Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 11561

 1                           Wednesday, 15 June 2011

 2                           [Stanisic Defence Opening Statement]

 3                           [Open session]

 4                           [The accused entered court]

 5                           --- Upon commencing at 9.05 a.m.

 6             JUDGE ORIE:  Good morning to everyone.  Madam Registrar, would

 7     you please call the case.

 8             THE REGISTRAR:  Good morning, Your Honours.  This is case

 9     IT-03-69-T, the Prosecutor versus Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Madam Registrar.

11             We're here this morning to hear the opening statement, but

12     exceptionally I'd like to invite the Stanisic Defence to -- to present

13     itself since we have a new member on the team.

14             MR. JORDASH:  Introducing Mr. Scott Martin as the co-counsel for

15     Mr. Stanisic, and of course others that you're very familiar with sit

16     around me.  I think also, though, you haven't been introduced to

17     Ms. Dobrota who is our legal assistant.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you very much.  Mr. Martin, especially for you

19     a welcome in this courtroom.  The Stanisic Defence went through some

20     difficult times as has been discussed in court, and your arrival

21     certainly will improve that situation.

22             MR. MARTIN:  Thank you.

23             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Petrovic, I do not know whether that's the

24     reason why Mr. Bakrac is not present today, so one more on the other

25     bench, one less for you, but welcome to you as well.

Page 11562

 1             MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, thank you.  I do

 2     believe that that negative scenario will not come true.  Mr. Bakrac will

 3     be joining us in the course of the day and we'll be a complete team.

 4     Thank you.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  I take it that he has important things to do

 6     at this moment.

 7             We are here today to hear the delayed opening statement of the

 8     Stanisic Defence.  Mr. Jordash, are you ready to present that statement?

 9             MR. JORDASH:  Your Honours, I am.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Please proceed.

11             MR. JORDASH:  Your Honours will, I hope, have a book in front of

12     you.  Many of those exhibits referred to within our confidential exhibit,

13     and so we have not produced slides to go on the screen.

14             The Prosecution allege that Mr. Stanisic acted in concert with a

15     variety of civilian and non-civilian officials and groups from April 1991

16     to 31st of December, 1995 to forcibly remove the majority of non-Serbs

17     from large areas of Croatia and Bosnia through the commission of the

18     crimes alleged in the indictment.

19             The Prosecution bring the case, and they must prove it.  The

20     Defence case will demonstrate that the Prosecution case fails to convince

21     and justice demands that Mr. Stanisic be acquitted of all charges.  The

22     Prosecution case rests upon rumour, mythology, exaggeration, and outright

23     fabrication.  To find Mr. Stanisic guilty pursuant to this joint criminal

24     enterprise or to find that he contributed to any of the crimes alleged

25     would be to strain the elements of the modes of liability and turn them

Page 11563

 1     into instruments for attributing guilt by association.  The Prosecution

 2     invites you to hold Mr. Stanisic responsible not for what he did, not

 3     even for what the Serbian DB did, but for what the whole of the Serbian

 4     MUP did.  We urge you to reject the invitation.

 5             THE INTERPRETER:  The counsel is invited to read more slowly for

 6     the sake of the interpreters.  Thank you.

 7             MR. JORDASH:  I beg your pardon.

 8             In short, you must be satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that

 9     there is a sufficient link between Mr. Stanisic and these crimes, and I

10     emphasise sufficient.  The Defence case will establish that there is no

11     sufficient link.  The evidence is just not there.

12             This is not to argue that the case advanced against Mr. Stanisic

13     is not seductive or that without explanation it doesn't cast suspicion.

14     We accept that there are explanations that are due and the Defence case

15     will provide them.  Explanations rooted in context and common since, not

16     the broad brushstrokes that have been used to mask the fundamental flaws

17     in the Prosecution case.  A proper analysis of Mr. Stanisic's acts and

18     conduct in the context in which they took place and the chaos in which he

19     operated will expose those flaws.  Evidence giving rise to mere suspicion

20     is evidence that fails to amount to guilt.

21             The deceptive premise of the Prosecution case is that

22     Mr. Stanisic is responsible for the actions of all those associated with

23     or employed by the Serbian MUP or DB, no matter the nature of that

24     association or the activity pursued.  It is simply not enough to suggest

25     that Mr. Stanisic, his employees, operatives, or associates participated

Page 11564

 1     in the war or even that those associated in some loose way with the DB

 2     committed crimes or acted in furtherance of a criminal purpose.

 3             The Prosecution case is an expedient one.  At the heart of it

 4     lies the false premise that Mr. Stanisic was omnipresent and omnipotent

 5     and could control thousands of people and bend them to his will.  The

 6     indictment does not allege superior responsibility.  That omission is a

 7     clear acknowledgement that the Prosecution cannot prove that Mr. Stanisic

 8     had effective control, not even over Mr. Simatovic.  Yet the case

 9     advanced does little but present employer/employee relations as

10     dispositive of Mr. Stanisic's guilt.  It's a theory designed to

11     compensate for the lack of evidence.

12             Mr. Stanisic must have intended the crimes.  He must be found to

13     have significantly contributed to the common criminal plan.  The ICTY has

14     made clear that to hold a member of a JCE responsible for crimes

15     committed by nonmembers of the enterprise, it has to be shown -- it has

16     to be shown that the crime can be imputed to one member of the joint

17     criminal enterprise and that this member, when using the perpetrator,

18     acted in accordance with the common plan.  The existence of this link is

19     a matter to be assessed on a case-by-case basis.  So the fact that

20     Mr. Stanisic knew or had friendly relations with individuals such as

21     Karadzic or, at times, Martic, or Ilija -- Or Ilija Kojic or

22     Radovan Kostic or others involved in setting up Serbian structures is

23     plainly not enough, nor that some of these men and others were employed

24     as operatives or reserve forces within the DB or even at some of Arkan's

25     Men or perhaps other undesirable characters were employed on a temporary

Page 11565

 1     basis within the DB.  And I use the term "employed" in a loose sense.

 2             The legal requirement I've outlined are particularly important in

 3     this case because of the nature of the work of the Serbian DB or, for

 4     that matter, any state security.  As Your Honours will see from slide 1,

 5     the core task of the DB was to collect evidence by activity that

 6     threatened the constitutional order of the republic.  It achieved this

 7     goal by using operatives to gather information from a network of

 8     associates or sources.  Of course, those operatives or those sources

 9     could attempt to do this from a cosy armchair in front of the fire at

10     home, but that would defeat the purpose.  Operatives and sources had to

11     be close to the events, the events that impacted upon state security.

12     Their associates or sources must be those who were even more proximate to

13     the events and may, in fact, be criminals themselves.

14             The case against Mr. Stanisic, as the Defence will demonstrate,

15     is built on obscuring this central fact.  We submit the Prosecution

16     theory is analogous to a prosecuting authority prosecuting a police

17     officer who went undercover in an organisation suspected of committing

18     crime to collect information and then prosecuting the officer's -- and

19     then prosecuting the officer's superior for committing a crime, and then

20     relying on the actual criminals as witnesses in his subsequent trial.

21             If I may give a short example.  We know that Ilija Kojic worked

22     as an operative for the Serbian DB.  We know that witnesses such as

23     JF-030 said that Kojic went to Belgrade and reported directly to

24     Stanisic, but there has been no evidence that during the period between

25     1991 and 1995 Kojic imposed himself on the SBWS government using his

Page 11566

 1     employment for the DB as authority to achieve any criminal purpose.  On

 2     the contrary.  As JF-034 confirmed, the government of the SBWS worked by

 3     majority vote and it had no contacts with the DB Serbia in 1991/1992.

 4     The Defence case will show that DB operatives were employed in the main

 5     for the limited purpose of gathering intelligence.  The Prosecution

 6     invite you to use that role to infer that Mr. Stanisic procured these

 7     individuals.

 8             The Stanisic Defence will be divided into four parts.  The first

 9     part, as Your Honours can see from slide 2, is the work and structure of

10     the DB.  The first part is critical.  It will lay out the basic structure

11     of the DB and its discrete place within the Serbian MUP.  The witnesses

12     will explain how the basic structures were centres within Serbia and

13     administrations within Belgrade.  It will explain how the centres

14     collected information and supplied it to the administrations, how the

15     chiefs of the administrations were supposed to supply that information to

16     the assistants or to the deputy or the chief.  Only very important

17     information would reach the chief, and only then if the deputy saw fit to

18     provide that information.

19             The witnesses will explain the basic employment structure within

20     the DB and how each administration had delegated authority to recruit new

21     employees or staff or obtain logistics and how each were supplied

22     directly from the 8th administration.

23             The Prosecution have studiously avoided delving too deeply into

24     these topics for good reason.  To explain how the DB worked and the

25     responsibilities that each type of worker had and the systems of

Page 11567

 1     delegated responsibilities would undermine the theory that Mr. Stanisic

 2     is responsible for every employee, every temporary worker, every source,

 3     every hanger-on, and every supply of logistics used or distributed within

 4     the service.

 5             The proposition that Mr. Stanisic is responsible for employing

 6     every individual engaged at any time by the DB is about as convincing as

 7     expecting the President of the ICTY to know who is employed at the ICTY

 8     at any time, the precise nature of their tasks, and also to be

 9     responsible for their misbehaviour whilst on mission.

10             Slide 3, we move to the work and structure of the DB.  As

11     discussed, the DB witnesses will explain the core work of the DB.  It

12     involved counter -- it involved primarily counter-intelligence.  The DB

13     was not a police service.  Its core duties were not ordinary crime

14     prevention or controlling border crossings.  Its core duties was

15     counter-intelligence.  At best, it had around 2.000 or so employees and

16     most of these were support staff, not trained operatives.  It would be

17     impossible to have done what the Prosecution claim it did.  This was the

18     work of the public security, whose numbers were in excess of 15.000.

19     Under Milosevic, these numbers grew as Badza was promoted above Stanisic

20     and as he, not the accused, became the number-one man.

21             The first accused's persistent pursuit of Operation Tomson,

22     designed to disable and neutralise extremist groups within Serbia, may

23     well have put many extremists out of action and saved hundreds if not

24     thousands of Serbian and non-Serbian lives.  This evidence is not to be

25     reduced to mere mitigation.  As the DB witnesses will attest, it is a

Page 11568

 1     powerful manifestation of Stanisic's state of mind.  These sober and

 2     careful professionals will confirm Mr. Stanisic's non-ethnocentric

 3     approach to his work and the difficulties that had to be overcome by the

 4     DB to take the action that it did.  They -- they will confirm that the DB

 5     under Stanisic took action within its jurisdiction in a difficult

 6     political climate to prosecute all those who committed crimes against

 7     civilians of all races and creeds within and outside of Serbia.

 8             Mr. Theunens advanced a theory that the failure of the DB to

 9     prevent paramilitary formation within Serbia was illustrative of

10     Mr. Stanisic's support for their criminal actions in Bosnia and Croatia.

11     Mr. Theunens's Partisan approach to his task was evident for all to see.

12     Operation Tomson escaped his notice.

13             The hundreds if not thousands of actions taken to try to disable

14     the paramilitaries is an eloquent illustration of the core task of the

15     Serbian DB and the accused's approach to his job.  As slide 4

16     demonstrates, the paramilitaries were creative and the job was difficult.

