1 Monday, 26 March 2012
2 [Open session]
3 [The accused entered court]
4 --- Upon commencing at 12.24 p.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Good afternoon to everyone.
6 Madam Registrar, would you please call the case.
7 THE REGISTRAR: Good afternoon, Your Honours. This is case
8 number IT-03-69-T, the Prosecutor versus Jovica Stanisic and
9 Franko Simatovic.
10 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
11 I was informed, Mr. Jordash, that you would like to address the
12 Chamber. But before giving you an opportunity to do so, there may have
13 been some confusion about the time in which we would start today. To the
14 extent the communication was not perfect and to the extent the Chamber
15 has played a role in that, we regret that confusion and hope that next
16 time communication will be better.
17 Mr. Jordash, I do not know what you want to raise, but if it's
18 about the next witness and all kind of limits and lines of questioning,
19 then I would suggest that we first move into private session. If it's
20 about another matter, please --
21 MR. JORDASH: No, it's about that matter.
22 JUDGE ORIE: -- proceed.
23 Then we move into private session.
24 [Private session]
11 Pages 18548-18560 redacted. Private session.
14 [Open session]
15 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honour.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
17 We are now back in open session. Could I invite you,
18 Sir Ivor Roberts, to stand and to make a solemn declaration of which the
19 text will be handed out to you by the usher.
20 THE WITNESS: I solemnly declare that I will speak the truth, the
21 whole truth, and nothing but the truth.
22 WITNESS: SIR IVOR ROBERTS
23 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please be seated.
24 Mr. Jordash, we were scheduled to have a first session which, of
25 course, started late. I suggest, unless the Registry has major
1 objection, to continue now until 1.30. You might not be finished by
2 that, although please keep in mind that you introduced the witness as a
3 92 bis witness which, of course, limits very much the time for
5 MR. JORDASH: Yes.
6 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
7 Sir Ivor, you'll first be examined by Mr. Jordash. Mr. Jordash
8 is counsel for Mr. Stanisic.
9 Please proceed, Mr. Jordash.
10 MR. JORDASH: Thank you, Your Honour.
11 Examination by Mr. Jordash:
12 Q. Good afternoon, Sir Ivor.
13 A. Good afternoon.
14 Q. Please, would you give your full name and date of birth for the
15 record, please?
16 A. Ivor Antony Roberts, 24 September 1946.
17 MR. JORDASH: Thank you, could we have on the screen, please,
19 Q. What you are going to see in front of you -- in fact, what you
20 have in front of you, I believe, is a copy of your statement; is that
22 A. Yes.
23 MR. JORDASH: With the parties' agreement, Sir Ivor would like to
24 look at a paper copy of his statement.
25 MR. FARR: No objection, Your Honour.
1 JUDGE ORIE: No objections from the Simatovic Defence either.
2 Please proceed.
3 MR. JORDASH: Thank you.
4 Q. I would just like to go through some formalities which are
5 required before we can apply to tender your statement. Would you please
6 quickly look --
7 THE INTERPRETER: Please slow down for the sake of the
8 interpreters, please.
9 MR. JORDASH: I beg your pardon.
10 Q. Would you please have a look at the front of the statement, and
11 if we could then move to the last page, please. And would you confirm
12 that that's your signature and you were interviewed by the Defence and
13 signed this as your statement?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Have you had an opportunity to review the statement and make any
16 amendments or clarifications that you wish to make?
17 A. I've re-read it and I've no amendments to make.
18 Q. Thank you. And were the contents of the statement in accordance
19 with the truth?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And if asked the same questions, would you in substance give the
22 same answers?
23 A. Yes.
24 MR. JORDASH: May I tender this as an exhibit, Your Honours,
25 please, with the underlaying document?
1 JUDGE ORIE: Which under -- there --
2 MR. JORDASH: 1D05475 and 1D04847. 1D04847, in fact, consists of
3 a number of documents.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Related documents.
5 Madam Registrar.
6 THE REGISTRAR: Document 1D5474 will receive number D779,
7 Your Honours. Document 1D5475 will receive number D780. And document
8 1D4847 will receive number D781, Your Honours.
9 JUDGE ORIE: No objections.
10 D779, D780, and D781 are admitted into evidence.
11 You may proceed, Mr. Jordash.
12 MR. JORDASH: Thank you, Your Honours.
13 Q. Sir Ivor, now the statement and the underlaying documents which
14 are footnoted in the statement are evidence before the Court. So we do
15 not need to repeat the contents, but I would like to ask you about a
16 number of aspects of the statement just to seek further details or
17 clarifications. Do you follow me?
18 A. Yes, though I am not clear what the underlying documents are.
19 Q. Perhaps if you look at the footnotes in your statement, they are
20 the underlying documents that I am referring to.
21 A. Right. Okay.
22 Q. Just -- just for the record, you were provided with a copy of the
23 underlying documents at the time you completed the statement; is that
25 A. Yes.
1 MR. JORDASH: If I could have on e-court, please, 1D04847, and
2 e-court page 17.
3 Q. What I am asking to be called up to the screen is an interview
4 you gave and an interview which was entitled by the interviewer, "Will
5 bring back the Partisans to power." I think you described that as a
6 somewhat idiosyncratic title. Do you recall the interview?
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. And I want to ask you about the comments you made or the
9 conversations you may have had with Lord Owen concerning his opinion and
10 his change of opinion concerning the punishment of the Serbs. First of
11 all, would -- are you able to identify Lord Owen's change of view and
12 when it occurred approximately?
13 A. Sorry, am I -- what am I looking at?
14 Q. You're looking at a transcript of the interview you gave, the
15 interview which I referred to as being entitled: "We will bring back the
16 Partisans to Power." And you were asked there, according to the
17 transcript of the interview, about whether you knew Lord Owen very well.
18 A. Yes, I'm -- I see now. Well, the change of opinion is referred
19 to -- that's in the question.
20 Q. Let me -- let me ask you this, then. The answer you gave appears
21 to be, in part, that Lord Owen's view at some point was that
22 President Milosevic, since the time he accepted the peace plan in 1993,
23 had been in favour of bringing about peace in Bosnia?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And my first question is: Are you able to identify with more
1 precision when in 1993 that might be referring?
2 A. No, because I wasn't involved in Yugoslav affairs in 1993. I
3 didn't start at the embassy in Belgrade until March 1994.
4 Q. Did you have any conversations with Lord Owen or hear any public
5 pronouncements he made on the subject?
6 A. You mean prior to arrival in Belgrade?
7 Q. Or after. Either.
8 A. Well, many -- many conversations with Lord Owen after I arrived
9 in Belgrade, but I suppose I saw him around Christmas of 1993 when he
10 briefed me on what he wanted me to do when I got to Belgrade. We didn't
11 discuss his views prior to that time. We talked entirely about how he
12 saw the situation now and how we were going to move on and bring the war
13 to an end.
14 Q. And what was his view at the time you did speak to him about
15 these subjects?
16 A. He thought that since Milosevic had accepted the Vance-Owen peace
17 plan, that he had now decided that he should work with the grain of the
18 international community and not against it.
19 Q. Let me ask you to have a look at another document, P2358. This
20 isn't one of your underlying documents. This is a perspective exhibit.
21 It's a record of the Supreme Defence Council of the FRY held on the 30th
22 of August, 1994. And I want to ask you about comments that were made in
23 that meeting.
24 THE REGISTRAR: Document is under seal, Your Honours.
25 MR. JORDASH: Thank you.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Therefore not to be shown to the public.
2 MR. JORDASH:
3 Q. Before showing you the document, I -- can I -- can we presume
4 that you are aware of the Supreme Defence Council during your time in the
5 region and its essential role?
6 A. Well, I was aware that there was a Supreme Defence Council, but
7 it all seemed faintly theoretical in that one knew that Milosevic decided
8 what the outcome was usually before the council had met.
9 Q. Had you seen any Supreme Defence Council minutes before?
10 A. No, never.
11 Q. What I want to ask you about is a view expressed here concerning
12 that the view of the Serbs from Belgrade around August of 1994 concerning
13 their relationship with or concerns about the position taken by the
14 Bosnian Serbs.
15 MR. JORDASH: Could we please go to page 48 -- sorry, page 5 of
16 the English and 4 of the B/C/S. Perhaps we can go to page 3 of the
17 English so we can see the beginning of the meeting.
18 Q. Just so you can orientate yourself, Sir Ivor, there is the
19 participants of this meeting. And if we can then move to page 4 so we
20 can see the speaker or at least the person introducing the next speaker
21 that we will look at in a moment. You can see there Momcilo Perisic.
22 And then if we go to the next page, page 5 of the English and B/C/S 4,
23 where Perisic introduces Colonel Krga; and then to page 6, and if you
24 would read through Krga's speech. And I want to ask you about his view
25 and whether you have any comment to make, agreement or otherwise. Please
1 would you indicate when you finished the page.
2 A. Yeah.
3 MR. JORDASH: Please if we could keep moving through when
4 Sir Ivor mentions he's finished until --
5 THE WITNESS: Yes.
6 MR. JORDASH: Next page, please.
7 THE WITNESS: Yes. All right.
8 MR. JORDASH: Next page, please.
9 THE WITNESS: Yup. Yeah.
10 MR. JORDASH: Next page, please.
11 THE WITNESS: Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
12 THE INTERPRETER: Can we have the B/C/S version as well.
13 MR. JORDASH: So we're on page 11, which should be, I think,
14 B/C/S 7, I think.
15 THE WITNESS: Yes.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, could you -- yes, could you check
17 whether we are on the right page in B/C/S.
18 THE WITNESS: Yup.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, I still have some doubts as to whether
20 we are on the right page in B/C/S.
21 MR. JORDASH: I am doing -- I am just checking, Your Honour.
22 THE WITNESS: Yes. Yes. Yes.
23 THE INTERPRETER: Interpreter's note: We are still on the same
24 page in the B/C/S.
25 THE WITNESS: Yes.
1 MR. JORDASH: I think -- I think the B/C/S should be page 10.
2 THE WITNESS: Yes.
3 JUDGE ORIE: I think we are on e-court page 9, lower part.
4 THE WITNESS: Yes.
5 JUDGE ORIE: I think we are now moving to page 10 in B/C/S.
6 THE WITNESS: Yes.
7 MR. JORDASH: Now it's correct, apparently, the B/C/S.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Both in B/C/S and English we have "the third
9 phase" before us.
10 THE WITNESS: Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes. Yes.
11 MR. JORDASH: Should be on, I think, page 11.
12 MR. GROOME: I see the break is nearly upon us. The Prosecution
13 would have absolutely no objection to Sir Ivor being provided with any
14 documents Mr. Jordash would like him read over the break. Perhaps it
15 might be more efficient after the break to proceed that way --
16 MR. JORDASH: This is the longest portion I wanted Sir Ivor to
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I wondered already why you had not changed the
19 sequence of your questions in such a way that we would not have been here
20 to see a witness read for close to 15 minutes now. But I leave it in
21 your hands at this moment.
22 MR. JORDASH: Just one more page, I think. Sorry for the delay.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Let's finish that page and then have a look at the
24 timing of what then follows.
25 THE WITNESS: Yup. Yes.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I don't know whether you have more questions.
2 If so, then we would first take a break, Mr. Jordash.
3 But could you tell us how much time you would need after the
4 break. And you would agree with me that it would have been by far better
5 to have this portion to be read by the witness during the break rather
6 than for us observing how a witness reads.
7 MR. JORDASH: I accept it would.
8 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
9 MR. JORDASH: I would like an hour after the break.
10 JUDGE ORIE: How much time would you need, Mr. Bakrac?
11 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honours, as matters stand now,
12 I do not think that I would have any questions for Sir Ivor Roberts.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Farr?
14 MR. FARR: Two hours, Your Honours.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Two hours. One second, please.
16 You have one hour after the break, Mr. Jordash, but I'll be very
17 strict. One hour, not one minute more. Apparently you have not dealt
18 with the summary -- of the 92 ter summary yet, but let's first see that
19 we hear the evidence of the witness rather than to start dealing with
20 other matters at this moment.
21 We take a break and resume at quarter past 2.00.
22 --- Recess taken at 1.31 p.m.
23 [The witness stands down]
24 [The witness takes the stand]
25 --- On resuming at 2.22 p.m.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, you have until quarter past 3.00. We
2 had to wait for another while for something to be read, which -- I mean,
3 we are not spending our days here on 35 people looking as to how a
4 witness reads a document. That's -- and you know that.
5 So use your time efficiently. Quarter past 3.00. Please
7 MR. JORDASH: Thank you.
8 Q. Sir Ivor, on page 6 that I asked you to read, the speaker states
9 that relations have been severed with the leadership of the
10 Republika Srpska. And I want to ask you to comment on that from your
11 experience from the 30th of August, 1994. Was that something that you
12 observed and are able to comment on?
13 A. Yes. I was -- I was in Belgrade when it happened. It appeared
14 in an interview which Milosevic gave to "Politika" which was an
15 extraordinarily unrestrained attack on the Bosnia Serb leadership in
16 language which had commentators who had been in Belgrade for many years,
17 quite literally, gasping. They were quite surprised at the vehemence of
18 the language. This announced the rupture between the Bosnian leadership
19 and the Serb leadership. Milosevic said, from memory, something to the
20 effect that the policies of the Pale leadership was disastrous for the
21 Serbian people and, as a result, Serbia had the right to protect its own
22 interests and was going to impose a blockade across the Drina. And then,
23 I think, in the same interview Milosevic also warned the Pale leadership
24 against holding any referendum on the matter. This was a piece of advice
25 which the Pale leadership duly ignored and went ahead with a -- a
1 referendum to reject the latest proposals of the international community.
2 And so that led to the closure of the border, the arrival of observers,
3 and the lifting of some minor sanctions against the Federal Republic of
5 Q. How long did the closure of the border -- well, when did the
6 closure of the border take place and when did the observers arrive? Are
7 you able to place that in --
8 A. I can't remember any more the exact dates and times. I am sure
9 they are formally available to you much more than to me. But it all
10 happened -- all happened quite quickly. The observers arrived in stages.
11 It started off as quite a small observer force, from memory, but then
12 built up to quite a substantial one as -- as organised by and provided
13 for by Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, respectively the EU and the UN
15 Q. And within the text that I asked you to read, one of the options
16 laid out by the speaker was option B which involved the international
17 community withdrawing from the former Yugoslavia to leave the parties to
18 effectively exhaust each other militarily. And a consequence of that
19 expressed by the speaker was that there would be an uncontrolled influx
20 of mercenaries, weapons, and military equipment, and an uplifting of
21 combat operations. Was that a serious consideration at the time?
