1 Monday, 23 January 2006
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 [The witness entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.06 a.m.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: The witness there. Let him make the declaration.
7 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please, Your Honour.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will speak
9 the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: You may sit.
11 Mr. Milosevic, you may begin.
12 WITNESS: MILAN KOTUR
13 [Witness answered through interpreter]
14 Examined by Mr. Milosevic:
15 Q. [Interpretation] Colonel Kotur, good morning to you.
16 A. Good morning.
17 Q. Could you introduce yourself to us, please, and tell us your
18 movements in your service, what education you've had, et cetera.
19 A. My name is Milan Kotur. I was born on the 23rd of September, 1947
20 in Indjija. That is Vojvodina province, in the Republic of Serbia.
21 [French on English channel] school, secondary school of the science
22 stream. I went to the military academy for the ground forces, the
23 infantry. I completed the academy after four years, and the first rank I
24 was given was as a 2nd lieutenant and sent to the 2nd Army district in
25 Zagreb to take up my duties.
1 In addition to the military academy, I went to the staff academy
2 for two years and have completed the highest schools, military schools -
3 the School of National Defence in particular -- and in addition to that
4 several courses, the most important of which was the sabotage course, the
5 intelligence course, and superior intelligence course.
6 And the duties that I performed included the commander of
7 reconnaissance units, a regiment officer, and of my command duties,
8 battalion commander and brigade commander were the most important posts.
9 And of the operative duties, I was Chief of Staff of the brigade, chief of
10 the department for operative affairs in the corps, and chief of the
11 department of the armed forces when I was -- when I retired last March.
12 I have been in -- working in ten garrisons. I worked in ten
13 garrisons during my service: Zagreb, Varazdin, Koprivnica, Leskovac,
14 Kursumlija being among them, as well as Kosovska Mitrovica, Pristina once
15 again until I was sent to Leskovac and Novi Sad, and I retired in Novi Sad
16 from my duties there.
17 Q. Thank you, you said you were born in Indjija. Could you tell us,
18 please, whether your family lived in Indjija for a long time?
19 A. My parents, after World War II, came to Indjija in 1946.
20 Otherwise, they had lived in Croatia, on the territory of Croatia, that is
21 to say in the Kordun area and the Lika region. And during the Second
22 World War my family suffered a great deal, both on my mother's side and my
23 father's side in the Independent State of Croatia, at the time as it was
24 called. Several hundred thousand people lost their lives for the simple
25 fact of not being Croats. And later on my parents moved to Indjija, and
1 my other relatives remained living in Croatia where, in 1995, under the
2 effects of the armed forces of Croatia and the so-called Operation Storm,
3 they withdrew to Serbia, moved to Serbia, and today live -- went from Sid,
4 Nova Batajnica, Novi Pazar, Zemun and so on and settled in that general
5 area. Right down to Novi Pazar.
6 Q. Now, tell us, please, what your job was in Kosovo and Metohija,
7 and I'm thinking of the period just prior to the war and during the war.
8 A. As far as my basic duties were concerned, before the war and
9 during the war I was chief of infantry in the command of the Pristina
10 Corps. However, before the war, pursuant to an order of the Pristina
11 Corps dated the 23rd of October, I was sent to be a member of the team of
12 the Pristina Corps that numbered five officers and which had the task of
13 realising the tasks of the Pristina Corps emanating from the contents of
14 an agreement between OSCE and NATO in Kosovo for Kosovo and Metohija, and
15 I was at the head of that particular team.
16 At the beginning of the war, I headed another team that had as its
17 assignment to control and monitor the units which had taken up positions
18 in the defence area and closed off the axis from Macedonia towards Kosovo
19 and Metohija.
20 Q. Thank you. Let's dwell for a moment on your assignment. You said
21 you were the head of a team which was appointed by the Pristina Corps to
22 maintain ties and liaisons with the OSCE Verification Mission; is that
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Now, we have here a large number of documents. Are all these
1 documents in fact the product of your activities as part of the team and
2 as head of the team, in fact, which was appointed to maintain relations
3 with the OSCE?
4 A. All the documents that are there are the product of the work of my
5 team during the period while the Verification Mission was in Kosovo and
6 Metohija. I was the liaison.
7 Q. In the briefest possible terms could you explain us to the Kosovo
8 Verification Mission; how it functioned, its set-up and organisation. And
9 in tab 2 you will find a schematic, a diagram of the organisation.
10 A. The Kosovo Verification Mission, at the head of the mission was
11 Mr. Walker, and he was head of mission. He had its executive secretariat
12 and his council and his assistants. He had assistants for the police, for
13 political questions, a political advisor, he had a staff advisor. He had
14 Mr. Keller for politics, Drewienkiewicz for operational matters, and he
15 had Mr. Bochard [phoen], Bochard, whom -- I'm not sure what particular job
16 he had.
17 Q. Now, you yourself, were you fully acquainted with the contents of
18 the agreement governing the Verification Mission?
19 A. Yes, I was familiar with the agreement of the Verification Mission
20 in Kosovo and Metohija, and particularly as it related to the solving of
21 the crisis in Kosovo. In October 1998, the 26th of October, in fact,
22 agreement was signed in Belgrade on the Verification Mission for Kosovo by
23 the federal ministry of Yugoslavia and the presiding organ for security
24 and cooperation, which envisaged that the OSCE should establish a
25 Verification Mission, and had established a Verification Mission in Kosovo
1 and Metohija, including Yugoslavia's obligations to abide by the
2 Resolution 1160 and 1199, those two Resolutions. There was also an
3 agreement of the 15th of October in Belgrade which was signed by the Chief
4 of Staff of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the main commanding
5 officer for Europe of the NATO alliance, which envisaged the establishment
6 of a Verification Mission of Kosovo in the air as an addition to the OSCE
7 Verification Mission.
8 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers kindly be asked to slow down
9 for the benefit of the interpreters and the Court. Thank you.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic and the Colonel, you're being asked
11 to speak more slowly by the interpreters.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I will speak slower. Thank
14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Colonel Kotur, in view of the fact that you were at the head of
16 the team of the Pristina Corps, could you tell us, please, briefly, what
17 the duties were of the Pristina Corps.
18 A. Pursuant to a decision made by the federal organs of the Federal
19 Republic of Yugoslavia, an order was issued throughout Kosovo and Metohija
20 that the number of security forces should be reduced. That is to say the
21 MUP forces and the forces of the army of Yugoslavia, and their equipment
22 and materiel to the general normal level, that is to say the level before
23 terrorist activity broke out, with the intention of creating conditions
24 conducive to the speedy revival of the political process to settle all
25 unsettled humanitarian and political issues. All the units of the army of
1 Yugoslavia and all --
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: You're speaking at the same speed, and I can hear
3 it in the interpreter's voice they're struggling to keep up with you.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] All the units of the army of
5 Yugoslavia and all the additional equipment and materiel brought into
6 Kosovo and Metohija after February 1998 was withdrawn from Kosovo and
7 Metohija. The Pristina Corps, since it covered the overall territory,
8 geographically speaking, of Kosovo and Metohija, and all the duties and
9 obligations that stemmed from the agreement of the OSCE mission and NATO
10 were implemented by the Pristina Corps.
11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Tell us briefly, please, whether the Pristina Corps fulfilled all
13 its obligations emanating from the agreement reached with the OSCE.
14 A. The Pristina Corps fully complied with all the undertakings on the
15 basis of the agreement signed with the OSCE mission.
16 Q. Now, who was responsible for the security of the members of the
17 mission and how -- what was your conduct like vis-a-vis their members, the
18 members of the commission?
19 A. The Verification Mission was established in conformity and
20 agreement with the federal government of Yugoslavia, and it was also
21 established in Kosovo and Metohija under full government guarantees which
22 were provided for their security and safety, along with our responsibility
23 to guarantee the safety and security of their members fully.
24 There were diplomatic missions which -- enjoying diplomatic
25 immunity, and our conduct towards them was fully in keeping with the
1 Geneva Convention governing diplomatic agreements between countries from
2 which their privileges emanated and their immunity emanated and the
3 obligations we took on to provide full and complete safety and security
4 for their members.
5 Q. Tell us, please, during the time the Verification Mission spent in
6 Kosovo and Metohija, was this obligation fully realised? That is to say
7 was their security and safety realised fully? Were there any incidents
8 that broke out which jeopardised or threatened the mission and its
9 members? I'm talking about the conduct of the police, the army, the
10 citizens in Kosovo and Metohija.
11 A. There were no incidents which would jeopardise the mission, and
12 the security forces abided by their obligation to guarantee their security
13 and safety until they withdrew in 1999 on the 20th of March. We
14 communicated with them, we had direct contacts on an everyday basis at the
15 headquarters in Pristina and in the regional centres and the coordination
16 centres. We had contacts through communication channels, we had special
17 links with them, and mobile telephones, PTT communications, et cetera.
18 Then during their activities in the border area we had communications with
19 them, and also we looked into the causes and consequences of incidents,
20 and we had cooperation with the mission with the anti-defence systems of
21 the Pristina Corps, and that is in accordance with NATO regulations.
22 Q. You brought a map here, which is in tab 6 and which shows where
23 parts of the mission were in Kosovo and Metohija.
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. What is shown on this map?
1 A. Perhaps it would be a good idea to have a look at it. Can I put
2 it here? What we see here now is the area of Kosovo and Metohija, and all
3 the organs of the Kosovo Verification Mission are depicted here as
4 organised in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. The headquarters of
5 the mission were in Pristina. They had coordination centres in the main
6 towns of various regions like Kosovo Mitrovica, Pec, Prizren, Gnjilane and
7 Pristina. Every Regional Centre covered a zone which was roughly like the
8 zone of the districts in Kosovo and Metohija. Then Glina, Djakovica,
9 Decani. Not to go into all of that, these are the black dots here. And
10 in every bigger town they had their offices or, rather, their forward
11 posts. You can see here that the entire territory of Kosovo and Metohija
12 was covered with organs of the Kosovo Verification Mission.
13 Q. On the next map or, rather, in tab 7, you have a diagram of
14 communication among the various teams. Chart of communications between
15 the teams and liaison officers of the 3rd Army in the OSCE mission. Can
16 you explain that, how it functioned?
17 A. This is a chart of communication between the teams and liaison
18 officers of the 3rd Army and the OSCE mission. We see the chain of
19 command. It went down the chain of command. In the general staff, we had
20 a team that liaised with the mission, and then the 3rd commander was in
21 Nis and they liaised.
22 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please be asked to slow down.
23 Thank you.
24 JUDGE ROBINSON: Colonel, the interpreters have once again asked
25 me to request that you speak more slowly. Apparently you're a fast
1 speaker, so you have to exercise some --
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have forgotten.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you. The command of the
5 Pristina Corps had a liaison office and I headed it. And then liaison
6 officers in garrisons were linked to that team. In Pristina, Kosovska
7 Mitrovica, Djakovica, Prizren, Urosevac, Gnjilane, and Pec.
8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Are these garrisons that were roughly at brigade level and
10 regiment level?
11 A. Yes. Regiment and brigade level. As for the team of the Pristina
12 Corps, it also included officers in commands of the border battalions;
13 23rd -- 53rd, 55th, and 57th, with its seats in Djakovica, the 53rd, the
14 55th was in Prizren, and the 57th in Urosevac.
15 Q. All right.
16 A. And the team of the Pristina Corps had constant communication with
17 the Verification Mission in Pristina. And the command of the 3rd Army did
18 the same thing, but from time to time. That is depicted by the arrows
19 here on the chart. And the Verification Mission in Pristina also had
20 different regional coordination centres that were in the seats of the
21 different districts. Pristina, Pec, Kosovska Mitrovica, Prizren, and
22 Gnjilane. I've already indicated that on the map.
23 These regional coordination centres can be seen on this map. That
24 is a good thing. In order to understand better how well spread out the
25 mission was, they had different groups for weapons and for other
1 activities. They also had inspection teams for inspecting military bases
2 and arms; 23 at that. Then teams for monitoring interior borders, from 12
3 to 15. Investigation teams for investigating incidents and cease-fire
4 violations. A verification group for border operations, and teams for
5 monitoring the border with Albania and Macedonia.
6 As for the chain of command, the team of the Pristina Corps was
7 linked to the team of the 3rd Army, and the team of the 3rd Army to the
8 General Staff of the army of Yugoslavia and Belgrade. The team of the
9 General Staff for liaison with missions in Belgrade liaised with the OSCE
10 liaison office in Belgrade. That is again shown with these arrows.
11 Q. I hope that you have now fully explained the structure and
12 organisation of the Verification Mission and your relations with them.
13 Tell me, what was the cooperation with the mission like?
14 A. The cooperation with the mission, well, first and foremost, my
15 relations with the mission were based on mutual respect and confidence. I
16 considered them to be full partners in order to achieve a full democratic
17 solution on the basis of the full equality of all citizens in Kosovo and
18 Metohija. We had some misunderstandings in interpreting some agreements
19 and in other matters, but I think that on our part all the contacts were
20 very correct and they never went outside this particular framework.
21 Q. The framework of --
22 A. Correctness.
23 Q. And good relations.
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And tell me, how did the verifiers behave when meeting up with the
2 A. The verifiers behaved correctly to a large extent, and there was
3 also some behaviour when there was a bit of provocation involved, a bit of
4 lack of understanding, especially when they wanted to enter the border
5 areas unannounced, enter barracks and see units that were in this area.
6 Then there were some provocative questions, like, "What are you doing
7 there? There is no place for you here. Can your commander not talk to
8 us?" Then they tried to enter some unit premises by force, by removing
9 barriers. Cases like that. That's what happened during the stay of the
10 mission in Kosovo and Metohija.
11 Q. What you said just now, does that mean that they were always
12 announced when they would come, or was that not always the case?
13 A. That was not always the case, and that is why often such things
14 happened. Well, small incidents.
15 Q. According to the established organisation, did you have some kind
16 of agreement on this, how you should communicate, how they should be
17 announced in order for them to carry out their obligations?
18 A. As early as the first meeting we had with them, we explained the
19 structure of our organs existing in Kosovo and Metohija with a view to
20 carrying out this agreement, and also in terms of their relationship, both
21 with their centres on the ground and also our own liaison officers. Also,
22 our team and the Pristina Corps liaised with the mission in Pristina
23 itself. We agreed that all contacts that should take place in this area
24 would have to be announced 24 hours in advance.
25 In the beginning, this was not really observed, because they had a
1 very rigid method, a very aggressive, arrogant method in terms of their
2 approach. Quite simply, they ignored this agreement. The moment when
3 they stopped behaving that way, our cooperation became far more efficient
4 and better.
5 Q. You had daily meetings with the verifiers. What were the items on
6 the agenda of these meetings and what kind of problems did you encounter
7 and did you manage to resolve them?
8 A. Everything that happened in the territory of Kosovo and Metohija
9 was on the agenda of our daily meetings. All incidents, all situations
10 that cropped up that required explanations, all requests that the
11 verifiers had with a view to controlling units and visiting them were
12 discussed at these meetings. And we managed to resolve practically all of
13 these questions.
14 Q. Who attended these daily meetings?
15 A. These daily meetings that we had with the representatives of the
16 OSCE mission were always attended by someone from the team who took the
17 minutes, or in Pristina we also had an office of the Ministry for Foreign
18 Affairs, the federal ministry, numbering nine to 11 people. So sometimes
19 there would be a person from the Foreign Ministry who would be taking the
20 minutes, and also there would be an interpreter.
21 Q. What was the situation like in relation to the verifiers entering
22 the border area? What was the position of the verifiers? What did they
23 ask from you and what was the agreement like in this respect?
24 A. In accordance with the agreement between the Federal Republic of
25 Yugoslavia and the OSCE, the border units remained in the border area in
1 order to secure the state border, as well as all units that were providing
2 in-depth security of the state border, and they stayed in place.
