1 Thursday, 28 October 2010
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.22 p.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon to everyone. Madam Registrar, would
6 you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. Good afternoon,
8 everyone in and around the courtroom. This is the case IT-03-69-T, the
9 Prosecutor versus Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
11 I've few procedural issues to start with. Mr. Jordash, would you
12 mind if I delay a decision on your request to address the Court for ten
13 minutes why you need more time until we have perhaps talked a bit more
14 about scheduling.
15 Then second one. Prosecution's formal application in relation to
16 witness Dr. Charles Kirudja. I think that the parties indicated that
17 they would express themselves on this motion at the beginning of this
19 MR. JORDASH: We don't object to the proposal, Your Honour.
20 JUDGE ORIE: You don't object. Mr. --
21 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] We do not object, Your Honour.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Then perhaps it's very practical to already inform
23 the Prosecution about the decision if we have reached one.
24 [Trial Chamber confers]
25 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber grants the formal application in every
1 respect as found under 8(A), (B), and (C) of the formal application which
2 was filed on the 21st of October.
3 Since two Prosecution teams are involved, the Chamber will put
4 its decision on paper, but I think for practical purposes it would be
5 important for you to know right away whether the motion is granted.
6 That's the Kirudja issue. Then I would like to move into private
8 [Private session]
11 Pages 8263-8270 redacted. Private session.
19 [Open session]
20 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
22 Mr. Jordash.
23 MR. JORDASH: This is an application to allow the Defence an
24 opportunity to cross-examine Mr. Theunens until -- for the
25 Stanisic Defence until the end of tomorrow. At the moment, if
1 Your Honours give the extension you're considering, which is until, as I
2 understand it, the end of Tuesday, I intend, having spoken to Mr. Bakrac,
3 to stop after the first session of tomorrow to leave Mr. Simatovic's team
4 an ample and a fair opportunity to deal with Mr. Theunens the remainder
5 of tomorrow, Monday and Tuesday.
6 I'm asking that I -- we have an extension to allow our team to
7 cross-examine until the end of tomorrow, and if that is granted, it would
8 still be, in our respectful submission, much less than has been granted
9 in other cases of a comparable nature.
10 Your Honours, I hear what Your Honours say about the inefficiency
11 of the cross-examination. We don't accept it, the criticism in its
12 totality. Even if the cross-examination was as inefficient as
13 Your Honours suggest, in our respectful submission, it does not justify
14 curtailing the cross-examination to the extent that Your Honours intend.
15 I would simply say this in this regard, that I went through two-thirds of
16 the Prosecution's thesis on Arkan and his links to the Serbian MUP in
17 approximately one hour yesterday, and in total yesterday we had no more
18 than three and a half hours. If Your Honours curtail the
19 cross-examination as Your Honours suggest, I will finish tomorrow after
20 the first session, and I would have had approximately three and a half
21 hours yesterday, had less than two and a half hours today, and then an
22 hour tomorrow, which will be approximately six hours.
23 The Prosecution's report is 500 pages long with 500 exhibits.
24 Many of those exhibits run into the tens of pages and some of them the
25 hundreds of pages. If we were granted until the end -- if the
1 Stanisic Defence was granted until the end of tomorrow, we would have had
2 approximately, I think, nine hours, which we would submit still is well
3 within what has been granted to other teams on the basis of comparable
4 reports. And if we were to be granted until the end of tomorrow, we
5 would still be asking for Your Honours to take a flexible approach to
6 Mr. Theunens' previous testimony in five other trials, which is full of
7 extremely rich testimony, inconsistent in many parts to the testimony
8 that he's given in this case, given for different accused and for
9 different purposes. In an ideal world we would have the opportunity to
10 take Mr. Theunens through that voluminous testimony, which amounts to
11 hundreds of pages, so that we might take advantage of those
13 So in short, we submit, given the size and complexity of this
14 report, that nine hours that we're asking for is --
15 JUDGE ORIE: I'm listening and at the same time I'm trying to
16 digest some of the things you're saying. I'm trying to seek solutions
17 all the time.
18 MR. JORDASH: Your Honour -- I know that, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Okay.
20 MR. JORDASH: Given the size and complexity of the report, and
21 I've referred Your Honours to that, hundreds of hours have been spent and
22 had to have been spent over the last weeks reading this report and trying
23 to take notice of what Mr. Theunens is saying.
24 Secondly, we remind Your Honours of the previous precedent and
25 the most comparable, we would say, is the Seselj case, where Mr. Theunens
1 testified there for eight hours. But, Your Honour, the Presiding Judge
2 knows that Mr. Theunens also testified for 45 hours in the Gotovina case,
3 an indictment spanning only three months and an indictment with a joint
4 criminal enterprise and a forcible transfer related to one region. We
5 would say we are asking for much less than they asked for in that case.
6 And finally, the weight that the Prosecution will seek to put on
7 this report. The report is, we say, transparently a selection of what
8 Mr. Theunens and the Prosecution consider to be the highlights of their
9 case, and in order to expose that and go through the many -- the very
10 many things that Mr. Theunens has missed out, and we would submit
11 misrepresented, takes time. We're not asking to do all of that. We're
12 going to take some of that on trust that Your Honours will see that
13 anyway, but nonetheless, we would like to have a reasonable opportunity
14 to do it to a degree.
15 And may I make -- the final point is this, that Your Honours make
16 the point that we are losing witnesses. In our submission, we are not
17 losing witnesses. We have, in our submission, been somewhat hijacked by
18 the Prosecution's schedule. The Prosecution said and listed in their
19 schedule that Mr. Theunens should take and be dealt with in a week. We,
20 the Defence, have been saying for months that that was an unrealistic
21 assessment of a witness such as Mr. Theunens. So we said it in court,
22 and we said it at the time when we met Your Honour in an informal
23 setting, and we understood that Mr. Theunens would be sent away and come
24 back to deal with what we then were predicting from the Stanisic Defence
25 side a cross-examination lasting between 10 and 15 hours. And I repeat,
1 we're asking for less than we predicted several months ago. And in our
2 submission, we ought not to be hijacked by the Prosecution schedule,
3 which we've repeatedly said, in relation to this witness and most of the
4 other witnesses, is unrealistic.
5 We submit that we ought to, with a witness such as this, be given
6 a little bit of latitude to examine this huge complex report.
7 Those are our submissions.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Jordash.
9 [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]
10 JUDGE ORIE: We'll further consider the matter, Mr. Jordash.
11 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Bakrac.
13 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] I'll be very brief. I fully agree
14 with Mr. Jordash. I do not wish to criticise anyone. We have an
15 excellent co-operation with the Prosecution, but I think that the whole
16 problem stems from the planning carried out by the Prosecution. You said
17 that from the 25th of October onwards that we'll be sitting three days a
18 week, and had the OTP been more realistic and had they planned to hear
19 this witness over those two weeks, the situation would have been
21 However, I don't want to criticise only the Prosecution. We
22 received this from Mr. Weber, namely that by 2.15 tomorrow, the Simatovic
23 Defence should hand over their documents so that Mr. Theunens could see
24 them. Some of these documents are still being translated, and then we
25 would like to move faster and more efficiently if we manage to do this.
1 All of this speaks in favour of allowing Mr. Jordash to cross-examine
2 until the end of tomorrow, and then Mr. Theunens can look at the
3 documents provided by the Simatovic Defence over the weekend so that we
4 can work fast and efficiently next week.
5 Another thing. Please, precisely because of the fact that we are
6 in the situation that we're in, the Simatovic Defence team kindly asks
7 the Trial Chamber to hand down your ruling as soon as possible so that we
8 would know when we are to start.
9 Thank you so very much.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Bakrac.
11 Mr. Weber, do you want to add anything?
12 MR. WEBER: No, Your Honour, but I did want to clarify one thing.
13 The Prosecution did inform the Defence and believes it's our position
14 that we've been very transparent with both the Chamber and the Defence
15 concerning the scheduling of this witness. With that being said, we take
16 no position. We believe this is a matter for the Chamber in its
17 discretion to decide.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Weber, for that.
19 I think there's one thing I have to put on the record, but
20 meanwhile, I think we could ask the Usher to -- to escort, Mr. Theunens
21 into the courtroom.
22 On transcript page 8117, lines 13 to 15, I said P1347 up to and
23 including P1367 are admitted into evidence. I made a mistake there, or
24 at least there is a mistake. It should have been P1346 up to and
25 including P1367, which also makes understandable now why I said
1 immediately after that, among them P1346, P1347, and P1349 under seal.
2 This is hereby corrected and put on the record.
3 [The witness takes the stand]
4 WITNESS: REYNAUD THEUNENS [Resumed]
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon, Mr. Theunens.
6 THE WITNESS: Good afternoon, Your Honours.
7 JUDGE ORIE: First our apologies for the late start. Part of the
8 time was needed to discuss your further -- the time your testimony would
9 further take. I can already tell you, as a result, that we'll certainly
10 not finish this week, and the Chamber will take proper care that
11 communication between VWS and your employer will be -- will be dealt with
12 in an appropriate way, because we do understand fully your problems and
13 the problems your employer may have. So communication will be
14 established in relation to that. Unfortunately, I cannot give you a
15 final outcome. The parties do not know. The Chamber is still
16 considering various options, but it is on our mind to conclude your
17 testimony as quickly as is reasonably possible.
18 Having said this, I would like to remind you that you are still
19 bound by the solemn declaration you have given at the beginning of your
20 testimony. And Mr. Jordash will now very efficiently continue his
22 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours.
23 Cross-examination by Mr. Jordash: [Continued]
24 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Theunens.
25 A. Good afternoon, Mr. Jordash.
1 Q. I want to go straight to page -- page 70, chapter 1, of your
3 MR. JORDASH: For the -- Madam Registrar, the -- for
4 Madam Registrar, Exhibit P1575, MFI, please.
5 Q. And I want to deal, Mr. Theunens, with your opinion concerning
6 Article 118 of the 1991 Law on Defence of the Republic of Serbia
7 I understand your opinion, you conclude that this article, as it states,
8 prohibits anyone but competent state bodies from organising, reinforcing,
9 arming, equipping, and training armed forces, and from that you say
10 obligations arose which the Serbian MUP, amongst other ministries, failed
11 to fulfil, giving rise to the formation of paramilitaries and their
12 encouragement into the regions of Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Do I
13 summarise you correctly?
14 A. Yes, but I -- I'm not sure what you mean by "their encouragement
15 into the regions of Croatia
16 correct, they were established in Serbia, and they participated in combat
17 operations and other activities in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. And
18 to be fully accurate, it's not just a matter of establishing them but
19 also allowing them to exist during several years.
20 Q. Yes. It's the failure to fulfil the duties which flowed from
21 Article 118 which gave rise to the formation of the paramilitaries and
22 their continued existence. And what then precisely do you say was
23 encouraged? Is it the formation and their continued existence?
24 A. Exactly. It was my conclusion that if you do not enforce the
25 law, then by failing to enforce it you actually encourage this kind of
1 violation of the law.
2 Q. Right. Now, if we can move to page 111 of your report,
3 chapter 1, please. And I want to ask you about the 14th of August, 1991
4 Serbian government decree. Am I correct that this effectively was a law
5 which enabled volunteers to register with their local and/or any TO?
6 A. Indeed it concerned the registration of volunteers in the TO of
7 the Republic of Serbia
8 Q. And it was a law which you say regularised what was a de facto
10 A. Actually, in my report I say it's -- it's one of the three legal
11 measures. I mean, there is this -- this decree. There is a further
12 order on the level of the SFRY armed forces, and then there is the
13 presidential order number 73 of the 10th of December.
14 Q. Let me just stick, if I can --
15 A. Yeah, okay.
16 Q. -- with the August decree.
17 A. Mm-hmm.
18 Q. This effectively widened the definition of what was a volunteer;
19 is that correct?
20 A. No. My understand is that the same definition for volunteers is
21 included in this decree as what was defined elsewhere.
22 Q. What did the decree allow that it hadn't -- that hadn't been
23 allowed before?
24 A. I'm not sure whether the -- I mean, I can't identify what the
25 decree allowed that had not been allowed before.
1 Q. What was the object and purpose of the decree as you interpret
3 A. Well -- and again you can find the background in my report. I
4 will not go in detail now, but we have a situation where an increasing
5 number of especially - I mean, we're talking about Serbia - young men who
6 have military obligations. They refuse to join the JNA, I mean, for
7 example, for political or nationalistic reasons because they consider the
8 JNA as a Communist army. This is specifically the motivation of
9 volunteers who join the groups organised by the Serbian Radical Party.
10 Then we have other motivations. So what we see is that people even if
11 they don't fulfil the legal obligations to be a volunteer because they
12 have military obligations, they still refuse to join the regular armed
13 forces and are part of volunteer groups.
14 Q. So it enabled those who individually or collectively refused to
15 join the JNA to organise themselves as volunteers and then, through this
16 decree, register with the TO; is that correct?
17 A. You've mentioned a very important point, organise themselves.
18 It's something I've tried to highlight also in this report. Volunteers,
19 when they decide to join the armed forces, they do this on an individual
20 basis, and then the armed forces will decide where do we need these
21 volunteers, based -- I mean, based on the operational and other
22 requirements and obviously also the qualifications of the individual
23 volunteers. At this stage, it is not yet the -- I mean, it doesn't seem
24 to be the policy yet that you have a group of people who call themselves
25 a volunteer group and then that volunteer group joins the TO and remains
1 in the same configuration. That is, in my understanding, not the aim of
2 this decree.
3 Q. Right. But what this decree did was say, look, those of you who
4 have been forming groups as we know, forming groups organised around
5 political ideals, will now be allowed to register with a TO.
