1 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL CASE NO. IT-94-1-T
2 FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
3 IN THE TRIAL CHAMBER
6 Thursday, 9th May 1996
7 (10.00 a.m.)
8 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr. Niemann, are you ready to proceed or continue
9 with Dr.
11 MR. NIEMANN: Yes, your Honour.
12 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Good.
13 MR. NIEMANN: Might the witness be shown Exhibit 30 which is the book by
14 General Kadijevic, please?
15 MR. ORIE: Your Honour, I have a problem with my computer system; could
16 this be solved if possible, because I can highlight parts of the
17 transcript, but I have not the right file on it now so if this could be
19 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Is this the CaseView method that we have which is
20 not coming through?
21 MR. ORIE: It is the CaseView on the small computer; I can work with it
22 instead of just
23 looking at it. It can be done easily within a few seconds.
24 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr. Niemann, would you like to continue, please,
25 with Dr. Gow?
1 MR. NIEMANN: Thank you, your Honour.
2 DR. JAMES GOW, recalled.
3 Examined by MR. NIEMANN, continued.
4 Q. Dr. Gow, would you please look at page 77 of Exhibit 30 for me,
5 please? Is there a reference in the book by General Kadijevic there to
6 this question of the JNA fulfilling its objectives in the campaign in
8 A. Yes, there is. If your Honours recall, I was indicating yesterday
9 that the JNA, in my judgment, had begun possibly with the objective ----
10 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Would you turn on your microphone, please, Dr. Gow?
11 A. It was turned on. I do not know why it has gone off. If your
12 Honours recall, I was saying
13 at the end of yesterday that, in my judgment, the JNA could well have
14 begun the period of the war of dissolution after June 1991 with the
15 objective of holding together the SFRY
16 and of not going to war. That is a question about which I do not think
17 anybody can be clear. Some people say it, clearly, had the ambition of
18 war at that stage and before; my judgment would be that it probably did
19 not quite.
20 Following that, as we saw through excerpts from General
22 yesterday, it formulated a programme for action in Croatia that would go
23 in two phases.
24 The more extensive objective would be to topple the government in Zagreb
25 and to take control of Croatia.
1 The fall back objective, which was the first phase of
2 operations, was to establish the borders around -- of a new entity around
3 Serbian dominated, majority
4 Serbian population, areas or areas which were deemed to be necessary to be
5 part of the territories being controlled and in which there might be
6 minority Serbian populations.
7 In attempting to achieve that lesser objective, which was
8 what I have referred to as a new political project, that is, the project
9 to create the borders of a new entity, a new set of territories which
10 would be a mini Yugoslavia, what in some circles has been described as a
11 set of federated Serbian states, and that the borders -- and that there
12 would be specific borders for this new entity incorporating parts of
13 Croatia and parts, if not possibly in some cases the whole, of Bosnia and
15 In the section that I will just indicate here, you will
16 see that General Kadijevic notes that in close co-ordination with the
17 Serb insurgents, that is, the Serbian irregular forces in Croatia, all the
18 Serb regions, i.e. those designated as being part of the objective
19 of the first phase, and that is what I would judge to be the fall back
20 objective, the borders for this mini Yugoslav state, were achieved except
21 a part in western Slavonia. I think the fact that he indicates "except
22 for a part in western Slavonia" all the territories they sought to take
23 control of, in their terms to liberate, the fact that he indicates that
24 they did not achieve something is a clear indication that they had a
25 specific idea of what the boundaries of that mini Yugoslavia would be in
1 this case, although I cannot tell you exactly what the boundary in western
2 Slovenia would be because the General does not indicate what it would be
4 I would supplement this by saying that also General
5 Panic, to whom we made reference yesterday, who at the time we are talking
6 about was commander of the First Military District and was later to be
7 Chief of Staff of the JNA, has also indicated the same thing, that they
8 were unable to achieve all their objectives in western Slavonia.
9 Q. Dr. Gow, what were the consequences for Bosnia following the
10 activities of the JNA in Croatia in the latter part of 1991?
11 A. Bosnia and Herzegovina was put in a difficult situation as this
12 evolved. I think I already made mention yesterday of the problems that
13 were beginning to develop at the intercommunal level. At the state level,
14 Bosnia was obviously in a weaker position than, for example, Slovenia or
15 Croatia might have been, although Croatia was, of course, in a
16 weaker position than Slovenia had been, in this process of disintegration
17 of the SFRY. The pressures of the war in Croatia meant that the JNA began
18 to mobilize and use parts
19 of Bosnia and Herzegovina for actions in Croatia, and at the same time
20 began a series of manoeuvres and exercises to mobilize Serbian people in
21 Bosnia and Herzegovina into the reserve units of the JNA into certain
22 parts of the Territorial Defence structure (whilst not mobilising
23 non-Serbian people in other areas, and, in some cases, seeking to
24 disestablish Territorial Defence forces in majority Muslim or Croat areas.
25 Q. I think General Kadijevic also makes reference to this, does he not,
1 in pages 78 and 80 of
2 the Exhibit you have there with you, Exhibit 30 -- perhaps it is 80. Page
4 A. Maybe you can highlight this section so that we can see it. You see
5 that in the section I indicate, you see the section I indicate, that the
6 General reinforces what I was just saying; during the war in Croatia, the
7 JNA manoeuvred and used troops via Bosnia and Herzegovina which was to be
8 of vital significance for the JNA. This was both in the war in Croatia,
9 but also, as he goes on to say, the manoeuvres and movements, which were
10 not without problems, also enabled the mobilization of Serb parts of
11 Bosnia and Herzegovina to be very successful.
12 So this was already creating part of the framework for
13 possible later
14 operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the General indicates here that
15 after leaving Croatia that they should have a strong JNA force in Bosnia
16 and Herzegovina.
17 This, I would suggest, a part of the whole process of
18 mobilisation, is because the General regarded the situation, the position,
19 of the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina
20 as being the backbone of any future communist state for the Serbian
22 If you will permit me a moment, I think I may find this
23 here as well, but if you wish to press on, I can provide you with
24 relevant references later.
25 Q. We will move on, Dr. Gow. Parallel with the activities of the JNA in
1 Bosnia, was there any corresponding political developments that occurred?
2 A. In the autumn of 1991, the Serbian Democratic Party in Bosnia, the
3 SDS, declared four autonomous regions between this 12th and 19th
4 September. These were declared as Serbian autonomous regions, first in
5 Eastern Herzegovina, later of the Bosnian Krajina of north eastern Bosnia,
6 sometimes known as Semberija and of Sarajevo-Romanija. These were later
7 to be supplemented in November by the declaration of a fifth autonomous
8 region of northern Bosnia. Indeed, in January 1996, for a period there
9 was a brief semi-declaration of the further autonomous region as a
10 break-away from the Sarajevo- Romanija district, but this seems not to
11 have been fully implemented.
12 This process was the creation of the territorial and for
13 the shadow political infrastructure, I would say, for the borders of the
14 Serbian territories to be designated as
15 part of the mini Yugoslavia, to which I made reference following from
16 General Kadijevic, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, therefore, included
17 large parts of north western Bosnia
18 and northern Bosnia, north eastern Bosnia, eastern Bosnia and the very
19 south western
20 part of Bosnia and Herzegovina, known as eastern Herzegovina. This would
21 leave parts
22 of western Herzegovina in some areas in central Bosnia, presumably, not to
23 be part of this entity.
24 Q. Dr. Gow, would you look at the document you are now shown? Can you
25 tell us what the document is?
1 A. It is a page taken, one page, yes, from a Montenegrin publication,
2 Monitor, which has taken an extract from a Belgrade publication, Vreme,
3 and makes reference to a tape which was produced by the last Federal Prime
4 Minister of the SFRY, Ante Markovic. It was a tape which Markovic
5 produced at one of the later meetings of the Federal government while it
6 was still trying to sit in September 1991. It reports -- it indicates
7 that the tape that Markovic had, indicates, according to the text, a
8 conversation between Slobodan
9 Milosevic and Radovan Karadzic in which Milosevic is reported to be saying
10 to Karadzic that he should get in touch with General Uzelac, Commander of
11 the Banja Luka corps.
12 Q. Perhaps before we go into that, I will tender it.
13 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Is there any objection to Exhibit 45?
14 MR. WLADIMIROFF: We have no objection, your Honour.
15 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Exhibit 45 will be admitted.
16 MR. NIEMANN: Perhaps it could be marked and then handed back? Perhaps you
18 display it on the screen and then go through it, Dr. Gow. Is that the
19 part that refers to
20 that conversation, Dr. Gow, you referred to a moment ago?
21 A. What you see is the first page of the English translation of the
22 Serbo-Croat text which is provided. It makes reference in the first line
23 to something called "plan RAM". This is something about which there has
24 been much discussion since this period and, indeed, slightly before it,
25 across the territories of the former Yugoslavia.
1 The existence of the plan is not, as far as I am aware,
2 confirmed but many people have talked about it. On the other hand, some
3 people have denied its existence. The purported purpose of this plan, to
4 which on the tape reference is made, was for preparations and execution of
5 the creation of this set of territories throughout parts of Croatia and
6 Bosnia and Herzegovina based around the Serbian -- based around the
7 Serbian populations there, and around areas of which they would to take
9 If we can move on, on to the second page, you see an
10 extract from the conversation reported in which Milosevic tells Karadzic:
11 "Go talk to Uzelac, he'll tell you everything" ----
12 JUDGE STEPHEN: Who is this "Uzelac"?
13 THE WITNESS: Sorry, when I think I probably was not supposed to be
14 speaking, I had
15 already begun to say General Uzelac was Commander of the Banja Luka corps
16 of the
17 JNA. The implication is that as you read through this that Uzelac would be
18 helping the SDS leader by distributing weaponry and giving other forms of
19 logistical existence, I would surmise.
20 The reported conversation indicates the possible
21 existence of such a plan and certainly, if it is accepted, indicates the
22 co-operation between the SDS and the JNA in making these preparations in
23 Bosnia and Herzegovina in September 1991.
24 MR. NIEMANN: Thank you. Dr. Gow, I would ask you to look at this
25 document that I show you.
1 A. Excuse me, could I just point out -- would you mind if I pointed to
2 one more thing on this, which is at the very end, just there is one small
3 section in which the then Federal Prime Minister, Ante Markovic, indicates
4 that it is his judgment that the voices are undoubtedly those of Milosevic
5 and Karadzic, giving an indication that Karadzic should contact
7 Q. Dr. Gow, what is the document I have just given you there?
8 A. This is a transcript of the tape of the conversation between Slobodan
9 Milosevic and
10 Radovan Karadzic, and indicates that the conversation took place on 29th
11 May 1991.
12 This is a transcript of the tape to which the previous article we looked
13 at made reference, the tape that was produced by the Federal Prime
15 Q. This is a full transcript of that conversation, is it?
16 A. I believe so.
17 MR. NIEMANN: Your Honours, at this stage I would ask for the audio tape
18 to be actually played, but while it is being -- perhaps I should do this
19 first, I will tender that transcript now.
20 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Is there an objection to Exhibit 46, I gather?
21 MR. WLADIMIROFF: Yes, your Honour. We have a problem here. That is the
22 reason why
23 we are objecting to it. There is no source where that tape is coming
24 from. There is a difference here if we look into Exhibit 45 because there
25 it is a newspaper that is a source
1 -- be it true or not, that is not the issue here -- but here we have a
2 blank tape without anything.
3 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr. Niemann?
4 MR. NIEMANN: Thank you, your Honour. I will not proceed with this
5 Exhibit just for the moment, if your Honours please. I will pass on it and
6 come back to it, I think. So perhaps that document could be returned to
8 (To the witness): Dr. Gow, was the JNA being prepared
9 for military activity in Bosnia during the latter part of 1991 and the
10 early part of 1992?
11 A. It was. The JNA was being prepared for military activity through
12 this -----
13 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: One minute, Dr. Gow. What is the problem, Mr.
14 Tadic, can you hear?
15 MR. WLADIMIROFF: He could not hear the interpreter.
16 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr. Tadic, can you hear me now in your language?
17 Can you hear me now? Are you able to hear me in your language?
18 THE ACCUSED TADIC: (Responds affirmatively in Serbo-Croat, not
20 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: OK, Mr. Niemann.