3 The border area was expanded by about five kilometres, and all
4 these forces, the border forces and the in-depth security units were in
5 this border belt. In this border belt there is a special regimen which
6 was regulated by the rules of border service. Since all units in the
7 border area are armed and have ammunition, this is probably the only
8 peacetime task that is carried out in combat conditions. That is why it
9 is very important to protect the safety and security of people, of the
10 population there or the verifiers - we're discussing the verifiers now.
11 It was very important not to go in unannounced or without a liaison
13 Q. All right. Was the only request from your side that a liaison
14 officer be present when they enter the border area?
15 A. That was our only request, for the sake of the safety of the
16 verifiers so that their mission or their request that had to do with the
17 population or inspecting the border units, all the things that they were
18 entitled to. We just wanted them to be announced, and this could only be
19 carried out through a liaison officer.
20 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, where is this evidence taking us?
21 How does it relate to the charges in the indictment? I can see the
22 relevance of -- of it to a certain degree, but it's not clear to me why we
23 need to spend so much time on the Verification Mission.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, because the Verification
25 Mission played a certain role in preparing the war against Yugoslavia, and
1 I want this to be shown through the testimony of the man who headed the
2 Pristina Corps team and who cooperated with them.
3 Secondly, several members of the Verification Mission testified
4 here, and I'm going to ask him about the claims they made during the
5 course of giving evidence here.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's what I'd like to hear, because I think we
7 have had enough background information on the work of the Verification
8 Mission. So if you would proceed to that part of the evidence, I think
9 that would be more helpful.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I'll move through this
11 very quickly and get to that part.
12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Colonel Kotur, here's a question for you, a general question: Was
14 the Verification Mission objective? Do you think that they reported as
15 things really happened?
16 A. I could not be sure that the mission was objective in its
17 reporting. When taking into account the complete work of the mission, the
18 overall work of the mission, and where they spent a lot of their time, I
19 came to the conclusion that they were not always fair and correct and that
20 they did not only have that intention, to verify what happened, but they
21 also tried to get us into some kind of parallel relations or, rather,
22 relations between the KLA and the military. They wanted to turn us into
23 partners in all of this. And this attitude towards the so-called Kosovo
24 Liberation Army, they were very benevolent towards them. So when I take
25 all of this into account, especially some events like Racak and some
1 others, I could not claim that -- that their reporting was quite truthful,
2 fully truthful.
3 Q. All right. Let's put it this way: Roughly we have three
4 protagonists here: You have the Verification Mission, you have the KLA,
5 and our organs. What was your conclusion on the relations that were
6 established there within that triangle?
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, why is the Verification Mission
8 described as a protagonist? Will his evidence substantiate that?
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, quite simply, it is one of the
10 protagonists, one of the entities that was active in Kosovo and Metohija
11 at the time, and it has relations with our authorities, as was originally
12 envisaged, but then they established some relations with the KLA as well.
13 I'm asking Colonel Kotur to give us his observations in relation to these
14 relations. It really exists. I imagine that there is no need to prove
15 that, that the mission exists, that it works, that there is an agreement
16 on the basis of which it is supposed to operate, and now let us see how it
17 operates in relation to the agreement and what --
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Very well. Let the colonel answer.
19 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The attitude of the mission towards
20 the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army was a rather benevolent one, if I am
21 to put it in a single sentence. They had their representative, their
22 permanent representative in the headquarters of the so-called Kosovo
23 Liberation Army, and often their statements and their requests were fully
24 being taken into account without any kind of verification or double
25 checking, whereas our side always had to prove that they had not done
1 something or that they had done something if that was the case. Their
2 interpretation was that the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army was not
3 sufficiently organised and was not under a single command, and that it
4 lacks discipline and that, therefore, the requirements of them could not
5 be like those from us. That would be it in a nutshell.
6 Q. All right. As far as general questions go, I'll ask you one
7 concerning the attitude and the conduct of the Kosovo Verification
8 Mission. Could you tell us briefly what misunderstandings existed with
9 the KVM regarding the interpretation of the agreement concerning their
10 mandate and especially the methods of their work, as briefly you can.
11 A. They believed, as far as methods of work are concerned, that they
12 have an unlimited choice of methods available to them, as well as
13 unlimited freedom of movement. Nobody contested their freedom of
14 movement. There were only restrictions regarding the border belt.
15 As for the method they chose, and that was the right to inspect
16 any unit they chose, units armed with 12.7-millimetre calibre weapons
17 upwards, they thought they were entitled to enter into installation,
18 inspect any unit, and use their technology to determine the exact location
19 of every feature, every installation.
20 According to our interpretation of our agreement with the OSCE, we
21 did not think that they were entitled to do that, and that was one of the
22 misunderstandings we had.
23 Q. To save time, I don't want to go through all the documents
24 contained in these two binders, but let me ask you: Can we find in either
25 of them any document reflecting that our side did not comply with its
1 obligations or that something was not consistent with our agreement with
2 the OSCE? Because KVM conducted many inspections. Did they find during
3 their inspections of our weaponry anything that was inconsistent with the
4 agreement concerning weapons?
5 A. No, they did not find any cases of non-compliance. For instance,
6 until the 27th, at 1200 hours, the Pristina Corps was under obligation to
7 withdraw -- to withdraw all its forces in the spirit of the agreement, and
8 before the Kosovo Verification Mission arrived, their job was done by the
9 KDOM, which was a diplomatic mission formed jointly by many embassies.
10 And in the month of November, they covered all our units to the maximum -
11 all barracks, all the units deployed - and they determined that we had
12 fully complied with the agreement. And we continued to comply with that
13 agreement until the termination of the mandate of the mission. And even
14 when we undertook certain measures, we were entitled to do so in terms of
15 security of our units and the territory.
16 Q. Why was the KVM withdrawn from the SFRY?
17 A. It was withdrawn on the 20th of March, 1999, in order for the
18 bombing of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia to begin.
19 Q. Now, regarding their conduct towards the KLA - you mentioned it
20 briefly - what was the condition of the KLA before the arrival of the
21 Kosovo Verification Mission?
22 A. Well, that was an organisation that was completely broken,
23 crushed. In end September it did no longer represent a force. They had
24 limited territories under their control. All communications, all the
25 roads were free for traffic. And on the 29th of September, we analysed
1 all the operations we had undertaken against terrorist groups, and we had
2 established that they were completely successful.
3 Q. Now, tell me, what was their situation, the situation of the KLA
4 after the arrival of the KVM?
5 A. Well, they began to be revived a little, to return to the areas
6 they had held before they were crushed, and even conquer new areas that
7 they had not held. Before 1998, they began to recruit new troops, to
8 conduct more intensive training, to organise themselves better.
9 In logistical terms, it advanced and even obtained some
10 anti-aircraft weapons.
11 Q. And what was the attitude of the mission to such developments
12 within the KLA?
13 A. The view of the mission was completely benevolent, especially
14 since they had a standing representative in the staff of the KLA and they
15 were completely aware of everything that was going on, but they didn't
16 take any steps to stop it. However, in cases where we had to react to
17 such developments, they would say, "Please don't. This would irritate
18 them. Withdraw," et cetera.
19 Q. Who were the victims of KLA attacks?
20 A. Primarily their unloyal citizens whom they deemed to be
21 insufficiently patriotic. Secondly, Serbs, who were kidnapped. Also the
22 police and the army. Everything that represented the state and the state
23 authorities in Kosovo and Metohija was a target of attack.
24 Q. Where did equipment for the KLA arrive from, and where did KLA
25 members go for training?
1 A. They got most of their weapons in 1997. After the break-up of
2 state authorities in the Republic of Albania and after mass robberies of
3 their arms depots, the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army armed itself well.
4 Other routes for smuggling weapons went through Albania towards Kosovo.
5 We managed to intercept trailers coming from Croatia as well.
6 Q. Tell me, please, did our side - because you led our team - did our
7 side inform the KVM of all important events and incidents?
8 A. We reported to the mission on a daily basis about all important
9 events on the territory of Kosovo and Metohija. We had a regular
10 compulsory daily contact at 1000 hours, but we also had many other
11 contacts during the day, and we reported all important things to them.
12 Q. You said that one of the points of the agreement to -- one of the
13 points of the agreement was to reduce our forces to the level required.
14 How was that determined, that level?
15 A. Well, through KDOM there was a diplomatic mission that was formed
16 by embassies of the US, France, Canada, and other countries. That KDOM
17 later blended with the Verification Mission in Kosovo and Metohija. Only
18 one segment of the KDOM, the American segment, did not blend with the
19 mission. They verified the previous stage or, rather, our compliance at
20 the previous stage, and all other components of the KDOM apart from the
21 American one blended with the KVM.
22 Q. So they established that there was no integration?
23 A. Correct.
24 Q. Were there any misunderstandings with the KVM mission concerning
25 exits and movements of our troops from barracks?
1 A. We were under obligation to report all movements the size of a
2 company and upwards, everything that came into Kosovo or left Kosovo, and
3 we reported all that ourselves. And all misunderstandings and problems
4 that occurred occurred in December when we received a new batch of young
5 soldiers in December, and we had to train them because we cannot -- we
6 could not train them within the barracks. And you have to know that our
7 army does not consist of professional soldiers but of conscripts.
8 So every time our troops left the barracks for training caused a
9 problem with the Verification Mission, although in prior negotiations they
10 had said, "Yes, we understand that you have to train your soldiers, but
11 you are irritating the KLA, they will attack, you will return fire, and
12 there will be a conflict." That was the reaction of the mission.
13 Q. What about our security forces? I mean both the army and the
14 police. Did they react to provocation or would they be the first to
15 provoke and attack the KLA?
16 A. Well, if you took those daily reports and looked at them, you
17 would see that the army or the police of Yugoslavia never caused a
18 problem. They never fired first. They only undertook such action as was
19 necessary to protect their forces.
20 Q. While you were there, what was the approach of the authorities - I
21 mean not only the army and the police but also the state authorities -
22 towards the Albanian population?
23 A. There was no discrimination. The Albanian population was treated
24 equally with the other population.
25 Q. In tabs 16 to 19, you have reports on the cooperation with the
1 mission for October 1998. Can we find in these reports any incidents
2 wherein our side did not comply with its obligations?
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, I don't think we have
4 to go document-by-document because that would take a lot of time. These
5 reports are daily, weekly, and regular reports.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] If we take one regular weekly report
7 written on the 29th October, 1998, and it was written by the head of the
8 liaison team from the 3rd Army command.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...
10 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That is tab number 7.
11 MR. KAY: 17.
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, 17, 17. These reports always
13 followed a uniform pattern. Item 1 was always movements by units of
14 company strength and above. That sort of thing was reported daily to the
15 OSCE mission. I don't want to read it here, but you can see it in every
17 Item 2 of such report would deal with incidents involving members
18 of army units and measures undertaken against the members of the VJ
19 involved in the incidents, as well as observations on activities by the
20 OSCE missions and its members.
21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Are these the headings of these three items that were reflected in
23 every report; movements, incidents, and observations?
24 A. Yes, along with other activities. But these would be the three
25 main points that would be listed in every report and reported daily --
1 both on a daily and weekly basis. You can see -- in fact, I'm not going
2 to read item 1, I'm going to read item 3. "On the 27th of October, in the
3 barracks in Urosevac, a diplomatic-military mission visited. The team
4 visited areas where the MC-243 had been deployed; Stimlje, Dulje, and
5 Birac. And the mission did not have any objections. Also,
6 representatives of another KDOM mission toured other areas - Dulje,
7 Doganovici, Grncar - also without any remarks or comments." This reflects
8 the conduct of our forces and the fact that they were reduced to the
9 levels of February 1998.
10 On the 27th, the mission visited Kosovski Junaci barracks and had
11 no particular remarks.
12 On the 28th, we also see that one team visited, consisting of
13 three US officers. They visited barracks in Djakovica, and since they
14 were unannounced, they did not have authorisation to inspect the barracks.
15 You can see that from 9.30 to 1200 hours the same team visited the 52nd
16 Mixed Artillery Brigade and inspected the artillery weapons in the Vranje
17 garrison in compliance with the Dayton agreement. They also had no
18 objections to our compliance.
19 It was stipulated strictly how much artillery and other offensive
20 weaponry every barracks was allowed to have, and we had to report to the
21 office in Vienna the exact deployment of our forces and equipment. If a
22 piece of equipment was being repaired, we had to report that to the office
23 in Vienna, as well as the date when it was returned to the unit.
24 Q. Tell me, during these inspections, was there a single irregularity
25 that was found during the entire tenure of the KVM?
1 A. No, not a single irregularity, although you can see on page 3 in
2 paragraph 1 that a team inspected combat equipment in Vucitrn barracks,
3 and that starting at 8.40, ending with 10.40 hours, the same team checked
4 the combat equipment in Kosovska Mitrovica garrison. The team had an
5 exact map and details of the deployment of the 125th Motorised Brigade and
6 strategic war reserves in the brigade's zone of responsibility. They also
7 had information about the organisation and establishment structure and
8 numerical strength of the brigade's combat equipment.
9 This was no exception. They had all this information about every
10 unit of the army of Yugoslavia. There was no problem in inspection. And
11 after such a complete inspection and preparation, they did not have any
12 remarks or objections to the way we were complying with the agreement.
13 Q. Thank you, Colonel. Now, you have here in tabs 19 to 39 once
14 again reports which relate to November. Are they all your own reports in
16 A. Yes, they are. This is a team or, rather, this was a report
17 written by the team of the 3rd Army, but not single point written by them
18 here were they able to write unless they received it from me. So it was a
19 team from the Pristina Corps that wrote these reports, but they were a
20 sort of service which sent it on to the General Staff in order to comply.
21 At the beginning we tried to comply that chain of command, upwards and
23 Q. Thank you. Now from, 19 to 39, tabs 19 to 39, we have -- they all
24 contain reports written in November 1998. Do we need to dwell on any one
25 of them as being characteristic, a characteristic event, or are they
1 reports which confirm the regularity on the part -- of conduct on the part
2 of our side, or irregularities perhaps?
3 A. Well, you're not going to find any irregularities on our part in
4 these reports. All the reports merely confirm the things we did and how
5 we complied with the agreements that we were duty-bound to do. So in
6 these reports you will see that controls had already started within the
7 border belt in the units on the territory, and we lodged a protest with
8 the SMIP in Pristina and requested that this should not be done in that
9 way but that this should be announced in advantages, as stipulated by the
10 agreement, because they were unannounced.
11 Q. All right. Now, in these unannounced visits, were they able to
12 establish any irregularities on our part at all?
13 A. No. There were no irregularities. The only thing was that they
14 weren't able to enter the border belt and control the units. All they
15 would say was, "You're not announced. We haven't received announcements
16 from the liaison officer, so go to the garrison, contact the liaison
17 officer, and once he grants you permission, you'll be able to visit."
18 Q. Now, why was this insisted upon? Why did they have to contact the
19 liaison officer? Of course, there's the general explanation why a liaison
20 officer exists at all in the first place, but why was strict adherence to
21 this required?
22 A. Well, we never knew who could enter. Anybody could take an OSCE
23 vehicle and enter and say they were verifiers and enter the border belt.
24 They could say, "I want to control the area, to check out the area." So
25 soldiers on the ground didn't know who the verifiers were. They didn't
1 know who their leaders were. They were just regular soldiers doing their
2 military service. They weren't professional soldiers, they were civilians
3 trained for a period of five months, plus an extra period of four months
4 in which they did their military service, so they weren't well-versed in
5 affairs of that kind. They couldn't determine themselves or make
6 decisions themselves and check and verify to see whether they were actual
7 members of the Verification Mission or whether anybody had taken the car
8 over, put on a badge, and come to control them. So that was something
9 that was not allowed. And in fact I don't know any other place where this
10 would have been allowed without authorisation and permission and control,
11 without you being held by someone there and said, "There you have it, go
12 ahead." And if there were any misunderstandings, then somebody would have
13 to mediate, and that was the liaison officer. He was best placed, he knew
14 what had to be done and had the authorisation and power to do things like
16 Q. All right. Now, were your units informed that in any situation
17 the mission would be -- or members of the mission would be escorted by a
18 liaison officer?
