1 Thursday, 20 March 2003
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 9.08 a.m.
5 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Please be seated.
6 Good morning to everybody. May we hear the case, please.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning. This is Case Number IT-97-24-T, the
8 Prosecutor versus Milomir Stakic.
9 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you. And the appearances, please, for the
11 MR. KOUMJIAN: Good morning, Your Honours. Nicholas Koumjian, Ann
12 Sutherland, and Ruth Karper.
13 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: And for the Defence, please.
14 MR. LUKIC: Good morning, Your Honours, Branko Lukic, John
15 Ostojic, and Danilo Cirkovic to the Defence.
16 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Good morning again.
17 Before we start, may I ask, what is the real time estimate the
18 Defence would need for today with the military expert.
19 MR. OSTOJIC: Good morning, Your Honour. It's difficult to
20 estimate, because of the exhibits we would hope to walk through, as the
21 Court sees in front of them the exhibits that the General has examined and
22 we hope to move into evidence. We hope that it would be rather short.
23 His report, we believe, at least in my opinion, is complete. I hope to
24 walk him through the report. Obviously we don't want to have him just
25 read the report like other witnesses. So I will take as much time as the
1 Court allows. I could short circuit it, I want to highlight several
2 specific points relating to the time period specifically involving the
3 attacks, the three within the ten days, as well as the detention centres.
4 That's the highlight of it. So I can take as long or as little I guess as
5 the Court permits.
6 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: What would -- what did you yourself calculate in
7 the moment?
8 MR. OSTOJIC: The last calculation approximately two and a half
9 hours. And that's paring it down to be perfectly candid. I mean --
10 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Absolutely, because what we have to do is we
11 have to be aware that this expert is available only for two days, and
12 during these two days, no extra hour or extra minute is possible because
13 of other hearings and the absence of additional courtroom availability.
14 What about the Prosecution? I know it's difficult to ask already
15 at this point in time.
16 MR. KOUMJIAN: I would estimate three to four hours.
17 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: So normally, it takes longer. Can we maybe
18 resolve the problem already by trying not to tender the documents during
19 the hearing, but doing this in a kind of package solution. Only the most
20 important documents, no doubt, where you believe it's absolutely mandatory
21 that the expert witness has to rely on or believes that he has to rely on
22 and he has to draw our attention especially. But in general, I think it
23 would be a waste of the precious time to do this exercise during his
24 presence. Can we agree on this?
25 MR. OSTOJIC: I believe so, Your Honour. Yes.
1 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: So let us hope that we can go through the final
2 questions. And what -- has there been already the attempt to come to an
3 agreement on the admission of documents?
4 MR. KOUMJIAN: No, we don't have the documents the Defence is
5 proffering today. We have not received a list or copy of those.
6 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: I'm a little bit taken by surprise seeing one,
7 two, three, four -- I can't see them. It seems to be something like --
8 MR. OSTOJIC: Nine, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Yes, nine files. What we received indeed was as
10 a basis for this expert statement, one file with a number of documents and
11 a list, and the formal motion to amend the list of exhibits. When I
12 asked -- I referred only to those other documents where we didn't have the
13 possibility to decide on the admission. Those documents tendered in the
14 past are -- where we had already a motion on the amendment of the exhibit
15 list. Did you come for these documents to any conclusion or agreement?
16 MR. KOUMJIAN: We will not object to the addition of those
17 documents. Sorry, my microphone does not seem to be working. There it is
19 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: This facilitates -- these documents there, may I
20 ask, are they already 65 terred?
21 MR. OSTOJIC: I believe 90 per cent of them are, Your Honour. If
22 I can just explain, perhaps I will help the Court as well as the Office of
23 the Prosecution. The three binders to the right in front of the Court
24 immediately are actually the footnotes. The parties have all those
25 exhibits because most of them, if not all of them, were tendered to us at
1 one point or another. To the extent that there are additional documents
2 as reflected in the report by the General, he specifically cites the 65
3 ter, and that document is enclosed within those three binders. The
4 balance six binders include a compilation of materials that include
5 different topic areas as reflected in the indictment, specifically there's
6 police reports, which indicate on the issues of prevention and punishment;
7 there's other military reports that the General did not use in his report,
8 but nonetheless reviewed and may rely on depending, again, upon the
9 questions, et cetera.
10 I can't recall what the next volume is, but two volumes include
11 various articles that the General reviewed in connection with the
12 background of the events and for further support. All those articles are
13 in the possession of the OTP, and I believe the Court, through our 65 ter
14 submission and ultimate translation.
15 I believe there's just a couple documents that are not included,
16 but I think under the rules, the Court can take judicial notice of it,
17 specifically the Geneva Convention, there's references in there that the
18 General makes in his report, specifically if I recall, Article 25 of the
19 report, and we would expect to be able to ask him questions relating to
20 that because it goes to the issue of detention centres.
21 MR. KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, just to explain, because it may
22 require more time for us to prepare in cross-examination, we haven't
23 received these documents before. Some of these footnotes cite 65 ter
24 numbers. We originally received all of the Defence 65 ters, most of which
25 were not translated. Some were. The translated -- complete translations,
1 I believe we've only received up to Document 249. So we haven't received
2 some of the documents that are 65 terred and footnoted in the Defence
3 expert's report. We're ready to go today right now, but as soon as we can
4 get the documents, the better for us to prepare our cross-examination.
5 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Right. I understood this caveat. Therefore, I
6 have to ask the Defence to conclude the examination-in-chief today, in the
7 light of what you have said before and your own estimate. I think this is
8 fair. It allows us, even though it's late, maybe to go through the
9 documents during the afternoon, for those who have time to do this. But
10 let's try.
11 A final question: General Wilmot is still an acting general?
12 MR. OSTOJIC: As reflected in his CV, he's retired, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: To put it very simple: As a retired general,
14 he's acquainted to be addressed as "General" or how?
15 MR. OSTOJIC: I address him as "General," but it really doesn't
16 matter. If the Court wants to address him as Mr. Wilmot, I don't think he
17 would have an objection. I just --
18 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: We have Only to be judicially correct, and for
19 this purpose, therefore my purpose -- purpose of my question. Okay.
20 MR. OSTOJIC: One other --
21 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Please.
22 MR. OSTOJIC: One other thing, if I may, to respond, I think there
23 might be a confusion with the 65 exhibits. This is the first I hear that
24 they only got up to 249. I know there has been some discussions with our
25 case manager on that. When we submitted the 65 ter number and we raised
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 it in an oral motion an hour before the Court, the 65 ter Defence number
2 exhibits, we filed the exhibit list on November 18th as the Court knows.
3 We asked for the translation that was ultimately completed sometime in
4 February, I believe, of this year.
5 When we -- two weeks or a week before we got it completed, we
6 received from the OTP a list of approximately 100 or so, and I think it
7 was actually 150 exhibits that they have already previously translated,
8 but not tendered. So we got that list from them. So they have in essence
9 in their possession we believe most if not all of the exhibits that were
10 previously tendered. But we welcome the opportunity to visit with them
11 immediately afterwards and to resolve any concerns or problems that they
12 have, Your Honour.
13 MR. KOUMJIAN: I just suggest it be very simpler for us, if the
14 Defence is providing the Court with a copy of the documents we receive the
15 same copy, rather than making Ms. Karper try to collect the documents from
16 among our 3 million pages of documents. If we just receive an extra copy
17 of what the Defence gives the Court, it would be very helpful.
18 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: At the moment, we are with Document 249.
19 MR. KOUMJIAN: We actually have gotten the full translations
20 through 249.
21 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: The same is true for us.
22 MR. OSTOJIC: Your Honour, we would like to begin as soon as
23 possible, but Mr. Lukic has advised me he personally gave to the Court
24 officer all the exhibits on our 65 ter list, not just up to 249 -- not the
25 Madam Registrar, but the court officer -- Ms. Courtney Musser.
1 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Unfortunately, she fell ill, and there are some
2 logistic problems, but we will find out as soon as possible. It's already
3 a search and seizure under the way. So without further ado, may I ask the
4 usher to escort the witness into the courtroom, please.
5 [The witness entered court]
6 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Good morning, General Wilmot.
7 THE WITNESS: Good morning, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Welcome to the Tribunal.
9 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
10 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: May we start with what you have in your hand,
11 your solemn declaration.
12 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
13 whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help me God.
14 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you. Please be seated.
15 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
16 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: You are called as an expert witness by the
17 Defence. Therefore, the floor is therefore for the Defence, Mr. Ostojic,
19 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, Your Honours.
20 WITNESS: RICHARD WILMOT
21 Examined by Mr. Ostojic.
22 Q. Good morning, General.
23 A. Good morning, Mr. Ostojic.
24 Q. As you know, my name is John Ostojic, and along with Branko Lukic
25 and our case manager Danilo Cirkovic, we represent Dr. Milomir Stakic.
1 Today we're going to ask you a series of questions in connection with your
2 report that was submitted to the Court on March 3rd, 2003. If at any
3 time, sir, you do not understand my question, please inform me of the
4 same, and I'll try to clarify the question so that you may fully
5 understand and you may give us your complete answer. Fair enough?
6 A. Yes, sir.
7 Q. For the record, can you please give us your full name.
8 A. It's Richard Wayne Wilmot, W-i-l-m-o-t.
9 Q. Can you give us your date of birth, please.
10 A. December 28th, 1934.
11 Q. Where do you presently reside?
12 A. I reside in two places. Sedona, Arizona, and northern Arizona in
13 the city of Phoenix depending on the weather.
14 Q. Sir, by way of background can you share with us your educational
15 background, essentially the highest level of education that you attained,
16 where, and when?
17 A. I'm a graduate of Michigan State University, in east Lansing,
18 Michigan, and I'm a graduate of the U.S. Army War College and the
19 Industrial College of the Armed Forces.
20 Q. Attached to your report is your curriculum vitae. Is that
22 A. Yes, it is.
23 THE INTERPRETER: Could the counsel and witness please break
24 between question and answer.
25 MR. OSTOJIC:
1 Q. Yes, General, they are translating what we are discussing and
2 three languages are used in this Court. So to the extent -- and it's my
3 fault, I should have warned you of this -- to the extent that it's
4 possible, I'll try to pause, and I would like you to do so as well after
5 my question before you provide us with an answer. Okay.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. As I was stating, is your curriculum vitae attached to your
9 A. Yes, it is.
10 Q. And that's approximately six pages. Correct?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Can you tell us what year you graduated from the United States
13 Army War College.
14 A. 1975.
15 Q. Can you tell us a little bit about the college, what kind of
16 courses are taken at that college.
17 A. The United States Army War College is an institution of learning
18 which is reserved for the people in the military, in the army in
19 particular, who seem to be advancing through the ranks and are destined
20 for higher command. The war college doesn't teach tactics; it doesn't
21 teach training; it doesn't teach logistics. It teaches the use of the
22 elements of national power. It talks about the United States at its
23 highest level, at the executive level, the statutes and laws, the
24 implications of warfare, and so it's a much more strategic college of
25 instruction than some of the other institutions of the army.
1 Wrapped up among the student body are people from the air force,
2 people from the navy, people from the marine corps, people from the state
3 department, people from the Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies
4 of the government. The total student body is about 200 people. The
5 course lasts for one year. The course is designed in such a way that each
6 morning, a distinguished speaker, could be a foreign speaker, comes to the
7 student body, presents a one-hour presentation, and then that person meets
8 with his associates because normally he brings assistants with him or her,
9 meets with the students to discuss the details of what was presented in
10 the morning. So it's a rather thorough and interesting course. Also in
11 that course, a student is allowed to travel, travel abroad, to work on
12 issues and problems. The students are required to write papers, to offer
13 ideas about the national structure and how it could be better used.
14 And so it is a strategic look, it's a higher look, than one might
15 do, one might accomplish at, for example, to command the General Staff
16 College which deals with tactics.
17 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Mr. Koumjian, you were on your feet?
18 MR. KOUMJIAN: I've had five pages of the CV, but I see counsel is
19 probably counting also the cover page, thank you.
20 MR. OSTOJIC: That would be correct.
21 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you, please proceed.
22 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you.
23 Q. Sir, you also studied at the Strategic Studies Institute in
24 Oxford, England. Correct?
25 A. That was part of the war college programme. I and five other
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 colleagues were preparing a paper that dealt with the first use of
2 tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, if it ever came to that, and of course
3 that has long since passed. In doing our research, we were invited to the
4 institute at Oxford. And we spent several days there and met with some of
5 the key curriculum people, used their libraries and reference materials.
6 And it was a very, very interesting session and one that I appreciated
7 very much at that time.
8 Q. Would you be kind enough to highlight your additional training and
9 graduation from other schools in the military as reflected on what's the
10 third page of your CV. It's highlighted for us.
11 A. Well, the United States Army Command General Staff College, as I
12 mentioned earlier, is an institution where you are taught tactics at a
13 higher level, for example, division, corps, and at that time field army
14 level. It's a course that is designed for majors and lieutenant-colonels
15 primarily. It is a prestigious course. It's conducted at Fort
16 Leavenworth, Kansas. It's one year in duration. And -- but it is much
17 more tactical in nature than is the Army War College. In addition to
18 that, you're taken out on field exercises. You participate in field
19 training exercises as we call them. You're given examinations, and you go
20 through a process of testing and examining throughout the year.
21 Q. Thank you.
22 A. The Industrial College of the Armed Forces, also one year course,
23 and I took that by correspondence in this case. The Industrial College of
24 the Armed Forces is also located in Washington, D.C. It's a logistics
25 course, and it is rather strategic in nature also because it examines the
1 issue of the fiscal policy of the country and works its way all the down
2 to the more detailed issues of the logistical system of the Department of
3 Defence and the military as it existed at that time.
4 Q. And then, sir, you list for us additional training and courses
5 which you have taken during your career, correct, in the centre of page
6 three of your curriculum vitae?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Is there any one that you would particularly like to highlight or
9 do you want to share with us, such as the Ranger school or the advanced
10 quartermaster course?
11 A. Well, the Ranger school prepared me to do some special operations
12 in the army. The Rangers school is -- I guess for those who don't
13 understand the work "Ranger," substitute the word "commando." It's a
14 very, very rigorous 9 to 12 week course with an extremely high dropout
15 rate. We had 217 students start and 49 graduated about two months later,
16 two and a half months later. So it's a very rigorous course and one that
17 certainly tests your mental and physical limits, and if you're ever in
18 stress or strain in a combat situation, I think it is a very, very good
19 benchmark because you look back on that while you're in this physical
20 stress or strain and you say to yourself, I can do this, I can do this,
21 I've done it before.
22 Q. Sir, likewise on page 3 of your curriculum vitae, you highlight
23 some of the honour and achievements that you've had. Correct?
24 A. Yes, sir.
25 Q. Are there any in particular that you'd like to highlight for us?
1 A. No, I think they are sort of standard honours.
2 Q. Now, I'd like to ask you, sir, can you tell us with respect to
3 your employment after graduation from the United States Army War College,
4 did you continue to be employed with the army?
5 A. Yes, of course. Yes.
6 Q. From what period to what period?
7 A. From 1975 when I graduated until -- I believe I retired in 1982.
8 It may have been late 1981, but in that time frame, about six years.
9 Q. What's the highest rank that you achieved while you served in the
10 United States Army time?
11 A. The rank of Brigadier-General.
12 Q. Sir, were you one of the youngest ever to achieve that rank?
13 A. I don't know if I was one the younger ever, because I think in the
14 early stages of the United States Army when you could buy a commission,
15 people who were 20 years old were buying commissions if they came from a
16 very wealthy and so-called aristocratic families and made themselves
17 generals at an early age. But in this particular era and on the day I was
18 promoted, I was the youngest flag officer in all the services and I stayed
19 in that position for about six months until someone younger was promoted.
20 Q. Sir, can you share with us if you were ever engaged in any
21 military combat. Did you see action overseas anywhere?
22 A. Yes, I did. I was in the 1st Infantry Division in Vietnam and saw
23 combat with that division including the Tet defensive. And at that time I
24 held the position of deputy intelligence officer for the division. I was
25 also the military intelligence detachment commander, and I was a training
1 officer for the long-range patrol for the division. And so I spent about
2 a year in Vietnam and saw combat there with that organisation. And then
3 strangely enough, as a civilian, I was involved in some combat in an
4 assignment that I had where I actually travelled into Afghanistan and
5 supported the Muslim rebels in their attempts to oust the Soviet army
6 during its occupation and during the war in the mid-1980s in Afghanistan.
7 Q. Can you highlight for us your employment history following your
8 retirement from the army.
9 A. Once I retired from the army, I decided that I would like to do
10 something slightly different, so I went to work for a very small
11 organisation in London. And I moved to London and lived there for about I
12 guess eight years. I was working for a company that was under contract to
13 the Central Intelligence Agency. So while I was not on the rolls of the
14 CIA, I was one of the worker bees that helped them accomplish the tasks
15 that they assigned to that organisation.
16 I stayed at that work for about eight years, as I mentioned, and
17 then I returned to the United States. And let me see, I decided I wanted
18 to build a house, so I could create my own construction company. Got a
19 general contractor's license, built a house, built several spec -- what we
20 call spec houses, the idea being to sell those houses for a profit. I
21 discovered after building six or seven or those that I really didn't like
22 that business, I found it kind of boring, so I dropped out of that. And I
23 went into being a consultant. I formed a -- what I call a think tank,
24 gathered up a group of professionals, and we started taking a look at
25 infrastructure problems in third-world countries, the idea being that we
1 wanted to go to those third-world countries and their governments and
2 maybe get contracts to help them to improve their infrastructure using
3 monies from anywhere we could find it, including U.S. State Department.
4 At the same time, I publicised myself as a consultant and had
5 various consulting activities and duties through that period of time. And
6 then I was hired by an organisation called the Steele Foundation, which
7 originally was a nonprofit company. It is now a for-profit organisation,
8 and they are in the risk management business and crisis management
9 business. And I became the CEO of that organisation, and then just
10 recently I guess six or eight months ago, I downgraded myself to one of
11 the executive directors because I found that being the CEO was more taxing
12 in terms of using my time, and I didn't want to spend that amount of time
13 with that organisation.