21 MR. NIEMANN: I will repeat the question, your Honour.
22 (To the witness): Dr. Gow, was the JNA being prepared for military
23 activity in Bosnia during the latter part of 1991 and the early part of
25 A. The JNA was carrying out a series of exercises and manoeuvres on
1 territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina, moving military forces through the
2 territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Some of these were clearly in
3 relation to the war in Croatia, others, I would suggest, were in
4 preparation for possible future needs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. At the
5 same time, the exercises and manoeuvres were being used as a mechanism for
6 mobilizing elements of the Serbian population into armed forces,
7 structures, in the Territorial Defence and in the
8 JNA reserves.
9 Q. Were any concerns raised in Bosnia about these preparations by the
11 A. Questions were asked in the Bosnian Parliament in September in which
12 it was asked of the JNA what its activity in Bosnia at that time was
13 intended for. Concerns were being expressed at the way in which the JNA
14 was on the road throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina.
15 Q. What measures were taken to strengthen the JNA and the Serbian
16 position in Bosnia in the late part of 1991 and the early part of 1992?
17 A. The manoeuvres and exercises, to which I have already made
18 reference, were being conducted and at the same time the JNA appears to
19 have begun a process in some areas
20 of moving its troops mostly out of garrisons so that they would probably
21 not face the
22 same situation that they had in Croatia where they were trapped in
23 garrisons as the
24 conflict began.
25 Q. At this stage, I would ask you to go to page 50 of Exhibit 30, Dr.
1 Gow, in the book by General Kadijevic, please. If it could be placed on
2 the screen? In relation to preparations by the JNA, is there a reference
3 there or a segment there that you can take us to
4 concerning that?
5 A. In the section, in the sentence here, the General indicates the
6 importance of using the Territorial Defence structures in Serb regions in
7 Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina in co-operation with the JNA for
8 realising that this concept of deployment for the operations which were
9 being undertaken.
10 Q. You see a reference there, "Accordingly, all Territorial Defence
11 units were disarmed prior
12 to the outbreak of fighting", do you know when that occurred approximately
13 in terms of dates?
14 A. The Territorial Defence Forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina were being
15 disarmed through
16 the latter part of 1991 -- in some areas were being disarmed through the
17 latter part of
18 1991 and in conjunction with the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
19 also into
20 the first part of 1992, this was joint activity between the JNA and parts
21 of the Bosnian government.
22 These efforts on the part of the Bosnian government were
23 said to be as a
24 means for trying to avoid the potential for conflict, to try to take away,
25 to co-operate with the JNA and try to make sure there was no conditions
1 for conflict. At the same time, it is my understanding that the JNA was
2 ostensibly taking the weapons away for them to be renewed, and there was
3 some suggestion that they would be renewed at a future date.
4 It appears that in Serbian areas this process of
5 disarmament was not taking place and, in fact, some of the arms were being
6 redistributed into those areas.
7 Q. Redistributed to whom?
8 A. Redistributed to Territorial Defence Forces in Serbian majority areas
9 in which the majority Serbian population, or elements of the majority
10 Serbian population, were being mobilized into the Territorial Defence
11 Force through the exercises which were being carried out in conjunction
12 with the JNA.
13 Q. Would you look at the document that I now show you?
14 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: So, Dr. Gow, that last sentence that begins,
15 "Naturally, we used
16 the Territorial Defence of Serb regions in Croatia", "Territorial Defence"
18 Territorial Defence Forces, I gather; is that what you are saying?
19 A. That is correct, yes.
20 MR. NIEMANN: That document that you see there, what is it?
21 A. This is a copy taken from the Belgrade publication, Yugoslav Survey,
22 and it is an extract concerning the platform of the position of Bosnia and
23 Herzegovina and organisation of
24 the Yugoslav community.
25 Q. Do you know who obtained the document?
1 A. The document was obtained by the Office of the Prosecutor.
2 Q. Do you consider this to be a reliable source?
3 A. I do.
4 MR. NIEMANN: I tender this document, your Honour.
5 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Is there any objection to, I believe that is,
6 Exhibit 47?
7 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No, your Honour.
8 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Exhibit 47 will be admitted.
9 MR. NIEMANN: Just looking at that document, can you take us to the
10 relevant portion that
11 you wish to refer us to in connection with your evidence?
12 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: What is the date on that document?
13 A. The original document is, I believe, from 21st October. I had better
14 check -- sorry, 16th October 1991.
15 MR. NIEMANN: Can you describe for us the significance of this in terms of
16 your evidence, please?
17 A. Your Honours will recall that a short time ago I described the
18 creation of the four Serbian autonomous regions in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
19 or the proclamation of them, in September 1991. Partly in response to
20 this, in October 1991, the Bosnian Parliament held a session to discuss
21 the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina and its position within the
22 obviously difficult situation as the SFRY was disintegrating and as there
23 was a war going on in Croatia.
24 At that time, you will see by reference to paragraph 2 of
25 the document, that
1 the Parliament of Bosnia and Herzegovina at that stage affirmed the
2 sovereign state
3 quality of Bosnia and Herzegovina, indicating them to be a state of equal
4 citizens and peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is, the Muslims, the
5 Slav Muslims, the Serbs and the Croats, as well as any other population
6 groups living on the territories.
7 This was a significant assertion of the sovereign
8 statehood of Bosnia as one
9 of the elements of the SFRY; if you move on to paragraph 3, I think you
10 can take the reference
11 to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina being integral and indivisible
12 as being a reference, as being in reference to the declaration of the
13 Serbian autonomous regions, that is, to make it clear that the
14 declaration of Serbian autonomous regions and the growing suspicion that
15 there would be an attempt to change the borders of Bosnia and
16 Herzegovina either by force or if, as could be expected, it were not to be
17 achieved any other way, and therefore the Parliament was making a comment.
18 I should point out that a large number of the Serbian
19 Democratic Party representatives at this stage did not participate in the
20 vote because they did not wish to recognise the vote that was being taken,
21 which I would say again is an indication in support of their -- I would
22 say again was an indication of the intention which was
23 emerging in the declaration of the Serbian autonomous regions to try to
24 create the borders of a new entity which would challenge the territorial
25 integrity and sovereignty of the Bosnian state as defined in the 1974
1 constitution of the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2 Q. Dr. Gow, this is linked to what you said a moment ago about the JNA
3 manoeuvres and so forth on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, is it?
4 A. Yes, what I am indicating is that the political activity of the SDS
5 in this context, the military activity of JNA units on the territory of
6 Bosnia and Herzegovina, indicated, gave
7 sufficient grounds for many people to wonder whether what was going to
8 happen, and to suspect the intention of trying to create a territorial
9 expansion of the Republic of Serbia,
10 or of the rump Yugoslavia, depending on which terminology is used, through
12 territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia. This appeared to be
13 what was
14 underway in Croatia, as I think General Kadijevic's book indicates was the
15 case, and it
16 was what was suspected to be the case in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
17 This is a mark of the way in which the authorities in
18 Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Parliament with a Muslim Croat majority
19 regarded the situation and wanted to reassert the sovereignty of Bosnia
20 and Herzegovina in opposition to the declarations of
21 the autonomous regions.
22 Q. Thank you. Was this concern that was happening in Yugoslavia at this
23 stage, not only in relation to Bosnia but generally, reflected in the
24 international community as well?
25 A. It was.
1 Q. In connection with that, would you look at the next document I show
2 you, please?
3 (Handed) Can you tell me what that document is?
4 A. The document is an extract taken from the volume "Yugoslavia Through
5 Documents" edited by Snezana Trifunovska to which reference has been made
6 in my testimony already.
7 The particular extract refers to a declaration on the situation in
8 Yugoslavia adopted at an informal meeting of the Council of Ministers of
9 Foreign Affairs of the European Communities and its Member States.
10 Q. Do you regard that as a reliable source?
11 A. I do.
12 MR. NIEMANN: I tender that, your Honour.
13 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Is there any objection to Exhibit 48?
14 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No objection, your Honour.
15 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Exhibit 48 will be admitted.
16 MR. NIEMANN: If that could be displayed on the projector? Do you see
17 there the expression of concern by in this case the European Community?
18 A. That is the case, yes.
19 Q. Yes, proceed.
20 A. I indicate for the benefit of your Honours that the date of the
21 statement was 6th October 1991. I would also draw your attention to the
22 reference to agreements reached at The Hague on 4th October 1991 between
23 the Presidents of Croatia and Serbia and General Kadijevic. The context
24 for this was the European Community Conference on Yugoslavia which was
25 organised from September 1991 through to the summer of 1992. That
1 conference, as part of the EC's concern for the situation in Yugoslavia,
2 attempted to seek
3 an overall solution to the conflict and dispute on territories of the
5 The significance of this, if I may move to the second
6 page -----
7 JUDGE STEPHEN: I have a question. The passage that I see on my screen is
8 concerned certainly with heavy fighting in Yugoslavia. It does not seem
9 to be concerned with preparations by the JNA in Bosnia.
10 A. That is, indeed, the case.
11 Q. I thought it was that that was giving rise to concern in Europe?
12 A. The concern in the EC and among its Member States at this stage was
13 for the situation in
14 the territories of the SFRY as a whole -- I do not understand why my
15 microphone keeps suddenly going off ---
16 MR. NIEMANN: Mine keeps doing it too.
17 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Perhaps you are touching it by mistake.
18 MR. NIEMANN: No, your Honour, I am not touching mine.
19 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: We will check it at the recess.
20 THE WITNESS: -- there was concern for the situation on the territories of
21 the SFRY as a
22 whole where it was clear that there was a major political dispute between
23 the various republics which had constituted the SFRY, and at the moment
24 this declaration was made there was clearly a significant armed conflict
25 taking place on the territory of Croatia. There was no specific reference
1 to Bosnia and Herzegovina in this document. But if I may move on to the
2 second page, I can explain the significance of this document with
3 reference to the previous document ---
4 JUDGE STEPHEN: Thank you.
5 THE WITNESS: -- that the significant aspect of the meeting on 4th October
6 was that the solution that was to be sought would be in the perspective of
7 the recognition of the independence of those republics which were seeking
8 it. This was a recognition which was made in principle by the Serbian
9 President at the meeting on 4th October, that the republics would be given
10 recognition of the sovereignty of the republics and, therefore,
11 the right of the republics to independence.
12 This was an agreement which Serbia was later to withdraw
13 on 18th October, but from this point onwards, and the significance of the
14 agreement is that the concession was made in principle on 4th October, and
15 that from this point onwards the EC addressed the problems of the conflict
16 in respect of the right to independence of the republics
17 seeking it.
18 With reference to the previous document affirming the
19 sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina in October, you will note that that
20 declaration of sovereignty would also fit into the context of the
21 discussions taking place in The Hague concerning the sovereignty and
22 possible independence of those republics seeking it on the basis of their
24 MR. NIEMANN: Following on from that, did the European Community then
25 proceed to set
1 out the basis upon which new states in Eastern Europe would be recognised
2 and, in particular, Yugoslavia?
3 A. First, in the course of October, the European Community Conference
4 drafted a document, a draft Convention, on arrangements between the
5 Yugoslav states. That agreement was drafted on the basis of the
6 agreement, in principle, of President Milosevic on 4th October.
7 On 18th October, when the document was presented,
8 President Milosevic rejected the document. In that context, the EC then
9 said that if there was not agreement
10 to this document within the space of a month, then on the basis of its
11 statement of this day and of a meeting that occurred at the same time and
12 on the basis, I think, of the principle agreement on 4th October, it would
13 proceed towards recognising the independence, the possibility of
14 recognising the independence, of those republics seeking it on the basis
15 of the state sovereignty as expressed and discussed at the EC conference.
16 When Serbia did not agree to the draft convention in
17 November 1991, the EC then began to move towards recognising the
18 independence on the basis of these
19 discussions and these documents. On 16th/17th December 1991, the EC set
21 guidelines for the possible recognition of independence of new states
22 emerging from the communist Federations in the Soviet Union, in
23 Czechoslovakia but, particularly, in the case of the SFRY.
24 Q. Would you look at the document that is now shown to you, please?
25 (Handed). Is this the guidelines that you have just referred to?
1 A. This is a copy, this a document again taken -----
2 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr. Niemann, I am told that only five microphones
3 can work at once. You’ve had three on in front of you at one point. I
4 know you move around a lot and that is a problem, but keep it to one,
5 perhaps two. You have two and I guess if I turn mine on we are at
6 maximum, so you keep one on, Mr. Niemann, and you just need one, I do
7 believe, Dr. Gow.
8 THE WITNESS: I believe I need two because whenever I use one you cannot
9 hear me.