19 A. That's the information that they received, that's what they had
20 been prepared for, and so they saw that these conditions were complied
22 Q. Let's take a given situation. They came to a barracks. There
23 would be a guard on duty, a soldier on duty in front of the barracks.
24 Now, did that soldier have any information about the Verification Mission
25 and how to behave towards members of the Verification Mission?
1 A. The soldier on duty was there to guard the barracks. He was -- if
2 he didn't -- he didn't have any information about who he was to let
3 through or not, and foreigners could not be allowed to explain that to
4 him. For example, when General Drewienkiewicz arrived, he started to
5 apply this kind of method: He arrived at the barracks and said, "I want
6 to go into the barracks and conduct an inspection." "Now, who gave you
7 permission to do so?" He would say, "I have the right to do so, and I
8 wish to do so." Now, the guard would not let him in, and then the officer
9 on duty would have to react. He didn't know what it was all about. And
10 then he would park his vehicle in Pristina at the entrance to the barracks
11 and wouldn't leave for 15 minutes.
12 So the officer on duty said, "Would you please move your vehicle
13 because there's a problem with entrance into the barrack." And he would
14 say, "There's no sign saying that." And then he would have a cup of
15 coffee and keep his vehicle parked in front of the entrance to the
17 Later on this would happen in Prizren. He would film the
18 barracks, he would say, "I want to conduct an inspection in the barracks."
19 The barracks would see what they -- what he wants, and they would say,
20 "Well, I don't have permission, authorisation to let you in." The Dayton
21 Accord specifically stated who was in charge and who was allowed to do
22 what and issue what authorisation, permission. So authorisation and
23 permission would be granted for the border belt and not the facilities and
24 barracks, equipment, and materiel, and so on and so forth, control of the
25 units. So this would not be allowed. No control and inspection within
1 the barracks. Although this was up to the brigade command.
2 So this kind of conduct, which was very problematic, wouldn't be
3 allowed. The soldier knew -- on duty knew he wasn't able to allow anybody
4 to enter.
5 Q. But he could allow somebody to enter if he had permission from his
6 superior officer; is that right?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And were there any problems when there were regular procedures,
9 when the liaison officer was present and inspection had to take place?
10 A. Never. When the liaison officer was present, you could always
11 enter all the border belts, all the units on the territory, but just not
12 into the barracks because, pursuant to the agreement, they did not have
13 the right to inspect units within the barracks.
14 Q. All right. Fine. Now, let's have a look at tabs 40 to 48. Once
15 again, they are all reports relating to the month of December. Now, in
16 those reports can we find any irregularities anywhere, or perhaps - how
17 shall I put this? - any problems that might have occurred which our organs
18 would were not able to settle in cooperation with the OSCE?
19 A. This tab verifies events taking place in December. From the 1st
20 of December to the end of December. In these daily reports, from tab 40,
21 it says, for example, under point 2, Incidents, it says: "On the 1st of
22 December, at about 1000 hours, in the sector of the combat group 549/4 in
23 the village of Zjum, an OSCE mission jeep with licence plates stopped and
24 two persons came out. They videotaped the disposition of the Combat
25 Group's tanks. They stayed ten minutes and then set off in the direction
1 of Dragas." Filming wasn't allowed of the units on the territory and in
2 the barracks, which is what they did on that particular day.
3 Now, on the 1st of December, a contact between the OSCE mission
4 and the liaison officer of the 53rd Border Battalion, which had been
5 arranged so that the incident that had taken place at the Likane border
6 post on the 28th of November, 1999, could be verified, was not
7 established. The contact did not take place.
8 I think that this -- at this incident at the Likane border post
9 somebody was killed who tried to enter Kosovo and Metohija from Albania.
10 A terrorist attempt. A terrorist attempted to enter.
11 Q. These are your daily reports and weekly reports; is that right,
13 A. Yes, that's right.
14 Q. Now, do they contain information about what actually happened with
15 respect to the subject matter you're explaining to us?
16 A. Yes. They contain all the information on the subjects I went
18 Q. Can we find any irregularities there on our side and how they
19 cooperated with the OSCE, with the Verification Mission?
20 A. No.
21 Q. All right. Fine. Now, we have here a large number of daily
22 reports which have already been tendered as exhibits during General
23 Delic's testimony, and they are reports which relate to 1999 alone. And
24 they're numbered -- they have been assigned numbers because they're not
25 new tabs. Now, in these reports -- and I'm mentioning them here because
1 they are your own documents and they were tendered and admitted when
2 General Delic testified. Now these reports 1 to 30, do they contain
3 anything which could represent any form of irregularity at all vis-a-vis
4 the Verification Mission or obligations taken on by our side at all?
5 A. As for these reports, all we can say is that from them we can see
6 our relationship and attitude towards the verifiers, what the verifiers'
7 attitude was towards us and towards certain events. Perhaps -- or,
8 rather, there were different interpretations of certain events, but no
9 irregularities on our part were visible here in these reports.
10 Q. And that relates to January. Now, in 31 to 51, tabs 31 to 51, we
11 have the February reports that were also presented during General Delic's
12 testimony. They are also your reports, are they?
13 A. Yes, they are.
14 Q. Now, in those reports and for that period of time and taking them
15 all together, could you point out any deviations at all or
16 incompatibilities between our -- the conduct on the part of our organs and
17 what was stipulated in the agreement?
18 A. I would just like to indicate one problem that took place. The
19 greatest problem of deviation from that, not on our part but it was the
20 Verification Mission, was when the event of Racak took place. We had an
21 agreement with the verifiers by which if any incident should break out or
22 any event should take place, that they should not -- nobody should go
23 public until the facts of the matter had been established beforehand.
24 Now, for the first time the verifiers were very blatant in their
25 actions. Without previously checking out the situation, they went to the
1 media, informed them about Racak, about an alleged massacre against
2 innocent civilians having been conducted and perpetrated by the forces of
3 the MUP and army of Yugoslavia. And you could find something relating to
4 that in the January reports and our contacts with them in that matter.
5 MR. NICE: Your Honour, I'm a little concerned about the exhibit
6 position. I've got a schedule provided by the accused, and so far as I
7 can see, 31 to 51 are not 1999 documents. Maybe I've got a different
8 document than any document the Court has.
9 JUDGE KWON: I think he has a separate list for those that have
10 been admitted already.
11 MR. NICE: It may well be, but if he --
12 JUDGE KWON: I was looking for it but I couldn't find.
13 MR. NICE: If he is assuming that we are on notice as to the
14 documents he's going to be speaking about and we would have retrieved them
15 in some way and considered them, the answer is at the moment we haven't
16 done that because, unless we've missed the document, we haven't been on
17 notice to do so.
18 JUDGE KWON: And also as for documents which would refer to the
19 events in December 1998, although the transcript says that it's from tab
20 40 to 48, I would assume it should be from tab 40 to tab 68.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, what do you have to say about
22 these administrative matters?
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'm talking about documents
24 now that were presented during the testimony of General Delic, and they
25 were just assigned numbers and were not put into tabs because they had
1 already been tendered into evidence as exhibits. So we have documents, a
2 set of documents for January, from the 1st of January until the 31st of
3 January, and those are the numbers 1 to 31. Then we have documents for
4 February also introduced during the testimony of General Delic. And
5 finally, the documents for March with numbers which relate to the
6 Verification Mission until it left.
7 JUDGE KWON: At least you should identify the numbers in order for
8 the Chamber to look at those documents later on.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. Now, I'll tell you
10 straight away --
11 JUDGE KWON: And we don't have that copy of that document at this
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. From 1 to 30. 1 is
14 D300, tab 262, and you have that in the list. Number 2, which was
15 provided during the testimony of General Delic, is Exhibit 300, tab 263,
16 and so on. Number 3 is D300, tab 264, and onwards in that same order. So
17 you have each of these exhibits identified and tendered.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... what you're
19 referring to. That's not before us.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. Well, then that is my
21 mistake, but I'm telling you what they're about. So I'm referring to
22 documents 1 to 31. All of them come under D300, ranging from numbers two
23 hundred and -- number 1 is 262, number 2 is 263, and so on and so forth
24 until number 31. All that comes under D300. And the same refers and
25 applies to the other group of documents, documents that have been marked
1 for identification and presented here during General Delic's testimony.
2 May I be allowed to continue now, please?
3 MR. KAY: D300, 262 to 292 have been previously admitted, we
4 think, from our records as we've just looked at it.
5 JUDGE KWON: He doesn't have to spend time for what has already
6 been admitted.
7 MR. KAY: No. I think that's where the confusion arises in
8 calling it 1 to 30.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, submit what you have to the
10 Registry so that we can have copies made.
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well. I shall do that,
12 Mr. Robinson. But as I say, as the documents have been admitted, I'm just
13 going through them because we have here testimony by the author of the
14 documents themselves, and he is here to indicate their main
15 characteristics, taking them always a collective body of documents. And
16 if there are any incidents, then he is here to draw our attention to them.
17 That is why I'm not going into them in detail, because we've already been
18 through that.
19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. But I should now like to dwell on just one matter, Colonel,
21 something that you raised when you said that there were problems with
22 respect to the incident in Racak. And in the meantime I have received --
23 or, rather, I was found the document by Professor Rakic amongst these
24 other documents that Mr. Nice's service had at their disposal. Since I
25 haven't had the time to make copies of this document, I hope that it has
1 already -- or they have already been introduced into evidence. And what
2 we're looking at now is a document dated the 16th of January, 1999, the
3 Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the group for cooperation with the
4 OSCE mission, and it is a conversation between General Dusan Loncar,
5 leader of the coordination team of the federal government for Kosovo and
6 Metohija, with General Drewienkiewicz, the deputy head of OSCE mission.
7 Do you have that document with you? We handed over the document,
8 on the last day, albeit, but we did hand it over during the preparations.
9 A. Yes, I found it.
10 Q. Please, since this is a record of that meeting between General
11 Loncar and General Drewienkiewicz --
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: What is the exhibit number of that,
13 Mr. Milosevic?
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Unfortunately, I don't know. 39130
15 are the last numbers, and then there is one that's erased. Maybe it's
16 number 1. It says Exhibit, but it's not clear.
17 MR. NICE: I suspect it may be Exhibit 94, tab 28. And if the
18 Chamber has brought its file of Racak documents, if I'm right about that
19 it will be number 11. I'll check to see if it is number 11, and if my
20 copy is unmarked, I can make it available for the overhead projector.
21 Yes, that would appear to be the document. Providing I can have it back,
22 I can lay this one on the overhead projector.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice.
24 MR. NICE: Mr. Nort, please. There is one mark but it's
25 irrelevant. It's a highlight is all.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Is the English text now on the ELMO?
2 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
3 Q. Judging by the first words, it should be identical. I'm not going
4 to dwell on the first page. Colonel, could you please take a look at the
5 second page of the document. On the second page, third paragraph. The
6 third paragraph. It says: "General Drewienkiewicz next demanded from
7 General Loncar that the Stimlje operation be dealt with. That is the main
8 reason why he came."
9 Could you read on.
10 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note that it's not on the ELMO.
11 MR. NICE: Could we find the correct place in the English, please.
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. I think it's there now.
13 MR. NICE: No. That's about Decani.
14 JUDGE KWON: -- Decani. It's Stimlje.
15 MR. NICE: If Mr. Nort hands it to me, I'll try and find it.
16 Thank you very much.
17 Well, Your Honours, it should be -- it should be the passage I
18 think we've been looking at where there is reference to Decani, because by
19 my calculation -- okay. Found it. Thank you to Ms. Dicklich.
20 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think there is no mention of
21 Decani over here, but never mind. I assume it's the same document.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Well, Decani is on the document in front of us.
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.
24 MR. NICE: In the middle of the screen we can see "Stimlje."
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.
1 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
2 Q. Could you read this paragraph, please. "He said that he had --"
3 A. "He said that he had information indicating that over 30 civilians
4 were killed there, among them a large number of 8-year-old children, women
5 and elderly. He informed General Loncar that both he and Walker, along
6 with a large number of journalists, would go to the scene as soon as the
7 meeting was over and that they would inform the OSCE, the international
8 community, about all of this. He threatened or, rather, he warned that
9 this would be 'very bad for our side.'"
10 Q. Pause there. Do you know about what happened on that day?
11 A. Yes. I was present at that meeting during that conversation, but
12 I just want to say that General Drewienkiewicz called me as early as the
13 15th, on the evening of the 15th, around 2300 hours, 2330 hours; it was
14 almost midnight. He phoned me, and he asked me about the action in Racak.
15 I explained to him that what I knew was that this was an anti-terrorist
16 action carried out by the MUP. He said then that his first information
17 was that there were a few dead, five or six dead, and the same number of
18 wounded persons, but he did not talk to me about women, children, et
19 cetera. So that's the evening of the 15th.
20 The next day, in the morning, I maintained communication with him
21 from my office, which was at the Federal Executive Council of Kosovo and
22 Metohija, and General Loncar's office was right next to mine. He told me,
23 "You committed a massacre in Racak. You killed women and children.
24 Walker and I are going there with journalists in order to disclose this to
25 the world."
1 I asked him not to act abruptly. Let us all stick to our
2 agreement. The investigation authorities should investigate the matter,
3 with the participation of the Kosovo Verification Mission, and then when
4 we see how things stand, then we could come out in public.
5 He replied to me then that Mr. Walker had already left for Racak
6 with journalists and that he was already there. He requested a meeting
7 with General Loncar. We agreed on that meeting. We scheduled it. As far
8 as I can remember, around midday, 11.30. It wasn't midday yet, but say
9 around 11.30.
10 General Drewienkiewicz, when this meeting took place - this is the
11 record of that meeting - the record was made by a person from the Ministry
12 of Foreign Affairs. I see the signature here Radenko Simic, whereas the
13 information note itself was signed by Mr. Slana, who was head of the
14 foreign ministry office there.
15 What General Drewienkiewicz said was fully described, and I've
16 already read out this paragraph to you, that over 30 civilians were killed
17 there, whereas the largest number of these civilians were 8-year-old
18 children, women, and the elderly.
19 Q. Colonel, there is something illogical here now. He says that he
20 told General Loncar that Walker and he, with a large number of
21 journalists, immediately at the end of this meeting would go to the scene,
22 whereas you say that as he was scheduling this meeting in the telephone
23 conversation with you, he said that Walker had already set out and that he
24 was on his way to the scene. So these two do not match. What's it all
1 A. What he said here does not correspond to that but the truth is
2 what I stated a few moments ago. During the telephone conversation, I was
3 told that he and Walker would go there with journalists, and when I told
4 him they should wait, he told me that Walker had already left. When he
5 came to the meeting, he said that he and Walker would go after this
6 meeting, that they would go there.
7 Q. What was the truth?
8 A. The truth was that Walker was already there. This meeting went on
9 for about an hour or an hour and a half, so we ended it about 1300 hours,
10 whereas Walker, on the 16th, by 1300 hours was already there with some KLA
11 commanders, talking to them. He was in Racak. That is the information we
12 had. And it's illogical that at 1300 hours Walker could have been in
14 Q. All right.
15 A. This can easily be established on the basis of his movements on
16 the 16th.
17 Q. All right.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, it's time for the break. We will
19 adjourn for 20 minutes.
20 --- Recess taken at 10.31 a.m.
21 --- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, please continue, Mr. Milosevic.
23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. Colonel, could you please now look at the bottom of the second
25 page, the last paragraph -- or, rather, the one but last. It's a biggish
1 paragraph. This is a record of what General Loncar said. Could you
2 please read out what it says. "Further on, he pointed out that in all
3 movements of the army and the MUP --" what does it say here?
4 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone for the witness, please,
5 interpreter's note.
6 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
7 Q. The one but last paragraph on page 2. "Loncar expresses protest
8 because of General Drewienkiewicz's statement."
