1 Tuesday, 8 November 2011
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.22 p.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon to everyone.
6 Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours.
8 This is Case number IT-03-69-T. The Prosecutor versus
9 Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
11 Ween haven't seen each other for awhile. Are there any
12 procedural issues to be raised at this very moment? I see no by the
13 Prosecution. I do not hear anything from either Stanisic or Simatovic
15 Before we invite the Stanisic Defence to call its next witness,
16 I'd like to go briefly into private session.
17 [Private session]
11 Pages 14726-14728 redacted. Private session.
6 [Open session]
7 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
8 JUDGE ORIE: The witness the Stanisic Defence is calling I'll for
9 the time being call him Witness 36. Mr. Jordash, have you verified with
10 the witness whether he has any person interest in --
11 MR. JORDASH: None at all, thank you.
12 JUDGE ORIE: None at all. We don't have to deal with that in
13 private session, I'll just put it on the record.
14 MR. JORDASH: Your Honour, yes. I've discussed at length and he
15 is familiar with the issues.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Then could the witness be escorted into the
17 courtroom. Perhaps we could use our time, the 92 ter motion was filed on
18 the 4th of November, which is only a couple of days ago. Any position as
19 far as the Prosecution is concerned.
20 MR. FARR: We haven't yet seen a signed version of the statement.
21 I assume there is one -- if it's identical to the -- if counsel can
22 represent that it's identical we'll have no objection once the foundation
23 is laid. With respect to the documents, our position is that only four
24 of them were authenticated. Only four of them were authenticated by the
25 statement. Those were 1D5249, 1D5248, 1D5240, and D246 MFI. That said,
1 there are a number of documents referred to in the statement that are
2 also referred to on the comment chart that we received and we've provided
3 the Defence our position with respect to those documents on the comment
5 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
6 [The witness entered court]
7 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon, Mr. Dragicevic.
8 THE WITNESS: Yes, my name is Vlado Dragicevic.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Before you give evidence --
10 THE WITNESS: Excuse me, I should talk in Serbian.
11 JUDGE ORIE: You can talk in your own language. You'll receive
12 translation. Before you give evidence the rules require you to give a
13 solemn he declaration. The text is now handed out to you, would you
14 please make that solemn declaration.
15 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I solemnly declare that I will
16 speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, please be seated.
18 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Dragicevic, we were informed by the Defence that
20 you have no personal reasons to apply for protective measures. However,
21 the Republic of Serbia has asked for certain protective measures,
22 including hearing your testimony in closed session. As the Republic of
23 Serbia is well aware of now, that an application for closed session based
24 on general considerations of state security is not granted and has not
25 been granted for a while by this Chamber. Nevertheless, the Chamber
1 accepts that there may be reasons to hear part of your evidence in
2 private session, that is not to be known to the public, and that is if
3 the questions or the answers would reveal the identity of a BIA source,
4 the identity of a BIA operative, or a location used by the security
6 So if we come to that point, the parties are already alert on
7 that, but you could be alert on it as well. In addition to that, if
8 there are really sensitive issues in the relations between the Serbian
9 secret services and any foreign secret services, the parties may apply
10 for going into private session. If you feel that there's anything really
11 sensitive about that which directly affects concretely state security
12 interests then we could consider to go into private session for those
14 You'll first be examined by Mr. Jordash. Mr. Jordash is counsel
15 for Mr. Stanisic.
16 Mr. Jordash, please proceed.
17 WITNESS: VLADO DRAGICEVIC
18 [Witness answered through interpreter]
19 Examination by Mr. Jordash:
20 Q. Good afternoon.
21 A. Good afternoon.
22 Q. Please give your full name on date of birth for the Court,
24 A. My name is Vlado Dragicevic. I was born on the 1st of October,
25 1949, in Belgrade.
1 MR. JORDASH: Could I ask, please, for 1D05257 to be brought up
2 to the screen. I have a hard copy for the witness who has indicated he
3 prefers if possible to see the hard copy.
4 Q. What is going to be handed to you now is a document which is a
5 statement and I want you to look at it and confirm whether that's a
6 statement which is your statement.
7 MR. JORDASH: May I just have a moment, please.
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, that's the statement.
9 MR. JORDASH: For the record, this is the same statement that was
10 disclosed to the Prosecution. It hasn't changed.
11 Q. Do you recognise your signature on the document? Does this --
12 A. Yes, I do.
13 Q. Do you recall being interviewed on the dates indicated, 3rd of
14 June, the 28th of September, 19th and 30th of October, and the 2nd of
15 November, 2011?
16 A. That's right. These are the dates.
17 Q. And if you just quickly open the statement, is that the statement
18 that you've seen before and confirmed with your signature?
19 A. Yes, that's my statement and this is my signature.
20 Q. And the content of the statement, is it in accordance with the
22 A. Yes, it is. It is truthful.
23 Q. And have you had an opportunity to review the statement and make
24 any clarifications and corrections that you wanted to make?
25 A. Yes, I have.
1 Q. And if you were asked the same questions concerning the same
2 subjects, would you provide in substance the same answers?
3 A. Yes.
4 MR. JORDASH: May I tender the statement, please.
5 JUDGE ORIE: No objections.
6 Madam Registrar, the --
7 THE REGISTRAR: The number would be D466, Your Honour.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
9 Now, there's one matter, Mr. Jordash, I take it that the witness
10 has signed also page 22 in English - perhaps he could have a look at it -
11 where he says: "I do not agree with my statement being given to anyone
12 other than the parties," which of course where you earlier said he is not
13 asking for any protective measures, it's a kind of non-disclosure claim.
14 And, Mr. Dragicevic, the hearings are public here. We were
15 informed that you do not seek any protective measures for yourself. We
16 have decided on any protective measures requested by the Republic of
17 Serbia and informed you about that. So, therefore, if this document is
18 admitted, it will be a public document. There's no problem despite your
19 statement on page 22nd -- the 22nd page that you do not agree with the
20 statement being given because it will be public, unless we decide
21 otherwise, but then we'd like to know exactly why you would object to
22 make this a public document?
23 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I have no reason
24 whatsoever to object to this.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Then it -- then D466 is admitted into evidence.
1 Please proceed.
2 MR. JORDASH: Could we have, please, on the screen 1D05258. And
3 we have a hard copy for the witness.
4 Q. This, as you'll see, Mr. Dragicevic, is a table, a list of
5 documents to the left and the right-hand column, a comment column. Do
6 you recall when you came to The Hague being given a number of documents
7 to review, this chart, and asked to place your comments in the chart
8 having reviewed the documents?
9 A. Yes, I do.
10 Q. Do you recognise the signature and the date on the front page?
11 A. Yes, that's my signature.
12 Q. Did you complete this chart and then put your signature on each
14 A. Yes, I filled it in and placed my signature.
15 Q. Were your comments in accordance with the truth?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Were you given an opportunity to review your comments to make any
18 clarifications or corrections you wanted to make?
19 A. Yes, I was.
20 Q. And if you were shown the document and asked to make comments
21 again, you'd make in substance the same comments?
22 A. Yes.
23 MR. JORDASH: May I tender this chart with the documents. There
24 are a number of documents where there's still objections. Perhaps if the
25 chart could be tendered and the document MFI'd for the moment.
1 MR. FARR: No objection to that approach, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar, MFI number would be?
3 THE REGISTRAR: The number for the chart would be D467,
4 Your Honour.
5 JUDGE ORIE: And this MFI'd. Any need to have it under seal,
6 Mr. Jordash?
7 MR. JORDASH: No, I don't think so.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Then it will be MFI'd as a public document. Now, as
9 far as the signatures are you said at the bottom of every page.
10 MR. JORDASH: I'm hoping there are signatures on every page.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Well, I'm a bit --
12 MR. JORDASH: It's the right-hand corner.
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, I did sign it.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, just see whether we have it. I see page
15 1 out of 10 is one version in e-court, whereas I have another one which
16 says page 1 of 11. That is the --
17 MR. JORDASH: One is B/C/S, I think, Your Honour, one is English,
18 and the one on the right is the English and the witness signed the one on
19 the right.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
21 MR. JORDASH: He speaks English well.
22 JUDGE ORIE: It is the English one which is signed and has one
23 page less. Yes, that's fine with me.
24 Please proceed.
25 MR. JORDASH: May I ask if Your Honours have been given the list
1 of names with numbers? Perhaps the witness could also be given a copy.
2 Q. What is going to be handed to you, Mr. Dragicevic, is a sheet of
3 paper with the names of certain individuals who will appear in your
4 evidence and whose identity should be kept from the public. So when
5 referring to those names, would you please refer to the numbers.
6 MR. JORDASH: I think we can be probably exclude Number 13 from
7 that. I don't think there's any need for him to not be mentioned in
9 Q. You follow me?
10 A. Yes.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, are you going to file the list of names
12 as a confidential exhibit?
13 MR. JORDASH: Yes, please, yes. We haven't uploaded it yet.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Otherwise we don't know what Number 1 or 10 or 7 has
15 done without knowing who it is. Is it uploaded?
16 MR. JORDASH: No, it's not.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Would you please take care that it will be uploaded
18 so that a number can be assigned and that it will be admitted as a
19 confidential exhibit.
20 Please proceed.
21 MR. JORDASH:
22 Q. Now, Mr. Witness, I want to take you through your statement and
23 some of the exhibits to elaborate and clarify some issues. There is no
24 need to repeat the content of these documents because all are now before
25 the Court. You follow me?
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. Let's go straight to your statement D466 and paragraph number 3.
3 There you are discussing attending a conference in London in 1991
4 or 1992 with Assistant Minister Kertes and upon your return being fired
5 by Minister Bulatovic having been accused of not seeking permission from
6 the minister to go to London. What was the situation in relation to that
7 visit to London? Who invited you to go and for what reason?
8 A. Sometime in 1991 and 1992 a conference was organised in London in
9 relation to the situation in the then Yugoslavia. At the time I was head
10 of the department for international co-operation and all contacts with
11 foreign services in the federal Secretariat of the Interior. At the
12 time, Mr. Mihalj Kertes was assistant minister of the interior, later to
13 become the customs director. He invited me to accompany him to London.
14 More to the point, he told me that I should get ready at once and be at
15 the airport in two hours' time in order to fly to London. I did as much.
16 However, as we returned to Belgrade, I received a letter informing me
17 that I had been relieved of all of my duties.
18 Q. What did Kertes want you to do in London?
19 A. I was merely told I should accompany him to London. I understood
20 it as a security detail. I was supposed to provide security for him
21 during the London trip. Nothing more.
22 Q. Did you do --
23 THE INTERPRETER: Could all unnecessary microphones please be
24 turned off. Thank you.
