1 Wednesday, 10 June 2009
2 [Prosecution Opening Statement]
3 [Open session]
4 [The accused Simatovic entered court]
5 [The accused Stanisic not present]
6 --- Upon commencing at 2.30 p.m.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon to everyone.
8 Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
9 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Good afternoon,
10 everyone in and around the courtroom. This is case IT-03-69-T, the
11 Prosecutor versus Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
13 Just to keep matters short, I establish that in the courtroom
14 appeared Ms. Brehmeier-Metz and Mr. Groome for the Prosecution.
15 You, Mr. Jordash, for the Defence of Mr. Stanisic.
16 And you, Mr. Jovanovic, for the Defence of Mr. Simatovic.
17 Mr. Simatovic is present as well; Mr. Stanisic is not present.
18 Today a report was filed signed by the assistant commanding
19 officer of the UNDU, Mr. Hansen, reporting on what he observed in his
20 communication with Mr. Stanisic. Most important parts that Mr. Stanisic
21 indicated that he feels too unwell to attend court in person, that he was
22 not willing to waive his right to attend court in person, and that he did
23 not express a wish to use the video conference link which is available to
24 him. Then we have a document, "Absence From Court Due to Illness," which
25 was signed by Mr. Stanisic in which he expresses that he is unable to
1 attend court proceedings due to illness, that he has discussed the matter
2 with his counsel, and he did not fill in the box that he understands that
3 he has a right to be present at all trial proceedings and that he,
4 however, waives that right, he has not ticked that box.
5 Further we have just the second page of the absence in court
6 which was filled in and signed by Dr. Eekhof and we also have received a
7 report from Dr. Eekhof dated the 10th of June, 2009, addressed to the
8 Registrar of the ICTY. And if I would summarise that report it would be
9 that it's -- the situation seems to be unchanged in essence.
10 Once we had received this report the Chamber staff has inquired
11 with the parties whether there would be any questions to be put to
12 Dr. Eekhof. The parties expressed that they would have no questions for
13 Dr. Eekhof, and therefore the Chamber thought that it was not necessary,
14 having no questions itself, that Dr. Eekhof should be on standby.
15 Any comments in relation to this? Not Mr. Groome, not by the
16 Stanisic Defence --
17 MR. JORDASH: No, thank you.
18 JUDGE ORIE: -- and not by you, Mr. Jovanovic.
19 [Trial Chamber confers]
20 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber decides that it will proceed in the
21 absence of Mr. Stanisic for the same reasons as were applicable yesterday
22 and which the parties will receive in writing. The situation being
23 unchanged, the decision is the same as well.
24 Whereas yesterday the decision of the Chamber may have come more
25 or less as a surprise to Mr. Stanisic, in which case we granted him
1 15 minutes to see whether he still wanted to join the videolink. Today
2 it's different. Mr. Stanisic could expect a similar decision of the
3 Chamber, and where he expressed already that he would not want to use the
4 videolink facilities, there's no reason to adjourn again and to send him
5 this message and to give him an opportunity that's ...
6 Mr. Jordash, I take it that you consider that a fair conclusion,
7 apart from what you think about the whole situation?
8 MR. JORDASH: Yes, Your Honour, I do.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Then we will proceed.
10 Mr. Groome.
11 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, before I turn the mike over to
12 Ms. Brehmeier-Metz, I wanted to say that the technical problem has been
13 resolved, so we will be playing the videos and the sound. I would like
14 to express my gratitude to Dragan Randelovic who remained late last
15 evening to correct the problem with the equipment. We've also
16 distributed digital versions of the presentation so the Chamber and the
17 Defence can look at some of the slides and the videos that were
18 malfunctioning yesterday, and look at your own convenience. And with
19 that, Your Honour, I would ask Ms. Brehmeier-Metz to continue her
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Have the booths been provided with hard copies
22 of any spoken word in any of the videos?
23 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, they were provided with the slides --
24 so the transcript of the spoken word is on the slide. They have the hard
25 copy of that, they'll have e-court, and they have the full text of our
2 JUDGE ORIE: May I take it that often there is an English
3 translation of the word spoken on the slide or on the video?
4 MR. GROOME: That's correct, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Now, it is the task of our interpreters to translate
6 for us what is said in the original language and not to repeat what
7 someone else may have translated unless these are CLSS translations which
8 meet the standards of this Tribunal.
9 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, the videos have the original speaker
10 speaking in B/C/S, so I'm assuming that that won't be translated. That
11 will go out as it is. And for the English channel, the translation of
12 that is there for the translator to see. So I don't believe there's
13 any --
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but who made those translations?
15 MR. GROOME: Some are CLSS and some are draft translations of
16 that text.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, because we work on the basis of CLSS
18 interpretation and translations. Now I take it that the interpreters
19 would have no problems with the work of their colleagues having provided
20 translations because the same standard of quality applies. If, however,
21 there are any -- any draft translations, then I think it's appropriate
22 that our interpreters would have the original language before them, and I
23 think yesterday I specifically asked for hard copies of any transcript to
24 be available so that, as I said yesterday, the interpreters -- that one
25 has an opportunity to verify whether the words spoken are the same as the
1 words written down, the transcript of the original -- originally spoken
2 words; and that the other interpreter can then translate from that
3 transcript. I would not -- some hesitation to ask them to do anything
4 else than what they're supposed to do, that is, to translate the
5 originally spoken words or to interpret them for us so that we have them
6 originally spoken on the video and audio, and that we have verified
7 translation into English and verified translation in French on the
9 I think I invited you yesterday to provide hard copies of --
10 isn't it?
11 MR. GROOME: Yes, you did, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Well, then I have some difficulties in understanding
13 why what was valid yesterday is not valid today anymore.
14 MR. GROOME: I apologise. My focus was on trying to resolve a
15 pretty significant technical problem. Your Honour, there is one clip of
16 Mr. Seselj where there is the translation on the clip. Perhaps I could
17 check before it's played whether it's -- it may be one of the CLSS
18 translations. It was played and it's been in the possession of the
19 Defence for over a year. I don't believe there's been any dispute about
20 the accuracy of the translation. But certainly if Your Honour's is that
21 it's CLSS, I will try to verify that it is.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that's what we rely on and that's what we are
23 so happy with, the quality of our interpretation.
24 Then let's get started. Let's see whether -- if there's any need
25 to have a further transcript, whether you can provide it. And if not,
1 we'll try to find a solution.
2 My concern was not primarily whether the Defence had it but of
3 course the completeness of the record is also for purposes of, for
4 example, an appeal if ever an appeal would be there. It's for the
5 Appeals Chamber to have complete information.
6 Please proceed.
7 Ms. Brehmeier-Metz, you will continue where you left us
9 MS. BREHMEIER-METZ: I will indeed, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
11 MS. BREHMEIER-METZ: Good afternoon, Mr. President. Good
12 afternoon, Your Honours.
13 Yesterday afternoon I finished off introducing the legal theory
14 of the Prosecution case in relation to incidents charged in the
15 SAO Krajina. The second region in Croatia covered by this indictment is
16 Eastern Slavonia
17 in Slavonia
19 in January 1991 the Serb National Council, or SNC, of Slavonia, Baranja,
20 and Western Srem, which we will from now on refer to by its abbreviation
21 SBWS, was established. The SNC proclaimed the Serbs in Croatia to be a
22 sovereign people with a right to autonomy in February 1991. The area is
23 depicted on slide number 55.
24 At a meeting held at Backa Palanka just across the Danube river
25 in Serbia
1 the so-called Great National Assembly of SBWS. On 25th June, 1991, the
2 very day that Croatia
3 this Great National Assembly declared secession from Croatia and
4 established the Serb Autonomous Region or SAO SBWS. Goran Hadzic who had
5 been the president of the Serbian National Council was elected prime
6 minister designate.
7 The SAO Western Slavonia
8 entity, however, will not play a prominent role in the proceedings before
9 this Court. Suffice it to say that in February 1992, the SAO Western
11 Republic of Serb
12 Goran Hadzic, who is depicted in slide 56, turned out to be the
13 most prominent political figure in the self-proclaimed SAO SBWS. He had
14 been a founding member and president of the Serbian National Council and
15 was elected first prime minister designate and on 25th September 1991
16 prime minister of the SAO SBWS.
17 When the three SAOs in Croatia
18 February 1992, he became president of this newly built entity and
19 remained in that position until December 1993 when Milan Martic took
20 over. Like the political figures in the Krajina, the leadership of the
21 newly created SAO SBWS would also refrain from doing anything without
22 first consulting with Belgrade
23 meet with both Slobodan Milosevic and Jovica Stanisic. He would receive
24 instructions on how to proceed. When he came back to Dalj, he would
25 convene the police and TO commanders and he would frequently mention
1 things he was told by Milosevic.
2 During an intercepted telephone conversation with Karadzic on
3 14th December 1991, Stanisic would say, among others:
4 "I barely convinced Hadzic not to go ..."
5 Thereby again indicating his close connection with the political
6 leadership of SAO SBWS.
7 Like the Krajina, the SAO SBWS also lacked money and resources,
8 and the Government of Serbia provided the region with everything that was
9 needed to support them. During his regular meetings with
10 Jovica Stanisic, Hadzic would continuously address the question of
11 equipping his police force and Stanisic would see that it would be
13 Jovica Stanisic, however, not only exerted his influence during
14 meetings with Hadzic in Belgrade
15 personally came to Eastern Slavonia. Around 19th or 20th September,
16 1991, he arrived in Dalj. We will present evidence that Stanisic
17 screamed at people and berated them because Vukovar, the town that then
18 lay under siege by the JNA, had not surrendered yet. The witness will
19 recall that Stanisic pointed out that they had all the equipment
20 necessary to take the city. He ordered Hadzic to be brought to a meeting
21 in Dalj together with all the TO commanders. Indeed, that meeting took
22 place with Stanisic, Hadzic, and others being present. And in
23 October 1991, as can be seen from slide 57, Stanisic came to see
24 General Arandjelovic accompanied by two members of the Red Berets,
25 Bozovic and Ivanovic, Crnogorac.
1 The person to organise this was Radovan Stojicic, also known as
2 Badza, a member of the Serbian MUP who later became deputy minister of
3 interior of the Republic of Serbia
4 know about him. Stojicic had been the head of the Anti-terrorist Unit,
5 or SAJ
6 He came to SAO SBWS by the end of September 1991, after
7 Jovica Stanisic had come to Dalj and complained about Vukovar. We will
8 invite you to draw the inference that although according to the
9 organisation structure of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs,
10 Stojicic was not Stanisic's subordinate. He was sent by Stanisic in
11 order to ensure that the local police forces would function according to
12 the wishes of the leadership and in order to assist the furtherance of
13 the JCE's common plan, which included the fall of Vukovar. Consequently,
14 Stojicic, a member of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of Serbia, was
15 appointed the commander of the SAO SBWS TO in early autumn 1991.
16 Here on slide 59 we have some photos taken at Stojicic's funeral.
17 We can see Milosevic and Arkan standing close to each other paying their
18 respects, and the right frame of the slide shows Jovica Stanisic also
19 present during the same occasion.
