1 Wednesday, 17 April 2002
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.17 a.m.
5 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Good morning, everybody. Sorry for this short
6 delay due to a technical problem.
7 Would you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Yes, Your Honours. Good morning. This is case
9 number IT-97-24-T, the Prosecutor versus Milomir Stakic.
10 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you.
11 May I have the appearances, please, Ms. Korner.
12 MS. KORNER: Joanna Korner, Andrew Cayley, Nicholas Koumjian, and
13 Ruth Karper, our case manager.
14 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: For the Defence, thank you.
15 MR. LUKIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Branko Lukic and Mr. John
16 Ostojic for the Defence.
17 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you. Before we go into some
18 administrative matters and other matters related to Rule 48, 48 bis, I
19 want to come back to the question of the factual agreement which is still
20 open. Therefore, the question directly to the Defence: Did you come or
21 do you intend to come to a certain kind of factual agreement as it was
22 suggested by the Office of the Prosecutor to go through the indictment
23 paragraph by paragraph and then tell whether or not you can agree on
24 certain facts? I wonder if this would not be possible. I once again have
25 to remind you that sometimes later in the trial it could be too late, just
1 to quote the former Russian head of government, Mikhail Gorbachev saying
2 to all of us, "The one who comes too late will be punished by the life."
3 So, therefore, my question is, what is your point of view today?
4 MR. LUKIC: Your Honours, I can tell you that my team went through
5 the indictment and we found that even the general things were wrongly
6 depicted in this indictment. So probably we will object to the indictment
7 in its whole. But anyway, we can speak with the Prosecution if they found
8 it necessary. We haven't done it yet. But we didn't go through the
9 indictment step by step, and if they find time, we are ready to have that
10 meeting. But I can tell you in advance that we didn't find too many
11 things which would be agreeable.
12 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you for this. Only if there are only a
13 few points where you can agree, it would indeed be helpful, and I only can
14 invite you to do so and to try the very best. Please always bear in mind,
15 it's not our money; it's the money of the global taxpayer we are wasting
16 here when we discuss issues which should normally be accepted facts.
17 Please come back to this.
18 Then formally I have to ask the Defence, under Rule 84: Do you
19 want to make an opening statement now or later, as foreseen in the Rule?
20 MR. LUKIC: Your Honours, we will reserve that right for later.
21 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you. And the second question goes to
22 Dr. Stakic, under Rule 84 bis. Dr. Stakic, do you want to make a
23 statement pursuant to Rule 84 bis?
24 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
25 THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Your Honours, at this point in time,
1 I don't think I have anything to say.
2 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: All right. Thank you. Then we come, hopefully
3 only in a very short time, to the list of witnesses. We have two lists to
4 discuss in short today. First and the less problematic exercise will be
5 the list of the next ten witnesses. Here I have only one remark, and this
6 is that for certain witnesses, we don't have transcripts yet, and this is
7 Witness 3, scheduled for the 23rd of April, and for Witness 6.
8 MS. KORNER: Yes. Can I tell Your Honours straight away, Witness
9 3 will not be here. When he was contacted -- or rather, he was, we
10 thought, able to attend. He is not. He's being evicted and he has to
11 find new accommodation. So he will have to be rescheduled. Accordingly,
12 the Witness 2 will be giving evidence from tomorrow, and thereafter, if
13 you go to the proposed deposition witnesses, the second witness there will
14 be testifying thereafter, and we still have to try and move up the other
15 witnesses on our list. We've had exceeding difficulty in persuading
16 people to attend at short notice, and of course it makes life more
17 difficult for the victim and witnesses service, who have to get these
18 people here.
19 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Sorry. Did I understand you correctly that the
20 second -- next witness will be Witness 7?
21 MR. KORNER: No. If Your Honour looks at the list of what was
22 then proposed to be witnesses taken through deposition --
23 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Yes.
24 MS. KORNER: -- the second witness there, who was the -- yes.
25 It's number 14 on Rule 65 ter statements.
1 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Yes.
2 MS. KORNER: He will be coming immediately after the witness who
3 is number 2 on our proposed witness list.
4 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Good. Then from the list of the ten to appear
5 in the beginning, it's only number 6, where we don't have the transcript?
6 MS. KORNER: Yes. Your Honour, we'll make arrangements that Your
7 Honours have the transcript for both numbers 3 on that list and 6. At
8 least, I hope we will.
9 [Prosecution counsel confer]
10 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I understand the reason that you weren't
11 provided is that, as we knew, the registry had access to all transcripts.
12 We assumed, maybe wrongly, that they were provided to Your Honours, but we
13 can in fact, in any event, provide it.
14 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: We indeed would be grateful, and just to
15 conclude this general question, this Trial Chamber would appreciate if
16 there is any update on the summaries, if you could not only provide the
17 Defence, as it was discussed in the 65 ter meeting, but also the Trial
18 Chamber with the update of the summary, and of course if it's not too
19 much, we would enjoy if you could add in the list of summaries the
20 references to the different documents available for us, because it doesn't
21 make much sense always to copy and copy. We have all the documents, and
22 it would be easier just to make reference to the files and where we can
23 find first of all the exhibits.
24 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, this is what we would propose to do, as
25 we've been doing in the Brdjanin and Talic case, namely, that Your Honours
1 and the Defence will be provided in advance with the numbers of the
2 documents to which a witness will be referring during testimony. That's
3 the number on the exhibit list. In addition to that, if I understand this
4 correctly, does Your Honour mean that if a witness, during the course of a
5 proofing session, says something extra, Your Honours as well as the
6 Defence would wish to be provided with it?
7 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Yes.
8 MS. KORNER: Right. Very well.
9 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you. And then let's turn to the most
10 important question, what to do with your request on depositions. I saw
11 that evidently, from this list of the ten witnesses there, already one
12 witness is now on the list of the viva voce list of the first ten, so
13 therefore I regard this as withdrawn. The Witness 37 on the list 8. Is
14 that right?
15 MS. KORNER: Yes, Your Honour. I mean, I received a number of
16 messages yesterday from a legal officer whose name I can't remember, about
17 this, but I thought we discussed during the Pre-Trial Conference the fact
18 that because this trial had started and the Brdjanin and Talic trial will
19 not reach the Prijedor evidence until, at the earliest, we estimate, the
20 end of June, the whole deposition matter was dead in the water, if I can
21 use that English expression. And so therefore we've proceeded on the
22 basis that we will have to call these witnesses. We've attempted to see
23 whether, as I think I said to Your Honour at the Pre-Trial Conference,
24 witnesses who attend to give evidence in this trial somehow or other been
25 inserted into the Brdjanin and Talic trial. That's proving -- when we
1 attempted this exercise, for example, with this witness, the first
2 witness, it proved to be very difficult. I'm still awaiting the Defence's
3 agreement to see when he testifies here, if he's required to testify in
4 the Brdjanin and Talic trial, if he can in some way be inserted. But it
5 just is very difficult. But as far as the proposed deposition witnesses
6 go, with the exception of the two who we've asked for videolink, we're
7 just proceeding on the basis that we'll have to call them in one or other
9 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Right. But I had a look yesterday to avoid any
10 additional confusion on the transcript of the Pre-Trial Conference, and I
11 took it that the Office of the Prosecutor until now did not withdraw this
12 motion, and therefore please take it that the Trial Chamber will be open
13 to all solutions, whatever, and we'll try to find out which is the best
14 possible solution as regards the single witness, and therefore we went
15 through all the witnesses, witness by witness. And indeed, I think to
16 come, as soon as possible, to a conclusion on these ten witnesses. I
17 would say if it's possible, let's quite short go through this ten -- the
18 list of ten witnesses whether or not 92 bis is possible. We know the
19 background of at least nine witnesses, what they, from your point of view,
20 are intending to say, and therefore it should be better and easier to be
21 provided what can happen, especially when it comes to videolink witnesses.
22 The question remains whether or not you state your request to do this as
23 in the form of deposition. But let's proceed --
24 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, may I just say: It's very important
25 that Dr. Donia is able to complete his evidence-in-chief today, because
1 he's due to testify in another case tomorrow.
2 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Right.
3 MS. KORNER: I wonder if this matter can be put into obeyance. I
4 think there needs to be more discussion between the two teams.
5 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Probably we can come to, as regards certain
6 witnesses, to a quite clear solution, because already the Chamber came to
7 the conclusion that at least I want to tell you, Witness 1, 2, 6, 8, and
8 9, they have to be heard viva voce, in courtroom.
9 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, I'm pretty certain, almost certain, at
10 least two of the names I'm quite clear we would have had to have called
11 viva voce.
12 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Yes. And then to cut this story short, I can
13 tell you that notwithstanding other decisions on the basis of the
14 contributions of the parties, it could be, it could be, I emphasise,
15 feasible to introduce Witnesses 4, 5, and 10 as 92 bis; and as regards
16 Witness 3 and 7, here indeed we should go into some in-depth detailed
17 discussion whether really a videolink is sufficient and whether or not it
18 should be provided by the way of deposition or not. But this we can leave
19 to a discussion probably early tomorrow.
20 MS. KORNER: Yes. I have to tell Your Honour that as regards
21 Witness 6 on that list, there's no equally -- no question, but he'll have
22 to testify live, if a deposition can't be taken. In the Brdjanin and
23 Talic case, he gives clear and compelling evidence of one particular
24 aspect of the case, which undoubtedly will be challenged. So there's no
25 question that he can be Rule 92 there.
1 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Witness 6.
2 MS. KORNER: Witness number 6 on the list.
3 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Yes. But here we --
4 MS. KORNER: He also gives --
5 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: For certain reasons, we need to --
6 MS. KORNER: No, I understand that, and that's why he clearly will
7 have to give evidence and be cross-examined in respect of this accused as
8 well. That's obvious.
9 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Okay.
10 MS. KORNER: I mean, it might be helpful -- well, we can sort this
11 out at a later date, Your Honour, because I'm anxious not to delay
12 Dr. Donia. Whether we could do him by deposition. But with both parties
13 there. But as I say, Your Honour, we haven't withdrawn the motion, for a
14 simple reason. We do need a ruling, because both sets of Defence counsel
15 in one form or another have objected. But there seems to be, on the face
16 of it, no unfairness that has been pointed to by either sets of Defence
17 counsel in this case as to why we shouldn't be able to conduct this
18 exercise, in particular with this man, because although he's English, he's
19 a businessman, and it is enormously difficult to -- who travels a lot, to
20 time down [sic], to get him to come to the Tribunal, and he's testified
21 before, so he's someone who knows the system and he's not anxious to waste
22 a lot of time. So Your Honour, I am concerned that in some form or other,
23 you know, if there's a ruling, at least -- and the ruling goes against us
24 on this application, well, then fine, but at the moment there's no ruling
25 from either Trial Chamber on this matter.
1 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Okay. Then to make it quite clear, there is a
2 decision of the Trial Chamber that it's necessary to hear Witness 1 -- on
3 the list Witness 1, Witness 2, Witness 6, Witness 8, and Witness 9 viva
4 voce, and the others should be discussed tomorrow to avoid unnecessary
5 waste of time we need for Mr. Donia. We start tomorrow early in the
6 morning with the question of the remaining five, how to deal with them.
7 MS. KORNER: You don't mean five, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: The remaining four.
9 MS. KORNER: No. There's only --
10 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: We have --
11 MS. KORNER: I think Your Honour has already indicated that you
12 want to hear from the witnesses you've indicated. The other witnesses you
13 suggest can be Rule 92. We can tell Your Honour whether we think that's
14 appropriate or indeed --
15 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: It has to be discussed with the parties, of
17 MS. KORNER: Yes.
18 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Let's do this tomorrow, but once again, 1, 2, 6,
19 8, 9, and 8 is already included in your list of the first ten witnesses.
20 MS. KORNER: Yes.
21 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Then let's come back to the other five witnesses
22 tomorrow in the beginning of the trial. But now let's turn to --
23 MS. KORNER: Your Honour, Dr. -- would Your Honour excuse me. I
24 have to appear in the Brdjanin and Talic case this afternoon and
25 Mr. Cayley is going to be calling Dr. Donia.
1 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Okay. Mr. Cayley.
2 MR. CAYLEY: Good morning, Mr. President, Your Honours. I will be
3 leading Dr. Donia in evidence. Could I ask Your Honours, do you have the
4 binders that were provided to the Court I think yesterday, which contain
5 the exhibits that he will refer to? Good. Just to make it clear,
6 Mr. President, there are two separate reports, as you know. There was a
7 report that was produced for the Brdjanin and Talic case and there was a
8 report, a subsidiary report produced for this case. There are exhibits
9 that relate to both reports. The exhibits that relate to the report that
10 was produced for this case have been disclosed to the Defence, have been
11 provided to Your Honours. The exhibits for the main report that was
12 produced for the Brdjanin and Talic case have not yet been provided to the
13 Defence, but they will be today. Very few of them are going to be
14 referred to him -- are going to be referred to by Mr. Donia this morning,
15 and I understand that the cross-examination of the witness will take place
16 next week, so the Defence will have ample time to look at those documents.
17 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Yes. I think we have the documents SK1 to SK41
18 as exhibits. Then we have the report that was filed the 22nd of March,
19 and additionally, you provided us with the transcripts. We have to come
20 back to the question of transcripts next week, but first of all, I go out
21 from the fact that you are aware that the Trial Chamber is only prepared
22 to hear Dr. Donia on this -- first of all, this first part, this first 20
23 pages, and not the entire exercise as regards history from the tribes in
24 the area.