6 A. If you look at Article 2 of the decree, which you can find on
7 page 112 of part 1 of my report, it -- it reminds the reader of the
8 criteria that applied to volunteers, i.e., persons who do not have a
9 military obligation and are not younger than 17. The age is not so much
10 an issue. The real issue is the military obligation, as I explained
12 Q. And the real issue as well, if we read on in Article 2, is that
13 it allows those who do not have wartime assignments in the JNA to travel
14 from Serbia
15 A. Yes, but I mean it's partly correct. The reference to no wartime
16 assignments in the JNA is indeed made, but the TO -- if you're talking
17 about the TO of the Republic of Serbia
18 matter, but there was no -- I haven't found a document that justifies the
19 participation of units of the TO of the Republic of Serbia
20 operations outside of Serbia
21 one aspect of the whole story - that a number of units of the TO of the
22 Republic of Serbia
23 1st Military District also covers part of the territory of Croatia
24 could be argued from a purely military point of view, and I'm not talking
25 about legal implications, i.e., the declaration of a state of war and so
1 on, but from a purely military point of view, that these units of the TO
2 of the Republic of Serbia
3 or in the framework of units of the 1st Military District on the
4 territory of -- of Croatia
5 Q. Well, I think we might be jumping ahead. What I'm concerned with
6 initially is what it enabled people in Serbia to do in relation to
7 joining a TO within Serbia
8 who were so minded, those who did not have wartime assignments in the
9 JNA, to travel to their local TO or travel to another TO within Serbia
10 register and become regularised as a volunteer. Isn't that the whole
11 point of this decree?
12 A. I mean, there was one TO. It's not a TO in Serbia. There was
13 one TO in the Republic of Serbia
14 these people registered in the TO, they lose their status of volunteers
15 and they become members of the TO like any other member of the TO. If
16 the legal conditions, and they are explained in the decree, are
18 Q. I think the answer then is yes. This is what the decree did,
19 enabled individuals in Serbia
20 JNA or who had not joined the JNA prior to set off from their various
21 homes and join the TO. Isn't that the point of the decree?
22 A. Yes, but --
23 Q. Is that a yes?
24 A. No, no, I'm sorry, you forget the first line of Article 2. It's
25 not just an issue of a wartime assignment. The main issue is no military
2 Q. Okay. No, I don't -- I'm not sure we need to disagree about
3 anything here. Putting aside --
4 A. But I'm surprised you forget that part.
5 Q. Well, can -- do you agree with the other part? Do you agree that
6 it enabled those without military obligation and those without a wartime
7 assignment to travel from their homes and join the TO of Serbia?
8 A. If the conditions -- the legal conditions set out in Article 3
9 are fulfilled. Because that Article 3 explains when the registration
10 takes place. And at the date of this decree, none of the three legal
11 states, i.e., the state of war, the state of emergency, or the state of
12 imminent threat of war, had been declared or announced.
13 Q. But do you not now fall victim to what I did, which is to miss
14 out the next section which says in peacetime and for training purposes
15 from Article -- persons from Article 2 of this decree can voluntarily
16 join the military manoeuvres and other forms of training of the unit,
17 headquarters and institutions of Territorial Defence.
18 A. I'm not sure I completely follow you because in my view that is
19 not the same as a registration in the TO. That is just a voluntary -- as
20 it explains a voluntary participation for training purposes which
21 probably lasts as long as the training lasts and then everybody goes home
22 again and life continues. It's not the same as registering in the TO.
23 Q. Okay. Point taken, but that's -- so we have two forms of
24 enabling provisions effectively, those -- the registering and the
25 attending for training; correct?
1 A. Yeah, and I think it would be useful if we really want to be
2 hundred per cent precise to go through the whole decree and --
3 Q. Well, I don't really have time for that.
4 A. No, okay.
5 Q. We'll keep going if you don't mind.
6 A. Yeah. No. It's no problem.
7 Q. This decree, as you note in your report, is the first of three
8 pieces of legislation which slowly widened the notion of what individuals
9 within Serbia
10 TO and the Serbian JNA; is that correct?
11 A. I just want to be more precise. It -- I mean if you want to put
12 it in one sentence, it's widening the notion of individuals to register
13 in the SFRY armed forces or what remains of the SFRY armed forces at that
14 stage because the TOs -- obviously Slovenia is gone and the republican TO
15 of Croatia
16 Q. So did this new legal framework then allow military conscripts,
17 individually or collectively, who had initially refused to serve in the
18 JNA but then having been recruited by nationalist parties to be then
19 accepted in JNA or TO units?
20 A. Again, and I have highlighted that had in my report, I have not
21 seen any reference to collectively joining the armed forces at that early
23 Q. Well, I'm asking in relation to the new legal framework that
24 arose due to the three pieces of legislation which you refer to in your
1 A. Yeah, for that I'm reading the -- re-reading the order number --
2 the presidential order number 73 which is discussed on page 117 and 118
3 of my report. Again we talk about even if the volunteers show up in
4 group -- groups their assignment in a unit of the SFRY armed forces,
5 i.e., at that time mainly the JNA, would decide -- would be decided by
6 the JNA based on the requirements of the units, where do we need what
7 kind of military personnel on one hand and on the other hand, obviously,
8 the qualifications of the volunteer.
9 Q. Yeah. So what you're saying is that you haven't seen anything
10 which - is this right? - enables the group which arrives to register to
11 then remain as their own subordinate group. Is that what you're saying?
12 A. We're talking here about the legislation. Obviously there are
13 documents, I mean, when we talk about the combat operations, for example,
14 in Eastern Slavonia when we see OG South, and, okay, these operations
15 take place prior to the order 73, that there the command of OG South
16 allows a number of volunteers to remain in their separate group albeit --
17 although under JNA command during combat operations. And most well-known
18 examples there are, for example, the Leva Supoderica and the Petrova
19 Gora, they are officially called local Serb TO detachments but, in fact,
20 they consist for the largest part of volunteers who joined the Serbian
21 Radical Party volunteer groups, including people from the area but also
22 from Serbia
23 Q. Looking back at the August decree, what -- what do you say prior
24 to that August decree were the acts which were unlawful in Serbia
25 according to 118?
1 A. We know, for example, that -- and I haven't gone in detail on the
2 Serbian Radical Party volunteers in this report, but I mean my report on
3 the SRS volunteers is in evidence -- has been admitted into evidence in
4 the Seselj trial, and there we know that already at those early stages
5 the Serbian Radical Party is organising volunteers, I mean by that
6 recruiting them as well as gathering means to -- to arm them at a later
7 stage. Another example is --
8 Q. Could I just stop you there. I'm trying to at this stage not
9 move into what was happening on the ground according to you but your
10 interpretation of 118. You've said, look, the 118 means something.
11 A. Yeah.
12 Q. Serbian MUP didn't abide by it. Now, what I'm trying to have you
13 explain to the Court is what do you say were the acts, the actual acts
14 which were impermissible in law according to 118? Prior to the August
16 A. Well, a first example would be the activities of
17 Captain Dragan --
18 Q. No, Mr. Theunens, I mean, I'm trying to get you to break down --
19 like I say, please, if you'd stay away from the -- what were the facts,
20 but I'm trying to have you explain what this law means. You've made a
21 judgement on this law.
22 A. Yeah.
23 Q. And I'm -- the law seems to say, well, you can't form armed units
24 outside of state competent bodies.
25 A. Indeed.
1 Q. Now, when do you say the illegality arises? What are the acts
2 which you say were impermissible such that, and we'll come to this in due
3 course, such that the MUP's responsibilities arose and thereby, according
4 to you, they failed to abide by them? So the first step, as I see it in
5 this analysis, is what acts were impermissible according to 118 prior to
6 the decree in August.
7 A. Yeah. I tried to understand your question, but when you talk
8 about acts I would refer to facts.
9 Q. Well, acts or behaviour. For example -- let me try to concretise
10 this. Was it unlawful for a group of men with a nationalistic political
11 agenda to gather in a room and discuss going to Croatia to fight? Would
12 that be under 118 unlawful?
13 A. It depends what the discussions would be about. If the
14 discussions concerned really to -- to organise a group and to set up
15 structures, for example, to recruit members, to transport them from
17 people would be armed, how they -- what they would do, then we would -- I
18 mean, looking at the duties of the state security, for example, one would
19 expect that these groups would be monitored.
20 Q. Well, hold on a second. We'll come to the duties.
21 A. Okay.
22 Q. We'll come to the duties.
23 A. Okay.
24 Q. I want to deal with the law and what you say was -- you -- you
25 say that this 118, in fact, made it unlawful for groups of people to get
1 together and discuss how they might go about organising a group to go
2 and -- into Croatia
3 unlawful under 118?
4 A. Well, I think we may read the article. It's quite clear.
5 Q. Well, okay.
6 A. Because I mean if you organise -- just quoting your question,
7 organise a group to go and Croatia
8 nature of the group involves organising, reinforcing, arming, and
9 equipping, and training armed forces, i.e., people who use weapons for --
10 in combat conditions, I would say that this is unlawful.
11 Q. Well, if it's only limited to discussion at that point. Would
12 that be unlawful, the mere discussion of it?
13 A. I'm not sure what you mean by the point discussion because
14 anything involves communication, I mean --
15 Q. Well, a group of people --
16 A. [Overlapping speakers] ...
17 Q. A group of people in a room, belonging to Seselj or Seselj's
18 party, sitting there saying, well, you know what, maybe we should get
19 together, maybe we shouldn't go and get some arms, and maybe we should go
20 down to Croatia
21 unlawful under 118 according to your interpretation?
22 A. It could become unlawful.
23 Q. Would it be unlawful and in what circumstances would it be
24 unlawful according to you?
25 A. Well, if you -- if you -- if you start implementing these issues.
1 Q. Right. Okay. So it's not the discussion, it's the -- it's the
2 commencement of implementation?
3 A. I mean it's a discussion about words we're doing here and I'm --
4 Q. No, I don't think it is actually, because if I'm a police officer
5 and I want to know who I can arrest if I have an arrest power, and we'll
6 come to that in a minute, and I need to know what I can arrest somebody
7 for. And if I can arrest them for sitting around having a discussion,
8 that's one thing. If I have to wait for them to go and get arms, that's
9 a totally different thing. You'd agree with that, no?
10 A. I mean, what do you mean by discussion?
11 Q. Well, this is the point. You've interpreted 118, and you say
12 that the MUP failed to abide by it. So you must have come to a
13 conclusion -- this is our position at least, that you must have come to a
14 conclusion about what behaviour was prohibited by 118.
15 A. That is what I've been trying to help to mention in the
16 beginning. For example, the fact that Dragan is, according to an SSNO
17 security organs report, doing certain things in -- in Croatia. Not that
18 fact that he is in Croatia
19 prior to that.
20 Q. Okay. So what would be the history --
21 A. That is an example.
22 Q. -- prior to that? It's -- it's --
23 A. Well, we would --
24 Q. Sorry. Let me just say we're not talking about behaviour outside
25 of Serbia
1 A. Indeed.
2 Q. Right. So Dragan's misbehaving, let's say hypothetically,
3 outside of Serbia
4 applies to what he did before he left Serbia.
5 A. Yeah, because the misbehaviour -- I mean, you have to define the
6 misbehaviour. If the misbehaviour consists of using armed groups or an
7 armed group which he has established in Serbia or trained or organised or
8 equipped, then 118 comes into -- into play.
9 Q. Yeah. Well, how -- this is -- right. So what is the behaviour
10 that Dragan would have to do in Serbia
11 your interpretation?
12 A. He would have -- he or assisted by others would have had to,
13 again looking at the text of 118, organised, reinforced, armed, equipped,
14 or trained armed forces.
15 Q. You said "or trained." The legislation --
16 A. And trained, I'm sorry.
17 Q. And trained.
18 A. And trained, yeah.
19 Q. So it's -- Dragan would have to have been found to do those
20 things, organise --
21 A. Yeah.
22 Q. -- reinforce, arm, equip, and trained armed forces?
23 A. Yeah.
24 Q. Okay. At that point the obligations was arise upon the Serbian
1 A. It would arise upon the Serbian government as a whole and I
2 understand -- I mean, I haven't analysed the duties of the ministry of
3 interior of the MUP, but --
4 Q. Well, would --
5 A. If you allow me to answer --
6 Q. Sorry.
7 A. But Article 94 of the constitution, I mean, states that
8 ministries have to abide by the law, so ...
9 Q. Right. Okay. Now, that's the law that was prior to the decree.
10 Now, after the decree in August, what was permitted as a result of that
12 A. You mean the one on the TO?
13 Q. The Serbian decree in August, the one that related to both the
14 registration of the -- in the TO and the training by the TO.
15 A. It allowed for the registration of volunteers in the TO of the
16 Republic of Serbia
17 the three states, i.e., a state of war, a state of emergency, or -- I'm
18 sorry for the transcript. So Article 3, the state of war, the state of
19 emergency or the state of an imminent threat of war had been declared.
20 Q. Or peacetime training?
21 A. Or peacetime training.
22 Q. Yeah.
23 A. But for me that is not registration, as I've tried to explain.
24 Q. No. Fair enough.
25 MR. JORDASH: I don't know what time we started, Your Honours.
1 I'm conscious of ...
2 JUDGE ORIE: We started approximately 20 minutes past to
3 25 minutes. This clock is always a bit ahead. I think on the transcript
4 it says 2.21 or 22. So perhaps within the next couple of minutes a
6 MR. JORDASH: This is -- if -- if -- yeah --
7 JUDGE ORIE: This --
8 MR. JORDASH: Yes. Thank you.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Before we take the break, Mr. Theunens, you don't
10 have to wait for it, but it will not take long. If we would insert, as
11 we already provisionally announced as a possibility to be explored, a
12 Monday afternoon session, if we would in addition to that add two
13 sessions in the morning of Tuesday and, if need be, two sessions in the
14 morning of Wednesday, of course then having five sessions a day, which
15 is -- in view of Mr. Stanisic's condition might be too much, but would
16 then try to agree on -- on how to arrange those sessions during the day,
17 whether we would have a bit of a longer break, perhaps three sessions in
18 the morning, start late in the afternoon, or start earlier in the
19 afternoon but then to finish early. So that's still to be considered.
20 This would add to the Monday and the Tuesday afternoon. We have already
21 at least four sessions, perhaps sessions of sometimes one hour, but we
22 have to find out a schedule for that.
23 Would that work? And I'm just asking this to consider over the
24 break not only with Mr. Stanisic but also whether you could find a
25 division of time such that this would work. This is not an answer yet in
1 any way to the other matter, which is Witness JF-26, whether we should
2 start that or not.
3 One question, Mr. Weber. If we would have a bit of a -- now, let
4 me see. Any deadline for tomorrow in such a new schedule, documents to
5 be provided, we have several duties, would there be some flexibility in,
6 for example, giving that an extra day? You were all working over the
7 weekends anyhow, isn't it? That's -- would you please try to find out --
8 MR. WEBER: Yes.
9 JUDGE ORIE: -- whether you could come to an agreement on those
11 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, that's just largely a matter of
12 fairness. If there's something that's fair that the Defence could do in
13 terms of notifying us of the bulk or what they may use first, things of
14 that nature, we will discuss that with them.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If you could agree with Defence on that, that
16 would certainly be appreciated. We'll have a break and we will resume at
17 5 minutes past 4.00.
