1 Tuesday, 28 February 2012
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 2.22 p.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon to everyone. Madam Registrar, would
6 you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case
8 IT-03-69-T, the Prosecutor versus Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar. The Chamber would like
10 to deal with a few preliminaries before we continue to hear the evidence
11 of the witness and may even be the case that we have to deal with a few
12 even later today.
13 The first one. The Chamber was notified by an informal
14 communication last night at close to 7.00 p.m. that the Simatovic Defence
15 will not be calling Witness DFS-015, but we were not informed about the
16 availability of Witness DFS-016, who is next in line.
17 Mr. Bakrac, once we've finished with the present witness, what
18 are your plans?
19 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I'm expecting news
20 from the ground about the next witness who can come. They will tell me
21 when he will come. With your leave, I would like to inform you about
22 that before the end of today's hearing.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, but would that witness be available, well,
24 let's say tomorrow?
25 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I don't think so. Not
1 only do I not think so, I'm sure that he will not be available tomorrow.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, because the cancelling of the previous witness,
3 of course, comes a bit a surprise to us, and apparently you have not
4 taken any measures in that context to fill in the gap that now exists.
5 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, according to our
6 estimate made yesterday, we decided to give up on the witness that was
7 envisaged and since then I, this morning and the rest of the day, we will
8 try and see who will be our next witness who could be made available to
9 the Trial Chamber as soon as possible.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, still it's difficult for the Chamber to
11 understand that the day before the testimony starts you suddenly conclude
12 that you don't want to call the witness at all. That is -- that sounds
13 as if everything is badly prepared.
14 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Well, Your Honour, we are in the
15 process of carrying out the final proofing, and so far the final proofing
16 will lead us to our final conclusion. We were not in a position to
17 envisage things, and as a result of our final proofing our conclusion
18 will be that we will give up on the witness that we meant to call. We
19 have already stated that the -- our Defence has -- is facing a lot of
20 difficulties with regard to everything that I have already mentioned and
21 with regard to the fact that we joined the case later, our request to be
22 provided with more time for preparations.
23 We are now in a position that we already indicated to the
24 Trial Chamber. We are now in the process of finalising our list of
25 witnesses that we will call up. All of the problems that we are facing
1 in view of the situation that I have already described for the benefit of
2 the Trial Chamber and which I don't want to go over again have put us in
3 this situation.
4 JUDGE ORIE: I think it's wise not to go over it again, but it
5 seems -- it sounds as if you say -- you gave a wrong decision. You see
6 here are the consequences instead of adapting your work to the what the
7 decision is, because if the Chamber decides on -- on time for preparation
8 and if you halfway say, Of course we couldn't do that, look -- look
9 how -- now it becomes clear to you what our problems are. That sounds as
10 if you have not understood what a decision by the Chamber means; that is,
11 that you have to speed up, find a solution, whatever you want to do but
12 not to confront us a couple of hours before the start of the testimony of
13 a witness and saying that in final proofing that it turned out that you
14 would not call him. That is a matter which in my experience is not under
15 normal circumstances to be expected in final proofing but should become
16 clear already at earlier stages.
17 Let's not talk about it any further. You have no witness ready
18 for the remainder of the week. If you have considered it even a
19 possibility that you would have to withdraw that witness, then you should
20 have prepared for an alternative scenario as well, which again you
21 apparently have not done.
22 Let's move on with scheduling issues.
23 Mr. Jordash, on the 22nd of February, you told us that you would
24 contact Witness DSD-067 and DSD-061, the two -- the expert Mr. Brown and
25 the witness Sir Roberts. On the 23rd of February we have been informed
1 through an informal communication that Mr. Brown indicated that he would
2 prefer to start his testimony in the week beginning the 19th of March,
3 and we learned on the 24th of February that Sir Roberts was -- Sir Ivor
4 was available to testify on the 26th and the 27th of March, although he
5 preferred the 26th of March.
6 Now, 26 of March, first of all, is a Monday, as you are aware of,
7 and usually we are not sitting on Mondays but we could, of course, try to
8 accommodate, but what we would very much like to have is the time
9 estimates for the examination-in-chief and the cross-examination of both
10 Mr. Brown and the witness so that we can try to fit it all in.
11 MR. JORDASH: I think Mr. Brown direct examination up to two
12 hours, and --
13 JUDGE ORIE: Brown, two hours. Yes.
14 MR. JORDASH: And Sir Ivor, up to an hour and a half.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Could I hear from the Simatovic Defence how much
16 time they would need to cross-examine Mr. Brown and Sir Ivor.
17 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I don't think we will
18 need more than half an hour for each of the two witnesses.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Prosecution.
20 MR. GROOME: Yes. Good afternoon, Your Honour. I estimate that
21 we would need two and a half hours for Mr. Brown and one and a half hours
22 for Sir Ivor Roberts.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Which means that it should be possible to hear the
24 evidence of Sir Ivor Roberts in -- perhaps not in one day but in one day
25 plus a little bit. We'll then consider whether we can reschedule our
1 hearings in March to start on the Monday the 26th rather than on the
3 I also do understand that the 19th of March, the week of the 19th
4 of March, that would be -- we could conclude his testimony in that week
5 relatively easily. We'll try to schedule it in this way.
6 MR. JORDASH: Thank you, Your Honours.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Any further questions as far as scheduling is
9 You said later today, Mr. Bakrac, you'd inform us about the next
11 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Does the scheduling of Mr. Brown and
13 Sir Ivor Roberts in any way affect your further plans as far as
14 scheduling is concerned?
15 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, at this moment I can't
16 say. From this point of view, I don't think that this will have any
17 impact. As far as we are concerned, I think that the witnesses in
18 question can be scheduled at the given times.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you for that, Mr. Bakrac. Then I move on to
20 another subject.
21 Mr. Jordash, on the 26th of January, and I'm talking about
22 Witness Pelevic, you have indicated -- you objected and addressed us
23 saying that the Prosecution had violated Rule 90(H)(iii) of the Rules by
24 putting its case to the witness in accordance with that Rule. Then on
25 the 21st of January you stated that you did not seek an immediate ruling
1 on your objection, but that you would may make further motions on the
2 matter at a later time. The Chamber then instructed parties to discuss
3 the issue among themselves to see if there were areas of possible
5 On the 9th of February, the Chamber requested the Stanisic
6 Defence to clarify its position, and in particular, to specify what sort
7 of remedy you would consider appropriate if the objection remains.
8 Mr. Jordash, you then replied that you would revert to the Court
9 in due course, and I don't think that there was any follow-up since the
10 9th of February, or have I missed something?
11 MR. JORDASH: No, I don't think there has been a follow-up. Our
12 position is -- is, I'm afraid, as uncertain as it was then in that our
13 preferred option is to wait until the end of the evidence and then look
14 at our various complaints and see how they all, in our view, have
15 accumulated and then wait for the Prosecution closing brief, and at that
16 point we'll have all the available material to be able to decide what
17 submissions we would like to make.
18 And we have in mind submissions, one, concerning what the
19 Prosecution ought to be able to now rely upon in relation to particular
20 witness evidence, what submissions they ought to make in relation to that
21 Prosecution evidence if they haven't put that particular aspect of their
22 case to particular witnesses. And two, the more extreme remedy of being
23 able to suggest to the Trial Chamber that certain evidence ought to be
24 excluded in particular instances.
25 These are assessments which, in our respectful submission, we
1 cannot make at this time. We don't know what the Prosecution are going
2 to -- to say in relation to --
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. At the same time, Mr. Jordash, once all the
4 evidence has been presented, of course then the Prosecution should know
5 whether any evidence is excluded. And if you say, Well, let's first see
6 what their final brief tell us. Of course, in that final brief they
7 would have to know whether there's any evidence which is excluded. So
8 therefore I do understand your argument to say, Well, we first have to
9 look testified as whole, and then we can make the necessary submissions.
10 What I have more difficult -- more difficulties to understand is
11 that you say, But then we'd like first to look at to what extent they do
12 rely on certain portions of the evidence and then make an application
13 either to exclude it or to take your -- to choose your position, because
14 I can imagine that the Prosecution then would ask for another final brief
15 or at least to be able allowed to file another final brief not knowing on
16 what evidence they could -- could rely.
17 So part of it I do understand. Part of it I have quite a
18 difficulty in understanding. That is the timing. Perhaps you'll think
19 about it and --
20 MR. JORDASH: Yes. I mean -- yes. If I can think about it.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Nothing is lost to think about --
22 MR. JORDASH: No.
23 JUDGE ORIE: -- Mr. Jordash, and I'm not forcing you to already
24 start to present the results of your intellectual activity at this moment
25 to the Chamber.
1 Ms. Marcus, are you still thinking, or are you going to present
3 MS. MARCUS: Thank you, Your Honour. No. It was only on this
4 very point. When Your Honour raised this question on the 9th of
5 February, Your Honour inquired with Mr. Jordash as to an e-mail that was
6 sent to the Prosecution. I'd just like to note for the record that that
7 e-mail was sent by the Defence to the Prosecution on the 31st of January
8 and we responded the very same day. So I would just like that to be on
9 the record that on this issue of 90(H) with respect to Witness Pelevic we
10 presented our responses to the Stanisic Defence the same day.
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Of course it may well be, Mr. Jordash, that if
12 you wait and at later stage seek any remedy or any relief that of course
13 we might be in a situation that we have to consider the -- the
14 procedure -- proceeding that moment as well.
15 MR. JORDASH: Well, I've thought about our position, and I think
16 in this circumstance the difference between asking Your Honours not to
17 allow the Prosecution to be able to rely upon a particular piece of
18 evidence is tantamount to asking them -- asking Your Honours to exclude
19 it, because what we're engaged in is -- is the following: The
20 Prosecution may say, We want to rely upon proposition A and the witness's
21 answer to proposition A. We may then turn around and say, Well, you
22 ought to have put proposition B. That is the only way you can fairly
23 rely upon proposition -- the answer to proposition A. That's the type of
24 intellectual exercise I can see we will want to engage with and that's
25 why I say we can't really deal with it until we hear what the
1 Prosecution's position is going be in relation to their various
3 JUDGE ORIE: But your position is clear to the Prosecution
4 because if you say this is what you should have done, then it should be
5 clear to them what your complaint is. Of course, we are not privy of
6 the -- of the e-mail exchanges between the parties.
7 MR. JORDASH: But the difficulty is that -- that it's an
8 impossible task at this stage given the hundreds of possible propositions
9 the Prosecution may seek to rely upon to be able to to say what the
10 Prosecution should have done in a particular given situation. We can
11 give them broad areas where we say that they failed to put their case
12 adequately, but until they pick out the minutiae of the propositions they
13 want to rely upon, we don't know what our position will be.
14 MS. MARCUS: Your Honour, all I can say to that is that there
15 were three questions put to us in that e-mail. We responded. If
16 Mr. Jordash has some other questions he'd like to put, we're happy to
17 respond if that would assist in his coming to his own conclusion.
