International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 3740

1 Wednesday, 29 May 2002

2 [Open session]

3 [The accused entered court]

4 --- Upon commencing at 9.02 a.m.

5 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Good morning. Please be seated. Could you

6 please call the case.

7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning. This is Case Number IT-97-24-T, the

8 Prosecutor versus Milomir Stakic.

9 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: And the appearances, please.

10 MR. KOUMJIAN: Nicholas Koumjian with Ruth Karper for the

11 Prosecution. Good morning.

12 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you.

13 MR. LUKIC: Good morning, Your Honours. Branko Lukic and Mr. John

14 Ostojic for the Defence.

15 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Good morning. Before we start with the

16 cross-examination, I want to come back to an issue we discussed during the

17 65 ter (i) meeting. And I want to do it once again in the presence of Dr.

18 Stakic. That is the question of signatures. And as I mentioned already

19 before, the Trial Chamber is of the opinion that, in principle, it is

20 necessary to have an expert witness on the question whether or not one can

21 find out if or if not the signatures -- different signatures we have found

22 until now on certain copies are written by Dr. Stakic or not. And it

23 could not be necessary, as it was indicated by the Defence, if -- I

24 couldn't call it an agreement, but if there would be a statement by Dr.

25 Stakic. First of all, I have to emphasise once again that of course, the

Page 3741

1 right of Dr. Stakic to remain silent and the right of the Defence to say

2 nothing, quite clear.

3 But I don't know whether or not you have discussed this issue with

4 your client, and furthermore, the question: In case you would decide that

5 you would say your client would advise you that, as regards the one or

6 other signature, this could be accepted, this could be done in several

7 different ways. Either by saying: "We are not contesting," or by saying

8 "The one or the other signature, that's right, that's the signature of

9 our client." Or it would be, as I said in the beginning of the trial, of

10 course, the right of Dr. Stakic to make his own statement, if he so wants,

11 in agreement with the Defence. Or it would be a possibility, and it was

12 discussed by the Bench, that if it would be regarded as appropriate by the

13 Defence, that Dr. Stakic could appear only, and only limited to this

14 issue, and appear as a witness in the case. And we would take care that

15 no other issue would be discussed in the framework of such statement. So

16 therefore, had you had the possibility to discuss the issue with your

17 client?

18 MR. OSTOJIC: Good morning, Your Honour. It was my task, if I can

19 put it that way to meet and to try to discuss the signatures on some of

20 the documents, although we did receive additional documents which purport

21 to have Dr. Stakic's signature. And my plan was to meet with Dr. Stakic

22 either Monday afternoon or Tuesday afternoon. But due to some personal

23 commitments of my own, I was not able to go to the Detention Centre

24 yesterday. Mr. Lukic did. I still maintained a copy of the documents and

25 personally was going to check with Dr. Stakic on that. Just so the

Page 3742

1 Chamber knows, we will go through that and have a complete report by next

2 Wednesday with respect to the documents that we either contest, or the

3 documents we will not contest with respect to signatures. There is, just

4 briefly checking with him, some discrepancy on the signatures; however, --

5 or at least that's our position, again. We have to take a closer look at

6 it. The stamp is on some of the signatures. I have just been passing in

7 between the breaks and we check with Dr. Stakic on that. So we would

8 reserve the right to do that and to report back to the Chamber by next

9 Wednesday. I know we're meeting on Tuesday, but because of the four-day

10 break, we might need to have Monday and Tuesday afternoon to meet with him

11 on that.

12 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: The time is running, and as we mentioned before,

13 it is necessary to start with -- if necessary -- such an expert witness as

14 soon as possible because such expertise normally takes two or more months.

15 And therefore, it has to be decided immediately. But seeing, and

16 respecting, your readiness to discuss this issue seriously with your

17 client, I think it's appropriate that we can proceed as suggested, if the

18 OTP doesn't object, and then we could discuss in toto all the signatures

19 on the -- yeah. On all the documents we have in list 1, 2, and 3, and the

20 one we got two pieces of paper -- it would be very neutral -- we got from

21 the Witness Murselovic. And if we can go through all these documents next

22 Wednesday, I think it should be appropriate.

23 MR. KOUMJIAN: I would just suggest that I get together with the

24 Defence after they have had a chance to discuss it with their client. We

25 do not necessarily maintain that every signature that is above a line with

Page 3743

1 the accused's name, is the accused. I've seen some where the word "Za"

2 meaning for, appears before the signature. So we may not be in dispute

3 that some of these were signed by somebody else.

4 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Okay.

5 MR. OSTOJIC: If I may, Your Honour, on this point --

6 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Can we conclude that it's then the real and the

7 final deadline next Wednesday on this issue?

8 MR. OSTOJIC: Yes, Your Honour, we may.

9 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you.

10 MR. OSTOJIC: I have one other item if I may, Your Honour, related

11 to this. Would it be appropriate if the Defence, during the

12 cross-examination, submit to this witness signatures of parties including

13 Dr. Stakic in order to have him verify or select which signature he deems

14 to be the one that is Dr. Stakic's? Without going into much detail, we

15 would propose that there's at least five to ten such signatures on a

16 signature card similar to the photo identification card that the OTP

17 proposed earlier, during the beginning of the trial. We would just like

18 leave of Court to do that. We don't want to surprise the Chamber, nor the

19 witness and try to submit this signature block, if you will, to a witness.

20 We have a differing view on some of the testimony, without going into it

21 in detail. So that would be one way in which we think we can establish

22 what this Chamber and this Tribunal is trying to achieve, and that is

23 truth, to see the veracity of each of the witnesses and, at the end of the

24 day, to determine the truth as to what occurred on or about the area of

25 Prijedor in 1992.

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Page 3745

1 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Right. Observations by the OTP to this point?

2 MR. KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, we are opposed to having experiments

3 conducted in the courtroom. I leave it to Your Honours' discretion, but

4 we would be opposed to that being done in the courtroom. I would like to

5 bring up another matter just related to this witness. We need -- for his

6 schedule it's not possible for him to stay beyond Thursday. I just hope

7 we can complete his cross-examination and all questioning by Thursday. If

8 not, we're going to have to work out another date to bring him back.

9 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Right. I think we all share the view that this

10 can be and must be concluded until Thursday. But I don't know how you

11 want to proceed. We have numerous signatures, and if you, of course, have

12 them in a comparative approach, I can't identify any obstacles. And so

13 therefore, let's wait and see what will happen in general. There

14 shouldn't be any objections from our side.

15 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, Your Honour. And I do have one last

16 point distantly related to this witness, if we're considering some

17 administrative issues if I may.

18 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Yes, please.

19 MR. OSTOJIC: Last Friday, Mr. Inayat testified, in part, both

20 during the direct examination on behalf of the OTP and some of the

21 questions from the Defence late last Friday, we are requesting based on

22 Mr. Inayat's -- and I apologise to him if I'm mispronouncing his name,

23 based on his testimony that it may take anywhere from one to three days to

24 provide us with an index from their either Zylab [sic] programme or from

25 whichever computer software programme they are utilising, in order to

Page 3746

1 determine what, if any, additional documents we have not received which we

2 may deem, and I understand the rule and that it's the Prosecutor decides

3 if it's relevant, pursuant to Rule 68. And without going into too much

4 detail, if the Court examines the threshold issues that we examined, one

5 being namely propaganda, what we would like to determine and we think it's

6 important although it's up to the Court to decide is whether or not the

7 propaganda on all three sides would be considered relevant in Prijedor

8 municipality, and whether or not the response by some, whether on the

9 Serbian side or the Bosniak/Muslim side, or the Croatian side were

10 responsive or replying to propaganda initiated by one of the three sides.

11 We received from Kozarski Vjesnik the propaganda, in part, of the Serbs.

12 We think it would be relevant to receive that propaganda, if any, from the

13 other two sides.

14 We think the index will help establish that. We believe that

15 under the broad interpretation of Rule 68, that that would be deemed

16 exculpatory, in part. Secondly, we have been receiving from the OTP,

17 generously, additional Rule 68 materials. For example, I believe

18 yesterday we received, dated May 28th, additional documents with Tab

19 Number 881. And we appreciate that, so we want to thank them in open

20 court for that. But we believe there are yet additional documents, if we

21 were provided this index which, under the time constraints that I

22 understand the OTP is under and the specific unit that Mr. Inayat's team

23 one is a team leader of, if we would have that, we would be able to

24 discern and determine which additional documents we may need. And at that

25 point, either an ex parte evaluation can be done by the Chamber, or the

Page 3747

1 OTP can determine whether it even wants to proceed on that step, or merely

2 provide us a copy of the documents that we're requesting. Because as we

3 suggested last Friday, I'm not sure if it was eloquent or clear enough, we

4 do not have access to documents which have been the original, which have

5 been removed and are no longer in the Prijedor municipality, namely the

6 four to six institutions that the OTP and the team leaders removed those

7 documents from. So it's necessary for our defence to be able to see, in

8 totality, these documents to make a determination as to whether or not it

9 would fit within our defence.

10 MR. KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, I would have a great deal to say

11 regarding this request. My request is can we deal with this after the

12 witness is finished, because it can take a long time.

13 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: I understand. I only want to invite the parties

14 to come to an agreement between the parties before the Bench has to decide

15 on this. But the parties should know, and I believe they have already got

16 the impression, that the Bench is not too enthusiastic on propaganda and

17 its probative value in this case when it came to the admission of evidence

18 in the beginning on the basis of the testimony of Dr. Donia. But please,

19 try to come to a solution among the parties, and let's now start with the

20 witness today.

21 May the witness be brought in, please.

22 [The witness entered court]

23 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Good morning. Please be seated. And you are

24 prepared for cross-examination?

25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes.

Page 3748

1 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: We may start immediately. And thank you for

2 that.

3 WITNESS: MIRSAD MUJADZIC [Resumed]

4 [Witness answered through interpreter]

5 Cross-examined by Mr. Lukic:

6 Q. [Interpretation] Good morning, Dr. Mujadzic. My name is Branko

7 Lukic, and together with Mr. John Ostojic, we represent the defence of Dr.

8 Stakic before this Tribunal. I should like to ask for your assistance in

9 clarifying certain issues which are of interest to the Defence, just as

10 you have assisted the Prosecution in their case.

11 In light of the fact that we speak the same language, we're likely

12 to pose problems to interpreters. I know that it's not natural to make

13 pauses between questions and answer, but please bear in mind that after I

14 have finished asking my question, to wait a little, perhaps have a look at

15 the screen to see whether the interpretation has come out, and then

16 proceed with your answer. Thank you.

17 Let me begin with page 8, line 17 of the transcript of yesterday's

18 testimony.

19 A. I'm sorry, but I do not see anything on my screen. Could the

20 screen be switched on, please.

21 Thank you.

22 Q. I will indicate the pages and the lines from the transcript, but I

23 will, at the same time, quote your words. I am indicating the page

24 numbers and the line numbers only for the purposes of the record. So

25 please, do not be confused with that.

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Page 3750

1 You told us about the steering committee of the SDA in Prijedor on

2 page 8, line 17 of Monday's transcript. You said that "at that time in

3 the Prijedor SDA, there were two factions within this board. Each of them

4 supported their own candidate." Can you explain to us the differences

5 between these two factions at the time?