9 A. "Loncar expressed protest over General Drewienkiewicz's statement
10 that he did not know who shot first, emphasising that this is highly
12 Q. Let's just pause there. What's this all about?
13 A. On the 15th of January, near Rznic, two verifiers were wounded.
14 And on the 16th of January, a motor vehicle from Regional Centre 1 -
15 that's Prizren - was shot at. There was a bullet that was fired at it.
16 The so-called Kosovo Liberation Army intentionally shot at the verifiers,
17 and that proved to be true later on. We knew that straight away. When we
18 first met, that's what he said, because Mr. Ciaglinski, he said it. He
19 knew about it because it was one of his verifiers that was in the vehicle
20 and who was wounded, and he knew exactly who shot at him.
21 That's what I said at the very outset. The problem was whenever
22 there was an incident, especially when General Drewienkiewicz was
23 concerned, he always suspected our side of having done something and we
24 always had to prove that we didn't do it. The KLA commanders themselves
25 admitted they did that. That's what Mr. Ciaglinski stated too.
1 Their assessment was that this was done intentionally, on purpose,
2 because the KLA commander for Jablanica noted that they should not follow
3 police and army vehicles, especially in areas that were under their
4 control. And I can tell you that from the 15th of January onwards,
5 verifiers teams were no longer following the movements of the army and the
6 MUP when they went through the territory that was the control under the --
7 under the control of the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army, and that's why
8 Mr. Loncar said to Drewienkiewicz that what he said was unfair, because it
9 is known very well who shot at the verifiers and why.
10 Q. You were present at the meeting?
11 A. Yes, I was.
12 Q. What was Drewienkiewicz's reaction to Loncar's protest over the
13 fact that he said that he did not know although it was known that the
14 members of the KLA did it?
15 A. No, he did not react. He stuck to what he said originally, and
16 especially at this meeting. He was very angry. He came very angry and
17 aggressive. And it says here in the record that he didn't even want to
18 have a cup of coffee. And that is the polite way to behave in our parts,
19 to have a cup of coffee when you first meet up. He didn't want to have
20 coffee with us because he was so angry over what had happened in Racak.
21 That is what he stated. Later on, he calmed down a bit. Towards the end
22 he wasn't that arrogant, but he stuck to his original position, although
23 later on that proved to be the wrong position and incorrect.
24 Q. And what does it say further on? What does Loncar say?
25 A. He pointed out that, as they had told him earlier on, the action
1 was carried out in order to apprehend the terrorists who had killed a
2 policeman, and since they encountered well-prepared resistance, well
3 prepared by the terrorists, he pointed out that they had been informed
4 about our intentions.
5 Q. What about the sentence that you omitted? "He further pointed
6 out --" You did not read that. What was that?
7 A. "He pointed out further that the KVM was informed about all
8 movements of Yugoslavia army and MUP units and that this was the case
9 relating to operations -- activities, rather, around Stimlje."
10 Q. What can be seen on the basis of what Loncar is saying?
11 A. What can be seen here and also on the basis of our reports was
12 that we reported daily on what was going on, and that also pertains to the
13 Stimlje action.
14 Q. So Loncar pointed out that you always informed them in a timely
15 fashion and that they were informed about the operation or action in
17 A. Yes. The MUP informed the KVM that they would have an action in
19 Q. Did Drewienkiewicz react to that in any way?
20 A. No, he did not react. He simply kept silent. He presented what
21 he had to say, and he did not react to what General Loncar said to him.
22 He just pursued what he had to say, and he always stuck to what he had to
23 say at this meeting.
24 Q. As head of the liaison team, did you know that they had been
25 informed about this event in Racak?
1 A. I knew about that through Loncar because I was Loncar's deputy,
2 the deputy and assistant at the federal office for liaising with the
3 Verification Mission Kosovo and Metohija. I was leader of the team on
4 behalf of the Pristina Corps, but also at the same time I was Loncar's
5 deputy. So I know about what Loncar was saying in terms of the MUP
6 activity, et cetera.
7 Q. Thank you. Now I'm just going to ask you to comment on yet
8 another record that I have here that we got recently -- or, rather, on the
9 last day. That is a record of the meeting between Aleksandar Nikolaev,
10 head of the political department, from the 12th of January. So it's just
11 a few days before this, just a few days before what happened in Racak,
12 that is.
13 A. I've just found it.
14 Q. The number is 139112. The Foreign Ministry office in Pristina.
15 MR. NICE: We're not immediately sure whether this has been
16 exhibited. If the accused wants to produce documents, even if they've
17 been provided to him under Rule 68 or otherwise, it remains his duty to
18 make them available to us in one way or another. I'm doing my best to
19 make good his shortcomings, but on this document I'm not sure that we've
20 got a document to hand. It doesn't appear to be in the Racak list.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, what is the position? Where is
22 this document?
23 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Where it says "Exhibit," there is an
24 empty space. And it is obviously coming from the office of Mr. Nice,
25 because I have no other documents in this connection. It has an ERN
1 number, 0139112, and it's a record of consultations with Mr. Aleksandar
2 Nikolaev from the KVM. If you agree, we can put it on the ELMO, and the
3 witness and I will have it in the Serbian version.
4 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Let it be placed on the ELMO.
5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. Please, Colonel, put it on the ELMO, and you can read from there.
7 A. Which page do you mean?
8 MR. NICE: Ms. Dicklich's search would suggest from the ERN number
9 given that this may be Exhibit 792, tab 4. We'll try and find a hard
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice.
12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. We will skip the part where it says that the meeting was held on
14 the premises of the office. Look at point 2.
15 A. Shall I read?
16 Q. So it's a meeting with Aleksandar Nikolaev, chief reconstruction
17 political internal department, KVM. "Our collocutor presented us with
18 some details regarding events in the KVM following the murder of policemen
19 and kidnapping of VJ members."
20 A. It goes on to say: "Immediately upon receiving the news of the
21 said events, General Drewienkiewicz informed Walker in Washington.
22 Ambassador Walker asked General Drewienkiewicz to wait a little before
23 sending the report to Washington, warning him," in quotation marks, "that
24 is possibly disinformation. Despite that, General Drewienkiewicz
25 organised a meeting with other deputies of Walker and they decided by
1 majority vote to send the report to Washington nevertheless, over which
2 Walker was furious," in quotation marks. "Furthermore, during this
3 meeting the collocutor informed us with their assessment of the situation
4 in Kosovo and Metohija made by the analysis department of the KVM on the
5 9th of January, consisting of the intelligence service of the KVM, and so
6 on. This department includes American, English, and German officers,
7 analysts. This assessment covers current situation and intentions of the
8 KLA, VJ, MUP, et cetera."
9 Q. What does he say about KLA?
10 A. He says: "It is assessed that the KLA shall intensify their
11 activities in the area of Mitrovica, Urosevac, as well as on the
12 Urosevac-Suva Reka-Stimlje route."
13 Q. So that's this part around Racak.
14 A. "This assessment is corroborated by the latest activities of the
15 KLA (murder of policemen and kidnapping of soldiers.) It is our estimate
16 that these two actions were coordinated very well, even professionally, in
17 an organised way, and implemented in the same fashion. The KLA announces
18 new attacks against MUP members. It is obvious that the KLA is trying to
19 reduce all contacts with the KVM to official ones, and it is done through
20 so-called public relations officers, wherein Rusti Asari [phoen] is the
21 representative of the KLA."
22 Q. What does it say further on?
23 A. "Assert -- it is evident that there is a gradual distancing," in
24 quotation marks, "of the KLA from the population, and attempts to
25 establish on the territory held by the KLA other parallel authorities such
1 as MUP, municipal organs, et cetera. The KVM is increasingly depicted as
2 incompetent, and this trend in the information produced by the KLA is
3 evermore pronounced. It is expected that it will continue. It is also
4 expected that they will fabricate incidents, even murders of Albanians, to
5 be ascribed to the MUP and the VJ.
6 "The KLA is taking actions to intimidate the population. VJ was
7 expected to react much more strongly after the kidnapping of soldiers."
8 Q. What does it say about the VJ? --
9 THE INTERPRETER: The speakers are going too fast with this
10 on-site translation. Can we return the previous page?
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic and the witness, the interpreter
12 says you're going too fast. Bear in mind that she's seeing the document
13 for the first time.
14 JUDGE KWON: Mr. Nice, could you give me that exhibit number
16 MR. NICE: 792, tab 4.
17 While I'm on my feet, we are trying to get English version down
18 here as soon as possible because it really is very difficult to follow
19 this without an English version to read.
20 The accused, may I invite him through the Court, must recognise
21 his duty is to get these documents available in advance. He should be
22 able to track down, from the documents he's got, whether they are
23 exhibits, but he knows that if, in the final analysis, he's unable to do
24 that himself or through the pro se liaison office or through my learned
25 friends Mr. Kay, he can always ask Ms. Dicklich to help in advance and she
1 will do so, although it takes time away from her other exercises, her
2 other jobs. And it would help us all if this is done so we can have
3 documents in advance.
4 Now we finally have the English version.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice. The remarks are very
6 pertinent, Mr. Milosevic, and in future if you come here unprepared, I
7 will do what would be done in my country: You will not be allowed to lead
8 evidence relating to that document. You must come here fully prepared.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] As regards the issue where I got the
10 document from, I have already said that I obtained it, without any doubt,
11 from the office of Mr. Nice. It was part of the disclosure under Rule 68,
12 part of his obligation to disclose it to me. I didn't have time to --
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: That has nothing at all to do with your leading
14 evidence from that document which you got from Mr. Nice. You must come to
15 court prepared. You must have the copies ready for the Bench and for the
17 MR. NICE: To complete the picture, in fact, it was produced
18 through Ivasov by the Prosecution, and so the accused should be alert to
19 the fact that he has it two different ways, and where he has it in both
20 the form of 68 material and as an exhibit, he should of course alert us to
21 the fact that it's already an exhibit.
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Please proceed.
23 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
24 Q. So, Colonel, this is a document reflecting a conversation on the
25 12th of January, that is three days prior to the events in Racak.
1 A. Correct.
2 Q. That's an analysis made by the intelligence department of the
3 Kosovo Verification Mission, and they expect fabrication of incidents by
4 the KLA, even murders of Albanians, to be ascribed to the MUP and the army
5 of Yugoslavia. So that's the expectation, the forecast, of the
6 Verification Mission. Is that written in this document?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Are Urosevac and the area around Racak --
9 A. Stimlje and Suva Reka.
10 Q. -- mentioned twice in this document?
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I won't dwell on it any further,
12 because I had a couple of more documents to which Mr. Nice might have the
13 same objection. I will not proceed with them in view of the way you
14 reacted, Mr. Robinson, saying that I can not lead such evidence.
15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Let us return to your reports. Tell me, under the numbers 31 to
17 51, can we find documents relating to testimony of General Delic? Are
18 they your documents?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. 31 is D300, tab 301. 32 is D300, tab 302, and so on and so forth.
21 A. Yes, they are.
22 MR. NICE: We have now these documents from our collection down
23 here so that they can be placed on the overhead projector, just us doing
24 for the accused that which he should have done for you.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: On behalf of the accused, I thank you, Mr. Nice.
1 Mr. Milosevic, it's not only disrespectful, it's inefficient,
2 because we waste a lot of time trying to find these documents.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I understood, Mr. Robinson, that
4 documents that have already been admitted into evidence may be led as long
5 as I mention the number of the exhibit, that I don't have to produce them
6 again because they are already part the evidence. I'm just asking the
7 witness, who authored these documents, to testify, to speak to their
8 contents and their authenticity. They were produced during the testimony
9 of General Delic.
10 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
11 Q. So, Colonel --
12 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, even if they're already exhibits,
13 you should have copies for us in court, because we don't have all the
14 exhibits here. But deal with this briefly. Or, as Judge Kwon is just
15 saying to me, you may inform us beforehand so we can have the copies
17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. Colonel, in this entire overview of documents for the month of
19 February, do you have any incident reflected wherein it could be said that
20 our side had not honoured its obligations towards the Verification
22 A. Our side honoured all its obligations towards the Verification
23 Mission, except in those cases where the Verification Mission was not
24 acting in the spirit of the agreement.
25 Q. Is there any specific event for the month of February reflected in
1 these documents where we can see an omission on our side?
2 A. I could not find any.
3 Q. Very well. And finally, this overview of documents also contains
4 the numbers from 52 to 73 that were also produced through General Delic
5 relating to the month of March. 52 is D300, tab 448. 53 is D300, 449,
6 and so on. Daily and weekly reports.
7 Do weekly reports cover, for the most part, all that is contained
8 in daily reports only in summary form? Are they consistent?
9 A. They are completely consistent. And the summary reports summarise
10 the information for the previous week's -- for the previous week reflected
11 in daily reports.
12 Q. In this batch of documents for March, do we see any incident
13 wherein our side did not act consistently with the agreement?
14 A. No, there are no such incidents. I would just like to say that
15 there is an incident where -- a case where the Pristina Corps command made
16 an assessment that their position was unfavourable and that the KLA had
17 6.000 to 7.000 men in the north of Albania, 2 to 3.000 in Macedonia, and
18 around 15.000 men under arms in Kosovo and Metohija. That was the
19 equivalent to 20 to 25.000 armed combatants; that is, terrorists. In that
20 period we had around four to five daily attacks against civilians and the
21 police. Out of all the districts in Kosovo and Metohija, four were
22 completely overwhelmed by terrorist activity. Out of 28 municipalities,
23 19 were the site of some sort of combat activity, and 300 civilians -- and
24 300 villages were held by the KLA.
25 Q. That is the report for a period during -- or, rather, just after
1 the arrival of the KVM. Did you compare the situation with violence at
2 the beginning of KVM tenure and at the end?
3 A. I already said that this is the situation when the KVM was
4 leaving, and I already said that before they arrived the KLA was
5 completely crushed. They were not an organised force. They were
6 under-equipped, and they did not hold many territories under their
7 control. I had just begun to say what the assessment of the Pristina
8 Corps was at the beginning of March when the -- some units were already
9 arriving as reinforcements to the Pristina Corps because its strength was
10 under the establishment level, but we had informed the Verification
11 Mission that we would be doing that. It was a time when many aircraft had
12 already been deployed in Italy vis-a-vis Yugoslavia, and we notified the
13 Verification Mission that without these reinforcements we would be unable
14 to deal and successfully perform our duties.
15 It could be treated as a violation of the agreement between our
16 country and the OSCE, because we were supposed to reduce our strength to
17 the level of February 1998, but we were taking this step in the
18 circumstances that I described, and I believe the signatories of the
19 agreement were Generals Clark and Naumann, and General Djordjevic on our
20 side. And according to that agreement, we reserved the right to bring in
21 more forces if that was justified by a particular assessment, provided we
22 notified the Verification Mission.
23 Q. Yes. Thank you.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now, I hope that this -- the fact
25 that we went through these reports very briefly is sufficient for them to
1 be tendered into evidence. Of course there I don't mean the ones that
2 have already been admitted into evidence during General Delic's testimony,
3 but the other ones that range to the end of 1998, and all of them are
4 documents of Colonel Kotur's.
5 [Trial Chamber confers]
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Can you identify them, Mr. Milosevic, those that
7 have not already been admitted?
8 [Trial Chamber confers]
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, are you able to help us with whether
10 December 1998 documents have already been admitted?
11 MR. KAY: It looks to me like they should have been admitted, so
12 we're trying to track through the records to see what the rulings have
13 been on these particular documents. We can't help you instantly, I'm
14 sorry, Your Honour, but we're just checking that.
15 JUDGE KWON: Give me a minute and I'll check. Let us proceed.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let us proceed, Mr. Milosevic, and we'll come
17 back to this question.
