notes of this committee, that he was illegally taken out of

17 the central prison. According to our legal system, a suspect or an

18 accused person can be taken out of prison only upon instructions from the

19 court in charge. The police absolutely has nothing to do with such a

20 person any longer. They cannot get in contact with him, they cannot hear

21 him; nothing. After being handed over to the investigating judge, he is

22 solely under court jurisdiction.

23 However, the police came to pick him up. He was taken by car to

24 the security institute in Belgrade. That is where Dusan Mihajlovic was,

25 some other high police officials. They organised a luncheon for him, and

Page 43067

1 during this luncheon they were persuading him to testify falsely against

2 you and accuse you of the killing of Ivan Draskovic, the attempted murder

3 of Vuk Draskovic, et cetera, and that, in return, his indictment would be

4 abolished, that they would no longer press charges, that they would give

5 him a false identity, that they would give him plenty of money so that he

6 and his family can live care free in any country of the world, in a

7 country of his choice.

8 I think you have that. I published all the stenographic notes of

9 these hearings, and I think that you therefore have the stenographic notes

10 of the hearing of Radomir Markovic and everything he stated to the members

11 of my committee.

12 Q. These stenographic notes published from his hearing is here in tab

13 12. Could you please find it. Have you found it?

14 MR. KAY: The translation is --

15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

16 Q. I will not insist that we read large portions of this transcript.

17 Please open page 156.

18 A. I found it.

19 Q. Around the middle of the page, it says: "Professor Dr. Vojislav

20 Seselj, while you've been in prison, has somebody been blackmailing you?"

21 A. This is an old story. I know that from my private information.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you know the protocol. We have to

23 find it in our English.

24 MR. NICE: Halfway down what is page 2 at the bottom, with the

25 markings 156-160 at the top.

Page 43068












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13 English transcripts.













Page 43069


2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we continue now, Mr. Robinson?


4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Radomir Markovic is answering:

5 "Mr. Seselj, I was arrested in order to accuse Slobodan Milosevic

6 of being the modus vivendi of all evil and acts of terrorism.

7 "Seselj: Were you taken outside the prison without an order from

8 an investigating judge?

9 "Markovic: Yes, I was.

10 "Seselj: How many times?

11 "Markovic: Once. This comrade took me outside. (Indicates the

12 policeman present.)

13 "Seselj: Who took you outside?

14 "Markovic: Zoran Mijatovic.

15 "Seselj: Where did he take you?"

16 And Zoran Mijatovic was the main chief of the Serbian police at

17 the time.

18 "Seselj: Where did he take you?

19 "Markovic: To a villa of the State Security Service inside the

20 compound of the Security Institute. There is an isolated building there

21 called the villa. He took me there and later, Goran Petrovic and Minister

22 Mihajlovic came.

23 "Seselj: What did they want from you?

24 "Markovic: They wanted me to accuse Slobodan Milosevic, to

25 confess to all those crimes, all those murders, and to say that Slobodan

Page 43070

1 Milosevic directly ordered me to do it.

2 "Seselj: What did they offer you?

3 "Markovic: They offered me a new identity, freedom, money for me

4 and my family in any country I wanted to go to.

5 "Seselj: When you told them that you were not involved in the

6 murders, how did they react?

7 "Markovic: From the very first day, I had told my colleagues who

8 came here to talk to me; I pointed out fundamental shortcomings in the

9 procedure and the statements and testimony taken from the person accusing

10 me. I was hoping that they wanted to help me. I was hoping that they had

11 overlooked something accidentally. I did not know that it was a scenario

12 to accuse me, to place me in such a hopeless position so that I would

13 accuse Milosevic, so that he could be tried and that everything that was

14 done could be justified, that he was the terrorist. You know very well

15 that when they wanted --"

16 Q. That will do.

17 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... we can

18 endure. Ask a question.

19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All right.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. During his hearing, that's what Markovic said to you at an

22 official session of the parliamentary inquiry committee. Was the entire

23 committee there?

24 A. No, it was not. But at the beginning you have the list of members

25 who were there. In addition to me, Mileta Bulatovic, from the Socialist

Page 43071

1 People's Party of Montenegro; Miodrag Djidic from the Democratic Party,

2 Djindjic's Democratic Party, that is. Veljko Odaljevic from your

3 Socialist Party; and Zelimir Nikcevic from the People's Party of

4 Montenegro. Then there was the official secretary, Godana Perisic

5 [phoen], from the staff of the federal parliament; Milena Vasiljevic, the

6 official stenographer; and Zora Zlatkovic, another official stenographer.