18 --- Recess taken at 3.35 p.m.
19 --- On resuming at 4.10 p.m.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Before we continue, I suggested a possible solution
21 exclusively on the basis of available courtrooms, nothing else yet being
22 explored and arranged for. Would it resolve the problem to such an
23 extent that we could agree on that, that means additional sittings on --
24 a sitting on Monday in the afternoon, which is in addition, Tuesday
25 additional sessions in the morning, Wednesday, if need be, also
1 additional sessions in the morning? Would that work? In all respects I
2 am thinking about Mr. Stanisic's condition, and we would have to work out
3 a daily schedule, and in terms of what you need for cross-examination.
4 MR. JORDASH: It would and we would be very grateful for that
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Bakrac, who is silent usually -- no. That's --
7 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, whenever I'm in
8 agreement, I'm silent, and I stand up when I have something to object
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, well, in criminal procedure, remaining silent
11 and agreeing to something is not the same. But we will further, then,
12 explore on the basis of the suggestion I made before this break and which
13 is agreeable to the Defence and the Defence is here the party who is most
14 interested in changing the schedule, Mr. Weber, but I nevertheless also
15 ask you whether it would meet major difficulties.
16 MR. WEBER: No, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Then, Mr. Jordash, please proceed.
18 Perhaps it's also good to inform you, Mr. Theunens, we discussed,
19 as you were aware, of intensifying the schedule for the early part of
20 next week, and the parties agree with that. I said before that we
21 would -- that VWS would assist in communications with your employer.
22 Would it meet any further problems apart from the problems you have
24 THE WITNESS: No. I mean I think the Trial Chamber is aware of
25 the issues in the sense that they don't like me to be absent too long. I
1 understand -- I mean, they will understand the requirements here,
2 obviously, so I think to spend more hours a day is also better for me.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Okay.
4 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Then we'll further explore that possibility.
6 Mr. Jordash.
7 MR. JORDASH: Thank you, Your Honour.
8 Q. So I want to one to 118 and ask you perhaps more concretely what
9 you say was prohibited.
10 It wasn't prohibited, was it, under 118 to -- to travel and head
11 towards the border to cross into Croatia
12 A. I mean, we talk about two different matters. Article 118 does
13 not deal with volunteers. Legal volunteers at least.
14 Q. Sorry, what do you mean by that?
15 A. Sorry. Volunteers are dealt with by other legislation than
16 Article 118.
17 Q. Well, I'm just trying to work out whether 118 prohibited that.
18 Is your answer to that then no, it doesn't prohibit that?
19 A. It does, and I think it would be more efficient if we look, for
20 example, at P1051, which is included on page 87 of part 1 of my report,
21 where actually the person who is well placed to deal with these issues,
22 i.e., the minister of defence of the Republic of Serbia
23 Vice-Admiral Milorad Jokic, expresses his views on the 25th of July,
24 1991, in relation to a press conference where a political party announces
25 the establishment -- or excuse me, the recruitment and training of
1 volunteers for its group.
2 Q. I think we're falling prey to the same thing. I'm interested in
3 the process by which you came to your conclusion about the dereliction of
4 duty by the Serbian MUP. So I'm trying to work out the process by which
5 you came to that conclusion, and for that, I suggest you must have gone
6 through this process. Tell me if I'm wrong. One, to work out what 118
7 prohibited in concrete terms; is that correct?
8 A. Yes, and I gave elements of -- of --
9 Q. Okay. We'll come back to that.
10 A. Okay.
11 Q. Two, to have analysed what enforcement powers that the Serbian
12 MUP had which it failed to use; correct? I'm just asking whether --
13 A. Yeah, but I'm looking at the wording I used in my report when I
14 discussed this.
15 Q. Well, if you go to chapter 1, page 91, you say this --
16 MR. JORDASH: Could we have, perhaps, that on e-court. P1575,
17 MFI'd, and it's page --
18 THE WITNESS: Yes.
19 MR. JORDASH: -- 113 of e-court.
20 THE WITNESS: No, no. Mm-hmm.
21 MR. JORDASH:
22 Q. And you say this. Based on Article 94 of the constitution, I'm
23 paraphrasing, 1991 Law on Internal Affairs of the Republic of Serbia
24 was incumbent upon the Ministry of the Interior to enforce the law in
25 general and Article 118 of the Law of Defence of Serbia on the
1 prohibition of the establishment of armed forces that were not under
2 state control.
3 And you stand by that?
4 A. Yes. And even there are examples. There is a letter include --
5 Q. Yeah, but I don't want to move to the examples. I want to move
6 as to your understanding of the legislation and how it was you arrived at
7 this view.
8 A. Indeed, but the example shows -- it's a concrete example.
9 Radovan Stojicic informs a member of the parliament of Serbia which --
10 about the measures the MUP has taken against a party affiliate. I think
11 it's Bokan from the White Eagles. And Stojicic in his position as deputy
12 minister of interior informs that he has been arrested and then
13 transferred to the competent authorities. So there we see that the
14 Ministry of the Interior carries out its -- its duties.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Theunens.
16 THE WITNESS: Yes.
17 JUDGE ORIE: The question was simply whether you stood by what
18 you wrote. Now, you did not only say that you stood by that but you also
19 started explaining why. Might well be that Mr. Jordash would have easily
20 accepted that and that there was no need to explain why. So therefore,
21 if we want to conclude somewhere early next week, perhaps you focus very
22 much on the questions. And if at a later stage you think that by not
23 pointing to the example misunderstandings could arise, let's then wait
24 until the moment where that's the case rather than to already anticipate
25 on all kind of possible developments which may but also may never follow.
1 MR. JORDASH:
2 Q. 118 you say prohibited certain conduct. Did it prohibit a
3 volunteer or a person travelling towards Croatia with the intention to
5 A. If -- if he's to volunteer in a -- an armed group, then it would
6 fall under the prohibitions included by Article 118.
7 Q. If he travels alone to the border in order to join the TO of the
8 SBWS, you would say that that was unlawful under 118?
9 A. Yeah, but the TO of SBWS is another thing.
10 Q. Would you say that's unlawful under 118, Mr. Theunens?
11 A. I think it would be a matter of legal interpretation and I'm not
12 qualified for that.
13 Q. Well, you've interpreted 118 and your interpretation is critical
14 for this issue.
15 A. Indeed, but as you see in my report, my interpretation is based
16 on much more obvious examples and these examples you can find throughout
17 my report.
18 Q. Okay. But --
19 A. And okay -- yeah.
20 Q. Was it illegal to carry weapons in Serbia in 1991?
21 A. I think -- I mean, it would require a weapons permit depending on
22 the nature of the weapon.
23 Q. What kind of weapon could you obtain a permit for?
24 A. That's something I don't -- I didn't analyse but I know -- okay,
25 and I'll stop here.
1 Q. You didn't analyse that?
2 A. No, but I think common sense would dictate that carrying what we
3 called "war weapons" would not be allowed without the person carrying the
4 weapon having specific permits.
5 Q. What's a war weapon?
6 A. It's a weapon which has a particular calibre and which may have a
7 particular rate of fire and a particular range.
8 Q. Was it unlawful to carry a hunting rifle?
9 A. I mean, in my country you need a permit for that. I don't know
10 whether it was in Serbia
11 Q. Was it unlawful to travel to a TO sub-unit in Serbia with a
12 hunting rifle? In 1991.
13 A. No.
14 Q. Was it unlawful to travel in a vehicle with three other people
15 with hunting rifles towards a TO with the intention of joining up?
16 A. If you -- if all the three people had permits for their hunting
17 rifles, they could drive wherever they want in Serbia.
18 Q. Was it unlawful for a political party to organise a bus full of
19 potential -- people intending to volunteer and travel to the TO within
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, before we start asking the next
22 question whether it was unlawful to use a train for the same purposes or
23 to use a Volkswagen bus which could carry eight persons, so -- I mean, if
24 we would do the same in interpreting the law, we might have a very nice
25 evening in testing each other whether buying a knife under certain
1 circumstances would or would not be an attempt. The issue is let's look
2 at what happened, and let's ask the witness whether he considered this to
3 fall within the scope of, and then you mention the article, and then ask
4 him why he comes to the conclusion rather than to go from a -- from a
5 scooter to a bike to a car to a -- I see your point.
6 The point is perfectly clear. Where to draw a line in respect of
7 this. What does it mean? Is it purely domestic? Is it not purely
8 domestic? You've made that point already five or seven or eight times by
9 saying, well, but if it's just in Croatia
10 that be covered by -- that is a rather difficult issue of the -- of the
11 scope of the territorial jurisdiction of legislation. Are we talking
12 about criminal legislation? Are we talking about administrative
13 legislation? We have not yet discussed the matter of criminal or not
14 criminal. If it is criminal, would the active personality principle
15 apply? I mean, that's a kind of legal expertise, I think, which I do not
16 mind you testing the witness on why he came to those conclusions, but the
17 way in which you're doing takes an enormous amount of time and does not
18 assist the Chamber a great deal.
19 I'm not saying don't touch upon the subject, but do it in such a
20 way that it assists the Chamber.
21 MR. JORDASH: I'm not sure how to test the theory -- theory of
22 Mr. Theunens without seeing what knowledge he had or had not of what was
23 illegal and what was the Serbian MUP's duty.
24 JUDGE ORIE: You could spend two days on going from the one end
25 of the scale to the very other end of the scale. Rather, look at what
1 appears to have happened or what the expert considers that may have
2 happened on the basis of the documents and then try to find out why he
3 considered this to be -- to fall within or outside the scope, rather than
4 to come with all kind of examples which --
5 MR. JORDASH: Your Honour, could I ask Mr. Theunens to leave.
6 I'm trying to explain why I'm taking this approach, and I'd rather do it
7 without Mr. Theunens --
8 JUDGE ORIE: I'm afraid that that would take even more time. You
9 may have understood what my concern is and what the Chamber's concern is.
10 I consulted with my colleagues. I will allow you to proceed. Keep that
11 in the back of your mind. Don't give up perhaps necessarily on every
12 inch of your approach, but when I talked about the train and the scooter
13 and the Volkswagen bus, I think you understood what I meant.
14 MR. JORDASH: Could I please have on e-court P1042, e-court
15 page 0216-2288.
16 Q. I'm interested in whether you looked at Article 19, Mr. Theunens,
17 of the Defence law which contains 118.
18 A. I must have done so. I'm just checking whether I included in my
19 report, because I tried to restrict myself to the most -- to the articles
20 I considered most relevant.
21 Q. I don't think it is in your report.
22 A. Okay.
23 Q. But I think if we could have page 0216-2288, if you look at the
24 screen, Mr. Theunens.
25 Article 99 referring to Defence training. Just to be clear, we
1 may not need to turn to it, but Article 1 of this law is the
2 jurisdictional provision which limits the scope of 118 to issues of
3 defence within the Republic of Serbia
4 to it if you want, but --
5 A. Yeah, please turn to it.
6 Q. Okay. Let's go back again.
7 MR. JORDASH: Can we go please to page 0216-2249 of e-court,
8 please. And Article 1 there under general provisions. This law
9 regulates rights and duties of the Republic of Serbia
10 of defence.
11 A. Mm-hmm.
12 Q. As well as rights and duties of citizens and obligations of
13 companies, institutions, and other organisations in defence,
14 Territorial Defence, civil protection, monitoring and reporting
15 communications and crypto-protection, training for defence, security
16 within the defence domain, defence planning, as well as other issues of
17 importance for defence within the republic.
18 We could also refer to Article 2 as well, which again perhaps is
19 the general provision which is equally applicable.
20 MR. JORDASH: Could we go to the next page, please.
21 Q. Article 2. Defence preparations in the republic shall be
22 organised, planned and conducted in order to protect the sovereignty,
23 independence and territorial integrity of the Republic of Serbia
24 So you agree that the scope of 118 is that, relating to
25 activities within Serbia
1 A. Yes, and that's also how I interpreted it in my report.
2 Q. All right.
3 MR. JORDASH: Can we go to 0216-2288, please, Article 1999 --
4 sorry, Article 99.
5 Q. And we see there a title, "Defence Training." In order to
6 acquire military and other expert skills and knowledge, the citizens have
7 the right to be trained and taught as regards defence and protection. In
8 further the text referred to as defence training.
9 This is the aspect I'm particularly interested in. The defence
10 training is to be organised by the defence ministry, companies, and other
11 organisations with a uniform curriculum and programme.
12 How do you or how did you interpret that in relation to what
13 companies were permitted to do under Article 99?
14 A. This article is part of the concept of what was called
15 All People's Defence, i.e., whereby the TO, as is defined -- is defined
16 as the widest form of -- I don't recall the exact wording but of
17 participation of the population in the defence effort, and there was a
18 time in the -- I mean in the former Yugoslavia
19 companies would -- would participate in the defence of the country
20 together with the -- with the regular armed forces. And that, for
21 example, weapons were available in state-owned companies. I would stop
23 Q. So the All People's Defence doctrine, if I can refer to it as
24 that, was powerfully entrenched within the notion of Serbian defence.
25 Would you agree with that? Serbian defence preparations, if we can put
1 it that way.
2 A. It was a Yugoslav thing and the republics -- all the republics
3 participated in it in accordance with the legislation and the
5 Q. And a power --
6 A. It was a -- sorry, Yugoslav doctrine.
7 Q. Right. And enacted in -- in -- as a matter of fact as a powerful
8 incentive for many people to join up.
9 A. I mean, I haven't looked into that aspect, but I mean if you talk
10 about join up, it's joining up existing legal units, i.e., the JNA or the
11 TO and there was also something like civil defence, but the armed forces
12 consisted only of the JNA and the TO.
13 Q. Did Article 99 then allow companies to run training if they'd had
14 that authority delegated to them by the defence ministry as seems to be
15 the case looking at the plain reading of Article 99?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Yes. So there would be nothing wrong with a group of individuals
18 heading towards training within Serbia
19 they'd had that authority delegated to them by the Ministry of Defence?
