1 Tuesday, 24 September 2002
2 [Closed session]
12 Pages 8509 to 8511 – redacted – closed session.
7 [Open session]
8 Examined by Mr. Cayley:
9 Q. One matter, Mr. Brown, before we proceed. You and I are speaking
10 the same language. There are interpreters between us. So if you can
11 pause before you give your answer and I will do the same and that will
12 facilitate the interpretation. And if you could try to deliberately speak
13 at a slightly slower pace than you might normally do so, then we shouldn't
14 have any problems.
15 Now, for the purposes of the record, your name is Ewan Brown; is
16 that correct?
17 A. Yes, that's correct.
18 Q. And you were born on the 15th of May of 1964?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. And you are a British citizen?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. You are currently employed as a military analyst within the Office
23 of the Prosecutor; correct?
24 A. That is correct, yes.
25 Q. You have a bachelor's degree in history from the University of
1 East Anglia?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. And you have a master's degree in criminology from the University
4 of Leicester?
5 A. Yes.
6 Q. You attended the role military academy Sandhurst in 1986; is that
8 A. That is correct, yes.
9 Q. And that, I believe, is the officer training college or academy
10 for officers commissioned into the British army; correct?
11 A. That is correct, yes.
12 Q. If at this point, Your Honour, we could move into private
14 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Private session, please.
15 [Private session]
12 Page 8515 – redacted – private session.
21 [Open session]
22 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you.
23 Q. You are now, Mr. Brown, a military analyst within the Office of
24 the Prosecutor. Can you explain to the Judges the role of the military
25 analyst within the OTP.
1 A. Your Honours, there is a small team of military analysts within
2 the Office of the Prosecutor who sit somewhat separately from the
3 investigative teams and the Prosecution teams. The role of the analysts,
4 military analysts, is to provide specialist military assistance and
5 analysis, the analysis of documentation or evidence, in order to
6 synthesise, analyse, and collect that material, invariably on a
7 military-related issue, with which either to assist the investigation
8 process or, during the Prosecution phase, to assist the Prosecution in
9 making sense of the military component of the former Yugoslavia and the
10 issues we're dealing with in the Tribunal.
11 Q. When did you come to the Office of the Prosecutor to work as a
12 military analyst?
13 A. In August 1998.
14 Q. So you've been working on material within the office since that
16 A. Yes, that's correct.
17 MR. CAYLEY: If, Your Honour, I could offer into evidence the
18 witness's curriculum vitae, and if that could be given an exhibit number,
19 and if that document to be placed under seal, please.
20 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: This would be S339, under seal.
21 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you.
22 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Objections?
23 MR. OSTOJIC: No objection, Your Honour.
24 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Admitted into evidence.
25 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you.
1 Q. Now, Mr. Brown if you could please have in front of you your
2 report dated the 18th of July, 2002. I've just got a few preliminary
3 questions before we start discussing that report. Do you have that in
4 front of you?
5 A. Yes, I do.
6 Q. Now, this report entitled "Military developments Prijedor
7 municipality 1991 to 1992, a background report," who asked you to produce
8 this report?
9 A. The legal team on this case asked me to compile this report.
10 Q. Specifically whom on the legal team asked you to produce this
12 A. Ms. Korner asked me to produce the report.
13 Q. When were you asked to produce this report?
14 A. At the very beginning of this year I was provisionally made aware
15 that I may -- or a report, a military analysis report may be required in
16 relation to this case, although I was not formally tasked to write the
17 report until May of this year. At the beginning of May, I was, as I said,
18 asked to compile a report relating to the military issues in the Prijedor
19 municipality during the spring and summer months of 1992 in particular.
20 After a short period of preliminary study, in the middle of May there was
21 a formal meeting at which the structure of the report was outlined by
22 myself to the legal team, and really from the middle of May this year
23 until the report's completion date, which I believe is the 18th of July
24 was when I compiled the report itself, I believe a draft may have been
25 ready around the end of June, but the report was completed in July this
2 Q. What instructions were you given by Ms. Korner, by the legal team,
3 in respect of this report?
4 A. The instruction was somewhat general. I was asked to look at the
5 military component, military activities in Prijedor municipality, in
6 particular, in the spring and summer months 1992, in order to paint a
7 picture of which military units were present in the municipality and their
8 conduct. After my preliminary study and when we met again, I stated that
9 the report should be somewhat expanded in some areas, and relating to
10 other -- some wider issues that did have a bearing on Prijedor but may not
11 necessarily have been evident when we first discussed it in early May. So
12 I was in a position to, in essence, influence the structure of the report,
13 its content, and I was not guided or hampered in that respect.
14 Q. Now, I'm right in saying that this report is based exclusively on
15 documentary material; is that right?
16 A. Yes, that is correct.
17 Q. Can you tell the Judges what documentary material you have relied
18 upon in producing this report?
19 A. Your Honours, the material really can be categorised, I suppose,
20 into four areas. The first category are military documents in the
21 possession of the OTP. Those documents, in particular, come from the 1st
22 Krajina Corps, JNA 5th Corps, 1st Krajina Corps, which was the corps that
23 existed in the Krajina area, Bosnian Krajina area, during the period of
24 our concern, although there are a number of other military documents that
25 are of relevance.
1 The second are police documents, again relating either to the
2 wider Krajina or, more specifically, to Prijedor municipality.
3 The third category are political or governmental-style documents,
4 either relating directly to Prijedor or to the regional level in Banja
5 Luka, and a number relating to the republic level.
6 The fourth category are a small number, relatively small number,
7 of open-source documents: Press articles, and I believe there's one
8 video. Again, that's as an open-source document. So the military police
9 political and open-source are the four categories of documents that I've
11 Q. Now, you've stated to the Court that this report is principally a
12 report concerned with military events. Why have you therefore included
13 documents relating to the police, political documents, and open-source
15 A. Many of those document make reference to military matters,
16 military events, or, I would argue, influenced the deployment of military
17 forces in Prijedor in 1992.
18 Q. How many documents are referred to in your report?
19 A. I believe I have some 260-odd footnotes, although a number of
20 documents are referenced on a number of -- throughout -- or duplicated,
21 replicated through the report. Some of the footnotes are comments by
22 myself and not actually reference documents. I believe there are around
23 150 individual documents in total with reference to the report.
24 Q. Who selected those documents?
25 A. I did.
1 Q. Now, I don't want this next question, I don't want to sort of
2 number by number, but could you explain to the Judges where
3 proportionately those documents come from?
4 A. Your Honours, the documents themselves come from an array of
5 sources. The open-source documents I've already discussed are newspaper
6 articles in the public domain. The other documents come either from
7 seizures that the OTP has carried out in a number of locations in the
8 Krajina, documents provided by the Bosnia-Herzegovina government
9 authorities. I believe there's one document which has come from the
10 Republic of Croatia, and a small number of documents which are provided by
11 the Republika Srpska authorities.
12 Q. Where do the majority of the documents that you've relied upon
13 come from?
14 A. Approximately three-quarters, I believe, of the documents that I
15 used were from OTP seizures, either seizures that too place in Banja Luka
16 or seizures that took place in Prijedor municipality. I think the figure
17 is round about three-quarters of those documents were seized documents by
18 the OTP.
19 Q. So we can say that approximately 75 per cent of the documents that
20 you relied upon were seized directly from the Bosnian Serb army and
21 Bosnian Serb authorities; correct?
22 A. I believe that's approximately the figure.
23 Q. Could you give the Judges some idea of, taken together all of
24 these documents, their integrity as a source in producing your report?
25 A. Your Honours, the documentation that I utilised here, a
1 significant section comes from seized material, in essence, primary-source
2 material that the OTP obtained. I believe that those documents are
3 genuine and reflect -- and contemporary and reflect the picture contained
4 within them. The documents that were provided through other means, such
5 as those through the Bosnian authorities, which I have used, I have tried
6 to utilise documents that are corroborated by other sources or -- and by
7 that I mean corroborated by the seized documents, or were, if I put the
8 seized documents together with documents that have been obtained through,
9 say, the Bosnian authorities, that they can be corroborated, I believe. I
10 believe the documents to be accurate. I'm not a forensic document
11 specialist, but when the documents are put together, I believe that they
12 are credible and reliable.
13 Q. Now, on page 3 of your report, you state that there are certain
14 limitations contained within this report. It's broadly referred to in
15 paragraph 3. Can you state to the Judges what you believe are the
16 limitations of this report?
17 A. Yes, Your Honours. The report does have certain limitations which
18 I wanted to just introduce at the introduction of the document. The
19 report is not an exhaustive study of every single document relating to
20 Prijedor municipality. That would be, I think, a bit of a physical
21 impossibility to go through every single document. So there is just a
22 physical limitation there. The report is documentary based. It is not a
23 report that contains information relating to witness testimony or any
24 other material outside written -- the written documentation I've seen. So
25 there's a limitation there. The report is limited in time. It relates
1 predominantly to the spring and summer months of 1992, although it does
2 touch on issues in late 1991, but it is limited in time. And it is
3 limited to some extent in location. This is a report about Prijedor
4 municipality. Prijedor was not an isolated municipality within the
5 Krajina and Bosnia generally, but this is about Prijedor and is not about
6 necessarily all other areas. So that is also a limitation. I think
7 those are some of the areas that I believe should be taken into
8 consideration when reading the report.
9 MR. CAYLEY: If, Mr. President, the report could be given an
10 exhibit number and then I think we can move ahead with the heart of the
12 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: The exhibit number would be S340. Objections?
13 MR. OSTOJIC: We do object, actually, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: May I hear the reasons?
15 MR. OSTOJIC: We have two reasons for the objection. Number 1, we
16 believe that because of the limitations as Mr. Brown has outlined for us,
17 the report cannot give us and will not give us a complete and thorough
18 analysis required, based upon the indictment that's been charged against
19 Dr. Stakic and based upon his experience in connection with reviewing this
20 and creating this report. Secondly, it is rather clear that Mr. Brown is
21 simply an employee of the OTP who has generated this report in a
22 subjective manner and is clearly, pursuant to the instruction of the lead
23 trial attorney, Joanna Korner, has prepared a report looking at a very
24 limited scope, in his own words and a very narrow focus-minded report
25 of the events in Prijedor and making an attempt to try to link them with
1 the accused. Clearly in his direct -- thus far direct examination, he has
2 outlined for us that he is a military analyst and that he was providing
3 some military overviews. The report, however, is more expansive than that
4 and attempts, inadequately, in our opinion, to connect a political
5 individual as charged in the indictment to any military actions. And as a
6 subcategory of that, Mr. Brown has clearly indicated in his direct that he
7 did not go beyond the region, and yet he attempts to give us some sort of
8 opinion in connection with command structure and hierarchy but does not go
9 beyond the Prijedor municipality or the events prior to the spring and
10 summer of 1992 or those events subsequent to that.
11 Interestingly enough, we received this morning in excess of 250
12 pages under the ambit of Rule 68, which, not surprising to the Defence,
13 involve specifically the area where Mr. Brown claims to have reviewed
14 documents, namely, the 1st Krajina Corps, documents from the 5th Kozara
15 Brigade, and documents from the 434th Motorised Brigade. Those documents
16 were not included in his analysis, clearly, because we're receiving them
17 not only on the eve of his testimony but on the day of his testimony. I
18 think it's highly prejudicial and it's something that the Office of the
19 Prosecutor knew about since these seizures occurred in 1997, that it
20 should be disallowed.
21 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, do you want to hear me, or ... I mean,
22 I -- in essence, I've distilled from what my learned friend has said two
23 objections. He objects to the report based on the limitations that the
24 witness has stated. I mean, I think it's perfectly fair for any witness
25 to openly express to Judges that there are certain limitations within a
1 report. The Judges should know about that. And that doesn't mean to say
2 that a witness should be precluded from testifying or producing his report
3 before this Chamber.
4 Secondly, as regards an individual being an employee of the OTP, I
5 think it's standard practice in many countries that certain expert or
6 professional witnesses who are employed by a prosecution office or by a
7 police authority testify on a daily basis before courts, and they are
8 certainly never accused of being biased or partial. Equally, in this
9 institution it has been a regular practice for employees who have worked
10 for either the military analysis team or the leadership research team to
11 testify before chambers. Of course, it is a matter for you ultimately to
12 decide whether or not a witness is biased or not, but I don't think that
13 that is an objection which should preclude him from being heard. And
14 ultimately, the only way whether or not you can actually judge whether
15 Mr. Ostojic is correct in what he is saying is to hear the witness.
16 [Trial Chamber confers]
17 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: The Trial Chamber rejects the objections by the
18 Defence. It would be premature to rule on the probative value of this
19 report before having heard the report. Of course, we are aware to a
20 certain extent what we will hear, but, as we did it earlier, the final
21 evaluation of evidence is for the Judges, and the documents presented as
22 such in principle are admitted into evidence, and therefore this document
23 is admitted into evidence as S340.
24 Please proceed.
25 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
1 Q. Now, Mr. Brown, my understanding is that you have created a
2 PowerPoint presentation for the purposes of your evidence here today.
3 A. Yes, that is correct. I know the report is somewhat lengthy and I
4 felt maybe the easiest way to synthesize some of the key issues was to put
5 it into a PowerPoint presentation, which I hope works.
6 Q. The PowerPoint presentation is, in effect, an abbreviation of the
8 A. Yes, that is correct.
9 MR. CAYLEY: Your Honours, do you have hard copies of that
10 presentation before you?
11 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: I think we have.
12 MR. CAYLEY: There is also a French version.
13 Q. Mr. Brown, if you could open your report.
14 MR. CAYLEY: Your Honours, we're going to be using documents and
15 also viewing the PowerPoint presentation, and if you see on the panel
16 before you, you have buttons marked "computer evidence" and "video
17 evidence." "Computer evidence" will give you the PowerPoint presentation
18 and when the witness places a document that he's used in support of an
19 assertion that he's making, if you switch to "video evidence," that will
20 give you the document on the ELMO.
21 Q. Mr. Brown, this first slide marked "JNA command structure," could
22 you explain this slide to the Judges, in particular, how it's relevant to
23 Prijedor? And if you could use the pointer, I think that --
24 A. I think the pointer, unfortunately, is not working.
25 Q. Okay. We'll look at that in the break, but if you could explain
1 this particular slide to Their Honours.
2 A. Your Honour, one of the first parts of the report deals with --
3 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Unfortunately, we can't see anything on our
5 MR. CAYLEY: Have you pressed the button, Your Honour, marked
6 "computer evidence" on the panel in front of you? And it's not --
7 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: All of the screens are silent. It's really
9 MR. CAYLEY: Yes. Mine has gone exactly the same.
10 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: It's blue. Okay. There's only one screen not
11 working, the one of Judge Vassylenko. But you can start. We have the
12 possibility to follow on one computer.
13 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Your Honours.
14 Q. If you could explain this slide to the Court, please, Mr. Brown.
15 A. Your Honours, the first part of the report deals with general
16 developments and outlines some of the military units that are relevant to
17 Prijedor and to the Krajina area. And what I wanted to do here on this
18 slide was to synthesize the command structure of the JNA Yugoslav National
19 Army prior to the establishment of the Bosnian Serb Army in May 1992. The
20 JNA command structure in Bosnia comprised of a military district which was
21 located in Sarajevo, the 2nd Military District. To all intents and
22 purposes, the 2nd military district covered the territory of Bosnia and
23 Herzegovina. It was established in the early part of 1992, in part due to
24 the withdrawal of JNA forces from Croatia.
25 The 2nd military district consisted of a number of corps. The 5th
1 Corps, the JNA 5th Corps, was one of those corps, and it was located in
2 Banja Luka, and that is the second box, subordinated to the 2nd military
4 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: May I be so impolite to interrupt you? When you
5 address certain periods in time, could you please be more concrete for the
6 purposes of our trial? When you, for example, state "in the early part of
7 1992," could you be a little bit more concrete?
8 MR. OSTOJIC: May I have an input on this, Your Honour? And also,
9 since Mr. Cayley was kind enough to suggest, and Mr. Brown agreed, can he
10 also direct us to the document so that we can follow where it is that he
11 claims that it was established in 1992, if we may?
12 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: I think first of all we leave it -- we should
13 leave it to the OTP and to the witness himself to direct us if he so
14 wants. If there are any problems, then no doubt it's for the Defence, or
15 later the Judges, to ask some questions. But no doubt it would be helpful
16 that we don't have to do this exercise three times, that immediately,
17 where necessary, the sources could be mentioned. Thank you.
18 MR. CAYLEY: Your Honour, if I could just mention the issue that
19 Mr. Ostojic has just raised. Obviously there are 150 documents in this
20 report and we don't anticipate referring to every single document,
21 otherwise we are going to be here for weeks. I think there are certain
22 issues, such as the existence of the 2nd military district, which, quite
23 frankly, if that's challenged, I'd be surprised. So we have selected 30
24 documents. Mr. Ostojic has all of the documents. If he wants to put them
25 to the witness in his cross-examination, he can do so. But we don't
1 intend to produce documents for every single assertion that is made here.