18 Mr. Nice.
19 MR. NICE: A preliminary reckoning by Ms. Dicklich would suggest
20 that on the list we've now been provided with, which is the exhibits to be
21 used with Milan Kotur, on that list where it says documents have not been
22 admitted, they have not yet been admitted because with Delic the accused
23 did not deal with those exhibits at all, those potential exhibits. They
24 were in the Delic file, but it may be these simply weren't touched on by
25 him at all. Ms. Dicklich is trying to confirm the position, but it may
1 well be that this list now provided by the accused is accurate as to the
2 status of those documents.
3 But I know what problems develop when there is any uncertainty
4 about exhibits, problems that then require a great deal of work by all
5 organs of the Tribunal working for the Court, and can I suggest that we
6 perhaps put this back until after the next break so that we can be
7 reasonably confident on what the position is.
8 JUDGE KWON: For example, tab 2's 162 to 291 were all admitted
9 under Delic exhibit, except for those which were marked for identification
10 pending translations, but I haven't checked all the others.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Well, we'll follow the course suggested by
12 Mr. Nice.
13 Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.
14 JUDGE KWON: My apology. I'll check it. We'll check it again.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, you asked me to
16 identify them. I have already identified them. I identified them when I
17 asked the witness my question. But let me repeat: In tabs 19 to 39 we
18 have reports from the Verification Mission dating back to November 1998,
19 so that is dealing with the month of November. And I asked the witness
20 questions about that set of documents.
21 Now, in tabs 40 to 68, you have reports about the Verification
22 Mission dating to December, and I also asked the witness questions with
23 respect to that set of documents. So I have complied with your request
24 and ask that these tabs be tendered, tabs 19 to 39 and 40 to 68 inclusive.
25 And then afterwards, we have the Delic documents that are
1 incorporated by number identification and not tab numbers.
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: The registrar has confirmed that they were not
3 previously admitted, so we will admit them. Yes, assign an exhibit number
4 for the binder.
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] And please could you admit the
6 previous tabs that the witness dealt with individually; the diagram, the
7 map regarding the organisation, and everything else referring to the --
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- the Verification Mission, the
10 ones I explained.
11 THE REGISTRAR: [Previous translation continues] ... that was
12 provided by Mr. Milosevic will be Exhibit D332.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, they are admitted. Do you have numbers for
14 the -- the same binder, yes.
15 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
16 Q. Colonel, we heard testimony here from General Maisonneuve. Did
17 you have an opportunity of meeting General Maisonneuve; and if so, what
18 were his positions within the Verification Mission?
19 A. Yes, I did meet General Maisonneuve. He was at the head of the
20 Regional Centre, Regional Centre number 1, in fact, in Prizren.
21 Q. With respect to his testimony here, I should like to ask you a few
22 questions, and I consider that you are well placed to give answers to
23 them. He said that after the incident in Racak, the command of the
24 brigade in Urosevac, General Krsman Jelic, did not wish to meet with him.
25 Maisonneuve claims that he managed to have a meeting with General Jelic
1 only three weeks later, when he managed to force you to persuade Jelic to
2 have the meeting with him.
3 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Otherwise, as far as you gentlemen
4 are concerned, that is on page 5821 of the transcript, and the date of the
5 testimony was the 29th of May, 2002. And if need be, I can quote from the
6 transcript that particular page, but I've already given you a summary and
7 precis of what it says there and I'd like to hear the witness's answer.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Mr. Maisonneuve, well, I'm surprised
9 that he made a statement to that effect, because as a general of the
10 Canadian army he could have known, and I think he did know, the kind of
11 relationships that prevail in all armies throughout the world, including
12 the army of Yugoslavia. First and foremost, I was not the person who was
13 superior to General Delic for me to be able to persuade him.
14 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
15 Q. Not General Delic.
16 A. Ah, right, General Krsman Jelic, that's right. For me to be able
17 to persuade him to come to a meeting. I was just head of the team
18 liaising with the Verification Mission.
19 Q. All right, let's not say forced, but did you try and persuade him
20 to talk to Maisonneuve?
21 A. No. The moment the request came in via the mission's staff in
22 Pristina, headquarters in Pristina, to the effect that General Maisonneuve
23 would like to have a meeting with General Delic, we organised it straight
24 away. And his previous attempts to hold a meeting with Delic, whether he
25 wanted to or not, I wasn't informed of that. But at that moment, that was
1 the line of communication: It went from the Regional Centre with the
2 centre in Pristina and then the headquarters in Pristina, links with the
3 Pristina Corps that I headed and that Mr. Maisonneuve could have contacted
4 only the liaison officer or, rather, General Delic's liaison officer at
5 the Urosevac garrison, with the proviso that General Maisonneuve did not
6 cover that particular area himself. It was an area and territory under
7 the supervision of the Regional Centre 5 from Pristina.
8 Now, why Mr. Maisonneuve wanted to have that meeting, what the
9 reasons were for that is no longer important, because all the obligations
10 taken over by the 243rd Mechanised Brigade from Urosevac to be fulfilled
11 vis-a-vis the mission, it did so via the liaison officer. The same thing
12 that applied to the Pristina Corps, the -- through the liaison team headed
13 by me. So that relationships between us and the commanders and Delic and
14 so forth does not stand. There was no need for me to persuade anyone to
15 do anything in the way described.
16 Q. All right. Thank you. Now, generally speaking, did General Jelic
17 avoid meeting General Maisonneuve?
18 A. No. As far as I know, Delic never avoided a meeting with
19 Maisonneuve but quite simply Delic did not always have the time to meet
20 him when Maisonneuve took it into his head to have a meeting with the
21 commander. That's why you need liaison officers. And they were best
22 placed to organise anything that needed to be done, to convey anything
23 that needed to be conveyed, and so on and so forth.
24 Now, I myself, having said that, can claim with full
25 responsibility because I was a brigade commander for a long time, and the
1 brigade was deployed over a distance of 40 kilometres during a period of
2 intensive action on the part of the so-called Liberation Army of Kosovo,
3 attacking the brigade and the whole territory, so Delic [as interpreted]
4 did not have time to have a meeting, if he wanted a meeting, scheduled for
5 the same day. You would have to make your request in advance, and I
6 always ensured this through the corps and this would be made possible the
7 next day, for example.
8 Q. All right. You mentioned liaison officers. Now tell me this:
9 Were the liaison officers always at the disposal of the Verification
11 A. Yes, they were.
12 Q. So the brigade commander wasn't always available but the -- his
13 liaison officer was, is that what you're saying?
14 A. Yes, that's what I'm saying. I was available 24 hours, that is to
15 say round the clock, in Pristina, at the headquarters there.
16 JUDGE KWON: Just for the record, in previous answer the
17 transcript should say Jelic instead of Delic.
18 Proceed, Mr. Milosevic.
19 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, we're talking about Krsman
20 Jelic here.
21 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
22 Q. Is that right?
23 A. I made a mistake. I made a slip of the tongue when I said Delic
24 instead of saying Jelic.
25 Q. Very well. For the record, I'd just like to emphasise that we're
1 talking about Krsman Jelic.
2 Now, General Maisonneuve goes on to say the following, and we're
3 now going on to seeing that the meeting was held, we've clarified that
4 position, how the meeting came about in the first place, but he goes on to
5 say the following: He says that Jelic at a meeting with him didn't wish
6 to confirm that he had collaborated with the MUP during the operation in
7 Racak. Maisonneuve says that General Jelic on that occasion said that his
8 forces did not shoot at the village but at the surrounding parts,
9 targeting two other villages. So Krsman Jelic did not confirm that the
10 army and MUP worked in concert. And you can find that on page 5790 in the
11 transcript of Major -- General Maisonneuve's testimony.
12 Were you present at the meeting?
13 A. Yes, I was, and it was held in Urosevac within the framework of
14 the army of Yugoslavia.
15 Q. What was it exactly that General Jelic told Maisonneuve, and what
16 was Maisonneuve's reaction?
17 A. Mr. Maisonneuve insisted to know whether the army had taken part
18 together with the MUP in the operation at Racak or not. Mr. Jelic denied
19 it and said that the army had not taken part, that it was a MUP operation,
20 and he expressed a certain amount of dissatisfaction and insisted that
21 that was the case. But Jelic explained how things stood. I didn't
22 interfere because it was up to Mr. Jelic, who was responsible for
23 everything that went on in that area. I said very little during that
24 meeting, but I do know that Jelic claimed that the army had not taken
25 part, and he presented what it says in the record of the meeting.
1 Q. Now, your knowledge of the situation at that time. Did the army
2 take part or not? What do you know about that?
3 A. My knowledge tells me that the army did not take part. It was an
4 anti-terrorist operation organised by the MUP of Serbia.
5 Q. Very well. Fine. General Maisonneuve also stated that after the
6 event in Racak he visited the headquarters of the staff of the 243rd
7 Brigade in Urosevac, told them that it was his intention to receive
8 confirmation about the participation of their troops from the commander
9 and their responsibilities for the events in Racak. According to
10 Maisonneuve, at that meeting, at which the commander of the brigade,
11 Krsman Jelic, was not present, Colonel Petrovic -- now, who is Colonel
13 A. Lieutenant Colonel Petrovic was a liaison officer.
14 Q. Right. He was a liaison officer of the Jelic's brigade.
15 A. Yes, of the 243rd Mechanised Brigade.
16 Q. Confirmed that MUP had conducted the operation in Racak but that
17 he was supported by a Praga and a tank of the 243rd Brigade.
18 A. I never received a report from the liaison officer to that effect.
19 Q. Is it true that Colonel Petrovic said what Maisonneuve said he
21 A. Had Lieutenant Colonel Petrovic said that, then I would have had
22 it in the daily report from Lieutenant Colonel Petrovic, and that would
23 have been contained in the report of the team sent to the General Staff,
24 the team for liaisoning with the OSCE.
25 Q. Thank you, Colonel. Now, talking of that same meeting, staying
1 with the meeting - and in the transcript, it's on page 5766 and 67 -- 5786
2 and 87 of the 22nd of May, 2002, speaking about that same meeting,
3 Maisonneuve said that he wasn't satisfied because he hadn't talked to the
4 brigade commander but just the liaison officer by the name of Petrovic and
5 that that than officer had told him on the occasion, and he quotes, that
6 Stimlje was done with Pragas and armoured vehicles and one tank, on the
7 basis of which he understood that it was support to the army of
8 Yugoslavia. And he goes on to quote on 5788: "Stimlje was done by the
9 MUP with Praga [In English] vehicle and one tank. And then I guess
10 understood there that this was the VJ in support."
11 [Interpretation] According to your knowledge and information, is
12 this quotation by General Maisonneuve correct?
13 A. There is no single officer in the 243rd Brigade, especially not a
14 liaison officer, who would replace a small village of Racak with Stimlje.
15 Stimlje is a municipal locality, rather large populated area, and as far
16 as I understand it, it said that Stimlje was done with a Praga and a tank,
17 and that has nothing to do with Racak at all. So that statement is
18 completely incorrect, and I don't know where this comes from. There's
19 something not right there. If Maisonneuve said that, then I don't think
20 it can be a witness that can be believed, if anybody said that, a witness
21 who said that. Now, Racak, Stimlje, I'm not clear what we're talking
22 about here.
23 Q. Well, Stimlje is a municipal locality where the powers and
24 authorities function normally, the police and all the organs of power and
1 A. Yes. It is the seat of the municipality. It has a health centre,
2 a hospital, for instance, for retarded persons. It's a rather large town,
3 a rather large municipal town, the seat of the municipality. It's not
4 something that could be confused with Racak or anything else like that.
5 Q. I see. Thank you. Could any of our officers have said Stimlje
6 was done and mean Racak, mistake that?
7 A. I said that that was impossible a moment ago, especially an
8 officer from the 243rd Mechanised Brigade in whose zone of responsibility
9 that was anyway and he was there every day. He could not confuse Stimlje
10 with Racak. I have my suspicions as far as that statement made by General
11 Drewienkiewicz is concerned.
12 Q. No, this is General Maisonneuve.
13 A. General Maisonneuve, beg your pardon.
14 Q. He said that the police was involved in the action in Racak, which
15 was obvious for them in the military because they could see them on the
16 hill, supporting them. General Maisonneuve said in his opinion the army
17 was supporting the MUP. That is what was confirmed to him on the meeting
18 of the 16th of January by Lieutenant Colonel Petrovic, the liaison officer
19 of the 243rd Brigade, with one tank and a few Pragas at least, that that
20 was the support. This is what it says. I'm going to read it out to you:
21 "[In English] The police had been involved in Racak. It was obvious to
22 them. They could see them as they were up on the hill supporting, to my
23 mind supporting the police. And at one of the meeting on the 16th with
24 Petrovic, the liaison officer from 243rd Brigade, the lieutenant colonel,
25 he did say that the MUP had done the operation with support of VJ with at
1 least one tank and some Pragas."
2 [Interpretation] So the transcript page is 5865. What can you say
3 about this?
4 A. It is true that the MUP carried out this action. However, the
5 unit was not on a hill. It was below Canovica hill. It is in the area of
6 the pine forest where from Racak cannot be seen. The army could not have
7 seen it from that place.
8 Q. Could Petrovic have said anything like that at all?
9 A. I've already said so, just like what I said about Petrovic saying
10 about Stimlje being done with Pragas. I doubt that Petrovic could have
11 said this either.
12 Q. All right.
13 A. I was in that area. I know where the unit was located, and I know
14 roughly what the configuration of the terrain looks like. I know that I
15 passed there dozens of times towards Prizren. It's a very narrow road,
16 and nothing can really be seen from the road, rather, to the south of the
17 road where Racak is located in relation to the Stimlje-Suva Reka road.
18 Q. All right. How long was that unit in that area?
19 A. From April 1998, I think, all of 1998, more than half a year, and
20 then continued in 1999. So it was in that area for almost a year.
21 Q. Does that unit belong to part of the units that remained,
22 according to the agreement, at some points in Kosovo and Metohija?
23 A. Yes. That unit, according to the agreement with the OSCE mission,
24 had one of its companies in Stimlje-Suva Reka and underneath Canovica
25 hill. Part of that unit, that is.
1 Q. What was its task?
2 A. Its task was to provide security along at that road because this
3 was a road where in 1998 for a few months -- or, rather, for a few months
4 in 1998 we could not use that road because of the activities of the
5 so-called KLA. And also already in 1998 we had our first casualties on
6 that road due to the activities of the so-called Kosovo Liberation Army
7 activities. And that unit stayed there to provide security for that road
8 or, rather, to secure safety along that road.
9 Q. All right. Thank you, Colonel. Now I'm going to put a few
10 questions to you in relation to the testimony of General Drewienkiewicz.
11 In part of his statement that has to do with the freeing of eight soldiers
12 of the army of Yugoslavia that had been kidnapped by the KLA, he said that
13 the Verification Mission members made a great effort to make it possible
14 for these eight soldiers to be set free, those who had been captured by
15 the KLA, and that there were many moments when they thought that the army
16 and police would storm that position and that they were wedged between the
17 two sides, and they were trying to calm things down. Drewienkiewicz
18 particularly pointed out his own dedication because allegedly he slept on
19 the floor of his office for three days in case a telephone message came.
20 The transcript page is 2 -- 5 -- 2898. I'm not going to quote
21 that at any length, but what do you know about the engagement of the
22 Kosovo Verification Mission and Drewienkiewicz itself? What kind of
23 efforts did they make in terms of setting those soldiers free?
24 A. A few moments ago we read what the intelligence of the KVM was;
25 namely, that we had a very lukewarm reaction to the abduction of the
2 Q. Or, rather, that was their assessment of what our reaction was.
3 A. Yes. That's what we read. And now this same Verification Mission
4 that assessed our behaviour in this way is now saying that we had stormed
5 the place. Practically an action was almost carried out and now that they
6 were almost caught in the crossfire.
7 I am not denying the efforts made by the gentleman who, in
8 agreement with Mr. Sainovic, as soon as the KLA kidnapped these eight
9 soldiers of ours they immediately asked through the Kosovo Verification
10 Mission to establish contact with us to reach an agreement to have an
11 exchange. We accepted that immediately. They were very satisfied with
12 this position that we took, and Mr. Keller and Mr. Sainovic carried
13 through this agreement on the exchange.