20 Another member of the Serbian MUP who came to be of importance in
21 the SAO SBWS was Radoslav Kostic, also known as Kola or Ante. Kostic had
22 been an agent for the DB from early 1991 onwards. On slide number 60 you
23 see another excerpt from the video taken at Kula in 1997 at the training
24 centre that was named after Radoslav Kostic. Jovica Stanisic pays
25 tribute to his comrade by laying down a wreath at Kostic's memorial. The
1 Serbian DB had been involved in transporting weapons from the JNA
2 barracks at Bubanj Potok, south of Belgrade, to Borovo Selo as early as
3 April 1991. Kostic would oversee the transport of weapons. We will
4 present evidence that huge quantities were arriving from Serbia in the
5 region in June 1991. The weapons belonged to the JNA and the deliveries
6 were organised by the Novi Sad DB with Kostic in charge.
7 Kostic was also involved in forming the SAO SBWS milicija and
8 oversaw their equipment with weapons through the Novi Sad DB. In
9 September 1991, he accompanied Jovica Stanisic to Dalj. Slide 61 shows
10 the amount of financial support that came from Serbia. It deserves to be
11 noted that it was acknowledged that all this did not have any legal
12 foundations and that one planned to continue to provide assistance
14 Another intermediary between the political leadership in SAO SBWS
15 and Belgrade
16 the whole war: Zeljko Raznjatovic, or Arkan. He had begun his career in
17 the 1980s, committing several serious crimes throughout Europe
18 had been a fervent supporter of the Belgrade
20 In 1990, using members of this group, he set up a paramilitary unit
21 called Serbian Volunteer Guard or more notoriously, Arkan's men with its
22 elite subunit, Arkan's Tigers. It was this group that would come to
23 terrorise the non-Serb civilians in SAO SBWS and later in Bosnia
24 openly advocated the commission of war crimes to the men he trained. His
25 second in command was another person who was already introduced:
1 Milorad Ulemek, Legija. They would serve as a shock force, the strike
2 force for the JNA that preferred that some of the more blatantly illegal
3 crimes perpetrated against the population be committed by people like
5 Arkan had a very close working relationship with the Serbian MUP.
6 His unit was supplied by the MUP and he would claim he would do nothing
7 without Jovica Stanisic's knowledge and orders. A few days after the
8 take-over of Dalj, Arkan came to Borovo Selo with some of his men,
9 introduced them as being from the Serbian DB, and showed his ID card,
10 which was a Serbian DB identity card.
11 Many members of Arkan's Tigers would eventually be transferred to
12 the Special Unit of the Serbian DB, the Red Berets or the JATD, Unit for
13 Anti-terrorist Operations, and would receive payments directly from the
14 DB. Slide 64 shows one of these lists, covering the time-period 16th to
15 31st December, 1994
16 as Milorad Ulemek, Legija; Rade Rakonjac, listed as number 3; Jugoslav
17 Gluscevic, number 13; and Vlado Vukotic, number 31. I have redacted a
18 portion of these payment records because they contain the names of
19 protected witnesses who will testify before you. These records will also
20 serve as corroboration of their evidence.
21 Slide number 65 has at the bottom of it an excerpt from a report
22 detailing the type of training that was being conducted in the training
23 centres of the Special Units of the Serbian DB. I would also like to
24 play a short clip in which Arkan, speaking in English, describes his
25 unit's policy toward captured soldiers.
1 [Video-clip played]
2 "Mr. Raznjatovic: We don't take any more prisoners. We're
3 going to kill every fascist soldier we catch."
4 MS. BREHMEIER-METZ: There are other military reports such as the
5 one in slide number 66 that the Prosecution will tender that show the
6 notoriety of Arkan for brutality and criminal conduct that was not only
7 known by the non-Serbs who fled in terror at the sound of his name, but
8 also the JNA, Serb politicians, and most importantly for the purposes of
9 this case, to Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic.
10 In all, the SAO SBWS was never an independent entity. You will
11 hear evidence that Slobodan Milosevic controlled Hadzic through Arkan and
12 Stojicic, and Jovica Stanisic was the link between them and Belgrade
13 Since late 1990, many former members of the milicija, that is,
14 the police forces, had left their office and had established their own
15 milicija groups which operated independently and without any legal bases.
16 In July 1991, Goran Hadzic, along with Radoslav Kostic tried to organise
17 them. Kostic would remain the contact person for the milicija and supply
18 them with what was needed.
19 In the course of time, however, it became evident that Arkan had
20 become so powerful in Erdut and Dalj that those men in the milicija who
21 did not take side with him would endanger their lives. There were many
22 who rather joined Arkan in the crimes that were later committed in the
24 Around the summer of 1991, Hadzic set up a Special Unit that was
25 initially meant to ensure his security. Eventually, this unit was
1 renamed into the Serbian National Security, or SNB, and became a Special
2 Unit with specific powers. It was meant to be the equivalent to the
3 Special Units of the Serbian DB. Goran Hadzic was in overall command.
4 Among those that were of importance within the SNB was
5 Mihajlo Ulemek, Legija's uncle. He, as a member of Arkan's Tigers, was
6 the head of security within the SNB
7 serve as security guards for the government. In the course of this trial
8 we will present evidence that will show how the SNB, together with the
9 local TOs, the milicija, and first and foremost Arkan's men were involved
10 in the grave crimes that were committed in the region during the late
11 1991 and early 1992.
12 In August 1991, Arkan set up a training centre in Erdut that was
13 used not only to train members of his paramilitary group, but also
14 volunteers and TO members. The training centre was well equipped. A
15 report of late October 1991 mentions "large quantities of different
16 infantry weapons, grenade launchers, hand-grenades, Zolja hand-held
17 launchers, et cetera, that Arkan is issuing to whomever he wants."
18 Arkan's, however, was not the only training centre in the region.
19 In December 1991, the DB set up its own training centre near Ilok, just
20 across the border from Backa Palanka. This training centre, which
21 sometimes will also be referred to as Pajzos, served as one of the
22 training camps of the DB for both Red Berets and volunteers. And it was
23 specifically mentioned in Franko Simatovic's speech in Kula in 1997.
24 Crnogorac was in charge of the camp, with Franko Simatovic paying regular
25 visits to it.
1 The Prosecution alleges Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic to
2 be ultimately responsible for seven incidents in Erdut and Dalj between
3 September 1991 and July 1992. As a result of these incidents, non-Serb
4 civilians were forcibly removed from their lawful homes and a total of
5 107 persons were killed, merely because they were not of Serb ethnicity.
6 Arkan's men and the local police set up makeshift detention centres where
7 they would then hold non-Serb civilians under inhumane circumstances for
8 the only reason of being non-Serb. They would constantly beat the
9 detainees and threaten to kill them while they interrogated them.
10 In the course of this opening the Prosecution will not describe
11 all seven of these incidents; two of them may serve as examples as to how
12 the events in SAO SBWS took place.
13 The first incident that the accused are charged with occurred in
14 mid-September 1991. Goran Hadzic himself brought a number of Croat
15 civilians to the police headquarter in Dalj. For the detainees, life
16 turned to be hell. Every night and also during the days some of them
17 were taken out of the cells and beaten severely. You will hear the
18 evidence of one of the detainees, who will describe to you that at one
19 point a man kicked the door of the cell, broke the lock, and entered. He
20 told the detainees, "I want you to know I am Arkan," and looked on while
21 the three men accompanying him started beating the prisoners with iron
23 Around the 23rd of September, 1991, Hadzic and Arkan came back to
24 the detention centre in Dalj. Arkan was accompanied by some 20 of his
25 Serbian Volunteer Guard. They selected two of the detained civilians and
1 let them go. The remaining 11 detainees were then taken out of detention
2 and killed by Arkan and his men. Immediately afterwards, the commander
3 of Dalj police station, a Serb, reported the incident to the ministry.
4 His report is shown on slide number 68. He was removed from his post on
5 1st October, 1991
6 On 9th November, 1991, members of the local TO, SAO SBWS MUP
7 forces and members of Arkan's men arrested at least nine non-Serb
8 civilians in and around Erdut and took them to the TO training centre in
9 Erdut where they shot them dead the following day. Several days later,
10 the widow of one of the men started to make inquiries about her husband.
11 Mihajlo Ulemek intervened and ordered the execution of the rest of the
12 family, whereupon members of the SNB
13 killed the widow, her son, and his wife.
14 Another widow of those men that were killed on 10th November
15 asked for their whereabouts. On 3rd June, 1992, she was arrested by
16 members of the SNB
17 body in an abandoned well in Dalj Planina.
18 It is the Prosecution's case, as summarised on slide 69, that
19 Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic participated in the joint criminal
20 enterprise to forcibly remove Croats and other non-Serbs from targeted
21 lands in the SAO SBWS through organising, training, and financing the
22 direct perpetrators of the crimes in Eastern Slavonia. They also
23 contributed to this common plan by exerting a huge influence on and
24 directing the SAO SBWS government, and in particular Goran Hadzic who
25 would then order and direct the crimes that were committed.
1 As we have seen, the storm that was intended to sweep away
2 anything non-Serb began in the south of Croatia, the Krajina. From there
3 it moved to Eastern Slavonia, where it reached its climax in late 1991.
4 Serb forces would now turn their attention to the areas in Eastern Bosnia
5 that lie on the border to Croatia
6 municipalities that would suffer would be Bijeljina and Zvornik.
7 In order to understand how the joint criminal enterprise applied
8 its programme in Bosnia
9 unique among the six former republics of Yugoslavia, why it presented
10 fundamentally different challenges to the implementation of the joint
11 criminal enterprise's objectives, and why Bosnia tragically suffered some
12 of the gravest crimes committed during the war.
13 In the simplest terms, the characteristic which made Bosnia
14 unique and which must be understood is that, unlike other former
15 republics that had large minority populations that were relatively
16 contiguous, Bosnia
17 disconnected, spread out across the country in a polka-dot pattern, some
18 communities resembling ethnic islands in a sea dominated by some other
19 ethnic groups. What historians and other observers rightly extolled as
20 evidence of the peaceful integration of different ethnicities and
21 cultures would prove to present a special problem for the members of the
22 joint criminal enterprise.
23 What plan did they decide upon to break up this large patchwork
24 of ethnicities and carve out an area that would be dominated by Serbs?
25 One articulation of their plan can be found in a document.
1 Before describing that document and what happened in Bosnia
2 would like to take a few minutes to speak about some of the central
3 people involved in the crimes that occurred in Bosnia.
4 Radovan Karadzic was the first president of the Bosnian Serb
5 government which would eventually be called the Republika Srpska. As
6 such, he had formal authority over the Bosnian Serb Army and the Bosnian
7 Serb police. He has been indicted by this Tribunal and is currently
8 awaiting trial. He made his intentions clear in a speech given on
9 15th October, 1999, which is before you in slide number 71.
10 [Video-clip played]
11 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "This is the road that you want
12 Bosnia and Herzegovina to take, the same highway of hell and suffering
13 that Slovenia
14 Bosnia and Herzegovina to hell and Muslim people to possible extinction.
15 Because Muslim people will not be able to defend itself if it comes to
16 war here."
