1 Monday, 11 April, 2011
2 [Rule 98 bis]
3 [Open session]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone in and around this
7 courtroom. Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. Good morning,
9 everyone in and around the courtroom. This is case number IT-03-69-T.
10 The Prosecutor versus Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
12 Before I give an opportunity to the Prosecution to make its
13 submission in response to the 98 bis submissions of the Simatovic
14 Defence, I just put on the record that we've received a request by e-mail
15 to use slides. Any objection against that? I wouldn't expect any
16 objections. Then apart from that table of confidential exhibits you'd
17 like to deal with briefly in private session, but you also would like to
18 have them marked for identification, is that ... ?
19 MR. GROOME: That's correct, Your Honour, but I'm not sure we
20 need to go into private session to do that. Ms. Marcus is prepared to
21 address it in open session.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, of course. These are two new documents marked
23 for identification, although I do understand that the content is nothing
24 new, so just that we have a clear record of what you've used. Is the
25 Defence informed about these documents, these tables to be marked for
2 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour, they received the same e-mail that
3 was sent to the Chamber on Friday.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then perhaps an order to avoid any disturbance
5 of the flow of submissions, would there be any objection against the
6 documents the Prosecution indicated it wanted to have marked for
7 identification? I see a nodding no by the Stanisic Defence. Mr. Bakrac,
8 same for you? Then we can proceed as scheduled. The Prosecution now has
9 an opportunity to make submissions in response to the 98 bis submissions
10 by the Simatovic Defence.
11 Ms. Marcus, you are the first.
12 MS. MARCUS: Yes, Your Honour.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
14 MS. MARCUS: Thank you.
15 Good morning, Your Honours, and everyone in the courtroom. On
16 behalf of the Prosecution, we thank you for this opportunity to respond
17 to the 98 bis motion for acquittal made by the Simatovic Defence. To
18 begin with, I will present to the Chamber some information regarding our
19 submissions today. I will then formally commence our arguments.
20 On the screen before you is a table of contents of our oral
21 submissions. Although each member of the team will address a discrete
22 area of evidence, the Prosecution response is intended as a single
23 response and much of the evidence described by one team member has
24 brought relevance to the entire Prosecution case. I have a few
25 preliminary remarks for Your Honours, prior to the commencement of the
1 substantive submissions. First, the Prosecution's submissions will
2 contain a overview of the evidence in support of the charges in the
3 indictment in response to the Simatovic Defence 98 bis submissions, in
4 particular, their assertion that the Prosecution has not presented
5 evidence in relation to any of the counts in the indictment.
6 Second, the Prosecution does not plan to present a separate
7 segment on the legal standards. Rather, our submissions will be focused
8 upon the factual evidence in support of the charges and how that evidence
9 could support a conviction on all counts by a reasonable Trial Chamber.
10 And thereby why the motion for acquittal should be denied.
11 Third, a motion for acquittal at this stage obliges the
12 Prosecution to marshal its evidence, to facilitate the Chamber's review
13 of the Prosecution evidence and to avoid lengthy recitations of exhibit
14 numbers and transcript references, the Prosecution will rely on a series
15 of demonstrative slides for this purpose. These slides do not contain
16 argument and are not evidence in and of themselves. It is our hope that
17 they will assist the Chamber as well as those transcribing our words.
18 In some cases we have included excerpts of documents and
19 testimony to facilitate the Chamber's review and expedite this process.
20 Also in this regard, although we will not give precise citations for
21 everything we say here, we are able to do so, should the Chamber so
22 request. If there is something that we say which the Chamber would like
23 to have the precise references for, please indicate that and we will be
24 glad to do so.
25 Fourth, for the purpose of clarity the Prosecution will at all
1 times refer to the third amended indictment in this case simply as the
2 indictment. Finally, Your Honours, before I commence, I would like to
3 set out the manner in which the Prosecution plans to deal with
4 confidential evidence, whether that be closed session or private session
5 testimony or under-seal exhibits. The Prosecution has reviewed its
6 submissions fully and is confident that the manner in which the evidence
7 will be presented will fully comply with the protective measures orders
8 of the Chamber. In many instances when it becomes necessary to refer to
9 confidential evidence, the Prosecution rather than asking to go into
10 private session, will simply refer to a table of confidential evidence
11 which was just referred to by Mr. President.
12 This chart lists numbers which will be used by the Prosecution to
13 inform the Chamber which witness or which document was quoted or referred
14 to, without publicly revealing transcript page numbers for closed or
15 private session testimony, pseudonyms of protected witnesses, or the
16 contents of under-seal exhibits. In this respect, Your Honours, I have a
17 brief motion to make.
18 In the filings in relation to Reynaud Theunens, we requested that
19 certain documents be kept under seal because they were pending in the
20 Serbia protective measures litigation. There are -- since that time on
21 the 12th of April, 2010, there has been a motion filed by the government
22 of Serbia in which they explicitly stated that for some of the documents
23 in that we received in response to RFA 219, they do not seek any
24 protective measures. Three of those documents will be referred to in our
25 submissions today. Those three are P1078, P1188, and P1192.
1 The first person to refer to those submissions will be
2 Ms. Friedman, which you can see is section D. We would respectfully
3 request that if the Chamber is able to that we be granted leave to use
4 those, to cite those documents in open session rather than going into
5 private session. But we are in the hands of the Chamber with that
7 JUDGE ORIE: Any objection to the suggestions made by Ms. Marcus?
8 Not. Then, because officially the status has not been changed yet?
9 MS. MARCUS: That's correct, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE ORIE: One second, please.
11 [Trial Chamber confers]
12 JUDGE ORIE: I am addressing the parties. Apparently if there's
13 no objection against dealing in public with these exhibits, then may I
14 take it that there's no objection against changing their status into
15 public documents. Apparently all the parties agree. Therefore P1078,
16 P1188, and P1192, the status is changed from confidential into public.
17 Please proceed.
18 MS. MARCUS: Thank you, Your Honour. I will now commence the
19 Prosecution's submissions.
20 Rule 98 bis, as outlined by Mr. Bakrac, provides that at the
21 close of the Prosecutor's case, the Trial Chamber shall, by oral decision
22 and after hearing the oral submissions of the parties, enter a judgement
23 of acquittal on any count if there is no evidence capable of supporting a
24 conviction. The test that has been consistently applied is that a
25 Rule 98 bis motion will succeed if there's no evidence supporting a
1 particular count, or if the only relevant evidence is so incapable of
2 belief that it could not properly sustain a conviction, even when the
3 evidence is taken at its highest for the Prosecution.
4 The Prosecution submits, Your Honours, contrary to the assertions
5 of the Simatovic Defence, that it has presented evidence in support of
6 each count in the indictment. In fact, the Prosecution submits that with
7 respect to all counts in the indictment, the Prosecution has not only met
8 its burden at this stage of the proceedings, but has met its ultimate
9 burden. The Prosecution has presented relevant, probative, and
10 consistent evidence in support of each count in the indictment.
11 Therefore, Your Honours, the Prosecution submits that the Defence motion
12 for acquittal must fail.
13 I will now pass the floor to Mr. Travis Farr, who will address
14 Your Honours on the joint criminal enterprise on planning and ordering.
15 MR. FARR: Good morning, Your Honours. As Ms. Marcus has
16 indicated, I will focus my remarks on the joint criminal enterprise
17 alleged in the indictment. And I will focus in particular on the
18 evidence of the common criminal purpose of that JCE. This common
19 criminal purpose is set out in paragraph 13 of the indictment as "the
20 forcible and permanent removal of the majority of non-Serbs, principally
21 Croats, Bosnian Muslims and Bosnian Croats from large areas of Croatia
22 and B&H, through the commission of the crimes of persecution, murder,
23 deportations and inhumane acts, forcible transfers."
24 The Simatovic Defence denies the existence of this common
25 criminal purpose. At transcript page 11334, they said, "The Defence
1 points out that there is no evidence regarding a joint objective."
2 In addition to challenging the existence of the common criminal
3 purpose, the Simatovic Defence says that there is no evidence that
4 Mr. Simatovic shared any common criminal purpose. That's on the same
6 There's been a great deal of evidence in this case that is
7 relevant to JCE, in fact, it is probably not an exaggeration to say that
8 most of the evidence led in this case is relevant to the issue of JCE in
9 one way or another. For the Chamber's reference, slide 3, on the screen
10 before you, contains some of the most important evidence of JCE in this
11 case, some of which will be referred to by my colleagues.
12 Obviously our time today doesn't allow me to discuss all or even
13 most of this evidence. Accordingly, I plan to focus on a relatively
14 small number of pieces of evidence with a direct bearing on the existence
15 of the common criminal plan. In doing so, I will take matters somewhat
16 out of chronological order for ease of presentation. I'll begin with the
17 evidence related to Bosnia-Herzegovina, move on to the SAO Krajina and
18 conclude with the SAO SBWS. Although we've organised our presentation
19 today based on these regions, I want to emphasise at the outset that this
20 case involves a single integrated criminal plan spanning all three
21 regions and several years. We submit that Mr. Simatovic, and the other
22 members of the JCE, always viewed this as a single project and the
23 Chamber should as well.
24 One note about persecutory intent, the common criminal purpose of
25 this JCE involved the permanent forcible removal of non-Serbs. This
1 means that all of the JCE intent evidence that we discuss today is also
2 relevant to persecutory intent. Much of the evidence I discuss will also
3 be relevant to the modes of liability of planning and ordering.
4 Your Honours, before I begin with the evidence from Bosnia, a
5 brief word about the relationship between the accused. The most
6 important relationship between JCE members in this case is the
7 relationship between the two accused. Throughout the indictment period,
8 the accused had a close relationship of co-operation and trust, and this
9 relationship is central to the Prosecution case with respect to both
10 accused. This relationship is demonstrated by documentary evidence, such
11 as the official records admitted as P471, and it's reinforced by the many
12 witnesses such as Milan Babic and Dejan Sliskovic, who stated that
13 Mr. Simatovic was Mr. Stanisic's second in command. Those references are
14 page 12918 and -- of P1878 and paragraph 41 of P441. And Your Honours, I
15 would ask that we move briefly into private session.
16 JUDGE ORIE: We move into private session.
17 [Private session]
8 [Open session]
9 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
11 MR. FARR: The most vivid picture of the relationship between the
12 two accused comes from Dejan Sliskovic. Sliskovic had the chance to
13 observe both of the accused's living and working arrangements up close
14 for a period of months during Operation Pauk. He gave evidence that for
15 a period of several months, Mr. Stanisic and Mr. Simatovic shared an
16 office in the house that served as their command centre and living
17 quarters in Petrovo Gora. That's paragraph 32 of P441.
18 Your Honours, under these circumstances, Mr. Stanisic and
19 Mr. Simatovic must have shared knowledge and discussed plans and
20 functioned as a single cohesive unit. This is why, despite
21 Mr. Stanisic's having waived his right to make submissions under 98 bis,
22 we will refer to evidence which relates to him. The two men were
23 inseparable and the evidence about their conduct is inextricable.
24 Your Honours, I'll now turn to evidence related to Bosnia. On
25 the 13th and 14th of December, 1993, a critical meeting was taking place
1 in Belgrade, attended by some of the most powerful men in the former
2 Yugoslavia. We know about this meeting thanks to an excerpt from one of
3 Ratko Mladic's notebooks, which has been admitted into evidence as P2532,
4 and this slide, number 4, shows an excerpt from the first page of that
6 Your Honours, in our submission, what happened at that meeting is
7 a textbook illustration of joint criminal enterprise as defined by the
8 law of this Tribunal. The first element of JCE is a plurality of
9 persons. The plurality of persons at this meeting in Belgrade included
10 key leaders from Serbia and the Republika Srpska, many of whom were also
11 key members of the JCE charged in this case. The names of JCE members
12 listed in paragraph 12 of the indictment are highlighted in red in the
13 excerpt before you. They include political leaders like
14 Slobodan Milosevic, Radovan Karadzic, and Momcilo Krajisnik. They
15 include military leaders like Ratko Mladic. They include MUP leaders
16 like Mico Stanisic and Radovan Stojicic, aka Badza. Of course
17 Jovica Stanisic was also present, and spoke first at that meeting.
18 Your Honours, as set out at transcript pages 11319, 11321, and
19 11325 to 326, it is the Simatovic Defence case that Arkan was closely
20 linked to Badza in 1991 and closely linked to Karadzic in 1995. Here we
21 see both of these men at a meeting with Mr. Simatovic's close associate,
22 Jovica Stanisic, in 1993. The second element of JCE is a common criminal
23 plan and the men at this meeting clearly shared a common criminal plan.
24 This is shown by the nature of the discussion, which is basically about
25 two things: First, the extent to which Bosnian Serb forces have
1 established exclusive control over large areas of Bosnia; and second, how
2 that control can be consolidated.
3 A common criminal plan, of course, must be common, and it must be
4 criminal. Jovica Stanisic speaks first at the meeting and his comments
5 are shown on slide number 5. He makes it clear that the goal is a common
6 one when he says to the RS delegation, "We are meeting in order to
7 improve your operational and tactical position and see about help from
9 Mr. Stanisic shares the goal of the RS delegation. He wants to
10 know how he can help to achieve it. Karadzic speaks immediately after
11 Mr. Stanisic. He says, "Unification with Serbia is smiling upon us."
12 Karadzic's comments, which are shown in slide 6, also make it clear that
13 the goal of the group is the criminal goal of the permanent forcible
14 removal of non-Serbs from large parts of B&H. He articulates the first
15 strategic objective of the Bosnian Serbs, that is, "to be separated from
16 the Muslims and Croats."
17 His other comments show that this strategic objective refers to
18 physical separation, not to institutional or organisational or cultural
19 separation or whatever other possibilities might be suggested. This is
20 clear from his statement that Serbs are controlling 75 per cent of the
21 territory and controlling the most important parts of the territory.
22 Of course, the Chamber also has before it the evidence of
23 Dr. Ewa Tabeau, Dr. Tabeau's evidence shows the massive population
24 movements that occurred as a result of the pursuit of this goal.
25 Your Honours, we have a plurality of persons and we have a common
1 criminal plan. The next element is contribution. Mladic's record of
2 this meeting shows that Jovica Stanisic contributed to the achievement of
3 this common criminal plan in two key ways. First, he served as a channel
4 of communication between the members of the JCE. Second, he send armed
5 men to help achieve the goal. Mr. Stanisic's prominent role in presiding
6 over this meeting in itself constitutes a contribution to the JCE. This
7 is a singularly clear example of him providing channels of communication
8 between and among the core members of the JCE as alleged in paragraph
9 15(a) of the indictment.
10 Of course, this exhibit indicates that Mr. Stanisic also
11 contributed to the JCE by sending armed men to help achieve the goal. On
12 page 8 of the English translation of this exhibit, a portion of which we
13 see on slide number 7, Mr. Stanisic says, "We can spare 100 to 120 men."
14 And, "Our combat group is ready to set out tomorrow."
15 Your Honours, General Mladic's contemporaneous notes of this
16 meeting provide a snap-shot of the joint criminal enterprise as it
17 existed on those two days in late 1993. We would submit that as a
18 starting point for analysing the JCE in this case, this meeting proves
19 convincingly that the JCE was alive and well and functioning as charged
20 in the indictment on 13 and 14 December 1993.
21 In other words, Your Honours, the question is not whether the JCE
22 ever existed as all, as the Simatovic Defence has suggested, but rather
23 when it began.