17             Slide 5 shows the locations of the Serbian DB centres.  The

18     centres near the border with Croatia and Bosnia were overwhelmed with

19     this work.  The extremists were flooding across the border from the war

20     zones into Serbia.  Hundreds of weapons were flooding into the country

21     and crime was rife.  Seselj was agitating in the Serbian Assembly, and

22     the prospect of civil war in Serbia loomed large.

23             Mr. Stanisic had no interest in creating, organising, supplying,

24     and directing paramilitaries.  His work was to dismantle them as and when

25     they returned to Serbia and threatened the constitutional order.  The

Page 11569

 1     Defence witnesses will explain the political and logistical environment

 2     that hampered that work.

 3             Your Honours will see at slide number 6 a meeting of the Supreme

 4     Defence Council on the 31st of July, 1992.  On page 15 of the exhibit, it

 5     indicates that Arkan appears to be assisted by the Federal Secretariat of

 6     the Interior.  Your Honours will note the date, July of 1992, after many

 7     of the crimes in Bosnia had been committed.  The Prosecution attempt to

 8     link Mr. Stanisic to Arkan and to those crimes.

 9             Arkan had strong links with Bogdanovic, and of course the future

10     deputy minister of the MUP, Radovan Stojicic.  The DB, as the Defence

11     will show, could not do anything about that.  The Defence case will prove

12     that from 1991 to 1995, Mr. Stanisic had nothing whatsoever to do with

13     Arkan.  Had he known that the men from Arkan's Tigers or Super Tigers had

14     been employed, even on a reserve force basis, he would have reacted and

15     prevented it, consistent with his practice of preventing the DB from

16     being tainted by SUP associations.

17             Moreover, as Arkan hid behind the federal SUP and committed

18     crimes in Zvornik in 1992, it was Stanisic who arrested the Vuckovic

19     brothers and prosecuted Dusko for those very same war crimes.

20     Mr. Stanisic personally insisted upon it.  As the third Defence witness

21     will confirm, this was startling news within Serbia at the time, the

22     notion of prosecuting those who were fighting -- the notion of

23     prosecuting those who were fighting in Bosnia or Croatia was practically

24     unheard-of in Serbia at the time.

25             Mr. Stanisic, as the Defence case will demonstrate, was trying to

Page 11570

 1     send a clear message to the Serbian paramilitaries in Bosnia and Croatia:

 2     Commit crimes, and your time will also come.

 3             Mr. Stanisic may therefore be forgiven for being insulted by the

 4     links the Prosecution now try to make.  JF-86 gave evidence that

 5     Pavlovic, the commander of the TO of Zvornik, had a close relationship

 6     with Mr. Stanisic's deputy, Milan Tepavcevic.  Pavlovic came to the MUP

 7     building apparently to meet Tepavcevic.  JF-086 also testified that

 8     Spasojevic would meet Tepavcevic at the MUP Serbia frequently, once every

 9     week during the first two years of the war.  Two local attempts to arrest

10     the members of the Yellow Wasp led by the Vukovic brothers failed because

11     Pavlovic signalled to them about their potential arrest and they were

12     able to escape.  The Prosecution will invite you to infer that Tepavcevic

13     was acting at the behest of Stanisic in supporting Pavlovic who then,

14     himself, supported the Yellow Wasps.

15             In our submission, Mr. Stanisic's action against this

16     paramilitary group undermines that inference.  It also undermines the

17     overall inference that the Prosecution want you to draw, which is this:

18     That Mr. Stanisic is responsible because his employees misbehaved or

19     committed crimes in the region or associated with criminals.  Perhaps

20     Tepavcevic did behave in that way.  Perhaps other subordinates in the DB

21     also acted in that way, but a contract of employment does not make you

22     responsible for the crimes of your employees when they act on a frolic of

23     their own.

24             Slide 7 is a continuation of this submission.  At a time when

25     Serbian authorities were either in hiding or refusing to co-operate with

Page 11571

 1     international justice, Mr. Stanisic was assisting in opening the

 2     Srebrenica case in this Tribunal.  As I understand the Prosecution's

 3     theory concerning paragraph 60 and 61 of the indictment and the killings

 4     of the Muslim men and boys from the Srebrenica enclave, they allege that

 5     Mr. Stanisic contributed indirectly to those massacres.  His delivery of

 6     Erdemovic to The Hague and his willingness to assist with the opening of

 7     the Srebrenica investigation exposes the falsity of that allegation.

 8             The second part of the Defence slide 8 will deal with the

 9     Prosecution's allegation that Mr. Stanisic contributed to the Croatian

10     crime base.  The second part of the Defence will commence with

11     dismantling the allegations that suggest that Mr. Stanisic established

12     Golubic, that he established his own paramilitary group, that he

13     continued to organise, supply, and finance Serb forces to commit crimes

14     alleged in the indictment.

15             The Defence will show that rather than any significant

16     participation in any criminal purpose, the accused's participation in the

17     Krajina was minimal and directed in furtherance of preventing crime and

18     ensuring security for the people of the Krajina.

19             The Prosecution allegation starts with the suggestion that six

20     weeks after Milosevic gave the order for the creation of special units

21     tasked with protecting Serb interests outside of Serbia, Stanisic

22     established these units in the state security department of the Serbian

23     Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Stanisic and Simatovic established 25

24     training camps in pursuance of the joint criminal enterprise.  The

25     Prosecution theory will be exposed as what it is.  Had it been based on

Page 11572

 1     fact or reality, the Prosecution would not, we submit, have struggled so

 2     to define what their case is on these essential issues.

 3             In the Prosecution's first pre-trial brief in 2004, the first Red

 4     Berets were a discrete group, a select group of trainers from Golubic, a

 5     clearly identifiable group, the nucleus of the unit which became the JSO.

 6     This can be contrasted with the substantially more flexible theory that

 7     was advanced through the opening speech, that the special units of the

 8     Serbian DB would refer to themselves by several names such as JATD and

 9     JSO, Arkan's Men, and Arkan's Tigers, Martic's men, Captain Dragan's

10     Knindzas.

11             A very flexible theory designed to roll with the evidence as it

12     unfolds.  The theory is based on the unit documentary which itself is

13     based on the Kula video ceremony.  To build a case, we submit, on the

14     vain glorious rumblings of men emerging from civil war beating their

15     chests in demonstration of their prowess is bound to fail to capture the

16     truth of what happened.

17             It is clear that Golubic was set up and that a group emerged from

18     it known as the Knindzas.  It -- it is common ground between the

19     Prosecution that this group -- between the Prosecution and the Defence

20     that this group did not stay together but separated into smaller groups

21     of men or individuals to assist in the war effort in Croatian Bosnia.

22     The Defence case will show that the notion that Stanisic had authority or

23     control over all of them at all times is, of course, a prosecutorial

24     fiction designed to hold him responsible for all their actions.  Of

25     course, the accused Mr. Stanisic must take some responsibility for his

Page 11573

 1     own present predicament given that nonsensical speech at Kula in 1996 or

 2     1997.  It is a demonstrable piece of fiction lifted from a bad Hollywood

 3     movie but no one -- that no one but, perhaps, the Prosecution believes.

 4     It's worth examining Mr. Simatovic's speech for a moment or two, as the

 5     Defence will do.

 6             Mr. Simatovic in the video marked as exhibit number P61 claimed

 7     that the Second World War -- sorry, the second war service intelligence

 8     administration, which was set up at the time, included a special team for

 9     offensive and logistical support of the special operations unit.

10     Mr. Simatovic said from the 12th of October 1991 in battles with armed

11     Croatian police forces in the zones of Benkovac, Stari Gospic, Plitvice,

12     Glina, Kostajnica and others, the unit provided important support in the

13     liberation of all areas in the RSK.  Mr. Simatovic claimed that around

14     5.000 soldiers were engaged in these battles and their actions were

15     co-ordinated by the command and an intelligence team from the 2nd

16     administration.

17             The Defence case will examine the Prosecution case and show that

18     that suggestion or those suggestions are almost wholly uncorroborated.

19     There is simply no evidence that there was a unit command from the DB and

20     an intelligence team from the 2nd Administration co-ordinating 5.000 men

21     in the Krajina.  On the contrary, as the Prosecution's own evidence

22     suggests and the Defence evidence will corroborate, there was a unity of

23     command in the Krajina and it involved Martic's men being subordinated to

24     the JNA.

25             The Prosecution's Mladic diaries directly contradict those

Page 11574

 1     exaggerated claims.  They confirm precisely who was in charge, who was in

 2     command, and who was responsible for the combat and the crimes in the

 3     locations in the indictment.  We have exhibited them.  The Prosecution

 4     elected not to.

 5             For example, in regards to fighting in the SAO Krajina, Mladic

 6     writes 65 ter 5596, I will find the exhibit number later, that:

 7             "Soldiers of the headquarters administration are a disgrace.

 8     They cannot distinguish who belongs to Martic and who belongs to Mladic."

 9             He writes on P300 that he was issuing tasks - this is Mladic - to

10     the Territorial Defence Main Staff and the SUP of the SAOK.  Where is

11     Simatovic in Mladic's diary during this critical period?  If he or the DB

12     special unit were in command, why does Mladic not notice that?

13             As the Defence evidence will show through the testimony of

14     DST-34, DST-62, DST-31, and DST-43, the crimes alleged in the indictment

15     in the Krajina cannot be attributed to a unit command from the

16     intelligence administration and cannot be attributed to Mr. Stanisic.  As

17     Mr. Stanisic said to me yesterday, "I hadn't even heard of Skabrnja."

18             Back to the Kula video.  In the video, Mr. Simatovic claimed that

19     the DB created 26 training camps.  The claim is nonsensical and will be

20     easily demonstrated to be so.  He claimed, listing 21 training camps,

21     that the DB had created them and in order to service them, in 1992 the

22     unit, the special unit of the DB, began building and securing a network

23     of small airfields in Bosnia and Herzegovina and forming a combat

24     squadron.  About a thousand combat reconnaissance, transport, and

25     humanitarian flights were made from the airfields in Bratunac, Skelani,

Page 11575

 1     Sokolac, Rogatica, and others.  According to Simatovic, those flights,

 2     that combat squadron, remained undetected from NATO's sophisticated

 3     equipment.

 4             It is obvious, we submit, that that could not be correct.  The

 5     most sophisticated military organisation in the world, thousands of

 6     combat flights, combat squadron, and nobody notices.

 7             The Defence case will invite Your Honours to closely examine the

 8     Prosecution evidence.  It is all there, we submit, in the Prosecution

 9     case, and the Defence witnesses will explain and contextualise it.

10             Take, for example, Mr. Simatovic's suggestion that the special

11     unit built and secured an airfield in Skelani.  Please see Exhibit P2104,

12     slide number 9.  It is a military security report that outlines some

13     intelligence received confirming that there was a training camp organised

14     in Skelani directed by Pupovac.  Indeed, P2872 confirms that Pupovac was,

15     in July 1991, a member of the Krajina sub-Special Purpose Unit.  The

16     Prosecution evidence from JF-030 confirmed Pupovac had been one of

17     Captain Dragan's pupils.

18             If we turn to slide number 9, Prosecution Exhibit 2104, one can

19     see that the training camp alleged at Skelani was in fact small and in

20     fact consisted of a few sessions of firing practice and a couple of

21     tactical exercises.  Food was provided by the army.  There was another

22     training camp set up by a man called Neskovic, but it was only able to

23     attract a few youth.