18 MR. JORDASH: Well, it won't, unless the Prosecution are willing
19 to specify or able to specify precisely what detail of their case they
20 will seek to rely upon. In a case where there are hundreds if not
21 thousands of possible positions that they may take on a particular issue
22 or on a particular crime base at least, the standard practice of the
23 Prosecution when being asked to specify their case is to refer us to the
24 indictment in the pre-trial brief. We don't expect that to change at
25 this point in time three years after the case has started. So we can
1 engage in a process of putting to the Prosecution what we say they should
2 specify in relation to their case, but we'll get the same answer I fear.
3 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber will think about it as well.
4 The next and for this moment the last item, on the 19th of
5 January, Mr. Jordash, the Stanisic Defence requested the Chamber to lift
6 the confidentiality of the parts of evidence of Mr. Dimitrijevic, which
7 was given in the court session of the 18th of January, the day before.
8 You have through an informal communication invited the Chamber to
9 lift the confidentiality of a certain portion of the cross-examination
10 and to make that public. We do not know and since it is, of course, at
11 this moment still evidence given in private session also do not know
12 whether we have to go into private session to hear the position of the
13 other parties. If all parties would agree with it, then there might be
14 no need to go into private session.
15 MS. MARCUS: Your Honour, with you leave, I'd like to have a look
16 at it and get back to Your Honours. I will do that later today.
17 JUDGE ORIE: That's fine. Mr. Bakrac.
18 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Our Defence agrees.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Then we'll hear from the Prosecution and then decide
20 whether or not to lift the confidentiality of transcript page 16164, line
21 8 up to and including transcript page 16174, line 23.
22 If there is nothing else to be raised by the parties.
23 Mr. Bakrac, you asked for another five minutes with the present witness.
24 Could he be escorted into the courtroom.
25 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
1 [The witness takes the stand]
2 WITNESS: MLADEN KARAN [Resumed]
3 [Witness answered through interpreter]
4 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon, Mr. Karan. Please be seated.
5 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Karan, I'd like to remind you you're still bound
7 by the solemn declaration you've given at the beginning of your
8 testimony. Mr. Bakrac will now continue for the last five minutes his
10 Mr. Bakrac, please proceed.
11 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour. Before I
12 start putting questions to Mr. Karan, we left off last week when I was
13 showing the map CB03 to Mr. Karan and the Registry received it as EC-44,
14 and now I would like to tender it.
15 JUDGE ORIE: That's the map that was marked by the witness?
16 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour.
17 THE REGISTRAR: Document saved as IC-44 will receive number D752,
18 Your Honours.
19 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence. Please proceed.
20 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honour.
21 Examination by Mr. Bakrac: [Continued]
22 Q. [Interpretation] Good afternoon, Mr. Karan.
23 A. Good afternoon.
24 Q. We almost finished my direct examination last week, and we were
25 discussing a drone that was shot down. You told us, if I'm not mistaken,
1 that some equipment was kept by -- by Lieutenant-Colonel Letic.
2 A. Yes, lieutenant-colonel.
3 Q. We heard testimony here that Mr. Ajdinovic fell into disfavour in
4 late 1994 or early 1995 and was arrested by the Serbian DB in Glina, who
5 accused him of taking precious reconnaissance equipment from a drone,
6 sold the equipment and pocketed the money. Are these allegations true to
7 the best of your knowledge?
8 A. This is absolutely not true. I was involved in this. Petar
9 Ajdinovic was not in the RSK from 1992 onwards, and he did not have
10 anything to do with that drone. Lieutenant-Colonel Letic was the only
11 one who kept the equipment, and he didn't sell it. He returned it to the
12 Pauk command on the orders of the chief of security of the Main Staff.
13 Q. Mr. Karan, sometime after Operation Storm in 1995, did
14 Slobodan Lazarevic ask you or demand from you that you let him go from
15 the 21st Corps?
16 A. That's impossible. I have no authority to either admit or let
17 anyone go from the service. So this is absolutely not true.
18 Q. Did he address you with a request to allow him to leave Slavonia
19 and go to Belgrade or something like that?
20 A. No. That never turned up in any of my contacts with him, and I
21 didn't seen see him when I was in the 11th Corps as the chief of security
22 in 1995.
23 Q. Mr. Karan, in the natural course of things, would you go to
24 Topusko at the time when the Pauk operation was under way?
25 A. Well, if I duty took me there, yes. I was in Topusko several
1 times even during the Pauk operation and all the way up to
2 Operation Storm.
3 Q. Do you have direct knowledge or did you perhaps hear as the chief
4 of security that Franko Simatovic had some premises or offices in Topusko
5 where he spent time, worked?
6 A. No, I never heard of anything like that.
7 Q. Was the command of your brigade in Vojnic -- sorry, was the
8 command of your corps in Vojnic?
9 A. I've said before that the corps command was based in the hunting
10 lodge called Muljava, 3 to 4 kilometres away from Vojnic, and it was just
11 my office, the headquarters of my section, that was in Vojnic, not far
12 from the SUP building in the so-called cultural hall.
13 Q. Did Mr. Simatovic have any office at all at the headquarters of
14 your security section in Vojnic or in the Muljava hotel at the corps
16 A. He didn't have an office on my premises, and I know for sure that
17 he didn't have an office at the corps command either, and I don't know
18 about any other locations.
19 Q. Thank you, Mr. Karan.
20 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you, Your Honours. This
21 completes my direct examination.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Bakrac.
23 Mr. Jordash. I think your indication was that you would need one
24 hour 15 minutes approximately.
25 MR. JORDASH: Yes, please.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Please proceed.
2 Cross-examination by Mr. Jordash:
3 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Karan.
4 A. Good afternoon.
5 Q. Could we have on the screen please 1D4904. Please, would you
6 have a look at this document and see if you can cast any light on it.
7 It's a document dated the 17th of November, 1991, and I'm dealing, just
8 to orientate yourself, with your time with the Guards Motorised Brigade
9 in Vukovar in 1991.
10 This is 4904. I don't know if I said 4909, but it's 4904 is what
11 we want. Yes, we have it.
12 Just have a read through it and when you're finished we can go to
13 the next page, so you can read the whole document.
14 Perhaps we can go to page 2 of the English. And perhaps 3 of the
16 A. I've read it.
17 Q. And the next page of the B/C/S, please. And perhaps the last
18 page of the English.
19 THE INTERPRETER: Could all unnecessary microphones please be
20 switched off. Thank you.
21 MR. JORDASH:
22 Q. Are you there?
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Were you aware of this order by Major-General Biorcevic on 17th
25 of November, 1991, ordering - amongst other things - all forces within
1 the zone to be identified and placed under the command of the JNA?
2 That's at number 8 of the document. Were you aware of this order?
3 A. I know this order, not this one from the 12th Corps because it's
4 the Novi Sad Corps, but we in the Guards Motorised Brigade received a
5 similar order, of course at a lower level than the corps.
6 Q. At number 11, Biorcevic notes that he placed Colonel
7 Branislav Radoman from the 12th Corps command in charge of controlling
8 the implementation of the order and providing directives for work. Did
9 you know that gentleman and did you observe him implementing or
10 attempting to implement this order?
11 A. This pertains to the northern part above Vukovar, an area covered
12 by the 12th Corps. It was, in other words, the area of responsibility of
13 the 12th Corps. I was not aware of this item 11 that
14 Colonel Radoman Branislav was responsible for the implementation of this
15 order, but I knew that in our area TO staffs were under the command of
16 the JNA, and volunteer forces also had to place themselves under the
17 command of the JNA and that their unauthorised movement had to be
18 prevented as well as any other irregular activities by them that would
19 disrupt the deployment of combat forces, law and order, and the
20 functioning of the civilian and military authorities.
21 Q. The order that you in the Guards Motorised Brigade received, was
22 that -- the similar order that you referred to, was that at the same time
23 or a similar time as this order?
24 A. Yes. I'm just saying that these orders relate to the directive
25 from the Supreme Command proclaiming an immediate threat of war. This
1 order is, in fact, a result of that directive.
2 Q. And do you know whether in your area it was implemented?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. And do you have any knowledge as to whether Biorcevic also
5 applied it to Arkan or whether the order from your zone of responsibility
6 was applied to Arkan?
7 A. From our area of responsibility, the execution of this order did
8 not relate to Arkan because he was not present there. However, this
9 order had to be complied with without further ado, because the JNA units
10 had to be filled to full complement and be placed at full combat
11 readiness, and they had to have a full complement of personnel, combat
12 equipment, and everything else.
13 Q. Do you have any knowledge as to whether Biorcevic's personal
14 relationship with Arkan impacted upon this order for subordination?
15 A. The JNA had the rule that all interpersonal relationships had to
16 be left outside when you are doing your work. I knew even before that
17 they -- that they were friends, but there was no alternative but place
18 all of them including Arkan and his volunteers under the JNA command.
19 Q. And do you know that as a fact, did you observe that as a fact,
20 that Arkan was, at least following this order, placed under direct
21 subordination to the Novi Sad Corps vis-a-vis this order?
22 A. That is a fact. All forces were to be placed under the command
23 of the highest-ranking unit in the field. No alternative to that.
24 Q. Mr. Karan, I'm not dispute what you're say, but I'm trying to
25 ascertain the source of your knowledge. Were you told that? Did you see
1 it yourself in military operations? How do you know this to be a fact in
2 relation to Arkan?
3 A. I know because I know how the volunteers who were in the
4 operation group south were treated. There's no reason why it should be
5 any different with the operation group north. There was no improvisation
6 there. It was a fact that was obvious on the ground, and it's an
7 absolute truth.
8 Q. Okay. Thank you. Let me have you look at something else which
9 is related. 1D03611, please, on the screen, and it's -- what you're
10 going to be shown, Mr. Karan, is a section of minutes from the 27th
11 session of the Supreme Defence Council of the FRY, and if we could
12 orientate ourselves by looking at page 1 in the first instance so you can
13 see who attended this particular session.
14 We can see there amongst the attendees there's Milosevic, Lilic,
15 Perisic, and others. Do you have that?
16 A. I can see that.
17 Q. And if we can go to page 10 of the English -- sorry, page 11 of
18 the English and 11 of the B/C/S.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Marcus.
20 MS. MARCUS: Yes, Your Honour. According to our information,
21 parts of these minutes are under -- should be under seal. I have certain
22 pages indicated. I can provide that information to Mr. Jordash if he
23 wants, but I think out of an abundance of caution this should not be
25 MR. JORDASH: I don't recall a -- I mean, I recall a lengthy
1 discussion about whether they should be, and I recall alerting the
2 Chamber to the fact that had appeared on a public and do appear on a
3 public web site, but if that's the Prosecution's cautious position, I'm
4 happy to follow that.