24 One piece of evidence that sheds some light on that question is
25 Mr. Simatovic's speech at the Kula camp awards ceremony in 1997. In that
1 speech, now admitted as part of P61, Mr. Simatovic states that the
2 Special Operations Unit of the State Security Service was formed on 4 May
3 1991. Mr. Weber will address that exhibit further in his submissions.
4 Another key piece of evidence regarding the evolution of JCE
5 intent is Karadzic's speech before the Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina in
6 Sarajevo on 15 October 1991, now in evidence as P940. An excerpt of that
7 speech is on slide 8, before you now. In that speech, Karadzic said:
8 "This is the road that you want Bosnia and Herzegovina to take,
9 the same highway of hell and suffering that Croatia and Slovenia went
10 through. Don't think you won't take Bosnia and Herzegovina to hell and
11 the Muslim people in possible extinction. Because, Muslim people will
12 not be able to defend itself, if it comes to war here."
13 Your Honours, a lawfully conducted war, no matter how terrible
14 for the combatants, could never result in the extinction of a people.
15 Therefore, Karadzic's statement before the Assembly of B&H was a threat
16 to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity. Karadzic is saying, in
17 effect, give us the political solution we want or crimes will be the
18 result. He makes this threat precisely by referring to events in Croatia
19 where crimes were already occurring.
20 Why is Karadzic's speech relevant to the intent of Mr. Simatovic
21 in this case? Both of the accused were in touch with Karadzic in the
22 months after he gave his speech. In one of those conversations,
23 Jovica Stanisic expressed almost exactly the same idea that Karadzic
24 expressed in his speech. That conversation took place on the 22nd of
25 January, 1992, and that intercept is now in evidence as P690. We see an
1 excerpt from that intercept on slide 9 on our screens now.
2 In this exchange, Karadzic and Stanisic are talking about what
3 will happen if Serbs and Croats are unable to resolve their disagreements
4 through negotiations. Karadzic says that if the Serbs and Croats are not
5 able to resolve all of their contentious issues, then "They are in for 30
6 years of torture with blue helmets, with disagreements, with all sorts of
7 things." Mr. Stanisic replies, "With killings." Karadzic says, "I beg
8 your pardon." And Stanisic repeats, "With killings." Mr. Stanisic then
9 says, "We'll then have to push them to go to Belgrade, you know." And a
10 few seconds later continues by saying, "Or we'll exterminate them
11 completely, so let's see where we'll end up."
12 What does this conversation say about the existence of the common
13 criminal plan in January of 1992? The context here is very important.
14 This conversation took place months after the war had started in Croatia,
15 after the fall of Vukovar, and after crimes on a massive scale had
16 already taken place. Large-scale violence was not a theoretical
17 possibility but a present reality.
18 In this context, talk of killings and extermination was not idle
19 pre-war bravado, rather, Mr. Stanisic's statement that "we'll exterminate
20 them completely" was a statement that nothing would prevent the JCE
21 members from reaching their goals. Stanisic's private statement to
22 Karadzic thus echoes Karadzic's public statement in his speech to the
23 Assembly of B&H and expresses the same idea: If we don't get what we
24 want through political means, we will commit crimes to achieve it.
25 Shortly after this conversation, Karadzic also spoke to
1 Mr. Simatovic. P693 is an intercepted conversation between Karadzic and
2 someone identifying himself as Frenki from 6 days after Stanisic and
3 Karadzic had the conversation in which Mr. Stanisic mentioned
4 extermination. During this conversation, parts of which are on slide 10,
5 Frenki tells Karadzic that he is behind him completely. He also says to
6 Karadzic, "You are the main man there, doctor, and that's how it stays."
7 The two of them agree to meet soon.
8 In light of the close relationship between Stanisic and
9 Simatovic, and in light of the relationship between Stanisic and Karadzic
10 shown by the Belgrade meeting and their intercepted conversation, this
11 conversation between Simatovic and Karadzic confirms that all three men
12 were participants in a common project sharing a common goal.
13 Your Honours, I'll now turn to evidence related to Croatia,
14 beginning with the SAO Krajina. Other than the accused, Milan Martic and
15 Ratko Mladic are the key JCE members from the SAO Krajina. Martic in
16 particular played a prominent role in all of the events there and the
17 Prosecution case for the SAO Krajina depends significantly on his
18 relationship with the accused. In that context, there is one key event
19 that clearly illuminates the relationship between Franko Simatovic and
20 Milan Martic and shows the criminal intent of both men. That event is
21 the attack on Lovinac carried out by Mr. Simatovic, Martic, and others in
22 the summer of 1991.
23 Milan Babic discusses this event in his evidence, which is shown
24 on slide 11 and has been admitted as P1877 pursuant to Rule 92 quater.
25 Babic describes how he learned about the attack from Frenki himself. In
1 September of 1991, Babic heard Frenki bragging about the attack in a
2 restaurant in Knin. Describing this, Babic says:
3 "I heard that together with Milan Martic and David Rastovic, and
4 with a mortar platoon from Lapac, he," meaning Simatovic, "had fired at
5 Lovinac, at the police station and at the village itself. I heard from
6 him after these events, I heard him bragging that they had razed it all."
7 Your Honours, in our submission, this clearly shows Mr. Simatovic
8 acting with the goal of forcing the Croat civilian population to leave
9 the SAO Krajina. To put it another way, it is clear evidence that
10 Simatovic intended the permanent forcible removal of Croat civilians.
11 The fact that he and Martic worked together in this attack just confirms
12 that they were working together towards this goal.
13 We would note that this evidence of Babic is corroborated and in
14 fact, in our submission, is greatly strengthened by the evidence set out
15 in the confidential evidence table at B1 through B3.
16 In addition to the Lovinac evidence, there has been significant
17 other evidence led regarding the SAO Krajina with a direct bearing on the
18 intents of the accused and Milan Martic. A great deal of that evidence
19 was led in closed or private session or is under seal, so I would direct
20 the Chamber's attention to confidential evidence table at B4 through B11,
21 with respect to the JCE intent of Milan Martic, and B12 to B13, regarding
22 the JCE intent of Mr. Stanisic and Mr. Simatovic.
23 The evidence also shows that the accused both maintained
24 extremely close relationships with Milan Martic throughout the times
25 relevant to the indictment. These relationships began before the
1 indictment period and continued throughout it. For example, Milan Babic
2 indicates that he met Jovica Stanisic with Milan Martic near Golubic at
3 the end of August 1990. That's P1878 at page 12930.
4 Babic also indicates that Mr. Stanisic, Mr. Simatovic, and
5 Martic, among others, met at Karadzic's flat in Sarajevo in May 1991.
6 There they were "discussing some maps where the Serbs were in control and
7 areas where they should establish control, or rather, the SDS, Karadzic's
8 party." That's P1878 at page 13082.
9 Other witnesses corroborate and strengthen the evidence of
10 regular meetings between the accused and Milan Martic before and
11 throughout the indictment period. They also describe on-going support
12 for Milan Martic by the accused during this period. I would direct the
13 Chamber's attention to the confidential evidence table at B14 to B19.
14 These witnesses' accounts of the close relationship between the
15 accused and Milan Martic are corroborated by numerous exhibits. One of
16 these exhibits is a greeting telegram sent by Mr. Stanisic on 5 July 1994
17 for RSK security day, now admitted as P2667. An excerpt of the text is
18 on slide 12 before you. Mr. Stanisic writes:
19 "We are now entering the decisive phase of the fight to achieve
20 the common goals of all the Serbian lands, more determined and prepared
21 than ever before."
22 This, we submit, clearly shows that Mr. Stanisic saw himself as
23 being involved in a joint project with the security forces of the RSK at
24 a time when Milan Martic was president of the RSK. This telegram wasn't
25 the first time that Jovica Stanisic formally acknowledged his
1 relationship with the RSK security forces though. The previous year,
2 that is, in 1993, Mr. Stanisic actually attending the celebration of RSK
3 security day in person. The video admitted as P12 shows that
4 Mr. Stanisic had a front row seat between Milan Babic and Goran Hadzic as
5 Milan Martic addressed those assembled to mark the day. We can see that
6 from the still from that video on slide 13 before us now. The Chamber
7 will recognise Jovica Stanisic, marked with number 2, sitting between
8 Babic, who is number 1, and Hadzic, who is number 3. This still is in
9 evidence as page 3 of P990.
10 The esteem between the RSK security forces and Mr. Stanisic was
11 clearly mutual. P428, which is on slide 14, is a list of individuals who
12 are being awarded security service plaques on RSK security services day.
13 The first name on the list is Jovica Stanisic. Your Honours, in light of
14 this long-standing relationship of support and co-operation between the
15 accused and Milan Martic, it comes as no surprise that Milan Martic would
16 send a new year's greeting letter to Jovica Stanisic. An excerpt of that
17 letter, admitted as page 2 of P995 and on the screen before you now says:
18 "Last year, 1994, was marked by the effort to attain a common
19 stance in our joint effort - the creation of a unified Serbian state."
20 Similar greetings were sent to other members of the JCE,
21 including Karadzic and Krajisnik, two of the men who appear in the photo
22 with the accused that has been admitted as P391 and that is also shown on
23 slide 13. Your Honours, the creation of a unified Serbian state is not
24 if itself a criminal goal, but the methods by which this "joint effort"
25 was pursued by the members of the JCE in this case, including both of the
1 accused and Milan Martic, included forcible transfer, deportation,
2 murder, and persecution on a scale not seen in Europe since World War II.
3 I'll now turn to evidence concerning the SAO SBWS. We've already
4 discussed evidence of the accused's ties to Radovan Karadzic and
5 Milan Martic. Just as Karadzic was a key leader of the Bosnian Serbs and
6 Milan Martic was a key leader of the Serbs in SAO Krajina, Goran Hadzic
7 was a key leader of the Serbs in the SBWS. And I would note that the
8 Simatovic Defence highlighted the links between Hadzic and Arkan at
9 T-11322. Just like Karadzic and Martic, Goran Hadzic had extensive
10 contacts with Jovica Stanisic. Borislav Bogunovic's evidence is that
11 Goran Hadzic went to Belgrade to meet with Jovica Stanisic and Slobodan
12 Milosevic about four times between May and August 1991 and that he would
13 return from these meetings with instructions about how to set up the
14 SAO SBWS government. That's P554, paragraphs 14 to 15 and transcript
15 pages 5973 to 5975.
16 All of the available evidence indicates that Stanisic and Hadzic
17 were discussing the same three things at their meetings that Stanisic,
18 Karadzic, and the others had discussed at the meeting in Belgrade in
19 December 1993: The territory to be brought under Serb control, the goal
20 of ethnic separation, and the means of achieving both. Ms. Friedman will
21 provide additional details on this topic.
22 A key piece of evidence in this regard is Exhibit P403, which you
23 see on slide 16 now before you. P403 is a map of the SAO SBWS prepared
24 with the assistance of a witness who was in a position to have insight
25 into the views of Goran Hadzic, as indicated at B23 and B24 of the
1 confidential evidence table. We submit that the areas labelled "Hadzic's
2 plan" on this exhibit show the parts of the SAO SBWS that Goran Hadzic
3 intended to be brought under control of Serb forces. The portion of P403
4 labelled "end result" shows the areas that eventually in fact did come
5 under the control of Serb forces.
6 These two areas are the areas outlined in different shades of
7 blue, which are much clearer on the exhibit in e-court than they can be
8 made in this slide. I would observe though that the two areas are
9 substantially the same.
10 Your Honours, this area was brought under the control of Serb
11 forces in the course of a campaign that began with the attack on Dalj in
12 early August 1991 and that was substantially complete with the fall of
13 Vukovar on 18 November 1991. In the course of those attacks, the
14 Croat-controlled towns and villages shown on P403 fell to Serb forces.
15 One quick comment on Vukovar: The indictment in this case no longer
16 charges murders related to the fall of Vukovar. But Vukovar remains
17 relevant to the case in two ways. First, the indictment still contains
18 charges related to persecution, forcible transfer, and deportation from
19 the entire area of the SAO SBWS. Second, Vukovar was a key part of the
20 plan to establish Serb control over the SBWS. For this reason,
21 understanding events related to Vukovar is important to understanding the
22 JCE in this case.
23 This Serb take-over of the SBWS resulted in population movement
24 on a truly massive scale. In that regard, I would refer to the evidence
25 of Anna Maria Radic, particularly page 6 of Exhibit P552 and table 9 of
1 P551. The magnitude of these population movements, while massive, is not
2 surprising in light of the evidence that non-Serbs were forcibly driven
3 out. Some of this evidence can be found in the confidential evidence
4 table at B25 and B26.
5 What was the accused's knowledge of, and role in, this take-over?
6 We submit that the evidence makes it clear that they were aware of this
7 take-over, that they knew precisely what was involved in it, that they
8 supported it, and that they participated in it. A key event in this
9 regard is Jovica Stanisic's visit to Dalj in mid-September 1991. JF-032
10 described this visit vividly at transcript pages 4659 to 4660. He
11 testified that Stanisic arrived in front of the police station in Dalj in
12 a convoy of four or five vehicles with Belgrade licence plates. He got
13 out of his vehicle and he asked those present where Goran Hadzic was.
14 When he was told that Hadzic was not at the police station, Mr. Stanisic
15 started shouting at those present, asking why Vukovar hadn't fallen yet.
16 He then told the people in front of the police station to find Hadzic and
17 to bring him to Dalj for a meeting.
18 This whole incident took just 40 or 50 seconds, but it speaks
19 volumes about the accused's knowledge of, intentions regarding, and
20 participation in, the events in the SAO SBWS. First, it's significant
21 that Mr. Stanisic came to Dalj. Croats had been forcibly driven out of
22 that very village just a month and a half previously. Second, it's
23 significant that Mr. Stanisic was upset about Vukovar. Vukovar, of
24 course, is a place that Croats would be forcibly driven out of, shortly
25 after Stanisic's visit to Dalj, and the last place in the SAO SBWS to
1 fall to Serb forces. Together, Mr. Stanisic's presence in Dalj and his
2 preoccupation with Vukovar demonstrates that he and Mr. Simatovic shared
3 the goals of Hadzic and others to consolidate control over the region
4 outlined in P403.
5 Perhaps most significant though is Mr. Stanisic's behaviour
6 towards the people in Dalj. When Mr. Stanisic got out of his car in
7 Dalj, he acted like the boss. He expected to be recognised, he expected
8 to be obeyed, and in fact, he was obeyed. Mr. Stanisic's behaviour shows
9 that he was a man with authority in the SBWS.
10 JF-032's account of Mr. Stanisic's visit to Dalj shows that
11 Vukovar was an area of special concern for Mr. Stanisic. How did he deal
12 with this problem? Evidence related to Vukovar, and in particular to
13 Franko Simatovic's role there, is relevant to the Chamber's understanding
14 of the crimes charged. I refer the Chamber to the confidential evidence
15 table at B27 to B29 for that evidence.
16 Your Honours, in light of the other evidence we've discussed
17 today, none of this is surprising. It is not surprising that
18 Mr. Stanisic, the man who in 1993 was offering military assistance to
19 help Karadzic consolidate the Serb take-over and ethnic cleansing of
20 large parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina, would be involved in exactly the same
21 matters in the SBWS in 1991. Neither is it surprising that
22 Mr. Simatovic, who had personally participated in attack on a Croat
23 village in the Krajina a few months before and bragged about destroying
24 it completely, would now be involved in the attack on Vukovar. Rather,
25 the events in Bosnia and the events in Croatia corroborate each other and
1 show a clear and consistent pattern. This pattern demonstrates that the
2 events in Bosnia and Croatia were part of a single joint criminal
3 enterprise spanning both republics and several years. In light of this
4 pattern, a Trial Chamber could reasonably conclude that Mr. Simatovic
5 shared the common criminal plan to forcibly and permanently remove
6 non-Serbs from large areas of Croatia and B&H through the commission of
7 the crimes charged in the indictment.