24             This exhibit should be contrasted with P387, slide number 10.

25     It's a report concerning the Red Berets of the 17th of June, 1993,

Page 11576

 1     authenticated by the Prosecution witness Milovanovic.  The document notes

 2     that the former 5th KVO of the Skelani Battalion was located in the

 3     Skelani elementary school, the so-called Red Berets.  They were refusing

 4     to follow orders of the Skelani commander.  More significantly, the

 5     report notes that these men, whoever they were, agreed to join the OB and

 6     then will continue during -- doing security.  They had agreed to assist

 7     to secure the new airport in Skelani with 16 men and continued to secure

 8     the crossing, a source of income.  This is what, it seems, was the

 9     reality at Skelani.  The so-called Red Berets, if they can indeed be

10     linked to the DB, agreed to assist to secure the new airport.  The DB had

11     nothing to do, it seems, with building that airport, only with securing

12     it with a few men.

13             The -- the truth is, and that's what will be demonstrated during

14     the Defence case, is that the Kula speech was a fantasy.  The VRS built

15     an airfield in Skelani.  Ex-members of the Krajina SUP were given the job

16     to secure it in order to bring them into the military command.  These

17     were volunteers causing trouble, nothing to do with the DB, and that

18     airfield referred to by Mr. Simatovic had nothing to do with

19     Mr. Stanisic.

20             The Defence will show that the training allegedly conducted by

21     the Serbian DB and particularly the so-called special unit has been

22     grossly exaggerated and wrongly attributed to Mr. Stanisic and the DB.

23     There is a significant difference between taking over a field and

24     conducting a few lessons in tactical manoeuvres and the type of

25     investment required for a camp such as Golubic.  As DST-42, DST-40,

Page 11577

 1     DST-38, and any other person with military experience will explain, to

 2     create and supply and maintain a training camp takes time, money, and

 3     supplies.  It cannot be done without people knowing about it.

 4             The evidence of training bases adduced by the Prosecution is

 5     evidence in large part of ad hoc exercising camps.  Even if they could be

 6     attributed to Mr. Stanisic, they could not be a significant contribution

 7     to any criminal purpose.

 8             We have heard much of Fruska Gora, and it's worth examining the

 9     evidence to illustrate the point.  As described by JF-031, in the five

10     months that he was there, 40 to 50 people were trained.  That is not a

11     training camp.  It's an exercising field.  It doesn't require resources.

12     It doesn't require supplies, and Mr. Stanisic did not supply it.

13             We do not submit that there were no training camps.  We do not

14     suggest that none of the resources of the DB went towards any of the

15     training camps.  We do not suggest that no person employed in the

16     permanent or reserve forces of the Serbian MUP or DB was involved.  There

17     may have been training of some sort at Korenica or Pajzos or Brcko, but

18     the Defence will establish that these alleged training camps, if they

19     existed, were small and did not require resources.  They did not act as

20     the mainstay of the JNA recruits.  They did not act as the mainstay of

21     the VRS recruits or any other military organisation.

22             As Witness JF-31 confirmed, the DB did not ship logistics to

23     Fruska Gora.  Excuse me.  Other than training at Mount Tara in 1993, or

24     the training of Fikret Abdic men during Pauk, Mr. Stanisic had absolutely

25     nothing to do with these exercising camps.

Page 11578

 1             The second part of the Defence case will demonstrate the

 2     following:  First, that there was no criminal purpose in the Krajina

 3     until at the very earliest August or September of 1991.  As the Krajina

 4     witnesses will confirm, the Serbian citizenry were for good objective

 5     reasons genuinely frightened for their security.  They demanded that the

 6     local Krajina authorities provide defensive protection against Croatian

 7     authority aggression.  That some of the fears were highly subjective does

 8     not undermine that demand.  That the likes of Martic, but especially

 9     Babic, were irresponsible and failed to provide good leadership in this

10     time of crisis is not proof of acting in concert to remove non-Serbs.  A

11     political ambition to link or unify Serbian majority territories in the

12     Krajina to Serbia is not a criminal purpose unless it is intended to be

13     achieved through the commission of crimes.

14             Golubic created in late 1990, developing through into 1991,

15     emerged from these fears and security concerns.  It was designed to

16     create police officers capable of protecting the citizenry in this new

17     militarised and violent environment.

18             As confirmed by Prosecution witness JF-039, and to be

19     corroborated by the Defence witnesses D6 -- DST-62, DST-31, and DST-43,

20     Golubic was not aimed at the commission of crime but designed to enable

21     the TO and the police to better conduct their ordinary tasks.  The

22     Prosecution claim that any criminal purpose existed prior to August 1991

23     ignores the reality on the ground and is aimed at implicating

24     Mr. Stanisic through Mr. Simatovic.  Indeed, as the Defence evidence will

25     show, up until early September 1991, the JNA were acting as a neutral

Page 11579

 1     party and were acting as a buffer between the ragtag militia on both

 2     sides.  If there was a criminal purpose prior to that time, it didn't

 3     involve the JNA, nor by extension did it involve Milosevic, nor on the

 4     Prosecution case the accused, Mr. Stanisic, who, according to the

 5     Prosecution, was Milosevic's right-hand man.

 6             As the Defence case will show, the Serbian MUP as an institution

 7     became involved in May of 1991.  Not in the manner suggested by the

 8     Prosecution.  The Serbian MUP became involved as an institution to try to

 9     prevent war and to try to prevent ethnically based fears boiling over

10     into hatred and violence.  It's our submission that nobody was planning

11     at that stage to forcibly transfer any population or even to begin a war.

12             A multitude of reports and evidence to be adduced by the Defence

13     will corroborate this submission.  Slide number 11 is an example.  It is

14     a security report from the Serbian MUP reporting on the chaos in the

15     Krajina region in May of 1991.  If clearly states that:

16             "We deem it necessary that the MUP of the Republic of Serbia,

17     through the federal SUP and the government of the Republic of Serbia

18     launch an initiative whereby the SFRY Presidency would establish that

19     conditions have been met for the application of Article 8 of the law on

20     the basis of the state security system and issue a decision to the effect

21     that security affairs in the territory of the Republic of Croatia are to

22     be directly organised and carried out by the federation, and importantly,

23     that joint forces of the federal SUP are to be formed in order to

24     protect, operate in threatened areas.

25             In other words, in May of 1991, the Serbian MUP was gearing up to

Page 11580

 1     prevent crimes and protect all the citizenry of Croatia.

 2             Slide number 12 demonstrates the same point, indicating that the

 3     Serbian MUP was interested in preventing war and ethnic strife.

 4             Slide number 13 demonstrates the challenges posed at that time.

 5             Second, the Defence case will demonstrate that Mr. Stanisic did

 6     not contribute to any criminal purpose in the Krajina before or after

 7     August of 1991.  The DB was not the mainstay of financial or logistical

 8     support for the Krajina or the SBWS.  Mr. Stanisic had nothing to do with

 9     the setting up of Golubic.  Mr. Simatovic was not acting at

10     Mr. Stanisic's or the DB's behest except in intelligence-gathering

11     matters.  Mr. Simatovic was not organising the training in Golubic.

12     Mr. Stanisic had nothing to do with supplying the Knindzas or any member

13     of Martic's police during their combat or in furtherance of their combat

14     in the locations specified in the indictment.

15             The Defence case will show through the evidence of Witness 35,

16     34, 62, and 31, that on the 4th of January, 1991, the Executive Council

17     of the SAO Krajina established the regional secretariat for internal

18     affairs in Knin.  On the same date, Martic was appointed the secretary.

19             On the 5th of January, 1991, the Executive Council informed the

20     MUP of Croatia that the establishment of the SUP revoked the authority of

21     the MUP of Croatia in the SAO Krajina.  It is our case that through this

22     period and through this process, the SAO Krajina Serbian leadership

23     reached out to all parts of the Serbian government and also through

24     personal contacts in order to obtain financial, logistical, and military

25     assistance.

Page 11581

 1             Slides 14 to 16 demonstrate that assistance came from many and

 2     varied sources.

 3             The truth of JF-039's claim that Stanisic ordered the setting up

 4     of police stations in the Krajina in January of 1991 and paid for

 5     everything, and the money came to the Krajina in cash, delivered in

 6     military transport bags by Simatovic, has to be seen in the light of

 7     those requests for assistance and that assistance being provided.

 8             Had Mr. Stanisic been involved in the way suggested, had he been

 9     so intimate with Martic, there would be evidence that Martic approached

10     Stanisic for funds at a later stage.  Instead, as P1552, on slide 16,

11     demonstrates, Martic requested financial assistance to Milosevic,

12     Sainovic, and Sokolovic, for the salaries of his policemen.  Why did he

13     not write to Stanisic if Stanisic had been delivering cash in the bags

14     described by the Prosecution case?

15             In any event, we submit that the Prosecution case fails to

16     consider the reality.  The Prosecution's interpretation of the JCE fails

17     to discern contributions by Serbian institutions designed to enhance the

18     security of the SAO Krajina and Serbian areas in general from

19     contributions designed to fuel war and hatred or advance the alleged

20     criminal purpose.

21             Ordinary Serbian citizens in the SAO Krajina deserved better

22     leaders, but their failure to elect them did not mean they waived their

23     right to security.  That had to be provided through a functioning

24     criminal justice system.  The Serbian government including the federal

25     and Serbian MUP were right to respond to requests for assistance.  Of

Page 11582

 1     course that response must be carefully analysed to see what that

 2     assistance was and how it was intended, but as the Defence will show,

 3     there were genuine objectively based security concerns.

 4             The Prosecution invitation to treat all assistance to the Krajina

 5     as intended to further a criminal purpose must be resisted.  That is

 6     clear, we submit, from the Prosecution's own case, and it will be made

 7     clearer during the Defence case.

 8             JF-035 and others were making operational decisions about how the

 9     police stations, the new police stations set by the Serbian authorities,

10     would operate.  JF-035 indicated that it was the SAO SBWS's police duty,

11     and I quote, "to protect all citizens living there, those who behaved

12     properly, who did nothing wrong, and lived normally."  Your Honours will

13     find that on the 28th of June, pages 6011 to 6012.

14             There was a need for the newly established police stations to be

15     equipped with supplies, and that included some weapons, in order to able

16     to be a fully functioning police force to fight the crimes committed by

17     criminals who were running amok.  Therefore, the MUP of Serbia was

18     approached and responded.  They had relevant expertise and, of course,

19     some supplies.  Nonetheless, this material assistance both in the Knin

20     Krajina and the SBWS did not involve the Serbian DB.  It is the Defence

21     case that most of this assistance had absolutely nothing to do with

22     Mr. Stanisic.

23             The Defence --

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash, if you could find a suitable moment

25     within the next five minutes to have a break, it would be appreciated.

Page 11583

 1             MR. JORDASH:  Your Honour, yes.

 2             The Defence evidence will show that Mr. Stanisic's main role was

 3     on the mainland protecting the Republic of Serbia.

 4             If Your Honours needed to repair a car, you go to a mechanic.

 5     When Martic, Babic, Hadzic et al. needed to set up police stations, they

 6     went to the federal SUP and the public security section of the republican

 7     SUP.  The Prosecution case obscures the fact that the Serbian MUP

 8     consisted of two parts.