10 MR. NIEMANN: I am told to turn three on because nobody can hear me.
11 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: That is because you move around so much. You are
12 going to have to stand somehow or, perhaps, we may have to get a
13 microphone to clip on you. Try
14 with your one and you may use two and I will turn mine off. The technical
15 booth tells us that it is better for you to use one, Dr. Gow. We can hear
16 you pretty well; if we cannot,
17 we will let you know that we cannot hear you. So will you operate with
19 THE WITNESS: I am happy to operate with one. I just found it frustrating
21 constantly to be told that I could not be heard, but I am happy with one
22 if that is
24 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: We heard pretty well. You have one.
25 MR. NIEMANN (To the witness): The document that you have before you, you
1 just were
2 telling us, that is that declaration that you referred to?
3 A. The document I have before me is an extract from the Trifunovska
4 volume, edited volume Yugoslavia Through Documents, to which reference has
5 been made a number of times. The extract is the EC declaration concerning
6 the conditions for recognition of new states adopted at the Extraordinary
7 European Political Counsel Meeting, Ministerial Meeting -- sorry, European
8 Political Co-operation Ministerial Meeting on 16th December 1991.
9 MR. NIEMANN: Might that be tendered, if your Honours please?
10 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Is there any objection to 49?
11 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No objection, your Honour, without any technical sound.
12 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Although you have to speak into yours.
13 MR. WLADIMIROFF: We have no objection, your Honour.
14 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Exhibit 49 will be admitted.
15 MR. NIEMANN (To the witness): Dr. Gow, just looking at that particular
16 exhibit, could you take us to the principal conditions that were set down
17 with respect to recognition of
19 A. The first indicates that the declaration invited those Yugoslav
20 republics wishing to be recognised as having independence in time for the
21 meeting on 15th January indicated there, should indicate this to the
22 European Community and its Member States by 23rd December, and that in
23 doing so they should wish that they wish to be recognised as
24 having independent international personality and that they accept the
25 commitments outlined in the guidelines. The guidelines themselves -- if I
1 can try to move it down -- are mentioned in a footnote to the text. If we
2 can move on to the second page -----
3 MR. NIEMANN: Perhaps go back, I think.
4 JUDGE STEPHEN: We have not finished reading the first.
5 MR. NIEMANN: Go back to that page. The next page, would you go on to
6 that now, please?
7 A. The footnote continues on to the following page in which the
8 guidelines for recognition themselves are identified, including
9 recognition of relevant international treaties and political agreements.
10 If your Honours have had time to read the guidelines, I would also
11 indicate finally that the Community and its Member States made it clear
12 that they were
13 not prepared to recognise any entities which were the result of an act,
14 what they deemed
15 as an act, of aggression.
16 Q. As a consequence of these conditions being set out, did
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina itself,
19 A. The presidency and government of Bosnia and Herzegovina made an
20 application to the EC and its Member States for recognition as having
21 independent international personality.
22 Q. What was the Bosnian-Serb response to the actions taken by the
23 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
24 A. The Bosnian Serbs did not -- the Bosnian Serb, in this case I talk
25 about the adherence of the SDS and its supporters -- the Bosnian Serbs in
1 this case, as defined, did not support the application of the presidency
2 and government of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as could be
3 expected through the decisions of the Assembly which they had formed and
4 through the declaration of the Serbian autonomous regions, and on 9th
5 January they designated a constitution which would come into effect and
6 create a Serbian republic of
7 the people of -- a Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina comprising
8 the territories
9 of the autonomous regions in the event of Bosnia and Herzegovina being
10 recognised as having independent international personality. They asserted
11 that this territory would be a part of Federal Yugoslavia.
12 Q. Is there a name that is commonly applied to this republic?
13 A. The name at this stage was the Serbian Republic of -- the Republic of
14 the Serbian people of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the course of 1992, the
15 name of this entity was changed to Republika Srpska, a name by which
16 commonly it is referred, a name by which reference
17 to it is commonly made.
18 Q. Would you look at the next document that I show you? (Handed) What is
19 this document?
20 A. The document is a copy of an extract from the official gazette of the
21 Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and it is dated 27th January
23 Q. Does it appear in Serbian with a translation into English language?
24 A. It does.
25 Q. Where was the English translation of the document obtained?
1 A. I believe that the English translation was provided by Dr. Radomir
2 Lukic from the designated Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republika
4 MR. NIEMANN: I tender that, your Honour.
5 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: That is Exhibit 51?
6 MR. NIEMANN: 50.
7 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: 50. Any objection to 50?
8 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No, your Honour.
9 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Exhibit 50 will be admitted.
10 MR. NIEMANN (To the witness): I think that the declaration can be seen,
11 can it not, on the English translation on about the fourth page of the
12 English document?
13 A. I am sure your Honours can read, but I will just indicate for
14 convenience the title is the Declaration on the Proclamation of the
15 Serbian Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. It indicates in Article 1 that
16 the territories of the Serbian autonomous areas or regions
17 would comprise the territories of those areas as well as areas in which it
18 is said that
19 Serbian people were removed by a process of murder and expulsion during
20 the Second World War.
21 It indicates in Article 2 that this Republic is intended
22 to remain part of the federal state of Yugoslavia, and be a federal unit
23 of that state. This would be consistent with the kind of project I was
24 identifying earlier in the writings of General Kadijevic, to create a mini
25 Yugoslavia comprising parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina and parts of
2 Q. Did the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, later to become
3 the Republic of Srpska, then proceed to draw up its own constitution?
4 A. It did.
5 Q. Would you look now at the document which I show you? (Handed)
6 Firstly, can you tell us what the document is?
7 A. The document is again a copy of the Sluzbeni glasnik, the official
8 gazette of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The date on it
9 is 16th March. It refers to the decision on the proclamation of the
10 constitution of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that
11 decision is from 28th February 1992.
12 MR. NIEMANN: Yes, I tender that, your Honour.
13 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Any objection to Exhibit 51?
14 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No objection, your Honour.
15 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Exhibit 51 will be admitted.
16 MR. NIEMANN (To the witness): Perhaps you might just show us at least the
17 front page of
18 the English translation of that document? Dr. Gow, does that refer at the
19 top of the document the date 16th March, but then in the preamble the
20 reference to the decision of 28th February 1992?
21 A. That is correct.
22 Q. Thank you. Is there any other part of the document you wish to go
24 A. If we could move to the following page, you will note in the basic
25 provisions of the constitutional document that, "The Serb Republic of
1 Bosnia and Herzegovina, state of the Serb people and of all citizens
2 living therein", I think this is an indication that there was the
3 possibility that any people who were prepared to remain part --
4 non-Serbian people who were prepared to remain part of this entity could
5 have a place in it. I may make further reference to that later in
7 The article 2 again indicates in the constitution that
8 the territory of this Republic will consist of the Serb autonomous
9 regions, municipalities, etc. and so forth, as in the article I referred
10 to in the January 9th declaration. Again it states that the Republic
11 is a part of the Federal state of Yugoslavia. So, indicating again that
12 it would be a federal unit linked with Serbia and Montenegro rather than a
13 part of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
14 Q. Thank you.
15 A. If I might move to the final page?
16 Q. Just stay there for a moment.
17 JUDGE STEPHEN: One question. The capital of this territory was Pale or
19 A. The territory was not Knin. As far as I recall, the capital was not
20 designated. At the time
21 of this activity, Banja Luka in north western Bosnia appeared to be the de
22 facto capital. This is where many of the discussions in Assembly meetings
23 were taking place. I think later the capital de facto became Pale. I am
24 not in a position to say categorically that the capital was Banja Luka,
25 Pale or, indeed, anywhere else -- maybe I should be but I am afraid I
2 Q. But it was not Knin?
3 A. It was not Knin; Knin was within a territory designated as the
4 Republic of Serbian Krajina in Croatia which would be a separate unit
5 within this set of federal structures and, if I may say, would clearly be
6 the capital of the Republic of Serbian Krajina.
7 MR. NIEMANN: Might that Exhibit be returned then?
8 THE WITNESS: If I may, I wish to go to the final page. If I may just
9 finally draw your attention to Article 144 which indicates that this
10 provisional constitution will come into effect on the day of its
11 proclamation, and the date of proclamation was to be 7th April 1992.
12 MR. NIEMANN: A moment ago in your evidence, Dr. Gow, you referred to the
13 fact that the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina had actually applied for
14 recognition by the European Community.
15 A. That is the case, yes.
16 Q. What was the response then of the European Community to this
18 A. The European Council of the Member States in taking this course of
19 action asked an Arbitration Commission, which had been established as part
20 of the European Community Conference on Yugoslavia, to advise on the
21 guidelines which had been established. That Arbitration Commission was
22 under the presidency of Monsieur Robert Badinter who was President of the
23 French constitutional court. In the case of each of the four applications
24 which were made by the former Yugoslav republics seeking independence it
25 offered an opinion. The four republics seeking independence were
1 Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Macedonia.
2 In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Arbitration
3 Commission in its opinion indicated that, although the presidency and
4 government of Bosnia and Herzegovina had made the declaration of
5 independent -- sorry, had sought independence on the basis of the
6 parliamentary vote in October 1991, when we saw the document I referred to
7 as the platform on the sovereignty of Bosnia in the context of the
8 Yugoslav community, that although that had taken place, the fact that the
9 Serbian Democratic Party had declared autonomous regions, and that the
10 Assembly of the Serbian Democratic Party had indicated that it did not
11 support that platform, meant that there should be a -- that the position
12 in Bosnia and Herzegovina was not clearly established at this time.
13 It advised, among other things, that clarification
14 possibly might be found through the holding of a referendum under
15 international supervision
16 Q. In connection with the answer you have just given to my question,
17 would you please look at the document that is now shown to you? (Handed)
18 Dr. Gow, what is this document
19 that you have?
20 A. The document is a copy of Opinion No. 4 by the Arbitration Commission
21 on international recognition of the Socialist Republic of
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina by the European Community and its Member States. The
23 document is from 11th January 1991.
24 MR. NIEMANN: I tender that your Honour.
25 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: 1991?
1 THE WITNESS: I am sorry, yes, thank you, your Honour, it is 1992.
2 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: That is exhibit ---
3 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No objection, your Honour.
4 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: -- no objection. Exhibit 52 will be admitted.
5 MR. NIEMANN (To the witness): Just looking at this particular Opinion,
6 consisting of three pages, is there any particular part that you would
7 take us to in connection with what you have already said in terms of the
8 conditions that were to be set for recognition, or the suggestion,
9 perhaps, might be a better way of putting it? I think I direct you to the
10 very last paragraph?
11 A. Following what I was just saying, you will see in the paragraph here
12 that the Commission chaired by Monsieur Badinter noted that outside the
13 institutional framework of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina on 10th
14 November, the Serbian people had voted for the common Yugoslav state and
15 indicated that it did not support this position, and that through to 9th
16 January they had proclaimed the independence of this Serbian Republic,
17 one of the documents we saw a few moments ago.
18 I then move through and indicate that, as you read from
19 paragraph 4, the Commission thought that in these circumstances the will
20 of the peoples of Bosnia and Herzegovina to constitute the Republic of
21 Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign and independent state cannot be held
22 to have been fully established. Because of this assessment, it goes on to
23 suggest that clarification is needed possibly by means of a referendum of
24 all the citizens and to be carried out under international supervision.
25 That is, in fact, what happened.
1 Q. When did that happen?
2 A. The referendum was conducted on 29th February and 1st March 1991.
3 Q. Did the European Arbitration Commission on the international
4 conference on former Yugoslavia then address the matter following that?
5 A. Following the holding of the referendum, the Arbitration Commission
6 was then asked, was again asked to express an opinion. In its opinion it
7 judged that a referendum had been
8 held under international supervision and that two-thirds of those voting
9 had voted for the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina and that,
10 therefore, this was sufficient to constitute an expression -- sufficient
11 to express sufficiently the will of the people of
12 Bosnia and Herzegovina. The EC and its Member States and other countries
13 then proceeded to recognise the independent international personality of
14 Bosnia and Herzegovina.
15 Q. Do you recall approximately the percentage of voters that
16 participated in this referendum?
17 A. The percentage of the voters was, I think, 63 and a half per cent; of
18 those something over
19 90 per cent voted for the independence of the Republic, therefore,
20 satisfying the condition established by the Parliament that any move to
21 independence -- as I recall it, any move to independence would require a
22 two-thirds vote of the population -- sorry, of those voting.
23 Q. Would you look please at the document that I now show you?
24 JUDGE VOHRAH: Dr. Gow, this was despite the fact that the Bosnian Serbs
25 had boycotted
1 the referendum?