25 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I did.
1 MR. JORDASH:
2 Q. Was there any protocol in place which said you should have sought
3 permission from the minister?
4 A. No, there was no such protocol, there was no reason why assistant
5 minister's order would be called into question. This never crossed my
7 Q. Do you know if there was any ulterior reason why Bulatovic fired
9 A. No. I was told that I should have applied to the minister
10 directly for a permission to go on that trip.
11 Q. Moving to paragraph 5, you started working for the DB of Serbia
12 as a special advisor. What was envisaged in that role as special
14 A. The role of the special advisor was an official act whereby
15 members of a service would be ranked. Specifically I advised the head of
16 service about contacts with foreign security services and received
17 guidance from him on what I was to do next.
18 Q. Had Mr. Stanisic had such advice previous to your employment?
19 A. Which employment do you mean? I don't understand.
20 Q. Your employment as a special advisor. Had Mr. Stanisic been
21 receiving advice concerning contact with foreign security services up
22 until that point?
23 A. To answer the question, I need to explain the structure that was
24 in place at the time. Contacts with foreign intelligence services were
25 maintained only by the federal security service. The republican security
1 services were not entitled to maintain these contacts.
2 Q. And what was the change at this point in time? Was there a
3 change at this point in time?
4 A. The change occurred when I became a member of the State Security
5 Service of the Republic of Serbia.
6 Q. Do you know if this was a change which was occurring in other
7 republican services?
8 A. I suppose so since other republican services created their own
9 respective services whereas the federal service virtually ceased to
11 Q. Moving to paragraph 8 of your statement wherein you are
12 discussing the take-over of the federal SUP and you note six lines down
13 in the English that you had received information or the Serbian DB
14 received information from the federal MUP premises which was information
15 about the leaders of the other republics including Tudjman and
16 Izetbegovic, and you note that you did not use that information [As read]
17 "... because we did not think it was the way in which it should be used.
18 We did not think it was appropriate to act in that manner. Stanisic
19 mentioned it several times and meetings with representatives of foreign
21 Why was it considered by Stanisic and the service to be
23 A. When the state security of the Republic of Serbia took over the
24 building of the federal SUP, naturally we obtained documents and
25 information related to certain individuals and leaders of the former
1 republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. As you put
2 it, and as I said in my statement, at every meeting with representatives
3 of foreign intelligence services when they put questions related to the
4 take-over of the building of the federal SUP, Mr. Stanisic always
5 insisted on the fact that we were in possession of the documentation but
6 believed that this was not a way of going about publishing the documents,
7 or going public with the documents, as that would not have been deemed
8 appropriate towards the said individuals. We kept the documentation
10 Q. The question -- just listen and answer directly to the question.
11 The question was, why was it considered inappropriate?
12 A. We considered it inappropriate because it had do with individual
13 leaders and their character. They were leaders of the newly-established
14 republics. We personally thought that this was no way of going about
15 things, i.e., disclosing the documents at that point in time.
16 Q. Apart from the service, do you know if they were disclosed to
17 anyone outside of the service?
18 A. I'm not aware of that.
19 MR. JORDASH: Moving to paragraph 11, please.
20 Q. Paragraph 11 you testify to the movement of employees to the DB
21 of Serbia and the fact that no one was fired from the federal SUP. And
22 you testify to one of the heads of the administrations being a Croat,
23 Zlatko Radnic. Do you see that?
24 THE INTERPRETER: Could all the unnecessary microphones please be
25 switched off. Thank you.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes.
2 MR. JORDASH:
3 Q. What was Zlatko Radnic's role in the Serbian DB from 1992?
4 A. Zlatko Radnic was head of the administration charged with the
5 protection of individuals and institutions of special significance.
6 Q. And how long did he continue in that post?
7 A. He continued in that post up until 1999 when both of us were
8 removed from our positions pursuant to a decision of the then head of the
9 DB, Radomir Markovic.
10 Q. Were questions ever raised about Radnic's continued employment in
11 the DB?
12 A. You mean after 1999?
13 Q. No, I mean from 1992 onwards, whether there were questions raised
14 by any authority about the continuation of a Croat's employment in the
16 A. As far as I remember, the then director Janackovic who kept
17 exerting pressure on Mr. Stanisic wanted Zlatko Radnic to be removed from
18 his position and membership of the State Security Service of Serbia being
19 a Croat.
20 Q. We can turn to it, but there is a document 1D02591, which
21 describes a visit by yourself and Stanisic and Loncar and a Zlatko Radnic
22 in 1996 to see the CIA in America. Do you recall that?
23 A. Yes, I do. It was our first visit to the CIA in the
24 United States. The delegation was composed of Mr. Jovica Stanisic as the
25 head of SDB of Serbia, Mr. Borislav Loncar head of analytics,
1 Mr. Zlatko Radnic as head of the administration for the protection of
2 individuals --
3 Q. Sorry to interrupt. We are going to come back to that visit in
4 more detail a bit later, but the question I want to ask you now is
5 whether that is the same Zlatko Radnic as we've been talking about, the
6 Croat who was the head of the administration for security of VIPs?
7 A. Yes, you are right. That's the man.
8 Q. Thank you. We'll come back to that in a moment. Let's go back
9 to your statement, paragraph 12. Paragraph 12, just to situate
10 ourselves, is dealing with a period from October 1992, and your job as
11 the head of the administration for international co-operation with the --
12 within the Serbian DB and the primary duties you had there. Can I just
13 ask a few questions to try to clarify what the situation was in relation
14 to Serbia's position within the international community at that point in
16 Were there any economic sanctions imposed at that point on the
18 A. Yes, there were.
19 Q. And in relation to ambassadors from the international community
20 from western countries, were there any international ambassadors in the
21 FRY at that point?
22 A. Yes, there were. Though, with your permission, I'd like to say
23 that some of the functions were delegated to the rank of a charge
24 d'affaires rather than an ambassador.
25 Q. Who was that?
1 A. These reflected political views on the part of the some of the
2 states and where sanctions are involved, the levels represented in the
3 embassies get relegated to a level below so you no longer have an
4 ambassador in place but rather a charge d'affaires, so that would be the
5 next in line.
6 Q. Do you know at what point the Contact Group consisting of a
7 number of countries was formed?
8 A. Well, I suppose that it was in 1992, though I'm not positive
9 about it.
10 Q. Let's go back to your statement. You testified to your primary
11 duties as the head of the administration for international co-operation
12 being to meet with representatives of foreign services, mainly on their
13 request, and to submit reports on those meetings. Which services were
14 you meeting in late 1992 and onwards?
15 A. In late 1992 there were significantly fewer representatives
16 compared to the earlier period. However, from 1992 onwards, we managed
17 to obtain the presence of more of them and have contact with close to 60
18 representatives of foreign intelligence services of various countries.
19 Q. Could you name those that were considered to you and the service
20 to be important, or particularly important, I should say?
21 A. Well, we considered to be particularly important our contacts
22 with representatives of the US, France, the Russian Federation, Germany,
23 and we tried in every possible way to establish contact and renew our
24 formerly good co-operation with the countries in the immediate area, and
25 of course with China too.
1 Q. And when you say "we tried in every possible way" at what point
2 in time did those efforts begin and how long did they continue through
3 the 1990s?
4 A. Well, in the early 1990s, the situation was very bad. At one
5 point I wondered what the point of my job was since I was unable to
6 appropriately respond to requests put forth by some representatives of
7 foreign intelligence services. Working as I was for the federal SUP at
8 the time, I wasn't able to provide them with information that they were
9 interested in.
10 Q. And what about when you started working for the Serbian DB, were
11 you able to begin that work at that point, or when?
12 A. At that point we had already started with some of our activities
13 aimed at developing co-operation. Of course, this was not a process that
14 could be completed overnight. Still, in the course of several years, I
15 can safely say that we restored the level of co-operation we had before
16 and were able to develop solid relations with various services.
17 Q. And we'll come to some specifics shortly, but in a general sense,
18 what was the point from your perspective of that co-operation? What was
19 it designed to achieve?
20 A. The objectives of co-operation depend on the situation of a given
21 country. For us it was a rather distinct moment of confusion where
22 issues of vital interest had to be resolved first. The throughput of
23 information had to be made possible, especially information relating to
24 the situation on the field. And we had to introduce peace and stability
25 in the Balkans.
1 At the same time there was a political purpose to these meetings
2 as well. Political messages can be passed along between two countries
3 through their respective intelligence services. This is a way of
4 establishing good contacts and resolving a great many issues among
5 countries, and improving their relations in general.
6 Q. Again in a general sense, what were the foreign intelligence
7 services interested in? What was it that they, from what you could see,
8 hoped to achieve through meeting representatives of the Serbian DB?
9 A. Well, first of all, the purpose of these meetings was their
10 desire to become acquainted with the situation in the crisis area as well
11 as with the situation in Serbia itself. In addition, they thought it
12 their vital interest issues such as fights against international
13 terrorism, organised crime, fire-arms smuggling, and these were the
14 issues that they were particularly interested in. I would like, first
15 and foremost, to underline the importance of the struggle against
16 international terrorism because all the countries, globally speaking,
17 were interested in that a particular issue.
18 Q. And in relation to events within the former Yugoslavia, were they
19 interested in those, and if so, could you discern a purpose for that, why
20 they were interested?
21 A. Yes, they were interested, but primarily with a view to
22 introducing and bringing peace and stability to the war-torn areas. As
23 well as with a view to implementing the agreements that had been set up
24 by the international community.
25 Q. And were you given instructions from Stanisic in relation to that
2 A. My duties as the head of the administration for international
3 co-operation involved my obligation to report Mr. Stanisic, who was my
4 immediate superior, about every contact that I made. And I always
5 consulted with him when I had a conversation or a meeting with someone.
6 Q. And how did you decide what information you should provide in
7 relation to the objective concerning peace and stability in the war-torn
9 A. In such situations it was up to my personal assessment. If I
10 decided that I wouldn't be able to do something on my own, I would then
11 consult Mr. Stanisic and he would give me instructions and guidance and I
12 would act accordingly in my communications with representatives of
13 foreign intelligence services.
14 Q. Looking at paragraph 12 again, and the second part of the
15 paragraph, you confirm that reports were written on all of the meetings
16 and those materials should exist in the department of analytics. And
17 that you know that the defence for Mr. Stanisic requested that it be
18 provided with materials and that a response was received that the BIA did
19 not possess such materials.
20 Do you know of any reason why those materials should not be with
22 A. After every conversation I would compile an Official Note which I
23 submitted to Mr. Stanisic as my immediate superior. Therefore, all the
24 documents that I drafted, and I can categorically state because I was the
25 head of the administration and for the most part I worked independently,
1 are in the analytics department of the incumbent security and information
2 agency. If you allow me, I would like to note that after the 5th of
3 October, I began working for the BIA and up until 2003 I was the chief,
4 the chef de cabinet of the chief of the national security. Therefore, I
5 know for sure that this documentation still exists.