 9             Slides 17 to 19 provides some examples which will be corroborated

10     during the Defence case.  Mr. Stanisic and the DB were not involved

11     except in the most minimal of ways and only then for legitimate security

12     purposes.

13             As the Prosecution evidence shows and the Defence evidence will

14     support, Martic had no expectation at any time that Stanisic would

15     provide him or his police with any supplies of any kind.  On the

16     contrary, Martic approached Stanisic on an extremely limited basis.  He

17     knew where Stanisic's expertise was based.  Slide number 20, Prosecution

18     Exhibit P1556 provides an eloquent demonstration of what Martic sought

19     from Mr. Stanisic.

20             Your Honour, that's a convenient moment.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  We'll take a break.  I have, however, one

22     question before we do so, for you.

23             Yesterday, we discussed the expert report to be produced by

24     Mr. Browne, and it is described as various aspects of.  You have relied

25     several times on the Mladic diaries today.  Does that mean that there's

Page 11584

 1     no basic challenge to the authenticity of it?

 2             MR. JORDASH:  There is no basic challenge to the fact that Mladic

 3     wrote the diary.

 4             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  You say perhaps when he did that, that that's

 5     another matter, and these are perhaps matters -- because it was unclear

 6     to us what the various aspects would be, but I now understand that

 7     there's no basic challenge that these documents were produced by

 8     Mr. Mladic and that's the position of the Stanisic Defence.

 9             MR. JORDASH:  Yes.  And what we will submit is that in relation

10     to where Mladic implicates others, they should be approached with extreme

11     caution.  In relation to where Babic -- excuse me, where Mladic lays out

12     more contextual evidence, Your Honours can more easily rely upon that.

13             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  You'd say we have to be very cautious in

14     interpreting or in accepting the truthfulness of -- of parts of what he

15     has written down.

16             MR. JORDASH:  Yes.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  And could I just perhaps check with you,

18     Mr. Petrovic.  Does the Simatovic Defence take a similar position in

19     relation to these diaries?

20             MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, in principle, yes.

21             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you for those answers.

22             We'll have a break, and we will resume at a quarter to 11.00.

23                           --- Recess taken at 10.16 a.m.

24                           --- On resuming at 10.52 a.m.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash, if you're ready to proceed.

Page 11585

 1             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you, Your Honour.

 2             If I can return to completing the submissions on the Croatian

 3     crime base.

 4             Evidence will be led to show the limited role expected and played

 5     by the DB.  This evidence will contradict the ridiculous theory advanced

 6     through Babic and others that allege that Mr. Stanisic not only managed

 7     to take over the Serbian MUP but also subverted the whole of the SAO

 8     Krajina leadership and military machine and bent them to his will.  It is

 9     alleged that there was a so-called parallel structure with Milosevic at

10     the head, followed by Stanisic, with the TO of Krajina, the volunteer

11     units, and Martic's Police or the militia of Krajina along with certain

12     presidents of the municipalities.  That case rests upon the fiction that

13     in 1991 onwards, Mr. Stanisic had untrammeled power, that he was

14     Mr. Milosevic's right-hand man.

15             As stated at paragraph 45 of the Prosecution's pre-trial brief,

16     Mr. -- sorry, Minister Sokolovic was just a figurehead and Mr. Stanisic

17     was the de facto minister of the interior.  However, as the Defence case

18     will show, that alleged state of affairs appears to have escaped

19     everyone's notice at that time.

20             Bogdanovic was the minister of interior of Serbia until June

21     1991.  He, like his successor Sokolovic, was a high-ranking functionary

22     in the Communist Party and thereafter in Milosevic's SPS party.  Stanisic

23     was not even a member of either party.  When he became chief of the

24     service, in order to prevent the service from becoming a political tool,

25     he actively discouraged anyone from joining any political party.

Page 11586

 1     Mr. Stanisic was subject to a politically motivated investigation in

 2     1991.  Bogdanovic and Junackovic tried to remove him.  It was only his

 3     professionalism and respect from within the service that may have saved

 4     him.

 5             Your Honours will recall P630, an intercepted telephone

 6     conversation between Karadzic and Kertes on the 24th of June, 1991.

 7     Kertes claimed to Karadzic that Jovica had been given carte blanche, and

 8     the Prosecution allege, that is carte blanche to supply weapons to

 9     Bosnia.  The Defence case will demonstrate that that is not correct, but

10     in any event, as the Defence will advance, there could not conceivably

11     have been a criminal purpose in existence in Bosnia in June of 1991, but

12     the point I'd make at this stage is this:  Kertes was right about one

13     thing.  Jovica's hands were tied and he was driving -- that is Junackovic

14     was driving Mr. Stanisic crazy.  It's a reference to Mr. Stanisic being

15     subject to an internal investigative commission, politically motivated by

16     members of Milosevic's political party.

17             It doesn't make sense, we submit, to suggest that Stanisic was

18     the most powerful man in the MUP and yet his hands were tied by

19     Junackovic.

20             The Supreme Defence Council minutes from the FRY during 1992 make

21     it crystal clear that Mr. Stanisic, firstly, did not take part in any of

22     that decision-making.  Regular attendees of the Supreme Defence Council

23     were members of the federal administration.  Various leaders of the

24     former Yugoslavia, as well as senior members of the military.  The

25     Supreme Defence Council minutes show the Serbian and Montenegrin

Page 11587

 1     contribution to the wars in Croatia and Bosnia.  They show that the

 2     decisions were primarily dictated from this decision-making body.  I

 3     shall return to these minutes later on, but the Serbian MUP was not

 4     invited.  Mr. Sokolovic attended once on the 7th of August, 1992.  From

 5     1992 through to the end of 1995, Mr. Stanisic, this omnipresent and

 6     omnipotent chief, is mentioned once in the context of making an ordinary

 7     arrest.  His service barely warrants a mention.  We have placed these

 8     minutes on our exhibit list.  It's an eloquent demonstration of the

 9     inaccuracy of the Prosecution case against Mr. Stanisic and the DB that

10     the Prosecution did not do the same.

11             As the Defence case will show, all the documentary evidence from

12     Supreme Defence Council minutes to the 108 -- 88th session of the

13     Presidency, the SFRY, on the 25th of February, 1992, to the various

14     personal diaries that have emerged, all fail to place Stanisic at the

15     centre of the action.

16             The Prosecution case impliedly accepts this.  That is why they

17     allege he was a channel of communication.  It means that he was not a

18     decision-maker.  Of course, as the various exhibits we will adduce will

19     show, the political and military leadership required no channel of

20     communication.  There are tens and tens of intercepts reflecting direct

21     contacts between the politicians and the military.  Given the role and

22     importance that is sought to be attributed to Mr. Stanisic, it is

23     instructive how little he appears.

24             Mr. Milosevic required no channel of communication to speak to

25     Karadzic.  As the intercepts will show, at times he was on the phone

Page 11588

 1     directly with him almost every day.

 2             Slide 21:  The Mladic diaries are a little interesting.  As

 3     Prosecution Exhibit 2529 shows, on the 2nd of July, 1993, Mladic has a

 4     meeting with Sainovic, Badza, Karadzic, Krajisnik, Stanisic and others.

 5     Sainovic introduces Stanisic and Badza as the men who carry out things,

 6     an interesting description that the Prosecution rely upon as an

 7     indication of Mr. Stanisic's importance.  However, the more interesting

 8     fact has been obscured.  The diaries start on the 29th of June, 1991,

 9     just before Mladic became a colonel and Chief of Staff of the 9th Corps

10     of the JNA in Knin, and before he moved to being the commander of the

11     Main Staff of the VRS on the 12th of May, 1992.

12             The Stanisic that appears before this -- before this 2nd of July,

13     1993, meeting is Mico Stanisic, and Your Honours can see the entries

14     which relate to him.  Even if that is disputed by the Prosecution, the

15     entries indicate a Stanisic who is relatively unimportant.

16             The whole war had raged in Croatia in 1991 and in Bosnia in 1992,

17     and the first accused, Milosevic's right-hand man, doesn't appear in

18     Mladic's diaries.  Witnesses DST-34, 62, 31, and 43 - our fourth, fifth,

19     sixth, and seventh witnesses - all occupied significant roles within the

20     Krajina either on a permanent or temporary basis.  Their political or

21     professional roles meant that they were close to the federal state or the

22     RSK leadership, including Martic and Babic.  They did not see or hear of

23     Stanisic's involvement with weapon supplies, the Krajina government, with

24     Dragan, with Golubic, with the police of the Krajina, or their training.

25     They, unlike certain prosecution witnesses, like Mr. Lazarevic, did not

Page 11589

 1     request or receive relocation packages to comfortable countries overseas.

 2     They have no reason to lie to assist Mr. Stanisic.

 3             Witnesses DST-35, 44, 63, and 30 will confirm that the same is

 4     true in the SBWS.  35, 44, and 63 were all busy professionals working

 5     along the border of Serbia with Croatia.  Their jobs meant they were

 6     operating along the border between Serbia and the SBWS or inside SBWS

 7     itself.  The witnesses will confirm the role of the Vojvodina SUP and the

 8     Serbian MUP in trying to protect the border, prevent the illegal

 9     transport of weapons from Serbia into Croatia and back into Serbia.  The

10     witnesses will confirm their role in setting up police stations within

11     the SBWS.

12             It's our submission that these police forces were largely a force

13     for good, preventing crimes and bringing law and order in a region in

14     desperate need of security.  DST-35 will describe how this was undermined

15     by the minister of the interior, Bogdanovic, who for personal reasons

16     made sure that Arkan could travel freely with weapons into the SBWS

17     region.  DST-44 will describe the friendship between his superior Badza

18     and Arkan.  That friendship prevented other more responsible authorities

19     from taking restraining action.

20             It is Badza, if he was alive, and Bogdanovic who should be

21     sitting where Mr. Stanisic is.  It is them who provided Arkan and others

22     with support.

23             DST-44 will confirm the collaboration between the Vojvodina SUP,

24     the Serbian DB, and the Serbian public security in action Srem designed

25     to protect non-Serbs along the border.  All these witnesses will confirm

Page 11590

 1     that the DB's role was limited to gathering intelligence.  The Serbian DB

 2     did not even assist in the establishment of the RSK DB in 1992.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash, your speed of speech is slowly going

 4     up.

 5             MR. JORDASH:  I beg your pardon.  I'm just becoming conscious of

 6     the time, but I'll slow it down, Your Honour.