2 A. This was in spite of the fact that large numbers of Bosnian Serbs had
3 either boycotted or been prevented from taking part in the referendum.
4 That is the case. One reason why only 63.5, or thereabouts, per cent of
5 the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina participated
6 in the referendum was that large number, large parts of the Serbian
7 communities in Bosnia were not participating in the referendum.
8 MR. NIEMANN: This document that I now show you, what is it?
9 A. This is a copy of an Opinion No. 8 by the Arbitration Commission and
10 relates to -- it is actually going to be very difficult to read -- the
11 opinion, it relates to the opinions on the independence of the republics.
12 Q. Where was this document obtained from?
13 A. It was obtained from the European Commission.
14 MR. NIEMANN: I tender that, your Honour.
15 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Is there any objection to Exhibit 53?
16 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No, your Honour.
17 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: 53 will be admitted.
18 MR. NIEMANN (To the witness): Dr. Gow, do you wish to take us to any
19 particular part of
20 that document? I think on the final page there is a reference to the
21 consequences of the referendum and so forth.
22 A. You will see that the Arbitration Commission notes that, "the
23 referendum proposed in Opinion No. 4 was held in Bosnia and Herzegovina on
24 29th February and 1st March and that a large majority of the population
25 voted in favour of the republic's independence". That relates overall to
1 the question on the dissolution of the SFRY, indicating that the Republic
2 of Bosnia and Herzegovina was regarded as having independent international
4 Q. What is the data of this document?
5 A. The date of the document ---
6 Q. I think it is on the bottom of the page that is on the screen.
7 A. -- I think was 4th July 1992. Yes, it was 4th July 1992.
8 Q. Dr. Gow, but in terms of recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina, had there
9 been some steps taken by the international community prior to this date of
10 4th July 1992?
11 A. The document itself acknowledges that a large number of states in the
12 international community of states had recognised the independence of
13 Bosnia and Herzegovina. On
14 7th April 1992, the European Community and its Member States recognised
15 the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as did the United States; many
16 other countries followed.
17 Q. Could you look for me, please, at the next document that I show you?
18 A. If I could just also confirm, beyond the recognition of other Member
19 States, as can be seen on the document here, on 22nd May 1992, Bosnia and
20 Herzegovina, along with two other former Yugoslav states which had been
21 recognised, was admitted to membership of the United Nations; again a
22 further confirmation of its participation as an independent international
24 Q. Did the international conference on the former Yugoslavia's
25 Arbitration Commission then express an opinion in which it stated, in its
1 view, when the various republics had seceded from the Socialist Federal
2 Republic of Yugoslavia?
3 A. The Arbitration Commission was asked by the international conference
4 on the former Yugoslavia -- this was the successor conference to the
5 European Community conference established jointly by the European Union
6 and by the United Nations -- the Arbitration Commission was asked to
7 clarify an earlier opinion. In its Opinion, I think, No. 1 of November
8 1991, it had indicated that the SFRY was in a process of dissolution. It
9 was asked to confirm if that process of dissolution had been completed.
10 Q. Would you please look at the document that I now show you? (Handed)
11 What is that document?
12 A. The document is a copy of Opinion No. 11 of the Arbitration
13 Commission responding to a question put by the co-chairman of the steering
14 committee of the conference on
15 Yugoslavia on 20th April 1993. The date of the opinion itself is 16th
16 July 1993.
17 MR. NIEMANN: I tender that, your Honour.
18 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Is there any objection to Exhibit 54?
19 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No objection, your Honour.
20 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Exhibit 54 will be admitted.
21 MR. NIEMANN: Could you hand it back? If you could take us to the
22 relevant provisions of that opinion but, in particular, I think paragraphs
23 6 and 10 on pages 2 and 3 respectively.
24 A. You will see that in the opinion of the Arbitration Commission
25 relating to opinion No. 4 of 11th January 1992, to which reference has
1 already been made, the Arbitration Commission judged that the referendum
2 had been held, that a majority of the people
3 expressed themselves in favour of a sovereign and independent Bosnia and
4 that the referendum was officially promulgated on 6th March, that is, the
5 result was announced
6 and the President of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Alija Itzebegovic, declared
7 independence. The Arbitration Commission then makes the judgment that
8 since that date,
9 notwithstanding dramatic events that have occurred in Bosnia and
10 Herzegovina, the constitutional authorities of the Republic have acted
11 like those of a sovereign state in
12 order to maintain its territorial integrity and their full and exclusive
13 powers. So, 6th
14 March 1992 has become, must be considered, the date on which
15 Bosnia-Herzegovina succeeded the SFRY. That is the date on which it
16 became independent.
17 Q. I think further down the page at paragraph 10 they summarise their
18 views in respect of all
19 of the republics, do they not?
20 A. Yes, in answer to the question as a whole, in paragraph 10, the
21 Arbitration Commission expresses its view that the dates on which the
22 states emerging from the SFRY can be regarded as having left the SFRY and
23 have become independent are 8 October 1991 for Croatia and Slovenia; 17
24 November 1991 for the former Yugoslav Republic of
25 Macedonia; 6 March 1992 for the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina and,
1 finally, 27 April 1992 for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and
2 Montenegro. That would be the date on which there could be no longer any
3 question of the continuing existence of the SFRY, although it seems
4 doubtful that anybody would say it continued to exist before
6 Q. Dr. Gow, a moment ago you said in your evidence that states had begun
7 the process of recognition of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina as early
8 as 6th April 1992?
9 A. If I may correct you, I said 7th April 1992.
10 Q. Sorry. Would you look at the document that you are now shown,
11 please? (Handed) What
12 is that document?
13 A. It is an extract taken from the Trifunovska volume "Yugoslavia
14 through Documents" to which reference had already been made. The
15 particular extract concerns the declaration
16 on the recognition of Yugoslav republics by the EC, in particular, the EC
17 declaration on recognition of Bosnia-Herzegovina and President Bush's
18 statement on the recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia and
19 Slovenia. The dates to which I made reference are 10th March 1992 for the
20 declaration on recognition of Yugoslav republics, the 6th April for the EC
21 declaration and 7th April for President Bush's statement.
22 MR. NIEMANN: I tender that, your Honour.
23 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: That is Exhibit 55. Is that the declaration itself,
24 the EC
25 declaration, is it?
1 A. That is.
2 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Any objection?
3 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No objection, your Honour.
4 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: 55 will be admitted.
5 MR. NIEMANN: Thank you. (To the witness): Can you just point to those?
6 A. If I point, first of all, to item No. 173 in the Trifunovska volume,
7 you will see it is the EC declaration on recognition of Bosnia and
8 Herzegovina. It is dated 6th April 1992. It indicates that the community
9 and its Member States decision to recognise as of 7th April 1992 the
10 Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
11 Q. Immediately underneath that?
12 A. Immediately, if I move down the page you will see a statement by
13 President Bush of the United States of America made in Washington on 7th
14 April 1992 indicating that United States recognises Bosnia and Herzegovina
15 as well as some of the other Yugoslav, former Yugoslav republics as
16 sovereign and independent states.
17 Q. Dr. Gow, what was the reaction in Banja Luka of the Bosnian Serbs to
18 the international recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina?
19 A. I indicated earlier that on 7th April 1992 the Bosnian Serb political
20 movement indicated -- declared implementation of the February 28th
21 provisional constitution and that took place in Banja Luka.
22 Q. This document that I now show you, does that relate to the answer you
23 have just given?
24 A. The document is a copy of the official gazette of the Republika
25 Srpska and contains the constitution of the Republika Srpska. The date
1 for the official gazette is 31st December 1992 and the date for the
2 constitution is 17th December 1992.
3 MR. NIEMANN: I tender that, your Honour.
4 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Is there any objection to 56?
5 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No, your Honour.
6 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Exhibit 56 will be admitted.
7 MR. NIEMANN (To the witness): Dr. Gow, what was the effect or purpose of
8 this document
9 in relation to the constitutional development of the Republic of Srpska?
10 A. The first way in which this document is significant is because it
11 indicates the change in name from the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and
12 Herzegovina to Republika Srpska. If I could move to the first Article of
13 the constitution, you will note that in the provisional constitution of
14 28th February, the Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was the
15 state of Serbian people and other people and the citizens of the state. In
16 this case, the Republika Srpska is the state of the Serb people alone, no
17 mention of others, of other possibilities.
18 But you will note that the territories used to constitute
19 the Serb ethnic
20 entities, that is, what were the autonomous regions, it establishes the
21 borders only by
22 means of a plebiscite. I am not clear that that plebiscite was ever
23 taken, although a series
24 of plebiscites were taken on a number questions. Finally, it again
25 confirms in December 1992 that the Republic is part or regards itself as
1 part of Federal Yugoslavia and,
2 therefore, not part of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
3 Q. Perhaps that exhibit could be marked and returned? Dr. Gow, going
4 back, if we may, to April 1992, following the international recognition
5 of Bosnia-Herzegovina, what then followed this process of international
7 A. Leading up to and following the international acknowledgment of
8 Bosnia and
9 Herzegovina's independent international personality, there was a major
10 armed conflict.
11 Q. Could you just look at this map that I now show you? (Handed) Dr.
12 Gow, what does this map relate to?
13 A. The map indicates places in the early part of the period we are
14 discussing in March and
15 April 1992 in which armed conflict occurred in the very first weeks of the
16 conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The map is slightly stylized and
17 indicates major communication points in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
18 Q. Who prepared the map?
19 A. The map was prepared by the Office of the Prosecutor at my direction.
20 MR. NIEMANN: I tender that document, your Honour.
21 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Is there any objection to Exhibit 57?
22 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No, your Honour.
23 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Exhibit 57 will be admitted. Before you get into a
24 discussion of
25 that, Mr. Niemann, we will take a recess for 20 minutes. We have
1 received, Mr. Wladimiroff, the motion on Defence access to the accused.
2 Have you received a copy of that, Mr. Niemann?
3 MR. NIEMANN: We have, your Honours.
4 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Then we will consider that after the recess when we
5 return. We
6 will stand in recess for 20 minutes.
7 (11.30 a.m.)
8 (The hearing adjourned for a short time)
9 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr. Wladimiroff, we have received the motion on
10 Defence access
11 to the accused. I have reviewed it. Would you wish to state your
13 MR. WLADIMIROFF: Yes, your Honour, I think a little to add to what has
14 been written in the motion by itself; I take it it is self-explanatory, so
15 you will understand what is the argument. The argument is simply based on
16 the general principle which is recognised in most jurisdictions, that the
17 Defence has free access to the client and, therefore, it should not be
18 limited otherwise other than, for example, official observations, but not
19 by numbers or other restraints.
20 If I may add, we have asked for the Trial Chamber to
21 order that a Defence counsel and their designated consultant be allowed
22 free access. May I add to that that we also wish you to set the
23 conditions because so far we have only been able to discuss matters with
24 our client here in these premises while the door was open and the guards
25 were able to overhear what we were discussing. We would rather prefer not
1 to be heard. So, therefore, we ask that you set conditions under which we
2 may talk to our client, not overheard by the guards.
3 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: I have attached to the motion, Mr. Wladimiroff, a
4 letter to you
5 dated May 8th 1996. It says: "Professor Wladimiroff, the Registrar has
6 considered your request that two of your expert witnesses be allowed to
7 meet Mr. Tadic in the holding cell at the Tribunal for the purposes of
8 consultation". Then it says: "I regret to inform you
9 that such an arrangement is not possible since the cells at the Tribunal
10 are not suitable for conferences of several people. For this reason, the
11 Registrar has confined visits at the Tribunal to the detainee's legal
12 representatives. It will, of course, remain possible for the expert
13 witnesses to visit Mr. Tadic at the detention unit. I apologise for the
14 inconvenience which this may cause. Signed by Dominique Marro, the Deputy
16 With respect to your first request, the access, I think I
17 will ask Mr. Marro to respond, if he wishes. This is the letter that he
18 submitted to you. It sets forth his reasons. That was not the decision
19 of the Trial Chamber. It was the decision of the Registrar. So let me
20 hear from Mr. Marro.
21 MR. WLADIMIROFF: May I draw your attention before you ask Mr. Marro to
22 respond to
23 No. 6 of the motion, because I think that is a relevant part as far as the
24 restraints are concerned here.
25 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes. What you say is that since the Defence has
1 visited the
2 accused of the Tribunal with four persons at several previous occasions,
3 this restraint
4 seems unfounded where the Defence requested for the access of four persons
6 MR. WLADIMIROFF: Exactly.
7 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr. Marro?