5 MS. MARCUS: Your Honour, this is quite a large body of evidence.
6 Obviously the SDC minutes, there was a lot of debate about it. We have
7 very detailed charts that have been put together as to which pieces of
8 which SDC minutes, et cetera, so in an abundance of caution as I said I
9 think that we should probably be discreet about it.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Not to be shown to the public.
11 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
12 JUDGE ORIE: Portions were already shown to the public.
13 Ms. Marcus, is there anyway for you to find out whether those portions
14 are affected by -- you have, you said, all kind of charts, and
15 unfortunately the Chamber has not. Could someone try to find out,
16 because otherwise we would have to make a video redaction.
17 MS. MARCUS: According to the information I have, page 1 and page
18 10 are among those to which protective measures apply.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Then a video redaction is hereby ordered.
20 Please proceed.
21 MR. JORDASH: Now, the -- thank you, Your Honour.
22 Q. Now, the subject I want to deal with now is Bora Ivanovic, and
23 I'd like you to read page 11 and moving through to page 16, please, and I
24 want to ask you about what you know, if anything, about the prosecution
25 of Ivanovic for co-operating with the likes of Arkan.
1 A. No. I don't know if General Ivanovic was ever prosecuted for the
2 friendly and good relations he had with Arkan, but I know the man myself,
3 and I know that he was not quite an honourable officer, that he was
4 involved in some activities that are not appropriate to the rank of
5 officer, activities that are criminal in nature, and he was also bent on
6 some irregularities outside the service, like drunkenness, et cetera.
7 Q. Thank you for the answer. Let me try to shortcut things, then.
8 MR. JORDASH: If we can go to page 14 of the English and 15 of
9 the B/C/S -- sorry, 14 of both, and Perisic there is -- is -- there's a
10 discussion about Ivanovic, and Perisic notes:
11 "The commission came to a conclusion, that is, going to the court
12 and the court will prove that Bora a gave 4 million bullets contrary to
13 your order."
14 "Milosevic: When did he give them?"
15 Perhaps if I'm going to read we should go into private session,
16 Your Honour.
17 JUDGE ORIE: We move into private session.
18 [Private session]
11 Pages 17765-17769 redacted. Private session.
8 [Open session]
9 THE REGISTRAR: We're in open session, Your Honours.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
11 MR. JORDASH:
12 Q. And what I'm interested in is the message sent by Perisic
13 according to Mladic that in August of 1994, Milosevic wanted Mladic or
14 was urging him to refuse obedience to the RS leadership, which according
15 to the message is leading the people into disaster, and I read halfway
16 down the English page:
17 "He wants you to make a U-turn in policy that the plan can be
19 Do you see that?
20 A. Yes, I do.
21 Q. And then if we go over to page 283 of the English and B/C/S, we
22 see Mladic's view of that proposal, and two-thirds of the way down the
24 "What is asked of us is to refuse obedience to the RS
25 leadership - that is an immature idea, which is the same as if the VJ was
1 asked to refuse obedience to the FRY leadership.
2 "Milosevic's statement that the RS leadership has separated from
3 the Serbian interests must not be a cause for discord in the army."
4 Were you aware of the depth of Milosevic's frustration with the
5 RS leadership and his attempt to encourage Mladic to rebel?
6 A. Yes, we knew a lot about the functioning of the political power
7 and the functioning of the military. Similar things happened in our
8 midst. The political authorities were not concerned with the overall
9 interest, and that particularly reflected in the Republic of Serbian
10 Krajina. At least in Republika Srpska it functioned in a way, much
11 better than in our midst. It was only in 1994 that there were some
12 attempts here to have political authorities functioning. The interest of
13 particular political leaders were totally different. There was a group
14 in favour of total integration in Croatia, and the others were completely
15 against that.
16 In the Republika Srpska, everybody was aware of the fact how that
17 Mladic had a negative attitude towards Karadzic. They were not on good
18 terms. They clashed constantly.
19 Q. Now, in August of 1994, where were you based and what were your
20 day-to-day tasks?
21 A. In August of 1994, I was chief of security of the 21st Corps. We
22 were engaged in very serious activities, i.e., combat activities. We
23 were engaged against the 5th Corps of the BiH Army and the popular
24 defence of Western Bosnia. In mid-August we received a lot of refugees,
25 and all of the troops of the popular defence of Western Bosnia. They all
1 arrived in our territory. That took up a lot of our time. We organised
2 their accommodation. We're talking about some 50.000 or 60.000 refugees
3 who were accommodated in Turinje and Batnoga camps. We also had smaller
4 groups of refugees roaming about. We would collect them, and we would
5 steer them towards the camps. People were fleeing combat activities.
6 MR. JORDASH: May we take a break, Your Honour, please?
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. We take a break, and we resume at 4.00.
8 --- Recess taken at 3.32 p.m.
9 --- On resuming at 4.04 p.m.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, please proceed.
11 MR. JORDASH: Thank you, Your Honour.
12 Q. I'm going to return to your precise role in a moment, Mr. Karan,
13 but you've raised the issue of 50- to 60.000 refugees, and I want to deal
14 with Fikret Abdic's meetings with you and what you know about
15 Fikret Abdic's motivations.
16 MR. JORDASH: Could we have on the screen, please, 1D05440.
17 Q. What's coming on the screen is a letter that Fikret Abdic
18 apparently sent to Bill Clinton, who was then the President of the US.
19 Just have a quick flick through it. It's dated, as you'll see at the
20 end, the 7th of October, 1994, so just before Pauk began.
21 Now, let's -- because we're short of time, let's turn to page 3
22 of the English and page 2 of the B/C/S, and there Abdic, at the bottom
23 of -- or towards the bottom of page 3 of the English, notes:
24 "People of Western Bosnia were the first ones to reject such
25 insane intentions and with its exodus it drew the attention to the future
1 cataclysms which are yet to come. Sixty thousand people who fled in
2 front of terror will soon reach Europe, as well, is proud of its
3 historical resistance."
5 "Regardless of the torture of representatives of international
6 organisations which deprive us of the right to live, food, water,
7 accommodation, medications, trying to force us to go back to the private
8 state of Alija Izetbegovic, we will endure in our sacrifice."
9 And then turning to the page 3 of the B/C/S and page 4 of the
10 English. Towards the bottom of page 4:
11 "The thing which needs to be done urgently is to provide enough
12 supplies, accommodation, and health care for more than 60.000 refugees."
13 Now, Mr. Karan, you were -- were you seeing Fikret Abdic on a
14 regular basis at this point in time, and, if so, does that reflect his
15 view, and did that reflect the situation on the ground?
16 A. Absolutely. I met with Fikret several times a week. We had to
17 implement some activities together in order to organise the life of the
18 people in every sense of the word. It was our obligation to organise the
19 militarily able-bodies refugees. We didn't want them to scatter all over
20 the territory of Kordun.
21 I know for a fact that this was Fikret Abdic's position towards
22 the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina and in particular towards
23 Alija Izetbegovic.
24 Q. And --
25 A. I don't know if you wish me to say anything else. I don't know
1 what your question was, as a matter of fact.
2 Q. You answered part of it. In relation to the 60.000 refugees, in
3 October of 1994, before the beginning of Pauk, what was the general
4 condition of these refugees? Were they suffering from a lack of basic
5 food supplies and so on?
6 A. Well, they were not exactly starving, but there were problems
7 with health care. We had some people who were sick. We had problems
8 with very young children. The capacity of our hospital in Vojnici in
9 Kordun could not meet the demand of so many people. Moreover, we had to
10 reorganise our own forces to engage with the 5th Corps. We had to deploy
11 our troops along the length of the border with Western Bosnia. The
12 situation was dire but not unsustainable.
13 MR. JORDASH: May I tender this document as an exhibit, please.
14 MS. MARCUS: Your Honour, we've objected before to these
15 documents, I believe, because they come from Mr. Stanisic's own personal
17 MR. JORDASH: The witness has authenticated the facts within the
18 document, and there's no reason to suspect that this document isn't
19 authenticate reflecting as it does the views expressed by Fikret Abdic at
20 the time, whether they came from the accused or not.
21 MS. MARCUS: Your Honour, the witness has agreed with a portion
22 of the document, that is true, but there's quite a lot in the document,
23 and I don't know why the Defence can't get the -- the original version.
24 What we -- we -- as a -- as a matter of principle, we -- we oppose
25 documents that come from the collection of the accused. So that's our
1 position, Your Honour.
2 MR. JORDASH: Well, I leave it in Your Honours' hands. They come
3 from the accused. There's no reason to suspect on the face of it that
4 this is anything other than an authentic document.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Under normal circumstances one would ask the
6 provider of document where he got it from, et cetera, et cetera, and of
7 course Mr. Stanisic is not taking the stand as a witness. It will marked
8 for identification. We'll consider the matter.
9 [Defence counsel confer]
10 MR. JORDASH: If we can provide that information of course, then
11 we will.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. If that would, of course, then convince
13 Ms. Marcus. That's a -- it's an indirect way of receiving information
14 which may be relevant to our decision whether or not we'll admit.
15 Now, there's one --
16 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
17 JUDGE ORIE: Before we ask Madam Registrar to provide a number,
18 the original - which is most likely not the original - have you inspected
19 that, Ms. Marcus? I mean the copy in terms of whether it's -- sometimes
20 you can see whether it's a scanned document. Sometimes you can see --
21 and I may have missed questions in relation to the signature.
22 Mr. Jordash, forgive me when I have not been attentive enough,
23 but did you ask whether the witness recognises the signature as the one
24 of Fikret Abdic, or have you --
25 MR. JORDASH: No, I didn't.
1 JUDGE ORIE: -- compared it with any other --
2 MR. JORDASH: No, I didn't. I'd -- perhaps that can be done.
3 JUDGE ORIE: -- known signatures of Fikret Abdic? Perhaps
4 that --
5 MR. JORDASH: Yes, that might help.
6 JUDGE ORIE: -- might be the -- might help, yes. Perhaps a
7 comparison as well. Perhaps you could ask the witness. It's on your
8 screen at this moment.
9 Can you -- you see those -- on this copy there's a signature. Do
10 you recognise that signature? I could ask you whether you recognise
11 this, the one of Fikret Abdic, because to leave that as an open question
12 is, of course, where the name Fikret Abdic has been mentioned now ten
13 times and his name appears just above it. But do you recognise what you
14 see on this letter as being the -- as being similar to the signature of
15 Fikret Abdic?
16 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] It is quite. I know it.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I take it that the original is somewhere in
18 the US archives.
19 MR. JORDASH: We have the original. Mr. Stanisic received it
20 from Fikret Abdic's Chief of Cabinet, a man called Arif Vukovic.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
22 MR. JORDASH: Or Vukovic.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Now, I take it that the real original has been sent
24 to the addressee.
25 MR. JORDASH: Yes.
1 JUDGE ORIE: So you have another copy. That's what you --
2 MR. JORDASH: That's what I meant, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE ORIE: -- wanted to say but which comes close. You have
5 Ms. Marcus, perhaps it -- despite the fact that you, in general
6 terms, oppose to documents coming from the accused, of course if there
7 are serious doubts, there are other ways of verifying the authenticity of
8 the letter, but the first step, I would think, is to inspect the one --
9 the copy which is in the hands of the Defence.