22 A. Well, I am not sure whether it was a serious consideration for
23 the leadership in Belgrade. The problem for the international community
24 was to keep -- well, they -- their objective was to keep piling the
25 pressure on the Bosnian Serbs to force them to accept the international
1 community's -- or the contact group's peace plan which would effectively
2 bring the war to an end. I don't think anyone in the international
3 community thought it was a great idea simply to walk away and leave the
4 two parties to exhaust themselves. That was -- that was something that
5 was never seriously considered, as far as I was aware.
6 Q. You mentioned that Milosevic saw the policies of the Pale
7 leadership as disastrous for the Serbian people and for the interests of
8 Serbia. What interests did Milosevic express to you or to others at the
9 time would be damaged by the Bosnian Serb approach?
10 A. I think he -- well, there were two things. I think politically
11 he felt that Serbia was coming under enormous pressure, rightly because
12 it was felt that Serbia having been largely responsible for the crisis in
13 the first place was being targeted by sanctions which probably impacted
14 on the people in Serbia, as opposed to the people in Republika Srpska,
15 far more heavily. I think a large part of the community in -- the Serb
16 community in Republika Srpska were country folk, peasants, if that
17 doesn't sound too offensive a word, who lived very simply, who lived off
18 the land. Sanctions had relatively little impact on the average farmer
19 in the Serbian territories in Bosnia; whereas, somewhere like Belgrade, a
20 cosmopolitan city was very badly hit by sanctions as I was able to see it
21 first-hand from the day I arrived. I -- the currency had been destroyed
22 just before I arrived. I think I am right in saying that inflation hit
23 352 trillion per cent which is something like 2 per cent a second or
24 something fantastical like that. Two per cent a minute, maybe. Anyway,
25 the economic situation was probably worse in Serbia and the
1 Federal Republic of Yugoslavia than it was in Republika Srpska.
2 So that was one consideration. The other consideration was --
3 so -- so Milosevic was obviously wanting to have sanctions lifted as soon
4 as possible. It was no help to him in his efforts to maintain himself in
5 power to have a country that was effectively beggared by international
6 sanctions, so he needed that lifted. And the other consideration, I
7 think, was the trend which was already perceptible then, for the military
8 balance to shift away from the Bosnian Serbs. And Milosevic's -- one of
9 his concerns, I think, was that if the Bosnian Serb military leadership
10 looked as though they were completely collapsing, there would be enormous
11 pressure on Milosevic to intervene militarily himself in Bosnia which
12 would only make his international position hugely worse.
13 Q. Was any concern expressed about what would happen to civilians if
14 the republic -- if the Bosnian Serb administration collapsed?
15 A. The civilians where?
16 Q. In the Republika Srpska.
17 A. No. I mean not -- I mean, I -- I -- I should qualify that. No
18 concern was made -- was expressed to me that I can remember, but we are
19 talking about events over 15 years ago. It's possible that I just don't
20 have any memory of it.
21 Q. Thank you. Option C was discussed in the Supreme Defence Council
22 by the speaker, and option C suggested an imposition of a peace plan by
23 the international community. And at page 16, the speaker noted that
24 these events would be extremely detrimental to the security of the FRY
25 and would be reflected in, inter alia, an attempt to organise
1 paramilitary units and send them to help Republika Srpska. Was any --
2 were you part of any discussions or did you hear about any discussions by
3 the Serb leadership from Belgrade concerning their fear that unless the
4 peace plan was accepted by the Bosnian Serbs that one of the problems
5 might be a new attempt to organise paramilitary units in Serbia and send
6 them to the Republika Srpska?
7 A. No.
8 Q. Now, moving on from that text.
9 MR. JORDASH: Could I ask, please, that we --
10 Q. There will be much less for you to read in this instance,
11 Sir Ivor.
12 MR. JORDASH: P258, again, please. But this time, please,
13 page 51 of the English, and it's under seal.
14 Perhaps we can shortcut this.
15 Q. While that's happening, Milosevic, in the same Supreme
16 Defence Council minute, discusses his view or his apparent view - this is
17 page 51 of the English and 34 of the B/C/S- - his view of the
18 consequences of a unification or an attempt to unify the RSK with the
19 Republika Srpska administrations. And I want to ask you whether that was
20 anything -- a subject you discussed with him at any time. If I can take
21 you to the bottom of the page. Milosevic is speaking there. And he
23 "Let me remind you that after Vance's plan was adopted, the
24 Republic of Serbian Krajina has decided to resolve its status through
25 negotiations, and not by war."
1 And then over the page:
2 "Any unification would instantly trigger a war between Croatia
3 and Krajina, with Croatia enjoying the support of the whole world. They
4 would say that's an occupation. A new territory has been created."
5 Perhaps there Milosevic is discussing any perceived or possible
6 reunification of the RSK with either the RS or with Serbia itself and
7 rejecting that, at least in this session. Was that something you
8 discussed with Milosevic or were aware of?
9 A. There was, from time to time, talk of a unification between the
10 RSK and the RS, but it's not something I ever discussed with Milosevic.
11 Q. Were you aware of what the official government position was, the
12 Serbian government's position in Belgrade?
13 A. That they were against it.
14 Q. I'm --
15 A. This is a quote from Milosevic, is it?
16 Q. Yes, I am -- but from --
17 A. He's saying that would trigger a war in which Croatia enjoys the
18 support of the whole world; i.e., he doesn't think that's a great idea.
19 Q. Was that something you were aware of at the time?
20 A. Yeah.
21 Q. Through conversations with who?
22 A. I think it was more a reading of the official Belgrade press that
23 you could see that they were - and of course that was controlled by
24 Milosevic -- that they would report suggestions in this -- in that sense
25 in a negative way, but I don't recall ever discussing it with Milosevic
1 himself. I -- I am -- I inferred from the discussions -- or, I inferred
2 from my reading of the official media that this wasn't an idea which he
3 would support.
4 MR. JORDASH: Could I have on the screen please 1D05476.
5 Q. And I believe, Sir Ivor, that you have been given a copy.
6 A. 5476.
7 Q. Yes. It's a state security centre Valjevo, 7th of November,
8 1994, an Official Note. And it reports -- if you've had the opportunity
9 to read it?
10 A. I have read it quickly. From -- what part of it do you want me
11 to look at?
12 Q. Well, I want to try to shortcut things by summarising -- the
13 report seems to reflect a conversation had with the minister or the
14 former advisor to the minister for state security of Republika Srpska,
15 Slobodan Skipina?
16 A. Skipina, yeah.
17 Q. Who reports concerning a collegium.
18 A. Yeah.
19 Q. Where Karadzic and Krajisnik strongly attacked the leadership of
20 the Republic of Serbia and Serbia's State Security Service for meddling
21 into the affairs of the Republika Srpska DB service?
22 A. Yeah.
23 Q. And their demand that the minister sever all ties and contacts
24 with members of the state security of the Republic of Serbia. And I just
25 wanted to ask if you had any knowledge of these conflicts and the view of
1 the Karadzic at that time, November 1994, concerning Serbian state
3 A. Well, it was quite obvious that after the border was closed
4 between Serbia and Republika Srpska that there were extraordinary
5 tensions between the political leaderships in Belgrade and Pale, tensions
6 which didn't necessarily exist between on one level the armies of the two
7 states and at the other the security services of the two states. They
8 were, after all, not political rivals in the way that Milosevic saw
9 Karadzic and Krajisnik. I think I said in my witness statement that
10 Milosevic regarded Karadzic as Frankenstein's monster who had outgrown
11 his creator and didn't -- no longer took instructions from him. So that
12 was the relationship between Milosevic and Karadzic, and indeed
13 Krajisnik. But the relationships between the state security officials in
14 both RS and Yugoslavia were, I think, different. And so they were
15 between the two armies. I had some feeling for that at about the same
16 time that this is dated, November 1994. And I seem to remember having a
17 meeting with General Perisic, the then head of the Yugoslav
18 General Staff, discussing the border closure with him. And he made it
19 clear that while he was enforcing it, it was something with which he had
20 no sympathy and that he was -- his real sympathies lay with his brother
21 officer, General Mladic.
22 Q. This document suggests that there was a conflict, at least, on
23 some level between the Serbian state security and, certainly, Karadzic
24 and Krajisnik. Is that something you are able to comment on?
25 A. No. I think it's -- I think the -- what I get from this short
1 minute is the feeling that Serbian state security was -- still regarded
2 itself as the senior partner in its relationship with -- with the
3 Bosnian Serbs and expected to be able to impose its will, and that
4 Karadzic and Krajisnik were determined that they shouldn't impose their
5 will and that there would be a flushing out of anyone who persisted in
6 maintaining a close relationship with the state security of Yugoslavia or
7 the Republic of Serbia.
8 Q. Just to be clear, are you commenting on your interpretation of
9 the document or on any facts that you personally observed at the time?
10 A. No, I couldn't say I'd had facts at my disposal. That was the
11 impression one had for the reasons I was saying earlier, that while the
12 political leaderships were very much out of sympathy with each other, at
13 other levels conversations and understandings continued between state
14 security people and -- and the armies.
15 Q. You mentioned a moment ago that Perisic was enforcing the border
16 even though his sentiments were somewhat against that. How long was it
17 that he enforced the border? Are you able to put that into some
19 A. Well it was just other a year, as I remember, until the Dayton
20 peace accord. I think the Dayton peace accord was November 1995, wasn't
21 it? And the border was closed in September 1994 -- so we are talking
22 about -- I mean, I am talking very broad terms, but I just can't remember
23 the exact dates anymore. We are talking about 14 months, I suppose.
24 Q. Thank you. Let me take you to 1D05477, please. I hope that's a
25 document you had been given.
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And it's -- it's, again, a state security report from this time
3 the Uzice centre. Did you have the opportunity to read this?
4 A. I hadn't quite finished it. I got to about page 7 in the time I
5 had available.
6 Q. Well, page 6 is the -- is the page I am particularly interested
7 in, and it's page 3 of the B/C/S. And the --
8 A. Sorry, what's the B/C/S?
9 Q. Sorry, this is for purposes of the B/C/S reader.
10 A. I'm sorry, I don't know what --
11 JUDGE ORIE: B/C/S might not be a known expression to you.
12 Instead of Serbo-Croatian, in the beginning of this Tribunal there was a
13 survey of the languages used in the former Yugoslavia which led us to
14 give the name Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian to the languages mainly spoken in
15 the former Yugoslavia, and that is what B/C/S stands for.
16 THE WITNESS: Oh, I see. Thank you. B/C/S, of course, is one
17 language, it's just Serbo-Croatian. It's just --
18 JUDGE ORIE: I would invite you to read the reports. What the
19 differences are, what the similarities are, but it comes down that
20 everyone from the former Yugoslavia is supposed to be able to understand
21 and to express itself in a language which we call, as a composite thing,
22 B/C/S, Bosnian-Croatian-Serbian.
23 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
24 MR. JORDASH:
25 Q. The writer of the report, at page 6 of the English, notes what
1 one -- I think five lines down, that Karadzic was pessimistic in his view
2 of the situation in the Republika Srpska. And just for the -- so we can
3 orientate ourselves, this is April 1995. And one of the reasons Karadzic
4 had formed this pessimistic view was that the VRS was in a weaker
5 situation and was losing its ability for maneuver through a shortage of
6 fuel and ammunition. I was wondering if you were able to comment on
7 that -- that view?
8 A. I'm -- I read it with interest because, I mean, I haven't -- I
9 didn't see -- I haven't seen Karadzic for probably getting on for a year
10 by then. Maybe nine months. And I was struck by the comment that he --
11 that he was so pessimistic. I mean, I -- I think he had a very accurate
12 picture of why things were going badly for Republika Srpska and its army,
13 and I am -- but I'm -- I always had the impression of Karadzic, not that
14 I saw much of him, but when I did meet him that he was full of bluster
15 and overconfidence. And it's interesting that he's accurately
16 pin-pointed the difficulties of his position and that impact that closure
17 of the border was having on the Vojna Republika Srpska, the Republika
18 Srpska army, shortage of fuel and ammunition.
19 Q. Was there any reason why you were not seeing Karadzic on a
20 regular basis?
21 A. Yes, a very simple one. The border was shut. The Bosnian Serb
22 leadership were forbidden to travel to Serbia. And I was in Belgrade, so
23 it's as simple as that.
24 Q. Thank you. Let me move to a later subject, D00536. I don't know
25 if you've been given that document. I suspect you have.
1 A. Yes, but -- oh, sorry, I have read this one. Yes --
2 Q. That's --
3 A. -- that's the June 1995.
4 Q. Statement by the president of the Security Council.
5 A. This is after the hostage crisis had just started, broken, hadn't
6 it? Wasn't it?
7 Q. Yes.
8 A. I've lost track of the exact dates.
9 Q. Yes, it is. I think it's agreed at this point the hostage crisis
10 has developed. And this should be under seal, I think. It seems --
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, not to be broadcast to the public. But I am a
12 bit surprised about Security Council statement by the president. How
13 could that possibly be a confidential document?
14 MR. JORDASH: I was surprised. I didn't -- I assumed it wasn't
15 confidential, but then I saw the Madam Registrar responding.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, I would be -- Madam Registrar, any further
17 explanation as to why a statement by the president of the security
18 council would be under seal?
19 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
20 JUDGE ORIE: It may well be a mistake. There is no reason to
21 keep it away from the public. It can be dealt with as a public document.
22 MR. JORDASH: Thank you.
23 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Madam Registrar explains that it's possible
25 since the document is MFI'd only that it's part of a batch of documents
1 which is under seal and then by mistake not take -- not made an exception
2 to what --
3 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
4 JUDGE ORIE: But whatever the status of the batch may be, this
5 document cannot possibly be a confidential document.
6 Please proceed.
7 MR. JORDASH: Thank you.
8 Q. At the time, were you aware that the hostage crisis included
9 blockading of various UNPROFOR personnel?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. Do you agree with the contents of this statement from your
12 personal knowledge, that these -- this was the wider context of the
13 immediate hostage taking?
14 A. Well, from personnel knowledge, no. I wasn't in Bosnia, so I'm
15 simply aware of the reports coming out of the Bosnian of what had
17 Q. And this is -- is this consistent with the reports you were
18 getting at the time?
19 A. Broadly, as far as I can recall. It's a long time ago.
20 Q. What happened in terms of the peace negotiations as a result of
21 the hostage crisis, did they continue?
22 A. Well, I would say they were put on one side, effectively, by the
23 hostage crisis. The hostage crisis became the most urgent matter to deal
24 with, certainly as far as my government was concerned.
25 Q. How long were they put aside for?
1 A. Some weeks until the hostage crisis was resolved. I am not sure
2 I quite understand your question. The -- the -- the political attempts
3 to find a political solution were technical always running, but that
4 didn't mean that anything was actually happening.
5 Q. And in terms of events on the ground, what happened -- was there
6 an impact upon military operations on the ground within Republika Srpska
7 and Bosnia as a whole?