8 THE REGISTRAR [Original in French]: Your Honour, the point I wanted to
9 make was that
10 the Registry has always tried, as far as possible, to help out the Defence
11 as well as any other people involved in this trial, so there is no
12 principal objection to the request being made. Now, the problem here is
13 mainly that of a practical nature, because in part of this building there
14 are five small cells which have been set up in such a way that accused
16 in fact, waiting there before they appear at the trial.
17 For any possible discussion to take place, this has not
18 actually been provided for. I do regret that because the confidential
19 nature of the discussions has not been secured. I would personally be in
20 favour of having a possibility for those who want to discuss in those
21 cells to do so, these discussions being confidential. But, for security
22 reasons and for reasons of convenience, of course, allow visits in these
23 cells. Clearly enough, we have always allowed the counsels of the accused
24 to be able to pay visit to
25 their clients and to take the necessary instructions from them, because of
1 the hearings taking place.
2 Now, the problems we were faced with yesterday and,
3 contrary to the point explained by Mr. Wladimiroff, were not members of
4 the Defence. We are not talking about attorneys and counsel with a power
5 of attorney. We are talking about witnesses.
6 Of course, they are experts but they are witnesses. We thought that the
7 dividing line between the attorney and witnesses would not enable us to
8 secure free access under such conditions.
9 I would also add to that that over and above the concerns
10 expressed by Mr. Wladimiroff yesterday afternoon, we are trying to look
11 for another possible way of
12 settling this problem; in other words, having discussions between the
13 experts and the accused. I do hope that we will be able to use another
14 room in forthcoming weeks. It might not be available at all times, but at
15 least it will enable us to settle the matter.
16 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: It seemed to me that we have two questions. One has
17 to do with
18 the cell itself, with the number of cells. There may be some problem with
19 the privacy, so
20 to speak, of Mr. Tadic's discussions. But if you have met with four
21 persons, but the door,
22 I gather, has been opened, so you would want to meet and the door would be
23 closed, is
24 that not so, along with the expert witness?
25 MR. WLADIMIROFF: That is correct, your Honour.
1 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Is there a problem with from that for security
2 purposes, Mr.
4 THE REGISTRAR: I do hope and I do think that if this is being instructed
5 to us by the judges, we will certainly meet that request, but I do not
6 think that witnesses should find
7 themselves in the accused's cells. It would not be a right thing.
8 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: You are not asking for witnesses; you are asking for
9 an expert witness, I gather. He is a witness but a different kind of
11 MR. WLADIMIROFF: Beside that, it had not been noticed to the Registrar
12 that these
13 gentlemen are expert witnesses, are at this stage of the trial
15 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: The person who wanted to speak with Mr. Tadic is at
17 table, I gather?
18 MR. WLADIMIROFF: We want to speak with Mr. Tadic in their presence and
20 reactions from Mr. Tadic in their presence.
21 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: That is the gentleman who is sitting at counsel
22 table, I gather.
23 MR. WLADIMIROFF: And another gentleman sitting in the audience hall.
24 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Both of whom will be expert witnesses?
25 MR. WLADIMIROFF: They may be expert witnesses; so far they are
1 consultants to the Defence.
2 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: They are consultants but they may be designated as
3 expert witnesses.
4 MR. WLADIMIROFF: Yes.
5 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: The reason I am asking you is that it seems to me
6 that there is a difference between expert witnesses and witnesses.
7 MR. WLADIMIROFF: Absolutely. We are not going to present any witness of
8 fact to Mr. Tadic and discuss matters with him.
9 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr. Wladimiroff, without talking with the head of
10 the security --
11 we have only heard from the Registrar -- we will allow, at least until we
12 have had an opportunity to confer with the chief of security, expert
13 witnesses to confer with Mr. Tadic along with the lawyers, but there will
14 be a maximum of four persons at any one time in the cell in this building
15 with Mr. Tadic. So that may be on occasion two persons who you
16 may designate at some point in the trial as your expert witnesses along
17 with two lawyers, but in any case, whatever combination, no more than four
19 MR. WLADIMIROFF: That is exactly what we wanted so we are very pleased.
20 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Very good, and the door may be closed when you are
21 conferring with him. As I indicated, we will talk with the chief of
22 security. If there are any problems with that, then we will advise you
23 and, if necessary, we will enter an order. At the present time, we do not
24 have that problem because only one cell is being occupied in this building
25 at this time. There may come a time, though, when that will not be the
1 case and perhaps
2 an adjustment will have to be made. Also, as Mr. Marro indicated, there
3 is a room that
4 will be adjacent to this courtroom where possibly arrangements can be made
5 where you will have a little more comfort in your conferring. We will
6 advise you of that as the days go on.
7 MR. WLADIMIROFF: We appreciate that. Thank you, your Honour.
8 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr. Niemann?
9 MR. NIEMANN (To the witness): Dr. Gow, there is just one matter I wish to
10 clear up before we proceed to look at the last exhibit that you were given
11 which arose earlier in
12 testimony. You said in relation to the referendum on the independence of
13 Bosnia and Herzegovina that there was a 63 per cent participation, but a
14 number of people of Serbian nationality did not participate in this vote
15 because they were prevented from doing so.
16 Can you just assist us, perhaps, by going a little further and telling us
17 who it is that you were referring to, so far as you know, that prevented
18 them from participating in this referendum?
19 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: I think his testimony was that there was a certain
20 number that did not participate either because they chose not to or were
21 prevented, but you will talk now,
22 I gather, about that proportion who were prevented, according to your
24 THE WITNESS: It is my understanding that in some areas people were
25 prevented from, or attempts were made to prevent people (and in cases
1 successful attempts) from
2 participating should they have decided to do so because the elements of
3 the SDS and, according to reports, in conjunction with elements of the JNA
4 created barricades which prevented ballot boxes being taken into certain
6 MR. NIEMANN: Just to conclude that, you were not in making reference to
7 people of Muslim nationality or of Croatian nationality as preventing
8 these people from voting?
9 A. I was not indicating that political or official representatives of
10 either of those communities was attempting to do that. I would not be a
11 position to say whether or not any individual member involved in such
12 activity was or was not of any particular ethnic community.
13 Q. Thank you. Going to the map which has now been made Exhibit 57 and
14 in relation to the war that followed in Bosnia-Herzegovina following the
15 recognition of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina's state, can you refer
16 to that map in terms of the military activity?
17 A. The map as displayed indicates the main communications axes through
18 Bosnia and Herzegovina. It indicates the dates on which violent armed
19 incidents connected with the war occurred. These were not only following
20 the international acknowledgment of the independent international
21 personality of Bosnia and Herzegovina, but also in the period immediately
22 prior to it.
23 The first of these clashes was at Bosanski Brod on 27th
24 March, and at the
25 same time there were clashes at Derventa, which should actually be -- the
1 star should actually be on the communication axis there rather than
2 halfway along. There were also incidents at places, for example, such as
3 Bijeljina on 2nd April, that is, in the period
4 prior to the international acknowledgment of the independence of Bosnia
5 and Herzegovina on 7th April, and also at Kupres here.
6 The nature of these incidents which continued after the
7 international recognition and were to take place at all the other places
8 designated in this first month of attack appear to be part of a
9 co-ordinated Serbian JNA programme of activity to establish
10 a framework of control for all the access and communication points into
11 and out of
12 Bosnia and Herzegovina.
13 You will note that all the places where there were these
14 incidents in the first month of the war are all places of points which
15 control completely access into and out of Bosnia and Herzegovina. They
16 are on the main communications axes, so you will see the early action of
17 Bosanski Brod was particularly with reference to the possibility and,
18 indeed at that stage, the reality of Croatian army forces being in place
19 on the border there.
20 All the incidents take place either at entry points into
21 Bosnia and Herzegovina or at points of major importance on the
22 communications axes, that is, in a manner so as to prevent, by taking
23 control of those areas -- in a manner so that by taking control of those
24 areas access could either be guaranteed from Serbia and Montenegro into
25 Bosnia and Herzegovina to support the campaign, or could be denied to
1 anybody wishing to try to
2 give assistance from the territory of the Republic of Croatia.
3 The incidents were accompanied by a series of actions
4 involving JNA and paramilitary groups.
5 Q. Would you look at this document that I now show you? (Handed) Dr.
6 Gow, what does that map represent?
7 A. The document is a map representing control of territory by the
8 different armed forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I would say, in 1993.
9 Q. Who prepared the map?
10 A. The map was prepared by the Office of the Prosecutor at my direction.
11 MR. NIEMANN: I tender the map.
12 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No objection, your Honour.
13 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: No objection to 58; it will be admitted on your
14 exhibit list, Mr. Niemann. You indicate that it is areas of control in
15 Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1992?
16 MR. NIEMANN: Yes.
17 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Should it be 1992?
18 MR. NIEMANN: I am just going to ask that question, your Honour. (To the
19 witness): Dr. Gow, I think you just said then, and for the transcript,
20 1993; do you mean 1993?
21 A. I said 1993. I would be prepared to accept that it was for 1992.
22 The situation changed relatively little in much of this period. The
23 reason why I said 1993 is because of the
24 extent of the green on the map and it looks more like 1993. I asked for
25 the map to be drawn up and I will accept that if this was on the basis of
1 information for 1992, that is
2 what it indicates. I do not think, whether it is 92 or 93 will not
3 significantly alter the
4 nature of the evidence.
5 Q. Thank you.
6 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: 58 then is admitted.
7 MR. NIEMANN: Perhaps you might just, taking us through that map, indicate
8 the respective positions of the various participants in the war?
9 A. Yes. The map as composed was derived from information derived from
10 Ministry of Defence information in the United Kingdom indicating areas of
11 control. The area shaded
12 in -- the area I am now indicating which to me is indicated in a kind of
13 deep rose pink colour -- but I understand the colours appear differently
14 on different monitors, so if
15 people can acknowledge that whatever that colour is for them, that is the
16 colour to which
17 I am referring -- indicates territory under Serbian control.
18 For most of the period we are talking about, the official
19 designation for the force controlling this territory is the Vojska
20 Republika Srpska, that is, the Army of the Serbian Republic, but, as we
21 will, I believe, move to explain in further evidence, that army was de
22 facto the remnants of the JNA.
23 The area down here which for me is marked in blue
24 represents Croatian forces, that is, the Bosnian Croatian HVO forces, but
25 there were also elements of the Croatian army there. The area covered in
1 green represents areas in which the army of Bosnia and Herzegovina was in
2 control, or units associated with it in the case of places in eastern
4 What the map shows overall is that a situation which, in
5 terms of Serbian control of territories, changed very little from May 1992
6 through to the summer of 1995. It shows the degree to which the Serbian
7 military and political forces took control of large parts of Bosnia and
8 Herzegovina. These were the territories which were designated de facto as
9 forming part of the Republika Srpska -- the Republika Srpska, as you
10 recall from the constitutional documents we gave before, which regarded
11 itself as being part of not Bosnia and Herzegovina but the Federal
12 Republic of Yugoslavia.
13 JUDGE STEPHEN: Does that mean that there was one government in control of
14 the whole of the area shown as Bosnian-Serb Army?
15 A. Certainly.
16 Q. Was that government one that was run from Pale?
17 A. It is certainly the case that the leadership based in Pale claimed
18 responsibility for exercising government or tight authority over the whole
19 of that territory.
20 MR. NIEMANN: Thank you. Perhaps that Exhibit might be returned?
21 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: One question about the map then. This would
22 indicate areas of control in Bosnia-Herzegovina for the period May 1992
23 through the summer of 1995?
24 Do I understand your testimony correctly?
25 A. Until the summer of 1995, that is correct, with -- there may be some
1 small changes but, broadly, that would be the picture.
2 MR. NIEMANN: Perhaps that exhibit might be returned? I would ask you
3 now, Dr. Gow, to look to the video monitor to watch the series being
4 played which is part 5 of Exhibit 31, if your Honours please, of the
5 video. Can part No. 5 of Exhibit 31 be now played?
6 (Part 5 of Exhibit 31 was played).
7 Dr. Gow -- just stopping there, please -- that was a very
8 short segment. Can you tell us what it relates to?
9 A. It is again an extract taken from the series "Death of Yugoslavia"
10 and it shows the leader of the Serbian Democratic Party in Bosnia and
11 Herzegovina, Radovan Karadzic, in the Parliament of Bosnia and
12 Herzegovina. The cutaway that you see while he is speaking is to Alija
13 Itzebegovic, President at that time of Bosnia and Herzegovina and leader
14 of the Muslim Party of Democratic Action.