6 A. The substantial differences concerned the overall organisation of

7 the Prijedor municipality. The Prijedor municipality consisted, and still

8 does, of Kozarac, Omarska, Ljubija, Prijedor town, and the area which is

9 called Brdo. Out of these segments, so to speak, of the municipality, the

10 town of Kozarac had its characteristic identity, because it is a much

11 older town than the town of Prijedor. Its origins date back to the 13th

12 century. Likewise, Ljubija was also distinct in this sense as part of the

13 municipality because of the mine ore complex. And then there was the town

14 of Prijedor, which can also be considered as a separate entity within this

15 municipality. So the factions that you refer to were, first of all,

16 regional in their character because certain areas supported their own

17 candidate, and other areas had their own. So these differences were

18 regional, so to speak, in their nature. As it is usually the case with

19 the elections, every area has their own candidate to support.

20 Q. Thank you for your answer. On page 11, line 24, still Monday's

21 transcript, you testify about a census. Is it correct that the results of

22 this census were never verified?

23 A. I was not directly involved in the census of the population

24 because there were municipal boards at the level of the municipality that

25 were in charge of the census. These boards were established pursuant to a

Page 3751

1 proposal issued by various parties, members of the parliament in the

2 municipality. This proposal was accepted by the assembly and was

3 forwarded to the republic commission, the republic board for census. And

4 pursuant to that proposal, this commission was established and its members

5 appointed, thereby guaranteeing the regularity and legality of the census.

6 There were several such commissions and several persons in charge of

7 taking the census. This commission was a multiethnic commission and

8 multiparty in its character as well. So the results of the census were

9 first reviewed by the commission, and then after that, the results were

10 forwarded to the commission which functioned at the level of the republic.

11 And from there, I believe that they were forwarded to the republic

12 institute for statistics where once again the results were reviewed and

13 verified.

14 I must admit that personally, I don't know that there have been

15 any objections as to the census of the population in Prijedor, so I don't

16 know whether there was any need to verify anything subsequently. I don't

17 remember anyone raising the issue of authenticity of the population census

18 in Prijedor or the credibility of this census.

19 Q. You're not familiar with the objections that the SDS had as to the

20 results of the census?

21 A. I remember that they objected to the results of the elections, and

22 they did so on several occasions.

23 Q. Are you not aware of the fact that they criticised the results of

24 the census as well?

25 A. No, I'm not.

Page 3752

1 Q. Can we therefore conclude that you're not -- you don't know

2 whether the results of the census were ever verified?

3 A. Are you referring to the Prijedor municipality or the results of

4 the census in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a whole?

5 Q. I'm referring to the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a

6 whole.

7 A. I have already said that I do not remember having heard any

8 objections or criticism as to the results of the population census, so I'm

9 afraid I'm unable to answer your question.

10 Q. That is also a legitimate answer. Whenever you feel you're not

11 able to provide us with an answer, please feel free to say so.

12 On page 15, line 11, we're still on Monday's transcript, at the

13 very end of the page and then throughout the following page, page 16, you

14 explained to us how Mr. Milosevic wanted to revoke the right of the

15 republics in terms of voting, by trying to introduce a one-person,

16 one-vote principle. Do you know whether the autonomous provinces, Kosovo

17 and Vojvodina which were two component parts of Serbia had the same right

18 of vote at the level of the federation as the republics?

19 A. Is that your question? I think that you are only partially right.

20 As far as I am familiar with the constitution of the former federative

21 Republic of Yugoslavia, this equality was equally reflected in the

22 Presidency of Yugoslavia after Tito's death which had eight members, eight

23 members of the presidency. Each republic had their representative to the

24 presidency, as was the case with the autonomous provinces. As for the two

25 Chambers of the parliament of the federation of Yugoslavia, it consisted

Page 3753

1 of the chamber of republics and provinces, the members of which were

2 elected as follows: There were 12 members, 12 representatives, from each

3 of the republics, and eight members, as far as I can recall, from the two

4 provinces. So they had fewer representatives in this segment of the

5 parliament than the republics. So the influence of the provinces was

6 significantly reduced when compared to the influence of the republics.

7 As for the first part of your question, that is, the abolishment

8 of the right to equal vote, I don't know whether this was merely your

9 allegation or if you wish me to respond to your question.

10 Q. I believe you have provided us with a sufficient response. Thank

11 you.

12 Can we, therefore, agree that at the level of the head of state,

13 which was a collective body which was introduced after Tito's death, of

14 course, I'm referring to the presidency of Yugoslavia, that Serbia

15 together with Montenegro and two of its provinces had four votes and that

16 it could not be outvoted in any way?

17 A. Are you implying the assumption that at any rate, Montenegro was

18 giving its vote, according to your hypothesis, to some sort of Serb

19 majority within Yugoslavia?

20 Q. Was that a customary occurrence at the time? Did Montenegro ever

21 vote against Yugoslavia?

22 A. Yes, you're quite right about that. That was the case at the

23 time. Serbia and Montenegro always voted together. If you remember, if

24 you're familiar with those days, you will also recall the so-called Jogurt

25 revolution through which Milosevic was able to impose his men, to install

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Page 3755

1 his people in both provinces and also in Montenegro. So you're quite

2 right about that. He always had four votes within the federal presidency

3 in Yugoslavia, and there was no way he could be outvoted.

4 Q. Why was it then necessary to introduce the one-person/one-vote

5 principle?

6 A. The principle of one-person/one-vote was not the result of any

7 realistic threat posed to the Milosevic regime or any realistic threat

8 posed to the Serbian population in Yugoslavia in general. The

9 introduction of this principle was the result of Milosevic's wish to

10 dominate Yugoslavia and to have the majority on his side. He did not --

11 he was not satisfied with the balance with this ratio of forces within the

12 presidency. He wanted to have the majority of votes.

13 Q. As for the one-person/one-vote principle, although I -- although

14 it is accepted in all western countries and in the majority of democratic

15 systems in the world, do you still believe that the principle in question

16 was inadequate and that it could not be applied to Yugoslavia as a whole;

17 and if so, would you give us your reasons why?

18 MR. KOUMJIAN: Objection, relevance as to the relevance of this

19 witness's views of what the politics of Yugoslavia should have been.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Actually, I'd be happy to answer the

21 question.

22 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: I know --

23 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone Your Honour, please.

24 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: -- Please understand, we have not to decide on

25 politics, on political questions, what would have been the right political

Page 3756

1 solution and so on. I know we can't have a clear distinction and a clear

2 line, but I would really ask you to concentrate on both with your

3 questions and your answers, to concentrate on the relevant matters of this

4 case where we have to come at the end of the day to the conclusion whether

5 or not there is a criminal responsibility of a concrete person or not. But

6 I don't -- I know very well, it's different to find the correct line. But

7 please bear this in mind, both with the questions and the length of your

8 answer. Thank you.

9 MR. LUKIC: [In English] Should I move on, Your Honour?

10 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: We could first of all hear the short answer of

11 the witness, and then you may proceed.

12 Do you remember the question? Okay.

13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I do, Your Honour. I'll do my

14 best and try to be as brief as possible.

15 You're right. This principle is followed by most of the countries

16 in Europe. However, most of the European countries are one nation

17 countries, such as France and Germany. On the other hand, Yugoslavia was

18 a federation which was made up of several different republics, which in

19 distant past were independent countries with a very long tradition. So

20 this was the reason why Yugoslavia was specific in this regard. And this

21 was the reason why Yugoslavia required a different kind of voting and not

22 the one-person/one-vote principle.

23 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. So this principle was primarily applied to protect the peoples

25 that lived within Yugoslavia?

Page 3757

1 A. That's correct.

2 Q. Does that also mean that this one-person/one-vote principle could

3 be applied in Bosnia-Herzegovina as Yugoslavia on a small scale?

4 A. In the context that you speak about, Bosnia-Herzegovina could not

5 be compared to Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia was composed of geographically

6 homogenous wholes and it was a state which came into existence by an

7 agreement following World War I. Bosnia-Herzegovina, on the other hand,

8 is a state that was created as far back as the 10th century. It's past is

9 a thousand years long. Its past has been in existence as an entity for a

10 thousand years. So perhaps there is a degree of similarity in as far as

11 Bosnia-Herzegovina, indeed, is a state composed of three peoples with

12 equal rights. But unlike in Yugoslavia, in Bosnia-Herzegovina, there

13 weren't any different geographical entities. As I said yesterday, in

14 Western Bosnia, there were only Serbs. There was a part of Bosnia where

15 there were only Croats. It wasn't like that. The whole of

16 Bosnia-Herzegovina was mixed. Even small villages were. So these are two

17 very different things and there can be no comparison in that context

18 between Yugoslavia and Bosnia-Herzegovina.

19 Q. Are you familiar with the concept, the constitutiveness of a

20 people, constitutionality of a people?

21 A. Yes, I'm familiar with that concept.

22 Q. Was it valid before the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

23 A. Yes. Bosnia and Herzegovina had its three constitutional peoples.

24 Q. Nowadays, after the principle was abolished during the war, is it

25 in force in Bosnia-Herzegovina today?

Page 3758

1 A. Now we're talking about the Dayton agreements, but I will try to

2 provide an answer to this question. By the Dayton agreements, which did

3 not entirely reflect the will of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

4 Bosnia and Herzegovina was established as a state consisting of two

5 entities. One was Republika Srpska, and the other was the federation.

6 One of the entities, Republika Srpska, did really bear in its name the

7 title "Republika Srpska" which would lead one to believe that it was an

8 entity that belonged only to Serbs, and the other entity, the federation,

9 was allegedly a community of Bosniaks and Croats. And that's how the

10 first constitution was drafted in both of these entities.

11 However, the Dayton accords were merely a peace agreement, and as

12 such, it does not imply constitutional provisions for a given country so

13 that later on, an initiative was started, and it's nearing implementation

14 in the federation. It's almost implemented, that all three peoples should

15 be constitutional peoples in the area of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which means

16 that both in the federation that, at first, only implied Bosniaks and

17 Croats. Serbs now should, too, be a constitutional people. And by the

18 same reciprocity, also in the territory of Republika Srpska, Bosniaks and

19 Croats should become constitutional groups. This is not the case now, but

20 such reciprocal solutions should soon begin to take place. The high

21 representative of UNHCR for Bosnia-Herzegovina also confirmed this.

22 I'm sorry this explanation proved a bit lengthy, but it was a

23 complex question, so I did find that I had to provide a lengthy

24 explanation.

25 Q. Do you know how many Bosniak delegates there are currently in the

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Page 3760

1 assembly of Republika Srpska?

2 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: I'm not prepared to admit questions being not of

3 relevance for the case. The time before and the incidents leading to the

4 period of time which is the subject matter of our case is, of course, of

5 importance, but not the time after.

6 MR. LUKIC: [In English] Thank you, Your Honour. I'll move on.

7 Q. [Interpretation] Okay. We shall leave this area now. And I will

8 ask you something related to your statement on Monday's transcript, page

9 15, page 16 where you speak about the whole of Yugoslavia breaking up into

10 the pro-Milosevic and pro-Yugoslavia camps and those who were against it.

11 You also say that this affected Prijedor.

12 Do you believe that this division was also the main course for the

13 war that broke out in Bosnia and Herzegovina?

14 A. Mr. Lukic, please excuse me, but the question appears illogical to

15 me. Whether someone supported Milosevic or not, can this lead to a war?

16 Q. The implication is that the war was a consequence of a division, a

17 conflict, so that was my question.