8 Your Honours, with the Chamber's leave, Mr. Weber will now
9 address the Chamber on matters related to the SAO Krajina.
10 MR. WEBER: Good morning, Your Honours.
11 My submissions will focus on the responsibility of the accused
12 for the crimes committed in the SAO Krajina in 1991. During the course
13 of these submissions, the Prosecution will address the significant
14 contributions made by the accused to the JCE through the formation,
15 training, and direction of special units of the Serbian State Security
16 Service and will respond to the Defence assertions regarding the role of
17 these special units during combat operations.
18 The submissions on the special units of the Serbian DB and their
19 relationship to the JNA or VRS are relevant to all counts and
20 specifically to paragraphs 5 and 15 of the indictment. This discussion
21 will involve certain aspects of the JCE in the Krajina and the
22 relationships between JCE members throughout the case.
23 The organisation, training, and support provided by the accused
24 through their direction of special units represented a substantial
25 contribution to the JCE in and of itself. Special units of the State
1 Security Service of Serbia existed between 1991 and 1995. As for the
2 Red Berets, they began as special purpose units of the Republic of Serbia
3 MUP and were later formalised as the JA TD, then the JSO. Initially,
4 they were known in the Krajina as Knindze, and later were commonly known
5 as the Red Berets. This unit served as a key component in the formation
6 and training of other Serb forces, as the term is defined in paragraph 6
7 of the indictment, and as a highly skilled combat group engaged in
8 operations in Croatia and Bosnia.
9 The origin of special units of the Serbian DB dates to early
10 1991. According to Exhibit P975, Slobodan Milosevic publicly declared on
11 the 16th of March, 1991:
12 "I ordered a mobilisation of the reserve police forces yesterday.
13 Further engagement and formation of new police forces is to follow, and
14 the government was tasked with preparing appropriate formations to
15 guarantee our security and make us capable of defending the interests of
16 our republic, and also the interests of the Serbian people outside Serbia
18 Shortly after this order, Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic
19 commenced a recruitment and organisation of special units. This task
20 included the engagement of members of the Serbian DB in the formation of
21 new police forces in the SAO Krajina. Evidence of this is reflected in
22 Mr. Simatovic's initial remarks during his Kula speech, which is on the
23 slide before the Chamber. There are two important components of these
24 initial remarks by Mr. Simatovic. First, is the Prosecution's case that
25 special units of the Serbian DB were formed as early as April 1991.
1 Mr. Simatovic, in his speech, unambiguously states that the special units
2 of the State Security Service were constituted on 4 May 1991. Evidence
3 that corroborates the formation of the unit in 1991 is listed on slide
4 18. Exhibit P1655 includes information which further corroborates the
5 formation date at stated by Mr. Simatovic.
6 Second, Mr. Simatovic's speech shows that the State Security
7 Service of Serbia implemented the task of forming new police forces as
8 described by Slobodan Milosevic. The Prosecution points out one
9 particular aspect of this task. Milosevic stated that the government was
10 tasked with preparing appropriate formations that would be capable of
11 defending "the interests of the Serbian people outside Serbia."
12 Mr. Simatovic parallels this sentiment in the Kula ceremony and stated
13 "where the existence of the Serbian people was directly jeopardised
14 throughout its entire ethnic area." These statements, by two members of
15 the JCE, illustrate in general terms the foundational purpose of the DB
16 special units in 1991.
17 At the inception of special units of the Serbian DB, the accused,
18 and other members of the unit, made a significant contribution to the JCE
19 through the financing, arming, and training of Martic's police, also
20 known as the Krajina Milicija. According to the evidence of Milan Babic,
21 Exhibit P1877 at pages 1539 to 1545, Jovica Stanisic paid for the camp at
22 Golubic that was set up by the Secretary of the Interior of the Krajina,
23 Milan Martic, with the assistance of the State Security Service of
24 Serbia, in particular, Captain Dragan and Franko Simatovic.
25 For further evidence that relates to the material support and
1 financing of Martic's police, the Prosecution refers the Chamber to
2 confidential evidence table at C1 to C10.
3 As part of their support of special units in the Krajina, the
4 accused provided military training to members of Martic's police. At
5 Golubic, recruits came from all municipalities of the Krajina. The
6 trainees were equipped with uniforms and weapons, after receiving
7 training provided by the accused and others with Serbian DB affiliations,
8 the members of Martic's police would go back to their municipalities in
9 order to form special units of the SAO Krajina. This evidence
10 specifically addresses paragraphs 3 and 15 of the indictment. Evidence
11 of the accused's involvement with the training of Martic's police at
12 Golubic is now before you on slide number 19. The Prosecution also
13 refers the Chamber to the confidential evidence table at C9 to C14.
14 The early direct involvement of the accused in the formation and
15 training of Martic's police in the SAO Krajina is evident from evidence
16 pertaining to Dragan Vasiljkovic, also known as Captain Dragan and
17 Daniel Snedden. Captain Dragan worked for the State Security Service in
18 Serbia in 1991 and evidence of his relationship with the State Security
19 Service is now before you on slide number 20. This evidence shows how
20 Franko Simatovic, Captain Dragan and other officials of the MUP Serbia,
21 such as Dragoljub Filipovic, also known as Major Fica, played a leading
22 role in the training of the special police units in the Krajina. For
23 further evidence that relates to the relationship between Captain Dragan
24 and the accused, the Prosecution refers to the Chamber to confidential
25 evidence table at C15 to C17.
1 THE INTERPRETER: Kindly slow down when reading. Thank you.
2 MR. WEBER: While the starting points of the Red Berets occurred
3 at Golubic, the accused would continue to forge special units of the
4 Serbian DB and mould other Serb forces at training centres throughout
5 Croatia and Bosnia. Mr. Simatovic references many of the training
6 centres during his Kula speech, which is now before you on slide 21. In
7 particular, the Prosecution would note at this time the references to
8 training centres at Golubic; Plitvice; Petrova Gora; Benkovac, which
9 includes the village of Bruska; Lezimir, which is also referred to as
10 Fruska Gora in the trial record; Ilok, which has also been referred to as
11 Pajzos; Doboj; Samac; Bijeljina; and Ozren. After being provided with
12 training and logistical support from the Serbian DB, special units
13 trained at these locations committed crimes. For example, those
14 responsible for crimes in Saborsko were trained at Golubic. This is the
15 evidence of Witness JF-006.
16 JF-047's evidence establishes that the perpetrators of crimes in
17 Bosanski Samac came from Ilok and Lezimir. Similarly, perpetrators of
18 crimes in Doboj received training at Mount Ozren according to the
19 evidence of JF-005. With respect to the special purpose units which
20 would become known as the Red Berets, the Prosecution presented a large
21 volume of testimonial and documentary evidence, including personnel and
22 payment records from the Serbian State Security Service and the evidence
23 of JF-005, JF-031, JF-047, and Dejan Sliskovic. This evidence reflects
24 the composition and activities of the unit between 1991 and 1995, and
25 demonstrates the manner in which special units of the Serbian DB were
1 directed by the accused.
2 For example, Zivojin Ivanovic, also known as Zika Crnogorac.
3 Ivanovic was one of the original members of the unit, and a trainer at
4 Golubic, where he participated in the selection process of the recruits
5 belonging to Martic's police. After this initial assignment, Ivanovic
6 would command units that participated in combat operations in the
7 Krajina, SBWS, and Bosnia. He also was assigned to the camp in Lezimir
8 in March 1992, where members of the unit received training before combat
9 operations in Bosanski Samac. Evidence pertaining to Zivojin Ivanovic
10 can be found on slide 22.
11 Radojica "Raja" Bozovic, who has also been referred to as Kobac.
12 Bozovic was another original member of the unit in 1991. After going to
13 Lezimir, Bozovic would command a Red Beret unit in Doboj in 1992. He
14 would continue his service to the accused as the commander of reserve
15 units of the JA TD during Operation Pauk. Bozovic also participated in
16 operations with Arkan in September 1995. Further evidence pertaining to
17 Raja Bozovic can be found on slide 23. Ms. Harbour will address
18 Mr. Bozovic's role in the crimes committed in Doboj.
19 The Defence argues in part the accused are not responsible for
20 the charged crimes because some of the perpetrators at the time of the
21 offences or at some other point were subordinated to an army, whether it
22 be the JNA or the VRS. Put another way, the Defence is saying the
23 accused are not responsible for the conduct of units they formed,
24 trained, financed through the payment of salaries, armed, supplied
25 uniforms and equipment for, deployed across borders, and directed into
1 combat, because at some particular point they were resubordinated to
2 someone else. This premise ignores the fact that the accused are charged
3 as members of a JCE. It is the Prosecution's case that from 1991 and
4 continuing through 1995, particular units under the control of the
5 Serbian DB operated in co-ordination with the JNA or VRS along with
6 Territorial Defence units and paramilitary forces during attacks on
7 municipalities in Croatia and Bosnia.
8 These attacks were a part of a widespread and systematic campaign
9 to remove the non-Serb population from these municipalities. The
10 co-ordinated use of Serb forces under the control of different JCE
11 members not only shows the existence of a JCE, but also illustrates how
12 members of the JCE implemented their common plan. As a means of
13 accomplishing this co-ordination, the JNA or VRS would form ad hoc joint
14 formations reflecting the combined use of units under the control of the
15 military, the accused and other members of the JCE. The purpose of these
16 temporary formations was to coordinate the activities of different units.
17 As indicated in the testimony of expert Reynaud Theunens at pages 8059 to
18 8060, these ad hoc formations were established to carry out a specific
19 mission in a specific area during a specific time-period. Accordingly,
20 tactical and operational groups referred to in reports as TGs or OGs,
21 were established because they consisted of several sub-units or elements,
22 which outside the framework of the specific mission do not necessarily
23 operate together.
24 The Theunens report further details materials relating to joint
25 combat operations involving ad hoc formations, including exhibits that
1 discuss Tactical Group 2 in Saborsko in November 1991 at P1575, e-court
2 pages 193 to 196; Tactical Group 17 in Bosanski Samac in mid-April 1992,
3 at P1575, e-court pages 356 to 370; and Tactical Groups 2 and 3 during
4 Operation Pauk at P1575, e-court pages 279 to 280.
5 Your Honours, I don't know if this is a good time for a break, I
6 can further continue if you like.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it is the right moment. I'm looking at the
8 clock, you've used until now one-third of your time. I also see that in
9 terms of pages of your slides you are at page 12 whereas the total is 47.
10 Now, of course I do not know whether the other slides may take less time.
11 One thing is however certain, speeding up your speech is not the
12 solution. We'll take a break and resume at quarter to 11.00.
13 --- Recess taken at 10.19 a.m.
14 --- On resuming at 10.58 a.m.
15 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber apologises for the late restart, but
16 there are sometimes other urgent matters to deal with that kept us busy
17 for ten minutes too much. Please proceed, Mr. Weber.
18 MR. WEBER: Yes, Your Honours.
19 From a command perspective, Milan Babic described how this
20 co-ordination operated during the fall of 1991 in the Krajina. This
21 evidence is pound in Exhibits P1877, page 1567 and P1878, pages 13129 to
22 30. According to Milan Babic, there were two clear chains of command
23 from August 1991 onwards. Slobodan Milosevic was at the head of both.
24 One line went through the JNA. The second line went through
25 Jovica Stanisic and the State Security Service of Serbia who would direct
1 the police of the Krajina, special volunteer units and groups belonging
2 to the State Security Service of Serbia. During joint operations in the
3 Krajina, the units belonging to these two command structures would
4 co-ordinate and subordinate themselves on the ground while engaging in
5 combat operations. As further evidence of Martic's relation to
6 Mr. Stanisic, the Prosecution references witness C-15, who stated on page
7 1624 that Martic called Jovica Stanisic, "his only and first commander."
8 The Prosecution also refers the Chamber to adjudicated fact 28
9 from the 28 January 2010 decision in confidential evidence table at C18
10 to C25 for further evidence of the co-ordination between Martic's police
11 and the JNA.
12 Mr. Farr earlier discussed Exhibit P2532, an excerpt from the
13 Mladic notebooks. There are additional reference to the significant
14 contributions made by the accused in the Mladic notebooks, including
15 Exhibit P2545. An entry from 30 September 1995 documenting a meeting
16 between Mladic, General Perisic, and Mr. Stanisic in Belgrade. During
17 this meeting, Mr. Stanisic references Arkan and discusses how the sending
18 of forces helped in Sanski Most. On 15 November 1995, Ratko Mladic, more
19 directly references Arkan's relationship to the accused during a
20 conversation with Radovan Karadzic in Exhibit P2955.
21 Mladic states that:
22 "Arkan is ... pure MUP of Serbia."
23 Exhibit P2545 together with Mladic's statement about Arkan
24 clearly shows the co-ordination of forces under the control of different
25 JCE members, including Mr. Stanisic. When viewed in conjunction with the
1 evidence presented in relation to the Red Berets, Arkan's Tigers,
2 Martic's police, or the Skorpions, it is apparent that the accused in the
3 Serbian DB retained the ability to direct these units, and the temporary
4 operational subordination of units in co-ordinated combat activities was
5 to advance the JCE's common purpose to forcibly remove the non-Serb
6 populations from areas in Croatia and Bosnia.
7 It is through the co-ordinated use of Serb forces that the
8 accused are responsible for crimes which were planned, ordered and
9 committed in the SAO Krajina. After Slobodan Milosevic's instructions to
10 his government to form new units, the government of the SAO Krajina
11 undertook a series of decisions between April and August 1991, which
12 facilitated the accused and Milan Martic in the recruitment and
13 organisation of special units. These decisions are admitted and many are
14 subject of adjudicated facts. The Prosecution notes a few of these key
15 legislative actions at this time on slide 25. The practical effect of
16 these acts was to further consolidate control of Serb forces in the
17 Krajina under the authority of Milan Martic, which in turn allowed the
18 accused a greater ability to direct these forces that they trained and
20 At the end of July 1991, Captain Dragan and other members of the
21 unit undertook the leading role in planned combat activities with
22 Martic's police and the Krajina TO. In evidence are a number of reports
23 that document the participation of DB members, the Krajina TO, and
24 personnel from Golubic during the attack on Glina. For example,
25 Exhibit P2658, now before the Chamber, is a report dated 26 July 1991.
1 It is authored by Zivojin Ivanovic. In this report, Ivanovic describes
2 two important aspects of the relationship between the Serbian DB and SAO
3 Krajina units. First, the report states:
4 "Following the instructions and orders that I received from the
5 captain and the core personnel of the Glina Territorial Defence staff
7 "The captain" is later identified this in this report is
8 Captain Dragan. This shows that officials from the Serbian DB directed
9 units in the Krajina and co-ordinated their activities with the command
10 staff of the Krajina Territorial Defence.
11 Second, the report states Ivanovic "set off to carry out the task
12 with two squads." In relation to the initial statement indicating the
13 receipt of orders, the second reference indicates that Ivanovic possessed
14 the ability to direct two squads under his command. The Prosecution
15 would also reference the following reports with the accused Simatovic on
16 the addressee list. These are P1121, P1122, and P2671 up to and
17 including P2682.
18 As indicated by expert Theunens at page 1894, such reports were
19 "sent to people who have a need to know the information in order to
20 prepare their decision-making and planning. These people included
21 Franko Simatovic, Milan Babic and Milan Martic, among others."
22 The Prosecution refers the Chamber to confidential evidence table
23 at C23 to C25 for further evidence of Mr. Simatovic's participation in
24 combat activities in the Krajina.