15 The Serbian Democratic Party leader is issuing a
16 warning-come-threat in which he says, and this I believe was in March
17 1992, but I stand to be corrected, I may have misremembered that, in which
18 he indicates that if the presidency and government in Bosnia and
19 Herzegovina are to proceed to declare independence, to seek to have
20 independent international personality, then the Muslim population would
21 not be in a position to defend itself.
22 MR. NIEMANN: Does your Honours wish to see it again or was that
24 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: No, it is not necessary.
25 JUDGE STEPHEN: I hope this is not simple idle curiosity, but in your
1 sheet of exhibits, if we subsequently are looking at these films, what are
2 these times? Take 1, programme 3,
3 time, I thought that was one hour 39 minutes. Is it one minute 39
4 seconds and then what are the fractions of a second?
5 MR. NIEMANN: Yes, your Honour. If I can place it on the screen, I might
6 explain it so that
7 we can go through it.
8 JUDGE STEPHEN: Because we will need to know when we play these over to
10 MR. NIEMANN: I understand. If it can be put on the screen, I think I
11 might be able to assist. There is a reference there right at the top of
12 the page, your Honours, you will see that
13 there is the title of the programme and it says that it is a five part
14 series. The situation is that when this was copied for the purposes of
15 providing it to our colleagues on the Defence, we put it on to two tapes.
16 We put the whole series on to two tapes.
17 Immediately underneath that, you can see tape 1 and it goes down and then
19 subsequently becomes tape 2.
20 So what happens is that the Defence have two full tapes.
21 If they need to look at the particular part of the programme being played
22 in context, they can go precisely to
23 the point in the tape and see it. Then they can see the side of it
24 because they have the
25 whole place provided. They are then given the time because on the bottom
1 of the tape
2 there is a time marker so it assists them in locating it.
3 It is not really there in any sense so much for the court
4 because the tape the court will get will only be the excerpts. We are not
5 providing the tape with the whole five part series. It goes for many,
6 many hours. It is a very, very long series. There were five programmes.
7 We do indicate the reference to the programme is where it appears in the
8 programme that was played on the BBC. So programme 2, programme 3 and so
9 forth is where it appears.
10 So if it were, your Honours, the first column -- in fact,
11 it is the third column with writing in it, but the third column, which
12 starts headed "Tape 1, programme 2" and then the numbers there is merely
13 to assist the Defence. The part that your Honours may
14 be assisted with at some subsequent stage, if you want to watch the tape,
15 is where it says "Parts" because, if your Honours please, if you look at
16 the tape when it is played, the one that will be tendered in evidence, it
17 has a little number that comes up just before the sequence starts. That
18 is corresponds with part 1, part 2, part 3, 4 and so on.
19 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Our copy is all on one roll, I understand, so it
20 will be very simple for us.
21 MR. NIEMANN: Yours is very simple.
22 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: We will just play it and it will show consecutively
23 as listed here.
24 MR. NIEMANN: Yes. So what your Honours are seeing is we are taking you
25 to the parts, but
1 it is all on the one tape. If you played it all, it would be no longer
2 than, I would imagine, 10 minutes or something like that.
3 (To the witness): Dr. Gow, what role, if any, did the
4 paramilitary groups play in the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
5 A. Paramilitary groups such as those to which reference was made
6 yesterday organised by Zeljko Raznjatovic, Arkan, and by Vojislav Seselj,
7 were involved in the incidents in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the spring of
8 1992 at some of the places that I indicated on the map. Arkan was present
9 in places such as Bijelina and Zvornik where his forces were
10 used to go into the towns and to begin part of the process of taking
11 control of those areas
12 as part of the Serbian project and as part of the process of beginning to
13 eliminate or expel those who would be non-loyal inhabitants.
14 MR. ORIE: Your Honour, if I may, it seems to the Defence that we are
15 coming to a point
16 where testimony is going to be given, at least we fear that it will be, on
17 events that happened in approximately the time of the offences our client
18 has been charged with. As far as the Defence is aware, the expert witness
19 has no first hand knowledge of what actually happened at that time and at
20 these places.
21 So if it would come to questioning him about this, we
22 would object because we think it proper that if this expert witness would
23 give his opinion about the events that happened, that your Chamber first
24 should hear witnesses or, at least, hear testimony from people who have
25 seen and have heard and have been present during that time, and not
1 start with hearing the expert opinions on these issues before having heard
2 the evidence itself. I doubt a bit on what point exactly we should make
3 this objection, but I think we either reach this point or we are coming
4 quite near to it.
5 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr. Niemann?
6 MR. NIEMANN: I am not entirely sure to what portion of the evidence the
7 Defence are referring, your Honours, but no doubt they will take their
8 objection in relation to any specific question I ask that they wish to
9 object to. All I might say at this stage, and it is difficult to deal
10 with it until we know precisely what the objection is and what it relates
11 to, is that Dr. Gow has been, in our submission, qualified as an expert
12 throughout his testimony up to now. He has referred to various sources
13 that he has relied upon in order
14 to express his opinion. He will do so, and continue to do so, throughout
15 the balance of
16 his testimony. In my submission, it is entirely appropriate and proper
17 for an expert appropriately qualified, having regard to the source
18 material that the expert has referred to and studied, to express an
19 opinion about that.
20 Just how much notice the court takes of the opinion in
21 absence of any other evidence that may be tendered is a matter for the end
22 of the day. It may be that on some matters there could be considerable
23 evidence called of eyewitness testimony, and there may be in some areas
24 not so much evidence. That is a question that will be addressed, no
25 doubt, by the Defence in terms of how much weight your Honours should put
1 on what
2 Dr. Gow has said.
3 In my submission, it is not a question of admissibility;
4 it is entirely a question of weight. If Dr. Gow is accepted by the
5 Tribunal as an expert, as I submit that he has been up-to-date, he has
6 expressed his opinion, he is entitled to give that opinion. The Defence
7 are perfectly entitled then to turn round and say that because there is
8 nothing else other than Dr. Gow's opinion, or because of the basis upon
9 which he expresses that opinion, your Honours should attribute little or
10 indeed no weight to it. But that is for another time and another place.
11 In my submission, there is nothing so far, and I
12 apprehend that nothing Dr. Gow will say, will touch on the question of
13 whether or not it should be
15 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr. Orie.
16 MR. ORIE: Your Honour, first I would like to point out that where the
17 Prosecutor says that
18 Dr. Gow has indicated his sources and has stressed that he is an expert in
19 the field, I may remind you that one of the sources Dr. Gow mentioned is
20 the witnesses of the Prosecutor. So, what we would like to prevent is
21 that Dr. Gow's opinions as an expert represented here, although they may
22 mainly be based on the statements of the Prosecutor's witnesses, and it is
23 exactly at this moment that I object against this because, as far as we
24 are aware, but we have not heard any details about that, as far as we are
25 aware Dr. Gow has not
1 been present in the area at the time we are approaching now, at least not
2 in the places we are speaking of at this moment. I would strongly oppose
3 arguing at the end of the day on what part of the opinions of Dr. Gow are
4 without any factual basis, so just leave it as the Prosecutor suggests to
5 a matter of arguing on the relevance of the statements, of the
6 reliability, on the basis of it. I think your Chamber should not hear
7 evidence that is at risk of being just a reproduction of the statements of
8 the witnesses of the Prosecution.
9 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Well, here we are to discuss our Rules of Evidence,
10 all 10 of them. The first objection that you raised, you indicated, Mr.
11 Orie, that you considered that it was appropriate for the Defence to offer
12 its witnesses first before hearing from Dr. Gow, that
13 is persons who actually saw what happened, I thought that is what you
15 MR. ORIE: Yes.
16 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: I do not know that that is necessary. It seems to
17 me it is
18 appropriate for the expert witness for the Prosecution to testify,
19 assuming that proper foundation has been laid, before then. You will have
20 your opportunity should you choose to offer witnesses, to speak contrary
21 to what Dr. Gow testifies to. Of course, you will
22 have your opportunity for cross-examination. So I do not know that we
23 should wait for witnesses from the Defence before we hear from Dr. Gow.
24 The problem with Dr. Gow's
25 testimony, as I see it, really goes to the foundation, what he is basing
1 his testimony on.
2 As I recall, Dr. Gow said as he had indicated yesterday, and we saw parts,
3 what did we
4 see, parts 1 through 3 or 4 or parts 2 through 4 at least of Death of
5 Yugoslavia or
6 snippets of parts 2 and 3, just 2 and 3 I guess, we did not see any of
7 part 4, just 2 and 3
8 and perhaps part 1. He made references or there were references made in
9 the Death of Yugoslavia to paramilitary groups. But all of that, as I
10 recall, Mr. Niemann, related to the conflict between Serbia and Croatia
11 and had nothing to do with the presence of the paramilitary groups in
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is the area now that this witness is getting
13 into talking about.
14 Every single one of those snippets, except for I believe
15 the report of the conference between Milosevic and President of Slovenia,
16 had to do with the conflict between Serbia and Croatia. So that, for
17 example, when we heard from Seselj when he spoke about paramilitary groups
18 and when we heard from Bokan I guess and he spoke about Serbia supporting
19 paramilitary groups, Bokan I guess was talking about Vukovar and that has
20 nothing to do with the area the witness is now getting into.
21 So it seems to me he is attempting to rely upon testimony
22 that was related
23 and restricted to the conflict between Croatia and Serbia to now say that
24 there were paramilitary groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina. That is really the
25 problem where we are.
1 That goes to foundation, it seems to me. You can handle it either by
3 or, if you want to, you can make the objection, but your objection that we
4 should wait for witnesses I do not know that that is appropriate, Mr.
6 MR. ORIE: A misunderstanding, your Honour, because I did not only refer
7 to witnesses of the Defence but as far as we can interpret the list of
8 witnesses that are offered by the Prosecution that we think it appropriate
9 to first hear those witnesses who may have first-hand knowledge of what
10 happened and only afterwards hear Dr. Gow's expert upon that.
11 MR. NIEMANN: Your Honours, I would like to say something.
12 JUDGE STEPHEN: Can I ask one question to elucidate? Your objection I
13 understand is that you do not want Dr. Gow to give evidence based on
14 evidence that is going to be given by Prosecution witnesses?
15 MR. ORIE: Yes, of course, it is a problem. We do not know exactly what
17 JUDGE STEPHEN: That is it, is it not?
18 MR. ORIE: But that is the main issue, yes.
19 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: It appears to the judges that to the extent Dr. Gow
20 is an expert
21 that he may base his opinion on evidence I suppose that is not yet in
22 evidence. In other words, he is giving an expert opinion and the evidence
23 upon which he is basing that opinion has not come into evidence. Now I do
24 not know whether the Prosecutor is going to offer this evidence, the
25 underlying documentation or support for Dr. Gow's opinion,
1 but at this point he may give testimony as to his opinion. The question
2 becomes what is
3 he basing that on. So it seems to me you are entitled to ask him that.
4 Mr. Niemann, I suppose in the interests of moving along, I would suggest
5 that you ask Dr. Gow that. For example, yesterday when he gave us charts
6 on the percentages of Serbs in the JNA force
7 at different times, I asked him what it was based on. Judge Stephen asked
8 him, "When
9 you say 'Serbs' are you talking about Serbs from Serbia or Bosnian
10 Serbs?" So, as long
11 as it is made clear by Dr. Gow before he gives his opinion what he is
12 basing his opinion
13 on, then I think you will be in a good position, at least to cross-examine
14 him or proceed how you wish at that point.
15 We will let the testimony in and it really goes to the
16 weight, but we suggest that
17 you ask Dr. Gow to indicate what he is basing his opinion on before we
18 Judges have to ask him.
19 MR. ORIE: Your Honour, if you allow me to make one additional
20 observation. One of the reasons of the concern of the Defence is that the
21 list of exhibits that has been presented to us is not at its end yet but
22 almost at its end. So that is an additional reason for the
23 Defence to fear that the sources might change in the questioning to come
24 soon, because at least as we can see it looks as if there will be other
25 sources to rely upon as far as the facts are concerned. That is the
1 reason why. I appreciate very much that every subject to start with asking
2 Dr. Gow what is the basis of his factual knowledge of what he will testify
4 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Fine. You understand the ruling. We are getting
5 close to the end
6 of the exhibits. We only have a few more.