10 MS. MARCUS: Yes, Your Honour. I think upon looking at that I
11 can give our final position.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then the -- Madam Registrar, the number of
13 this letter would be?
14 THE REGISTRAR: Document 1D5440 will receive number D755, Your
16 JUDGE ORIE: D755 is marked for identification.
17 You may proceed Mr. Jordash.
18 MR. JORDASH: Thank you, Your Honour. Similarly, could we have a
19 look at 1D05441 which is a letter from Fikret Abdic, dated again the 7th
20 of October. I'm not going to dwell on it.
21 Q. I'll just ask you to look at the signature and see if you
22 recognise it in the first instance.
23 If we can go to page 2 of the B/C/S and 3 of the English.
24 Do you recognise the signature, Mr. Karan?
25 A. Yes, I do. That's his signature.
1 Q. And go -- if we can go back to page 1. This is a letter to
2 Ms. Ogata. Are you able to confirm Ms. Ogata was the commissioner for
3 refugees for the UN at the time?
4 A. That's general knowledge.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 MR. JORDASH: May I tender this exhibit -- as an exhibit as well,
8 JUDGE ORIE: The same procedure, I take it.
9 MS. MARCUS: Yes, thank you.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
11 THE REGISTRAR: Document 1D5441 will receive number D756, Your
13 JUDGE ORIE: D756 is marked for identification.
14 MR. JORDASH:
15 Q. Do -- do -- sorry, let me start that again. Did you speak to
16 Fikret Abdic about the Pauk operation and about the agreement with
17 Milosevic that Serbia would try to assist with the situation on the
18 ground in and around November of 1994?
19 A. Yes, except that Fikret Abdic did not call it Operation Pauk.
20 Instead, he said that he must, at all costs, for the sake of the people
21 of the Autonomous Region of Western Bosnia, return to his territory.
22 There were quite a few such contacts, especially because he derived
23 optimism from his talks with President Milosevic who had told him that
24 all assistance would be provided to make his idea come true, and in this
25 connection the command of our corps also reorganised its forces and
1 established a so-called ready unit of battalion strength, around 500 men,
2 carefully selected men between 25 and 35 from all infantry brigades with
3 different arms also attached to them such as armoured units, artillery
4 support, part of logistical support and such.
5 Q. As far as Abdic was concerned, the agreement that had been
6 reached with Milosevic and Karadzic was the help that he'd been seeking
7 for many a month before from different parties, from the UN, from
8 Bill Clinton, and so on, this for Fikret Abdic was welcome assistance,
10 A. You're perfectly right. It was a matter of life and death.
11 Q. Why do you say a matter of life and death? Why do you put it in
12 that way?
13 A. Because his idea was that he has, absolutely has to go back. He
14 did not accept what happened in August as a military defeat. In addition
15 to the attack of the 5th Corps, I think it was also a political operation
16 to make people think twice about the policy of Fikret Abdic and his idea
17 to create Bosnia as he envisioned it.
18 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Bakrac.
20 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I see a mistake in the
21 transcript in line 16. A different name is written than the one the
22 witness pronounced, which changes the meaning of the answer.
23 JUDGE ORIE: I'll read to you part of the transcript.
24 Witness, it reads now:
25 "I think it was also a political operation to make people think
1 twice about the policy of..."
2 And what name did you then mention?
3 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] To think twice or think again about
4 the fate of the people of Western Bosnia and the policies of
5 Alija Izetbegovic.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That also sounds more logical. So about the
7 policy of Alija Izetbegovic.
8 Please proceed.
9 MR. JORDASH:
10 Q. And do you know why Fikret Abdic -- I don't want to dwell on
11 any -- the obvious, but do you know why Fikret Abdic saw it as so
12 critical to return to the Bihac pocket?
13 A. Fikret Abdic was the leader of the people in that region. People
14 believed in him, and he could not betray them. Only someone who was in
15 the area of Kordun when those people fled knows how much authority he
16 wielded among the masses despite the fact that they lived very poorly.
17 He was an unrivalled leader in that region, and although he's now in
18 prison in Rijeka, I believe there is still a political division in Velika
19 Kladusa between those are in favour of Fikret and those who are against
21 Q. And it's correct, isn't it, that Abdic had previously won the
22 presidential elections against Izetbegovic but had given up that post; is
23 that correct?
24 A. Correct. He was the absolute winner at the multi-party elections
25 in Bosnia and Herzegovina as a candidate running for the SDA. However,
1 for various reasons, he refused to become president of the Presidency,
2 and he accepted only to be the leader of his own people in the territory
3 of Velika Kladusa municipality and an area perhaps slightly broader than
4 that. He did not subscribe to the Islamic Declaration by
5 Alija Izetbegovic. He was a man of peace, a leader of industry,
6 commerce, production, and he was certainly not in favour of war.
7 He was practically pushed into resisting the 5th Corps' operation
8 by the commander of the 5th Corps, Ramiz Durakovic, who was an extremist
9 who mistreated the people of Western Bosnia through his military and
10 police structures, and that's how it began. That's how the conflict and
11 the rift among the people began.
12 Q. And it's correct, isn't it, that Fikret Abdic didn't have any
13 territorial ambitions beyond controlling an area and avoiding that area
14 being dragged into any conflict that was raging within Bosnia? Do I
15 summarise that fairly?
16 A. You did.
17 Q. Thank you.
18 MR. JORDASH: Could we have on the screen, please, 1D02454.
19 Q. I'm going to stay with the same subject of the run-up to Pauk,
20 and it's a State Security Department document dated the 11th of October,
21 1994, entitled: "The Cazin Krajina - Information About Forces of the
22 So-Called Government of the BiH (5th Corps)."
23 And if you just have a quick look through it, you'll see the
24 document describing the military preparedness of the 5th Corps in October
25 of 1994.
1 And I'm particularly interested if we can turn to page 3 of the
2 English and page 2 of the B/C/S.
3 We see a general discussion being completed about the operation
4 Tiger and Sloboda '94. It's a 5th Corps operation which seized the
5 entire territory of the Cazin Krajina. And the bit I'm interested in is
6 where the issue of the Serbian support is discussed. The top of page 3
7 in the English.
8 "In the conflicts between Fikret Abdic and the 5th Corps, the
9 Serbian side supported Abdic (by supplying him with weapons and
10 ammunition, providing artillery support, et cetera). Both the VRSK and
11 the VRS were involved in providing the support (but we do not know how
12 co-ordinated it was). For the most part, the Serbs were employing
13 cautious tactics while supporting Fikret Abdic which was aimed at
14 maintaining the status quo and having the two Muslim sides exhaust each
15 other because the assessment was that Abdic was closer to the Croatian
16 than the Serbian side."
17 And now my question is: This State Security Department 2nd
18 Administration report, dated the 11th of October, 1994, assesses that
19 Abdic is receiving support with weapons and ammunition from two sources
20 connected to the Serbian side, the VRSK and the VRS. Do you agree that
21 that was the support Abdic was receiving up until October of 1994, from
22 those two separate sources?
23 A. That's absolutely true. With the proviso that the Army of
24 Republika Srpska did not provide materiel and equipment to the army of
25 Fikret Abdic. Our side did that, the Army of the Republic of Serbian
1 Krajina. The VRS had co-ordinated operations with his army against the
2 forces of the 5th Corps. There were many problems in agreeing about
3 combat operations and offensives for all sorts of reasons. Usually it
4 was mistakes made by the army of the national defence of Western Bosnia.
5 They would be late or they would fail to follow the axes envisaged by the
6 plan of operation, et cetera. They were not organised well enough,
7 certainly worse than the VRS or the VRSK.
8 Q. Right. Now, let me ask you this: As far as you're concerned
9 through your work within the security organ as you've described to us in
10 1994, at this point in time you're not aware of any supplies coming
11 directly to Serbia to assist Fikret Abdic. Am I correct about that?
12 A. Assistance to Fikret Abdic by equipment and ammunition, that was
13 mainly conducted by secret depots of the VRSK. Later, however, he could
14 only be supplied from the territory of the FRY.
15 Q. When was later? What do you put that?
16 A. After the establishment of the Pauk command and the development
17 of the plan of co-ordinated combat operations against the 5th Corps.
18 Q. The secret depots of the VRSK. Where were they and how well
19 supplied were they?
20 A. When I say "secret depots," they were not secret to us. They
21 were secret to the UNPROFOR command of the Sector North after the
22 decision that heavy weaponry and artillery must be placed 20 kilometres
23 away from the border of Croatia and 20 kilometres away from the border of
24 the national defence of Western Bosnia army. They were placed in private
25 cellars, basements, family houses, et cetera, yards.
1 Q. Was there a large warehouse in Cerkezevac, C-e-r-k-e-z-e-v-a-c,
2 near Kladusa?
3 A. We, the 85th Logistics Base had a big depot, and there have
4 another big depot at Petrova Gora in a facility called Spomenik. You
5 cited the name correctly.
6 Q. And was there one in Dosnica in Golubic?
7 A. Yes. At Golubic there was a depot of strategic reserves. In
8 addition to lethal ammunition, there was also fuel. I did not understand
9 the second place name. I didn't understand your pronunciation at least,
10 or perhaps I don't know that place.
11 Q. Dosnica. D-o-s-n-i-c-a. I think we're talking, I suspect, about
12 the same place. Dosnica which is or was in Golubic?
13 A. It's a sector around Golubic, but Golubic was the name of this
14 depot of strategic reserves.
15 Q. I see. And how plentiful were the supplies in 1994 pre-Pauk?
16 Was Fikret Abdic able to receive all the supplies he required to assist
17 him with his operations pre-Pauk?
18 A. I've said earlier that Fikret Abdic never received all the
19 equipment he requested, partly because the command and the political
20 structures did not fully trust him. And when I say "command," I mean
21 some in the command who believed that if he is given all the weapons that
22 he wanted --
23 Q. Sorry to cut you off. Let me be just a bit more specific. What
24 I'm after is a description of how plentiful the supplies were. Whether
25 if the political or military will had been there, could the SVK in your
1 view have supplied Fikret Abdic with all his requests?
2 A. For a limited operation, yes, but to support him fully, I don't
3 think they would have been able to.
4 Q. May I --
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash.
6 MR. JORDASH: Yes.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Your last question is of some concern to me. You
8 say, "I'm after a description of how plentiful the supplies were." And
9 you added then, "If the political or military will had been there, could
10 the SVK in your view have supplied Fikret Abdic with all his requests."
11 These are two matters mixed up. The one is what do you need, and
12 the second is is there sufficient material to supply. Plentifulness
13 includes both elements which are not clearly separated in your question,
14 so I'm a bit confused.