7 The Federal Assembly still has a recording of this hearing.

8 Q. You mentioned that there was an all-out attack against you because

9 you published these stenographic notes.

10 A. When we started working, you see, first of all, everybody from the

11 governing regime structures underestimated our possibility of finding

12 anything out through this parliamentary inquiry, and that is how this

13 happened that this parliamentary inquiry was set up. However, we worked

14 very thoroughly.

15 I published a book of 1.000 pages, very small print, including all

16 the stenographic notes and everything else that the committee did. We

17 agreed at the very outset that we be very discreet about everything we

18 find out until we finish our work. When we finished this parliamentary

19 inquiry, when we were to present a report to the Federal Assembly, we

20 agreed that we make the entire material of the parliamentary committee

21 public.

22 As soon as the report was handed in, I gave a large number of

23 journalists large chunks of the transcript, copies of that, and many

24 newspapers started publishing that. That seriously threatened the

25 government in Serbia, the regime of Serbia at the time. Zoran Djindjic

Page 43072

1 was livid. He wanted to press criminal charges against me. This criminal

2 report was actually never put in place but I was informed it was there for

3 years and that it was withdrawn only a few -- only very recently.

4 So the government, the regime was furious because we not only

5 solved the murder of Pavle Bulatovic but realised who committed many other

6 murders. The murder of Pavle Bulatovic and many others show that there

7 were foreign instigators as well, because everybody in Serbia and

8 Montenegro realises that had Pavle Bulatovic lived, Predrag Bulatovic

9 never would have managed to take away Momir Bulatovic's party. This is a

10 sheer coincidence that they all happen to have the same surname, that they

11 come from the same wider family in Montenegro but they're not related.

12 After that, the Americans told Predrag Bulatovic to steal away

13 Momir Bulatovic's party. Had Pavle Bulatovic lived, that would have been

14 impossible in view of his authority and reputation in Montenegro and

15 Serbia and Montenegro. So Pavle Bulatovic's murder had to do with the

16 preparations of the putsch in Serbia.

17 Q. What about the killing of Curuvija? Who did you blame for that?

18 A. A certain Jorga, then a certain Canda. These are nicknames of

19 well-known criminals in Belgrade. I think Jorga's last name was Jevtovic.

20 I cannot remember now all those names, but it's all there in the book.

21 Curuvija was killed when he was no problem for the regime any

22 longer. He was the owner of Dnevni Telegraf, the dirtiest newspaper ever

23 published in Serbia. We passed a law that was a bit restrictive, a law on

24 the press, and then he had to undergo certain sanctions. They had to

25 close down his newspaper. He stopped publishing his newspaper because he

Page 43073

1 could not pay all the fines that he had to pay because of all the libel

2 suits because of all the lies he published in his newspaper.

3 All of a sudden, when the bombing had already started, he got

4 killed. Of course, for a long time this murder was hushed up. There were

5 rumours that the state security service was involved based on reports

6 about them keeping him under surveillance, but nobody from the current

7 authorities actually solved that murder. The man was also involved in

8 some financial scandals, smuggling contraband, but probably this is of no

9 interest to the Court here.

10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Did you see how you just spoke? The last

11 sentence. That was modulated. Try to maintain that tone, because it's

12 becoming very, very difficult for me to concentrate. You just achieved a

13 tone, a level that is perfectly acceptable. See whether you can maintain

14 that.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, maybe that is the

16 consequence of fear that you instilled in me by saying that you would put

17 an end to my testimony if I failed to rise again when you enter. Maybe

18 the fear is still having a hold on me and suppressing my adrenaline. But

19 please do not expect me to speak as Mr. Nice speaks. My wife would leave

20 me immediately.

21 JUDGE ROBINSON: The decibel level was just as high before. But

22 you just achieved a very moderate tone and let us try and maintain that.

23 I think it's in the interest of everybody.

24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I will try, but I'm tired now, and

25 maybe the decibel level is the result of that. However, if I raise my

Page 43074

1 voice again, please know that it's not deliberate and it's not intended to

2 interfere with your work.