18 A. The true causes of this war lie much deeper. If you ask me what

19 the causes were, I could try to provide an answer; however, your question

20 implies that it was this division that caused the war in the first place,

21 which I do not agree with.

22 Q. You mentioned the pro-Yugoslavia parties, at that time, the SDS,

23 the Serbian Reconstruction Movement, and the Radical Party. Against this

24 were the HDZ, the SDA, the Social Democrats, and part of the Communist

25 Party. Is this correct? Can you recall this?

Page 3761

1 A. If you can please remember I said that the SDA, in its programme,

2 had, as one of its most prominent features, the preservation of

3 Yugoslavia. The SDA was one of the most interested parties of Bosniaks,

4 as such, were people with the greatest interest in preserving Yugoslavia

5 as a community of six different peoples all with equal rights, because

6 Yugoslavia, as such, guaranteed security and stability to the Bosniak

7 people. But speaking of two different concepts of Yugoslavia, the SDA did

8 not advocate Milosevic's view of Yugoslavia, Milosevic's idea of

9 Yugoslavia, but it did support Yugoslavia. So this division is not really

10 reliable.

11 Q. I was only quoting you.

12 MR. KOUMJIAN: I would object because that misquoted the witness.

13 The witness in that answer indicated that these were parties with a

14 certain national zeal. He never identified those parties as being the

15 pro-Yugoslav parties. It's on -- for some reason, my page and line

16 numbers are slightly different than Mr. Lukic's. But on my page 16, it

17 would be line 16, if we're talking about parties based on a certain

18 national zeal such as the Party of Democratic Action, the Croatian -- I

19 withdraw. I don't want to go into it any further. I think I slightly

20 misread it before I intervened. Excuse me.

21 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: It would be indeed for all our assistance, also

22 the Bench couldn't follow the quotations. I don't know why, what's wrong

23 today. Apparently we have different numbers of pages as regard the 28th

24 of May, it's only slightly different. But unfortunately, as regards the

25 27th, it is already the -- it's starting page 3568. I don't know. On the

Page 3762

1 basis of Livenote, we have to take care using that, it's a different

2 numbering. I don't know why today. But please, we rely on you quoting

3 careful the entire sentence, and there will be no problem at all.

4 MR. LUKIC: [In English] I'll certainly do my best, Your Honour.

5 Thank you.

6 Q. [Interpretation] Did you, in your statement, contend that the SDA

7 would place a condition on staying in Yugoslavia if Croatia stayed and in

8 order to achieve the principle of equidistance?

9 A. I said that Yugoslavia was by definition a community of six states

10 with equal rights, including Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Montenegro,

11 Macedonia, and the two provinces. Any of these states or republics --

12 should any of these states or republics secede, which was almost certain

13 as far as Slovenia was concerned at that moment, the balance you mentioned

14 was destroyed, especially in the presidents where the ratio was four

15 against four, and now already the ratio would be four against three in

16 Milosevic's favour. So that already would destroy the balance and destroy

17 the possibility of having equal rights for all the republics.

18 Bosnia said that it wanted to preserve Yugoslavia at all costs,

19 even if only Croatia stayed because Croatia was not that far down the road

20 of secession at that time as Slovenia was.

21 Q. Can you then, please, tell us whether the SDA, after Croatia's

22 secession, had a definite plan for the secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

23 A. If you would please just think back to that period, and I would

24 like to briefly present Your Honours with the situation in that period,

25 the situation which the then presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina was facing.

Page 3763

1 What you are saying about the SDA, the question is no, there was no

2 definite plan of secession. There were different initiatives, various

3 options so that if you remember, there was the so-called Belgrade

4 initiative led by Professor Muhamed Pilipovic [as interpreted] and a

5 political group surrounding him. They went to Belgrade to negotiate with

6 Milosevic in order to try to secure for Bosnia-Herzegovina in possible

7 rump Yugoslavia a certain status through new constitutional solutions.

8 This initiative, unfortunately, failed. It fell through. It was obvious

9 that Milosevic offered no such solutions as to guarantee the peoples of

10 Bosnia and Herzegovina equal rights in rump Yugoslavia.

11 Q. We are talking about Mr. Muhamed Filipovic. Which party did he

12 belong to?

13 A. For a certain period of time, he belonged to the Party of

14 Democratic Action and then, after that, Muslim/Bosniak organisation.

15 Q. When he went to these negotiations, which party was it?

16 A. The Muslim/Bosniak organisation.

17 Q. I asked you about the SDA's plans.

18 A. At that time, all parties, with the exception of the SDS, at the

19 level of presidency considered jointly options for the future of Bosnia

20 and Herzegovina. Therefore, Mr. Filipovic's initiative, and the

21 initiative of Mr. Zulfikar Pasic had political backing from all parties

22 which amounts to the same thing as if all parties were taking part in this

23 attempt to reach an agreement.

24 It was only later, in February, so, much later after the secession

25 of Croatia, after the SDS walked out of the parliament and proclaimed its

Page 3764

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Page 3765

1 own Serbian republic, and a long time after the Autonomous Region of

2 Krajina was proclaimed, with a view to secession and annexation by Serbia,

3 it was quite clear that at that point, the issue became so complex that

4 people had to decide about it on a referendum. So the parliament voted a

5 referendum. And the question should be put to the people whether they

6 were in favour of a sovereign Bosnia-Herzegovina.

7 Q. I would just like to go back to Professor Muhamed Filipovic for a

8 moment and ask you, are you familiar with the fact that he did, indeed,

9 accept the Belgrade initiative, but that the initiative was rejected by

10 the SDA?

11 A. To the best of my knowledge he brought this initiative before a

12 party meeting, and after this initiative was discussed, the conclusion was

13 reached that what Milosevic offered did not guarantee equal rights for

14 Bosnia and Herzegovina in this potential new rump Yugoslavia, or the

15 equality of the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

16 Q. Page 17, line 12 --

17 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: The Bench would kindly ask the Defence to

18 refrain from general political questions. As I mentioned before, the

19 subject matter of our case is a different one, and we can't go in depth in

20 these political questions, first of all, questions of political

21 opportunities at that time. We have to restrict ourselves to facts at

22 that time.

23 MR. LUKIC: [In English] But Your Honour, in this case, the

24 political background is crucial for the assigning of the guilt of the

25 accused in this case. We have to show the attitude and the standpoint of

Page 3766

1 other parties and who was actually pushing in which direction.

2 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: As I said, it's a question of facts, and we

3 shouldn't discuss opinions.

4 MR. LUKIC: I will just have to quote the witness. So if the

5 Prosecution considers that issue crucial and important, I think that we

6 have the right to address the same issue.

7 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Please proceed in the spirit the Bench just

8 suggested to you.

9 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.

10 Q. [Interpretation] Page 51, Monday's transcript, line 10, you state:

11 "When Slovenia and Croatia began to secede from Yugoslavia, the attitude

12 of the SDA was that should Croatia stay part of Yugoslavia, we shall

13 continue to consider this state as Yugoslavia. Should Croatia secede,

14 then the balance is destroyed and the state is no longer Yugoslavia, but

15 rather Greater Serbia. Our view was that in this case, we could not

16 remain in that state as part of Greater Serbia." I must ask you again,

17 does this mean that the SDA associated the secession of Bosnia and

18 Herzegovina with the secession of Croatia, or made it dependent on the

19 secession of Croatia?

20 A. No. As you have read out right now, the SDA thought, believed,

21 that Bosnia-Herzegovina should not stay in Greater Serbia.

22 Q. In your opinion, was it at that point that the secession of Bosnia

23 and Herzegovina became inevitable?

24 A. As Milosevic wasn't offering any other solutions, the initiative

25 by Filipovic that I was talking about was a blueprint for this. So that

Page 3767

1 seems to have remained the only possibility at that time.

2 Q. Does that mean that you proceeded with secession regardless of the

3 will of one of the ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina?

4 A. No, that is not correct. Please, if I may just finish, although

5 the SDA, for example, had a large number of Bosniak votes, it did have a

6 number of votes of other ethnic groups. The Serbian Democratic Party also

7 contended that it had -- that most of its votes were Serbian, but that it

8 had other votes, too, from other groups, which was clearly demonstrated by

9 local elections in Prijedor. The same goes for the HDZ, or at least

10 that's what they were claiming. This means that the Party for Democratic

11 Action was not and could not be the only representative of the Bosnian

12 people. So there is no equation sign between the SDA and Bosniaks. And

13 there is no equation mark between the SDS and Serbs. So in the

14 referendum, there were Serb members of parliament who also voted in

15 favour, but the later results of the referendum showed that there were

16 quite many Serbs also who voted in the referendum in favour of an

17 independent Bosnia and Herzegovina.

18 If we suppose that all Bosniaks and all Croats in Bosnia and

19 Herzegovina gave their vote in favour, that would still be a lot less than

20 63 or 64 per cent, I can't remember now, which was the number of votes --

21 the percentage of the votes in favour. This implies that also, a

22 significant part of Bosnian Serbs favoured an independent Bosnia and

23 Herzegovina.

24 Q. At the time of the referendum were representatives of the SDS

25 absent from the parliament? We knew about the results of the plebiscite

Page 3768

1 where 95 or 96 per cent of the Serbs voted for remaining in the common

2 state, the shared state. So we're not speaking about here about the SDS

3 but about the will of the Serbian people, and you were familiar with this

4 at the time of the referendum.

5 A. Mr. Counsel, with all due respect, I should like to remind you of

6 the essential differences between the plebiscite of the Serbian people and

7 the referendum which was held in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The plebiscite of

8 the Serbian people was held, as far as I remember, as early as in November

9 1991, long time before any debate on the possible secession of Bosnia and

10 Herzegovina was possible. The plebiscite was called by the Serb

11 Democratic Party, which means that it was not called by any legal

12 institution of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina at the time, but by a

13 single political party. This plebiscite demonstrated clearly certain

14 aspects of national segregation, because blue ballots were intended for

15 Serbs, and yellow, I believe, for non-Serbs, which tells you how at the

16 very stage of voting, there were already elements of segregation which

17 obviously caused a certain amount of distrust amongst the non-Serb

18 population. Moreover, if I remember, the result of the plebiscite was a

19 hundred per cent. Allegedly, the turnout was a hundred per cent, and all

20 of the voters voted in favour. And as far as I could observe by living in

21 Prijedor, a significant number of Serbs didn't vote, did not turn out at

22 the plebiscite. So the number -- the figure that you indicated, 95 or 96

23 per cent, could by no means be accurate.

24 Q. The information that you have, does it refer to the number of

25 affirmative votes by the voters who turned out at the plebiscite, or to

Page 3769

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Page 3770

1 the number of those who turned out compared to the overall size and number

2 of the population?

3 A. In the interpretation of the election results of the Serbian

4 Democratic Party, it was said that the overall Serb population voted in

5 favour, voted affirmative at the plebiscite. We, on the other hand, did

6 not have direct insight into the results of this election, because the

7 Serb Democratic Party was the only body in charge of this election and

8 processing its results. So on the basis of the interpretation given by

9 them, it was possible to conclude that all Serb citizens turned out, and

10 that all of them voted in favour.

11 Q. You said that you did not have access to information. Did the SDS

12 attempt to hide this information, or did they try to make it public?

13 A. I said that we did not have direct insight into the counting of

14 the votes and the verification of the results, which the kind of work

15 which is normally done by the relevant commissions at the level of

16 municipalities and at the level of the republic. The Serbian Democratic

17 Party did not have -- was not -- this plebiscite was not legitimate. The

18 Serb Democratic Party attempted to make it legal and legitimate, but in

19 actual fact, it was not. And this is what I'm talking about.