25 MR. CAYLEY: Absolutely, Your Honour. That's my perfect
1 understand. Dr. Donia, in fact, his testimony will simply be an abridged
2 version of the 20-page report. He will refer to one or two matters from
3 the original report, the Brdjanin and Talic report, simply to put matters
4 in a context which will make sense for Your Honours. But no, we will not
5 be going through the large report.
6 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Okay. Then Dr. Donia may be --
7 MR. CAYLEY: One last matter, Mr. President. There are three
8 documents which are not in the binders which the witness will refer to,
9 and I will distribute those in the first break, because the witness won't
10 refer to those until the end of his testimony. They're very, very brief.
11 I think they're about three pages.
12 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Okay. Please, Mr. Cayley, take care yourself
13 when you regard it as necessary to have the break after -- yes, it should
14 be somewhere at 10.30, the first break.
15 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: It's up to you how to conduct this.
17 And then Dr. Donia may come.
18 [The witness entered court]
19 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Good morning, Dr. Donia. Please take the solemn
21 WITNESS: ROBERT DONIA
22 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
23 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
24 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you, Dr. Donia.
25 Please proceed, Mr. Cayley.
1 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President
2 Examined by Mr. Cayley:
3 Q. Dr. Donia, before we commence, I know you've testified a number of
4 times before the Tribunal before, but if you can remember that we both
5 speak the same language. There are interpreters between us, so I will be
6 listening to the French translation and I will be pausing after your
7 answers to allow the translation to catch up.
8 First of all, Dr. Donia, very briefly, if you could tell Their
9 Honours something of your antecedents, your academic credentials, why you
10 are qualified to give an expert opinion before this Court.
11 A. I first spent time in the former Yugoslavia in the mid-1970s,
12 1974, 1975, on a Fulbright Hayes grant doing research for dissertation in
13 history at the University of Michigan that dealt with the Bosnian Muslims
14 in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. I subsequently completed that
15 dissertation at the University of Michigan in 1976 and taught at Ohio
16 State University Lima campus and the University of Oregon for four years,
17 at which time I left the academic profession and worked for the firm of
18 Merrill Lynch in matters completely unrelated to south-eastern Europe from
19 1981 until 1998. I have since then conducted research and writing and
20 lectured on matters dealing with Bosnia-Herzegovina and the former
21 Yugoslavia, and I currently have an appointment as a research scholar at
22 the University of California at San Diego and as a research associate at
23 the University of Michigan.
24 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. Usher, if the letter of request could be handed
25 out to the Court and Their Honours, and to the witness.
1 Q. Dr. Donia, I'm handing to you the letter that was written to you
2 by Ms. Korner, which sets out the requirements of the Office of the
3 Prosecutor in respect of your expert opinion, both in written form and
4 your oral testimony today. Can you explain to the Judges very briefly
5 what was required of you?
6 A. I was asked to examine documents in the possession of the Office
7 of the Prosecutor, and on the basis of those, to prepare a report on the
8 factors which may have contributed to the events in Prijedor from 1992 to
9 1995 -- I'm sorry, April 1992 to December 1992.
10 Q. Now, you have a binder in front of you which are the exhibits
11 which Their Honours have in front of them, marked SK1 to SK41. Can you
12 very briefly explain the contents of this file?
13 A. The vast majority of the documentation in this binder consists of
14 one of two things: First is an extensive set of minutes from the meetings
15 of the Prijedor SDS Main Board in 1991 and the first half of 1992. Most
16 of the other exhibits pertain to our press articles taken primarily from
17 the local Prijedor newspaper Vjesnik in the same time period. There are
18 also a few documents which were -- which are in the possession of the
19 Office of the Prosecutor which are declarations or decisions by local
20 bodies in Prijedor.
21 Q. Dr. Donia, the Prijedor SDS Main Board minutes are, I believe,
22 Exhibit 12A and 12B in the binder. Can you very briefly explain to the
23 Judges exactly what those minutes are?
24 A. These minutes exist in one bound volume in the original language,
25 are handwritten in Cyrillic script, and are divided into, perhaps as many
1 as 30 meetings held principally by the Prijedor SDS Main Board, and a few
2 meetings held by other bodies which were related to the SDS Main Board.
3 One for example, of the club of deputies of the SDS in the Prijedor
4 Municipal Assembly. There is also the English translation of those
5 minutes which precedes it.
6 The handwriting is clearly taken at times in haste, and so there
7 are many incomplete sentences, and in some instances reference that are
8 not wholly clear, but by and large it represents the deliberations and
9 debates that went on in the Prijedor SDS Main Board.
10 Q. Just to be absolutely clear, these minutes, they are not a
11 transcript of what was stated; they are simply a summary of what was
12 stated by the various participants in these meetings. Is that correct?
13 A. That's correct. They are secretaries' minutes as transcription of
14 the discussions.
15 Q. Dr. Donia, very briefly, referring to the principal report that
16 you produced for Brdjanin and Talic, in that report you refer to what you
17 regard as the three most significant events which in your opinion preceded
18 the war in the former Yugoslavia. Could you very briefly explain to the
19 Judges those three significant events.
20 A. Yes. In that report I identified three important factors which
21 preceded the Bosnian war. Number 1 was the collapse of the communist --
22 or League of Communists of Yugoslavia in January 1990. Number 2 was the
23 first multiparty elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the latter half of
24 the twentieth century. Those elections were held in November, November
25 18th, 1990. And third was the decennial census which was taken at the
1 end of March 1991 throughout the former Yugoslavia, and in each
2 municipality of Bosnia and Herzegovina and other republics.
3 Q. And I'm right in saying that these three particular events did
4 have a special effect on the events in Prijedor; is that right?
5 A. Yes, that's correct.
6 Q. Now, you referred to the multiparty elections that took place in
7 Bosnia and Herzegovina in November of 1990. Can you explain to the Judges
8 who the principal political parties were that were participants in those
9 multiparty elections?
10 A. The three parties that won the most votes were the three principal
11 nationalist parties, namely, the Croatian Democratic Union, or HDZ, which
12 represented Croatian voters; the Serbian Democratic Party, or SDS, a party
13 of Serbs; and the Party of Democratic Action, or SDA, which was the
14 Bosnian Muslim political party. Together, these parties won something
15 over 80 per cent of the votes and positions in the voting of November
16 1990, and between them, among them, controlled the assembly of
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was
18 the executive organ for which elections were held.
19 The so-called opposition parties were numerous. The two primary
20 vote-getters among the opposition parties were the League of Communists
21 Social Democratic Party, which was the formerly ruling League of
22 Communists of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which had changed its name and adopted
23 the additional title of Social Democratic Party in the months before the
25 The second party that won a good number of votes was the Alliance
1 of Reformist Forces of Yugoslavia. This party was founded by Yugoslavia
2 federal prime minister Ante Markovic and favoured economic reforms.
3 Markovic was a Serb -- or a Croat from Bosnia, and selected as the place
4 to inaugurate the party's activities Mount Kozara just above Prijedor
5 because of the important historical association of that location with the
6 Partisan resistance in World War II.
7 Q. We'll come on to that subject very briefly, Dr. Donia. Now, you
8 stated that these multiparty elections took place at a national level.
9 Did they also take place at a local level in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
10 A. Yes. They took place in each of the 109 municipalities, where
11 voting took place for the Municipal Assembly of each municipality, and
12 these municipalities -- the assemblies were typically sizeable. They
13 ranged in size from 27 members to 130. So the municipalities themselves
14 had a sizeable ruling bodies which were these assemblies.
15 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be provided with a map which was
16 I think offered by Ms. Korner yesterday. Mr. President, I've given it, if
17 I may, an exhibit number, 48. It's a map of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
18 If you could place it on the ELMO, please, Mr. Usher.
19 Q. Dr. Donia, very briefly, if you could explain to the Judges the
20 structure of the government in Bosnia and Herzegovina. You've already
21 referred to it that there was a government at a national level and then at
22 a municipal level.
23 A. In 1990, the character of this --
24 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Sorry to interrupt. Could you please provide
25 that we can also see the map on the --
1 MR. CAYLEY: I think the machine, Your Honour, is warming up at
2 the moment.
3 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Okay.
4 THE WITNESS: I believe the power is off.
5 MR. CAYLEY: If the power could be switched on the projector.
6 Your Honours, can you now -- you can see it. Thank you.
7 A. The Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was one of six republics in
8 the socialist federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As with the other
9 republics, Bosnia and Herzegovina was administratively divided into
10 municipalities or opstina. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, in 1990, there were
11 109 such municipalities. In most cases, they were rural administrative
12 units centred on a town of some size, either smaller or larger, after
13 which the municipality was named. In some cases, these municipalities
14 cooperated in associations for particular purposes, school districts,
15 economic cooperation, matters like that, but the municipalities had been
16 the primary administrative unit under various names, dating back over a
17 hundred years. So the practice of these local administrative units was
18 one that had persisted over the decades, really, of the twentieth century.
19 Prijedor, of course, is one municipality in the north-western part
20 of Bosnia, a part of the area known as the Bosnian Krajina because of its
21 historical role as a border land from the time of the Ottoman Empire prior
22 to 1878.
23 Q. Now, Dr. Donia, you've already stated to Their Honours that the
24 main victors of the multiparty elections were the nationally-based
25 parties, the SDS, the SDA, and the HDZ. In your principal report for
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 Brdjanin and Talic, you refer to the inter parte agreement, which I know
2 from your report on Prijedor has an important effect on matters in
3 Prijedor. Can you explain to Their Honours exactly what the inter party
4 agreement was and how it affected the allocation of positions of authority
5 at both national and municipal levels.
6 A. During the election campaign, the three national parties formed an
7 informal agreement among themselves not to attack one another, and rather,
8 to direct all their campaigning activities against the incumbent League of
9 Communists, social Democrats, and other non-national parties. This
10 agreement was informal. It was largely honoured throughout the campaign,
11 although not in all municipalities and not at all times. And assured that
12 the three national parties did not detract from one another's appeal,
13 particularly in municipalities with roughly balanced populations between
14 the nationalities.
15 As the election approached and the prospect of a victory by these
16 parties became more likely, the Republican-level party leaders extended
17 that inter-party agreement to the division of primary positions in
18 government, should they be victorious, and after the election, this
19 agreement was further extended to an agreement regarding numerous
20 portfolios within the government. The primary provision was that the
21 first vote-getting party would be entitled to the Presidency of the
22 Municipal Assembly; the second party would appoint the president of the
23 executive committee of the municipality, and the third party -- or the
24 first party again would get the vice-presidency of the Municipal
25 Assembly. And this agreement pertained to a number of portfolios within
1 the municipality. The police was perhaps the most important of these
2 portfolios in Prijedor, and the inter-party agreement provided that the
3 chief of police would be designated by the first vote-getting party. His
4 second in command, who was referred to as the commander of the police
5 station, would be designated by the second vote-getting party. And the
6 commander of the traffic police would go also to the first vote-getting
7 party in the municipality. This had various iterations according to the
8 national -- the party leaders who reached it, and its application in both
9 the republic-level government and municipalities was the primary source of
10 political contention in the first months after the election.
11 Q. Now, we will speak about the details of Prijedor and the
12 contention that took place there in 1991 and 1992 in a moment.
13 Now, one or two other matters from your main report. You refer to
14 the concept of regionalisation within the report that you produced for the
15 Brdjanin and Talic case, and that is relevant to events in Prijedor. Can
16 you explain to the Judges the concept of regionalisation and the effect
17 that that concept had on matters in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1991 and early
19 A. Regionalisation was a concept that was promoted principally,
20 although not exclusively, by the SDS. It consisted of three different
21 strategies or approaches. The first and most obvious form of
22 regionalisation was the creation of a body made up of several
23 municipalities which had a majority Serbian population, or a substantial
24 Serbian population. So these regional associations was the first variant.
25 The second form of regionalisation was the creation of new
1 municipalities with Serb-majority population, created by carving out those
2 Serbian territories from existing municipalities.
3 And the third concept was to create parallel institutions,
4 parallel to the elected ruling institutions of existing municipalities,
5 without a necessarily territorial designation assigned to those
7 These were all concepts adopted by the SDS from earlier
8 precedents, and at times were advocated by the HDZ, the Croatian party, as
9 well as the SDS.
10 Q. Did the SDA, or the Muslim party, engage in regionalisation?
11 A. The SDA did engage in very limited efforts to organise separate
12 Muslim institutions in three or four municipalities in Bosnia, principally
13 in reaction to regionalisation efforts by other national parties. It was
14 generally, however, opposed to the regional breakdown of
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina and instead supported a unified republic.
16 Q. Now, another subject addressed at some length in your main
17 report. I want to also address this very briefly. The JNA, the Yugoslav
18 People's Army, how was that army connected with the state of the former
20 A. The Yugoslav People's Army, the JNA, was born as the Partisans of
21 Josip Broz Tito in World War II. It carefully nurtured and guarded that
22 revolutionary partisan tradition. It was the army of Yugoslavia and was
23 tasked by constitutional mandate both to defend the country against
24 external aggression and to protect the socialist order of Yugoslavia. It
25 therefore was a key institution in keeping Yugoslavia together, and after
1 the collapse of the League of Communists in January 1990 was the principal
2 institution holding Yugoslavia together.
