1 Wednesday, 15 June 2011
2 [Stanisic Defence Opening Statement]
3 [Open session]
4 [The accused entered court]
5 --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Good morning to everyone. Madam Registrar, would
7 you please call the case.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Good morning, Your Honours. This is case
9 IT-03-69-T, the Prosecutor versus Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
11 We're here this morning to hear the opening statement, but
12 exceptionally I'd like to invite the Stanisic Defence to -- to present
13 itself since we have a new member on the team.
14 MR. JORDASH: Introducing Mr. Scott Martin as the co-counsel for
15 Mr. Stanisic, and of course others that you're very familiar with sit
16 around me. I think also, though, you haven't been introduced to
17 Ms. Dobrota who is our legal assistant.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you very much. Mr. Martin, especially for you
19 a welcome in this courtroom. The Stanisic Defence went through some
20 difficult times as has been discussed in court, and your arrival
21 certainly will improve that situation.
22 MR. MARTIN: Thank you.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Petrovic, I do not know whether that's the
24 reason why Mr. Bakrac is not present today, so one more on the other
25 bench, one less for you, but welcome to you as well.
1 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, thank you. I do
2 believe that that negative scenario will not come true. Mr. Bakrac will
3 be joining us in the course of the day and we'll be a complete team.
4 Thank you.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I take it that he has important things to do
6 at this moment.
7 We are here today to hear the delayed opening statement of the
8 Stanisic Defence. Mr. Jordash, are you ready to present that statement?
9 MR. JORDASH: Your Honours, I am.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
11 MR. JORDASH: Your Honours will, I hope, have a book in front of
12 you. Many of those exhibits referred to within our confidential exhibit,
13 and so we have not produced slides to go on the screen.
14 The Prosecution allege that Mr. Stanisic acted in concert with a
15 variety of civilian and non-civilian officials and groups from April 1991
16 to 31st of December, 1995 to forcibly remove the majority of non-Serbs
17 from large areas of Croatia and Bosnia through the commission of the
18 crimes alleged in the indictment.
19 The Prosecution bring the case, and they must prove it. The
20 Defence case will demonstrate that the Prosecution case fails to convince
21 and justice demands that Mr. Stanisic be acquitted of all charges. The
22 Prosecution case rests upon rumour, mythology, exaggeration, and outright
23 fabrication. To find Mr. Stanisic guilty pursuant to this joint criminal
24 enterprise or to find that he contributed to any of the crimes alleged
25 would be to strain the elements of the modes of liability and turn them
1 into instruments for attributing guilt by association. The Prosecution
2 invites you to hold Mr. Stanisic responsible not for what he did, not
3 even for what the Serbian DB did, but for what the whole of the Serbian
4 MUP did. We urge you to reject the invitation.
5 THE INTERPRETER: The counsel is invited to read more slowly for
6 the sake of the interpreters. Thank you.
7 MR. JORDASH: I beg your pardon.
8 In short, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that
9 there is a sufficient link between Mr. Stanisic and these crimes, and I
10 emphasise sufficient. The Defence case will establish that there is no
11 sufficient link. The evidence is just not there.
12 This is not to argue that the case advanced against Mr. Stanisic
13 is not seductive or that without explanation it doesn't cast suspicion.
14 We accept that there are explanations that are due and the Defence case
15 will provide them. Explanations rooted in context and common since, not
16 the broad brushstrokes that have been used to mask the fundamental flaws
17 in the Prosecution case. A proper analysis of Mr. Stanisic's acts and
18 conduct in the context in which they took place and the chaos in which he
19 operated will expose those flaws. Evidence giving rise to mere suspicion
20 is evidence that fails to amount to guilt.
21 The deceptive premise of the Prosecution case is that
22 Mr. Stanisic is responsible for the actions of all those associated with
23 or employed by the Serbian MUP or DB, no matter the nature of that
24 association or the activity pursued. It is simply not enough to suggest
25 that Mr. Stanisic, his employees, operatives, or associates participated
1 in the war or even that those associated in some loose way with the DB
2 committed crimes or acted in furtherance of a criminal purpose.
3 The Prosecution case is an expedient one. At the heart of it
4 lies the false premise that Mr. Stanisic was omnipresent and omnipotent
5 and could control thousands of people and bend them to his will. The
6 indictment does not allege superior responsibility. That omission is a
7 clear acknowledgement that the Prosecution cannot prove that Mr. Stanisic
8 had effective control, not even over Mr. Simatovic. Yet the case
9 advanced does little but present employer/employee relations as
10 dispositive of Mr. Stanisic's guilt. It's a theory designed to
11 compensate for the lack of evidence.
12 Mr. Stanisic must have intended the crimes. He must be found to
13 have significantly contributed to the common criminal plan. The ICTY has
14 made clear that to hold a member of a JCE responsible for crimes
15 committed by nonmembers of the enterprise, it has to be shown -- it has
16 to be shown that the crime can be imputed to one member of the joint
17 criminal enterprise and that this member, when using the perpetrator,
18 acted in accordance with the common plan. The existence of this link is
19 a matter to be assessed on a case-by-case basis. So the fact that
20 Mr. Stanisic knew or had friendly relations with individuals such as
21 Karadzic or, at times, Martic, or Ilija -- Or Ilija Kojic or
22 Radovan Kostic or others involved in setting up Serbian structures is
23 plainly not enough, nor that some of these men and others were employed
24 as operatives or reserve forces within the DB or even at some of Arkan's
25 Men or perhaps other undesirable characters were employed on a temporary
1 basis within the DB. And I use the term "employed" in a loose sense.
2 The legal requirement I've outlined are particularly important in
3 this case because of the nature of the work of the Serbian DB or, for
4 that matter, any state security. As Your Honours will see from slide 1,
5 the core task of the DB was to collect evidence by activity that
6 threatened the constitutional order of the republic. It achieved this
7 goal by using operatives to gather information from a network of
8 associates or sources. Of course, those operatives or those sources
9 could attempt to do this from a cosy armchair in front of the fire at
10 home, but that would defeat the purpose. Operatives and sources had to
11 be close to the events, the events that impacted upon state security.
12 Their associates or sources must be those who were even more proximate to
13 the events and may, in fact, be criminals themselves.
14 The case against Mr. Stanisic, as the Defence will demonstrate,
15 is built on obscuring this central fact. We submit the Prosecution
16 theory is analogous to a prosecuting authority prosecuting a police
17 officer who went undercover in an organisation suspected of committing
18 crime to collect information and then prosecuting the officer's -- and
19 then prosecuting the officer's superior for committing a crime, and then
20 relying on the actual criminals as witnesses in his subsequent trial.
21 If I may give a short example. We know that Ilija Kojic worked
22 as an operative for the Serbian DB. We know that witnesses such as
23 JF-030 said that Kojic went to Belgrade and reported directly to
24 Stanisic, but there has been no evidence that during the period between
25 1991 and 1995 Kojic imposed himself on the SBWS government using his
1 employment for the DB as authority to achieve any criminal purpose. On
2 the contrary. As JF-034 confirmed, the government of the SBWS worked by
3 majority vote and it had no contacts with the DB Serbia in 1991/1992.
4 The Defence case will show that DB operatives were employed in the main
5 for the limited purpose of gathering intelligence. The Prosecution
6 invite you to use that role to infer that Mr. Stanisic procured these
8 The Stanisic Defence will be divided into four parts. The first
9 part, as Your Honours can see from slide 2, is the work and structure of
10 the DB. The first part is critical. It will lay out the basic structure
11 of the DB and its discrete place within the Serbian MUP. The witnesses
12 will explain how the basic structures were centres within Serbia and
13 administrations within Belgrade. It will explain how the centres
14 collected information and supplied it to the administrations, how the
15 chiefs of the administrations were supposed to supply that information to
16 the assistants or to the deputy or the chief. Only very important
17 information would reach the chief, and only then if the deputy saw fit to
18 provide that information.
19 The witnesses will explain the basic employment structure within
20 the DB and how each administration had delegated authority to recruit new
21 employees or staff or obtain logistics and how each were supplied
22 directly from the 8th administration.
23 The Prosecution have studiously avoided delving too deeply into
24 these topics for good reason. To explain how the DB worked and the
25 responsibilities that each type of worker had and the systems of
1 delegated responsibilities would undermine the theory that Mr. Stanisic
2 is responsible for every employee, every temporary worker, every source,
3 every hanger-on, and every supply of logistics used or distributed within
4 the service.
5 The proposition that Mr. Stanisic is responsible for employing
6 every individual engaged at any time by the DB is about as convincing as
7 expecting the President of the ICTY to know who is employed at the ICTY
8 at any time, the precise nature of their tasks, and also to be
9 responsible for their misbehaviour whilst on mission.
10 Slide 3, we move to the work and structure of the DB. As
11 discussed, the DB witnesses will explain the core work of the DB. It
12 involved counter -- it involved primarily counter-intelligence. The DB
13 was not a police service. Its core duties were not ordinary crime
14 prevention or controlling border crossings. Its core duties was
15 counter-intelligence. At best, it had around 2.000 or so employees and
16 most of these were support staff, not trained operatives. It would be
17 impossible to have done what the Prosecution claim it did. This was the
18 work of the public security, whose numbers were in excess of 15.000.
19 Under Milosevic, these numbers grew as Badza was promoted above Stanisic
20 and as he, not the accused, became the number-one man.
21 The first accused's persistent pursuit of Operation Tomson,
22 designed to disable and neutralise extremist groups within Serbia, may
23 well have put many extremists out of action and saved hundreds if not
24 thousands of Serbian and non-Serbian lives. This evidence is not to be
25 reduced to mere mitigation. As the DB witnesses will attest, it is a
1 powerful manifestation of Stanisic's state of mind. These sober and
2 careful professionals will confirm Mr. Stanisic's non-ethnocentric
3 approach to his work and the difficulties that had to be overcome by the
4 DB to take the action that it did. They -- they will confirm that the DB
5 under Stanisic took action within its jurisdiction in a difficult
6 political climate to prosecute all those who committed crimes against
7 civilians of all races and creeds within and outside of Serbia.
8 Mr. Theunens advanced a theory that the failure of the DB to
9 prevent paramilitary formation within Serbia was illustrative of
10 Mr. Stanisic's support for their criminal actions in Bosnia and Croatia.
11 Mr. Theunens's Partisan approach to his task was evident for all to see.
12 Operation Tomson escaped his notice.
13 The hundreds if not thousands of actions taken to try to disable
14 the paramilitaries is an eloquent illustration of the core task of the
15 Serbian DB and the accused's approach to his job. As slide 4
16 demonstrates, the paramilitaries were creative and the job was difficult.