 7             The Prosecution cannot prove, we submit, and the Defence case

 8     will show that Stanisic played a role in the formation and sustenance of

 9     the RSK.  In the absence of convincing evidence, they fall back on the

10     mythology of the Red Berets that allegedly began with Mr. Stanisic taking

11     Captain Dragan to Knin.  The Defence case will refute that allegation.

12     It is based on rumour, speculation, and Captain Dragan's boastful ways.

13             If we can return for a moment to P1050, the diary of Glisic, the

14     secretary to General Simovic, the Ministry of Defence, written sometime

15     in 1992.  As the evidence will show, there is a theme that's developed

16     through the documents.  Once again -- once again, Mr. Stanisic does not

17     get star billing.  On the contrary, he doesn't even make an appearance in

18     Simovic's office, and he's not even discussed.  Your Honours will be

19     invited to read the various portions, they can be found at 1D2616 to

20     1D2627.  The entries read like a who's who of the moment, from Milosevic,

21     Babic, Hadzic, Arkan, Kertes, General Kadijevic, General Adzic,

22     Admiral Brovet, retired General Pekic, and of course the infamous Dragan.

23     The only man of apparent significance who does not make an appearance is

24     Mr. Stanisic.

25             The Prosecution make much of P992, slide 25 -- I beg your pardon,

Page 11591

 1     slide 33.  Dragan, of course, claimed in a letter that was sent to the

 2     command of the TO on the 8th of November, 1991, that he had an obligation

 3     towards the state security of the Republic of Serbia and his activities

 4     had to be fully in accordance with that service.

 5             Putting aside the vagueness of that claim, as with all Dragan's

 6     and prosecutorial claims, we invite Your Honours to put it to the test.

 7     As the exhibit shows, P992, Captain Dragan was disgruntled about

 8     Simovic's request that he become an ordinary captain of the TO.  At the

 9     time he wrote the letter, he was famous throughout Serbia, far beyond his

10     actual achievements.  He wanted to be the commander of a new

11     Serbian Army.

12             As the Defence evidence will show, he thought that by claiming

13     obligations towards the state security that Simovic -- I've just been

14     helpfully reminded.  It's slide 25 we're looking at, beg your pardon.  He

15     wanted to be the commander of a new Serbian Army.  He thought that by

16     claiming obligations towards the state security, Simovic would allow that

17     to happen.  Simovic having refused, Dragan launched a virulent press

18     campaign against Simovic and the Ministry of Defence, making all sorts of

19     outlandish claims about the DB.  Your Honours will see from slide 26

20     another outlandish claim by Dragan concerning the Serbian Special Police

21     forces.

22             The Defence case will explain the Red Beret story.  The evidence

23     will strip away the mythology.  We agree that the story starts with

24     Dragan and the selection of certain recruits from those who trained at

25     Golubic.  The unit consisted of instructors and some recruits who had

Page 11592

 1     already been trained at Golubic.  The name of the group was the Knindzas.

 2             The unit under the command of Captain Dragan in autumn of 1991

 3     engaged in military operations, mostly in the direction of the Plitvice

 4     lakes.  The Knindzas were operating under Martic, because the Knindzas

 5     were part of the police.

 6             Second in command was Dragan.  The third in command was

 7     Crnogorac.  They participated in the operation in Plitvice.  The goal of

 8     the operation was to push the Croatian forces out.

 9             Mr. Simatovic was not in command of the unit.  They received

10     orders from Martic.  They were not part of the DB, as the Mladic diaries

11     we referred to earlier suggest.  They were indistinguishable from the RSK

12     police, because they were the RSK police.

13             At some point in time in autumn of 1991, the Knindzas were

14     ordered to assist the JNA in capturing Ilok.  They based themselves in

15     Fruska Gora.  That 25- to 30-strong group included Crnogorac and

16     Raja Bozovic.

17             As the Defence evidence will show, principally through DST-42, it

18     was around this time that Mr. Stanisic became involved with the group.

19     He negotiated to use some of the Knindzas to assist with Serbian state

20     security duties.  Ilok is just a few kilometres distance from Pajzos

21     where an intelligence outpost of the DB service was located.  It

22     consisted of an electronic surveillance installation and men from the

23     Knindzas were used to secure it.  Members of this security detail did not

24     take part in any military operations on behalf of the Serbian DB.

25             Your Honours may recall the evidence of Prosecution witness

Page 11593

 1     JF-031, who recalled Mr. Stanisic visiting Fruska Gora in October of 1991

 2     or thereabouts.  Mr. Stanisic visited with his young son who was

 3     clutching a magazine with the Knindzas on the front.  The Knindzas were

 4     famous, and his son wanted to see this now famous group.  Had Fruska Gora

 5     been a proper military base, would Stanisic have brought his young son?

 6     Stanisic had in mind that this group might be useful to the state

 7     security of Serbia for a limited purpose.  As was confirmed by JF-031,

 8     Stanisic emphasised that the men to be used for Pajzos were not to be

 9     used for military operations.  Panic was persuaded that the men should

10     not be used for operations in Vukovar.  We rely upon that evidence.  It

11     is a colourful demonstration of Mr. Stanisic's intent.  Whilst the JNA,

12     the TO, volunteers including Arkan, were hell bent on destroying Vukovar,

13     Stanisic refused to be involved or to allow himself to be drawn into that

14     war.

15             A short while later, a group of men including Bozovic entered

16     Pajzos and began guarding it on behalf of the Serbian MUP.  They remained

17     part of the -- they remained part of the RSK police and were commanded by

18     Martic.  They were on loan to the DB of Serbia for that and only that

19     task.  The remainder of the Knindzas were assigned by Martic elsewhere

20     and had nothing to do with the Serbian DB.

21             It is perhaps possible that had Mr. Stanisic's role with these

22     men ended there with the subcontracting of a limited number for this

23     limited purpose, he may not have found himself as an accused in this

24     trial.  However, in early 1992, a terrorist group from Croatia

25     infiltrated into Serbia and had to be hunted down and captured in the

Page 11594

 1     Serbian town of Apatin.  Mr. Stanisic came with Badza it assess how to

 2     handle the situation.  The SAJ, the public security anti-terrorist unit,

 3     was temporarily out of action.  A decision was made to use a small group

 4     of the Knindzas, including Raja Bozovic to catch these terrorists who

 5     were eventually handed over in a prisoner exchange to the Croatians.

 6             Mr. Simatovic noted this fact in his Kula speech.  He dated that

 7     this was one of the most important tasks undertaken by the Serbian

 8     special unit, capturing the terrorists from Apatin.  He got the date

 9     wrong and placed that occurrence in 1993, but nonetheless, it's a curious

10     aspect of his speech that despite co-ordinating 5.000 men in Krajina,

11     setting up 26 training camps, supervising thousands of flights

12     transporting essential military and humanitarian equipment, active

13     participation in six operations in Croatia and Bosnia, Mr. Simatovic

14     should describe the capture of 20 or so terrorists as one of the main

15     successes of the special unit of the DB.  It was one of the most

16     important, because the remainder was just not true.

17             Following that operation, part of that group captured terrorists

18     from Apatin misbehaved and had a conflict with the police in Apatin.  One

19     of them was assaulted by Bozovic.  Stanisic ordered that the group should

20     no longer be used by the DB, and Bozovic was sent a clear message he was

21     no longer welcome in Serbia.

22             Around this time, in February 1992, the UN forces had moved into

23     Croatia pursuant to the Vance Peace Plan.  The men who had been members

24     of the Knindzas were no longer together as one group.  There were members

25     in Knin, members in Korenica.  Zika Crnogorac went to Slavonia and turned

Page 11595

 1     up in Brcko.  Captain Dragan had some of his other men in SAO Baranja.

 2     These were not offshoots of the DB's special unit but ex-members of the

 3     Knindzas operating as professional volunteers.

 4             The Defence will show that Mr. Stanisic had nothing to do with

 5     dispatching these men to Bosnia or anywhere else.  The allegation is

 6     based on the theory of a case that once again implies a level of

 7     authority and planning that simply wasn't there.  There is powerful

 8     evidence, and we rely upon it and we'll corroborate it, that Mr. Stanisic

 9     had nothing to do with dispatching Bozovic to Bosnia.

10             As Exhibit 392, Mladic's diary, clearly shows, Bozovic, a

11     professional volunteer, received a request from the commander of the

12     1st Krajina Corps in Bosnia, General Talic, to report to the Doboj

13     centre.  The chief of the centre was Andrija Bijocevic.  15 or 20 men

14     were transferred with Bozovic.  In our submission the Mladic diary 392 is

15     proof positive that Mr. Stanisic did not arrange for Bozovic to go to

16     Doboj.  He didn't arrange for Bozovic.  He didn't arrange for any of the

17     men to go anywhere.

18             That is the story of the genesis of the Red Berets which will be

19     outlined in the Defence case.  It's the story of men who informed a group

20     that became famous.  Their fame was enhanced by claims of their

21     connections to the DB.  The journalists and the Prosecution did the rest.

22             As DST-40 will confirm, there existed a Serbian MUP decision

23     dated the 4th of August, 1993, to form an anti-terrorist unit.  The

24     evidence will clearly show that this was the formation of a new unit.  It

25     required planning and organisation.  It wouldn't have been needed if the

Page 11596

 1     Prosecution theory is correct.

 2             DST-40 will testify to the efforts made to create this unit.  He

 3     will confirm and elaborate that the formation of such a unit is a

 4     difficult endeavour.  It takes years to set up a professional unit.

 5     DST-40 will confirm the DB's committed attempts to employ appropriate

 6     people.

 7             The concept of reserve forces is important in this case.  The MUP

 8     Serbia was legally entitled, in fact obligated, to employ reserve forces

 9     when they were needed to prevent activities aimed at endangering the

10     security of the country.

11             The Defence case will show that Mr. Stanisic had no role in

12     employing or paying reserve forces.  He had no role in the employment of

13     persons who the Prosecution claim to be key members of the special unit

14     of the Serbian DB.  That certain undesirable men may have found their way

15     onto the list of reserve forces, that is the temporary forces, is

16     unsurprising in the chaos of war.  However, it has nothing to do with

17     Mr. Stanisic, in the same way that the employment of temporary staff in

18     this court has nothing to do with the President of the ICTY.

19             Slide number 28 shows the type of employment decisions that

20     Mr. Stanisic made.  The Defence case will show that these themselves were

21     barely decisions.  There was a commission at the centre of the 8th

22     administration, the administration which dealt with logistics and

23     supplies.  The commission made the selection of employees, and

24     Mr. Stanisic would sign those decisions.  In the absence of a good

25     obvious reason not to, Mr. Stanisic was effectively rubber-stamping other

Page 11597

 1     decisions.

 2             That members of the Knindzas or those they associated with, or

 3     reserve forces, would claim to be members of the DB is again

 4     unsurprising.  Find me a bar in the world full of men with military

 5     experience, and I will find you a man who claims to have been a man of

 6     special forces.  Find me a man who fought alongside any of the

 7     ex-Knindzas during the Balkans war, and I will find you a member of the

 8     Red Berets.  It's a convenient prosecutorial theory, but it's a poor way

 9     we submit to attribute individual culpability for international crimes.

10             Part three of the Defence case will deal with the alleged

11     contribution of the accused to the Bosnia and Herzegovina crime base.  It

12     will set out to demonstrate three central propositions:

13             First, that there is absolutely no reliable evidence that

14     supports the existence of a criminal purpose in Bosnia before April of

15     1992.

16             Second, that had the Serbian political or military authorities

17     from Serbia participated in any criminal purpose after that date, which

18     is doubtful, they had most certainly withdrawn from it by late 1993 at

19     the latest.  The Defence will show that the Serbian military and

20     political authorities withdrew any meaningful co-operation from the

21     Bosnian Serb leadership at around this time.  There was no shared

22     concerted action in furtherance of any criminal purpose.

23             The third part of this section of the Defence will show that

24     Mr. Stanisic did not at any time share any criminal purpose, nor did he

25     contribute in any way.