20 A. I'm not sure what you mean by there would be nothing wrong with.
21 Q. [Overlapping speakers] ...
22 A. Are you referring to 118?
23 Q. Yes. Sorry, yes.
24 A. Okay. If the Ministry of Defence was apply -- was abiding by the
25 law, there would be no problem.
1 Q. Right. But once the Ministry of Defence had delegated that
2 training to companies, there wouldn't be any responsibility on the
3 Serbian MUP to act to stop it. In fact, they couldn't. Would you agree
4 with that?
5 A. I'm not sure, because I mean are we talking about the theory or
6 the way how this legislation was implemented?
7 Q. Well, the theory which -- the interpretation of the law that you
8 would put on it.
9 A. Yeah.
10 Q. I mean, if there's training going on, it's arranged by a company,
11 the Ministry of Defence has okayed it, they've authorised it, would you
12 agree the Serbian MUP would have no right to stop it?
13 A. Again, if the Serbian -- the Ministry of Defence is abiding by
14 Article 118, so no activities that are prohibited by 118 are taking place
15 or can take place, and they give an authorisation to a state-owned
16 company to conduct training that is part of a wider programme that has
17 been approved before, then there is no reason for the MUP to -- to
19 Q. But on what basis could the MUP intervene if, for example, the
20 Ministry of Defence had not abided by Article 118? What -- what
21 regulations or laws could the Serbian MUP act pursuant to?
22 A. I mean, there is the -- I mentioned it earlier, Article 94 of
23 the -- I think the Serbian Constitution which states that ministries have
24 to enforce the law. There's also a matter of state security can be
25 involved, because again I'm referring to the situation as it was
1 developing in the former -- in Serbia
2 already summer but fall 1991. There may have been cases where the
3 Serbian Ministry of Defence was maybe organising these kind of -- or
4 allowing such activities to be organised by non-government or non-state
5 approved, yeah, units or groups, and then it could involve state
6 security, because you have people who do not fall under state authority
7 doing certain things, I mean military training, which can also affect the
8 stability -- I mean the --
9 Q. Would you agree with me that --
10 A. Yeah.
11 Q. -- what you're referring to then is the remit of the state
12 security of Serbia
13 acts which threatened the constitutional order? Is that correct?
14 A. Indeed.
15 Q. And the state security of Serbia was regulated such that it could
16 and should take steps to prevent civil disorder if it threatened the
17 constitutional order of Serbia
18 A. I haven't analysed that aspect in detail but my understanding of
19 role of state security in general, independent of SFRY, corresponds with
20 what you just said.
21 Q. Yeah. Different to the public security which had a role to
22 prevent civil disorder, full stop.
23 A. We would have to look at the articles. We haven't -- as I said,
24 my report does not cover the -- the duties, the legal duties, the
25 detailed legal duties of the state or the public security.
1 Q. Right. You don't then proffer an opinion as to whether the state
2 security fulfilled its duties. You offer a global opinion that the
3 Serbian MUP didn't.
4 A. Yes. That's as far as my report goes.
5 Q. And you don't know anything -- or maybe that's going too far.
6 Sorry. But you don't know the details of what the state security's
7 jurisdiction was in regard to preventing civil disorder which
8 prevented -- which would have caused constitutional fragmentation?
9 A. As I said, I mean, I haven't analysed the duties nor the
10 organisation -- I mean, the duties of the state security, sorry, nor the
11 organisation of the Ministry of the Interior, so I cannot answer that
13 Q. You can't, is this right, give -- I mean, apart from the extreme,
14 let's take the example of -- a hypothetical example of Seselj in -- in
16 on a bus in that form and sending them to Croatia. Now that, would be
17 unlawful under 118; correct?
18 A. It would be, yes.
19 Q. But apart from that, are you able to offer the Court any
20 information concerning what powers the Serbian MUP had to stop elements
21 of that behaviour? Do you understand what I mean when I say "elements of
22 that behaviour"?
23 A. I understand, but again I gave a very small overview of the key
24 articles which would be understandable for -- for, I think, any citizen
25 of relevant legislation that briefly touches upon the duties of the
1 Ministry of the Interior, and that's something you can find at the bottom
2 of page 91 in -- in part 1 of the report. I mean, one of the articles,
3 Article 94 of the constitution states that the ministries, including the
4 Ministry of the Interior, have to enforce the law. Article 118 is part
5 of the law.
6 And then, excuse me, I refer to the ministry -- to the Law on
7 Internal Affairs. Again I didn't analyse it because it didn't fall
8 within the scope of my report, but these articles are very
9 straightforward. The Ministry of the Interior can arrest people. I
10 mean, they are responsible for internal affairs. They can arrest people.
11 Q. Do you know on what basis they can -- could arrest people in
12 1991? I mean the specific -- this is what I'm trying to get at. It's
13 one thing to have an authorising or prohibiting law. It's another thing
14 for the policeman on the street to interpret and know what he's entitled
15 to do to remain within the law.
16 A. I understand. But what I tried to mention earlier, P1057, i.e.,
17 the letter -- Radovan Stojicic --
18 Q. Let's turn to that then --
19 A. Yeah.
20 Q. -- because I did want to discuss that. Page 93 of your report --
21 A. Indeed.
22 Q. -- footnote 258.
23 MR. JORDASH: Could we have P1057 on the screen.
24 Q. And while that's coming up, what you say about that page 93 of
25 your report is that the response to a question by a member of the
1 Assembly, Vojvodic, indicates that the Serbian authorities in general and
2 the Ministry of Interior in particular selectively enforce Article 118 of
3 the 1991 defence law. And just before we get to looking at the exhibit,
4 how did you come to that conclusion by looking merely at the question?
5 A. Actually, I looked at the answer.
6 Q. Okay. Well, let's --
7 A. The answer --
8 Q. Let's look at the answer then.
9 MR. JORDASH: Could we go to page 1 -- could we go to the next
10 page, please. And if we could just enlarge it slightly.
11 Q. This is the answer. So we have Vojvodic asking the question
12 which, and I paraphrase, why has Bokan, the leader of the White Eagles,
13 been arrested by the Ministry of Interior when it is known that a great
14 number of volunteers owned unregistered weapons and none have been
15 arrested. And then the Ministry of Interior answers:
16 "Increased interest of the citizens of the Republic of Serbia
17 armaments and greater quantities of illegally possessed weapons,
18 ammunition and explosive devices, demand for more intensive measures of
19 the Ministry of the Interior in order prevent carrying in of weapons
20 through illegal channels especially from war-affected areas."
21 And before we move to the next page, this was the context in
22 which the Serbian MUP was working at that time, wasn't it? It was an
23 increased interest amongst the civilians of Serbia who -- especially
24 along the border who felt, rightly or wrongly, under threat?
25 A. The document does not make any reference where Bokan was -- I
1 mean he's arrested in Belgrade
2 80 kilometres from the border.
3 Q. Yes. But I'm saying isn't it your knowledge -- isn't it within
4 your knowledge that this was the context in which the Serbian MUP was
5 working? Its workload had increased because there were -- there was an
6 increased interest amongst the civilians for weapons. Whether they were
7 right to feel threatened or not, but there was this increased interest.
8 Don't you accept that?
9 A. I accept that that is what Radovan Stojicic wrote in his reply to
11 Q. You don't accept that there were volunteers heading off and
12 coming back with weapons? Heading to the war zones and coming back with
14 A. That's something else. I do accept that, but the text here
15 doesn't refer to volunteers.
16 Q. Okay. If you don't want to give your views, then we'll move to
17 the next page.
18 A. No. I mean, the text talks about citizens of the Republic of
20 border, and maybe they want to defend themselves. And then you introduce
21 the word "volunteers."
22 Q. I'm asking you a straightforward question as to whether it's
23 within your knowledge that civilians in Serbia in 1991 evinced, like not
24 before, a desire to arm themselves.
25 A. Yes, and if you want my view on that, that was -- I think that is
1 a -- a diplomatic description of what was happening with the -- i.e., the
2 organisation, recruitment, and -- and arming of nongovernment-controlled
3 armed groups.
4 Q. Okay. If that's -- that's fine. Let's -- let's move on. That
6 A. Okay.
7 Q. For the same reason goes on the minister of interior. In other
8 words, for owning weapons, a sniper gun with an optic sight and several
9 grenades, so-called kasikara, which acquisition, carrying and holding is
10 forbidden by the aforementioned law, as well as for owning weapons
11 without a permission of the authorised organ, criminal charges were
12 brought against Dragoslav Bokan by the MUP, Belgrade department, for the
13 criminal act from the article number 33, paragraph 1 and 2, of the Law on
14 Weapon Ammunition.
15 Nothing so far to show selectivity, you accept?
16 A. I mean, obviously I'm not going to draw a conclusion just on one
17 document. If you want, I can explain why I put -- why I wrote
19 Q. Let's go to the next page before you do that. Maybe there isn't
20 a next page.
21 A. I think that that's all.
22 JUDGE ORIE: It's just three pages.
23 MR. JORDASH: Could we go back to the second page, please.
24 Q. Okay, I think I've made a mistake. Okay. Would you explain then
25 why you came to the conclusion?
1 A. Indeed. The issue is that Bokan and the White Eagles were quite
2 infamous from at a much earlier stage and I refer, for example, to a
3 report by Human Rights Watch sent to President Milosevic as well as
4 General Kadijevic. There is also the Eremija [phoen] letter in my report
5 which talks about other politically oriented groups who are committing or
6 allegedly committing crimes in Croatia
7 combat operations as well as outside that participation. We have seen
8 several documents over the past days, information reports by the 1st
9 Military District security organs about Arkan moving around weapons. And
10 here we see that 27th of May, 1992, which is actually quite late, I mean
11 the war in Croatia
12 groups, including groups I have considered to be controlled by or related
13 otherwise to the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia
14 still moving around weapons and ammunition. But the only person, I mean
15 at least on the basis of my research, who was arrested by that -- by that
16 stage is Dragoslav Bokan.
17 Q. Okay.
18 A. I haven't seen that Dragan was ever -- Captain Dragan was ever
19 arrested. The same for Zeljko Raznjatovic. I know that a number of SRS
20 volunteers were arrested after November 1993.
21 Q. Can you just, though, answer this question --
22 A. Okay, yeah.
23 Q. What was it about Dragan's behaviour in Serbia which justified
25 A. Because unless -- and that brings us back to the to the crux of
1 the matter. Unless he was operating with the blessing of the Ministry of
2 Interior and under their control, he was violating Article 118.
3 Q. In what way?
4 A. Because he was organising armed group, and of course these
5 people -- he recruited people, and they moved to Croatia where obviously
6 he became more active in the field of --
7 Q. Are you saying he --
8 A. -- training.
9 Q. Are you saying he organised -- let me just read the -- are you
10 saying that within Serbia
11 trained armed forces?
12 A. Armed groups or armed individuals who qualified as a group --
13 Q. Armed -- armed forces it says in Article 118.
14 A. Yeah, but I think --
15 Q. So did he do that?
16 A. Do you want to know the legal definition of armed forces? I
17 don't think that Article 118 doesn't make a distinction -- I mean,
18 Article 118 talks about legal armed forces.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Let me try to understand what's happening.
20 Mr. Jordash, you're asking what's the basis for arrest Dragan or
21 anyone else. What we see from the example is that at least Mr. Bokan was
22 arrested for carrying arms, which is, from what I understand, not -- not
23 one of the offences described in this legislation, in the legislation we
24 are talking about.
25 MR. JORDASH: Yes.
1 JUDGE ORIE: That seems to be very much administrative
2 legislation, whereas any arrest or whatever, that could be in legislation
3 on arms, legislation on property, legislation on -- on creating civil --
4 I mean, we all know that, and I tried to look at -- at the -- the --
5 at -- almost at the end of this legislation you find a few offences which
6 seem to be minor offences rather of an administrative nature and not
7 providing information, et cetera. So therefore, to focus that much on
8 118, which is a transitional -- it's -- it's not the main basis of it.
9 It's a transitional paragraph in this legislation. How could we think
10 about being arrested applying investigative criminal procedural
11 legislation on the basis of 118? I mean, I'm -- I'm just asking myself.
12 The matter is, I think, by far more complex --
13 MR. JORDASH: Well, this -- this -- sorry, Your Honour.
14 JUDGE ORIE: -- than -- and the complexity is not, I would say,
15 clearly analysed by proceeding in the way we do. For me it just
16 confused. Is 118 enough to arrest someone? Or apparently in Bokan
17 others were arrested on a totally different ground, on a --
18 MR. JORDASH: But that -- but --
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes?
20 MR. JORDASH: Sorry. But that's the point I'm trying to make.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Well, then let's -- so therefore this legislation
22 doesn't provide for the answers. The same for jurisdiction, whether
23 jurisdiction is purely -- whether this legislation is of a purely --
24 jurisdictionally on a purely territorial basis. Of course, in any system
25 you'd first start looking at the criminal code, or in France, I think the
1 code of criminal procedure where the jurisdiction or rules are found. So
2 it's --
3 MR. JORDASH: That's the point, though. Mr. Theunens hasn't done
5 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Let's -- let's then --
6 MR. JORDASH: But --
7 JUDGE ORIE: But that can be established in such a simple way.
8 MR. JORDASH: But that's what this is -- I mean, Mr. --
9 JUDGE ORIE: Well, apparently I understood what you're aiming at.
10 So you have achieved your goal, isn't it, that the matter is far more
11 complex. At the same time, whether issues like arrest resolve the whole
12 matter, whether law enforcement is purely a matter of arrest or
13 administrative matters, there are a lot of instruments in law, as you may
14 know, to enforce the law.
15 MR. JORDASH: Yes.
16 JUDGE ORIE: I'm just trying to understand where we are at this
17 moment, what -- apparently I've understood part of the point you wished
18 to make.
19 MR. JORDASH: Yes. I'm aiming at Mr. Theunens' conclusion that
20 the Ministry of the Interior of Serbia pursuant to Article 118 had duties
21 which they failed to enforce. I'm --
22 JUDGE ORIE: One second, please.
23 MR. JORDASH: I'm hopefully cross-examining to show Mr. Theunens
24 actually doesn't understand what enforcement or regulation the Serbian
25 MUP had, and that's, in our submission, a condition precedent for the
1 conclusion that he's reached. If he doesn't understand the duties and
2 the enforcement powers that the Serbian MUP had, then they cannot say
3 that they failed to abide by them. That's the point. I mean --
4 JUDGE ORIE: Unless you take it a very -- I would say a very
5 global level, that state organs have a general duty to -- to abide by the
6 law and to do whatever is within their competence apart from what that
7 is. And then we'll further have to look at that --
8 MR. JORDASH: Apart from what --
9 JUDGE ORIE: -- in order to -- in order to ensure law
11 MR. JORDASH: Yes. And apart of what's within their competence,
12 and this is what I submit Mr. Theunens hasn't analysed.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. So the simple question is: Mr. Theunens, have
14 you specifically looked into competencies as far as arrests are
15 concerned, administrative enforcement? Apparently you have not.