2 MR. OSTOJIC: If I may reply. If they claim that it was
3 established in 1992, they have the burden of proof. Let them prove it.
4 We contest that. It's absolutely incorrect. Mr. Brown knows it's
5 incorrect, Mr. Cayley knows it's incorrect. The OTP in other cases have
6 established that it's incorrect. If they are going to tell this Court,
7 we're going to throw everything at you and let's see if the Defence and
8 the Defence counsel can somehow manoeuvre through these land mines that we
9 set up for them. It's just simply not true. I cannot, as an official of
10 the Court and as an attorney representing the accused Dr. Stakic, allow
11 this witness to tell us something and claim that there's any veracity to
12 his report when there's no basis for him to establish whatsoever that this
13 2nd military district in Sarajevo was established for the first time in
14 1992. It's just simply not true. I can't allow it to happen, Your
15 Honour. I'm sorry.
16 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you. But I think we should calm down and
17 return to the language normally used in this courtroom, and I would advise
18 you not to tell a witness that he knows that it's incorrect what he states
19 here in the courtroom. I think it's not necessary to go down to such a
21 As I had emphasised, it would be of assistance to be more concrete
22 with the dates, and if you, Mr. Brown, or the counsel of the OTP regards
23 as necessary, please give us a hint on what basis you come to the
24 conclusion. Thank you. But the initial point of this dispute was a
25 question: What do you mean by "the beginning of 1992"?
1 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, I'm unaware of the exact establishment
2 date of the 2nd Military District. I believe the 2nd Military District
3 was established as part of the wider agreements in relation to the
4 settlement of the war in Croatia. Part of that agreement included the
5 withdrawal of forces from Croatia in late 1991, I believe in December 1991
6 was when the agreement was signed, although I do not know the exact date.
7 I believe - and I don't know if -- I don't think I've referenced
8 it in this report - the 2nd Military District was established either in
9 the last few days of 1991 or the first few days of 1992. Prior to the 2nd
10 Military District, the units in Bosnia had been, in essence, commanded by
11 the 1st Military District in Belgrade, which has headquarters in Belgrade.
12 So the 2nd Military District was a new establishment structure.
13 I know from other documentation, some of which we will show later,
14 that the 2nd Military District was in establishment in the early months of
15 1992, that daily combat reports from the JNA 5th Corps in Banja Luka were
16 being sent to the 2nd Military District in Sarajevo, and there are
17 references in my report to that effect. Without going through each
18 individual footnote, I cannot highlight the first daily combat report that
19 I can show to you that the 2nd Military District was in establishment, but
20 I know, for example, that we have a reference on the 17th of February,
21 1992, which is a daily combat report to the 2nd Military District, showing
22 that it certainly was in establishment by that date.
23 MR. CAYLEY:
24 Q. Now, the next box down in your command structure is the 5th Corps
25 in Banja Luka. Were there other corps that were under the command of the
1 2nd Military District?
2 A. Yes, there were a number of other corps the 2nd Military District
4 Q. Why have you highlighted the 5th Corps in Banja Luka?
5 A. The JNA 5th Corps in Banja Luka in essence, its peacetime location
6 covered the municipality of Prijedor, as well as other municipalities in
7 the Bosnian Krajina area. So the 5th Corps was the corps that covered --
8 included Prijedor municipality.
9 Q. And again we'll see a number of documents, I think later on, from
10 that corps. But the next question I have for you is the next box which is
11 formed by a dotted line is the Prijedor regional command. What can you
12 tell us about that as a military headquarters?
13 A. In Prijedor municipality there existed a Prijedor garrison, a
14 peacetime garrison headquarters. At some stage in 1992, the JNA 5th Corps
15 established the Prijedor Regional Command, which in essence was more of an
16 operational command. It sat between two brigades and the corps. I do not
17 know the exact establishment date of the Prijedor Regional Command, but I
18 do know that it was established -- it had been established at least by the
19 10th of May, 1992 because of documentation, and I believe there's some
20 footnotes in my report which I can draw your attention to.
21 I also know that on the 17th of February, from documentation,
22 1992, there was a move and an instruction from the 5th Corps to collocate
23 the Territorial Defence in Prijedor, the Territorial Defence headquarters,
24 with the command headquarters, that is, the JNA command headquarters in
25 Prijedor, and I would assess that sometime between February 1992 and May
1 1992 the 5th Corps established Prijedor Regional Command. Prijedor -- and
2 the reason I put the box in dotted line is because I don't know when the
3 establishment -- the exact establishment date of that regional command
5 The JNA 5th Corps established a number of subordinate commands in
6 between the brigades of the corps throughout 1992, and Prijedor Regional
7 Command was one of those.
8 Q. Now, the two brigades that you have underneath Prijedor Regional
9 Command, geographically, where were those two brigades located?
10 A. Both brigades were located in Prijedor.
11 Q. Now, again, when do you know -- and again, this may only be a sort
12 of by the latest date -- were those two brigades under the command of the
13 JNA 5th Corps and in existence? What documentary evidence have you seen
14 of that?
15 A. Both the 343rd Motorised Brigade and the 5th Kozara Brigade,
16 sometimes known as the 5th Infantry Brigade, were mobilised in September
17 1991 for operations in Croatia. In September 1991, I believe on the 18th
18 of September. The JNA 5th Corps received an order to conduct operations
19 in Croatia to defeat Croatian paramilitary units and to assist in
20 protecting JNA facilities in Croatia, and its instruction was to, in
21 essence, head for the Hungarian border through Western Slavonia. Both the
22 343rd Motorised Brigade and the 5th infantry or 5th Kozara Brigade were
23 mobilised as parts of that operation and deployed to western Slavonia in
24 September 1991 and became or were under the control of the corps from that
1 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: May I already now ask you whether or not this
2 343rd Motorised Brigade ever had another name?
3 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, when the JNA transformed into the VRS
4 in Bosnia, they dropped the first 3 and called it the 43rd Motorised
6 MR. CAYLEY:
7 Q. Now, these two brigades, very briefly, did they see action in
9 A. Yes. Both brigades did see action in Croatia. Elements of both
10 brigades were deployed to Croatia from September 1991, and elements of the
11 brigades remained in western Slavonia I believe until about June 1992.
12 There was a period of rotation where elements of the brigade would go back
13 to Prijedor on leave, and some documentary evidence indicates that that
14 occurred, but both brigades saw combat action in Croatia.
15 Q. Now, you say in this document that the commander of the 343rd
16 Motorised Brigade was Vladimir Arsic and the deputy was Radmilo Zeljaja.
17 You also indicate that the commander of the 5th Kozara Brigade was Pero
18 Colic. How do you know this?
19 A. There are a number of documents, including some referenced in my
20 report, indicating the positions of these men.
21 MR. CAYLEY: If we could move now, please, to the next slide,
22 which deals with the Territorial Defence structure.
23 Q. Can you explain to Their Honours the distinction between the JNA
24 and the Territorial Defence?
25 A. Both the JNA and the Territorial Defence, or TO, were a component
1 of what was known as All People's Defence in the former Yugoslavia. This,
2 in essence, was a process by where the country could be defended in times
3 of attack. It included the mobilisation of personnel at municipal and
4 local level into the Territorial Defence, providing a more localised
5 defensive structure, whilst the JNA's function was primarily to defend the
6 federal borders.
7 The Territorial Defence was based on each individual republic. It
8 was a republic-level organisation funded by each republic, and with a
9 republic Territorial Defence staff in each of the republics.
10 Q. Now, dealing first of all with the three boxes that run down the
11 middle of the chart, labelled "Republic TO staff, District TO staff, Banja
12 Luka TO Prijedor," can you explain that line of command to Their Honours?
13 A. Yes. Your Honours, there were various command staffs within the
14 Territorial Defence. There was a republic TO staff in Bosnia-Herzegovina
15 that was based in Sarajevo. Subordinate to that were a number of district
16 Territorial Defence staffs, including one in Banja Luka that covered a
17 number of the Krajina municipalities, including Prijedor. Subordinate to
18 the District TO staffs were those municipal Territorial Defence units
19 based on a municipality.
20 Q. Now, the TO in Prijedor was not the only municipal Territorial
21 Defence under the command of the District TO staff in Banja Luka; is that
23 A. That is correct. I believe there are a large number of
24 municipalities in the Krajina that also fell under the command of the
25 District TO in Banja Luka.
1 Q. Now, the district and republican Territorial Defence staff, were
2 they staffed in part by regular JNA officers?
3 A. Yes, I believe they were.
4 Q. Now, to now address the broken lines that you have going between
5 the District TO staff in Banja Luka to the 5th Corps in Banja Luka, can
6 you explain the meaning of that broken line?
7 A. Yes. I put in these lines and links because it's clear from
8 documentation that the 5th Corps had a significant influence on the
9 District TO staff in Banja Luka, in part due to operations in Croatia in
10 late 1991, when a number of Territorial Defence units, Territorial Defence
11 units were mobilised for operations, including the 5th Kozara Brigade.
12 The 5th Kozara Brigade and one other Territorial Defence-based unit were
13 placed under the command of the 5th Corps for operations in Croatia. But
14 also in the spring months of 1992, as the situation in Bosnia developed
15 and changed, the 5th Corps began issuing instructions to the District TO
16 staff in Banja Luka, and those instructions were being disseminated down
17 to municipal bodies. So although there was this republic district
18 municipality command chain, the 5th Corps, by April 1992, was issuing
19 instructions to the District TO staff on a variety of matters.
20 Q. Now, you also have a box linking the Territorial Defence in
21 Prijedor with the JNA Prijedor regional command. You also have a broken
22 line there. What does that broken line signify?
23 A. Again, some documentation indicates that Prijedor Regional Command
24 was in a position of some influence on the TO in Prijedor. I mentioned
25 the 17th of February instruction whereby there was a collocation -- to be
1 a collocation of the TO headquarters with the JNA command in Prijedor. In
2 May 1992 there were a number of instructions coming -- one, for example,
3 which I think I've referenced, whereby the 5th Corps requested from the
4 Regional Command the disposition of units within Prijedor, including
5 Territorial Defence units down to platoon squads, and other documentation
6 linking and involving meetings indicate that the Prijedor Regional Command
7 had an influence on the Territorial Defence in Prijedor. And ultimately
8 when the TO was finally disbanded in late May 1992, the Territorial
9 Defence commander was subordinated to the Prijedor Regional Command and
10 the conscripts were disseminated into units including the 43rd Motorised
11 Brigade. So I believe there was a clear link between the Prijedor
12 Regional Command and the TO in Prijedor.
13 Q. Now, the final box is the link between the Prijedor municipal
14 government and the TO in Prijedor, and again you have a broken line. Can
15 you indicate the significance of that particular linkage?
16 A. More generally, the municipalities had a significant role to play
17 with the Territorial Defence in a municipality. Territorial Defence
18 commanders would be nominated at municipal level, although they would have
19 to be authorised through the Territorial Defence command chain. Issues
20 relating to financing, mobilisation, records, were within the remit of the
21 Prijedor municipal government. And again, documentation, specifically
22 relating to Prijedor, in late May, shows that, for example, the Crisis
23 Staff authorised the disbandment of the TO and the placing of the TO
24 commander within the Prijedor regional command. So again, this linkage
25 into the TO is highlighted on this slide.
1 Q. Now, I think this particular subject-matter is contained in page 8
2 to 12 of your report. Is that right?
3 A. Yes, Your Honours, that's correct.
4 MR. CAYLEY: If we could now move to the next slide.
5 Q. Now, here you are showing the Bosnian Serb army command
6 structure. First of all, when did the VSR, the Bosnian Serb army, form in
8 A. Your Honours, on the 12th of May in Banja Luka, there was a
9 meeting held, the 16th assembly session of the Serb Republic
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina, at which an announcement was made to establish the
11 Bosnian Serb army, initially called the army of the Serb Republic of
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina, latterly called the VRS, sometimes referred to as the
13 Bosnian Serb army. Decisions were taken at that meeting on the 12th of
14 May establishing the army and establishing Ratko Mladic as its commander,
15 or commander of the Main Staff. There was a period whereby there was a
16 formal transition between the remaining JNA units in Bosnia and the
17 establishment of the VRS, and on the 19th, 20th of May, 1992, was when JNA
18 units were meant to have left Bosnia, but in essence there was a
19 transformation of those JNA units into the new Bosnian Serb army. But the
20 establishment date of the army was the 12th of May, 1992.
21 Q. Now, looking specifically at the chart, you have, in the position
22 of the Supreme Command of the Bosnian Serb army the presidency of the
23 Bosnian Serb Republic; is that right?
24 A. That is correct. The 12th of May decision made it clear that the
25 presidency was the highest organ and was in command of the army.
1 Q. Now, underneath that you have the Main Staff of the Bosnian Serb
2 army, and you've noted that that headquarters was formerly the 2nd
3 Military District that you've already referred to, the 2nd Military
4 District of the JNA.
5 A. Yes. Your Honours, elements of the 2nd Military District in
6 essence formed the nucleus of the VSR or VRS Main Staff. For example,
7 Ratko Mladic had been initially appointed to be deputy commander of the
8 2nd Military District. He was then laterally appointed to commander of
9 the military -- 2nd Military District. But he was appointed as commander
10 of the VRS Main Staff at the 12th of May, and a number of other officers
11 who were at the 2nd Military District remained and formed a nucleus of the
12 Main Staff.
13 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: It may assist if you could immediately mention
14 this document of 12th of May.
15 THE WITNESS: Yes, Your Honour. I believe it's footnote 25 in the
16 report. I have a copy of the report, the document, if there are
17 particular sections that need to be referred to.
18 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: I think it would be of assistance if this
19 document could be tendered.
20 MR. CAYLEY: We are going to refer to sections of the document,
21 Your Honour. It's a voluminous document, but I'm perfectly prepared to
22 tender all of it as an exhibit if you so wish.
23 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Let's come back to this later. But --
24 MR. CAYLEY: I will bear that in mind. We anticipate looking at a
25 section of it, so what I can do, in order to meet your concerns, is
1 introduce another part of it which deals with this particular matter.
2 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Footnote 25, thank you.
3 MR. CAYLEY:
4 Q. Witness, you then note in this military command structure
5 underneath the Main Staff the 1st Krajina Corps. Now, first question:
6 Were there a number of corps that were subordinated to the Main Staff of
7 the Bosnian Serb army?
8 A. Yes, there were a number of other corps. I believe initially
9 five, and it grew to six by the end of 1992.
10 Q. Whereabouts was the main headquarters of the 1st Krajina Corps?
11 A. The 1st Krajina Corps's main headquarters was in Banja Luka;
12 however, it had, as a result of operations in Croatia in 1991 and into
13 1992, deployed a headquarters to Stara Gradiska, which is north of Banja
14 Luka over the river in Croatia.
15 Q. And the 1st Krajina Corps headquarters was based on the nucleus of
16 the JNA 5th Corps headquarters in Banja Luka; would that be right?
17 A. Yes, that is correct. A significant number of the officers who
18 were serving, if you like, as 5th Corps officers simply remained and
19 stayed in their positions when they named -- the name changed to the 1st
20 Krajina Corps. And the Corps Commander, for example, General -- Major
21 General Momir Talic, who was appointed commander in May -- March 1992
22 remained as the 1st Krajina Corps commander through the war.
23 Q. Now, you've noted underneath that, as with the previous slide,
24 that there was an intermediate headquarters between the brigades and the
25 1st Krajina Corps, that being the Prijedor Regional Command and we won't
1 go into that because you've already explained that. But underneath that
2 command were two brigades: The 43rd Motorised Brigade and the 5th Kozara
3 Brigade; is that right?
4 A. Yes, that's correct. The command structure stayed the same.
5 Q. And as you previously responded to Judge Schomburg's question, the
6 343rd Brigade of the JNA simply became the 43rd Brigade of the 1st Krajina
8 A. Yes, that is correct.
9 Q. Now, the box on the right-hand side I'd like you to explain where
10 you state -- and you've already touched on this issue, that Territorial
11 Defence units that had previously operated to another chain of command
12 were integrated into the Bosnian Serb army. Yes.
13 A. Yes. Your Honours, again at the 16th assembly session on the 12th
14 of May it was announced that Territorial Defence units should be
15 integrated and become part of the Bosnian Serb army, and that process was
16 put into action relatively quickly. Territorial Defence units were often
17 renamed as light infantry brigades and were integrated into the relevant
18 corps of the VRS, and in Prijedor municipality, by late May 1992, in
19 accordance with the direction that had been given on the 12th of May, the
20 TO of Prijedor was integrated into the 1st Krajina Corps. The TO
21 commander, Slobodan Kuruzovic was placed under the command of the Prijedor
22 regional command, and from other documentation from the 1st Krajina Corps,
23 a similar process occurred in a number of other municipalities in the
25 Q. I believe that this is covered in pages 10 to 14 of your report.
1 If you can just check that.
2 A. Yes. The elements of that are contained in those sections.
3 MR. CAYLEY: If we could now move to the next slide.
4 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Do you believe you can do it in the next five
5 minutes or would it be appropriate --
6 MR. CAYLEY: I think it might bleed over 11.00, Your Honour, to be
7 honest. I think it might take a little bit longer.