15 MR. JORDASH: Your Honour, yes.
16 Q. You've answered, Mr. Karan, that for a limited operation the SVK
17 could have supported Fikret Abdic fully; correct?
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. But then you seem to suggest that for something other than a
20 limited operation there wouldn't -- or the SVK would not have been able
21 to provide him fully. Am I understanding you correctly?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. And was that because the warehouses just didn't contain enough
24 supplies or the SVK itself didn't have the supplies to give?
25 A. Certainly. We in the corps command made assessments of our
1 supplies, and we could not provide them with everything, because we
2 didn't have enough, plus the war with Croatia was in the offing.
3 Q. Hence -- no, I'll leave it there.
4 MR. JORDASH: No more questions.
5 Q. Thank you, Mr. Karan.
6 MR. JORDASH: Thank you, Your Honours.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you Mr. Jordash.
8 Ms. Marcus, are you ready to cross-examine the witness?
9 MS. MARCUS: Yes, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Karan, you'll now be cross-examined by
11 Ms. Marcus. Ms. Marcus is counsel for the Prosecution.
12 Please proceed.
13 MS. MARCUS: Thank you.
14 Cross-examination by Ms. Marcus:
15 Q. Good afternoon, Mr. Karan.
16 A. Good afternoon.
17 Q. An Operational Group is a temporary formation with different
18 units performing a certain task within a given time period under a
19 temporary unity of command; is that correct?
20 A. You could interpret it that way.
21 Q. For the purposes of the Vukovar operation, the JNA were the
22 dominant forces. Would you agree with that?
23 A. Correct.
24 Q. And the Guards Brigade was renamed by the fact that some other
25 units were attached to it and then it was called OG South; is that
2 A. No. The Guards Motorised Brigade was never renamed. It's just
3 that the commander of the Guards Motorised Brigade was appointed
4 commander of the Operation Group south.
5 Q. Mr. Karan, those were in fact your words in the Mrksic case that
6 I just put to you, so perhaps let me ask my question with my words. The
7 Guards Brigade, combined with some other units, were combined and then --
8 combined under the command of OG South. Would you agree with that then?
9 A. I would agree with that and with what I said a little while ago.
10 The Guards Brigade didn't lose its name. It continued to exist. In
11 OG South there were other units, and besides the security organs there
12 was another unit in charge of -- of that unit.
13 Q. You told us on the 22nd of February, at transcript page 17672,
14 that in the context of the Vukovar operation, "the Territorial Defence
15 and other structures fell under the JNA command."
16 If I understand you correctly, although the dominant military
17 operations were the operations of the JNA in the area where it was, units
18 of the Territorial Defence were temporarily resubordinated to OG South
19 during the time of your operations there in relation to Vukovar; is that
21 A. Yes. While the order was in place for an imminent threat of war.
22 Q. Now, as the assistant for counter-intelligence for the security
23 organ of the Guards Motorised Brigade, you also played a role in
24 monitoring and advising and guiding OG South more generally in respect of
25 counter-intelligence threats. In other words, your responsibilities were
1 not restricted purely to security issues of the Guards Motorised Brigade,
2 but you also had some security responsibilities in relation to OG South
3 more broadly. Would that be correct?
4 A. [No interpretation]
5 JUDGE ORIE: We have no translation.
6 THE INTERPRETER: The interpreter apologises.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Marcus, could you please have a look at the
8 transcript and resume where we left off without interpretation.
9 MS. MARCUS: Yes.
10 Q. Mr. Karan, I had just put to you a question. Perhaps you could
11 indicate whether you recall it. I asked you -- I said your
12 responsibilities were not strictly purely related to security issues of
13 the Guards Motorised Brigade, but you also had some security
14 responsibilities in relation to OG South more broadly. Could you please
15 kindly repeat your answer.
16 A. Yes, I can repeat my answer. Security organs of the Guards
17 Motorised Brigade were not also the security organs of OG South. In
18 order for them to become that, a new security organ should have been set
19 up, but that could have been done only pursuant of a decision by the
20 security administration. The disseminated units of the OG South had
21 their security organs who had their chain of reporting towards their
22 superiors, towards their superior commands, i.e., their superior security
24 It is completely erroneous to claim that the security organ of
25 the Guards Brigade was also the security organ of OG South. That simply
1 was not the case.
2 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Bakrac.
4 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Allow me to intervene. On line 13
5 and on line 14, the institution that should have issued a decision that
6 the witness was talking about was erroneously recorded.
7 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] A decision should have been passed
8 by the security administration of the SSNO. The Federal Secretariat of
9 National Defence.
10 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I stopped talking.
11 The witness immediately took over, and now as we read the transcript, it
12 seems as if I was the one who talked instead of the witness.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. It looks on the transcript that you told us by
14 whom a decision should have been passed, and if I understand you well, it
15 was the witness who told us, and I think we can then proceed.
16 By the way, before we do so, Ms. Marcus, you referred to a quote
17 of the witness. Let me just have a look. On the 22nd of February, and
18 you referred us to page -- I couldn't find it on the page, and therefore
19 I --
20 MS. MARCUS: Yes, Your Honour. I intended to refer to page
21 17672, line --
22 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
23 MS. MARCUS: -- lines 5 through 7.
24 JUDGE ORIE: And it very much looks -- because that's not on the
25 22nd of February. I think that the correct reference would be 17752.
1 That's at least where it appears in my -- let me just check again.
2 MS. MARCUS: Your Honour, I must confess that in the transcript
3 that I have, as of the end of the day on the 23rd, we were only up to
4 page 17744, and then we have today's temporary transcript. One of us
5 must be incorrect. I'm sure it's me, Your Honour.
6 JUDGE ORIE: I think, as a matter of fact, that the page I
7 mentioned has a better chance of -- let me just check again. Yes, it is
8 17752, where I found it. Please proceed.
9 MS. MARCUS: Thank you, Your Honour.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Now -- yes. We have it. Please proceed.
11 MS. MARCUS:
12 Q. Mr. Karan, on the topic that you were just talking about, there
13 was quite a lot of debate in your previous testimony. I'm just going to
14 focus on the part that's relevant for our discussion today. Now as part
15 of your security role with the Guards Motorised Brigade, you would've, at
16 a minimum, had to have been informed about the security situation
17 regarding the other units under operational command of OG South. Would
18 that be accurate?
19 A. Yes, you can put it that way. We exchanged information.
20 Q. Now, since the TO was temporarily resubordinated to the JNA, you
21 would have informed, whether formally or through an exchange of
22 information as you say, of any security-related information in connection
23 with the activities of those TO units who were resubordinated to OG South
24 for the Vukovar operation; is that correct?
25 A. That is correct.
1 Q. Now, in your capacity as assistant for counter-intelligence, your
2 role was to follow or monitor the security situation. The aim would be,
3 among others, to identify any activity that could endanger your unit and
4 to suggest or undertake measures to remove that threat. In this
5 capacity, it would have been part of your job to identify any activity
6 carried out by the TO forces under the temporary resubordination of the
7 JNA which could impact upon the security situation for the
8 Guards Motorised Brigade. Would that being accurate?
9 A. Partly. One could say that my colleague from the TO staff
10 proposed measures to his superior, to his command, and those measures
11 concerned JNA units and possibly their activities that might have
12 threatened the command or the Motorised Brigade units. However, there
13 were no such situations. There were no such misunderstandings on the
14 ground, or at least I don't recall any from that time.
15 Q. During your testimony, and I hope I get the page right this time,
16 Your Honour, on the 22nd of February, at transcript page 17674, you were
18 "Do you know that in the area of responsibility of the Novi Sad
19 Corps, within the Territorial Defence there was also a group of
20 volunteers led by Zeljko Raznjatovic, Arkan?"
21 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Marcus.
22 MS. MARCUS: Yes, sir.
23 JUDGE ORIE: I think you noted rightly a minute ago that the
24 transcript starts at 17677, so it could not be under the 22nd of
25 February. So it must be -- I'll find it for you if you have a little
1 quote. I'll be able to find it.
2 MS. MARCUS: Yes. All I can say, sir, is that right in front of
3 me, I'm looking from the 22nd of February, page 17674, and I find my
4 quote there. I'm sure that I have a technical glitch or something that
5 makes it inconsistent.
6 JUDGE ORIE: That is for me the -- if you please proceed, I'll
7 try to find the quote.
8 MS. MARCUS: Thank you. I will do. Thank you.
9 MR. JORDASH: Is it possible to take a break and --
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, you'd say it would take me a while to find that
12 We'll take a break a bit earlier than -- no. This is the usual
13 time for the break. We'll take a break and resume at 5.30.
14 --- Recess taken at 5.00 p.m.
15 --- On resuming at 5.49 p.m.
16 JUDGE ORIE: We start quite a bit later. Mr. Bakrac, at the end
17 of this session we'll stop a bit earlier. I'll give you some more
18 information about scheduling and that's what kept us busy during the
19 whole of this longer break, but since the witness is in --
20 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Thank you.
21 JUDGE ORIE: -- I'd rather take five or seven minutes of this
22 session than deal with the matter at this moment.
23 Yes. Mr. Jordash, may I take it that you want to tender
25 MR. JORDASH: Yes, please. 1D02454, if it could be MFI'd until
1 we provide the Prosecution with provenance information.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And that is the information about forces of
3 the so-called government of BiH, the 11th of October, 1994.
4 MR. JORDASH: Yes.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
6 MR. JORDASH: Thank you.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
8 THE REGISTRAR: Document 1D2454 will receive number D757, Your
10 JUDGE ORIE: And I hear of no objections. D757.
11 MS. MARCUS: Yes, we do object, Your Honour, based on provenance
12 information that we're waiting for.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Provenance. Therefore is marked for identification.
14 And we'd like to hear from the parties soon.
15 Then where the minutes were MFI'd before the break, the minutes
16 D753, Mr. Jordash, they are MFI'd under seal. That doesn't come as a
17 surprise, I take it.
18 Then I further have to find out whether on my computer the
19 transcript versions are not updated. Apparently we're working from
20 different versions, and it might be that mine is old. Now, I usually do
21 not do that myself, updating. We'll see what happened and at least the
22 version which -- I said the 22nd of February, which in my version starts
23 at 17677, starts in the version I just received a hard copy, at page
24 17597, which may explain some of the inconsistencies in the version I
25 apparently was working from and you used, Ms. Marcus. I apologise for
1 the confusion created there.
2 MS. MARCUS: Thank you, Your Honour. Yes, just, we confirmed it
3 with the Defence and the Registry. We all, the Prosecution, the Defence,
4 and the Registry all have the same page numbering. So --
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Then I'll have to pay specific attention to
6 the updating of my electronic transcript.
7 Are you ready to proceed?
8 MS. MARCUS: Yes, Your Honour. Thank you.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Please do so, and could you finish in approximately
10 one hour from now so that I have a couple of minutes left.