17 Slide 5 shows the locations of the Serbian DB centres. The
18 centres near the border with Croatia and Bosnia were overwhelmed with
19 this work. The extremists were flooding across the border from the war
20 zones into Serbia. Hundreds of weapons were flooding into the country
21 and crime was rife. Seselj was agitating in the Serbian Assembly, and
22 the prospect of civil war in Serbia loomed large.
23 Mr. Stanisic had no interest in creating, organising, supplying,
24 and directing paramilitaries. His work was to dismantle them as and when
25 they returned to Serbia and threatened the constitutional order. The
1 Defence witnesses will explain the political and logistical environment
2 that hampered that work.
3 Your Honours will see at slide number 6 a meeting of the Supreme
4 Defence Council on the 31st of July, 1992. On page 15 of the exhibit, it
5 indicates that Arkan appears to be assisted by the Federal Secretariat of
6 the Interior. Your Honours will note the date, July of 1992, after many
7 of the crimes in Bosnia had been committed. The Prosecution attempt to
8 link Mr. Stanisic to Arkan and to those crimes.
9 Arkan had strong links with Bogdanovic, and of course the future
10 deputy minister of the MUP, Radovan Stojicic. The DB, as the Defence
11 will show, could not do anything about that. The Defence case will prove
12 that from 1991 to 1995, Mr. Stanisic had nothing whatsoever to do with
13 Arkan. Had he known that the men from Arkan's Tigers or Super Tigers had
14 been employed, even on a reserve force basis, he would have reacted and
15 prevented it, consistent with his practice of preventing the DB from
16 being tainted by SUP associations.
17 Moreover, as Arkan hid behind the federal SUP and committed
18 crimes in Zvornik in 1992, it was Stanisic who arrested the Vuckovic
19 brothers and prosecuted Dusko for those very same war crimes.
20 Mr. Stanisic personally insisted upon it. As the third Defence witness
21 will confirm, this was startling news within Serbia at the time, the
22 notion of prosecuting those who were fighting -- the notion of
23 prosecuting those who were fighting in Bosnia or Croatia was practically
24 unheard-of in Serbia at the time.
25 Mr. Stanisic, as the Defence case will demonstrate, was trying to
1 send a clear message to the Serbian paramilitaries in Bosnia and Croatia:
2 Commit crimes, and your time will also come.
3 Mr. Stanisic may therefore be forgiven for being insulted by the
4 links the Prosecution now try to make. JF-86 gave evidence that
5 Pavlovic, the commander of the TO of Zvornik, had a close relationship
6 with Mr. Stanisic's deputy, Milan Tepavcevic. Pavlovic came to the MUP
7 building apparently to meet Tepavcevic. JF-086 also testified that
8 Spasojevic would meet Tepavcevic at the MUP Serbia frequently, once every
9 week during the first two years of the war. Two local attempts to arrest
10 the members of the Yellow Wasp led by the Vukovic brothers failed because
11 Pavlovic signalled to them about their potential arrest and they were
12 able to escape. The Prosecution will invite you to infer that Tepavcevic
13 was acting at the behest of Stanisic in supporting Pavlovic who then,
14 himself, supported the Yellow Wasps.
15 In our submission, Mr. Stanisic's action against this
16 paramilitary group undermines that inference. It also undermines the
17 overall inference that the Prosecution want you to draw, which is this:
18 That Mr. Stanisic is responsible because his employees misbehaved or
19 committed crimes in the region or associated with criminals. Perhaps
20 Tepavcevic did behave in that way. Perhaps other subordinates in the DB
21 also acted in that way, but a contract of employment does not make you
22 responsible for the crimes of your employees when they act on a frolic of
23 their own.
24 Slide 7 is a continuation of this submission. At a time when
25 Serbian authorities were either in hiding or refusing to co-operate with
1 international justice, Mr. Stanisic was assisting in opening the
2 Srebrenica case in this Tribunal. As I understand the Prosecution's
3 theory concerning paragraph 60 and 61 of the indictment and the killings
4 of the Muslim men and boys from the Srebrenica enclave, they allege that
5 Mr. Stanisic contributed indirectly to those massacres. His delivery of
6 Erdemovic to The Hague and his willingness to assist with the opening of
7 the Srebrenica investigation exposes the falsity of that allegation.
8 The second part of the Defence slide 8 will deal with the
9 Prosecution's allegation that Mr. Stanisic contributed to the Croatian
10 crime base. The second part of the Defence will commence with
11 dismantling the allegations that suggest that Mr. Stanisic established
12 Golubic, that he established his own paramilitary group, that he
13 continued to organise, supply, and finance Serb forces to commit crimes
14 alleged in the indictment.
15 The Defence will show that rather than any significant
16 participation in any criminal purpose, the accused's participation in the
17 Krajina was minimal and directed in furtherance of preventing crime and
18 ensuring security for the people of the Krajina.
19 The Prosecution allegation starts with the suggestion that six
20 weeks after Milosevic gave the order for the creation of special units
21 tasked with protecting Serb interests outside of Serbia, Stanisic
22 established these units in the state security department of the Serbian
23 Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Stanisic and Simatovic established 25
24 training camps in pursuance of the joint criminal enterprise. The
25 Prosecution theory will be exposed as what it is. Had it been based on
1 fact or reality, the Prosecution would not, we submit, have struggled so
2 to define what their case is on these essential issues.
3 In the Prosecution's first pre-trial brief in 2004, the first Red
4 Berets were a discrete group, a select group of trainers from Golubic, a
5 clearly identifiable group, the nucleus of the unit which became the JSO.
6 This can be contrasted with the substantially more flexible theory that
7 was advanced through the opening speech, that the special units of the
8 Serbian DB would refer to themselves by several names such as JATD and
9 JSO, Arkan's Men, and Arkan's Tigers, Martic's men, Captain Dragan's
11 A very flexible theory designed to roll with the evidence as it
12 unfolds. The theory is based on the unit documentary which itself is
13 based on the Kula video ceremony. To build a case, we submit, on the
14 vain glorious rumblings of men emerging from civil war beating their
15 chests in demonstration of their prowess is bound to fail to capture the
16 truth of what happened.
17 It is clear that Golubic was set up and that a group emerged from
18 it known as the Knindzas. It -- it is common ground between the
19 Prosecution that this group -- between the Prosecution and the Defence
20 that this group did not stay together but separated into smaller groups
21 of men or individuals to assist in the war effort in Croatian Bosnia.
22 The Defence case will show that the notion that Stanisic had authority or
23 control over all of them at all times is, of course, a prosecutorial
24 fiction designed to hold him responsible for all their actions. Of
25 course, the accused Mr. Stanisic must take some responsibility for his
1 own present predicament given that nonsensical speech at Kula in 1996 or
2 1997. It is a demonstrable piece of fiction lifted from a bad Hollywood
3 movie but no one -- that no one but, perhaps, the Prosecution believes.
4 It's worth examining Mr. Simatovic's speech for a moment or two, as the
5 Defence will do.
6 Mr. Simatovic in the video marked as exhibit number P61 claimed
7 that the Second World War -- sorry, the second war service intelligence
8 administration, which was set up at the time, included a special team for
9 offensive and logistical support of the special operations unit.
10 Mr. Simatovic said from the 12th of October 1991 in battles with armed
11 Croatian police forces in the zones of Benkovac, Stari Gospic, Plitvice,
12 Glina, Kostajnica and others, the unit provided important support in the
13 liberation of all areas in the RSK. Mr. Simatovic claimed that around
14 5.000 soldiers were engaged in these battles and their actions were
15 co-ordinated by the command and an intelligence team from the 2nd
17 The Defence case will examine the Prosecution case and show that
18 that suggestion or those suggestions are almost wholly uncorroborated.
19 There is simply no evidence that there was a unit command from the DB and
20 an intelligence team from the 2nd Administration co-ordinating 5.000 men
21 in the Krajina. On the contrary, as the Prosecution's own evidence
22 suggests and the Defence evidence will corroborate, there was a unity of
23 command in the Krajina and it involved Martic's men being subordinated to
24 the JNA.
25 The Prosecution's Mladic diaries directly contradict those
1 exaggerated claims. They confirm precisely who was in charge, who was in
2 command, and who was responsible for the combat and the crimes in the
3 locations in the indictment. We have exhibited them. The Prosecution
4 elected not to.
5 For example, in regards to fighting in the SAO Krajina, Mladic
6 writes 65 ter 5596, I will find the exhibit number later, that:
7 "Soldiers of the headquarters administration are a disgrace.
8 They cannot distinguish who belongs to Martic and who belongs to Mladic."
9 He writes on P300 that he was issuing tasks - this is Mladic - to
10 the Territorial Defence Main Staff and the SUP of the SAOK. Where is
11 Simatovic in Mladic's diary during this critical period? If he or the DB
12 special unit were in command, why does Mladic not notice that?
13 As the Defence evidence will show through the testimony of
14 DST-34, DST-62, DST-31, and DST-43, the crimes alleged in the indictment
15 in the Krajina cannot be attributed to a unit command from the
16 intelligence administration and cannot be attributed to Mr. Stanisic. As
17 Mr. Stanisic said to me yesterday, "I hadn't even heard of Skabrnja."
18 Back to the Kula video. In the video, Mr. Simatovic claimed that
19 the DB created 26 training camps. The claim is nonsensical and will be
20 easily demonstrated to be so. He claimed, listing 21 training camps,
21 that the DB had created them and in order to service them, in 1992 the
22 unit, the special unit of the DB, began building and securing a network
23 of small airfields in Bosnia and Herzegovina and forming a combat
24 squadron. About a thousand combat reconnaissance, transport, and
25 humanitarian flights were made from the airfields in Bratunac, Skelani,
1 Sokolac, Rogatica, and others. According to Simatovic, those flights,
2 that combat squadron, remained undetected from NATO's sophisticated
4 It is obvious, we submit, that that could not be correct. The
5 most sophisticated military organisation in the world, thousands of
6 combat flights, combat squadron, and nobody notices.
7 The Defence case will invite Your Honours to closely examine the
8 Prosecution evidence. It is all there, we submit, in the Prosecution
9 case, and the Defence witnesses will explain and contextualise it.
10 Take, for example, Mr. Simatovic's suggestion that the special
11 unit built and secured an airfield in Skelani. Please see Exhibit P2104,
12 slide number 9. It is a military security report that outlines some
13 intelligence received confirming that there was a training camp organised
14 in Skelani directed by Pupovac. Indeed, P2872 confirms that Pupovac was,
15 in July 1991, a member of the Krajina sub-Special Purpose Unit. The
16 Prosecution evidence from JF-030 confirmed Pupovac had been one of
17 Captain Dragan's pupils.
18 If we turn to slide number 9, Prosecution Exhibit 2104, one can
19 see that the training camp alleged at Skelani was in fact small and in
20 fact consisted of a few sessions of firing practice and a couple of
21 tactical exercises. Food was provided by the army. There was another
22 training camp set up by a man called Neskovic, but it was only able to
23 attract a few youth.