6 Now, why it wasn't made accessible to me, I don't think this is a
7 proper place to discuss that.
8 Q. Let me just ask you something about what you just said, you said
9 that you would like to note that after the 5th of October, you began
10 working for BIA. Which year, please?
11 A. I'm referring to the events that were called the revolution in
12 Serbia which took place on the 5th of October, 2000.
13 Q. Sorry, can I just press you on what your answer that you do not
14 think this is a proper place to discuss why documentation was not made
15 accessible to you. Why is that?
16 A. I said that because I feel really ashamed for not having received
17 from my country and my state what I needed and what I wanted to receive.
18 Q. Okay. Thank you. Let's move on in the statement to paragraph
20 JUDGE ORIE: The question was whether you have an explanation why
21 it was not made available to you. I appreciate that you feel quite
22 unhappy and, even as you said, ashamed for it, but what caused it, do you
23 know? Because it's not only you that has not given access to it, but
24 also the Stanisic Defence. That's the issue which is important for this
25 Chamber. So do you know of any reason why you or Mr. Jordash would have
1 had -- would have not been granted access to those materials?
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't give you the true reason
3 and I wouldn't like to speculate. Now, in the response received by the
4 security information agency, they say that they didn't have the documents
5 that was being required. I retired in 2003 and I left these documents
6 behind and I know that these documents exist. If it was destroyed, that
7 would constitute a criminal offence. This is all that I can say about
8 the matter.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Jordash.
10 MR. JORDASH:
11 Q. One clarification, if I may. Why would it constitute a criminal
12 offence? What are the rules concerning destruction of these types of
13 documents within the Serbian DB or the BIA?
14 A. The reason is that such documents mustn't be destroyed. The
15 usual practice is that if a decision about the destruction of documents
16 is to be taken, can only happen after many years. I think that some
17 files can be opened and some documents destroyed, for example, after 50
19 Q. Thank you. Now, paragraph 15 you testify to a co-operation --
20 sorry, the signing of co-operation protocols. Are you able to indicate
21 when the protocol was signed with the American service, approximately?
22 A. Roughly speaking, I can say that this took place in 1996.
23 Q. And the Russian and the Chinese, please?
24 A. [In English] With -- [Interpretation] Sorry. As for the Chinese
25 intelligence service, we had a rather peculiar situation because contacts
1 with their service go back to the 1980s. A protocol was signed at the
2 time between the former Yugoslavia and their intelligence services. It
3 might as well be the oldest protocol of the kind that our service had.
4 As for the service of the Russian Federation, I think the same applies to
5 them as well, that it took part -- it happened in 1995 or 1996. I cannot
6 be sure. With Croatia in 1996 as well, with the Egyptian service and the
7 German service and some other services as well.
8 Q. Okay. Just very briefly, what is generally contained in a
9 co-operation protocol?
10 A. In principle a protocol on co-operation contains guide-lines
11 governing co-operation between two services and also obligations of the
12 both sides with regard to the agreements reached. And it mainly referred
13 to the issues that I already mentioned, such as the combat against the
14 international terrorism, arms smuggling, technical co-operation,
15 training, or inter-training between the services. And mutual visits and
16 exchange of information that are of interest for the both services.
17 Q. I want to move on to the co-operation of the Serbian DB with the
18 American intelligence agency, the CIA.
19 MR. JORDASH: I don't know if this is the right time but I'm
20 moving on to a slightly different subject.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Perhaps we first take a break, but before
22 doing so, first of all, Mr. Jordash, I'd like to remind you that the
23 summary of 92 ter witnesses has to be prepared, has to be read into the
25 MR. JORDASH: I do apologise very much so.
1 JUDGE ORIE: If you please could take care that it would be
2 produced and read as quickly as possible.
3 Then as far as the documents contained in the chart are
4 concerned, many of which have not been assigned numbers, Madam Registrar
5 has provisionally reserved and also provisionally assigned numbers D468
6 up to and including D508 to those documents and is quite willing, I
7 think, to inform you what numbers are provisionally assigned to what
8 documents exactly. There are some which have already received exhibit
9 numbers or MFI numbers but for the others, numbers have been reserved.
10 We'll take a break and we'll resume at 4.00.
11 [The witness stands down]
12 --- Recess taken at 3.31 p.m.
13 --- On resuming at 4.05 p.m.
14 JUDGE ORIE: I would have expected the witness to be in already,
15 but ...
16 [The witness takes the stand]
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, if you are ready, please proceed.
18 MR. JORDASH: Thank you, Your Honour.
19 Q. Let's return to your statement, Mr. Dragicevic, D466. And I want
20 to ask you about the contacts between the service and the American
21 service. And you've indicated in your statement that you met,
22 Number 1 --
23 MR. JORDASH: Let's go to paragraph 18.
24 Q. Now, paragraph 18 you -- when do you think you personally first
25 met Number 1?
1 A. I met Number 1 in 1991 when I was still a member of the federal
3 Q. And were those meetings from intelligence gathering, intelligence
4 giving objective useful?
5 A. Yes. Gentleman Number 1 was an official representative of the
6 Central Intelligence Agency of the US and his task was in the course of
7 the contacts with myself, or rather, the federal service to attempt and
8 exchange useful information that would be beneficial to both services.
9 Q. And moving into 1992, did those contacts when you were working
10 for the federal service remain useful?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Now, at some point in time you introduced Number 1 to
13 Mr. Stanisic. What was the purpose of that?
14 A. Given that number 1 was an official representative of the
15 American intelligence service, the only address where he could come and
16 gather information that he was interested in was the federal service of
17 the day in Yugoslavia. However, you have to bear in mind the fact that
18 the disintegration of Yugoslavia was already underway and that we in the
19 federal service were in a position in which we no longer received the
20 information that we had previously been receiving from the State Security
21 Services of other Yugoslav Republics. We were virtually reduced to a
22 mere existence. I personally, as the head of the administration for
23 contacts with foreign intelligence services, was not able anymore to give
24 answers to certain questions that Number 1 had and we reached a point
25 when our contacts became pointless and meaningless.
1 Without wishing to sever contacts with the US service though and
2 at the request of Number 1, to enable him to contact representatives of
3 the State Security Service of the Republic of Serbia, I complied with
5 Q. Can I just return to the subject of co-operation protocols.
6 You've testified that the co-operation protocol with the United States
7 service was not signed until 1996. Were you, therefore, operating
8 without a co-operation protocol between 1992 and 1996?
9 A. An official protocol on co-operation between the two services did
10 not exist. However, there were oral agreements on the basis of which the
11 US service officially deployed their representative to the Embassy of the
12 United States in Belgrade.
13 Q. Does the term --
14 MR. JORDASH: Sorry.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, from the statement, we briefly
16 discussed during the break the line of the examination. We found that
17 much of it is found in the statement. Perhaps not exactly in the same
18 words, but the gist of it appears in the statement and we also wondered
19 whether all the details which are added, whether they are really of such
20 importance and relevance that we couldn't live without them. Here, for
21 example, if there's no protocol, if the protocol is only signed until
22 1996 and if you find in the statement that apparently there's a lot of
23 co-operation and contacts, et cetera, then of course I could guess that
24 the witness would say that there was no official protocol before 1996
25 because he said it was only signed in 1996.
1 Now, whether it -- when you worked together, of course, there
2 must be some kind of an understanding or agreement. Now -- so that apart
3 from -- of course we find already that there was a developed co-operation
4 and, I would say, it's common knowledge that secret services will work
5 together up to the point where they consider it useful to work together
6 and there were other areas where they might not want to work together at
7 all, so that's a kind of common understanding. So we are wondering what
8 it is specifically that you are seeking to establish apart from a
9 positive approach by Mr. Stanisic and his service in their co-operation
10 with other countries at that period in time. If we are missing
11 something, please tell us, but that's what we understand already on the
12 basis of the statement.
13 MR. JORDASH: All I'm trying to do is establish the extent of
14 that co-operation and in particular the extent of the co-operation with
15 the Contact Group at an early stage when others and other governmental
16 entities were not engaged in such co-operative lines of work.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Please consider my observations just made and ask
18 yourself to what extent what you apparently want to establish, whether
19 that basically, if not yet in the statement at least on the basis of the
20 many many questions you have added to that and whether there's any more
21 efficient way to find out whether we understood it and whether we can
22 proceed to the next subject. Please proceed.
23 MR. JORDASH: Your Honour, I'll move swiftly.
24 Q. Just one question on that subject, Mr. Dragicevic. Was there a
25 process of accreditation?
1 A. Yes, there was a system of accreditation and Number 1 was an
2 officially-accredited representative of the US intelligence service
3 stationed in their embassy to Belgrade.
4 Q. Were there agencies from the Contact Groups accredited in 1992 or
6 A. Yes, more or less at that time with slight variations.
7 Q. Paragraph 21 of your statement, you testified that there were
8 other unofficial meetings of which -- this is meetings between the
9 service, the State Security of Serbia and the CIA and particularly
10 Number 1, which were not -- which Milosevic was not privy to. Why was
12 A. Well, you need to understand that in contacts between two
13 services there are often meetings pertaining to exclusively professional
14 matters about which a president of the state does not need to be briefed
15 and informed on a daily basis. That is not a proper way and that was not
16 the practice.
17 Mr. Milosevic or President Milosevic was informed about all the
18 crucial points of such contacts and he endorsed them.
19 Q. Was Number 1 interested in Milosevic's activities in relation to
20 Croatia and Bosnia, and was information provided about those?
21 A. Of course. Certain things that were vitally important were
22 conveyed to President Milosevic and the political leadership in the form
23 of a report or information, and that's the usual practice.
24 Q. What I'm asking about is what information was provided to
25 Number 1? Was Number 1 interested in Milosevic's activities?
1 A. Of course. Every intelligence officer is interested in knowing
2 what the activities on the other side are, especially of the leadership.
3 In contacts with Number 1, attempts were made at gaining insight into the
4 political views held by Mr. Milosevic on certain issues, as well as what
5 the views of the leadership of the Republic of Serbia were, so, yes,
6 there were such cases.