7 JUDGE STEPHEN: Which is a great relief!
8 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: So, if you will do that, Mr. Niemann. Again it is a
9 trial to the
10 judges and much of it will go to weight, we will be able to separate out,
11 but I think you have a legitimate concern of knowing on what he bases his
13 MR. NIEMANN: There is just one matter, your Honour, I would like if I may
14 to address, just something that fell from your Honour when you were
15 discussing this. If we have given
16 the impression in the presentation of our evidence that the excerpts of
17 the tape of the Former Yugoslavia, exhibit 31, were in relation to the
18 paramilitary, were limited only to paramilitary involved in the war in
19 Croatia, then I regret that because I think perhaps, and
20 I will ask Dr. Gow, we would say it goes further than that, that there was
21 a general reference to the use of paramilitaries. We certainly would be
22 putting it on that basis, that
23 it is wider and it does apply to Bosnia as well, bearing in mind that the
24 interviews took place at a much later stage. They were not
25 contemporaneous with the war that was
1 taking place between Serbia and Croatia.
2 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: We will take a look at it. I just remember what
3 Seselj said. I remember what Bokan said and I thought that Bokan was
4 talking about, if I am pronouncing
5 the name correctly, Vukovar and Seselj again was talking, again after the
6 fact but about at that point, at least in point in time it was my
7 remembrance we were, even before the independence of Croatia. But that is
8 just my recollection. You are certainly free to
9 correct that, that is for sure, but at least we know about the parameters
10 for the testimony of Dr. Gow as an expert witness.
11 MR. NIEMANN: If your Honours please.
12 Dr. Gow, if I might just take you to that question.
13 Yesterday you were shown some excerpts of a tape which recorded
14 conversations by a number of persons that you
15 had identified as paramilitary leaders, including I believe Seselj and
16 Bokan, is that correct?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. From your understanding of the subject matter that they were
19 discussing, do you consider it was limited only to Croatia and the war
20 between the former socialist Republic of Yugoslavia and Croatia, or do
21 you believe it had a wider reference to events that
22 occurred beyond that conflict leading into and including the conflict in
24 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: And if so on what do you base that opinion?
25 A. The reference made to the Dragoslav Bokan was with reference to
1 Croatia. If you were to play the section designated part 2 again, I
2 believe you would find in listening to Seselj that he talks not only about
3 involvement in places in Croatia but he clearly states involvement with
4 Bosnian Serbs. He says there were some Bosnian Serbs fighting but there
5 were also armed forces, the JNA and special Police Forces from Serbia. If
6 you care to play it again
7 I think you will see that that was the case.
8 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Now that is part 2?
9 A. That is part 2.
10 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Would that be the first tape one interview with
11 Seselj or which one so we can look at it?
12 A. It is the material indicated as part 2 and it was towards the end of
13 the material indicated as part 2. There were several references within
14 part 2 on this schedule. If somebody could play maybe that could clarify
15 the matter.
16 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: He makes references to paramilitary groups in
17 Bosnia-Herzegovina and paramilitary groups receiving the backing of the
18 JNA in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
19 THE WITNESS: Yes.
20 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Thank you.
21 MR. NIEMANN: Perhaps that could be played, your Honour. Dr. Gow, I would
22 ask if you
23 could indicate where it is that you are referring to so the tape could be
24 stopped at that
1 (The tape was played).
2 THE WITNESS: You might want to stop this and pay attention to it.
3 MR. NIEMANN: Dr. Gow, is this the part that is about now to follow, is
4 this the part you are referring to?
5 A. This is the part to which I was making reference.
6 Q. Perhaps that could be played on.
7 A. Thank you.
8 Q. Dr. Gow, apart from the excerpt you have just seen there from the
9 video, is there any other basis upon which you rely when you express or if
10 you express an opinion about the involvement of the paramilitaries
11 operating in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
12 A. If I might remind your Honours and the Trial Chamber, when I began
13 giving testimony I
14 was asked on what basis I was giving evidence and at that stage I answered
15 in the affirmative, that I was basing testimony on reading a variety of
16 written sources, both official and non-official, both from the territories
17 of the former Yugoslavia and from outside those territories. In addition
18 to that I was basing the evidence on materials and on conversations with
19 what I regard as knowledgeable people. I did not go into the detail of
20 that, but the kinds of knowledge people to which I make reference are
21 either those who have been in the area or those who have done particular
22 work with regard to the area or those who are in positions working perhaps
23 as officials of governments or international organisations to be able to
24 express what I regard as credible opinions. I would base my judgments on
25 that kind of information, and throughout that is what I have been
1 attempting to do. As far as I will proceed in giving evidence, that is
2 what I will continue in my attempt to do.
3 With specific reference to the question of paramilitaries
4 either in Croatia or in Bosnia and Herzegovina, I see that there could be
5 little problem in anybody discussing the presence of the those forces.
6 There were open reports of the types of units described
7 being involved in incidents in the places to which reference is made. I
8 believe as evidence continues, one of the coming exhibits will also
9 indicate the presence of these people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I can
10 only try on the basis of the -- I can only try on this basis
11 to assist the court in what whatever way I can and as far as I can be
12 expert in anything at all.
13 Q. Dr. Gow, in the last excerpt on the tape that we played there was a
14 reference to Bosnia-Herzegovina or Bosnia I think it said, Bosnia. Do you
15 know from what was said there to what part of Bosnia reference was being
16 made by Seselj?
17 A. I do not know to which particular part of Bosnia and Herzegovina
18 Seselj was making reference. He was simply saying that there were Bosnian
19 Serbs there but there were also his forces and forces from Serbia, and
20 that the most significant forces were those from Serbia.
21 Q. Dr. Gow, I would ask you now to look at the next document I show you.
22 (Handed). Firstly, can you tell me what that is?
23 A. This is a copy of the United Nations Security Council resolution 752
24 1992, dated 15 May 1992.
25 Q. Who obtained the document, do you know?
1 A. It was obtained by the Office of the Prosecutor from the United
3 Q. I tender that, your Honour.
4 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Is there any objection to 59?
5 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No objection, your Honour.
6 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: 59 will be admitted.
7 MR. NIEMANN: Dr. Gow, perhaps you could look at that document and, in
8 particular -- well, perhaps show the first and second pages on the screen
9 to start with. That is a resolution
10 of what date? I think it is shown at the top there.
11 A. The date is 15th May 1992.
12 Q. Yes. Going particularly to paragraphs 3 and 4 on the second page of
13 the document, do you rely on either of those paragraphs as support for
14 your testimony in relation to the involvement of Belgrade?
15 A. I do. The two paragraphs indicated identify that units of the JNA,
16 as well as units of the Croatian army, were present on the territory of
17 Bosnia and Herzegovina at this time. The Security Council is demanding
18 that those units be withdrawn, unless they are placed under the control of
19 the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
20 Q. Yes. Perhaps that Exhibit might be returned, please.
21 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Dr. Gow, does that resolution indicate what was the
22 reason for the presence of the JNA? It indicates they are in
23 Bosnia-Herzegovina as well as, if we can take a look at it again, does it
24 indicate they were engaged in a conflict with Bosnia-Herzegovina or
25 perhaps as you indicated earlier they were on that soil using it as a
1 jumping-off grouped, so to speak, for Croatia?
2 A. It may be of assistance to your Honour if ----
3 Q. Please, it went so quickly.
4 A. --- I can indicate that the Security Council considered the
5 announcement on 4 May 1992 by the authorities in Belgrade on the
6 withdrawal of the Yugoslav People's Army personnel from Bosnia and
7 Herzegovina other than those who were originally from the republic of
8 Bosnia and Herzegovina.
9 Q. Where it says, "Having considered"?
10 A. "Having considered the announcement in Belgrade on 4 May 1992
11 described in paragraph 24 of the report of the Secretary General of 12 May
12 1992 concerning the withdrawal of Yugoslav People's Army personnel from
13 republics other than Serbia and Montenegro and the renunciation of
14 authority over those who remain."
15 Q. That means?
16 A. That means that on 4 May 1992 the authorities in Belgrade announced
17 that the JNA would be withdrawn from the territory of Bosnia and
19 Q. I understand that that indicates that they were there. I guess my
20 question is you testified earlier ----
21 A. I said it indicates that the authorities in Belgrade on 4th May said
22 that the forces would be withdrawn. The resolution on 15 May indicates
23 that the forces are still present.
24 MR. NIEMANN: That is in paragraphs 3 and 4?
25 A. Which is paragraphs 3 and 4 on the second page.
1 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: I understand they were there, but I understand also
2 from earlier testimony that you had indicated that they were in
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of a
4 conflict with Croatia. My question is whether this resolution indicates
5 that they were in
6 the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina in conflict with the Bosnians or there
7 as a part of
8 their conflict with Croatia?
9 A. I do not recall if the resolution makes comment on that.
10 MR. NIEMANN: If you go to the first part of the resolution you see the
11 third paragraph, the third paragraph "Deeply concerned"?
12 A. The third paragraph does indicate the concern of the Security Council
13 for the depressingly violent situation, particularly in Bosnia and
14 Herzegovina. Further down it notes the tragic incident on 4th May 1992 in
15 which a member of the European Community Monitor Mission was killed. The
16 resolution -- I will quickly check -- if I can take your Honour back to
17 paragraph 3, you will see, I think you can take it from the demand of the
18 Security Council that outside elements, including units of the Yugoslav
19 People's Army, ceased immediately that interference, that the Security
20 Council regarded the presence of the Yugoslav People's Army units, and the
21 Croatian army units possibly, as being interference in the internal
22 affairs of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It does not state
23 specifically how the Security Council regarded the purpose of that
25 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: We will stand in recess until 2.30 please. (1.05
2 (Luncheon Adjournment)
3 (2.30 p.m.) PRIVATE
4 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr. Niemann, are you ready to proceed?
5 MR. NIEMANN: Yes, your Honour. I think Dr. Gow is coming in. (To the
6 witness): Dr. Gow, just prior to the adjournment for lunch, you were
7 looking for us at the United Nations Security Council resolution 752,
8 which is dated 15th May 1992, and has become Exhibit 59. Dr. Gow, can you
9 tell us what the state of the conflict was in Croatia at the time of the
10 passing of the adopting of this resolution?
11 A. There had been a cease fire in the conflict in Croatia signed on 2nd
12 January 1992 under the auspices of the European Community and the United
13 Nations. That was the cease fire between the government of Croatia and
14 its forces, the JNA and Serbian, local Serbian forces in Croatia.
15 Therefore, in a formal sense, the conflict in Croatia was not carrying on,
16 although there were repeated violations of that cease fire agreement which
17 were reported, but these were small but they were on a regular basis.
18 I think it is important to note that much of what I have
19 been saying in testimony was, in the first instance, with relation to
20 Croatia, but then has also been in relation to Bosnia and Herzegovina and
21 that much of the evidence that I have been trying to give is indicating
22 the nature of the war. I think it may be a mistake that because there are
23 two theatres of war, one in Croatia and one in Bosnia and Herzegovina, to
24 treat, to think of it as two separate questions.
25 The central element in all of this is the project to
1 create the set of territories involving the linked Serbian units between
2 Serbia, through the Serbian Republic in Bosnia
3 and Herzegovina and the Republic of Serbia in Croatia. So, therefore,
4 all of this activity is connected. The war in Bosnia and Herzegovina is
5 one aspect. In a way, it is rather like regarding the war -- during the
6 Second World War regarding Germany's eastern front war with the Soviet
7 Union as being a separate war from its western front campaign with the
8 western allies.
9 Q. Dr. Gow, was Security Council resolution 752 of 15th May 1992
10 complied with?
11 A. It was not.
12 Q. Did the Security Council react to the noncompliance with resolution
14 A. It did. It met and it issued a further Security Council resolution
15 which was 757.
16 Q. Would you look at the document I now show you? (Handed) Is this
17 Security Council resolution 757?
18 A. This is a copy of Security Council resolution 757, dated 30 May 1992.
19 MR. NIEMANN: I tender that, your Honour.
20 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Any objection?
21 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No objection, your Honour.
22 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Exhibit 60 will be admitted.
23 MR. NIEMANN (To the witness): Dr. Gow, I think if we could go to the
24 second page of the resolution, to the heading "Deploring":
25 A. In the section indicated beginning "Deploring", the Security Council
1 indicates that there has not been compliance with the demands made in
2 resolution 752. Among those items to which reference was made in 752, it
3 goes on to note that, to reaffirm the involvement, the point about the
4 involvement of the Yugoslav People's Army in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
5 Q. Thank you. Might that exhibit be returned to the Registrar? I would
6 now ask for part 6 of Exhibit 31, the video, be now played, please? Dr.