3 Q. Now, the organisation of the Territorial Defence has relevance to
4 events in Prijedor. Can you explain to the Judges what the Territorial
5 Defence was.
6 A. Coming out of the World War II partisan experience, Yugoslav
7 defence theory emphasised that there needed to be a local force, local
8 individual -- local forces that could respond rapidly in the event of any
9 outside invasion or threat and be made up principally of local volunteers.
10 Consequently, the Territorial Defence forces, or TO, were an
11 integral part of Yugoslav defence theory. In the 1970s, local TO
12 organisations came under the administration of the ministries of defence
13 of the individual republics, in addition to being a part of the JNA
14 command structure, and the theory was that they would hold off and could
15 hold off in isolation any outside invader until such time as the JNA could
16 become effective in driving an invader out.
17 Q. Let us now move to Prijedor.
18 MR. CAYLEY: And if the witness could be shown appendix 2 of his
19 report, which is a map, an extract of a map showing Prijedor and Banja
21 Q. Dr. Donia, if you could identify firstly the significant
22 geographical features on this map and then identify for Their Honours the
23 strategic importance of Prijedor, the city of Prijedor and the
25 A. Yes. The dominant physical feature in Prijedor is the mountain
1 range that runs along that northern part of the municipality, and I
2 believe we can see this dotted line which defines the area known as the
3 Mount Kozara National Park. This is a series of summits rather than a
4 single high summit, but the two most important ones are Mrakovica, right
5 here, which is the site of a large partisan monument, and Lisina, which is
6 right here, the site of an important television relay station in
7 northern -- north-western Bosnia. This highland contrasts with the long
8 valley to its south-east, and through that valley runs a road and a
9 railroad line which connect Banja Luka to the north-western part of the
10 rest of Bosnia, and also the Croatian territories beyond Bosanski Novi.
11 And these had great strategic significance in World War II and in the
12 period of the 1990s for their role in connecting those two areas.
13 The other area of considerable significance is the large iron mine
14 at Ljubija. In World War II, this was a very valuable resource that at
15 various times both the occupying forces and the Partisans exploited for
16 its iron ore potential and continued to be a very -- really, I think, the
17 keystone of the Prijedor municipality economy throughout the socialist
18 period, from 1945 to 1990.
19 Within this, of course, is the city of Prijedor, which has always
20 been an important intersection between this east/west road and the route
21 running further north into the mountains and into Croatia, and also the
22 administrative centre of this area and itself the location of some local
24 Q. Dr. Donia, you referred a moment ago to the strategic significance
25 of this area during the Second World War, and I know in your report you
1 link events during the Second World War with events that took place in the
2 early 1990s, so I think it would be prudent for a moment to refer to those
4 Firstly, within the area of Prijedor and the Krajina, who were the
5 principal protagonists during the Second World War?
6 A. The Prijedor municipality, as the rest -- like the rest of Bosnia
7 and Herzegovina, was conquered in April 1941 by German forces, and with
8 some help from Italians, and in Zagreb, the extreme nationalist --
9 Croatian nationalist Ustasha regime was put in authority all over -- most
10 of Croatia and nearly all of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Consequently, this area
11 came under both German and Italian and Ustasha administration.
12 In the early months of Ustasha rule, north-western Bosnia was the
13 scene of many massacres carried out by Ustasha units and bands and their
14 allies, directed against Serbs, Jews, and Romany, and even Croats who
15 opposed the regime. Many thousands of Serbs were killed, by far the most
16 numerous victims of these activities were Serbs. And many others were
17 sent to concentration camps, the best known of which and most important of
18 which was the Jasenovac concentration camp, which was very close to
19 Prijedor, just across the river in Croatia, directly to the north of
20 Prijedor town. And so this -- these atrocities and ongoing slaughters
21 evoked a rebellion which began as a Serbian rebellion against these
22 Ustasha atrocities and became part of the partisan resistance movement
23 which was led by Josip Broz Tito.
24 In 1942, the partisans actually captured the city of Prijedor in
25 May 1942, and this and other successes led the German High Command to
1 order a major offensive against Eastern Bosnia and north-western Bosnia in
2 which became known in socialist literature as the Third Enemy Offensive.
3 This offensive was successful in that the Germans recaptured Prijedor and
4 took control of the Ljubija mine and encircled a large partisan force on
5 Mount Kozara. But they were not able to completely exterminate that force
6 and some partisans escaped the encirclement, and this became a staple of
7 the story of partisan heroism and the Yugoslav revolutionary successes,
8 partisan successes, that were celebrated in the times of socialist
10 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be shown appendix 5 to his
12 Q. You stated in your final sentence, Dr. Donia, that the successes
13 of the partisans was celebrated in socialist Yugoslavia, and I think
14 appendix 5 from your report represents a part of that celebration. If you
15 could explain to the Judges the nature of that photograph and where it was
17 A. Yes. I took this picture in October of last year on Mount Kozara,
18 at Mrakovica. This monument was built in the early 1970s as a memorial
19 to the partisan victims and those civilians who perished in this area.
20 And to the left of this monument is an area, a very excluded area in the
21 woods, with the embossed names of over 9.000 victims or people who died --
22 partisans who died in these battles. This became really something of a
23 shrine visited by school students and also became -- they designated this
24 entire area the national park, as I indicated before, and the national
25 park issued publications and held meetings to the right of this memorial,
1 about 300 yards, is a hotel complex and meeting centre, and it's just to
2 the right of this memorial that Ante Markovic held his organising meeting
3 of the Alliance of Reformist Forces of Yugoslavia in July of 1990.
4 So this became a memorial that was widely known and honoured in
5 socialist Yugoslavia. The name Kozara became the name of a military
6 barracks, the newspaper in Prijedor adopted that name, Kozarski Vjesnik,
7 and the military war unit of the Territorial Defence forces was known as
8 the Fifth Kozara Brigade. So the name Kozara came to embody this
9 revolutionary tradition.
10 Q. Dr. Donia, in conclusion, the fact that these terrible atrocities
11 had been committed in Prijedor and the fact that it had been a centre of
12 this heroic partisan resistance, did this have an effect on events in 1990
13 and onwards into 1991 and 1992?
14 A. Yes. I think the partisan tradition was more powerful, more
15 durable, in Prijedor municipality than many other places in Bosnia, and it
16 explains in part the relatively successful performance of the League of
17 Communists, Social Democrats, and Reformists in the elections of November
18 1990, because in Prijedor itself, the election results gave 30 seats in
19 the Municipal Assembly to the SDA, the Muslim party; 28 seats to the SDS,
20 the Serbian party; and 30 seats to the combined Reformists, social
21 Democrats, and a couple of other small parties, one other small party.
22 Consequently, Prijedor was one of the few municipalities in which the
23 so-called Left Bloc, or opposition, played a significant political role
24 after the elections.
25 Q. Now, Dr. Donia, on page 1 of your report, you identify four
1 factors which had a particular effect on events in Prijedor from January
2 1990. Now, you've already identified one of those, the Partisan legacy,
3 which you've just spoken about. What were the other three factors?
4 A. Well, first was the relationship, demographic relationship,
5 between Serbs and Muslims. For the entire twentieth century, the Serbs
6 had enjoyed a demographic plurality or majority in Prijedor, but in the
7 1991 census, these two groups were neck and neck, and the Muslims, in
8 terms of census respondents, had a few more than the Serbs for the first
9 time in the twentieth century. That was one factor.
10 The important role of the non-nationalist or leftist parties was
11 another factor. It meant that in the Municipal Assembly, no single party
12 could accomplish anything without the support and cooperation of one other
13 party or group.
14 And the last factor I've identified was an unusually contentious
15 SDS organisation in the first year of its existence.
16 Q. Dr. Donia, you've already stated to the Court the results of the
17 multiparty elections in the Prijedor Municipal Assembly in 1990. Now,
18 speaking again about the inter-party agreement, was this implemented in
19 the municipality of Prijedor between the three nationalist parties?
20 A. The inter-party agreement was implemented in the early months
21 after the election between the SDS and the SDA. The SHDZ's claims were
22 largely ignored, but those two parties, after difficult and long
23 negotiations, agreed upon about the top dozen, say 10 to 15 appointments
24 in the city government, in the municipal government. And at its first
25 meeting in the 1991 year, in January, the SDS and SDA agreed on the key
1 appointments, six top appointments, of which I'll just name three: The
2 president of the Municipal Assembly per the inter-party agreement was
3 nominated by the SDA, and that was Muhamed Cehajic; the president of the
4 executive committee was Milan Kovacevic, nominated by the SDS; and the
5 vice-president of the Municipal Assembly, also designated by the SDS, was
6 Dr. Milomir Stakic. And then the subsequent three positions were likewise
7 divided between those two parties, so that they were three and three.
8 Q. And am I right in saying that that information is contained in a
9 Kozarski Vjesnik article behind tab 2, Exhibit 2 in the exhibits in front
10 of you?
11 A. Yes, that's correct.
12 Q. Now, Dr. Donia, Exhibits 2 to 8 in the binder are also newspaper
13 articles from Kozarski Vjesnik, and they in essence give us a snapshot of
14 the first six months of the functioning of the Municipal Assembly after
15 the multiparty elections. Can you briefly summarise for the Judges what
16 happened in those first six months. I think you've already started in
17 terms of explaining the election of various officials, but can you go on
18 from that period, please.
19 A. Yes. The Municipal Assembly sessions were long, tortuous, and
20 centred primarily on the adoption of the agenda. However, the assembly
21 was successful in addressing a number of burning issues facing the
22 municipality. There were several strikes that were settled with the
23 assistance of the municipal leadership. Additional portfolios beyond the
24 six that I mentioned were agreed upon at the second session of the
25 assembly, but further negotiations on the division of portfolios,
1 governing portfolios and appointments between the SDS and the SDA were
2 unsuccessful. They were ongoing and they were at times close to a
3 resolution but never actually achieved an agreement on most positions.
4 The assembly met approximately monthly, but it was -- many of its
5 activities were in a sense frozen by the failure to agree on governing
7 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, would you like to take a break at this
8 point or do you want to continue for a while?
9 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: I think it's an appropriate moment, and we
10 should resume at ten minutes to 11.00. Thank you.
11 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.
12 --- On resuming at 10.55 a.m.
13 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: May we have Dr. Donia once again, please.
14 MR. CAYLEY: Yes, Mr. President. He's being fetched at this
16 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Probably it's just the time to decide whether or
17 not we take the document filed the 22nd of March, the report of Dr. Donia,
18 as such, as document P1, only the document, nothing about the
20 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, quite. We would be offering it into
21 evidence, but I think its number will be P -- SK42, the reason being that
22 the first 1 to 41 are the documents that Dr. Donia is referring to. So
23 that particular exhibit will be SK42A.
24 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: If there are no fundamental objections, both
25 from the Defence and from the registry, we can proceed as requested.
1 MR. CAYLEY: And the report -- the major report done on the
2 Bosnian Krajina will be SK43.
3 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Until now it's a kind of attachment to this
4 report; right?
5 MR. CAYLEY: Well, it's a bit hard, Your Honour, to represent it
6 by that, because it is the major component. The report for this case was
7 a subsidiary report, but the evidence contained within it is relevant and
8 is material to this case. So we've marked it as a separate exhibit, 43.
9 It follows on directly from the Prijedor report, which is 42.
10 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: This would be the part 1997 24PT page 10.788
11 on the top?
12 MR. CAYLEY: That's correct, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Any objections? No objections. Then this
14 should be SK43; right?
15 MR. CAYLEY: Yes, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: But already today I'll ask the Office of the
17 Prosecutor to show, probably next week, after the hearing of Dr. Donia,
18 for additional good cause why it should be necessary to introduce the
19 transcripts of Brdjanin and Talic in this case, because until now we can't
20 see any additional value.
21 MR. CAYLEY: You don't want to hear argument on that now, Your
22 Honour; you want to hear argument on that later?
23 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: I decided yesterday that we should discuss this
24 the 24th, taking into account that it's right to have seven days for the
25 Defence to prepare any kind of objection. So therefore, this should be
1 discussed not earlier than 24 April.
2 MR. CAYLEY: May I proceed, Your Honour?
3 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Yes.
4 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you.
5 Q. Dr. Donia, before the break we were speaking about the first six
6 months of the functioning of the Municipal Assembly in Prijedor, and I
7 want you to now focus on the summer of 1991 and the disagreement between
8 the SDS and the SDA over the appointment of senior officials within the
9 police department in Prijedor. If you could explain to the Judges.
10 You've referred to it briefly already, but if you could explain what
11 exactly happened in respect of that disagreement.
12 A. As I indicated, the inter-party agreement provided for the leading
13 vote-getting party, the SDA, to get the first and third positions in the
14 police department. In summer 1991, the SDS made its nomination known for
15 the position of commander of the police station, the number-two position.
16 However, the republican government, the ministry of internal affairs,
17 which has responsibility for the police, judged this candidate to be
18 unqualified to serve as commander of the police station. Consequently, he
19 was not put in office, and after negotiations between the two parties, a
20 Muslim nominee was placed in that position for an interim period of two
22 Q. Was this matter, the appointment of the second-ranking police
23 officer, ever resolved between the SDS and the SDA?
24 A. No.
25 Q. And I think this particular event is referred to on page 5 of your
1 report and in Exhibits 8 to 10 of the bundle of documents; is that
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Now, Dr. Donia, let's move now to page 6 of your report, and let
5 us speak of the Prijedor SDS. When was the Prijedor SDS founded?