8 A. I couldn't answer. I was in Serbia, apart from one visit to
9 Bosnia at that time, which Milosevic had personally authorised because
10 the border was shut and when I went to see two of the Bosnian Serb
11 leaders to express my government's anger at what had happened to the
12 UNPROFOR hostages and to warn them that we regarded it as a matter of
13 prime national importance that they be released unharmed, and that
14 failure to do that would have severe consequences for the Bosnian Serbs.
15 Q. Was there any discussion about what those consequences would be?
16 A. They asked me what it meant by it, and I told them it would mean
17 military intervention by British forces to extract our forces and punish
18 those who had taken them.
19 Q. Now, you've indicated that you were in Serbia at the time, but
20 were you privy to any discussions or information concerning whether there
21 had been a change in military operations, whether battles had stopped or
22 intensified or whatever?
23 A. Well, there was so much going on that summer. It was shortly
24 afterwards, I think, the Croatian forces attacked the main
25 Republika Srpska Krajina territory, and that resulted in several dozens
1 of thousands of Serb refugees coming into Serbia. So that was very
2 visible to those of us living in Belgrade because you could see them on
3 the motorway. The effects of military action during the hostage crisis,
4 that I can't recall, and I am not sure I would have been able to see that
5 from where I was sitting in Belgrade.
6 MR. JORDASH: Could I have please on the screen 1D05433.
7 Q. Do you have that in front of you, Sir Ivor, please?
8 A. What's the reference again?
9 Q. 1D05433.
10 A. I don't think I do. No.
11 Q. Please could we -- could we have it on the screen, please.
12 And it's a documented dated the 20th of June, 1995.
13 MR. JORDASH: And 5453. I beg your pardon, it's -- I couldn't
14 read the writing. 1D05453.
15 Q. It's a document dated the 20th of June, 1995, as you'll see in a
16 moment, federal ministry of foreign affairs, sector for multilateral
17 relations, and it's entitled, "Reactions to the Release of UN Peace Force
18 Personnel Taken Hostage by RS." If you would just have a look at that,
20 A. Um-hm.
21 MR. JORDASH: Next page, please. And it's still the page 1 of
22 the B/C/S.
23 Q. And the bit I am particularly interested in is the third
25 A. Yup.
1 Q. Were you part of this anything -- were you anything to do with
2 the delegation which, according to this document, expressed special
3 gratitude to Jovica Stanisic for his role in the hand-over and release of
4 the UNPROFOR members?
5 A. Well, I don't remember there being a delegation like this of
6 France, Britain, Canada. I was there first in every case. I went to
7 Novi Sad in the middle of the night on the time -- on the occasion of the
8 first release of hostages on a hunch that that's where the UNPROFOR
9 soldiers were going to be taken. And I stayed there until I met the
10 soldiers. There was nobody from France or Canada there. I didn't see
11 anyone from the federal foreign ministry on that occasion. And we had at
12 least another two rounds of meeting, and the -- of collecting our troops.
13 They came out in dribs and drabs. At the end of the whole process, the
14 government asked me to express our gratitude to those involved in -- in
15 the release of the UNPROFOR soldiers. But I personally have no memory of
16 doing it in the company of the French and the Canadian or, indeed, in the
17 presence of Vladislav Jovanovic.
18 Q. Okay. Can I ask you one more question, if I may. In your
19 statement at paragraph 14 you note that Milosevic regarded Karadzic as a
20 major stumbling block to his efforts to bring the war in Bosnia to an
21 end, and, He regularly in my time in Belgrade looked for ways to force
22 Karadzic out of office?
23 A. Yeah.
24 Q. Are you aware of any role played by Stanisic in that eventual
25 removal of Karadzic from the political scene?
1 A. The -- there were many different ways that Milosevic tried to get
2 rid of Karadzic. He hoped at one stage to persuade a majority of the
3 deputies in the Pale Assembly to simply vote Karadzic out of office, but
4 that never worked. He tried to encourage those whom he thought were more
5 likely to dance to his tune, like Bosnian Serbian vice-president
6 Nikola Koljevic, to take over, but Koljevic was too loyal to Karadzic
7 whom he'd known for 30 or 40 years. And he tried to engineer a situation
8 where General Mladic would take over in a kind of military coup. The
9 answer to your question is that several of these maneuvers would have
10 been conducted by Stanisic because that's who Milosevic used to try to
11 execute his will in Bosnia when his own attempts had failed.
12 Q. Do you know of any specifics, though, in relation to the eventual
13 removal of Karadzic and the role played by Stanisic?
14 A. That goes on to, I think, the summer of 1996 when the
15 international community were determined to get rid of Karadzic from the
16 leadership of the SDS as an indicted war criminal, and that there was --
17 were many attempts and Karadzic typically would say that he was taking a
18 backseat or wasn't really involved anymore, but this was -- usually
19 turned out to be nonsense. And, again, I think it was Jovica Stanisic
20 who was sent to make clear to Karadzic that he had to stand down. That
21 was my understanding. But I didn't physically see it happen, obviously,
22 but that was the message that I think was -- was coming through from --
23 from Milosevic.
24 MR. JORDASH: Could I take instruction, please. I think I might
25 have finished.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Just let me ask for one clarification.
2 Carefully listening to your last two questions, perhaps I should
3 wait for a second so that Mr. Jordash is not missing either question or
5 [Defence counsel confer with accused]
6 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, I waited for a second so you would hear
7 the question and the answer.
8 MR. JORDASH: Thank you.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Sir Ivor, it's not entirely clear to me. In the
10 first question you say, well, more or less, this was the role of
11 Jovica Stanisic in these kind of matters. Mr. Jordash then asked you
12 whether you had any specifics. And now -- and the second is -- the
13 second question you answered:
14 "But I didn't physically see it happen, obviously, but that was
15 the message that I think was coming through from Milosevic."
16 Now, do you have any more precise recollection on -- was it that
17 Milosevic told you or was that someone said to you, Mr. Milosevic, talk
18 to me that I sent Stanisic. Do you have any specific knowledge or is it
19 mainly on the basis of what you consider to be the division of labour
20 between Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Stanisic?
21 THE WITNESS: I can't recall which of those it was. It could
22 either have been -- very often these things were actually reported in the
23 press in clear terms, that Milosevic had sent Stanisic --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
25 THE WITNESS: -- to see Karadzic in Pale. It wasn't something
1 that was necessarily kept as a state secret.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, it --
3 THE WITNESS: On other occasions it may have been that that was
4 what he told me in the company of perhaps Carl Bildt at that time, or, to
5 put it in its correct proportion, when I was accompanying Carl Bildt.
6 That was the strong impression I had. But if you said to me, Can you
7 tell me how you inquired that piece of knowledge, I can't tell you at
8 this distance of time.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you. Please proceed, Mr. Jordash.
10 MR. JORDASH: I've finished.
11 Q. Thank you, Sir Ivor.
12 MR. JORDASH: Thank you, Your Honours.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Jordash.
14 Mr. Bakrac, still the same position? No questions?
15 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Yes, Your Honour. You're right.
16 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
17 Mr. Farr, are you ready to start your cross-examination?
18 MR. FARR: Yes, Your Honour.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Sir Ivor, you'll now be cross-examined by Mr. Farr.
20 Mr. Farr is counsel for the Prosecution.
21 Mr. Farr, you may proceed.
22 Cross-examination by Mr. Farr:
23 Q. Good afternoon, Sir Ivor.
24 A. Good afternoon.
25 Q. I'd like to start by clarifying a couple of things in your
1 statement. In paragraph 5 you discussed the time after your arrival FRY
2 in 1994. Then you say of Milosevic:
3 "He had clearly given up his most ambitious plans."
4 What were you referring to as Milosevic's most ambitious plans?
5 A. Well, this is my surmise because I didn't arrive in Yugoslavia
6 until, as I said in my statement, early 1994. I think the month was
7 March. My surmise was that Milosevic started off in his long ascent to
8 power with the intention of becoming the new Tito in that he would have
9 been in control of the SFRY. I think he found that as the other
10 republics responded with extraordinary alarm to his behaviour, that they
11 had to -- that he had to scale down his ambition, and eventually wanted
12 to be top dog among the Serbs in the former Yugoslavia.
13 Q. In paragraph 6 of your statement, you say:
14 "From this time, August 1994, when Milosevic decided to accept
15 the contact group plan and sever relations with the Bosnian Serbs until
16 they accepted the plan, Milosevic followed as far as one could detect a
17 path parallel to the international community in working to find a
18 solution to the problems of the region, most of which he had created."
19 Can you tell us which problems in particular you were referring
20 to that Milosevic had created?
21 A. Well, the violent breakup of the SFRY.
22 Q. And, in your view, how had Milosevic created those problems?
23 A. By attempting to take over control of the whole country. And
24 when that failed, to destabilise Croatia and then Bosnia by carving out,
25 with the assistance of local acolytes, Serb states.
1 Q. And you go on to say:
2 "His support for the contact group plan was consistent. The US,
3 which had originally been skeptical, gradually came round to accepting
4 our position, that Milosevic, having been the greater part of the
5 problem, now needed to be part of the solution."
6 And I am interested in the words "greater part of the problem."
7 Greater part of the problem as compared to whom?
8 A. Tudjman.
9 Q. Anyone else you were referring to?
10 A. Well, I think not many of the leaders of former Yugoslavia
11 emerged with great credit from the breakup. Some had a particularly
12 malign influence, others less so, but I don't think anyone came away from
13 the -- from the whole process with their hands clean.
14 Q. Going back to paragraph 5, you discussed the relationship between
15 Milosevic and the Bosnian Serbs, and you say of the Bosnian Serbs:
16 "They proved, however, to be like Frankenstein's monster,
17 virtually out of control and disobedient when faced with their creator's
19 What do you mean when you describe Milosevic as the creator of
20 the Bosnian Serbs?
21 A. Well, it's a figure of speech. He is obviously not their creator
22 in any physical sense. I think he saw people like Karadzic and
23 Krajisnik, Plavsic, and Koljevic, and the other members of that crew as
24 being amenable work mates in his plans of carving out a Bosnian Serb
1 Q. It sounds as though you've describe co-operation. To your
2 knowledge, did it go beyond that?
3 A. Sorry, I'm not with you.
4 Q. In other words, did it go beyond co-operation to active support,
5 and if so, of what kind?
6 A. Well, those go back to times when I wasn't there, so I wouldn't
7 want to be categorical about modalities and events which I didn't witness
8 or wasn't even present in the same regional space as.
9 Q. In paragraph 12 of your statement, you say:
10 "Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic started off from very different
11 political perspectives. Karadzic was pursuing the old Chetnik path, an
12 unrepentant nationalist. That had always been my impression when talking
13 to him. There was a kind of obsession with the past, whereby Serbia, and
14 the Serbs in general, were comitted to fighting medieval wars in the
15 20th century, keeping the Muslim enemy at bay, the guardian at the gate."
16 Other than what I've just read to you, is there anything else
17 that you intended when you described Karadzic as an unrepentant
18 nationalist following the old Chetnik path?
19 A. I don't think so.
20 Q. Did being an unrepentant nationalist imply any particular vision
21 or goal as to what the map or the population of the Balkans should look
23 A. Well, it would be one in which Serbia has as great amount of
24 territory as possible.
25 Q. And would that be territory that had been ethnically cleansed of
2 A. It would.
3 MR. FARR: Could we please have 65 ter 1345.1 on the screen.
4 Q. Sir, this document is an excerpt from the 42nd session of the
5 Republika Srpska National Assembly, which was held on the 18th and 19th
6 of July, 1994. The topic of discussion is the contact group plan, and
7 I'd like to read you a quote of something that Dr. Karadzic said in that
8 context --
9 MR. FARR: And, sorry, yes, if we could have page 2 in English
10 and page 2 in B/C/S, near the bottom of the page in both languages.
11 Q. I'm going to read the sentence beginning wort words, "We know for
12 sure that we have to give something up," and this is Karadzic speaking.
13 He says:
14 "We know for sure we have to give something up. That is clear
15 beyond a shadow of a doubt if we wish to achieve our primary strategic
16 aim which is to get rid of the enemies ..."
17 And then the next page in the B/C/S, please:
18 "... to get rid of the enemies in our house, the Croats and
19 Muslims, and not be in the same state with them anymore."
20 Sir, does that reflect Radovan Karadzic's goals as you understood
21 it at the time that you knew him?
22 A. Sorry, I'm trying to find the space where it says this.
23 Q. Yeah, the sentence is -- it begins with the words "We know for
24 sure ..."
25 A. Ah there we are, yes.
1 Q. Yeah.
2 A. Sorry, what's the question again?
3 Q. The question is whether the quotation that I just read you, that
4 is about getting rid of the enemies in our house, the Croats and Muslims,
5 and not being in the same state with them any more, does that reflect
6 Radovan Karadzic's goal as you understood it at the time you knew him?
7 A. Well, I think where he's using rather euphemistic language here
8 when he says, Get rid of the enemies, not be in the same state with them
9 anymore. He's using language here which for public consumption is more
10 politically astute, if you like. He's saying, We don't want to share the
11 same roof as these people. He's not saying, This is our house and we
12 don't want any of you in it. So -- but that's, I think, what he really
13 wanted. Or at least he wanted it by covering as much territory as he
14 could reasonably hope to get away with. By the time this -- he's talking
15 now in 1994, he realises that he's only going to get half the physical
16 land mass of Bosnia.
17 MR. FARR: And, Your Honours, I would tender this excerpt as a
18 Prosecution exhibit.
19 JUDGE ORIE: Madam Registrar.
20 THE REGISTRAR: Document 1345.1 will receive number P3115,
21 Your Honours.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
23 Mr. Farr, I see this is on page 72. You have used half a page.
24 Do you expect the Chamber to read all the - how many are there? - 75 or
25 more pages?
1 MR. FARR: Your Honour, the document that we are looking at is
2 three pages long. It consists of the cover page, this page, and then the
3 following page on which Dr. Karadzic's comments are continued.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Then my problem disappears. P3115 is admitted into
5 evidence. Yes, so as a matter of fact, these -- it's just an excerpt of
6 the minutes, because I do understand that the minutes cover 75 pages, but
7 it's a small excerpt.
8 MR. FARR: Exactly, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Which always raises the issue whether any of the
10 other parties for contextualisation would like to have more than the
11 limited number of pages we find here.
12 MR. JORDASH: I could --
13 JUDGE ORIE: You may think about it if -- but I would then expect
14 you to come back to it by, let's say, not later than housekeeping session
15 later this week.
16 MR. JORDASH: Yes, I am going to check if it's part of our bar
17 table. It may well be.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. All 75 pages?