17 MS. BREHMEIER-METZ: The Prosecution will establish --
18 JUDGE ORIE: One second.
19 MS. BREHMEIER-METZ: The Prosecution will establish with
20 intercept evidence, documents, and testimony the interaction between
21 Jovica Stanisic and Dr. Karadzic, who played a paramount role as a core
22 member of the joint criminal enterprise. The Prosecution will introduce
23 a number of intercepts between Mr. Stanisic and Dr. Karadzic, mostly from
24 the critical period of August 1991 until February 1992. In these
25 conversations, you will hear them discuss both political and practical
1 issues related to the implementation of the joint criminal enterprise's
2 plans, and will understand that the two men realised that what they were
3 discussing was covert and had to remain hidden because you will hear them
4 talk on these intercepts in guarded language, at times even reminding
5 each other of the importance of not saying too much on the phone.
6 In an intercept of 14th December, 1991, Jovica Stanisic tells
7 Radovan Karadzic that he will send his men over into Bosnia to deal with
8 specific problems. Stanisic also refers to "his boys," whom he says he
9 has sent in previously. And finally, Stanisic tells Dr. Karadzic that he
10 will order Goran Hadzic, the Croatian Serb leader from Eastern Slavonia,
11 to do something.
12 Momcilo Krajisnik, shown here with Biljana Plavsic on slide
13 number 72, was a member of the Bosnian Serb leadership during the war.
14 He held a number of senior political positions, including being a member
15 of the National Security Council, the Expanded Presidency of the
16 so-called Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. He was also the
17 president of the Bosnian Serb Assembly. He was convicted of persecutions
18 as a crime against humanity.
19 Biljana Plavsic was a leading Bosnian Serb politician from before
20 the conflict until the war's end. She was notorious for the extremity of
21 her Serb nationalist ideology. She was a member of the collective
22 Presidency of Bosnia
23 Serbian Republic
24 Serb Army. After pleading guilty to the crime of persecution as a crime
25 against humanity, she was sentenced to 11 years' imprisonment.
1 Ratko Mladic was a career JNA officer who became chief of the
2 Main Staff of the Army of Republika Srpska. He has been indicted by this
3 Tribunal and is currently a fugitive. He said, and it is printed on
4 slide number 73:
5 "People and peoples are not pawns nor are they keys in one's
6 pocket that can be shifted from here to there.
7 "We cannot cleanse nor can we have a sieve to sift so that only
8 Serbs would stay or that Serbs would fall through and the rest leave ...
9 I do not know how Mr. Krajisnik and Mr. Karadzic would explain this to
10 the world. People, this would be genocide."
11 A document that articulates the objective of Bosnian Serbs was
12 officially introduced at the 16th Session of the Assembly of the
13 so-called Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on 12th May, 1992. It lays
14 out six strategic objectives for the Bosnian Serb people. In
15 Mr. Simatovic's speech in Kula, he tied the activities of the Special
16 Units of the Serbian DB to those six objectives. The first objective,
17 shown here on slide number 74, is the separation of the Serbian people
18 from the other two national communities.
19 Two: Establishment of a corridor between Semberija and the
20 Krajina. Mr. Simatovic's remark at Kula that his units were involved in
21 the "corridor at Brcko" is a reference to the second strategic objective,
22 to connect lands the Serbs targeted in the western and eastern parts of
24 Three, shown here on slide number 76: Establishment of a
25 corridor in the Drina Valley
1 between Serbs. This corridor was really a large expanse of territory
2 comprising most of the eastern half of Bosnia. Mr. Simatovic refers to
3 his unit's presence in "the Drina."
4 Slide number 77 shows the fourth strategic goal: Establishing a
5 border on the Una and Neretva Rivers
6 Five: The division of Sarajevo
7 operations in Sarajevo
8 And six: The sixth strategic objective was providing the Serbs
9 with access to the sea.
10 As we describe the crimes committed in the six Bosnian
11 municipalities in which the present indictment charges crimes, we ask the
12 Chamber to keep in mind how the locations targeted by the accused and the
13 crimes they perpetrated there advanced the objectives expressed in these
14 goals. With respect to the joint criminal enterprise as it was applied
15 to the unique geography and demography of Bosnia, these goals are clear
16 articulations of the shared intent of the core members of the joint
17 criminal enterprise.
18 In December 1991 a document with the title: "Instructions for
19 the Organisation and Activity of the Organs of the Serbian People in
20 Bosnia and Herzegovina in Extraordinary Circumstances" was promulgated
21 among high level representatives of the Serbian Democratic Party, the
23 as the Variant A and B document because of its contents. When it
24 prescribed the actions to be taken by SDS functionaries, it distinguished
25 between municipalities in which the Serbs were the majority, this was
1 Variant A; and those municipalities in which Serbs were in the minority,
2 this was Variant B. In essence, the document contained precise
3 instructions regarding how local Serbs were to convene and declare a
4 local assembly of Serbian people in the municipality which would then
5 take upon itself the authority to take over the functions of the existing
6 government, including the function of the existing police and security
8 Municipal take-overs proceeded in four steps. The first step was
9 the construction of a system of governance that paralleled the official
10 government, but was for Serbs only; second, the arming of the Serb
11 population; third, the violent armed take-over of non-Serb
12 municipalities; and fourth, the ethnic cleansing, whether through murder
13 or expulsion, of the non-Serb population.
14 Here in slide number 80 is a map of the Special Unit's training
15 facilities. The 13 labelled in yellow are camps that the accused
16 established in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As you can see, they are in areas
17 marked for Serbs by the second, third, and fourth strategic objectives;
18 Eastern Bosnia
19 Semberija in the Krajina, and southern Bosnia along the Una and Neretva
21 In this trial the Prosecution will confine its evidence to just
22 six of the many municipalities that were taken over in this manner.
23 These municipal areas are:
24 (A) Bijeljina, in north-western Bosnia. Our evidence will be
25 confined to the forcible transfer of people from that municipality;
1 (B) Zvornik, the label for Zvornik is in the right-hand column,
2 number six from both the bottom and the top;
3 (C) Bosanski Samac, the label for Bosanski Samac is in the top
4 row, far right;
5 (D) Sanski Most, in north-central Bosnia. Later Mr. Groome will
6 talk about the events in Sanski Most in 1995;
7 (E) Doboj, the label for Doboj is in the top row, second from the
9 (F) Trnovo, near Sarajevo
10 the take-over of this area, but in June and July of 1995, in the
11 aftermath of Srebrenica one of the State Security Special Units, the
12 Skorpions, participated in the execution that followed the fall of
13 Srebrenica by summarily executing six Muslim males.
14 The Special Units of the Serbian DB directly participated in the
15 take-over of each of the other five municipal areas. After the violent
16 take-over of these towns, non-Serbs, predominantly Muslims, were forcibly
17 removed from their homes and their land through the commission of the
18 crimes of murder and persecution, perpetrated with the intent to secure
19 the area for Serbs. Many who were not killed were forced at gunpoint to
20 sign over the property rights to their lands and then placed on a bus to
21 take them out of the area. Others were subjected to unrelenting
22 harassment and persecutory acts which took the form of arbitrary arrests,
23 illegal detention in appalling conditions, beatings, curfews, and
24 frequent, aggressively conducted searches of the homes of non-Serbs.
25 Creating an ethnically pure Serb municipality in a peaceful,
1 multi-ethnic community is hard to imagine in any case. It really
2 stretches our capacity to imagine what such an enterprise would entail
3 when we consider a place like the municipality of Zvornik
4 the war in 1991 had a population that was 54.8 per cent Muslim. After
5 the war, 1997 or 1998, only 0.6 per cent of the population of Zvornik was
7 Mr. Groome will now summarise the evidence of five municipalities
8 in Bosnia
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Ms. Brehmeier-Metz.
10 Mr. Groome, please proceed, and keep in mind the speed of speech.
11 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour. Could I ask what time the Chamber
12 would like to break so that I can be mindful of the time.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Usually the first break is after one and a half
14 hour, which would mean that since we had a late start that that would be
15 in approximately 15 to 20 minutes from now.
16 MR. GROOME: Thank you.
17 Your Honours, on the 24th of March, 1992, about eight days before
18 the Bijeljina take-over, Radovan Karadzic stated, as shown in slide
19 number 81, that soon the Serbian municipalities will begin the take-over
20 process. The take-over of Bijeljina and Zvornik was a well-planned and
21 well-executed --
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jovanovic.
23 MR. JOVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I apologise for
24 interrupting my learned friend from the Prosecution, but also with the
25 previous speaker we were told that those were Bosnian municipalities and
1 Bijeljina was the first one to be listed, but in the third amended
2 indictment Bijeljina does not exist anymore, it has been excluded. So
3 based on the third amended indictment, the Bosnian municipalities within
4 the crime base are Bosanski Samac, Doboj, Sanski Most, Trnovo, and
5 Zvornik. I don't think that we need to hear about the events in
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, Mr. Jovanovic expresses his concerns as
8 to whether in this opening statement you go beyond what is in the
10 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, as Ms. Brehmeier-Metz stated, the
11 Prosecution is still -- there are still counts in the indictment related
12 to the forcible transfer of Muslims from Brioni. While it is true that
13 in the third amended indictment the Prosecution did drop some of the
14 individual counts of murder, it never dropped the forcible transfer. And
15 it has always been the position of the Prosecution that the events of
16 Bijeljina and Zvornik are so inextricably intertwined that the evidence
17 which is led in Bijeljina is absolutely necessary to an understanding of
18 what occurred in Zvornik.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jovanovic, is there any dispute about the
20 forcible transfer still being charged in relation to Bijeljina?
21 MR. JOVANOVIC: [Interpretation] I could understand this if in the
22 broader context of Zvornik the Prosecution speaks of Bijeljina as well;
23 however, in the third amended indictment, Bijeljina has been excluded and
24 all of the events which take -- took place there. It was included in the
25 previous indictment but not in this one. So the events in Bijeljina have
1 been completely dropped.
2 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, if it might assist, Mr. Jovanovic
3 refers to paragraph 64 and 65 of the third amended indictment. Toward
4 the bottom of both of those paragraphs, it will be clear that with
5 respect to counts 4 and 5, deportation and inhumane acts, forcible
6 transfers, that indeed Bijeljina is still very much a part of the
7 Prosecution indictment.
8 JUDGE ORIE: I'll check it.
9 Meanwhile please proceed.
10 MR. GROOME: Your Honours, the take-over of Bijeljina and Zvornik
11 was a well-planned and well-executed campaign that occurred with
12 precision and lightning speed over the course of a few days. The Special
13 Units of the Serbian DB, in this case Arkan's men, established a camp in
15 the signal in the early morning hours of the night of March 31st into the
16 morning of the 1st of April, 1992.
17 Both Bijeljina and Zvornik fell within the first and most
18 important goal, the separation of the ethnic populations, as well as
19 within the second and third strategic goals, the establishment of a
20 corridor to areas targeted by Serbs that lie in central and Western
23 In an effort to shorten the length of this trial, the
24 Prosecution, as just discussed, will no longer seek to prove the killings
25 and persecutions that occurred in Bijeljina. And while we will only
1 prove the crimes against humanity of deportation and forcible transfer
2 with respect to Bijeljina, a basic understanding of what happened there
3 is essential in order for the Chamber to understand who Arkan was and
4 what Mr. Simatovic and Mr. Stanisic knew about him.