8 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Let's have a break now. The trial stays
9 adjourned now until 11.25.
10 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, could I just ask one thing of the
11 witness because I can't talk to him in the break, if he could pull out the
12 section of the assembly minutes about the formation of the Bosnian Serb
13 army that you were interested in yourself, if he could do that in the
15 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Right. This would be of assistance.
16 --- Recess taken at 10.55 a.m.
17 --- On resuming at 11.29 a.m.
18 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Please proceed.
19 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
20 Q. Witness, this slide is I think an abbreviated representation of
21 pages 15 and 16 of your written report; is that right?
22 A. Yes, Your Honours, that's correct.
23 Q. Can you explain what this slide represents?
24 A. I wanted to simplify the issues relating to the SDS takeover of
25 Prijedor municipality on the 30th of April, 1992, highlighting, where I
1 could, where the documents indicated participants, where military support
2 was given, and the reporting that went through the JNA 5th Corps at the
4 Q. Now, looking at the extreme right-hand side of this slide, you
5 have "Reporting: 5th Corps informed reported to 2nd Military District 1
6 May 1992." If you could take the first document that you selected and
7 place that on the ELMO.
8 First of all, Mr. Brown, what is this document?
9 A. This document is an example of the daily combat reports that the
10 JNA 5th Corps would send to the 2nd military district command. These
11 daily combat reports were normally sent once a day, sometimes twice a day,
12 and on rare occasions three times a day, in the documents I've seen in
13 1992. And this is in essence a standard daily combat report with a
14 standard format, and it is the 5th Corps reporting key issues up to the
15 2nd military district command on the 1st of May, 1992.
16 I'd like to draw your attention in particular to paragraph 1 and
17 the sentence which is highlighted, which states:
18 "After the SDS takeover in Prijedor, the situation in general is
19 calm. During the night, a killing occurred at a checkpoint in Prijedor
20 and a Muslim organisation sealed off the village of Kozarac, preventing
21 access to it."
22 For me, this indicates a knowledge on behalf of the JNA 5th Corps
23 of the events in Prijedor, and in particular, the takeover in that
25 Q. Now, in the original Serbian version of this document, who is the
1 document signed by?
2 A. The document -- the signature block is "Major General Momir
3 Talic," but it's signed on his behalf I believe by Dragan Marticic who was
4 chief of operations and training at the headquarters of the 5th Corps.
5 Q. Now, if we can go back to your slide. Now, immediately to the
6 left of the box that you have marked "reporting" you have a box marked
7 "military support," and underneath that Lieutenant Colonel Arsic and
8 Major Zeljaja. Can you explain that conclusion that you reached in your
10 A. Yes. Your Honours, if it's possible just to go back slightly to
11 the reporting issue. When I say 5th Corps informed, there is a reference
12 in a 5th Corps daily duty team, basically a notebook of the 5th Corps,
13 dated the 30th of April, indicating that the SDS had taken control of
14 Prijedor, and I believe that that reference was used as the basis for the
15 reference in the daily combat report of the 1st of May that annotated
16 notebook reference is footnote 51 in the report.
17 Moving on to the second box -- sorry.
18 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: May I just interrupt you? May I ask the OTP:
19 What about these documents mentioned here? How do you want to tender or
20 not to tender?
21 MR. CAYLEY: Your Honour, our intention was not to offer every
22 single document, because I think that will create a situation of
23 information overload. If you wish, for certain documents to be tendered
24 which we're not tendering, I'm perfectly prepared to do that, but it was
25 only my intention to offer the document of the 1st of May of 1992 which
1 was on the ELMO, just to allow the witness to refer to the notebook, which
2 he has done.
3 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: So in this trial, normally we attach immediately
4 a new exhibit number. This would be then 341. Do you have copies
5 available for all participants?
6 MR. CAYLEY: I think, Your Honour, that everybody has a copy in
7 front of them already of that document.
8 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thanks. So --
9 MR. CAYLEY: I'll remember that in future.
10 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Objections?
11 MR. OSTOJIC: No objections, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Admitted into evidence. Exhibit S341.
13 And then, finally, it would be of assistance that immediately if
14 reference is made to footnotes - for example, footnote 25, in part indeed
15 it was Exhibit 141-1-2 whenever you mention a footnote, it could be of
16 assistance that we could hear immediately whether or not this document was
17 already admitted into evidence, and I think you just made reference to
18 footnote 52. Correct?
19 THE WITNESS: I believe footnote 51, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: 51, yes. Duty team notebook entry. I think
21 such a notebook entry, if it's not yet admitted, it would be of assistance
22 if this could -- such a document could be tendered.
23 MR. CAYLEY: We can arrange that, Your Honour. I just need to
24 sort that one out. We'll do that in the break and come back to it. But
25 certainly for those documents that we do intend to put into evidence, we
1 have noted where they are existing exhibits so that we don't put repeat
2 documents into the document file. But I can sort that out in the break,
3 that particular document, and bring Mr. Brown back to the particular
4 reference that he's referring to.
5 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you.
6 MR. CAYLEY:
7 Q. Mr. Brown, moving back to the slide, issue of military support,
8 can you explain that part of the slide?
9 A. Yes. There is some limited evidence that the military were
10 involved prior to the takeover in encouraging and supporting the takeover,
11 and I found a reference to a radio interview - a Radio Prijedor
12 interview - later in the war in 1995, at which Simo Miskovic, Slobodan
13 Kuruzovic, who was the Territorial Defence commander, and Simo Drljaca
14 appeared. In the transcript of that radio interview, Miskovic and
15 Kuruzovic indicated that there had been a meeting at the barracks in
16 Prijedor at which support and encouragement was given by Colonel Arsic,
17 Prijedor regional commander and also commander of the 343rd Brigade. That
18 is referenced in my report on page 15. Kuruzovic in the transcript stated
19 that they went up to the barracks to discuss military tactics and decide
20 when and what had to be done. Dr. Stakic, former president of the
21 municipality, myself - meaning Kuruzovic - Drljaca, Jankovic, Cadjo,
22 Miskovic, as chairman of the SDS, and Lieutenant Colonel Arsic, was there.
23 He went on to say that they discussed nearly up to 7.00 and upon the
24 colonel's insistence, decided that the moment was right, in essence, to
25 carry out the takeover. Miskovic also stated a similar event, description
1 of the events in his -- during the same radio interview, that in essence
2 Colonel Arsic encouraged them and gave them support and that they had a
3 good chance of success.
4 Q. Just remind us again - I know you've already said it - who was
5 Major Zeljaja. You've already said that Lieutenant Colonel Arsic was the
6 commander of the 343rd Brigade, later the 43rd Brigade. Who was Zeljaja?
7 A. Zeljaja was deputy commander of the 43rd Motorised Brigade, he
8 later became commander of the brigade, later, I believe in August 1992.
9 Zeljaja, also in a quoted newspaper article in Kozarski Vjesnik in 1994
10 echoed to some extent that military support had been given, and in that
11 interview, Zeljaja was quoted as saying they had offered maximal help and
12 support to the SDS, both in organising preparation and advising them in
13 order to overcome certain problems in relation to the takeover of power.
14 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Once again, you quote this in a footnote or
15 where can we find this document?
16 THE WITNESS: Yes. The Zeljaja interview is at footnote 50, Your
17 Honour, which is a Kozarski Vjesnik article dated the 20th of May, 1994,
18 entitled "We know our goal."
19 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: The document as such?
20 THE WITNESS: Sorry, Your Honour?
21 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: The document as such would be available?
22 THE WITNESS: Yes, I have a copy here.
23 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: I always have to ask: It's included in this
24 file on exhibits? Because it's now in a totally different order than it
25 was today -- as it was yesterday.
1 MR. CAYLEY: Your Honour, as I said a moment ago, my original
2 intention was not to offer all 150 documents, for the obvious reasons.
3 That document was originally disclosed as part of the footnotes but was
4 not in the bundle. It's not something I intend to offer to the Court. If
5 you want us to, we can do so, but the problem is going to be that
6 Mr. Brown is going to take a long, long time to get through all of this if
7 we put into evidence every single document that's referred to in his
8 report. So what we tried to do was select what we thought were the most
9 relevant documents. But as you wish. If you want us to put it in, we
11 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: I think it's not necessary that it's done in the
12 presence of the witness, only if by the end of the day or in the beginning
13 of tomorrow, also for the purposes that it may serve for the
14 cross-examination, it is available for the parties.
15 MR. CAYLEY: Yes.
16 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: And I think also the Defence should immediately
17 tell us if they need a document as such, and not only in the form of a
19 Please, I can see --
20 MR. OSTOJIC: Yes, Your Honour. The document that I think
21 Mr. Brown is referencing in footnote 50 has already been admitted into
22 evidence under number S274A and B, over our objection, but nonetheless
24 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: You are discussing now only the radio interview;
1 MR. OSTOJIC: Actually, specifically the article that was just
2 referenced, "We know your goal," interview with Colonel Zeljaja.
3 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Yes. I recall your objections. And we wanted
4 to come back to the one or other, and therefore my question is now,
5 because we didn't decide on this, we wanted to decide in the presence of
6 Witness Brown.
7 So let us proceed, but have the documents mentioned by either the
8 Chamber or the Defence available until tomorrow.
9 MR. CAYLEY:
10 Q. So just to be clear, Mr. President, all of those documents to
11 which the witness refers but which are not immediately available to put on
12 the ELMO, we'll deal with those tomorrow, essentially, as part of the
14 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Yes. I don't think it's necessary to have it
15 once again as part of the examination-in-chief. We have heard it now.
16 But to allow us later on, if the document is contested - and as we just
17 heard, one of the documents was highly disputed, and especially this radio
18 statement - and therefore please provide us with the underlying document.
19 We will draw your attention to these documents that we believe are
20 necessary. Thank you.
21 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you.
22 Q. Now, moving on to the left-hand side of the slide, you have there
23 "participants." Now, my assumption is that here you're referring to the
24 participants in the takeover of Prijedor on the 30th of April, 1992; is
25 that right?
1 A. Yes, that is correct.
2 Q. Now, if you could please place on the ELMO document of the 30th of
3 April, which I think you have in the binder in front of you. Now, first
4 of all, could you tell us what this document is.
5 A. Yes. This is a Prijedor SJB document dated the 30th of April,
6 which was sent to the Banja Luka Security Services Centre, and it's the
7 SJB chief, Simo Drljaca, in essence, giving a summary of events on the
8 takeover. It reads:
9 "Based on your dispatch of the above number and date, please be
10 informed of the following: Ten police stations and 1.587 policemen were
11 mobilised. No one failed to respond or avoided work duty. In accordance
12 with the conclusions of the executive board of the Serbian assembly of
13 Prijedor municipality, at 0400 hours in the municipality, control was
14 seized over SJB's and all other major facilities. These activities were
15 carried out in a synchronised manner and without firing a bullet. Normal
16 work and operation of the service was established through guarding,
17 policing, and patrol services. Industrial and other organisations are
18 operating normally. You will receive timely information on future
20 Q. What did you conclude from this document?
21 A. When this document is placed alongside the interview, it's clear
22 that the police were heavily involved in the takeover, and according to
23 this document, that the takeover was carried out in accordance with the
24 conclusions of an executive board of the Serb assembly in Prijedor and
25 that power was taken -- or control was taken without firing a round.
1 Q. Where does this document come from?
2 A. This document was seized by the OTP in Prijedor.
3 Q. Now, you also conclude that TO, or Territorial Defence, forces
4 were participants, from your slide. I think you've already touched upon
5 this regarding the radio interview. How do you conclude that the TO were
6 involved in the takeover of Prijedor on the 30th of April of 1992?
7 A. There is some limited information based on that radio interview
8 from Kuruzovic, who stated that he and subordinate officers had drawn up a
9 plan and mobilised certain TO personnel, and together with the police,
10 they took over key buildings and facilities in the town.
11 MR. CAYLEY: If we could move on, please, Mr. Brown, to the next
13 Your Honour, if I could offer the document that's just been
14 referred to as S342, please. That's the document dated the 30th of April,
15 1992 from Prijedor public security station.
16 MR. OSTOJIC: No objection, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: May I first ask Madam Registrar whether or not
18 this document was already admitted earlier.
19 MR. CAYLEY: It has a 65 ter number of 105, I'm told.
20 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Yes. Under the reservation that it must be
21 double-checked, objections?
22 MR. OSTOJIC: No objection, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Admitted into evidence. Please proceed.
24 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you.
25 Q. Now, Mr. Brown, this slide entitled "strategic goals," to what
1 does this refer?
2 A. This refers to discussions that took place at the 16th assembly
3 session on the 12th of May in Banja Luka, the meeting that I alluded to
4 earlier on, which also took decisions in establishing the Bosnian Serb
5 army. This meeting, in essence, was a meeting of the senior SDS
6 leadership, including the republic-level leadership, Krajisnik, Karadzic,
7 as well as municipal leaders. At this meeting, Radovan Karadzic announced
8 the strategic goals of the Bosnian Serbs and listed them in priority
9 order. The session also adopted a number of other decisions, including
10 the establishment of the army and the appointment of Ratko Mladic as its
11 commander, or commander of the Main Staff.
12 Q. If I could just interrupt you.
13 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, this is an existing exhibit within the
14 case. It's S141-1, minutes of the 16th session of the assembly of the
15 Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
16 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you.
17 MR. CAYLEY:
18 Q. And, Mr. Brown, I know you've extracted a part of that existing
19 exhibit for the purposes of this slide, and if you could place that on the
21 MR. CAYLEY: And in the English version, Your Honours, this is
22 pages 13, 14, and 15 of Prosecutor's Exhibit S141, so it doesn't need to
23 be re-exhibited.
24 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: May I ask the Defence whether or not Dr. Stakic
25 has this document in a language he understands?
1 MR. OSTOJIC: I'll have to ask him, Your Honour. If you could
2 just give me a moment.
3 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Please. Because if not, I would appreciate that
4 the highlighted sentences should be read out.
5 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, Your Honour, for the courtesy. We do
6 have it.
7 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you.
8 Please proceed.
9 MR. CAYLEY:
10 Q. If you could read out the first goal and then what I'd like you to
11 do is go back to the slide and explain your interpretation of that goal.
12 A. Karadzic announced the goals and in the minutes stated:
13 "The Serbian side in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the president, the
14 government, council for national security, which we have set up and
15 formulated, have formulated the strategic priorities, that is to say, the
16 strategic goals, for the Serbian people. The first such goal is
17 separation from the other two national communities, separation of states,
18 separation from those who are our enemies, who have used every
19 opportunity, especially this century, to attack us, and would continue
20 with such practices if we were to stay together in the same state."
21 This strategic goal was placed as the first strategic goal, and
22 there are references later in the document, for example, from Krajisnik
23 that this was the priority goal. I would argue that it is clear from the
24 discussions that occurred in that assembly session, both from references
25 from the delegates and also from Karadzic and senior-level officials, that
1 there was a clear desire to separate from the other two national
2 communities and that this would involve resettlement within
4 Q. Now, the second strategic goal, and if you can go back to the
6 A. The second strategic goal, it seems to me, is a corridor between
7 Semberija and Krajina. "That is something for which we may be forced to
8 sacrifice something here and there, but it is of the utmost strategic
9 importance for the Serbian people, because it integrates the Serbian
10 lands, not only of Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina, but Serbian
11 Bosnia-Herzegovina with Serbia and the Serbian Krajina with Serbian
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia.
13 "So that is a very important strategic goal which we have to
14 achieve, because there will be no Krajina, Bosnian Krajina, Serbian
15 Krajina, or alliance of Serbian states if we do not secure that corridor,
16 which will integrate us and give us unimpeded flow from one part of our
17 state to another."
18 Q. Now, going back to your slide, can you indicate approximately the
19 geographical area that's being referred to in this part of the minutes?
20 A. In essence, if you look to the slide, the starred area of number
21 2, both to the left and right of that was the territory that they were
22 referring to. This area had been -- or control of this area had been
23 taken by the Croats earlier, I believe in late March 1992, and there was a
24 severance of the link between the Krajina area to the left of the slide
25 and the area to the right, and Karadzic indicated that the
1 re-establishment of this link was of strategic importance. But it wasn't
2 simply that it -- from this statement here, that it unified the Krajina
3 with the other areas, Bosnian Serb areas, in Bosnia but that it unified
4 and linked the Serb areas within Croatia with the Serb areas in
5 Bosnia-Herzegovina and also the Serb areas in Bosnia with Serbia. In
6 essence, the corridor was important and control of the corridor was
7 important because, as Karadzic puts it, it unifies the Serb lands.
8 Q. Linking that goal specifically to the military, is there any
9 manifestation on the ground of the implementation of that strategic
10 goal by the Bosnian Serb army?