19 MR. JORDASH: It might be.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Then we have to consider that as well.
21 Mr. Bakrac.
22 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] Your Honour, I will consult
23 Mr. Jordash and then we will probably take the same position, but only
24 after we look at the matter together.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
1 Then you may proceed, Mr. Farr.
2 MR. FARR:
3 Q. Sir, in your statement you do note that Milosevic and Karadzic
4 started off from very different political perspectives, but is it fair to
5 say that Karadzic's views were no secret and that Milosevic would have
6 known of them at the time that Milosevic was supporting or co-operating
7 with Karadzic?
8 A. I couldn't say. When he was co-operating with Karadzic was
9 before he suffered the humiliation at Pale in 1993 when his support for
10 the Vance-Owen plan was rejected. And that was a year or so before I
11 arrived in Bosnia -- in Serbia.
12 Q. In paragraph 9 of your statement, you are discussing the period
13 after Dayton, and you say the following:
14 "Milosevic was keen at this stage to project himself, however
15 improbably, as the man who had helped to bring the wars in the region to
16 an end."
17 And I'm interested here, I guess, in the words "however
18 improbably." Why do you express this scepticism about Milosevic's
19 portrayal of himself as a peacemaker?
20 A. Well it was improbable because of his reputation before as the
21 man described as the butcher of the Balkans, someone who'd played a
22 cardinal role in unleashing the horrors of the wars in Croatia and
23 Bosnia, and there was, therefore, an element of suspension of belief
24 almost. I have to accept the person who had caused so much of the
25 trouble to now be the man who is helping to bring the wars to an end. I
1 think in some writings I've done on this subject, I described
2 Milosevic -- quoting a biographer of a Milosevic, as a pyromaniac
3 fireman. And I think that's what I'm trying to get over, however
4 clumsily in this sentence, someone who goes around setting ablaze a whole
5 nation and then comes around with lots of buckets of water to put them
6 out and then claims the credit for it. That's the point I am making.
7 I'm not saying -- in other words, I'm making it -- I'm trying to make it
8 clear that it was fair of him to say, Yes, I did power water on this
9 problem to cool it down, but, of course, the bit he wants to leave out of
10 the equation is, Why did we have the configuration in the first place?
11 It was a bit like his attitude towards sanctions.
12 In the elections, and, again, you'll have to forgive my failure
13 to pin down exact dates, but in the elections towards the end of 1996,
14 Milosevic was able to claim credit for having achieved the full lifting
15 of sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. And this was
16 trumpeted in the media as an absolute triumph. But, of course, why were
17 the sanctions appointed in the first place? That's if point I am really
18 making about the pyromaniac fireman.
19 MR. FARR: Could we now please have 65 ter 6444 on the screen,
20 and I would note this is the same document that has been admitted as
21 D780. I am using the version I have uploaded because I am sure of the
22 page numbers and because there is a B/C/S translation of the portion I am
23 interested in, so I think it will help the booths.
24 Q. And sir, the document coming onto screen before you is a
25 transcript of the interview you gave for the British diplomatic oral
1 history programme. And as I mentioned, this the document that's cited in
2 a number of footnotes to your statement.
3 MR. FARR: If we could have the top of page 26 in English, which
4 is the middle of the page 3 in B/C/S.
5 Q. And at the very top of the page in English, you say:
6 "I probably met with him 40 or 50 times over nearly four years."
7 And that's, of course, what we see in paragraph 3 of your
8 statement. The interviewer then asks you:
9 "Even so, that's a lot of meetings. What did you think of him?"
10 Your answer was:
11 "I think he was a ruthless power broker who was responsible for
12 the deaths of thousands of people. You couldn't think of him in other
13 than negative terms."
14 Now, I don't know whether you have had any legal training, and I
15 want to be clear that I am not asking you to make any legal conclusion,
16 but who are the thousands of people you are referring to whose deaths
17 Milosevic is responsible for?
18 A. Well, I haven't had any legal training, so I am not quite sure
19 what you are asking me to --
20 Q. Why is it that you said that was -- what was -- what was on your
21 mind when you said that Milosevic was responsible for the deaths of
22 thousands of people?
23 A. Well, I think he played a key role in provoking the wars in
24 Croatia and Bosnia.
25 Q. And just so we are clear, who are the thousands of people who you
1 were referring to here?
2 A. Those who died in Croatia and Bosnia.
3 MR. FARR: And if we could now please have the bottom of page 23
4 in English, which is the bottom of the first page in B/C/S.
5 Q. And at the very bottom of the page, you are discussing the
6 hostage crisis. And as indicated in paragraph 15 of your statement, you
7 say that you went to see Milosevic and impressed upon him how much you
8 needed the British soldiers out in one piece. And then you talk about
9 going to see the Bosnian Serbs in Bosnia. And the interviewer asks you:
10 "Who are you dealing with?"
11 MR. FARR: And then if we could go to the next page in both
12 languages, please.
13 Q. At the top of the page we see your answer, which is:
14 "A whole range of war criminals, really; almost everyone I met
15 was an indicted war criminal: Milosevic, Milutinovic, who was the
16 foreign minister for much of the time, and whose trial is going on now, I
17 think; Karadzic and Krajisnik also on trial now, I think."
18 Now, again, not asking for any legal conclusions, but why did you
19 describe these men as war criminals?
20 A. Well I'm not a -- I'm not a lawyer, as I've readily conceded, but
21 all these people were, by that stage, by the time I gave the interview,
22 indicted war criminals.
23 Q. And was it solely for that reason that you described them as war
25 A. Well, I'm not going to -- there seems to be some legal nuances
1 you want me to get into here and I don't want to get into them because I
2 am not a lawyer. So I'll -- if you like, I was sloppy in having said a
3 whole range of indicted war criminals.
4 Q. I wasn't trying to induce you to offer any sort of legal opinion.
5 I was simply asking what it was, what facts in your knowledge -- what it
6 was in your mind when you characterised them this way. I think you've
7 indicated that it was the fact that you knew them to be indicted war
9 Now, further down in that same paragraph you say:
10 "Most of the people I've dealt with are either dead, some by
11 their own hand, in prison, or on the run. Mladic, of course, I met him
12 once. I thought he was actually deranged. People say he's in Belgrade.
13 I don't know if that's accurate."
14 Can you just briefly describe for us the circumstances of your
15 meeting with Mladic?
16 A. I -- I think it was -- I think it was a pressure on Bihac, but I
17 could be wrong. It's certainly one of the safe areas. I mean, I can
18 check this, but I'm -- I'm just giving you a very broad brush picture. I
19 am sure there was particular pressure which was causing a great deal of
20 concern to my government and other western governments, and I was given
21 instructions to go and talk to Milosevic about him -- about it. And he
22 said he'd done his best to try and rein in the Bosnian Serbs, but given
23 the circumstances where there was a clear division between the Bosnian
24 Serb leadership and the Yugoslav leadership, he would say then, They are
25 not listening to me. And then he said, But, of course, you can make your
1 points directly, if you like, to General Mladic.
2 So -- so I did. So I met Mladic and pointed out -- made the
3 point -- same points I'd made to Milosevic about the -- the awful nature
4 of what he was doing and in doing my best to persuade him to desist. And
5 then he went into a kind of obscure rant about Britain and its hostile
6 attitude towards the Bosnian Serbs, and he said he was never going to buy
7 British silk shirts again. And naturally, I looked somewhat puzzled at
8 this. And then he explained that when he was a boy during the
9 Second World War he had, when the allies had dropped supplies into
10 Bosnia, they had dropped them by parachute, and the parachutes were made
11 of silk. And as a little boy he would take the parachutes back to his
12 mother who would make them into silk shirts. And ever since then he
13 bought silk shirts from Britain, but now he wasn't going to buy silk
14 shirts from Britain anymore as a result of the unremitting hostility
15 towards the Bosnian Serbs. That's what I said I thought he was actually
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Farr, I am looking at the clock. You are
18 already a little bit over the time we usually -- when we usually take a
19 break. Are you still sticking with your assessment that you would need
20 two hours, which would mean that you would have one hour and 35 minutes
22 MR. FARR: For the moment, yes, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Try to be very focused and try to keep the
24 witness as focused as well.
25 We take a break and will resume at 10 minutes past 4.00.
1 --- Recess taken at 3.40 p.m.
2 [The witness stands down]
3 [The witness takes the stand]
4 --- On resuming at 4.13 p.m.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Before we continue, Mr. Farr.
6 Mr. Jordash, there was some confusion about a UN Security Council
7 statement, president of Security Council statement, 1D05238, which is, by
8 the way, MFI'd as D536.
9 Now, there is a list, and this is not the only list where due to
10 the fact that there is a confidential chart involved that provisionally
11 all the documents appearing in that chart, provisionally placed under
12 seal - and I think this one specifically, which was introduced by the
13 Stanisic Defence - if I look at that list, there are many more, which I
14 hardly can imagine that they deserve to be confidential. So therefore I
15 would like to invite the Stanisic Defence to go not only through this
16 list, which is found in an internal memorandum by our Court Officer of
17 the 29th of November, 2011, but also other lists still pending, to check
18 them on whether there is really any need to have these documents
20 Then we move on.
21 Mr. Farr, are you ready to continue?
22 MR. FARR: Yes, Your Honour.
23 JUDGE ORIE: Please do so.
24 MR. FARR: Could we now please have 65 ter 6443 on the screen.
25 Q. And sir, while that's coming up, this document that we are about
1 to see is a piece from the "Sunday Independent" of Ireland originally
2 published on 29 May 2011, and the title is, "My meeting with monster
3 Mladic." The subtitle is "Ivor Roberts is surprised that the psychotic
4 Serbian leader allowed himself to be taken alive." Do you recall writing
5 this piece for the "Sunday Independent"?
6 A. Yes, I wrote the piece, though the headline was not mine.
7 Q. In this article after briefly describing your meeting with
8 Mladic, you turn to the question of why Mladic was able to evade capture
9 for so long, and then you cite opinion polls indicating a surprisingly
10 high level of support for Mladic among the Serbian public. And if we
11 could just scroll down to the last two full paragraphs in English and the
12 bottom of the second page in B/C/S.
13 A. Is it possible to make them a bit bigger? It's just I'm having
14 some trouble.
15 JUDGE ORIE: I take it that that could be possible. Could the
16 portion that we are looking at be enlarged. Second page, last two full
17 paragraphs. It seems to be the first page. No, let me just have a look.
18 MR. FARR: It's the bottom of the first page in English --
19 JUDGE ORIE: The first page.
20 MR. FARR: -- and the bottom of the second page in B/C/S. So I
21 think we have got the right -- the right stuff on the screen right now.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Could you also repeat when it was published because
23 that appears not on the document itself, is it, Mr. -- well.
24 MR. FARR: Your Honour, the --
25 JUDGE ORIE: It doesn't appear to the transcript clearly.
1 MR. FARR: Your Honour, the date does not appear on the piece
2 itself. When we got it from the internet it was indicated that it was
3 the 29th of May, 2011.
4 Q. And perhaps, Sir Ivor, could you confirm that that was the
5 approximate date on which it was published?
6 A. Well, I can't remember the date at all, except that it was
7 shortly after Mladic was taken. So if -- whatever the date of that was,
8 it would be within a week or two of that.
9 Q. Okay. I -- I'm going to read these last two paragraphs verbatim
10 and then ask you some questions about them. We are starting with the
11 words, "So why is a mass murder ...," and the quote is:
12 "So why is a mass murder regarded as a hero in some Serb
13 quarters? When multiethnic Bosnia declared itself independent of
14 Serb-dominated Yugoslav in early 1992 and the Bosnian war broke out, the
15 Yugoslav government led by Slobodan Milosevic fed the Serbs in both
16 Yugoslavia and Bosnia an unremitting diet of propaganda, arguing that the
17 Bosnian Serbs would be massacred in an independent Bosnia dominated by
18 the majority Muslims and Croats.
19 "The only answer, according to the propaganda line, was for the
20 Bosnian Serb army (helped by their Serbian brothers in arms) to conquer
21 as much of Bosnia as it could and ethnically cleanse those areas under
22 its control of Muslims and Croats. The rest is bloody history. So while
23 the rest of us saw Mladic as a key player in and executive of a criminal
24 enterprise, for many Serbs in Bosnia and Serbia he was defending the
25 Bosnian Serbs from genocide. A propaganda success of which Goebbels
1 would have been proud. And it still has resonance today."
2 Can you tell us first how you came to know about this propaganda
3 campaign run by, as you say, the Yugoslav government led by
4 Slobodan Milosevic?
5 A. Well, by my reading of the background to what had happened in
6 Yugoslavia before I arrived there.
7 Q. You say that the only answer, according to the propaganda line,
8 was for the Bosnia Serb army to conquer as much of Bosnia as it could and
9 ethnically cleanse the areas under its control of Muslims and Croats.
10 Did you ever form a view as to the purpose of this propaganda?
11 A. Well, to -- like all propaganda, it's to -- to persuade your
12 public that the line you're taking is supported by some objective which
13 you want your public to support and share.
14 Q. Was the purpose to facility and encourage the conquest and ethnic
15 cleansing of Bosnia by the Bosnian Serbs?
16 A. Well, to support it, not necessarily to facility it.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Farr, both I and my colleagues have wondered why
18 you would need to introduce this matter with the text with comparisons to
19 Nazis and to monsters, et cetera? You could have introduced these
20 matters. If you want to know about propaganda, ask the witness without
21 reading us major parts with highly suggestive language with -- there is
22 nothing wrong with that language if you want to publish it or if you want
23 to impress a public, but it -- it intervenes with the factual knowledge
24 this Chamber would like to receive from witnesses. It mixes matters up.
25 So would you please -- if you want to find out what this witness knows
1 about the propaganda, and we now learned that to some extent it was what
2 he read before and formed an opinion about, which everyone is fully
3 entitled to do. But this Court, of course, is primarily interested in
4 receiving knowledge of facts observed by the witness himself, and
5 inevitable that in the position Sir Ivor has been in -- there may some
6 judgements, some assessments be part of that as well. But that could be
7 introduced also without referring to monsters or references to Goebbels.
8 Would you please keep that many find and --
9 MR. FARR: Yes, Your Honour. I mean, my only observation is that
10 these are the witness's words. These are not my words, but I will keep
11 your instruction in mind.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Isn't it -- I didn't say that these are not the
13 witness's words, apart from that there was not -- the only thing is that
14 until now is that that title was not his, whether is -- that the author
15 of it has not even been established by you --
16 MR. FARR: Yes, Your Honour, he said he did write it.
17 JUDGE ORIE: But apart from that, even if these are his words, I
18 may express myself in different circumstances while publishing -- while
19 doing whatever in terms which I would not use while I'm a witness, and
20 you should be aware of that.
21 Please proceed.
22 MR. FARR:
23 Q. Sir, based on your knowledge of the way that the Yugoslav
24 government functioned during your time in Belgrade, are you able to say
25 whether a campaign of this sort could have happened without the knowledge
1 and approval of Slobodan Milosevic?