11 MS. MARCUS: Yes, Your Honour. Before I begin with respect to
12 the 19th of January request by the Stanisic Defence to lift
13 confidentiality of part of Dimitrijevic's evidence, we do not have any
14 objection, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Then all parties agree, which means that transcript
16 pages T-16164, line 8, up to and including 16174, line 23 are -- will be
17 public and are not confidential any more.
18 Please proceed.
19 MS. MARCUS: Yes, Your Honour. And with respect to D574, MFI, we
20 received provenance information over the break, and we're satisfied it
21 comes from an RFA, so we withdraw our objection to that document.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Which means that nothing opposes admission any more.
23 D574 is admitted into evidence. Any need to have it under seal ...
24 MR. JORDASH: No, Your Honour.
25 JUDGE ORIE: No. Then it's a public exhibit.
1 Please proceed, Ms. Marcus.
2 MS. MARCUS: Thank you, Your Honour. Could I ask that -- we've
3 received the originals of D755 and D756, both MFI'd from the Defence.
4 Could I ask that they be shown to the witness so that he can look at the
5 original signature rather than looking at it. These are the Abdic --
6 purported Abdic letters to President Clinton and Ms. Ogata.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I expect the originals to be somewhere in the
8 United States, but could we then later have a look at what has been shown
9 to the witness so that we know how original they are.
10 MS. MARCUS:
11 Q. Mr. Karan, could I just ask you to look at those and especially
12 to the signature and tell us whether you are able to confirm that that is
13 the signature of Fikret Abdic on both?
14 A. I remember the signature -- signature, because that's how he
15 signed the document when he presented a pistol to me as a gift.
16 MS. MARCUS: Your Honour, I withdraw our objection. They can be
17 admitted. We would also request that those originals also be admitted
18 physically into evidence. They are -- Your Honours, they are in coloured
19 signature. They appear to be the original documents. So our only
20 remaining question, then, to the Defence was: Were these letters, in
21 fact, ever sent?
22 MR. JORDASH: Well, I don't want to give evidence, so I don't
23 know the answer to that off the top of my head. That's one thing. And
24 secondly, I can see no reason why the originals would have to be filed
25 with the court since the copies are perfectly adequate copies and the
1 Prosecution don't object to -- to their authenticity.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Could we first have a look at them.
3 [Trial Chamber confers]
4 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Marcus, you've asked the originals to be -- to
5 be admitted into evidence. The question you're raising in relation to
6 this is that this seems to be, indeed, an original typewritten letter
7 which you would expect in the archives of the addressee rather than of
8 anyone else, so therefore there still remain a few questions -- at least
9 you could raise questions. Whether they remain or not depends on many
11 In order to not lose - Mr. Jordash, I'm now addressing you as
12 well - in order not to lose the opportunity to, at any later stage, to
13 inspect the originals, at least these originals, it's -- again, it's
14 not a -- it is not a photocopy, it is not a carbon copy, it looks as if
15 both would then have been retyped, which is still is not impossible. I
16 also see that they have often been stapled. The Chamber would like to
17 instruct you to keep them in your possession and available for inspection
18 whenever there's any need to further inspect them.
19 Would such instruction cause you any problems, Mr. Jordash?
20 MR. JORDASH: No, not at all.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Marcus works it meet your concerns?
22 MS. MARCUS: Yes, Your Honour, thank you.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Then these copies are to be returned to the Stanisic
24 Defence. Mr. Jordash keeps the originals, and the electronic versions of
25 the two letters are now admitted into evidence.
1 Madam Registrar, the numbers were -- I think Ms. Marcus mentioned
2 them, but.
3 MS. MARCUS: D755 and 756, Your Honour.
4 JUDGE ORIE: D755 and D756 are admitted into evidence.
5 Please proceed.
6 MS. MARCUS: Thank you, Your Honour, and just to be clear, it's
7 all right with Your Honour if I continue to use the transcript references
8 that I have in my notes; is that correct?
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Use yours. They seem to be far better than
11 MS. MARCUS: Thank you, sir.
12 Q. Mr. Karan, during your testimony on the 22nd of February, at page
13 17674, you were asked:
14 "Do you know that in the area of responsibility of the Novi Sad
15 Corps, within the Territorial Defence there was also a group of
16 volunteers led by Zeljko Raznjatovic, Arkan?"
17 Your reply was:
18 "I learned about that when I was still a member of the security
19 administration, because at our meetings we discussed information about
21 You also said at that same page:
22 "We already had information that Zeljko Raznjatovic, Arkan, had
23 placed himself under the command of the Territorial Defence, that he had
24 a training camp, and that he had been armed by the JNA from JNA depots."
25 There has been a suggestion in this case that Arkan's SDG was a
1 permanent unit of the JNA in the SBWS in the fall of 1991. Does this
2 accord with your own knowledge?
3 A. Arkan's unit was a permanent unit on the strength of the
4 Territorial Defence that was resubordinated to the JNA. That would be a
5 more precise way of putting it.
6 Q. Perhaps another way to put it would be that Arkan's SDG were at
7 times temporarily and operationally subordinated to the JNA for the
8 purposes of specific combat operations. Would that accord with your
9 understanding of the situation?
10 A. Yes. One could interpret the situation in that way.
11 Q. Were Arkan's men either in whole or in part ever temporarily
12 resubordinated to OG South for the purposes of the Vukovar operation?
13 A. No. While that operation was on, they were not active in our
14 area of responsibility.
15 Q. Just so that I understand your evidence correctly, at no time
16 during the Vukovar operation, to your knowledge, were Arkan's SDG
17 involved. Did I get that right?
18 A. No, you did not. The Vukovar operation involved actions from
19 both north and south. I am testifying about OG South, and I'm saying
20 that Arkan's forces did not participate in any of the OG South
22 Q. Okay. But they did participate in the Vukovar operation, but
23 your evidence is that that was not under the resubordination of OG South;
24 is that correct?
25 A. There's nothing in dispute here. I'm saying that he was engaged,
1 but he was engaged on the strength of OG North.
2 Q. So it would have been the security organ of OG North that would
3 have had the information regarding Arkan's involvement in the Vukovar
4 operation. Is that accurate?
5 A. Well, I suppose so.
6 Q. Well, you were sharing information, weren't you, between OG South
7 and OG North if it was information related to the security of combat
8 operations; isn't that right?
9 A. No. OG South and OG North were not physically linked. There was
10 a town between our two groups and it was still not conquered by then.
11 When it comes to OG North we did not share information with that group
12 since OG North, the 12th Corps, and other structure that were on its
13 strength were linked to the General Staff, whereas my Guards Brigade was
14 linked in counter-intelligence sense to the chief of the office of the
15 Federal Secretariat for National Defence.
16 Q. You've given us some evidence about Arkan's involvement with
17 OG North. You've talked about some information you had about his
18 relationship with Generals Bratic and Biorcevic. So you did, according
19 to your own testimony, obtain some information about Arkan's involvement
20 with OG North; isn't that right?
21 A. That's correct.
22 Q. Were you aware of a report by General Panic that Arkan's men in
23 general would come in after the army finished its mission to "clear the
25 MS. MARCUS: Your Honours, P1177.
1 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] No, I didn't know.
2 MS. MARCUS:
3 Q. Based on your experience as a security operative, if you had
4 obtained information of Arkan's participation with OG South, would you
5 have viewed that as a threat to combat operations or as something
6 positive for combat operations?
7 A. In any case, every activity that would have been in keeping with
8 the tasks given to us by the command would not have been a threat. It
9 would have been regarded as a positive activity. At the moment when that
10 activity, be it even Arkan's activity, that threatened our units, we
11 would oppose to those activities and we would take measures to counter
13 Q. According to the evidence in this case, Arkan's men were present
14 at Velepromet on the 20th of November, 1991, during which the evacuation
15 of the prisoners from the Vukovar Hospital was in process. Were you
16 aware of this?
17 A. I was present at the moment when the Vukovar Hospital was being
18 evacuated. I personally requested a team from Novi Sad to come to carry
19 out the medical triage of all the individuals, because the previous night
20 all of a sudden about 2.000 people ended up in the hospital. I didn't
21 want the security organs to do that, but doctors -- I'm not a doctor. I
22 have no way of knowing who's wounds and who's not. At that time there
23 was a team that was sent from the security administration to attend the
24 procedure of the evacuation.
25 I only know that Arkan attended a meeting after Vukovar was
1 taken. When it comes to the hospital evacuation itself, his members were
2 not there. The only people who were there were MPs of the Guards
4 Q. Did you find out about Arkan's attendance at a meeting after
5 Vukovar was taken? Did you find that out at the time, or did you learn
6 that afterwards?
7 A. I learnt about that subsequently, because on the 20th or the 21st
8 November 1991, I was transferring Dr. Vesna Bosanac, surgeon;
9 Juro Njavro; Antun Bilic; and Marin Vidic Bili, to the prison in Sremska
10 Mitrovica. After that, I went to visit my family in Bijeljina. So I
11 learnt about that meeting between Arkan and Hadzic and the core commander
12 and that the Chief of Staff also attended that meeting. That Was
13 Lieutenant-Colonel Miodrag Panic. I also learned that he wanted the
14 prisoners to be returned from Mitrovic to Vukovar where they should
15 allegedly been tried by a people's Tribunal. This is what I learned
16 subsequently. Obviously General Mrksic, who was at the time
17 Colonel Mrksic, he did not agree to that, so that idea never took off the
19 Q. When you said, "I also learned that he wanted the prisoners to be
20 returned from Mitrovica to Vukovar," who is he?
21 A. I mean Arkan and Hadzic, Goran Hadzic.
22 Q. Isn't it a fact that what Arkan was doing in Velepromet on the
23 20th of November, 1991, coming in at the tail of the end of the JNA's
24 operations there was in fact to "clear the ground"?
25 A. I'm afraid I don't fully comprehend your question. Could you
1 please rephrase it. It looks like a comment to me more than a question.
2 Q. I had put to you earlier -- I'd asked you whether you were
3 familiar with a report. The report is in evidence in this case. The
4 report was by General Panic that Arkan's men in general would come in
5 after the army finished its mission to "clear the ground." I was asking
6 you isn't it a fact that what Arkan was doing at Velepromet was, in fact,
7 doing precisely what General Panic said?
8 MR. JORDASH: I do wonder, Your Honour, if it would be better if
9 the witness was shown the report.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And then perhaps he should rather not look at
11 P1177, Ms. Marcus, because P1177 is not admitted into evidence and is --
12 are clips from a video. So there must be a --
13 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] [Overlapping speakers] I can
14 answer --
15 MS. MARCUS: Your Honour, let me look into that then and return
16 to it later.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I hope that I'm not making a similar
18 mistake because it would be --
19 MS. MARCUS: I'm sure you're not, Your Honour. Let me check that
20 and return to that afterwards, so I'll leave that question for now.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then please proceed.
22 MS. MARCUS:
23 Q. Now, you said you learned about Arkan's presence subsequently.
24 When you said "subsequently," what do you mean? Did you mean upon your
25 return from Bijeljina, which I believe was the 22nd of November, 1991?