16 THE WITNESS: No, but --
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Theunens.
18 THE WITNESS: I haven't looked at these detailed competencies but
19 the conclusion is based on the fact that I haven't seen any document that
20 any of the by then well-known paramilitaries or volunteers was arrested
21 on the basis of Article 118. The only legal action that took place --
22 JUDGE ORIE: Apart from whether 118 is an article which would
23 provide for a proper basis for arrest or whether you would have to rely
24 on other legislation, such as the legislation on weapons and armament,
25 because this law seems not to be very prominent in providing -- providing
1 definitions of offences.
2 THE WITNESS: Indeed, Your Honours. So -- but -- but to
3 continue, for example the volunteers of the Radical Party, it is only
4 after -- I mean on the basis of the material I have reviewed, it's only
5 after there is a political fallout between Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Seselj
6 that the state -- the competent state authorities in the Republic of
8 volunteers who were affiliated to the SRS and they're all arrested on the
9 basis of violation of the law -- of the legislation in relation to
10 possession of arms. Article 118 never appears even if, in my conclusion,
11 the possession of arms is directly related to activities they were
12 conducting in violation of Article 118.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Okay. Let's then -- if I careful listen to
14 you is the following, that where those who might have violated
15 Article 118 most likely would have committed offences again the law on
16 arms and ammunition as well, it comes as a surprise that it was so --
17 such a small number of arrests, which, although based on the Law of Arms
18 and Ammunition, would be linked to activities you would consider to be
19 relevant in the context of Article 118. That's apparently what your
20 reasoning is without going into any further details as to the exact
21 competencies of those who were, as you say, supposed to act or those who
22 really acted.
23 Mr. Jordash, I'm trying to understand what we're doing.
24 MR. JORDASH: Yes.
25 Q. And, Mr. Theunens, you'll concede that that what Mr. -- what
1 His Honour Judge Orie just said doesn't appear in your report. You don't
2 quote from the relevant --
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it's clear that the specifics on police
4 investigations or prosecutions do not --
5 THE WITNESS: They're not in --
6 JUDGE ORIE: They're not in the report.
7 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, I just --
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber.
9 MR. WEBER: Sorry to step in. We're discussing one article.
10 There are many other things that are referenced in the report and --
11 JUDGE ORIE: I'm not saying that there is not, but I'm trying to
12 understand what Mr. Jordash apparently wants to elicit from this witness.
13 And it's relatively simple. If you have a -- would have asked in the
14 beginning apart from whether 100 -- Article 118 creates a proper basis
15 for arrest where we see that arrests are usually done on other basis,
16 have you specifically paid attention to these competencies, and do you
17 not consider to form a final opinion on what should have done also in
18 this respect, that you would have to need -- that you needed to attention
19 to that as well. And then I think that Mr. Theunens would have easily
20 said yes. I'm not quite sure, Mr. Theunens, but that's what I understand
21 from your -- from the answers to some of my questions, and then we can
22 move on. Which means that a certain element, a certain aspect is not
23 dealt with in substance in drawing the conclusions. Now, whether what
24 Mr. Theunens did deal with sufficiently support his conclusions is, of
25 course, then another matter.
1 MR. JORDASH: Well, I thought that's what I was aiming at but
2 if --
3 JUDGE ORIE: Well, apparently I -- if I understand you well, I
4 have understood more or less what you were about to continue to ask
5 Mr. Theunens.
6 MR. JORDASH:
7 Q. So --
8 JUDGE ORIE: But what I'm trying to tell you is that why not get
9 to the core of that --
10 MR. JORDASH: Because I'm trying to highlight to Your Honours
11 that the complexity of the situation, because we will in due course or we
12 may in due course call evidence to establish in front of Your Honours
13 what the competencies of the Serbian MUP were and to deal with the
14 aspects of Mr. Theunens' analysis which we say he should have engaged in
15 and failed to.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. He didn't -- he didn't pay attention to those
17 specific aspects. That's the most important thing we've established now.
18 THE WITNESS: I mean, I -- as I said, for me this -- the -- the
19 reply by Stojicic is an example. It shows that the Ministry of the
20 Interior can arrest people for illegal possession of weapons. I think
21 from the contents of my report it can be concluded that the groups you're
22 talking about were in the possession of weapons and that these weapons
23 were acquired in or via Serbia
24 a document here for the arrest of Bokan and then -- but these documents
25 are not included in this report, but arrests for volunteers of -- of
1 Mr. Seselj's party, whereby these arrests only took place after there was
2 a political conflict with Mr. Milosevic, I concluded from that that the
3 legislation was selectively applied --
4 MR. JORDASH:
5 Q. Well, the report in fact says that Tode Vojvodic, his answer to a
6 question indicates that the Serbian authorities in general and the
7 Ministry of Interior in particular selectively enforced. Now you're
8 adding to your report. That's the point. That's not what your report
9 says at page 93. Anyway, let's move on.
10 A. It's coherent, but I haven't included the information on the SRS
11 volunteers in my report, that's correct.
12 Q. Let's have a --
13 A. But you have the Seselj report.
14 Q. Let's have a look -- well, we'll come to that shortly.
15 JUDGE ORIE: We don't have the Seselj report, Mr. Theunens. You
16 should be aware of that.
17 Mr. Weber.
18 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, just putting on the record that I
19 believe his opinion is that he -- that the article implies and I believe
20 it's talked about on different context. I just -- Mr. Jordash is quoting
21 to it, and I just wanted to make sure the opinion is on the record
23 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Mr. Jordash, please proceed, and --
24 MR. JORDASH: It doesn't say "implies." It says "indicates."
25 JUDGE ORIE: In the next break you are invited to sit together
1 and to see whether it says "implies" or "indicates," and if there's any
2 ongoing disagreement, the Chamber will be glad to further pay attention
3 to it. Please proceed.
4 MR. JORDASH: I'll move on.
5 Q. You only rely in your report on 118 as the sole criminal piece of
6 legislation, don't you?
7 A. No, not specifically. I mean, I -- I -- I use 118 to show that
8 the Serbian authorities did not act against the establishment of -- of
9 political party based volunteer groups as well as other groups which are
10 not foreseen by -- by the legislation but, by analysing the
11 documentation, proved to be controlled by or linked otherwise to the
12 Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia
13 were not initially foreseen in the law.
14 Q. Thank you for the answer. Is there a power of arrest in 118?
15 A. No.
16 Q. No. Is there a power of arrest in that particular piece of
18 A. Which particular piece of legislation?
19 Q. The Law on Defence.
20 A. We would have to look at it. I --
21 Q. Well, I'm putting it to you there isn't. You don't know.
22 A. That's fine.
23 Q. Let's have a look at footnote 259, which is P1057.
24 MR. JORDASH: Please could we have that on e-court. You will
25 have to forgive me, I don't have the e-court number.
1 THE WITNESS: This is P1057.
2 MR. JORDASH: Oh. I beg your pardon. I'll come back to this.
3 Could I just have a moment, please.
4 Could -- could we have footnote 258, which is P1057, or is that
5 the same one? I beg your pardon. Sorry, Your Honours. Let's move on.
6 I'll come back to that point.
7 Q. I want to have a look instead at P1054, just moving back to
8 page 92 of your report. Footnote 255 and 256, where you use this
9 document to establish in your mind the notice that the Ministry of the
10 Interior had concerning --
11 A. Yeah.
12 Q. -- private armed volunteer groups. If we look at page 1, we have
13 a discussion in a response to Seselj's comments. And if we move down
14 below, the answer to Seselj is the part I'm interested in.
15 A. Okay.
16 Q. The Ministry of the Interior issues the following response with
17 reference to 118, reiterating what it says, and then saying:
18 "It's becoming more and more obvious --"
19 A. Can I interrupt you? Just the -- because I want to correct my
20 previous answer. I said that Article 118 -- I agreed with you that you
21 said -- you suggested it didn't have any implications to arrest, and I
22 was just referring to the actual text as it is in the Law of Defence.
23 But in this letter, actually, it is said that people can be in prison for
24 60 days now.
25 Q. That's different to a power of arrest. That's a power of --
1 that's a punishment rather than a power of arrest, Mr. Theunens.
2 A. Okay, but in my nonlegal mind I assumed that imprisonment
3 includes -- assumes --
4 JUDGE ORIE: Let's get rid of this. If you want to imprison
5 someone, if he reports voluntarily you don't have to arrest him. If you
6 are talking about pre-trial arrest or arrest in the context of an
7 investigation -- let's -- what you say, it's an offence, and let's leave
8 it to that.
9 THE WITNESS: Okay, Your Honours.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Because if it's not an offence, there should be no
12 MR. JORDASH:
13 Q. If we can go to the next page to have a look at the remaining
15 MR. JORDASH: Could we go back again, please.
16 Q. What was the significance you gave this -- this answer, that this
17 informed the Serbian MUP?
18 A. Indeed. In Roman II on page 92, I drew the conclusion that this
19 reply explicitly -- or shows that the Serbian Ministry of Interior
20 explicitly recognised that it was aware of the existence of armed
21 volunteer formations. Then I quote from the text, it is becoming more
22 and so on until the end of the paragraph with carried out. I also quote
23 the paragraph where it's stated that the Serbian -- the MUP of the
24 Republic of Serbia
25 page. Yes. I think on the fifth line, and I ended -- I mean that's on
1 the top -- the bottom of page 92, part one, that the reply does not
2 indicate which specific measures the MUP Serbia is taking.
3 Q. So you can see there that the ministry is saying that it's
4 carrying out its duties in accordance with the Law on Defence. It is
5 co-operating with the state authorities and is taking measures with an
6 aim of preventing any activities of illegal armed groups on the territory
7 of the republic. And it then states the operational work which is
8 focused on illegal possession of arms, military training that is
9 violating Articles 99 and 103 of the Law on Defence, and all other forms
10 of paramilitary activities disturbing the public order. In that respect,
11 MUP has filed 13 criminal reports.
12 A. That's what the document states, yes.
13 Q. Right. So it did give some detail about what the Serbian MUP was
15 A. Okay. You can discuss -- one can debate some detail or more
17 Q. Yeah. Okay. Well let's go to P1048, please, which is at page 95
18 of your report, footnote 264. And you rely upon this report to show
19 the -- to show the involvement of the Ministry of the Interior and the
20 arming of volunteers and paramilitaries. Can you see that?
21 A. Indeed.
22 Q. And if we look at the text of the report, at page 1 we can see
23 some detail in the second paragraph there. Four or five lines down. In
24 addition, they are establishing arming and training party-related
25 paramilitary groups. Some individuals are trying to get permission from
1 their members and supporters to be trained at VJ barracks. Making
2 preparations for attacks against military installations and operations to
3 topple the legal authorities. Discouraging men liable for military
4 service from responding to summons from military organs. And encouraging
5 members of peacetime and reserve formations to operate VJ units from the
6 party's positions. And attempting it get their own positions and support
7 within the VJ.
8 Was it known at that point that these political parties were
9 organising groups and their aim was ultimately to topple the Serbian
10 government? Is that something which was common to these opposition
11 parties and their activities?
12 A. There were political parties who were organising armed groups.
13 Now, it's not clear from the outset that they want to topple the Serbian
14 government. It may be that some groups developed that goal, because
15 obviously most of them were of nationalistic orientation and were
16 suspicious of the Serbian authorities, but that's what I tried to explain
17 and I try to be brief. Earlier that my conclusion is that somebody like
18 Vojislav Seselj, for example, relied on the -- call it tacit
19 authorisation of the Serbian authorities and his relationship with
20 Slobodan Milosevic, his good relation with Slobodan Milosevic, in order
21 to organise and so on the -- his groups, and that only when there was a
22 political fallout between two in November 1993, that legal steps were put
23 against his volunteers.
24 Q. Okay. Let's go to -- you do accept then that many of these
25 groups did want to topple the Serbian government?
1 A. It depends at which moment in time.
2 Q. Well, in 1991, which ones do you think -- did you conclude wanted
3 to topple the Serbian government?
4 A. I haven't -- in my analysis I haven't addressed that specific
6 Q. Let's have a look at page 2 of this exhibit. You can see there
7 at the top of the page the party -- perhaps we -- discussing the SPO.
8 Who are the SPO?
9 A. The Serbian Renewal Movement of Vuk Draskovic.
10 Q. And it says there at the top this party reportedly has
11 detachments formed on paper all over Serbia which it plans to activate at
12 a given moment to try to topple the legal authorities. Would you accept
13 that that was the case?
14 A. That is what the document states, but again when I would analyse
15 that specific issue, I would also look for -- for other documents, from
16 all documents, as I've done throughout my report for the topics I have
17 discussed here.
18 Q. You haven't put that in your report, have you, that this group
19 wanted to at some point topple the legal authorities?
20 A. No, because I believed it was outside the scope of my report.
21 Q. Okay. Let's move down the page to the third paragraph. The
22 command of the Hajduk Veljko Detachment also has several platoons and
23 assault groups of the Serbian Volunteer Guard subordinated to it which
24 were formed in some of the bigger towns in south-eastern Serbia - there's
25 the list of towns - and have the task of engaging in the forcible
1 occupation of important military installations, MUP installations, and
2 infrastructure, and prompting their members and supporters to engage in
3 widespread armed insurrection at a given point -- moment in order to
4 seize power.
5 Isn't that something that was within your knowledge,
6 Mr. Theunens, that this kind of activity was what the Serbian government
7 was facing around this time?
8 A. There were for sure groups that wanted to topple -- I mean,
9 topple or act against the government because they were of very
10 nationalistic orientation, but my focus in the report was on groups of
11 parties that enjoyed good relations with the government. And there is,
12 for example, in the document a reference to the paramilitary groups
13 organised by the SRS --
14 Q. So you didn't consider in your report the groups that didn't
15 enjoy good relations with the government?