2 A. No, it could not have happened without the knowledge or approval.
3 Are you talking about the propaganda line there?
4 Q. Yes.
5 A. Yeah. No, it couldn't have happened without Milosevic's consent.
6 Q. A portion of the quote indicates that you saw Mladic as a key
7 player in and executor of a criminal enterprise. Can you tell us what
8 facts within your knowledge led you to that conclusion?
9 A. Well, as His Honours has pointed out, this is language which I am
10 using in a newspaper article which is not the language I would use in a
11 court of law because I would need to have factual evidence based on my
12 own observation of those whom I was confident of. So I'd rather not go
13 into that.
14 Q. Okay. I have finished with that document.
15 MR. FARR: Can we now please have P2532 on the screen.
16 Q. And, sir, just for your information, the document coming up on
17 your screen comes from a notebook kept by Ratko Mladic. And the entry
18 that we are looking at is from 13 December 1993, although that's not
19 what's on our screen at the moment.
20 A. It says July 1994, doesn't it?
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Farr will find the right pages, I take it.
22 MR. FARR: I think what we need is P2532.
23 Q. So this comes from a notebook kept by Ratko Mladic, and this
24 entry is from the 13th of December, 1993. So this is still about three
25 months before your arrival in Belgrade. It is just around the time of
1 your meeting with Lord Owen that you described during your direct exam.
2 And this records a meeting in Belgrade attended by two delegation: One
3 is from Serbia and one is from the RS. From Serbia the attendees were:
4 Milosevic, General Perisic, Sokolovic, Stanisic, Badza, Tepavcevic, and
5 General Mrksic. From the RS the attendees were Karadzic, Krajisnik,
6 Mladic, Milovanovic, Cukic, Miletic, Maric, Salapura, Stanisic, and
7 Kovac. Jovica Stanisic speaks first at the meeting, and he says:
8 "It is because of your initiative that we are meeting in order to
9 improve your operational and tactical position and see about help from
11 Karadzic speaks next, and he says:
12 "We are moving towards the end of the conflict. This moment is
13 the most favourable for us to end the war. We are holding 75 per cent of
14 the territory and controlling the most important parts of the territory."
15 Are you able to confirm at the time of your arrival in Belgrade
16 in March 1994 that Bosnian Serbs were controlling about 75 per cent of
17 the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
18 A. I would have thought the figure was slightly less, maybe 68,
19 70 per cent, I can't quite remember. Seventy-five per cent seems rather
20 high, but I mean, I'm not saying it's wrong. It just doesn't seem what
21 my memory tells me.
22 Q. Karadzic continues saying:
23 "We have not achieved some of it in the Neretva valley and a
24 foothold on the coast which we could have achieve by political means.
25 "We have to return part of the territory because the MZ or
1 international community will not agree to 31 per cent of the Serbs
2 holding 75 per cent of the territory.
3 "Unification with Serbia is smiling upon us."
4 Now Mr. Karadzic is also correct here when he says that the
5 international community was not willing to let the Bosnian Serbs keep
6 75 per cent of the territory of Bosnia. And, in fact, the exchange of
7 territory for official recognition of the Republika Srpska was one of the
8 key issues in the contact group plan; is that correct?
9 A. Yeah.
10 Q. And then moving on to the bottom of the page, Karadzic says:
11 "What are our strategy objectives?
12 "1. To be separated from the Muslims and Croats.
13 "2. To establish territorial control in Posavina.
14 "3. For the Drina not to be the border.
15 "4. To take control of part of the Neretva valley.
16 "5. To have a foothold on the coast.
17 "6. To have our part of Sarajevo."
18 Were you aware of these six strategic goals of the Bosnian Serbs
19 and that they were published in the Official Gazette of the RS in May of
21 A. No.
22 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Farr, is there any dispute about the strategic
23 objectives or -- because it comes a bit as a surprise in this context.
24 MR. FARR: Your Honour, the witness has knowledge of them. It
25 may be relevant for his evidence about the negotiations or about the
1 goals of the contact group plan.
2 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. But apparently he is not aware of them.
3 Please proceed.
4 THE WITNESS: Let me add that I wasn't aware of them as set out
5 some two years before I arrived. But it was quite clear that objective
6 1, 2, 4 -- sorry, 5 and 6 were things that the Bosnian Serbs always went
7 on about. I take it that 3, for the Drina not to be the border, refers
8 back to the line that you quoted two lines above, unification with Serbia
9 is smiling upon us; i.e., that the Drina should not be a border between
10 Republika Srpska and Serbia proper.
11 MR. FARR:
12 Q. Are you in a position to comment on the extent to which any of
13 these goals had been achieved in Bosnia by the time you arrived in
14 Belgrade in March of 1994?
15 A. Well, it's hard to make such categorical statements, to be
16 separated from the Muslims and Croats? Well, they were fighting each
17 other in two different camps, as it were. Territorial control in
18 Posavina, that was being fought over; for the Drina not to be the border,
19 well, that's -- that was something that was never achieved; the Neretva
20 valley, I don't remember; have a foothold on the coast, no, they never
21 achieved that; to have their part of the Sarajevo, well they had their
22 part of Sarajevo and were bombing rest.
23 Q. What follows in this meeting is a discussion of two potential
24 military operations; one at various elevations around Sarajevo, including
25 one called mount Zuc, and one in the Praca river valley.
1 MR. FARR: And if we could have the bottom of page 4 in both
3 Q. I'd like to read Milosevic's conclusions. He says:
4 "1. Do not plan and do not do Praca.
5 "2. Work out the Sarajevo operation.
6 "3. The SRK does not have its own forces. They have to resolve
7 this quickly and with assistance."
8 And, sir, just so you know, it's our case that SRK is the
9 Sarajevo Romanija Corps, the VRS Corps engaged in the siege of Sarajevo:
10 "4. How to neutralise propaganda around Sarajevo ..."
11 MR. FARR: If we could have the next page please in both
13 Q. "5. The world is interested only in what the Serbs do ...
14 "6. Let the Muslims trample the Croats near Vitez, Busovaca,
15 Gornji Vakuf, and Kiseljak and Kresevo.
16 "7. Work out the operation and define the strength of the
17 forces. "
19 "8. General Perisic will give everything that does not
20 jeopardize BG for combat readiness of units here."
21 Sir, were you aware that Slobodan Milosevic was involved in this
22 kind of discussion about an operation in Sarajevo with the Bosnian Serb
23 leaders at the time of your meeting with Lord Owen in December of 1993?
24 A. No.
25 Q. And is this kind of meeting and this kind of discussion
1 consistent with the picture that Milosevic paint for you of his
2 relationship with the Bosnian Serb leaders at the time you arrived in
3 Belgrade in March 1994?
4 A. Well, I didn't meet Milosevic on my own, i.e., without a foreign
5 office minister or one of the international negotiators until around
6 December of that year. So the line that would be taken in
7 international -- in meetings with international negotiators or
8 delegations was perforce a very one that was effective for public
9 consumption and certainly wouldn't have the sort of language that Mladic
10 is recorded here.
11 Q. I guess the question I am trying to get at is it seems to me -
12 and correct me if I'm wrong - that in your statement you paint a picture
13 of what you believe the relationship between Milosevic, on the one hand,
14 and the Bosnian Serbs, on the other hand, was at the time you arrived in
15 Belgrade in March 1994, and that is that it was a strained relationship
16 and that it had been a strained relationship since, let's say, May of
17 1993 when the Bosnian Serbs rejected the contact group plan. Can you
18 tell me, first, am I understanding your evidence correctly? Are you
19 indicating that in your view that was a strained relationship at the time
20 you arrived in March of 1994?
21 A. It was certainly strained by the late summer of that year. As
22 for earlier, it was very hard to say. There is no specific indications.
23 But by the late summer, the contact group were actively trying to
24 encourage Milosevic, as indeed were Owen and Stoltenberg, in encouraging
25 Milosevic to formally to break with the Bosnian Serbs, which is what
1 eventually happened as we discussed earlier today.
2 Q. Perhaps I can just ask this: Are you surprised to see a record
3 of a meeting of this kind happening in December of 1993?
4 A. December 1993, not particularly. But I certainly would have been
5 if it had been December 1994.
6 Q. Thank you, sir. Now if we -- a bit further down the page we see
7 the words, "Approved 30 T-34 tanks, ZIS field gun, shells for ZIS and
9 Then getting close to the bottom of the page we see what appears
10 to be Mladic's suggestion for how to proceed with the discussions where
11 it says:
12 "My draft conclusion.
13 "Let us define forces, weapons, and time tomorrow, as well as the
14 team that will decide."
15 Then immediately after that, Milosevic says:
16 "I agree with General Mladic's proposal ..."
17 MR. FARR: And if we could have the next page in both languages.
18 Q. And there it says:
19 "But we should start the operation if the agreement is not signed
20 and if sanctions are not lifted.
21 "The operation is to be planned, prepared, and forces are to be
22 concentrated, but it should not be started until we hear the results of
23 the negotiations from Brussels."
24 Are you able to tell us what negotiations in Brussels Milosevic
25 is referring to here?
1 A. These Geneva Conventions -- in Brussels? In Brussels? That
2 surprises me. I would have thought they would have been in Geneva. I
3 don't know what negotiation in Brussels he would have been referring to
4 because most of the meetings with Bosnian Serbs on accepting peace plans
5 were held in Geneva. I can't think of what results of negotiations in
6 Brussels are, unless he is talking about internal European Union
7 negotiations. This is a particular moment of --
8 Q. Well, does --
9 A. Where sanctions are being discussed again. I don't remember.
10 Q. Does it assist if I indicate that apparently on the 10th and 11th
11 of December, 1993, the European Council met in Brussels for the first
12 time following the entry into force of the treaty on European Union. One
13 of the things they did was to adopt a declaration on the former
14 Yugoslavia, which, among other things, invited the Serb, Bosnian, and
15 Croat leaders to in Brussels on 22nd December. Does that --
16 A. Yes, well, thank you. Had you mentioned that to start with we
17 could have saved some time.
18 Q. Are you at all surprised -- our position is that this document
19 shows that Milosevic is conditioning the -- or what he's saying is that
20 an operation around Sarajevo may be conditioned on the results of
21 negotiations in Brussels. Does that surprise you?
22 A. I mean, it's hard to be surprised by Milosevic. He was a
23 constant master of tactics and surprises. In that sense, most of them
24 turned out to be strategic flawed, but that wouldn't stop him thinking of
25 some tactical ploy which he thought might be helpful. It's hard to put
1 all this in context without my having been there at the time.
2 Q. Thank you. I've finished with that document. I'd now like to
3 turn to the reasons that Mr. Milosevic supported the various peace plans.
4 And I'd like to start just by telling you the Prosecution's position
5 regarding the reasons for his support.
6 We say that his support for the peace plans was not based on a --
7 was not because he was a humanitarian or had interest in reducing human
8 suffering or because he had any regret or concern about the ethnic
9 cleansing that had taken place in Bosnia. In fact, we say he, himself,
10 had supported both the war and ethnic cleansing in Bosnia. We say that
11 he supported the peace plans, at least in part, because the Serb side had
12 enjoyed phenomenal success early in the war, and, in Milosevic's view,
13 had achieved everything it could through war and violence. The peace
14 plans provided an opportunity to consolidate a great portion of those
15 gains and make them permanent.
16 Milosevic was concerned that if the peace plans were not
17 accepted, the Bosnian Serbs could lose everything they had gained,
18 decreasing both their power and his. In Milosevic's view, in other
19 words, the territory that had to be traded pursuant to the peace plans
20 was worth less than the official recognition and guarantees of Serb
21 rights that, in his view, were offered by the peace plans.
22 Are you able to comment on that?
23 A. In other words, you're saying, if I've got this right - and I'm
24 just re-reading the transcript of what you helpfully read out - that he
25 felt that he ought to bank the gains that the Bosnian Serbs had made
1 before things went awry and he would lose what had been gained.
2 Q. Precisely.
3 A. Well, I'd -- I think if we are talking about the time when he
4 was -- when we were -- when I arrived, when we were discussing earlier
5 whether he -- Serbia -- that the Bosnian Serbs occupied 68 or 70 or
6 75 per cent of Bosnia, I don't think Milosevic agreed that that was
7 sustainable and he knew that the international community would not agree
8 that the Bosnian Serbs should have more than 49 per cent of Bosnia. In
9 fact, that was a point that I regularly made to the Bosnian Serbs, and I
10 remember Karadzic at one point saying that that was only his agreement,
11 to 49 per cent, 49:51 per cent split was only a one-day offer, and
12 because it hadn't been agreed -- it -- there hadn't been an agreement, it
13 was no longer on the table. It was something that one kept coming back
14 to in negotiation with the Bosnian Serbs.
15 Karadzic, and Krajisnik in particular, would resolutely keep
16 pushing that away and saying that that was no longer acceptable.
17 Milosevic, however, did accept it, repeatedly accepted it, and in my
18 experience from, say, late 1994 till Dayton, consistently argued this.
19 And my impression was this was something -- this was partly what led to
20 the split between Belgrade and Pale was that he was determined -- he
21 accepted that 49:51 per cent was not negotiable. I mean, what
22 constituted the 49 per cent was, of course, negotiable, but he wasn't
23 going to fight for the Bosnian Serbs for anything over 49 per cent. He
24 wasn't going to be supporting them politically and he certainly wasn't
25 going to be supporting them anymore militarily.
1 Q. And you've actually anticipated my next question to a certain
2 extent. We say that the source of this disagreement was essentially
3 that -- well, Milosevic wanted to cash out and go home, the Bosnian Serbs
4 wanted to keep gambling, and in their view they could keep more land in
5 the long run by rejecting the peace plans and continuing to fight.
6 Therefore, the disagreement between Milosevic and the Bosnian Serbs was
7 not a disagreement over the fundamental goal of maximising the territory
8 over which they exercised permanent control, it was simply a dispute
9 about what was possible, what was that maximum territory, and the best
10 way to achieve that permanent control. Do you have a comment on that?
11 A. Well, I would quote -- I can't now remember whether it was
12 Richard Holbrooke, but it was probably, I think, Bob Fraser [phoen], who
13 said something to the effect, and I'm paraphrasing now, that Milosevic
14 was like a Chicago gangster who had decided that he was tired of his
15 criminal activities and was now going to, as it were, cash in his chips
16 and launder his money and live a quite life in Louisiana or somewhere and
17 put his gangster days behind him. And that, I think, Fraser's
18 caricature, if you like, was actually quite close to the mark.
19 I think Milosevic had, as I think I said earlier, I can't
20 remember if it was in response to you or your colleague across the
21 courtroom, that I think he -- well, I'll leave it at that, actually.