24 This exhibit should be contrasted with P387, slide number 10.
25 It's a report concerning the Red Berets of the 17th of June, 1993,
1 authenticated by the Prosecution witness Milovanovic. The document notes
2 that the former 5th KVO of the Skelani Battalion was located in the
3 Skelani elementary school, the so-called Red Berets. They were refusing
4 to follow orders of the Skelani commander. More significantly, the
5 report notes that these men, whoever they were, agreed to join the OB and
6 then will continue during -- doing security. They had agreed to assist
7 to secure the new airport in Skelani with 16 men and continued to secure
8 the crossing, a source of income. This is what, it seems, was the
9 reality at Skelani. The so-called Red Berets, if they can indeed be
10 linked to the DB, agreed to assist to secure the new airport. The DB had
11 nothing to do, it seems, with building that airport, only with securing
12 it with a few men.
13 The -- the truth is, and that's what will be demonstrated during
14 the Defence case, is that the Kula speech was a fantasy. The VRS built
15 an airfield in Skelani. Ex-members of the Krajina SUP were given the job
16 to secure it in order to bring them into the military command. These
17 were volunteers causing trouble, nothing to do with the DB, and that
18 airfield referred to by Mr. Simatovic had nothing to do with
19 Mr. Stanisic.
20 The Defence will show that the training allegedly conducted by
21 the Serbian DB and particularly the so-called special unit has been
22 grossly exaggerated and wrongly attributed to Mr. Stanisic and the DB.
23 There is a significant difference between taking over a field and
24 conducting a few lessons in tactical manoeuvres and the type of
25 investment required for a camp such as Golubic. As DST-42, DST-40,
1 DST-38, and any other person with military experience will explain, to
2 create and supply and maintain a training camp takes time, money, and
3 supplies. It cannot be done without people knowing about it.
4 The evidence of training bases adduced by the Prosecution is
5 evidence in large part of ad hoc exercising camps. Even if they could be
6 attributed to Mr. Stanisic, they could not be a significant contribution
7 to any criminal purpose.
8 We have heard much of Fruska Gora, and it's worth examining the
9 evidence to illustrate the point. As described by JF-031, in the five
10 months that he was there, 40 to 50 people were trained. That is not a
11 training camp. It's an exercising field. It doesn't require resources.
12 It doesn't require supplies, and Mr. Stanisic did not supply it.
13 We do not submit that there were no training camps. We do not
14 suggest that none of the resources of the DB went towards any of the
15 training camps. We do not suggest that no person employed in the
16 permanent or reserve forces of the Serbian MUP or DB was involved. There
17 may have been training of some sort at Korenica or Pajzos or Brcko, but
18 the Defence will establish that these alleged training camps, if they
19 existed, were small and did not require resources. They did not act as
20 the mainstay of the JNA recruits. They did not act as the mainstay of
21 the VRS recruits or any other military organisation.
22 As Witness JF-31 confirmed, the DB did not ship logistics to
23 Fruska Gora. Excuse me. Other than training at Mount Tara in 1993, or
24 the training of Fikret Abdic men during Pauk, Mr. Stanisic had absolutely
25 nothing to do with these exercising camps.
1 The second part of the Defence case will demonstrate the
2 following: First, that there was no criminal purpose in the Krajina
3 until at the very earliest August or September of 1991. As the Krajina
4 witnesses will confirm, the Serbian citizenry were for good objective
5 reasons genuinely frightened for their security. They demanded that the
6 local Krajina authorities provide defensive protection against Croatian
7 authority aggression. That some of the fears were highly subjective does
8 not undermine that demand. That the likes of Martic, but especially
9 Babic, were irresponsible and failed to provide good leadership in this
10 time of crisis is not proof of acting in concert to remove non-Serbs. A
11 political ambition to link or unify Serbian majority territories in the
12 Krajina to Serbia is not a criminal purpose unless it is intended to be
13 achieved through the commission of crimes.
14 Golubic created in late 1990, developing through into 1991,
15 emerged from these fears and security concerns. It was designed to
16 create police officers capable of protecting the citizenry in this new
17 militarised and violent environment.
18 As confirmed by Prosecution witness JF-039, and to be
19 corroborated by the Defence witnesses D6 -- DST-62, DST-31, and DST-43,
20 Golubic was not aimed at the commission of crime but designed to enable
21 the TO and the police to better conduct their ordinary tasks. The
22 Prosecution claim that any criminal purpose existed prior to August 1991
23 ignores the reality on the ground and is aimed at implicating
24 Mr. Stanisic through Mr. Simatovic. Indeed, as the Defence evidence will
25 show, up until early September 1991, the JNA were acting as a neutral
1 party and were acting as a buffer between the ragtag militia on both
2 sides. If there was a criminal purpose prior to that time, it didn't
3 involve the JNA, nor by extension did it involve Milosevic, nor on the
4 Prosecution case the accused, Mr. Stanisic, who, according to the
5 Prosecution, was Milosevic's right-hand man.
6 As the Defence case will show, the Serbian MUP as an institution
7 became involved in May of 1991. Not in the manner suggested by the
8 Prosecution. The Serbian MUP became involved as an institution to try to
9 prevent war and to try to prevent ethnically based fears boiling over
10 into hatred and violence. It's our submission that nobody was planning
11 at that stage to forcibly transfer any population or even to begin a war.
12 A multitude of reports and evidence to be adduced by the Defence
13 will corroborate this submission. Slide number 11 is an example. It is
14 a security report from the Serbian MUP reporting on the chaos in the
15 Krajina region in May of 1991. If clearly states that:
16 "We deem it necessary that the MUP of the Republic of Serbia,
17 through the federal SUP and the government of the Republic of Serbia
18 launch an initiative whereby the SFRY Presidency would establish that
19 conditions have been met for the application of Article 8 of the law on
20 the basis of the state security system and issue a decision to the effect
21 that security affairs in the territory of the Republic of Croatia are to
22 be directly organised and carried out by the federation, and importantly,
23 that joint forces of the federal SUP are to be formed in order to
24 protect, operate in threatened areas.
25 In other words, in May of 1991, the Serbian MUP was gearing up to
1 prevent crimes and protect all the citizenry of Croatia.
2 Slide number 12 demonstrates the same point, indicating that the
3 Serbian MUP was interested in preventing war and ethnic strife.
4 Slide number 13 demonstrates the challenges posed at that time.
5 Second, the Defence case will demonstrate that Mr. Stanisic did
6 not contribute to any criminal purpose in the Krajina before or after
7 August of 1991. The DB was not the mainstay of financial or logistical
8 support for the Krajina or the SBWS. Mr. Stanisic had nothing to do with
9 the setting up of Golubic. Mr. Simatovic was not acting at
10 Mr. Stanisic's or the DB's behest except in intelligence-gathering
11 matters. Mr. Simatovic was not organising the training in Golubic.
12 Mr. Stanisic had nothing to do with supplying the Knindzas or any member
13 of Martic's police during their combat or in furtherance of their combat
14 in the locations specified in the indictment.
15 The Defence case will show through the evidence of Witness 35,
16 34, 62, and 31, that on the 4th of January, 1991, the Executive Council
17 of the SAO Krajina established the regional secretariat for internal
18 affairs in Knin. On the same date, Martic was appointed the secretary.
19 On the 5th of January, 1991, the Executive Council informed the
20 MUP of Croatia that the establishment of the SUP revoked the authority of
21 the MUP of Croatia in the SAO Krajina. It is our case that through this
22 period and through this process, the SAO Krajina Serbian leadership
23 reached out to all parts of the Serbian government and also through
24 personal contacts in order to obtain financial, logistical, and military
1 Slides 14 to 16 demonstrate that assistance came from many and
2 varied sources.
3 The truth of JF-039's claim that Stanisic ordered the setting up
4 of police stations in the Krajina in January of 1991 and paid for
5 everything, and the money came to the Krajina in cash, delivered in
6 military transport bags by Simatovic, has to be seen in the light of
7 those requests for assistance and that assistance being provided.
8 Had Mr. Stanisic been involved in the way suggested, had he been
9 so intimate with Martic, there would be evidence that Martic approached
10 Stanisic for funds at a later stage. Instead, as P1552, on slide 16,
11 demonstrates, Martic requested financial assistance to Milosevic,
12 Sainovic, and Sokolovic, for the salaries of his policemen. Why did he
13 not write to Stanisic if Stanisic had been delivering cash in the bags
14 described by the Prosecution case?
15 In any event, we submit that the Prosecution case fails to
16 consider the reality. The Prosecution's interpretation of the JCE fails
17 to discern contributions by Serbian institutions designed to enhance the
18 security of the SAO Krajina and Serbian areas in general from
19 contributions designed to fuel war and hatred or advance the alleged
20 criminal purpose.
21 Ordinary Serbian citizens in the SAO Krajina deserved better
22 leaders, but their failure to elect them did not mean they waived their
23 right to security. That had to be provided through a functioning
24 criminal justice system. The Serbian government including the federal
25 and Serbian MUP were right to respond to requests for assistance. Of
1 course that response must be carefully analysed to see what that
2 assistance was and how it was intended, but as the Defence will show,
3 there were genuine objectively based security concerns.
4 The Prosecution invitation to treat all assistance to the Krajina
5 as intended to further a criminal purpose must be resisted. That is
6 clear, we submit, from the Prosecution's own case, and it will be made
7 clearer during the Defence case.
8 JF-035 and others were making operational decisions about how the
9 police stations, the new police stations set by the Serbian authorities,
10 would operate. JF-035 indicated that it was the SAO SBWS's police duty,
11 and I quote, "to protect all citizens living there, those who behaved
12 properly, who did nothing wrong, and lived normally." Your Honours will
13 find that on the 28th of June, pages 6011 to 6012.
14 There was a need for the newly established police stations to be
15 equipped with supplies, and that included some weapons, in order to able
16 to be a fully functioning police force to fight the crimes committed by
17 criminals who were running amok. Therefore, the MUP of Serbia was
18 approached and responded. They had relevant expertise and, of course,
19 some supplies. Nonetheless, this material assistance both in the Knin
20 Krajina and the SBWS did not involve the Serbian DB. It is the Defence
21 case that most of this assistance had absolutely nothing to do with
22 Mr. Stanisic.
23 The Defence --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, if you could find a suitable moment
25 within the next five minutes to have a break, it would be appreciated.
1 MR. JORDASH: Your Honour, yes.
2 The Defence evidence will show that Mr. Stanisic's main role was
3 on the mainland protecting the Republic of Serbia.