20 Q. What I'm trying to establish through this line of questioning is

21 whether the SDA and HDZ, as representatives of the majority of the Croat

22 and Bosniak population in Bosnia and Herzegovina knew at the time that one

23 significant segment of the population was against the secession of Bosnia

24 and Herzegovina from Yugoslavia.

25 A. What we knew for sure was the fact that this was opposed by the

Page 3771

1 Serbian Democratic Party, that is, its leadership. We're not even sure

2 whether the overall membership of the Serbian Democratic Party was against

3 this. We also knew that the Serbian Democratic Party was not the sole

4 representative of the Serbian population. You cannot equate the SDS with

5 the Serbian population.

6 Q. How about the HDZ and the SDA?

7 A. Likewise.

8 Q. But they were also the only ones who decided on it?

9 A. No, this decision was also made by all other party members who

10 were represented at the parliament.

11 Q. Are you familiar with the statement by Mr. Alija Izetbegovic at

12 the time who was the president of the Party of Democratic Action? I

13 quote: "Bosnia is worth sacrificing peace in Bosnia."

14 A. Give me just a moment to organise my response.

15 If aggression should be underway against any country in Europe or

16 somewhere else in the world, as was the case with Milosevic in Yugoslavia,

17 and if anyone should attempt to obliterate a European country in this way,

18 would it be possible for the president of the state in question to say

19 that it is necessary to prepare ourselves to defend the country against

20 its extinction? Because that is exactly what he meant when he said that.

21 Q. So you are familiar with the statement that I just quoted given by

22 Mr. Izetbegovic?

23 A. Yes, I am.

24 Q. On page 69, line 19, Monday's transcript, you stated that the

25 presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina declared a state of immediate danger

Page 3772

1 of war in April 1992. Is this correct?

2 A. I believe that I also stated, and if I didn't, let me do it now,

3 that the exact date when the state of immediate danger of war was declared

4 in Bosnia and Herzegovina was not known to me. So once again, I'm not

5 sure whether it took place in April or sometime in mid-May that year.

6 Q. Thank you. You said that you didn't have any military structure.

7 Have you read the book written by Mr. Sefer Halilovic, "The Cunning

8 Strategy"?

9 A. No, I have not.

10 Q. Prijedor saw the formation of the Patriotic League as early as

11 1992?

12 A. Yes, that is correct.

13 Q. What is the relationship between the Party of Democratic Action

14 and the Patriotic League?

15 A. The Party of Democratic Action was one of the parties that

16 supported the objectives and the aims of the Patriotic League; namely, the

17 defence of the homeland.

18 Q. Is the SDA, at the same time, the founder of the Patriotic League?

19 A. To the best of my knowledge, the initiative came from Mr. Sefer

20 Halilovic. And again, as far as I know, Mr. Sefer Halilovic was never a

21 member of the Party for Democratic Action.

22 Q. On page 18, line 9, Monday's transcript, you make mention of an

23 instruction issued by the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina that its

24 citizens should not take part in the war against Croatia. Are you able to

25 tell us when this instruction was issued? Approximately, at least.

Page 3773

1 A. I believe that it could be the month of July, July 1991.

2 Q. Are you familiar with the number of mobilisations that were called

3 up in 1991?

4 A. The number of mobilisations? In which area and at what time?

5 Q. In Bosnia and Herzegovina in 1991. I am referring to September,

6 October, and November 1991.

7 A. I am familiar with one such order, one callup, which was issued at

8 the local level in the Prijedor municipality. That is one mobilisation

9 that I'm familiar of. But I do not know anything about other

10 mobilisations, that is, mobilisations in other parts of Bosnia and

11 Herzegovina.

12 Q. You told us something about who is in charge of calling up a

13 mobilisation. Is it possible to call up a mobilisation at the local

14 level? You also said that it was the municipal -- you said that the

15 municipal secretariat for national defence was only an agency belonging to

16 the ministry in question.

17 A. Yes, that is correct, which means that a local secretariat could

18 not, on its own, call up a mobilisation.

19 Q. What about the secretary of the secretariat for national defence?

20 Was that Mr. Becir Medunjanin at the time?

21 A. Yes, Becir Medunjanin was the secretary.

22 Q. Is Mr. Becir Medunjanin Bosniak by ethnicity?

23 A. Yes, he is.

24 Q. At the time, was Mr. Medunjanin a member of the SDA?

25 A. Yes, he was.

Page 3774

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Page 3775

1 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Would it be an appropriate time for a break now.

2 MR. LUKIC: [In English] Yes, Your Honour. Thank you.

3 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Then the trial stands adjourned until 11.00

4 sharp.

5 --- Recess taken at 10.26 a.m.

6 --- On resuming at 11.04 a.m.

7 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Please be seated. Before we restart, I have to

8 announce a decision of the Chamber. The time limit for the

9 cross-examination by the Defence expires tomorrow at 1:30. For obvious

10 reasons, we have the witness only available for the two days, and so it's

11 up to the Defence to decide which are the most important matters to raise.

12 And additionally, we would ask -- you spoke about a board this morning,

13 please present it to the Prosecution and the Bench before you present it

14 to the witness. Thank you.

15 We have new appearances on the side of the Prosecutor?

16 MR. KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, for the record present in addition to

17 myself and Ms. Karper is Pooja Bhalla, an intern with our office. Thank

18 you.

19 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Please proceed.

20 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

21 Q. Dr. Mujadzic, can we continue now?

22 A. Yes, we can.

23 Q. Are you familiar with the fact that in September 1991, the

24 response to the mobilisation was over 80 per cent, and this response

25 included Croats, a small number of Croats, but in terms of percentage, the

Page 3776

1 same number of Bosniaks responded to the callup as Serbs?

2 A. Does this relate to mobilisation in Prijedor municipality?

3 Q. Yes. The data I've just given refers to mobilisation in Prijedor

4 municipality.

5 A. It's the first time I see this information, but I find it to be

6 very indicative. As I have said before, Bosniaks and Croats did respond

7 to the mobilisation, and I provided the example of the gathering in Jaruge

8 for the Territorial Defence under Colonel Colic but having noticed many of

9 the mobilised wearing Chetnik insignia, and having heard their

10 nationalistic and chauvinistic speeches made by some of the commanders and

11 by Colonel Colic himself, the majority of those who responded to the

12 callup, among the Bosniaks and Croats, as well as a certain number of

13 Serbs, refused to go to the front line and refused to remain in the units

14 when they heard about the aims of this mobilisation. Are you familiar

15 with the makeup of the units?

16 Q. Thank you. I cannot answer questions. I cannot testify from

17 where I stand.

18 Did a majority of the Serbs respond to the mobilisation? Are you

19 familiar with that?

20 A. Even today, I have many Serbs among my friends and acquaintances.

21 I know that a significant number of Serbs failed to respond to the

22 mobilisation. They deserted and left Bosnia for third countries because

23 they were in disagreement with the policies advocated by those who

24 organised these mobilisations.

25 Q. Those Serbs who responded to the callup, were they given weapons

Page 3777

1 on that occasion? Can you tell us anything about that?

2 A. As I have already said, when I talked about mobilisation in Jaruge

3 by Colonel Colic, not all of those who responded to the callup eventually

4 joined the units. Many of them, when they heard about the aims of this

5 mobilisation, and the aim was to go to the war in Croatia and fight

6 against their neighbours and friends of yesterday, many gave up and did

7 not join the units, which includes a number of Serbs, too.

8 Q. Those who did join, were they given weapons?

9 A. I assume they did, assuming that they joined the unit and they

10 were going to the front line. Probably they were given weapons, but I did

11 not witness this. I was not an eyewitness to this, so I cannot say for

12 sure.

13 Q. Did the people who joined the units, did they get any tanks, guns,

14 Howitzers, rifles as part of the JNA?

15 A. The units at that time purported to be still the JNA, but their

16 commanding staff and their tolerance for the presence of reservists of the

17 JNA, people carrying insignia that were not JNA insignia, but rather

18 Chetnik insignia, white eagles' insignia, extremist units led by Vojislav

19 Seselj, all these people de facto turned the JNA into a Serbian

20 ideological army under the ideology of Slobodan Milosevic.

21 Q. Maybe I was not clear enough. I have been trying to draw your

22 attention to weapons and not to insignia statements or anything like that.

23 What I want to ask you is did the JNA hide, conceal the fact, that it gave

24 people rifles, guns, Howitzers, tanks, those people who did respond to the

25 callup and who did join the units? Did the JNA do this secretly or

Page 3778

1 publicly?

2 A. Whoever joined the units eventually, units of the Territorial

3 Defence led by Colonel Colic, and I think the 43rd Brigade led by

4 Colonel -- or at that time Second Lieutenant Arsic, of course, they were

5 given weapons.

6 Q. Did everyone who responded to the mobilisation and join the units,

7 was everyone given weapons?

8 A. I hope that I have already answered this question in my previous

9 reply.

10 Q. Why should the JNA, then, need to give weapons in secrecy to Serbs

11 in the villages throughout the area as they did, as you have just

12 described it?

13 A. Are we talking about assumptions or about facts? Our facts say

14 that the JNA did, indeed, distribute weapons.

15 Q. So at the same time they distributed weapons to Serb, both

16 secretly and publicly. Is that your testimony?

17 A. Please do not try to interpret what I wanted to say. Please ask

18 me directly about my interpretation. I never said this. It was you who

19 said that the JNA armed members of the units that it had mobilised, as any

20 other army would have done. And you said yourself that among the members

21 of these units, there were not only Serbs. I know that there were

22 Bosniaks and Croats who did go to the front line in Croatia. Therefore,

23 the JNA distributed weapons to those people who responded to the

24 mobilisation and accepted to go to the war in Croatia. And at that time,

25 it was still legal. However, the JNA also illegally distributed weapons

Page 3779

1 around Serbian villages and only to the Serbian population, which was not

2 connected to what they were doing with those who responded to the

3 mobilisation.

4 Q. Did the majority of those who did respond to the mobilisation,

5 were they Serbs?

6 A. Yes.

7 Q. I would like to continue now with a different issue, and I would

8 like to ask you something related to what you stated on Monday, Monday's

9 transcript page 21, line 25 through page 22, line 9. You contend that

10 within the police forces and all other institutions, justice, financial

11 institutions, social enterprises and institutions in Prijedor, as well as

12 throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosniaks were unequally represented as

13 compared to Serbs. Is it your testimony that in Bosnia and Herzegovina,

14 the principle of equal representation was not applied or the rotation of

15 personnel recruited from all the ethnic groups of Bosnia and Herzegovina,

16 also known as the "national key"?

17 A. That's correct. In Bosnia, the national key did, indeed, exist,

18 and this so-called national key implied that at the level of the

19 republican organs of authority, if the president of the central committee

20 of the communist party of Bosnia and Herzegovina, because we're talking

21 about Tito's Yugoslavia, this implied that the president of the parliament

22 was Serb, if the president of the central committee was a Bosniak and the

23 president, prime minister, was a Croat. This was a parity that was upheld

24 at the republican level, at least as far as the leading positions were

25 concerned. However, speaking about percentage, the figures are related to

Page 3780

1 the structure of the administration or the key positions within the

2 administration. Therefore, it is not sufficient if the prime minister is

3 Bosniak, as long as assistance to ministers, advisors, were in 80 or 90

4 out of a hundred cases Serbs or members of other ethnic groups. Because

5 those bodies that create laws, make proposals for laws, constitute some

6 sort of a fixed, permanent administration. Let's take the example of the

7 U.S.A. It is the administration that remains a fixed point of reference

8 and guarantees the stability of the state. If you change one man, you

9 can't change the lot.