5 The brutality of Arkan in Bijeljina was even reported
6 contemporaneously by senior officers in the Yugoslav Army, one of whom
7 saw the awesome potential for unimaginable inter-ethnic crimes, as
8 recorded here on slide number 83. In this contemporaneous report a
9 major-general in the Yugoslav Army complains that movements of his own
10 armoured units were restricted by Arkan and his men.
11 Arkan and his 50 men could hold up a JNA armoured column because
12 Arkan was a core member of the group of people who were behind these
13 crimes. Shortly after the take-over of Bijeljina, we see Arkan and
14 Mrs. Plavsic greet each other with a kiss here shown on slide 84.
15 [Video-clip played]
16 MR. GROOME: It would be Bijeljina where Arkan would cement his
17 reputation for unbridled brutality.
18 Slide 85 shows two photos shot by Ron Haviv, a war photographer.
19 He introduced the world to the brutality of Arkan's men. Shortly after
20 the pictures shocked the world, Arkan himself identified the men in the
21 picture as his to a BBC
22 As a result of the efforts of the joint criminal enterprise and
23 relevant to the indictment now before the Chamber, many of the non-Serbs
24 of Bijeljina were forced out or fled in terror.
25 Your Honours, if there was a colourable claim that the two
1 accused were unaware of Arkan's penchant for extreme violence before
2 Bijeljina, there can be no escaping this knowledge after Bijeljina, as
3 Arkan made his way to his next target: Zvornik.
4 Zvornik is one of the towns that lie on the eastern border of
6 town connected it to Mali Zvornik, its sister town in Serbia. You will
7 hear witnesses describe how in the weeks before the take-over of the
8 town, JNA artillery positions were established in Mali Zvornik with guns
9 pointing towards Bosnia
10 The take-overs of Bijeljina and Zvornik were the product of one
11 well-planned operation. The Prosecution will introduce the transcript of
12 an intercepted telephone conversation, shown here in slide 88, in which
13 Plavsic speaks with Arkan's deputy and asks about how things went in
14 Zvornik and asks him to pass on her request for Arkan to come to another
16 A group of responsible local Serb and Muslim leaders from Zvornik
17 tried tenaciously to keep the peace in Zvornik. During a meeting in
18 which they had reached agreements that would have hopefully prevented
19 violence, Arkan burst into the room, slapped the Serb representative,
20 accusing them of giving away Serb lands. This is referred to on slide
21 number 89. Arkan turned to the Muslim negotiator and gave him an
22 ultimatum. It is in red at the bottom of the slide. Izet Mehinagic
23 would recount these events in a desperate telegram to the
24 Yugoslav People's Army, which is the text above the ultimatum on this
1 On the evening of the 8th of April the take-over was underway.
2 The adult men were separated and at least 20 civilians murdered.
3 Following the take-over, the surviving Muslims of Zvornik were subjected
4 to a reign of terror.
5 Reports like this one on slide number 90 and others we have seen
6 show Arkan's effectiveness at achieving the joint criminal enterprise's
7 goals. They also show notice to the JCE's core members of Arkan's
8 ability to whip up Serbian nationalistic fervor.
9 Kozluk was a small town on the outskirts of Zvornik. After the
10 initial take-over, the predominantly Muslim population sought to reach a
11 peaceful settlement with the Serbs now in power. But on the 26th of
12 June, 1992, the Muslims of Kozluk were told to leave by the Serb mayor.
13 Here is a list of those who were forced out on slide number 91. The
14 mayor told the Muslims that if they did not leave, an all-out attack
15 would be launched which would kill all the Muslims. The Muslims left,
16 but not before Serb authorities made them sign papers giving their homes,
17 land, and personal property to the new government in Zvornik.
18 The deportees were taken along the route shown by the blue line
19 toward Hungary
20 authorities denied them entry because they did not have passports, the
21 deportees were issued Serbian passports, that is, Bosnian nationals were
22 issued with the passports of another country: Serbia. You will recall
23 from yesterday's discussion of the mandate of Mr. Stanisic's department
24 or Mr. Stanisic's ministry, that it included the control of passports.
25 Vojislav Seselj was a core member of the joint criminal
1 enterprise, president of the Serb Radical Party, who formed the Serbian
2 Chetnik Movement, and sent his volunteers to conflict areas of Croatia
3 and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In a videotaped interview with the BBC,
4 Vojislav Seselj would describe the involvement of Simatovic in the
5 planning of the take-over of Zvornik. I will now ask that the video on
6 slide number 94 be played.
7 [Video-clip played]
8 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "The Zvornik operation was planned
9 in Belgrade
10 more numerous. However, the Special Units and the units most eager to
11 fight came from this side. Those were the very police units, the
12 so-called Red Berets, they are the Special Units of the Serbian State
13 Security Service.
14 "It was devised by the key people from the State Security
15 Service, among them Franko Simatovic, Frenki. He was one of the direct
17 MR. GROOME: Your Honours, would that be -- would that be a
18 convenient place to break?
19 JUDGE ORIE: It is, Mr. Groome.
20 How much time would you still need after the break?
21 MR. GROOME: I certainly will finish within the next session,
22 Your Honour. It's hard to judge the precise time, but I can say with
23 confidence that it wouldn't take more than the next session.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Then we'll have a break and we'll resume at a
25 quarter past 4.00.
1 --- Recess taken at 3.50 p.m.
2 --- On resuming at 4.17 p.m.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Before you continue, Mr. Groome, I would like to
4 invite perhaps at a later moment Ms. Brehmeier to explain to us in still
5 number 61 what the billions of dinars are approximately in real money,
6 because I couldn't gain any impression on how much money was really
7 spent. And since I think the economy at that time was mainly done in
8 Deutschemarks, perhaps if a translation into understandable currency
9 could be made it would be appreciated.
10 Mr. Groome, please proceed.
11 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour. Just on that point, as it seems
12 Your Honour is already aware, that was a period of significant hyper
13 inflation where witnesses talk about the price of a quart of milk going
14 up between the time they walked into the store and the time they went to
15 pay for it, but we will make every effort to try to give an estimate of
16 what it was in Deutschemarks.
17 Your Honour, if I might return now to Zvornik. One of the
18 reasons that Zvornik was one of the municipalities selected by the
19 Prosecution is that it clearly demonstrates the intent that the members
20 of the core group of perpetrators shared. The excesses perpetrated
21 against the Muslim population of Zvornik had spiralled into a level of
22 chaos in which no one, not even Serbs, were safe from the criminals
23 turned loose with impunity in the municipality of Zvornik
24 in this report on slide number 95.
25 In a report drafted by Colonel Tolimir about events all over
2 superiors of the men who had perpetrated such grievous crimes in Zvornik
3 with his superiors. Here in slide number 96 he identifies by name
4 Arkan's men, Captain Dragan's men, and Seselj's men. He describes these
5 three groups as being composed of many criminals, even pathological
6 criminals. He states that these formations:
7 "... display hatred of non-Serbian peoples and one can conclude
8 without reservations that they are the genocidal element among the
9 Serbian people."
10 He goes on to say:
11 "War profiteering and looting are the motive for a great majority
12 of paramilitaries."
13 Here on slide number 97 Tolimir enumerates the 30 to 40 million
14 German marks' worth of booty stolen from the area of Srebrenica and
15 Skelani. In the end of July 1992 there was a crack-down against
16 paramilitary forces in Zvornik. In fact, the Serbian DB would itself be
17 involved in the investigation of these paramilitary units. Two
18 paramilitary leaders, the Vukovic brothers, leaders of the Yellow Wasps,
19 would ultimately be investigated and arrested by the Serbian MUP.
20 Your Honours, the two accused contributed to the goals of the JCE
21 in the ways outlined in the box on the right-hand side of slide 98 and by
22 so doing made themselves individually, criminally liable for the crimes
23 committed in Zvornik.
24 All elements of the JCE, except those from the Republic of Serb
25 Krajina on the far left of the diagram, had some involvement in the
1 take-over and ethnic cleansing of Bijeljina and Zvornik.
2 Bosanski Samac, shown here on slide 99, located along the Sava
3 River in north-Eastern Bosnia
4 targeted to create the land bridge between land targeted by Serbs in the
5 east of Bosnia
6 successful conquest and ethnic cleansing of Bosanski Samac would achieve
7 the first and second goals, namely, separation of the ethnic communities
8 and establishment of a corridor, the Posavina corridor as it came to be
9 popularly known.
10 In early 1992 the Serb Crisis Staff of the Bosanski Samac
11 municipality sent 20 local men to be trained in the Red Beret Training
12 Camp in Ilok. These men were just completing their training at the
13 Red Beret camp when the take-overs of Bijeljina and Zvornik were
14 underway. They were airlifted back to Bosanski Samac on JNA helicopters
15 with 30 members of Seselj's men. Before leaving, they were personally
16 briefed by Mr. Simatovic.
17 The day after Arkan announced he had finished his task in Zvornik
18 the attack on Bosanski Samac commenced. Among these 50 men who went to
19 Bosanski Samac, there were others who were trained by the Serbian DB who
20 would work with them in the take-over of the town. Slobodan Miljkovic,
21 also known as Lugar, was present; as were Dragan Djordjevic, also known
22 as Crni; and Srecko Radovanovic, also known as Debeli; and a group of men
23 from Serbia
24 As this report on slide 100 indicates, Crni, one of the leaders
25 of the crimes perpetrated in Samac, was in fact arrested and what
1 happened after his arrest demonstrates the role that both Simatovic and
2 Stanisic played in the take-over of Samac.
3 Another report shown here on slide 101 summarises the types of
4 crimes that Crni and his men were believed to have perpetrated. They
5 include specific allegations including murder and the looting of
6 expensive cars. A local Serb leader recognising the loss of Crni to
7 their efforts to ethnically cleanse Samac went to the Serbian MUP
8 building in search of Franko Simatovic. It was his intention to ask
9 Mr. Simatovic if there was anything he could do to secure Crni's release
10 from the military police. He was unable to find Mr. Simatovic but as he
11 walked in the parking-lot he by chance saw Jovica Stanisic, who he
12 approached and explained the problem to. Mr. Stanisic told him that he
13 would see to the matter by sending a telex to the military. Shortly
14 thereafter Crni was released to continue his crimes.
15 The answer to how Crni, a man whose excesses resulted in his
16 arrest by the Bosnian Serb Army he was fighting alongside of, could
17 promptly be released is perhaps best captured in a report issued by the
18 local military authorities.
19 In this document on slide 102 the author makes the observation
20 that the crimes now being committed in the name of Serbs are comparable
21 to the crimes committed against the Serbs in the Second World War.
22 The basic facts of Crni's release were set out in this Bosnian
23 police report on slide number 103. The Prosecution charges that the two
24 accused contributed to the achievement of the JCE's goals in the ways
25 listed in the box on the right of slide number 104. By doing so they
1 made themselves individually criminally liable for the crimes committed
2 in Bosanski Samac. As in Bijeljina and Zvornik, all elements of the JCE,
3 except those in the Republic of Serb Krajina, were involved.
4 Before the war, the population of Bosanski Samac had been 29.8
5 per cent Croat and 8.7 per cent Muslim. After the war those figures were
6 1.9 per cent Croatian and 1.3 per cent Muslim.