14 It is true that the commander in the area of Bajgora did not
15 always honour the agreements made. He dragged his feet. He was trying to
16 get things done. Mr. Ciaglinski characterised him as a rather simple man,
17 a commander who was trying to show off in front of his own soldiers and
18 his own people.
19 We carried out certain movements of our own units. In case the
20 negotiations failed, we would have acted in military fashion. However,
21 that never happened. Not even remotely was there such a situation.
22 In these talks, when I was asked whether we were planning
23 something like that, I said no. For as long as the talks were going on,
24 it never crossed our minds to carry out any kind of action of this nature.
25 So this boasting of Mr. Drewienkiewicz that they made this major
1 effort, I really cannot see that. And as I said, their own assessment was
2 that our reaction was rather lukewarm. This was the police, the military
3 police, seven military policemen of the motorised brigade. There was an
4 NCO, a crime technician, who had a Puch combat vehicle, a highly valuable
5 one with all the equipment a crime technician uses, and also all the
6 armour and weapons that were needed. When the KLA kidnapped soldiers,
7 they kept all this equipment. And when they're saying that our reaction
8 was lukewarm, they probably have in mind the fact that the soldiers were
9 kidnapped and that this equipment was taken, because these were not
10 ordinary soldiers.
11 Q. All right. At any rate, as far as their assessment is concerned,
12 they said that they expected a stronger reaction on the part of the
14 A. We've dealt with that.
15 Q. We've dealt with that. General Drewienkiewicz stated that on the
16 16th [Realtime transcript read in error "6th"] of January he had contacts
17 with General Loncar who came to his office and said that they should talk.
18 Loncar allegedly said to him then that he had just heard about the content
19 of the press conference that Walker had held and that he thought that it
20 was not done right. Loncar allegedly told me that he got instructions
21 from Belgrade to go to Drewienkiewicz and to convey that message. Loncar,
22 according to the witness's words, said that Walker had not indicated at
23 the press conference that everything that happened in Racak was a response
24 to the previous killing of the police but that the police entered Racak
25 looking for the people who had killed policemen a week earlier, and as
1 this witness said, Loncar tried to justify this, that is to say the
2 presence of the armed forces of Yugoslavia in the village, before
3 commenting on what really happened, regardless of whether this was in
4 keeping with the orders or not.
5 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please read slower.
6 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you must read more slowly for the
7 benefit of the interpreters.
8 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right.
9 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
10 Q. So that is on page 2914 in the transcript.
11 MR. NICE: By whatever slip, whether of the tongue or of the
12 transcript, the date of the 6th of January is obviously the 16th of
14 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes, it's the 16th. That's what I
15 said, the 16th of January.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you.
17 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
18 Q. According to what Drewienkiewicz said on this transcript page
19 which I've just referred to, he had contacts with Loncar who came to his
20 office and told him that they should talk. Do you know anything about
22 A. I don't know anything about that contact. I believe that this --
23 that had this kind of contact been made, I would have known something
24 about it. Had General Loncar gone to Drewienkiewicz's office directly
25 without reaching previous agreement and scheduling the meeting, I really
1 don't know anything about that. I believe that Loncar would not have gone
2 without me or the representative of the MUP. He would not have gone to
3 see General Drewienkiewicz on his own. He never did that before. I just
4 know of one particular meeting. If I remember correctly, it was on the
5 18th, but with Mr. Walker. General --
6 Q. That's different.
7 A. I know what I know, that this meeting that was had around midday
8 on the 16th, with Drewienkiewicz and myself on the premises of our office
9 in the morning.
10 Q. All right. Drewienkiewicz says here that Loncar came to see him.
11 And a few moments ago, just before the break, towards the end of our
12 previous session here, we presented in the Serbian and English languages a
13 record on the meeting held on the 16th of January - that is to same the
14 very same day - where it says meeting between General Dusan Loncar, head
15 of the coordination team of the federal government for Kosovo and
16 Metohija, with General Drewienkiewicz, head of mission of the OSCE. You
17 said that you attended the meeting.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. This is a record which starts --
20 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speaker please slow down.
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, did you hear that? I'm tired of
22 telling you. The interpreters are having difficulty following you. Read
23 more slowly.
24 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Very well.
25 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. So we saw the record which unequivocally establishes that
2 Drewienkiewicz came to the meeting where Loncar was, and the others
3 present, those who were keeping the minutes, and you were at the meeting
4 too. That's what you said when we were looking at the record. Is that
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. Now, what General Drewienkiewicz said during his testimony
8 corresponds to the date mentioned here, but it does not correspond to what
9 had allegedly happened, namely that Loncar came to see him. Here we have
10 a record stating that he came to your office to have this meeting, and
11 that allegedly he told him about the press conference and about the
12 instructions from Belgrade. Was there any mention of this at the meeting
13 where Drewienkiewicz was present together with you about any instructions
14 from Belgrade in relation to his press conference or whatever?
15 A. No, no. There were no instructions that we had, no. I think that
16 they held this press conference only after Racak, sometime in the
18 Q. All right. I read out to you what Drewienkiewicz said. Since you
19 were at the meeting which was held in your offices, and it says that
20 Drewienkiewicz came to this meeting furious, may you think that there was
21 yet another meeting when Loncar went to see Drewienkiewicz on the same
23 A. I don't know anything about that. And I think I would have known
24 had this meeting been held. However, I'm not aware of any such thing.
25 Q. All right.
1 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Now, I don't know. Mr. Robinson, in
2 the materials for Drewienkiewicz's evidence, in tab 72 of his testimony,
3 he referred to the aide-memoire of the members of the army of Yugoslavia
4 in the area that was covered by sabotage activity dated June 1998. I have
5 the aide-memoire, but I did not particularly submit it to you because it
6 was admitted during General Drewienkiewicz's testimony.
7 JUDGE ROBINSON: Let it be placed on the ELMO.
8 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
9 Q. Please place your copy on the ELMO.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Is there a copy to be placed on the ELMO?
11 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Yes.
12 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
13 Q. Drewienkiewicz, during his testimony, interpreted some rules from
14 this document. And can you tell me whether you were aware of this way of
15 interpretation or, rather, were all members of the Kosovo Verification
16 Mission that you were in contact with provided the same interpretation of
17 these rules, and how does this interpretation differ from the
18 interpretation of these same rules by members of the military? I'm
19 referring to the interpretation of these rules and one's attitude towards
20 what was happening on the ground.
21 A. This is a manual which was prepared by the General Staff of the
22 army of Yugoslavia engaged in the territory engulfed by sabotage and
23 terrorist activities. It contains all international standards in this
24 respect and rules that could be applied when anti-terrorist action is
1 This manual and everything that is contained in it does not differ
2 from internationally recognised standards in any way. So General
3 Drewienkiewicz's analysis here, I believe, is not right. I think that he
4 tried to interpret some things in his own way and to draw conclusions that
5 would be contrary to international rules and to this manual of ours.
6 MR. NICE: Your Honour, if this evidence is relevant at all it's
7 confusing me because I'm not being reminded of what the interpretation
8 was. I am not going to interrupt much or at all on the grounds of
9 relevance. The accused will spend his limited time as he thinks fit, but
10 I just don't see how this really can help us at all.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, what is the relevance of this
13 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, Mr. Drewienkiewicz testified
14 here, as you were able to see, about certain examples, giving a totally
15 different interpretation. And this is a manual for members of the army of
16 Yugoslavia acting in areas engulfed in sabotage and terrorist activities.
17 He said that certain provisions here were put very mildly, they were not
18 binding enough. And I was going to ask our witness if this is a binding
19 manual for members of the VJ or can it be interpreted in a flexible
21 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Kay, what would you say about this evidence?
22 It goes to the credibility of General DZ?
23 MR. KAY: We're just looking at it in the English on the exhibits
24 that have been scanned, so we're looking at the document at the moment.
25 It occurs to me that this is relevant to evidence given by DZ as to what
1 the position was. This witness is entitled to comment upon that, which is
2 the purpose of this testimony.
3 JUDGE KWON: The problem, though, is the accused hasn't put the
4 question specifically enough.
5 MR. KAY: Perhaps if he can rephrase it, that may assist the
6 Court. I don't know whether the Court's been able to get it in the
7 English from the scanned exhibit to see it on their screen. We've been
8 able to achieve that.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, reformulate the question.
10 JUDGE KWON: Unfortunately, our network does not have the
11 translated version.
12 MR. KAY: Ah, right.
13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. All right. I will read to you what Drewienkiewicz said, and I
15 will ask the witness to say whether it is so or not.
16 Is this an official document from the General Staff?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. From 1998?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Drewienkiewicz says, on page 2980 of the transcript: "[In
21 English] Well, if I can take you to the last page of the document which
22 says what has to be done with this document. And it says that this
23 memorandum shall be sent to the units at company -- at company and
24 independent platoon level."
25 MR. NICE: Even in a different courtroom with different machinery,
1 Ms. Dicklich is invaluable in her ability to multi-task and she's managed
2 to find this document on Sanction, which we have here on a separate
3 screen. And if Sanction can be thrown up onto the system, you'll have it
4 in English.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: That would be helpful, yes.
6 JUDGE KWON: Do we have only the first page?
7 MR. NICE: If the accused would let us know which page we should
8 be looking at in the English, Ms. Dicklich will be able to oblige.
9 JUDGE ROBINSON: What's the page, Mr. Milosevic?
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I am now quoting from what
11 Drewienkiewicz said in his testimony. It would be good to show the first
12 page of the original in the Serbian language to show what the cover page
13 looks like. It's an official document of the General Staff of the army of
14 Yugoslavia. There is the Yugoslav coat of arms, it says: "Army of
15 Yugoslavia. Reminder for Yugoslav army members engaged in areas affected
16 by sabotage and terrorist activities."
17 Now, Drewienkiewicz says that this reminder would be sent "[In
18 English] at company and independent platoon level."
19 [Interpretation] Is that the lowest tactical level that this
20 reminder would reach?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Does that imply that everybody would be familiarised with it?
23 A. Yes, down to squad or platoon commander, which is the lowest
24 level. The commander would be familiarised and thereby the soldiers.
25 Q. And then he says, going to the next paragraph, he quotes: "[In
1 English] Systematically go through the entire reminder with all army
2 members on the territory where sabotage and terrorist attack are conducted
3 and proper individuals thus prepare individuals and units to implement the
4 prescribed procedure."
5 [Interpretation] All right. And then the quotation ends and he
6 says and it finishes: "Officers in command positions shall be responsible
7 for the consistent implementation of the reminder in their formations."
8 He goes on: "[In English] This I think indicates that there was a
9 set of rules to be followed in dealing with insurgents -- followed in
10 dealing with insurgents," et cetera.
11 [Interpretation] So what about this procedure? Did it encompass -
12 and that is the important thing - all those who were active, who were
13 engaged, as it says in the title, in areas affected by sabotage and
14 terrorist activities, instructing them to act consistently with the rules?
15 A. Yes, that was ensured. And I said this reminder took into account
16 all international standards regarding fight against terrorism. And
17 speaking of this reminder, this insistence on page 4, which Drewienkiewicz
18 commented upon, says: "Try to avoid use of weapons against members of
19 terrorist groups." He said that this word "try to avoid" is too mild.
20 Q. But he quoted from the document himself, and I believe you can do
21 that too.
22 On page 2981 of the transcript, Drewienkiewicz quoted this
23 document of the General Staff: "[In English] The following is forbidden:
24 Killing detained persons; inflicting bodily harm on them; robbing detained
25 persons, sick and wounded; desecrating corpses; looting them."
1 [Interpretation] Then end of quotation. And he says on the next
2 page, I think, quoting again: "[In English] Offending human dignity, rape
3 and forced prostitution."
4 [Interpretation] All this is written and he quoted it. And then
5 comes what you just mentioned. Drewienkiewicz says on 2982: "If we go on
6 to paragraph 4," again he quotes: "One should endeavour to avoid use of
7 artillery weapons -- [In English] One should endeavour to avoid the use of
8 artillery weapons and other weapons against citizens who are not offering
9 any resistance, against places of worship, and the like. And that, again,
10 is what one would hope to see, but the word 'endeavour' -- the word
11 'endeavour' again I would draw your attention to, because I think it
12 should be written that every effort ought to be taken to."
13 [Interpretation] And then again under quotation marks:
14 "'Endeavour' is, frankly, weak in this sort of context, in my view."
15 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's time for a question and then we'll adjourn.
16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
17 Q. So Drewienkiewicz criticised this reminder, which contains - and
18 he quoted a lot from it - a lot of orders and bans, and this wording,
19 translated into English as "endeavour" or "making an effort" as related to
20 the use of artillery weapons. Would you interpret it as allowing you to
21 use artillery weapons because the word "endeavour" is so mild?
22 A. This concept does not differ in any way from the wording
23 Drewienkiewicz recommended as fitting. In our interpretation of the word
24 "endeavour," it is exactly the same as what he recommended. It does not
25 say at any point that something like this could be done without taking any
1 measures to avoid casualties. I don't see the difference, the distinction
2 that he was trying to make.
3 Q. Let me ask you, is there any difference between this protocol of
4 edition to Geneva Conventions, 12th of August, 1949, relating to the
5 protection of victims of international armed conflict, protocol I, and
6 Article 57 that says: "In the conduct of military operations [In English]
7 care shall be taken to spare the civilian population, civilians and
8 civilian objects."
9 [Interpretation] Does this wording of the Geneva Convention or,
10 rather, the protocol to the Geneva Convention, differ in any way from what
11 is written in this reminder if we say, "In the conduct of military
12 operations, constant care shall be taken to spare the civilian population,
13 civilians, and civilian objects?" Is that the same thought expressed in
14 this reminder, or is Mr. Drewienkiewicz right in saying that this is not
15 emphatic enough?
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ...
17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I don't see any difference between
18 what Drewienkiewicz is saying and our word "endeavour." I think --
19 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, how much longer will you be with
20 this witness?
21 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I planned to finish today, including
22 the cross-examination, but unfortunately this is proceeding a bit more
24 MR. KAY: Just to assist the Court. The last section we were on
25 was on page 8 of the English document, where the word "endeavour" was. My
1 Sanction connection went. I don't know if everyone else still had it, but
2 it was page 8.
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you must consider whether you need
4 to ask all these questions of this witness in relation to General DZ's
5 testimony. You do have a right to have your witness comment on the
6 testimony if you're seeking to contradict the witness, the witness's
7 testimony, but I don't know how much importance is to be attached to
8 General DZ's testimony. So you need to consider whether you need to spend
9 so much time with this witness on that aspect.
10 We will adjourn now for 20 minutes.
11 --- Recess taken at 12.20 p.m.
12 --- On resuming at 12.46 p.m.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Nice.
14 MR. NICE: Record-keeping and exhibits, as promised. The Court
15 probably has two documents, one in ordinary portrait format, headed
16 Exhibits to be used with Milan Kotur, some clearly not exhibited and
17 others marked as documents, for example, D300, tabs 165 and so on, not
18 admitted. It seems to us that that is an accurate reflection of the state
19 of those documents which were to be found in the binders provided by the
20 accused. Similarly accurate appears to us to be the other document, I
21 think provided by the pro se liaison officer, dealing with documents that
22 the accused wanted to be considered or looked at, having been produced by
23 or through Delic. They are either all been produced, or it may be - and
24 we haven't been able to check this - some of them are produced for
25 identification subject to production of final translations. So these two
1 documents would appear to be accurate and satisfactory to work from.
2 JUDGE ROBINSON: Thank you, Mr. Nice, yes.
3 Mr. Milosevic, do you want all the documents to be admitted from
4 -- until number 15?