7 Q. And what was the point, from your perspective, of providing that
9 A. Well, I think that primarily it served gaining better insight
10 into the situation on the ground for the American side with the main task
11 of improving co-operation between the two countries, primarily in
12 political terms and normalising it so that it may yield better results in
13 the future.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash -- could we go for a second into private
16 [Private session]
11 Page 14756 redacted. Private session.
4 [Open session]
5 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
6 MR. JORDASH:
7 Q. Sorry, perhaps I can return to that subject but just we are back
8 in open session, Mr. Witness, but you gave evidence in a private session
9 about certain discussions. Can I just ask one straight simple question:
10 Was the information that the Americans sought provided?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Thank you. Let's go to paragraph 22 of your statement. You make
13 reference there to an attempt to organise a visit in relation to the
14 possible existence of mass graves. When was that?
15 A. It was organised on several occasions. I wouldn't be able to
16 state the year. At any rate, on two or three occasions I, myself, went
17 with Number 1 to Eastern Bosnia where we were interested in finding out
18 whether, in certain localities that the American side had information
19 about, there were any mass graves.
20 Similarly at a later date, I was involved in the visit of the
21 Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, who came to the area to see for
22 herself if there were any mass graves there.
23 Q. When was the first visit, approximately? Which year?
24 A. I don't know for a fact. I think it was 1993, roughly. And I'm
25 referring to the first visit.
1 Q. And in that first visit were there any obstacles to that visit?
2 A. Well, naturally we -- our trip there was top secret. We took the
3 trip under very difficult conditions placing our lives at risk. Still,
4 we were aware that this was the only way to do something concrete and
5 receive confirmation.
6 Q. Did you receive any co-operation from the Bosnian Serb
8 A. Yes. We were given a security detail by a special unit of the
9 Ministry of the Interior of Republika Srpska.
10 MR. JORDASH: Could we go to paragraph 26, please.
11 Q. You testify that no one from the army wanted to speak to Number 1
12 and then he could not talk to politicians or agents in the field. How do
13 you know this?
14 A. Number 1 told me so personally. His position did not make it
15 possible for him to become close to the top military or political
16 leadership. After all, he was a member of the American intelligence
17 agency and was connected to us. We were his colleagues in his line of
19 Q. In paragraph 28 you discuss contacts and co-operation with the
20 Russian intelligence service and you testify that a large quantity of
21 information was provided to Number 9. What kind of information was
22 provided to Number 9?
23 A. Between 1993 and 1995 we had had quite a few contacts with the
24 Russian Federation's intelligence service. Let me repeat, by the time
25 the Russian Federation had already divided up the former KGB to two
1 services, FSB, the counter-intelligence service, and the intelligence
2 service, SVR or SVA. The head of the intelligence service was
3 academician Yevgeny Primakov at the time. He would occasionally come to
4 Belgrade during that period of time and we would travel to Moscow.
5 After several visits and the adoption of the protocol, Mr. -- or
6 rather Number 9 was assigned to Belgrade as the official representative
7 of the Russian intelligence service. At the request of the
8 Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the representative of the Russian
9 service in Belgrade was sent a great deal of information concerning the
10 situation on the ground in Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Serbia, that
11 they later on used in peacekeeping operations and general activities of
12 the Russian Federation with a view to restoring peace in
14 Q. Let's move to the hostage rescue operation in 1995. How did you
15 first become involved?
16 A. The hostage crisis in Republika Srpska in late May of 1995 was
17 one of the most difficult crises in Bosnia-Herzegovina. It all happened
18 during the two months of May and June of 1995.
19 Q. And how did you get involved?
20 A. I accompanied Mr. Stanisic on his trips along the
21 Belgrade-Bijeljina-Pale route where he invested a great deal of effort to
22 resolve the hostage crisis as fast as possible.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, I'm still puzzled by some of the
24 answers. I'd like to briefly go back into private session.
25 [Private session]
11 Page 14760 redacted. Private session.
10 [Open session]
11 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
13 MR. JORDASH: Thank you.
14 Could we have the chart, please, 1D05258, which is now D467. And
15 perhaps this should also be under seal, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE ORIE: The chart should be under seal. Madam Registrar,
17 D467 to be changed from a public document to an exhibit under seal.
18 MR. JORDASH:
19 Q. Number 2 in the chart, you comment about UN report on the hostage
20 crisis and you note that several French soldiers were killed, and what I
21 want to ask is, after those deaths, how serious -- how seriously did it
22 appear at the time that the other hostages might be killed?
23 A. It was one of the very serious situations and one could expect
24 almost anything to happen. After that incident, across the battle-field
25 in Bosnia-Herzegovina more than 470 members of the United Nations forces
1 were taken hostage, privates and officers. Most of them came from the
2 French Battalion, British Battalion, Ukrainian Battalion, and all of them
3 were lined up as human shields next to military installations of the
4 Army of Republika Srpska in case NATO forces should strike.
5 Q. How do you know that Stanisic proposed negotiations to Sokolovic?
6 A. I know that because Stanisic told me to get ready for that trip.
7 After the negotiations were held with Minister Sokolovic and in a
8 situation where nobody was able to find any sort of solution to the
9 situation in that country, Mr. Stanisic, at his own initiative and in
10 consultation with Minister Sokolovic and after consultations with
11 Mr. Milosevic, decided to take these steps. Mr. Milosevic told him that
12 he could go ahead with it although the impression gained was that he was
13 highly skeptical of us being able to be successful in that at all.
14 Q. You note in this chart that the political leadership of Serbia
15 including Milosevic had no contact with the RS leadership because of the
16 sanctions. How do you know this?
17 A. At the time the then Republic of Yugoslavia in August of 1994
18 imposed sanctions on Republika Srpska. During that period there were no
19 contacts to speak of, we could say that they were non-existent. What
20 further aggravated the fact was that the political and military
21 leaderships of Republika Srpska and the Republic of Serbian Krajina drew
22 up a joint plan to begin the process of unifying the
23 Republic of Serbian Krajina and Republika Srpska. The assessment our
24 service had was that things had gotten out of control, primarily out of
25 political control. We were fully aware of the fact that the hostage
1 crisis involving the UN personnel was damaging not only for the Serbs in
2 Bosnia but also for the Serbs in the Krajina and then the
3 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in general.
4 Q. Your first visit to speak to Krajisnik and Karadzic, what was the
5 nature of the discussions and what was their response?
6 A. As far as I remember, the first trip was to Bijeljina where
7 Mr. Stanisic met up with Karadzic and Mr. Krajisnik. Those were the
8 first discussions that took place on the issue of the hostage crisis. On
9 our arrival in Bijeljina in addition to Mr. Karadzic and Krajisnik, we
10 saw the leaders of the Republic of the Serbian Krajina, Mr. Babic and
11 Mr. Martic.
12 Q. What was the discussions you had with Krajisnik and Krajisnik?
13 We'll come to Babic and Martic in a moment. What was the discussion and
14 what was their response?
15 A. Mr. Stanisic tried to explain to them the negative aspects behind
16 the operation undertaken by the VRS in respect of the hostages and the
17 repercussions that such an operation could have in terms of the
18 international community, as well as the possible NATO strike against
19 Republika Srpska with a view to liberating the hostages involved.
20 Q. And their response? You said in the comment chart that Karadzic
21 demanded material support. What was that he was demanding?
22 A. The discussions were very difficult and painstaking and
23 Mr. Karadzic asked for logistical support that could be forthcoming from
24 the Republic of Serbia. Of course, we could not promise any such
1 Q. What kind of logistical support was he looking for?
2 A. I can't tell you at this stage because I simply can't remember
3 what it involved. I wasn't present during all the conversations they
5 Q. And the same question in relation to Babic and Martic. What was
6 in brief the nature of the discussions and their response?
7 A. As for Babic and Martic and the idea to unify the
8 Republic of the Serbian Krajina with the Republika Srpska, Mr. Stanisic
9 did all in his power to explain to them in political, diplomatic and
10 security-related terms that to make such a move would be tantamount to
12 Q. What was the view that Stanisic expressed concerning why that
13 would be tantamount to madness?
14 A. Well, politically speaking, the entire idea would lead to ruin
15 and would be an entrapment for Mr. Karadzic and Republika Srpska
16 leadership. It would also go against all the agreements reached with the
17 international community and would constitute a sort of provocation in the
18 face of everything that had been agreed upon by that time.
19 Q. In brief, what was your understanding of what had been agreed
20 with the international community at that point?
21 A. My understanding of the agreement reached with the international
22 community was that the aim was to stop all hostilities, introduce peace,
23 and find a political settlement. The unification of these two regions
24 would call all of this into question.
25 Q. How many times do you recall did you and Mr. Stanisic return to
1 Republika Srpska during this crisis?
2 A. As far as I can remember, we first visited Bijeljina, then we
3 went to Pale where we talked with Mr. Krajisnik and then we went back to
4 Belgrade. After that we went to have talks with General Mladic, and
5 after that we went straight to Pale where we had a meeting with the
6 entire political leadership of Republika Srpska. To our enormous
7 surprise, we found there the Greek minister of the interior and the Greek
8 minister of defence.
9 Q. Let me return to General Mladic. What was the discussion had
10 with Mladic and what was his response?
11 A. I wasn't present during the conversation between Mr. Stanisic and
12 Mr. Mladic, but I would say that Mr. Stanisic was guided by the same
13 principles which were unconditional release of the hostages and I think
14 that he did his best trying to convince Mladic what adverse effects
15 everything that they were doing would have.
16 Q. At that point in time, how certain were you and Stanisic as to
17 who was responsible for the seizure of the UN personnel? Sorry, I think
18 I might have mumbled. What I want to ask is this: At that point in
19 time, how certain were you and Stanisic as to who was responsible for the
20 seizure of the UN personnel?
21 A. Well, the taking of UN personnel hostage was solely the
22 responsibility of the Army of Republika Srpska, i.e., General Mladic
24 Q. Were you able to gather any insight into the relationship between
25 Karadzic and Mladic at that point in time?
1 A. I have no direct knowledge about this, although I can say that I
2 heard stories about the rift between Karadzic and Krajisnik on the one
3 hand and Mladic as the top military man on the other hand.
4 MR. JORDASH: Could I please have on the screen 1D05235.
5 Q. And this is a report of the Secretary-General pursuant to
6 Security Council Resolutions 982 and 987. I just want to ask you about
7 an aspect of it.
8 MR. JORDASH: There isn't a B/C/S translation of this but we will
9 have one produced or certainly the sections, Your Honour, as soon as
10 possible. Can we go to paragraph 30, please.
11 Q. Are you familiar -- you've seen this United Nations report; is
12 that correct?
13 A. I saw this document for the first time during my consultations
14 with the Defence team.
15 Q. Unfortunately it's not very clear. I want to ask you about
16 paragraph 30 which deals with the no-fly zone and if you read that to
17 yourself. If I can just pick out sections.