14 So I still work with them, but now I'm called I think one of the
15 managing directors or executive directors. I can't remember the exact
17 Q. Just give us a brief, if you will, overview of the Steele
18 Foundation corporation in which you were the CEO. Was it broken up in
19 different units and groups and can you just highlight what types of
20 consulting work the Steele Foundation performed.
21 A. Well, first of all, it's a growing organisation. It's a very
22 professional organisation. We have offices now in London, in New Delhi,
23 and Mexico City, and Sao Paulo, we are hoping to open an office in Saudi
24 Arabia. And then we have several offices throughout the United States.
25 It's in the business of providing crisis management consulting to
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13 English transcripts.
1 primarily corporations and in some cases to governments. We have -- we
2 have an executive security branch, and that executive security branch
3 protects people from -- well, let's just use the word "bodyguard," but
4 that's not really a good word because we are much more bodyguards. In
5 fact, we are the only private company in the world that protects the
6 president of a nation today. We also protected the Arch Bishop of
8 We just recently finished a protective detail for the former
9 Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. So our clients that we protect are
10 high-level people either from government or from the entertainment
11 industry or from business. So that's another part of our business. We do
12 behavioural sciences, if a CEO of a corporation receives an abhorrent
13 letter and some employee says to that CEO, I'm going to kill you because
14 you fired me, we can evaluate that letter and tell the CEO if that's
15 really going to -- is really a danger. So behavioural sciences is one of
16 our areas. Information security, computer security, environmental health
17 and safety, and a rather broad, broad capability in business
18 investigations. So we have, I don't know, five or six profit centres, and
19 we're deployed in various places across the globe.
20 Q. General, I'd like to now turn the focus to this case in
21 particular. And thank you -- and I know there's more in your curriculum
22 vitae that we do have. So I don't mean any disrespect to you in
23 connection with that, but we would like to at least move with respect to
24 the issues before us. So if I may, sir, with respect to this case, were
25 you asked by the Defence attorneys to review materials and to give us an
1 opinion in connection with various issues?
2 A. Yes, I was.
3 Q. Can you approximately tell us when that was?
4 A. I think it was about as early as August of 2002.
5 Q. Can you tell us what the task was that was undertaken by you as
6 requested by the attorneys for Dr. Stakic.
7 A. Well, there's a combination of tasks, and actually when you asked
8 me to take a look at this I guess I came up with some of my own because I
9 thought that I needed some background information. I wanted to review
10 material that described the creation of the federal army of Yugoslavia,
11 and assess the missions and functions of the army and assess the
12 relationship to the republic, to the local municipality, and to the police
13 forces in the area. I wanted to examine the command and control system,
14 doctrinal issues, rules of engagement, definitions of military terms,
15 lines of responsibility of the military forces, military officers, and how
16 they interacted, law enforcement agencies, police officers, civilian
17 authorities at the municipal level.
18 So those are some of the things that I took a look at.
19 Q. Now, sir, if you look on page 2, obviously, on Section 2, the task
20 undertaken, in the last paragraph there you state: "It is imperative if
21 one is going to provide an assessment and opinion on facts which
22 transpired during April-September 1992, one must and is compelled to
23 examine both sides of the conflict in order to avoid the presentation of a
24 distorted, biased, prejudiced view of the events."
25 Sir, tell us why you believe it's necessary and compelling to
1 examine both sides of a conflict.
2 A. In any conflict -- in a conflict there are usually two
3 belligerents, they each have an opinion and a view and to find some
4 balance and how that all came about and what is taking place in the
5 particular time we are interested in, in this particular case, those dates
6 that you suggested, one must take a look at what motivates each side.
7 Q. Can you share with us, sir, some of the materials you reviewed in
8 connection with formulating the opinions in creating the report that we
10 A. Some of the materials reviewed, and there were other items, but
11 certainly I looked at the indictment, and that was a start point for me.
12 I looked at Ewan Brown's report, the expert witness of the Prosecution. I
13 looked at the testimony of Mr. Brown. I looked at Richard Butler's
14 report, and Richard Butler, as I understand it, is a military expert that
15 testified in another case here at the Tribunal and found his report to be
16 very interesting. I looked at some academic and historic reports. I
17 think Donia was one, who wrote one. Trifkovic and Gostin [phoen]. I
18 looked at some maps and some diagrams just to get a feel for the geography
19 and the geometry involved in the situation and in this case at hand.
20 I looked at some videotapes, saw videotapes of activities in
21 camps, visitations by the press to certain camps. I looked at videotapes
22 and saw some combat situations and some exchanges of combat activity. I
23 look at some witness transcripts, some newspaper clippings. I certainly
24 looked at some combat reports of the VRS. I looked at military rules,
25 regulations, and laws as it pertained to the former JNA which evolved then
1 into the VRS, and I looked at some police reports. So there's just some
2 of the documents, some of the categories of documents that I reviewed.
3 Q. Now, sir --
4 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Sorry. To facilitate proceedings, it would be
5 helpful when in the future you're making reference to reports, you may
6 know that these reports are ongoing reports, and they are updated, that
7 you specify the date of the report you had available. This is especially
8 true for the Butler report and the Trifkovic report.
9 THE WITNESS: Okay.
10 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you.
11 MR. OSTOJIC: Would the Court like me to ask him the dates of
12 those two reports?
13 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: When we come to this. Please.
14 THE WITNESS: Thank you, sir.
15 MR. OSTOJIC:
16 Q. Sir, the next section of your report, page 5, which is Section 4,
17 "General Issues to be Addressed and Analysis and Opinion," are these the
18 issues sir that you addressed in your report in connection with the
19 material you reviewed and the opinions you are going to share with us?
20 A. Yes, there are eight issues that I set out and highlighted in the
21 report. Do you want me to touch on those?
22 Q. Yes, if you don't mind.
23 A. Okay. First of all, the question of whether the military is and
24 was susceptible to orders and directives from civilian authorities in the
25 area where the conflict and combat was taking place was an issue that I
1 examined. And then the military response to provocations and to attacks
2 involving loss of life in the military forces. And then I took a look
3 obviously at the -- regarding the May 22nd, 1992, Hambarine incident, and
4 the justification of the military action that followed that incident. And
5 then the May 24th Kozarac incident, and the military attack that followed
6 that and its justification or lack thereof. And then the 30 May 1992
7 Prijedor attack and the military attack that followed in the city and
8 whether it was justified or not.
9 And then I also examined the issue of the military securing an
10 area where an attack took place temporarily displacing civilians and
11 personnel into camps before searching for the offenders, the rationale for
12 all of that, and was the military justified in detaining suspects for six
13 to eight weeks at a time. And then finally the punishment by local or
14 military authorities of criminal actions that took place in the region in
15 question, because it appears that there was a lot of rogue bands of thugs,
16 some acting quasi military, that were perpetrating crimes in the area.
17 Q. Your next section, sir, page 7, Section 5, it gives us a general
18 overview of some concepts. I'd like to first address with you and have
19 you explain to us the doctrine of the unity of command. Can you tell us
20 what the doctrine is and how it works.
21 A. Well, I think the doctrine of the unity of command is probably as
22 old as the military. Unity of command implies that there is one person in
23 charge. And I think even Chuang Tzu in his book written thousands of
24 years ago, a wonderful Chinese tactician and strategist said that unity of
25 command is a significant principle of war. One person must be in charge.
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13 English transcripts.
1 One person must be able to make the decision. Outside influences cannot
2 affect that person making that decision. Certainly he can get
3 recommendations from his staff, his military staff, because they might
4 know something that he doesn't know. But in the end, unity of command
5 pertains, and it's the commander that implements a decision, that offers a
6 decision, that comes to a decision, and that takes action. So outsiders,
7 civilian people, police authorities, politicians, they don't play in this
8 game. They can't. Because combat is a very fast-moving situation, and
9 you must have one person in charge so that he can take the action
10 necessary to accomplish the mission.
11 Q. Can you share with us what the doctrine chain of command implies
12 or what it is with respect to the military.
13 A. Well, chain of command and unity of command are brothers. Unity
14 of command implies that one person makes a decision. Chain of command
15 implies that there is a hierarchy. And chain of command suggests that
16 there are subordinates. So a commander, let's say a commander at the
17 corps level, decides to take action in a particular area, creates a
18 mission, and sends that requirement down the chain of command to his next
19 subordinate and directs him to take action. That's the chain of command
20 in action. That's also a unity of command in action because now that
21 battalion commander becomes responsible for whatever that mission is, and
22 together the battalion commander and the corps commander are fully
23 responsible for all that happens or doesn't happen with regard to that
24 activity. So chain of command suggests there's a hierarchy, and there's a
25 flow of information, and there is a relationship between senior and
1 subordinate that is clear.
2 Q. Sir, from your review of the materials that you highlighted for us
3 including the military rules of the former Yugoslavia, namely the JNA as
4 well as the army of Republika Srpska, did you find that there was a
5 specific chain of command within the structure of those rules,
6 regulations, and laws?
7 A. Yes, there's clearly, as one would expect, a chain of command, and
8 there is a relationships from echelon to echelon. And clearly, there is
9 transmission of instructions and transmission of missions, and there's a
10 flow of information in both directions so that there's clarity and so that
11 the people in charge can take decisions that are reasoned.
12 Q. At any point, sir, do the rules, regulations, and laws of the
13 former Yugoslavia as well as that of within Vojska Republika Srpska,
14 including your experience, did they ever contemplate that local civilian
15 municipal leaders would be involved in any such chain of command?
16 A. I never saw any evidence in the documentation that I looked at
17 that suggested that. And it would be a peculiar circumstance where that
18 might happen. It certainly isn't a common thing if it happens anywhere in
19 the world, among any army in the world. I can see maybe in an extreme
20 situation for example where there's a natural disaster and civil action is
21 required, and huge, huge numbers of people are required to put a village
22 or a city or restore some facility back to some sense of normalcy, where
23 the military could be called upon by the political leaders of a
24 municipality, of a city, of a county, and no doubt the military would
25 respond in that situation because there would be extracurricular rules
1 that would allow that to happen. And that's probably about the only way
2 that it would happen.
3 Q. Now, you state when you discuss unity of command what would
4 happen --
5 THE INTERPRETER: Can the counsel and witness make a break between
6 question and answer, please.
7 THE WITNESS: Sorry.
8 MR. OSTOJIC:
9 Q. Now, sir, when you discuss unity of command on page 10 of your
10 report, you discuss what the problems would be if in fact this unity of
11 command doctrine is breached by the infiltration of any local, civilian,
12 municipal authorities or any local politicians for that matter. What do
13 you mean when you say that a commander cannot serve two "bosses" and why
14 would that be a violation and something that is impractical in terms of
16 A. It especially applies to an ongoing combat situation where
17 military forces are moving to contact, finding targets, and taking
18 decisions. They can't stop as they pass through the town to ask the
19 mayor, what is it, mayor, that you would like for us to do? And the mayor
20 would give them instructions. It doesn't work that way. The mayor first
21 of all isn't trained in military affairs; he's not trained in tactics;
22 he's not trained in strategy.
23 So this juggernaut, this military, this entity called the
24 military, has got to control itself in outside influence. If there's more
25 than one boss, the commander would have to make choices. Well, here's a
1 civilian politician, a very high level, who wants me to do this, but my
2 mission is to do that. It won't work. He can't make that choice. He has
3 got to go and take on the mission assigned to him through the military.
4 It's just plain as the nose on my face that there's no way that he
5 can work for two bosses.
6 Q. And now, if you can share with us what your "stove pipe" analysis
7 model is and help us have a better understanding of that. It's reflected,
8 for the Court and the OTP, on page 11, Section 6.
9 A. I was trying to conjure up some idea on how I could better explain
10 what I was talking about here, so I thought of stove pipes. Stove pipes
11 run from the stove right through the roof and out and exhaust themselves.
12 When you have a stove pipe, certain things go up and down in that stove
13 pipe. You have a military stove pipe. Missions, requirements, logistical
14 needs, operational matters, flow up and down the stove pipe. The chain of
15 command is in that stove pipe. People are all aware within that stove
16 pipe of what's going on. And then I thought, well there's probably a
17 police stove pipe, a law enforcement stove pipe where the same sort of
18 activity takes place. And they don't necessarily cross over, these two
19 stove pipes. And then there's probably a third one called the political
20 stove pipe, and they don't necessarily cross over with the other two.
21 So what I was trying to do was isolate the fact that operations,
22 administration, and maintenance takes place, missions and roles, inside
23 these stove pipes, and there's very little crossover, and that was what I
24 was trying to describe, Mr. Ostojic.
25 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: General, you can take it that the Bench and the
1 parties have read your report and, therefore, maybe it's appropriate to
2 limit the comments to the so-called extras, the remarks you want to make
3 to these parts. But please continue.
4 THE WITNESS: Okay.
5 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
6 Q. Then the next section in your analysis, you do an analysis of the
7 authority, the establishment of the VRS, Vojska Republika Srpska, from in
8 fact the former JNA of Yugoslavia, and you show us what the rules and
9 regulations are from each of the levels within the chain of command. And
10 then you share with us also the appointment authority as well as the
11 disciplinary authority within the military. If I can just ask you in a
12 nutshell there, who had the authority in the military of the VRS in the
13 spring and summer of 1992 to appoint people to certain positions? And for
14 everyone, I think it's on page 22 of your documents.
15 A. Within the military stove pipe, the military have the authority to
16 appoint people to certain positions. I believe in other documentation
17 that points out that the president is responsible for appointing corps
18 commanders, and then working down from there, there's a system within this
19 military organisation to allow the appointment of new commanders, the
20 changing of assignments. So inside the military stove pipe, it's military
21 people that appoint military people to take on positions.
22 Q. And does it not also indicate who is at the top of this chain of
23 command, if you will, in the stove pipe analysis for the military?
24 A. At the top of the chain of command is the president. He's a
25 civilian. And there are some indications also that there's a Secretary of
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13 English transcripts.
1 Defence or minister of Defence who is also involved in this. Those are
2 the two key civilians that affect the military.
3 Q. Although perhaps clear, if I may just clarify one point, when you
4 say the "president," it's the president of the country or the president of
5 the republic, correct?
6 A. Yes, the president of the country or the republic, the federal
8 Q. It's not the local municipal leader, is it?
9 A. No.
10 Q. Is there any indication from the military documents that you
11 reviewed in connection with the opinions that you're going to render here
12 today for us and as reflected in your report whether the local civilian
13 authorities had any input as to who may be appointed to any position
14 within the military?
15 A. I saw absolutely no evidence that would suggest that.
16 Q. In fact, even in your military, sir, there's no evidence that the
17 local politicians are involved in terms of coordinating or cooperating or
18 appointing anyone to a certain authority level in the military. Correct?
19 MR. KOUMJIAN: Could counsel just clarify "your military," what's
20 he's --
21 MR. OSTOJIC: The United States military. I apologise to
22 Mr. Koumjian.
23 A. Would you say it again, please.
24 Q. Sir, within the documents that you reviewed namely from the former
25 Yugoslavia that you highlighted for us as well as your experience while
1 being in the United States military, did you find any documents which
2 would support or even infer that a local politician would have any
3 involvement in the command or coordination or appointment authority of
4 military men?
5 A. I saw no evidence of that at all.
6 Q. And sir, can you tell us or give us your opinion if that's
7 something that's normal within the military ranks, that there would be no
8 provision for a local politician or a local municipal leader to be
9 involved in the military? Is that something that's excluded because of
10 some reason or rationale?
11 A. I think it's a normal modus operandi, because if it is not
12 exercised that way, then you have already violated the whole principle of
13 the chain of command and unity of command by bringing in people outside
14 the stove pipe to tell that stove pipe how to operate.
15 Q. Sir, I'd like to direct our attention to pages 24 through 26 of
16 your report.
17 A. All right, sir.
18 Q. And there are, sir, we talk about the discipline authorities and
19 you highlight for us some of the rules that you reviewed as to what would
20 occur if a subordinate or any military man would violate the rules of his
21 military command. Who has the right, sir, to punish the individual who
22 violated or was in derelict of his duties while serving in the military?
23 Would it be, sir, the civilian local municipal leaders or who?
24 A. It's the military, not the civilian local leaders. It's still
25 inside the stove pipe, so you see we have quite a complete system.
1 Q. Is it true, sir, that the former Yugoslav rules and bylaws that
2 were incorporated with the Vojska Republika Srpska, or I should say army
3 Republika Srpska, did they also follow that disciplinary authority and
4 chain of command as you suggested?
5 A. Yes, they did, in fact the documents suggest, strongly suggest,
6 the evidence is there, that the doctrine of that original JNA was simply
7 transferred over to the new organisation. And so it became a mature
8 organisation immediately because it took on those mature doctrines, rules,
9 regulations, ideas, and concepts.
10 Q. General Wilmot, help me understand, if a military man is on leave
11 from his military duties and including your stove pipe analysis, but the
12 military man commits a violation of the law or in essence a crime, who
13 would, under your stove pipe analysis, be required to investigate and
14 punish that individual?
15 A. The military would.
16 Q. And why so, sir?
17 A. Because the person is a member of the military organisation,
18 recognised as such, and comes under the rules and regulations of the
19 military and how it deports itself in public. So while I can see an
20 instance where possibly a civilian authority might arrest a military
21 person on the street, the military would end up with that person and would
22 be the ones that would indict, investigate, indict, and possibly punish if
23 found guilty.
24 Q. Sir, when you say "civilian authority," to whom are you referring
1 A. I could be referring to the police that might arrest this person
2 or the police -- or even a political organisation possibly that somehow
3 reports to the police that this person is doing something in public that
4 is contrary to the rules, please arrest them. So that's -- I'm talking
5 about the entire civilian population, no matter what their duties,
6 responsibilities may be.
7 Q. In your stove pipe analysis, sir, and from the police documents as
8 well as the military documents that you reviewed, is the police structure,
9 although referred to as a civilian structure, is it separate and distinct
10 from the civilian political leadership?