5 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I omitted some tabs. I did omit
6 some tabs. But just the ones I mentioned, because there are a number of
7 diagrams and schematics contained in the documents. I don't think they
8 need all be admitted. I just mentioned the ones that I would like to have
9 admitted and the ones commented on by the witness.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: [Previous translation continues] ... 167 will be
11 admitted. Those are the ones --
12 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right.
13 JUDGE KWON: And 16 onwards, all of them admitted.
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: And from tab 16 to 68 will be admitted.
15 Yes, Mr. Milosevic. Let's try to have your examination-in-chief
16 concluded as quickly as possible.
17 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I'm doing my best, Mr. Robinson, and
18 I am bearing in mind your suggestion, and I don't need to deal with
19 Drewienkiewicz at such great length, but I would just like to mention one
20 more question and that was something that he raised as well as some other
21 witnesses of the opposite side.
22 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
23 Q. On page 3016, he says the following, and I'm going to quote a
24 short passage from the transcript: "[In English] Therefore, FRY forces --
25 when FRY forces responded, it was our opinion that that response should be
1 proportionate, and it quite often wasn't and therefore we would report it
2 as being disproportionate."
3 [Interpretation] Now, Colonel, he here implicitly confirms the
4 fact that our forces did react and respond to KLA attacks, but the problem
5 was -- and he doesn't challenge that, but the problem was that it was
7 Now, did you consider this question with the representatives of
8 the Verification Mission? Did you bring that up, this disproportionate
9 alleged response on the part of our side, and did our side act
10 disproportionately and often, as he says so here?
11 A. As regards our response to the provocations or attacks of the
12 so-called Liberation Army of Kosovo and Metohija, we did our best to
13 ensure that it be a proportionate response as far as was possible, that is
14 to say to protect us from the attacks. And you're going to find that
15 stipulated in the daily report sent to the liaison team and the General
17 There were at meetings -- at two or three meetings times when this
18 question was raised of proportionate and disproportionate response,
19 looking at the number of persons killed, number of persons taken prisoner,
20 and that he doubted that this was proportionate, although he did say that
21 our response was justified, and so on and so forth. But that's where it
22 ended. It stopped there.
23 What I can tell you is this: We did take care that our response
24 should be proportionate and adequate and commensurate with the attack to
25 protect our units or facilities or features or whatever.
1 Q. Thank you. Now, you attended the first meeting with Walker, who
2 otherwise led -- was led by General Loncar on our side in Pristina; is
3 that right?
4 A. Yes, that is right.
5 Q. Now, what can you tell us about that meeting? What was the
6 subject of the meeting?
7 A. Well, at the first official meeting that General Loncar chaired
8 and led on behalf of the federal committee for relations with the
9 Verification Mission, the composition of which was the representatives of
10 the MUP, Colonel Mijatovic and I myself, and an interpreter from the
11 foreign affairs department, and that was held at the headquarters of the
12 Verification Mission in Pristina. And at the meeting Mr. Walker told
13 Mr. Loncar or, rather, he apologised right at the beginning of the meeting
14 because he had taken up the retirement time which would otherwise have let
15 him play with his grandchildren, and that he was to blame because, he
16 said, that at a meeting with Milosevic in Belgrade he happened to remember
17 Mr. Loncar and their cooperation dating back to the Slavonia days and he
18 wished to work with somebody who he knew. And so it was at his request
19 that Mr. Milosevic enabled him to do so and to meet Loncar.
20 So that was the beginning of the meeting. At the meeting itself,
21 we presented our structure and the make-up of our team and the liaison man
22 for Kosovo and Metohija. We decided upon our guidelines for cooperation
23 about verification of events and matters of that kind during that first
24 initial contact, as much as we were able to present. He was alone, just
25 with an interpreter. He didn't have his advisors there with him. And
1 then Mr. Walker informed us of a meeting that he had had before arriving
2 in Pristina with you, and he told us that he was surprised how far
3 Mr. Milosevic lacked knowledge and information about the situation
4 prevailing in Kosovo and Metohija. He also said that he was even more
5 surprised of the way in which Mr. Milosevic interpreted the agreement
6 signed by our government with the OSCE with respect to the establishment
7 of a Verification Mission in Kosovo and Metohija and its work. So that,
8 in the briefest terms, were the contents of that meeting of ours.
9 We decided at the meeting or, rather, General Loncar asked me to
10 speak on behalf of the Pristina Corps and Colonel Mijatovic on behalf of
11 MUP. That's what was proposed, and the general mood was friendly between
12 Loncar and Drewienkiewicz. It was established that the --
13 Q. Did you mean Drewienkiewicz or Walker?
14 A. No, I meant Walker, sorry. So that Mr. Loncar and Mr. Walker held
15 the discussions themselves.
16 Q. Right. You've now described to us that first meeting. As a
17 witness here, Mr. Walker said that it is not -- "My assertion is not true
18 that General Loncar was appointed to his position in Kosovo and Metohija
19 at his request." May we have your comments on that assertion made by
20 William Walker?
21 A. Well, that assertion doesn't hold water because, as I said at the
22 beginning, he apologised to begin with, said it was his wish to cooperate
23 with Loncar and his fault for separating Loncar from his days as a
24 pensioner, carefree days of enjoying his retirement. That's what he said
25 to him personally and apologised to him for pulling him out of retirement,
1 so to speak.
2 Q. Otherwise, he said: "I did not ask for General Loncar. As I say,
3 I only inquired about someone we both knew [In English] as a means of
4 getting the conversation started. But as I also said, I was really quite
5 surprised when I got to Kosovo a few days later and found General Loncar
6 there representing the government, especially since I'd been told he was
7 in retirement and his whereabouts were unknown to the president."
8 [Interpretation] Does that explanation of his stand?
9 A. No, it doesn't. It's not the correct one, not truthful. What I
10 said is true.
11 Q. Very well. Let's move on to another area with respect to Walker.
12 He said that he received the first information about Racak from General
13 Loncar and that General Loncar was not present during the visit to Racak
14 and that he called General Loncar -- he invited General Loncar to go with
15 him but that the man didn't accept.
16 Now, do you know anything about that, why Loncar didn't want to
17 go, didn't go to Racak with Walker or didn't want to Racak with him?
18 A. First of all, nobody invited or asked Loncar to go to Racak. I
19 know that for sure. And that can also be seen from the minutes and
20 records that we read of the 16th of January meeting where
21 Mr. Drewienkiewicz had a meeting with Loncar and myself. And Walker was
22 already in Racak at that time.
23 Secondly, the first piece of information that something was going
24 on in Racak or not I was asked to give by Mr. Drewienkiewicz on the 15th
25 in the evening, somewhere around 2330 hours -- or 2330 hours, I'm sorry.
1 Yes. And I think I said that in my previous response.
2 Loncar couldn't have informed Walker, because Walker was
3 elsewhere, travelling in Montenegro or in Skopje or somewhere. And so the
4 first information that could have reached him, it was logical to suppose,
5 could have just come from Mr. Drewienkiewicz as his deputy. And in the
6 afternoon in Pec where he held a meeting with his verifiers,
7 Mr. Drewienkiewicz heard about this action, although it was announced
8 earlier on.
9 Q. Very well. So Walker spoke about an attack here of a drunken
10 policeman, an attack at members of the mission and said that he considered
11 that his safety and security and that of his team was jeopardised, and he
12 asked Loncar to conduct an investigation, which Loncar agreed to do,
13 promised to do. Later on allegedly Loncar said to him that Walker and the
14 others had dreamt up this whole thing, fabricated it, because they had
15 provoked the policeman and the whole incident happened in quite a
16 different way from what Walker described it. So that's what he says in
17 his testimony on page 6838 -- or 37 and 8.
18 Q. Do you know anything about that?
19 A. Well, I do know something about that because the building where
20 the mission had its headquarters and the building in which Mr. Walker was
21 accommodated borders on -- is next door to the MUP meeting in Pristina,
22 and it is true that a policeman did try to get up close to Walker, but
23 nothing more than that. That's all that happened. But soon afterwards,
24 Walker seemed to have raised this incident to a higher level, adding to it
25 more than was truthful, with the desire to allow his security men to arm
1 themselves, because they didn't have an armed escort. So there were
2 polemics over this armed escort subject. But that's where the whole
3 incident finished. It wasn't an important incident.
4 Q. Did anybody in fact attack him?
5 A. No, nobody attacked him.
6 Q. Walker, on page 6867, says that he did not receive information
7 about Racak on the afternoon of the 15th because he was in Montenegro
8 throughout the day, but he heard about Racak for the first time when he
9 later returned to Pristina, when Drewienkiewicz came to see him and told
10 him that somebody had communicated with him from Loncar's office and
11 informed him that a conflict had taken place with the KLA in Racak. Can
12 you confirm that? Do you know anything about Racak?
13 A. So this confirms it. It confirms who Drewienkiewicz communicated
14 with, which is me, from Loncar's office, because my office and Loncar's
15 office are next door to each other, and incoming calls would be passed on
16 to me if Loncar wasn't there. Now that Drewienkiewicz said to him first,
17 said this to Walker first, that would be logical because he was his
18 deputy, Walker's deputy.
19 Q. Now, did you inform Drewienkiewicz that an incident in Racak had
20 taken place or not?
21 A. Drewienkiewicz asked me something about the event in Racak on the
22 15th in the evening at 2330 hours. But he already knew about the event;
23 he just wanted to talk to me about it.
24 Q. You've already told us about that.
25 A. Yes, I have.
1 Q. On page 6690 or, rather, 6900, he said that they kept asking
2 police commanders about information as to how many policemen, how many
3 soldiers, tanks, weapons, artillery pieces they had, so that they could
4 assess whether the number was growing, getting smaller, or stayed the
5 same. Do you have any comments to that?
6 A. No. I don't know. I don't really know. They knew how many
7 weapons we had, how much weaponry we had. There was no need for them to
8 ask us, because according to a report, we read that in Kosovska Mitrovica
9 they had a whole infrastructure with all the established units, a full
10 complement of units and they knew all about that, so it wasn't something
11 that was unknown, not an unknown quantity, because all the information
12 about the situation in our army, the units of our army, were stored in the
13 controls department in Vienna.
14 Q. He says that the agreement was not acted upon according to which
15 the army was duty-bound to inform of troop movements, et cetera, et
17 THE INTERPRETER: Could the speakers kindly be asked to slow down.
18 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, again the interpreter is asking
19 you to slow down.
20 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
21 Q. I said despite that obligation, members of the KVM often came
22 across tanks in streets, moving in various directions of which the
23 verifiers were not informed. So what is the truth in all of this?
24 A. The truth is this: They were informed about all and every
25 movement on the part of our units, and you can see this from the daily
1 reports that were written. So there was not a single troop movement that
2 they weren't informed of. And we had no reason not to inform them about
3 it. So that these tanks roaming around the streets and all the rest of it
4 is a little ludicrous, if I might say so.
5 Q. All right. Fine. Now, the witness of the opposite side,
6 Mr. Ciaglinski -- you know who he is, don't you?
7 A. Yes, I do.
8 Q. He brought up a few things here.
9 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. Robinson, Ciaglinski partly
10 testified in closed session, and I would like to ask you for this to be
11 discussed in open session, but I cannot present the arguments for that in
12 open session because I don't know what your ultimate ruling will be. So
13 could I please ask you to move into private session for a moment so that
14 you would see what this is about, and I hope that you will agree that this
15 can be discussed indeed in open session.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes. Yes. We'll hear your arguments.
17 [Private session]
25 [Open session]
1 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I suggest that we ask
3 the witness after all, does he agree to have this in open session?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I agree.
5 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
6 Q. All right. Now we are in open session again. Thank you for
7 having allowed to deal with this in open session.
8 On transcript page 3218, Ciaglinski speaks of some meeting with
9 you and others. I'm not going to go into all of this right now, but I
10 have to read part of the transcript.
11 "Question: At the conclusion of that meeting, did something occur
12 that was particularly noteworthy to you?
13 "Yes. I was given some information which I found rather
15 Question again: "And without disclosing the name of the
16 individual who provided that information, can you tell us the general
17 circumstances about how it was that you had an opportunity to get this
18 additional information?
19 "At the conclusion of one of our meetings, when most of the
20 members who had taken part in this meeting had departed, myself and my
21 interpreter met with this official, and he put a map on the table and
22 began telling us exactly what the future options were for Kosovo.
23 "Mr. Ryneveld: Might we move briefly into private session.
24 "Judge May: Yes."
25 [Interpretation] And then it says "Private session."
1 [In English].
2 "Question: Once we've been assured that your comments can now not
3 be heard by anyone -- are we at that stage?
4 "Registrar: Yes.
5 "We are in private session.
6 "Sir, who was the individual who you met with in the presence of
7 your interpreter, who spread out the map?
8 "Answer: Colonel Kotur.
9 "Question: And just so that we know who he was, he was the
10 gentleman who had been part of the commission for some time?
11 "Answer: Yes. He was -- he was there right from the very
12 beginning, as the -- sort of the main VJ, serving VJ officer on the
13 commission who had in fact disappeared ..."
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you must ask a question now.
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I thought that I should read
16 out the transcript and then to get a response to --
17 JUDGE ROBINSON: I think you've already read enough. Put your
19 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
20 Q. Colonel, is this correct, what Ciaglinski said here, that when the
21 meeting was over, when you were alone with him, that you spread out this
22 map and gave him some kind of explanations? After all, in all fairness,
23 there are other explanations that he gives in terms of what he -- you said
24 to him. But tell me, did you spread out a map and give him some
25 information as to what the intentions of the army of Yugoslavia were?
1 A. That is absolutely incorrect. I did not spread a map out for him.
2 I did not give him any kind of explanations.
3 Q. All right. Further on he says: "[In English] ... right from the
4 very beginning as the -- sort of the main VJ, serving VJ officer on the
5 commission who had in fact disappeared when the -- who had --"
6 [Interpretation] who actually -- "[In English] -- Brankovic Commission
7 came in but occasionally put in an appearance again.
8 "And he was present at this particular --
9 "He was present at this meeting, and what happened was that it
10 was just himself, my interpreter and myself present when these discussions
11 took place."
12 Again another question:
13 "What level was he with the VJ?
14 "Well, he was an extremely experienced officer who had served for
15 more than ten years, possibly as much as 15 years in Kosovo, had a house
16 in Kosovo and had been -- had taken part in the activities in 1998 as a
17 commander in the Djakovica area where various events, fairly serious
18 fighting, took place."
19 [Interpretation] And so on and so forth. "[In English]... the
20 type of uniform he wore ... he tended to wear a special forces uniform but
21 he was very well informed, very well --"
22 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, please put a question. You're not
23 using your time well.
24 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
25 Q. What he says here, that for ten or 15 years you were in Kosovo.
1 Is that correct?
2 A. That's correct. I was in Kosovo for ten years.
3 Q. And he puts a question to you: Who were you directly subordinated
4 to, and you said General Loncar. So according to what he said here, you
5 explained to him -- rather, the rest is in public session. There is no
6 mention of your name, but it says what you had said, and it says here,
7 it's written down in the transcript: "This official spread the map on the
8 table in front of me, and without any preamble at all, he told me exactly
9 how the plan to deal with the KLA would take place."
10 [Interpretation] And then Ryneveld gives him some kind of map,
11 some ordinary map of Kosovo. Never mind. And he gives him some green
12 markers so that he could show --
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Mr. Milosevic, you are wasting time. What is
14 your question? If you don't have any other questions for the witness,
15 then we'll move to cross-examination.
16 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I have to read this out, what
17 Colonel Kotur allegedly said to him. That's what it says here on page
18 3222. Right. Basically it's a quote allegedly from Mr. Kotur.
19 "Basically we are going to carry on our operations from Vucitrn and push
20 the KLA across towards Glogovac. At Glogovac there is a large force of
21 --" this was where -- [Interpretation] and so on. T72 and T84. "[In
22 English] We will then cut off and destroy any stragglers that manage to
23 make it over the hill towards Glogovac."
24 [Interpretation] He talks about Podujevo and Mitrovica.