6 A. August of 1990.
7 Q. Now, I think that date comes from the minutes of the SDS board of
8 the 3rd of July of 1991, and I'm going to direct your attention to that in
9 a moment. You stated that one of the factors that influenced the
10 municipality of Prijedor was the very fractious intra-party relationships
11 within the SDS, and I think in your report you refer to a meeting of the
12 3rd of July of 1991 to demonstrate and support that opinion. And if I can
13 now direct you to that particular meeting.
14 MR. CAYLEY: Your Honours, you will find that behind tab 12 of the
15 bundle, as part of the SDS party municipal board minutes. In the bottom
16 right-hand corner of this document there is an ERN number, which is the
17 evidence registry number, and that is how I will assist you in navigating
18 through these documents. If you refer to the last three digits, which you
19 will see on the front of this document is 336, and if I can direct you to
20 369. So the whole number is in fact an eight-digit number, but I'm only
21 referring to the last three digits. It's 369, and there you will find the
22 minutes of the Prijedor SDS of the 3rd of July of 1991.
23 Sorry, Your Honour. The Defence don't have these, apparently.
24 MR. LUKIC: Maybe we do. I don't know. But can you tell us first
25 which binder? Because we've got four binders.
1 MR. CAYLEY: It's the -- this is volume 1 of 1, Donja Exhibits SK1
2 to SK41, the documents related to the Prijedor report.
3 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: And please, one additional request: Whenever
4 you want to go into details of this document, which evidently has not yet
5 been translated into the French language, could you read it out. Then we
6 have it in the transcript in French as well. Thank you.
7 MR. CAYLEY: I will, Your Honour. Just to clarify matters with
8 the Defence, my understanding is that they were placed in the Defence
9 locker yesterday, but we can actually give you another set if you don't
10 have them in front of you now.
11 MR. OSTOJIC: We accept the offer by the Prosecutor.
12 MR. CAYLEY: Could you not write on that set, actually. Thank
14 Q. Dr. Donia, you heard what His Honour Judge Schomburg said. If you
15 could read slowly any of the sections which are of particular relevance.
16 I know mainly you will summarise the essence of these meetings.
17 This meeting of the 3rd of July of 1991, what was significant
18 about this meeting?
19 A. Well, let me first read, if I may, the title perhaps: "Minutes of
20 the Meeting of the Assembly of the Prijedor SDS, 3 July 1991."
21 This meeting was begun by Mr. Radomir Neskovic, who was a member
22 of the Main Board of the SDS of Bosnia-Herzegovina. He was in this
23 meeting acting as something of an overseer. Halfway down this first page,
24 one sees him saying, Mr. Neskovic, member of the Main Board of the VHSDS
25 was given the floor. He conveyed the greetings of the Main Board and
1 suggested the following agenda: Number 1, performance report. And moving
2 on to the second page, at the bottom of the second page of the English
3 translation, we see that the four-item agenda that he proposed was in
4 fact, in the last sentence, the agenda was adopted with one vote against,
5 cast by Mr. Mijatovic, that's Mr. Mijatovic, who had no right to vote. So
6 the role of Mr. Neskovic as the overseer of this is first of all directed
7 toward requesting a performance report from the president of the Prijedor
8 SDS, Mr. Srdic. I think that the request for a performance report is a
9 universal organisational signal that one's performance is not up to
10 standard. And in the performance report, Mr. Srdic gives a rather bland
11 description of the party's activities up to this point. On the third
12 page, top of the third page, with the section that begins performance
13 report, the president of the Prijedor SDS municipal board submitted the
14 report. The Prijedor SDS was established on 2 August 1990, on St. Alias
15 day in Maricka.
16 In the -- about six lines down, he notes that -- he says:
17 "He also mentioned the division of power." This is a reference to
18 the inter-party agreement, "and the celebration of Christmas Eve. The
19 division of power at the municipal level came to a halt for objective
20 reasons, the failure to meet the requirements of certain offices." This
21 is a reference to the SDS nominee for the position of chief of the police
23 Following this performance report, it is greeted by a torrent of
24 criticism from other party members. About two-thirds of the way down the
25 page, Zdravko Jovic states that there was not enough self-criticism in the
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 report and there had been failures. The next paragraph he continues:
2 "We only appointed eight people to the offices of the authority
3 and in order to function we need at least 200 people."
4 And moving to page 4 of this report, or the next page, the ERN
5 last three digits being 372, we see Mr. Dusan Kurnuga, about one-third
6 of the way down the page, Dusan Kurnuga objected to the misplaced
7 applause and to the dual between Jovic and Srdic. He expressed that he
8 was chiefly responsible for establishing an SDS chapter in Prijedor.
9 Moving down four lines, he continues: "After Milakovic, a new
10 group of people came to oust Milakovic, and now those same people were to
11 be ousted. Electoral defeat happened because of the communist methods of
13 Then down two brief paragraphs: "The performance report was not
14 acceptable. It would have to be prepared differently. Difficulties in
15 organising the party in the town of Prijedor."
16 Onto the next page, the second speaker there, Mr. Milo Radetic, he
17 was not satisfied with the report.
18 And down two paragraphs, Mr. Mico Kovacevic, there has been no
19 real takeover of power except in those departments which have been
20 distributed so far.
21 Now, these I think are all indications of the internal dissent and
22 criticism of the leadership that are expressed at this meeting. And
23 Mr. Milan Pilipovic, down two more speakers, begins to identify the key
24 problems that these speakers see. His point 1 is the party must gain more
25 support among the Serbs. 75 per cent of the Serbian population voted for
1 the SDS."
2 That number, of course, is far below the per cent in
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina as a whole.
4 And on the following page - this is 374 - one-third of the way
5 down, Mr. Momcilo Radanovic, recommendation to the Prijedor intellectuals
6 to find a way for a larger area of the former Omarska municipality to
7 separate from the Prijedor municipality and join the Banja Luka region.
8 This is a reference to the regionalisation strategies then being
9 considered by the party.
10 So this meeting is evidence, I think, of substantial internal
11 dissension in the party and a leadership crisis with the existing
13 Q. Dr. Donia, you stated that the figure of 75 per cent of the
14 Serbian population in Prijedor voting for the SDS, and then you went on to
15 say that that number, of course, is far below the per cent in Bosnia and
16 Herzegovina as a whole. Are you stating that in Prijedor, the number of
17 Serbs who voted for the SDS was significantly below those Serbs in other
18 municipalities who voted for the SDS?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Now, in terms of that particular issue, I think it had been
21 addressed previously, and I want you to speak in more detail on that
22 particular matter, the matter of Serbs voting for the SDS. And if we can
23 now go to the meeting of the 20th of March of 1991, which, Your Honours,
24 you will find on ERN number 343.
25 Now, this particular meeting of the SDS municipal board I believe
1 was held immediately prior to the population census; is that right?
2 A. Yes, 11 days before.
3 Q. Now, in this particular set of minutes, they express some
4 considerable concern about ensuring that all people of Serb ethnicity
5 declare themselves as Serbs; is that right?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Can you point to those particular sections and speakers who do
8 express those concerns?
9 A. Okay. If I can maybe read the title.
10 Q. Yes.
11 A. "Meeting of the Prijedor SDS municipal board, 20 March 1991." The
12 first and predominant item on the agenda is report and preparations for
13 the census.
14 This meeting, I think should be noted, is attended by a number of
15 non-SDS members and is apparently an open, public discussion of the
16 party's preparation for the census. On page 345, at the top of the
17 page, there is a quote from Mr. Ecim, who has been giving the report on
18 preparations for the census: "The general principle applied in
19 census-taking is the territorial principle. The party can exert influence
20 through the census committee and the instructors."
21 Also on page 345, down three paragraphs: "It is a fact that the
22 committee, almost all committees from the republican level down to the
23 municipal one, is in the hands of Muslims. The counting of farming land
24 units is more vital than the population census, because 69 per cent of the
25 land is in Serbian hands."
1 And moving to --
2 Q. Dr. Donia, could you explain to the Judges the significance of
3 that particular comment?
4 A. Well, there are two comments there, and one is, of course, the
5 party's concern about who is controlling the census-taking process, and
6 obviously it's a matter of concern and a negative that the Muslims are
7 controlling those committees, in the view of Mr. Kursumovic.
8 The second comment indicates a feeling that if the population
9 figures turn out unfavourable, from the Serbian standpoint, they will
10 nonetheless be concerned about what percentage of land in the municipality
11 is controlled by -- is owned by Serbs.
12 I can move to page 3, 4, it's almost illegible there, but it's
13 346. Toward the bottom of the page 346, Ecim. Ecim remarked that
14 nationality is the most sensitive issue, Serb, Muslim, Croat, and others,
15 which is a miscellaneous category "if someone states that he is an
16 orthodox Christian, he will be included among others." This is a kind of
17 warning that if one identifies himself only by religion, it would not
18 necessarily put that person in the Serbian national category.
19 The next paragraph:
20 "Savanovic, insisting the absence of republican instructors, the
21 problem is making the Serbs realise that they are of Serbian nationality
22 and not Yugoslavs."
23 His concern here is that those responding to the census will
24 identify themselves as Yugoslavs and detract from the Serbian count.
25 Next paragraph:
1 "The solution, every local board to stage a panel and to convince
2 people to declare themselves Serbs." And going on:
3 "For the president, Srdic wanted a radio programme be arranged,
4 the main point of which would be to appeal to the Serbs to say that they
5 are Serbs."
6 So in this meeting, the party is making extensive preparations to
7 try to assure that everyone who ought to be counted in the census as a
8 Serb is in fact so counted.
9 MR. CAYLEY: If the witness could be shown appendix 4 of his
10 report, which is Prosecutor's Exhibit 42A.
11 Q. Now, am I right in saying, Dr. Donia, that all of this discussion
12 was taking place because the Serbs were very concerned in Prijedor that
13 the Muslims were going to outnumber them after the population census had
14 taken place?
15 A. Yes. That was a concern not only in Prijedor municipality but
16 throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina.
17 Q. Now, this is a graph which you produced which indicates the
18 numbers of the various ethnic groups within Prijedor from 1879 to 1991,
19 and if you could explain to the Judges firstly where the information comes
20 from to produce this graph, and secondly, the significance of the data
21 that's represented.
22 A. Yes. I prepared this chart using census returns from the
23 Austro-Hungarian period, the Royal Yugoslav Period, and socialist Yugoslav
24 period as well, and I think there's some caution I would note in the use
25 of these numbers. The first three censuses are not considered by most
1 observers to be particularly accurate, those of 1879 to 1895, and the
2 categories for those first four censuses were in fact religion rather than
4 Nevertheless, there is, over time, a consistency here that I think
5 is well illustrated by this graph.
6 Throughout the twentieth century, the Serbs held a numerical
7 advantage in Prijedor municipality, and the Muslims, who are the green
8 line, were rapidly gaining on that number in the years from 1961 onward.
9 There is one curious fact here that should be noted, and that is that in
10 1953, one could not identify himself or herself as a Muslim by
11 nationality. The only option available was -- or one of the options
12 available was Yugoslav. And so many of those who declared themselves
13 Muslims in 1948 or 1961 clearly in this situation opted for the Yugoslav
14 identity. That number falls precipitously in 1961, the Yugoslavs, further
15 in 1971, spikes up in 1981, and declines somewhat again in 1991. This was
16 the group to which the members of the SDS referred in saying that they
17 believed that many of these people who declared themselves Yugoslavs were
18 in fact Serbs.
19 The other group of interest, although not numerically very
20 significant, was "others," and it was the concern of the SDS in 1991 that
21 the "others" category included many people who ought to be declared
22 Serbs. And it is in fact the case that either the Yugoslav or the "other"
23 category, if added to the number of Serbs in the census, would have
24 produced a Serbian relative majority in the 1991 census. The two
25 combined, of course, would have produced a substantial increase in the
1 number of Serbian respondents.
2 So this became the focus of SDS activities, both before the census
3 and immediately afterwards, when the SDS sent a letter to the census
4 commission and asked for the census to be retaken in Prijedor
6 Q. And what was the result of that request for the census to be taken
8 A. That request received no response.
9 Q. And if you haven't already made it clear, this graph clearly shows
10 that in 1991, on the basis of the census, for the first time since the
11 nineteenth century, the Muslims were in the relative majority in the
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Now, let's turn our attention, Dr. Donia, to the meeting of the
15 30th of April of 1991, which appears on page 348.
16 MR. CAYLEY: It's the set of minutes, Your Honours, immediately
17 after the meeting concerning the census.
18 Q. Now, I think at this time, in April of 1991, the Prijedor SDS
19 municipal board was concerned about becoming a member of the Krajina
20 association of municipalities. Can you explain to the Judges what the
21 Krajina association of municipalities was and how this relates to the
22 concept of regionalisation, which you've already referred to in your
24 A. In pursuit of a regional association of municipalities with
25 substantial Serbian populations, a group of SDS leaders in north-western
1 Bosnia convened a founding assembly of the community of municipalities of
2 Bosnian Krajina on the 25th of April, 1991, in the town of Celinac. At
3 that meeting, 14 municipalities had already voted to become charter
4 members of the Krajina, what's called the ZOBK, the acronym for the
5 community of municipalities of the Bosnian Krajina. Prijedor was not one
6 of those, but Prijedor SDS representatives were present at that meeting as
7 guests, and this meeting of the SDS Prijedor municipal board held on 30
8 April 1991 reflects a report on that regionalisation meeting by, first of
9 all, Mr. Pilipovic, and then other persons who were present at the
11 The discussion then turns to the question of how the Prijedor
12 municipality might join the ZOBK. Its dilemma was that the SDS, with only
13 28 votes in the Municipal Assembly, lacked the requisite votes to pass
14 such a resolution in Prijedor. The solution that is agreed upon can be
15 seen at the bottom of page 349. It's 349, page 2 of this document - is
16 voiced by Milan Babic, at the bottom of that page. He justified the round
17 table idea, that is, having a round-table discussion of municipal
18 delegates. 42 of the deputies are of Serbian nationality, which is why he
19 is in favour of the round table, "uniting all our deputies and the
20 left-wing Serbs. That would be Serbs in the two opposition parties. And
21 then taking account to see how many of the Muslim nationals from the Left
22 Bloc we need."
23 And then on the next page, Milan Curcija speaks and says he agrees
24 with the comments but also with the possibility of using money to win
25 their support. Maintained the position that if it did not work, joining
1 the ZOBK, we would break up the municipality and create Prijedor II.