11 A. Yes, my research certainly suggests that it is very much a
12 separate entity, and it represents also a stove pipe.
13 Q. And that stove pipe, sir, I think from what's reflected at least
14 in your report and from some of the testimony you reviewed goes from the
15 initial police officers, the reserve police officers, the regular police
16 officers, through the chief of the stations and all the way to the
17 Minister of Interior Affairs which is referred to as here as I think MUP,
18 M-U-P. Correct?
19 A. Correct.
20 Q. Now, do you have an opinion, sir, based upon a reasonable degree
21 of sent as to whether the rules and regulations and laws of the military
22 concerning the former Yugoslavia, namely the JNA and the VRS, were they
23 sophisticated rules and regulations? Did you find them to be?
24 A. Yeah, I found them to be a very mature and very sophisticated.
25 They were clear, they were instructive, they were easily understood, and
1 certainly they could be followed without any difficulty. But yes, they
2 were mature and sophisticated.
3 Q. Sir, let's move to the events specifically leading up to the
4 conflict in the Prijedor municipality in the spring and summer of 1992.
5 From your review of the articles, the military reports, the police
6 reports, among other things, did you examine what events led up to the
7 actions that took place in May of 1992 in the municipality of Prijedor,
8 and if so, did you find any of them to be significant?
9 A. Yes, I did examine the events, and I made a quick overview in my
10 report of those events. It was primarily to put in context the situation
11 so that I could understand it more clearly, but there was a lot of
12 activity, there were skirmishes, there were people being shot at, there
13 were attacks. There were armies being formed. There were republics being
14 formed. There was mobilisation taking place, and there was great stress
15 and great strain among the population as to -- and fearfulness as to what
16 was going to transpire and what was going to happen. So it was a time of
17 chaos and confusion, and it was simply a time where one knew that combat
18 was probably going to follow, but didn't know in what form. So there was
19 fearfulness in the population.
20 Q. Sir, were there attacks from your review on the JNA military at
21 any point during the period of 1992 that you reviewed?
22 A. Yes, there were.
23 Q. What is the significance of that, sir?
24 A. There seemed to be a fleeing of some people from the JNA
25 identified I guess as Muslims primarily. And then attacks on the JNA as
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 it tried to leave its barracks or as it travelled down a road moving some
2 of its supplies, equipment, and vehicles. And so there seemed to be a
3 situation going on where contending forces were being set up and
4 developed. And now we had belligerents facing each other, and those
5 belligerants took action against each other.
6 For example, I think it was on May the 3rd, a JNA column out of
7 Sarajevo was ambushed and attacked by Muslim units. And a military column
8 on the 15th of May, leaving Tuzla, was attacked by Muslim units, and there
9 was quite a few casualties there, something like I guess somewhere between
10 170 and 200 were killed, and 150 wounded and 300 were taken prisoner.
11 Now, that's a significant combat event.
12 Q. Immediately prior to that event, if we can have the Madam
13 Registrar show the General Exhibit D6. And, sir, while they are
14 presenting that to you, it's a dispatch that was issued with respect to an
15 instruction to attack or to prevent military convoys from leaving Bosnia
16 and Herzegovina territory. And is that one of the documents that you
17 reviewed and referred to in your report, specifically pages 32 and 33.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Now, this was according to some of the testimony intercepted by
20 the Serbs in the Prijedor Municipality, and there's some indication, at
21 least from the representations made by the Office of the Prosecution, that
22 that was withdrawn or that was considered to be a falsified report that
23 was issued. Your opinion, sir, based upon a reasonable degree of
24 certainty, in light of this April 29th, 1992, dispatch, and the two events
25 that you just highlighted to us, namely May 3rd and May 13th, 1992, where
1 there were attacks on convoys, do you have an opinion as to whether or not
2 these orders are actually followed and convoys were stopped in the area of
3 the former Yugoslavia and attacks were made upon the JNA?
4 A. There's a relationship between this message and what transpired,
5 so I would assume -- I would have to assume that they were carrying out
6 these orders.
7 Q. Now, sir, you discussed the May 3rd event where approximately
8 seven JNA soldiers were ambushed and killed. Can you tell us which
9 documentation you relied on in order to form that conclusion. I think
10 it's footnote 70, if I'm not mistaken, to move it along.
11 A. It's an academic report, historian report, in fact there was a
12 General McKenzie newspaper and there was a newspaper column. General
13 McKenzie in the process of writing a book, and I believe it's been
14 published, mentioned this event. So it's from his document
15 Q. In fact, sir, it's a war diary that General McKenzie maintained
16 and --
17 A. Yes, it is.
18 Q. -- kept contemporaneous with the events as they unfolded on or
19 about May 3rd, 1992. Correct?
20 A. That's right.
21 MR. KOUMJIAN: Objection, leading the witness.
22 MR. OSTOJIC: In the interests of time, I was, but I can restate
23 the question, Your Honour.
24 Q. Sir, can you look in the binders there and pull out for us, to the
25 extent that you have it, footnote 70. Thank you.
1 Can you tell us, sir, while you're looking and to the extent you
2 found it what do you have as your footnote number 70?
3 A. It's General McKenzie, Lewis McKenzie's United Nations Protection
4 Force, a convoy incident, and it's from a diary that he wrote. And that's
5 where I found this material.
6 Q. Now, directing you to the third page of that --
7 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Sorry, may I interrupt here. You state:
8 "Relied upon various accounts presented by academic historians." So your
9 testimony would be in footnote 70, you relied on Mr. McKenzie's --
10 THE WITNESS: That's correct, General McKenzie's account.
11 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: So not plural, but single. Correct?
12 THE WITNESS: Yes.
13 MR. KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, if the witness is referring to a
14 document, I think it's appropriate that we get an opportunity to see the
15 document the witness is referring to. We don't have a copy of that.
16 MR. OSTOJIC:
17 Q. General, if you don't mind, if you open the binder, you can then
18 take out the document and we can perhaps place it on the ELMO. Or then
19 the usher can assist you in doing that.
20 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: During the break, copies can be provided.
21 MR. OSTOJIC: The usher will assist you, General.
22 Would the usher be kind enough to put footnote 70 on the ELMO for
23 us, please.
24 Q. General, on the screen before you, you should have a reflection of
25 what's placed on the ELMO. Is that the report, sir, that you reviewed or
1 at least a part of it from General -- Major-General Lewis McKenzie's
3 A. Yes, it is.
4 Q. Book, I should say. And below immediately it shows the convoy
5 incident May 3rd, correct, 1992?
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. I apologise for leading, but can we turn to page 3 of that report,
8 sir --
9 MR. KOUMJIAN: Excuse me, is this going into evidence? Then we
10 will have to describe what else is on the page. If it isn't then I'd like
11 to describe --
12 MR. OSTOJIC: It is.
13 MR. KOUMJIAN: Okay, thank you.
14 MR. OSTOJIC: We would like it to. I don't know if it is.
15 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: If you tender this, we shouldn't go in formal
16 details, only that we ensure that we have it, and only that we know what's
17 underlying footnote 70. Do I take it correctly that also footnote 71 is
18 based on the same source?
19 MR. OSTOJIC: There's another footnote, and we'll get to that if I
20 may, Your Honour. It's an article as well as --
21 THE WITNESS: It's a news article.
22 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Okay, then may I ask Madam Registrar what would
23 be the next D number?
24 THE REGISTRAR: D95, Your Honour.
25 MR. KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, of course, I reserve my right to
1 object having not seen the document.
2 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: We proceed as usual. It's provisionally marked
3 D95, and then later on, we ask for objections, if any. So please
5 MR. OSTOJIC:
6 Q. Sir, on page 3 of that document, is it reflected on the second to
7 the last paragraph from the bottom the incident involved that's reflected
8 in your report where seven JNA military men were killed? Can you read
9 that section to us, please.
10 A. "Some 200 JNA soldiers had disappeared. At first I assumed they
11 had bolted for the Serb-controlled area just south of the ambush site.
12 Later I had discovered that they had been taken prisoner. All of the JNA
13 weapons and military equipment of any value was confiscated by the TDF,
14 and six to seven JNA officers had been killed in cold blood. During the
15 incident, our modest UN presence of ten people had prevented a massive
16 blood bath."
17 Q. Now, if I can ask you to turn to page 1 of that document so that
18 the TDF can be defined for us on this incident of May 3rd, 1992, and I
19 think immediately below General McKenzie's picture.
20 A. Mm-hmm.
21 Q. What is the TDF as referred to by General McKenzie as it existed
22 on May 3rd, 1992.
23 A. He's talking about an entity called the Territorial Defence force.
24 Q. Is that a Serbian or Croatian Territorial Defence force, or does
25 he state that it was a Bosnian (Muslim) TDF?
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 A. Bosnian Muslim TDF, Territorial Defence force. And he goes on to
2 say, "who are rapidly getting out of control."
3 Q. As a military man, what effect would the attack on a convoy and
4 the killing of seven of your soldiers be in cold blood, what effect would
5 that have in the region or in the territory once that news has transpired
6 to other members of the military?
7 A. First of all, it would probably be a very sobering piece of news.
8 Secondly, it would put everyone on a higher alert, personal alert. And
9 third of all, it would probably put into the mind of the ordinary soldier
10 the idea, well, we must respond and how are we going to respond. And then
11 among the officers, it would probably set them to thinking about a
12 response and how to handle the situation. So I think there would be a
13 sort of a solidarity, a resolve would develop among those who were
15 Q. Would tensions be on the rise?
16 A. Oh yes, absolutely.
17 Q. Would there be a higher status of alert?
18 A. Yes, absolutely, personally and unitwise, yes.
19 Q. The next event, sir, that you have with respect to the events that
20 may have triggered subsequent events in the Prijedor Municipality is an
21 event that occurred, I believe, in your report it says May 15th, 1992, and
22 you cite footnote number 71.
23 Can you please or would the usher could be kind enough to place
24 that on the ELMO. And while he's doing that, General, could you tell us
25 what occurred on or about May 13th, 1992? 15th is in your report, but I
1 think we've established that it's the 13th, correct, General, based on the
2 article and based on what you shared with me yesterday. Correct?
3 A. That's correct.
4 Q. Sir, can I direct your attention, this is a newspaper article as
5 reflected on the ELMO from -- dated May 13th, 1996. Correct?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And it's a report with respect to the anniversary of the events
8 that happened four years prior. Correct?
9 A. That's correct.
10 Q. And it discusses, does it not, sir, in the third paragraph the
11 isn't that you refer to in your report, namely the attack on the Bosnian
12 Serb army showing soldiers being killed, some being wounded, and other
13 captured. Correct?
14 A. That's correct, some 172 JNA soldiers were killed. Some burned to
15 death in Tuzla, which is a town in northeastern Bosnia while more than 100
16 were wounded and about 140 were captured.
17 Q. The article also proceeds to highlight the fact that on May 3rd,
18 that what we just discussed, six JNA soldiers were killed in Sarajevo
19 which is the incident you referred to earlier as reflected in General
20 Lewis McKenzie's diaries. Correct?
21 A. Yes, same one.
22 Q. What effect did that event in conjunction with the events of May
23 3rd, 1992, have on the military in connection with the tensions and
24 anxieties that maybe built up on or around the area of Bosnia in 1992?
25 A. Well, I can imagine that it certainly added to the chaos,
1 confusion, the tension, and the stress of all concerned in the area. And
2 I can imagine that battle lines were being drawn, and people were choosing
3 up sides, and people wanted reaction to this and wanted a response to
4 this. And so I would anticipate that plans were being drawn up to respond
5 to it.
6 Q. And the two warring factions at that time essentially were the
7 Bosnian Muslims and the Bosnian Serbs. Correct?
8 A. Correct.
9 Q. And at that time, were there declarations of state of imminent
11 A. There were.
12 Q. We're overlapping again. My fault. I apologise. Let me just
13 restate the question because I'm not sure if the answer was provided.
14 Were there, sir, declarations of war or state of imminent war at that time
15 that were declared by both or either's party?
16 A. Yes, there were.
17 Q. What effect from a military standpoint does that declaration have,
18 sir, on the military personnel as well as on the general populous?
19 A. Well, it certainly increases the level of readiness. It certainly
20 increases the level of activity. For example, if the military had not
21 been issued ammunition for their weapons, I'm sure that by now they would
22 have been. If the military had not formed themselves up into positions
23 from which they could launch attacks or defend, I'm certain that this sort
24 of activity would cause that to happen. And I'm speaking generally here.
25 I can't tell you that they formed a defensive position around area A or
1 area B in this particular situation we're talking about. I'm simply
2 talking in generalities. And what I really mean to say is they're
3 increasing they're level of readiness, they're getting ready to do
5 Q. What effect would it have on the civilians, sir, to learn the
6 information that the JNA soldiers were, as described by General Lewis
7 McKenzie, "killed in cold blood" and as described in the newspaper
8 account, that over 170 were killed? What effect would it have on
10 A. Well, that certainly is a significant number, and so I'm -- I
11 would presume that the civilians would wonder about the security situation
12 in the country and their own personal security, the security of their
13 families, their children, their property. Because that was a major, major
14 activity. And so they would wonder about what is the status, what is
15 really going on here, and who's next?
16 Q. I'd like to now move to the --
17 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Before we move to another document, this Tanjug
18 news report, May 13th, 1996, would be provisionally marked D96. And in
19 order not to make any mistake, I have to ask you, General, when you refer
20 in footnote 71, you "relied on various accounts presented by academic
21 historians," the underlying source would be this Tanjug news report? And
22 what brings you to the comment "relies upon various accounts presented by
23 academic historians"?
24 MR. KOUMJIAN: Sorry, but the witness shook his head and the
25 transcript didn't get his positive response to Your Honour's last
2 THE WITNESS: Your Honour, are you telling me that the statement
3 71 or the footnote 71 "relied upon various accounts presented by academic
4 historians" which actually is a newspaper article. So it's an erroneous
5 statement in the footnote. It's actually a newspaper article. You're
6 telling me that that should be changed, and I should agree to it. Is that
7 right, sir?
8 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: It was a question.
9 THE WITNESS: Yes, I agree. I think I was given something on the
10 order of 30 hours to try to prepare this report, and it didn't turn out to
11 be a 30-hour task. It turned out to be more like a couple hundred hours.
12 So I think that there are probably discrepancies in the report simply
13 because I moved along as quickly as I could. So I apologise if this in
14 fact is not a historian report; it is in fact a news report.
15 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you for this clarification. Please
17 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
18 Q. Sir, I'd like to now turn to the next section of your report, and
19 that is Section 34, and to discuss the issues of confrontation,
20 provocation, and attack, specifically as it relates to the Prijedor
21 Municipality in the spring and summer of 1992. First, my question to you,
22 sir, is: What is a confrontation, provocation, and attack? Page 34, not
23 Section 34.
24 A. Well, a provocation could be a situation where some children put
25 out rubber tyres across a road and set them on fire, and a group of people
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 or a convoy come up to that roadblock, and the children, youngsters,
2 teenagers throw rocks at the convoy. That could be a provocation. The
3 result of that could be a confrontation where the man in charge of the
4 convoy goes out and tells those teenagers to get out of the way and get
5 those tyres out of there, we're going to come through there. If the
6 teenagers don't do that, then they might run them off and simply move the
7 tyres and go on through. So the action taken, as you can see from my
8 description, is quite limited and quite reasonable, get off the road, move
9 the tyres, we're coming through.
10 Whereas an attack might be where a convoy comes up to a roadblock
11 and all of a sudden is under live fire and maybe someone is killed. Now,
12 the confrontation that follows the attack might be completely different.
13 There's an escalation factor here. The convoy commander might decide to
14 deploy some people out of his convoy and go after the perpetrators of the
15 attack. And that might then lead to an escalated combat situation in that
16 area. So that's kind of the difference between the ideas of a
17 provocation, and then a confrontation, an attack and a confrontation.
18 Q. Describe for us, if you will, what the rules of engagement would
19 be when there's a provocation. And I believe for the Court, it's page 35
20 of the General's report.
21 A. In a provocation, the rules of engagement should allow for an
22 escalation where you might start out by, for example, in a rioting crowd,
23 just breaking up the crowd, finding the leaders, arresting them, and
24 moving them out, or arresting certain groups from that crowd and reducing
25 their numbers and therefore dissipating their power, at least their
1 perceived power. But anyway, you want to apply a remedy at the same level
2 as the provocation. You don't want to kill anybody, you don't want to kill
3 any civilian, you don't want to kill anybody, you simply want to quell
4 this riot. That's one situation.
5 Whereas if you come into a situation where you are under attack,
6 and people are firing at you and people are killing -- some opponent out
7 there, some belligerent out there is killing your troops or your people,
8 then you have to take a more powerful reaction. And that might very well
9 be deploying your troops and going after the attackers and clearing the --
10 let's say it's a roadblock in this case, and passing through, and then
11 going into adjacent areas to find the people that created this attack,
12 that started this attack, and to capture them, to arrest them, to
13 interrogate them. So the rules of engagement allow you to defend
14 yourself, and you defend yourself at the same level you were attacked.
15 Q. And these, sir, rules of engagement apply to all the militaries
16 across the world. Correct?
17 A. Yes, I would say as a generality, that's the -- they apply
19 MR. OSTOJIC: Your Honour, I'm not sure if they should take a
20 break at this point.
21 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: The trial stays adjourned until 11.00 sharp.
22 --- Recess taken at 10.33 a.m.
23 --- On resuming at 11.06 a.m.
24 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Please be seated. The usher is apparently
25 already on his way.
1 We use the time, Prosecution, any objections against D95, D96?
2 MR. KOUMJIAN: No, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Admitted into evidence, D95A and D96A. I take
4 it that the Defence takes care that also Dr. Stakic understands these
6 MR. OSTOJIC: Yes, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you. You may proceed.
8 THE INTERPRETER: Your Honours, the interpreters and court
9 reporters kindly ask both speakers to slow down.
10 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: You heard --
11 THE WITNESS: I'm heard. I'm admonished to slow down, so I will
12 do my very best to slow down.
13 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you.