10 Q. So even when Tito was still alive, the Bosniaks were neglected as

11 concerns their appointments to leading positions?

12 A. This was more evident at the local level than at the republican

13 level. I will provide an example, an example of Prijedor, which is the

14 situation I am most familiar with. Ever since the war, until 1990, so

15 throughout 45 years, Bosniaks were appointed to the position of the chief

16 of police only twice, which means that a Serb was appointed to the same

17 position 43 times. In all the key structures, important positions, within

18 the local police, out of a total of a hundred employees, in about 10 or 12

19 important positions, there were only 2 Bosniaks, and the remaining 8

20 positions were always, even at such times when certain positions were

21 traditionally held by members of Serb ethnicity. Let's take the example

22 of municipal administration. Over a total of 336 employees of Prijedor

23 municipality, only about 70-something were Bosniaks, part of which were

24 alleged Yugoslavs. And there were between 15 and 20 representatives of

25 Croat ethnicity. But there were over 200 Serbs. So even this

Page 3781

1 administration reflects what I have said before.

2 And just another final example: I could name a lot of such

3 examples. Since 1945, so we're talking about Tito's Yugoslavia, in

4 Prijedor municipality, the position of the president of the municipality,

5 Cehajic, as far as I can remember, was only the third or fourth Bosniak

6 person in that position, and the remaining 40 times the president was

7 appointed, it was always Serbs who were appointed. I think once it may

8 have been a Croat. So this is a very typical occurrence. At these

9 levels, it was reflected in most of the structures in most municipalities

10 in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, it wasn't this that the Bosniaks really

11 minded. Even this kind of Yugoslavia was accepted by the Bosniaks. The

12 problem was that what Milosevic actually offered was a lot less than what

13 I have now been speaking about.

14 Q. Is this insufficient representation of Bosniaks in administration

15 positions, was it conditioned by the fact that Bosniaks were mostly into

16 private enterprises; and thus, they controlled most of the money in

17 circulation in Prijedor municipality?

18 A. What you've said is correct, but that is a result and not a cause.

19 The fact that Bosniaks, the reason that Bosniaks couldn't find employment

20 in the structure of the state was mostly because they were into private

21 business. But they should have been in a position to influence the taxes

22 raised from private business, as is normal, common practice throughout the

23 world.

24 Q. I think we can agree that in the former system, no entrepreneur

25 could affect the level of taxes, regardless of his nationality.

Page 3782

1 A. What I said referred to the new system, a system that was supposed

2 to be a democratic one, and certain changes were supposed to take place. I

3 wasn't talking about the previous system. As far as the previous system

4 is concerned, I agree that no one could effect this, apart from the

5 administration. And I have already said who held the most important

6 positions on this administration.

7 Q. Let us return to the issue of weapons and armament. We have

8 reached the conclusion that all those who responded to the mobilisation

9 and joined the units were given weapons, that all Bosniaks and -- had all

10 Bosniaks and all Croats decided to respond to the mobilisation, would all

11 of them have been given weapons?

12 A. Yes, probably they would have all been given weapons.

13 Q. Can we, in that case, blame the JNA for not arming Muslims and

14 Croats?

15 MR. KOUMJIAN: Objection. Argumentative.

16 MR. LUKIC: [In English] I withdraw.

17 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Sustained.

18 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

19 Q. You say that the Territorial Defence was -- constituted the army

20 of the republic. What about the armed forces of the Socialist Federative

21 Republic of Yugoslavia? Did they not belong to one and the same system,

22 to a unique system of the military, and is it not true that the

23 Territorial Defence units were part of, and subordinate to, the JNA units

24 in case of imminent threat of war?

25 A. When I use the expression "the army of the republic," I was being

Page 3783

1 metaphorical. The fact remains that the Territorial Defence was organised

2 according to the republican principle. It was organised on the basis of

3 the republics. And the JNA had its units deployed in various barracks

4 throughout Yugoslavia, whereas the Territorial Defence was organised in

5 the republics, the Slovenians, for instance, had the Territorial Defence

6 of Slovenia, and so on and so forth. And what you say -- on the other

7 hand, what you say is true in cases of war or imminent threat of war, the

8 assumption was that the Territorial Defence would be made part of a

9 unified system of command. They would not be -- be opposed to each other.

10 This organisation of the Territorial Defence reflected the idea of Tito,

11 according to which each citizen of the country was the subject, so to

12 speak, of the national defence. So the Territorial Defence units were

13 related and connected to the territory where they were actually organised.

14 But, the assumption was not, of course, that the Territorial

15 Defence unit in a given area, as was the Territorial Defence unit of

16 Colonel Colic, should go to war in Croatia, for example, which happened.

17 So this principle of national defence, which was established during Tito's

18 Yugoslavia, was impaired in the example that I just gave you. But there

19 were cases of similar activity on the part of the JNA even before these

20 events.

21 Q. We established, to go back to the SDA, that you were elected the

22 first president of the SDA after the elections, and that Mr. Kapetanovic,

23 Nijaz and Mr. Mevludin Sejmenovic were elected your deputies. Is that

24 correct?

25 A. Yes, it is.

Page 3784

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Page 3785

1 Q. There was another round of elections the next year in August of

2 1991. And once again, you were elected president of the party. Your

3 deputies or the vice-presidents were Muharem Keric, Brafo Dzafic [phoen],

4 and Mr. Hasan Talundzic. Is that correct?

5 A. No.

6 Q. Would you be so kind and correct me.

7 A. Kapetanovic and Sejmenovic were once again elected vice-presidents

8 of the party.

9 Q. But was there a change in this structure at one point in time; and

10 if so, when?

11 A. No, no, there was no such change at any point in time.

12 Q. So Mr. Kapetanovic remained as your vice-president throughout that

13 period of time?

14 A. Yes, that is correct.

15 Q. What was the position of Mr. Talundzic in the SDA?

16 A. As far as I can recall, and to the best of my knowledge, he was an

17 ordinary member of the party with no specific function.

18 Q. You were a deputy to the assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Is

19 that correct?

20 A. Yes, it is.

21 Q. You were a deputy to the Chamber of Citizens in this assembly?

22 A. Correct.

23 Q. There was also a Chamber of Municipalities as part of this

24 assembly, the assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina?

25 A. Correct.

Page 3786

1 Q. When you were present at the sessions of this assembly, was there

2 any discussion about a possible introduction of one more chamber, the

3 Chamber of Peoples, whose objective would be to guarantee the

4 constitutional equality of the constituent peoples of Bosnia-Herzegovina?

5 Was this issue ever debated at any of the sessions which you attended?

6 A. Your Honours, I think I need a few moments to recall, to remember,

7 this issue in order to be able to respond to this question.

8 I'm afraid I cannot answer with certainty, but I believe that the

9 issue was debated.

10 Q. Was there ever any talk about the possible establishment of the

11 council for national equality whose work was envisaged pursuant to the

12 already-made amendments to the constitution, if you can recall?

13 A. Once again, I cannot speak with certainty, but it seems to me that

14 that issue was also debated.

15 Q. Do you know that, at the first session of the anti-fascist council

16 of the national liberation force in Yugoslavia who established in Mrkonjic

17 Grad in 1943 that Yugoslavia was not only a Croat -- that Bosnia and

18 Herzegovina was not only a Bosnian, a Croat, or a Serb country, but it was

19 Bosnian, Croat, and Serbian at the same time, and that as such, it would

20 be made part of Yugoslavia? This was the legal constitutional basis of

21 all of the constitutions of Bosnia and Herzegovina which were subsequently

22 adopted, and this principle was respected and applied even in 1990 and

23 1991, that it was still in force. Are you familiar with this fact?

24 A. Yes, I am.

25 Q. Let me go back to the issue of referendum, please. According to

Page 3787

1 you, who are aware of this principle, the decision to have a referendum

2 against the will of one of the peoples represented in the assembly, did it

3 not constitute the contravention of this constitutional principle? You

4 have mentioned the fact that there were individual Serbs, members of other

5 parties, who were opposed to this. But if you intend to include this in

6 your answer, will you please tell us the figures? How many of such Serbs

7 there were members of other parties, and how many of that did, in fact,

8 participate in the voting of the decision whereby it was decided that the

9 referendum would be called?

10 A. Now we are entering the area of the legality of the decision to

11 have a referendum, which is a rather complex legal issue. In order for me

12 to be able to fully and adequately respond to your question, we would

13 first have to define the concept of representatives of the Serbian people.

14 Do you consider the Serbian Democratic Party to be the representative of

15 the Serbian people? Because apart from the Serbian Democratic Party, then

16 and now, there is a number of parties which in their name contain the word

17 "Serb" but there were other parties that were not described as "Serb"

18 parties who did not have any national or ethnic description in their

19 title. So we are faced with the problem of defining the concept of the

20 representatives of the Serbian people.

21 Q. Let me try to clarify. I am referring to the representatives of

22 the Serbian people who advocated the attitude of the Serbian population

23 expressed at the plebiscite.

24 A. Well, first of all, I think that we concluded that the plebiscite

25 was not legal, that it was not based in law. Thereby, we have to question

Page 3788

1 its legitimacy. I think we have already established that a large segment

2 of the population, the Serbian population, did not turn out, which renders

3 its results debatable. This plebiscite was conducted by a single

4 political party. Furthermore, I do not remember that this referendum had,

5 at any point in time, had its representatives, elected representatives.

6 So I think that your question is misconstrued to begin with.

7 Q. Let me try with another question. Are you familiar that a

8 two-third majority is required for the passing of any constitutional

9 amendments in Bosnia and Herzegovina? So in cases of such referendum, at

10 least 60 per cent of the electorate should vote in favour of the

11 constitutional amendment proposed. However, the overall turnout for the

12 referendum for the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina was over 64 per

13 cent, so it was less than the number which was required for the

14 affirmative vote.

15 A. First of all, the decision to go to a referendum did not require a

16 two-thirds majority. The decision did not concern any constitutional

17 amendment. It was merely a decision to have a referendum, whereby the

18 population was given an opportunity to express its opinion on an issue

19 which was debated at the referendum. So the subject of the referendum did

20 not concern any constitutional changes.

21 Q. However, the results of the referendum should have -- were

22 supposed to lead eventually to constitutional amendments?

23 A. That's another issue.

24 Q. You touched upon the issue of legitimacy of the referendum. Did

25 this referendum legitimise any constitutional changes by its results?

Page 3789

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Page 3790

1 A. I'm afraid I'm not competent to discuss the issue of legitimacy of

2 the referendum. The legality and the legitimacy of the referendum, the

3 decision thereon, and its results were discussed by an independent

4 commission, the Badinter [realtime transcript read in error "a"]

5 Commission, if you remember. If my memory serves me right, the commission

6 was established by the European Community. This commission approved the

7 results of the referendum; and likewise, approved both the legitimacy and

8 the legality of the referendum.

9 Q. Was the decision of this commission a political one or a legal

10 one? Did it take into account the valid constitution of Bosnia and

11 Herzegovina at the time, if you know?

12 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Please, refer to facts only and not to the

13 opinion of the witness.