1 A. Yes that was the case.
2 Q. I'm going to ask Mr. Laugel to play a few minutes of a video.
3 This video has opinion played as P556 but I'm only to play a portion.
4 The portion I will show is from 6:24 to 7:19. Before I do so, Your
5 Honours, I would like to note for the Chamber's information that although
6 there is very little dialogue and what there is is not clear, and we do
7 not rely upon any of the words spoken, for the sake of completeness, I
8 did sync -- we did have the transcript synced. You can read it going
9 below the video. I would greatly prefer for us all to listen to the
10 video as it plays rather than having a voiceover for what little dialogue
11 there is, if this is acceptable to Your Honours.
12 JUDGE ORIE: I hear of no objections. Let's look at the video in
13 the way you suggested.
14 [Video-clip played]
15 MS. MARCUS:
16 Q. Mr. Karan, did you recognise any of the people we saw in that
18 A. Yes, I did. I recognised Goran Hadzic and Arkan.
19 Q. Did you recognise this location as Velepromet in Vukovar?
20 A. No. I can't remember the location. It is a facility. There
21 were civilians there. I wouldn't know whether that was Velepromet or
23 Q. You referred earlier to a meeting that was held attended by Arkan
24 and Hadzic. We have evidence in this case that there was, in fact, as
25 you said, a meeting. This was held at Velepromet on the 20th of
1 November, 1991, in the early afternoon. According to the evidence, it
2 was chaired by Goran Hadzic, and attended by Sljivancanin, Mrksic, Arkan,
3 Slavko Dokmanovic, Borislav Bogunovic, and others. This meeting
4 reportedly took place after some prisoners had already been sent away by
5 bus but while other prisoners were being loaded onto buses. Are you
6 aware -- is that the meeting that you told us of earlier? Are you aware
7 of this meeting?
8 MS. MARCUS: Your Honours, P553.
9 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Yes. That was the meeting that I
10 referred to, and I learned about that meeting only subsequently when I
12 Q. Yes. So you said. On this day as you told us, and as you
13 testified previously, you were first in the hospital in Vukovar, then
14 later you were in Negoslavci, and only in the evening did you leave
15 Negoslavci for Sremska Mitrovica. That was your prior evidence; is that
17 A. Correct.
18 Q. So were you aware then that prisoners were being loaded onto
19 buses at the same time this meeting was going on, and some of this was
20 taking place right at Velepromet before, during, and after this meeting?
21 Were you aware of that?
22 A. I wasn't aware of that. I was at the hospital only for a very
23 short while. My task was to make sure that the doctors could carry out
24 the triage, i.e., the separation of those who were wounded from those who
25 were not, and after that I went to my own office where I prepared
1 questions, answers, and talks with the Croatian forces. The team from
2 the security administration and our security organs were supposed to use
3 my notes. In other words, I did not monitor or observe any of the
4 activities that were taking place with regard to the evacuation of
6 Q. If it were, in fact, the case that the TO and Arkan had been
7 interfering with the JNA operational plan on that day to evacuate, as you
8 say, all the prisoners to Sremska Mitrovica, would that in your view have
9 posed the kind of security threat to JNA operations such that it would
10 have been your responsibility to look into this matter and potentially
11 take action to respond?
12 A. Arkan did not get involved in that transport. He was actually
13 against the transport, but he could not prevent it from happening,
14 because some of the buses had already left and he did not prevent it,
15 which means that he was not in a position to do that. He only protested
16 against the transport. And this is as much as I could learn later from
17 my colleagues.
18 Q. That's actually precisely what I was asking. Let's break it
19 down. You said Arkan actually was against the transport. The
20 information about Arkan's attempted interference in the transport, would
21 that have constituted the kind of security threat that -- such that it
22 would have been your responsibility to look into that matter?
23 A. In any case, one could put it that way; however, the commander
24 was there, the Chief of Staff was there, the chief of security was there.
25 I don't know what they did at that moment. However, I learnt
1 subsequently that buses were sent to Sremska Mitrovica.
2 Q. Yes, of course, and some of the prisoners never made it to
3 Sremska Mitrovica. So now let me ask you the same question that I asked
4 you about Arkan with respect to the TO. If you had been informed that
5 the TO was trying to block the transfer of prisoners out to Sremska
6 Mitrovica, would that have posed the kind of security threat to JNA
7 operations such that would have been your responsibility to look into
8 this matter and to take action to respond?
9 A. As I've already told you, any activity by anybody which threatens
10 order, work, and security in the units represents some sort of threat and
11 calls for the engagement of not only the security organs but of all the
12 command organs, because we are not the only ones who looked after the
13 security of our brigade. "Security" is a very wide term.
14 Q. Mr. Karan, by the time you returned, you would have known, I
15 presume, that many of the prisoners had, in fact, been executed and
16 others had disappeared. That would clearly be an activity which
17 threatens order, work, and security. What did the JNA do -- what did you
18 and the security organ do to investigate that?
19 A. When it comes to this activity that you describe, the execution,
20 as far as I can remember, it was impossible for a certain number of
21 prisoners to be transferred to Mitrovica because it was already late and
22 the light was already falling. They were first transferred to the
23 barracks in Vukovar and also a large group of armed people started
24 gathering there. That's why they were transferred to the Ovcara farm and
25 handed over to the 80th brigade of the Kragujevac Corps who were already
1 deployed there. They had their military police, and they had all of
2 their structure as a command that would inherit the authority of the
3 present command on the ground. So my security organ no longer had any
4 authority to monitor the activity of the security organ and the military
5 police of the Kragujevac Brigade that had arrived in the area because
6 they belonged to the 1st Army District and we, on the other hand, were
7 directly connected with the office of the Federal Secretariat for
8 National Defence.
9 Q. Mr. Karan, I'll get back to what you just said in a moment. Let
10 me just ask you something for clarification. Based on your understanding
11 of the command structure, would the TO have been in a position to demand
12 the hand-over of prisoners held by the JNA, or would the JNA and the TO
13 have had to mutually agree for those prisoners to have been handed over?
14 A. No. The TO could not ask the JNA for prisoners, nor was there
15 anything to agree about. Quite simply, they were handed over to the
16 80th Brigade from Kragujevac. Then the 80th Brigade was responsible for
17 them, not the TO. And they could ask -- I don't know, but I learned only
18 later what was done and whose mistake it was.
19 Q. Mr. Karan, General Aleksandar Vasiljevic was your superior in the
20 organ; is that correct?
21 A. Vertically, yes, he was my last superior.
22 Q. General Vasiljevic testified in the Milosevic case that he was
23 informed of the role of the TO in the final stages of the Vukovar
24 takeover and the killing and disappearance of hundreds of prisoners from
25 the Vukovar Hospital and the JNA barracks. Is it your evidence that you
1 did not, in fact, hear at all about this, about the hand-over of the
2 prisoners from the JNA to the TO following which many of them were
4 A. I assert again at that time I was not aware of the activity
5 because at that time we were already preparing to return to Belgrade, and
6 I learned what happened later.
7 MR. JORDASH: May we have a transcript reference, please?
8 JUDGE ORIE: Ms. Marcus, do you have a transcript reference?
9 MS. MARCUS: Yes, I have a transcript reference here. I'm not
10 sure it encompasses the entirety of that. Perhaps I could send that to
11 Mr. Jordash after court, the whole part. Okay?
12 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, because we have no -- we, at least, have no
13 direct access to the Milosevic transcript. Please proceed.
14 MS. MARCUS: Yes. Thank you, Your Honour.
15 Q. You found out about this, then, on the 22nd of November when you
16 returned to Vukovar. That's what you just said previously, unless I
17 misunderstood you.
18 A. You did not understand me correctly. I found out on the 22nd
19 about the meeting. We learned about that activity in Ovcara much later,
20 much later.
21 Q. And what did the JNA hierarchy do in respect of that information?
22 A. I don't know which information you mean.
23 Q. The activity in Ovcara, which is what you said. I would say
24 execution and disappearance of hundreds of prisoners that had been held
25 by the JNA.
1 A. I agree with you that it was execution and a crime. I don't know
2 exactly what the top echelons of the JNA did about it. I know there is a
3 trial going on in Belgrade of the participants in the killing at Ovcara,
4 the so-called Leva Supoderica detachment under the command of
5 Milan Lancuzanin.
6 Q. On the 22nd of February at transcript page 17679 to 80, you were
8 "Mr. Karan, while you were still there in Slavonia, in Vukovar,
9 you said your area was the operation zone south. As an operative, did
10 you have knowledge that in that area the operation zone south, there was
11 a unit of the state security of Serbia?"
12 Your answer was:
13 "No. Let me be very clear about what I am asserting. Our
14 position is that the TO and, in fact, Arkan's men, were operating in
15 co-ordination with other Serb forces on the ground, including the JNA, in
16 a joint effort to take control over large portions of territory in
17 Croatia and to permanently remove significant proportion of the non-Serb
18 population from those areas. Our position is that both the TO and
19 Arkan's men did participate operationally in military actions in
20 co-operation with the JNA at times, but that ultimately the actions of
21 the TO and Arkan's men, in furtherance of this effort to remove the
22 non-Serb population from these areas of Croatia was directed, influenced,
23 supplied, financed, and ordered by the Serbian DB and, in particular, the
24 accused Jovica Stanisic and Franko Simatovic."
25 Would you like to comment on that?
1 A. I'll have to disappoint you. For the duration of the Vukovar
2 operation, the Yugoslav federation still existed. The laws of the FRY
3 were still in place, and we had to act in accordance with those laws.
4 They had to be obeyed.
5 As for taking over the territory of the Republic of Croatia,
6 that's not true. It was still the FRY. There never existed a plan, or
7 at least I never knew about a plan to remove the Croatian population from
8 a particular area in Slavonia or that it was some sort of joint
9 enterprise between the structures you just named. No, I can't agree with
11 Q. On the 22nd of February, at page 17676, you were asked:
12 "In view of the decision we have seen proclaiming an immediate
13 threat of war, did Zeljko Raznjatovic, Arkan, within the TO of Slavonia,
14 Baranja, and Western Srem have a legal basis for participating together
15 with JNA units, in your opinion?"
16 And you answered:
17 "Yes, and it's not only in my opinion."
18 You were then asked:
19 "Do you know who it was in the Novi Sad Corps that
20 Zeljko Raznjatovic, Arkan, maintained contact?"
21 And you answered:
22 "I know that Zeljko Raznjatovic, Arkan, had a close relationship
23 first of all with Mladen Bratic, who was commander of the Novi Sad Corps
24 until he got killed, with Boro Ivanovic, and he was Chief of Staff, I
25 think, and there was a general who replaced Bratic. I believe it was
1 Andrija Biorcevic."
2 Did you also have a good relationship with Bratic and Biorcevic?
3 A. No. I never met those people. Boro Ivanovic was the only one I
4 ever met.