7 Like Samac and Brcko, these municipalities not only had large
8 non-Serb populations that needed to be removed, but they also lay in the
9 corridor or land bridge that was to be created between the targeted lands
10 in west of Bosnia
11 Over 15.000 Muslims would flee Doboj during the take-over. When
12 the war began Doboj municipality was 30 per cent Muslim, 11 and a half
13 per cent Croat, and 50 per cent Serb; by the war's end, it was 0.6 per
14 cent Muslim, 1.5 per cent Croat, 92.5 per cent Serb.
15 Before the take-over of Doboj men from a long list of DB
16 paramilitaries began converging on Doboj including Martic's men from the
17 Krajina. While Arkan commanded his own men and Seselj's men had their
18 own commanders, the remaining men were referred to as Red Berets and were
19 commanded by Rajo Bozovic, a colonel in the Special Units of the
20 Serbian DB. The take-over of Doboj ended on the 3rd of May, 1992. This
21 overwhelming force, many trained and outfitted by Mr. Stanisic and
22 Mr. Simatovic, were able to quickly and decisively seize control of a
23 municipality with a population of 102.549 people covering an area of
24 684 square kilometres.
25 When the town was firmly in Serb control, the campaign of
1 persecutions against Doboj's Muslims began, mirroring what by this time
2 had become the well-known signature of those units: Beatings, arbitrary
3 arrests, interrogations, and murder. Non-Serb homes were aggressively
4 searched and damaged, making it clear that non-Serb families who had
5 lived in Doboj for generations had now better leave.
6 Non-Serb civilians from Doboj were taken into custody and housed
7 in various makeshift detention facilities in and around Doboj. For
8 example, nearly 200 people were imprisoned in a disco. In these
9 facilities the detainees were beaten and some prisoners were taken out
10 and summarily executed. Muslim prisoners were forced to eat pork, in
11 violation of their religious beliefs.
12 In acts of almost unspeakable vulgarity prisoners were compelled
13 to perform sexual acts upon each other.
14 On the 12th of July, 1992, about 50 detainees were taken from the
15 disco and used as human shields. These detainees were placed in front of
16 the Serbian front lines and made to walk toward the front lines of the
17 Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina. When the detainees hesitated, a Serb
18 shot one detainee in the head to encourage the others. When the Bosnian
19 soldiers began beckoning the detainees, calling them to run towards the
20 Bosnian front lines, the detainees broke into a run, the Serbs then
21 opened fire killing 27 of these human shields.
22 So decisive and absolute was the Red Berets' campaign in Doboj
23 that those in the neighbouring municipality of Teslic
24 an example, as indicated in this report shown on slide number 106. The
25 report mentions by name Bozovic, the same Bozovic who Milosevic
1 recognises on the Kula tape. These are but four of the many municipal
2 areas that were taken over by Bosnian Serbs in the spring and summer of
3 1992, take-overs that were marked by the precision of their execution and
4 the brutality of their success. The Prosecution charges that the two
5 accused contributed to the achievement of the JCE goals in the ways set
6 out in the box on the right of slide 107, and by doing so incurred
7 personal criminal liability for the crimes committed in Doboj.
8 Here, different from the previous municipalities, it is also the
9 Prosecution's case that the direct involvement of Martic's men also
10 implicates the individual criminal responsibility of the accused.
11 The overall criminal plan was a success and many municipalities
12 were placed under Serb control in the spring of 1992. To place the
13 crimes committed in these four municipalities in the context of the
14 overall plan of the joint criminal enterprise, it is helpful to look at a
15 series of maps on slides 108 to 115 that show in chronological order the
16 take-over of territory as well as the role the two accused took in this
17 process. It is the Prosecution's case that the rapid, comprehensive, and
18 organised assertion of Serb control over territory in Bosnia-Herzegovina
19 is evidence of the existence of and the effectiveness of the joint
20 criminal enterprise.
21 The take-over process begins when Arkan enters Bijeljina on the
22 night between the 31st of March and the 1st of April. In that first
23 week, over a dozen municipalities would be taken over and placed under
24 Serb control. While some of those municipalities such as Titov Drvar
25 were predominantly Serb and asserting control was primarily done by
1 switching allegiance from Sarajevo
2 as Bijeljina, these municipalities were taken by armed force and the
3 commission of serious crimes against the civilian population.
4 During the second week, the focus of the take-overs would remain
5 on the Drina Valley
6 places like Visegrad, Foca, and Sekovici.
7 THE INTERPRETER: Thank you for slowing down.
8 MR. GROOME: As you have already heard, Mr. Stanisic and
9 Simatovic played a direct role in the take-over of Zvornik and the
10 expulsion of its large Muslim population.
11 In Central Bosnia
12 second week of April.
13 Here in slide 111 we see that in the third week of the take-over,
14 after Arkan would advise that his work was completed in Zvornik, the
15 Special Units of the Serbian DB would turn their attention to the
16 municipality of Bosanski Samac. The take-overs continue along the
17 Drina River
18 Vogosca, part of the greater Sarajevo
19 control this week. Up in the north-western part of Bosnia, in the
20 Bosnian Krajina, Serb control would be forcibly imposed with its by now
21 characteristic crimes in Bosanski Novi and Sanski Most.
22 Serb gains would continue in the Bosnian Krajina into the last
23 days of April when Prijedor, where some of the most grievous crimes of
24 the take-overs were committed. Serb control was asserted over
25 Mrkonjic Grad and large parts of Bosanska Krupa, bringing the border of
1 Serb-controlled lands to the banks of the Una River. The campaign in the
2 Drina Valley
3 encirclement of Sarajevo
4 By the end of April in this 30-day period, 35 municipalities
5 would be taken over, an average of over one municipality per day.
6 While the pace of the take-overs would slow a bit during the
7 following months, the pace of the crimes only accelerated. The accused
8 would send Colonel Bozovic, along with other members of the Special
9 Units, to spear-head the take-over of Doboj, a critical municipality in
10 the Posavina corridor. The encirclement around Sarajevo would be
11 complete with the taking of Hadzici, Trnovo, and Ilidza in May. With the
12 fall of Rogatica and Rudo, the take-over of the municipalities along the
13 eastern border of Bosnia
14 Srebrenica. Also in May, three more municipalities in the
15 Bosnian Krajina would also fall.
16 The Bosnian Krajina would be completely secured by the end of
17 June with the take-over of Prnjavor and Kotor Varos. During June the
18 primary focus of take-overs shifted to the southern areas of Bosnia
19 Nevesinje, Bileca, and Ljubinje would be placed under Serb control as
20 well as Trebinje with the exception of its southern area of Ravno which
21 was controlled at the time by Croatian forces.
22 By the end of the summer with the take-over of Derventa and
23 Odzak, over 50 municipalities would be placed under Serb control to
24 secure the functioning of the Posavina corridor.
25 The two maps you now see on the screen in slide 116 are
1 demographic maps; one from 1991, before the ethnic cleansing campaign of
2 1992; and one from 1997, after the campaign. You may observe by the
3 success -- the success of the joint criminal enterprise as measured
4 statistically in dramatic demographic changes.
5 If you look along the Posavina corridor, that is the horizontal
6 oval at the top of the map, the target of the second strategic goal, you
7 will see a dramatic shift in the population as marked by the change of
8 colour to red.
9 The vertical oval on the right-hand side of the map is the
10 Drina Valley
11 represents the restructuring of the demographic landscape from mixed or
12 Muslim majority municipalities into red, Serb municipalities.
13 These take-overs and subsequent crimes resulted in population
14 shift hundreds of thousands of people. Nearly 400.000 people forcibly
15 removed from their homes.
16 The map on slide 117 shows what happened after the summer of
17 1992. Some additional take-overs would continue. The light blue
18 municipalities show where there will be evidence of involvement of the
19 Special Units of the Serbian DB; and the dark blue municipalities
20 indicate those locations in which the two accused are charged with the
21 commission of crimes.
22 The next charges in the indictment will concern the serious
23 crimes committed toward the end of the conflict in 1995. It would be
24 incorrect for the Chamber to conclude that Mr. Stanisic's and
25 Mr. Simatovic's involvement in Bosnia
1 period -- I'm sorry, throughout this period they were very much involved
2 in joint operations designed to hold onto the targeted lands they seized
3 in 1992 and to resist the Bosnian government's attempts to recapture this
5 You will hear summary evidence of the accused's involvement in
7 they established in Bajina Basta in Serbia, just across the border with
9 I would now like to turn the attention of the Chamber to the
10 crimes charged in the indictment related to Trnovo. The facts of what
11 occurred in Srebrenica in July 1995 have been the subject of several
12 trials in these courtrooms. I will not repeat them here; they are well
13 known. We all know that the slaughter of the Muslim men and boys in
14 Srebrenica marks the single, most egregious atrocity perpetrated against
15 the Bosnian Muslim people.
16 The two accused here in this trial are charged with the death of
17 three men and three boys whose murder was captured on videotape. In
18 order for you to understand the Prosecution's case as to why Mr. Stanisic
19 and Mr. Simatovic are responsible for the deaths of the six, we must look
20 at what is occurring in another part of the country prior to Srebrenica.
21 I want to focus your attention on the north-west corner of
23 which in 1993 had a population of approximately 300.000 people, mostly
24 Muslims. Its local leader, a Muslim man by the name of Fikret Abdic
25 sought to extricate himself from the war in Bosnia by dissociating
1 himself with the Bosnian government and entering into an uneasy alliance
2 with Milosevic in Belgrade
3 with Croatia
4 and shortly thereafter, the Bosnian army was engaging Abdic's poorly
5 trained and equipped men.
6 Abdic turned to Milosevic for help and within a short time
7 Milosevic responded by sending Mr. Stanisic and Mr. Simatovic to the
8 Bihac pocket to command an operation called Pauk, or the Spider.
9 Milosevic sent the two men whom he could rely on for this task.
10 Stanisic would in turn bring with him the men who he had come to rely on
11 in his covert operations in the rest of Bosnia, the Special Units of the
12 Serbian DB led by Colonel Bozovic, Legija, Captain Dragan, and Arkan.
13 They established their headquarters in Mount Petrova Gora in the Krajina.
14 The diary depicted here on slide 120 is one of the commanders in
15 the Pauk operation and shows a number of references to Mr. Simatovic and
16 one of several references to Mr. Stanisic. We can also find references
17 to Mr. Stanisic in the recently acquired diary of Ratko Mladic from this
19 On the 6th of April, 1995, Mladic met with General Perisic,
20 Jovica Stanisic, and others in Belgrade
21 Bihac. As shown here on slide 121, Jovica Stanisic described the support
22 given to both Fikret Abdic and Milan Martic and more importantly said:
23 "I sent 150 men from Slavonia
24 The Special Units of the Serbian DB were to join forces with the
25 Serbian Krajina army as well as Abdic's men.
1 [Video-clip played]
2 MR. GROOME: Two of the three tactical groups formed with these
3 joint forces would be under the direct command of the Special Units of
4 the Serbian DB. The second tactical group would be placed under Legija's
5 command. And the third tactical group would be placed under the command
6 of Colonel Rajo Bozovic. The Skorpions were part of Legija's tactical
8 The Skorpions were first formed after the fall of Vukovar,
9 following a request by the Djeletovci oil company to Milan Milovanovic, a
10 minister of the SAO SBWS - its commander Slobodan Medic, also known as
11 Boca. The unit's task was to protect the oil fields in the Djeletovci, a
12 task at times shared with Arkan's men. The unit grew quickly to include
13 several hundred men. The Serbian DB provided the Skorpions with
14 significant equipment and paid the salaries of its members in cash.