14 MR. LUKIC: [In English] I withdraw the question, Your Honour.

15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, looking at the English

16 transcript, the interpreter probably did not hear the name Badinter, the

17 Badinter Commission. I can only see the word "commission" in the word.

18 The name should be added. It's Badinter.

19 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

20 Q. You were the president of the municipal board of the SDA in

21 Prijedor. You were a deputy to the Chamber of Citizens in the parliament

22 of Bosnia and Herzegovina. You were also a member of the main board of

23 the SDA, president of the regional committee for the Bosnian Krajina on

24 behalf of the SDA. Is this correct? Are these the positions that you

25 have held, with respect to the SDA?

Page 3791

1 A. Two of the positions that you indicated are related to the SDA.

2 The fourth one is my function as a deputy, which is a state function, a

3 state position.

4 Q. As far as state functions are concerned, were you also president

5 of the municipal commission for appointments to the Municipal Assembly in

6 Prijedor?

7 A. No, I was not. It was not possible for me to have that function,

8 because I was not a deputy to the municipal parliament. As a republican

9 deputy, I could only attend such sessions as a visitor. I could not play

10 any part in the decision-making process, nor could I make any proposals to

11 that effect.

12 Q. Thank you for this correction. My information may not be right.

13 Are you familiar with the procedure of appointing persons to

14 various municipal functions? Which appointments were subjects of the

15 negotiations in which you participated as a member of the SDA?

16 A. The appointment procedure as regards municipal positions is a very

17 complicated one. Let me just emphasise that I only partly participated in

18 such negotiations. At the beginning, it was a commission whose member I

19 was, but this commission was followed by a number of other commissions

20 whose member I was not. Speaking of the negotiations. As for the

21 appointments themselves, the initiative comes from the municipal board of

22 a party, which initiative is then examined by the municipal board of

23 deputies who then decide whether they would support or oppose this

24 decision at the local parliament. And the meetings of these deputies were

25 attended by several people, and then -- and they decided to which

Page 3792

1 candidate they would give their support. The voting was always secret.

2 And out of several nominations, this club, this board of deputies selected

3 the candidate that they intended to support at the session of the

4 parliament.

5 Q. But it is true, is it not, that the party also nominated the

6 officials whose appointments were not voted at the session of the

7 Municipal Assembly? I am referring to the position of the chief of the

8 public security station, for instance. His appointment could not be

9 discussed at the Municipal Assembly. What was the procedure in this case?

10 A. As far as I know -- I'm sorry, I believe that I have explained

11 this procedure of appointments in my previous testimony. If necessary,

12 I'll be happy to repeat it.

13 Q. You said that the proposal came from the municipal level. Would

14 you please clarify. Did you mean the Municipal Assembly, when you talked

15 about the municipal level, or the municipal boards of political parties?

16 A. This particular statutory provision was something that we

17 inherited from the former Yugoslav law, and it was made part of the

18 relevant law of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina after the first

19 multiparty elections, after we had had a single-party system for a number

20 of years, the Communist League was the one party in question, and they

21 nominated and appointed such individuals. So after this period of time,

22 we moved to a multiparty system. However, we still had the former -- the

23 old laws were still applicable. And as far as I can remember, according

24 to that procedure, it was the president of the municipality who nominated,

25 who proposed, the candidate for this post, and this candidate was then

Page 3793

1 approved by the minister. However, both in the previous system and later

2 on, it became clear that since the minister is not familiar with the

3 reality throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, and since he could not have

4 known all of the relevant individuals, it was always the proposal of the

5 president of the municipality that was eventually approved. So that was

6 the procedure that was followed at the time.

7 Q. So you would not agree with me, would you, if I put it to you that

8 all the proposals, all the nominations in connection with the SUP or what

9 later became MUP, were coming from the SUP or MUP themselves and not from

10 the Municipal Assembly?

11 A. The nominations for the chief of police at the local level were

12 always proposals of the social and political community at that level.

13 They were not proposals of the relevant police station, that is, the

14 public security stations. Its employees never made such proposals.

15 Q. Thank you. As for what concerns the secretariat for national

16 defence, are you referring to the electoral procedure? Were the relevant

17 republican organs in charge of nominations to regional and subregional

18 institutions? So aside from the secretariat of national defence, the

19 public auditing service, post, and telecommunications, railways, the

20 railway, insurance, regional funds, are you familiar with the procedure of

21 appointing candidates to these positions?

22 A. As far as the secretary of national defence, I know for sure that

23 the proposal must be processed by the Municipal Assembly. So the

24 Municipal Assembly makes a proposal. I think also the regional

25 secretariat of national defence plays a certain role. I think it provides

Page 3794

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Page 3795

1 an opinion, but the republican minister must formally endorse the

2 appointment. But as with the head, this is more -- the character of this

3 appointment is more for many l but what really counts is the proposal

4 which comes from the Municipal Assembly which was adopted most of the

5 times. As for the other institutions you've mentioned, they are all

6 public, that is, state institutions. The Municipal Assembly nominated not

7 the managers of these companies, but the so-called Executive Boards for

8 these public companies. For example, the regional fund had an Executive

9 Board consisting of -- I'm not sure -- 12 or 15 members. I know that the

10 Executive Board of the Prijednabanka [phoen] included 15 members. And

11 members of this Executive Board were nominated by the Municipal Assembly,

12 and this board appointed -- elected its own president. And then this body

13 nominated and appointed managers of all these institutions.

14 The municipality has jurisdiction over these public companies,

15 some of these public companies such as the post and telecommunications or

16 water management, and also the public auditing service as far as I can

17 remember, as they had a republican infrastructure, their hierarchy

18 descending from the republican to the local level, according to the same

19 principle as the positions I have mentioned before, the chief of the local

20 police and the secretary of national defence. There were formal

21 appointments by republican -- from the republican level. But the proposal

22 was made at the local level, which, in practice, meant that all these

23 positions and the candidates were nominated and appointed at the local

24 level.

25 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: May we please have a break now until 12.30.

Page 3796

1 --- Recess taken at 12.04 p.m.

2 --- On resuming at 12.34 p.m.

3 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Please be seated. And you may continue, please.

4 MR. LUKIC: [In English] Thank you, Your Honour.

5 Q. [Interpretation] Dr. Mujadzic, we spoke about the procedure of

6 appointing persons to leading positions in a number of institutions. Did

7 the Municipal Assembly have a say also when leaders of institutions were

8 replaced or dismissed, where you say that the Municipal Assembly did have

9 a say and did take part in appointing these persons?

10 A. Yes, the Municipal Assembly had the right to give initiative for

11 the replacement of these persons or the dismissal of these persons. And

12 if such requests were justified, they were usually adopted.

13 Q. Is a government an organ of legislative or executive authority or

14 power?

15 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Once again, please refrain from theoretical

16 questions.

17 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The government is by definition an

18 organ of executive power. I'm sorry if I was not supposed to answer this

19 question.

20 MR. LUKIC: [In English] Your Honour, I think that the witness

21 knows about the structure of the municipal bodies, so yesterday he spoke

22 about these issues. And I just want to clarify, to put some institutions

23 and governmental institutions in a certain fields. So I think that the

24 witness can help us to clarify those issues which have been mentioned

25 previously.

Page 3797

1 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: If it comes to concrete facts, there's no

2 problem. But please read your question, and then you will see immediately

3 that we are, of course, please understand my language correctly, that we

4 are not in a seminar on public international law for beginners.

5 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

6 Q. Did the Prijedor Municipal Assembly, is it an organ of legislative

7 or executive power?

8 A. The Municipal Assembly takes decisions at the local level. It

9 does not pass laws. The legislative power lies at the state or republican

10 level of Bosnia-Herzegovina. And the municipal level merely took

11 decisions.

12 Q. So the Municipal Assembly can -- only has the authority to pass

13 and adopt bylaws?

14 A. That's correct.

15 Q. Which organ of the Prijedor Municipal Assembly has the executive

16 power?

17 A. The Executive Board, the local government.

18 Q. Who did the Executive Board answer to for its work, the president

19 of the municipality or the members of the municipal board?

20 A. Both.

21 Q. So your testimony today is that the Executive Board answers to the

22 president of the Municipal Assembly?

23 A. The president is, by definition, at the same time a member of the

24 Municipal Assembly, so if the Executive Board answers to the Municipal

25 Assembly, it should only be logical that it also answers to the president

Page 3798

1 of that body. And this is precisely defined in the municipal statute, the

2 fact that the Executive Board should also answer to the president of the

3 Municipal Assembly.

4 Q. Is this responsibility of the Executive Board to the president of

5 the Municipal Assembly in his role as a member of the Municipal Assembly,

6 or are there cases when this responsibility is to the president of the

7 Municipal Assembly as an autonomous organ or body?

8 A. Unfortunately, I'm not an expert in law, so I'm unable to answer

9 this question. But as far as I know from my general political education,

10 is that there are certain issues for which the Executive Board answers

11 directly to the president of the municipality.

12 Q. Thank you.

13 Are you familiar with the competences and functions of the

14 Municipal Assembly?

15 A. Its competences and functions are enumerated in the statute of the

16 Municipal Assembly. They are defined under the law on local government at

17 the republican level, and also defined under some constitutional

18 provisions. But I'm not in a position now to enumerate all these

19 competences and functions because essentially I was never a member of the

20 administration. I always worked as a physician, so I'm not familiar with

21 professional details concerning the competences of the Municipal Assembly.

22 Q. Thank you.

23 When we spoke about the employment office and about the public

24 auditing service about the telecommunications service, water management,

25 and electricity management, Yugoslav railway, do you know whether these

Page 3799

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Page 3800

1 institutions were financed from the municipal budget, or in a different

2 way?

3 MR. KOUMJIAN: Could I ask that the question just clarify the time

4 period that we're talking about.

5 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: First of all, the time period, and we had it

6 already several times in the past, we should not discuss in length what

7 should have been under the law or under the statute, but we have to

8 discuss and find out what have been the facts. And as the counsel of the

9 OTP correctly stated, the period of time is of utmost importance here.

10 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

11 Q. [No Interpretation].

12 A. [No Interpretation].

13 Q. [No Interpretation].

14 MR. KOUMJIAN: Sorry, is Your Honour getting an interpretation?

15 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: No. Are there problems in the booth?

16 THE INTERPRETER: Can you hear me?

17 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Yes.

18 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] You were talking about the power

19 distribution company, the employment office, and the Yugoslav railways.

20 Was anything else mentioned in addition to that?

21 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

22 Q. The public auditing service.

23 A. As far as these institutions are concerned, the way they were

24 financed was very different. They didn't have a unified system. The SDK

25 is a state institution only. The employment office is also a state

Page 3801

1 institution. And the power distribution company and the Yugoslav railway

2 and the PTT are profit-oriented institutions. The Yugoslav railway sells

3 tickets and makes money. The PTT takes money for its services, whereas

4 the SDK and the employment office are, in a way, nonprofit organisations.

5 Their task was to organise certain areas for the state to function. Under

6 normal circumstances, these services were financed from the budget.

7 Q. Which budget, the municipal budget or another budget?

8 A. These two institutions that I have singled out, the state

9 institutions, were financed from the republican budget. But let us not

10 forget that the municipal influence, what we talked about when we talked

11 about the different services, it drew its influence from the fact that

12 these institutions were in the municipal territory, and from the fact that

13 the taxes came from the municipal area. It drew its authority, which we

14 have not tried to dispute, from this very fact.