14 MR. OSTOJIC: May I proceed, Your Honour. Thank you.
15 Q. General, we're now going to examine the actual incidents that
16 occurred in the Prijedor Municipality as reflected in your report, page
17 38, Section 9. And in fact, sir, there were approximately how many
18 incidents that occurred over what period of time in the spring and summer
19 of 1992 in the Prijedor Municipality from your review of the documents?
20 A. There were three incidents, May 22nd, May 24th, and May 30th,
22 Q. And I apologise for rushing through some of this, sir, but it is
23 somewhat covered in your report, and I'd like to get some exhibits in as
24 well. Can you just generally describe for us the incident that occurred
25 on May 22nd, 1992, at Hambarine.
1 A. At Hambarine, there was a group of military men returning from
2 training to their homes apparently. They came up to a checkpoint, and
3 they were taken under attack. And two people lost their lives, from what
4 I was able to glean from the documentation. And then there was a
5 response, which involved requesting that those people who were responsible
6 for the attacks be turned over to the authorities, and that everyone turn
7 in their weapons. That didn't happen, and so there was a military
8 response later on at the point of the attack and in the area around the
10 Q. Just so that we're clear, help me understand, General, the
11 military men that were coming back or returning to go home during their
12 leave, were they men from the JNA, essentially Serbian combatants or
13 Serbian military men?
14 A. Yes, they were.
15 Q. And they came under attack and under fire by whom?
16 A. Apparently by a group of Muslim individuals who were manning this
18 Q. From your review, sir, of the documents and from your experience,
19 the military issued an ultimatum to the people within that checkpoint.
21 A. They did.
22 Q. And sir, is that something that's reasonable and acceptable from a
23 military standpoint? Do you have an opinion based upon that?
24 A. Yes, I think it would be a very, very reasonable response from the
25 military authorities in the area to ask that the perpetrators be turned
2 Q. And once -- from your review, is that also a prudent request, a
3 prudent initial move by the military who lost the lives of some of its
4 personnel at that checkpoint?
5 A. Very prudent indeed.
6 Q. And subsequent to that, what if anything occurred, sir?
7 A. The perpetrators were not turned over. Weapons were not turned
8 in. And so the military went into the area in search of the perpetrators,
9 and the result was that there was gunfire, exchange of fire, and a combat
10 situation developed in and around the area.
11 Q. Do you have an opinion, sir, based upon a reasonable degree of
12 certainty based upon your education and experience as well as your review
13 of the documents --
14 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, please.
15 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, my apologies.
16 Q. Sir, do you have an upon based upon a reasonable degree of
17 certainty, based upon your experience and education as well as from your
18 review of the documents in connection with this case whether or not the
19 military was justified in responding to the attack on its two personnel on
20 May 22nd, 1992?
21 A. In my opinion, they were fully justified in the actions that they
23 Q. Now, sir, let's turn to the next confrontation or provocation that
24 occurred, and that would be two days later, on May 24th, 1992, at the
25 checkpoint in Jakupovici, namely on or around the village of Kozarac. Can
12 Blank page inserted to ensure pagination corresponds between the French and
13 English transcripts.
1 you tell us, sir, factually the backdrop from the materials that you
2 reviewed what occurred at or about that checkpoint?
3 A. Apparently, the military was in a convoy moving along the road,
4 and they came up against a roadblock. Apparently they stopped, they were
5 attacked. They were taken under fire, and one of their men was killed.
6 The military responded. I assume that that means that they deployed into
7 the areas around where the attack took place, and a combat situation
8 developed in the immediate and the extended area.
9 Q. And sir, based upon a reasonable degree of certainty, based upon
10 your experience and education, and from the materials that you reviewed,
11 do you have an opinion as to whether or not the military was justified to
12 respond to the attack on its military convoy resulting in the death of its
13 military personnel?
14 A. Yes, I believe that they were justified in that response.
15 Q. At that point, sir, from your review of the materials, is it true
16 that actually the -- as you call it in your report, the "enemy," they were
17 starting a procedure of capturing them. Correct?
18 A. That's correct.
19 Q. Can you describe for me under what provision does the military
20 have or the right to capture its "enemy" at a time of engaged warfare?
21 A. In the course of combat, if one force has overwhelming fire power
22 and the other force sees and observes that and are willing to give
23 themselves over as captives, then the attacking force or the more powerful
24 force should honour that and take what I will call at this point prisoners
25 of war, take them into detention, hold them, maybe even interrogate them
1 at the point of capture to gather any combat intelligence that they can
2 gather at that moment to lead them to further activity, to find further
3 forces, other forces, that they can either destroy or capture as they move
4 along in this process. So it is typical that in combat, if the
5 opportunity presents itself, that one would take prisoners.
6 Q. And, sir, that's also covered within the Geneva Convention as
7 reflected --
8 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, counsel, please.
9 MR. OSTOJIC:
10 Q. Ultimately I'll get it done before this case is over. Thank you.
11 Sir, and its reflected in your report that in fact the Geneva
12 Convention, specifically Article 25 among others, covers the fact that
13 during combat activities when you capture the detainee he is considered
14 the prisoner of war, and they use the term "camp," do they not?
15 A. Yes, they do.
16 Q. And can you tell us, although we'll get into the detention centres
17 a little later or the camps as they are referred to a little later, in
18 this circumstance, there's an issue or a term used in the military called
19 pursuit during combat activity. Are you familiar with that term?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Can you describe that term to us, please.
22 A. Pursuit would involve following, chasing, attempting to corner or
23 pin down an enemy element, and maybe the basic reason for the pursuit
24 would be to capture them, among other things, or it may be to destroy
25 them. But the idea is that you are in pursuit, you are chasing someone
1 who needs to be in your view, as the attacking force, tracked down and
3 The word "camp" is used in the Geneva Convention because you can
4 set up a very temporary camp right there behind the front lines. I call
5 it a prisoner of war cage. It doesn't sound as nice as camp, but actually
6 it's just a very temporary holding area where a quick interrogation is
7 completed. And then the doctrine for every army that I know of is to take
8 that prisoner, that person that you captured after pursuit, and take them
9 to the rear area into a more permanently established camp where they can
10 be interrogated again and detained, taken off the battlefield, nullified
11 as a threat to the force that captured them.
12 Q. Which entity, sir, considering and in light of your stove pipe
13 analysis, would be the one that would discharge the duties to arrest,
14 capture, interrogate, and detain members of the opposing army or opposing
16 A. It would be the military.
17 Q. Let me now with the Court's permission ask the usher to show you
18 the rules, some of which you reviewed from the federal secretariat for
19 national defence, caption military secret, ERN number 03030230. If I can
20 direct the usher, it's on the stack of documents underneath some of those
22 I could perhaps help you, to speed things up in light of the
23 time. Thank you. And perhaps with the Court's permission, he can place
24 it on the ELMO, first the cover sheet, and then I would say ask you turn
25 to page 119.
1 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: You don't have copies for the parties or is it
2 65 terred already?
3 MR. OSTOJIC: We are in the process of making them, Your Honour.
4 We will get that to the Court. We thought we had made copies, and
5 apparently we stand corrected on that. So my apologies to the Court and
6 to counsel. But I believe they have it because it's their 65 ter number.
7 It's a document we received from them at some point.
8 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: We'll come back to this later. Provisionally
9 marked D97.
10 MR. OSTOJIC: Once again, I stand corrected. It is 65 terred,
11 number 562.
12 Q. As we can see on the ELMO, this is the cover page of the federal
13 secretariat for national defence, caption military secret internal,
14 brigade rules, et cetera, 1994.
15 Sir, I'd ask that the usher please show you page 119 of that
16 document and place it on the ELMO. Specifically, sir, examining Section
17 13, with respect to pursuit in combat activities, can you please read for
18 us Section 13, subsection 455 and 456.
19 A. "Pursuit is a combat tactical activity which is the result of a
20 successful attack. The goal of pursuit is to develop existing results,
21 prevent the enemy from pulling out of combat and retreating in order to
22 get organised once again, in accordance with his plans for combat, and
23 then to rout, surround, and destroy the enemy."
24 "456: The brigade will successfully pursue the enemy by
25 constantly reconnoitring, monitoring, and identifying the enemy actions
1 and intentions, maintaining constant combat contact, prompt commencement
2 of pursuit, coordinated action of the forward, and pursuit detachments and
3 pursuit columns with the TO units and forces in the enemy rear, pursuing
4 the enemy on a wide front, maintaining a compact pursuit disposition, and
5 ridding the units of unnecessary gear."
6 Q. That would be adequate for now. Can you just tell us what it
7 means under subsection 456, "pursuing the enemy on a wide front."
8 A. Let's say there is a point of attack, there is a point of contact,
9 the enemy retreats from that point of contact, let's say we are calling
10 ourselves the friendly force in this case. We as the friendly force
11 deploy and possibly we are a battalion-size unit, and we deploy our entire
12 battalion across a wide front, like maybe 800, 900, 1200 metres wide, and
13 conduct a pursuit, a sweeping action through the area, looking for those
14 forces that conducted the attack at the point we started from. So wide
15 pursuit includes deployment of your unit, covering much more ground than
16 you were covering at the point of attack in search of the people that are
17 attempting to retreat, escape, and fight another day.
18 Q. Now, with respect to May 24th, 1992, there was certainly a pursuit
19 of the enemy on a wide front as you have described. Was the military
20 justified in accordance with both your experience and your knowledge and
21 education as well as that from the Yugoslav military documents to continue
22 this pursuit in a wide front?
23 A. Absolutely.
24 Q. Let's just briefly -- we'll come back to May 24th with respect to
25 the detention centres later in the section captioned detention centres or
1 camps. Let's just move next to the next date in which there was an attack
2 by the Bosnian Muslims, and that would have been how many days after May
3 24th, 1992?
4 A. Six days, May 30th, 1992.
5 Q. Is that significant, sir, that within ten days, there were three
6 attacks on the military and in the town of Prijedor?
7 A. It is significant. It sounds like war, doesn't it?
8 Q. Now, what effect, if any, would three specific attacks within a
9 ten-day period have on both the military personnel and their commanders on
10 or around the area of the Prijedor Municipality?
11 A. They would certainly be tightening up their security operations.
12 They would certainly be considering plans. They would certainly be
13 considering reconnaissance activities, and they would certainly be
14 considering intelligence and intelligence estimates and other threats that
15 might come to fruition in the area.
16 Q. Share with us the backdrop that you reviewed from the materials
17 provided to you in connection with the May 30th, 1992, attack and incident
18 that occurred in the city/town of Prijedor?
19 A. Well, apparently Muslim forces come across the river, and I think
20 it's the Sava River, into the town of Prijedor and took it under attack,
21 attacking various facilities in the city, and this fighting went on for
22 several hours. And apparently the military force there and the police
23 forces there were both taken by surprise, and so initially, the attacking
24 force had the advantage. And it took quite a while to drive them out of
25 the city and back across the river.
1 Q. And it's the Sana River, as opposed to the Sava River.
2 A. Sana, excuse me.
3 Q. Help me with this: Also the military at this point, did they
4 continue to pursue or were they in pursuit of the "enemy" as a result of
5 the May 30th, 1992, attack upon the city/town of Prijedor?
6 A. Yes, they did pursue the attacking forces, but they also stopped
7 in I guess I would describe it as a suburb neighbourhood. I've never been
8 there so I don't know exactly how to describe it called Stari Grad, is
9 it? And they decimated that neighbourhood, which is contrary to the rules
10 of land warfare and probably criminal action if one would take a look at
11 it and if certain -- and if authorities would examine what happened there,
12 it was an atrocity, and something that the army should have been brought
13 to account on.
14 Q. Let's break down the events as they related to May 30th, 1992.
15 The initial attack by the Bosnian Muslim forces in the city/town and the
16 response by the military, was that response, sir, justified based upon a
17 reasonable degree of certainty and based upon your review of the materials
18 in conjunction with your experience and education?
19 A. The response of driving out the attacking force was certainly
20 justified. The actions in that small ethnic neighbourhood were not
22 Q. We'll get to that in a second. After the military started
23 pursuing the forces outside the city/town of Prijedor and into Stari Grad,
24 do you have an opinion as to whether or not the military action taken on
25 or around Stari Grad by virtue of the pursuit by the military on May 30th,
1 1992, was justified?
2 A. It was justified.
3 Q. And what you're saying, sir, in addition to that is that the
4 attack that led to the actual Stari Grad after the pursuit and the
5 essential destruction of the entire Stari Grad, was that, sir, justified
6 in your opinion?
7 A. No.
8 Q. And why not, sir?
9 A. Because the forces went into a built-up, civilian area, and it
10 appears to me as if they simply vented their hatred, destroying homes,
11 destroying businesses probably, the livelihood of those people that lived
12 in that neighbourhood, and that's contrary to all the rules of land
14 Q. Who, sir, in your opinion, is responsible and authorised to file a
15 complaint against the military as a result of the action that was taken on
16 the village of Stari Grad on May 30th, 1992?
17 A. Can you ask the question again, please.
18 Q. Sure, my apologies. As a result of the action that was taken that
19 you opine is unjustified in the village of Stari Grad, does the military
20 command structure allow for the military to report that activity and
21 ultimately to punish or start proceedings to investigate and to punish the
22 perpetrators of the attack on Stari Grad on May 30th, 1992?
23 A. Yes, the command structure does allow for that, and it should have
24 been occurred. But it's broader than that. Anyone in the military could
25 have reported this event and this criminal action, and as a result of that
1 report, it should have been investigated, it should have been evaluated,
2 and then people brought to task who were leading the effort. So even the
3 foot soldier could have reported such an incident.
4 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Only that the transcript is correct, did you say
5 "anyone in the military could have reported" or "should have reported"?
6 THE WITNESS: I thought the question was structured in such a way
7 that the answer would be could have. The answer also could be should
8 have, because every soldier is obligated to report a criminal or a law
9 that's a -- a command that is illegal. In the case of Lieutenant Kelly in
10 Vietnam --
11 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Let's stay here in the area.
12 THE WITNESS: Okay.
13 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Because this would be based on the manual in A,
14 providing the obligation to report. Right?
15 THE WITNESS: Yes.
16 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you.
17 MR. OSTOJIC:
18 Q. In any of those -- strike that. Sir, now let's focus quickly, if
19 we may, on the detention camps specifically page 45 of the General's
20 report, and the issues surrounding that. There were three detention
21 centres in the Prijedor Municipality in essence in and around the spring
22 of 1992. Correct?
23 A. Yes, there were.
24 Q. I know you advised me the names are somewhat difficult to
1 A. Trnopolje was one of them I believe, close to the pronunciation.
2 And let me see if I can find the other two.
3 Q. Let me just help you in the interests of time. Keraterm and
4 Omarska were the other two, correct?
5 A. Yes, Keraterm and Omarska.
6 Q. And these detention camps as you've mentioned, pursuant to Article
7 25 of the Geneva Convention, are they, sir, authorised to be set up?
8 A. Yes, it's good form for the military to establish camps to the
9 rear. Those camps, therefore, offer protection to combatants who are now
10 disarmed and are no longer in the conflict. Those camps should also
11 provide medical facilities, food, housing comparable and similar to what
12 the troops in the field are using, and so yes, they are authorised to set
13 them up, and it's good form to set them up.
14 Q. Sir, let me ask you, these camps were set up as a result of what?
15 A. These camps were set up as a result of the number of prisoners
16 that were being taken, the number of detainees that were being taken, and
17 the confusion in the area where the conflict was being conducted. And so
18 what the military force did in this case was simply begin to extract large
19 numbers of people and move them to I'll describe it as move them to the
20 rear so that they could sort out who was who. Detain them, question them,
21 find out who they were, and what role they played in that particular area,
22 and get them away from the combat zone so that the real enemy could be
23 contended with.
24 Q. Now, help me understand the process, in detaining individuals who
25 were suspects during a battle, namely three specific battles against the
1 military within ten days, is there a procedure that is utilised during the
2 interrogation process. For example, would you, once you interrogate
3 detainee number 1, immediately release detainee number 1, and if not, why
5 A. No, you wouldn't release detainee number 1, you would hold
6 detainee number 1 until you've interrogated everybody that's waiting in
7 line. So it's a lengthy process, it takes time, because you may find that
8 detainee number 392 has something significant to say about detainee number
9 1. And if you had let him go, you may have just let go a commander of one
10 of the opposing forces without even knowing it. So it's a long process,
11 it requires holding people over time so that you are able to build an
12 understanding of who everybody is that was picked up that was detained
13 that is now being held.
14 Q. With the Court's permission, I'd like to have the usher place
15 provisions of the Geneva Convention on the ELMO, specifically Section 2,
16 Article 118. It starts on the bottom of that page and proceeds to the
17 next page.
18 Sir, I'd like to ask you this question while we're looking at this
19 provision of the Geneva Convention. Can you tell me, based upon a
20 reasonable degree of certainty your experience and education how long
21 detainees are required to be kept in detention camps as a general premise?
22 A. Detainees can be kept in detention for the duration of the
24 Q. Can we --
25 A. Civilian detainees, I think generally speaking, 90 days unless
1 something is discovered in their background that would cause you to keep
2 them longer.
3 Q. Let's examine what it says specifically on Article 118. It starts
4 under Section 2, and if you could read the entire section for us, and then
5 I think it proceeds on the next page concluding.
6 A. "Prisoners of war shall be released and repatriated without delay
7 after the cessation of hostilities."
8 Q. Of active hostilities. Correct?
9 A. Correct.
10 Q. I just wanted to get it clear on the record. Who decides when the
11 active hostilities cease, and in this case, when did the active
12 hostilities cease in the former Yugoslavia, specifically in the Prijedor
14 A. Normally, there is a -- some sort of a peace process that takes
15 place. And the contending parties agree to certain terms for that peace
16 process to be finalised, and at some point, you have a cessation of
17 hostilities agreed to by all parties.
18 Q. And the Geneva Convention, sir, does not specify what the time
19 frame is for the release of these detainees other than to say "upon
20 cessation of active hostilities." Correct?
21 A. As far as I know, that's the only -- that's the only terms of
22 releasing prisoners of war.