25 The Serbian DB also played a central role in the establishment
1 and organisation of command posts in a system of reporting in the very
2 municipalities where crimes were later committed. For example,
3 Exhibit P1120 is a report dated 23 July 1991 from the Davor municipal war
4 staff. This report indicates that there was a meeting between the
5 defence minister who was Milan Martic as of 29 May 1991, Captain Dragan,
6 and the staff commanders from neighbouring municipalities including
7 Kostajnica. This report includes an assessment by Captain Dragan that
8 "Unity had been established in the conduct of all operations in the
9 area." And concludes: "A system of reporting to the competent organs of
10 the SAO Krajina and the Republic of Serbia have been agreed." This
11 evidence further illustrates the level of co-ordination in the planning
12 of operations between Martic and the Serbian DB.
13 The accused continued to direct and provide logistical support to
14 Martic's police in the Krajina Territorial Defence throughout the fall of
15 1991. These units, under the direction of the accused and Milan Martic,
16 committed crimes in the Krajina. Franko Simatovic, in his own words at
17 the Kula ceremony, described the relationship between the Serbian DB and
18 the Krajina police in the fall of 1991:
19 "Mr. President, allow us to inform you briefly about the unit's
20 history, its combat record, present situation, and function. When it was
21 formed, its core was made of up of members of our service, Republic of
22 Serbian Krajina police, and volunteers from Serbia. The Second War
23 Service Intelligence Administration, which was also set up at the time,
24 included a special team for offensive and logistical support of the
25 special operations unit. From 12 October 1991, in battles with armed
1 Croatian police forces in the zones of Benkovac, Stari Gospic, Plitvice,
2 Glina, Kostajnica and others, the unit provided important support in the
3 liberation of all areas of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina. Around
4 5.000 soldiers were engaged in these battles and their actions were
5 co-ordinated by the unit command and an intelligence team from the second
7 As members of a JCE, the accused are responsible for committing
8 crimes in the municipalities of Kostajnica, Korenica, Ogulin, Benkovac
9 and Zadar. The horrific nature of these inhumane atrocities is evident
10 from the testimony of the Prosecution's witnesses. The Prosecution notes
11 that many of the facts related to the commission of these crimes in the
12 Krajina are adjudicated. These adjudicated facts are included for the
13 Chamber's reference on the following slides related to the crimes in the
14 specific municipalities.
15 With respect to the Kostajnica municipality, on 20 October 1991,
16 a truck bearing the insignia "Milicija SAO Krajina" brought elderly,
17 unarmed Croat civilians to the Hrvatska Dubica fire station. In total
18 over 40 non-Serb civilians, mostly elderly, were brought to the fire
19 station that day. The following day, 41 of the Croat civilians from the
20 fire station were killed, along with two Serbs. Members of Martic's
21 police are among those responsible for these killings. In the Korenica
22 and Ogulin municipalities near Plitvice, crimes were committed in the
23 villages of Vukovici and Saborsko as part of co-ordinated attacks by the
24 JNA, Krajina TO, and members of Martic's police in October and November
1 According to the evidence of JF-031, Franko Simatovic and other
2 members of the unit were involved in the participation of combat
3 operations in this area as early as August 1991. Franko Simatovic set up
4 a command centre in the Korenica municipality. This is in the evidence
5 of Milan Babic in Exhibit P1878 at transcript page 13397.
6 Radislav Maksic personally saw both Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic
7 in the Korenica municipality during the fall of 1991. The Prosecution
8 refers the Chamber to confidential evidence table at C26 to C28 for
9 further evidence.
10 On 7 November 1991, local Serb TO units and a special unit from
11 Nis entered the hamlet of Vukovici and killed 9 Croat civilians. With
12 respect to Saborsko, prior to November 1991, at least 20 of the locals
13 from Saborsko went to Golubic and returned to the municipality. They
14 called themselves Martic's police and wore the insignia of the police of
15 the SAO Krajina. In November 1991, Saborsko was attacked by
16 Tactical Group 2, the joint formation of the JNA and SAO Krajina units
17 who included members of Martic's police.
18 In the Zadar municipality on 18 November 1991, the perpetrators
19 of crimes in Skabrnja included individuals who wore uniforms with the
20 words "SAO Krajina" on them. Volunteers from Serbia who were joined to
21 the Benkovac Territorial Defence along with Goran Opacic, who was part of
22 the Benkovac SJB special unit, were present during the attack on 18
23 November 1991. The Prosecution refers the Chamber to confidential
24 evidence table at C29 and C30 for further evidence. After the crimes in
25 Skabrnja, Goran Opacic receives recognition on the RSK State Security
1 Service day in 1994 along with Jovica Stanisic and Captain Dragan. This
2 Exhibit is P428, which was referenced by Mr. Farr earlier. Further
3 evidence relating to Goran Opacic, his training and relationship to the
4 Serbian DB is included on slide 32.
5 Now before the Chamber is the Prosecution's evidence in relation
6 to the crimes committed in Bruska. Armed men identifying themselves as
7 Martic's men or Martic's Militia came to Bruska almost every day to scare
8 the inhabitants of this village. The armed men called the villagers
9 Ustashas and said that Bruska would be part of a Greater Serbia. One of
10 the hamlets in Bruska was Marinovici was comprised of eight houses. In
11 1991, the Marinovici hamlet was inhabited by Croats. The killings in
12 Bruska which occurred in the Marinovici hamlet on 21 December 1991 were
13 perpetrated by Martic's police. The Prosecution provides the Chamber
14 with an overview slide with references to the significant contributions
15 made by the accused to the JCE in the Krajina as discussed during these
16 submissions. This evidence directly pertains to paragraphs 3, 5, and 15
17 of the indictment and relevant to all counts. Through the evidence
18 presented at trial, the Prosecution established that both accused bear
19 responsibility for the horrific events that transpired in the SAO Krajina
20 during the fall of 1991. This evidence alone justifies the denial of the
21 Defence motion pursuant to Rule 98 bis.
22 At this time, Ms. Friedman will present the Prosecution's
23 submissions in response to the SBWS.
24 MS. FRIEDMAN: Your Honours, the Prosecution has led credible and
25 reliable evidence that demonstrates the accused's role in planning,
1 ordering and committing, through a JCE, the murders of over 60 people and
2 the crimes of persecution, forcible transfer and deportation in the
3 SAO SBWS or Serb Autonomous Region of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and
4 Western Srem. Since all counts are encompassed in these charges, the
5 Defence's motion for acquittal should be denied based on the evidence for
6 this region alone.
7 Even before the charged start date of the JCE, Serbia's political
8 leaders, including Mr. Stanisic, were shaping events in what would become
9 the SAO SBWS. Mr. Stanisic's role in planning the events and his
10 participation in a JCE in creating the Serb entity there is evidenced in
11 his meetings with Hadzic and his contribution to the local police force
12 and to arming Serb forces in the region.
13 Mr. Simatovic's role in the JCE is evidenced by his involvement
14 in setting up two camps in the region and the fact that he and his men
15 fought in Vukovar as seen in confidential evidence table B27.
16 Several witnesses have testified that Goran Hadzic met regularly
17 with Slobodan Milosevic and Jovica Stanisic. Before the conflict, Hadzic
18 had been a warehouse clerk. The meetings with Milosevic began as early
19 as May 1990, and continued every step of the way, with the formation of
20 the Serb National Council of SBWS in January 1991, the declaration of
21 sovereignty on 26 February 1991, and the formation of the SAO SBWS
22 government in August 1991.
23 Stanisic was present at approximately four meetings with
24 Milosevic and Hadzic between May 1991 when the conflict broke out in SBWS
25 and August 1991 when the take-over of Dalj, Erdut, and surrounding
1 villages occurred. He was also present at a meeting in Novi Sad in late
2 October or early November 1991, after the Dalj murders had occurred and
3 in the midst of the Erdut murders, to discuss with Hadzic and others the
4 possibility of accommodating Serb refugees in the vacated houses of
5 Croats from Ilok. He clearly knew that the object of the JCE was being
7 Hadzic would return from his meetings in Serbia with instructions
8 which he would implement. Hadzic conveyed that he had an agreement to
9 establish the government in SBWS and the support of the Serbian
10 government. According to Bogunovic, "The SAO SBWS was a virtual
11 government. It existed in paper but in fact we could not do anything
12 without Serbia's support." And that's at P554, paragraph 19.
13 In addition to advice, Hadzic and his government obtained
14 material assistance from Stanisic and other JCE members in establishing
15 and equipping the police and other Serb forces in the SBWS. Hadzic went
16 to Novi Sad for uniforms, salaries, and advice about setting up police
17 stations. Stanisic himself was at a meeting in late August 1991 where
18 Hadzic got uniforms for the police. Hadzic also received funds for his
19 personal security unit, the SNB, from Serbia, which is seen at
20 Exhibit P504. I will discuss the SNB in further detail later in my
22 Stanisic also provided support to the SBWS police through a DB
23 operative named Radoslav Kostic. Kostic was employed with the Serbian DB
24 from December 1990. On this point, I refer the Chamber to the
25 confidential evidence table at D1. Kostic issued orders regarding the
1 establishment of the SBWS police, co-ordinated supplies, and was involved
2 in appointing people to the local state security services in SBWS and
3 ensuring that they would report to the Serbian DB in addition to the SBWS
4 chain of command. I refer the Chamber to information in the confidential
5 evidence table at D2, D3, and D4.
6 Jovica Stanisic, through his role as head of the DB, played a
7 significant part in providing arms to the SBWS. Firstly, Stanisic gave
8 Ilija Kojic weapons to distribute in Vukovar around August of 1990. You
9 have heard this from Witness Savic at T-1758 to 1759. Secondly, DB
10 operatives Radoslav Kostic and Lazar Sarac co-ordinated the transfer of
11 arms from Serbia across the Danube, to be stored in Borovo Selo and then
12 distributed prior to the take-over of Dalj as early as April 1991. For
13 further corroboration of Sarac's employment in the DB, I refer the
14 Chamber to the confidential evidence table at D5.
15 The appointment of government ministers in SBWS is a telling
16 indicator of Milosevic and Stanisic's substantial influence over the
17 development of the SAO SBWS. The list of the first ministers appointed
18 is contained in Exhibit P16 which appears on the slide before you.
19 Borislav Bogunovic is listed as the minister of interior, but he has
20 observed that despite this official function, the decisions regarding the
21 police force were taken in Belgrade by others.
22 Bogunovic further testified that when appointing ministers,
23 Hadzic came up with selections which were different from those proposed
24 by the other government members. In some instances, he selected men who
25 were previously unknown to them. Savic said that some of these men
1 arrived in January 1991 from Novi Sad, representing themselves as
2 official representatives of the Serbian government offering their
3 services and assistance, spreading propaganda and discussing proposals
4 for setting up the Serb National Council of SBWS.
5 Hadzic stated that these men were important in order to establish
6 the necessary links to Belgrade and Novi Sad.
7 Returning now to the first person listed on this exhibit,
8 Minister of Defence Ilija Kojic. This is the same man who supplied arms
9 provided by Stanisic and he was appointed to this role on Hadzic's
10 proposal. In November 1991, Kojic was also officially employed by the
11 Serbian MUP while he continued to serve as defence minister in the SBWS
12 government. Kojic's employment in the Serbian MUP is significant. The
13 Defence has argued that the accused are not responsible for actions which
14 are attributed to the Serbian MUP public security as opposed to the
15 Serbian MUP state security. The evidence about Kojic unequivocally
16 rebuts this assertion. An official record suggests that Kojic was
17 employed in the public security and only transferred to the state
18 security in April 1993. The Prosecution refers the Chamber to the
19 confidential evidence table at D6 on this point.
20 However, Ilija Kojic gave a statement to authorised officials of
21 the Republika Srpska MUP. That's P1698. In this statement, he
22 explicitly stated that when he worked in Vukovar, he was an operative of
23 the Republic of Serbia state security. He explained that despite being
24 listed with public security, he was a DB operative, subordinated to the
25 head of the DB, Jovica Stanisic.
1 The statement makes it clear that the distinction between the
2 public security and state security did not prevent them from co-operating
3 and did not prevent Stanisic from tasking at least some of the public
4 security's personnel. Moreover, Stanisic also used Radovan Stojicic,
5 known as Badza, who was the chief of the public security service to
6 achieve his goals. Stanisic and Badza were both appointed to their post
7 on the instructions of President Milosevic to the minister of interior,
8 Zoran Sokolovic. I refer Your Honours to the confidential evidence table
9 at D7.
10 Further, General Milovanovic testified at T-4383 to 4386 that
11 Badza himself referred to Stanisic as his boss, and Bogunovic testified
12 at T-6061 that Hadzic saw Stanisic as the link between Milosevic and
13 Badza. Stanisic relied on Badza to command the TO and on Arkan to fight
14 with the JNA in joint operations and to wreak havoc on the civilian
15 population. I will discuss the role, the specific role of each man in
17 Badza, deputy minister of the interior, a JCE member and someone
18 who considered Stanisic to be his boss, was already present in the SBWS
19 when the take-over operations in Dalj and Erdut began. He attended
20 government meetings, demanded to be informed of everything, and even gave
21 orders to the minister of interior. Badza was sent in order to ensure
22 that actions were undertaken in accordance with the common plan, and in
23 fact, his title suggests that he had the authority to do just that. His
24 official title was the commander of the TO of the SAO SBWS, as seen in a
25 certificate admitted at P54, but more significantly, he announced himself
1 as, "the commander to one and all" to the local police forces and TO,
2 according to the evidence noted at confidential evidence table D8.
3 He made it clear that there would be no independent leadership
4 among the local TO and police, that it would all be co-ordinated and
5 monitored from the headquarters in Erdut.
6 Badza's intent to be the central co-ordinator is also clear in
7 subsequent events. When Bogunovic, the minister of interior would not
8 report daily to him and would not agree to closer contact with Badza than
9 with the JNA, Badza influenced Hadzic to remove Bogunovic from office.
10 And that's at P553, paragraph 73. Badza influenced the events in the
11 region in several key ways. First, the meeting he held in Erdut, when he
12 announced himself as the commander, focused on sending SBWS forces to
13 Vukovar, which was envisioned at capital of the RSK, Republika Srpska
14 Krajina, which would be formed. Second, he tasked his deputy, a man
15 named Miodrag Zavisic, with establishing police offices in villages.
16 Third, with him were about 60 to 70 men who were Special Police force
17 from Serbia. C-15 testified that because Badza's men were trained for
18 special operations, they would be the ones to lead TO units into
20 Fourthly, he assisted in acquiring uniforms and equipment for the
21 SBWS police in Novi Sad. And finally, he played a role in planning and
22 facilitating Arkan's crimes, as I will discuss in greater detail.
23 Stanisic sent Arkan, a JCE member, to the SBWS before the
24 take-overs and Arkan established his training centre and base in Erdut.
25 He had 50 or 60 men at first, but eventually had about 2 to 300 men under
1 his command. The Defence have argued that Arkan was subordinated to the
2 JNA and SBWS and that he was not connected to Stanisic and Simatovic.
3 Your Honours, the Prosecution's case is that Arkan, like other units of
4 the Serbian DB, did at times participate in operations under joint
5 command of the JNA, and that these co-ordinated operations were in
6 keeping with the intent of the JCE. The evidence also demonstrates that
7 Arkan acted separately from the JNA in committing the murders charged in
8 Dalj and Erdut, and that these actions were also the intent of the JCE.
9 In May 1991, Arkan himself openly stated that Jovica Stanisic was
10 his boss. This was confirmed by Radmilo Bogdanovic, the minister of
11 interior of Serbia and another JCE member, who stated that they sent
12 Arkan to the region as a commander. This evidence was provided by
13 Witness Savic. Stanisic not only sent Arkan to the region, he also
14 supplied Arkan's training centre with weapons and ammunition as indicated
15 in Exhibit D31. And ensured that Arkan could move around freely, as
16 announced by Badza at the meeting mentioned earlier, and described in
17 greater detail in the confidential evidence table at D9.