15 Q. Yesterday's transcript, page 51, line 8, you contend "the

16 Executive Board is a kind of local government which doesn't have the

17 authority to adopt any significant decision without approval from the

18 Municipal Assembly or from the president of the Municipal Assembly." Would

19 you be so kind --

20 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Would you please be so kind and quote the entire

21 sentence. As it is stated: "In normal peacetime, the Executive Board

22 is..." And going on.

23 MR. LUKIC: [Interpretation]

24 Q. Therefore, page 51, line 8: "In normal peacetime, the Executive

25 Board is a kind of local government..."

Page 3802

1 A. I think I said "local authority."

2 Q. [In English] Local government.

3 MR. LUKIC: I can read in English so the translator may translate

4 properly in B/C/S, but I may not be that skillful.

5 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, the interpreters do not have the

6 transcript, so we can only quote from memory.

7 MR. LUKIC: I'll read from the transcript, so they can translate

8 properly.

9 Q. In normal peacetime, the executive committee is a kind of local

10 government which cannot reach any significant decision without the

11 assembly or the president of the municipality having to approve -- issue

12 his approval in respect of this decision."

13 [Interpretation] Can you please tell me and the Trial Chamber

14 which legal or bi-legal provision it was, where you found the foundation

15 for such a statement?

16 A. At all levels, starting at the state level, whoever knows anything

17 about the way a state functions know that the government makes proposals

18 for laws. At first, they draft laws. That's the way things were done in

19 the assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Then certain amendments are made.

20 The government then processes these amendments, makes a proposal for the

21 law, which is then discussed again by the assembly, reviewed again by the

22 assembly. And it is only then that a law can be passed. A similar

23 procedure, except not with regard to laws but other sorts of decisions,

24 was applied at the level of local governments. Therefore, the executive

25 committee prepared, as any other administration involved in similar

Page 3803

1 processes, and all the decisions were discussed by the local parliament

2 and either approved or amended, and adopted. This is standard procedure.

3 It is clearly defined in all democratic countries of the world.

4 Q. So when you said this, you meant the passing of laws and bylaws,

5 and not just any other affair conducted by the Municipal Assembly which

6 did have other functions, too?

7 A. In my statement, I clearly stated "important decisions." I could

8 not precisely define the statute of the municipality based on the law on

9 local government which precisely defines which decisions exactly. But we

10 are talking about most of the important decisions. It is quite clear that

11 some of the decisions or less important solutions can be made by the

12 Executive Board. But in practice, even with such less important

13 decisions, the Executive Board always consults the president of the

14 Municipal Assembly because at the end of the day, it was the president of

15 the assembly, as any president that could bring up the question of

16 dismissing the representative of the government as well as the president

17 of the Executive Board, who was directly responsible to him for his work.

18 Q. When speaking about the president of the municipality, did he have

19 the power to decide, as an individual, on anything within the competence

20 of the Executive Board?

21 A. We are talking about peacetime functioning of the government. The

22 president of the Executive Board, in the intervals between two assembly

23 sessions, looked after the consistent implementation of the assembly's

24 decisions. As far as I know, that was his main function. So all those

25 decisions that were passed and placed within the competence of the

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Page 3805

1 Executive Board, that was in charge of implementing them, the duty of the

2 president is to see to it that these decisions are consistently

3 implemented.

4 Q. Did the Municipal Assembly have any part in the work of the

5 secretariat or the inspection teams that were part of the Executive Board?

6 A. Are you referring to local ministries? Can you just clarify it,

7 please.

8 Q. At that time, they were called secretariats.

9 A. But that sounds a bit unclear, because what they actually were,

10 they were local ministries, small local ministries. We can call them

11 that. So the question was whether the Municipal Assembly had any part in

12 their work, in the work of these secretariats?

13 Q. Whether it had the authority to order anything. I can give you

14 examples. I have provided examples for other witnesses. Could the

15 Municipal Assembly order the secretary for urban planning and communal

16 services to issue a building permit to anyone, or did this segment of the

17 Executive Board have independence in its activities?

18 A. My apologies, Your Honours. I must repeat again. By profession,

19 I am a doctor, and my knowledge of state administration is limited to my

20 general knowledge of political administration. But I will still try to

21 answer this question.

22 Orders are given in the army, so a general, for example, can issue

23 an order to his subordinates. But in democratic procedure, civilian

24 authorities, if a proposal is made for making a change in the urban plan

25 or resolving any important issues concerning urban planning, since that's

Page 3806

1 what we're talking about, the proposal must be processed and considered by

2 the assembly, and the president of the assembly then sees to it that the

3 decision is consistently implemented. So if a particular local minister

4 or secretary fails to implement a decision in such a way as was decided by

5 the assembly, then the president of the government is the first who is

6 held responsible if his minister does not do his work in a proper way.

7 And then he can start the initiative for such a person, such a man, to be

8 removed from office, because his activity is contrary to the function of

9 his office.

10 Q. Can such an initiative be given by any of the deputies at the

11 Municipal Assembly?

12 A. Yes, there is a provision in law to that effect. All deputies can

13 initiate such an act.

14 Q. To the best of your knowledge, are there any decisions taken by

15 the Executive Board which need the approval of the president of the

16 Municipal Assembly?

17 A. I believe that I explained the functioning of the Municipal

18 Assembly and its president on several occasions during my testimony in

19 response to a couple of your questions, but I will try briefly once

20 again --

21 Q. I can perhaps quote your testimony.

22 A. Please do.

23 Q. In yesterday's transcript, on page 51, line 41, you stated the

24 following --

25 A. The interpretation 14, not 41.

Page 3807

1 Q. I'll quote your words in English, and you will have them

2 interpreted. "The Municipal Assembly or the president of the Municipal

3 Assembly is superior to the president of the Executive Board."

4 [Interpretation] You must understand the significance of this

5 question. It is closely related to the issue of responsibility of Dr.

6 Stakic. Sometimes, we really have to be persistent. In this case, we do

7 need explanation and your assistance. This type of superior authority,

8 was it vested only with the Municipal Assembly or with the president

9 himself? Was he also superior to the Executive Board, to the best of your

10 knowledge again?

11 A. Of course. To the best of my knowledge, I will try and explain to

12 Their Honours and yourself this issue. And I understand how important it

13 is. I think that the statute of the Prijedor Municipal Assembly would

14 help in this case, or any other statute of the Municipal Assembly which

15 clearly specifies the authority, the duties, and competences of the

16 president and the Municipal Assembly. Since we do not have such a

17 document here, I will briefly try to explain the nature of this

18 relationship.

19 Q. The Chamber has -- does have the statute. Can we agree that the

20 overall authority of the president of the Municipal Assembly is prescribed

21 in the statute, or is there any form of authority that falls outside the

22 scope of the statute? If there's anything that falls outside the

23 framework of the statute, please tell us about it.

24 A. Are you asking me about the difference of how it was in practice?

25 The president of the municipality is the president of the local

Page 3808

1 parliament. And he is in charge of presiding over the local parliament,

2 which, in turn, is in charge of issuing proposals, adopting proposals,

3 issuing initiatives with respect to local decisions which are provided for

4 by the Executive Board in form of proposals. And it is the president who,

5 later on, makes sure that the decisions taken by the local parliament are

6 implemented through the executive body, which is the local government

7 together with its president. So it is the president who makes sure that

8 the decisions are implemented by the executive body.

9 So for the implementation of -- it is the president of the

10 municipality who is responsible for the implementation of these decisions,

11 because not every deputy can be involved in this. Being a deputy is a

12 local, nonprofessional function. Therefore, it is the duty of the

13 president, who is employed as such and who receives salary for this type

14 of office, who is in charge of supervising this implementation.

15 Practically speaking, his role is much greater than the role of a simple

16 deputy to the assembly. His influence, of course, is greater than the

17 influence of the deputies. There is a big difference between being a

18 deputy to the assembly and its president. Formally speaking, they are at

19 the same level. However, in practical terms, the president of the

20 municipality, in accordance with its statute, has greater responsibility,

21 influence, and de facto authority than the deputies.

22 Q. The decisions reached by the Municipal Assembly, can they be

23 adopted only through the voting of its members, that is, the deputies to

24 the Municipal Assembly?

25 A. Yes. The statute also makes provision for that. A certain

Page 3809

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Page 3810

1 majority is stipulated. It is referred to as a quorum. Then depending on

2 the nature of the decision, a two-third majority quorum is necessary or a

3 simple majority, as it is usually the case in most of the local

4 governments in democratic countries.

5 Q. The chief of the public security station, Mr. Talundzic, before

6 the war, was he responsible for his work to the municipal structures of

7 government, or was he answerable to the competent and superior bodies

8 within the MUP itself by virtue of relevant statutory provisions?

9 A. Formally and legally speaking, the chief of the local police is

10 answerable in terms of hierarchy to the chief of the regional police who,

11 in turn, is answerable to the chief of the police at the level of the

12 republic, that is, the minister of the interior. However, as I have

13 already explained, in the case of the appointment procedure for the local

14 chief of police and as it is the local level of government who is

15 responsible for his appointment, then practically speaking, in reality,

16 the chief of local police is answerable to the local authorities. Because

17 it is the local authority who, at any point in time, could dismiss him or

18 initiate his removal which, again, in practice, was always adopted.

19 Q. What body of local authority are you talking about when you said

20 about its being able to initiate the removal of Mr. Hasan Talundzic, if

21 you know?

22 A. Usually, in practice, this was always the president of the

23 municipality, the individual who had the highest ranking position in a

24 given socio-political community. And when I say a socio-political

25 community, I am referring to the municipality. The term comes from the

Page 3811

1 former terminology of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia.

2 Some of the terms have changed because of the nature of these positions

3 and structures changed. The municipal structure changed in Bosnia and

4 Herzegovina after the cantons had been introduced, so I have to apologise

5 for using the term "a socio-political community," however, this was the

6 term that was used before. And it referred to a higher level of local

7 authority than is the case with the local community in European countries.

8 So we're not talking about the same level of authority.

9 Q. How did it work in practice? Would the president of the

10 municipality just write a letter, call someone by telephone, and ask for

11 such a removal or dismissal?

12 A. In practice, it was usually enough to have a telephone

13 conversation with the minister. And the minister would then adopt a

14 decision on the removal of the local chief of police. So in practice, the

15 problem could be solved in this manner. The president of the municipality

16 could -- now I'm not quite sure what body I'm talking about -- could

17 formally initiate the removal of the chief of police for various reasons.

18 But in practice, it was often enough to have an informal conversation with

19 the minister in order to have the local chief of police replaced.

20 Q. So is it your testimony today that there was a legal basis and

21 legal authority and competence of the president of the municipality to

22 take part in the procedure of removal of the local chief of police? I'm

23 referring to the municipal police structures.

24 A. As far as I can recall, speaking of Talundzic's appointment

25 specifically, I think that there were seven proposals that were sent to

Page 3812

1 the minister. I don't remember the exact number at this point. I'm not

2 sure about the body, the local body, from which these proposals emanated.

3 I cannot speak about that with certainty. However, I am certain that it

4 is the president of the municipality who wields the greatest influence in

5 this respect.

6 Q. The president of the municipality, did he have any influence to --

7 on the JNA and the appointment of JNA officers?