Page 11598

 1             Dealing with the first point, there was no criminal purpose in

 2     Bosnia and no evidence to suggest otherwise until at least April 1992.

 3             The Prosecution case establishes that in late August 1991, the

 4     SDS leadership within Bosnia began to consider the creation of separate

 5     Serb territory with a view to enabling Serbs to remain in Yugoslavia.

 6     This plan envisaged the institution of separate structures, including the

 7     police and the military and the political arenas.

 8             The Prosecution case also establishes that on the 19th or 20th of

 9     December, 1991, the document which became known as the implementing

10     instructions for Variant A and B was introduced by Karadzic to a meeting

11     of high-level SDS representatives.

12             On the 16th Republika Srpska Assembly session, Karadzic outlined

13     the Bosnian Serb six strategic objectives.  I hope Your Honours will

14     forgive me from reading a section of the Krajisnik judgement which --

15     upon which we will rely, paragraphs 995 and 996:

16             "It would be incorrect to place these goals on a pedestal ... for

17     in the final analysis they are anodyne statements, severing as official

18     state policy and even qualifying for publication in the Bosnian Serb

19     Republic's 'Official Gazette.'  If one is inclined to find in them

20     insidious hidden meanings it's because of the context and the events that

21     followed, and an anachronistic reading of the May goals is not only

22     inadvisable, it misses the point.

23             "Much more important in relation to actual policy was the

24     feedback loop of co-ordination and support that existed between Bosnian

25     Serb forces on the ground and the central leadership.  Takeovers,

Page 11599

 1     killings, detention, abuse, expulsions ..." and so on, "had begun in the

 2     territories ... before the pronouncement of the strategic goals on the

 3     12th of May, 1992.  These incidents were launched in early ... 1992 ..."

 4             The Defence will rely upon this to assert that there could not

 5     have been any shared criminal purpose until this time.

 6             A plurality of persons acting in concert in pursuit of a common

 7     purpose, whilst we do not accept that the Serbian political and military

 8     leadership were part of any plurality acting in pursuit of any criminal

 9     purpose within Bosnia, the Defence will demonstrate that following the

10     Bosnian Serbs' rejection of peace endeavours, any co-operation or

11     collaboration between the two became minimal.  It became, from the

12     Serbian -- from Serbia proper, intended only to prevent war and a

13     burgeoning refugee crisis in Serbia.

14             The framework of the defence we shall present will rest on the

15     discussions and decisions that took place in the Supreme Defence Council

16     of the remnants of the SFRY.  The disenchantment with the extremists from

17     the Bosnian Serb leadership began in 1992, and by late 1994, co-operation

18     that might imply a shared criminal goal and criminal intent had long

19     since ceased.

20             Slide 30 is an excerpt from the Supreme Defence Council minutes

21     in June of 1993.  It is clear from reading these minutes that Serbian

22     authorities, the leadership who were part of the Supreme Defence Council,

23     had enough.  There was still some assistance as the Supreme Defence

24     Council minutes reflect.  However, this did not last long.

25             As slide 31 demonstrates, and of course we invite Your Honours to

Page 11600

 1     read the whole of the minutes, the FRY decided to sever relationships

 2     with its -- leadership of VRS.  It reiterated that it should wield

 3     influence on the Republika Srpska because peace was in its common and

 4     most important national and state interests.  It recognised that if

 5     Banja Luka was bombed, there would be a hundred thousand refugees

 6     flooding into Serbia.

 7             Slide 32 and 33 are more of the same.  This nation, Serbia, shall

 8     not be slaughtered because of three hot-heads from Pale.

 9             By the 27th of September, 1994, the time of the 25th Session, the

10     Supreme Defence Council most certainly had had enough.  However, the

11     decisions to withdraw aid and assistance were not straightforward.  The

12     security of the Bosnian Serbs was also a matter of security within

13     Serbia.  This is discussed at length in the Supreme Defence Council

14     minutes.

15             Slide 34 reflects on the 20 -- I beg your pardon.  On the 2nd of

16     November, 1994, the -- the Supreme Defence Council recognised the

17     reality.  They recognised that whilst not wanting to assist with the

18     Bosnian Serbs' territorial objectives, there was a need to prevent the

19     war flooding into Serbia.  There was a need to return refugees to the

20     Bihac region.  These were the discussions which were the basis for Pauk.

21     These were the discussions which were the basis for Mr. Stanisic's

22     involvement in Pauk.

23             Slide 35, of huge relevance, we submit, for the Prosecution case

24     in 1995.  The Supreme Defence Council recognised a real threat if the

25     Bosnian Serbs were defeated.  The security of Serbia was threatened.

Page 11601

 1     Refugees and the crisis that would be caused were at the forefront of the

 2     participants' minds.

 3             The aforementioned Supreme Defence Council minutes and decisions

 4     will be the framework of the Defence case relating to the Bosnian crime

 5     base.  The Defence evidence will show that there can be no doubt that any

 6     shared criminal purpose had ended long before 1995.  The assistance

 7     offered in late 1994 onwards by Mr. Stanisic to Operation Pauk was not

 8     motivated by any criminal intent but a genuine desire to bring the

 9     leadership of the RSK to the peace table and to solve a genuine refugee

10     crisis in Bihac and to prevent a larger one in Serbia.  The operations in

11     Trnovo and the operations in Banja Luka must be seen in this light.  That

12     is why the Prosecution have struggled to explain the relevance of Pauk to

13     their joint criminal enterprise.  The Prosecution's joint criminal

14     enterprise fails to distinguish lawful action in pursuant of lawful

15     objectives and war in pursuant of crime.

16             Mr. Stanisic, we submit, did not contribute to the Bosnian crime

17     base.  The Defence will show that the accused did not contribute in any

18     way to the criminal purpose, if one existed, in Bosnia.  As the Defence

19     will show, there is simply no reliable evidence.  Mr. Mladic's crude

20     attempt to implicate Mr. Stanisic through a set of doctored diaries will

21     be exposed.

22             The Bosnian Serb MUP arose from an enactment on the 28th of

23     February, 1992, the Bosnian Serb Law on Internal Affairs.  The Bosnian

24     Serb MUP was to handle security affairs on behalf of the government.  We

25     accept that in the early days the Bosnian Serb MUP co-ordinated with and

Page 11602

 1     was helped by the Republic of Serbia.  Reports prepared by the federal

 2     State Security Services in March 1992 confirm formal co-operation between

 3     the federal SUP in Belgrade and the Bosnian SUP police.  The Defence case

 4     will prove that this co-ordination plan did not involve the Serbian DB.

 5     It is powerful proof of Mr. Stanisic's state of mind that his service did

 6     not assist the Bosnian MUP or DB.  This is borne out by the Mladic

 7     diaries, and even with the attempt to implicate Mr. Stanisic, they bear

 8     witness to Mr. Stanisic's failure to assist.

 9             As I've already outlined earlier, it is true that Stanisic

10     introduced a meeting with Mladic on the 13th of December, 1993, and

11     stated:  "It is because of your initiative we are meeting to improve your

12     operational and tactical position and see about helping Serbia," but it

13     is also true that Stanisic did not say another word at that meeting,

14     according to Mladic.  He was, in that instance, going through a

15     formality, merely introducing the meeting.  The Defence will show that

16     neither he nor his service assisted the Bosnian Serbs.

17             The Defence case will show that the assistance to the Bosnian

18     Serbs came from other quarters.  Slides 36 to 48 show a reflection and a

19     representative selection of where that assistance came from.  These

20     exhibits show where that assistance came from.

21             Slide 48, Prosecution 65 ter 2351, a request sent to Stanisic

22     from the Republika Srpska MUP, 12th of May, 1995:

23             "Could your technical service please repair and service a mobile

24     400-watt shortwave communication centre, generate a unit and a vehicle.

25     Could you please also reconsider our earlier request for the necessary

Page 11603

 1     technical equipment."

 2             That, in June 1995 when Mr. Stanisic was supposed to be at the

 3     height of his powers, is how the Republika Srpska MUP regards

 4     Mr. Stanisic.  Your Honours will note the "request to reconsider our

 5     earlier request."

 6             Mr. Stanisic did not form any co-operative relationship with the

 7     Bosnian DB.  That is why largely absent from the Mladic diaries.  There

 8     was an open conflict between his service and the Bosnian service.

 9     Mr. Stanisic did not like General Mladic as Mr. Stanisic had declined to

10     become involved with Vukovar in late 1991.  He wanted no part in attacks

11     on safe areas or the disgraceful bombing of civilian areas such as those

12     in Sarajevo and elsewhere.

13             This animosity turned to open conflict in June of 1995, when

14     Mr. Stanisic negotiated the release of the UNPROFOR hostages.  It was

15     plain to Mr. Stanisic that he was not negotiating with a rational man.

16             Unfortunately but predictably, that lack of reason has not been

17     removed over the last 15 years.  Despite fact that Mladic had ample

18     opportunity and every reason to do so over the last 15 years to doctor

19     his account, the Prosecution in this case proffer them without

20     reservation as truth.  It will be interesting to see if that's the

21     position adopted during the prosecution of Mladic.

22             It is plain on their face, we submit, and the Defence case will

23     show through detailed evidence that they are self-serving when

24     implicating others.  The massacres in Srebrenica appear not to have

25     occurred in the world outlined by Mr. Mladic.

Page 11604

 1             The Defence case will show that the entries implicating Stanisic

 2     barely make sense and will not be corroborated.

 3             If I can return to the 2nd of July, 1993, meeting where Stanisic

 4     is alleged to have said:

 5             "The majority of what we need should be issued via the MUP of

 6     Serbia.  The centres should be Pale, Herzegovina, and Talic."

 7             There is no evidence that the Serbian MUP set up centres in these

 8     locations.  There's no evidence that Talic is even a location but might

 9     be a reference to General Talic.  It is, however, quite telling, and the

10     Defence case will elaborate on this point, that at the end of the

11     meeting, Mladic takes only Sainovic's number, telephone number.  Of

12     course, when one reads the Supreme Defence Council minutes and looks at

13     the remainder of exhibits, it is plain that neither Stanisic nor Badza

14     financed or supplied the VRS.  The Serbian DB did not even support the RS

15     DB.

16             This is not to argue, and we will not argue it during our

17     defence, that the Serbian MUP, that is the public security, did not offer

18     assistance to the Bosnian Serbs, nor will the Defence suggest that there

19     were not individuals with the DB who did not -- who did -- who offered ad

20     hoc assistance to the Bosnian Serb forces.  It is quite possible, for

21     example, as alleged by Prosecution witness JF-026, that the RS MUP

22     received aid in the form of uniforms and communication equipment from

23     police stations in Mali Zvornik and Loznica.  It was, however, a constant

24     frustration of the Bosnian Serbs that the Serbian MUP did not provide

25     proper assistance.  Whether that submission is correct or not, the

Page 11605

 1     contributions offered by the Serbian MUP cannot be attributed to

 2     Mr. Stanisic.

 3             Had Mr. Stanisic been aware of any involvement of the DB

 4     resources or personnel and the training of any forces, including those

 5     that went to Bosanski Samac, he would have stopped it.  We shall apply to

 6     admit the testimony of the commander of the 17th Tactical Group, Nikolic,

 7     and two men trained at that alleged Serbian DB camp, DST-68 and 57.