18 Further, Arkan's training centre, where he beat and killed many
19 civilians, was funded by the SBWS government, as Your Honours can find in
20 Exhibit P332 and P1187. The evidence also demonstrates that the SBWS
21 government was itself heavily influenced and funded by Serbia, for
22 example, at P968.
23 Arkan engaged in a a widespread and systematic attack of violence
24 and terror on the civilian populations of Dalj and Erdut. JF-032
25 described at T-4688 how Arkan's Men would do as they please and bring
1 people to the training centre at will. He referred to them as "the
2 executioners." Slide 40 identifies key evidence Your Honours have heard
3 and admitted in relation to the crimes in Dalj.
4 The first of the two mass executions charged in Dalj occurred on
5 the night of the 21st of September, 1991. On this night, Arkan and
6 Hadzic arrived in the police building. They removed the two men who had
7 connections to prominent Serbs, and then Arkan's Men murdered the
8 remaining non-Serb detainees. The details of the crime were documented
9 in a contemporaneous police report about the removal of the men from the
10 prison and has been admitted as P10.
11 The second mass execution charged in Dalj occurred on the night
12 of the 4th of October when Arkan and his men, including
13 Milorad Stricevic, shot the non-Serb civilians held in the Dalj police
14 building and dumped the bodies in the Danube. Documentary evidence of
15 this incident includes both the contemporaneous police report, P11,
16 drafted by local policemen who eventually resigned, as well as a
17 certificate signed by Milorad Stricevic, stating that he had removed the
18 prisoners, P315. One of the listed recipients of the seconds report was
19 Badza's deputy.
20 Following this incident, the local population demanded
21 accountability. Arkan held a speech and took responsibility for the
22 crimes. He said that no one could do anything to him and that he
23 operated with the policy "a tooth for a tooth and an eye for an eye."
24 The rest of the SAO SBWS murders were perpetrated in Erdut,
25 mostly at Arkan's training centre, and the bodies were dumped in mass
1 graves or wells. Slide 41 identifies the key evidence in relation to
2 these crimes. Between November 1991 and June 1992, Arkan's Men, along
3 with the SBWS TO and local police rounded up Croats and ethnic Hungarians
4 in Erdut, Dalj, and Klisa, bringing them to Arkan's training centre in
5 Erdut, where they were interrogated, beaten, threatened and in many cases
6 they were ultimately murdered. The record is replete with firsthand
7 evidence of civilians who suffered this brutality themselves and whose
8 own families and neighbours were arrested and killed.
9 The evidence has shown that the non-Serb population of Dalj,
10 Erdut and the SBWS region was deported and forcibly transferred by the
11 members of the JCE and the armed forces that they used as their tools.
12 Many civilians were literally put on buses and expelled, while others
13 fled due to the coercive and threatening circumstances. The first
14 arrests and forcible transfer of non-Serbs began in July 1991 with
15 subsequent waves occurring after the take-over of Dalj and Erdut in
16 August 1991, the fall of Vukovar in November 1991, and in April 1992 when
17 Arkan's Men deported a number of elderly villagers who had remained in
18 Erdut. Many of the villagers who initially stayed in their homes after
19 the take-over, such as Luka Sutalo and C-1118 were subjected to such
20 terrible conditions that eventually they too fled. Sutalo described how
21 he feared for his life and applied for a permit to leave, which was
22 granted only after he had signed over his property to the village
23 council. At T-3991, Sutalo described the searches and interrogations and
24 concluded by stating, "We had no rights, we weren't given any food, any
25 clothes and we realised we couldn't survive there, that we had to flee."
1 Some of the villagers who fled when Dalj and Erdut were
2 originally taken over returned, especially the small community of ethnic
3 Hungarians from Dalj who believed that they could stay in their homes.
4 However, once their family members disappeared, the fear and sorrow was
5 too great and they too fled. This is a pattern that Your Honours will
6 hear Ms. Harbour and Ms. Marcus refer to in relation to events in Bosnia
7 and Herzegovina.
8 The facts clearly demonstrate the persecutory intent in the
9 murders and forced displacements that took place in SBWS. The vast
10 majority of those killed were non-Serbs and you've heard evidence from
11 JF-015, JF-021 and Sutalo that Serb detainees and detainees who had Serbs
12 intervene on their behalf were released. I also refer Your Honours to
13 the confidential evidence table at D10 for evidence that lists were
14 generated for the purpose of ejecting non-Serbs.
15 The record further demonstrates that these crimes were part of a
16 widespread and systematic attack against the civilian population which
17 had a nexus to the armed conflict. I refer Your Honours to the
18 confidential evidence table at D11 for a statement about the scale of the
20 All of the crimes were perpetrated by a JCE member directly or
21 through physical perpetrators who were used as tools of a JCE member. In
22 addition to Arkan's Men and the SBWS TO, another armed unit which would
23 participate in crimes together with Arkan's Men was known as the
24 Serb National Security or SNB, the SNB is among the Serb forces listed in
25 paragraph 6 of the indictment, it was a Special Police Unit formed by
1 Hadzic to provide security for the government but which had broad
2 authority to engage in other tasks. Both C-15 and JF-035 have testified
3 about this unit. The evidence indicates that Hadzic met with the unit's
4 commander, Stevo Bogic on a daily basis. He received reports and
5 provided instructions. Bogic was also Hadzic's kum and a member in his
6 government, as you saw in P16. The SNB closely collaborated with Arkan's
7 Men in the arrest, killing and looting of non-Serb civilians in and
8 around Erdut. The liability for three murders charged in paragraph 38,
9 which were physically perpetrated solely by the SNB, is linked to the
10 accused both through Arkan whose men co-operated with the SNB and
11 requested that they kill the family, and through Hadzic who instructed
12 his men to co-operate with Arkan's Men in committing crimes. Arkan's
13 crimes are crimes that were intended by the JCE. The sources of
14 information were so plentiful that the only reasonable conclusion is that
15 the accused knew exactly what Arkan was doing it as he was doing it. In
16 fact, the evidence leads to the conclusion that the JCE plan involved
17 sending Arkan to commit these crimes, precisely because he advanced the
18 JCE's purpose so effectively.
19 Arkan's criminal background was known to Jovica Stanisic, even
20 before he was sent to the SBWS. The state security of Serbia essentially
21 did a background check on him, they received a full and detailed report
22 about his criminal charges already in January 1991, admitted as P1646.
23 Once Arkan was in the region, they knew that he was murdering prisoners
24 and civilians. It was no secret. Arkan even gave a television interview
25 in the autumn of 1991 stating that he does not take prisoners, which
1 Your Honours have admitted as P326. In addition, the JNA security organ
2 wrote numerous reports about Arkan's crimes. P1188 states that:
3 "Arkan is engaged in the slaughter of the prisoners sent by the
4 local territorial units." P1076 recommends that the problems should be
5 raised at the level of the federal organs and official organs of the
6 Republic of Serbia. Other such reports about Arkan's crimes are found in
7 P327, P1647, and P1078.
8 P1078 also states that:
9 "It is known that Raznjatovic is openly supported by the MUP, TO
10 and MNO, Ministry of Defence, of the Republic of Serbia."
11 Additional reports --
12 THE INTERPRETER: Kindly slow down when reading. Thank you.
13 MS. FRIEDMAN: Additional reports about the support and
14 co-operation between Arkan and the MUP and DB are contained in P327,
15 P1061, P1075, P1077, P1651, and D31. Your Honours, I also refer you to
16 T-1999 to 2000 and P25, paragraph 9, for evidence from a witness who was
17 held in Arkan's training centre and heard Arkan say that he was awaiting
18 an order from Belgrade about what to do next.
19 The local police could not put a stop to Arkan's crimes because
20 the people with the most power in the SBWS were those who sent -- were
21 those who were sent by Serbia or under their control, namely Hadzic,
22 Badza, Kojic, Kostic, and Arkan himself. Simply put, all roads led back
23 to the accused and the Serbian leadership. The relationship and constant
24 co-ordination between the JCE members, Hadzic, Badza, and Arkan, as
25 described by many witnesses is further evidence of the implementation of
1 the JCE. In addition, the Prosecution directs the Chamber's attention to
2 the confidential evidence table at D12 and D13.
3 Rather than putting a stop to the crimes, quite the opposite, the
4 accused took action to ensure that Arkan and the others could and would
5 continue to commit them. Stanisic had the ability to influence Hadzic in
6 his actions, as clearly demonstrated by the abundance of evidence about
7 Hadzic's meetings with Stanisic and Milosevic, and the material support
8 he relied on. Stanisic also had the ability to order Badza, who was in
9 the command of the entire TO and police forces, to put a stop to Arkan's
10 crimes. To the contrary, Badza and Hadzic provided forces to collaborate
11 with these men and as you've heard from Mr. Bakrac, Arkan was in fact
12 carrying out Badza's orders. Throughout the years that followed, as
13 these armed men crossed in and out of Serbia, Stanisic and Simatovic, who
14 were in charge of the borders, did nothing to stop them and continued to
15 fund and arm them. Slide 47 identifies some of the key evidence about
16 the contributions which the accused made to the JCE as implemented in the
17 SBWS in 1991 and 1992. Much of the same evidence also supported findings
18 that the accused planned and ordered the crimes.
19 In addition to this evidence already discussed, there is yet
20 another component that demonstrates Stanisic and Simatovic's contribution
21 and their responsibility for planning subsequent crimes. Stanisic and
22 Simatovic established two DB training camps in the region during that
23 period. The first discussed by both JF-036 and C-15 was initially set up
24 by Captain Dragan in Tito's castle in Tikves in July or August 1991.
25 Your Honours have heard from Mr. Weber about Captain Dragan's
1 relationship with the Serbian DB. There is evidence that members of this
2 unit killed five civilians from Grabovac, a nearby location also in SBWS
3 in May 1992, causing their family members to flee. The second camp
4 discussed by Bogunovic was located in Ilok, also known as Pajzos.
5 Mr. Simatovic set up the camp in Ilok in December 1991 and D33
6 corroborates the existence of both camps. The JCE's intent was to
7 forcibly remove the non-Serb population from both Croatia and Bosnia.
8 Subsequent developments in the region bear this out. The SAO SBWS and
9 SAO Krajina were successfully merged into the Republika Srpska Krajina or
10 RSK in February 1992. Hadzic served as the first president, followed by
11 Milan Martic, who you've heard about from Mr. Weber. This next step was
12 again implemented, in part by continued consultation between Milosevic,
13 Stanisic, Hadzic, and Martic.
14 According to JF-032, Kostic and Kojic, the DB operatives who were
15 so key in SAO SBWS were appointed as assistants to Martic in 1992 when he
16 became minister of interior of the RSK. Further, as cited in the
17 confidential evidence table at D14, local RSK police initially received
18 payment from the Serbian MUP until the Krajina dinars came into effect
19 and they received letters stating that they were Serbian MUP employees.
20 In addition, you will hear from my colleagues that DB trained units and
21 instructors continued to engage in campaigns of ethnic cleansing in
22 Bosnia. And Arkan's unit's relationship with the DB, clearly at play
23 already in SBWS, became formalised.
24 Your Honours, I will now hand over to Ms. Harbour who will
25 discuss the crimes perpetrated in Bosnia in 1992.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
2 MS. HARBOUR: Thank you. Your Honours, I will address the
3 accused's liability for crimes in Bosnia in 1992. Forcible transfer,
4 deportation and persecution in Bijeljina, and these counts in addition to
5 murder in Zvornik, Bosanski Samac and Doboj, all as part of a widespread
6 and systematic attack against the civilian population during an armed
7 conflict. For any single one of these three operations, whether the
8 operation in Zvornik and Bijeljina or in Bosanski Samac or in Doboj, the
9 evidence is sufficient that Stanisic and Simatovic could be convicted on
10 all five counts of the indictment.
11 Before discussing their liability for these crimes through their
12 role in the JCE and by planning and ordering, I will discuss the context
13 in which these crimes were committed revealing why they were integral to
14 the JCE's common criminal plan.
15 In order to effectuate the common criminal plan in Bosnia, the
16 Bosnian Serb leadership made several policy decisions that would dictate
17 the focus of the JCE members' efforts. On 19 December 1991, the SDS
18 leadership issued the Variant A and B instructions. The objective was to
19 separate the ethnic Serbs from non-Serbs by organising Serb local
20 governments, police forces, and Territorial Defences. This fed into the
21 Bosnian Serb leadership's six strategic goals. Mr. Farr mentioned the
22 first goal, which in essence articulates the common plan: The separation
23 of the Serb people from the other two ethnic communities entailing the
24 permanent removal of a significant part of the non-Serb population. The
25 crimes committed in Bosnia in the first half of 1992 targeted areas that
1 would also further the second and third strategic goals, which together
2 aimed to connect Serbia and the Serbian territories in Bosnia to the
3 Serbian territories in Croatia by establishing control over the so-called
4 Posavina corridor.
5 The Serbs targeted Bijeljina, Zvornik, Bosanski Samac, and Doboj
6 because of their location along the Posavina corridor. By the time
7 Karadzic officially articulated these goals on 12 May 1992, the accused
8 and other members of the JCE had already significantly contributed to
9 achieving them.
10 The Prosecution's case is that Stanisic and Simatovic, through
11 their leadership roles in the Serbian DB, planned the take-over of
12 Bijeljina and Zvornik intending to drive the non-Serb population out
13 through the crimes of forcible transfer, deportation, murder, and
14 persecution. On the orders of Stanisic and Simatovic, Arkan co-ordinated
15 with other forces including Seselj's men, the JNA, local TOs, and Serb
16 paramilitaries to implement the common criminal plan. And following the
17 take-over, Stanisic and Simatovic ordered their tool, Marko Pavlovic, as
18 Zvornik TO commander, to finish the job, co-ordinating mass deportations
19 through the Serbian MUP.
20 Before the attack on Bijeljina and Zvornik, the Serb leadership
21 was preparing for ethnic division, creating and implementing policies
22 that discriminated against the non-Serb population, listed at slide 49
23 and at E1 through E3 of the confidential evidence table. From 1991,
24 sources in Serbia armed Zvornik's Serbs. Zvornik received arms from the
25 police and JNA legally and illegally. Radmilo Bogdanovic, a member of
1 the JCE and Rade Kostic, who, as Ms. Friedman discussed, was responsible
2 for arms distribution in SBWS, also armed the Serbs in Zvornik by
3 organising weapons transfers from Croatia. I refer Your Honours to the
4 confidential evidence table at E4.
5 At the end of March 1992, the Serbian DB under Stanisic's
6 authority gave orders to take control over Bijeljina and Zvornik in rapid
7 succession. On 31 March, Arkan's Tigers entered Bijeljina and in
8 co-ordination with the Bijeljina TO and paramilitaries took control of
9 the town. The Serb forces began a persecutory campaign of violence
10 targeting Bosnian Muslim civilians. In this context, Muslim civilians
11 evacuated Bijeljina. As one witness stated, whoever could leave, left.