2 The essence of this meeting is a discussion about the unsuccessful
3 attempt of the SDS to bring Prijedor municipality into the ZOBK.
4 Q. Now, even though at this time Prijedor could not become a member
5 of this association of municipalities, as you've already explained, was
6 there any influence exerted by this regional government of the Prijedor
8 A. In summer 1991, there's a document that includes Prijedor within
9 the ZOBK, even though it formally had not joined. In addition, the ZOBK
10 leaders asserted the organisation's jurisdiction over the television relay
11 station on Mount Kozara, at Lisina.
12 Q. That's Exhibit 19, Dr. Donia.
13 MR. CAYLEY: And Your Honours, you'll find that document that is
14 relevant to this evidence behind tab 19.
15 Q. And this is an announcement, is it not, by the assembly -- the
16 community of Bosnia Krajina municipalities, dated 6th August, 1991.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Can you just briefly state the nature of this announcement.
19 A. This announcement reports that the presidency of the ZOBK received
20 information that the Ministry of Interior of Bosnia-Herzegovina was
21 sending units to take control of the TV relay station at Lisina on Mount
22 Kozara. And then it states that the people of Bosnian Krajina and
23 Pukajza, which would be the area under Mount Kozara, would not allow the
24 intervention of HMUP forces in this area.
25 Q. So this, in essence, supports your opinion that even though
1 Prijedor was not yet a member of the ZOBK, this regional government had
2 started to exert significant influence over the area; is that right?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Now, you mentioned in the minutes of the 30th of April of 1991
5 that there was reference to the creation of Prijedor II, of a separate
6 municipality within Prijedor. Was there any historical precedent for that
7 particular idea?
8 A. Yes. After the Second World War, the socialist government had
9 realigned the internal organisational structure of Bosnia-Herzegovina and
10 made Prijedor into something of a district, under which were numerous
11 local units of government. And at one point, one of these was the Omarska
12 area, which then, under some different name, was considered the equivalent
13 of a municipality. Consequently, at one point, Omarska was a separate
14 organisation from Prijedor, and on this basis and other grounds, the SDS
15 proposed to again create an Omarska municipality by breaking away a series
16 of five local communes from Prijedor and creating a new Omarska
17 municipality. This would have been the 110th municipality in
19 Q. If I could now refer you to the minutes of the meeting of the
20 assembly of the Prijedor SDS of the 3rd of July of 1991, which refers to
21 the SDS proposal of that time to create a separate municipality within
23 A. Yes, on page 374 of the Prijedor SDS document, and I believe we've
24 noted this already, Mr. Momcilo Radanovic makes a recommendation to the
25 Prijedor intellectuals to find a way for a larger area of the former
1 Omarska municipality to separate from the Prijedor municipality and join
2 the Banja Luka region. The Banja Luka region in this context was another
3 name that was frequently used to apply to the ZOBK.
4 Q. Now, were the areas that were to break away and form this separate
5 municipality predominantly occupied by people of Serb ethnicity?
6 A. Yes. The five local communities or communes were overwhelmingly
7 Serbian in national composition.
8 Q. Was the referendum ever held?
9 A. The referendum was scheduled for the 25th of August, 1991, but at
10 the last minute was cancelled, and the press reports quote SDS leaders as
11 citing inadequate preparation of the populations of those five communes,
12 who had either not been told about the referendum or were not properly
13 prepared for the correct way to vote.
14 Q. Just to make it clear and distinguish this referendum from the
15 other referendums we've referred to, this was a local referendum to be
16 held in Prijedor in these -- the locally Serb-dominated communes to create
17 a separate Prijedor municipality; is that right?
18 A. A separate Omarska municipality, yes.
19 Q. If I can now refer you to Exhibit 22, which is a newspaper
20 article. Now, this newspaper article I think contains comments by
21 Dr. Stakic in respect of that referendum. Could you just state to the
22 Judges what Dr. Stakic had to say about the referendum.
23 A. Yes. He was interviewed for this article. So the journalist says
24 because the president of the Municipal Assembly, Mr. Cehajic, was on
25 vacation, which makes sense in August, but reaching Dr. Stakic, he told
1 the reporter in a quote at the very bottom -- at the end of this article
2 words that I've quoted in the paper on page 10 in my translation into
3 English. He said:
4 "My view is that the demand for an Omarska municipality is
5 motivated by accumulated problems, but we must bear in mind that an
6 unfavourable moment was selected for the referendum, and it is best to
7 await a more favourable time."
8 Q. Was this referendum ever discussed by the Municipal Assembly or
9 the executive committee of the Municipal Assembly?
10 A. In this article, prior to the quote I've just read, Dr. Stakic is
11 asked if the referendum, or the movement for a separate municipality, was
12 discussed in either the executive committee or the Municipal Assembly, and
13 he indicates that it was never brought to the attention of either body.
14 He does mention some prior discussion last year -- or the previous year,
15 in the Omarska area, about this, but says that nothing recent was
16 discussed by those two bodies.
17 Q. So the matter of this particular referendum at this time was never
18 placed before the SDA, the HDZ, or the Left Bloc party, as far as this
19 newspaper article indicates?
20 A. That's correct.
21 Q. Now, I think four days after the referendum on the creation of a
22 separate municipality was supposed to take place, a meeting of the SDS
23 deputies club took place in Prijedor. And if I can refer you to the
24 meeting of the 29th of August of 1991, which you will find on page 381 of
25 the SDS Board minutes. And I think that these set of minutes is
1 essentially dealing with a crisis in the leadership and the election of
2 new leaders of the SDS following the failure of this referendum. Is that
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Could you highlight for the Judges the important parts of this
6 particular meeting.
7 A. Just to be clear, it took place four days after the scheduled but
8 cancelled referendum and is entitled, "Meeting of the SDS Deputies Club
9 and SDS local board presidents."
10 This meeting, then, is not of the SDS Main Board but of the
11 deputies of the SDS in the Municipal Assembly and the presidents of local
12 boards of the party. And the meeting is opened, in the second paragraph,
13 by Dragan Savanovic, who was the president of the Deputies Club. And in
14 that paragraph it states:
15 "Dragan Savanovic gave the introductory remarks on the reasons for
16 calling the meeting. The reason was that the meeting of the SDS municipal
17 board was not called."
18 Two paragraphs down, Mr. Srdic warned that the Deputies Club could
19 not make the decision. Only the SDS municipal board could do so."
20 And next paragraph, Dragan Savanovic recommended the party's
21 organisational structure. This is the first indication of a totally new
22 organisational scheme for the party's operation:
23 "Only the SDS municipal board could do so."
24 I'm sorry. Wrong quotation. "The deputies club had no intention
25 of taking power."
1 Then down one paragraph, Mr. Srdic:
2 "It is alleged that several of us did not complete the division of
4 This again a reference to the slowness of fulfilling the
5 inter-party agreement.
6 And down five lines:
7 "As far as SUP is concerned --" SUP was the old term for police
8 "-- based on the election results, the SDA gets the chief and the
9 commander of the traffic police, while the SDS gets the SJB commander."
10 That would be the commander of the police station.
11 Next paragraph:
12 "Dragan Savanovic then put to the vote the Deputies Club
13 decision. In favour of the Deputies Club decision, 17."
14 And in the next paragraph which begins Savanovic, we see that
15 Srdjo Srdic left the meeting. In the subsequent press report on this
16 meeting, Kozarski Vjesnik states that Srdic was thereby ousted from his
17 position as president of the party is not quite accurate, but what rather
18 happens in the rest of this meeting is that the party makes -- or the
19 Deputies Club makes plans for an election of new officers to be held in
20 the next several days.
21 And at the bottom of the next page, 382, Mr. Radetic says in the
22 second paragraph of his comments:
23 "First the circus with a suspension of the party in January, then
24 the circus with the assembly and Neskovic," Neskovic being the person who
25 had been the overseer of the meeting a month and a half before.
1 On the following page, 383, Dr. Stakic expresses his suggestion on
2 the course of things. It's about one-third down the page on 383:
3 "Believed that the Deputies Club should call a meeting of the
4 municipal board." He recommended that it should say that the meeting was
5 called at the initiative of the Deputies Club in order to call a session
6 of the assembly.
7 And that assembly will turn out to be an electoral assembly of the
8 party to designate new leaders "and that the stamp should be brought to
9 the SDS office."
10 On the following page, 384, halfway down, he speaks again and
12 "We should not hurry with the assembly session. It should be
14 And Savanovic follows by saying:
15 "The municipal board meeting on Tuesday, 3 September 1991, at 1900
16 hours, and the election assembly meeting on Tuesday, at 1800 hours, is
17 accepted unanimously."
18 The rest of this document is the public statement that the party
19 will make following this meeting, announcing the election assembly. And
20 on the last page, 385, a much more blunt statement for -- if we go to the
21 third line on page 385, only for Sarajevo and Banja Luka. This would be
22 only for the SDS organisation superiors and internal consumption, a very
23 blunt assessment of the party's failures under the outgoing leadership.
24 Q. If, Dr. Donia, we can go to the next set of minutes, which Your
25 Honours will find on page 386, and this is a meeting of the 3rd of
1 September of 1991 of the SDS Prijedor municipal board. If you could point
2 out the significant parts of this meeting, please, Dr. Donia.
3 A. This meeting of the SDS Prijedor municipal board, local board
4 chairman and Deputies Club, 3 September 1991, begins with a progress
5 report by Mr. Savanovic, and in the next paragraph after point 1:
6 "A report on a trip made to Sarajevo by five party members:"
7 Savanovic himself, Dr. Stakic, Mr. Vojinovic, as well as Mr. Srdic and
8 Pavic. And in that paragraph, it's clear that the purpose of their trip
9 to Sarajevo was to meet with the party president, Radovan Karadzic, who
10 accepted the organisational structure that was proposed, and that entailed
11 an expansion of the number of members of the municipal board.
12 About two-thirds of the way down the page, Vujinovic clarified the
13 problem of president Karadzic naming ten people in the municipal board.
14 This is the first of a couple of indications that Karadzic insisted on or
15 subsequently appointed these members of the municipal board of the
16 Prijedor SDS.
17 On the next page, 387, the second speaker on that page, Savanovic,
19 "Karadzic gave an order to hold municipal board meetings every
20 week. This is one of the ways of addressing the previously perceived
21 weakness of inadequate meetings.
22 Three speakers down, Dr. Stakic says:
23 "Karadzic will take such measures if we do not work well. A
24 proposal to expand the board to include new people with no connection to
25 the local boards. One option is to postpone the assembly session for four
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 or five days and prepare everything."
2 And subsequently in this meeting, it -- or subsequently it is
3 agreed by this body that electoral assembly will be deferred until the
4 11th of September, 1991.
5 Q. If, Dr. Donia, we could refer to the SDS municipal board and
6 Deputies Club meeting of the 9th of September, 1991.
7 MR. CAYLEY: And Your Honours, you will find that on page 392, if
8 you are looking at the ERN numbers.
9 Q. What, if anything, of significance occurred at this meeting,
10 Dr. Donia?
11 A. At this meeting, which is entitled "SDS municipal board and
12 Deputies Club meeting 9 September 1991," this transitional Working Group,
13 headed by Savanovic, continues its work and determines the list of
14 candidates for the electoral meeting assembly to be held two days later.
15 On page 393, halfway down the page, Mr. Rodic says Srdic, who is
16 the president, is not to be put on the list, by unanimous decision it was
17 concluded that Srdic could not be placed on the list of presidential
18 candidates. This was his final removal from power. However, he -- it
19 should be noted, I think, that he was a remarkably gracious loser. He was
20 a deputy in the assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina and continued to be active
21 and I think quite an important member of the party organisation in
22 Prijedor even after his removal as president.
23 Q. Now if we can move to the meeting of the 11th of September of
25 MR. CAYLEY: And that, Your Honours, you will find on page 397.
1 Q. And this is a meeting at which a new leadership of the SDS is
2 appointed in Prijedor, is that right?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Could you highlight from this document the important parts for
5 Their Honours, please.
6 A. This session, entitled, "Minutes of the assembly meeting of the
7 Prijedor municipal organisation of the Serbian Democratic Party," held on
8 11 September 1991, begins with the nomination of a three-person group to
9 chair this session. Those three persons are Dragan Savanovic, Milomir
10 Stakic, and Milan Pilipovic.
11 This is a very public, open meeting. In fact, people were invited
12 from all over Bosnia-Herzegovina. And it begins with the singing of the
13 national anthem of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and God
14 give us justice anthem. There's a long introductory speech by Professor
15 Pilipovic, which is reported almost, very extensively, in the press
16 article dealing with this meeting.