23 Q. Now, these prisoners of war detainees are being held in a
24 detention camp as allowed by the Geneva Convention, and they are being
25 interrogated to determine what, the criminal proceedings that may be
1 brought against them?
2 A. They are being interrogated for the intelligence and the
3 information that they may be able to offer about activities that are
4 taking place in the field. They're being interrogated about their
5 relationship to enemy elements in the field. They are being interrogated
6 as to what their status really is in society so that they can be
7 identified as noncombatants who have no impact on the situation, prisoners
8 of war, or possibly even criminals.
9 Q. And sir, let me now direct your attention quickly if I may to the
10 Yugoslav orders and rule on the application of the international law of
11 war in the armed forces of the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia
12 which is Defence 65 ter number 561. If the usher would be kind to first
13 show us the front page, and just for the record has ERN number 00807690.
14 And we'll be looking specifically at Section 240 which has the ERN number
16 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: This would be provisionally marked D97, but we
17 have to come back to this because of the poor quality of the copies we
18 have received.
19 THE REGISTRAR: D98, Your Honour.
20 MR. OSTOJIC:
21 Q. If we may just turn to the applicable section, I believe to --
22 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: I have to correct myself. As normal, Madam
23 Registrar is correct. The previous 65 ter 562 that was D97, and what we
24 now have before us, 65 ter number 561, this indeed would be D98. Thank
25 you for this assistance.
1 MR. OSTOJIC:
2 Q. Now, General --
3 MR. OSTOJIC: If I may proceed, Your Honour. Thank you.
4 Q. General, examining the rules or orders in the Yugoslav military as
5 it existed at that time, they also had a provision, did they not, sir,
6 with respect to detaining forces that were enemy to the actual army?
7 A. Mm-hmm.
8 Q. Yes?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Sorry. General, we must keep all our answers verbal, and no nods
11 of the head or shrugs of the shoulders because our court reporters cannot
12 take down such shrugs or nods, please. Thank you.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Sir, with respect to the conflicts that were arising in the
15 Prijedor Municipality in the spring and summer of 1992, based upon the
16 review of the military documents that existed from the former JNA and from
17 the VRS, the army of Republika Srpska, was the military justified in
18 capturing -- after these three incidents capturing suspects and detaining
19 them in what was called as camps?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Can you tell me, sir, based upon the provisions, specifically the
22 provision that's before you, I believe provision 240, was there a law that
23 existed that allowed the military to detain these individuals who were
24 captured and placed in these camps for a certain number of period -- or
25 for a certain period of time before they either proceed with criminal
1 proceedings or they released them? Was there a specific time frame set
2 out in the rules of the Yugoslav military regulations and laws?
3 A. Yes, there was.
4 Q. And we're kind of ahead of ourselves but we pointed that out on
5 paragraph 240 of this section of the rules. Correct?
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. Can you read to us, sir, that section so we have it in the record
8 and tell us specifically what the time frame is that the military is
9 authorised to detain people who are suspects during essentially warfare.
10 A. Article 240, criminal Prosecution: "No prisoner of war may be
11 tried or punished for an act not explicitly specified by the laws of the
12 detaining power, or by international law, in force when the act was
13 committed. Immediately upon capture, prisoners of war should be informed
14 of the criminal acts entailing capital punishment. After their being so
15 informed, capital punishment may not be pronounced on a prisoner of war
16 for any other criminal offence without the consent of the power on which
17 he depends. Criminal proceedings must be conducted as quickly as
18 possible. Custody may not last longer than three months. The time spent
19 in custody shall be included in the serving of a prison sentence."
20 Q. Now, sir, in the present situation, namely the Prijedor
21 Municipality, as a result of those three incidents in May of 1992 and the
22 arrest and detention of prisoners of war or what they believed were the
23 "enemy" at that time, the Yugoslav rules allowed that these detainees be
24 kept in detention camps for 90 days, three months. Correct?
25 A. Correct.
1 Q. Or criminal prosecution should begin, and if it doesn't begin,
2 they should be released. Correct?
3 A. That's correct.
4 Q. Sometime in August, whether it's August 5th or August 6th, 1992,
5 the Keraterm and Omarska camps were closed. Correct?
6 A. Correct.
7 Q. And now these camps were commenced to operate immediately after
8 May 24th, 1992, namely the attack on Kozarac. Correct?
9 A. That's correct.
10 Q. Is that, sir, based upon your opinion - I'm asked to slow down, I
11 apologise. Is that, sir, based upon your opinion a reasonable amount of
12 time to keep detainees in so-called camps, from May 24th through let's
13 even say the mid of August 1992?
14 A. Yes, it is.
15 Q. The hostilities in former Bosnia and Herzegovina, in the former
16 Yugoslavia, ceased sometime in 1995 as we discussed before. If they kept
17 these detainees for a longer period beyond that point based upon the
18 Geneva Conventions, were they permitted to do so?
19 A. Yes, they were.
20 Q. From your review of the material, sir, can you tell us who
21 administered, maintained, and operated the detention centres in or around
22 the Prijedor Municipality in the spring and summer of 1992?
23 A. They were operated by the military, and there was some assistance
24 from the local law enforcement authorities.
25 Q. That would be the police. Correct?
1 A. Police, correct.
2 Q. I'd like to just skip ahead a little bit, and I apologise if we're
3 running short on time, and have you look at what we've identified as
4 Defence 65 ter number 316, 317, and 318. This involves, just so that we
5 could speed the process, the issues of Mount Vlasic where 150 or so
6 Bosnian Muslims were killed. And I'd like to show these documents to the
7 General, with the usher's assistance and the Court's permission.
8 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: At the moment, admittedly also after a long
9 search and seizure attempt, we didn't find these 65 ter numbers.
10 MR. OSTOJIC: We will --
11 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: If you have additional copies, it would be
12 good. Otherwise, it should be put on the ELMO.
13 MR. OSTOJIC: We will place it on the ELMO, Your Honour. I was
14 unfortunately under the misimpression that the complete set was provided
15 to the Court and to our learned friends at the Office of the Prosecution.
16 Again, our apologies for that. We hope to get it no later than today,
18 Q. If we can just move or scan back a little so we can get the
19 entirety of the document reflected on the ELMO. This, General, has the --
20 now I can't see the ERN number, but for the record it has the ERN number
21 00635446. It's a document dated September 11th, 1992, on the top, and it
22 seems to have two or three other signators within the document.
23 Sir, this document, in essence, is a request by the police in the
24 stove pipe analysis that you utilised from Banja Luka directing the -- the
25 minister of interior --
1 THE INTERPRETER: Please slow down.
2 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, thank you.
3 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: At the same time so that we don't lose the
4 order, this would be provisionally marked D98.
5 MR. OSTOJIC: 99, I believe, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: You are really too fast, not only in speaking
7 but also in providing documents. D99.
8 MR. OSTOJIC:
9 Q. Now, sir, this involved the tragic incident from Mount Vlasic. Is
10 there -- in this case, there's an allegation as you've read in the
11 indictment that there was nothing to prevent or punish individuals. Does
12 this document, sir, request that the police chief in the Prijedor
13 Municipality start an investigation and conduct or issue any charges
14 against the individuals involved in the Mount Vlasic attack?
15 A. Yes, it does.
16 Q. And can we turn with the usher's kind assistance to the next page,
17 and that would be I believe the response to this letter from the police
18 chief himself.
19 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: D100, provisionally marked.
20 MR. OSTOJIC: Just for the record, this is dated the 14th of
21 September, 1992, and the previous one, I believe, is the 14th -- or the
22 11th. I'm mistaken.
23 THE REGISTRAR: The previous document was dated 14th September,
24 and the record says 11.
25 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you.
1 Q. This is a response to that letter, correct, that was issued
2 requesting that there be an investigation. Correct?
3 A. Yes, it is.
4 Q. Now, we can all read it. It's on the ELMO. The first paragraph
5 essentially is a response saying that the individuals who were involved in
6 the convoy are -- have been deployed to another area and are serving
7 duty. Correct?
8 A. That's correct.
9 Q. What interests me most, General, is the second paragraph. Who,
10 sir, based upon that second paragraph from this exhibit does it reflect
11 was actually taking the convoy and who was in charge of as it states
12 "providing physical security for the convoy" and who required the
13 individuals to do so?
14 A. The army and the Red Cross.
15 Q. Anywhere, sir, does it show that the civilian municipal
16 authorities, namely the political leaders within the Prijedor
17 Municipality, requested or sought that the police provide security for the
18 convoys that resulted on the 21st of August, 1992, massacre at Mount
20 A. No, it does not.
21 Q. Is there any evidence, sir, in the documents that you reviewed
22 which would suggest, infer, or establish that the civilian municipal
23 authorities at any time had any command or authority over the police or
24 military involving any incidents relating to the Mount Vlasic massacre on
25 August 21st, 1992?
1 A. No.
2 Q. Can we turn to the next letter that was written in connection with
3 this issue. I believe that's a letter dated the 13th of October, 1992,
4 which has the ERN number -- it's under our 65 ter number -- the ERN number
5 actually is 00633338 in the B/C/S version, but they did not incorporate
6 another ERN number on the English version. So that's why the English
7 version does not have an ERN number. Your Honour?
8 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Unfortunately, I can't see any date on the
9 screen here.
10 MR. OSTOJIC: On the top left-hand corner, the third line, Your
11 Honour. I stand corrected, Your Honour. I'm looking at a different
12 document. The document on the ELMO, correct, does not have a date.
13 Q. Sir, this is another letter by the police chief Simo Drljaca from
14 the Prijedor Municipality in connection with a request to identify the
15 individuals who were at Mount Vlasic. Correct?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Does that letter, sir, in fact state that a list was provided of
18 those individuals and they give a Document Number and the date of the
19 letter which identified those individuals involved in the Mount Vlasic
21 A. Would you restate the question.
22 Q. Sure. Does the letter that we're looking at --
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. -- does that letter, sir, reflect that Simo Drljaca, the police
25 chief of the Prijedor police station, public security station, that he
1 sent information that was requested about the policemen who had escorted
2 the convoy on the 21st of August, 1992?
3 A. He said that he sent information on the policemen, active and
4 reserve, on August 21st, 1992. Yes, he did say that.
5 Q. Who escorted the convoy. Correct?
6 A. Who escorted the convoy, yes.
7 Q. At that point, sir, assuming that it was given or even assuming
8 that it was not, do the civilian authorities in the municipality of
9 Prijedor have any involvement whatsoever in the pursuit of the criminals
10 who perpetrated these acts at Mount Vlasic among other places in the
11 spring and summer of 1992?
12 A. No, they don't.
13 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: This document would be D101 provisionally.
14 MR. KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, I believe this may be already marked
15 as S275, if the Registrar could just double check that.
16 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Please proceed, Mr. Ostojic.
17 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you, Your Honour.
18 Q. I'd like now to generally ask you a couple questions about some of
19 the other binders that you put together for us. In a general sense, sir,
20 from the documents that you reviewed, can you describe for us whether the
21 chaos and the tensions were always at an all-time high in the Prijedor
22 Municipality during the spring and summer of 1992?
23 A. No. There was a period of time in the early spring when things
24 were quite calm in Prijedor. And in fact, the Serbs, the Serb faction,
25 claimed Prijedor as their own, and they did it without firing a shot,
1 without interrupting any commercial activity, without interrupting
2 anyone's lives. And it seemed as if everyone agreed with that status.
3 Things were calm. People were getting along. And activities were normal,
4 and everything was relatively quiet.
5 Q. Do you have an opinion, sir, since that point when the Serb
6 takeover, namely April 30th, 1992, up until what point was everything
7 relatively quiet?
8 A. Everything was relatively quiet up until the point of the
9 checkpoint incident, and then that was the first of the three incidents
10 that seemed to ignite tension, stress, and chaos, and confusion.
11 Q. If I may just show you --
12 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Sorry to interrupt for a moment that we don't
13 have to come back to this. Normally I show more self-restraint, but on
14 the -- we can see on the screen that you, General, just said: "And it
15 seemed as if everyone agreed with that status." Could you please give us
16 the underlying facts, the basis, for this assessment.
17 THE WITNESS: Well, I think there are some documents which I guess
18 I will have to see if I can uncover here in these books which suggested
19 that activities were normal in Prijedor and things were calm, and that
20 people were getting along, even though there were ethnic differences among
21 the population of that city/town.
22 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Thank you. Please proceed.
23 MR. OSTOJIC:
24 Q. I'd like now with the Court's permission and the usher's
25 assistance to show you 65 ter number 308, and if it could be placed on the
1 ELMO. It's dated 26th of May 1992. If we can scan so that the document
2 in its entirety -- if we may scan so that the document in its entirety is
3 shown on the screen. Thank you.
4 Now, this, sir, is a letter from the local police chief Simo
5 Drljaca again to his, as you call stove pipe chain of command, in the
6 Banja Luka Security Services Centre. Correct?
7 A. Yes, it is.
8 Q. Now, I would ask the technician to please focus on the last
9 paragraph of this document so we may have it before us. This is, sir, a
10 couple days after the events that transpired both in Hambarine on May 22nd
11 as well as those that transpired on May 24th in the village of Kozarac.
12 Specifically, can you read for us that paragraph, the last paragraph, that
13 Mr. Drljaca writes: "With respect to the activities that were organised,"
14 and I'd like to ask you who organised the activities based upon these
16 A. "Further activities in this regard will be carried out in an
17 organised manner and in cooperation with military organs and members of
18 the national security service. The intensity of these activities will
19 depend on the development of the combat operations and their possible
20 spreading to other areas, about which we will inform you in time."
21 Q. Now, in this document, Mr. Drljaca says that there's cooperation
22 with the military organs and members of the national security service.
24 A. Yes, he does.
25 Q. From this or any of the other police documents, sir, that you
1 reviewed, was there any indication whatsoever that the civilian, military,
2 municipal -- strike that. May I restate the question.
3 Sir, in the documents that you reviewed, was there any evidence
4 whatsoever to suggest or infer, much less establish, that the local
5 civilian municipal leaders were involved in any of the activities
6 resulting from the three incidents or attacks that led to the army setting
7 up detention camps in the spring and summer of 1992?
8 A. I haven't seen any evidence that suggests that.
9 Q. Let me show you, because the Court asked you and you testified in
10 connection with the hostilities or the period of time that was relatively
11 peaceful, namely from April 30th through May 22nd, 1992, I'm going to show
12 you a document which is our 65 ter number 297, which is dated August 4th,
13 1992. It has ERN number 00916569.
14 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Sorry. In order that we don't lose order, in
15 fact, the document that was provisionally marked D101 is to a certain
16 extent identical with S275, save that it includes a date, the 13th of
17 October, 1992, and the DX is crossed out and it's open. Otherwise, it's
18 the same content.
19 You agree that we admit this as S275-1?
20 MR. OSTOJIC: Yes, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Then the last document we would have, this would
22 be, then, in fact D101 --
23 MR. KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, this is S251, this document. It's
24 already admitted as S251.
25 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Let's take care and first find out whether it's
1 really identical.
2 MR. KOUMJIAN: Perhaps the Registrar could also check the
3 previously marked -- I'm not somehow the Court identified it, but Defence
4 65 ter 316, we believe is S263. I believe the Court had provisionally
5 marked it as D98.
6 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Right.
7 MR. OSTOJIC: May I proceed, Your Honour?
8 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: I hope that during the next break, we can have
9 an assessment of the real number of the documents. But please continue.
10 MR. OSTOJIC:
11 Q. General, the document that we're reviewing now seems to be a
12 response to the again as you call it the stove pipe analysis from Simo
13 Drljaca from the Prijedor station to his commander in Banja Luka.
15 A. Yes, it does.
16 Q. Specifically, sir, that letter I'd like to focus with the
17 assistance of our technician on subsection (b). You mentioned the Serb --
18 essentially the Serb takeover on or about April 30th, 1992. In this
19 document that Mr. Drljaca is responding to his commander, does he state
20 anywhere there that there was -- who does he identify as the people who
21 took over in Prijedor? Can you read that paragraph for us, to us.
22 A. "The members of the active and the reserve police force,
23 practically alone and without a fight, took over in Prijedor, sealed off
24 the town, and organised the security of all vital structures." The
1 Q. Thank you. Thank you. Now, tell us from a general sense of the
2 review of the documents that you have, and I know you've broken down the
3 binders, whether the hostilities continued during the spring and summer of
4 1992 in the Prijedor Municipality, and please identify for us the binder
5 that you're looking at and some of the documents in which it may assist
6 you in answering your question. Was there continued chaos and essential
7 anarchy in the municipality?
8 A. Up to the point where the police took over as described in the
9 document we just read from, things were calm. But then after the May 22nd
10 incident, chaos and confusion set in and hostilities developed, and there
11 was actual combat actions and activities. And that is shown in various
12 combat reports from the military, and it's I think also shown in some
13 police reports that we reviewed.
14 Q. Would you be kind enough to grab the binder which reflects -- and
15 what number binder, is it, sir, in your binders of materials?
16 A. Let me find it here first. Probably going to be binder number 2.
17 It's under "Military Reports and Efforts to Maintain Law and
18 Order"; "Military Reports, Combat Reports, and Provocations"; "Military
19 Reports, Croatian forces"; "Military Reports, Abuse, and Persecution of
20 Serbs." And what do you want me to do at this point, sir.
21 Q. Is that the binder, sir, that essentially shows that after May
22 30th, 1992, that in fact hostilities continued to be -- to continue to
23 exist in the Prijedor Municipality all the way through and including and
24 beyond September 30th, 1992?
25 A. That's correct. There are numerous combat reports here that point
1 out that activities of that nature were being conducted and were
2 continuing to be conducted, and that hostilities erupted in and around the
3 areas as a result of these activities.
4 Q. Sir, did you find from a review of these documents whether or not
5 there were paramilitary formations that were created after May 30th, 1992,
6 that resulted in criminal activity of both looting and burning of homes as
7 well as killing citizens in the Prijedor Municipality?