12 And this is E5 on the confidential evidence table.
13 By the time JCE member Biljana Plavsic came to Bijeljina on 4
14 April, Serb flags waved from two mosques. Plavsic greeted Arkan with a
15 kiss. For the evidence on Bijeljina, I refer the Chamber to slide 50 and
16 the confidential evidence table at E6. Soon after, during a meeting of
17 the Zvornik Crisis Staff, Plavsic asked that Arkan be called to assist
18 Zvornik as well. Through Radmilo Bogdanovic and Kostic, the Zvornik
19 police arranged to meet with Arkan who immediately sent his deputy and
20 around 20 of his Tigers to Zvornik.
21 Around 7 April Arkan met with the head of the Muslim police in
22 Zvornik. In his own words:
23 "I gave them an ultimatum to surrender the town by 0800 hours;
24 otherwise I would destroy it. That's how it was."
25 This is P1601, page 3.
1 Asked who masterminded the Zvornik attack, JCE member Seselj
2 said: "It was key people of the State Security Service who thought it
3 up, among them Franko Simatovic, Frenki. He was also one of the key
5 This is from P18, page 29.
6 Arkan's Men attacked Zvornik as the Serbian DB planned and
7 ordered on 8 April. Consistent with the JCE, Arkan's Tigers co-ordinated
8 this effort with JNA units and Serb paramilitaries. The JNA provided
9 tanks, artillery, mortars to Arkan's Men. Before attacking, JNA
10 General Jankovic received a letter from a private citizen describing
11 Arkan's ultimatum and foretelling "unprecedented massacre of the
12 unprotected and innocent population." The letter pleaded with the JNA
13 not to align with the forces threatening the population, but instead to
14 defend the population. This is P1380.
15 The JNA disregarded this plea, instead combining with Arkan's Men
16 and the paramilitaries to crush Zvornik's Muslim population. As one
17 witness described, during and following the take-over, Arkan's unit, the
18 Serb Crisis Staff, and the JNA became aggressive and ethnically cleansed
19 the area in order to create territories inhabited by a majority of Serbs.
20 This is E7 on the confidential evidence table.
21 For evidence regarding the Zvornik attack, I refer Your Honours
22 to the evidence of JF-026, Theunens' expert report P1575 beginning at
23 e-court page 336, and E6 on the confidential evidence table.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Although we have not yet been here for 75 minutes, I
25 think it's a right time for a break. We'll take a break and I'm looking
1 at the Prosecution. If we would restart at 12.30, would we be finished
2 by quarter to 2.00, which would be another 75 minutes then?
3 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, I believe we are very close to staying
4 on schedule and finishing within that time-period.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Then we'll take a break and resume at 12.30.
6 --- Recess taken at 12.04 p.m.
7 --- On resuming at 12.33 p.m.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Harbour, please proceed and please keep in mind
9 that while reading the speed of speech often goes up.
10 MS. HARBOUR: The accused are charged with approximately 20
11 murders committed by Arkan's Men during the Zvornik attack. And I refer
12 the Chamber to the confidential evidence table at E8 and the evidence of
13 JF-070. Following Zvornik's take-over, the Zvornik TO under command of
14 Branko Popovic, also known as Marko Pavlovic, continued to persecute
15 non-Serbs. Pavlovic was closely associated with the Serbian DB and
16 carried out their bidding. He came to Zvornik with Kostic, the same
17 Kostic upon whose statue Stanisic placed a wreath in the Kula video,
18 which is P61. Pavlovic referred to Kostic as boss. On the confidential
19 evidence table, this is E9.
20 Locals in Zvornik municipality knew Pavlovic to be Serbian DB
21 sent from Belgrade to "fix the situation" or "control things" in Zvornik.
22 Those quotes are at E10 and E11 on the confidential evidence table.
23 Pavlovic had frequent contact with Stanisic's assistant, Tepavcevic, and
24 local members of and affiliates of the Serbian DB based just across the
25 river from Zvornik. Sources for this are at E12 and E13 on the
1 confidential evidence table.
2 In a subordinate's application to the Captain Dragan fund, which
3 Simatovic presented at the Red Berets' award ceremony as one of the
4 Serbian DB unit's humanitarian activities, Pavlovic was listed as being
5 the commander of a special military police unit. And I refer
6 Your Honours to slide 54. Through his close connections to Kostic and
7 the JNA, Pavlovic procured weapons for the Zvornik TO from Croatia and
8 Serbia. As evidence that this was part of the common plan, Mladic's
9 military notebook reflects that Pavlovic reported at a meeting with
10 Karadzic and Mladic on 30 June 1992, that co-operation with the army
11 remained firm including for the purpose of supply. And this is from
12 P2528, page 8.
13 As TO commander, Marko Pavlovic co-ordinated all of the armed
14 forces and paramilitaries operating in Zvornik. He approved payroll
15 sheets authorising the Zvornik interim government to pay the various
16 paramilitary groups and JNA members under the Zvornik TO. I refer
17 Your Honours to slide 55 for the relevant exhibits.
18 In the months following Zvornik's take-over, Serb forces
19 continued to persecute the Muslim civilian population through arbitrary
20 detentions, beatings, and other acts. In this context, half of the
21 Bosniak village of Kozluk's predominantly Muslim population had fled
22 Kozluk by June 1992. The Serb forces under Pavlovic's TO thus succeeded
23 in forcibly displacing the non-Serb population by creating the same
24 environment of fear that Serb forces employed in the Krajina and the
1 In June, more than 20.000 Serb refugees came to Zvornik. In
2 order to implement the common plan and also to house Serb refugees, Serb
3 forces rounded up 1800 Muslim civilians from Kozluk and the neighbouring
4 Skocic and loaded them on to buses organised by the local Serb
5 leadership. Pavlovic signed deportation orders which are P2138 and
7 The Bosnian Serb police transported the refugees under armed
8 guard over the Bosnian border into Serbia and the Serbian police guarded
9 their transport through Serbia to the Hungarian border. There the
10 Serbian MUP supplied the convoy with passports to enter Hungary, as is
11 clear from the MUP stamp on the passports at P2141. The Serbian MUP
12 contributed enormously to this elaborate forcible deportation process,
13 from allowing the initial crossing of 1800 people over Serbia's border to
14 co-ordinating local Serbian police to guard and transport the convoy
15 through the entire length of the Serbian territory, to finally issuing
16 hundreds of passports. I refer the Chamber to the evidence on the
17 confidential evidence table at E14 and E15 regarding crimes in Zvornik
18 municipality after the take-over, including these mass deportations.
19 In his notebook, Mladic states that at a meeting on 30 June 1992,
20 among Mladic, Karadzic, and representatives of several municipalities,
21 the president of SDS Zvornik stated that:
22 "We have successfully implemented the president's decision to
23 settle Divic and Kozluk with our children."
24 And this is P2528, pages 4 to 5. Marko Pavlovic then stated:
25 "We are most active in evicting the Muslims, we brought peace to Sepak,
1 Divic, and Kozluk. Some of them wanted to move out, while we demanded
2 it. We had to evict some of the people also for the sake of our 'heroes'
3 who fled from Kovacevici." And this is the same document at pages 8
4 through 9.
5 With the Muslim population of Zvornik drastically reduced through
6 murders, forcible transfer and deportation, and persecution of ethnic
7 Bosniaks, Pavlovic went on to report at this meeting that in Zvornik
8 Arkan and Seselj's volunteer formations had "enjoyed exceptional
9 success." And this is page 7 of that exhibit.
10 A Serbian DB document from July 1992 characterised the situation
11 in Zvornik as "genocide committed in the Zvornik region by the SDG
12 volunteers and the volunteers from Loznica." This is on the confidential
13 evidence table at E16. The fact that Pavlovic reported to Mladic and
14 Karadzic, two JCE members, about the successful contributions of two
15 other JCE members to operations that a DB operative termed genocide,
16 indicates that the large-scale killing and forcible displacement of
17 non-Serb civilians in Zvornik and Bijeljina had intentionally targeted
18 non-Serbs exactly as the JCE members had envisioned.
19 As with the Zvornik-Bijeljina operation, the Prosecution's case
20 is that Stanisic and Simatovic planned the Bosanski Samac operation.
21 Through the Serbian DB, they trained and armed local Serbs at the
22 Ilok/Pajzos training camp. Simatovic then personally ordered this
23 Red Beret unit to attack Bosanski Samac where they murdered, forcibly
24 transferred, deported and otherwise persecuted the municipality's
25 non-Serb population, in co-ordination with other Serb forces such as the
1 JNA and local TO.
2 Prior to the take-over, ethnic tensions were rising in
3 Bosanski Samac, as local Serb leadership made a number of policy
4 decisions that discriminated against non-Serbs, as indicated on slide 59.
5 In late March 1992, a Serbian DB training camp near Ilok called Pajzos in
6 Eastern Slavonia, which Ms. Friedman briefly discussed, began training
7 recruits from Bosanski Samac. The camp's instructors were members of the
8 Serbian DB, most notably, Dragan Djordjevic, also known as Crni,
9 Srecko Radovanovic, also known as Debeli, and Slobodan Miljkovic, also
10 known as Lugar.
11 Crni's membership in the Serbian DB is well established, in the
12 evidence of Todorovic and JF-047. Todorovic, chief of the Bosanski Samac
13 police, recounted an incident from the summer of 1992 that exemplified
14 the close relationship between Crni and both accused. Crni was arrested.
15 He asked Todorovic to talk to "his people" about getting him released.
16 Todorovic then went to the Serbian MUP in Belgrade in search of
17 Simatovic, but was instead directed to Stanisic. Upon learning of Crni's
18 arrest, Stanisic said that those responsible had "touched into a hornet's
19 nest." And he would tell them to release Crni immediately. Sure enough,
20 Crni was released some ten days later. This is from P1576 at pages 23475
21 through 77.
22 In addition, there's evidence that Crni joined the unit on
23 5 October 1991, that Stanisic was personally involved in recruiting him,
24 and that the Serbian DB was aware that Crni, like many other DB recruits,
25 had previously engaged in criminal activities. Please refer to the
1 confidential evidence table at E17 for this evidence.
2 JF-047 and Todorovic have testified that Debeli and Lugar were
3 also members of the Serbian DB subordinate to Crni. A request for
4 assistance that Lugar later wrote to the Serbian DB outlines his
5 involvement in the DB, training at the Lezimir and Ilok/Pajzos camps,
6 then commanding a unit in the Bosanski Samac attack, and this is P1425.
7 The collaboration that resulted in the Ilok/Pajzos camp becoming involved
8 in Bosanski Samac is itself evidence of the JCE. Police and Defence at
9 the local and Serbian levels devised the plan for the Serbian DB to train
10 Bosanski Samac locals. Stevan Todorovic and Milos Bogdanovic, who as the
11 municipal secretariat of national defence, met in Belgrade with a member
12 of the federal Secretariat for National Defence and with Milan Prodanic
13 of the Serbian DB. Prodanic later informed Milos Bogdanovic that he
14 would send men to give training at a camp organised by the Serbian MUP.
15 Together, Milos Bogdanovic and Todorovic recruited local men to undergo
16 military training at Ilok/Pajzos in March 1992. This is from the
17 evidence of Todorovic, and Lugar's statement, which is P1428 at page 4,
18 corroborates Todorovic's involvement.
19 The camp at Ilok/Pajzos was set up to train special purpose units
20 of the Serbian MUP. These came to be commonly known in Bosanski Samac as
21 the Red Berets or as the Grey Wolves, based on the recognisable grey wolf
22 insignia on their sleeves. The non-Serb civilians whom they brutalised
23 knew them as the Specials.
24 As indicated on slide 61, the KDF applications of individuals who
25 trained at Ilok/Pajzos during this time characterised the unit as either
1 the Special Unit of the MUP of Serbia or as Grey Wolves. And these
2 applications also demonstrate Debeli's and Lugar's role in the
3 Bosanski Samac operations.
4 According to JF-047, the Red Berets who were trained at
5 Ilok/Pajzos in March 1992 knew Simatovic to be their commander. There is
6 also evidence of Stanisic's superiority to Simatovic and the Ilok/Pajzos
7 Red Berets for which I refer the Chamber to the confidential evidence
8 table at E18. Ilok/Pajzos, like the other Serbian DB camps that my
9 colleagues have discussed, was among the training camps that Simatovic
10 himself highlighted during the Red Beret's award ceremony in 1997.
11 One former Red Beret provided detailed evidence of the DB
12 training camp at Ilok/Pajzos, including the role of Simatovic, Bozovic,
13 Dragoslav Krsmanovic, Zvezdan Jovanovic, and Arkan. And I refer the
14 Chamber to P523, pages 7 through 11 and to E19 on the confidential
15 evidence table. Just before the take-over, Simatovic personally
16 instructed the Red Berets at the Ilok/Pajzos camp on the plan and
17 objective of the upcoming operation. Fifty Red Berets including Crni,
18 Debeli, and Lugar, 30 men from Serbia and 20 local trainees arrived by
19 helicopter in Batkusa on 11 April 1992. On the night between 16 and 17
20 April, these Red Berets, co-operating with the local police and TO,
21 secured the key facilities in town. Once the Red Beret units secured the
22 important structures, the JNA took over and JF-047 gives extensive
23 evidence about Simatovic's briefing and the take-over.
24 Two days before the take-over, Crni had attending a meeting with
25 Todorovic, Blagoje Simic and others where they discussed including the
1 Red Berets in the existing 17th Tactical Group of the JNA, which later
2 became the VRS's 2nd Posavina Brigade. This is Todorovic's evidence
3 P1576 at page 23452. During the Bosanski Samac operations, the
4 Red Berets were in fact incorporated into TG-17. Lieutenant-Colonel
5 Nikolic, commander of the TG-17, held overall tactical and operational
6 command of the units participating in the take-over. This co-operation
7 advanced the JCE's common purpose and reflected the shared intent among
8 the JCE's members whose organisations were represented at this meeting.
9 Namely, the Serbian DB, the JNA, the RS MUP, and Bosnian Serb political
11 Nevertheless, the Red Berets functioned as a distinct unit.
12 Temporary subordination to the JNA did not affect the Red Berets
13 permanent chain of command. JF-047 testified that orders came from Crni
14 through Debeli. The Red Berets' victims easily discerned that they were
15 not JNA, but rather "attached to another command," said Tihic at
16 transcript page 3215. The difference was apparent in their uniform,
17 behaviour, training, Serbian regional dialect, and their "assertion of
18 power." This evidence is also from Tihic at page 3219 to 20 in the
20 Nikolic endorsed the Red Berets as "a legal elite unit of Serbian
21 commandos, whose arrival had been legalized through the official organs
22 of the government and the army, both at the level of Samac municipality
23 and at the highest level in Serbia and Yugoslavia." This is from P1418,
24 page 1. Nikolic's description reflects the Red Berets' central role in
25 implementing the common criminal purpose and the shared intent of high
1 level members of the JCE.
2 As in other areas discussed today, the Serbian DB armed and
3 equipped various Serb forces in Bosanski Samac and neighbouring areas.
4 JF-047 testified that Vaso Mijovic, a known DB member, brought four to
5 six truck-loads of ammunition from Belgrade to Brcko on an approximately
6 weekly basis, giving a few cases to the small Red Berets unit and storing
7 the rest in VRS hangars for VRS use. The Serbian MUP also lent equipment
8 to the VRS's 2nd Posavina Brigade as evidenced by P1523.