15 Approximately 30 per cent of its members had been trained in one of the
16 Serbian DB training camps in Kula, Mount Tara
17 Its members were also issued with identification papers, identifying them
18 as Serbian DB members. Milanovic was the intermediary between Medic,
19 Simatovic, and Stanisic. In 1996 after the war some members of the unit
20 would remain in the service of the Serbian DB and join the JSO.
21 The two men that you see in this video on slide 122 are Legija,
22 who you have already heard much about, and Slobodan Medic, the man who
23 gave the direct order to kill the six captives in Trnovo.
24 The video is long and I will not ask the Chamber to look at all
25 the relevant parts now, but in one segment you will hear Legija deciding
1 what to do with captured Muslims. His decision, as you might expect, is
2 consistent with his treatment of non-Serbs in other areas of the
3 conflict. Mr. Simatovic would mention this involvement in Pauk in his
4 May 1997 speech in Kula when he said:
5 "In Western Bosnia, the unit was the backbone of Fikret Abdic's
7 The Pauk operation lasted until August 1995.
8 Let me now take you back to Eastern Bosnia, July of 1995. The
9 Bosnian Serbs decided to overtake the UN protected area of Srebrenica.
10 By the end of July, nearly 8.000 Muslim boys and men would be summarily
11 executed. Not all of the murders were committed in the immediate
12 vicinity of Srebrenica.
13 In addition to their presence in the Bihac pocket, Special Units
14 of the Serbian DB were also present in Central Bosnia. The story of the
15 involvement of the Serbian DB in what happened in Srebrenica began about
16 a month before the massacre. In late June the Serbian MUP was active in
17 rounding up Serb men who were believed to be avoiding their military
18 service. Slide 123 is a document recording this. Morale of the Serb
19 soldiers at this stage was very low. There was a high incidence of
21 Many of these men crossed into Serbia to stay with family or to
22 hide among the crowds in Serbia
23 Tomislav Kovac, the deputy minister, reports that on June 23rd he has
24 handed over to the VRS in excess of 1.500 men taken into custody in
1 able-bodied men to go to the front lines in Bosnia, Mladic and Karadzic
2 were still woefully in need of additional troops.
3 In late June of 1995 a meeting was held at the MUP Serbia to
4 decide upon a response to a request for assistance that had been made by
5 the Government of Republika Srpska. In a meeting attended by Arkan and
6 Slobodan Medic, the decision was taken that members of the Special Units
7 of the Serbian DB under the command of a member, Vaso Mijovic, a senior
8 commander in the Special Units, would go to Bosnia and help fight the
9 Bosnian army.
10 Only a few days later on the 30th of June, 1995,
11 Slobodan Milosevic met with Ratko Mladic, Fikret Abdic, and Mile Mrksic
12 in Belgrade
13 Jovica Stanisic. Again, General Mladic made notes about this meeting.
14 They discussed the support to be given to the Republika Srpska and
15 Slobodan Milosevic specifically asked Stanisic to solve the logistic
17 In response, Jovica Stanisic proposed to send more men in
18 addition to the men he had already provided; 80 men from Erdut, namely
19 Arkan's men; and 80 men from Djeletovci, namely the Skorpions. Slide 124
20 shows an entry from Mladic's diary regarding this.
21 I would now draw your attention to slide 125 and would like to
22 return to a portion of the Skorpion videotape that shows their arrival on
23 the 26th of June.
24 [Video-clip played]
25 MR. GROOME: After the religious ceremony I showed you at the
1 start of this opening, a ceremony which took place in Djeletovci, this
2 large group travelled to Pale in a Serb-controlled area just outside of
4 slide 125, an RS MUP report records their arrival and their planned
5 deployment to the Trnovo battle-field the next day.
6 The map on slide 126 --
7 [French on English channel]
8 MR. GROOME: The map on slide 126 shows the relationship between
9 Pale, Trnovo, Sarajevo
10 used as the command post. During the course of the trial you will get a
11 sense of the size of this operation by seeing the many paramilitaries
12 gathered in Jahorina. One of the ways we can track the presence of the
13 Special Units of the Serbian DB is that they sustained significant and
14 regular casualties in the Trnovo area. Slide number 127 shows a chart of
15 some of the documents that the Prosecution will introduce establishing
16 that throughout this period Special Units of the Serbian DB were present.
17 Another senior member of the Special Units I would like to
18 introduce you to is Vaso Mijovic. It was him that commanded the Special
19 Units while they were operating in Trnovo. When Srebrenica fell on the
20 11th of July, a column of 10.000 to 15.000 Bosnian Muslim men and boys
21 fled. The column was hit by Bosnian Serb artillery on the 12th, and
22 those who survived the artillery barrage, several thousand, were
23 captured. These prisoners were systematically executed at a variety of
24 places between the 13th and 17th of July, 1995. Some of the captured
25 were distributed for execution outside the Srebrenica area.
1 Approximately 15 captives were given to the Skorpions as their complement
2 of detainees to be killed. Some of these prisoners were delivered to the
3 Skorpions at their base in Trnovo.
4 Slide 129 shows a report of Mijovic on the official letter-head
5 of the Special Units of the Serbian DB, at this stage officially called
6 the Unit for Anti- Terrorist Operations or JATD. On the 19th of July,
7 Mijovic notifies his counterparts in the Republika Srpska Ministry of
8 Internal Affairs that he was ordered to pull back from the zone of combat
9 to "undertake other assignments." What those assignments were the report
10 does not say. We do know that this is around the period in which the six
11 captives were killed.
12 Slobodan Medic and a group of Skorpions put six of the captives
13 in a truck and drove them to an isolated area near Trnovo to kill them.
14 Medic ordered that what they were about to do be videotaped. Slide 130
15 contains a short excerpt of that video. It does not include the actual
17 [Video-clip played]
18 MR. GROOME: The Skorpions shouted abuse at the prisoners, kicked
19 them -- kicked them and taunted the youngest boy that he would die a
20 virgin. The six almost certainly knew that they were about to die. They
21 were made to wait while the truck driver went into town to get a newly
22 charged battery for the camcorder. Once the camcorder was ready, four of
23 the prisoners were made to stand in a line while the other two were
24 forced to lay in the grass. The four standing up were then shot one by
25 one. After the first was shot in the back, the others were made to walk
1 to the spot where the previous victim had just fallen to stand and wait.
2 As some of the victims twitched in the grass, additional shots were fired
3 into their heads to ensure that they would not survive. The two who had
4 been forced to lie in the grass were made to carry the bodies into a
5 nearby house. The Skorpions then shot and killed the two remaining men.
6 In this report of the 24th of July, 1995, shown on slide 131, we
7 can tell by this rotation report that the Skorpions returned to their
8 regular duties. Here the staff commanders remarks that the rotation of
9 troops between the Banja Luka special police and the Skorpions has gone
11 It is the Prosecution's case, as summarised here on slide 132,
12 that the Skorpions were one of the units of the Serbian DB and that the
13 accused are criminally responsible for killing of the three men and three
14 boys in Trnovo. In this case, these members of the units of the DB under
15 the command of a senior DB officer, Vaso Mijovic, were made available to
16 Karadzic, Mladic, and other core members of the joint criminal enterprise
17 to perpetrate crimes in furtherance of their common criminal purpose.
18 Around the same time-period, Arkan was in the municipality of
19 Sanski Most. He was there primarily to frighten deserters from the
20 Bosnian Serb army into holding the front lines against the Croatian
21 forces who were by now re-taking some of the territory lost to the Serbs
22 in 1992. We can see from this report in slide 134 that Mr. Stanisic is
23 in direct contact with Arkan on these matters. While in the municipality
24 of Sanski Most, a place that after 1992 had a few Muslims left, Arkan
25 engaged once again in his characteristically brutal crimes. His presence
1 there was part of a larger Serbian DB operation that encompassed not only
2 Sanski Most but Mrkonjic Grad, Kljuc, and Prijedor. This coordinated
3 mission involved the Special Units of the Serbian DB commanded by
4 Rajo Bozovic; Arkan's Tigers were under his command.
5 In mid-1995 advances by the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina threatened
6 to re-take Sanski Most from the Serbs. To prevent this, Arkan's Tigers
7 were sent to Sanski Most. On the 19th of September, Arkan's men arrived
8 in large numbers and rounded up any remaining Muslims they could find.
9 They were imprisoned in the Hotel Sanus in appalling conditions, 30 of
10 them were kept in the hotel's small boiler room, a room from which they
11 were occasionally removed in order to be beaten. Two detainees died from
12 this brutality.
13 On September 20th, 1995, Arkan's Tigers took at least 12 men from
14 the Hotel Sanus to a house in the nearby village. There the men were
15 shot two at a time in the back of the head. The last two victims had
16 their throats slashed when Arkan's men ran out of bullets.
17 On the 21st of September, Arkan's Tigers took another group of
18 approximately 65 Muslims where they were executed in a similar manner.
19 Several days later several hundred Muslim detainees were placed
20 on a bus and expelled from Sanski Most.
21 One month later, on the 23rd of October, 1995, following the
22 events in Sanski Most, Radovan Karadzic would publicly give an award to
23 Arkan. He was now leaving Bosnia
24 that his presence in Bosnia
25 Bijeljina where it had begun. I would turn your attention to slide
1 number 135 while I play this video.
2 [Video-clip played]
3 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "For the guard and for you as
4 commander of the guard.
5 "Thank you very much, Mr. President.
6 "With a lot of gratitude for your presence here. It's not the
7 end. This is --
8 "Thank you very much. Would you like to address the guard."
9 MR. GROOME: It is the Prosecution's case -- it is the
10 Prosecution's case that the accused are criminally responsible for the
11 crimes committed in Sanski Most because Arkan was a co-member in the
12 joint criminal enterprise and a member of the Serbian DB units. The
13 accused provided Arkan with some of the support and military supplies he
14 needed to perpetrate these crimes. It is also the Prosecution's theory
15 that they are responsible, having made members of the Special Units of
16 the Serbian DB available to other members of the joint criminal
17 enterprise, in this case Radovan Karadzic, who directed them to
18 perpetrate crimes in furtherance of the common criminal purpose.
19 After NATO finally struck some Bosnian Serb positions, Mladic's
20 troops took UN peacekeepers hostage in June 1995 and placed them as human
21 shields on potential targets. Milosevic, immediately recognising the
22 jeopardy this placed Serbia
23 Stanisic to intervene, to go with Simatovic, and with the full authority
24 of Milosevic to return with the hostages unharmed.
25 The Prosecution does not deny Mr. Stanisic or Mr. Simatovic any
1 of the honour or respect they have earned and deserve in this display of
2 courage, freeing the hostages and perhaps even saving their lives.