4 If Your Honours needed to repair a car, you go to a mechanic.
5 When Martic, Babic, Hadzic et al. needed to set up police stations, they
6 went to the federal SUP and the public security section of the republican
7 SUP. The Prosecution case obscures the fact that the Serbian MUP
8 consisted of two parts.
9 Slides 17 to 19 provides some examples which will be corroborated
10 during the Defence case. Mr. Stanisic and the DB were not involved
11 except in the most minimal of ways and only then for legitimate security
13 As the Prosecution evidence shows and the Defence evidence will
14 support, Martic had no expectation at any time that Stanisic would
15 provide him or his police with any supplies of any kind. On the
16 contrary, Martic approached Stanisic on an extremely limited basis. He
17 knew where Stanisic's expertise was based. Slide number 20, Prosecution
18 Exhibit P1556 provides an eloquent demonstration of what Martic sought
19 from Mr. Stanisic.
20 Your Honour, that's a convenient moment.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We'll take a break. I have, however, one
22 question before we do so, for you.
23 Yesterday, we discussed the expert report to be produced by
24 Mr. Browne, and it is described as various aspects of. You have relied
25 several times on the Mladic diaries today. Does that mean that there's
1 no basic challenge to the authenticity of it?
2 MR. JORDASH: There is no basic challenge to the fact that Mladic
3 wrote the diary.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You say perhaps when he did that, that that's
5 another matter, and these are perhaps matters -- because it was unclear
6 to us what the various aspects would be, but I now understand that
7 there's no basic challenge that these documents were produced by
8 Mr. Mladic and that's the position of the Stanisic Defence.
9 MR. JORDASH: Yes. And what we will submit is that in relation
10 to where Mladic implicates others, they should be approached with extreme
11 caution. In relation to where Babic -- excuse me, where Mladic lays out
12 more contextual evidence, Your Honours can more easily rely upon that.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You'd say we have to be very cautious in
14 interpreting or in accepting the truthfulness of -- of parts of what he
15 has written down.
16 MR. JORDASH: Yes.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And could I just perhaps check with you,
18 Mr. Petrovic. Does the Simatovic Defence take a similar position in
19 relation to these diaries?
20 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, in principle, yes.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for those answers.
22 We'll have a break, and we will resume at a quarter to 11.00.
23 --- Recess taken at 10.16 a.m.
24 --- On resuming at 10.52 a.m.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, if you're ready to proceed.
1 MR. JORDASH: Thank you, Your Honour.
2 If I can return to completing the submissions on the Croatian
3 crime base.
4 Evidence will be led to show the limited role expected and played
5 by the DB. This evidence will contradict the ridiculous theory advanced
6 through Babic and others that allege that Mr. Stanisic not only managed
7 to take over the Serbian MUP but also subverted the whole of the SAO
8 Krajina leadership and military machine and bent them to his will. It is
9 alleged that there was a so-called parallel structure with Milosevic at
10 the head, followed by Stanisic, with the TO of Krajina, the volunteer
11 units, and Martic's Police or the militia of Krajina along with certain
12 presidents of the municipalities. That case rests upon the fiction that
13 in 1991 onwards, Mr. Stanisic had untrammeled power, that he was
14 Mr. Milosevic's right-hand man.
15 As stated at paragraph 45 of the Prosecution's pre-trial brief,
16 Mr. -- sorry, Minister Sokolovic was just a figurehead and Mr. Stanisic
17 was the de facto minister of the interior. However, as the Defence case
18 will show, that alleged state of affairs appears to have escaped
19 everyone's notice at that time.
20 Bogdanovic was the minister of interior of Serbia until June
21 1991. He, like his successor Sokolovic, was a high-ranking functionary
22 in the Communist Party and thereafter in Milosevic's SPS party. Stanisic
23 was not even a member of either party. When he became chief of the
24 service, in order to prevent the service from becoming a political tool,
25 he actively discouraged anyone from joining any political party.
1 Mr. Stanisic was subject to a politically motivated investigation in
2 1991. Bogdanovic and Junackovic tried to remove him. It was only his
3 professionalism and respect from within the service that may have saved
5 Your Honours will recall P630, an intercepted telephone
6 conversation between Karadzic and Kertes on the 24th of June, 1991.
7 Kertes claimed to Karadzic that Jovica had been given carte blanche, and
8 the Prosecution allege, that is carte blanche to supply weapons to
9 Bosnia. The Defence case will demonstrate that that is not correct, but
10 in any event, as the Defence will advance, there could not conceivably
11 have been a criminal purpose in existence in Bosnia in June of 1991, but
12 the point I'd make at this stage is this: Kertes was right about one
13 thing. Jovica's hands were tied and he was driving -- that is Junackovic
14 was driving Mr. Stanisic crazy. It's a reference to Mr. Stanisic being
15 subject to an internal investigative commission, politically motivated by
16 members of Milosevic's political party.
17 It doesn't make sense, we submit, to suggest that Stanisic was
18 the most powerful man in the MUP and yet his hands were tied by
20 The Supreme Defence Council minutes from the FRY during 1992 make
21 it crystal clear that Mr. Stanisic, firstly, did not take part in any of
22 that decision-making. Regular attendees of the Supreme Defence Council
23 were members of the federal administration. Various leaders of the
24 former Yugoslavia, as well as senior members of the military. The
25 Supreme Defence Council minutes show the Serbian and Montenegrin
1 contribution to the wars in Croatia and Bosnia. They show that the
2 decisions were primarily dictated from this decision-making body. I
3 shall return to these minutes later on, but the Serbian MUP was not
4 invited. Mr. Sokolovic attended once on the 7th of August, 1992. From
5 1992 through to the end of 1995, Mr. Stanisic, this omnipresent and
6 omnipotent chief, is mentioned once in the context of making an ordinary
7 arrest. His service barely warrants a mention. We have placed these
8 minutes on our exhibit list. It's an eloquent demonstration of the
9 inaccuracy of the Prosecution case against Mr. Stanisic and the DB that
10 the Prosecution did not do the same.
11 As the Defence case will show, all the documentary evidence from
12 Supreme Defence Council minutes to the 108 -- 88th session of the
13 Presidency, the SFRY, on the 25th of February, 1992, to the various
14 personal diaries that have emerged, all fail to place Stanisic at the
15 centre of the action.
16 The Prosecution case impliedly accepts this. That is why they
17 allege he was a channel of communication. It means that he was not a
18 decision-maker. Of course, as the various exhibits we will adduce will
19 show, the political and military leadership required no channel of
20 communication. There are tens and tens of intercepts reflecting direct
21 contacts between the politicians and the military. Given the role and
22 importance that is sought to be attributed to Mr. Stanisic, it is
23 instructive how little he appears.
24 Mr. Milosevic required no channel of communication to speak to
25 Karadzic. As the intercepts will show, at times he was on the phone
1 directly with him almost every day.
2 Slide 21: The Mladic diaries are a little interesting. As
3 Prosecution Exhibit 2529 shows, on the 2nd of July, 1993, Mladic has a
4 meeting with Sainovic, Badza, Karadzic, Krajisnik, Stanisic and others.
5 Sainovic introduces Stanisic and Badza as the men who carry out things,
6 an interesting description that the Prosecution rely upon as an
7 indication of Mr. Stanisic's importance. However, the more interesting
8 fact has been obscured. The diaries start on the 29th of June, 1991,
9 just before Mladic became a colonel and Chief of Staff of the 9th Corps
10 of the JNA in Knin, and before he moved to being the commander of the
11 Main Staff of the VRS on the 12th of May, 1992.
12 The Stanisic that appears before this -- before this 2nd of July,
13 1993, meeting is Mico Stanisic, and Your Honours can see the entries
14 which relate to him. Even if that is disputed by the Prosecution, the
15 entries indicate a Stanisic who is relatively unimportant.
16 The whole war had raged in Croatia in 1991 and in Bosnia in 1992,
17 and the first accused, Milosevic's right-hand man, doesn't appear in
18 Mladic's diaries. Witnesses DST-34, 62, 31, and 43 - our fourth, fifth,
19 sixth, and seventh witnesses - all occupied significant roles within the
20 Krajina either on a permanent or temporary basis. Their political or
21 professional roles meant that they were close to the federal state or the
22 RSK leadership, including Martic and Babic. They did not see or hear of
23 Stanisic's involvement with weapon supplies, the Krajina government, with
24 Dragan, with Golubic, with the police of the Krajina, or their training.
25 They, unlike certain prosecution witnesses, like Mr. Lazarevic, did not
1 request or receive relocation packages to comfortable countries overseas.
2 They have no reason to lie to assist Mr. Stanisic.
3 Witnesses DST-35, 44, 63, and 30 will confirm that the same is
4 true in the SBWS. 35, 44, and 63 were all busy professionals working
5 along the border of Serbia with Croatia. Their jobs meant they were
6 operating along the border between Serbia and the SBWS or inside SBWS
7 itself. The witnesses will confirm the role of the Vojvodina SUP and the
8 Serbian MUP in trying to protect the border, prevent the illegal
9 transport of weapons from Serbia into Croatia and back into Serbia. The
10 witnesses will confirm their role in setting up police stations within
11 the SBWS.
12 It's our submission that these police forces were largely a force
13 for good, preventing crimes and bringing law and order in a region in
14 desperate need of security. DST-35 will describe how this was undermined
15 by the minister of the interior, Bogdanovic, who for personal reasons
16 made sure that Arkan could travel freely with weapons into the SBWS
17 region. DST-44 will describe the friendship between his superior Badza
18 and Arkan. That friendship prevented other more responsible authorities
19 from taking restraining action.
20 It is Badza, if he was alive, and Bogdanovic who should be
21 sitting where Mr. Stanisic is. It is them who provided Arkan and others
22 with support.
23 DST-44 will confirm the collaboration between the Vojvodina SUP,
24 the Serbian DB, and the Serbian public security in action Srem designed
25 to protect non-Serbs along the border. All these witnesses will confirm
1 that the DB's role was limited to gathering intelligence. The Serbian DB
2 did not even assist in the establishment of the RSK DB in 1992.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, your speed of speech is slowly going
5 MR. JORDASH: I beg your pardon. I'm just becoming conscious of
6 the time, but I'll slow it down, Your Honour.