9 The Red Berets committed a string of atrocities targeting
10 non-Serb civilians in the wake of the Bosanski Samac take-over, and I
11 refer the Chamber to the evidence of witnesses Tihic, Lukac, JF-079 and
12 JF-012. The accused are charged with the murders of at least 16 Muslim
13 and Croat civilians at Crkvina on 7 May, 1992, after Lugar and several
14 other Red Berets went on a shooting rampage. There's evidence that Lugar
15 committed these murders on specific orders in the confidential evidence
16 table at E20. For a full account of the Crkvina massacre, please see E21
17 and E22.
18 The Red Berets co-ordinated numerous forced exchanges,
19 transferring non-Serb civilians from Bosanski Samac to Croatia as shown
20 on slide 64. The accused intended these crimes. They recruited
21 Red Berets with criminal inclinations, then planned and ordered the
22 operation which went exactly as intended. As Tihic testified, "Special
23 units that took part in the attack against Bosanski Samac, or who led the
24 attack against Bosanski Samac, were the masters. I know full well that
25 nothing could have been decided without them afterwards. You could see
1 straightaway that these were persons who were prone to crime and that
2 killing someone meant nothing to them." This is from page 3120. Tihic
3 went on to state that "Crni was the commander of all. He is the one who
4 issued orders." This is 3136 in the transcript.
5 A report of the 2nd Posavina Brigade of the Bosanski Samac
6 operations described the Red Berets "official role as war criminals in
7 the area." And went on to report that "criminals of a Yugoslav calibre
8 were hiding among the Serbian commandos who had come to train the Serbian
9 police. With the blessing of those who had brought them in and those who
10 had sent them, they engaged in unheard of looting of private and socially
11 owned property. The massive arrests and isolation of Croats and Muslims
12 followed without any criteria, and some of the prisoners were subjected
13 to measures such as abuse, torture, or even killing." This is P1418,
14 pages 1 to 2.
15 The Doboj operation followed the same pattern as in
16 Bosanski Samac. The Prosecution's case is that it was planned and
17 ordered by the accused and that it was committed through implementation
18 of the JCE. As in Bosanski Samac, the Serbian DB trained and armed local
19 Serbs at the Mount Ozren Red Berets training camp led by Bozovic, a
20 prominent member of the Serbian DB. Through Bozovic, the accused ordered
21 the Red Berets unit to attack Doboj where they murdered, forcibly
22 transferred, deported, and otherwise persecuted the municipality's
23 non-Serb population in co-ordination with other Serb forces including the
24 JNA, local TO, and local police.
25 Leading up to the take-over, the Serb leadership implemented a
1 number of policies and laws to discriminate against the Bosniak and Croat
2 population, indicated on slide 66. In early 1992, Bozovic, a member of
3 the DB who Mr. Weber has already introduced, established a Red Berets
4 training camp at Mount Ozren. According to JF-005, Simatovic visited the
5 Mount Ozren camp and there's evidence that Stanisic ordered and approved
6 weapon transfers from Serbia to the camp. Please see the confidential
7 evidence table at E23.
8 As with the Ilok/Pajzos camp, Simatovic referred to Mount Ozren
9 at the Red Berets award ceremony on 4 May 1997. Bozovic was the
10 commander of this camp and of the special units in Doboj. As one of the
11 Serbian DB special unit's original members, he was directly subordinate
12 to Stanisic and Simatovic. He was a prominent figure in the Serbian DB,
13 as demonstrated by his introduction during the Red Berets award ceremony
14 as one of "the unit's veteran officers." To which Milosevic responded
15 that he had personally read Bozovic's reports and this is P61, page 4.
16 E24 on the confidential evidence table has evidence that Mr. Stanisic was
17 directly involved in recruiting Bozovic.
18 Bozovic had a vicious reputation and Mladic considered him akin
19 to mafia, having established "deaths camps" with Arkan. And this is
20 from P2956.
21 Following the same pattern seen in Bosanski Samac, the local Serb
22 political and military leadership funneled local recruits to Mount Ozren
23 through training. Together the president of the SDS Doboj Municipal
24 Board Milan Ninkovic and JNA commander, Milovan Stankovic ensured that
25 formations of the Doboj police, JNA and volunteers were sent for
1 training. The recruits received camouflage uniforms and red berets with
2 insignias stating JSN, Special Purpose Unit, with a brown wolf. They
3 became known in Doboj as the Red Berets.
4 On 3 May 1992, around 300 men in the Mount Ozren trained
5 Red Berets unit, at Bozovic's order, took over Doboj by force. The
6 Red Berets secured important structures to prevent Muslims from entering.
7 They forced people found in the buildings to declare their loyalty to the
8 Serbs, which is evidence of their persecutory intent. As in
9 Bosanski Samac, and reflective of the joint nature of the JCE, the
10 Red Berets co-ordinated the take-over with the JNA and Serb
11 paramilitaries. Stankovic had overall command of the Doboj operation
12 with Bozovic. There's evidence that Stankovic received orders from
13 Stanisic through Bozovic. Please see the confidential evidence table at
15 Officially, the Red Berets were under CSB Doboj, but in fact they
16 were under Bozovic, under the Serbian DB. CSB Doboj's payment records
17 during that period, listed on slide 68, show that Bozovic's group was
18 paid as a special group. Furthermore, several KDF applications, also on
19 the slide, indicate that Mount Ozren trainees joined Red Beret units or
20 MUP of Serbia units under the command of Bozovic and Frenki.
21 In July 1992, many of the Red Berets were integrated into the
22 military police. JF-005 testified that Stankovic, who by this point was
23 TG Ozren's commander, continued co-ordinating with Bozovic. The
24 Red Berets in the military police thus continued receiving orders from
25 Bozovic. They were separated from their base unit and their commanders
1 were not allowed to ask questions.
2 During and following Doboj's take-over, the Red Berets pursued a
3 campaign of violence and persecution targeting Doboj's Muslim and Croat
4 population. Bozovic ordered his men to torture non-Serb civilians and
5 the victims recognised him as being in control of the Red Berets. I
6 refer Your Honours to the evidence of JF-008, JF-009, B-1115, Ahmetovic
7 and Hadzovic for more details of this persecution and evidence of
8 discriminatory intent.
9 The accused are charged with at least 27 murders committed on 12
10 July 1992, after the Red Berets and other Serb forces used non-Serb
11 detainees as a human shield against the Bosnian forces. And for this I
12 refer Your Honours to the evidence of JF-008, JF-009, and Hadzovic, and
13 P254 and P92. As a result of the horrific crimes in Doboj and reports of
14 a similar pattern of attacks in other municipalities, thousands of
15 Muslims and Croats fled their homes in Doboj and many others were
16 detained and forcibly exchanged within Bosnia and across the Croatian
17 border. And for this evidence, I refer the Chamber to the evidence of
18 Hadzovic, JF-005, B-1115, JF-008, JF-009, and Exhibits P93, P94, and
20 The Red Berets' Doboj operations followed the same pattern as in
21 Bosanski Samac, entailed similar acts of violence, and achieved the same
22 results, emptying these municipalities of non-Serbs. Having seen the
23 Red Berets' success in Bosanski Samac, Stanisic and Simatovic, through
24 their loyal subordinate Bozovic, repeated this pattern in Doboj because
25 it furthered the JCE's purpose. Predictably, Doboj was just as
1 successful. The "Doboj experience" was later described as "an example of
2 how a Serbian state should be created." This is from P1435, page 3.
3 I'll now turn the floor over to Ms. Marcus.
4 MS. MARCUS: Slobodan Medic, aka Boca and the Skorpions were
5 deployed to the Serbian front to the Trnovo front for approximately one
6 months to the end of June to the end of July 1995. During their
7 deployment to the Trnovo area, they were engaged in operations in
8 co-ordination with the VRS and RS MUP forces. This coordination
9 culminated in the execution of six Bosnian Muslim men and boys who had
10 been captured in part of the attack by Serb forces on Srebrenica.
11 Evidence has been adduced showing that the Skorpions had been in
12 Djeletovci in SBWS since the end of 1991, or the beginning of 1992.
13 Djeletovci is located near other locations central to JCE operations
14 throughout the indictment period, including Tovarnik, Njemci, which is
15 near Ziriste and Ilok/Pajzos. I refer the Chamber to the evidence of
16 JF-032, JF-024, JF-048, and Borivoje Savic.
17 Three co-ordinated operations in Bosnia in 1995 demonstrate the
18 implementation of the common criminal plan: Pauk, Trnovo, and
19 Sanski Most. At the end of 1994, the Skorpions under Slobodan Medic were
20 deployed to joint field operations in conjunction with other Serb forces
21 in the Velika Kladusa Pauk operation. For additional evidence in
22 relation to the Pauk operation, I refer the Chamber to P2146 and P235.
23 The Pauk Joint Command in which the Skorpions and Arkan's SDG
24 operated continued into May 1995. At the same time, the accused not only
25 sent troops and support for Pauk, they were also present themselves with
1 great regularity in Bosnia in May to June 1995. Within ten days
2 following the release of the last UN hostages, the Serbian MUP deployed
3 their forces to join in operations at the Trnovo front in conjunction
4 with the very same Bosnian Serb MUP and VRS forces who had been engaged
5 at Pauk, who had taken UN troops hostage, and who at the time of
6 deployment were preparing to take over Srebrenica.
7 The Serbian MUP forces including the Skorpions and Arkan's Tigers
8 engaged in operations at the Trnovo front throughout the month of July
9 1995, during which time the Skorpions executed the six men and boys.
10 Following the pullout order conveyed by Vaso Mijovic, a DB agent, Serbian
11 MUP forces pulled out were the Trnovo front on the 24th of July, 1995.
12 Six weeks later, Arkan's Men were deployed to Sanski Most to carry out
13 operations there. The proximity in time and the centralised
14 co-ordination involved in Pauk, Trnovo, and Sanski Most characterise the
15 last phase of the implementation of the common criminal plan.
16 The Skorpions and Arkan's Men had been deployed to participate in
17 the Pauk operation, Mr. Stanisic said on the 6th of April, 1995, "I sent
18 150 men from Slavonija through Pauk. The crossing had to be done
20 You can see this excerpt on slide 71.
21 At a meeting on the 30th of June, 1995 in Belgrade at which
22 Mladic, Milosevic, and Stanisic were talking with Fikret Abdic, Stanisic
23 is recorded as saying, "We have been supplying 100.000 men for six
24 months. There is poor organisation in RS, they plundered us."
25 Milosevic suggested, "Jovica should resolve logistics problems,
1 and let RS resolve this problem of holding up convoys."
2 Mr. Stanisic stated, "I can find 120 perfect men who would come
3 there in seven days. They would be from the eastern sector. That is
4 support. They should not be engaged (we gave 80 from Erdut, we gave 80
5 from Djeletovci)."
6 I refer the Chamber to the Pauk diary admitted at P235 and to
8 It should be noted that in the Pauk diary which spans from
9 November 1994 through to the end of May 1995, Jovica Stanisic is named
10 explicitly twice; Frenki, 15 times; Legija, 78 times; Bozovic, 37 times;
11 and Kobac, Rajo Bozovic's nickname, appears at least 120 times.
12 The Prosecution evidence has demonstrated that the deployment of
13 the Skorpions to Trnovo to assist in carrying out the Eastern Bosnia
14 portion of the common criminal plan was designed in the course of two
15 meetings which took place prior to that deployment and which were
16 attended by high-level DB officials and other central actors in the plan.
17 May I request private session, please.
18 JUDGE ORIE: We are turn into private session.
19 [Private session]
6 [Open session]
7 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
9 MS. MARCUS: Following that first meeting, there was a second
10 meeting which took place in the building of the Serbian MUP in Belgrade
11 before the Skorpions left for Trnovo. This meeting was attended by
12 individuals central to Serbian MUP and DB hierarchy including
13 Ilija Kojic, who worked directly for Mr. Stanisic, as Ms. Friedman has
14 already discussed.
15 Also attending this meeting were Milan Milanovic aka Mrgud,
16 Ljubo Miljevic, Arkan, Slobodan Medic aka Boca, Radovan Stojicic aka
17 Badza, and several others. P1666, an excerpt of which appears on slide
18 74, describes this meeting including the location and the attendees.
19 Mr. Bakrac discussed this meeting in his submissions. For corroboration,
20 I refer the Chamber to the confidential evidence table at F1.
21 At this meeting, according to the evidence led in this case,
22 Badza told those present that the RS was being attacked and that if
23 possible Arkan's unit, the Skorpions, and the Plavi unit should help the
24 VRS in Trnovo for a month. I refer the Chamber to the confidential
25 evidence table at F2.
1 Witness evidence confirmed that Frenki had arranged for the
2 Tigers to take part in the Treskavica operation. I refer the Chamber to
3 the confidential evidence table at F3 and F4.
4 Ilija Kojic's role was to organise deployment of these three
5 units that made up the battalion sent to the war front in Trnovo. Please
6 refer to the confidential evidence table at F5. Witnesses testified that
7 Mrgud was the intermediary between Slobodan Medic and Milorad Ulemek, aka
8 Legija, and the DB leadership in Belgrade. One witness reported that
9 Slobodan Medic himself had boasted that his orders came from Stanisic and
11 Dejan Sliskovic testified that Slobodan Medic commanded the
12 Skorpions and during combat activities he was subordinated to the
13 Red Beret command staff. Simatovic visited the Skorpion headquarters in
14 Djeletovci after the events in Trnovo. I refer the Chamber to the
15 confidential evidence table at F6.
16 The Skorpions deployed to the Trnovo front at the end of June
17 1995. According to his own notes, Mladic was at Jahorina on the 25th of
18 May, 1995. I refer the Chamber to P394. On the 23rd of June, 1995,
19 Mladic said in a meeting with Karadzic and others:
20 "We must conduct an operation near Trnovo."
21 On the 30th of June, 1995, the Serbian MUP's anti-terrorist unit
22 sent a telegram to Ratko Mladic and in response Mladic issued this urgent
23 order, P1454. Mladic ordered on the 1st of July that helicopters be
24 provided for the evacuation of any men wounded at the Trnovo front and
25 that any such injuries be reported formally. Serbian MUP hierarchy was
1 informed of this. This pattern of documentation suggests that the
2 Serbian MUP were providing their pilots and possibly their helicopters
3 for the purpose of assisting in the evacuation of wounded fighters at the
4 Trnovo front.
5 Serb forces on the ground issued regular reports which appear on
6 slide 77. These official military and police reports providing
7 information on the wounded including Serbian MUP members span throughout
8 July 1995. For additional corroboration, I refer the Chamber to the
9 transcript at 10059.
10 The Prosecution case that the Skorpions as a unit of the Serbian
11 MUP were deployed to the Trnovo front where they were subordinated to or
12 operated in co-ordination with other Serb forces, in this case, including
13 Arkan's Men, the RS MUP, and VRS forces. The accused used their
14 authority to direct and organise the financing, logistical support, or
15 other substantial assistance or support to these special units and
16 continued to send forces and provide support to the Serbian MUP forces on
17 the ground at the Trnovo front over an extended period of time before,
18 during, and after the large-scale massacres at Srebrenica and Zepa and
19 the consequent execution of the Trnovo victims.
20 Evidence of the arming and provision of supplies and logistical
21 support to the Skorpions by the Serbian MUP was presented by JF-048 who
22 testified that the Skorpions came to the DB camp in Pajzos to obtain
23 ammunition from the warehouse. The DB provided multiple licence plates
24 to the Skorpions for ease of movement, several different uniforms,
25 Serbian MUP badges once they deployed to Trnovo, higher salaries than
1 other police work, according to one estimate higher by a multiple of
2 seven, payment in newly printed dinars, training, communication via radio
3 and telephone with Arkan's unit and with VRS forces during the operation.
4 For additional evidence of the contributions by the accused, I
5 refer the Chamber to the confidential evidence table at F7 and to slide
6 number 78.