16 A. No, because that was outside the scope of my report. And I mean,
17 just to be complete, I -- I -- of course I conducted searches on the
18 names of these groups but I couldn't really identify precise information
19 on -- on their involvement in -- in issues that were of interest for this
20 report. I know that the Serbian Renewal Movement -- I mean the
21 Srpska Garda of the Serbian Renewal Movement were involved in operations
22 in Gospic in 1991, but that was not within the scope of my report, these
23 specific operations.
24 Q. Could we have a look, please, at 2 -- footnote 261, page 93 of
25 your report. P1059. This is what you rely upon to --
1 MR. WEBER: Your Honour.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber.
3 MR. WEBER: The document's under seal.
4 MR. JORDASH: Thank you.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Therefore, not to be shown to the public. Please
7 MR. JORDASH:
8 Q. This is what you used to rely upon to show that the
9 State Security Service of the Republic of Serbia
10 the activities of at least one volunteer group; is that right?
11 A. I think it's footnote --
12 Q. Sorry, it's 1058. P1058.
13 A. Yes. It's footnote 260. Indeed.
14 Q. And if we could have a look at it, if we could, please. This
15 is -- what is this, Mr. Theunens?
16 A. It's an information, a report on the situation in
17 Western Slavonia, i.e., in Croatia
18 Q. Right. And it's a report which was sent, is this right, from the
19 SSNO to the state security?
20 A. I mean the heading clearly states SDB State Security of -- I
21 mean, the Republic of Serbia
22 to what I see, it has been compiled by the SDB of the MUP Serbia.
23 Q. My mistake. One second, please.
24 MR. JORDASH: I'm going to have to come back to that actually. I
25 do apologise, Your Honour. I tabulated things wrong.
1 THE WITNESS: But of interest is that the SDB compiles a report
2 about the situation in Croatia
3 MR. JORDASH: Let's have a look, please, at P1059. Footnote 261,
4 under seal.
5 Q. And it's what you rely upon to show further awareness by the
6 Serbian MUP of information that the UB had collected on the alleged
7 involvement of paramilitary and volunteer formations in the commission of
8 crimes against the civilians in the RSK, including the identity of the
9 alleged perpetrators.
10 Now, this is what you would say is a report sent to the Serbian
11 MUP; correct?
12 A. Yes. I mean I only see the cover page where it says SSNO, but
13 then it's --
14 Q. But looking at your -- your report at page 93, I think that you
15 say the document, is this right, the document entitled "Analysis."
16 A. Yeah, but we would have to go --
17 Q. Okay. Let's go to the next page.
18 A. Because the ERN I put for the --
19 Q. Information on the crimes against civilians.
20 A. Yeah. Footnote 261 consists of a document that is sent by the --
21 the security administration, i.e., the SFRY Armed Forces.
22 Q. Sent to --
23 A. No, no. I'm sorry for the confusion. What I tried to do, I
24 compared two different documents. I compared a document compiled by the
25 state security of the Republic of Serbia
1 document we saw.
2 Q. Yeah.
3 A. With --
4 Q. This was an information sent to the Serbian MUP and then there is
5 a response document by the state security; is that right?
6 A. I mean, that's not how I described it in my report. Maybe, I
7 don't know, during the break if I could look at the hard copies, I could
8 check it.
9 Q. Okay.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Look at the clock, Mr. Jordash. That might even be
11 a good suggestion.
12 MR. JORDASH: Yes, it would and I can get my papers in order.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll have a break and we resume at
14 ten minutes to 6.00.
15 --- Recess taken at 5.25 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 5.58 p.m.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Jordash. No, before I ask you
18 to do that, Mr. Weber, I earlier asked you for information about the
19 history of the scheduling of Witness 26. Of course, in the context it
20 should have been understood as asking for the history of Witness JF-52.
21 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, that's how I understood it, actually.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Jordash.
23 MR. JORDASH: Thank you, Your Honour.
24 Q. Let's go back to page 93 of chapter 1, Mr. Theunens. I want to
25 have a look at two documents you detail there at (C), and you note, in
1 relation to these two documents, that what you took from them was that
2 the Ministry of the Interior of the Republic of Serbia
3 information that UB had collected on the alleged involvement of Serbian
4 paramilitary and volunteer formations in the commission of crimes against
5 civilians in the RSK, including the identity of the alleged perpetrators.
6 Was there nothing else you took from those documents of significance to
7 the issues worth considering?
8 A. I don't remember whether I addressed -- I used these documents in
9 other sections of my report, but basically just a small correction. It's
10 one document, P1060. That is a document compiled by the state security.
11 Q. Yeah, but the first document is P1059, which is the UB report,
13 A. Exactly. Indeed.
14 Q. And then there's P --
15 A. And P1060 is the state security document.
16 Q. Is the response --
17 A. Yeah.
18 Q. -- of the state security. Let's have a look briefly at P1059,
19 and what this is is a report, an information report. Is it a report to
20 the -- sent from the SSNO to the Belgrade DB, department -- state
21 security department?
22 A. From what is on screen I can see that it's indeed a document from
23 the SSNO, but I'm not sure where the addressee -- I can't see the
24 addressee on the document.
25 Q. Well, if you look at your report, and we'll come to that in a
1 minute, but it says which was compiled in response to a similar report by
2 the UB.
3 A. Indeed.
4 Q. Right. Or you're saying it may not have got -- it may not have
5 been sent from the SSNO to the Belgrade DB?
6 A. No, no, no. What I'm trying to say is that we should actually
7 look at P1060, which the state security document, because that should
8 then show -- could mention that it's compiled in response to the UB
10 Q. It does, and we'll get to that. It does.
11 A. Exactly.
12 Q. So if you just take that one trust from me for the moment and
13 then --
14 A. Okay.
15 Q. So let's look at 1059 and let's look at page 2, please. And its
16 entitled, as you can see, "Information on the crimes against civilians."
17 And then, I don't want to go through all of the document, but the
18 document lists at page 2, crimes by -- or suspected crimes by the
19 Valjevo TO Detachment with approximately ten members of the Dusan Silni
21 A. Mm-hmm.
22 MR. JORDASH: If we go to the next page, please.
23 Q. And we can see page 3, and 3 of the B/C/S as well, further
24 details there of the crimes alleged. And then if we go further down the
25 page you can see that the persons -- or the institutions it was sent to.
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. You only quote, I think, very few -- I think it may be only this
3 report from the SSNO to the Belgrade DB. Is that -- am I correct that
4 it -- that you haven't come across many of these documents from the SSNO
5 to the Belgrade
6 A. Exactly. I mean, this is one of the few which explicitly
7 indicates, and also on the first page, that the information is passed to
8 the DB.
9 Q. Yeah.
10 A. And the Ministry of the Interior.
11 Q. There is no obligation on the SSNO to send information to the
12 Serbian MUP.
13 A. I don't know the regulations that apply to that, but I would
14 assume -- again it's my interpretation of the regulations that the SSNO
15 UB, the security administration, would share information with the
16 Ministry of the Interior if they're obliged by law, i.e., to ensure that
17 the proper law enforcement measures are implemented or if there is an
18 operational need to share the information. But again that's just my
19 interpretation. I cannot refer to a specific regulation or legislation.
20 Q. Right. But --
21 A. Maybe if we go back to page 1 because I saw a reference to
22 Ministry of the Interior in the middle. Maybe that explains why it was
23 sent to the Ministry of the Interior. It's in the middle of the page
24 more or less.
25 Q. Yeah. "However, while carrying out the basic tasks as the
1 priority under the condition of combat activities and the nonexistence of
2 the legally enforceable jurisdiction, as well as the fact that the
3 purpose of the -- the perpetrators of these crimes would most often
4 desert the unit immediately in an organised manner or on a
5 self-initiative, the committed crimes were generally only registered and
6 only partially documented. All information was immediately passed on to
7 the local organs of government, the organs of internal affairs of the
8 Republic of Serbia
9 A. Yeah. That's what I tried to say.
10 Q. What did you try to say, sorry?
11 A. That, as I explained earlier, that the SSNO -- or the UB of the
12 SSNO forwarded the information because there was an operational
13 requirement or in order to ensure that the proper law enforcement
14 measures were taken.
15 Q. Right. So are you not surprised that you haven't come across
16 more of these types of documents in your time with the ICTY?
17 A. Not really, because as you know, most of the documents I -- I had
18 were documents that the 1st Military District sent to the SSNO. This is
19 one of the few documents we had at the time when I compiled my report
20 that is compiled at the level of the SSNO.
21 Q. Okay.
22 A. And I can assure you that such documents were requested at the
23 time, not specifically -- not only for this case but for many other cases
25 Q. Right. If we go -- thank you. If we go to -- are we on page 3?
1 Can we go it page 3, because there's a report there of an incident in the
2 Lovas village.
3 A. Indeed.
4 Q. Are you familiar with that?
5 A. I am.
6 Q. And are you familiar with who the perpetrators were and whether
7 there was a follow-up by the SSNO in terms of these suspected crimes?
8 A. I'm not -- I think the perpetrators belong to the Dusan Silni
9 group. When -- I say "I think" because I remember there is the letter or
10 the report by Lieutenant-Colonel Eremija, who was the officer responsible
11 for morale in the Proletarian Guards Motorised Division, i.e., the unit
12 that covered the area of Lovas at the time, and I think this report dates
13 from fall 1991, in which this crime -- sorry, in which this crime or this
14 alleged crime and the alleged perpetrators are described. I am not
15 familiar with the follow-up.
16 Q. Okay. If we look at page 4, please. You see there noted halfway
17 down the page the authorised official from the military post Novi Sad
18 4323 Novi Sad
19 military proud, the VP 282 Belgrade. Strigic, as we can see further up
20 the page, was a member of special purpose unit of the Beli Manastir SUP
21 and yet he was prosecuted by the military police. Why would that be?
22 A. We -- I mean, we would have to go through the whole document
23 because maybe he was somebody with -- I mean, I'm just -- maybe he was
24 somebody with military speculation -- a military obligation, I'm sorry.
25 Q. What do you mean military obligation? In which circumstances
1 would the military police jurisdiction kick in, if I can put that way?
2 A. If he was -- for sure if he was a member of a military unit at
3 the time of when the crimes were committed.
4 Q. Right. Thank you. Are you surprised that such a report dated
5 May 1992 emanating from the SSNO doesn't include such things as Arkan and
6 his conduct?
7 A. It's not a question of surprise. This is a document about, I
8 think -- I would have to go through the whole document again, but I
9 believe it deals with specific crimes, and more specifically the one in
11 Q. Yes, but it's dealing with -- if we can go to page 2. It's
12 dealing with issues which relate largely to SBWS; is that correct? And
13 quite -- and also probably Srpska Krajina generally. You see at the top
14 of page 2. Wouldn't you have expected a report at this level to have
15 included Arkan within it at this point in time?
16 A. Not specifically, because we don't know -- I would assume that
17 this is not the only report. There may be also reports on Arkan. We
18 know that the 1st Military District compiled, and actually at a much
19 earlier stage, we looked at them in fall 1991, quite a substantial number
20 of reports on Arkan. They were sent to the SSNO. I -- since I don't
21 have the documents from the security administration of the SSNO, I don't
22 know what the SSNO did with the reports it received from subordinate
23 security organs.
24 Q. And are you surprised -- that same question in relation to
25 Ovcara, the massacre in Ovcara by certain members of the JNA?
1 A. I mean the trial judgement and the appeals judgement state that
2 the executions were committed by members of volunteer groups who were
3 operating under the command of the JNA.
4 Q. Yeah, but no mention in this report, but that's to you not a
6 A. I mean, there maybe another report on -- on Ovcara. Ovcara is a
7 very complex issue. If you want, we can go into detail, but I'm not
8 sure whether --
9 Q. No, I don't think that is necessary. Thank you.
10 A. But I mean this is not an exclusive report. If we could -- if we
11 would establish this is the only report the SSNO prepared, then indeed
12 there maybe reason for surprise and then we would look into why only one
13 report. But I cannot establish whether there were more reports, and I
14 cannot establish whether this is the only report.
15 Q. Okay. Can we go to P1060, the response by the DB to this report.
16 And it's dealt with in the same -- sorry, across the page 94 in your
17 report. Footnote 262.
18 A. Indeed. And to answer your question from the beginning why --
19 where you said that why do you only -- or why did you deal with that
20 document in such a brief manner, I just used the document for the section
21 notice of the Ministry of the Interior.
22 Q. Yeah. But you didn't, and this is what I find significant, and I
23 would suggest it is significant in relation to your methodology. You
24 don't include the response by the DB and what its response was, which I
25 suggest is -- well, is an interesting response given your thesis.
1 Page 1, analysis -- so this is a state security department sent to
3 the 26th of May, 1992. And if we go from page 1 to page 2, you'll see
4 that -- and I suggest if you read this, you'll see that the DB take --
5 took its responsibilities fairly seriously and carefully, I suggest,
6 analysed its own jurisdiction.
7 We see, for example, on page 2, paragraph 1 and I'll just read
8 part of it:
9 "The responsibility for the sufferings of the civilians, first
10 and foremost, lies with Lieutenant-Colonel Miodrag Dimitrijevic and the
11 reserve commanding officers, Peric Darko and Vlajkovic Radovan, both from
12 Valjevo." And then it gives a description.
13 And then in brackets it says:
14 "We think that the military prosecutor would have authority for
15 the possible criminal procedure against these persons."
16 A. Mm-hmm.
17 Q. And then down the page to paragraph 2, noting in response to the
18 crimes against women, a criminal report has been filed with the
19 authorised military prosecutor's office and the investigation is ongoing.
20 And same with 3.
21 And doesn't this response by the DB indicate exactly what I've
22 just said, that this was the DB responding in a way which you suggest the
23 Serbian MUP didn't respond, which was to take its responsibilities
24 seriously? Did you not think that was worth putting in the report?
25 A. I -- my view on paragraph 1 or the part that you read out simply
1 shows that the DB confirms the existing legislation to the military,
2 i.e., that members of the armed forces who have allegedly committed
3 crimes shall be investigated and -- or shall face military jurisdiction.
4 It would be useful if I could compare the two documents then to
5 see whether if the UB document also identified civilians, for example,
6 among the volunteers of Dusan Silni, what the recommendations of the DB
7 in their regard was. Or maybe you can do that now.