3 JUDGE ROBINSON: In fact, I have distinctly said it's not

4 deliberate and not meant to be offensive.

5 Yes, Mr. Milosevic.

6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

7 Q. Let me come back to my question, Mr. Seselj; namely, something

8 that Mr. Nice said when cross-examining General Obrad Stevanovic. The

9 years between 1997 and 2000, in particular the assassination of several

10 people, assassinations of people were not an uncommon event. Let us not

11 limit ourselves to this period 1997 to 2000 that Mr. Nice mentioned. Let

12 us take it from 1989 to 2000. Was there a single opposition leader who

13 was killed in that period?

14 A. No. Not a single opposition leader was killed. It was only

15 criminals who were killed, usually in mutual settlements of account in the

16 underground. But high officials of the regime were sometimes killed as

17 well, people who enjoyed your trust. Radovan Stojicic Badza was a man of

18 your inner circle who was completely loyal to you. I know that for a

19 fact, although this man Badza arrested me on one occasion in Gnjilane, put

20 me in prison for two months, but I have to tell the truth here and testify

21 about facts.

22 There were two attempts to assassinate Vuk Draskovic. That much

23 is true. That is the only opposition leader who is the subject of

24 assassination attempts. However, the circumstances were always very

25 strange.

Page 43075

1 The first was on the Ibarska highway when a truck full of sand

2 suddenly sprang in front of him and his driver and his wife's brother were

3 killed on the spot. Draskovic was unscathed. That looked very strange to

4 me, although our police, traffic police, said immediately it was simply a

5 traffic accident. I, however, found the circumstances bizarre.

6 The investigation started, and then it emerged that the truck

7 belonged to the state security service. The state security officers were

8 involved, et cetera, et cetera. The subject was very unpleasant to the

9 authorities, and it later turned out that the same people who were

10 suspected of trying to assassinate Vuk Draskovic were those who placed

11 Zoran Djindjic in power.

12 Zoran Djindjic was -- in fact, Vuk Draskovic was always on the

13 ready to take over power if a clash happened between you and me. You

14 always kept Draskovic in the hope that he would form a coalition

15 government with you. And then comes this assassination attempt on

16 Draskovic.

17 Who was the most bothered by Draskovic at the time? I can say

18 with full responsibility that Djindjic found him most bothersome. Several

19 months later, there was another assassination attempt on Vuk Draskovic in

20 Budva. Very strange. The assassin fired two bullets, each one failing to

21 graze him, to graze his ears, and he remained uninjured. Draskovic was in

22 Budva where he had an apartment and the police of Montenegro always

23 provided him with security to stand in front of his apartment. On the day

24 of that assassination attempt, the police in Montenegro failed to provide

25 the security detail. They obviously knew what was in the offing.

Page 43076

1 JUDGE ROBINSON: You have given a full answer.

2 Mr. Milosevic.

3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Let us move on then. I didn't ask

4 for this in particular, but I suppose, Mr. Robinson, that the exhibits

5 that have already been quoted and have been presented in good order with

6 translations can be admitted?

7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. The following tabs are admitted: 1, 2, 3,

8 12, 25 in relation to chapter 19, 30, and 31. There is also Ivan

9 Kristan's article in Socialism. Do you want that last one?

10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, certainly.

11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. What's the number?

12 THE REGISTRAR: That will be D303, tab 32.

13 MR. NICE: Your Honour, it hadn't been previously exhibited, no

14 translation at present, therefore it will presumably be on your usual

15 terms.

16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. No translation, so it's marked for

17 identification pending translation.

18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well, Mr. Robinson. I

19 understand that it is only the article of Mr. Kristan from the Socialism

20 magazine is without the translation. The other documents all have a

21 translation.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: All have -- I see, yes. Thank you.

23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Let us move on.

24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

25 Q. Mr. Seselj, witness Fehim Elshani, who testified here in February

Page 43077












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Page 43078

1 2002, transcript page 838, stated the following: "During the war in

2 Kosovo, Serb forces issued a communique saying that in the case of an

3 attack by NATO, they would retaliate against Albanian population." This

4 was stated not by Serb forces but the Serb government through its leaders

5 in public communiques. You were a deputy Prime Minister. Is this true,

6 what this witness says?