17 On page 398, item 1, halfway down the page, "adoption of the rules
18 of procedure for the Prijedor SDS municipal organisation assembly."
19 There's a new set of rules of procedure that are being implemented. Three
20 paragraphs down, we see that Radomir Neskovic, the representative of the
21 SDS Main Board who had been present in July is present here as well. He
22 asked to address the assembly. He suggested an addendum to Article 7.
23 And at the bottom of this page, Radomir Neskovic objects to
24 Article 41. So the Sarajevo SDS organisation plays an important role, I
25 think, in this particular meeting.
1 On pages 399 and 400, the results of the voting for the president
2 and vice-president of the party are reported. At the bottom of page 399,
3 the report is made that Mr. Simo Miskovic receives the vast majority of
4 votes, with 121. And on page 400, for vice-president, Dr. Milomir Stakic
5 received 103 votes. Again, the vast majority of votes.
6 And finally, this meeting is closed by three brief addresses at
7 the -- about halfway down the printed portion of this page, one by Mr.
8 Neskovic, another by Professor Cehajic, the SDA leader, president of
9 the Municipal Assembly, and finally, the president of the SDP, which is
10 the Social Democratic Party, Mr. Keric. So at this public meeting, the
11 guests include the leaders of these other parties, who express their -- as
12 a courtesy, express their greetings to the SDS.
13 Q. Now, Dr. Donia, having reviewed all of these documents and
14 newspaper reports together, after this change in leadership, after the
15 appointment of Miskovic and Dr. Stakic to the leadership of the SDS, how
16 does the style of leadership change?
17 A. This election brings an end to most of the contention in the party
18 and results in many discussions that show party members to be focused on
19 specific projects and experiencing substantial successes with the party's
20 work on these individual projects. It's a much more dynamic and focused
21 organisation following the election of September 11.
22 Q. Now, I think after the election takes place, the party issues a
23 public statement, and you will find that reported in Kozarski Vjesnik.
24 It's Exhibit SK9. And I think you refer in your report to this particular
25 announcement by the party as a demonstration of the change in the style of
1 leadership and relations with other political parties. Could you explain
2 to the Judges the nature of this particular public statement and why it
3 supports your opinion that there was this significant change in the nature
4 of the leadership.
5 A. I'm sorry. I'm not quite clear on the -- this is a report on the
6 session of the assembly. This is a statement of I believe the 17th of
7 September by the party, which expresses the party's dissatisfaction with
8 the SDA's performance in the pursuit of the inter-party agreement, and in
9 the second paragraph of the article, on the right-hand side of the exhibit
10 that you have mentioned, charges that at a time when the SDA held this
11 interim appointment of the chief of the police station, that the party,
12 the SDA, used that occasion, with the cooperation of the Ministry of the
13 Interior of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to smuggle arms into the Muslim-majority
14 village of Kozarac. And this was, of course, an agreement, the division
15 of police portfolios was an agreement that had been reached by the party's
16 previous leadership, but this represents a very different tone in terms of
17 its approach to cooperation or relations with the SDA.
18 Q. You stated a little bit of uncertainty about this. It's actually
19 on page 6 of your report. And I want to direct you to something else that
20 you state on that page. You refer to this statement about the SDA and the
21 BiH colluding in smuggling weapons and then you refer to a statement made
22 the next day by Dr. Stakic. Could you please refer to that statement made
23 by Dr. Stakic and explain the significance of it?
24 A. On the 18th of September, just one week after the election,
25 Dr. Stakic is quoted as having made a statement at a session of the -- or
1 prior to a session of the executive committee of the municipality,
2 charging that the SDA had violated the inter-party agreement and instead
3 argued that the basis for the inter-party agreement should be the
4 population structure of not just the Prijedor municipality but three
5 adjoining municipalities as well. And that was not carried out in
6 Prijedor; therefore, the SDA had violated the inter-party agreement. And
7 he subsequently, along with Mr. Kovacevic, led a walkout of all SDS
8 members from the executive committee of the municipality.
9 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Sorry. May I interrupt you just in this point
10 of time, making reference to page 6 of your report. You just mentioned
11 this sentence referring to Dr. Stakic's announcement, and then in your
12 report you have footnote 14, from scientific point of view it's quite
13 clear you have to quote it as you did. But unfortunately, we, the Judges,
14 can't understand this language. Could you please be so kind and translate
15 footnote 14.
16 THE WITNESS: Yes. I wonder if I read the Serbian, if a
17 translator might go into English or French? And you'll have to forgive --
18 all of you have to forgive my pronunciation in the language.
19 "[Interpretation] By an agreement between the parties, it is envisaged
20 that the commander of the station should be elected by the majority
21 population. As for his deputy, he should be elected amongst the
22 second-largest community. Since the Serb people in these four
23 municipalities constitutes the majority, then the commander of the public
24 security station should be a Serb. This was not done in Prijedor.
25 Therefore, the SDS is withdrawing its deputies both from the executive
1 board and the assembly of municipalities. The vice-president of the
2 Municipal Assembly, Mr. Stakic, and Mr. Kovacevic, then left the meeting
3 of the Executive Council."
4 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you very much for this assistance.
5 MR. CAYLEY:
6 Q. Now, just to refer back to your prior evidence, this was a very
7 different line than was being taken by Mr. Srdic, the prior president of
8 the SDS in Prijedor, isn't it?
9 A. Yes. It was a different approach to the question of the
10 inter-party agreement.
11 Q. And Srdic had regarded the SDA as having actually complied, by and
12 large, with the inter-party agreement?
13 A. Well, I don't know that he viewed him as having complied to a
14 point. There remain substantial disagreements. However, he accepted in
15 principle the division of these offices according to the inter-party
16 agreement at the republican level.
17 Q. And here Dr. Stakic is essentially stating that the Serb
18 population in four municipalities, rather than just Prijedor, should be
19 taken into account in deciding on these positions within the police force?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Was that something that was originally envisaged by the
22 inter-party agreement that had been agreed by the national parties after
23 the multiparty elections?
24 A. It was not foreseen, or a part of those agreements, as we can --
25 I'm able to identify them, no.
1 Q. Now, in your report, Dr. Donia, you identify five significant
2 events which took place after Miskovic and Dr. Stakic were appointed to
3 the leadership of the SDS. The first one you've already referred to,
4 which is a different interpretation of the inter-party agreement. Now,
5 can you recall the other four particularly significant events which took
6 place after this change in the SDS leadership?
7 A. Yes. The party engaged in several activities. I think the most
8 significant was the support for mobilisation of Prijedor TO units for the
9 war in Croatia. The plebiscite of the Serbian people of 9 and 10
10 November, 1991; the establishment of Serbian-only parallel institutions;
11 and the membership in the ZOBK, which in September 1991 was renamed the
12 Autonomous Region of Krajina, or ARK, A-R-K.
13 Q. Let's briefly talk about mobilisation of the Territorial Defence
14 forces in Prijedor, and I want to refer to a document from the bundle of
15 documents relating to your report in Brdjanin and Talic.
16 MR. CAYLEY: Your Honour, I'm not going to refer to the exhibit
17 number, because it's the same exhibit number in this case and will create
18 complete confusion. What I suggest to do is for me to remove it from the
19 file and give it a new exhibit number in this proceeding, if that is
20 acceptable to you.
21 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Yes.
22 MR. CAYLEY: If the document can be handed to the witness.
23 For the benefit of the Defence, this is part of the bundle of
24 documents that you either have now or will get shortly after this
25 hearing. You have it already. You have it already.
1 Q. Now, Dr. Donia, what is the significance of this document? And
2 while you're referring to it, because the Judges don't have it in front of
3 them, if you could place it on the ELMO, that would be helpful.
4 A. This is in fact two documents, one of which is a cover sheet, the
5 one we're looking at now, to municipal -- can I get that larger? Let's
6 see. It's from the Command of the Bosnian Krajina volunteer units in
7 Banja Luka, dated 24 August 1991, to the municipal staffs of volunteer
8 units, indicating that enclosed in an essay submitted at the session of
9 the representatives of the municipalities of Bosnian Krajina. The
10 enclosed report, then, or attached report, is an essay or statement
11 entitled "Aims and organisational principles of the volunteer units on the
12 territory of Bosanska Krajina."
13 This document simply indicates that the volunteer forces in the
14 Bosnian Krajina are calling for others to join them because the JNA does
15 not have sufficient forces to do the tasks which these people believe it
16 should be doing, and makes clear that this is an appeal to Serbs to join
17 as volunteers in support of the JNA.
18 Q. If I could refer you, Dr. Donia, to page 14 of your report.
19 MR. CAYLEY: And if that document could be returned to me and I
20 will, with the agreement of the registry, give it a number.
21 Q. Now, Dr. Donia, the document that you've just referred to, in
22 essence, was a call to arms, was it not?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Now, in late September of 1991, a Territorial Defence force was in
25 fact raised as a brigade in the municipality of Prijedor, wasn't it?
1 A. Yes. The Prijedor TO unit mobilised and formed the Fifth Kozara
2 Partisan Brigade, which was then deployed to western Slavonia in Croatia
3 to fight along with the JNA.
4 Q. When that force first deployed after it was raised in late
5 September of 1991, what was its ethnic composition?
6 A. The first deployment of this Fifth Kozara Partisan Brigade was --
7 corresponded closely to the national composition of Prijedor municipality
8 as a whole, both by statements of the members of the National Defence
9 Council and by the casualties that it suffered. It's plain that the force
10 was probably a majority of Serbs but had substantial numbers of Muslims
11 and Croats that were a part of it as well.
12 Q. Had the SDS prior to this time been critical of the JNA fighting
13 in Slovenia?
14 A. At the time the JNA withdrew from Slovenia in July 1991, the SDS
15 board meeting reflected bitter criticism of the JNA for being
16 insufficiently committed to the defence of Yugoslavia, and their
17 closed-session comments were much more bitter than the public declaration,
18 but both, in fact, reflected their disappointment that the JNA had not
19 been more aggressive in Slovenia and had agreed to withdraw from there.
20 Q. Were they less critical of the JNA's role in the war in the
21 Republic of Croatia?
22 A. They were less critical and openly prepared to support the JNA
23 with volunteers, with actual deployment, of course, and with hospitality
24 within the Prijedor municipality for units that either passed through or
25 were stationed briefly there.
1 Q. And indeed, the Fifth Kozara Partisan Brigade fought under the
2 command of the JNA 5th Corps in Croatia, did it not?
3 A. Yes, it did.
4 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: I think it's now time for a short break, and
5 let's resume at 20 minutes to 1.00.
6 --- Recess taken at 12.23 p.m.
7 --- On resuming at 12.41 p.m.
8 MR. CAYLEY: Yes. Thank you, Mr. President. I think they're just
9 fetching Dr. Donia to the Court.
10 Mr. President, one matter while the witness is coming. He is an
11 expert who is testifying in another trial tomorrow and he will need to
12 have contact with other prosecutors in the office, and I just want to
13 ensure that there's no objection, either from you or the Defence, for that
14 kind of contact. He is an expert, and certainly it's been normal practice
15 in the Tribunal in the past that there is no kind of objection, but I just
16 wanted to make sure that you are content with that.
17 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: You can be sure of that. What one Defence
18 counsel and the Judges have in common is coming from a civil law system
19 and we appreciate to have contacts between each other. Thank you.
20 MR. CAYLEY:
21 Q. Dr. Donia, I'd like to try and get through the balance of your
22 evidence in the hour that we have remaining today, so I'm going to
23 abbreviate certain matters. But I just want to remain with the 5th
24 Kozara Brigade for a moment, and if I could refer you to Prosecutor's
25 Exhibit 31, SK31, which is in your binder and is a public statement issued
1 by the assembly of the Bosnian Krajina municipality, so the regional level
2 of Serbian government that you previously referred to in your evidence.
3 Now, am I right in saying that this is a document which expresses
4 some concern about the safety of the Serbian population in Croatia and
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And because of that, the president of the assembly decides on a
8 general mobilisation of Territorial Defence and public security reserve
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. And he also refers to a decision whereby the assembly had decided
12 to end the shooting and killing of Serbs in Okucani and Stari Gradiska;
13 is that right?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Now, if you could briefly refer to appendix 6 of your report, and
16 if that could be placed in front of you.
17 MR. CAYLEY: And this is appendix 6, Mr. President, of
18 Prosecutor's Exhibit 42.
19 If it could be moved up, and if you could move it to your left.
21 Q. Now, this decision, Prosecutor's Exhibit 31, refers to Okucani and
22 Stari Gradiska. Can you point those out for us, please, Dr. Donia.
23 A. Yes. If I may, I think it is not correct to characterise this
24 document as a call for general mobilisation. It is indeed a statement
25 that it will -- the ZOBK or the ARK may resort to a call to arms but is
1 not specifically mobilising in a sense that that term is usually used in
2 this context.
3 The area to which this document refers is illustrated by the two
4 lower arrows here on this map. It's from a somewhat later time. The map
5 is from 1995. But for purposes of illustration, the Okucani town here and
6 Stari Gradiska just north of the river in Croatia are the two geographic
7 points of reference noted in the document we're examining.
8 Q. And in the summer of 1991, to what region did the 5th Kozara
9 Brigade of Prijedor deploy?
10 A. The 5th Kozara Partisan Brigade was deployed to this area of Lipik
11 and Pakrac -- are the two towns that are mentioned in the reports of the
12 unit's deployment.