 8             The training was organised by the JNA commander and the Federal

 9     Secretariat for National Defence.  The training lasted for only a few

10     days and involved, it follows, only minimal resources.  In other words,

11     that and other training camps could exist without institutional support

12     by the DB.  It could exist and did exist without Mr. Stanisic's

13     knowledge.  It has nothing to do with him.

14             These men who I've referred to, the witnesses we will apply to

15     admit, gave evidence in the Simic trial that they were members of the RS

16     police or the RSK police.  None of them claimed any connection to

17     Stanisic or to the mythological Red Berets.  JF-047 who was recalled to

18     this court to deal with obvious inconsistencies perjured himself for

19     personal gain.  As the Defence evidence will show, it was Mr. Stanisic's

20     service that arrested Lugar and Debeli in Serbia when they returned from

21     their exploits in Bosanski Samac.  If Mr. Stanisic had been involved in

22     investing so much in training these elite forces, why would he have

23     supported their arrest upon their return to Serbia in 1992?

24             Your Honours, I have about ten minutes.  Would Your Honours allow

25     an extra ten minutes, please?

Page 11606

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  You're well over the two hours now.  At the

 2     same time, I was informed, Mr. Groome, that there was a matter in

 3     relation to protective measures which you would like to raise; is that

 4     correctly understood?

 5             MR. GROOME:  Yes, Your Honour.  I estimate it would take about

 6     five minutes.

 7             JUDGE ORIE:  It might even take a bit more to the extent that I'm

 8     informed about the nature of the matter you wanted to raise.

 9             Mr. Jordash, I was asking this because we usually have a break

10     after 75 minutes.  We're now close to 70 minutes.  I would suggest that

11     we take a break first, that you then have your additional ten minutes,

12     that we would then hear Mr. Groome --

13             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  -- on the matter he would like to raise and that we

15     finish well in time.

16             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you, Your Honour.

17             JUDGE ORIE:  Well, you say you have ten minutes left.  Then

18     apparently the slides are not equally -- equally distributed over the

19     time.  You are claiming that even if you would take 12 or 13 minutes,

20     that, under the present circumstances, would not cause a great problem.

21             MR. JORDASH:  Thank you.

22             JUDGE ORIE:  We'll take a break.  We'll resume at 12.30.

23             Mr. Jordash, you're expected not to finish any later than 10

24     minutes to 1.00, and then we'll hear the further submissions by

25     Mr. Groome.

Page 11607

 1                           --- Recess taken at 11.57 a.m.

 2                           --- On resuming at 12.32 p.m.

 3             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Jordash, please proceed.

 4             MR. JORDASH:  And so to move to a conclusion, the Defence case

 5     will show that the Prosecution interpretation of this joint criminal

 6     enterprise is but a blunt instrument.  It fails to accurately define the

 7     criminal purpose, it fails to identify when it may have began with any

 8     precision, and it fails to distinguish Mr. Stanisic's actions from those

 9     actions in furtherance of a criminal purpose.  The operations at Tara,

10     the Drina operations, the operations at Pauk, and the operations in 1995

11     are an eloquent demonstration of that submission.

12             The evidence will show as we've outlined that these were

13     legitimate military operations.  Of course, it was of concern and the

14     consequences were grave, that these operations involved certain

15     criminally disposed men.  However, that does not make the essential

16     lawfulness of the military objectives unlawful or make them part of the

17     JCE alleged.  Those who can be shown to be responsible for the sending of

18     Arkan and those who committed crimes have a case to answer, and those who

19     can be shown to be criminally responsible should pay the price.  And the

20     Defence will demonstrate that Mr. Stanisic had nothing to do with the

21     choices which led to those crimes and nothing to do with the crimes.

22             As I've indicated, the story of the Red Berets is much more

23     straightforward.  It's not even nearly as dramatic as the Prosecution

24     witnesses and some of the documentary evidence implies.

25             Some of the men who may have committed crimes may have been

Page 11608

 1     employed temporarily by the DB, but that doesn't make them forever and a

 2     day the responsibility of the DB or, particularly, of Mr. Stanisic.  We

 3     rely upon the fact that Mr. Stanisic had no role in choosing and

 4     employing these reserve forces.  Had he been able to micro-manage the

 5     state security in the way suggested by the Prosecution case, then he

 6     couldn't have fulfilled his essential duties.

 7             It is tempting to reach for simplistic answers and coherent

 8     stories, and the story of the Red Berets is one such tale.  It is a

 9     caricature description akin to a James Bond movie with Mr. Stanisic, the

10     caricature devil at the centre.

11             We submit that Mr. Stanisic and the Serbian MUP has been

12     demonised by the press, by the Serbian mythology, and lastly, now, by the

13     Prosecution witnesses.  We submit that the evidence will show that he did

14     his best to create security within Serbia for those and all of those who

15     were endangered by the war.  That is why his service became involved in

16     the operations towards the end of the war.

17             We submit that it is easy to point to sections of exhibits and

18     easy to take evidence out of context.  The Defence will provide that

19     context.

20             If I may just refer Your Honours to slides 51 to 61 -- sorry, 56

21     to 61.  In some ways it's a microcosm of the role Mr. Stanisic played in

22     the Defence case we will prove.  It relates to the period of the

23     Banja Luka operations.  Mr. Stanisic, in slide 56, is clearly engaged in

24     trying to find the two pilots, French pilots, who have been taken hostage

25     by the hot-heads from Pale.  Your Honours will see on slide 56 the view

Page 11609

 1     of Mladic, that Jovica is looking for the pilots, and there is no doubt

 2     that he does not like Slobo.

 3             Your Honours will see from slide 57 that Stanisic is playing one

 4     of the often games he was forced to play.  Bluff and double bluff is the

 5     role of an intelligence man, telling Mladic what he needed to tell in

 6     order to find the French pilots, saying he was exposed and working

 7     without the knowledge of Milosevic.  And if we move further down slide

 8     57, we see there that Mladic, presumably on information, presumably

 9     having discussed with the VRS high command, notes that a team from the

10     Serbian DB has arrived.  They are Filipovic and Bozovic.  They arrived.

11     Bozovic was a member of the reserve forces.  He was forever associated

12     with the DB from the early days.  It's telling that these are the men

13     identified as belonging to the DB.

14             Three hundred Arkan's volunteers arrived.  Mladic doesn't

15     associate them with the DB.  If Mr. Stanisic had had this long-standing

16     arrangement and relationship with Arkan's Men, he would have known that

17     Arkan's volunteers were part of the team from the Serbian DB.

18             And we turn to slide 58, and can I ask, please, to just briefly

19     for P24 -- 2545 P1 to be put on the screen.  The slide 58 has Stanisic

20     saying:

21             "There is no command there.  Political conflicts, cities are

22     falling.  Arkan is embedded there.  We sent 400 people."

23             We dispute that Arkan is embedded there is precisely the right

24     interpretation.  The right interpretation involves a meaning which

25     effectively says that Arkan put himself there.  In any event, even if

Page 11610

 1     Your Honours don't accept that, it is most telling that Jovica says in a

 2     list of chaos, in a list of problems, there is no command there,

 3     political conflicts, cities are falling, Arkan is there.  Why does

 4     Mr. Stanisic put that in a list of problems if he personally sent him

 5     there?  I mean, while Mr. Stanisic looks for the pilots.

 6             If we look over the page to slide 60, Mladic's notebook entry of

 7     the 3rd of October, 1995.  Filipovic notes:

 8             "Arkan's men are operating under the control of Pecanac."

 9             And he expresses approval for that, and that's what the

10     Prosecution rely upon.  They rely upon employees of the DB, themselves

11     forming individual relationships with the likes of Arkan and then

12     attributing that to Mr. Stanisic.

13             Bozovic, on slide 60, notes that:

14             "They came with a task," referring to the Serbian MUP, "a task

15     that they were aware of.  It was agreed that the RS -- that they would

16     replace the RS police and the RS police would go to the forward defence

17     line.  This was agreed with President Karadzic and General Milovanovic."

18             An illustration of what our defence is, because we submit that

19     the Banja Luka operations involved the Serbian MUP, and they involved the

20     Serbian MUP who sent men to replace the RS police who were being dragged

21     into the conflict, and the idea was that the Serbian MUP would replace

22     and conduct normal security duties.  That was agreed with

23     President Karadzic and General Milovanovic.

24             And at the bottom of slide 60 Your Honours will see a reference

25     there to Jakovljevic:

Page 11611

 1             "People are openly asking who brought Arkan and under whose

 2     patronage they are doing this."

 3             1995, it appears that no one at that time from the VRS high

 4     command associated Arkan with Stanisic.  If there was a glimmer of truth

 5     in the Prosecution case, he would have been known as Arkan -- as

 6     Stanisic's man.  And meanwhile, Stanisic is looking for the pilots.

 7             And then over the page to slide 61.  Another demonstration of the

 8     demonisation, we suggest, which has taken place in relation to the

 9     Serbian MUP.  Mladic notes he has a meeting with the inner circle of the

10     General Staff of the VRS, and he notes that already for four days no

11     resources have been coming from the FRY and the Serbian MUP has probably

12     put the border under its control after Arkan was chased away.  So there

13     you have it.  The Serbian MUP controlling and preventing Arkan from

14     working.  And there you have it at the bottom of slide 21 [sic], Mladic

15     noting that they have a problem with the RS MUP after Arkan was chased

16     away, and Tomo Kovac Minister of the Interior does not accept the order

17     and use of the military police.

18             In other words, there's the association:  Arkan was invited by

19     the RS MUP and prevented from returning by the Serbian MUP, and therein

20     lies the Prosecution case exposed.

21             And so finally, turning to Prosecution Exhibit P690, and the

22     Prosecution put some weight on this because it -- in reality it's one of

23     the very, very few comments from Mr. Stanisic which might be construed as

24     indicating support for any criminal enterprise.

25             We submit it is pre-war bravado.  A proper analysis of that

Page 11612

 1     discussion shows that the discussion revolves around a peace agreement

 2     and the necessity for bringing people like Babic, extremists to the

 3     negotiating table, and Stanisic using inflammatory language.  It is not

 4     an indication of his mens rea.  It's an indication of pre-war bravado and

 5     frustration that others will not accept peace.  And if we go over the

 6     page to line 63, the section missed out by the Prosecution where Stanisic

 7     says:

 8             "If they want it, they'll have an all-out war."

 9             "Yes, yes," says Karadzic.

10             Stanisic answers:

11             "Better do it like decent people."

12             And in our submission, that's what the Defence will show, that

13     Stanisic did it like a decent person, because as the witnesses will

14     confirm, he is a decent person.  And whilst cities were falling and

15     whilst Arkan placed himself there, Stanisic was doing what he did, trying

16     to secure Serbia by rescuing the two pilots, trying to secure that peace

17     would come and that Serbia would not be dragged into the war, and that

18     will be the Defence case.

19             Thank you.

20             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you, Mr. Jordash.  Just ...