7 The Prosecution cannot prove, we submit, and the Defence case
8 will show that Stanisic played a role in the formation and sustenance of
9 the RSK. In the absence of convincing evidence, they fall back on the
10 mythology of the Red Berets that allegedly began with Mr. Stanisic taking
11 Captain Dragan to Knin. The Defence case will refute that allegation.
12 It is based on rumour, speculation, and Captain Dragan's boastful ways.
13 If we can return for a moment to P1050, the diary of Glisic, the
14 secretary to General Simovic, the Ministry of Defence, written sometime
15 in 1992. As the evidence will show, there is a theme that's developed
16 through the documents. Once again -- once again, Mr. Stanisic does not
17 get star billing. On the contrary, he doesn't even make an appearance in
18 Simovic's office, and he's not even discussed. Your Honours will be
19 invited to read the various portions, they can be found at 1D2616 to
20 1D2627. The entries read like a who's who of the moment, from Milosevic,
21 Babic, Hadzic, Arkan, Kertes, General Kadijevic, General Adzic,
22 Admiral Brovet, retired General Pekic, and of course the infamous Dragan.
23 The only man of apparent significance who does not make an appearance is
24 Mr. Stanisic.
25 The Prosecution make much of P992, slide 25 -- I beg your pardon,
1 slide 33. Dragan, of course, claimed in a letter that was sent to the
2 command of the TO on the 8th of November, 1991, that he had an obligation
3 towards the state security of the Republic of Serbia and his activities
4 had to be fully in accordance with that service.
5 Putting aside the vagueness of that claim, as with all Dragan's
6 and prosecutorial claims, we invite Your Honours to put it to the test.
7 As the exhibit shows, P992, Captain Dragan was disgruntled about
8 Simovic's request that he become an ordinary captain of the TO. At the
9 time he wrote the letter, he was famous throughout Serbia, far beyond his
10 actual achievements. He wanted to be the commander of a new
11 Serbian Army.
12 As the Defence evidence will show, he thought that by claiming
13 obligations towards the state security that Simovic -- I've just been
14 helpfully reminded. It's slide 25 we're looking at, beg your pardon. He
15 wanted to be the commander of a new Serbian Army. He thought that by
16 claiming obligations towards the state security, Simovic would allow that
17 to happen. Simovic having refused, Dragan launched a virulent press
18 campaign against Simovic and the Ministry of Defence, making all sorts of
19 outlandish claims about the DB. Your Honours will see from slide 26
20 another outlandish claim by Dragan concerning the Serbian Special Police
22 The Defence case will explain the Red Beret story. The evidence
23 will strip away the mythology. We agree that the story starts with
24 Dragan and the selection of certain recruits from those who trained at
25 Golubic. The unit consisted of instructors and some recruits who had
1 already been trained at Golubic. The name of the group was the Knindzas.
2 The unit under the command of Captain Dragan in autumn of 1991
3 engaged in military operations, mostly in the direction of the Plitvice
4 lakes. The Knindzas were operating under Martic, because the Knindzas
5 were part of the police.
6 Second in command was Dragan. The third in command was
7 Crnogorac. They participated in the operation in Plitvice. The goal of
8 the operation was to push the Croatian forces out.
9 Mr. Simatovic was not in command of the unit. They received
10 orders from Martic. They were not part of the DB, as the Mladic diaries
11 we referred to earlier suggest. They were indistinguishable from the RSK
12 police, because they were the RSK police.
13 At some point in time in autumn of 1991, the Knindzas were
14 ordered to assist the JNA in capturing Ilok. They based themselves in
15 Fruska Gora. That 25- to 30-strong group included Crnogorac and
16 Raja Bozovic.
17 As the Defence evidence will show, principally through DST-42, it
18 was around this time that Mr. Stanisic became involved with the group.
19 He negotiated to use some of the Knindzas to assist with Serbian state
20 security duties. Ilok is just a few kilometres distance from Pajzos
21 where an intelligence outpost of the DB service was located. It
22 consisted of an electronic surveillance installation and men from the
23 Knindzas were used to secure it. Members of this security detail did not
24 take part in any military operations on behalf of the Serbian DB.
25 Your Honours may recall the evidence of Prosecution witness
1 JF-031, who recalled Mr. Stanisic visiting Fruska Gora in October of 1991
2 or thereabouts. Mr. Stanisic visited with his young son who was
3 clutching a magazine with the Knindzas on the front. The Knindzas were
4 famous, and his son wanted to see this now famous group. Had Fruska Gora
5 been a proper military base, would Stanisic have brought his young son?
6 Stanisic had in mind that this group might be useful to the state
7 security of Serbia for a limited purpose. As was confirmed by JF-031,
8 Stanisic emphasised that the men to be used for Pajzos were not to be
9 used for military operations. Panic was persuaded that the men should
10 not be used for operations in Vukovar. We rely upon that evidence. It
11 is a colourful demonstration of Mr. Stanisic's intent. Whilst the JNA,
12 the TO, volunteers including Arkan, were hell bent on destroying Vukovar,
13 Stanisic refused to be involved or to allow himself to be drawn into that
15 A short while later, a group of men including Bozovic entered
16 Pajzos and began guarding it on behalf of the Serbian MUP. They remained
17 part of the -- they remained part of the RSK police and were commanded by
18 Martic. They were on loan to the DB of Serbia for that and only that
19 task. The remainder of the Knindzas were assigned by Martic elsewhere
20 and had nothing to do with the Serbian DB.
21 It is perhaps possible that had Mr. Stanisic's role with these
22 men ended there with the subcontracting of a limited number for this
23 limited purpose, he may not have found himself as an accused in this
24 trial. However, in early 1992, a terrorist group from Croatia
25 infiltrated into Serbia and had to be hunted down and captured in the
1 Serbian town of Apatin. Mr. Stanisic came with Badza it assess how to
2 handle the situation. The SAJ, the public security anti-terrorist unit,
3 was temporarily out of action. A decision was made to use a small group
4 of the Knindzas, including Raja Bozovic to catch these terrorists who
5 were eventually handed over in a prisoner exchange to the Croatians.
6 Mr. Simatovic noted this fact in his Kula speech. He dated that
7 this was one of the most important tasks undertaken by the Serbian
8 special unit, capturing the terrorists from Apatin. He got the date
9 wrong and placed that occurrence in 1993, but nonetheless, it's a curious
10 aspect of his speech that despite co-ordinating 5.000 men in Krajina,
11 setting up 26 training camps, supervising thousands of flights
12 transporting essential military and humanitarian equipment, active
13 participation in six operations in Croatia and Bosnia, Mr. Simatovic
14 should describe the capture of 20 or so terrorists as one of the main
15 successes of the special unit of the DB. It was one of the most
16 important, because the remainder was just not true.
17 Following that operation, part of that group captured terrorists
18 from Apatin misbehaved and had a conflict with the police in Apatin. One
19 of them was assaulted by Bozovic. Stanisic ordered that the group should
20 no longer be used by the DB, and Bozovic was sent a clear message he was
21 no longer welcome in Serbia.
22 Around this time, in February 1992, the UN forces had moved into
23 Croatia pursuant to the Vance Peace Plan. The men who had been members
24 of the Knindzas were no longer together as one group. There were members
25 in Knin, members in Korenica. Zika Crnogorac went to Slavonia and turned
1 up in Brcko. Captain Dragan had some of his other men in SAO Baranja.
2 These were not offshoots of the DB's special unit but ex-members of the
3 Knindzas operating as professional volunteers.
4 The Defence will show that Mr. Stanisic had nothing to do with
5 dispatching these men to Bosnia or anywhere else. The allegation is
6 based on the theory of a case that once again implies a level of
7 authority and planning that simply wasn't there. There is powerful
8 evidence, and we rely upon it and we'll corroborate it, that Mr. Stanisic
9 had nothing to do with dispatching Bozovic to Bosnia.
10 As Exhibit 392, Mladic's diary, clearly shows, Bozovic, a
11 professional volunteer, received a request from the commander of the
12 1st Krajina Corps in Bosnia, General Talic, to report to the Doboj
13 centre. The chief of the centre was Andrija Bijocevic. 15 or 20 men
14 were transferred with Bozovic. In our submission the Mladic diary 392 is
15 proof positive that Mr. Stanisic did not arrange for Bozovic to go to
16 Doboj. He didn't arrange for Bozovic. He didn't arrange for any of the
17 men to go anywhere.
18 That is the story of the genesis of the Red Berets which will be
19 outlined in the Defence case. It's the story of men who informed a group
20 that became famous. Their fame was enhanced by claims of their
21 connections to the DB. The journalists and the Prosecution did the rest.
22 As DST-40 will confirm, there existed a Serbian MUP decision
23 dated the 4th of August, 1993, to form an anti-terrorist unit. The
24 evidence will clearly show that this was the formation of a new unit. It
25 required planning and organisation. It wouldn't have been needed if the
1 Prosecution theory is correct.
2 DST-40 will testify to the efforts made to create this unit. He
3 will confirm and elaborate that the formation of such a unit is a
4 difficult endeavour. It takes years to set up a professional unit.
5 DST-40 will confirm the DB's committed attempts to employ appropriate
7 The concept of reserve forces is important in this case. The MUP
8 Serbia was legally entitled, in fact obligated, to employ reserve forces
9 when they were needed to prevent activities aimed at endangering the
10 security of the country.
11 The Defence case will show that Mr. Stanisic had no role in
12 employing or paying reserve forces. He had no role in the employment of
13 persons who the Prosecution claim to be key members of the special unit
14 of the Serbian DB. That certain undesirable men may have found their way
15 onto the list of reserve forces, that is the temporary forces, is
16 unsurprising in the chaos of war. However, it has nothing to do with
17 Mr. Stanisic, in the same way that the employment of temporary staff in
18 this court has nothing to do with the President of the ICTY.
19 Slide number 28 shows the type of employment decisions that
20 Mr. Stanisic made. The Defence case will show that these themselves were
21 barely decisions. There was a commission at the centre of the 8th
22 administration, the administration which dealt with logistics and
23 supplies. The commission made the selection of employees, and
24 Mr. Stanisic would sign those decisions. In the absence of a good
25 obvious reason not to, Mr. Stanisic was effectively rubber-stamping other
2 That members of the Knindzas or those they associated with, or
3 reserve forces, would claim to be members of the DB is again
4 unsurprising. Find me a bar in the world full of men with military
5 experience, and I will find you a man who claims to have been a man of
6 special forces. Find me a man who fought alongside any of the
7 ex-Knindzas during the Balkans war, and I will find you a member of the
8 Red Berets. It's a convenient prosecutorial theory, but it's a poor way
9 we submit to attribute individual culpability for international crimes.
10 Part three of the Defence case will deal with the alleged
11 contribution of the accused to the Bosnia and Herzegovina crime base. It
12 will set out to demonstrate three central propositions:
13 First, that there is absolutely no reliable evidence that
14 supports the existence of a criminal purpose in Bosnia before April of
16 Second, that had the Serbian political or military authorities
17 from Serbia participated in any criminal purpose after that date, which
18 is doubtful, they had most certainly withdrawn from it by late 1993 at
19 the latest. The Defence will show that the Serbian military and
20 political authorities withdrew any meaningful co-operation from the
21 Bosnian Serb leadership at around this time. There was no shared
22 concerted action in furtherance of any criminal purpose.