3 Should the Court find them guilty of crimes after this trial, the
4 Prosecution will join the Defence in submitting that their deeds during
5 the hostage crisis merits consideration by the Chamber in assessing an
6 appropriate sentence.
7 It is the Prosecution's case, however - and there can be no
8 mistake regarding this - the authority Mr. Stanisic and Mr. Simatovic
9 commanded that day, the day they decided to use their authority and their
10 ability to save lives, is tragically the very same authority and the very
11 same ability that they had used more often over the prior four years to
12 take lives, to persecute innocents, to drive people from their homes.
13 The reason Mr. Milosevic sent them there during the hostage
14 crisis, one of the most tense and volatile events during the war, when
15 all the eyes of the world were fixed on what might happen to these
16 UN peacekeepers, the reason he sent them there was because they, like no
17 one else, had the capacity to walk in among this madness and come out
18 with the hostages unharmed.
19 I would like now to turn to the indictment itself and offer a
20 brief explanation of the charges and the Prosecution's theory of the
22 The indictment charges both accused with crimes against humanity
23 in violation of Article 5 of the Tribunal's Statute and violations of the
24 laws and customs of war, in violation of Article 3 of the Statute.
25 Slide 137 is a summary of the indictment against Mr. Stanisic and
1 Mr. Simatovic.
2 The crimes against humanity are enumerated in Counts 1, 2, 4,
3 and 5 of the indictment and are respectively: Count 1, the crime of
4 persecution in violation of Article 5(h); Count 2, murder in violation of
5 Article 5(a); Count 4, deportation in violation of 5(d); and finally
6 forcible transfer, one of the inhumane acts prohibited under Article 5(i)
7 of the Statute.
8 The crime of murder is also charged as a violation of the laws
9 and customs of war and it is charged in Count 3 which charges murder as
10 recognised by Common Article 3(1)(a) of the Geneva Conventions of 1949
11 and punishable under Article 3 of the Tribunal's Statute.
12 It is the Prosecution's case that the accused are individually
13 criminally responsible for these crimes pursuant to Article 7(1) of the
14 Tribunal's Statute in that they participated in these crimes with the
15 requisite intent in the following ways:
16 They committed the crimes as members of and participated in a
17 joint criminal enterprise whose goal and purpose was to perpetrate these
18 crimes; they participated in the planning of these crimes; they ordered
19 some of the crimes in this indictment; they aided and abetted in the
20 planning, preparation, and execution of the crimes charged in this
21 indictment. Further, that with the requisite mens rea they aided and
22 abetted in the planning, preparation, and execution of the crimes.
23 It is the Prosecution's case that both accused were part of and
24 helped form a joint criminal enterprise, a criminal enterprise conceived
25 at the highest levels of the Government of the Republic of Serbia
1 with core members from the affected regions in Croatia and Bosnia
3 plan designed to secure exclusively for Serbs land lying in Croatia
4 Bosnia-Herzegovina. To acquire these targeted territories this criminal
5 enterprise would envisage the large and rapid removal of the non-Serb
6 population by the perpetration of the crimes of murder and persecution.
7 Crimes of this magnitude are always the product of a collective,
8 a large group of people who work together to realise their common
9 criminal purpose. The intent to commit the crimes charged in this
10 indictment can be found in all levels of the organisations that were
11 involved in their commission. This case will focus on the highest
12 echelon of those co-perpetrators, the most senior participants.
13 It is the Prosecution's position that at all times relevant to
14 this case these core members shared the intent to remove non-Serbs from
15 designated parts of Croatia
16 acts. The glue that bound them together, that harmonised their
17 individual contributions, that ensured that they worked in unison toward
18 a common goal was the shared criminal intent.
19 The jurisprudence of joint criminal enterprise has evolved to
20 recognise that such criminal enterprises may come to take several forms,
21 as shown on slide number 140. These different forms reflect the nuances
22 between the different ways in which co-perpetrators can join, conceive
23 of, and implement their criminal plans.
24 While the actus reus
25 identical, they are distinguished based upon their mental element or mens
2 The evidence you will hear in this case is consistent with two
3 forms of joint criminal enterprise.
4 JCE 1, which is sometimes referred to as the basic form,
5 conceives of criminal responsibility for members of a criminal enterprise
6 engaged in a common criminal agreement to commit a specific crime. While
7 each member may carry out a different role in the commission of the
8 crime, they nonetheless each intend for that specific crime to be
9 committed and contribute to it.
10 This is to be contrasted with JCE 3, sometimes referred to as the
11 extended form, in which the crime charged, while not part of the
12 originally intended crime, is nonetheless a natural and foreseeable
13 consequence of the implementation of that criminal purpose.
14 With respect to this case, firstly, most importantly, and the
15 principal legal theory of the Prosecution is that Jovica Stanisic and
16 Franko Simatovic were members of the core group of co-perpetrators that
17 conceived of the crimes contained in this indictment. At all times
18 relevant to these charges they had the shared intent to forcibly remove
19 non-Serbs from designated areas in an effort to effect fundamental
20 demographic changes in the population. The intent that they shared was
21 not only to forcibly remove these targeted groups of non-Serbs, but they
22 shared the intent to kill them and to persecute them as a means to
23 realise their goals.
24 How do we know that they shared this intent? There will be much
25 evidence from which the Chamber may conclude that the two accused shared
1 the criminal intent of other core members such as Martic, Karadzic,
2 Hadzic, Mladic. I will confine myself to a single example now.
3 In Zvornik fighters belonging to Seselj, Arkan, and a group
4 called the Yellow Wasps, the Vukovic brothers, were all engaged in the
5 commission of serious crimes there. You will hear evidence that the
6 Yellow Wasps were investigated by Mr. Stanisic, by the Serbian State
7 Security, and subsequently arrested by the Serbian Ministry of Internal
8 Affairs. They were ultimately prosecuted in a Serbian court for crimes
9 they committed in Bosnia
10 proper to investigate and arrest the Vukovic brothers, the question that
11 is raised is: Why wasn't similar action taken against Seselj's men or
12 Arkan's men? Not only was action not taken but you will be presented
13 with evidence that the crimes they committed after Bijeljina and Zvornik
14 were facilitated and supported by the two accused. It is the
15 Prosecution's case that the only reasonable conclusion that can be drawn
16 from this is that Arkan and Seselj were among -- that Arkan and Seselj
17 were among the core members of the JCE and that Stanisic and Simatovic
18 shared their intent to perpetrate the crimes in Zvornik.
19 The evidence is also consistent with what is commonly referred to
20 as joint criminal enterprise 3. The two accused as well as the other
21 core members of the joint criminal enterprise shared the intent to
22 forcibly remove non-Serbs from designated areas.
23 Under this theory even absent a finding that the accused shared
24 the intent to murder and persecute Muslim and Croats, they would remain
25 liable if they shared the intent to forcibly remove these non-Serbs and
1 they willingly accepted the proximate and foreseeable risk that this
2 forcible removal of people would result in the commission of murders and
4 In the context of this case, the accused having joined with
5 others possessing the shared intent of forcibly transferring people from
6 their homes bear individual criminal responsibility for the crimes of
7 persecution and murder which are reasonably foreseeable.
8 The Prosecution will establish with compelling evidence that over
9 the course of the duration of the joint criminal enterprise statements by
10 other participants in the criminal plan and reports in the media of the
11 notorious crimes made it abundantly clear to the two accused that the
12 campaign of ethnic cleansing unleashed their plan -- unleashed by their
13 plan involved the strong probability and in time the certainty that
14 murder and persecution would result from it, and with that full
15 awareness, they willingly proceeded knowingly assuming the risk that such
16 grave crimes would occur.
17 As I have previously said, the actus reus for JCE 1 and JCE 3
18 are, except for slight nuances --
19 THE INTERPRETER: Thank you for slowing down.
20 MR. GROOME: I'm sorry. First, that there be a plurality of
21 persons. Given the large collective nature of these crimes, we can in
22 practical terms only identify for you and present evidence regarding
23 those members we believe to be the core members of the joint criminal
24 enterprise. These are the people indicated on the chart we have used
25 several times over the course of this opening.
1 The second actus reus
2 purpose which amounts to or involves the commission of a crime under this
3 Statute. It is the Prosecution's case that each of the crimes charged in
4 this indictment was a purpose of the joint criminal enterprise.
5 The third actus reus
6 furtherance of the common criminal design in a manner that assists in its
7 achievement, contributes to it, materially helps its execution in a
8 significant way.
9 I will now in a very summary fashion using slide 143 to identify
10 the acts of participation which the Prosecution allege incur criminal
11 liability for Mr. Stanisic and Mr. Simatovic.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, constantly the interpreters, both French
13 and B/C/S, are approximately one or two lines behind. Give them an
14 opportunity to take a breath now and then. That will certainly be
16 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
18 MR. GROOME: With respect to the Krajina, it is the Prosecution's
19 case that their efforts to organise, finance, train, and equip Martic's
20 men and army, thereby enabling them to perpetrate the serious crimes they
21 did against the non-Serb population of the Krajina, was an act of
22 participation in the overall joint criminal enterprise.
23 Similarly, with respect to the SAO SBWS, it is the Prosecution's
24 case that the accused's acts of participation in the joint criminal
25 enterprise were in part financing and equipping Arkan and his men who
1 directly perpetrated the crimes. With respect to both the Krajina and
2 the SAO SBWS, Mr. Stanisic and Simatovic gave direction to the local
3 political leaders, including Martic, Babic, and Hadzic to ensure that
4 their political activities also advanced the goals of the common criminal
6 Finally, even if after the conclusion of this case the Chamber
7 has a reasonable doubt about whether Mr. Stanisic and Mr. Simatovic
8 directly funded and equipped Arkan, you would still -- they would still
9 be responsible for his crimes, the crimes of another co-member in a joint
10 criminal enterprise, if the Chamber was satisfied beyond reasonable doubt
11 that they were in fact part of the same joint criminal enterprise.
12 With respect to the Bosnian municipalities that Mr. Stanisic and
13 Mr. Simatovic had a role in their take-over in 1992, it is the
14 Prosecution's contention that their culpable acts of participation in the
15 JCE included: Planning the attacks; providing training, arms, equipment,
16 and funding; and in some instances, they also arranged military transport
17 for the direct perpetrators of the crimes.
18 In the event the Chamber finds that the evidence does not permit
19 an inference that they directed immediate perpetrators of these crimes
20 and in fact that it was Bosnian Serb leaders alone who directed them to
21 commit crimes, the Prosecution's case would be that placing these men and
22 this equipment at the disposal of another core member of the JCE to use
23 to advance the criminal purpose of the JCE also incurs liability.
24 With respect to Trnovo, their acts of participation include
25 deploying the Skorpions which, it is the Prosecution's case, were part of
1 the Special Units. Also, if the evidence does not suggest that they
2 personally knew of the killings of the six males, it is the Prosecution's
3 case that by placing their men at the disposal of other members of the
4 JCE, in this case Mladic and Karadzic, also incurs to them liability for
5 the crimes they committed under the direction of these other core
7 With respect to Sanski Most, as you request see on slide 145, the
8 Prosecution's case is similar to our case with respect to other crimes
9 perpetrated in Bosnia
10 Finally, Your Honours, in such a large collective crime, the
11 jurisprudence of the Tribunal in the Brdjanin appeal judgement recognised
12 that those most responsible for these serious crimes are also those most
13 removed from them. It considers that those high-level members of the
14 enterprise can and do use others to directly perpetrate the crimes they
15 intend, and as such bear individual criminal responsibility. Under this
16 theory, the core members of the joint criminal enterprise, sharing a
17 common intent to remove non-Serbs used others to directly advance their
18 criminal goals.