22 MR. FARR: Could we please have 65 ter 1320 on the screen. And
23 this document we are bringing up now is the minutes and a transcript of
24 the tape recording of the Republika Srpska's National Assembly's --
1 So 65 ter 1320, please. I'm not sure this is the right document
2 we are seeing on our screen. Ah, that's it. So this is the record of
3 the 30th session of the Republika Srpska National Assembly from the 5th
4 and 6th of May, 1993. And this is the occasion that you referred to in
5 your statement when Milosevic went to Pale to promote the Vance-Owen
6 plan. And if we could have the bottom of page 105 in English and in
7 B/C/S ERN page 0215-0189, which is e-court page 76. So at the bottom of
8 the page in English we see the name of Slobodan Milosevic, which
9 indicates that he is about to be the speaker. And if we could go over to
10 the next page in English, about the middle of the page.
11 Q. I'm going to read a portion beginning with the words, "But all
12 the testimonies about the horrors of war ..." And it looks like that's
13 about five lines down in the English version. So the quote is this:
14 "But all the testimonies about the horrors of war, concluding
15 with General Mladic's long presentation and the examples that he gave,
16 all can be unified in one claim, in one assertion - that the war needs
17 stop as soon as possible, that it needs to stop now. However, let me
18 return to the question of today, which is not how great are the horrors
19 of war, because this nation felt it in their chests throughout its entire
20 history. Today's question is whether to consolidate the already achieved
21 and then accomplish the rest of, what we call, the remaining 'open
22 questions' in a peaceful process, or to ruin the already achieved, with
23 huge losses. That is the real alternative and that is the real question
24 on which this Assembly should decide. I do not believe that the Assembly
25 should make such a tragic mistake in the interest of the people for whom
1 it speaks. And it would not be the first time in history that someone
2 created evil by wishing the biggest good for one's people, lacking the
3 measure of what is possible and what is achievable and what are the ways
4 to acquire something."
5 Sir, it's our position that this excerpt sets out exactly the
6 basis of the conflict between Milosevic and the Bosnian Serb leaders. It
7 was a dispute about what was possible and what was achievable and the
8 best way to acquire what they wanted. It had nothing to do with any
9 moral rejection by Milosevic of the crimes and ethnic cleansing that had
10 already taken place in Bosnia. Can you comment on that?
11 A. Well, I certainly would agree that there is nothing humanitarian
12 about his approach and his willingness or wish to bring the war to an
13 end, and nor did I ever hear him express a single word of regret in
14 private for anything that had happened. The numbers who had died were of
15 no -- I never heard him express any concern about that at all. I think
16 the -- the only gloss I would put on this, and given the fact that this
17 is effectively a statement to the Bosnian Serb people, is that I think
18 it's coming back to the original propaganda line, which I referred to in
19 the article I wrote about a year ago, that what is -- what -- what he's
20 effectively putting over is, We've saved you, or, You have saved yourself
21 with our help from the threat of being, first of all, separated from
22 Yugoslavia by Bosnian independents, which is not something that we
23 wanted, and we've also -- you have taken sufficient territory to make
24 sure you're not going to be overrun by the Muslim-Croat federation.
25 That's, I think, the subtext there.
1 MR. FARR: If we could have the middle of the next page, which is
2 107, in English, and ERN page 0215-0190, e-court page 77, also the next
3 page in B/C/S.
4 Q. I'll just read one more portion beginning with the words, "Don't
5 say that the Serbs shall be unequal ..." And that's about halfway down
6 the page in English. The quote is:
7 "Don't say that the Serb shall be unequal. How can the Serbs be
8 less sovereign than the Croats or than the Muslims in BiH that was
9 conceived like this and based on such principles. According to this,
10 45 per cent of the land belongs to the Serbs and 30 per cent to the
11 Muslims. The Serbs get 50 per cent more of the territory, while the
12 Muslims are 50 per cent more numerous than the Serbs. The Croats get
13 20 per cent and some territory. So how, how, and where can one read in
14 Vance-Owen's plans that the Serbs shall be less sovereign than the Croats
15 or the Muslims."
16 Now here we see Milosevic expressing his support for the
17 Vance-Owen plan in explicitly national terms. He supported the peace
18 plan because it gives Serbs essentially a good deal in terms of
19 territorial size compared with population size. This represents, we say,
20 not a rejection of ethnic cleansing but an affirmation that the project
21 of ethnic cleansing has been successfully completed and a desire to make
22 those results permanent. Are you able to comment on that?
23 A. Sorry, what particularly do you want me to comment on? I am not
24 quite clear.
25 Q. Only if you are able to and if you wish to make a comment on
2 A. Well, I don't think -- the division that the international
3 community came up with, 49 per cent to the Serbs and 51 for the Muslim
4 Croats was not based on population. It was based on the territorial --
5 the areas of -- of respective control of territory going back to the land
6 registers. So if Milosevic is just trying to make a virtue out of a --
7 out of the fact that at the end of the negotiation, that if the Pale
8 Assembly accepts the Vance-Owen plan, they will get a substantial amount
9 of land. But, of course, before the war broke out, they already had a
10 substantial amount of land, and not based on population but on the fact
11 that by and large Serbs were farmers and Muslims lived in the cities.
12 It's just kind of as crude as that, if you like. But, of course, there
13 is a big debate about the land registers and how up-to-date and authentic
14 they were.
15 But the 49:51 per cent deal was worked out with some
16 acknowledgment of the fact that Serbs, as the rural dwellers, were always
17 going to have more land than just the -- whatever it was, the 33 per cent
18 of the population that they represented. I don't know whether that's
19 helpful to what you were trying to --
20 Q. It's helpful to have your comment. Absolutely.
21 A. Thank you.
22 MR. FARR: Your Honours, we have uploaded just the portions of
23 this document consisting of Milosevic's speech as 65 ter 1320.1. And we
24 would tender that portion.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Any objections? No objections. Would you consider
1 whether for contextualisation you would like to have more in, and we
2 would then like to hear from you not later than this Wednesday.
3 MR. JORDASH: Yes. And the same comment we'd make about the bar
4 table. It may well be in there.
5 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
6 Madam Registrar, the number would be?
7 THE REGISTRAR: Document 1320.1 will receive number P3116,
8 Your Honours.
9 JUDGE ORIE: And is admitted into evidence.
10 Please proceed.
11 MR. FARR:
12 Q. I'd like to turn now to the issue of Milosevic's degree of
13 influence with the Bosnian Serbs. Is it fair to say that Milosevic had
14 an interest in indicating to you that he had less influence over the
15 Bosnian Serbs than he may, in fact, have had?
16 A. It depends who you mean by the Bosnian Serbs. What -- what he
17 claimed at various points when I first came across him, when I started,
18 he would claim that, as shown in Pale in 1993, he couldn't snap his
19 fingers and get the Bosnian Serbs to comply with what he wanted. And
20 part of his aim in that was to argue, Why am I subject to sanctions when
21 the people who are causing the problem and are being obstructive and are
22 out of my control are on the other side of the Drina. That was part of
23 the argument. But at some stage - and I couldn't put an exact date on
24 it - his position changed. I suppose it would have been in early late
25 1994, early 1995, to one where he arrogated to himself more influence
1 that I think he actually had. He was constantly saying that he expected
2 the Bosnian Serb Assembly to throw -- to overthrow Karadzic. So you had
3 a Janus-like Approach. So I don't -- I can't agree with your
4 characterisation because that's only one half of the Janus, if you like.
5 Q. I'd like to quote something from that same piece regarding a
6 meeting with Mladic from May of 2011. I am happy to have it on the
7 screen, if you'd like to see it. I am happy just to read the quote to
8 you as well. Perhaps I will read the quote and then you can tell me
9 whether you would like to see it. The quote is this, and this is from
10 the very beginning:
11 "While none of the meetings I had with Serbian leaders during the
12 Bosnian war could be described as pleasurable, some were less unpleasant
13 than others. My only meeting with Ratko Mladic was, however, as grim and
14 uncomfortable as it got. I was running the British embassy in Belgrade
15 at this time, early 1995, and at a meeting with Slobodan Milosevic, had
16 urged him to use his undoubted influence in Bosnian to rein in the
17 Bosnian Serb army."
18 What did you mean when you referred to Slobodan Milosevic's
19 undoubted influence in Bosnia in early 1995?
20 A. 1995. Well, Milosevic -- as I was saying earlier, Milosevic was
21 keen to portray himself as -- at that time, as having influence with
22 deputies from the Pale assembly whom he saw as a means of getting rid of
24 Q. Does your use of the word "undoubted influence" in that context
25 indicate that you, yourself, believe that he had at least some influence
1 in Bosnia, even in early 1995?
2 A. Yes, but not comparable to the influence he had at the outset of
3 the crisis.
4 MR. FARR: I'd like to turn to the -- some issues dealing with
5 the hostage crisis. Could we please have D781 on the screen, which was
7 Q. This is a package of documents received by the Stanisic Defence
8 from the UK government. I don't know whether there is any reason to deal
9 with this in private session now. Apparently not.
10 JUDGE ORIE: There seems to be no condition of confidentiality
12 But, Mr. Jordash, it's a letter which was addressed to then lead
13 council for Mr. Stanisic. Any need to deal with it confidentiality?
14 MR. JORDASH: No. As far as I am aware, no.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Then please proceed, Mr. Farr.
16 MR. FARR: If we could have page 5 in English. And I believe
17 there is only an English version at the moment. So page 5, then.
18 Q. And, sir, this is Belgrade telegram number 335. It's dated
19 6th June 1995.
20 MR. FARR: And if we could have the next page in English.
21 Q. Down at the bottom we see that it's, in fact, a cable from you.
22 And I'd just like to read paragraph 6 which falls under the heading,
24 "While the release of some hostages may be imminent, it is
25 unlikely that the Bosnian Serbs will let them all go without a struggle.
1 This is their trump card; once played, their hand will be virtually
3 Sir, doesn't the simple fact that the Bosnian Serbs would give up
4 their trump card at the behest of Mr. Milosevic and Mr. Stanisic indicate
5 that the Belgrade leadership retained a significant degree of influence
6 with the Pale leadership, even in the summer of 1995?
7 A. I don't think it indicates that particularly.
8 Q. And why don't you think that it indicates that? I mean,
9 presumably giving up one's trump card is something that's not done --
10 A. Well, I think trump card in the context of this particular saga.
11 It wasn't the trump card of their whole position in the war. I think
12 that's -- perhaps you're reading a more general comment into it than
13 something that's quite a small -- it's not of small significance, but it
14 relates to one small part of the whole Bosnian war.
15 Q. Earlier today, at page 40, you said -- the answer to your
16 question -- this was in the context of getting Karadzic to resign from
17 politics. And you said:
18 "The answer to your question is that several of these maneuvers
19 would have been conducted by Stanisic because that's who Milosevic used
20 to try and execute his will in Bosnian when his own attempts had failed."
21 Now, it seems to me that the hostage crisis would be one example
22 of that; getting Karadzic to resign from politics might be another. Are
23 there any other examples that you are aware of when Milosevic used
24 Stanisic to execute his will in Bosnia when Milosevic's attempts had
1 A. None that I can think of in my time.
2 MR. FARR: And can we now have page 35 of the document on the
3 screen in English.
4 Q. Now here, as you can see, we've jumped ahead to November of 1995.
5 And this is Belgrade telegram number 772. It's obviously been heavily
6 redacted, but we can see that the subject is "Dayton Peace Agreement,
7 Serb Reactions." And if we could now go forward two pages, to page 37.
8 At the bottom of the page I'll just read out paragraph 14. It
10 "While that may be the formal position, I suspect that there may
11 need to be some dirty work at the crossroads to ensure Bosnian Serb
12 acquiescence. The split within the Banja Luka and Pale elements of the
13 leadership will be an obvious focus of Milosevic's attention. It may
14 well be that the cuddly Mr. Stanisic, the secret police chief, will be
15 dispatched to Pale with his tried and tested (during the hostage crisis)
16 mixture of death threats, blackmail, and bribery."
17 Sir, the name of the author of this cable is redacted, but I'm
18 assuming that it's you; is that correct?
19 A. It could have been. But it could have been my deputy because he
20 would have signed the telegram in my -- if I wasn't in town, for
22 Q. All right. I -- I'd would just like to go through these items in
23 order starting with the death threats. In paragraph 15 of your
24 statement, you say that Milosevic told you that he had had -- that he had
25 threatened to have Karadzic killed if the Bosnian Serbs would not release
1 the UN hostages. And you also say that this message was delivered to
2 Karadzic by Stanisic. Is it fair to say that Mr. Stanisic was an
3 appropriate messenger for a death threat because he was a feared figure?
4 A. Yes, I think that was -- that was certainly what Milosevic told
6 Q. Other than Milosevic, did you have any other source for viewing
7 Stanisic as a feared figure?
8 A. Not that would stand up to your legal scrutiny.
9 Q. And according to Milosevic, who was it that feared Stanisic?
10 A. Karadzic.
11 Q. And why did Karadzic fear Stanisic?
12 A. I have no idea, but I presume that -- well -- I think it has to
13 be said that secret police chiefs are not normally known as particularly
14 warm and genial figures, and certainly not in Serbia. The history of
15 them for going back to Rankovic in Tito's time was not to one for the
16 squeamish. So I think if you receive a call from your erstwhile patron
17 and now somewhat strained patron as police chief who tells you that
18 Mr. Milosevic plans to have you killed if you don't let the hostages go,
19 you're -- you're -- it will at least focus your attention.
20 Q. Moving on to the -- the second point, blackmail. Is it also fair
21 to say that Mr. Stanisic was someone perceived to know a great many
22 secrets and who, therefore, might be in a position to blackmail others?
23 A. I think one of the documents we looked at earlier said as much in
24 the document about the splits between the Serbian security service and
25 the Bosnian Serb security service, if I'm -- my memory serves me. One of
1 the reasons for Karadzic and Krajisnik's unhappiness was precisely that
2 they saw the Serbian security people meddling and able to use their
3 knowledge of the corruption of the -- of the Bosnian Serb leadership to
4 effectively blackmail them to comply with their -- with their, in this
5 case -- Milosevic's wishes.
6 Q. And moving on to the third point, bribery. Are you aware of any
7 reason that Stanisic would be in a position to -- to offer bribes or
8 incentives to the Bosnian Serb leaders in order to get them to do what
9 Milosevic wanted?
10 A. It was said after the event - and again, I can't quite remember
11 the locus - that Milosevic had supplied in contravention of his own
12 self-imposed embargo some spare parts for the Bosnia Serb army.
13 Q. At the time of the hostage crisis?
14 A. Yes. In -- as a bribe to release the hostages.
15 Q. Sir Ivor, thank you for answering my questions today.
16 MR. FARR: Your Honours, no further questions.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Farr.
18 Mr. Bakrac, position still the same?
19 MR. BAKRAC: [Interpretation] I have no questions, Your Honour.
20 Thank you.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, do you have any further questions in
22 re-examination for the witness, and how much time would that
23 approximately take?