7 A. That is absolutely not true. The entire public in our country

8 followed carefully all the communiques of the government and we see that

9 this is a flagrant lie. There was no such communique ever.

10 Q. Thank you. Witness Mahmut Bakalli enumerated some people who were

11 not prepared to negotiate. Among others, he named Tomislav Nikolic,

12 deputy president of Seselj's Radical Party. Is that true? He testified

13 on the 18th of February, 2002, and that's on transcript page 538. So he's

14 talking about your deputy, Tomislav Nikolic. Was he among the people who

15 were not prepared to negotiate?

16 A. This again is absolutely untrue. Tomislav Nikolic was a member of

17 the delegation of Serbia and he travelled to Kosovo many times, to

18 Pristina, for negotiations with Albanian political parties.

19 Unfortunately, without any success. But you can judge for yourself about

20 the veracity of Mahmut Bakalli when you know that Mahmut Bakalli called

21 Zoran Djindjic the most dangerous Serb nationalist just several days

22 before Djindjic was murdered. All Serbian newspapers published this

23 several days before Zoran Djindjic's death.

24 Q. Another witness, Agim Berisha, said that Seselj had stated that he

25 would expel all Albanians to the other side of the Prokletije mountains.

Page 43079

1 That is transcript page 965, and he testified on the 20th of February,

2 2002.

3 A. Well, that is absolutely untrue. You have already seen a passage

4 from my speech where I said that Albanian immigrants who do not have

5 Serbian citizenship and at the same time hold separatist views would have

6 to be expelled. Any country would do the same.

7 Q. He was more specific. He said you would expel them to the other

8 side of Prokletije mountains.

9 A. Well, that may have been a figure of speech because Prokletije

10 mountains are the highest in the area. That would have involved a bit of

11 mountaineering.

12 Q. He said on the same day, on page 967, that he had heard from

13 Seselj of a special plan that was in existence, and he says, "We were

14 afraid for our lives because we were only civilians locked up in our

15 homes." And when I asked him on that 26th of February where exactly

16 Seselj stated he would expel Albanians across Prokletije mountains, he

17 answered he didn't know whether he read about it in the newspapers or

18 heard about it on television, and he wasn't sure whether Seselj was

19 speaking about Albanians as such or about the KLA. Could you comment.

20 A. Well, obviously those people who coached this witness in his false

21 testimony didn't do a good job, so he got confused in the witness box. He

22 didn't know what to say. The only obvious thing is that he was lying.

23 Q. Now we have something rather special. Witness Konaj, who

24 testified on the 25th of April, 2002, transcript page 3788. He says that

25 police vehicles escorted Seselj's convoy, that one of these vehicles came

Page 43080

1 into the intersection between Gorazdevac and Loxhe, and there they came

2 across some children playing ball, and then they abused those children,

3 killing Tahir Halaj -- or Shalaj, on the day.

4 A. I already said that when I visited certain crisis areas in Kosovo

5 in the summer of 1998, I visited Gorazdevac, which is not far from Pec.

6 There was a police escort, but during my entire stay in Kosovo and

7 Metohija there was not a single incident. The rest is the witness's

8 fabrication.

9 Whether something like that happened in some other place far away

10 from where I was, whether somebody was indeed killed, I don't know.

11 Maybe. But not a single incident was linked to my visit to Kosovo. I was

12 never even insulted verbally once, nor did my escort threaten anybody.

13 But it's true that I had a police escort; one car in front us and one car

14 behind us. I also had journalists with me, as I usually did during all my

15 visits and tours, because that was one of the purposes, to spread the word

16 that I was looking for a political solution, for negotiations, et cetera.

17 And I also visited Serb settlements to persuade people not to move

18 to Serbia, because at one point the population of Gorazde, which is a

19 purely Serb place, said that they were going to move to Serbia because

20 they couldn't stand it any longer. They couldn't stand the pressure.

21 Q. A protected witness, K5, stated on the 27th of May, 2002,

22 transcript page 5549, that there existed paramilitary groups in Kosovo

23 that belonged to Seselj, as he says, and that were called White Eagles.