23 The third part of this section of the Defence will show that
24 Mr. Stanisic did not at any time share any criminal purpose, nor did he
25 contribute in any way.
1 Dealing with the first point, there was no criminal purpose in
2 Bosnia and no evidence to suggest otherwise until at least April 1992.
3 The Prosecution case establishes that in late August 1991, the
4 SDS leadership within Bosnia began to consider the creation of separate
5 Serb territory with a view to enabling Serbs to remain in Yugoslavia.
6 This plan envisaged the institution of separate structures, including the
7 police and the military and the political arenas.
8 The Prosecution case also establishes that on the 19th or 20th of
9 December, 1991, the document which became known as the implementing
10 instructions for Variant A and B was introduced by Karadzic to a meeting
11 of high-level SDS representatives.
12 On the 16th Republika Srpska Assembly session, Karadzic outlined
13 the Bosnian Serb six strategic objectives. I hope Your Honours will
14 forgive me from reading a section of the Krajisnik judgement which --
15 upon which we will rely, paragraphs 995 and 996:
16 "It would be incorrect to place these goals on a pedestal ... for
17 in the final analysis they are anodyne statements, severing as official
18 state policy and even qualifying for publication in the Bosnian Serb
19 Republic's 'Official Gazette.' If one is inclined to find in them
20 insidious hidden meanings it's because of the context and the events that
21 followed, and an anachronistic reading of the May goals is not only
22 inadvisable, it misses the point.
23 "Much more important in relation to actual policy was the
24 feedback loop of co-ordination and support that existed between Bosnian
25 Serb forces on the ground and the central leadership. Takeovers,
1 killings, detention, abuse, expulsions ..." and so on, "had begun in the
2 territories ... before the pronouncement of the strategic goals on the
3 12th of May, 1992. These incidents were launched in early ... 1992 ..."
4 The Defence will rely upon this to assert that there could not
5 have been any shared criminal purpose until this time.
6 A plurality of persons acting in concert in pursuit of a common
7 purpose, whilst we do not accept that the Serbian political and military
8 leadership were part of any plurality acting in pursuit of any criminal
9 purpose within Bosnia, the Defence will demonstrate that following the
10 Bosnian Serbs' rejection of peace endeavours, any co-operation or
11 collaboration between the two became minimal. It became, from the
12 Serbian -- from Serbia proper, intended only to prevent war and a
13 burgeoning refugee crisis in Serbia.
14 The framework of the defence we shall present will rest on the
15 discussions and decisions that took place in the Supreme Defence Council
16 of the remnants of the SFRY. The disenchantment with the extremists from
17 the Bosnian Serb leadership began in 1992, and by late 1994, co-operation
18 that might imply a shared criminal goal and criminal intent had long
19 since ceased.
20 Slide 30 is an excerpt from the Supreme Defence Council minutes
21 in June of 1993. It is clear from reading these minutes that Serbian
22 authorities, the leadership who were part of the Supreme Defence Council,
23 had enough. There was still some assistance as the Supreme Defence
24 Council minutes reflect. However, this did not last long.
25 As slide 31 demonstrates, and of course we invite Your Honours to
1 read the whole of the minutes, the FRY decided to sever relationships
2 with its -- leadership of VRS. It reiterated that it should wield
3 influence on the Republika Srpska because peace was in its common and
4 most important national and state interests. It recognised that if
5 Banja Luka was bombed, there would be a hundred thousand refugees
6 flooding into Serbia.
7 Slide 32 and 33 are more of the same. This nation, Serbia, shall
8 not be slaughtered because of three hot-heads from Pale.
9 By the 27th of September, 1994, the time of the 25th Session, the
10 Supreme Defence Council most certainly had had enough. However, the
11 decisions to withdraw aid and assistance were not straightforward. The
12 security of the Bosnian Serbs was also a matter of security within
13 Serbia. This is discussed at length in the Supreme Defence Council
15 Slide 34 reflects on the 20 -- I beg your pardon. On the 2nd of
16 November, 1994, the -- the Supreme Defence Council recognised the
17 reality. They recognised that whilst not wanting to assist with the
18 Bosnian Serbs' territorial objectives, there was a need to prevent the
19 war flooding into Serbia. There was a need to return refugees to the
20 Bihac region. These were the discussions which were the basis for Pauk.
21 These were the discussions which were the basis for Mr. Stanisic's
22 involvement in Pauk.
23 Slide 35, of huge relevance, we submit, for the Prosecution case
24 in 1995. The Supreme Defence Council recognised a real threat if the
25 Bosnian Serbs were defeated. The security of Serbia was threatened.
1 Refugees and the crisis that would be caused were at the forefront of the
2 participants' minds.
3 The aforementioned Supreme Defence Council minutes and decisions
4 will be the framework of the Defence case relating to the Bosnian crime
5 base. The Defence evidence will show that there can be no doubt that any
6 shared criminal purpose had ended long before 1995. The assistance
7 offered in late 1994 onwards by Mr. Stanisic to Operation Pauk was not
8 motivated by any criminal intent but a genuine desire to bring the
9 leadership of the RSK to the peace table and to solve a genuine refugee
10 crisis in Bihac and to prevent a larger one in Serbia. The operations in
11 Trnovo and the operations in Banja Luka must be seen in this light. That
12 is why the Prosecution have struggled to explain the relevance of Pauk to
13 their joint criminal enterprise. The Prosecution's joint criminal
14 enterprise fails to distinguish lawful action in pursuant of lawful
15 objectives and war in pursuant of crime.
16 Mr. Stanisic, we submit, did not contribute to the Bosnian crime
17 base. The Defence will show that the accused did not contribute in any
18 way to the criminal purpose, if one existed, in Bosnia. As the Defence
19 will show, there is simply no reliable evidence. Mr. Mladic's crude
20 attempt to implicate Mr. Stanisic through a set of doctored diaries will
21 be exposed.
22 The Bosnian Serb MUP arose from an enactment on the 28th of
23 February, 1992, the Bosnian Serb Law on Internal Affairs. The Bosnian
24 Serb MUP was to handle security affairs on behalf of the government. We
25 accept that in the early days the Bosnian Serb MUP co-ordinated with and
1 was helped by the Republic of Serbia. Reports prepared by the federal
2 State Security Services in March 1992 confirm formal co-operation between
3 the federal SUP in Belgrade and the Bosnian SUP police. The Defence case
4 will prove that this co-ordination plan did not involve the Serbian DB.
5 It is powerful proof of Mr. Stanisic's state of mind that his service did
6 not assist the Bosnian MUP or DB. This is borne out by the Mladic
7 diaries, and even with the attempt to implicate Mr. Stanisic, they bear
8 witness to Mr. Stanisic's failure to assist.
9 As I've already outlined earlier, it is true that Stanisic
10 introduced a meeting with Mladic on the 13th of December, 1993, and
11 stated: "It is because of your initiative we are meeting to improve your
12 operational and tactical position and see about helping Serbia," but it
13 is also true that Stanisic did not say another word at that meeting,
14 according to Mladic. He was, in that instance, going through a
15 formality, merely introducing the meeting. The Defence will show that
16 neither he nor his service assisted the Bosnian Serbs.
17 The Defence case will show that the assistance to the Bosnian
18 Serbs came from other quarters. Slides 36 to 48 show a reflection and a
19 representative selection of where that assistance came from. These
20 exhibits show where that assistance came from.
21 Slide 48, Prosecution 65 ter 2351, a request sent to Stanisic
22 from the Republika Srpska MUP, 12th of May, 1995:
23 "Could your technical service please repair and service a mobile
24 400-watt shortwave communication centre, generate a unit and a vehicle.
25 Could you please also reconsider our earlier request for the necessary
1 technical equipment."
2 That, in June 1995 when Mr. Stanisic was supposed to be at the
3 height of his powers, is how the Republika Srpska MUP regards
4 Mr. Stanisic. Your Honours will note the "request to reconsider our
5 earlier request."
6 Mr. Stanisic did not form any co-operative relationship with the
7 Bosnian DB. That is why largely absent from the Mladic diaries. There
8 was an open conflict between his service and the Bosnian service.
9 Mr. Stanisic did not like General Mladic as Mr. Stanisic had declined to
10 become involved with Vukovar in late 1991. He wanted no part in attacks
11 on safe areas or the disgraceful bombing of civilian areas such as those
12 in Sarajevo and elsewhere.
13 This animosity turned to open conflict in June of 1995, when
14 Mr. Stanisic negotiated the release of the UNPROFOR hostages. It was
15 plain to Mr. Stanisic that he was not negotiating with a rational man.
16 Unfortunately but predictably, that lack of reason has not been
17 removed over the last 15 years. Despite fact that Mladic had ample
18 opportunity and every reason to do so over the last 15 years to doctor
19 his account, the Prosecution in this case proffer them without
20 reservation as truth. It will be interesting to see if that's the
21 position adopted during the prosecution of Mladic.
22 It is plain on their face, we submit, and the Defence case will
23 show through detailed evidence that they are self-serving when
24 implicating others. The massacres in Srebrenica appear not to have
25 occurred in the world outlined by Mr. Mladic.
1 The Defence case will show that the entries implicating Stanisic
2 barely make sense and will not be corroborated.
3 If I can return to the 2nd of July, 1993, meeting where Stanisic
4 is alleged to have said:
5 "The majority of what we need should be issued via the MUP of
6 Serbia. The centres should be Pale, Herzegovina, and Talic."
7 There is no evidence that the Serbian MUP set up centres in these
8 locations. There's no evidence that Talic is even a location but might
9 be a reference to General Talic. It is, however, quite telling, and the
10 Defence case will elaborate on this point, that at the end of the
11 meeting, Mladic takes only Sainovic's number, telephone number. Of
12 course, when one reads the Supreme Defence Council minutes and looks at
13 the remainder of exhibits, it is plain that neither Stanisic nor Badza
14 financed or supplied the VRS. The Serbian DB did not even support the RS
16 This is not to argue, and we will not argue it during our
17 defence, that the Serbian MUP, that is the public security, did not offer
18 assistance to the Bosnian Serbs, nor will the Defence suggest that there
19 were not individuals with the DB who did not -- who did -- who offered ad
20 hoc assistance to the Bosnian Serb forces. It is quite possible, for
21 example, as alleged by Prosecution witness JF-026, that the RS MUP
22 received aid in the form of uniforms and communication equipment from
23 police stations in Mali Zvornik and Loznica. It was, however, a constant
24 frustration of the Bosnian Serbs that the Serbian MUP did not provide
25 proper assistance. Whether that submission is correct or not, the
1 contributions offered by the Serbian MUP cannot be attributed to
2 Mr. Stanisic.
3 Had Mr. Stanisic been aware of any involvement of the DB
4 resources or personnel and the training of any forces, including those
5 that went to Bosanski Samac, he would have stopped it. We shall apply to
6 admit the testimony of the commander of the 17th Tactical Group, Nikolic,
7 and two men trained at that alleged Serbian DB camp, DST-68 and 57.