24 MR. JORDASH: I do have approximately 15 minutes of questions.
25 JUDGE ORIE: Fifteen minutes, which -- I'm also looking at you
1 because we -- we started almost quarter past 4.00.
2 MR. JORDASH: I would also -- sorry to interrupt, Your Honour.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
4 MR. JORDASH: I would also like to address you for five minutes
5 on an issue which arose during my learned friend's cross-examination. In
6 the absence of the witness is probably wisest.
7 JUDGE ORIE: And then to do that before you re-examine the
9 MR. JORDASH: Yes. I --
10 JUDGE ORIE: We could do that. I think what would be the most
11 logical way of proceeding would be that we already give a break to the
12 witness, that you address the Chamber during five minutes. We then take
13 a break and resume at most likely approximately five minutes to 6.00.
14 MR. JORDASH: Thank you, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Sir Ivor, the Stanisic Defence would like to address
16 the Chamber in your absence, so you get the early break today. Would you
17 please follow the usher and we will continue in a little bit over half an
18 hour, and then it will not take very long any more.
19 [The witness stands down]
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash.
21 MR. JORDASH: I am trying to find the place in the transcript,
22 because the -- the -- the issue is this: That it's been put quite
23 clearly to the witness - and I will find it in the transcript shortly -
24 but it's been put very clearly to the witness two things which are of
25 significance -- of huge significance for the case.
1 First of all, that ethnic transfer had been completed by, I
2 think, 1993 or 1994. And secondly, and related to that, that Milosevic
3 was acting to, at that point -- I want to be careful here so I don't
4 misquote --
5 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, are you referring to page 73, lines 12
6 and following, where Mr. Farr in his question suggests an interpretation
7 of the words of Mr. Milosevic?
8 MR. JORDASH: Well, yes, although it's not an interpretation of
9 Mr. -- no, sorry, that was the context in which the Prosecution asked the
10 question --
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
12 MR. JORDASH: -- but Mr. Farr clearly said "this represents, we
13 say, affirmation that the project of ethnic cleansing had been
14 completed." --
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
16 MR. JORDASH: And that's of huge significance because we say that
17 ethnic cleansing had been completed and Sanski Most and Trnovo in 1995
18 had nothing to do with that, and the criminal enterprise, if it existed,
19 had ended, and that seems to be consistent with what the Prosecution put
20 to the witness.
21 Earlier in that -- I begged your pardon. I'd hoped to have the
22 transcript on paper, but I think there -- the point -- the ancillary
23 point is that the Prosecution appeared to -- to accept to a significant
24 degree the Defence position that Milosevic was, as this witness has
25 confirmed, supporting the peace agreement, the motives behind it
1 obviously in dispute, but that again is something which Mr. Farr made
3 And what I would respectfully ask is that the Prosecution make
4 that position clear, to put to a witness these fundamental points which
5 appear to agree with the Defence position ought to be made explicit, in
6 our submission, and we ought to know at this side of the room and
7 Your Honours ought to know whether that is the Prosecution case.
8 JUDGE ORIE: I'm read reading what you said, Mr. Jordash.
9 Now, correct me when I'm wrong. Mr. Farr, in your question you
10 linked, although the text of the quote didn't seem to give a direct --
11 such a direct link - you said, Well, this whole discussion about
12 accepting 49:51 per cent, look, isn't this a clear expression of
13 Mr. Milosevic doing that, ethnic cleansing being completed.
14 Whereas the quote you gave doesn't say anything about ethnic
15 cleansing. It was -- you introduced that. And as a matter of fact, I
16 noticed, not only now, but already at the time, that whatever the witness
17 said about ambition of getting more or less or -- but he left the whole
18 ethnic cleansing out of his answer, so to that extent I do not find him
19 to confirm in any way the direct link, as you suggested, with the ethnic
21 Let me first try to verify whether this is a -- an accurate
22 understanding of both your question and the answer, and I'm looking both
23 to you, Mr. Farr, and to you as well, Mr. Jordash.
24 MR. JORDASH: Yes.
25 JUDGE ORIE: And now -- Mr. Farr.
1 MR. FARR: Your Honour, I was putting our -- putting our case to
2 the witness, but I -- I think what this highlights is -- the purpose of
3 putting the case to the witness is so that the witness is not confused.
4 It's not a way for the Prosecution to amend its pleadings by sloppy
5 wording. And I didn't intend to do that. Of course, we continue to rely
6 on the indictment. We rely on the pre-trial brief.
7 My goal was to make sure that if the witness had something that
8 he wanted to say about that, that would be useful for the Trial Chamber,
9 the Trial Chamber would have an opportunity to hear that. Of course,
10 it's not our case that the criminal plan ended in May 1993. That's clear
11 from the indictment. We say it lasted until December of 1995.
12 Your Honour, may I confer?
13 JUDGE ORIE: Please do.
14 [Prosecution Counsel Confer]
15 MR. FARR: And I think -- the one thing that I think I can say is
16 that we don't contest Milosevic's support for the peace plans. What's
17 disputed about that is the motivation for it, and in particular the
18 Defence argument set out in the pre-trial brief -- in their pre-trial
19 brief at paragraph 245 and 249 that Stanisic's support for these peace
20 plans somehow demonstrate that he could not have the criminal intent
21 required for the JCE. In other words, their case is that support for the
22 peace plan necessarily means that one -- never in one's life intended the
23 forcible permanent removal of non-Serbs from large portions of Bosnia
25 Our case on that point is that if one's support for peace plans
1 is designed to lock in the degree of ethnic cleansing that has already
2 bene achieved and has already been completed, then it does no such thing.
3 In fact, it tends to make the opposite point, that, in fact, it
4 demonstrates a desire to consolidate those results. Again, to say that
5 it was completed at that point was sloppy wording, and wasn't intended as
6 a modification of the indictment.
7 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, I would ask you the following. You may
8 comment on what Mr. Farr said. If you say, Well, his answer doesn't
9 satisfy me, then tell us in very practical terms what you expect Mr. Farr
10 to tell the witness? Try to phrase, help him, assist him, in what he
11 should put to the witness so that I fully understand what you think is
12 missing in the way in which the Prosecution presents it case to the
13 witness. Apart from I am not at this moment yet anticipating on any
14 duty -- I'd first like to know from you that you say what you should put
15 to the witness, A, B or c, because that apparently -- and then we have
16 two matters. First, whether that is the position of the Prosecution, and
17 we had a bit of a discussion about what exactly their position is. And
18 the second is to what extent they are under an obligation to put it in
19 that kind of terms to the witness.
20 MR. JORDASH: Unlike our usual submissions, in some senses I am
21 not suggesting that my learned friend should have put any particular
22 thing to the witness. I'm -- I'm submitting that my learned friend
23 should not have put something to the witness --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Is that the --
25 MR. JORDASH: -- if that is not part of their case.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Is that the completion of the ethnic cleansing.
2 MR. JORDASH: That is, as I understand the Prosecution case, the
3 ethnic cleansing continue through 1995. And that -- the pursuit --
4 that's the criminal object which was being pursued until 1995, I
5 understood because it hasn't been qualified any differently it's best
6 that -- that actually meant --
7 JUDGE ORIE: Let me then stop you there for one second. Talking
8 about whether or not the ethnic cleansing was completed, yes or no. The
9 witness in his answer more or less ignored it. Would Mr. Farr then have
10 to repeat it again and say, But I told you -- or is that --
11 MR. JORDASH: No, because the witness hasn't -- I didn't seek to
12 elicit from the witness the factual situation on the ground, whether
13 ethnic cleansing had been completed by 1995 and --
14 JUDGE ORIE: So whether it was a misleading presentation of the
15 Prosecution's position, it has had no effect because the witness didn't
16 even touch upon it, unless you say that's the bad result of
17 misrepresenting your own case, but I didn't gain that impression. But am
18 I wrong?
19 MR. JORDASH: Yeah, I agree. I'm not suggesting --
20 JUDGE ORIE: Okay.
21 MR. JORDASH: -- that anything fresh should be put to the
22 witness. I am just making an inquiry of the Prosecution, if you like,
23 through Your Honours, if -- because if that's the -- I wanted to know the
24 answer to the question because I wanted to be sure when re-examining the
25 witness that I'm doing so on [overlapping speakers] basis.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Proper understanding of the Prosecution's case.
2 Anything else at this moment you would suggest, or do you say with these
3 answers I can continue after the break? Because that's my --
4 MR. JORDASH: Yes, I -- I -- I am not sure I understand the
5 Prosecution's position entirely. I am not sure that it's clear whether
6 they do say the ethnic cleansing was completed or not --
7 JUDGE ORIE: I -- I did understand it. But please correct me
8 when I'm wrong, Mr. Farr, that I would say, consolidating your position,
9 that you would consider that not to be without a link to the ethnic
10 cleansing which was performed until then? Is that a right understanding?
11 MR. FARR: I am not sure I understood what Your Honour was saying
12 just then.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Well, if ethnic cleansing is complete, that means
14 it's done, nothing has to be done anymore if you want to ethnically
15 cleanse an area. I did understand where you linked the speech of
16 Mr. Milosevic to the ethnic cleansing being completed, that you intended
17 to say that, well, taking advantage of the ethnic cleansing to the extent
18 it has taken place already. Is that your --
19 MR. FARR: Precisely, Your Honour. Precisely.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, that is how I understand it and that's
21 how apparently Mr. Farr intended it, although not very neatly formulated.
22 Is this sufficient for you to consider after the --
23 MR. JORDASH: Well, in some ways it's not. I -- I don't want to
24 be difficult, but if there is -- and the jurisprudence of this Tribunal
25 suggests that there had been ethnic cleansing and it occurred and
1 continued and had pretty much been completed by 1992. I'm referring, for
2 example, to the Krajisnik judgement, they're not -- the further one gets
3 away from the actual ethnic cleansing, the less the Prosecution's
4 submission has weight. What I mean by that is if Mr. Stanisic is
5 supporting a peace plan in the beginning of 1993, one can easily say,
6 Well, how could that possibly impact upon or remove the inference that he
7 intended forcible displacement one month before. It's clear that the
8 Prosecution's submission would have more weight, that Mr. Stanisic could
9 be said to be trying to consolidate those gains.
10 When one moves then to 1995, the inference that one can draw -
11 that the Prosecution will seek to have you draw - gets, I think, less and
12 less strong. And that's why it's important to us to know whether the
13 Prosecution accept that the majority of the ethnic cleansing had been
14 completed by 1992 or 1993. Things that happen in 1995 are significantly
15 some distance away from that -- those actual factual events on the
16 ground. We will say that the further one gets away, the less one can
17 infer criminal intent.
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Farr, any --
19 MR. FARR: Your Honour, the only thing I would say is that
20 neither the Defence nor the Court should ever assume that we have
21 attempted to modify our indictment by a badly written question that was
22 written late at night. And again, just to return, the purpose of putting
23 the case is to make sure that the witness is not confused. I think that
24 the question served that purse. It certainly wasn't intended to do
25 anything with respect to the charges. It wasn't intended to change the
1 allegation in the indictment, and we would just say that if we intend to
2 do that we will make it clear.
3 JUDGE ORIE: Meaning that the forcible removal was still on the
4 agenda apart from what the position was during these peace negotiations
5 and apart from the extent to which it had already been achieved or was
6 still to be achieved?
7 MR. FARR: Correct. Until the end of the -- end of the alleged
8 joint criminal enterprise.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
10 [Trial Chamber confers]
11 JUDGE ORIE: The Chamber considers that the matter has been
12 sufficiently clarified by the Prosecution for the Defence to be able to
13 re-examine the witness after the break, and we'll have a break until five
14 minutes past 6.00.
15 --- Recess taken at 5.36 p.m.
16 --- On resuming at 6.09 p.m.
17 [The witness takes the stand]
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, are you ready to re-examine the
20 MR. JORDASH: Yes, please.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Please do so.
22 Re-examination by Mr. Jordash:
23 Q. I just have very questions left, Sir Ivor.
24 MR. JORDASH: Please, could we have on the screen P2358.
25 Q. We return to the Supreme Defence Council minutes. You were asked
1 questions by my learned friend from the Prosecution about Mr. Milosevic's
2 motivations, and I just want to clarify some issues.
3 MR. JORDASH: Could we have please page 39 of the -- sorry, no,
4 page 48 of the English and 32 of the B/C/S. And this is a continuation
5 of a speech by Milosevic that we looked at earlier. It should be P2358.
6 THE REGISTRAR: And the document is under seal.
7 MR. JORDASH: Thank you. So we should have page 48 of the
8 English and 32 of the B/C/S. And the section I am interested in is the
9 last paragraph, where Milosevic says:
10 "This nation shall not be slaughtered because of the three hot
11 heads from Pale. And our towns full of young people shall no be bombed
12 because someone wishes to take more than half of the territory of Bosnia
13 and Herzegovina since one half is not sufficient, even though they don't
14 have a enough population to inhabitant it."
15 And then over the page, please, to page 49 of the English and 33
16 of the B/C/S:
17 "As for our domestic public, it is for peace. Seselj does not
18 represent the domestic public. And mark my words, the opposition's
19 paramilitary formations have gone down the drain a long time ago. They
20 are just a small and pathetic bunch that doesn't have nickels to rub
21 together. The army should not be concerned with their paramilitary
22 formations. The police here are quite capable of dealing with them,
23 wherever they dare to show their face.
24 "The second great danger that we had faced was the introduction
25 of more severe sanctions. As I said, the first danger was the drawing of
1 Yugoslavia into the war."
2 Q. As we can see, Sir Ivor, there is a number of concerns Milosevic
3 expresses. Does this or not reflect the type of conversations you were
4 having with Milosevic concerning his concerns?
5 A. Yes, they would be broadly in line with these sort of concerns he
6 would be expressing.
7 Q. And the reference to the opposition's paramilitary formations.
8 Are you able to offer any insight into what Milosevic was concerned about
10 A. I think he is talking about people like -- about Vojislav Seselj.
11 Q. And Seselj's impact where?
12 A. In paramilitaries in Bosnia.
13 Q. Thank you.
14 MR. JORDASH: And then if we can turn, please, to 1D3612. Again
15 Supreme Defence Council minutes, this time held on the
16 2nd of November, 1994. I think this should be under seal too, please.
17 THE REGISTRAR: I apologise. I am confused with the transcript.
18 Is it 1D3612, I see indicated in the transcript? Or ...
19 MR. JORDASH: Yes, it is. Yes.
20 THE REGISTRAR: 1D -- yeah. This document is not e-court.
21 MR. JORDASH: Actually, I am happy to leave that point.
22 Q. Let me just finish then, Sir Ivor, if I may, with a couple of
23 other questions. First of all, was there a provision in the Dayton peace
24 agreement concerning refugees or displaced people?