13 Q. Now, can you describe the success or lack of it of the first
14 deployment of the 5th Kozara Partisan Brigade to Croatia in the summer of
16 A. That deployment saw substantial fighting. It was, I think,
17 partially successful in supporting the JNA, but it led to a substantial
18 desertion of over 200 troops in the unit. And when the unit returned to
19 Prijedor in late October, the armoured column that brought the troops
20 back, the soldiers who were on these vehicles fired long and loud into the
21 air as they were entering Prijedor, and this was certainly regarded as an
22 alarming display of firearms by the returning soldiers and was not
23 welcomed by the Prijedor population.
24 Q. Now, I'm right in saying that on page 16 of your report you state
25 that the Municipal Assembly voted unanimously, on the 7th of November of
1 1991, to remobilise the Fifth Kozara Brigade; is that right?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And you state that the mobilisation order at that time represented
4 an unusual compromise. Can you explain what that compromise was?
5 A. All reservists were required to report at 8.00 a.m. on the morning
6 of 8 November at the local military base. However, those who did not wish
7 to join the military unit were asked to turn in their weapons and then
8 were allowed freely to return home. Those who wished to join the unit
9 were free to do so, and in fact were subsequently deployed back to the
10 same area as the 5th Kozara Brigade.
11 Q. What was the ethnic composition of the 5th Kozara Brigade on this
12 second mobilisation and deployment to Croatia?
13 A. The second deployment was much more overwhelmingly Serbian in
14 composition. It also suffered substantial casualties, all of which were
15 named in the press reports at the time, and the vast majority of the names
16 of casualties indicate that those warriors were Serbs, whereas the first
17 person killed was a Muslim and was buried with great ceremony by the local
18 Muslim religious leader in Prijedor, the vast majority of these were in
19 fact Serbs.
20 Q. When did the 5th Kozara Brigade return to Prijedor after this
21 second deployment?
22 A. In April 1992.
23 Q. And how were they received when they returned to Prijedor?
24 A. I don't know. There was a committee, a welcoming committee that
25 was formed by the SDS to welcome them back, and what the exact nature of
1 the reception was, I don't know.
2 Q. Do you have your report in front of you?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. If you could go to the final sentence of the first complete
5 paragraph, where you refer to the unit that returned to Prijedor in early
6 1992. My question perhaps was not specific enough, but that's what I was
7 interested in.
8 A. Okay. Well, just to read that sentence, "the unit that returned
9 to Prijedor in early 1992 was made up of combat veterans who were lauded
10 for defending Serbian national interests."
11 I think my reference there was more to the ongoing praise that
12 this unit received in the pages of Kozarski Vjesnik and other local
13 organisations that were closely following, particularly Radio Prijedor,
14 that were closely following the deployment in Croatia.
15 Q. And these combat veterans that returned to Prijedor in 1992 were
16 predominantly soldiers of Serb ethnicity; is that right?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. Let's move on to the next part of your report, which deals with
19 the plebiscite of the Serb people that was held in October of 1991. Now,
20 if I can refer you -- I'm sorry. It's held in November of 1991. But if I
21 can refer you to the minutes of the 28th of October, the minutes of the
22 SDS municipal board.
23 MR. CAYLEY: And Your Honours, you will find these on page 421 of
24 Exhibit SK12, which is the big copy, the large copy of the minutes.
25 Q. Do you have that in front of you, Dr. Donia?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And this particular set of minutes discusses the plebiscite to be
3 held in November of 1991. Can you highlight for Their Honours the
4 important parts of this set of minutes? Could you explain, actually,
5 first of all, the nature of the plebiscite that was to take place in
6 November of 1991.
7 A. Yes. This document is titled, "Meeting of the SDS municipal board
8 Prijedor, 28 October 1991." The sole item on the agenda is plebiscite of
9 the Serbian people. On the date -- or at the first forming session of the
10 assembly of the Serbian people of Bosnia-Herzegovina, that is, those
11 deputies of Serbian nationality who were members of the assembly of
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina and formed their own assembly in objection to the
13 proclamation of autonomy or sovereignty by the Bosnian assembly. This
14 body made its first order of business holding a plebiscite of the Serbian
15 people to ask if they wished to remain in Yugoslavia. Non-Serbs were
16 allowed to vote in this plebiscite, but they were given a different colour
17 ballot and the formulation of the question was slightly different for them
18 as well. It was thus the project of the SDS to secure the most possible
19 votes in favour of remaining in Yugoslavia, particularly by the Serbian
20 population, and in fact few non-Serbs anywhere voted in the plebiscite.
21 At this meeting, we see the Prijedor SDS preparing for the
22 plebiscite in Prijedor. The first sentence:
23 "The chairman, Simo Miskovic, presented a report on the situation
24 as the introduction to the meeting."
25 He explains what the purpose of this is:
1 "We are now at the stage when the state is being constituted, and
2 all our efforts have to focus in that direction."
3 One line down:
4 "The results of the plebiscite, which will be held on 9 and 10
5 November, depend on our work."
6 Q. Dr. Donia, what state is Mr. Miskovic referring to there?
7 A. Well, this refers to a separate Serbian state which is in the
8 process of being considered and set up by the SDS leaders of the Republic.
9 Then his next-to-last statement:
10 "Preparations for the plebiscite have to be carried out up to the
11 last Serb, include refugees on electoral lists."
12 The next paragraph assigns responsibility for particular areas.
13 The last sentence there:
14 "Stakic is put in charge of the former Omarska municipality."
15 On the next page, 6 -- I'm sorry, 422, at the top of the page,
16 ousted former party president Mr. Srdic says:
17 "People living abroad should also be included, as well as those on
18 the front lines. All refugees and the wounded in hospitals."
19 Now, worth explaining that there were probably 5.000 or more
20 refugees from Croatia in the Serbia -- or in the Prijedor municipality at
21 this time, the vast majority of them were Serbs.
22 The next paragraph is Mr. Vojislav Jokic:
23 "We know how we fared at the elections and the census. This is
24 our third chance."
25 And halfway down the page, Milan Kovacevic:
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 "The SDS is in charge of the plebiscite, and the aim is the
2 unification of the Serbian people."
3 This document shows the effort of the SDS, the really organised
4 endeavour to make sure that the most possible voters participate and vote
5 favourably in the plebiscite.
6 Q. Now, I'm right in saying that the plebiscite of the Serbian people
7 actually took place on the 9th and 10th of November of 1991; is that
9 A. It did.
10 Q. What was the result of that plebiscite?
11 A. Throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina, the vast majority of voters,
12 99-plus per cent, voted in favour of remaining in Yugoslavia, and very few
13 non-Serbs participated in the plebiscite.
14 Q. Now, what was the result of the plebiscite in Prijedor?
15 A. I don't know the specific numbers. I don't have those numbers for
16 Prijedor. The impact on the party, the SDS, was I think profound. It
17 inspired the party to pursue the possibility of new elections because they
18 became convinced, on the basis of the plebiscite results, that the
19 majority of voters in Prijedor municipality were Serbs, and on this basis
20 they sought to revise electoral lists and in a sense recast the November
21 1990 election in a new form so that they could this time gain a majority.
22 Q. If I can refer you to the minutes of the 22nd of November of 1991,
23 which I think reflect what you are saying.
24 MR. CAYLEY: And you will find those, Your Honours, on page 427.
25 A. This is entitled, "Minutes of the Prijedor SDS municipal board
1 meeting, 22 November 1991," and at the bottom of this page, point 3,
2 report on the plebiscite. In the Prijedor municipality area, the Serbian
3 electorate makes up more than half the total electorate. The results can
4 help us in future activities."
5 The speaker here is Milan Pilipovic. And his last -- skipping one
7 "The chairman proposed that new elections be conducted. It is
8 necessary to adjust the voter registration lists by 28 November on the
9 basis of the plebiscite lists. All refugees shall report to the public
10 security station," that is, the police station," in order to be entitled
11 to vote."
12 And on page 429, the second speaker is again Milan Pilipovic, who
14 "The main thing is to see whether we can gain power legally at the
15 new elections."
16 So the project of redoing the voter lists and proposing new
17 elections for the Municipal Assembly gained great momentum in the results
18 of the plebiscite.
19 Q. If we can now refer to the minutes of the meeting held on the 2nd
20 of December.
21 MR. CAYLEY: And Your Honours, you'll find that on page 431.
22 Q. Now, this is a meeting again discussing the plebiscite, and I
23 think Miskovic indicates, following the results of the plebiscite, that
24 two options were available to the SDS in Prijedor. Can you please refer
25 the Judges to the part of these minutes where Miskovic discusses those
2 A. Yes. This is page 341, where Miskovic chaired the meeting, and
3 then Miskovic delivered the introductory address. "The purpose of this
4 meeting is to determine the best path to economic prosperity for Serbs in
5 the municipality of Prijedor."
6 Skipping one sentence:
7 "The plebiscite vote has shown that 60 per cent of the electorate
8 are Serbs. This indicates two options: 1, repeat the municipal elections;
9 2, take over and establish independent organs. It will be decided later
10 which of the two options will be chosen."
11 Q. Dr. Donia, which option was in fact chosen?
12 A. The latter option was chosen not so much by a decision taken
13 immediately by the Prijedor SDS as by an initiative from the SDS of
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina's Main Board.
15 Q. If on that particular note, if I could refer you to Prosecutor's
16 Exhibit 39.
17 MR. CAYLEY: And that, Your Honours, you will find behind tab 39
18 in your binder. This is a document entitled, "Instructions for the
19 organisation and activity of organs of the Serbian people in Bosnia and
20 Herzegovina in extraordinary circumstances."
21 Mr. President, this is a document that, in a number of trials, has
22 come in for considerable dispute between the parties, so we are going to
23 spend some time discussing this document and try to establish its
24 authenticity through other documents.
25 Q. Dr. Donia, do you have that document in front of you?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. What exactly is this document?
3 A. This document is one of over a hundred numbered copies of a set of
4 instructions from SDS headquarters in Sarajevo to those municipal SDS
5 leaders in which any number -- any significant number of Serbs lived. So
6 of the 109 municipalities in Bosnia, that would probably be 101 or 102
8 The document makes some important distinctions between variants,
9 and on the second page -- or the first page after the cover page of this
10 document, in point 3, these are first spelled out.
11 Variant A of this document refers to municipalities where the
12 Serbian people form a majority, and Variant B consists of those
13 municipalities where the Serbian people are not in the majority. So the
14 document really is, in a sense, two separate documents, one for Variant A
15 municipalities and one for Variant B municipalities.
16 Turning to the next page, it makes a further distinction between a
17 first stage, which amounts to instructions to prepare the institutional
18 foundation for a takeover of power, and a second stage which consists of
19 specific steps to be taken in actually taking power at the municipal
21 Stage 1 and -- the first and second stage are each applied to
22 Variant A and Variant B, so there's kind of a four-way -- or a division of
23 this document.
24 Now, on this page, which is 938, one sees that the first variant,
25 variant A, has a total of six points on this page and an additional five
1 on the following page, for eleven points in the first page.
2 Going ahead to page 941, Variant B first stage, there are ten
3 steps undertaken -- or recommended, instructed. And to try to make the
4 distinction clear or the specificity of these steps clear, I've put them
5 in an appendix, listing each of the ten points separately.
6 Q. This is appendix 7 of your report.
7 A. Yes.
8 MR. CAYLEY: This, Your Honours, is appendix 7 of Prosecutor's
9 Exhibit 42.
10 Q. And I think, Dr. Donia, it will become clearer as we go through
11 the SDS board minutes from Prijedor, the purpose of this tabular
12 representation you produced; correct?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Because the language from this document from Prosecutor's Exhibit
15 39 is in fact repeated in those minutes, is it not?
16 A. Much of the language is repeated in the Prijedor SDS meetings,
18 Q. Indicating that they received these instructions at some stage?
19 A. Yes. I think it indicates that they received the instructions and
20 paid very careful attention to the implementation of the steps recommended
21 by the SDS Main Board.
22 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, could I ask through you at this stage
23 whether or not the Defence do in fact dispute the authenticity of
24 Prosecutor's Exhibit 39.
25 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Yes.
1 MR. LUKIC: Yes, Your Honour. We dispute the authenticity of this
3 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you.
4 It should be clear for you now to proceed.
5 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
6 Q. If we could now refer, Dr. Donia, to an undated part of these
7 minutes, which appears in the December 1991 section of the minutes.
8 A. Yes. Page 435.
9 MR. CAYLEY: Your Honours, you'll find this on page 435 of the SDS
10 board minutes, and it is a set of minutes entitled, "Meeting of the
11 representatives of the Prijedor municipality sector for military
13 Q. Now, Dr. Donia, can you give an approximate date of this document,
14 based on the minutes that appear before and after it?
15 A. The minutes immediately preceding this session in the volume are
16 from 2 December 1991, and the subsequent meeting, next meeting, is on 27
17 December 1991. So this meeting logically fell between those two dates.
18 And since it pertains directly to consideration of a document that is
19 dated 19 December 1991, it is in all probability between the 19th of
20 December and the 26th or 27th of December, 1991.
21 Q. And the document of the 19th of December of 1991 that you're
22 referring to are the instructions from the Main Board of the SDS that
23 you've just been referring to, Prosecutor's Exhibit 39?
24 A. Yes, often referred to as the AB document.
25 Q. Can you explain to the Judges the significant parts of this
1 particular undated meeting.