18 [As read] "Resolution 781 of 1992 declared a ban on all military
19 flights in the air-space of Bosnia and Herzegovina and mandated UNPROFOR
20 to monitor compliance with it and to ensure that the purposes of flights
21 to and from Bosnia and Herzegovina were consistent with Security Council
23 And then paragraph 31 it's noted there that UNPROFOR's role as
24 regards to this part of its mandate is confined --
25 JUDGE ORIE: Could I just check whether I do have it under my
1 e-court but I can't reproduce it on my screen courtroom message channel 1
2 English. It's not there. Perhaps it's because only -- there's only
3 one -- it looks as if the English text is on channel 2 B/C/S although it
4 is English. There we are. Thank you. Yes, you were reading from which
5 paragraph, Mr. Jordash?
6 MR. JORDASH: Paragraph 31.
7 JUDGE ORIE: 31. Yes.
8 MR. JORDASH:
9 Q. [As read] "UNPROFOR's role as regards this part of its mandate is
10 confined to ground monitoring as selected airfields in the area" --
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, you are reading.
12 MR. JORDASH: Sorry.
13 Q. [As read] "All action related to enforcement is undertaken by
14 NATO. Despite a large number of violations by helicopters carrying
15 personnel, "flying trucks", the no-fly zone has been largely successful
16 in discouraging the use of the air-space of Bosnia and Herzegovina for
17 combat purposes. A recent exception, however, included several sorties
18 flown by the Croatian air force to Bosnian air-space to bomb positions in
19 Sector West in Croatia."
20 JUDGE ORIE: What you read "included," it reads in my text
22 MR. JORDASH: Involved, sorry, yes, my mistake.
23 Q. Were you aware of this no-fly zone at the time you went to
25 A. Yes, we knew that a no-fly zone that been declared and that
1 precipitated everything that happened afterwards.
2 Q. This is a slight tangent but relevant, I hope. There's been
3 evidence in this case that the DB were, despite this no-fly zone, flying
4 thousands of combat, reconnaissance, transport, and humanitarian flights
5 into Bosnia or within Bosnia. Is that something you can testify to? Do
6 you know about that?
7 A. Unfortunately, I know nothing about this.
8 Q. Just so you are provided with the full information, I took that
9 evidence from Mr. Simatovic's speech at Kula which you attended in 1996
10 where Mr. Simatovic claimed that the DB had been operating thousands of
11 combat and so on flights. Do you recall that speech?
12 A. I really cannot recall his speech in its entirety at this point
13 in time. I truly cannot.
14 Q. Fair enough. Let's move on to -- I'll move back to the hostage
16 MR. JORDASH: Could we have P48.18 on the screen. And it should
17 be a chart item number 19.
18 Q. You've seen this document, Mr. Dragicevic?
19 MR. JORDASH: Sorry, I don't think it is chart number 19. Let's
20 just have a look at the document for now.
21 Q. Do you recognise the document, Mr. Witness?
22 A. Yes, I saw it here when I came here and when I had my contacts
23 with the Defence team.
24 Q. Thank you.
25 MR. JORDASH: Number 12 in the chart.
1 Q. I just want to ask you about page 2 and a view -- sorry, not a
2 view. A record of a conversation, it seems, between Kirudja and
3 Stanisic. Do you remember know who Kirudja was? Do you know him at the
4 time or know of him at the time?
5 A. I heard of him at the time. I did not attend these meetings and
6 I presumed inferring from the first sentence that they took place on the
7 premises of the Ministry of the Interior of Republika Srpska, not on our
9 Q. Now, Kirudja writes at paragraph 3 that:
10 [As read] "Stanisic put the decision he had to make in a broader
11 context, one which involves President Milosevic. The negotiations with
12 US representative Frasure he said remain at a stage favourable for a
13 break-through agreement. It would be a pity if something were to happen
14 at this stage and derail the progress so made as well as the chances of
15 re-establishing a cease-fire in BiH."
16 Do you know who Frasure was?
17 A. [In English] Yes, I know.
18 Q. Who was that?
19 A. [Interpretation] He was a US representative involved in the
20 negotiations concerning the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, at least I
21 understood that much.
22 Q. The view expressed by Stanisic, or should I say the perspective
23 that he expressed to Kirudja that the resolution of the hostage crisis
24 was critical for the re-establishment of a cease-fire in Bosnia and
25 Herzegovina, was that a view you ever discussed with Stanisic?
1 A. Well, I talked to him as much as I had an opportunity to do so.
2 The events evolved very speedily and whatever we discussed happened while
3 we were on the road. As I said, I didn't attend these meetings.
4 Therefore, I cannot give you any specific comments in that respect.
5 Q. Let me ask you again about this Security Council report and just
6 one small aspect of it.
7 MR. JORDASH: Can we return to the report 1D05235. I think it's
8 1D05235. We had it on the screen earlier. Sorry, 5235. Apologies. And
9 paragraph, please, 74. Actually, 72.
10 Q. And what you'll see in front of you at 72 is a number of options
11 being discussed at the Security Council level, certainly in this report
12 to the Security Council, in response to the hostage crisis.
13 MR. JORDASH: I think if we go to the next page.
14 Q. And I want to ask you about option A, whether you were aware that
15 this was an option which was at least under some kind of discussion at
16 the UN level?
17 A. No, I wasn't.
18 Q. Okay. Let's leave it at that then. If we can move to how you
19 and the service were able to locate the hostages. You made mention in
20 the comments chart that the UN did not provide you with information.
21 Where did the information come from? How were you able to locate the
23 A. [In English] According to the talks with representatives, the
24 leadership of Republika Srpska, we came to the conclusion and with the
25 help of the Ministry of the Interior of Republika Srpska members of UN
1 forces were picked up and distributed in several locations, several ways.
2 I started to, sorry -- [Interpretation] They were moved to several
3 locations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and from there they were moved further on
4 to the Republic of Serbia.
5 Q. In the same comment, Your Honours, item 2, you note that you had
6 "unconfirmed information that Mladic had ordered to kill us." Where was
7 that information from and who was he purportedly going to kill?
8 A. This was unofficial and unconfirmed information that we received
9 when we went to General Mladic's HQ in Han Pijesak where we had these
10 talks. There were three of us there at the time, Stanisic, Simatovic,
11 and myself, but I cannot confirm any of this because I have no formal
12 evidence or any official document to support it.
13 MR. JORDASH: Can I just take instructions, please.
14 JUDGE ORIE: Please do so.
15 [Defence counsel and accused Stanisic confer]
16 MR. JORDASH: Please could we have, if I may, a video, P49. It's
17 a -- only a few minutes long, if we may play it just to try to situate
18 when these conversations took place. It's Mr. Stanisic speaking at
19 different times during the hostage crisis, and I want to try to have you
20 clarify when this might -- these conversations or these speeches took
22 [Video-clip played]
23 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Journalist: The hostages long
24 before next weekend.
25 Translator: Do you expect that other United Nations
1 representatives would be released by next week?
2 Jovica Stanisic: I already said that we hoped that everyone
3 would be released very soon.
4 Journalist: What was the arrangement? What did the Bosnian
5 Serbs get in exchange for releasing these hostages?
6 Jovica Stanisic: I think that we, of course, cannot answer this
8 Translator: I think that we can't answer that question now."
9 MR. JORDASH:
10 Q. Were you anywhere in the vicinity during this speech?
11 A. I was the translator.
12 Q. Do you recall when this speech approximately was in the
13 month-long crisis?
14 A. This speech was delivered after our meeting at Pale. That was
15 towards the end of May, and I believe that it was actually the 1st of
16 June. In fact, it was the end of May and the first official reports in
17 the media appeared on the 1st of June.
18 MR. JORDASH: And can we go now to 001503, please.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Before we continue, Mr. Jordash --
20 [Video-clip played]
21 JUDGE ORIE: Is there any dispute about the timing of what is
22 seen on this video?
23 MR. FARR: Your Honour, we wouldn't dispute the timing that the
24 witness has just indicated, no.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but apparently we are now seeking times where
1 there seems to be no dispute. You seem to be happy with the answers, but
2 of course I do not know, but why not then explore that at an earlier
3 stage and I think as a matter of fact if someone is interviewed and says,
4 well, we expect them to be released within a couple of days, then of
5 course on the basis of what is known from the time, it shouldn't be that
6 difficult to seek agreement on when this approximately was and if it was
7 one or two days earlier or later, I still wonder what exactly the
8 relevance of that is.
9 MR. JORDASH: I'll move on then to the final video, if I may.
10 This is the video which the Karadzic speaking after the --
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, and it resolves -- the answers of the witness
12 will resolve any matter which is in dispute?
13 MR. JORDASH: It may help to -- I don't think it will resolve the
14 dispute but it will certainly, I hope, buttress our position on it.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Let's see what the video tell us and what the
16 witness tells us. Please proceed.
17 MR. JORDASH: 65 ter 1D05255 for the transcript and for the video
18 it's V000-0491.
19 [Video-clip played]
20 "Interviewer: Earlier today John Simpson who is in the Bosnian
21 capital, Pale, Bosnian Serb capital, spoke to Radovan Karadzic, leader of
22 the Bosnian Serbs, his first British television interview since the
23 hostage crisis. John Simpson asked Mr. Karadzic if the Bosnian Serbs
24 would now give up land for a Bosnian Muslim state.
25 Mr. Karadzic: We Serbs do not oppose Muslims to have their own
1 state. Either as alone or together with Croats, and we do not oppose
2 them to have a viable state, no matter how many percentages it would be.
3 We would either talk about two viable states or three viable states and
4 then percentage should be a result of those rather than a condition to
5 the talks.
6 Interviewer: Can I turn to the question of your relations with
7 your previously friendly or semi-friendly neighbour to the north, the
8 Republic of Yugoslavia of Serbia. The relationship with
9 President Milosevic is clearly not a good one now, is it? He puts
10 intense pressure on you, and you really have nothing you can do, surely,
11 except accept that pressure and do what he want
12 Karadzic: Relation is not so good, although it has improved a
13 little bit because of these UN war prisoners, but still we have a
14 blockade on Drina River and still we do not have a good relationship as
15 we should have because we are the same nation.
16 Interviewer: Nevertheless, they managed to persuade you, in
17 inverted commas, to release the hostages that you took, the UN people,
18 how did they do that?
19 Karadzic: Not by threats or by pressure. By suggestions and by
20 incentives, and that's why we have accepted the suggestions of
21 President Milosevic. If anyone threatened us or pressed us, we would
22 fight because you know, the small nations also have pride and dignity,
23 and the smaller nation, the bigger pride.