8 A. Such elements, criminal elements, did develop, and they preyed on
9 the citizens in and around the area, and their assets and their homes and
10 their businesses. And these criminal elements were very active and very
11 disruptive. And they had a very deleterious impact on the region. People
12 were scared and fearful.
13 Q. What was the effect on the morale of the military in the spring
14 and summer of 1992 as a result of these hostilities that erupted and that
15 continued to maintain throughout the spring and summer of 1992?
16 A. The morale of the military was not at the highest level. I think
17 that the regular members of military wanted to see action. They felt as
18 if there was no action being taken. There was no leadership, there was no
19 one in charge. And they wanted more activity.
20 Q. Were there paramilitary formations formed by one ethnic group or
21 all ethnic groups from the materials that you reviewed and found?
22 A. Actually, they were from all ethnic groups, including the Serbs,
23 and some of them were criminal elements, in fact, even though they were
25 Q. From the documents that you reviewed, did the military from time
1 to time attempt to repel or arrest the element -- the criminal elements,
2 namely the paramilitary formations, regardless of what the ethnic
3 background was?
4 A. No, I didn't see any evidence of that.
5 Q. Did the paramilitary units that were considered in one document
6 that we'll get to in a second as SDS extremists, and that would be the
7 Serbian democratic party, as you know, the Serbian paramilitary unit, did
8 they in conjunction with the military commit these crimes or did the
9 military from your review of the documents complain about these criminal
10 elements that existed in the Prijedor Municipality in the summer of 1992?
11 A. No, the organised military complained about the marauders in the
12 area, the people who were out of control and the people that were just
13 travelling the countryside and performing criminal acts. They were out of
14 control and they were beyond the law.
15 Q. Sir, whose responsibility was it to attempt to arrest,
16 investigate, interrogate, and ultimately charge these paramilitary
17 formations that were looting, plundering, burning, and committing terrible
18 criminal acts within the Prijedor -- terrible criminal acts within the
19 Prijedor Municipality in the spring and summer of 1992?
20 A. In my estimation, it would be the police.
21 Q. Sir, I'd like to show you another exhibit with the Court's
22 permission and the assistance of the usher, a newspaper article that is
23 within your binder. Here it is, sir. And we do have copies actually for
24 the Court.
25 This is an article, while we are waiting for it to be placed on
1 the ELMO, that appeared in Kozarski Vjesnik on the 9th of April, 1993, and
2 it's an interview, I believe, with Mr. Simo Drljaca. And if I could
3 direct the usher to turn to page 2 of that article which bears the ERN
4 number 00389284. And we're going to focus on the last paragraph of that.
5 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: This would be D99, because, in fact, the
6 previous marked D99 was S263.
7 MR. KOUMJIAN: Mr. Lukic has an extra copy for us. We haven't
8 received our copy.
9 MR. OSTOJIC: Yes, if the usher would be kind enough to, with the
10 Court's permission, give a copy to the OTP. Thank you.
11 Q. Again, as I stated, we're directing our attention if I may to the
12 last paragraph on the second page of this article, which discusses the
13 cooperation between -- if I can read it, Your Honour, I know everyone can.
14 "The cooperation between the civil authorities and the police station was
15 satisfactory during the period of the seizure of authority. Everyone did
16 his job. After the takeover of authority, however, the new people did not
17 understand the real role of the police. The attempt to transform the
18 police into a council body, which would execute orders given by the
19 council civil authorities was unacceptable and misunderstandings arose."
20 Obviously the article continues. General, my question to you here
21 as it related to the prior document that we reviewed where Mr. Drljaca
22 contemporaneous with the events that transpired in the spring and summer
23 of 1992 states that the military -- I mean the police practically alone
24 took over power, and then in his interview approximately one year later in
25 Kozarski Vjesnik where he says there was cooperation. My question to you,
1 however, sir, Mr. Drljaca even one year later clearly states that the
2 police in essence, does he not, in essence would not and did not take any
3 instruction or orders from the civilian authorities. Correct?
4 A. Correct. Excuse me.
5 Q. From the review of any of the police documents that you saw, sir,
6 was there any indication that the police ever issued a report to the
7 municipal civilian authorities?
8 A. I never saw any such exchange.
9 Q. Did you at any time from your review of the military documents,
10 including the daily brief sheets as I think they are called, from the
11 military, was there any indication that those reports were being issued or
12 copied to the civilian municipal authorities?
13 A. No.
14 Q. Sir, let's talk about reporting for a moment. Can you tell me
15 what the purpose of reporting is and providing information to people, and
16 to whom such information should be provided in the context of your stove
17 pipe analysis?
18 A. In the military reporting and its purpose, it's probably like
19 everywhere else, to keep all interested parties informed as to the
20 situation, anticipated actions, condition of the organisation. And that
21 reporting travels up and down the military channels. And the people that
22 are involved in reporting try to make it as accurate as possible so that
23 good decisions can be made based on those reports.
24 Q. And sir, those reports, both from the military and the police,
25 they would be considered somewhat confidential, would they not?
1 A. Yes, in some cases they are confidential or even secret, depending
2 on the content. But certainly, they are kept within the confines of the
3 stove pipe.
4 Q. From the documents that you reviewed, was there ever a
5 distribution list for any of the documents that would somehow find their
6 way into the municipal, civilian authorities' offices or desk?
7 A. No.
8 Q. What's the significance, if any, of that?
9 A. The stove pipe was being maintained. It's a manifestation of the
10 fact that the civilian authorities had no control over the military, and
11 the military had no interest in informing the civilian authorities of
12 their actions and activities.
13 Q. Sir, that opinion is it not based upon a reasonable degree of
15 A. Yes, it is.
16 Q. And it's based upon your review of all the materials that you have
17 before you, as well as your experience, education, correct?
18 A. Yes, it is.
19 Q. Let me ask you, sir, let's turn back to the detention centres for
20 a moment, if you will. You viewed with me and without me videotapes of
21 some activities within the detention centres. Correct?
22 A. I did.
23 Q. Now, in those detention centres, as you've read from the fourth
24 amended indictment and saw there were some very terrible things that
25 occurred to many people within the detention centres, were there not?
1 A. Apparently so, yes.
2 Q. Sir, that's not -- your opinion is not one saying that those
3 detainees who were beaten, killed, or other crimes that occurred upon
4 them, unfortunately, your opinion is not that that was justified.
5 Correct? In fact, your opinion is that that was not justified, is it not?
6 A. Those criminal activities are totally unjustified.
7 Q. Your opinion with respect to the detention camps, sir, is in fact
8 the detention centres themselves, the camps themselves, were authorised to
9 be established and in a time of conflict such as the three incidents that
10 occurred in the Prijedor Municipality, that they were justified in opening
11 those, detaining individuals, interrogating them, and holding them until,
12 as Article of the Geneva Convention states, until cessation of all active
13 hostilities. Correct?
14 A. Correct.
15 Q. Who, sir, from your review of the documents and your review of the
16 tape, as well as the materials included in the articles that you've
17 reviewed, who was in charge of administering, maintaining, and operating
18 the detention centres?
19 A. The military.
20 Q. The Geneva Convention, sir, also provides that food, as you've
21 highlighted somewhat for us in your report and your testimony earlier
22 today, provides that food be provided to the detainees. Correct?
23 A. That's correct.
24 Q. Now, from your review of the military documents, the type of food
25 that was provided to the military, what type of food was it?
1 A. It varied. There were periods of time when it was what they
2 described as hot rations, and then there were periods of time when it
3 consisted of liquid food which I presume was probably soup.
4 Q. And that, sir, is reflected in the documents that you have in
5 front of you, correct?
6 A. Correct.
7 Q. That's found specifically in the military reports, both on the
8 daily as well as the weekly summaries provided within the military chain
9 of command. Correct?
10 A. That's correct.
11 Q. Sir, do you have an opinion based upon a reasonable degree of
12 certainty with respect to the atrocities that happened within the camps,
13 including the beatings, any rapes, and the killings that occurred, whose
14 responsibility was it to punish -- first, whose responsibility was it to
15 prevent these activities from proceeding or commencing?
16 A. The commander is always responsible for all that happens or
17 doesn't happen. So the camp commander is the first one in the line of
19 Q. And now, sir, based upon a reasonable degree of certainty, your
20 education, experience, as well as your review of the documents that you
21 have before you, do you have an opinion as to who is responsible to punish
22 the perpetrators of those crimes that existed in the camps in the summer
23 of 1992 in the Prijedor Municipality?
24 A. Since those camps were maintained, operated, and administered by
25 the military, it is within the purview of the military to take action
1 against the criminals that ran the camps and allowed those atrocities to
2 take place.
3 Q. And now, sir, the camps, as you stated earlier today, were run,
4 maintained, operated, and administered by both the military in conjunction
5 the police. Correct?
6 MR. KOUMJIAN: Objection, that misstates the evidence and counsel
7 is leading the evidence.
8 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Please rephrase your question.
9 MR. OSTOJIC: I will.
10 Q. Sir, can you tell us from your review of the documents who it is
11 in addition to the military that maintained, operated, and administered
12 the detention camps in the spring and summer of 1992 in the Prijedor
14 A. Is the question who in addition to the military?
15 Q. Correct.
16 A. The answer is the police, the law enforcement people.
17 Q. And with respect to that, sir, the crimes that may have been
18 committed by either the police or the military at these detention centres,
19 who based upon your opinion, has the obligation to prevent those crimes
20 from happening?
21 MR. KOUMJIAN: Objection, the witness has already answered that
22 question. Said it was the military.
23 MR. OSTOJIC: It was slightly different because --
24 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: I think the question is indeed slightly
25 different, and it comes down to the question whether the military would
1 have any possibility to prevent the police from acting in this way.
2 THE WITNESS: The answer is still the military. The military is
3 in the final analysis, in my opinion, responsible for the operations of
4 those camps. And even though it may be reinforced with elements of police
5 officers, those police officers must come under the instructions and the
6 direction of the military camp commander. They can't go off and do their
7 own thing, like shooting people. And so it's still the camp commander and
8 the military that's responsible.
9 MR. OSTOJIC:
10 Q. From your review of the documents, sir, did the civilian
11 authorities ever obtain any written information from either the police or
12 the military as to the activities that were occurring in the camps,
13 specifically the perpetration of any crimes that existed in the summer of
15 A. I did not see any evidence of that in the documentation I
17 Q. At any time, with respect to the police and military in these
18 detention centres who may have perpetrated crimes, were the civilian
19 authorities obligated, namely the municipal political leaders, obligated
20 to punish any of those individuals or does that stay within the purview of
21 the military and the police based upon your stove pipe analysis?
22 A. Stays within the purview of the military.
23 MR. OSTOJIC: Your Honour, we have several other documents, and
24 I'd like to introduce the documents that are reflected in the General's
25 report as the footnotes that I believe he has. I just don't want to say I
1 have no further questions unless the Court wants me to put the specific
2 documents, because there's in excess of 200 or so documents we would like
3 introduced into as evidence. I'll proceed the way the Court wishes.
4 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: The first right, of course, is to hear the
5 submission by the Prosecution having, as I understand, until now no access
6 at all to these as you call it footnotes.
7 MR. KOUMJIAN: Correct. Well, we have been able to find some of
8 the footnotes. I can't say that we haven't looked at any of them. I have
9 no objection to proceeding as Mr. Ostojic suggests. There is a small
10 chance that we would have an objection after reviewing it, but as the
11 Court is saying generally, we don't object, even on relevancy grounds we
12 don't object to the documents.
13 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: If need may be, the rule is as outlined in the
14 beginning of the case that a decision can be reversed. So therefore, I
15 think it's not -- absolutely not necessary to go into details of these
16 footnotes and only that they may be provided to the Chamber and
17 Prosecution, please.
18 MR. OSTOJIC: Yes, Your Honour. In light of that, we have no
19 further objections at this time.
20 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: The trial stays adjourned until a quarter to
21 12.00 [sic]. And we can proceed immediately after this? Thank you.
22 --- Recess taken at 12.28 p.m.
23 --- On resuming at 12.53 p.m.
24 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Please be seated.
25 May I ask in the meantime, any objections to the admission into
1 evidence the documents D95A through D101A?
2 MR. KOUMJIAN: No, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Then therefore, in this order as previously
4 marked, admitted into evidence.
5 MR. OSTOJIC: Unless the Court has anything, else, thank you, Your
6 Honour. We would like to move into evidence the report of General Wilmot
7 as well as the obvious references in his footnotes, if the Court would
8 like, and we are providing copies -- as I stated earlier, we will provide
9 complete copies of the footnotes that was referenced by General Wilmot as
10 an exhibit. We would ask that it be incorporated obviously in his report
11 and we ask that that be moved into evidence with the Court.
12 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Objection to do so with the caveat that the one
13 or other point may be revisited and then reversed?
14 MR. KOUMJIAN: No objection. But perhaps could I suggest that we
15 don't go through the marking of the footnotes and admission now because
16 there is -- some of them may be Prosecution exhibits. The report, could
17 we perhaps just mark that for the moment and deal with the footnotes
18 later. Whatever Your Honour feels is appropriate, but I do note that some
19 of the Defence footnotes are already Prosecution exhibits. It would take
20 some time to go through and determine this.
21 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: I think it facilitates the reading of the report
22 when we make reference to the footnotes as such and regard them in
23 principle as part of the statement. And as I take it, there are no
25 MR. KOUMJIAN: Correct.
1 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: So therefore, this report is, including the
2 footnotes, admitted into evidence.
3 You concluded?
4 MR. OSTOJIC: Yes, but I have one other point if I may.
5 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Please.
6 THE INTERPRETER: Microphone, counsel.
7 MR. OSTOJIC: Thank you. In addition, Your Honour, the Defence
8 would request respectfully that the six binders of documents, some of
9 which overlap with the footnotes, be introduced in as evidence pursuant to
10 the 65 ter numbers that are reflected on each the documents since those
11 were the documents that the General reviewed and relied upon in giving his
13 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Once again, I want to invite the parties first
14 to have a look on these documents and then I expect comments on this by
15 the parties. If there are any objections, then we would rule on this.
16 But I think it's premature to act as a judiciary normally should do, act
17 blindfolded, but not in relation to exhibits, please.
18 Mr. Koumjian, please.
19 Cross-examined by Mr. Koumjian:
20 Q. Good morning, General.
21 A. Good morning, sir.
22 Q. General, can we agree that it's a fundamental principle of
23 international law that civilians cannot be targeted for military attack.
24 A. Yes, I think it's certainly a fundamental principle.
25 Q. Sir, I want to go through all of your conclusions basically in
1 your report, but just skipping ahead for a moment, I want to go to the
2 incident at Hambarine. Is it actually your opinion based on what you
3 reviewed that the response of the military in Hambarine as described by
4 Defence Witness DD whose testimony you cite was an appropriate military
5 response to the incident as you understood it?
6 MR. OSTOJIC: May we have the footnote citation, Your Honour.
7 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: I don't know the footnote. It's helpful if you
8 can make reference to the concrete page, please.
9 MR. KOUMJIAN:
10 Q. General, you read the testimony of Witness DD, do you recall that,
11 the witness who talked about passing through the checkpoint in the
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. And later going through Hambarine and seeing I believe he said 30
15 to 50 houses that he could see from the road that had been destroyed by
16 tank fire. That's quite memorable testimony, isn't it? Do you recall
17 reading that?
18 A. Yes, I do.
19 Q. Sir, is it actually your testimony and your opinion as an expert
20 as a former general in the United States army, that destroying 30 or 50
21 houses along the road with tank fire is an appropriate response to the
22 incident that you described at Hambarine?
23 A. No, it's an overresponse.
24 Q. So, sir, in your conclusions that you gave in your report, when
25 you say -- talk about the Hambarine incident and say in number 3, page 51,
1 "In the instant matter, the military was justified in responding with the
2 use of force in the manner demonstrated." You do not mean to say that
3 that attack was justified. You now agreed that that was a crime that
4 happened, the attack on Hambarine --
5 A. Maybe I misstated it in my conclusions. What I meant to say was
6 that they were justified in responding, but they certainly weren't
7 justified in tearing down 50 houses in someone's village, no. That's
9 Q. Interpreting that incident in the way most favourable to the Serb
10 forces, two soldiers were killed by members of a checkpoint. The
11 testimony of Witness DD was that there were three people when he passed
12 that checkpoint earlier that day, but let us presume that there were 10
13 people, 10 or 12 at the checkpoint. Would it be correct that the military
14 would be justified in targeting only combatants, those individuals who had
15 taken part or were taking part in hostilities against the military?
16 A. The military asked that the people responsible for the attack be
17 turned in, and so the implication in my mind is that they were looking for
18 the two or three or four or whatever number of people that were actually
19 involved in the attack and in the killing of the two soldiers.
20 Q. Did anyone ever make you aware that actually there was a Crisis
21 Staff decision, a Crisis Staff order, published in the newspaper requiring
22 the people of Hambarine to turn over Aziz Aliskovic and the other persons
23 involved in that attack?
24 A. Yes, yeah.
25 Q. Did you consider that or did you mention it in your report, the
1 fact that the Crisis Staff had ordered the surrender of Mr. Aliskovic?
2 MR. OSTOJIC: Let me object to the form of the question, Your
3 Honour. I think it misstates the evidence. That was not an order, it was
4 a public announcement. And I would ask that the counsel give the General
5 if he wishes on that issue on ultimatums also the military ultimatum
6 that's referred to in the document that the General has who issued the
7 same ultimatum.
8 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: The second part of your objection is dismissed
9 for evident reasons. The first part, I think --
10 MR. KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, I can show the witness --
11 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Yes, this would be helpful if we have to show
12 some self-restraint in assessing evidence at this point in time.
13 Therefore, it would facilitate.
14 MR. KOUMJIAN: I can show the witness all the documents I refer
15 to, but I will not finish tomorrow if I do that.