11 A. Yes, there is. One of the most -- the clearest manifestation,
12 only a matter of weeks after the 16th assembly session on the 12th of May,
13 the 1st Krajina Corps launched operation corridor 92 in late June, and by
14 early July the corridor had been -- a corridor had been re-established,
15 and the corps spent the summer expanding that corridor link, and the
16 corridor link was never severed in the war. And for me this is
17 particularly important because the articulation of the strategic goal
18 number 2 was clearly implemented very quickly by the 1st Krajina Corps,
19 and in fact elements of another corps, only a matter of weeks after the
20 announcement of those strategic goals.
21 Q. May I go back to the document on the ELMO, and if you could please
22 identify for us within the text the third strategic goal.
23 A. "The third strategic goal is to establish a corridor in the Drina
24 Valley, that is, elimination of the Drina as a border between two worlds.
25 We are on both sides of the Drina and our strategic interest and our
12 Blank pages inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts. Pages 8555 to 8564.
1 living space are there. We now see a possibility for some Muslim
2 municipalities to be set up along the Drina as enclaves in order for them
3 to achieve their rights, but that belt along the Drina must basically
4 belong to Serbian Bosnia-Herzegovina. As much as it is strategically
5 useful for us in a positive way, it helps us by damaging the interests of
6 our enemy in establishing a corridor which would connect them to the
7 Muslim international and render this area permanently unstable."
8 Q. Now, can you identify that area on your slide?
9 A. That area is in essence to the north of star number 3, and in the
10 area of the box number 3.
11 Q. Now, the Drina River Valley essentially constitutes a national
12 border between Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia proper; is that right?
13 A. That is correct, yes.
14 Q. During the time period that we are looking at, 1992, is there any
15 evidence of military implementation of that particular strategic objective
16 on the ground?
17 A. Later in 1992 I believe there were operations by the VRS as a
18 result of directives that came from the Main Staff in relation to
19 operations in the Drina Valley, but it is not addressed in my report.
20 Q. Now, going back to strategic objective 4, and if again we can look
21 at that in the minutes.
22 A. "The 4th strategic goal is the establishment of the border on the
23 Una and Neretva Rivers."
24 Q. If we go back to the slide, if you can just indicate where that
1 A. I've just highlighted generally where those rivers are. I believe
2 that this strategic goal was in essence marking out the territory and the
3 boundaries of the territory by which the Bosnian Serbs wished to control.
4 Q. Now, going back to the minutes and fifth strategic objective, if
5 you could read that out for us?
6 A. "The fifth strategic goal is the division of Sarajevo into Serbian
7 and Muslim parts."
8 Q. Now, Sarajevo, of course, is a matter that is not addressed within
9 your report, is it?
10 A. No, it's not.
11 Q. And the last strategic objective, number 6, if you could read that
12 from the minutes.
13 A. "The sixth strategic goal is the access of the Serbian Republic of
14 Bosnia-Herzegovina to the sea."
15 Q. And again that matter is not addressed in your report, is it?
16 A. No, it's not.
17 Q. Now, you've highlighted a section. If it could be moved back.
18 MR. CAYLEY: We see, Your Honours, the sixth strategic goal.
19 Q. If you could read out this portion that you've highlighted.
20 A. "All these six strategic goals, of course, according to the
21 hierarchy, and that we shall finally (original underlined) -- finally
22 finish the job of the freedom struggle of the Serbian people."
23 Q. How do you interpret that in respect of the six strategic
25 A. I believe from that comment and comments later in the -- I believe
1 from Krajisnik, that it indicates the hierarchy of the strategic goals,
2 and that the strategic goals were the political direction that was given
3 from the senior Bosnian Serb leadership on the establishment of the
4 Bosnian Serb state, the limits and boundaries that were to be -- of that
5 state, and in relation to separation from the other national communities
6 and the discussions that were held at the meeting, the nature of that
7 state, and that that state would involve the resettlement of people within
9 Q. What was the top priority amongst those strategic objectives, from
10 these minutes?
11 A. Strategic goal number 1, separation from the other two national
13 Q. Now, the Honourable President earlier made reference to these
14 minutes in respect to the formation of the Bosnian Serb army, and what I
15 would like to do is very briefly direct you to page 60, pages 59 and 60 of
16 the English translation of these minutes, Prosecutor's Exhibit 141. Do
17 you have that in front of you, Mr. Brown?
18 A. Is it possible for you to read out the ERN number? I know there
19 are two translation versions of this. So I have one, which is page 60, is
21 Q. Yes. That's the same version that I have in front of me. And if
22 you could have pages 59 and 60. And here I'm referring to the numbers at
23 the bottom of the page of the translation rather than the ERN numbers.
24 Now, first of all, Mr. Brown - and it's a significant section of
25 these minutes. I'm not going to take you all the way through it. But
1 Lieutenant General Ratko Mladic speak at this assembly session?
2 A. Yes, he did. He gave a rather lengthy speech at the session.
3 Q. And in essence, in summary, what was that speech about?
4 A. It was to some extent not the easiest speech to follow, but he on
5 the one hand accepted the position of the commander of the new Serb army
6 and talked about some military issues relating to that, but he also
7 cautioned or uttered some words of caution to the SDS leadership about
8 what had been discussed earlier on and in relation -- in particular in
9 relation to the issue of resettlement, and cautioned the delegates that
10 what they might be heading down -- or the line that they might be heading
11 down would be genocide, and it's a word he himself used. He also used a
12 phrase saying that, in essence, what we are doing here must be guarded as
13 our closest secret. So on the one hand he uttered words of some caution,
14 and I think from reading the text he's one of the few who, interestingly,
15 does utter some cautionary comments. However, he accepts the position,
16 talks about the establishment of the army and how it should function, and
17 those are some of the issues that he discussed during his speech.
18 MR. CAYLEY: And Your Honours, you'll find that speech, I think,
19 between pages 37 and 50 of the English translation.
20 Q. Now, specifically the formation of the army, I'm not sure if
21 you've found anything different to me, but this is what I've found, where
22 this seems to be a formal resolution by Mr. Krajisnik on the formation of
23 an army, is that right, on this page, page 59?
24 A. Yes, that is correct.
25 Q. Could you just read that out briefly.
1 A. This is the bottom paragraph you're referring to, is it?
2 Q. I think actually there's a paragraph "Participants in the
3 discussion, article 110 shall be amended to say the Serbian Republic."
4 A. [Indiscernible] Amendments of the National Defence act so we've
5 adopted the amendments to the constitution. Participants in the
6 discussion. Article 110 shall be amended to say the Serbian Republic of
7 BH has its own army consisting of standing and reserve forces. The
8 standing forces consist of professional soldiers and conscripts doing
9 mandatory military service. A special law shall be passed on the Serbian
10 Republic of BH army. The 3rd amended -- sorry - the 3rd amendment,
11 Article 11, is to be amended to say pursuant to the constitution and the
12 law, the president of the Republic is commander of the Serbian Republic of
13 BH army in times of peace as well as of war."
14 Do you want to continue? And then he continues by saying:
15 "The presidency, not the president."
16 Q. I don't think it's necessary to read all of this out. I think it
17 speaks for itself. It's an existing exhibit. But are there any other --
18 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Sorry to interrupt. It's not an existing
19 exhibit. The 13th of June we admitted into evidence only some parts of
20 this document, S141-18 to 2B and we conclude with page 57. So --
21 MR. CAYLEY: I should ask for the other pages.
22 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: If you so want, then please, later on, in one
23 package, ask for the additional pages.
24 MR. CAYLEY: Yes. Thank you, Mr. President.
25 Q. Are there any other parts of this that you think should be
1 relevant for consideration by the Judges?
2 A. Yes. Page 60 has some comments which might be relevant in
3 relation to the Territorial Defence and the establishment of the army.
4 Q. So that is the basis, these minutes are the basis on which you
5 conclude that at this particular meeting, the Serbian army was
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. If now, Mr. Brown, we could move to the next exhibit, please. If
9 we could move now -- perfect.
10 Now, this particular slide is entitled "Weapon deadline
11 implementation in Prijedor." Now, I know we're going to use every
12 document that's referred to here but if you can just broadly explain what
13 this slide represents before we, as it were, travel through every one of
14 these documents.
15 A. Your Honours, in reviewing the material, and especially in April
16 and May 1992, I believe there were some preparations, some significant
17 preparations, made by the Bosnian Serb authorities, in essence, in
18 preparing for war. And one of the issues relates to the issuance of
19 deadlines for the surrender of illegally held weapons and the
20 disarmament -- the disarming of paramilitary groups. And although this is
21 a rather busy slide, I believe that there is a sequence of events in
22 relation to weapon deadlines and the disarming of paramilitary groups that
23 can be indicated through the documentation that runs from the republic,
24 the republic level Serb authorities through to Prijedor municipality, and
25 this slide with the documents I've tried to highlight that.
1 Q. Now, starting at the top on the left-hand side, you have there
2 that series of five boxes, which is entitled "Republic/ARK." Now, when
3 you're referring to the republic, what do you mean by that?
4 A. In essence, the republic-level, senior Bosnian republic-level
5 authorities, Bosnian Serb Republic authorities.
6 Q. When you refer to the ARK, or A-R-K, what are you referring to?
7 A. The Autonomous Region of Krajina, which was a regional-level
8 government based in Banja Luka.
9 Q. And that level of government was underneath the republican level
10 of government?
11 A. Yes. It was a regional level of government.
12 Q. And when you have on the right-hand side "Prijedor," what are you
13 referring to?
14 A. Prijedor municipality.
15 Q. Now, if you take the first document that is referred to, 16 April,
16 "Mobilisation of Serb Territorial Defence," if you could place that onto
17 the ELMO. First of all, what is this document?
18 A. This is a document dated the 16th of April which was sent by the
19 Bosnian Serb National Defence Minister, Bogdan Subotic, who had been a
20 JNA -- serving JNA officer. And it was sent to the government of the
21 Autonomous Regions and SAOs, as well as to all Serbian municipalities.
22 And it does two things: In essence, establishes the Bosnian Serb
23 Territorial Defence and declares an imminent threat of war, and it gives
24 some explanations as to those issues.
25 Q. Just a couple of questions, Mr. Brown, for clarification, if the
1 document could be moved up so that we can see what you're referring to.
2 Based on the first paragraph at the very top, your presumption is that it
3 was the intent of the author that this document be transmitted to all of
4 the Autonomous Regions, including the ARK; correct?
5 A. Yes, that is correct.
6 Q. Now, can you just go back to what you mentioned briefly? You say
7 that this was a decision of the presidency of the Serbian Republic of
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and what was the decision that was made on the 15th of
9 April of 1992, from this document?
10 A. The presidency decision of the 15th of April decides to, in
11 essence, create or mobilise the Territorial Defence of the Serb Republic
12 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, to establish that TO as an armed force of the
13 SR BiH and it states that command and control of the Territorial Defence
14 will be exercised, municipal district and regional staffs, and the
15 republican staff of the SBiH TO, and it also decides that a state of
16 imminent threat of war is declared. Page 2 of the translation also
17 announces a general public mobilisation of the TO in the entire territory
18 of the SR BiH.
19 Q. If we could have the second page of that document placed onto the
21 MR. CAYLEY: And Mr. President, for the purposes of the record for
22 this is an existing exhibit. It's S21.
23 Q. Now, you've already mentioned the general public mobilisation of
24 the Territorial Defence. Are there any other parts of this document which
25 you wish to highlight to the Judges?
1 A. Yes. Some of the comments in the explanation I've highlighted.
2 Point one: "Those municipal TO staffs which have until now functioned
3 well shall remain in their existing formations and composition."
4 And point 3: "The declaration of a state of imminent threat of
5 war shall entail the taking of all necessary measures appropriate to the
6 situation and in accordance with the specific situation in a given
8 And the final highlighted section:
9 "In the preparations for training and deployment of the TO units,
10 effective cooperation with the JNA units -- sorry - affect cooperation
11 with the JNA units and, where possible, establish unified command."
12 Q. You mentioned earlier in your evidence that you had viewed certain
13 documents which indicated prior to the creation of the Bosnian Serb army
14 there were certain linkages and evidence of control between the JNA and
15 the Territorial Defence. Is this one of the documents that led you to
16 that conclusion?
17 A. Yes. There are others, but this was one of them.
18 Q. Where does this document come from?
19 A. This was provided to us by AID Bihac, the Bosnian government
21 Q. Can we go back to your slide? The next box down on the left-hand
22 side, which is marked "4 May."
23 A. Yes. On the 4th of May, the Autonomous Region of Krajina passed
24 down a decision which contained a number of the elements of the 16th of
25 April mobilisation instruction that Subotic wrote.
1 Q. Could you put that document onto the ELMO, please. Now, first of
2 all, if the document could be moved down so the Judges can see the nature
3 of the document. What is this document?
4 A. As I said, this is a decision from the ARK secretariat for
5 National Defence. It states:
6 "Pursuant to decision number 1/92 of the 16th of April, 1992, the
7 ministry of National Defence of the Serbian Republic of
8 Bosnia-Herzegovina, and due to a change of circumstances on the territory,
9 and in order to defend and protect the nation and its assets, and to
10 preserve the peace in these parts, the government of the Autonomous Region
11 of Krajina reached the following decisions."
12 Q. Can I just ask you a question? The decision of the 16th of April
13 of 1992, to which this decision is referring, is that the document that we
14 are just looking at, Prosecutor's Exhibit S21?
15 A. Yes. It has the same date and the same reference number.
16 Q. Can you just highlight for the Judges the parts of this decision
17 that are relevant for the purposes of your report?
18 A. Decision 1 calls for a general public mobilisation in the entire
19 territory of the Autonomous Region of Krajina, in essence, echoing the
20 Subotic instruction.
21 The decision calls for a curfew to be established between 2200
22 hours and 0500 hours throughout the territory.
23 And also, paragraph 5 states:
24 "All paramilitaries formations and individuals in possession of
25 illegal weapons and ammunition are asked to surrender those weapons and
1 ammunition immediately, or not later than 1500 hours on the 11th of May,
2 1992, to the municipal TO headquarters or the nearest public security
3 station. Once this deadline has expired, the responsible bodies shall
4 carry out the search and confiscation of weapons and ammunition and shall
5 apply the most appropriate sanctions."
6 I've also highlighted in the explanation, paragraph 1, which
8 "In order to carry out a general public mobilisation, all
9 necessary measures as required by the situation and according to the
10 actual situation on the territory of each municipality shall be
12 That is also, in essence, a direct lift from the Subotic
13 instruction of the 16th of April.
14 Q. Could we look at the last page of that particular order?
15 A. Yes. Bullet point 4 states:
16 "The presidents of the All People's Defence counsels are
17 responsible for implementation of this decision and are given the
18 authority to do so," signed by -- or the signature block is "secretary of
19 the regional secretariat for National Defence, Colonel Miodrag Sajic."
20 Q. Now, when this particular decision is addressed to the president
21 of the All People's Defence counsels, to what level of government was that
22 being addressed?
23 A. To the municipality level, I believe.
24 Q. Do you know who Colonel Miodrag Sajic is?
25 A. I believe that Colonel Sajic had been the commander of the Banja
1 Luka Territorial Defence but was given the position of regional
2 secretariat for National Defence at the ARK, Autonomous Region of Krajina,
4 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, this document is not an exhibit;
5 therefore, if it could be given a number, please, and I would apply for
6 admission of it into evidence. I think it would be 343, S343.
7 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Objections?
8 MR. OSTOJIC: We do, Your Honour. Our objections are twofold:
9 One, there's no, on the face of the document or on the body of the
10 document, there's no reference that this document was ever tendered to or
11 submitted to any municipal level, much less to that of Dr. Stakic. The
12 testimony of Mr. Brown I think was actually rather unequivocal, where he
13 says simply "I believe." Interestingly again enough that the OTP doesn't
14 ask him for the basis or of any supporting materials to establish what
15 this presumption or as he calls it a belief is that this document was
16 ultimately tendered to the municipal levels. I think in essence an
17 improper foundation has been laid for the document. I think the opinion
18 respectfully to Mr. Brown is inadequate and insufficient for purposes of
19 admitting a document of this kind before this Trial Chamber.
20 [Trial Chamber confers]
21 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Following the policy of this Trial Chamber as
22 laid down in the first document on the admission of evidence of April
23 2002, this document is admitted into evidence, and it's only for the
24 parties later to give their arguments on these documents.
25 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
1 Q. A couple of questions, Mr. Brown, arising from what Mr. Ostojic
2 has just said. Where does this document come from? Again, just for the
3 purposes of the record, we're talking about S343.
4 A. This was given to us by the Bosnian government authorities.
5 Q. If we could now, please, go back to your slide presentation, and
6 there is an arrow going from this ARK National Defence council decision to
7 a box marked "5 May, Prijedor municipality Defence Council decision,
8 setting a deadline for the 11th of May. Now, just before we look at that
9 document, a couple of questions. The Prijedor municipality National
10 Defence council decision was the day after the ARK National Defence
11 council decision; is that right?