24 Interviewer: In hindsight, though, surely, it was a terrible
25 mistake to have allowed your people to have captured UN soldiers, for the
1 world to have seen them chained up, to see masked men holding guns at
2 their heads, that was a terrible thing, wasn't it? Wasn't that an awful
4 Karadzic: Well, one mistake causes another mistake. One drastic
5 move causes another drastic reaction. You have to realise that that was
6 a reaction, not action, and we felt hopeless and helpless and we had to
7 do something very drastic in order to prevent further strikes and in
8 order to show to the international community that we are cornered and
9 that we, being cornered, are ready to defend ourselves by all means.
10 Interviewer: Because many people in Serbia, for instance, in
11 Belgrade, thought that it was perhaps the action of individual commanders
12 in the field and that you hadn't necessarily given the orders yourself to
13 take UN people hostage.
14 Karadzic: I back always my military commanders.
15 Interviewer: That sound as if it was their idea rather than
17 Karadzic: No, no. We function as a state and I am commander in
18 chief, supreme commander and everything that my army do, I do back.
19 MR. JORDASH: Pause there, please.
20 Q. So just a couple of questions on the video. You heard Karadzic
21 saying that the relationship with the -- with Serbia was not good. Did
22 you see anything during your negotiations to indicate differently?
23 A. The only thing I can say is that relations were very tense during
24 negotiations and the entire action. It only goes to show the extent of
25 effort we invested into seeing this through to the end and how successful
1 we were.
2 Q. And the interviewer appears to pick up on some ambiguity in what
3 Karadzic is saying concerning whether he ordered the arrest of the UN
4 hostages or whether it was individual commanders on the ground. By the
5 end of the hostage crisis had you, from your observations, formed a final
7 A. At the time I was not in a position to draw any conclusions, but
8 if you ask me about my personal opinion, let me say that when the first
9 group of hostages were released, the minister of foreign affairs of
10 Republika Srpska, Mr. Buha, apologised to the UN personnel for the
11 treatment they were accorded, and said that they were compelled to do
12 what they did in order to protect their people from further NATO strikes.
13 We could hear Mr. Karadzic say the same thing here in this footage. Let
14 me repeat that I am in no position to speculate as to who was the person
15 who issued the order.
16 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter didn't catch the last thing the
17 witness said.
18 MR. JORDASH:
19 Q. What was the last sentence you just said, please?
20 A. I suppose it was a mutual agreement between the top political
21 leadership and military leadership. Besides, that was what Mr. Buha
22 himself had said.
23 MR. JORDASH: Could I, if I may, I did say it was the last video.
24 Can I show one last video which is only about 10 or 15 seconds long. And
25 it's V -- sorry. Oh, it's a minute and a half. 1D05254, please, and the
1 video is V000-4741. It's Mr. Stanisic speaking again.
2 [Video-clip played]
3 THE INTERPRETER: [Voiceover] "Gentlemen, officers and soldiers of
4 the United Nations peacekeeping forces in this area, I have been
5 authorised by our government to say the following: Recently our
6 president sent an appeal to the government of Republika Srpska asking for
7 your release. The leadership of Republika Srpska in response to this
8 appeal and the initiative of the president of the Republic of Serbia
9 decided to release you as a sign of goodwill and readiness to solve the
10 crisis in the former Bosnia-Herzegovina in a peaceful and political way.
11 If you allow me, I will take on responsibility for you, or rather, the
12 responsibility will be taken over by the security forces of the Republic
13 of Serbia, with full respect for your dignity and soldierly honour, I
14 will take you to the Republic of Serbia, that's to say the Federal
15 Republic of Yugoslavia, and hand you over to your United Nations command.
16 That's to say, representatives of your government."
17 MR. JORDASH:
18 Q. The only question I want to ask is in relation to what
19 Mr. Stanisic said about all respect for their dignity and their soldierly
20 honour. Did you see during that month Mr. Stanisic display any other
21 attitude towards the UN hostages?
22 A. No, never. He regarded them as members of the United Nations who
23 had been deployed there to exercise the duties conferred upon them in
24 that peacekeeping operation. He viewed them primarily as members of the
25 armies of their respective countries who found themselves in a position
1 where they were viewed by the entire world chained to posts without their
2 uniforms, and he expressed his intention to have them released and taken
3 back to their respective units to do what they we were sent there to do
4 under full military gear and therefore he regarded them as soldiers who
5 were performing their military duties.
6 MR. JORDASH: And may we have 1D05248 on screen.
7 Q. And it's with regard to paragraph 43 of your statement.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, can I ask one clarifying question.
9 In relation to your last answer, witness, you said Mr. Stanisic
10 viewed them primarily as members of the armies of their respective
11 countries. Does that mean that he did not view them as members of the
12 United Nations forces?
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Perhaps I misspoke. They were
14 members of the military formations of their countries but were deployed
15 on an honourable mission as representatives of the international
16 community bound by the orders and decisions of the United Nations. He
17 regarded them as such and not as foreign soldiers in an alien territory.
18 They were there to introduce peace and not as occupying forces.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Although his last words were that he would --
20 let me check that carefully. He said: "... and hand you over to your
21 United Nations command, that is to say, representatives of your
22 governments." I'm trying to understand what that addition means,
23 apparently not handing them over to the United Nations command but to
24 representatives of their government. And that also in relation to
25 your -- that part of your answer, that he viewed them primarily as
1 members of the armies of their respective countries.
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] When he said representatives of
3 governments, I believe that Mr. Stanisic primarily had in mind
4 representatives of embassies of certain countries who were there as well.
5 That's how I understood the additional part where he mentions
6 representatives of governments.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed, Mr. Jordash. I'm also looking at
8 the clock. I do not know.
9 MR. JORDASH: I've probably got about 10 to 15 minutes left.
10 That's all.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I see that. I'm also looking at Mr. Stanisic.
12 He might prefer a break at this moment or would Mr. Stanisic prefer the
13 10 or 15 remaining minutes and then have a break and then have another 45
14 minutes for the last?
15 MR. JORDASH: I think a break.
16 JUDGE ORIE: A break would be preferable. Then we first take a
17 break, we resume at 6.00 and we expect you to finish by 6.15.
18 --- Recess taken at 5.31 p.m.
19 --- On resuming at 6.02 p.m.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, please proceed.
21 MR. JORDASH: Thank you.
22 Q. Let's just finish in the next 10 to 15 minutes, Mr. Dragicevic,
23 and then I'll sit down for others to question you.
24 The document on the screen you deal with at paragraph 43 of your
25 statement and you say there that you visited Pale for the last time in
1 early July of 1995 and handed over this message; is that correct?
2 A. Yes, that's correct.
3 Q. Were you present when President Chirac and Chirkin [phoen]
4 provided that message?
5 A. No, I wasn't.
6 Q. Did you discuss the message then with Mr. Stanisic? Where did
7 you come by the information that this had come from -- directly from
8 those two?
9 A. I learned it from Mr. Stanisic on our way to Pale.
10 Q. Were you there when it was read out by Karadzic's spokesman,
11 Samotica [phoen]?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. As far as you are aware, did the Contact Group plan and the
14 negotiations resume following the resolution of the hostage crisis?
15 A. Well, that's precisely what the message is about, i.e., that the
16 resumption of peace negotiations with the Contact Group would be agreed
17 to as the starting position with an addition to the effect that the VRS
18 should open up all the roads for unhindered passage of humanitarian
20 Q. Did that happen?
21 A. I believe so.
22 Q. Now, just returning to the subject of Mr. Stanisic's speech and
23 view concerning whether the hostages were UN personnel or representatives
24 of their respective countries, are you able to testify as to whether
25 Mr. Stanisic received any award from the United Nations themselves?
1 A. I'm truly not aware of it.
2 Q. Okay. But you are aware that he received awards from, as we see
3 from your statement, the French; is that correct?
4 A. Yes. He received a medal from the head of the French
5 intelligence service, Mr. Dewatre.
6 Q. Were you there at that point in time when he received the medal?
7 A. Yes, I was on an official visit to Paris and the French
8 intelligence service together with Mr. Stanisic.
9 Q. And the purpose of that visit?
10 A. Well, I think the visit came about primarily thanks to the role
11 Mr. Stanisic played in having the UN personnel hostages released because
12 most of the UN personnel were French. At the same time, specific
13 conditions were put in place for co-operation between the DGSE, the
14 French intelligence service, and DST, the French counter-intelligence
15 service, since both these services had common priorities. When I say
16 "common priorities" I mean first of all fight against radical Islam and
17 terrorism in general.
18 THE INTERPRETER: Could all unnecessary microphones please be
19 switched off. Thank you.
20 MR. JORDASH: Let me just ask you about paragraph 56 of your
21 statement, D466, please.
22 Q. While that's coming up on the screen, you make the comment there
23 that the SDB of Serbia had better relations with the US, French, and
24 Chinese services than with the services of the RSK and the RS. Which
25 period are you referring to when you make that comment?
1 A. I meant the period shortly before the hostage crisis.
2 Q. Thank you. Then moving on to paragraph 65, and whilst that's
3 coming up, could you just explain why you came to the conclusion or what
4 was your source of information concerning the fact that the SDB of Serbia
5 had better relations with the foreign services than those in Croatia and
7 A. For the simple reason that most of the contacts were maintained
8 with these services rather than those from Croatia or Bosnia and
10 Q. Now, at paragraph 65 you mention briefly there the SDB of Serbia
11 helping to establish a check-point in the Republika Srpska. When was
12 that and what was the check-point? Perhaps I should say what was the
13 check-point? What assistance was given and what was the nature of the
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Apologies.
25 MR. JORDASH:
1 Q. Continue, Mr. Witness, with your account, but with using numbers,
3 A. Should I repeat what I said? In 1996, Number 11 paid a visit and
4 the main subject of discussion was the protection of international
5 forces, the IFOR, in Bosnia, as well as an active participation in the
6 overall protection of these forces in 1996 and 1997. In order for this
7 to come to fruition, the SDB of Serbia helped establish a specific
8 check-point of that agency in Republika Srpska, or a specific point from
9 where they would be able to more effectively cover the area in
10 co-operation with our service.
11 Q. Was anybody on the -- sorry, let me start that again.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, I think the witness mainly repeated
13 what is already in the statement and therefore what you specifically
14 asked, what assistance was given, that's already in the statement, unless
15 you had something else on your mind, the witness repeated that, and then
16 what was the nature of the check-point.
17 Could you tell us what the nature of the check-point was and also
18 answer the first question, when it was in 1996 that 11 visited Belgrade?
19 Perhaps first the last question. A month?
20 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't recall the month. I know
21 it was in 1996.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Any season? Spring, summer? If you don't
23 remember --
24 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I think it was summer already.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Summer 1996. And then what was the check-point
2 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I can't tell you anything specific
3 about the point because I visited the location only once. I didn't go
4 there again because the nature of my work did not take me there. I
5 didn't have anything to do with it.