19 Those they used may or may not have also shared their intent, but
20 this theory holds that even absent proof of a shared intent with these
21 perpetrators, the accused are criminally responsible because they
22 employed these people as instrumentalities of their criminal plan.
23 To give you an example from this case, I remind you about what we
24 have already said about Bosanski Samac.
25 When it became necessary, Jovica Stanisic would personally
1 intervene to have one of the primary perpetrators released, a man named
2 Crni, so that he could return to Samac and continue his crimes.
3 Did Crni and Stanisic share the same intent? Probably, but even
4 absent a finding that they did share the same intent, Mr. Stanisic and
5 Mr. Simatovic bear responsibility for the crimes of Crni if the Court
6 finds that Crni was used as an instrumentality of the joint criminal
7 enterprise to perpetrate its objectives.
8 It is the Prosecution's case that Mr. Stanisic and Mr. Simatovic
9 are responsible for and participated in the crimes charged in several
10 ways as set out in the indictment and the pre-trial brief. It is not our
11 case that each crime relied on only one mode of participation. Given the
12 size of the Special Units and the breadth of Stanisic's and Simatovic's
13 activities, it is most often the case that in any one criminal event
14 their involvement in these crimes can be discerned in more than one way.
15 The indictment also alleges that the two accused planned the
16 crimes charged. It is the Prosecution's position that Stanisic's and
17 Simatovic's establishment of 26 training camps, provision of instructors,
18 supply of military weapons and logistical equipment to the direct
19 perpetrators of the crimes is evidence upon which the Chamber could
20 reasonably conclude they engaged in acts of planning as defined by the
21 jurisprudence of this Tribunal.
22 The Chamber will recall slide number 42. In the Krajina, someone
23 by the name of Milojevic referring to things going according to "training
24 plan." You will also recall the statement of Vojislav Seselj in which he
25 identifies Mr. Simatovic as the mastermind behind the plan for the
1 take-over of Zvornik.
2 Ordering. According to the jurisprudence of this Tribunal,
3 ordering concerns a person in a position of authority using that position
4 to persuade another to commit an offence under the Statute. The order
5 can be explicit or implicit and can be proved with circumstantial
6 evidence. It is the Prosecution's case that the evidence will support a
7 conclusion by the Chamber that Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic sent
8 Arkan to the several municipalities in the indictment where he committed
9 crimes. And even if they did not explicitly tell him to commit the
10 crimes of murder and persecution, in the context of their knowledge that
11 everywhere he went he committed these crimes, the only conclusion that
12 can be drawn is that their directing him to a particular location with a
13 non-Serb population was an implied order to perpetrate the crimes of
14 murder and persecution there.
15 I will not spend any time discussing aiding and abetting at this
16 stage. All of the acts the Prosecution attributes to Stanisic and
17 Simatovic could be the basis of participation as an aider and abettor.
18 Your Honours, in the indictment the Prosecution alleges that the
19 accused committed these crimes by their acts and omissions. I would like
20 to take just a few minutes to expound on what is meant by that phrase.
21 The word "omission" actually has two distinct meanings according
22 to the jurisprudence of the Tribunal. One use of omission is as a form
23 of criminal liability; the other use is a description of a factual
24 situation from which inferences can be drawn. Omission as a legal form
25 of ideal liability imagines a situation in which an accused has a legal
1 duty toward the victim. For example, a legal duty to protect. It is not
2 the Prosecution's case that Mr. Stanisic or Simatovic had an affirmative
3 legal duty to ensure the welfare of the victims of crimes in Croatia
5 Omission as it applies to a factual determination from which
6 inferences can be drawn is how the Prosecution uses the word "omission"
7 in this case.
8 For example, if over the course of this case the Chamber takes a
9 view of the evidence that despite receiving information about the crimes
10 which were being committed as a result of their contribution to the joint
11 criminal enterprise and that in the face of that knowledge they failed to
12 take any corrective measures such as instructing the members of the
13 Special Units to refrain from criminal conduct, then the Court is
14 entitled to draw the reasonable inference that such omission constituted
15 encouragement, material support to the direct perpetrators of the crimes,
16 because they were emboldened by the failure of Stanisic and Simatovic to
17 take any corrective action.
18 You have seen a video of Arkan on the veranda of his shop in the
19 middle of Belgrade
20 hear other evidence that he and his men were a regular sight in Belgrade
21 They moved openly, dressed in uniform, carrying military weapons, often
22 in cars with tigers painted on the hood.
23 His ability to travel freely around Belgrade under the nose of
24 Stanisic, whose legal responsibility, if you recall, included the control
25 of extremist groups; Arkan's confidence in his own impunity, a result of
1 Mr. Stanisic's failure to ever take action against him, materially
2 advanced the crimes Arkan committed in addition to the accused's positive
3 acts of directing and supporting Arkan's crimes.
4 Your Honours, this brings to a conclusion the Prosecution's
5 summary of its evidence and overview of why it alleges that
6 Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic are criminally responsible for the
7 crimes charged in the indictment.
8 I thank you for your time and attention. As we prepare to call
9 our first witness later this month, I give the Chamber as well as
10 Mr. Stanisic and Mr. Simatovic my assurance and the assurance of
11 Mr. Brammertz that the Prosecution will conduct its case according to the
12 highest standards of fairness and justice, enabling this Chamber to reach
13 a fair and just adjudication of the charges against the accused.
14 Thank you, Your Honours.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Groome.
16 There apparently was one contested issue. Mr. Jovanovic, I think
17 it would be wise that -- one way or another that you agree with the
18 Prosecution on what is still part of the indictment or not, and if it
19 would assist you -- let me just have a look whether I still have it
20 somewhere. In the decision, I think it was a decision of April 2007,
21 wherein the ten incidents were struck and not to be led any evidence,
22 there -- of course it clearly says that we still have Counts 1, 4, and 5
23 which are broader. So therefore -- and of course we find especially
24 under 4 and 5 we have Bijeljina mentioned. So to say nothing in
25 Bijeljina is part of the indictment anymore -- if that is your view, then
1 I think we rather settle or come to conclusions in the beginning of the
2 trial rather than at the end. I don't know whether you want to further
3 discuss it with Mr. Groome and Ms. Brehmeier-Metz or -- at this moment
4 the indictment is as it is, just I encourage and urge the parties to come
5 at least to an understanding which is not so much apart from it.
6 So I encourage you to understand that. And if any matter there
7 remains, then perhaps it might be wise to address the Chamber in the
8 early stages of the proceedings.
9 Is there -- I was just wondering where exactly that was -- no,
10 it's not on my screen anymore, but it's the second part of the decision.
11 I don't know whether it was April or not, but the decision in
12 which it's explained what it means that the ten incidents are taken out,
13 whereas 18 remain, and there specific reference to the broader charges is
14 made in that decision. This just as guidance for you.
15 It will be quite a while before we resume. Is there any
16 procedural matter that we need to address at this moment before we
17 adjourn until the 29th of June?
18 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, this was a matter I raised in an e-mail
19 to your staff earlier today, but it would be helpful for the Chamber
20 [sic] to have some idea about how the Chamber will calculate the amount
21 of time allotted for cross-examination in the scheduling of witnesses.
22 So if a witness were to take, let's say, an hour in examination-in-chief,
23 if you could give us some idea about what the cross-examination time
24 would be, it would be helpful to schedule the next witness.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. At the same time much depends in that respect
1 on whether it's a 92 bis witness, whether it's a 92 ter statement, or
2 whether it's a viva voce witness because that makes quite a difference,
3 but we'll pay attention to it and we'll try to give you the guidance
4 you're asking for. It sometimes also depends on the subject matter of
5 the testimony. If it's highly contested, then of course there might be a
6 request for more time for cross-examination, whereas if it is crime base
7 and only contested at a certain level, it might be different. But we'll
8 try to assist you as good as we can.
9 Any other matter?
10 Ms. Brehmeier-Metz.
11 MS. BREHMEIER-METZ: Yes, Your Honour had requested me to find
12 out about --
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, about the Deutschemarks.
14 MS. BREHMEIER-METZ: -- the Deutschemarks of the number that was
15 mentioned on one of the slides, slide 61, and I'm happy to say that after
16 quite a bit of calculating I have come up with two numbers that I can
17 give to Your Honours. Apparently at that point in time in late 1991,
18 there were an official currency rate and a kind of semi-official currency
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
21 MS. BREHMEIER-METZ: The official one was 1 Deutschemark
22 amounting to 13 dinars, which would calculate the number given on the
23 slide to approximately 93 million Deutschemarks. And the semi-official
24 currency rate was 33.5 dinars, which would make approximately
25 36 million Deutschemarks. And all of that related to old Yugoslav dinars
1 and not the new ones that were later established.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So anything around 50 million Deutschemarks.
3 That's -- thank you for that information.
4 Any matter?
5 Mr. Jordash.
6 MR. JORDASH: I rise really to deal with the issue of Rule 84. I
7 don't know if Your Honours would wish us to indicate for the record that
8 we elect not to make an opening statement at this stage.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, that was my understanding. From informal
10 communication with the parties, it appeared that neither Defence would
11 like to make an opening statement, which means you still have an
12 opportunity to make an opening statement after the Prosecution's case has
13 been closed. And if there's any need to hear a Defence case.
14 MR. JORDASH: Certainly. And may I also for the record indicate
15 that the accused elects not a make an 84 bis statement for the same
16 reasons that he elects not to go to the video conferencing room. I
17 thought for -- out of an abundance of caution I should put that on the
19 JUDGE ORIE: I would say it goes almost without saying because if
20 we have no possibility to hear him, then of course he never could address
21 the Chamber and that is the situation at this moment.
22 MR. JORDASH: Thank you.
23 JUDGE ORIE: If there's no other matter.
24 Mr. Jovanovic, the Chamber understood that you also would not use
25 the right to make an opening statement at this moment?
1 MR. JOVANOVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honours. In the
2 informal communication while we were still discussing the schedule, the
3 Defence has informed both the OTP and the Chamber that at this point in
4 time the accused will not be giving a statement, and there will be no
5 opening statement either for different reasons than those given by the
6 Defence of Mr. Stanisic. That is our position at this point.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. For you, the same applies, that you can make
8 an opening statement at a later stage. Then still to be seen whether it
9 would be at the same time for both Defence cases or one at the beginning
10 of the presentation of one Defence case and the other at the beginning of
11 the other, that's still to be seen. But at this moment there is no
12 opening statement nor is there an unsworn statement under Rule 84 bis.
13 Which means that we adjourn and we will resume on Monday, the
14 29th of June, at quarter past 2.00 in this same courtroom, I.
15 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 5.56 p.m.
16 to be reconvened on Monday, the 29th day of
17 June, 2009, at 2.15 p.m.