12 A. That is correct, yes.
13 Q. And if you could place that document, please, on the ELMO.
14 MR. CAYLEY: This document, Mr. President, is Prosecutor's Exhibit
16 Q. First of all, what is this document?
17 A. This document are the minutes of the second session of the
18 National Defence council in the Municipal Assembly of Prijedor, which was
19 held on the 5th of May, 1992.
20 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Maybe it facilitates. I don't know whether you
21 are aware or not that all these documents have been read out earlier. For
22 example, this document, the 2nd of May, at 1523 hours exactly. We are
23 aware of this.
24 MR. CAYLEY: So the witness can simply summarise the content.
25 Thank you, Mr. President.
1 Q. If you could just highlight. You don't need to read it out,
2 because as the learned President has stated it's already been read into
3 the record. If you could just highlight the points that you used in your
5 A. Dr. Stakic presided over the meeting. It was attended by Slobodan
6 Kuruzovic, TO commander; Colonel Arsic, garrison or regional commander and
7 commander of the brigade; Simo Drljaca, police chief; and Radmilo
8 Zeljaja. The agenda on the meeting was to discuss the decisions on
9 mobilisation and the passing the resolutions, and it mentions here the
10 participants. The conclusions of the meeting that are of interest I've
11 highlighted in part 1 and part 2, which states: "The municipal
12 secretariat for National Defence is to reinforce the TO detachment and the
13 war unit 4777, in conjunction with the military department and in
14 accordance with the requests made by the commanders of these units."
15 Part 2:
16 "The mobilisation orders following from the decision of the
17 Autonomous Region of Bosanski Krajina assembly are to be carried out, when
18 the actual situation in the municipality renders it necessary and in
19 accordance with the needs and a special plan, through call-up papers
20 issued by the municipal secretariat for National Defence."
21 Q. A couple of question, Mr. Brown. First of all, where did we get
22 this document from? Where did the Office of the Prosecutor get this
23 document from?
24 A. This was seized by the Office of the Prosecutor in Prijedor.
25 Q. From whom? Do you know?
1 A. I'm not sure. I believe it may well have been the municipal
2 building in Prijedor, but I don't know for sure.
3 Q. So this was seized directly from the Bosnian Serb authorities?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Now, in paragraph 2, it refers to the mobilisation orders
6 following from the decision of the Autonomous Region of the Bosanski
7 Krajina assembly.
8 A. That is correct.
9 Q. So what is that referring, in your opinion?
10 A. The document that we have just seen, dated the 4th of May.
11 Q. Would that logically indicate that that document of the 4th of May
12 was received in Prijedor, since it's reflected in these minutes?
13 A. Yes, and there are a couple of other sections later on in this
14 document which would indicate that that was the case too.
15 Q. Can you keep going through the document and indicate those
16 particular sections to us?
17 THE INTERPRETER: Would you kindly slow down while reading the
18 documents. Thank you.
19 MR. CAYLEY:
20 Q. Again, Mr. Brown, you don't need to read this out because it's
21 been read into the document already, but if you could just summarise.
22 A. Bullet point 6 and bullet point 7 are, in essence, also contained
23 in the 4th of May ARK National Defence council decision, establishing
24 curfew and a deadline for the surrender of weapons.
25 Q. And that's contained in paragraph 7?
1 A. Yes, that's correct.
2 Q. Now, the original of this document is not signed, but there is a
3 block at the end which states: "President, Dr. Milomir Stakic," is that
5 A. Yes, that is correct.
6 Q. If we can now, please, go back to your slide and to the third box
7 down on the left-hand side of the 8th of May. ARK War Staff decision
8 asking for reports on mobilisation deadlines.
9 A. Yes. On the 8th of May, the Autonomous Region of Krajina War
10 Staff passed down some conclusions which related to reporting on the issue
11 of mobilisation and on weapon deadlines.
12 Q. Can you place that document on the ELMO, please.
13 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, this document is already an exhibit.
14 It's S104.
15 Q. So we're back at the regional government again, the Autonomous
16 Region of Krajina; correct?
17 A. Yes, that is correct.
18 Q. And this is a document entitled "War Staff."
19 A. Yes, that is correct.
20 MR. CAYLEY: Can I assume that this document has also been read
21 into the record, Mr. President?
22 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Not yet.
23 MR. CAYLEY:
24 Q. If you could highlight to us those sections which were relevant to
25 your report.
1 A. There was a meeting on the 8th of May and the following
2 conclusions were reached: Point 1. Presidents of the National Defence
3 councils are to submit detailed reports about conducting mobilisation in
4 their municipalities to the War Staff of the Autonomous Region of
6 Q. Who is that referring to, do you believe?
7 A. Dr. Stakic in Prijedor municipality, in relation to Prijedor
9 Q. And to presidents of National Defence councils in other
10 municipalities within the Krajina region; correct?
11 A. Yes, I assess that is to be correct.
12 Q. Paragraph 3.
13 A. Paragraph 3 states:
14 "Presidents of the National Defence councils are to report to the
15 War Staff of the Autonomous Region of Krajina about any actions they may
16 have taken in order to disarm the paramilitary units and individuals
17 possessing illegal weapons and ammunition."
18 Paragraph 4, notes:
19 "A one-hour interval - I presume that means at one-hour
20 intervals - the Banja Luka radio is to broadcast bulletins calling
21 citizens to surrender weapons in order to maintain peace in the area."
22 Q. Where does this document come from, if you know?
23 A. I believe this document was seized in Prijedor, but if you can
24 give me a second, I'll ... Yes. This document was seized during an OTP
25 seizure in Prijedor.
1 MR. CAYLEY: Just for the purposes of the record, this is a
2 document which has on it a stamp and a signature block, "President
3 Radoslav Brdjanin," but the document is not signed.
4 Q. Is that correct?
5 A. Yes, that's right.
6 Q. If we can now move back to your slide and back to the right-hand
7 side, and you have a dotted arrow going from the box marked "9 May."
8 "Prijedor SDS municipal board meeting indicating the extension of
9 the deadline until 14 May." Could you place that document, please, onto
10 the ELMO.
11 MR. CAYLEY: And for the purposes of the record, this is an
12 existing exhibit, Mr. President, SK46.
13 Q. Now, Mr. Brown, what is this document?
14 A. This document are the praecipe minutes of the SDS municipal board
15 held in Prijedor on the 9th of May.
16 Q. Do you know where this document comes from?
17 A. Seized by the OTP in Prijedor municipality.
18 Q. Can you just highlight to us the sections of this report which you
19 found relevant for your report?
20 A. I won't go through the whole document, but I highlighted some
21 issues. Kuruzovic, the TO commander, stated: "Go on with talks,
22 observing all the proprieties, but always keep in mind the final goal."
23 Although, he does state: "The idea is to achieve everything peacefully
24 and without destruction." Milan Kovacevic, President of the Municipal
25 Assembly Executive Committee, makes a couple of comments, one which
1 states: "The functioning of government at the level of Krajina can now be
2 felt, and instructions and decisions are being forwarded from the top."
3 In page 2 of the minutes there are comments from Simo Drljaca, the
4 police chief. "The main problem is the protection of facilities. It is
5 imperative that the TO take over such details so that the police can go
6 back to their duties. Regarding the negotiations with the Ljubija and
7 Kozarac stations, the deadline has been extended (until 1200 hours on the
8 14th of May), and that it is necessary to carry out a full mobilisation of
9 the TO and the reserve police force on Wednesday and Thursday."
10 Q. What do you believe that's referring to?
11 A. I believe that there had been ongoing negotiations with Ljubija
12 and Kozarac in relation to the surrender of weapons, and Drljaca stated
13 that this deadline had been extended until the 14th of May.
14 Q. If you could continue through the document.
15 A. Milomir Stakic -- there's some comments related to him, one of
16 which he says:
17 "Peace must be maintained at all costs."
18 And finally: "Full mobilisation is compulsory and all the Serbs
19 must respond to the call-up."
20 Q. And that is a document that is unsigned but has a signature block
21 of sorts at the end; correct?
22 A. Yes, that is correct.
23 Q. If we can now go back to the 11th of May, if we can go back to
24 your slide, and we see the 11th of May, ARK Crisis Staff decision of
25 extending the deadline until 14 May."
1 MR. CAYLEY: And this, Your Honours, is Prosecutor's Exhibit 146.
2 THE REGISTRAR: S140.
3 MR. CAYLEY: I'm sorry. You're absolutely right. Yes. 140.
4 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: This document has been read out, the 13th of
6 MR. CAYLEY:
7 Q. So again, Mr. Brown, you don't need to read this document out.
8 Now, again, this is a document from the regional-level government, the
9 Autonomous Region of Krajina Crisis Staff?
10 A. Yes, that is correct.
11 Q. And to whom is this document addressed?
12 A. There's a handwritten annotation which states:
13 "To the president of the municipality personally."
14 Q. And would it be right in saying that this document was addressed
15 to the presidents of each of the municipalities which comprised the ARK
17 MR. OSTOJIC: I object to the form of the question, Your Honour.
18 I think it calls for speculation.
19 MR. CAYLEY: Your Honour, I mean I think it's sort of blatantly
20 obvious that it's obviously referring to the presidents of municipalities
21 within the ARK region, but I can ask the witness to explain what he
22 interpreted by that particular handwritten notation on the document.
23 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Please restate your question.
24 MR. CAYLEY:
25 Q. Looking at the handwritten notation, Mr. Brown, in the original
1 document, how did you interpret that when you saw that?
2 A. I can only go by the annotation that is there, which says: "To
3 the president of the municipality personally." I cannot state
4 categorically that this has gone to all presidents, or which particular
5 president this is referring to. But bearing in mind the other documents
6 which we've seen, and the references to the flow of information between
7 the ARK and Prijedor municipality, I would assess that this would have
8 gone out to the various municipalities in the ARK area.
9 Q. Now, what are the particular sections which you wish to highlight
10 here in this document?
11 A. Bullet point 1:
12 "The deadline for the surrender of the illegally acquired weapons
13 is hereby extended to 2400 hours on the 14th of May, 1992. The deadline
14 that expired today has been extended at the request of the citizens of all
15 nationalities because of the wish to return the weapons in a peaceful way
16 and without the intervention of the police. After expiry of the deadline,
17 the weapons will be seized by employees of the Security Services Centre of
18 the Autonomous Region of Krajina, and the most severe sanctions shall be
19 taken against those that disobey the proclamation of the Crisis Staff."
20 Q. Where does this document come from?
21 A. This document, I believe, was given to us by the Bosnian
23 MR. CAYLEY: Now, just to remind Their Honours, in the previous
24 SDS municipal board minute meetings that we've just referred to of the 9th
25 of May, what was the date of the deadline in a document?
1 A. The 14th of May, although it was 1200 hours, not 2400 hours, as it
2 is annotated in this document.
3 Q. Now, moving on to the next document that you have in your slide,
4 the last document on the left-hand side, which is the "14th May: ARK
5 Crisis Staff decision on proactive measures for disarmament." Now, first
6 of all, Mr. Brown, where does this document come from?
7 A. This was also provided by the Bosnian authorities, Bosnian
8 government authorities.
9 Q. Now, if you could read out that section, because this is in fact a
10 new exhibit.
11 A. "The following conclusions were adopted at a session of the Crisis
12 Staff of the Autonomous Region of Krajina held on the 14th of May, 1992:
14 "1. The Security Services Centre of the Autonomous Region of
15 Krajina shall consistently carry out the decision of the Crisis Staff of
16 Autonomous Region of Krajina on the disarming of paramilitary units and
17 individuals who are illegally in possession of weapons and ammunition.
18 "The weapons should be handed over to the nearest public security
19 stations, where officers shall issue receipts confirming the return of
21 "Presidents of political parties and people who are looked up to in
22 their local communities must use their authority to influence citizens to
23 return weapons so that law and order may be maintained."
24 Q. And that document is apparently signed and stamped by Mr. Radoslav
25 Brdjanin, president of the ARK Crisis Staff; correct?
1 A. Yes, that is correct.
2 MR. CAYLEY: Your Honour, that is a new exhibit which I would
3 apply to be admitted into evidence as S344.
4 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Objections?
5 MR. OSTOJIC: No objections, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Admitted into evidence. Exhibit S344.
7 MR. CAYLEY: If we could go back to your slide. The last
8 document -- the final box on the right-hand side, dated 15 May "Prijedor
9 municipality National Defence council conclusions that a plan of
10 disarmament be drafted."
11 And this, Mr. President, is Exhibit S60.
12 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Already read out, the 28th of May.
13 MR. CAYLEY:
14 Q. So, Mr. Brown, if you could just highlight the parts which you
15 believe are relevant and important for the purposes of your report.
16 A. This is a further meeting of the National Defence council in
17 Prijedor, chaired by Dr. Milomir Stakic, and including Vladimir Arsic,
18 commander of the 43rd Brigade; Pero Colic, commander of the 5th Brigade;
19 Slobodan Kuruzovic, Radmilo Zeljaja, and Simo Drljaca. They have an
20 agenda at which they conclude the following. Point number 1 at the bottom
21 of the page states:
22 "The draft of the decision on the organisation and functioning of
23 the Crisis Staff is approved under the proviso that a representative of
24 the garrison in Prijedor be added to the proposed list of members of the
25 Crisis Staff."
1 Q. When they are referring to the garrison in Prijedor, what are they
2 referring to?
3 A. I believe the regional command in Prijedor.
4 Q. Of the Bosnian Serb army?
5 A. Yes, that is correct. On page 2 of the --
6 THE INTERPRETER: Kindly slow down. Thank you.
7 A. On page 2 of the translation, there were discussions relating to
8 mobilisation in the municipality and the status of deployed forces,
9 presumably meaning forces that were deployed and not sat in a garrison
10 location. And in conjunction with that discussion, the following
11 conclusions are of note. Bullet point 3 states:
12 "Start the transformation of both TO staffs and form a unified
13 command for control and command of all the units formed in the territory
14 of the municipality.
15 "In the assignment of the remaining conscripts to units, priority
16 is to be given to the reinforcement of war units 4777 and 8316."
17 Q. Can you pause there, Mr. Brown? To which units are these
18 referring, war units 4777 and 8316?
19 A. War unit 4777 was the 43rd motorised brigade. It's the military
20 post number for that brigade. 8316 I believe to be the Prijedor
21 Territorial Defence VP number, military post number. I believe that point
22 3 is of importance because not only does it link back to Subotic's
23 instruction of the 16th of April, in which there should be a unified
24 command, but it also links to the 16th assembly session on the 12th of
25 May, whereby the Territorial Defence staff was to be integrated into the
1 Bosnian Serb army.
2 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: As it may be of high importance, may I ask:
3 What is the basis for your assessment that brings you to "8316 I believe
4 to be the Prijedor Territorial Defence VP number, military post number"?
5 What's the basis for this?
6 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, the OTP had seized the part of the
7 archive of the 1st Krajina Corps in Banja Luka, which is part -- which is
8 contained within the databases of the OTP. On doing a search on 8316, I
9 came across one or two documents that indicated that 8316 was the VP
10 number for Prijedor Territorial Defence. I haven't -- I would have to
11 refresh my memory on the report, but I'm not sure if I've made reference
12 to that specifically in the report, but that is where I make that
13 assumption or that comment.
14 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: I would appreciate if you could come back to
15 this when having refreshed your memory, and probably even have the
16 documents available you just mentioned. Thank you.
17 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir.
18 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Please proceed.
19 MR. CAYLEY:
20 Q. Now, the final conclusion, Mr. Brown, after the discussion the
21 following conclusion was adopted. And you've already I think referred to
22 this in your slide that there should be a plan of disarmament.
23 A. Yes. There were discussions on the disarmament of paramilitary
24 formations, and the conclusion was adopted that:
25 "The public security station in concert with the army command
1 should draft the plan of disarmament, after which the actual process
2 should be set in motion (without predetermined deadlines) and with the
3 assistance of the media."
4 Q. And that document I think is again unsigned but has the block of
5 Dr. Milomir Stakic at the end; correct, the original version?
6 A. Yes, that is correct.
7 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, if you wish, this may be a good time
8 to pause, because we then move on to the next slide.
9 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: The trial stays adjourned until 2.30.
10 --- Luncheon recess taken at 12.58 p.m.
11 --- On resuming at 2.32 p.m.
12 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: May I first inform the Defence that the
13 Detention Unit is until now prepared to provide additional possibility for
14 visiting your client, whether today or tomorrow, from 6.00 to 8.00, but it
15 shall be arranged in a way that it's possible today, tomorrow, and on
16 Thursday, from 6.00 to 8.00.
17 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you very much, Your Honour. But just for
18 clarification, is that in the morning or in the evening?