2 A. This is one of the few meetings which is not a meeting of the
3 Prijedor SDS Main Board. It is entitled, "Meeting of the representatives
4 of the Prijedor municipality sector for military matters." It is,
5 however, presided over by Miskovic, the president of the Prijedor member
6 of the SDS Main Board, who opened the meeting, reading now from the first
7 paragraph, "who opened the meeting with a presentation of the instruction
8 which had come from the assembly of the Serbian people in Bosnia and
10 Now, I note here that he attributes this to the assembly of the
11 Serbian people, whereas the document that we just were looking at comes
12 from the Main Board of the SDS party organisation. So there's somewhat of
13 a discrepancy of his understanding of where it came from.
14 He then enumerates ten points, and two-thirds of the way down the
15 page, he gave the floor to Savanovic, who is in charge of these matters,
16 he, Savanovic, briefly explained the forthcoming tasks.
17 Now, what I have done is put the discussion as it exists here on
18 this spreadsheet and left that in plain type. If we put this back on the
19 ELMO, perhaps.
20 Q. So to make it clear, Dr. Donia, on it's left you have basically
21 copied the exact language of Prosecutor's Exhibit 39, the SDS Main Board
22 instruction of the 19th of December, 1991; and on the right-hand side you
23 have taken the text from this undated meeting contained in the SDS board
24 minutes, which is Prosecutor's Exhibit 12, and you've put the language
25 alongside each other to show that in essence the minutes represent
1 language that is very similar or identical to that from the instructions
2 issued by the Main Board of the SDS. Is that right?
3 A. Yes. The excerpts, quotes from this meeting we're looking at, are
4 done in standard type, and the bold italic type is reserved for discussion
5 at the next meeting in the Prijedor SDS minutes, 27th December.
6 Q. I'm sorry. So on the right-hand side there are essentially text
7 drawn from two meetings?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. If you could briefly go through -- I think it's worth while going
10 through that appendix.
11 A. Okay. I don't want to read the whole appendix, but just a
12 couple of what I think are the key provisions in this document of 19
13 December 1991. The first point is "Introduce a system whereby all SDS
14 municipal boards are continuously staffed and ensure uninterrupted contact
15 and cooperation with all local communal boards in the municipality."
16 This gets reflected in the undated meeting as:
17 "Introduce round-the clock duty and uninterrupted communications,
18 contacts with local boards on a daily basis are essential."
19 And then it's again reflected in the meeting of 27 December 1991,
20 with the language:
21 "The problem of round the clock duty in the SDS offices and
22 methods of maintaining constant communication with local boards. 1,
23 introduce around the clock duty according to the roster we have agreed
25 Point 3 I think is important in the language of the SDS Main Board
2 "The SDS municipal board will immediately form a Crisis Staff of
3 the Serbian people in the municipality."
4 This directive is reflected in the undated meeting as the
5 municipal board will direct a Crisis Staff and the 27th December meeting
6 with a somewhat more elaborate form, identifying in the same terms as the
7 SDS Main Board meeting instructions, the members of that Crisis Staff.
8 If we could go to just the next page, I will just take one more
9 example, which is quite relevant, and that's number 4:
10 "Convene and proclaim an assembly of the Serbian people in the
11 municipality comprised of deputies from the ranks of Serbian people and
12 presidents of SDS local communal boards."
13 Now, this differs from the instructions for the formation of a
14 Crisis Staff, which is just -- the local SDS is directed to form a Crisis
15 Staff. In the case of the Assembly of Serbian People, it's also directed
16 to proclaim it, and in fact, in all municipalities in which this took
17 place, there was a public announcement of the formation of the Assembly of
18 Serbian People in that municipality.
19 In the undated meeting, that order is reflected with the language:
20 "Convene a session and proclaim the assembly of the Serbian
21 people," and in the 27 December 1991 meeting, results in a brief
22 discussion about when this is to take place. The language is scheduling a
23 date for the session of the assembly as the Serbian people of Prijedor,
24 Stakic, 3 January, Gusuts [phoen], 6 January. Serdic does not agree
25 because it's Christmas, which people celebrate at home. It eventually
1 gets set for the 7th of January.
2 But this same echoing of the language in typically more simplistic
3 terms and often with an erroneous number to the corresponding document on
4 the left-hand side goes through the remaining ten points of the document.
5 Q. Dr. Donia, if I can refer you briefly to the minutes of the 27th
6 of December of 1991, which you've already stated you've incorporated into
7 this table that you've produced. Do you have those in front of you?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. Now, could you please highlight in this document, other than what
10 you've already said, anything of particular importance.
11 MR. CAYLEY: And these, Your Honours, you will find on page 438.
12 A. This document is entitled, "Minutes of the meeting of the Prijedor
13 municipal board of the SDS," held on 27 December, 1991. And in point 1,
14 third paragraph, we note that Simo Miskovic again presides and makes an
15 introductory presentation at this meeting, as he did at the previous one.
16 At the bottom of page 439, assignments are given among party
17 members to carry out specific committee formations. Second item on the
18 agenda, designating persons to set up the committees. The first committee
19 on inter-party cooperation is given to the president and vice-president,
20 respectively, of SDS at that time, Simo Miskovic and Milomir Stakic.
21 Other committee assignments are made and the committee for social affairs
22 was also Dr. Stakic, and that was something on which he had at that time
23 some previous experience working in that area.
24 Q. Can you go to the first page of that document, back to 438, and
25 you see where there are numbered items from 1 to 5. And then underneath
1 that, it states variant 2, capital letter "B" crossed out.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. What is that referring to?
4 A. Well, it appears to me that the notetaker here was uncertain
5 whether this was to be the stage or the variant being discussed is
6 probably not the first person to be somewhat overwhelmed by this document
7 and its various designations. But clearly concludes that this is the -- B
8 variant, or the second variant here, is the one which will apply to
10 Q. And the variant B version referred to in Prosecutor's Exhibit 39,
11 the instructions from the SDS Main Board, is where the Serbs are not in a
12 majority in a particular municipality; is that right?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And that was the case in Prijedor?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Let us now look at Prosecutor's Exhibit 45, which are,
17 Mr. President, the additional documents that I referred to this morning
18 that are not in the binders. And if they could be distributed.
19 MR. CAYLEY: And Mr. President, these documents are numbered 45 --
20 SK45, 46, 47, 48.
21 Q. Dr. Donia, do you have that in front of you?
22 A. No.
23 Q. You don't. I have my copy, if ... This is Prosecutor's Exhibit
24 45. What is this decision?
25 A. This is the decision on the proclamation of the assembly of the
1 Serbian people of Prijedor municipality, reflecting a session held on 7
2 January 1992. This would therefore be an act indicating the
3 implementation of .3, I believe, of the SDS Main Board instructions of 19
4 December. This was, as I indicated, a public meeting and produced a press
5 coverage or a press report following this meeting as well.
6 Q. It's actually, in terms of the instructions, from the Main Board,
7 Prosecutor's Exhibit 39. It's item 4. But I just want to read the
8 language, because I think it's important because it demonstrates a point
9 you made a moment ago. Item 4 of variant B, the first stage, states:
10 "Convene and proclaim an Assembly of Serbian People in the
11 municipality comprised of deputies from the ranks of Serbian people in the
12 Municipal Assembly and presidents of SDS local communal boards."
13 So this decision directly reflects the instruction contained in
14 Prosecutor's Exhibit 39, the instructions from the SDS Main Board, does it
16 A. Yes, it does. Just to be clear on the perhaps terminology,
17 Article 2 states the assembly has 69 members, including 28 representatives
18 of the Serbian people from the Serbian -- that's the abbreviation for
19 Municipal Assembly, okucani opstina. So those are the 28 SDS members of
20 the Municipal Assembly, and then the presidents of the local boards.
21 Q. Now, can I refer you to page 19 of your report. Do you have that
22 in front of you?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Now, at the time of the time of the convening of the Serbian
25 assembly in Prijedor, Dr. Stakic made a public statement, and you refer to
1 that in your report. Can you explain to the Judges the nature of that
2 public statement.
3 A. Yes. Following the formation of the Serbian assembly, at which he
4 was elected its first president, he was interviewed about the reasons for
5 the formation of a Serbian assembly, because this was always very
6 controversial and attracted considerable criticism from other parties.
7 And he told the interviewer that the assembly was not directed against the
8 Muslim people but against the irresponsible behaviour of leaders of the
9 SDA in Prijedor, and he then stated, as he had earlier, that the SDA had
10 avoided the agreement concerning division of authority - that would be the
11 inter-party agreement - and seized all significant functions in municipal
12 institutions, including National Defence, the municipal approximately
13 court, the police, the prosecutor, and the public accounting service.
14 Q. What is the accuracy of that statement?
15 A. The statement is not wholly accurate in describing -- it certainly
16 is not accurate in describing the seizure, because most of these positions
17 were taken by SDS nominees subsequent to negotiations with the SDS. That
18 was the case with the National Defence Council, and of course the police,
19 which we've already discussed. And it's true that the public accounting
20 service and municipal court and prosecutor were at that time in the hands
21 of SDS -- or SDA designees. It's partially inaccurate. It's partially
23 Q. Actually, I think you -- it was a slip of a tongue by you at one
24 point. You stated that it certainly is not accurate in describing the
25 seizure, because most of these positions were taken by SDS nominees,
1 subsequent to negotiations with the SDS, and I think you meant SDA
3 A. Yes. Pardon me. I meant SDA.
4 Q. If we could now move to -- actually, one question before that.
5 Now, in terms of the SDS attitude to the Muslim leadership, this statement
6 by Dr. Stakic, what did it represent in terms of the attitude of the SDS
7 to Muslim SDA leadership in Prijedor?
8 A. It was a statement that -- there was sort of a lack of confidence
9 in the SDA leadership and at the same time a statement that the Muslim
10 people were not the target of these SDS activities. But the approach to
11 the SDA leaders was similar to what it had been on 17th and 18th of
12 September, which was that they were acting in utter disregard of the
13 agreements reached with the SDS.
14 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Sorry to interrupt. Maybe for clarification,
15 here the exact language of footnote 63 of your report, I have the
16 impression it's not directly translated in the text. And additionally, do
17 you have Kozarski Vjesnik of 10 January 1992 as an exhibit?
18 THE WITNESS: I believe we do, Mr. President. The two quotes that
19 I gave at the bottom of page 19 are my translation and may not be what --
20 exactly what a professional translator would arrive at, but I did intend
21 here to give you a full and accurate translation of the quote that is in
22 the footnote. I'd be glad to read them, if you wish, for ... Okay. Let
23 me just read the B/C/S of the first quote:
24 "[Interpretation] Is not targeted against the Muslim population,
25 but the target is the irresponsible behaviour of the leadership of the
1 Party of Democratic Action in Prijedor."
2 [In English] And then the second part, which is the indented
4 "[Interpretation] The SDA has persistently been avoiding decisions
5 regarding the division of government and has taken all of the significant
6 and important functions in the institutions of the municipality, such as
7 the people's Defence, the municipal approximately court, the SUP, public
8 prosecutor's office and even the SDK."
9 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you.
10 MR. CAYLEY:
11 Q. Dr. Donia, the president asked whether or not that newspaper
12 article was incorporated into the bundle. I believe it is Prosecutor's
13 Exhibit 40. If you could just check. I may be wrong. This is the
14 article from Kozarski Vjesnik.
15 A. You're correct. This is Prosecutor's Exhibit 40, and the second
16 page of that exhibit contains the original B/C/S.
17 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you for this additional clarification.
18 Judge Fassi Fihri has another question.
19 JUDGE FASSI FIHRI: [Interpretation] Witness, you have stated that
20 the declaration is partly inaccurate. Does it mean that the reports also
21 were partially inaccurate or just the declaration itself -- rather, the
22 statement, not the declaration.
23 THE WITNESS: Your Honour's question to me was whether the
24 statement of Dr. Stakic was in fact true and accurate, and it was my
25 response that it was partially accurate but not completely so. The
1 characterisation of the --
2 JUDGE FASSI FIHRI: [Interpretation] So are you referring to the
3 statement or the facts contained therein? Is the statement itself
4 accurate or not? It exists, does it not?
5 THE WITNESS: The statement is, I believe, an accurate quote of
6 what he stated, and his characterisation of these positions as being held
7 by Muslims is accurate. I only take exception --
8 JUDGE FASSI FIHRI: [Interpretation] Which means that the fact that
9 Mr. Stakic is reporting about are partially accurate and partially
10 inaccurate; would that be the case?
11 THE WITNESS: Yes.
12 JUDGE FASSI FIHRI: [Interpretation] Thank you very much.
13 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, I think I can go on if you wish. I
14 think I'm going to go over into tomorrow for about 15 minutes.
15 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: I would say if you can conclude five minutes to
16 2.00, we can do it today. So you would have another 15 minutes today.
17 MR. CAYLEY: I'd like to take a bit more time over it than that.
18 It may go over that. I'm not sure. I have a number of documents. It's
19 not very long, but I think it might be better to finish with it tomorrow,
20 if you're content with that.
21 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Yes. When you really can limit the estimated
22 time to not more than 30 minutes, this would be the absolute deadline for
24 MR. CAYLEY: Yes, absolutely, Your Honour. It won't go beyond
25 that. I'm just concerned that if we do go on, we won't finish and then
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 we'll have to leave because of the next hearing.
2 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Right. Okay. Then the trial is adjourned and
3 we meet tomorrow, 9.00.
4 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.43 p.m.,
5 to be reconvened on Thursday, the 18th day of April,
6 2002, at 9.00 a.m.