25 JUDGE ROBINSON: And what turns on this issue, Mr. Milosevic, as
1 to whether Colonel Kotur said this to --
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] This is what turns --
3 JUDGE ROBINSON: -- to Ciaglinski? What is the issue?
4 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] What is at issue is that Ciaglinski
5 is obviously lying, and then he says that Kotur said to him -- "[In
6 English] And when we have finished dealing with the KLA, we will remove
7 all the Albanians from the territory of Kosovo forever."
8 JUDGE ROBINSON: That's it. Okay. So put that to the witness as
9 to whether he -- put that to the witness, quite simply.
10 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, that's exactly what I've been
11 doing, reading this. This is astonishing. That's why I'm reading it. I
12 want him to hear what had been said here.
13 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
14 Q. Please, Colonel, you heard the description that Ciaglinski gave of
15 that meeting of yours. Did you actually stay with Ciaglinski one-on-one?
16 Did you spread out a map? Did you say that, "We're going to expel the
17 KLA, and that after that we're going to expel the Albanians forever"?
18 A. That is a pure lie. I said none of this to Ciaglinski. Why he
19 invented all of this is something I really don't understand.
20 Secondly, he also invented that I had disappeared from the team
21 for relations with the Verification Mission. That's a lie too.
22 There was a change. There was a reorganisation of the team for
23 relations with the Verification Mission, but that was only on the 10th of
24 March, ten days prior to the departure of the Kosovo Verification Mission
25 from Kosovo. I had my last meeting with Mr. Ciaglinski on the 10th of
1 March. I have a copy of the minutes of that meeting here, and it was
2 included in this binder where these tabs are. I don't know exactly which
3 tab it is, but I can't find it. And at that meeting on the 10th of March,
4 I tell him that many officers, professional officers, came, 26 of them,
5 and that from the -- from the 10th of March onwards we have new people,
6 new professionals in Kosovo and Metohija. Until then, liaison officers,
7 in addition to conducting their regular duties, worked as liaison officers
8 as well.
9 So on the 12th of March I was given an assignment by General
10 Loncar, to make sure that the delegation of Albanians be sent to
11 Rambouillet by French aircraft. And on the 13th I was personally present
12 at the airport, guaranteeing that this transportation would be conducted
13 properly. So I was active until the very last day, as far as the mission
14 was concern -- or, rather, the team for relations with missions in Kosovo.
15 So it's not that I disappeared. What Ciaglinski is saying is not
16 the case. I would like that to be clear on the basis of the record from
17 the 10th of March. I believe that you have it in your materials there
19 Q. All right. I'm going to ask you to look it up by tomorrow,
20 regardless of whether we finish now or not. You don't have to dwell on
21 that right this instant.
22 And now for something completely different. Ciaglinski said here
23 that he was denied accession to FRY forces, that basically he had been
24 turned down. He said that if patrols of verifiers or, rather, teams from
25 the ground would return to him, he would contact the mission for
1 cooperation and seek access for the mission on the ground. He would
2 address Loncar or you, Colonel Kotur.
3 Is it correct that he was not allowed access to the forces of the
4 FRY and Serbia?
5 A. That's not correct. There was not a single question that
6 Ciaglinski raised in front of me and that I could not and did not resolve
7 to our mutual satisfaction. So touring units in the area and some units
8 in the border belt, control of the border units, touring border posts,
9 in-depth security units, we did all of that together. And I repeat once
10 again, not a single subject that he raised before the team of the Pristina
11 Corps was not seen through.
12 I'm not saying that at lower levels and at regional centres
13 officers for liaison and battalions, et cetera -- well, things happen, but
14 Mr. Ciaglinski, Mr. Drewienkiewicz, I, Mr. Loncar, all of this was carried
15 out in the field. So that's what I can say.
16 Q. All right. He talked about winter training or, rather, winter
17 exercises [In English] in relation to your duty in Kosovo, a term that is
18 known to you. [Interpretation] He says that he drew the attention of
19 persons responsible in the army that this was a violation of the agreement
20 and the response he got that they had to train because their training
21 ground is actually the area of Kosovo. Was this a violation of the
23 A. This was not a violation of the agreement. They actually agreed,
24 Ciaglinski did. I'll show you the record tomorrow. They agreed that this
25 was a normal reaction on our part, that it was only natural that we should
1 train our troops, and that the only problem was that they saw that through
2 this training of our units we were irritating the so-called Kosovo
3 Liberation Army and, being irritated, they could attack us, we could
4 respond, and then there could be a conflagration.
5 I think that on the 15th of February - I'm not sure about this, I
6 looked at one of my work notebooks during these past few days and I think
7 it found it there - Mr. Ciaglinski went to Brussels to report at the NATO
8 command there about the situation in Kosovo and Metohija. He said that
9 the presentation was positive, that it was in our favour, and I think that
10 Mr. Vollebaek, as a matter of fact, when he came to Kosovo and Metohija,
11 he conveyed our view of the situation, that we view the KLA as a terrorist
12 organisation, and then we had these NATO threats, and anyway, he said that
13 what we were doing was legitimate and all right. Vollebaek, he said, was
14 even surprised by this position and that he was actually surprised by how
15 he was presenting our positions.
16 Q. He said that at first General Loncar appeared independent and he
17 acted with self-assurance, but later on he was seeking more and more
18 instructions from Belgrade, from Sainovic and myself, and you were too.
19 What can you say about that?
20 A. That is not true at all. I was head of the team for relations
21 with the OSCE, and I was subordinated directly to General Pavkovic, the
22 commander of the corps, and I was responsible to him for my behaviour.
23 And I said that the Pristina Corps as a whole covered the entire territory
24 of Kosovo and Metohija and all activities in that area actually had to do
25 with the Pristina Corps, and we did not need any kind of information from
1 Belgrade as to how we should act and what we should do and not do,
2 especially Loncar didn't need that. He was a member of the federal
3 commission. I was his assistant. And with regard to all these questions
4 pertaining to the military, he would receive information from me. He had
5 less years of service in Kosovo. He was not so familiar with the
6 situation. That's why he had me as deputy, and on the side of MUP he had
7 Colonel Mijatovic who helped him.
8 At the level of the federal commission, he was only a coordinator
9 between MUP and the army, and he had absolutely no need for any advice.
10 Maybe Mr. Drewienkiewicz and Mr. Ciaglinski arrived at some
11 conclusions from the fact that Mr. Loncar was going to Belgrade
12 frequently. Maybe they thought it was for consultations. But the fact is
13 he lived in Belgrade, he resided in Belgrade, and went there regularly on
14 weekends and on holidays. That is maybe the reason why they saw the
15 situation that way, or maybe there could be some other reason, but General
16 Loncar never called Mr. Milosevic or anybody else from Belgrade to ask for
17 any clarification. If we did ask for information, we did it in writing.
18 Q. He made statements about increasing interference from Belgrade in
19 the affairs of Kosovo, and he says that you said that you were fed up with
20 politics, and that's why you asked that you be returned to the unit. [In
21 English] "And he had asked to go back to his military unit and so he was
22 also out of the commission."
23 A. I've already explained this. I worked in the commission until the
24 last day. And although there was some change in the team, I stayed in the
25 team. Colonel Petrovic came belatedly onto the mission, but I stayed
1 there until the end. It's just that from the 10th onwards, I did not
2 preside over the meetings. Colonel Petrovic did.
3 The Pristina Corps and the 3rd Army had a single team by that time
4 instead of two teams.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: Were you fed up with politics, Colonel? Colonel,
6 may I ask, were you fed up with politics, as you're alleged to have said?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No. I never said that, and I don't
8 know where he got that language and why he said that. Or maybe he put
9 together various bits and pieces and then made it up himself. I -- it has
10 nothing to do with what was actually said.
11 JUDGE ROBINSON: Yes, Mr. Milosevic.
12 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Well, I'm trying to skip as much as
13 possible --
14 JUDGE ROBINSON: I'd like you to finish --
15 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] -- in order to conclude.
16 JUDGE ROBINSON: I can't believe that you wouldn't be able to
17 conclude the examination-in-chief today.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] All right. I'll skip over the
19 greatest part of these transcripts.
20 MR. NICE: While the accused is doing that, in order to save time,
21 it will assist us, of course, if we can have sight of the 10th of March
22 record overnight. It's clear, known both to the --
23 JUDGE KWON: Is it not tab 14?
24 MR. KAY: Tab 14.
25 MR. NICE: So be it. Thank you.
1 JUDGE KWON: So we can admit it.
2 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I think Mr. Nice should be in
3 possession of these tabs.
4 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
5 Q. Colonel, just another question. It has to do with the testimony
6 of Ciaglinski here, and it is frequently mentioned by various parties.
7 Have you heard of any plan of violence or expulsion of Albanians from
9 THE INTERPRETER: There's no microphone for the witness.
10 JUDGE ROBINSON: Microphone for the witness.
11 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation]
12 Q. Nobody heard what you just said.
13 JUDGE ROBINSON: Just repeat your answer. Repeat your answer.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have never heard or known about
15 any plan of expulsion, so I wasn't able to say anything about it.
16 MR. MILOSEVIC: [Interpretation].
17 Q. Thank you. I have concluded my examination-in-chief.
18 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Robinson.
19 Thank you, Colonel.
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I found this record of the meeting
21 of the 10th, if it can be of assistance. It is number 244/99. My version
22 is only in Serbian.
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: It's tab 14. We will admit it.
24 Mr. Nice.
25 Cross-examined by Mr. Nice:
1 Q. And stay with that as a proposition. If I was misled it was by
2 your reference to workbooks. What is the document we're looking at on tab
4 And perhaps it could be placed on the overhead projector, please.
5 What form of record is this that we're looking at?
6 A. It says in the heading: "SMIP, Foreign Ministry office, Pristina,
7 10th of March, 1999." That is the "Federal Ministry for Foreign Affairs,
8 group for cooperation with the OSCE mission." It is a two-page document,
9 signed by the chief of the Federal Foreign Ministry office, Slana, and the
10 record was made by Soskic from the Federal Foreign Ministry office.
11 Q. So this is not a record you've made yourself?
12 A. No.
13 Q. Is it based to any extent on a record such as the workbook records
14 to which you've already referred, made by yourself?
15 A. I did not quite understand the question.
16 Q. Well, sorry, I was only trying to understand something you said a
17 little earlier. When asked by the accused about records, you made
18 reference to some of the workbooks, I think was the word that was used, or
19 at least in translation, that you had with you. This document, was it
20 built on a workbook or other record made by you?
21 A. No. This document was not written on the basis of any workbook.
22 It was written based on the minutes kept, not only at this meeting but the
23 kind of minutes that were regularly kept at such meetings attended by
24 representatives of the Federal Foreign Ministry in their office in
25 Pristina. And later, based on these minutes, they would develop this sort
1 of brief that was sent -- you can see from the document itself to whom it
2 was sent.
3 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... I want to deal with one other
4 matter of record-keeping. You've referred to workbooks. Do you have
5 personal contemporaneous workbooks; and if so, covering what periods of
6 time, with you today?
7 A. What I have is one notebook in which I kept documentation in the
8 period February, March 1999.
9 Q. Very well. What does it deal with? Does it deal with meetings
10 with people like Ciaglinski or not?
11 A. This notebook records meetings of the corps command, usually the
12 senior staff meetings at the corps command, because those were the
13 meetings that I attended and where I referred -- or, rather, reported to
14 the corps commander. But I also had to perform my regular duties as chief
15 of infantry parallel with this job, although the job with the mission was
16 of a higher priority.
17 Q. And that's the only notebook that you've brought with you, is it?
18 A. It's the only one I have.
19 Q. For example --
20 A. The only one I found.
21 Q. I see. For example, moving on beyond the time of the mission and
22 its departure, where were you, for example, in April of 1999?
23 A. Until the 11th of April, 1999, I was in the area of Gnjilane,
24 Urosevac, Vitina, Kacanik. And from the 11th onwards, 11th of April,
25 1999, I was in the area of Djakovica.
1 Q. Yes. And you were in an operational role at that time, weren't
3 A. No.
4 Q. What were you doing, then, at the time that there was a conflict
5 with NATO in Djakovica as a serving army officer if you weren't doing
6 operational things? Tell us.
7 A. After the ground operation that was mounted from the territory of
8 Albania against the Kosare installation, I was invited or, rather,
9 summoned by the corps command that was based in Grmani [phoen] Pristina,
10 and I arrived at the command sometime on the evening of the 10th without
11 knowing why I was being summoned. I found Commander Pavkovic at the
12 command post, and I was told that there were problems in Kosare, that the
13 situation there was unclear, and that they had summoned me in order to
14 send me to the 125th Motorised Brigade to take size of the situation and
15 to wait for General Lazarevic, who would be arriving later that evening,
16 who would brief me on the situation in Kosare, and then the next morning I
17 would leave for Djakovica.
18 I remember this because it was Easter, their most important
19 Christian holiday.
20 Q. Tell us, please, what you were doing around the 27th of April.
21 A. I can't remember.
22 Q. Can't you?
23 A. I can't remember --
24 Q. What was your role --
25 A. -- the 27th in particular.
1 Q. What was your role in relation to the incident internationally
2 known as the massacre at Meja and Korenica, please? What were you doing
3 in that operation?
4 A. I was not doing anything in that operation, and I don't know to
5 which extent you think I was involved in it. I don't understand the
7 Q. Very well.
8 A. I had nothing to do with that operation. That's what I'm trying
9 to say, that's why I don't understand the question.
10 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... record that tells us where
11 you were on the 27th of April?
12 A. I don't have any records.
13 Q. Let's go back to Ciaglinski just before we break. We know that
14 the evidence he gave about you was in part given in private session to
15 protect you. Since he gave that evidence, your wife has been in touch
16 with Ciaglinski on more than one occasion, hasn't she?
17 A. I think two times.
18 Q. To do or say two somewhat contradictory things. On the one hand,
19 she has alleged that Ciaglinski ruined your life. By telephone she made
20 these allegations. Is that right?
21 A. [No interpretation].
22 Q. What did she contact Ciaglinski to say, please?
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: What? I didn't get the answer to that question.
24 MR. NICE: It was a denial.
25 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreters did not hear any answer.
1 MR. NICE: I'll read it out again.
2 Q. On the one hand, she alleged that Ciaglinski had ruined your life.
3 She said that by telephone. Is that correct?
4 A. No.
5 Q. In which case I return to my supplementary question: What do you
6 say was the purpose of her attempting to contact Ciaglinski?
7 A. First of all, my wife knew Mr. Ciaglinski because she worked in
8 the Executive Council of Kosovo and Metohija where I had my office and
9 where we had regular daily meetings. So he had occasion to meet her, he
10 knew her. And she contacted him when she heard that he had stated what
11 Mr. Milosevic just read out in closed session, or after the closed
12 session. She simply couldn't understand how he could have said something
13 like that, because she knew that our relationship was very good, and on
14 the one hand she knew that I could not have stated anything of the kind.
15 It was a great surprise. And she couldn't understand why he could have
16 put it that way.
17 Of course, it did not ruin my life. I went into retirement after
18 many years of service, and that comment did not affect my career in any
19 way. So that's not true.
20 Q. [Previous translation continues] ... to tidy this little issue up.
21 I don't know how we're pressed for time. The second arguably
22 contradictory thing she did was to invite --
23 JUDGE ROBINSON: We have to stop now, Mr. Nice, after this
25 MR. NICE:
1 Q. I can deal with it. Two other things. I was going to say that
2 your wife invited Ciaglinski to lunch at your house in Nis, didn't she?
3 A. No.
4 MR. NICE: I'll tidy that up in the morning, with your leave.
5 JUDGE ROBINSON: We will adjourn now and resume tomorrow morning
6 at 9.00 a.m.
7 Colonel, I give you the standard warning not to discuss your
8 evidence with anybody.
9 We are adjourned.
10 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.46 p.m.,
11 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 24th day
12 of January, 2006, at 9.00 a.m.