19 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: I don't dare to say it's your interest in the
21 MR. OSTOJIC: Fair enough. Thank you.
22 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: So can we please continue with the
24 MR. CAYLEY:
25 Q. Mr. Brown, could I ask you to move to the next slide in your
1 presentation, please. Now, we spent the time before the lunch break
2 dealing with the weapon deadlines, and this is bulleted on this slide as
3 the first item under the title of "Military preparations relating to
4 Prijedor." Is that something the Judges should bear in mind when
5 considering all of the following bullet points that you list on this
7 A. Yes. In reviewing the documentation, I would assess that the
8 issue of weapon deadlines be placed in the context of other issues that
9 were occurring in the area. The four bullet points that I've listed below
10 those being some of those issues that I made reference to in my report
11 from page 16.
12 Q. Now, the first issue that you headline after weapon deadlines is
13 movement of units, and in that respect can I please ask you to place the
14 regular combat report of the 5th Corps, dated the 3rd of May, onto the
15 ELMO, please.
16 Now, first of all, what is this document?
17 A. It is another example of a daily combat report sent from the 5th
18 Corps command to the 2nd Military District in Sarajevo. It's dated the
19 3rd of May. And I've highlighted some of the areas that were noted in
20 this daily combat report in relation to the movement of some units into
21 Prijedor around this period. In particular, paragraph 2 notes:
22 "In the course of the 2nd and 3rd May, one 105-millimetre Howitzer
23 battery and one anti-armour artillery battery of the 343 RD Motorised
24 Brigade were relocated to the Prijedor area in order to strengthen the
25 units in the wider Prijedor-Ljubija-Kozarac area. The units have taken up
1 their positions."
2 I've highlighted a couple of other comments in this daily combat
3 report also which are highlighted.
4 Q. Perhaps you could read out the other two areas that you've
6 A. Bullet 3, situation on the ground, includes a sentence stating:
7 "Fear and apprehension are still present among the population,
8 particularly because of individual acts of sabotage against private
9 property and individual civilians."
10 Also in that paragraph, at the end of page 1, it states:
11 "In Prijedor, the uncle of the murdered conscript Radenko Djapa,
12 killed two and seriously wounded three Muslims. The motive for the
13 killings was revenge."
14 Q. Now, Mr. Brown, where does this document come from?
15 A. This is a document seized by the OTP, and it's part of the
16 military archive of the 1st Krajina Corps.
17 Q. In military terms, how significant a force is a 105-millimetre
18 Howitzer battery and an anti-armour artillery battery?
19 A. These are fairly significant weapons, and in relation to the 343
20 Brigade, where the highest calibre artillery the brigade had in its
21 make-up, the 105-millimetre Howitzer battery probably consisted here of
22 six guns. I say that in part because some documentation would indicate
23 that that is the case, but also having studied the military archives of
24 the Krajina Corps since 1999, a battery normally consists of six guns. It
25 can increase, but normally it's around six guns.
1 Q. If we can switch back to the slide.
2 MR. CAYLEY: Your Honours, this is not a document that has already
3 been exhibited, so if I could ask for an exhibit number, please.
4 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: 345. Objections?
5 MR. OSTOJIC: No, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Admitted, S345. But please take care that at
7 the end of the day we have available copies, both in English and B/C/S.
8 Thank you.
9 MR. CAYLEY: Yes, Your Honour.
10 Q. Now, Mr. Brown, the next issue that you headline in this slide is
11 mobilisation, and if we could look at the --
12 THE INTERPRETER: Could counsel speak in his mike, please. Thank
14 MR. CAYLEY:
15 Q. -- of the 21st of May, 1992. Could you first of all tell us where
16 this document comes from and what it is.
17 A. This document is also a document from the archive of the 1st
18 Krajina Corps, seized by the OTP. It's a document dated the 21st of May,
19 and the date has some significance. And it is, in essence, an order for
20 general mobilisation of the Serbian Republic of BH Army. I state that the
21 date has some significance because it comes a day after the formal VRS/JNA
22 transition, which occurred on the 19th, 20th of May, and the document
23 makes reference to Serb Republic of BH Presidency decision on the 20th of
24 May, which initiated general mobilisation of all citizens of the Serb
25 Republic of BH, both those in the territory of the republic and those
1 living outside the republic. All men between 18 and 60 and women the ages
2 18 to 55 are subject to the mobilisation. And in essence, this was
3 General Talic's first mobilisation instruction after the formal VRS/JNA
4 transition and for me reflects many of the issues that had been discussed
5 at the 16th assembly session, reflected Bogdan Subotic's instruction
6 establishing the TO and the general calls for full mobilisation.
7 Q. General Talic was the commander of the 1st Krajina Corps?
8 A. Your Honours, yes, that's correct.
9 Q. If we could now go to the next page of this document, and I think
10 you might want to highlight some of the paragraphs, not all of them.
11 A. Paragraph 1 states:
12 "Immediately establish direct contact with municipal and military
13 and territorial organs on the ground, offering expert and materiel support
14 for the mobilisation process."
15 The other paragraphs relate to issues to do with conscripts. I
16 draw your attention to paragraph 6:
17 "Explain to conscripts as they arrive the goals of our struggle
18 and brief them on their duties and rights. Do not enlist waverers or
19 suspicious persons into the units."
20 If I can continue onto page 3, and in particular, paragraph 8:
21 "Until the units receive concrete combat tasks, engage them in the
22 following tasks:
23 1. Maintain and improve the operational and tactical position of
24 own units.
25 2. Increase the military and combat compactness of wartime units.
1 3. Conduct intensive combat training, focusing on firing and
2 tactical training.
3 4. Establish the closest possible cooperation with the people and
4 legal authorities within their zones of responsibility."
5 If I can draw your attention to the next page, page 4, and in
6 particular, paragraph 14 and the distribution. Paragraph 14 states:
7 "Unit commanders of the units are directly responsible for
8 implementing these assignments."
9 And the distribution includes the 343 Motorised Brigade, the 5th
10 Infantry Brigade and Prijedor Regional Command.
11 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, that again is a document that is not
12 in evidence, and therefore I would apply that it be admitted into
14 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: 346. Objections?
15 MR. OSTOJIC: No objections, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Admit into evidence, 346.
17 MR. CAYLEY:
18 Q. If you could now, Mr. Brown, please take the document of the 22nd
19 of May, or it's a document actually minuting, I think, conclusions of a
20 meeting held on the 22nd of May, 1992. What is this document?
21 A. This is a decision on mobilisation on the territory of Prijedor
22 municipality, and it states in the preamble:
23 "Pursuant to the decision of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
24 Herzegovina on the general public mobilisation of forces and materiel in
25 the Republic, the Crisis Staff of Prijedor municipality, considering the
1 current situation and conditions, at the meeting held on the 22nd of May,
2 reached a decision on the mobilisation on the territory of the
4 I draw your attention to paragraph 1:
5 "All conscripts assigned to the following war units: 4777, 3507,
6 5456, 6817, 2982, 3839, 6588, and 4853, and TO 8316 are requested to
7 report to their war units immediately."
8 And there's a signature block at the bottom, "president of the
9 Crisis Staff of the municipality, Dr. Milomir Stakic."
10 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Would it be possible to have the best possible
11 original from this document in B/C/S available? Because, if I remember
12 correctly, 8316 has special meaning; correct?
13 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. I believe that TO 8316 is Prijedor
14 Territorial Defence. You asked me earlier on to check that -- I briefly
15 went through a very cursory search, and found one document from the
16 Krajina Corps which was dated -- I forget the date. I think it's February
17 1992, but I can check. I haven't brought it here. I can maybe get it in
18 the break if it's required. It's not a document that has been translated,
19 but it is an instruction relating to the provision of equipment to two
20 units, one of which is TO 8316 Prijedor Territorial Defence, 8316
21 Prijedor. I believe that might have been the document I was referring to
22 earlier when I said I had done some searches to try and find out what 8316
24 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: But here in this concrete case I want to come
25 back not only to the copy we have available, but apparently it's
1 handwritten, as it reads also in the translation, TO 8316. So if you
2 could provide it, maybe not today, the best possible original of this
3 document. Thank you.
4 MR. CAYLEY: Yes, Your Honour.
5 Q. Where does this document come from?
6 A. This was a document seized in Prijedor by the OTP.
7 MR. CAYLEY: So what I will do, Your Honour, is actually, although
8 I can't offer the original document into evidence, what I can do is offer
9 that for inspection by the Chamber and by the Defence, the document that
10 we seized in Prijedor.
11 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: We have already well established way to proceed
12 with the best possible originals, as we call it.
13 MR. CAYLEY: I'm hearing now from my colleague it's being
15 Q. This is document S61?
16 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: And it has been read out.
17 MR. CAYLEY: If that document could be moved down so we can see
18 the first paragraph again, I just have a couple of questions.
19 Q. Apart from 8316, are you aware of the VP numbers, the military
20 identification -- any of the other military identification numbers that
21 are written there?
22 A. Only 4777, which is the 343rd Brigade. I was unable to ascertain
23 what the other VP numbers were.
24 Q. And in terms of the chronology, this particular meeting referred
25 to on the 22nd of May of 1992 is the immediate day after General Talic's
1 order for general mobilisation?
2 A. Yes, that is correct.
3 Q. If we could go back to your slide, and you have, under
4 "Mobilisation," "Enhanced state of readiness," and I think in a number of
5 documents already referred to, that matter has been addressed, but if you
6 could explain exactly what that means and what documents you looked at to
7 put that bullet point in that slide.
8 A. There were a number of documents in the military collection, and
9 especially of reports either referenced in daily combat reports or in the
10 mobilisation instruction, raising the combat readiness of units in the
11 corps to the highest state of alert. This included references to putting
12 out observation posts for artillery and references to respond to any acts
13 of provocation fiercely. I've referenced some of those in pages 17 and
14 18, and it's also referenced, in essence, in the mobilisation instruction,
15 to put units at a high state of alert until they receive direct combat
17 Q. Now, the last bulleted point on this slide, you reference, is
18 improvement of civil-military cooperation. And if I could ask you
19 to put the 5th Corps order of the 14th of May, 1992 onto the projector.
20 First of all, what is this document?
21 A. This again is a 5th Corps document obtained by the OTP during a
22 seizure on the 1st Krajina Corps archive. It's a 5th Corps order to
23 improve command and control in units and it comes two days after the 16th
24 assembly session. And I draw your attention to items 3, 4, and 5 of the
25 report, or the order.
1 Item 3 states:
2 "The corps command (assistant commander for civilian structures)
3 shall resolve all issues relating to cooperation and coordination with
4 civilian structures contained in requests submitted by the units upon
5 receiving approval from the 2nd Military District command."
6 And item 4:
7 "All requests for assistance, cooperation, and coordination of
8 activities on the ground issued by civilian structures should be forwarded
9 to the corps command, who shall resolve them in cooperation with the
10 municipal authorities or pass them on to the 2nd Military District
12 Q. Could you just pause there for a moment. Okay. Carry on.
13 A. Bullet 5, in essence, orders that:
14 Because of combat activities in the zone of the corps, verbal
15 reporting of units to the corps command should start from the 15th of May,
16 and it will take place twice a day.
17 If I can move on to the second page. The corps also emphasised
18 that regular combat reports should be submitted to the corps every day at
19 1700 hours, and it gives the list of the make-up of the daily combat
20 report, which matches the daily combat reports which we've seen.
21 Item 8 states:
22 "The commanders of subordinated units, assistant commanders for
23 civilian sector, moral guidance and the rear, and the chief of engineer
24 are directly responsible to me for the implementation of this order."
25 I believe in that paragraph General Talic was saying that certain
1 staff officers in his corps, civilian sector being one of them, moral
2 guidance being another one, and the chief of engineers, and the rear
3 support, were responsible to him for the implementation of this order.
4 And I believe in the final distribution, that this order is disseminated
5 to all formations of the corps, including the staff officers annotated at
6 the top. And I draw your attention to number 13, the 5th Brigade; number
7 15, the 343rd Motorised Brigade; and number 21, the Prijedor Regional
9 MR. CAYLEY: Again, Mr. President, this is not a document that has
10 previously been offered into evidence, so I would offer it now.
11 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: 347. Objection?
12 MR. OSTOJIC: No objection, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Admitted into evidence, S347.
14 MR. CAYLEY:
15 Q. If we could briefly go back to your slide, Mr. Brown. Taking all
16 of these points together that you've listed within this slide, what
17 conclusion can you reach?
18 A. Your Honours, I would argue that all of these put together, and
19 they should be viewed together and not as individual issues, but put
20 together, show a coordinated effort with which to mobilise for war, and
21 that included military, civilian cooperation and coordination emanating
22 from the Republic, moving down through the regions to the municipality,
23 and that it was a desire on the part of the military to ensure that
24 civil-military cooperation existed within its units and brigades and that
25 they were mobilising for combat operations.
1 Q. You say in your evidence, in your response, that, the last part,
2 that it was a desire on the part of the military to ensure that
3 civilian -- civil-military cooperation existed within its units and
4 brigades. Only within the units themselves?
5 A. No. The whole corps. The 1st Krajina Corps was somewhat unusual
6 in having a staff officer who was directly responsible for the issue of
7 civilian affairs, and I believe that the instructions that the corps were
8 passing down to enhance civil-military cooperation indicated this desire.
9 MR. CAYLEY: If we could now move to the next slide.
10 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Sorry that I have to bore you with these
11 technical issues, but evidently document S347, the page on distribution,
12 we have it twice. Delete one of those of the double copies or was it
13 seized twice? What is the underlying reason?
14 MR. CAYLEY: If it's a double copy, of course, Mr. President, it
15 may be just the version given to you. But it's a three-page document, the
17 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: So then only once, please. For the registry.
18 Thank you.
19 MR. CAYLEY: Prints come out rather small on the television
20 screen, but before we actually get into any documents:
21 Q. What have you tried to represent here?
22 A. Your Honours, from reviewing the documentation, it is evident that
23 there was a non-Serb resistance, armed resistance, in the Prijedor
24 municipality, that the inhabitants of some non-Serb areas had attempted to
25 organise themselves, had attempted to procure weapons, had attempted to
1 establish some form of Territorial Defence staff. And what I've tried to
2 do here is to look at documentation that is not -- non-Serb documentation
3 in relation to this issue, and also integrate some non -- or some Serb
4 documents that we have in relation to trying to get a feel for what the
5 non-Serb population in Prijedor municipality were doing in relation to
6 armed resistance in the area. As I said, there were attempts to procure
7 weapons, there was a defensive structure of sorts, there was an attempt to
8 coordinate activities, and there were acts of provocation which did result
9 in the deaths of Serb soldiers.
10 That said, however, I believe that the weaponry that the non-Serbs
11 either managed to procure was limited and in no way compared to that of
12 the Serb forces in the area, that there were command and control problems
13 within Muslim and Croat population in relation to resistance that, there
14 were differences of opinion within the non-Serbs and how to deal with the
15 crisis that was developing in the municipality. The documentation -- the
16 non-Serb documentation is limited. I have not managed to find a lot of
17 material relating to this. Material that I have used in part comes from
18 material provided by previous defence cases, and one large memoir which
19 was written by Jusuf Ramic, who was a Territorial Defence commander in
20 Puharska and Prijedor. So I've tried to contrast the -- or integrate both
21 the Serb documentation and the non-Serb documentation together on this
23 Q. Can we first of all look at some of the non-Serb documentation,
24 the extract that you selected? And if you could place that onto the
25 ELMO. What is this document?
1 A. This document is part of a set of handwritten notes which were
2 provided in the Dusko Tadic case. I cannot vouch for their full
3 authenticity, but there are some issues that I would like to point out.
4 This particular section was from a meeting on the 6th -- I believe
5 the 6th of May, and these handwritten notes give bullet-point summaries
6 from those who were participating in the meetings, and they primarily
7 relate to the Kozarac/Kozarusa area. And it's from these meetings, as
8 well as the Jusuf Ramic book, that I draw some conclusions that there were
9 differences of opinion within the Muslim population in Prijedor, that
10 there were negotiation attempts, and that they were wary that acts of
11 provocation may be detrimental to their position.
12 So on this document, if you look at, for example, the comment by
13 Suljo on -- the second speaker, he states:
14 "I would accept any peaceful solution offered by any person. If a
15 Serb flag on the Kozarac SUP were a guarantee of peace, I would accept
16 even that."
17 Sivac talks about:
18 "Who has heard the news of the television and that the government
19 of Krajina has ordered all paramilitary units to be disarmed? They gave
20 us a deadline of the 8th of May."
21 Again, this is an indication of deadline issues. Velic states:
22 "We are doing everything we can to preserve the peace, but it
23 seems we are not going to succeed."
24 Pasic is somewhat more aggressive:
25 "I agree with the comrades. We are occupied. The aggressor
1 imposes its authority on us. We can either accept it until some better
2 time comes or get into war. The establishment of the municipality is
3 nothing. I asked about insignia and the postponement, and they told me it
4 was an order from BL," presumably Banja Luka. "It seems as if they are
5 ready to give up the insignia. If we get into war, many people will be
6 killed. Still, the municipality is not a solution. They claim that the
7 army will not interfere. We have to be very cautious."