24 Is this correct, Mr. Seselj?

25 A. First of all, I never had any kind of paramilitary groups.

Page 43081

1 Second, I never had anything to do with any White Eagles. And for the

2 entire duration of the war in Kosovo and Metohija, and even before, during

3 fighting with terrorist groups in Kosovo and Metohija, there were no Serb

4 paramilitary units from Serbia at any point. The government had a very

5 clear policy in that respect; namely, that we had to prevent the emergence

6 of any paramilitary units. There had been bad experience from previous

7 wars in Bosnia and in Croatia, and we wanted to avoid the repetition of

8 such experience at all cost.

9 There were no paramilitary groups in Kosovo whatsoever. There was

10 only the army of Yugoslavia and the police of Serbia who were active in

11 Kosovo.

12 Q. Do you have any idea why this expression, why this term "White

13 Eagles" is used? Was this term ever used in relation to your party or the

14 volunteers from your party? Is there any link whatsoever between the term

15 "White Eagles" and your party?

16 A. In previous wars there was a small paramilitary organisation

17 called White Eagles, but the Serb Radical Party had absolutely nothing to

18 do with them. On the contrary, we always kept our distance from them and

19 similar organisations, believing that they are doing a great damage to the

20 Serb people because their main motivation was looting and self-interest.

21 However, they never even appeared in Kosovo.

22 And there were even claims in Western media that Arkan was in

23 Kosovo with his volunteers guard. But Arkan spent the entire war in

24 Kosovo in the Hyatt Hotel in Belgrade, and he was in the plain view of all

25 the foreign press that were staying in the same hotel, despite the fact

Page 43082

1 that we were practically bombarded by these claims in the Western media

2 about Arkan's presence in Kosovo.

3 Q. Witness Shukri Buja, when asked whether he was surprised by the

4 police attack on Racak, answered in the negative. He explained that there

5 had been warnings about the arrival of Seselj and the activities of the

6 so-called Red Hand or Red Arm -- Black Arm, sorry.

7 A. This is pure fabrication. There was an organisation called Black

8 Hand about 100 years ago. It was a creation of the Obrenovic royal

9 family, who staged a coup, and in 1903 [Realtime transcript read in error

10 "'93"] they were replaced by the Karadjordjevic family, and this

11 organisation was supposed to threaten to kill Aleksandar Karadjordjevic.

12 But this is completely made up as far as the recent wars are concerned.

13 There was no such organisation.

14 JUDGE BONOMY: The transcript has a figure '93. Did you say 1903?

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] 1903. In 1903 there was a change of

16 dynasty in Serbia through a military coup d'etat. A group of military

17 officers organised themselves into an organisation called the Black Hand,

18 and there was a change in the ruling royal family. As I said, this

19 happened over a hundred years ago.

20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Witness Shukri Buja stated, and that's on page 6421 of the

22 transcript on the 6th of June, 2002, that video clips of Radio-Television

23 Serbia can be found showing Seselj in a military uniform reviewing his

24 units, as was the case with Arkan. Is this correct? Please be precise.

25 Tell us first of all, did you have any units of your own; and secondly,

Page 43083

1 did you ever review or inspect your units?

2 A. First of all, I never have any of -- units of my own. During the

3 war in Serbian Krajina and the beginning of the civil war in Bosnia and

4 Herzegovina, the Serb Radical Party had its volunteers but exclusively as

5 part of the JNA, which was the only legal military force on the territory

6 of the former Yugoslavia. In Kosovo and Metohija, we never had any

7 volunteers from the Serb Radical Party. The members of our party who were

8 military conscripts were mobilised into military units, and one of our

9 deputies was even killed. He was a captain first class and a reservist of

10 the Yugoslav army in the war on Kosovo and Metohija. However, we never

11 called for volunteers. If there were volunteers in Kosovo and Metohija,

12 they apply directly to the units of the army of Yugoslavia on their own

13 initiative.

14 I wore a uniform for a period when touring military positions in

15 Serbian Krajina at the time when the SFRY existed, when every citizen

16 could be considered a member of the armed forces if he was fighting the

17 enemy in an organised manner with weapons in his hands.

18 As soon as Yugoslavia dissolved, when first Slovenia and then

19 Croatia and then Bosnia and Herzegovina were internationally recognised, I

20 stopped wearing a uniform when visiting Serb forces in various theatres of

21 war, which I visited frequently.

22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, we will adjourn for the day and

23 resume tomorrow morning at 9.00 a.m.

24 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.45 p.m.,

25 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 24th day

Page 43084

1 of August, 2005, at 9.00 a.m.