16 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: In this concrete case, I think it's --
17 MR. KOUMJIAN:
18 Q. Sir, I'll going to read to you from Exhibit S389-1A. The third
19 paragraph down reads: "The Crisis Staff hereby orders the population of
20 Hambarine local commune and other local communes in the area, that is, all
21 the citizens of Muslim and other ethnicities, to hand over the
22 perpetrators of this crime, particularly Aziz Aliskovic and his group who
23 are the direct organisers of this clash to the Prijedor public security
24 station or the competent military organs by 1200 hours today, Saturday, 23
25 May. This crime has exhausted all deadlines and promises, and the Crisis
1 Staff no longer can, nor is it willing to, guarantee the security of the
2 population of above-mentioned villages in this area."
3 It's quite clear, General, isn't it, that this says the Crisis
4 Staff is ordering the population of Hambarine to turn over Mr. Aliskovic.
5 MR. OSTOJIC: I object to the form of the question. I would ask
6 that the caption of the document also be identified and read into the
7 record, Your Honour.
8 MR. KOUMJIAN: Your Honour, counsel can go redirect and cover the
9 documents, but it's not proper to bring up his arguments in the middle of
10 my cross-examination.
11 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: I think we have shown a lot of patience, and
12 also in both directions. I think it's the appropriate form of the
14 MR. OSTOJIC: If I just may state, Your Honour, with --
15 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: No, please accept the ruling.
16 MR. OSTOJIC: I am accepting the ruling, I just have another
17 objection. If counsel can place it on the ELMO so that we have the entire
18 document. That was the procedure that was established with every one of
19 our witnesses, I would presume. But fair enough.
20 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: In principle, it's for the parties to decide how
21 they want to present, but --
22 MR. KOUMJIAN: Let me just, if the witness requests it, I'd be
23 happy to do it. But it obviously will significantly lengthen the time for
24 the examination.
25 Q. General, if you need to refer to any of these documents that I
1 mentioned, I'd be happy to give you a chance to do so. I believe you're
2 reading the transcript of what I read regarding this Crisis Staff order.
3 Is it correct that in your report, you do not mention that the Crisis
4 Staff ordered the population to turn over Mr. Aliskovic?
5 A. That's correct.
6 Q. Did you consider that fact in reaching your conclusions?
7 A. No, in this case I don't think I considered that fact. Some
8 municipal authority, in this case, published a notice and asked that the
9 perpetrators of this crime turn themselves in. I see nothing wrong with
10 that. I suppose that the authorities, the military, and the police, all
11 at the same time were trying to get the attention of the population to
12 bring this thing under control.
13 Q. Sir, how do you order a population to turn someone over? Do you
14 understand that? If I'm a woman living in a house in Hambarine with my
15 children and my elderly parents, is it my responsibility to turn over Aziz
17 A. No, I don't think so. I suppose in some instances where we offer
18 rewards, then it might happen. But probably by just announcing it, it
19 probably won't happen because people are going to be protected and people
20 don't want to get involved and people don't want to be implicated.
21 Q. Is it proper, then, to attack these people and destroy their
22 houses with a bombardment that according to your report lasted six or
23 seven hours? Is that a proper response --
24 A. No, that's an overresponse.
25 Q. Thank you. Sir, you talked about the camps, and I believe you
1 testified today on the LiveNote that I had. It's page 76, line 1 or 2,
2 that "the military was the one that organised and operated the camps," and
3 you were asked earlier if the civilian authorities had a role in setting
4 up those camps. And you said: "I haven't seen any evidence to suggest
5 that." Am I correctly summarising your views?
6 A. That's correct.
7 Q. Sir, did you -- are you aware of any statement by Dr. Stakic that
8 the civilian authorities set up the Omarska camp?
9 A. No, I'm not aware of that. And I wouldn't understand the
10 definition of "set up" unless you explained it to me.
11 Q. If you heard -- well, Dr. Stakic say that these camps were a
12 necessity of the moment, Omarska and Keraterm, and were set up on the
13 orders of the civilian authorities, would that change your opinion as to
14 who initiated the setting up of those camps?
15 A. I'd have to know the definition of "set up." Do you mean he
16 simply turned over some property to be used so a camp could be
17 established? What does that mean, "set up"?
18 Q. Okay, let's say he used the word "established." Let me withdraw
19 the question. Let me ask another question.
20 A. Sure.
21 Q. Sir, if the Crisis Staff -- if someone said that "no one can be
22 released from this camp without my permission," would you understand that
23 that person had a role in the camp?
24 A. If the Crisis Staff said that no one can leave this camp without
25 my permission --
1 Q. Let me rephrase my inarticulate question.
2 A. Okay.
3 Q. Sir, have you seen the order of the Crisis Staff that no one may
4 be released from the Omarska, Keraterm, or Trnopolje camps without their
6 A. No, I don't think I have.
7 Q. And certainly, you would not give the same testimony that you gave
8 this morning if you had been aware of that decision. Isn't that true?
9 A. I would first have to have that refined a little bit and find out
10 if anyone actually did leave a camp, the camps, without the permission of
11 the defendant. In other words, he may have said it, but does it apply?
12 Does it work? Is it operative? Is his word a rule?
13 Q. Sir, what evidence do you cite, do you have, that indicates to you
14 that it was only the military that decided to set up the Omarska and
15 Keraterm facilities?
16 A. I don't think I used the word "set up," I think I used the words,
17 something like operate, maintain, administer the camp. The setting up of
18 the camp seems to me to be a different issue. It seems to be an issue of
19 someone selecting a piece of ground and saying set up the camp there. I
20 don't know if the military did in a or not. I didn't even care about
21 that. I was only interested in who operated and maintained and
22 administered the camp once it was established. It could have been set up
23 by a civilian authority. I don't know.
24 In fact, maybe that's exactly what did happen because what we're
25 talking about here I suppose are facilities that belonged to somebody or
1 some agency prior to the combat taking place. There are buildings
2 involved. Someone must have owned those buildings. Who had
3 responsibility for those buildings? Who selected those buildings? It
4 could have been the political authority for all I know. The point is once
5 they were set aside to be used as a camp, then it was the military that
6 ran them.
7 Q. Sir, what information do you have to show that it was the military
8 that decided who would be detained or the military that ran the camps at
9 Omarska and Keraterm?
10 A. Well, certainly it's outlined in the doctrine of the military that
11 that's exactly how things are to proceed, and so I relied on the
12 doctrine. I relied on the rules and I relied on their procedures as the
13 evidence that would strongly suggest that that's how it took place.
14 Q. Sir, if you became aware that the commanders of the camp were
15 Zeljko Meakic for Omarska, an active-duty police officer, and
16 Mr. Sikirica, police officer, for the Keraterm camp, would that change
17 your opinion?
18 A. No, because I saw evidence where the police and the military in
19 conjunction with each other did run the camps. So I knew that there was
20 police involvement.
21 Q. Let's go, sir, back to -- start from the beginning for a moment
22 and talk about how you prepared this report and your background. First, I
23 understand you have a very rich history in military history, military
24 employment, and in the business world. Can you tell us what your
25 knowledge was when you started this project about Prijedor and the former
1 Yugoslavia. What experience and education did you have regarding Prijedor
2 and the former Yugoslavia?
3 A. Certainly very little about the local area you identified as
4 Prijedor. But I did have I guess some working knowledge of the situation
5 in this part of the world simply by watching the normal newscasts and
6 occasionally reading an article or a news item about activities here. But
7 I'm not a historian, and I wasn't focussed on this area. I was living my
8 life doing other things and had other work to do. And I think it was
9 simply sort of a background sort of thing that I was observing and
10 watching as one watches current events.
11 Q. In fact, in 1992, if I understand from your curriculum vitae, that
12 you were involved in three different businesses, one being the
13 construction, one being the business out of London, and I believe there's
14 a third one that perhaps you could remind me of.
15 A. Maybe doing some consulting. I don't know.
16 Q. Perhaps. So that would be correct as far as what you were doing
17 in 1992. Correct?
18 A. Generally speaking, I think that's about right, yes.
19 Q. You cited what you looked at in preparing your report, and
20 recognising that we have an awful lot of documents in this case, can you
21 tell me, have you reviewed the Prosecution exhibits in this case, reviewed
22 all of them, some of them, and if only some of them, how were they
24 A. I did review some of them. I reviewed the materials submitted by
25 your military expert, Mr. Brown, and I reviewed his testimony. So I did
1 look at that document that he produced, his military report.
2 Q. Can you tell us if you saw any factual errors in Mr. Brown's
4 A. No, I don't think I saw any factual errors. In his
5 cross-examination, I see where he and I agree on many points concerning
6 the events that took place at the time. So there was compatibility, and
7 essentially I think we agreed on the doctrine.
8 Q. Sir, you indicate in materials reviewed, that you reviewed,
9 academic historian reports, you mentioned Mr. Donia and Mr. Trifkovic, I
10 believe, this morning. Was there a third report that you reviewed?
11 A. Well, certainly General McKenzie, I considered him to be in that
12 category. I think there was a third one.
13 Q. Did you actually read General McKenzie's book diary or only the
14 exhibit that was shown today?
15 A. No, I read excerpts. I didn't read all the material. It seemed
16 like there was a considerable amount of material to try to digest, so I
17 didn't read it all.
18 Q. You were given certain documents to read by the Defence and were
19 given by the Defence transcripts of certain witnesses. Is that correct?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And it would be correct that this was selected by the Defence
22 team, not by yourself.
23 A. No, I think it was a combination. The first thing I looked at was
24 the indictment, and from the indictment I thought -- I sort of created an
25 outline in my own mind of what I wanted to see and what I wanted to
1 understand and what I wanted to know, and so I asked about a series of
2 documents where I could get that information. Those documents were
3 provided. And then they were enhanced on the recommendation of the
4 Defence team.
5 Q. Sir, you mentioned this morning a report by Mr. Butler. Which
6 report was that that you reviewed? Sir, may I just suggest -- I have a
7 document to be distributed. Perhaps you can just tell us if this is the
9 A. You have the very report.
10 Q. While it's being distributed, could I you, sir --
11 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Sorry, before it's distributed, you don't see
12 any obstacles?
13 MR. KOUMJIAN: This is a report from the Krstic case, it's a
14 public document.
15 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: You refer only to the Krstic Butler report but
16 not the November report?
17 MR. KOUMJIAN: Correct.
18 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Okay. Then I have no problems with this.
19 MR. KOUMJIAN:
20 Q. Sir, this is the report that you reviewed?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Why is it, sir, that you didn't cite that among the material that
23 you reviewed?
24 A. Because it was reviewed late, so I didn't identify it as one of
25 the reports that I had reviewed. It came to me late.
1 Q. After you wrote the report?
2 A. Actually, yes.
3 Q. Are you sure about that?
4 A. I think so, yes -- no, maybe you're right. I think you are
5 right. I believe I was here about four weeks ago, and I think on --
6 during the flight back to the States, I did go through this document.
7 Q. Sir, if I would suggest to you that beginning on page 16 of your
8 report through page 28 of your report, you basically have just
9 summarised --
10 A. What's in Butler's report.
11 Q. -- what's in Mr. Butler's report?
12 A. Yeah, exactly.
13 Q. Without citing him.
14 A. Is that significant?
15 Q. Well, sir, as an author, do you find it significant, do you find
16 it ethical to take a paper from someone else, submit it into an
17 international court as your own work without citing it?
18 A. I see what you mean. So you're talking about plagiarism, which it
19 looks like I'm guilty of here. And to Mr. Butler, I would apologise
20 immediately. But you are right. This is a lift from Butler's report, and
21 yes, it's true.
22 Q. Okay, thank you.
23 Sir, if I understand, the fundamental tenet of your stove pipe
24 analysis is that a single civilian was at the head of the army, that being
25 the president of the federal republic?
1 A. The president and a secretary of defence.
2 Q. Sir, in April 30th, 1992 -- let's even go back. Let's go back to
3 1991. At the time of the outbreak of hostilities in Croatia between the
4 JNA and Croatian forces, who was the president that headed the army that
5 you're talking about, the JNA?
6 A. I believe I have his name here somewhere.
7 Q. If I could help you, I don't believe it's in your report.
8 A. No, it's not in the report. I thought I had an annotation, but go
9 ahead and help me if you could.
10 Q. Go ahead, I'm sorry. If you can find it.
11 A. Was it Radovan Karadzic?
12 Q. Well, actually Mr. Karadzic was a Bosnian Serb. I'm asking who
13 was the president of the federal republic of Yugoslavia.
14 A. I don't know it.
15 Q. You've heard, I'm sure, of Slobodan Milosevic.
16 A. I certainly have.
17 Q. Do you think Mr. Milosevic who was not the president of the
18 federal republic of Yugoslavia had any influence on the military, if you
19 have any knowledge of this, in 1991 at the time of the war in Croatia?
20 MR. OSTOJIC: I object to the form of the question, Your Honour.
21 I think it goes outside the scope of the direct and this is obviously an
22 attempt by the Prosecution again to obtain evidence for other proceedings
23 that they have.
24 MR. KOUMJIAN: No, it's certainly not. I can withdraw it.
25 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: I can't see some merits in this objection at
1 all, so therefore, please proceed, Mr. Koumjian.
2 MR. KOUMJIAN:
3 Q. From your layman's knowledge of the former Yugoslavia, did
4 Slobodan Milosevic have any influence on the JNA?
5 A. I really don't know.
6 Q. Did you hear that a large number of generals had been retired,
7 forcibly retired from the JNA, by Slobodan Milosevic prior to the outbreak
8 of hostilities?
9 A. No.
10 Q. Do you know, sir, that actually under your stove pipe analysis in
11 1991, Stipe Mesic was the president of the federal republic of
12 Yugoslavia. I don't know if you're familiar with that name, are you?
13 A. No.
14 Q. Do you recognise that he is now the president of Croatia, and
15 following your analysis, the current president of Croatia ordered the JNA
16 to attack Croatian forces. Wouldn't that be illogical, sir?
17 A. I created the stove pipe analysis and the idea of the stove pipe
18 only to show a doctrinal issue, to highlight a doctrinal issue which is
19 that an authority at some local level doesn't have any influence on the
21 Q. What I just told you that that analysis is absolutely not
22 appropriate for the former Yugoslavia at that time. Correct?
23 A. No, I don't think so, because I think you're talking about a very
24 senior or a significant civilian authority as opposed to someone in some
25 municipality or city like Prijedor.
1 Q. Well, sir, it's actually from your report on page 9, the second
2 full paragraph where you said: "Having said that, it is fully understood
3 that in Yugoslavia in 1992, at the very highest level, there was a
4 civilian authority who exercised command and control over the army, the
5 president of the nation." But you don't know who that president was, and
6 you now agree that that person did not have control over the army.
8 A. I don't know who that person was, and as I said earlier, I was
9 only trying to describe a doctrinal issue and not one that was in practice
10 at the time or in practice in this situation.
11 Q. On the 30th of April, 1992, do you know whether the army in
12 Prijedor was the JNA or the VRS?
13 A. It was the VRS.
14 Q. Actually, sir, it was still the JNA until the VRS was created the
15 12th of May or in early May. So would it be correct that on the 30th of
16 April, if I am correct what I just told you, that it was the JNA that was
17 in -- let me withdraw the question.
18 Sir, at the time of the attack on Hambarine and Kozarac, it's
19 correct that the VRS was the -- was created, had been created. Can you
20 tell me who commanded the VRS at that time, what civilian was in charge?
21 A. No, I don't know who the president was at that time.
22 Q. But it's clear to you that there would have to be a single
23 authority in command. Is that right, under the stove pipe?
24 A. Yes, there had to be a single authority in command.
25 Q. Have you heard of the collective presidency in the Republika
2 A. Yes, I have.
3 Q. On the 30th of April, 1992, do you know who the -- how many
4 presidents there were of the Republika Srpska?
5 A. Was it seven?
6 Q. No, there were two actually. Biljana Plavsic and Nikola
7 Koljevic. Do you know which of those if either exercised control over
8 Serb forces at that time?
9 A. No, I don't.
10 Q. Sir, the 30th of April, 1992, you talked about the Serbian
11 takeover. And in your report, you call it a peaceful occupation. Was it
12 peaceful, sir, because of those who took power or because there was no
14 A. It was peaceful because there was no resistance. It seemed as if
15 the authorities came in and said, Here's what we're going to do, we're now
16 a Serbian community, and there was no resistance to that. So it was
17 peaceful. It takes two to have a conflict, and that didn't occur.
18 Q. Thank you. Sir, would you describe the -- Hitler's occupation of
19 the Sudetenland or the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in 1968 as a
20 peaceful occupation because there was no resistance to those occupiers?
21 A. No.
22 Q. Do you understand that in Prijedor early in the morning, police
23 and military forces set up checkpoints, took over the Municipal Assembly
24 and other key buildings, turned the elected president of the Municipal
25 Assembly out of his office, and took power by force of arms? Isn't that
2 A. I'm not sure if that is exactly what happened or not. Maybe I
3 haven't seen that document where that evidence that you suggest is there.
4 Q. Thank you. And please, I don't mean to be insulting to you
5 because I realise that you had a limited amount of time to review the
6 documents. Sir, did you ever review an interview, a radio interview,
7 where SDS leaders and military officials talked about the takeover of
8 Prijedor on the 30th of April 1992?
9 A. No, I didn't.
10 Q. Do you know what the Territorial Defence is?
11 A. I think it's referred to as the TO, is it not commonly referred to
12 as the TO? And I understand that it's leftover from the days of President
13 Tito, and it's sort of like a reserve or national guard organisation that
14 can be called up.
15 Q. Would you describe that as military?
16 A. Once it's called arms, it becomes military.
17 Q. Sir, I don't know if you're familiar, are you familiar with the
18 name Slobodan Kuruzovic?
19 A. No.
20 Q. If you were -- review -- well, I'm not going to try to prove the
21 case over again to the witness. Let me move on to another subject.
22 I just want to go back for a moment to these footnotes. I believe
23 it was 70 and 71 in your report. When you wrote your report, had you read
24 the exhibit that's now in evidence from -- regarding General McKenzie?
25 A. I read excerpts from it.
1 Q. Would you consider General McKenzie an academic historian?
2 A. No, I don't think he's an academic historian, but he was a person
3 on the scene apparently, in country.