5 Q. Did you ever directly or indirectly have the opportunity to gain
6 an impression of Biorcevic as a JNA commander?
7 A. I don't know how much my personal impressions could affect his
8 career or anything else about him. My position itself would mean
9 nothing. The only thing worthwhile would if I had some knowledge that I
10 could document and then present to the administration. My personal
11 impression that he was on good terms with someone means nothing.
12 Q. Did you have any knowledge of what Biorcevic was like as a JNA
14 A. No. I was not his superior. The Chief of General Staff would
15 have known that.
16 Q. Do you know if Biorcevic was removed from the JNA or retired at
17 the end of his career?
18 A. I don't know.
19 Q. Mr. Karan, I'm going to move on to a different subject now. This
20 is going to be about the Pauk Joint Command, which you addressed in your
21 examination by Mr. Bakrac.
22 The Pauk operation was a temporary Joint Command to carry out a
23 certain task, namely, to break up the 5th Corps; is that correct?
24 A. Correct.
25 Q. You were aware that among the groups that were temporarily
1 resubordinated under the Pauk Joint Command were two tactical groups
2 operating in Velika Kladusa, one under Rajo Bozovic, which was Tactical
3 Group 3, and one under Legija, that's Milorad Ulemek, which was Tactical
4 Group 2; is that correct?
5 A. Correct.
6 MS. MARCUS: I refer the Chamber to P1639.
7 Q. Now, you told us on the 23rd of February at page 17728, that
8 Legija and the members of TG-2 were members of the army of the RSK. Is
9 it your evidence that Legija was a full-fledged member of the army of the
11 A. When I heard that they had arrived in my area of responsibility,
12 I sent a telegram to the Main Staff, to the security section, to tell me
13 who they were because I didn't know these people then. The answer I got
14 was that President Martic had asked for assistance, the commander of the
15 11th Corps. He asked, namely, that men be sent to him from the training
16 base to help him train the forces of Fikret Abdic in the upcoming
18 Q. So do I understand you correctly that what you found out was that
19 Legija had been sent from the training base to help train the forces of
20 Fikret Abdic for the upcoming operation? Is that -- do I understand your
21 evidence correctly?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Okay. Perhaps you could also answer the question that I asked
24 you, which was is it your evidence that Legija was a full-fledged member
25 of the army of the RSK?
1 A. As far as I understood my superior, they were under the command
2 of the Novi Sad Corps -- sorry, the Vukovar Corps, under the command of
3 General Dusan Loncar. Therefore, if Loncar had sent them, that implies
4 they were members of the 11th Corps.
5 Q. When you say as far as you understood, you don't really know,
6 it's just what you heard. Is that -- is that correct?
7 A. If my superior tells me something, I consider that as true,
8 because I don't think he would be deceiving me in such a situation. I
9 told you what happened and how I came to learn where these people had
10 come from and who had sent them.
11 Q. Would you agree that Legija's Tactical Group was temporarily
12 resubordinated for the purposes of Operation Pauk?
13 A. I don't know what you mean by Legija's Tactical Group, because as
14 far as I know Tactical Group 2 and Tactical Group 3 were made up of
15 Fikret Abdic's forces, and parts of certain brigades. I even saw myself
16 when one offensive group called Limeni were being trained. They were
17 something like a reconnaissance and sabotage unit.
18 Q. Some a few minutes ago at page -- temporary page 65, line 5, I
19 asked you the following question:
20 "You were aware that among the groups that were temporarily
21 resubordinated under the Pauk Joint Command were two tactical groups
22 operating in Velika Kladusa, one under Rajo Bozic, which was Tactical
23 Group 3, and one under Legija, that's Milorad Ulemek, which was Tactical
24 Group 2; is that correct?"
25 Your answer was:
2 Do you stand by that evidence?
3 A. Well, it's correct that they commanded those groups, but they
4 didn't own those groups, so you can't call them Legija's group and
5 Bozovic's group. Perhaps we did not understand each other entirely.
6 Q. So you agree that Legija and Bozovic commanded those tactical
7 groups in the context of Operation Pauk; is that right?
8 A. Correct.
9 Q. Were you aware that members of both these groups, including
10 Bozovic and Legija themselves, were paid by the Serbian DB for their time
11 operating in the context of the Velika Kladusa operation?
12 A. No, I don't know about that.
13 Q. I'll return to the matter of payments a little bit later. First
14 I'd like to show you a few documents which have been admitted in this
15 case in the context of the Pauk Joint Command.
16 MS. MARCUS: Your Honour, I'm conscious of the fact that the
17 Chamber asked for a few minutes at the end. At this point I'd be
18 entering a new area. If Your Honour would like to start now, that would
19 be --
20 JUDGE ORIE: Perhaps it's better than to -- to already excuse the
21 witness for the day.
22 Ms. Marcus, I take that we will be able to finish this witness --
23 conclude the testimony of this witness tomorrow. I think you'd need
24 another two and a half hours if I'm -- is that the correct --
25 MS. MARCUS: Yes, please, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Then you end up at approximately the same time as
2 the Simatovic Defence.
3 Mr. Karan, we have to deal with a few matters for which we do not
4 need you, so therefore you are excused already. I again instruct you
5 that you should not speak with anyone about your testimony, whether
6 already given or still to be given, and we'd like to see you back
7 tomorrow morning at 9.00 in this same courtroom.
8 And I'm looking at the other parties. Is there a fair
9 expectation that we would conclude the testimony of this witness tomorrow
10 if Ms. Marcus would need another two and a half hours?
11 Mr. Jordash is nodding yes. Mr. Bakrac, you're nodding yes as
13 You may follow the usher, and we'd like to see you back tomorrow.
14 THE WITNESS: [Interpretation] Thank you.
15 [The witness stands down]
16 MS. MARCUS: Your Honour, perhaps while the witness is being
17 escorted out, I could just correct something I said earlier. I said that
18 we dropped our objection to D574. I should have said D754. I apologise.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. That was brought to may attention as well.
20 Then I have to correct myself as well, because I said two lines after
21 that, "Which means that nothing opposes admission any more. D574 is
22 admitted into evidence," where of course I intended to say "D754 is
23 admitted into evidence," and there was no need to have the document under
25 A courtroom is too serious a place to think in terms of the
1 comedy of errors, but it came close to it. Perhaps you feel at home,
2 Mr. Jordash, because I do understand that it was for the first time
3 performed that -- well, not exactly, perhaps, your place, but at
4 Gray's Inn in London, the Comedy of Errors.
5 MR. JORDASH: Yes, and I can see I came to mind immediately.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Then the mystery about the number of the Panic
7 report, the P1177. Do we have a better number by now or ...
8 MS. MARCUS: Just one second, please, Your Honour.
9 Yes, it is P1177 was correct. That is a transcript of four
10 video-clips that were admitted from "The Death of Yugoslavia" interview.
11 So it's not a document but it's a transcript, and that comment can be
12 found on page 4 of the English version of the transcript.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. I think that the exhibit status in the -- in
14 e-court is marked not admitted. Perhaps you'd verify that. It is --
15 MS. MARCUS: I will, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Then a bit earlier than we hoped to do, but I also
17 see that there's some urgency in the matter for you, Mr. Bakrac, in view
18 of your preparing and scheduling for your witnesses, the Simatovic
19 Defence has asked for a break of eight weeks.
20 The Chamber has decided on the matter, but there are a lot of
21 other decisions which are directly related to it and which still have to
22 be formulated very carefully, which means that if I tell you today what
23 is granted and what is not granted, that first of all we have not yet the
24 final decision with all the reasons available for you. We also have not
25 yet available to you some of the decisions related to it, and I'll inform
1 you about that in a minute.
2 The Chamber does not grant an immediate break. The Chamber has
3 decided that we will not sit in the month of April. That means April,
4 the first week starting the 2nd of April we'll not sit. Then we have the
5 Easter weekend, the week after Easter, then we have the week starting the
6 16th of April. We have the week starting the 23rd of April, and then
7 finally the month ends by a UN holiday, that is the Queen's birthday.
8 That is the 30th of April.
9 We will not sit during that month in order to give further
10 opportunity to prepare, which means, Mr. Bakrac, that you are expected to
11 present your witnesses, and as far as I can see, the only three which are
12 firm at this moment is DFS-007, DFS-010, and DFS-060. There are a lot of
13 other witnesses still apparently quite uncertain, DFS-001, DFS-003, three
14 witnesses which are not yet on the 65 ter list. I hesitate to give their
15 names because I do not know whether you will seek any protective measures
16 for them. And then another two witnesses also not on your 65 ter list,
17 witnesses that are detained at this moment in other countries.
18 The first two weeks of March you're expected to present the
19 evidence of Witness DFS-007, 010, and 016, and to the extent you've made
20 up your mind and to the extent there's still time left, testimony of
21 Witness DFS-001 or DFS-003, which brings us then to the week of the 19th
22 of March. That is the week where most likely we'll use the three days to
23 hear the expert evidence of Mr. Brown, and the week after that we'll
24 start with the evidence of Sir Ivor Roberts. What then remains of that
25 week and what is still to be done we'll further see that, but after that
1 the month of April will be available for further preparations.
2 The other decisions I was talking about is the Chamber will give
3 further instructions about matters like when to file applications to have
4 witnesses added to the 65 ter list, when to file or when to decide on
5 whether to apply for 65 ter witnesses -- 65 -- for witnesses to be added
6 to the 65 ter list which you have not yet interviewed or only once
7 interviewed and who are detained abroad. We'll most likely give you
8 further instructions as when to file the reduced -- or the downsized
9 expert report and when you are supposed to have discussed with the
10 Prosecution what can be taken out, what you'll not rely on. All those
11 matters have not been finalised yet, but since you understandably asked
12 to know whether or not you should have your next witness to travel to The
13 Hague, this gives you, I think, a basic idea of what is most important
14 for you to know what the Chamber decided at this moment.
15 Again, reasons to follow, other decision to follow as well.
16 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, I thank you very much
17 for communicating that decision today. I did not have the opportunity to
18 do this earlier, but I wanted to assure you and the Trial Chamber that we
19 are perfectly well aware and we take very seriously the Court's decisions
20 and orders, and if we sometimes do not comply fully or quite on time,
21 that is only because we are sometimes unable to cope with all that is
22 burdening us at the moment.
23 I want to say how much we appreciate that month in April, a
24 welcome break that we need to consolidate, and we are now going to try to
25 review everything and see what witnesses we can come up with till the
1 end, taking into account your order to bring those that are on our 65 ter
3 With your leave, when I have read your decision, I would like to
4 perhaps add, too, to what I've just said.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Bakrac. I tried to finish at 7.00.
6 We did not succeed to finish at 7.00. Nevertheless, the Chamber
7 appreciates your words.
8 We'll adjourn, and we'll resume tomorrow, Wednesday day the 29th
9 of February, at 9.00 in this same Courtroom II.
10 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.02 p.m.,
11 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 29th day
12 of February, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.