8 The training was organised by the JNA commander and the Federal
9 Secretariat for National Defence. The training lasted for only a few
10 days and involved, it follows, only minimal resources. In other words,
11 that and other training camps could exist without institutional support
12 by the DB. It could exist and did exist without Mr. Stanisic's
13 knowledge. It has nothing to do with him.
14 These men who I've referred to, the witnesses we will apply to
15 admit, gave evidence in the Simic trial that they were members of the RS
16 police or the RSK police. None of them claimed any connection to
17 Stanisic or to the mythological Red Berets. JF-047 who was recalled to
18 this court to deal with obvious inconsistencies perjured himself for
19 personal gain. As the Defence evidence will show, it was Mr. Stanisic's
20 service that arrested Lugar and Debeli in Serbia when they returned from
21 their exploits in Bosanski Samac. If Mr. Stanisic had been involved in
22 investing so much in training these elite forces, why would he have
23 supported their arrest upon their return to Serbia in 1992?
24 Your Honours, I have about ten minutes. Would Your Honours allow
25 an extra ten minutes, please?
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. You're well over the two hours now. At the
2 same time, I was informed, Mr. Groome, that there was a matter in
3 relation to protective measures which you would like to raise; is that
4 correctly understood?
5 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour. I estimate it would take about
6 five minutes.
7 JUDGE ORIE: It might even take a bit more to the extent that I'm
8 informed about the nature of the matter you wanted to raise.
9 Mr. Jordash, I was asking this because we usually have a break
10 after 75 minutes. We're now close to 70 minutes. I would suggest that
11 we take a break first, that you then have your additional ten minutes,
12 that we would then hear Mr. Groome --
13 MR. JORDASH: Thank you.
14 JUDGE ORIE: -- on the matter he would like to raise and that we
15 finish well in time.
16 MR. JORDASH: Thank you, Your Honour.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Well, you say you have ten minutes left. Then
18 apparently the slides are not equally -- equally distributed over the
19 time. You are claiming that even if you would take 12 or 13 minutes,
20 that, under the present circumstances, would not cause a great problem.
21 MR. JORDASH: Thank you.
22 JUDGE ORIE: We'll take a break. We'll resume at 12.30.
23 Mr. Jordash, you're expected not to finish any later than 10
24 minutes to 1.00, and then we'll hear the further submissions by
25 Mr. Groome.
1 --- Recess taken at 11.57 a.m.
2 --- On resuming at 12.32 p.m.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, please proceed.
4 MR. JORDASH: And so to move to a conclusion, the Defence case
5 will show that the Prosecution interpretation of this joint criminal
6 enterprise is but a blunt instrument. It fails to accurately define the
7 criminal purpose, it fails to identify when it may have began with any
8 precision, and it fails to distinguish Mr. Stanisic's actions from those
9 actions in furtherance of a criminal purpose. The operations at Tara,
10 the Drina operations, the operations at Pauk, and the operations in 1995
11 are an eloquent demonstration of that submission.
12 The evidence will show as we've outlined that these were
13 legitimate military operations. Of course, it was of concern and the
14 consequences were grave, that these operations involved certain
15 criminally disposed men. However, that does not make the essential
16 lawfulness of the military objectives unlawful or make them part of the
17 JCE alleged. Those who can be shown to be responsible for the sending of
18 Arkan and those who committed crimes have a case to answer, and those who
19 can be shown to be criminally responsible should pay the price. And the
20 Defence will demonstrate that Mr. Stanisic had nothing to do with the
21 choices which led to those crimes and nothing to do with the crimes.
22 As I've indicated, the story of the Red Berets is much more
23 straightforward. It's not even nearly as dramatic as the Prosecution
24 witnesses and some of the documentary evidence implies.
25 Some of the men who may have committed crimes may have been
1 employed temporarily by the DB, but that doesn't make them forever and a
2 day the responsibility of the DB or, particularly, of Mr. Stanisic. We
3 rely upon the fact that Mr. Stanisic had no role in choosing and
4 employing these reserve forces. Had he been able to micro-manage the
5 state security in the way suggested by the Prosecution case, then he
6 couldn't have fulfilled his essential duties.
7 It is tempting to reach for simplistic answers and coherent
8 stories, and the story of the Red Berets is one such tale. It is a
9 caricature description akin to a James Bond movie with Mr. Stanisic, the
10 caricature devil at the centre.
11 We submit that Mr. Stanisic and the Serbian MUP has been
12 demonised by the press, by the Serbian mythology, and lastly, now, by the
13 Prosecution witnesses. We submit that the evidence will show that he did
14 his best to create security within Serbia for those and all of those who
15 were endangered by the war. That is why his service became involved in
16 the operations towards the end of the war.
17 We submit that it is easy to point to sections of exhibits and
18 easy to take evidence out of context. The Defence will provide that
20 If I may just refer Your Honours to slides 51 to 61 -- sorry, 56
21 to 61. In some ways it's a microcosm of the role Mr. Stanisic played in
22 the Defence case we will prove. It relates to the period of the
23 Banja Luka operations. Mr. Stanisic, in slide 56, is clearly engaged in
24 trying to find the two pilots, French pilots, who have been taken hostage
25 by the hot-heads from Pale. Your Honours will see on slide 56 the view
1 of Mladic, that Jovica is looking for the pilots, and there is no doubt
2 that he does not like Slobo.
3 Your Honours will see from slide 57 that Stanisic is playing one
4 of the often games he was forced to play. Bluff and double bluff is the
5 role of an intelligence man, telling Mladic what he needed to tell in
6 order to find the French pilots, saying he was exposed and working
7 without the knowledge of Milosevic. And if we move further down slide
8 57, we see there that Mladic, presumably on information, presumably
9 having discussed with the VRS high command, notes that a team from the
10 Serbian DB has arrived. They are Filipovic and Bozovic. They arrived.
11 Bozovic was a member of the reserve forces. He was forever associated
12 with the DB from the early days. It's telling that these are the men
13 identified as belonging to the DB.
14 Three hundred Arkan's volunteers arrived. Mladic doesn't
15 associate them with the DB. If Mr. Stanisic had had this long-standing
16 arrangement and relationship with Arkan's Men, he would have known that
17 Arkan's volunteers were part of the team from the Serbian DB.
18 And we turn to slide 58, and can I ask, please, to just briefly
19 for P24 -- 2545 P1 to be put on the screen. The slide 58 has Stanisic
21 "There is no command there. Political conflicts, cities are
22 falling. Arkan is embedded there. We sent 400 people."
23 We dispute that Arkan is embedded there is precisely the right
24 interpretation. The right interpretation involves a meaning which
25 effectively says that Arkan put himself there. In any event, even if
1 Your Honours don't accept that, it is most telling that Jovica says in a
2 list of chaos, in a list of problems, there is no command there,
3 political conflicts, cities are falling, Arkan is there. Why does
4 Mr. Stanisic put that in a list of problems if he personally sent him
5 there? I mean, while Mr. Stanisic looks for the pilots.
6 If we look over the page to slide 60, Mladic's notebook entry of
7 the 3rd of October, 1995. Filipovic notes:
8 "Arkan's men are operating under the control of Pecanac."
9 And he expresses approval for that, and that's what the
10 Prosecution rely upon. They rely upon employees of the DB, themselves
11 forming individual relationships with the likes of Arkan and then
12 attributing that to Mr. Stanisic.
13 Bozovic, on slide 60, notes that:
14 "They came with a task," referring to the Serbian MUP, "a task
15 that they were aware of. It was agreed that the RS -- that they would
16 replace the RS police and the RS police would go to the forward defence
17 line. This was agreed with President Karadzic and General Milovanovic."
18 An illustration of what our defence is, because we submit that
19 the Banja Luka operations involved the Serbian MUP, and they involved the
20 Serbian MUP who sent men to replace the RS police who were being dragged
21 into the conflict, and the idea was that the Serbian MUP would replace
22 and conduct normal security duties. That was agreed with
23 President Karadzic and General Milovanovic.
24 And at the bottom of slide 60 Your Honours will see a reference
25 there to Jakovljevic:
1 "People are openly asking who brought Arkan and under whose
2 patronage they are doing this."
3 1995, it appears that no one at that time from the VRS high
4 command associated Arkan with Stanisic. If there was a glimmer of truth
5 in the Prosecution case, he would have been known as Arkan -- as
6 Stanisic's man. And meanwhile, Stanisic is looking for the pilots.
7 And then over the page to slide 61. Another demonstration of the
8 demonisation, we suggest, which has taken place in relation to the
9 Serbian MUP. Mladic notes he has a meeting with the inner circle of the
10 General Staff of the VRS, and he notes that already for four days no
11 resources have been coming from the FRY and the Serbian MUP has probably
12 put the border under its control after Arkan was chased away. So there
13 you have it. The Serbian MUP controlling and preventing Arkan from
14 working. And there you have it at the bottom of slide 21 [sic], Mladic
15 noting that they have a problem with the RS MUP after Arkan was chased
16 away, and Tomo Kovac Minister of the Interior does not accept the order
17 and use of the military police.
18 In other words, there's the association: Arkan was invited by
19 the RS MUP and prevented from returning by the Serbian MUP, and therein
20 lies the Prosecution case exposed.
21 And so finally, turning to Prosecution Exhibit P690, and the
22 Prosecution put some weight on this because it -- in reality it's one of
23 the very, very few comments from Mr. Stanisic which might be construed as
24 indicating support for any criminal enterprise.
25 We submit it is pre-war bravado. A proper analysis of that
1 discussion shows that the discussion revolves around a peace agreement
2 and the necessity for bringing people like Babic, extremists to the
3 negotiating table, and Stanisic using inflammatory language. It is not
4 an indication of his mens rea. It's an indication of pre-war bravado and
5 frustration that others will not accept peace. And if we go over the
6 page to line 63, the section missed out by the Prosecution where Stanisic
8 "If they want it, they'll have an all-out war."
9 "Yes, yes," says Karadzic.
10 Stanisic answers:
11 "Better do it like decent people."
12 And in our submission, that's what the Defence will show, that
13 Stanisic did it like a decent person, because as the witnesses will
14 confirm, he is a decent person. And whilst cities were falling and
15 whilst Arkan placed himself there, Stanisic was doing what he did, trying
16 to secure Serbia by rescuing the two pilots, trying to secure that peace
17 would come and that Serbia would not be dragged into the war, and that
18 will be the Defence case.