8 Q. Well, I can, for example -- sorry, what are you saying is the
9 jurisdiction, then, of the DB in this situation?
10 A. I'm not so much saying what the jurisdiction is. I'm trying to
11 answer to your question in -- if you want, I can repeat it. Military
12 regulations are very clear that military personnel who have allegedly
13 commit -- or who are suspected of having committed a crime, they shall
14 face military justice system. I mean, military justice. My question was
15 to see whether in the UB report civilians are identified or people, not
16 members of the armed forces, like, for example, Dusan Silni group,
17 whether any reference is made to them in the -- in this -- in this DB
18 report here and see what the recommendations or the action undertaken by
19 the DB or the -- is.
20 Q. Well, let's have a look at page 4. Well, yes. Let's go to
21 page 1, first of all, to see what the analysis, the first analysis says.
22 The DB is saying of the information received "with accompanying
23 documentation on the possibility of taking to court the persons who
24 committed crimes against the civilians."
25 So this document appears to be, don't you agree, an response by
1 the DB looking into the possibility of its own jurisdiction being
3 A. Yes, but -- I'm sorry if I repeat it again, but the military -- I
4 mean the regulations on -- the 1977 regulation on military prosecutor and
5 military courts do not make any references to the state security in
6 relation to the enforcement of justice against members of the armed
7 forces. So what I'm trying to say is that the UB has sent this document
8 with a particular motive to the DB, and one possible motive could be that
9 the UB, in addition to military suspects or alleged perpetrators, has
10 also identified civilian alleged perpetrators where these would not
11 necessarily be put or be the subject of military justice.
12 Q. Well, let's have a look at page 3, paragraph 7, and it says:
13 "In the case of the killing of 16 civilians, most of them Croats,
14 which took place on the night of the 6th and 7th November 1991, no
15 evidence was submitted along. In the analysis of the information, it was
16 said -- it is said that a group of approximately 20 volunteers led by
17 Gogic Milan, aka Zuka, from Novi Sad
18 village of Enton [phoen], SO Vukovar, besides the unit of the JA, SUP
19 Serb SBWS carried out an investigation. Further authority lies with the
20 SB JNA as written in the SUP which carried out the investigation in the
21 SRDB Novi Sad
22 Isn't that the issue that you were addressing? Isn't that the DB
23 saying, well, actually this may be a situation where we might have
24 jurisdictio for the reasons that you've just given and we're going to
25 look into it?
1 A. Yes. I mean, for example.
2 Q. Yeah. And if we look over the page to page 4, number 9, with
3 reference to the Zuca, the Vuckovic male, one of two brothers, I think.
4 A. Mm-hmm.
5 Q. And you can see what reference there is that -- that he's a
6 criminal from Belgrade
7 of a unit which doesn't seem to be information that the DB has, and
8 then -- then consideration of what the DB could arrest him for. Isn't
9 that again a similar point? In the absence of his stated connection to
10 the JNA or TO, the DB then considers what it can do.
11 A. Yes. And he was -- I assume you will come back to Vuckovic at a
12 later stage when we discuss Zvornik but --
13 Q. Yeah.
14 A. -- anyway that's in my report. But yeah, it states here that he
15 was arrested -- oops. I touched the screen. But for illegal possession
16 of weapons.
17 Q. Didn't you think that this was significant, that of the very few
18 reports that you received of the SSNO reporting to the Belgrade DB
19 centre, and you get what I can suggest is a pretty careful response, it
20 seems on the face of it, didn't you think that was important to mention
21 in the report?
22 A. I agree with you that I could have put -- included this reference
23 that he was arrested for the possession and carrying of firearms. I
24 could have added that to the Bokan letter as an additional footnote, but
25 otherwise, as I said earlier, I used this document solely for the purpose
1 of notice, because we are -- I gave the answer already two times. I
2 don't see -- I mean, now, looking at it again, anything significant that
3 the Ministry of the Interior undertook except for reminding the military
4 of what their duties were in relation to the enforcement of military
6 Q. Okay. I'll leave the point there if you didn't find it
7 significant. Let me move to Mr. Seselj, which you've returned to on many
8 occasions during your testimony.
9 MR. JORDASH: Could we have on e-court, please, 65 ter 1D1349,
10 page 1D01-7542.
11 Q. And this is some of your comments, I think, on some issues of
12 relevance here.
13 Well, that's difficult to read.
14 This is your testimony in the Seselj case.
15 MR. JORDASH: Could we go slightly up the page.
16 Q. The -- you're discussing, as you can see there, the role of
17 political -- certain political parties in the establishment of
18 paramilitary formations, and your response to a question, were these
19 formations based on material that you have reviewed supported by the
20 Republic of Serbia
21 "Well, overall, as an overall comment one would say that they
22 were at least allowed to exist. There are indications that some groups
23 were the subject of investigation or even that they were prevented from
24 continuing to exist, and I refer, I think, to the Serbian Volunteer Guard
25 in specific references."
1 A. Yeah. Yeah.
2 Q. Could you just elaborate on that is answer in the Seselj case,
4 A. It must be an error. I must have meant the Serbian Guard so I
5 don't -- I mean, I don't check transcripts. Okay, I should check them
6 when I'm testifying but -- the Serbian Volunteer Guard --
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Theunens, the transcript is the exclusive
8 responsibility -- it's good that if any mistake was made that it is
9 corrected, but you have no duty to verify the transcript when testifying.
10 Please proceed.
11 MR. JORDASH:
12 Q. Thank you.
13 A. Yeah. I must have meant the Serbian Guard, Srpska Guard of
14 Vuk Draskovic, because we've touched upon that a few times. There, as
15 far as I remember, action was undertaken.
16 Q. When were they prevented from continuing to exist, and by whom?
17 A. I don't recall exactly. What I recall is that they were involved
18 in Gospic, I believe in the summer or fall 1991. And then you still saw
19 some kind of open-source reporting on alleged activities, but including
20 references also in security organ reports, but I don't -- I cannot say
21 exactly when -- or when they were disbanded. I have a recollection that
22 they were disband -- I mean that they were -- sorry, not just disbanded
23 out of their own volition but action was undertaken. But I have no exact
25 Q. By whom?
1 A. By the Serbian -- I mean Serbian government. I mean the Serb --
2 the competent Serb authorities.
3 Q. And who would they be?
4 A. It would involve the -- I mean the Ministry of the Interior,
5 maybe the Ministry of Defence.
6 Q. You didn't think that important to put in your report in this
8 A. That's not the issue. I mean, what I said there in Seselj is --
9 is based on my general knowledge. As you see in this report for --
10 except for the conclusions I draw on the facts, for each fact there is a
11 reference. Now, obviously I cannot find -- I don't have reference for
12 each and every thing I remember about the conflict in the former
14 Q. But you were analysing the responsibilities of the MUP and their
15 tacit authorisation of opposition paramilitary groups?
16 A. Indeed.
17 Q. How significant were the Serbian Guard in terms of these types of
19 A. It's always difficult to -- to -- to mention -- to judge the
20 significance, but at least based on my research they were -- as I
21 mentioned they were involved in one area, in Gospic, so in the Krajina,
22 and other areas I found some general references in -- in documents of the
23 1st Military Districts but nothing at the level of the groups I have
24 discussed in my report.
25 Q. I mean, you make mention through -- throughout your report of the
1 Serbian Guard, don't you, in this case?
2 A. If you can remind me where? I mean probably I mentioned them at
3 least once or twice but not as often as -- as Arkan or Dragan or
4 volunteers belonging to the Serbian Radical Party.
5 Q. Right. Okay. Well, let's leave the point there. Let's -- you
6 do make the point there in the next line about focusing in the Seselj
7 case on this Serbian Radical Party.
8 A. Mm-hmm.
9 Q. And the conclusion that there was co-operation with the Ministry
10 of Defence and/or the Ministry of Interior in order to organise, equip,
11 arm, and dispatch these units, as well as co-operation with the JNA. Is
12 there any reason you said "and/or" in that case?
13 A. I mean, grammatically speaking, "and" would have been sufficient.
14 Q. Okay.
15 MR. JORDASH: Let's go to 65 ter, please, on the e-court, 1D1349.
16 1D134G -- 9, sorry. 1D1349. And page, first of all, 1D01-7667.
17 Q. And this is where you deal with, I think, Seselj's relationship
18 with Slobodan Milosevic at some point in time.
19 MR. JORDASH: Could we just -- if we go down the page, please.
20 Could we go back up a little. And you say, I think -- keep going,
22 "THE WITNESS: This is public knowledge, referring to number 3 on
23 the list. I'm sorry if this -- I don't -- if you aren't able to locate
24 this in context, then we can come back to it, Mr. Theunens. But Mr. --
25 what is said there is Mr. Seselj suspected that person of having, yeah,
1 particular links, i.e., that he was collecting information for the state
2 security of the Republic of Serbia
3 I remember that was a time when this person was kicked out of the
4 War Staff, a press conference whereby this person more or less had to
5 make a confession about his ties with the state security of the Republic
6 of Serbia
7 Q. Does this trigger your memory?
8 A. Yes, it does.
9 Q. Who is that?
10 A. It was the -- the chief of the SRS War Staff. At the time I
11 don't recall his exact name but I can find --
12 Q. We'll come back to it anyway. But it was somebody kicked out
13 of -- a prominent person in the --
14 A. He was the chief of the SRS War Staff during the relevant time
15 period, i.e., from, I think, end of 1991, because he's -- I think his
16 predecessor was Zoran Rankovic and he took over from Rankovic. But I can
17 find out.
18 Q. Yeah. No, we'll come to that. I think --
19 A. Okay.
20 Q. It's Petkovic, I think.
21 A. Yeah, but in the first name I'm not hundred per cent.
22 Q. But he was kicked out when?
23 A. I believe in the latter half of 1993, but I can be wrong.
24 Q. He was kicked out for what in particular, do you know?
25 A. Yeah, the open-source information states that Vojislav Seselj was
1 suspicious that the co-operation he had with the Serbian government
2 Ministry of Defence as well as the Ministry of the Interior went beyond
3 what I would call advancing the goals of the War Staff, but that
4 actually, according to Mr. Seselj, this person was, yeah, collecting
5 information on the activities of the War Staff and the SRS for the DB.
6 Q. Thank you. Could we go down the page a bit please.
7 Judge Antonetti then asks you -- we're keeping the court staff busy.
8 Judge Antonetti asks you:
9 "This event indicates that in the Republic of Serbia
10 power struggles or between the political parties, the MUP and the
11 Ministry of the Interior, there was a struggle to exert influence; is
12 that right? Can you confirm this?"
13 And you say: "... and more specifically that the competent
14 services, i.e., the State Security Service, was aware that certain
15 political parties were organising, I mean recruiting, organising,
16 dispatching volunteers, and also involved in arming them, and from that
17 legal point of view it made sense to keep an eye on them, even though it
18 seems that it took some time before there was any --" can we go over the
19 page, please -- "before there was any action against these activities."
20 And you say:
21 "This is not dealt with in my report but I remember that it's
22 only after a political conflict arises between Mr. Seselj and
23 Mr. Milosevic sometime in October 19 -- November 1993 that the competent
24 authorities in Serbia
25 all arrested -- or most of them are arrested on the ground of illegal
1 possession of firearms and they're released quite soon."
2 So you're there making a clear distinction, it seems, between
3 what the state security was doing, which was keeping them under
4 surveillance, and then the competent authorities making the arrests
5 somewhat later in the day. Is that fair?
6 A. Yes, and the state -- I mean the competent authorities can
7 include the state security. I have -- as I said today, I have not
8 analysed the detailed tasks or competence of the state security.
9 Q. Thanks.
10 MR. JORDASH: Could we go to page 1D01-7668 -- oh, we've just had
11 a look at that. Okay. Can we go then to 65 ter 1D1349, the same one,
12 page number 1D01-8164.
13 Q. I mean, you've said on a number of occasions today, I think, that
14 Seselj was, I think this is right, allowed to -- by the -- by the
15 competent authorities in Serbia
16 today, this is something you've said before?
17 A. Yes, and, I mean, we have the testimony in Seselj and I have also
18 included some of these -- some of the statements Mr. Seselj made at the
19 time in my report. He stated that he had -- he collaborated with the
20 Ministry of Defence as well as with the Ministry of Interior Republic of
22 now is the -- are the operations in Eastern Bosnia-Herzegovina early
23 1993. There is extensive publications by the SRS as well as statements
24 by Mr. Seselj that these operations were conducted in direct
25 co-ordination with Mr. Frenki Simatovic, i.e. --
1 Q. Well, we're going to come to some of that.
2 A. Okay.
3 Q. But interesting that you don't preface these remarks with open
4 source. When you implicate the Serbian MUP or the accused, you don't
5 preface it with open source.
6 A. It's open source, but I mean -- open source, I don't have any
7 qualification in relation to it. Open source is just material that is
8 available to the public. I think the first day I said that in
9 traditional, call it intelligence work, it's generally stated that
10 80 perk cent of the information comes from open sources.
11 Q. Okay.
12 A. And of course there are certain caveats that may apply to open
13 sources, but Mr. Seselj made a lot of public statements and, okay, they
14 are obviously open source but I refer to them as Mr. Seselj's statements.
15 Q. Okay. Can we go back one page so we can get the context of what
16 you're saying in the Seselj case. And you were asked that -- that's
18 "How did volunteers of the Serbian Radical Party in the Serbian
19 village of Slavonia
20 did they get their weapons from? Answer me that."
21 And your answer was:
22 "Your Honours, that's the question -- that question was already
23 asked before the break, and I replied that they received the weapons
24 from -- in the area, so from the local village defence. However, while
25 reviewing my report during the break, I also found a statement by
1 Mr. Soskocanin, who participated in the incident in Borovo Selo, who made
2 a reference to the JNA. It's a very general reference, but anyway,
3 that's included in my report."
4 What precisely were you trying to say in that paragraph during
5 the Seselj case?
6 A. Well, this deals with a very specific situation. It is the --
7 the incident in Borovo Selo on the 1st and the 2nd of May, 1991, and my
8 testimony there is based on public statements and articles in SRS
9 publications whereby the SRS describes in detail how its volunteers
10 travel from Serbia
11 that are developing there, i.e., the local Serb TO that is being
12 established. And according to these articles, weapons -- I cannot say
13 all weapons, but weapons are provided by these local Serb TO.