8 And at the end, Tadic says:
9 "The SDA was fiercely attacked yesterday. I was a member of the
10 commission for negotiations. They were in the majority and we had only
11 seven seats. We offered them all sorts of solutions. The only solution
12 they accepted was Krajina."
13 There are a number of such references in the handwritten notes.
14 Some of those who speak are quite aggressive in terms of defending the
15 territory; others, for example, Suljo is more conciliatory and would
16 rather have peace, in essence, apparently at any cost. The Jusuf Ramic
17 document which I have to say is a long one and is not a particularly easy
18 read, also makes references to those differences of opinion, some who feel
19 that they should defend the territory, others who feel that they
20 shouldn't, and in a couple of sections in the Ramic diary, he quotes
21 that: "After one of the attacks, I believe on Hambarine, that he
22 dispatched some troops to the area," or after the deadline, sorry, not the
23 attack, "The deadline was given to Hambarine, that he dispatched some men
24 there, only to have to turned away because the population in Hambarine
25 didn't want to further inflame the situation."
1 So I would argue that there was a difference of opinion, and that
2 may be one of the reasons why Ramic, in his diary, discusses -- or is
3 critical at times of some Muslim leadership because that may manifest
4 itself in some poor coordination and poor command and control.
5 Q. Now, the handwritten notes that you've placed on the ELMO, you say
6 they came from the Tadic Defence team in that trial, they were offered
7 into evidence. Do you know where they got them from?
8 A. I'm unaware where they got those documents from. It is possible
9 that the documents were gained from documents taken after Kozarac had been
10 attacked and found their way into the Bosnian Serb authorities' hands, but
11 I'm not specifically aware of how they obtained those documents.
12 Q. Going back to your slide for one moment, you say that non-Serb
13 documentation indicates approximately 466 weapons of varying times. Where
14 do you get that from?
15 A. We obtained a listing, or there is a listing which I believe is
16 also from one of the Defence -- previous Defence cases, a listing which is
17 a mobilisation listing of the Kozarac TO. I've said it is possibly from
18 April or May 1992, and that is based on one entry in one of the
19 handwritten notes which talks about: We must prepare lists of people.
20 And I think that entry in the handwritten note is dated about the 2nd of
21 May. But there is a list which has been provided to the OTP of over 2.000
22 names on it, and it's a list, a handwritten list, broken down in a very
23 rudimentary military structure. It mentions some platoons. There's very
24 little command structure, supporting elements, such as heavy weapons and
25 the likes. That hand list -- handwritten list has a lot of signatures
1 next to printed names, handwritten printed names, and also there are a
2 number of weapons annotated on this handwritten list. I counted up the
3 number. There is some illegible sections of those listings, but I counted
4 up where I could read the number of weapons on that list, and it came to
5 round about 466. I may have got it slightly out by a few, but that's
6 approximately what I was able to count on the lists.
7 Those weapons are annotated of a variety of types: Pistols,
8 shotguns, hunting rifles, some automatic rifles. I believe there may be
9 some hand grenades. And that's where I get that figure in the slide.
10 Q. Now, the last three points on that slide, I think you've already
11 addressed the other points, but the last three points, in terms of
12 non-Serb documentation, attempts to buy weapons from the Serbs and
13 Muslims, ammunition a problem, command and control limited. From where
14 do you make those conclusions?
15 A. Those are all the conclusions that Jusuf Ramic mentions, or these
16 are the comments Jusuf Ramic put in his document. He makes a number of
17 references about the attempts of the non-Serb population to try and
18 procure weapons. He talks about them procuring weapons, both externally,
19 but also internally, from buying them from the Serbs, from soldiers who
20 are willing to sell them, and also from -- he's critical in some areas of
21 Muslims, some Muslims also selling weapons or gaining weapons and selling
22 them on for profit. The ammunition, he makes a number of references in
23 his work that ammunition was a problem. A weapon is only as good as the
24 ammunition you can have to fire it. It doesn't actually matter how many
25 weapons you have if you have only a limited supply of ammunition. He does
1 make a couple of references to that effect. And he is critical of
2 individual Muslims and some issues relating to command and control. He
3 also makes mention, although it's not annotated in this slide, of the acts
4 of provocation, and if that is one area that he particularly makes mention
5 of, it's the fact that provocation was only going to bring down the sort
6 of might of the Serb forces in the area on to them. So these are some of
7 the points that come out of his work.
8 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, before we move on, there is this
9 extract that I'd like to offer into evidence. I'm perfectly happy to
10 offer into evidence the entire document. These are the handwritten notes.
11 I'm told it may actually already be in evidence. I'm told it may be
12 Defence Exhibit.
13 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: So I don't have to ask for objections. Indeed,
14 I don't have the concrete number. Could Madam Registrar help me with
16 MR. OSTOJIC: It was during Mr. Sejmenovic's testimony, clearly
17 when it was introduced. But I do have a point of clarification, if I may.
18 I'm not sure if Mr. Brown has reviewed the Defence Exhibit or if there
19 were any other exhibits, so to the extent that they may be different, we
20 should have that exhibit and make a comparison, and if the exhibit that
21 the Defence has produced is the same, then obviously there's no need to
22 remark this exhibit, and we do not have an objection.
23 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Before we decide, let's, please, check whether
24 or not it's the same document.
25 MR. CAYLEY: I'll check that, Mr. President, and come back to it,
1 so we don't waste any time.
2 If we could now go to the right-hand side of this table, and here
3 you have addressed Serb documentation in respect of non-Serb forces, and I
4 only want to refer here to one document.
5 Q. But if you could just briefly summarise the documents, I think
6 some of which we've already offered into evidence, which deal with the
7 issue of non-Serb forces in Prijedor.
8 A. Yes. I tried to look also in the Serb documentation for
9 references relating to the non-Serb activity in Prijedor, and there are a
10 number, although I have to say not many, in the documents that I've seen.
11 One on the 17th of March, in a daily combat report, indicated that there
12 had been a distribution of 400 rifles to Muslims in Kozarac. That report
13 didn't make any indication of where that information had come from. On
14 the 1st of May, I think we've seen this document already, there was a
15 report that there had been the establishment of a checkpoint in Kozarac.
16 Again, the document didn't explain anything further in relation to that.
17 On the 17th of May, the 5th Corps reported that three Green Beret
18 companies, numbering 100 to 150 men, had been formed in the wider Prijedor
19 area. And a document the following day by the Prijedor SJB indicated
20 similar strengths to paramilitary companies and two platoons in Prijedor.
21 Q. If we could look at the document of the 2nd of August of 1992,
22 which is a Prijedor public security station report to the Banja Luka
23 Security Services Centre. First of all, what is this document?
24 A. This is a Prijedor SJB document sent on the 2nd of August to the
25 Banja Luka CSB, in essence, summarising the amount of ammunition and
1 weapons and other explosive materiel confiscated up until the 31st of
2 July, 1992 by the Prijedor police, and it lists the types of weapons and
3 equipment, materiels and their numbers by pieces.
4 Q. How many weapons are listed here, approximately, in terms of
5 rifles and handguns?
6 A. I had counted it up and I've forgotten it slightly, but I think it
7 may be about 690. But in the break I can count it up again.
8 MR. CAYLEY: For the reference of the Court, Mr. President,
9 Mr. Ostojic, the document that was referred to, the prior document, is in
10 fact D7, for the purposes of the record, Defence Exhibit 7.
11 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you.
12 MR. CAYLEY:
13 Q. Going back for one moment to your slide, the Muslims in their own
14 documentation identified 466 weapons, and the Serbs in their documentation
15 identified, I think you say here, 680 various firearms, on the 2nd of
16 August, 1992 had been recovered by Prijedor SJB?
17 A. Yes, that's correct, but I would add an element of caution in
18 drawing necessarily a direct comparison to these figures. This document
19 doesn't make reference to, say, the materiels that may have been seized by
20 the military. It is quite possible that the military, during operations
21 in Prijedor, would have seized weapons too. They don't make any
22 indication of that number.
23 I would, just in terms of the materiels, add that the weapons are
24 not of a particularly, I would say, sophisticated nature may be the
25 phrase. This indicates only 17 automatic rifles an M-84 is an old weapon,
1 in essence; it's not a World War II vintage weapon but based on a World
2 War II weapon. A lot of hunting rifles, and hunting carbines, and a
3 significant number of pistols. I would also draw your attention to the
4 ammunition seized, both in terms of pistol and hunting ammunition. A
5 thousand rounds of ammunition is not a particularly large amount of
6 ammunition. Again I would add an air of caution here: It is not beyond
7 the realms of possibility that ammunition was kept by the police and
8 utilised and may not have been put on this list. But it is a summary of
9 materiels confiscated, not materiels that have been dispatched elsewhere,
10 for example. So those are some of the conclusions I would reach from this
12 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, if I could apply for this document to
13 be admitted into evidence as 348.
14 MR. OSTOJIC: No objection, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Admitted into evidence, S348.
16 MR. CAYLEY:
17 Q. Mr. Brown, if we could go back to your slide and move on to the
18 next slide. And if you could first of all put the next document onto the
19 projector next to you, which I believe is a regular combat report from the
20 1st Krajina Corps to the Main Staff of the Bosnian Serb army.
21 A. Yes, that is correct.
22 Q. If we could look at the document first and then we'll come back to
23 the slide. Where did we get this document from?
24 A. This is a document seized from the Krajina Corps archive by the
1 Q. And it's a regular combat report from the corps to the Main Staff?
2 A. That's correct, yes.
3 Q. And it's dated the 24th of May, 1992?
4 A. Yes, that's correct.
5 Q. Can you take the Judges through the parts of this document which
6 you've addressed in your report?
7 A. This again is a standard layout for the daily combat report, but I
8 draw your attention to the part in paragraph 1 that states:
9 "In the area of Prijedor, and particularly in the village of
10 Hambarine, there was an armed attack by Muslim units, which our forces
11 cleared from the area. Further conflicts can be expected in that area and
12 in the area of Kozarac village."
13 Also, in paragraph 2, in relation to Prijedor, and the particular
14 sentence that starts:
15 "The mopping up of the extremist Muslim units in the area of
16 Hambarine village near Prijedor has been completed and Kozarac village is
17 sealed off. A group of 35 experienced soldiers from the 5th Infantry
18 Brigade was sent to Prijedor."
19 In page 2 of the combat report, it continues, at the very top of
20 the page:
21 "Clashes are taking place in Prijedor and Sanski Most, and it is
22 to be expected that they will intensify, especially in the area of
23 Kozarac, Sanski Most, and Ljubija."
24 In paragraph 6 it states:
25 "I have decided" -- this is not always present in the daily
1 combat reports, the I have decided part. It quite often refers to
2 important decisions that have been taken at the time.
3 "I have decided to put units throughout the area of the Bosanski
4 Krajina and in the corps's zone of responsibility in full combat readiness
5 and to respond to all instances of fire by enemy forces with energetic
6 action against detected targets, to break up and destroy Ustasha and
7 Green Beret formations, and to liberate endangered parts and establish
9 MR. CAYLEY: Your Honour, that is not a document that is exhibited
10 and I'd apply for that to be admitted into evidence as 349.
11 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: I can see no objection. Admitted into evidence
12 as 349.
13 MR. CAYLEY:
14 Q. Now, if we could go back to your slide, and if you could just take
15 Their Honours through that. I think most of what is on that slide is
16 either in the document which is referred to or in prior documents.
17 A. What I've tried to do here is just to summarise the chain of
18 events in relation to Hambarine, and from what the documentation in
19 particular -- the military documentation stated. It's indicated that a
20 checkpoint had been established at Hambarine by the 22nd of May.
21 Q. By whom had a checkpoint been established?
22 A. By the residents of Hambarine, the Muslim population, or an
23 element of them.
24 The second box indicates a disarmament plan which had been
25 scheduled for the 22nd of May. In earlier documentation, I noticed one of
1 the Prijedor decisions stating that the SJB and the army command were to
2 make a plan of disarmament without predetermined deadlines in order to
3 seize illegally held weapons and disarm paramilitary units. There's a
4 reference in a police document that this disarmament plan was in fact
5 scheduled for the 22nd of May, 1992. That is referenced in my report on
6 page 22, footnote 88, and it's the second footnote -- or the second
7 reference in footnote 88. The military documentations indicate that two
8 VRS soldiers and between four and six were wounded at a checkpoint on the
9 22nd of May. I put four to six because the documentations are a little
10 bit unclear. Some say 4, some say higher figures, but between four and
11 six were wounded.
12 Q. Sorry. You actually paused and missed out. What happened to the
13 two VRS soldiers from the documentation that you've seen?
14 A. They were killed.
15 Q. Please carry on.
16 A. As a result of that incident, a deadline was given to the
17 residents of Hambarine for the 23rd of May, 1992, to hand over the killers
18 of the soldiers by 1200 hours on that day. That is referenced in a number
19 of locations in the military documents, as well as referenced on a
20 number -- in a number of places in police material. Documentation
21 indicates that an attack on Hambarine began on expiry of that deadline on
22 the 23rd, and that, as we've seen in the one Krajina combat report by the
23 24th of May mopping up of Hambarine had been completed.
24 Q. In military terms, how rapid was that operation?
25 A. It was very rapid indeed. This was, in essence, a day within a
1 day and a half, at most.
2 Q. If we could move to your next slide, and if we could look at your
3 next document. Now, first of all, what is this document?
4 A. This is a special report sent to VRS Main Staff from the 1st
5 Krajina Corps, dated the 27th of May, 1992, and it's a special report
6 entitled "report on elimination of Green Berets in the wider area of
7 Kozarac village." The report summarises the involvement of the military
8 in the attack on Kozarac, which they indicate started on the 25th of May
9 and ended on the 27th of May. I think their date is not exactly correct,
10 and I believe that the attack, from other material, actually started on
11 the 24th of May.
12 The document summarises the units that took part, from a military
13 perspective, in the attack on Kozarac, and some other comments relating to
14 the strength of Green Berets. And if I read out paragraph 2 in
15 particular, it states:
16 "Participating in the armed conflict on our sided were components
17 of the 343rd Motorised Brigade (an enlarged motorised battalion),
18 supported by two 105-millimetre Howitzer batteries and one M-84 tank
20 I believe this translation to be inaccurate and I believe the
21 actual B/C/S says "platoon."
22 Q. Here you're referring to the M-84 tank, it should read "tank
23 platoon" rather than "tank squadron."
24 A. Correct.
25 Paragraph 3 states: "The total strength of the Green Berets was
1 1.500 to 2.000 men without heavy weapons."
2 And then it discusses the overall results:
3 "The wider area of Kozarac village, that is, the area of the
4 villages of Kozarusa, Trnopolje, Donji Jakupovici, Gornji Jakupovici,
5 Benkovac, Ratkovic [phoen], grid coordinate 830, has been entirely freed
6 of Green Berets. 80 to 100 Green Berets were killed and about 1.500
7 captured. Part of the Green Berets (100 to 200 persons) at large on Mount
8 Kozara. All casualties are five killed and 20 wounded and minor damage
9 (already repaired) on the track assembly of two M-84s.
10 "The Banja Luka-Ivanjska-Kozarac-Prijedor-Bosanski Novi road and
11 the wider area of Kozarac completely under the control of the 1st KK."
12 And this document is signed by, again, Dragan Marticic head of
13 operations and training at the 1st Krajina Corps.
14 Q. Again, this is a document, Mr. President, that hasn't been
15 previously been offered into evidence, so if I could offer it now, please?
16 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: S350. I can see no objections. Admitted into
18 MR. CAYLEY:
19 Q. We'll go back to your slide, Mr. Brown, and I think you've dealt
20 with a number of the points already, but if you could just rapidly take us
21 through the chronology.
22 A. Again the reference to a checkpoint in the Kozarac area, which is
23 the document of the 1st of May, I believe. Again, the reference to the
24 disarmament plan scheduled for the 22nd of May. There are references in
25 police documents and in other documentation that on the 24th of May, fire
1 had been opened from the barricades or a checkpoint at Kozarac and that
2 there may have been some casualties there, VRS soldiers, that is. There
3 are some references, in particular, in the daily notebooks of the corps,
4 that VRS reinforcements arrived from Prijedor, and that was indicated in
5 the 24th of May daily combat report, indicating that some soldiers from
6 the 5th Brigade had arrived in Prijedor. The 24th of May, 1992 attack on
7 Kozarac by an enlarged motorised battalion, two 105-millimetre Howitzer
8 batteries and one M-84 tank platoon was the document which we've just
9 seen. There are references in police documents, a number of police
10 documents, and military documents around the time that the attack involved
11 an artillery attack and that the mopping up included police units, again
12 indicating the previous document by the 27th of May the operation in
13 Kozarac had ended.
14 Q. If we could move to your next slide, Mr. Brown. What are you
15 representing in this slide?