21             Mr. Bakrac and Mr. Petrovic, from yesterday's Pre-Defence

22     Conference, the Chamber understands that you're waiving your right to

23     make an opening statement at this stage of the proceedings.  Mr. Groome

24     has expressed some concerns about compliance with Rule 65 ter (F).  I

25     just want to emphasise that of course if you choose not to make an

Page 11613

 1     opening statement, that that in itself does not mean that if there are

 2     changes in the nature of the accused's Defence, then of course it would

 3     be appropriate to report that, and I take it that Mr. Groome will keep a

 4     close eye on how you will proceed during the Stanisic Defence case and

 5     the Simatovic Defence case to see whether the concern reaches levels

 6     which ask for action.  Until now, it was just an expression of concern.

 7             MR. GROOME:  That's correct, Your Honour.

 8             JUDGE ORIE:  Then I'd like to leave it to that at this moment.

 9             I was informed that Mr. Groome would like to raise a certain

10     matter in relation to protective measures.  Are there any other matters

11     the parties would like to raise?

12             Mr. Jordash, I see you are nodding no.  I do not see any positive

13     response from the Simatovic Defence.  Therefore, I take it that we only

14     have the one issue to be raised by Mr. Groome.

15             Mr. Groome, do we need to go into private session or is there no

16     need to do that?

17             MR. GROOME:  I don't believe there's a need, Your Honour.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  Then please proceed.

19             MR. GROOME:  Thank you, Your Honour.  And just so it's clear,

20     this is unrelated to the opening that we've just heard.  It's a different

21     matter.

22             On the 27th of September, 2010, the Defence for Jovica Stanisic

23     sought access to all confidential inter partes materials in the case of

24     Prosecutor v. Simic et al.  The Trial Chamber granted this request on the

25     24th of March, 2011, with certain limitations, specifically the Trial

Page 11614

 1     Chamber's order required the extraction of several different categories

 2     of material, and that is the -- the title of that decision is decision on

 3     request of Jovica Stanisic for access to confidential materials in the

 4     Krajisnik and Simic et al. cases.

 5             Subsequently, the Defence for Franko Simatovic sought access to

 6     the Simic material on the 2nd of June, 2011.  In the process of drafting

 7     the response to the Simatovic request, the Prosecution realised that the

 8     Simatovic Defence was previously granted access to all inter partes

 9     confidential materials in the Simic case on the 12th of April, 2005, and

10     this was a decision rendered by the Appeals Chamber under case IT-95-9-A,

11     entitled:  "Decision on Defence Motion by Franko Simatovic for Access to

12     Transcripts, Exhibits, Documentary Evidence, and Motions Filed by the

13     Parties in the Simic et al. Case."

14             The respective Defence teams of the Simic case and the

15     Prosecution reviewed the material that the Appeals Chamber ordered to be

16     reviewed and informed the registry that there were no issues related to

17     protective measures or Rule 70 that needed to be resolved prior to giving

18     the Simatovic Defence access to this material.  The materials were

19     provided on a CD to Mr. Jovanovic, then counsel for Mr. Simatovic on the

20     20th of July, 2005.

21             As a matter of fairness, the Prosecution considers that both the

22     Defence teams should have the same access to confidential materials in

23     the Simic case.  Thus the Prosecution seeks this Trial Chamber -- or

24     requests this Trial Chamber to vary it's decision of March 2011 to --

25     to -- to bring that decision into conformity with the Appeals Chamber

Page 11615

 1     decision of the 12th of April, 2005, and to order the Prosecution to turn

 2     over the same materials that had been previously provided for the

 3     Simatovic Defence.  I provided courtesy copies of the Appeals Chamber

 4     decision earlier today.  If the Chamber grants this request, the

 5     Prosecution has identified no additional confidential inter partes

 6     materials subject to Rule 70, and we have located the CD that was

 7     provided the Simatovic Defence in 2005 and would be able to disclose that

 8     forthwith.

 9             Thank you, Your Honour.

10             JUDGE ORIE:  Thank you.  Any response for any observation?

11             MR. JORDASH:  Only thank you.

12             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] No, Your Honours.  Everything is as

13     indicated by the Prosecutor.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes, of course.  Apart from that you were asking on

15     the 2nd of June the same material you have received before, so if you say

16     let's leave it to that, let the Chamber write a decision on that, is --

17     if that's your intention, I cannot ensure you that we will follow that

18     suggestion.

19             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, my apologies.  I

20     thought we wanted to wrap up soon.  We weren't familiar with this.

21     That's why we weren't able to locate the detail about Mr. Jovanovic and

22     the decision dated back to 2005.  So that's where the misunderstanding

23     stemmed from.  And Mr. -- the filing concerning Mr. Jovanovic dated back

24     to 2003, and we weren't able to locate it.

25             JUDGE ORIE:  I'm not blaming you for having difficulties in

Page 11616

 1     finding the CD-ROM, although I would -- to the extent it has not been

 2     done, I would perhaps advise you to go through the list of decisions in

 3     this case so that you didn't miss one, which saves a lot of time in

 4     writing new motions which cover the same -- the same subject matter.  But

 5     may I take it that what you just said is an oral withdrawal of the 2nd of

 6     June motion?  Is that how we have to understand your submission?

 7             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  I was just about

 8     to state that, but for the reasons I mentioned and the problems we had

 9     with locating late Mr. Jovanovic's material, we kindly request the OTP to

10     hand this specific material over.  That's the material we were already

11     given back in 2005, and we withdraw our application.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Groome.

13             MR. GROOME:  Your Honour, that was provided if, Mr. Bakrac will

14     recall, in October of 2009.  He requested that we redisclose all of the

15     material provided to Mr. Jovanovic, and this material was provided on the

16     hard drive that the Defence was given.  And if he has any trouble

17     locating it, we will, of course, redisclose again.

18             JUDGE ORIE:  That then seems to be resolved.  If I -- Mr. Groome

19     will assist you in ensuring that you have this material available,

20     whether or not it's already in your possession, whether it's once or

21     twice in the possession of the Simatovic Defence.  And you were about to

22     say that you would withdraw the motion which is now put on the record.

23             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  Mr. Groome and

24     our Defence team will work together to try and locate the material, and

25     for the record, I do withdraw our motion, yes.

Page 11617

 1             JUDGE ORIE:  That's on the record.

 2             Then the matter itself, this Chamber -- Mr. Groome, you very much

 3     emphasised the equal position for both Defence teams.  Now, I'm not going

 4     to comment on what happened in 2005.  What I can do is to briefly comment

 5     on what we did in 2011.

 6             In 2011, this Chamber established that -- and in that respect

 7     referring to submissions made by the Prosecution that there are

 8     categories -- let me just have a look.  That there are categories that

 9     include remuneration, provisional release, fitness to stand trial,

10     Registry submissions of expert reports on health issues, notices of

11     nonattendance in court, modalities of trial, protective measures,

12     subpoenas, applications for video-conference links, as well as orders to

13     redact the public transcript and the public broadcast of a hearing.

14             We considered that the applicant had no forensic purpose for

15     access.  Now, the question then arises, what is more important, equality

16     between the parties, one of the parties having received material or at

17     least I do not know whether it existed or -- but at least not -- where

18     access is not excluded from material which this Trial Chamber considered

19     to have no -- no forensic purpose.  Now, what to do under those

20     circumstances, to restore equality by giving to the Stanisic Defence also

21     material which serves no forensic purpose?  There was no request for a

22     certificate to appeal this decision in this respect.  It was emphasised

23     by the Prosecution that this did not serve any forensic purpose.

24             Now, what is more important to restore equality by giving to the

25     Stanisic Defence material which we consider totally without purpose to

Page 11618

 1     give it to them, or to say let's leave the inequality exist as it does

 2     exist and not further add to access to materials which, in the view of

 3     this Chamber, no access should have been given to at least the Appeals

 4     Chamber at that time was very much concerned about the difference between

 5     inter partes and ex parte material.  Well, that's not an issue that

 6     arises here.

 7             So before the Chamber will decide, Mr. Jordash, are you

 8     interested in receiving materials without a forensic purpose just in

 9     order to restore equality in this respect?

10             MR. JORDASH:  Well, I can probably speak on behalf of our

11     beleaguered case manager, and the answer's no.

12             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now, Mr. Groome, thinking about further

13     distribution of, I would say, material often with a -- some kind of a

14     privacy element in it and without a forensic purpose, would you - also in

15     view of the answer given by the Stanisic Defence - would you insist on

16     your motion, your oral motion, that the Chamber would override the

17     protective measures?

18             MR. GROOME:  No, Your Honour.  I'm not going to insist that the

19     Stanisic Defence accept something that they do not want.  I guess one of

20     the considerations that prompted this was that I know that the two

21     Defence teams do have some co-operation, and if one had some material

22     that the other didn't, where we're setting up a situation where there

23     could be an inadvertent violation of an order to --

24             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Now, I do understand that the Defence teams,

25     both Defence teams are so much short of time that they would certainly

Page 11619

 1     not discuss matters which have no forensic purpose at all.  That's at

 2     least my expectation.  Under the present circumstances, may I take it

 3     that the Simatovic Defence, again I do not know whether there's any

 4     provisional release material in the Simic -- you would not know either,

 5     because you don't have that material, but would you, if you receive it,

 6     would you please carefully look at whether there's any material of those

 7     categories which we listed in the decision on the Stanisic motion for

 8     access and to avoid to discuss that with the Stanisic Defence, because it

 9     is in your hands.  It is confidential material.  It is not accessible to

10     the Stanisic Defence, and they have no problem with that.  So if you

11     would be very strict on that, no errors or no mistakes will occur.

12             MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.  We'll proceed as

13     best we can, and we'll follow your guidance.

14             JUDGE ORIE:  There's even another option which you could

15     consider.  The decision of the Appeals Chamber is there, and this

16     Chamber, of course, is not in any way competent to even discuss this

17     decision, but in view of the Chamber's decision and in view of the access

18     granted to the Stanisic Defence, you could even invite Mr. Groome when

19     again supplying you with the information to leave out what is not given

20     to the Stanisic Defence and not insisting on having full disclosure of

21     these materials.

22             Mr. Groome, you have -- you must have two sets, the old one and

23     the new one, the limited Stanisic one.  So I leave that entirely in your

24     hands whether you want to make such a request to the Prosecution or not.

25     It would at least restore in practical terms the equality.

Page 11620

 1             MR. GROOME:  Yes, Your Honour.

 2             JUDGE ORIE:  Mr. Groome, may I take it that from your earlier

 3     observation that your oral application is withdrawn.

 4             MR. GROOME:  Yes, Your Honour.

 5             JUDGE ORIE:  Yes.  Any other matter to be raised at this moment?

 6     If not, I would like to inform the parties that they will soon know

 7     whether next week Friday, which is, if I'm not mistaken, the 24th of

 8     June, that you'll be informed about whether we'll hear the evidence in

 9     the morning or the afternoon, and there is a fair chance that it would be

10     in the afternoon, and I put you already on notice before you make any

11     travel arrangements that there's a risk that it will be in the afternoon,

12     but you will be informed as soon as possible.

13             If there's no other matter, we stand adjourned, and we resume

14     Monday -- no, Tuesday, the 21st of June, at quarter past 2.00 in the

15     afternoon in Courtroom II, I take it.

16             Madam Registrar, could you confirm that?  Yes, it is hereby

17     confirmed.

18             We stand adjourned.

19                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 1.08 p.m.,

20                           to be reconvened on Tuesday, the 21st day

21                           of June, 2011, at 2.15 p.m.