14 Q. Right. So they're travelling through Serbia to Borovo Selo and
15 then obtaining their weapons when they arrive?
16 A. Yeah. Now -- I mean it's not in the testimony, but if you want
17 to be fully accurate, there's again open source information but I also
18 would like to refer to P1048 when we deal about weapons of SRS
19 volunteers. With open source information --
20 Q. What does that say, that exhibit, sorry?
21 A. P1048 states -- it's on page 94, part 1 of my report. It states
22 under the heading "Paramilitary groups organised by the SRS." And then a
23 large number of the people who have joined these formations are armed
24 mostly with small arms from depots of the former JNA, MUP, and Serbian
25 Ministry of Defence that were distributed in large numbers and so on and
1 so on.
2 What I was trying to say also is that the local Serb TO, on one
3 hand, they could lay their hands on weapons that were there even if --
4 and again I don't want to be too detailed but the JNA had taken control
5 over all these weapons. And that goes back to, I think, an order of
6 May 1990. And in addition, weapons were distributed by the Ministry of
7 Defence and, according to Seselj, also the Ministry of Interior of the
8 Republic of Serbia
9 local Serb TO that was established in parts of Croatia.
10 Q. And you base that on that exhibit, do you?
11 A. Not only on that exhibit. I mean, when I refer to the order, the
12 Adzic order, it's in part 1 of the report. It's May 1990. It has to do
13 with the Jedinstvo restructuring plan and the distribution of weapons by
14 the Ministry of Defence. There's other documents in my report that refer
15 to that and there's also open sources on that.
16 Q. Let's go further down the page, please.
17 A. Yeah, it's --
18 Q. You were asked -- it's put to you that they couldn't obtain the
19 weapons from the local TO because the JNA took all the weapons from the
20 TO. And you say you're aware of the order of May 1990 by General Adzic
21 to relocate the weapons of the TOs of the republic and the autonomous
22 provinces to JNA warehouses, but I understood that some of these weapons
23 in the course of the conflict were redistributed to Serbs in various
24 parts of Croatia
25 reference to information that the JNA assisted together with the MUP and
1 the Ministry of Defence.
2 MR. JORDASH: Could we go further down the page, please. To the
3 next page.
4 Q. To redistribute weapons to Serbs in various parts of Croatia
5 What did you mean by redistribute?
6 A. As a result of the May 1990 order of General Adzic, the weapons
7 of the Territorial Defence of the republics, I mean, should have been put
8 in depots that were under JNA control. Contrary to the previous
9 situation where the TO was in control of these depots. I didn't analyse
10 that issue in detail but, okay, it's common knowledge that not all
11 weapons were put under JNA control. Now, at the same time we also
12 see that -- or later on, I'm sorry. Later on, in the course of 1991,
13 there are examples of JNA units in control of TO weapons in areas with
14 the Serb -- or significant Serb presence in Croatia distributing these
15 weapons, or some of them, to the local Serbs as a part of the development
16 of local Serb defence structures.
17 Q. So were you saying there then that the MUP and the Ministry of
18 Defence had collaborated to redistribute those weapons which were already
19 in Croatia
20 A. No. What I'm trying to say is that there are different origins
21 of these weapons. There are weapons that were already in Croatia and
22 which -- and they belonged formally -- they are formerly to the Croatian
23 TO, and then other weapons -- I mean, weapons were also provided by the
24 Ministry of the Interior, and --
25 Q. Redistributed by the -- so they're already in Croatia according
1 to what you're saying. Isn't that fair?
2 A. No. I think you're kind of mixing it up. I'm trying to explain
3 what I meant by my testimony. I'm looking for the word "redistributed"
4 now but ...
5 Q. You can see it at the top of the page.
6 A. Yes, but then we --
7 Q. Oh, sorry. Let's go back then.
8 A. What -- I mean what is -- what happened was that the weapons
9 originated from -- I mean, there were different origins, I'm sorry.
10 Q. But there you're saying that the Ministry of Defence and the
11 Ministry of the Interior of Serbia - and go over the page - in --
12 please --
13 A. Mm-hmm.
14 Q. In -- redistribute weapons to Serbs in various parts of Croatia
15 A. I can correct "redistribute" there in the sense that I was told
16 and I remember very well, for example, doing a suspect interview of
17 Miodrag Jokic --
18 Q. Well, are we going to hear about new evidence that you have
19 picked up --
20 A. No.
21 Q. -- which is not --
22 JUDGE ORIE: You're asking for an explanation if the witness
23 thinks that -- if there's anything that comes to his mind might assist
24 him in explaining that.
25 MR. JORDASH: Your Honour, I apologise.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
2 THE WITNESS: Thank you, Your Honours. Miodrag Jokic, who has
3 been minister of defence of the Republic of Serbia
4 being very precise, that weapons held by factories, and that brings us
5 back to the point you raised earlier of the role of state-owned factories
6 in the defence system, I'm not sure whether it was in 1990 or even
7 earlier, were gathered, because these were old weapons. It's the famous
8 Thompsons and so on, weapons that were, I mean from Second World War.
9 They were collected and I believe with -- I mean with the involvement of
10 Ministry of Defence and/or the Ministry of the Interior, and then these
11 weapons were redistributed to Serbs or distributed to Serbs in -- in
13 pictures of local Serbs in Slavonia
14 check-points with a Thompson style -- I mean, a Thompson World War II
15 machine-gun. And to my recollection, that was not a weapon that was part
16 of the inventory of the Republic of Croatia
17 testimony Mr. Seselj also gave an additional explanation.
18 MR. JORDASH:
19 Q. Well, let's go to that. I want to go further down the page
20 because Seselj says to you:
21 "Let's cut this short. I'll tell you what I know about this and
22 you can confirm whether it's correct or not. These are weapons written
23 off by the JNA set aside to be destroyed. General Dusan Pekic, one of
24 the functionaries of the Association of Serbs from Croatia, using his
25 private contacts and channels because he was a well-known famous
1 commander from World War II, one of the most able generals the JNA ever
2 had, and although he had been a partisan, I speak very highly of him, so
3 he had good contacts. And using his private contacts with certain
4 officers, he managed to obtain those weapons which had been earmarked for
5 destruction. Am I correct in saying this? You mention Dusan Pekic in
6 your report."
7 A. Indeed it's correct. And I will just highlight we are not
8 thinking again in exclusives. Pekic played an important role together
9 with other members of the Association of Serbs in Croatia -- from Croatia
10 to organise local Serb defence structures as did the Ministry of Defence
11 and the Ministry of the Interior, as I have explained in this particular
13 Q. Right. Let's go to the next page, please.
14 A. Yeah. I just want to correct Ministry of Defence and Ministry of
15 the Interior to the Republic of Serbia
16 Q. So Pekic played an ...
17 A. There are documents from the Association of Serbs in Croatia
18 they -- again I haven't analysed that here but I know from the Milosevic
19 case they had also contacts with the Ministry of Defence. They would
20 meet or they would seek contacts with General Simovic [Realtime
21 transcript read in error "Simatovic"] and played a role and participate
22 in the organisation of defence structures of Serbs in Croatia.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Weber.
24 MR. WEBER: I just want to note on line -- page 90, line 18, it
25 reflects Simatovic. I believe the witness said Simovic.
1 THE WITNESS: Yeah, yeah, it's Simovic, minister of defence.
2 JUDGE ORIE: That's hereby corrected. Please proceed.
3 MR. JORDASH: Can we go to the top of this page, please -- sorry,
4 I can -- could we go three pages on, please, to 4334 in the right-hand
5 corner. Three more pages. Sorry, I cannot count. And you were asked by
6 Judge Antonetti: "Can you confirm or deny that the arms were given to
7 volunteers through the channel of General Pekic who was able through his
8 networks to send arms who seemingly were designed for destruction? Can
9 you confirm Mr. Seselj's theory or not?"
10 Can we go up the page, please.
11 Mr. Theunens, you answer -- please keep going.
12 "Your Honours, I confirm that thesis but it's not the only the
13 channel. I'm aware that in -- I'm not sure if it was 1989 or 1990, that,
14 for example, that in Serbia
15 that were used or could be used in time of conflict or other condition
16 when there was a requirement to do so, to protect factories and so on,
17 were all confiscated or brought together. And I'm not sure anymore
18 whether that was done by the Ministry of Defence or the Ministry of
20 Do you stand by that?
21 A. Yeah it's the same I said today. I testified today.
22 Q. "Just to come back to Pekic. I think in any organised country,
23 and the SFRY was certainly an organised country in 1990, you cannot just
24 redistribute weapons through private channels. Procedures have to be
25 followed, documents have to be established, and so on and so on. So the
1 police most likely didn't have any Thompsons or M-84s or other old
2 weapons in its equipment. But one cannot rule out that the police or the
3 Ministry of the Interior and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of"
4 - if we go over the page please - "Serbia played a road in organising the
5 transit or redistribution of these weapons. That's what I was trying to
7 Now, that is different to what you've been saying today, isn't
8 it? One cannot rule out is very different to a positive assertion that
9 they did.
10 A. I mean, I have, for example, in my report here P1048. I've
11 mentioned it earlier. I'm not sure whether I had -- I mean, at the time
12 I was testifying I remember that document, and my testimony is also a
13 reply to quite aggressive - I mean, what I would qualify aggressive -
14 questioning by Mr. Seselj -- yeah. Otherwise, I don't see a difference.
15 Q. Well, if you don't see a difference, that's fine. We leave it on
16 the record as that.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Well, Mr. Theunens, let's be -- if you cannot rule
18 out something or if you positively establish something, I mean to say I
19 can't see the difference. I think I would underestimate your
20 intelligence if I would accept that for an answer. You know that there's
21 a difference. Now, what your testimony today and what explains the
22 difference. If you say, I was a bit intimidated at the time therefore I
23 was overcautious, that's one explanation. Or if you'd say, Well, the
24 questions by Mr. Seselj were such that I had to adapt slightly my too
25 positive -- all possible explanations, but to say that you don't see the
1 difference, that seems not to be something we'd like to accept at
2 5 minutes to 7.00.
3 THE WITNESS: You're fully right, Your Honours. I'm -- I'm
4 trying to remember if I was aware of P1048 at the time or not, because
5 P1048 for me is a quite strong document. And, of course, the whole
6 discussion with Mr. Seselj is also that he was very vocal in the early
7 1990s and especially in particular after he broke with Mr. Seselj -- with
8 Mr. Milosevic, and okay, once he was here in The Hague he came with
9 different views.
10 MR. JORDASH: Let's move on. 65 ter 1D1349, please, on e-court.
11 Page 1D01-8147. If we go to the bottom of the page, please.
12 Q. So let's read your answer to -- let's go further up the page.
13 Sorry. You were asked the question now -- so -- Mr. Seselj asks you this
15 "Mr. Theunens, we're talking about up to September, up to the
16 month of September, no a single volunteer of the Serbian Radical Party
17 was in Western Slavonia. Isn't that right? So don't mix things up
18 before September and after September, if you're able to do that. Are you
19 able to do that?
20 "So up until September, the volunteers of the Serbian Radical
21 Party were defending certain villages called in by the local Serb
22 population to do so. Now, do you know that those volunteers crossed over
23 into Slavonia
24 authorities in Serbia
25 Could we go up the page, please.
1 "Your Honours, first of all, I would like comment on the fact --
2 on the claim made by Mr. Seselj that these volunteers had been called by
3 the local Serb population to come to the area. I would like to refer you
4 to English page 104 in page [sic] 2 of the report, where the activities
5 of the Chetnik volunteer detachment that participated in the -- okay, the
6 conflict in Borovo Selo on the 2nd of May has been discussed. And
7 according to 65 ter number 320, that Chetnik volunteer detachment had
8 been established following a decision by the Central Homeland
9 Administration of the Serbian Chetnik Movement and then dispatched to
10 Western Srem on the 2nd of April, 1991."
11 Can we go up, please.
12 "Now the circumstances of how these volunteers went from Serbia
13 to Croatia
14 did not use one of the three bridges over the Danube but that they
15 crossed --"
16 Can we turn, please.
17 "-- that they crossed the Danube by night using boats."
18 You stand by that answer?
19 A. Of -- I mean the volunteers that participated in the Borovo Selo
20 incident -- yeah, clash, yes, I haven't come across other information, so
21 that's the best knowledge I have.
22 Q. Well, you didn't say that in this case, did you, in your report
23 or in your evidence that the Seselj men were having to cross
24 surreptitiously because, for some reason, the Serbian authorities were
25 preventing them crossing use the three bridges. Why didn't you say that?
1 A. No. I mean, I confirmed that -- but that based on the
2 information in "Velika Srbija" they crossed the Danube using barges, and
3 okay, this is the situation in May 1991. And you will see in my report,
4 I mean the report in this case, that according to, for example,
5 Branislav Vakic, he says that there is over time -- and Branislav Vakic
6 was a senior SRS volunteer. Over time there was a change in his view in
7 the attitude of the Serbian authorities in relation to politically
8 oriented volunteers. And I can assure you, I mean, the SRS volunteers,
9 again based on the information I have seen, who participated in the
10 operations in Vukovar after September 1991, they were bus -- they were
11 coming in by bus.
12 Q. Well --
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash.
14 MR. JORDASH: Your Honour, yes.
15 JUDGE ORIE: I'm looking at the clock. I heard your sigh. Isn't
16 it that Shakespeare says "a thousand thousand sighs to save," but perhaps
17 for tomorrow.
18 MR. JORDASH: Yes, please. Thank you.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Theunens, we'll continue tomorrow in the
20 afternoon, quarter past 2.00 in Courtroom I.
21 We adjourn until then unless you have some follow-up, Mr. --
22 MR. WEBER: Your Honour, you requested information concerning
23 JF-52. On the 7th of September, 2010, the Prosecution sent a
24 notification for this witness for the first week of November. On the
25 15th of September, 2010, our notification indicated the 27th and 28th of
1 October, 2010. This witness was rescheduled then, and in our subsequent
2 notice, JF-52 was scheduled for the 1st and 2nd of November, 2010.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Thank you for that information. We'll further
4 consider the request of Mr. Bakrac. We'll adjourn for the day, and we'll
5 resume tomorrow, the 28th [sic] of October, quarter past 2.00,
6 Courtroom I.
7 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.02,
8 to be reconvened on Friday, the 29th day of
9 October, 2010, at 2.15 p.m.