16 A. What I tried to do was to tease out from the documentation the
17 reports as they were at face value on the casualties and prisoners taken
18 and place them in date order. So, for example, on the 24th of May, both
19 in military and police documents, there are references that two were
20 killed, four to six wounded in Hambarine, two killed and two wounded
21 around Kozarac. I believe those were two separate references.
22 Q. And here you're talking about VRS soldiers, Bosnian Serb soldiers?
23 A. Yes. From a non-Serb perspective, I think it's a daily combat
24 report that makes reference to 100 captured and estimates a thousand under
25 arms in Kozarac on that day. So really what I did was I looked at the
1 various dates to see if they made references to casualties or prisoners.
2 Q. We'll move to the 25th of May. You say that a hundred non-Serbs
3 captured. Where does that come from?
4 A. I'll have to look at the report, if I can, to find the footnote
6 Q. We can come back to this, Mr. Brown. I'll make a note so that we
7 don't waste any time. But in terms of the 26th of May, Serb documentation
8 is reporting heavy casualties in Kozarac and gives estimates of 320 under
9 arms in Hambarine, 300 under arms in Kozarac. Are you aware at the moment
10 of where that comes from?
11 A. I would have to check the report, but it may well be a daily
12 combat report of that day.
13 Q. We'll come back to those two. Now, the final document that you
14 refer to on this page, 27th of May of 1992, that, I think, is a police
15 document, and if you could place that on the projector in front of you.
16 A. There is an error here. This document is actually dated, I
17 believe, the 26th of May, and so the CSB -- where it states in the slide
18 CSB reported several hundred killed in Kozarac in Hambarine, killed or
19 wounded, should actually be in the 26th of May section, not the 27th of
20 May section. That somewhat more clear.
21 Q. What is this document?
22 A. This is a document giving a weekly update for the period 8th to
23 25th of May, 1992, and it was written by the Security Services Centre, or
24 CSB, in Banja Luka.
25 Q. And where did we get this document from?
1 A. This document was seized by the OTP in the CSB building in Banja
3 Q. Can you draw the Judges' attention to those parts which are
4 relevant to this conclusion in this slide?
5 A. Yes. The first paragraph makes note of:
6 "The areas of Kupres and Bosanska Krupa call for additional effort
7 on our part and we are re-directing our forces to mopping up the areas of
8 Prijedor and Bihac."
9 I believe this is an indicator that police were used in the
10 operations there.
11 The document highlights or summarises the events, and in paragraph
12 2, it states:
13 "The direct cause leading to the escalation of the situation in
14 the Prijedor area was an attack by Muslim paramilitary units on a military
15 vehicle and reservists returning home from the front line. On this
16 occasion, two soldiers were killed and two were seriously wounded and two
17 slightly. All the soldiers were of Serbian nationality. After an order
18 by the Prijedor military command to hand over the perpetrators of this
19 heinous crime was ignored, the army carried out an artillery attack on
20 the village of Hambarine and mopped up the area. The disturbance spread
21 to the Muslim village of Kozarac from where Muslim paramilitary units
22 launched attacks on military installations and the barracks and the army
23 engaged in a vigorous mopping up operation. Several hundred inhabitants
24 of these villages were killed or wounded."
25 Q. Is there anything else that you wish to highlight in this
2 A. No.
3 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, this is a document that hasn't been
4 previously been offered into evidence, so if I can offer it now.
5 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: S351.
6 MR. OSTOJIC: No objection.
7 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Admitted, S351.
8 MR. CAYLEY:
9 Q. If we could now move to the second part of this slide, and here
10 you note that, on the 30th, 31st of May, 1992, 8 to 12 soldiers had been
11 killed and 5 policemen killed. Is this a compilation of both military and
12 police reports?
13 A. Yes, it is. The 30th and 31st of May was when non-Serb forces
14 launched an attack on Prijedor, which initially had some small success but
15 was repulsed on that day. During that combat, the VRS report between 8 to
16 12 soldiers had been killed. There's a slight discrepancy whether it was
17 8 and whether it's 12, but I took both figures. The five policemen killed
18 was reported in a police document later on in 1992, which listed I think
19 maybe eight or nine policemen who had been killed during combat operations
20 throughout 1992, and I think five of them were listed as having been
21 killed on that date. So I took the figure of five policemen killed from
22 that document. But in essence, those casualty figures relate to the
23 attack on Prijedor in that period.
24 Q. Early June 1992, you note 8 killed and 23 wounded. Is that part
25 of the figure above or is that in addition to those 8 to 12 wounded that
1 you note on the 30th, 31st of May, 1992?
2 A. I cannot make a call on whether those figures, 8 and 23, were part
3 of that action or whether they were part of the action in Kozarac. The
4 document doesn't make it clear, and it's the document we're about to refer
5 to, I believe.
6 Q. And you note at that time 2.000 people in Omarska and 5.000 people
7 in Trnopolje. What is that referring to?
8 A. That is a military document making reference to those figures of
9 people in those locations, on the 1st of June.
10 Q. And if you could now place a particular document of the 1st of
11 June of 1992 onto the projector. If that document could be moved so that
12 we can see the heading, before we go into the main part.
13 What is this document, Mr. Brown?
14 A. This is a report compiled by the 1st Krajina Corps assistant
15 commander for morale and legal affairs, Colonel Milutin Vukelic and, in
16 essence, is a report on the political and security situation in the corps.
17 This document makes reference to the actions in Prijedor only a matter of
18 days prior to the 1st of June. And if I draw your attention to the final
19 section, or the final sentences of page 1 and on to page 2.
20 Colonel Vukelic stated in the report:
21 "The heaviest fighting has taken place in the area of Hambarine,
22 Prijedor, and Kozarac. Troops under the command of the Prijedor area
23 cleared Hambarine and Kozarac and completely destroyed one ZNG unit
24 (black-shirts, foreign mercenaries and legionnaires). The troops have
25 arrested more than 2.000 Green Berets who are now in Omarska, 135 of them
1 are in Stara Gradiska prison and about 5.000 in the village of Trnopolje.
2 Among the arrested is a large number of officers and organisers of
3 paramilitary formations. All Serbian Republic BH troops in the area have
4 demonstrated a high degree of combat readiness, with the troops from the
5 seasoned 343rd Motorised Brigade excelling. The troops and officers
6 received written commendation from the Corps Commander for the
7 determination, skill, and courage they have demonstrated. They are an
8 example of how one should act while defending the SR BH. Unfortunately, 8
9 SR BH army members have lain down their lives in the fighting, and 23 were
11 Q. Just one part of that document I'd like to ask you about, Mr.
12 Brown. It states -- Colonel Vukelic states that one ZNG unit had been
13 completely destroyed, comprised of black shirts, foreign mercenaries, and
14 legionnaires. Have you seen any evidence in any other document on the
15 presence of foreign mercenaries or legionnaires from any country,
16 in Prijedor, during this period of time?
17 A. No, I haven't.
18 Q. Going back to your slide, it's on that that you base your
19 conclusion that there were essentially 7.000 people imprisoned in Omarska
20 and Trnopolje during that time period?
21 A. According to this document, yes.
22 MR. CAYLEY: Again, Mr. President, this is not a document
23 previously offered into evidence, so if I could do so now.
24 MR. OSTOJIC: No objection.
25 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Admitted into evidence, S352.
1 MR. CAYLEY:
2 Q. If we could now go to your next slide, and before you take us
3 through that slide, if you could just reference the two documents that you
4 want to use in conjunction with this slide and then hopefully we can
5 finish the slide before we finish for the day.
6 The first document is the document of the 31st --
7 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: May I just hear what is the estimated time you
8 would need to proceed?
9 MR. CAYLEY: More than six minutes, Mr. President.
10 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: There would be a possibility - I just discussed
11 it with my colleagues - we scheduled today in the beginning to restart at
12 4.30 and then continue 90 minutes. A kind of compromise could be to
13 restart at 4.20 and then go until 5.00, but only if it's guaranteed that
14 in this framework you can finalise your examination-in-chief.
15 MR. CAYLEY: I can't do it in 40 minutes, Mr. President. I can't
16 finish my entire examination-in-chief in 40 minutes. I think I probably
17 need another hour, hour and a half.
18 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: In the beginning we agreed that it would take
19 one day and then one day for the Defence, and the OTP should be aware,
20 there will be no prolongation at all of the Prosecutor's case.
21 MR. CAYLEY: I think, having spoken with my colleagues, realising
22 this problem at lunch-time, that there is no need for the extension of
23 time for the Prosecutor's case. It will be finished on Friday, in
24 accordance with your order.
25 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Okay. Then, under these circumstances indeed,
1 let's continue only about five minutes past 4.00.
2 MR. CAYLEY: Thank you, Mr. President.
3 Q. If you could place the first document on the ELMO.
4 MR. CAYLEY: This document, Mr. President, is S107.
5 Q. Mr. Brown, what is this document?
6 A. This document is a document from the public security station
7 Prijedor in relation to the establishment of Omarska prison camp, or
8 Omarska Detention Centre.
9 Q. Where does it come from?
10 A. I believe this is a document seized by the OTP. I can just
11 check. Yes. This was seized by the OTP in Prijedor.
12 Q. Could you just highlight, for the purposes of your report, the
13 parts of this document that you wish to bring to the attention of the
15 A. Yes. The issues I've highlighted or the areas I've highlighted
17 "With a view to the speedy and effective establishment of peace on
18 the territory of Prijedor municipality and in accordance with the decision
19 of the Crisis Staff, I hereby ordered the following.
20 "1. The industrial compound of Omarska mines strip mine shall
21 serve as a provisional collection centre for persons captured in combat or
22 detained on the grounds of security services' operational information."
23 Q. If you could slow down a bit, Mr. Brown.
24 A. "2. Together with the appropriate documents, the persons taken
25 into custody shall be handed over to the chief of security, who is
1 duty-bound, in collaboration with the national, public, and military
2 security coordinators, to put them up in any of the five premises
3 allocated for the accommodation of detainees.
4 "3. A mixed group consisting of national, public, and military
5 security investigators shall be responsible for the work with and
6 categorisation of detainees. They shall organise themselves, respecting
7 the parity principle. Mirko Jesic, Ranko Mijic, and Lieutenant Colonel
8 Majstorovic shall be responsible for their work."
9 On page 2, I draw your attention to paragraph 5:
10 "The investigated persons shall be escorted together with the
11 relevant criminal or official reports to the Remand Prison in Banja Luka
12 or Stara Gradiska for further criminal processing."
13 And part 9:
14 "Authorised representatives of the army of the Serbian Republic of
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina shall, without delay, lay a minefield in accordance
16 with the mining regulations, which includes making a minefield layout,
17 correct markings, et cetera."
18 Paragraph 3 -- sorry, page 3, paragraph 11:
19 "The security services coordinators shall submit a report on the
20 preceding 24 hours to the chief of the Prijedor public security station
21 daily at 1200 hours, or immediately when the circumstances allow no
23 And finally, on the last page, the distribution list:
24 "1. The Crisis Staff. 2. The security services coordinators,
25 Mijic, Jesic, and Lieutenant Colonel Majstorovic. Banja Luka CSB, police
1 chief, security chief, and the general manager of the Ljubija iron ore
3 Q. If we go to the next document. Now, this is a report from the
4 Prijedor public security station; correct?
5 A. Yes, that is correct.
6 Q. Where does this document come from?
7 A. This document was part, I believe, the Banja Luka CSB seizure by
8 the OTP.
9 Q. Can you just highlight the relevant parts of this document to
10 Their Honours?
11 A. This document was compiled as part of a request through the
12 Ministry of Interior and Banja Luka CSB to municipality police,
13 requesting information on reception centres in Prijedor and other details
14 relating to police activity in the municipality in August 1992, and the
15 document flags the first part this commission and provides a report on
16 those details. It's a very lengthy document and quite detailed, but I
17 flagged up some of the issues. Part 1:
18 "In order to obtain a complete insight into the situation and the
19 development of events on the territory of the municipality of Prijedor, we
20 think it necessary to stress the fact that on the 29th and 30th of April,
21 the SDS party, Serb Democratic Party, in Prijedor, with its forces, took
22 control of all organs and in the municipality."
23 The bottom paragraph:
24 "In the meantime, the ministry of National Defence of the Serbian
25 Republic and the government of the Autonomous Region of Krajina made a
1 decision to disarm all paramilitary formations, groups and individuals in
2 the Serbian Republic, calling on the citizens to carry out these
3 activities in a peaceful and civilised manner, without any consequences
4 whatsoever ensuing to the possessors of arms."
5 And they go on to talk about there were some negotiations in
6 relation to this.
7 Page 2 of the report, in paragraph 2 and paragraph 3, makes
8 mention of the attack on Hambarine and on Kozarac. Paragraph 2 says:
9 "Since the citizens of the village of Hambarine did not respect
10 the decision of the ministry of National Defence of the Serbian Republic,
11 did not surrender their arms, refused to cooperate with the legal organs
12 of government over the attack on the soldiers and rejected demands the
13 army made of them, the Crisis Staff of the municipality of Prijedor
14 decided upon military intervention in this village to disarm and capture
15 the known perpetrators of the crimes against the soldiers. The army did
16 intervene, but it did not find the attackers of the soldiers. It only
17 established communications between Prijedor and Ljubija and put the
18 village of Hambarine under control. Muslim extremists offered resistance,
19 but this time there was no losses on the army side.
20 "However, on the 24th of May, 1992, in the village of Jakupovici,
21 Muslim extremists attacked an army patrol with firearms and wounded one
22 soldier. The army set off from Prijedor to support this patrol, but the
23 Muslim extremists tried to stop them with weapons at the first Muslim
24 houses on the way out of Prijedor, and on this occasion there was a fierce
25 armed conflict between the army and the Muslim extremists in the wider
1 area of Kozarac. Since the Muslims refused to surrender their arms, and
2 subsequently it was established that they had been preparing for armed
3 conflict for a long time and in all directions.
4 "During the actual operations, the army had left a free corridor
5 for all citizens who wished to leave the zones of armed conflict for
6 safely, for all, that is, who did not wish to take part in an armed
7 struggle against the army of the Serb Republic. The army organised the
8 reception of these citizens in Trnopolje in the premises of the elementary
9 school, the Dom the warehouse, and surrounding houses, and secured them
10 against the extremists. Thus, the open reception centre in Trnopolje came
11 into being, which is working even now. The very name says that this is an
12 open reception centre in which citizens of both sexes and all age groups
13 took shelter at the beginning of the conflict. The centre has no barbed
14 wire fences. No kind of questioning is carried out in it. The army
15 provides security from the outside against the threat of the extremists.
16 The number of citizens fluctuates, since all those who want to can leave
17 the centre at any time, for there is a railway station right next to the
18 centre. At the moment there are about 1.500 citizens of Muslim ethnicity
19 who have organised their own accommodation and food and receive help from
20 the army and the Red Cross."
21 On page 3, the document went on to talk about the other detention
22 camps, and I draw your attention to the centre paragraph:
23 "Although the Muslim extremists put up a fierce resistance,
24 ruthlessly settling scores with members of their own people who refused
25 to fight against the Serbian forces, the local government, the army and
1 the police were not ready for this development of events, believing to the
2 end in a peaceful and civilised agreement between the peoples. This
3 created a problem of the quartering, guarding, and treatment of captured
4 people. It was in this kind of situation that the Crisis Staff of the
5 municipality of Prijedor decided to use the premises of the Keraterm work
6 organisation in Prijedor to accommodate captured persons under the
7 supervision of employees of the SJB and the military police of Prijedor.
8 The Prijedor public security station, aware of the capabilities of its
9 staffing and the difficulty of the situation that had arisen, informed the
10 Banja Luka Security Services Centre and the Banja Luka corps command and
11 requested the help of professional staff for the operational processing of
12 captured persons. The Banja Luka CSB and the Banja Luka corps command
13 became actively involved in solving the situation and sent a large number
14 of experienced employees to Prijedor, after which mixed teams of members
15 of the national, public, and military security services, with the task of
16 conducting the operational processing of captured persons and
17 determining the degree of personal responsibility of each of them in the
18 armed rebellion. Operational processing started in the Keraterm facility
19 in Prijedor, to which the army brought about 600 persons at the beginning
20 of the conflict."
21 Q. Mr. Brown, can I just stop you there?
22 MR. CAYLEY: Mr. President, I didn't realise Mr. Brown was going
23 to read such a substantial portion of this document, so it may be that you
24 would wish to stop here and I'll carry on with this and the slide
25 tomorrow, as you wish.
1 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: [Microphone not activated]
2 MR. CAYLEY: No, I think it goes on to page 4 and also 5 and then
3 I want to ask him some questions about the slide.
4 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: [Microphone not activated]
5 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, Your Honour, please.
6 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: It's reasonable to conclude this day 77 of our
7 hearing. The trial stays adjourned. We resume tomorrow, 9.30, in
8 courtroom II.
9 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 4.09 p.m.,
10 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 25th day of
11 September 2002, at 9.30 a.m.