6 JUDGE ORIE: What exactly was checked at that point?
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Again, I can't answer the question
8 because I simply didn't know.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Next question, please, Mr. Jordash.
10 MR. JORDASH: Thank you.
11 Q. Did this have anything to do with Number 10?
12 A. Yes, number 10 was present there as well.
13 Q. Do you know in which capacity he was there?
14 A. I think he was the official leader of that group for Bosnia.
15 Q. Thank you. Can I just ask you about two other things, very quick
17 MR. JORDASH: First of all, could we have on the screen 1D05247,
18 and it's a document which records a visit to the USA intelligence
19 community, Belgrade, 7th of March, 1996.
20 Q. Do you recall this visit?
21 A. Yes, I do.
22 MR. JORDASH: Could we have page 17 -- 16, I beg your pardon, of
23 the English. Not sure of the B/C/S. Let's go to the English.
24 Q. The bit I'm interested in is the assessment of the -- of the
25 visit, taking into consideration all elements of the visit of the RDB
1 delegation to the US intelligence community. Then if we can go over the
2 page to 17 where it says in the first paragraph, first complete
3 paragraph -- let me read it.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Did you ask for page 8.
5 MR. JORDASH: No, 17, please.
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have page 8 in front of me.
7 MR. JORDASH: Me too. Can we go to page 17, please.
21 MR. JORDASH:
22 Q. [As read] "It is important to reiterate that Number 11 did not
23 receive the delegation of Croatian security services despite the state of
24 their bilateral relations."
25 Were you aware of that fact, Mr. Dragicevic?
1 A. Yes, precisely as you put it.
2 Q. Thank you.
3 MR. JORDASH: Finally, let's go, if we can, to 1D05076.
4 Q. And it's the -- this should be a -- do you recognise the
5 document, Mr. Witness?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. And it's document coming from the embassy of SFRY in Washington
8 and it's a response to the delegation visit to Washington, and there you
9 can see in the first full paragraph it notes that:
10 [As read] "The USA estimates that the Serbian DB is very solid
11 and professional service that successfully copes with the left and right
12 extremism and it has the function of carrying out peaceful politics."
13 And further down the page at the second to last paragraph we have
14 a repeat of that, and also the additional: "The DB has the function of
15 carrying out the implementation of DS and peaceful politics of the
16 president and the Serbian authority."
17 Were you aware of the following before you testified today of
18 that view held in 1996 by the US?
19 A. I think that this was the first visit by a group from the
20 State Security Service to the US. Earlier we said that there had been
21 quite a few obstacles and suspicions with regard to our visit, but in the
22 course of our talks with our counter-parts from the agency, we reached
23 some vital conclusions that contributed and created a new bilateral
24 political dimension, but it happened, as they put it, step by step.
25 Q. Thank you.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Could we also have an answer to the question. The
2 question was whether you knew about this view before you testified today?
3 The view held in 1996 by the US? Were you aware of it?
4 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] I have seen this document before I
5 came to this courtroom.
6 JUDGE ORIE: When did you see it for the first time? Was in
7 The Hague that you ...
8 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, yes, the first time I saw it
9 in The Hague.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
11 MR. JORDASH: Perhaps I can clear this up, Your Honour, with
12 another document which answers this, I think.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Well, after 25 minutes which is not 10 to 15
14 minutes, Mr. Jordash, and of course, I wonder, if this view is expressed
15 in a document, have you ever discussed with the Prosecution to tender
16 this as a bar table document, saying it illustrates how the co-operation
17 was appreciated by the US, instead of asking a witness where you know
18 that he has seen this document only now whether he was aware, he says,
19 well, I've seen it this week. I mean, we were not here to teach -- to
20 educate witnesses, but rather to hear evidence. But if there's only one
21 document that would be the last and then we --
22 MR. JORDASH: Hopefully. I should have shown this document, the
23 next one, instead of that one.
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Show the right documents to the right witness,
25 I would suggest. Please proceed.
1 MR. JORDASH: 1D02596, please.
2 Q. Mr. Dragicevic, if you just have a look at this document, and see
3 if you recognise it.
4 A. Yes, I recognise this document. In the upper right corner, you
5 can see my name and you can see the signature of Mr. Jovica Stanisic.
6 Whenever he read a document, he would designate it to a certain person
7 and here you can see this document bears my name.
8 Q. So you saw this at the time?
9 A. Yes, I did. I had it in my files.
10 Q. Last paragraph says that inter alia:
11 [As read] "...CIA and NSC evaluate their co-operation with SDB is
12 of utmost importance for the implementation of the Dayton Accords and
13 preservation of safety of American soldiers." Was that a view you had
14 heard at the time?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. And the view came from?
17 A. These views were expressed personally by Number 11.
18 MR. JORDASH: Thank you, no further questions. Thank you,
19 Mr. Witness.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, now I see you said the signature of
21 Mr. Stanisic was here. Has he signed for Mr. Nadazdin or did I ...?
22 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, the Chef de Cabinet of the
23 foreign minister, Mr. Vlado Nadazdin, sent this document to Mr. Stanisic.
24 JUDGE ORIE: [Previous translation continues] ... oh, you mean
25 that the signature is the initials at the top under your name, is that
1 the -- I'm just trying to find that's where we find Mr. Stanisic's
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes, you are absolutely right. You
4 can see my names and then the initials, yes, you are right.
5 JUDGE ORIE: The initials of Mr. Stanisic?
6 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] That's right.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then I give now an opportunity to the
8 Simatovic Defence, Mr. Petrovic, to cross-examine you.
9 Mr. Petrovic, are you ready.
10 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I am, Your Honours. Thank
12 Cross-examination by Mr. Petrovic:
13 Q. Thank you, Your Honours. Good evening Mr. Dragicevic.
14 A. Good evening.
15 Q. I have a few questions only for you on behalf of
16 Mr. Stanisic's [as interpreted] Defence. First of all, let us clarify
17 one thing that you talked about a while ago with my colleague Jordash --
18 JUDGE ORIE: I do not know whether it was only a mistake in the
19 translation or the transcription, but I take it that you are asking
20 questions on behalf of Mr. Simatovic, his Defence.
21 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, yes, of course. I
22 think I said as much and it must have been a mistake in the transcript.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
24 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
25 Q. Mr. Dragicevic, a while ago when you spoke with Mr. Jordash about
1 the year 1996 and the establishing of a point in Republika Srpska, in the
2 translation that we have, we have the term "check-point" appearing.
3 Would you agree with me that this was actually an intelligence point that
4 was set up by this American agency in Republika Srpska rather than a
5 check-point of sorts in a specific location?
6 A. Well, the word "check" in itself implies something being checked.
7 Therefore, I would agree with the first part of your question that it was
8 an intelligence point.
9 Q. Thank you, Mr. Dragicevic. Hopefully this is clear now.
10 Mr. Dragicevic, judging by your statement it seems that you were
11 for a period of time the special advisor to the chief of the department;
12 is that correct?
13 A. Yes, it is.
14 Q. Is it correct that according to the job classification in the
15 state security department, there were six positions of special advisors
16 to the chief of the department?
17 A. I really cannot confirm that. I cannot remember.
18 Q. Can you confirm that there were more than one special advisor?
19 A. Yes, yes, there were several of them.
20 Q. It is true that each of those special advisors had his own domain
21 from the scope of responsibility of the department?
22 A. Yes, each of them had their specific duties and responsibilities.
23 Q. Is it correct that a special advisor was not permitted to become
24 directly involved of the work of the chiefs of administration in the
25 state security department?
1 A. That is correct.
2 Q. Mr. Witness, can you tell us if you know when and how the
3 9th Administration was formed of which you became a head at a certain
4 point in time?
5 A. The 9th Administration was set up as an administration for
6 international co-operation. I was at its head and initially I was the
7 only member of the staff of that administration.
8 Q. Can you tell us when the administration was set up and how on the
9 basis of which document, if you know, of course?
10 A. I don't know on the basis of which document, but I know that it
11 happened in 1992.
12 Q. If you don't know on the basis of which document it was set up,
13 do you know then who was it whether it be an individual or an organ who
14 adopted such a document to serve as the basis?
15 A. Well, the chief of the department is directly responsible for
16 such issues. It is his decision which is then forwarded to competent
17 organs who issue proper decisions.
18 Q. Mr. Witness, for a long time you worked at the service and your
19 appointment to the position of the head of the department from the
20 position of a special advisor, can we qualify it as promotion or is it
21 stagnation or what kind of a career move was that?
22 A. Well, I never considered that to be degradation.
23 Q. Can we then understand it to be a promotion?
24 A. Well, I was a special advisor and head of the administration at
25 the same time.
1 Q. Thank you, Mr. Dragicevic. Let us first go back to something
2 that you mentioned today when you answered the questions by my learned
3 friend, Mr. Jordash. You spoke about the exchange of information with
4 various services, notably that of the US, Russia and others. I'm
5 interested in hearing whether that was the exchange of intelligence
6 information that your department had acquired?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. So are we talking about the information and data that were mainly
9 obtained by the 2nd Administration of the department?
10 A. Yes, for the most part it was.
11 Q. Thank you, Mr. Witness. Mr. Dragicevic, in your statement, which
12 is D466, in paragraph 80 when you spoke about Mr. Simatovic you mentioned
13 that Simatovic was the head of a section that was dealing with foreign
14 countries. Do you perhaps know whether this refers to a section in the
15 Belgrade AOS centre that was dealing with the American intelligence
16 service? In other words, are you aware of that fact?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. If you know, can you please tell us what kind of section are we
19 talking about? What is this AOS section doing?
20 A. That is a section that is dealing with the American service.
21 Q. Can you tell us specifically in what sense, with the American
22 service agents or those who were working on the ground? Can you give us
23 a description of what they operated on?
24 A. They were mainly involved in counter-intelligence work covering
25 possible activities of the American service in the territory of the
1 Republic of Serbia.
2 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: Could the speakers please
3 pause between questions and answer.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Dragicevic, could you also please make a small
5 pause between question and answer, otherwise the interpreters have
6 difficulties in following.
7 Please proceed.
8 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours.
9 Q. Was AOS dealing with American citizens who were, for whatever
10 reason, of interest for the service without knowing whether they were,
11 indeed, members of the American security service or not?
12 A. Well, I don't know any specifics but it is quite natural that in
13 the course of counter-intelligence activities you have to focus on other
14 people as well, not only members of the intelligence agencies.
15 Q. Mr. Witness, just a few more questions. Do you know that
16 Mr. Stanisic -- sorry, Mr. Simatovic, in May 1993 was appointed special
17 advisor to the chief of the department? Were you aware of that fact?