19 Thank you.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Jordash. Just ...
21 Mr. Bakrac and Mr. Petrovic, from yesterday's Pre-Defence
22 Conference, the Chamber understands that you're waiving your right to
23 make an opening statement at this stage of the proceedings. Mr. Groome
24 has expressed some concerns about compliance with Rule 65 ter (F). I
25 just want to emphasise that of course if you choose not to make an
1 opening statement, that that in itself does not mean that if there are
2 changes in the nature of the accused's Defence, then of course it would
3 be appropriate to report that, and I take it that Mr. Groome will keep a
4 close eye on how you will proceed during the Stanisic Defence case and
5 the Simatovic Defence case to see whether the concern reaches levels
6 which ask for action. Until now, it was just an expression of concern.
7 MR. GROOME: That's correct, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Then I'd like to leave it to that at this moment.
9 I was informed that Mr. Groome would like to raise a certain
10 matter in relation to protective measures. Are there any other matters
11 the parties would like to raise?
12 Mr. Jordash, I see you are nodding no. I do not see any positive
13 response from the Simatovic Defence. Therefore, I take it that we only
14 have the one issue to be raised by Mr. Groome.
15 Mr. Groome, do we need to go into private session or is there no
16 need to do that?
17 MR. GROOME: I don't believe there's a need, Your Honour.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Then please proceed.
19 MR. GROOME: Thank you, Your Honour. And just so it's clear,
20 this is unrelated to the opening that we've just heard. It's a different
22 On the 27th of September, 2010, the Defence for Jovica Stanisic
23 sought access to all confidential inter partes materials in the case of
24 Prosecutor v. Simic et al. The Trial Chamber granted this request on the
25 24th of March, 2011, with certain limitations, specifically the Trial
1 Chamber's order required the extraction of several different categories
2 of material, and that is the -- the title of that decision is decision on
3 request of Jovica Stanisic for access to confidential materials in the
4 Krajisnik and Simic et al. cases.
5 Subsequently, the Defence for Franko Simatovic sought access to
6 the Simic material on the 2nd of June, 2011. In the process of drafting
7 the response to the Simatovic request, the Prosecution realised that the
8 Simatovic Defence was previously granted access to all inter partes
9 confidential materials in the Simic case on the 12th of April, 2005, and
10 this was a decision rendered by the Appeals Chamber under case IT-95-9-A,
11 entitled: "Decision on Defence Motion by Franko Simatovic for Access to
12 Transcripts, Exhibits, Documentary Evidence, and Motions Filed by the
13 Parties in the Simic et al. Case."
14 The respective Defence teams of the Simic case and the
15 Prosecution reviewed the material that the Appeals Chamber ordered to be
16 reviewed and informed the registry that there were no issues related to
17 protective measures or Rule 70 that needed to be resolved prior to giving
18 the Simatovic Defence access to this material. The materials were
19 provided on a CD to Mr. Jovanovic, then counsel for Mr. Simatovic on the
20 20th of July, 2005.
21 As a matter of fairness, the Prosecution considers that both the
22 Defence teams should have the same access to confidential materials in
23 the Simic case. Thus the Prosecution seeks this Trial Chamber -- or
24 requests this Trial Chamber to vary it's decision of March 2011 to --
25 to -- to bring that decision into conformity with the Appeals Chamber
1 decision of the 12th of April, 2005, and to order the Prosecution to turn
2 over the same materials that had been previously provided for the
3 Simatovic Defence. I provided courtesy copies of the Appeals Chamber
4 decision earlier today. If the Chamber grants this request, the
5 Prosecution has identified no additional confidential inter partes
6 materials subject to Rule 70, and we have located the CD that was
7 provided the Simatovic Defence in 2005 and would be able to disclose that
9 Thank you, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Any response for any observation?
11 MR. JORDASH: Only thank you.
12 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honours. Everything is as
13 indicated by the Prosecutor.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, of course. Apart from that you were asking on
15 the 2nd of June the same material you have received before, so if you say
16 let's leave it to that, let the Chamber write a decision on that, is --
17 if that's your intention, I cannot ensure you that we will follow that
19 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, my apologies. I
20 thought we wanted to wrap up soon. We weren't familiar with this.
21 That's why we weren't able to locate the detail about Mr. Jovanovic and
22 the decision dated back to 2005. So that's where the misunderstanding
23 stemmed from. And Mr. -- the filing concerning Mr. Jovanovic dated back
24 to 2003, and we weren't able to locate it.
25 JUDGE ORIE: I'm not blaming you for having difficulties in
1 finding the CD-ROM, although I would -- to the extent it has not been
2 done, I would perhaps advise you to go through the list of decisions in
3 this case so that you didn't miss one, which saves a lot of time in
4 writing new motions which cover the same -- the same subject matter. But
5 may I take it that what you just said is an oral withdrawal of the 2nd of
6 June motion? Is that how we have to understand your submission?
7 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. I was just about
8 to state that, but for the reasons I mentioned and the problems we had
9 with locating late Mr. Jovanovic's material, we kindly request the OTP to
10 hand this specific material over. That's the material we were already
11 given back in 2005, and we withdraw our application.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome.
13 MR. GROOME: Your Honour, that was provided if, Mr. Bakrac will
14 recall, in October of 2009. He requested that we redisclose all of the
15 material provided to Mr. Jovanovic, and this material was provided on the
16 hard drive that the Defence was given. And if he has any trouble
17 locating it, we will, of course, redisclose again.
18 JUDGE ORIE: That then seems to be resolved. If I -- Mr. Groome
19 will assist you in ensuring that you have this material available,
20 whether or not it's already in your possession, whether it's once or
21 twice in the possession of the Simatovic Defence. And you were about to
22 say that you would withdraw the motion which is now put on the record.
23 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. Mr. Groome and
24 our Defence team will work together to try and locate the material, and
25 for the record, I do withdraw our motion, yes.
1 JUDGE ORIE: That's on the record.
2 Then the matter itself, this Chamber -- Mr. Groome, you very much
3 emphasised the equal position for both Defence teams. Now, I'm not going
4 to comment on what happened in 2005. What I can do is to briefly comment
5 on what we did in 2011.
6 In 2011, this Chamber established that -- and in that respect
7 referring to submissions made by the Prosecution that there are
8 categories -- let me just have a look. That there are categories that
9 include remuneration, provisional release, fitness to stand trial,
10 Registry submissions of expert reports on health issues, notices of
11 nonattendance in court, modalities of trial, protective measures,
12 subpoenas, applications for video-conference links, as well as orders to
13 redact the public transcript and the public broadcast of a hearing.
14 We considered that the applicant had no forensic purpose for
15 access. Now, the question then arises, what is more important, equality
16 between the parties, one of the parties having received material or at
17 least I do not know whether it existed or -- but at least not -- where
18 access is not excluded from material which this Trial Chamber considered
19 to have no -- no forensic purpose. Now, what to do under those
20 circumstances, to restore equality by giving to the Stanisic Defence also
21 material which serves no forensic purpose? There was no request for a
22 certificate to appeal this decision in this respect. It was emphasised
23 by the Prosecution that this did not serve any forensic purpose.
24 Now, what is more important to restore equality by giving to the
25 Stanisic Defence material which we consider totally without purpose to
1 give it to them, or to say let's leave the inequality exist as it does
2 exist and not further add to access to materials which, in the view of
3 this Chamber, no access should have been given to at least the Appeals
4 Chamber at that time was very much concerned about the difference between
5 inter partes and ex parte material. Well, that's not an issue that
6 arises here.
7 So before the Chamber will decide, Mr. Jordash, are you
8 interested in receiving materials without a forensic purpose just in
9 order to restore equality in this respect?
10 MR. JORDASH: Well, I can probably speak on behalf of our
11 beleaguered case manager, and the answer's no.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, Mr. Groome, thinking about further
13 distribution of, I would say, material often with a -- some kind of a
14 privacy element in it and without a forensic purpose, would you - also in
15 view of the answer given by the Stanisic Defence - would you insist on
16 your motion, your oral motion, that the Chamber would override the
17 protective measures?
18 MR. GROOME: No, Your Honour. I'm not going to insist that the
19 Stanisic Defence accept something that they do not want. I guess one of
20 the considerations that prompted this was that I know that the two
21 Defence teams do have some co-operation, and if one had some material
22 that the other didn't, where we're setting up a situation where there
23 could be an inadvertent violation of an order to --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, I do understand that the Defence teams,
25 both Defence teams are so much short of time that they would certainly
1 not discuss matters which have no forensic purpose at all. That's at
2 least my expectation. Under the present circumstances, may I take it
3 that the Simatovic Defence, again I do not know whether there's any
4 provisional release material in the Simic -- you would not know either,
5 because you don't have that material, but would you, if you receive it,
6 would you please carefully look at whether there's any material of those
7 categories which we listed in the decision on the Stanisic motion for
8 access and to avoid to discuss that with the Stanisic Defence, because it
9 is in your hands. It is confidential material. It is not accessible to
10 the Stanisic Defence, and they have no problem with that. So if you
11 would be very strict on that, no errors or no mistakes will occur.
12 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. We'll proceed as
13 best we can, and we'll follow your guidance.
14 JUDGE ORIE: There's even another option which you could
15 consider. The decision of the Appeals Chamber is there, and this
16 Chamber, of course, is not in any way competent to even discuss this
17 decision, but in view of the Chamber's decision and in view of the access
18 granted to the Stanisic Defence, you could even invite Mr. Groome when
19 again supplying you with the information to leave out what is not given
20 to the Stanisic Defence and not insisting on having full disclosure of
21 these materials.
22 Mr. Groome, you have -- you must have two sets, the old one and
23 the new one, the limited Stanisic one. So I leave that entirely in your
24 hands whether you want to make such a request to the Prosecution or not.
25 It would at least restore in practical terms the equality.
1 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Groome, may I take it that from your earlier
3 observation that your oral application is withdrawn.
4 MR. GROOME: Yes, Your Honour.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Any other matter to be raised at this moment?
6 If not, I would like to inform the parties that they will soon know
7 whether next week Friday, which is, if I'm not mistaken, the 24th of
8 June, that you'll be informed about whether we'll hear the evidence in
9 the morning or the afternoon, and there is a fair chance that it would be
10 in the afternoon, and I put you already on notice before you make any
11 travel arrangements that there's a risk that it will be in the afternoon,
12 but you will be informed as soon as possible.
13 If there's no other matter, we stand adjourned, and we resume
14 Monday -- no, Tuesday, the 21st of June, at quarter past 2.00 in the
15 afternoon in Courtroom II, I take it.
16 Madam Registrar, could you confirm that? Yes, it is hereby
18 We stand adjourned.
19 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.08 p.m.,
20 to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 21st day
21 of June, 2011, at 2.15 p.m.