25 A. Yes, I am sure there was. I can't remember the details now, I'm
2 Q. Well, perhaps we can deal with that then by tendering at a later
3 stage the Dayton peace agreement.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Or agree on the matter, Mr. Jordash. I take it that
5 the content of the Dayton peace agreement could -- well, I would be
6 optimistic to expect the parties to agree on that. That's --
7 MR. JORDASH: I think the --
8 JUDGE ORIE: I hope it's not over optimistic.
9 MR. JORDASH: I think that might be one thing we could agree on,
10 but I won't detain Sir Ivor with that for the moment.
11 Q. You left with region when, Sir Ivor?
12 A. I formally left in the beginning of November 1997, and I
13 subsequently went back as the foreign secretary's secret representative
14 on two occasions in 1998. This was when Mr. Robin Cook was the British
15 foreign secretary.
16 Q. When you back in 1998, do you know if Mr. Stanisic was still in
17 the position of chief of state security?
18 A. I believe so. But I would think you would know better than me.
19 Q. I am not sure anybody is interested in my view.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Well, if you agree with the Prosecution, everyone
21 would be happy, Mr. Jordash. It's, again, seems not to be a matter which
22 is really in dispute, is it?
23 MR. JORDASH: No, I was leading to the next question, which is --
24 JUDGE ORIE: Okay. Then put that next question to the witness.
25 MR. JORDASH: -- whether the witness is aware of Mr. Stanisic
1 leaving his position at that time and the circumstances.
2 THE WITNESS: No, neither of my two visits which were entirely
3 focused on Kosovo was there ever any mention of Mr. Stanisic that I can
4 recall in my long meetings which took place in I think March and July,
5 from memory, 1998.
6 MR. JORDASH:
7 Q. Did you meet Milosevic during those?
8 A. Yes, that was the purpose of my visit.
9 MR. JORDASH: May just have a moment, please.
10 [Defence counsel confer with accused]
11 MR. JORDASH: Thank you very much.
12 Q. Thank you, Sir Ivor.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Farr, any further questions for the witness?
14 MR. FARR: No, Your Honour.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you.
16 [Trial Chamber confers]
17 JUDGE ORIE: Sir Ivor, since the Bench has also no further
18 questions for you, I'd like to thank you very much for coming to
19 The Hague and for answering the questions that were put to you by the
20 parties, and only a few by the Bench. You are excused. You may follow
21 the usher, and I wish you a safe return to wherever you came from.
22 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
23 [The witness withdrew]
24 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, you're on your feet.
25 MR. JORDASH: Yes, just to tender -- or apply to tender, please,
1 some documents.
2 May I apply to tender 1D05453, 1D05476, and 1D05477, which were
3 documents I used during the examination.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Farr.
5 MR. FARR: I believe that the Defence has indicated that 1D05453
6 was received pursuant to an RFA. If they can confirm that on the record,
7 then no objection to that. With respect to the other two, we don't have
8 any origin information.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash.
10 MR. JORDASH: In relation to 1D05453, yes, it was received
11 pursuant to an RFA.
12 JUDGE ORIE: And the other two?
13 MR. JORDASH: Apologies. Could we MFI those two. We need to
14 check on provenance. We think it's the same RFA.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. And then we can add two MFIs to our list for
16 this Wednesday and hope to resolve it on that same day.
17 MR. JORDASH: I'll --
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Bakrac, apparently no observations on behalf of
19 the Stanisic Defence.
20 1D05453, Madam Registrar ...
21 THE REGISTRAR: Will receive number D782, Your Honours.
22 JUDGE ORIE: D782 is admitted into evidence. 1D5467,
23 Madam Registrar, would receive number --
24 THE REGISTRAR: Will receive number D783, Your Honours.
25 JUDGE ORIE: And is marked for identification --
1 MR. JORDASH: Sorry, it's 76, Your Honour.
2 JUDGE ORIE: 76, I'm sorry, I mission spoke. Then we are talking
3 about 1D05476 is marked for identification under D783. Last one 1D05477?
4 THE REGISTRAR: Will receive number D784, Your Honours.
5 JUDGE ORIE: And is marked for identification under that number
6 as well.
7 MR. JORDASH: Those two documents we have just discovered were
8 disclosed by the OTP.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Farr, does that change your position?
10 MR. FARR: Your Honour, as far as I recall, I didn't see an OTP
11 ERN on them. That is usually the way that we figure out what the origin
12 is for a document disclosed by us. Perhaps we could chat after court and
13 try to --
14 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
15 MR. FARR: -- sort this out.
16 MR. JORDASH: Yes, certainly.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Then the status remains as it was before.
18 Mr. Jordash, have you prepared a 92 summary for this witness.
19 MR. JORDASH: Yes. And there are a couple of other things, if I
20 may, with the exhibit.
21 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Okay. Then we first deal with the exhibits.
22 MR. JORDASH: Your Honours asked whether we wanted 65 ter 1320,
23 whether we wanted pages to contextualise. First of all, it's not on our
24 bar table and we are content with the Prosecution exhibiting the portion
25 they did.
1 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Now, it meanwhile, of course, has received a
2 Prosecution exhibit number, but since, apparently, nothing has to be
3 changed --
4 MR. JORDASH: That's correct.
5 JUDGE ORIE: -- we can leave it to that. There was another one
6 of a similar kind, isn't it?
7 MR. JORDASH: That was 65 ter 1345 and it is on our bar table,
8 the whole document.
9 JUDGE ORIE: The whole document. And on the bar table, the -- on
10 the chart is clear what specifically we're supposed to look at?
11 MR. JORDASH: Well, I haven't read the Prosecution response yet,
12 so I don't know what the position is, but we thought it was clear enough.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Yes. Since that -- since bar table document is
14 largely, is broader, I think it might be wise to withdraw the document,
15 and that was given what number, Madam Registrar? The last one which is
16 on the record is 73415, but ...
17 [Trial Chamber and registrar confer]
18 JUDGE ORIE: Mr. Jordash, could you repeat the number, whether
19 document ID or the number assigned to it for the one you said is now part
20 of a -- was already part of your -- was that P3116, document
21 65 ter 1320.1?
22 MR. JORDASH: The one on our bar table was 65 ter 1345.
23 JUDGE ORIE: .1, which appears to be P3115. The suggestion would
24 then be, Mr. Farr, to vacate the excerpt found in 65 ter 1345.1 and then
25 to ...
1 MR. FARR: Your Honour, one potential concern is that that may
2 affect the references in the witness testimony where I am referring to
3 particular pages of the document.
4 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
5 MR. FARR: It was only a three- or four-page excerpt.
6 JUDGE ORIE: It was only three or four pages -- actually --
7 MR. FARR: I'm mindful that it could result in some duplication,
8 but I think it would be perhaps a smaller burden than --
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, perhaps it's more practical to leave it as it
10 is, even if we have a couple of pages as a double in the system,
11 Mr. Jordash.
12 MR. JORDASH: Your Honour, yes.
13 JUDGE ORIE: Any further?
14 MR. JORDASH: Nope, that's fine. Thank you.
15 JUDGE ORIE: Then you have prepared a 92 ter summary.
16 MR. JORDASH: Yes.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Would you please read it into the record.
18 MR. JORDASH: Sir Ivor Roberts entered the diplomatic service in
20 JUDGE ORIE: And when reading, could you already slow down.
21 MR. JORDASH: Certainly.
22 And until his requirement in 2006 was posted to serve in various
23 positions in London, Lebanon, Paris, Canberra, Vanuatu, Madrid, Belgrade,
24 Dublin, and Rome. In Belgrade, the witness served as British charges
25 d'affaires, then ambassador. In this role, he had the opportunity to
1 meet often with Slobodan Milosevic 40 to 50 times over nearly four years.
2 At the time the witness arrived to the FRY in early 1994,
3 Milosevic was still smarting 6 c from the Bosnian Serb's rejection of the
4 Vance-Owen plan. It was the witness's opinion that Milosevic worked to
5 bring the Bosnian Serbs under control. After various fruitless attempts
6 to get the Bosnian Serbs to accept the contact group's plan, Milosevic
7 lost patience with the Pale leadership, and reacting from pressure from
8 the international negotiators, Lord Owen and Thorvald Stoltenberg, he
9 ordered the closure of the border between the FRY and Bosnia.
10 The witness further mentioned that Lord Owen had a complex
11 relationship with Milosevic. He and the witness believed that Milosevic,
12 since accepting the Vance-Owen peace plan, had been engaged in a policy
13 of trying to bring the war in Bosnia to a close and that he was actively
14 looking for a solution to the problems.
15 In his statement the witness notes that Milosevic and Karadzic
16 did not have a good relationship during his time in Belgrade. Milosevic
17 was humiliated in Pale in 1993 when he tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade
18 the Bosnian Serbs to agree to the Vance-Owen peace plan. The witness
19 notes that he regard Karadzic as a major stumbling block to his efforts
20 to bring the war in Bosnia to an end, and Milosevic was trying force him
21 from office.
22 The witness also discusses the UN hostage crisis in his
23 statement. When the witness learned about this matter, he immediately
24 went to see Milosevic and impressed upon him how much he needed the
25 British soldiers out in one piece. Milosevic assured him that he would
1 do what he could do get them released. Later, Milosevic told the witness
2 that he was sending Stanisic to Bosnia to see Karadzic about resolving
3 the hostage crisis.
4 The witness also describes his own experience during the hostage
5 crisis and the contributions he made to its resolution. Throughout the
6 UN hostage crisis, the witness had no meetings with Stanisic; although,
7 his deputy met him once at a briefing he gave. More generally, the
8 witness has only met Mr. Stanisic once. This meeting involved no more
9 than a handshake and took place in November/December 1995 at the Belgrade
10 military airport Batajnica.
11 Thank you, Your Honours.
12 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Mr. Jordash.
13 I'd like to briefly go into private session.
14 [Private session]
11 Pages 18648-18650 redacted. Private session.
15 [Open session]
16 THE REGISTRAR: We are in open session, Your Honours.
17 JUDGE ORIE: Thank you, Madam Registrar.
18 Ms. Marcus, please proceed. We are discussing at this moment
19 proposals for more efficient housekeeping session.
20 MS. MARCUS: Thank you, Your Honour.
21 Yes. What our proposal essentially was with respect to this --
22 the instant housekeeping session, we made other proposals for in the
23 future how we move forward, suggestions. But respect to this one we --we
24 prepared a chart as a spread sheet. We circulated the word version on
25 Wednesday at the same day that we filed the housekeeping submission, and
1 that was on the 21st of March. The chart has an empty column for the
2 Defence to provide their position. We have included in that chart every
3 MFI, both Prosecution and Defence, and a few other pending matters that
4 are not MFI related of which we were aware. It certainly may exclude a
5 few -- a few issues, but in my view it's quite extensive.
6 We have also inputted, since the Defence made a submission last
7 Wednesday. We responded on Friday, we've since then inputted into this
8 chart as well the Defence's position. But it's quite substantial,
9 Your Honours. It's about 100 pages of issues. But in our -- in the
10 Prosecution's submission, a lot of these issues have been discussed
11 previously, the positions of the parties have already been put on the
12 record numerous times, and it's our view that if this -- if the Defence
13 can either confirm what we've put in there, we've -- if the Defence have
14 put their position, it's in the chart, if they have additional points,
15 they can add it into the chart. It's very similar to our bar table
16 procedure. So we left that -- we took that model.
17 And then, Your Honours, our submission is that we would only need
18 to discuss on Wednesday any additional matters for which we haven't
19 already made submissions. So for these matters which are still pending
20 from the 24th November housekeeping or from the 12th December submission
21 that the Prosecution made, all of those matters can be, in our view,
22 dealt with in correspondence, with the Chamber's leave, before -- before
23 Wednesday, and Wednesday could simply be used for the Chamber to -- to
24 put those -- its -- its decisions on the record, for I would say maybe
25 two-thirds or even three quarters of the issues on the chart --
1 JUDGE ORIE: Hs the Chamber -- has the Chamber been provided with
2 a copy of the chart --
3 MS. MARCUS: Yes.
4 JUDGE ORIE: -- with your comments. Then I'm a bit -- well,
5 perhaps I'm not totally surprised that they haven't seen it because --
6 for all kind of reasons. Is the Defence comment already in it or is
7 there a new copy to be expected with the Defence comments in it?
8 MS. MARCUS: We have not received any response from the Defence.
9 What we have done is for those issues, which they raised in their filing,
10 we have noted that in our copy --
11 JUDGE ORIE: Yes.
12 MS. MARCUS: -- because we offered to tender the joint
13 position -- to provide it, not tender it maybe, but to provide it to the
14 Chamber afterwards. So we have running version that we've kept. We've
15 inputted what they've said in their submissions, but that only covered
16 maybe 15 or 20 of the documents and the rest are all remaining there.
17 This is just are a proposal, Your Honours, to save us court time. I
18 don't think it's really necessary to go through it on the record,
19 Your Honour.
20 JUDGE ORIE: Now, whatever the final outcome will be, is the
21 Defence willing to prepare the housekeeping session on the basis of the
22 chart prepared by the Prosecution?
23 MR. JORDASH: I feel a bit hurt that we haven't been asked if we
24 have done our homework, and we are doing our homework. It's just a
25 98-page document and we are finalising it, and we will have it filled in
1 by tomorrow.
2 JUDGE ORIE: I think we have a common experience what it takes to
3 go through MFI lists. That is true for the parties but for the Bench as
4 well. When do you think it could be ready?
5 MR. JORDASH: I think it should be ready by the end of tomorrow.
6 I --
7 JUDGE ORIE: Which would leave me the night to further prepare --
8 MR. JORDASH: Homework for you, Your Honour.
9 JUDGE ORIE: Yes, yes, yes. No, I'm just establishing the
10 practical consequences. If you -- if you have -- would have done half
11 the work, would you be willing already to share the half of that work
12 with us?
13 MR. JORDASH: Yes. I mean, what I will do is if I've -- what
14 I've just been told is it's coming to me by early tomorrow morning, so I
15 will undertake to get it to everybody by lunch, if that's satisfactory.
16 JUDGE ORIE: That would certainly assist, and we'll include this
17 in our preparations for the housekeeping session.
18 Ms. Marcus, did you ever have such a quick success in your
20 MS. MARCUS: I don't think so, Your Honour.
21 JUDGE ORIE: [Overlapping speakers] Yes, yes. I don't expect a
22 serious answer to that.
23 Then we adjourn for the day and we resume Wednesday, the 28th of
24 March, at 9.00 in the morning, in this same Courtroom II where a
25 housekeeping session will be held.
1 --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 6.48 p.m.,
2 to be reconvened on Wednesday, the 28th day
3 of March, 2012, at 9.00 a.m.