7 In addition to the pattern of reports on the wounded, the
8 Prosecution has presented a pattern of official police and military
9 reports from the front describing the day-to-day activities in and around
10 the Trnovo front involving the Skorpions/Serbian MUP forces throughout
11 July 1995. The documents are listed on slides 79 and 80. P1452 dated
12 the 1st of July, 1995, "Activities commenced the previous day were
13 continued at the Trnovo battle-field on the 30th of June 1995. The
14 combat group was described as including the Skorpions Serbian MUP."
15 P1455 from the 3rd of July and P1458 from the 7th of July
16 further described the joint operations of the MUP forces of the RS,
17 Serbia and RSK along with the VRS at the Trnovo front.
18 P1459, the 7th of July lists the numerical strength of the police
19 engaged at the Trnovo front including "the Republic of Serbia and the
20 Republic of Serbian Krajina special unit 350 policemen." By the 10th of
21 July 1995, the reports describe the advance of the forces at Srebrenica.
22 On that same day, as further evidence of the co-ordination on the ground
23 as a broader part of the Srebrenica offensive, Mladic issued P1462, a
24 dispatch appearing before you, to all SDBs and all police stations on
25 behalf of the "supreme commander of the Republika Srpska Armed Forces and
1 in order to crush the enemy offensive from the Srebrenica protected
3 He ordered the singling out of a mixed company of joint MUP
4 forces of the RSK, Serbia, and Republika Srpska to send to the Srebrenica
5 sector on the 11th of July, 1995.
6 We know that Vaso Mijovic was a person in a leadership role in
7 the DB during the Trnovo campaign. I refer the Chamber to the
8 confidential evidence table at F8. The Prosecution has presented a
9 compelling body of evidence demonstrating the deployment of the Skorpions
10 to Trnovo by the end of July 1995. The co-operation and co-ordination
11 amongst these forces throughout the month of July 1995 and concluding
12 with the Skorpions being pulled out at the end of July 1995. Operations
13 at the Trnovo front are a perfect example of the type of joint operations
14 which epitomised the way the JCE functioned.
15 In addition to deploying their forces, the evidence demonstrates
16 that the accused went themselves to the region. During the end of May
17 and until the middle of June 1995, Stanisic and Simatovic were in Bosnia
18 during the negotiations for the release of the UN hostages. Throughout
19 this time, as stated by Stanisic himself, the accused were both in direct
20 contact with the highest level Serb and Bosnian Serb authorities
21 including Slobodan Milosevic, Radovan Karadzic, and Ratko Mladic, all JCE
22 members. The Prosecution refers the Chamber to Exhibits P48.17, D142,
23 transcript at page T-430 to 433. We also refer the Chamber to the
24 transcript at page 2064 to 2067.
25 The accused contributed forces and their personal presence, as
1 well as other extensive logistical and operational support to the VRS and
2 RS MUP forces on the ground in Pauk, then in Trnovo, and finally in
3 Sanski Most. The Skorpions, as a unit of the Serbian MUP, provided the
4 ultimate participation in their acts in furtherance of the common
5 criminal plan, the execution of six men and boys captured from
6 Srebrenica. Vaso Mijovic, a DB official, informed the Skorpions that
7 they had been ordered to pull out of Trnovo and within a few days after
8 that order, Milan Milanovic, aka Mrgud travelled to Trnovo to retrieve
9 the DB forces from the field. Six weeks later, the DB deployed Arkan's
10 Men to Sanski Most, as part of the co-ordinated widespread and systematic
11 attack against the non-Serb civilian population.
12 On the 16th of April, 1992, Sanski Most was attacked by Serb
13 forces. Ultimately those non-Serbs who did not flee due to the killings
14 and other acts of violence were forced to leave due to the coercive and
15 oppressive environment. Those who remained until 1995 endured continual
16 discriminatory treatment. I refer the Chamber to the transcript at page
17 3028. The Sasina and Trnovo village executions were part of this
18 widespread and systematic attack upon the non-Serb civilian population in
19 Sanski Most and bore a nexus to the armed conflict.
20 Arkan and his men, as explained by my colleagues, were an
21 effective choice for the carrying out of operations in furtherance of the
22 common criminal plan. They were well trained for such persecutory
23 operations. I refer the Chamber to the confidential evidence table at
25 Witness evidence is that Arkan's Tigers were operating in
1 Sanski Most in co-ordination with the local TO. I refer the Chamber now
2 to the confidential evidence table at F10. Arkan's Men were operating in
3 the Sanski Most area at least between the 22nd of September and the 10th
4 of October in conjunction with other Serb forces including police from
5 Serbia, military police, and members of the VRS. Please refer to the
6 confidential evidence table at F11.
7 In P284, excerpted on slide 86, Arkan's own words provide
8 additional evidence of his persecutory intent. I also refer the Chamber
9 to P282 and P283. Financial support from the DB provided additional
10 means for Arkan's Men to operate and in some cases even to recruit
11 additional fighters. P289, appearing on slide 87, dated the 23rd of
12 September, 1995, is a letter signed by Ratko Mladic reporting on the
13 activities of Arkan and his men in Sanski Most. The document reads:
14 "Members of the SDG paramilitary units forcibly induct into their
15 ranks or recruit VRS members promising them a salary of 600 dinars,
16 10.000 dinars compensation if they are wounded, unemployment, and health
17 insurance through the MUP of the Republic of Serbia."
18 According to this document, Arkan was operating under the
19 official approval of Radovan Karadzic while identifying himself as "a
20 mountain brigade of the MUP of Serbia and RS." The SDG members were paid
21 directly in freshly printed money by the DB, at times individual SDG
22 members would go to the DB offices directly to pick up the money for
23 salaries and at other times, the money would be sent in bags to the SDG
24 office. The largest amount of payment by the DB to the SDG was
25 reportedly received after the Banja Luka operations, including Sanski
1 Most in September 1995. I refer the Chamber to P1616 and 1619 and to
2 P440 and P441.
3 The Prosecution has tendered into evidence in this case official
4 DB payment records spanning at least from the end of 1993 onward into the
5 postwar period. Listed on these payment records fully corroborating
6 witness testimony are numerous known members of Arkan's Tigers, the SDG,
7 whose monthly payments by the DB were officially recorded throughout the
8 latter part of 1994 and through 1995, covering the time-period during
9 which the Sanski Most crimes were committed. I refer the Chamber to the
10 transcript at page 8886 and 7.
11 On one DB payment record, which I request not to be broadcast to
12 the public, please, P454, page 19, the first name on that list is
13 Milorad Ulemek, aka Legija, and there are at least 15 SDG members
14 officially documented as having been paid by the DB directly that month,
15 including Mile, Mihajlo Ulemek and Jugoslav Gluscevic, combined on the
16 same list with several SDB members who were paid simultaneously with the
17 Tigers. I refer the Chamber to the confidential evidence table at F12
18 and to the transcript at page 8892 and 3.
19 P454 is only one example. Next slide, also please not to be
20 broadcast. It is the Prosecution's case that numerous payment records on
21 which known SDG members and DB members are listed bear the signature of
22 Franko Simatovic. The Prosecution refers the Chamber as additional
23 examples to P456, P457, P458, and for corroboration to P1080. A former
24 SDG member confirmed during his testimony that Rajo Bozovic received his
25 payment from the same place that Arkan's Men did. This assertion is
1 borne out on the payment records. I refer the Chamber to P465, a DB
2 payment record that Bozovic and other DB members, as well as numerous SDG
3 members are listed. This payment record is also signed by
4 Franko Simatovic.
5 One witness had was a former member of Arkan's SDG and who
6 participated in the Pauk joint operation in Velika Kladusa gave evidence
7 that Legija addressed Frenki "with the title, boss." P59 is a video of a
8 parade in Bijeljina at which Karadzic thanks and congratulates Arkan and
9 his SDG. This public display of praise and approval from the RS
10 President Karadzic took place just following the attack on Sanski Most.
11 The discriminatory intent is clear from both words and actions.
12 The DB provided communication and ensured the reliability of the
13 paths of communication between Frenki and Arkan as JCE members. The DB
14 created a direct telephone line from the Erdut camp, which Arkan used as
15 his base, as well as a direct radio link from Arkan's office in Belgrade
16 to the Erdut camp. I refer the Chamber to P1615, 1616, and 1619. Arkan
17 visited Frenki in his office for meetings frequently during the time from
18 the end of 1994 into the summer of 1995. I refer the Chamber to P1619,
19 P1615, and to the confidential evidence table at F13. For additional
20 evidence corroborating Arkan's co-ordination with the DB, I refer the
21 Chamber to the confidential evidence table at F14, and F15.
22 P1192 is a report from a DB operative from Novi Sad regarding the
23 activities of Arkan in the territory of Eastern Slavonia, Baranja, and
24 Western Srem where Arkan's Erdut training centre was located. The
25 document explains that following the fall of the western part of the RSK
1 in August 1995, the MUP of Serbia sent members of the SVK, who had fled
2 the FRY to Arkan's training centre in Erdut. There, these members of the
3 SVK were trained for five to ten days in Arkan's training centre and
4 subsequently sent to the front line. The intelligence source reports
5 that "Arkan is in" -- Your Honours, I'm conscious of the time, I have
6 about five minutes left. I've truly tried to trim it back and Mr. Groome
7 has three minutes. I apologise.
8 JUDGE ORIE: I saw Mr. Groome is last on the list. What does
9 that mean? Mr. Groome.
10 MS. MARCUS: That means that Mr. Groome will be delivering a few
11 minutes of conclusions.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I need two minutes, really not more, for
13 procedural matters. Ms. Marcus, you said five minutes, a couple of more
14 minutes for Mr. Groome, I expect you to finish at 10 minutes to 2.00, if
15 the interpreters and others assisting us would have no major problems
16 with that. I don't hear yet of major problems, let's proceed as quickly
17 as possible, not by speeding up.
18 MS. MARCUS: Thank you, Your Honour.
19 In this document, P1192, Arkan announced that his task was to
20 "immediately establish peace, order and strict discipline among
21 civilians. Two to three civilians are to be killed. That specifically
22 applied to the village of Sodelovci, in order to cause fear among the
24 Just as in Pauk and in Trnovo, in Sanski Most the Serbian MUP
25 provided multiple licence plates and ensured movement across borders. A
1 witness corroborated this, explaining that the MUP Serbian licence plates
2 were authentic and issued by the MUP of Serbia to the SDG. I refer the
3 Chamber to the confidential evidence table at F16.
4 An example of the benefit of multiple licence plates and
5 facilitation to cross borders occurred on the occasion of the filming of
6 the video, P59, of the parade in Bijeljina. Prior to this event, a call
7 was placed to the Serbian MUP on a direct emergency telephone line which
8 had been provided to the SDG by the MUP authorities. That call to the
9 Serbian MUP facilitated Arkan's movement across the border into Bosnia
10 from Serbia across the Raca crossing. I refer the Chamber to the
11 confidential evidence table at F17.
12 Just as in Velika Kladusa, in Trnovo, and now in Sanski Most, the
13 accused participated in the implementation of the common criminal plan
14 and designed and ordered the crimes charged through the same pattern of
15 mechanisms which as high level MUP officials in a JCE network they were
16 uniquely placed to provide. Co-ordination and deployment; visits to the
17 field, in person or via agents; ammunition and weapons; transportation
18 buses from Serbia; training; ensuring border crossings; multiple licence
19 plates; direct salary and per diem payments; a variety of uniforms;
20 communication through radio and telephone; and other logistical support
21 just as Milosevic said, Jovica will resolve the logistical problems.
22 I will conclude with some excerpts from General Ratko Mladic's
23 diary. First is Exhibit P2543, quoting General Gvero as saying, "The
24 municipality of Sanski Most is controlled by many wearing Arkan's
1 General Milovanovic at the same meeting is noted by Mladic as
3 "300 Arkan's volunteers arrived and were put into the RS MUP.
4 They were reportedly meant to be behind the lines and arrest all those
5 who are fleeing from the front."
6 In an entry just a few days later, the 29th of September, 1995,
7 Mladic records President Karadzic as saying:
8 "Jovica Stanisic is angry about something. He gave 300 of his
9 men and the US is begrudging us for having advertised Arkan."
10 And finally in notes taken of a meeting involving General Perisic
11 and the accused Jovica Stanisic on the 30th of September, 1995,
12 General Mladic quotes Jovica Stanisic as saying:
13 "Arkan is embedded there, we sent 400 people. As far as I have
14 been informed, this helped at Sanski Most and Novi Grad."
15 Your Honours, I will now turn the floor over to Mr. Groome.
16 Thank you.
17 MR. GROOME: Your Honours, I had one observation that I believe
18 will be equally appropriate in sur-rebuttal, so I will just say at this
19 stage that this completes the Prosecution's submissions on each of the
20 major areas of the indictment. It is the Prosecution's position that
21 each individual body of evidence presented to you today, as sections C
22 through F, individually establishes a basis upon which Mr. Simatovic's
23 application should be denied. Taken together, the Prosecution has
24 clearly met its burden at this stage of the proceedings. With that,
25 Your Honour, we conclude our submissions. I would ask that the
1 PowerPoint and table of confidential exhibits be assigned Exhibit numbers
2 and marked for identification. Thank you.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you Mr. Groome. I just asked Madam Registrar
4 whether they had been uploaded, she had not received an answer to that
6 MS. MARCUS: Your Honours, they will be uploaded as soon as
8 JUDGE ORIE: Now, I notice that of course the confidential, the
9 table of confidential evidence should be marked for identification
10 confidentially. How about the slides? Apart from 88 and 89, perhaps,
11 but ...
12 MS. MARCUS: Right, those are the two, yes, Your Honour, those
13 are the two that would have to be under seal, those two slides.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but are you not -- do you want to have them
15 marked for identification individually or are you uploading one series
16 without 88 and 89 and then in addition to that, one consisting of 88 and
18 MS. MARCUS: That's a good suggestion, Your Honour. We will
19 upload one version without those two slides and then as Your Honour sees
20 fit -- that one can be public.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And then the two remaining slides in a
22 separate --
23 MS. MARCUS: Separate document, yes.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, could you already perhaps preassign
25 numbers. The first for the series of slides without slides 88 and 89.
1 THE REGISTRAR: This would be P2973, Your Honours.
2 JUDGE ORIE: And that would be public. Then slides 88 and 89
3 would receive number ... ?
4 THE REGISTRAR: Number P2974, Your Honours.
5 JUDGE ORIE: And then finally the table of references to
6 confidential evidence would receive?
7 THE REGISTRAR: Number P2975, Your Honours.
8 JUDGE ORIE: And that would also be confidential, therefore under
10 One very quick question, the Simatovic Defence has filed a
11 request for certification to appeal the Scheduling Order and a decision
12 on Defence requests for adjustment of Scheduling Order of the 16th of
13 February. Does the Stanisic Defence want to respond or to make
14 submissions on that request?
15 MR. JORDASH: No, thank you.
16 JUDGE ORIE: And may I take it that the Prosecution wishes to do
18 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE ORIE: And could we have an expedited filing.
20 MR. GROOME: End of the week suit the Chamber?
21 [Trial Chamber confers]
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, end of the week would be then the time-limits
23 on which we have agreed by now. Yes. Then, there being no other
24 procedural matters on my agenda, we adjourn for the day and we'll resume
25 and hear further submissions tomorrow, Tuesday, the 12th of April,
1 quarter past 2.00 in this same Courtroom II.
2 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.55 p.m.
3 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 12th day of April,
4 2011 at 2.15 p.m.