8 A. Are you referring to the period of time before 1990, to the

9 peacetime?

10 Q. Yes.

11 A. No. In that case, no, he didn't have any influence on that.

12 Q. Mr. Cehajic, in his capacity of the president of the municipality,

13 could he issue orders to Mr. Hasan Talundzic as the chief of public

14 security station in Prijedor?

15 A. Are you referring to formal, legal orders, or informal orders?

16 Q. To the formal ones.

17 A. Formally speaking, the president of the municipality cannot

18 formally issue orders to anyone in peacetime.

19 Q. Speaking of informal influence, we all know that it is always the

20 wife of the individual who has the greatest influence on him. However,

21 let us concentrate on the civilian authorities and informal orders.

22 A. No, there were no such informal orders, unless we're talking about

23 dictatorship.

24 Q. Mr. Muhamed Cehajic, as the president of the Municipal Assembly

25 and the president of the National Defence Council, referring to the period

Page 3813

1 of time prior to the 30th of April, 1992, could he issue any orders to the

2 military, to, for instance, Zeljaja or Arsic?

3 A. No, he could not. He didn't have either formal or informal

4 influence, in that respect.

5 Q. Mr. Cehajic as the president of the Municipal Assembly and the

6 president of the National Defence Council, could he nominate or appoint

7 anyone to the positions within the Territorial Defence?

8 A. He did have some influence over the Territorial Defence, because

9 the Territorial Defence commanders were appointed on the basis of the

10 nominations made by the local, that is, the municipal parliament. I think

11 I've already explained that, that the commander at the level of the

12 republic was appointed pursuant to a nomination which came from the local,

13 municipal level. So he did have some influence over that.

14 Q. On page 33, line 14 of Monday's transcript, I'll read in English

15 so that you can receive accurate interpretation. You stated the

16 following: [In English] "... Was designed to function in immediate

17 threat of war, and, of course, in war danger. By virtue of that function,

18 the president of that council is also the president of the municipality,

19 and he is also the civilian commander of the defence of the town. And

20 according to law, he's responsible for the defence of the town on the

21 local level. So both the chief of police and the commander of the

22 civilian protection and the defence, Territorial Defence, are all under

23 his authority. And also, in terms of, not really immediate, common

24 subordination, but in a certain sense, he was also the superior of the

25 army that was in the area."

Page 3814

1 [Interpretation] Will you please tell us --

2 A. I don't think that I said -- at least, I don't remember having

3 said that he was superior to the military stationed in the area.

4 Q. Well, we can clear it up.

5 MR. KOUMJIAN: I just -- the transcript did not pick up the

6 beginning of the quote, so I'm not a hundred per cent sure. Perhaps it

7 was interpreted into B/C/S, but the beginning of the quote where he

8 indicated that it was the National Defence Council that we were talking

9 about was not included in the transcript. So I'm not sure if the witness

10 knows the body that we're talking about.

11 MR. LUKIC: [In English] I wasn't aware of this mistake, so the

12 sentence starts with "the council for national security was designed... ,"

13 so the rest we have.

14 Q. [Interpretation] Perhaps we can correct your testimony today, if

15 you believe that you did not state that he was superior to the army. We

16 can perhaps clarify.

17 A. If we're talking about the National Defence Council, which is

18 provided for in the relevant law of the republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina

19 and if we are talking about the circumstances that I described and

20 indicated, that is, the normal circumstances, then I don't remember having

21 said that the body in question was superior to the army. I don't think I

22 can talk about any superior authority of the local government over the

23 military. However, there was a certain coordination, because the

24 commander -- the commanders who were located, stationed, in the area could

25 attend the sessions of the councils. And the law also provided for the

Page 3815

1 fact that, aside from the chief of police, the commander of the

2 Territorial Defence, the vice-president of the Executive Board, who is

3 also at the same time the commander of the civil defence, that other

4 members can also be appointed. This does not exclude the possibility for

5 a commander of the military garrisoned in the area, and whose area of

6 responsibilities at the same time the area of combat operations, to be

7 appointed to the National Defence Council at the level of the municipality

8 as its member. So the law provides for that possibility as well.

9 Q. However, this body is only established in cases of imminent threat

10 of war?

11 A. Yes, that is correct.

12 Q. Is that a collective body?

13 A. However, I have to specify that the body can also become

14 operational in some other circumstances. You have mentioned only two of

15 such circumstances, the immediate threat of war and the war itself.

16 However, there are certain circumstances, certain situations where it can

17 also become operational in a given municipality.

18 Q. Speaking of Municipal Assemblies in general, do they normally have

19 such a body in peacetime? I'm referring to the National Defence Council.

20 A. I have just explained that. Theoretically speaking, it is

21 possible for this body to be established in peacetime as well. For

22 example, on the territories of some municipalities right after the war, a

23 number of terrorist groups appeared. You probably remember such cases

24 from the media, such terrorist groups were located on the territory of the

25 municipality. And their presence required immediate action. So, it was

Page 3816

1 possible for this body to convene in a situation of that kind or in some

2 other situations where the overall safety of the municipality and the

3 local population was in danger.

4 Q. What exactly did you have in mind when you said that the president

5 of the National Defence Council was also, at the same time, the civilian

6 commander of the defence of the town?

7 A. If the statute provides that he is responsible for the overall

8 defence of the town and for everything of that nature that is going on in

9 the town, then that makes him the civilian commander of the local

10 defence. It is merely a different description for what I have already

11 indicated.

12 Q. Can this duty also be found in the statute of the Prijedor

13 municipality?

14 A. Not literally speaking. I have just described it that way, but I

15 don't know whether you are now talking about the wording, the legal

16 wording, itself. I am not a lawyer. I have merely provided you with a

17 description of this concept as a politician, not as a lawyer.

18 Q. My mistake. I apologise. I not intend to insist on the title of

19 this office. I just wanted to find out whether these competences and the

20 function itself are provided for in the statute as part of the overall

21 authority of the president of the National Defence Council, either in the

22 statute or some other laws or bylaws?

23 A. What specific function do you have in mind?

24 Q. The fact that he is superior to the chief of police, to the chief

25 of civilian defence, and the chief of Territorial Defence, and that all

Page 3817

1 are under his command.

2 A. If we want to be precise, commands and orders are issued,

3 generally speaking, by commanders of military units. The words "command"

4 and "order" are -- belong to the military terminology. In wartime, the

5 civilian commander of the defence of a country is usually the president of

6 the country, or the prime minister, depending on the constitution. And

7 his competences are described as civilian command. But he usually is not

8 in charge of command itself. There's always a number of various bodies in

9 charge of adopting different decisions. They are implemented by the

10 police or the military, and it is the president who takes care, who makes

11 sure that such decisions are implemented. The same goes for the commander

12 of the Territorial Defence. The president of the municipality and the

13 president of this National Defence Council makes sure that these decisions

14 are implemented. So the president of the municipality does have

15 competences -- certain competences over the commander of the military,

16 the chief of police in that sense, also over the commander of the civilian

17 defence, over all members of the National Defence Council. So he is in

18 charge of supervising the implementation of the decisions adopted by this

19 body and other bodies within the municipality. He supervises the

20 implementation of these decisions as the president, in this case, as the

21 president of the National Defence Council. And that makes him responsible

22 for what you have just enumerated, for the various functions that you have

23 indicated.

24 Q. Your testimony today that the chief of police, civilian protection

25 and Territorial Defence, that all of them are under the command of the

Page 3818

1 president of the National Defence Council and that this is provided for by

2 a law?

3 A. No, that is not what I said. Please don't try to insinuate. I

4 explained very clearly the nature of these relationships which you are now

5 simplifying with a single word and you're trying to insinuate that I said

6 something that I didn't say. If that's what it takes, I will repeat my

7 explanation again or you can just read it.

8 Q. Can we then conclude that the president of the National Defence

9 Council is not superior to the police, civil protection, and Territorial

10 Defence, and is not their commander? He must be either of these two, or

11 maybe half he is and half he is not. Please.

12 MR. KOUMJIAN: Your Honour --

13 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Wait a minute, please. The objection.

14 MR. KOUMJIAN: The question is it has already been asked and

15 answered..

16 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Sustained. And for clarification, once again, I

17 said on previous occasions, it is not for a witness to tell the Bench what

18 is the law, what should have been in the past. If there would be always

19 no discrepancy between the law and reality, we would never need a court in

20 the world. We have to find out what are the facts, what has been the law,

21 and has there been any discrepancies? And therefore, please, I would ask

22 both parties not to ask questions to a physician on the legal situation

23 what should have been. We can read the statute ourselves.

24 MR. LUKIC: [In English] Your Honour, if I may, our client is

25 charged for command and personal, individual responsibility, and also de

Page 3819

1 jure and de facto. If my learned friend from the opposite side is ready

2 to withdraw his indictment in the de jure part, we'll quit asking these

3 questions. And as long as our client is charged de jure, we have to go

4 and ask questions like these. I apologise once again.

5 Another thing, I quoted the part of the statement of this witness.

6 I just wanted to clarify whether what has been mentioned in this

7 transcript is relevant or not. And secondly, is it true or not? Even the

8 witness, by himself, clarified that he never mentioned army as a part of

9 subordinate part under our client's responsibility. I tried further on to

10 clarify whether the TO, civil defence, and police was part of this common

11 responsibility. So I think that my line of questions is crucial and has

12 to be -- these questions have to be asked.

13 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: The point actually is that we have got precise

14 and -- I apologise -- lengthy answers on this issue. And I don't think

15 that it's really helpful to summarise these answers. We will have a look

16 very, very carefully on that what has been said. And it's not necessary

17 to ask for a second answer on the same issue. And this was the point of

18 the objection of the OTP, and therefore, the objection was sustained.

19 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, with your permission,

21 I would just like to say one sentence regarding the objection by the

22 counsel for the Defence. [In English] I don't have objection. I have a

23 comment.

24 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: It's for the parties to put questions here. And

25 please proceed, Defence counsel.

Page 3820

1 MR. LUKIC: Thank you.

2 Q. [Interpretation] Dr. Mujadzic, I would like to ask you something

3 about the Crisis Staff of the Prijedor SDA. Did the Crisis Staff of the

4 SDA, of Prijedor municipality, was it founded in October 1991?

5 A. I can't remember exactly now whether it was October or November.

6 Possibly even 1992.

7 Q. I'll allow for that, the fact that you can't remember. But the

8 members, this Crisis Staff, were they Mr. Muhamed Cehajic, yourself, Mr.

9 Becir Medunjanin, Mr. Hilmija Hopovac, Mr. Mustafa Hadzic and Mr. Camil

10 Pezo?

11 A. Some of these people were members of the Crisis Staff, but I'm not

12 sure about all of them.

13 Q. Can you please help us out and tell us exactly which of the people

14 from this list were members of the Crisis Staff of the SDA.

15 A. Must I answer this question?

16 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Yes.

17 MR. KOUMJIAN: Excuse me, I think the witness may prefer closed

18 session. I'm not sure if that's what he's saying.

19 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Any objections against --

20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that is correct.

21 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: -- Private session? I think it's enough.

22 MR. KOUMJIAN: Private session, yes.

23 [Private session]

24 (redacted)

25 (redacted)

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13 [Open session]

14 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: The trial stands adjourned until tomorrow, 9.00.

15 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at

16 1.46 p.m., to be reconvened on

17 Thursday, the 30th day of May, 2002,

18 at 9.00 a.m.

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