4 Q. Correct. But you would not call him an academic historian.
5 A. No, I don't think so.
6 Q. Why did you call in your footnote, cite various accounts presented
7 by academic historians if you were relying upon General McKenzie's article
8 or diary?
9 A. Because I had 30 hours to try to put this thing together, and so
10 there are some footnote errors which I will readily admit to, and some
11 typographical errors throughout the report, and I just did the best I
12 could, I guess. So maybe I misstated what he was or thought he was
13 something else.
14 Q. Sir, you began -- you began this morning by talking about the
15 importance of presenting both sides to a conflict.
16 A. Mm-hmm.
17 Q. And I believe on page 2 of your report, the last paragraph, you
18 say that "this is important to avoid the presentation of a distorted,
19 biased, prejudiced view of the events. It is my view that this report
20 gives a balanced and objective overview of the events."
21 Footnote 71 of your report appears to be from a Tanjug news
22 report. Do you know what the Tanjug news service is?
23 A. I have no idea.
24 Q. In trying to understand and present an accurate history of events,
25 particularly in a brutal civil war, do you think it's important to look at
1 the source of the information that you've received?
2 A. Of course it's important.
3 Q. Tanjug news service, if you knew this, that it was a news service
4 from Belgrade, and at the time this article was published, 1996, that
5 Belgrade, as you know, the then president of Serbia was Mr. Milosevic.
6 And do you believe that this article is worthy of being cited as an
7 accurate account as to the number of persons killed in this incident in
8 Tuzla that you cite?
9 A. I guess what you're suggesting is that the article is biased and
10 prejudiced. It's like a "New York Times," "Washington Post" issue, I
11 guess. So you're saying that maybe the report is not accurate. Well, in
12 the time frame I had to put this together, I took reports and I didn't
13 check out the accuracy or the political inclination or the -- whatever
14 background was associated with the news agency or the newspaper or the
15 television station. And so I simply took it on face value.
16 Q. Sir, you have a short section reviewing the events leading up to
17 the conflict, and you talk about the attack on the convoy in Sarajevo, and
18 this attack that you talk about in Tuzla. Apparently you did read the
19 "Death of Yugoslavia" or reviewed the videotape of that. Is that
21 A. Yes, I reviewed some videotape and got a feel for it from there.
22 Q. Do you recall in that videotape the interview of Mr. Jose Maria
23 Mendiluce where he talked about passing through northern Bosnia,
24 northeastern Bosnia, Zvornik, after Arkan's, I believe, troops had
25 entered, seeing trucks with blood dripping from the back of the trucks,
1 and discussing the aftermath of the bodies he saw of the occupation of
2 Zvornik by Arkan's troops? Do you remember that?
3 A. No, I don't remember that in particular.
4 Q. Do you remember from the video the peace demonstration in Sarajevo
5 and the Serb snipers from the Holiday Inn hotel firing on the crowd, I
6 believe a couple of people were killed that appeared in that video, they
7 actually had footage of part of that?
8 A. I did note in the video that there were snipers and there was
9 firing taking place, and at the time, I wasn't sure who the snipers were.
10 Q. Actually, it's quite clear that in the Holiday Inn video, it was
11 the SDS -- that was Radovan Karadzic's headquarters at the time, and the
12 video, at least according to the authors of that video, it was quite clear
13 that those were Serb snipers. Isn't that true, or you don't recall?
14 A. I don't really recall.
15 Q. In presenting both sides of the conflict, can you point out in
16 your report where you mention any attack by Serbian forces on non-Serbs in
17 this section on the history leading up to the attack?
18 A. I don't think I talked about any Serbian forces attacking in the
19 history part leading up to the three incidents in the Prijedor area. But
20 I do talk about the, of course, the attacks by the Serbian forces in those
21 areas, and I do proclaim the overreaction of the Serbian forces at several
22 of the instances that occurred which are mentioned in the report. So I
23 understand that the Serbian forces did in some instances exceed the bounds
24 of normal military operations.
25 Q. What incidents do you mention in your report other than saying
1 that there were paramilitaries out of control? What incidents do you
2 mention in your report committed by Serb forces? And let's specifically
3 talk about -- well, let's talk about all of Bosnia, anywhere in Bosnia
4 including Prijedor.
5 A. It's possibly not in the report, but I think I mentioned in
6 testimony this morning about that neighbourhood village area, the suburb
7 of Prijedor, where there was certainly an overreaction. And that whole
8 entire area was apparently decimated.
9 Q. Yes, thank you. That was Stari Grad.
10 A. Stari Grad, yes.
11 Q. Sir, were you aware of the Room 3 massacre at the Keraterm
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Now, do you believe that that was done by someone out of control?
15 Do you have any evidence to suggest that the military does not know -- did
16 not know at the time exactly who it was that perpetrated that crime?
17 A. I would imagine that the military does know who perpetrated that
18 crime, and I think in my testimony I suggested that those kinds of crimes
19 must be -- must be investigated and the people involved must brought to
20 justice. So I certainly don't condone that sort of attack in a Detention
21 Centre or a camp or whatever you want to call it. No.
22 Q. Sir, you mentioned that even the lowest private would have a duty
23 to report such a crime.
24 A. That's correct.
25 Q. Do you think the president of the municipality would have a duty
1 to condemn such an act publicly and to bring it to the attention of
2 whatever authorities could punish or prevent those types of crimes?
3 MR. OSTOJIC: Object to the form of the question, Your Honour. I
4 can state my reasons if the Court wishes.
5 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: In the moment, I can't see any reason, please.
6 MR. OSTOJIC: Your Honour, the fourth amended indictment does not
7 make an allegation against Dr. Stakic that he failed or breached any laws
8 and that it is a crime not to condone an act. So for him to suggest that
9 by virtue of the fact that Dr. Stakic did or did not condone an act such
10 as the Room 3 massacre --
11 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: You need not continue because the question was,
12 of course you could discuss the first part of the sentence, but to bring
13 it down to the point is the question whether it was to the bring it to the
14 attention of whatever authorities what could prevent or punish those types
15 of crimes, and this, no doubt, is one charge in the indictment. The
16 question of condone, I think is a separate one.
17 So if you could please be so kind and answer, especially the
18 second part of the question.
19 THE WITNESS: That being: Do you think the president of the
20 municipality would have a duty to condemn such an act publicly? Is that
21 the question I am to answer?
22 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: To bring it to the attention of those being
23 responsible for the investigation, the punishment, or to prevent those
24 types of crimes, as you can read it on line 21.
25 THE WITNESS: Certainly he's responsible for, and he's responsible
1 for it -- first of all, he's got to know about it. Was he aware of it?
2 And then he's responsible for certainly doing something about it.
3 MR. KOUMJIAN:
4 Q. Sir, as a person with particular experience in civil conflicts,
5 because I know you had mentioned in being in combat in Vietnam and
6 participating in actions in Afghanistan, is it correct that in a civil
7 conflict, that there is much more than just a military aspect to all
8 operations? There is a political aspect that everyone fighting such a war
9 has to keep in mind? In other words, to use the expression that was
10 popular during Vietnam, "to win the hearts and minds"?
11 A. I'm not sure of winning the hearts and minds is a political aspect
12 from the soldiering aspect, but yes, there are other factors and other
13 activities that are going on outside the military action that impinge on
14 that action.
15 Q. What effect do you believe it would have had in Prijedor if the
16 president of the municipality had brought to light that the military was
17 committing gross war crimes in its attacks on Hambarine, Kozarac, Stari
18 Grad, and in what was happening in these detention camps where thousands
19 of his citizens were being detained?
20 A. I suppose the citizens of those municipalities could see what was
21 taking place. They saw Stari Grad. They saw it decimated. I don't know
22 that the president needed to say anything about it. It was there to be
23 observed and to be seen. With regard to what was happening in the
24 prisoner of war camps, I'm not so sure that he had the information
25 available to him. I don't see any evidence to suggest that he does or
1 did, so I don't know if he knew what was going on in those camps.
2 Q. Sir, I'm not going to put all the evidence that we've heard over
3 the last year to you. I understand you haven't had the opportunity to
4 review it all. But let me just ask you this: If you were the commander
5 of the VRS -- General Mladic, the president of the Municipality of
6 Prijedor, made public statements saying the military in Prijedor is
7 abusing the citizens of Prijedor, committing crimes, these commanders
8 Arsic and Zeljaja will have to go, do you think that that would cause some
9 reaction by the general in charge of the army?
10 MR. OSTOJIC: I object to the form of the question, Your Honour.
11 It calls for speculation and it's an incomplete hypothetical.
12 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Maybe it's appropriate to rephrase this
13 question, in fact.
14 MR. KOUMJIAN:
15 Q. Sir, you testified that the civilian president could have no
16 effect on the military. My suggestion to you is that, in fact, a person
17 publicly identified as the president of the municipality who would
18 publicly condemn crimes committed by military forces in a civil conflict
19 in his municipality, that that would have important repercussions and that
20 the commanders of the army would have to or would be likely to respond to
21 such a public statement?
22 MR. OSTOJIC: Same objection, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: This time dismissed because it's part of the
24 Prosecution's case.
25 THE WITNESS: If such a forceful statement were made, then I
1 presume that the military commanders would investigate and look into the
3 MR. KOUMJIAN: This would be an appropriate time if Your Honour
4 wants to break, or I could go on for a few minutes.
5 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Please go on a few minutes.
6 MR. KOUMJIAN: Okay, thank you.
7 Q. Sir, can you tell us what you know, if you know anything, about
8 the National Defence Council. Have you heard of that body before?
9 A. I don't know anything about the National Defence Council.
10 Q. Did you review the minutes of the Prijedor National Defence
11 Council, perhaps the fairest thing would be to show those to you at this
12 time. If the usher could bring the witness S60 and S28.
13 A. This is the municipal organisation, right? The name National
14 Defence Council has thrown me off track. Yes, I did review some of the
15 documents from the National Defence Council.
16 Q. Can you tell me, sir, what your understanding is as to why the
17 National Defence Council was necessary, why such an organ existed in the
18 former Yugoslavia and under the defence doctrine of the former Yugoslavia?
19 A. It was probably created to -- it was probably created to keep the
20 civilian authorities informed of what might be taking place within the
21 Defence department or whatever it was called in Yugoslavia.
22 Q. Have you heard of the doctrine of all people's defence?
23 A. Does that have to do with the TO organisation and how that's
24 raised up and brought up?
25 Q. Well, let me just ask, are you familiar with the word? I believe
1 it goes beyond that.
2 A. All people's defence. No, I'm not real -- I'm not familiar with
3 that doctrine.
4 Q. Thank you. Sir, are you familiar with the fact that on the 22nd
5 of May, there was a decision by Dr. Stakic to mobilise individuals, that
6 all soldiers report to their units, all of the soldiers that were being
8 A. Yes. This was a situation where mobilisation was being put into
9 action, and people in the local areas were being notified that
10 mobilisation was taking place and were asked to report to certain stations
11 and facilities to make themselves known to the authorities apparently.
12 Q. Thank you. Now, if we could put S28, the first page, on the ELMO,
13 please, and perhaps help you find your own copy.
14 Sir, I'd like you to consider this document in relation to the
15 separate, nonoverlapping chains of command that you talked about in your
16 stove pipe analysis. You see that this is a decision signed by the
17 president of the National Defence Council, Dr. Stakic. And this council
18 was -- and I will inform you of the people's positions -- the members of
19 the council were Dr. Stakic; among the members was Rade Javoric, who I
20 believe was the former head of the TO; Slavko Budimir, who was in charge
21 of the municipal secretariat for people's defence which had to do with
22 mobilisations among other duties; Slobodan Kuruzovic, the new head of the
23 TO; Milan Kovacevic, who had a civilian function; Vladimir Arsic, the
24 commander of the 43rd Brigade; Simo Drljaca, the police chief, Bosko
25 Mandic head of civilian function; and Radmilo Zeljaja, who as you know was
1 the deputy commander at that time of the 43rd Brigade.
2 Among the conclusions the first one has to do with reinforcing the
3 TO, and a war unit, which I believe we've had testimony, 4777 is part of
4 the 43rd Brigade; mobilisation orders in point 2, an order about public
5 enterprises in point 3. Skipping over a few just to get -- point 5 has to
6 do with securing priority communications. Point 6 is a curfew, first let
7 me ask you about that.
8 Do you understand that the curfew in Prijedor would be enforced by
9 the police, the military police, and part of the military, the Territorial
11 A. Is that a question?
12 Q. Well, from reading this particular decision and from what you know
13 about how curfews are normally enforced, would you understand that the
14 police, and according to this decision, the military police and the TO,
15 would enforce the curfew?
16 A. It appears as if the police and the military police and the
17 Serbian TO organisation would enforce the curfew.
18 Q. The seventh point deals with paramilitary units and individuals
19 who possess weapons and ammunition illegally are being called upon to
20 surrender them immediately. And it gives a deadline. The last sentence
21 says: "After this period, the relevant organs will start searches and
22 seizures of any such weapons and ammunition and will apply the most
23 rigorous sanctions."
24 From this document, particularly the last two points, sir isn't it
25 correct that there appears to be significant coordination between the
1 civilians, particularly Dr. Stakic, the military, and the police, and that
2 decisions were made signed by Dr. Stakic and enforced by the military and
4 A. Well, were they enforced? Is there documentation that shows that
5 enforcement did take place? Is this really coordination or is it simply
6 cooperation. Dr. Stakic didn't have any forces at his command that I know
7 of, and so it was decided to have a curfew. In order to have a curfew,
8 you've got to have somebody that will enforce the curfew.
9 So Dr. Stakic apparently, through his signature here, said they
10 were going to use the military police to do that. But did the military
11 police really do it? Did this information go to the military? Did they
12 cooperate in this effort? I don't know. I see that he wrote a plan and
13 an order and instructions, but I don't know what the result was.
14 Q. Do you have any information that would make you believe that this
15 was simply wasting his time, that he wrote this order with no intention
16 that it be carried out and with no authority to have it carried out?
17 A. He could very well have an intention to carry it out, but I don't
18 know that he had the tools, I don't know that he had the mechanism to
19 carry it out. And in my limited investigation here, I haven't seen
20 anything that suggests that he does that. If you can show me something,
21 then maybe we'll be able to agree.
22 Q. Thank you. Trying to avoid showing you new documents, just going
23 with what you've discussed in your own report. Sir, you saw a lot of
24 evidence about weapons being seized and searches for weapons being done in
25 Prijedor by the police and by the military. Correct?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. So in fact there is evidence that this order was carried out.
4 A. I don't know if they were responding to this order, sir. When the
5 military was attacked at the checkpoint and at the roadblock, their
6 response was to go and disarm people. I don't know that they are standing
7 around waiting for Dr. Stakic to say: "Look, here's what happened here,
8 you boys got shot, so you better go and -- in fact, let me write you an
9 order. Let me write this order for you." I don't think that's the way it
10 works. I think the military commander deployed his forces and went out
11 and started chasing people. So I'm not so sure that this piece of paper
12 ties to what happened. It may be an after-the-fact sort of thing where
13 Dr. Stakic tried to make himself look good in the eyes of the public. I
14 don't know.
15 Q. I appreciate that, you don't know.
16 Sir, talking about the Hambarine incident, the information you
17 have about the incident came largely from the testimony of Dr. Mujadzic,
18 who was present shortly after the soldiers were killed. Correct?
19 A. Yes. I believe so, yes.
20 Q. And in fact, Dr. Mujadzic also pointed out that one of the persons
21 at the checkpoint, a Muslim, was wounded. Correct?
22 A. Yes, I believe I recall that, yes.
23 Q. Now, sir, I don't know if you've had any involvement - let me ask
24 you - in investigating, for example, police shootings to see whether they
25 were justified. Do you have any such experience in the military to see
1 whether a shooting --
2 A. No.
3 Q. Okay. Would it be correct, sir, that just the fact that a police
4 officer fires his gun does not mean that the shooting was not justified,
5 was not proper? You're looking quizzical, so I'll try to make it --
6 A. Please, try it again. I don't understand the question actually.
7 Q. Police officers shoot people who haven't fired at them, quite
8 often, I would say in the United States, and isn't it correct that just
9 the fact that the police have shot someone, and even if they haven't fired
10 at the police does not mean that the police were not justified? Let me
11 try again, because my question is bad.
12 Sir, if someone is pointing a gun in your direction and it appears
13 to be of immediate threat, do you have to wait for them to fire the gun or
14 are you justified in shooting at them to protect yourself?
15 A. If someone's pointing a gun at me and I have a gun, depending on
16 the heat of that confrontation, I may choose to shoot them before they
17 shoot me. And that's a personal viewpoint and that's a personal
18 explanation of what might transpire between myself and somebody that's
19 confronting me.
20 Q. From the evidence that you reviewed, would it be correct to say
21 that it cannot be determined by you or I exactly what happened during that
22 shootout where one Muslim was wounded, two Serb soldiers were killed, and
23 that it would take a very detailed investigation in order to determine
24 whether the police at the checkpoint were justified in shooting the
1 MR. OSTOJIC: Let me object to the form of the question, Your
2 Honour, and also what police is he referring to? Is he talking about the
3 members of the Muslim paramilitary that were at the checkpoint, and he
4 should include for it to be complete, that two other soldiers were also
5 injured, not just two killed, in order for it not to be a complete
7 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: I think it is a good point in time to have a
8 break. Before we break, please, are there any objections to the Butler
9 report of the 5th of April 2000? This would be S425.
10 MR. OSTOJIC: My only comment is if the Court would like the
11 entirety of the Butler report, that is only just one section of the
12 report. The report spans in excess of 150-so pages. It's whatever the
13 Court's pleasure is. That includes only just a section of the report
15 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: We can only decide on that what was tendered,
16 and only this part was for special reasons tendered. Do you have any
17 other objections?
18 MR. OSTOJIC: No, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE SCHOMBURG: Then admitted into evidence as S425. The trial
20 stays adjourned until tomorrow, 9.00.
21 [The witness stands down]
22 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned
23 at 1.59 p.m., to be reconvened on Friday,
24 the 21st day of March, 2003,
25 at 9.00 a.m.