18 A. Believe me, I really cannot confirm that. I don't know.
19 Q. Mr. Dragicevic, do you know that Mr. Simatovic had never been
20 appointed chief of the 2nd Administration in the department?
21 A. No, I'm not aware of that.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Petrovic, you use the acronym AOS and at least I
23 do not find it in paragraph 80. Could you briefly tell me what you refer
25 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Yes, I can, Your Honour. In
1 paragraph 80 the witness states that Simatovic was the chief of a
2 department and he dealt with western countries. I put to the witness
3 that this was AOS, that the title of the department Mr. Simatovic worked
4 for was AOS. This is not contained in the statement, rather there is
5 just a vague sentence that I wanted to clarify with the witness. And AOS
6 is short for American intelligence service, in Serbian, of course.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. The last line would have answered my question,
8 Mr. Petrovic. I just wanted to know what it was, AOS. Thank you.
9 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
10 Q. Mr. Dragicevic, one more question. A moment ago you said that
11 when the 9th Administration was formed, you were there as the only staff
12 member. How long did it take for the administration to be structured in
13 terms of personnel and work?
14 A. I was there on my own for about a year. After that I tried to
15 find individuals who would be suited to do the job. The main obstacle
16 lay in the lack of knowledge of foreign languages because using
17 interpreters in day-to-day communications proved risky at times.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Could you please focus on the question. How long
19 did it take for that administration to be operational as far as personnel
20 and work is concerned?
21 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Let me repeat that I was there on
22 my own for a year and it took me another two years.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
24 Please proceed.
25 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation]
1 Q. Mr. Dragicevic, were precisely these personnel issues the reason
2 why for awhile you were both a special advisor and head of the
3 9th Administration? In other words, you seem to be wearing two hats
4 whereas in fact you only performed one of these two roles; right?
5 A. Yes.
6 MR. PETROVIC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. Dragicevic. I
7 have no further questions.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Petrovic.
9 Mr. Farr, is it you who will cross-examine the witness?
10 MR. FARR: Yes, Your Honour.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Dragicevic, you'll now be cross-examined by
12 Mr. Farr. Mr. Farr is counsel for the Prosecution.
13 Please proceed.
14 Cross-examination by Mr. Farr:
15 Q. Good evening, Mr. Dragicevic. Can you hear me clearly?
16 A. Good evening. Yes, I can.
17 Q. To start with, can you please tell us when you first became aware
18 of the existence of a DB special unit?
19 A. I learned of the existence of a DB special unit in 1995 when
20 preparations were underway for such a unit to be set up.
21 Q. Can you tell us specifically when in 1995 and how you became
22 aware that a unit was being set up?
23 A. I think it was in late 1995. I learned about it from my
24 colleagues who were there with me. I don't know how else to describe it
25 to you. I wasn't able to find out anything in specific -- anything
1 specific since I wasn't involved in these duties.
2 Q. In paragraph 76 of your statement you indicated that you never
3 discussed the JSO or any other unit with Mr. Stanisic. Did you ever
4 discuss the JSO or any other DB unit with Mr. Simatovic?
5 A. Neither with Mr. Simatovic, nor with Mr. Stanisic. Let me
6 repeat, our duties and tasks were strictly defined.
7 Q. Did you ever have any information that led you to believe that
8 Mr. Simatovic was a member of the DB special unit?
9 A. No.
10 Q. As far as you know, did the DB special unit exist at the time of
11 the hostage crisis in May and June of 1995?
12 A. To the best of my knowledge, the special unit was set up in 1996.
13 Everything that happened before that period were preparations to
14 establish the unit.
15 Q. What was the name of the unit at the time you learned about it?
16 A. It was not a proper unit as yet. There were preparations to set
17 up a unit that was to be called a unit for special operations.
18 Q. So you were only ever aware of the unit under the name unit for
19 special operations or JSO; is that correct?
20 A. That's correct.
21 Q. And who do you know to have been the commander of that unit?
22 A. The commander of the JSO unit was Mr. Milorad Lukovic.
23 Q. Okay. I would like to turn to your work history now.
24 In paragraph 2 of your statement you say in 1990 you became the
25 head of administration for international co-operation of the federal
1 service. And you go on to say that according to the rules then in force,
2 only the federal service was entitled to maintain contacts with foreign
3 services and that republic services could not do that. Is it correct
4 that this changed with respect to Serbia from a legal standpoint in
5 approximately November 1992 with the issuance of rules amending the rules
6 on the internal organisation of the State Security Service and from that
7 time on the Serbian DB could maintain, legally, contacts with foreign
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. At paragraph 3 of your statement you describe your trip to the
11 London Conference with Kertes and you indicate that you were fired from
12 the federal service by Minister Bulatovic upon your return. Is it
13 correct that the London Conference occurred in August of 1992?
14 A. I can't state with any certainty which month it was in 1992, but
15 I was there with Mr. Kertes.
16 Q. You say in the same paragraph, and you told us earlier that the
17 reason you were fired is that you -- well, the reason given for your
18 dismissal was that you hadn't sought permission from the minister. Is
19 that the only reason that you were dismissed?
20 A. I didn't try to investigate if that was the only reason or not.
21 I was officially informed that I was supposed to seek permission from the
22 federal minister for my trip to London with Mr. Kertes.
23 Q. Were there any public allegations against you of misconduct while
24 you were attending the London Conference that you were aware of?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. What were the allegations?
2 A. The allegations were published by the media to the effect that as
3 a professional I accompanied Mr. Kertes to London --
4 JUDGE ORIE: It seems that you want to intervene or object.
5 MR. JORDASH: No, no, neither, I do apologise. May Mr. Stanisic
6 be excused for two minutes. Sorry.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Of course, we have only 10 minutes left --
8 MR. JORDASH: I think, yes, please.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Please.
10 Please continue your answer, witness.
11 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] The media stated that I accompanied
12 Mr. Kertes to London as a professional who had the task of placing
13 wire-taps or bugs, listening devices into the conference room, the room
14 where the conference was held.
15 MR. FARR:
16 Q. As far as you know, did those allegations have any role in your
18 A. They may have been used to that end but they could not have had
19 anything to do with it. What was at play was a total anarchy or
20 dissolution within the federal service.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Could I ask you the following, Mr. Dragicevic:
22 Earlier you were asked whether not having the permission to go to London
23 was the only reason, you say "I didn't try to investigate it." You also
24 testified that there was no -- it was not required to seek the
25 permission, you were not aware of any rule.
1 Now, if I'm fired on having done something which is not against
2 the rules, I would immediately ask myself is that the real reason. Now,
3 apparently you are telling us now about allegations, et cetera,
4 et cetera, I would have expected you to include that in the first answer
5 whether there were any other than the formal reasons, you told us this
6 was the formal reason, apparently that you thought that there may have
7 been other matters, I would have expected you answering the question in
8 accordance with the whole truth, to immediately raise that issue and say
9 it was published or in the media it was said that, and apparently you
10 have thought about that as a possible reason for being fired.
11 You may proceed, Mr. Farr.
12 MR. FARR:
13 Q. Sir, what's your response to those allegations that you've just
15 A. I was not given any sort of opportunity to respond to these
16 allegations or to appeal the decision that the federal service issued me
18 Q. What I am asking is what is your response today? Do you say that
19 these allegations were true, do you say they were false?
20 A. The allegations were completely untrue. I'm a person who studied
21 the English language and literature as well as law and I have no
22 propensity for anything electronic or any interest in it, so these
23 allegations were quite ridiculous. And if I may add, to manage to place
24 listening devices in a conference room which, as we all know full well,
25 is always screened for anything of the sort prior to the opening of the
1 conference, is quite strange.
2 Q. Moving on to your new job at the Serbian DB, in paragraph 4 of
3 your witness statement you indicated that you knew Mr. Stanisic "from
4 before." How did you know Mr. Stanisic from before?
5 A. Mr. Stanisic became employed in the State Security Service of the
6 Republic of Serbia a year after my employment there started and we knew
7 each other even from before that period.
8 THE INTERPRETER: We know each other from that period,
9 interpreter's correction.
10 MR. FARR:
11 Q. And when was that period exactly?
12 A. That was 1975 when I started working in the State Security
13 Service of the Republic of Serbia. After a certain period, I took up
14 studying law at the university in Belgrade. I was studying part-time and
15 the service banned me from continuing my studies there. I was very
16 unhappy with IT and I left the service in 1979.
17 Q. Did you know Mr. Stanisic on a continuous basis from 1975 until
18 the time he gave you the job in 1991 or 1992?
19 A. When I left the service in 1979 I became the manager of the
20 publishing house called the Yugoslav Review and then I would see
21 Mr. Stanisic after that on occasion.
22 Q. Is it fair to say that you remained friends during that period?
23 A. In my view a person can be considered lucky and happy if he or
24 she has one or two friends and Mr. Stanisic was to me a colleague with
25 whom I used to work.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Farr, I am looking at the clock, we are two
2 minutes away from adjournment. Would this be a suitable moment?
3 MR. FARR: Yes, Your Honour, that's fine.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
5 Then I have one matter to be put on the record before we adjourn,
6 which is the following: That 65 ter document 6291 tendered by the
7 Prosecution on the 20th of October, 2011, and admitted provisionally
8 under seal was by mistake assigned number P3039, a number which was
9 already assigned on that same day to document 65 ter 6301. Therefore,
10 now 65 ter 6291 has been assigned in e-court number P3042. This is
11 hereby on the record.
12 Mr. Jordash, the list of names with the numbers is uploaded in
13 e-court I do understand. Could we perhaps tomorrow in the event that you
14 tendered documents and I think there are a lot which may not have been
15 tendered, I'm not quite certain, I rather not do it now, it being 7.00
16 and caring about my reputation with the interpreters, transcribers,
17 et cetera, but first thing tomorrow morning if you prepare it well, it
18 will not take much time.
19 Then, Mr. Dragicevic, I would like to instruct you that you
20 should not speak with anyone or communicate in any other way with anyone
21 about your testimony, whether that's testimony you've given today or
22 whether that's testimony still to be given tomorrow. And when I say
23 tomorrow, Mr. Farr, could you give us an estimate on how much time you
24 really would need?
25 MR. FARR: Your Honour, my initial estimate is 4 hours. Of
1 course I'm conscious that the Chamber always pays careful attention to
2 the way in which things proceed, but ...
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, if you could shorten that, of course, without
4 loss of quality, that of course would be appreciated.
5 MR. FARR: Yes, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Then we'd like to see you back tomorrow morning at
7 9.00 because we adjourn until Wednesday, the 9th of November at 9.00 in
8 the morning in this same Courtroom II.
9 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.02 p.m.
10 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 9th day of
11 November, 2011 at 9.00 a.m.