7 Gow, I just ask you to watch it first and then we will come back to it, if
8 we may.
9 (Part 6 of Exhibit 31 was played)
10 Dr. Gow, who is the gentleman that has been interviewed
12 A. That was Borisav Jovic who had been the representative of President
13 Milosevic of the Republic of Serbia to the collective state presidency of
14 the SFRY in its final phase. President Jovic -- sorry, Mr. Jovic, in this
15 instance, is discussing the decision to take measures with regard to the
16 JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Those measures involved preparations for
17 moving people of Bosnian-Serb origin within the JNA into Bosnia and
18 Herzegovina so they would be deployed there and rotating those as many as
19 possible who
20 were not from Bosnia and Herzegovina to the territories of Serbia and
22 What President Jovic -- forgive me; I do not know why I
23 keep saying that -- what Mr. Jovic is saying is that they decided that it
24 was clear that if the JNA remained in Bosnia and Herzegovina as the JNA,
25 it would be regarded by the outside world as an aggressor, that is, in
1 fulfilling its role in the project I identified earlier with reference
2 particularly to the book by General Kadijevic and, therefore, what they
3 would do would be to attempt to blur the issue and to deceive the outside
4 world to some extent. That is to say, that the JNA would be withdrawn,
5 but at the same time de facto the JNA would be divided.
6 So, those people who were not citizens -- those people in
7 the JNA who
8 would be citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina because they were born there
9 would remain
10 with JNA units in Bosnia and would be transformed into the Army of the
12 Republic. But because the Army of the Serbian Republic and the Republika
13 Srpska itself would not have resources for such an army, Belgrade would
14 continue to pay for and to provide officers for an armed force of this
16 Q. When he makes reference ----
17 A. If I might say -- this is similar in a way to the tactic which
18 General Kadijevic described with reference to Croatia -- I mentioned this
19 in testimony yesterday -- the idea that you cannot make it clear to the
20 international community what it is that you are doing; you have to, you
21 say that you are doing one thing because you do not want to put yourself
22 in a situation where you might face particular actions.
23 Q. When you say there was an attempt to deceive the international
24 community of what was happening, is that your understanding of what he
25 means when he uses the term "pulling a fast one"?
1 A. The translation on the screen used the term "pulling a fast one". He
2 is attempting, indeed, to indicate the way in which they intended that
3 they would remove any clear sense that it was the JNA controlled by
4 Belgrade which was operating in Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of this
5 project for creating the set of states.
6 I should also point out that the decision to do this was
7 announced on 4th May 1992, at which point it was indicated that they
8 intended the process of withdrawal, what they call the withdrawal of the
9 JNA, that is, citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina -- sorry, citizens of
10 Serbia and Montenegro would -- that the process announced on May 4 would
11 be complete by May 19, and that that process was the withdrawal of
12 citizens of -- the withdrawal of the JNA which, in effect, meant the
13 withdrawal of citizens of Serbia and Montenegro and some of the equipment
14 of the JNA. The bulk of the equipment of the JNA was left with the forces
15 in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
16 Q. Dr. Gow, this was a concern in Belgrade, was it not, that arose
17 because the Security Council by this stage had already passed a resolution
18 making demands with respect to the withdrawal of the JNA?
19 A. This was a concern because it was already clear that the situation in
20 Bosnia and Herzegovina was being discussed in the international arena in a
21 way which might lead to the imposition of a sanctions regime or other
22 action against Serbia and Montenegro.
23 resolution 752 of May 15 indicated this concern for the
24 presence of the JNA. resolution 757 of May 30 took the measure of
25 applying economic, political sanctions
1 against Serbia and Montenegro because it was regarded as being responsible
2 for the
3 continuing presence of the JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina. That was
4 indicated in resolution 752 -- sorry, in resolution 757.
5 MR. NIEMANN: Do your Honours need to see that again?
6 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Pardon me?
7 MR. NIEMANN: Do your Honours wish to see the tape played again or is that
9 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: No.
10 MR. NIEMANN (To the witness): Dr. Gow, when the JNA divided itself, what
11 were the respective titles given to the two halves?
12 A. After May 19, when the formal date for withdrawal of the JNA from
13 Bosnia and Herzegovina had been -- after the date for which formal
14 withdrawal had been designated,
15 May 19, the old, what was left of the old JNA was, effectively, divided.
16 It was divided into the army of the Serbian Republic, the Vojska Republika
17 Srpska, the VRS, and the Vojska Jugoslavije, the Army of Yugoslavia, that
18 is, of Serbia and Montenegro.
19 Q. In your opinion, did this division of the JNA amount to a genuine
20 withdrawal of the army?
21 A. It was clear that the decision to withdraw the JNA in this was not a
22 decision so much to withdraw the JNA as to avoid, or attempt to avoid,
23 some of the political assessments which would be made in the international
24 arena and which, indeed, were made nonetheless. The attempt, the
25 situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and, indeed, in Croatia
1 after the withdrawal of JNA forces in the same manner from Croatia in the
2 first part of 1992, that is, from the parts of Croatia occupied and
3 controlled by Serbian forces, where weaponry and elements were left behind
4 for the local Serbian forces, the same thing happened in Bosnia and
6 The aim of this, as I was saying, was to give the
7 impression that it was a matter purely internal to Bosnia and Herzegovina,
8 although it is significant that the forces provided as a result of this
9 split in the JNA left -- were part of the single project I identified for
10 connecting the states, the project identified in General Kadijevic's book,
12 that this action was clearly distinct from the action taken by the JNA in
13 withdrawing from Slovenia, from non-Serbian controlled territories in
14 Croatia and from the Republic of Macedonia.
15 In all those cases, the JNA withdrew all its equipment
16 and in many cases destroyed facilities and things which would be left
17 behind which might be of benefit. So, in taking this action, Belgrade
18 was giving a very clear and substantial -- taking a very clear and
19 substantial position on the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the
20 degree to which assistance was being given.
21 Q. Would you look at the next document I show you, please? (Handed).
22 What is this document?
23 A. It is a copy of a report of the Secretary General of the United
24 Nations dated 3rd December 1992, and the copy is taken from the Cambridge
25 International Documents series.
1 MR. NIEMANN: I tender that, your Honour.
2 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Any objection?
3 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No objections, your Honour.
4 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Exhibit 61 will be admitted.
5 MR. NIEMANN (To the witness): Dr. Gow, just looking at this document and
6 in terms of what you have just been discussing in your testimony, can you
7 tell us the significance of this report by the Secretary General?
8 A. The significance of the report is that following on from the
9 references I have made to resolutions 752 and 757 regarding the presence
10 of the forces of neighbouring countries in Bosnia and Herzegovina
11 interfering in the independence and territorial integrity of that state,
12 the report from the end of 1992, that is, several months after the
13 Security Council resolutions to which I made reference, indicates the
14 continuing presence of the Croatian Army and reports the alleged presence
15 of the Yugoslav People's Army -- sorry, the continued presence of the
16 Yugoslav Army, by this time the VJ, the Vojska Yugoslavia.
17 Q. Can you draw our attention, please, to those references?
18 A. You will note the reference to the question of the units of the
19 Yugoslav People's Army and the elements of the JNA as per the earlier
20 resolutions. If you move down through, if we can move down through it,
21 you will see that the Secretary General is continuing through UNPROFOR to
22 receive credible reports of extensive involvement of forces of the
23 Croatian Army, and also that, allegedly, the Bosnian Serb forces, that is,
24 the VRS, the part of the JNA which was left active in Bosnia and
25 Herzegovina, continues to receive assistance from the Federal Republic of
1 Yugoslavia. These are all supported by journalistic accounts of other
3 The greater emphasis on the presence of the Croatian Army
4 is because the Croatian Army was operating in areas where Spanish, French
5 and British troops with
6 UNPROFOR were present and were able to give clear and authoritative
7 accounts. The
8 reports for the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia assistance are described as
10 because they cannot be given on the same basis, but they are, nonetheless,
11 broadly regarded as being credible by those who were there. Thank you.
12 Q. Might that exhibit be returned and, Dr. Gow, I would like to take you
13 back, if I may, to Dr. Kadijevic's book, firstly, Exhibit 30, if that
14 could be given to the witness, please?
15 A. I still have it; it was never taken away before.
16 Q. I am sorry. It is still with the witness. Page 65. It may not be
17 that page. Would you look at page 80?
18 A. Thank you. I was finding it difficult to see anything of relevance
19 on the page.
20 Q. I am sorry.
21 A. If you can move up, I can see immediately that page 80 looks far more
22 relevant. I draw your attention to the paragraph I am indicating now.
23 You will see General Kadijevic, in effect, confirming what I was saying
24 before. I will read the quote, read aloud the extract which is in
2 "The units and headquarters of the JNA formed the backbone of the Army of
3 the Serb Republic, complete with weaponry and equipment. That Army, with
4 the full support of the Serb people, which is required in any modern war,
5 protected the Serb people and created the military conditions for an
6 adequate political solution", that is one which would achieve the creation
7 of these republics, Serbian Republic in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as
8 the Republic of Serbian Krajina which, as far as international
9 circumstances would permit, would be joined with Federal Yugoslavia and
10 which, according to their constitutions, regarded themselves as
11 constituting part of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, but not of Bosnia
12 and Herzegovina.
13 Q. On page 88, perhaps, if you could look at that one?
14 A. Again, General Kadijevic is confirming the point that it was the JNA
15 which was carrying out these operations in conjunction and co-operation
16 with Serbian irregular forces, first of
17 all, in his terms, to liberate Serbian Krajina, but also in Bosnia and
18 Herzegovina the JNA, later the Army of the Republic of Srpska, which the
19 JNA put on its feet, helped to liberate
20 Serb territory, that is, to create effective Serbian control of the
21 territories which were indicated on one of the maps I showed earlier.
22 Q. Perhaps that could be removed from the screen? Had the JNA prepared
23 themselves for this division?
24 A. Yes, in the period leading up to the division of the JNA into the VRS
25 and the VJ, as I think I already said, to be clear, members of the Army
1 who were from Bosnia and Herzegovina were being moved into Bosnia and
2 Herzegovina while, as far as possible, those who were citizens of Serbia
3 and Montenegro were being withdrawn from Bosnia and Herzegovina. After
4 May 19 1992, many of those, although for some time after that many were to
5 remain, for the most part those who were citizens of Serbia and Montenegro
6 were withdrawn, although not within the time frame that was indicated.
7 Q. Did Belgrade though continue to support the Serb forces in Bosnia
8 after May?
9 A. It did, not only with the supply of -- with logistics assistance and
10 the supply of material, but
11 also at certain periods through the presence of the armed forces of the
12 Federal Republic
13 of Yugoslavia on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
14 Q. Would you look, please, at the document I now show you? Can you tell
15 me what the document is?
16 A. The document is an extract from the Summary of World Broadcasts,
17 Eastern European series. The Summary of World Broadcasts is produced by
18 the BBC monitoring service at Caversham in the United Kingdom. This
19 particular extract refers to the speech given by Slobodan Milosevic,
20 President of Serbia, to the Assembly of the Serbian Republic in Bosnia and
21 Herzegovina on, I think, 11 May 1993.
22 Q. Do you consider it as a reliable source?
23 A. I consider it to be a reliable source, yes.
24 MR. NIEMANN: I tender that, your Honours.
25 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Any objection?
1 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No objection, your Honour.
2 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Exhibit 62 will be admitted.
3 MR. NIEMANN (To the witness): Firstly, this is a broadcast on 11 May
5 A. That is true.
6 Q. Can you take us to any particular part of that exhibit that you wish
7 to refer in relation to your testimony concerning the involvement of
9 A. I will take you through the two pages of the document, if I may?
10 First of all, the report on
11 the left-hand side indicates the address given by -- the address was given
12 by Slobodan
13 Milosevic to the Assembly of the Bosnian Serbs. If I can move to the
15 page, apart from the first paragraph, the remainder is text of a statement
16 given by Slobodan Milosevic to Tanjug. Tanjug is the Yugoslav state press
18 If you begin to move through, he makes several references
19 that during the past two years the Republic of Serbia assisting Serbs
20 outside Serbia and the difficulties of
21 the situation in which this has put the Republic of Serbia. "Because of
22 its solidarity with assistance to the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina,
23 Serbia is subjected to brutal international sanctions". That is the
24 sanctions regime first imposed by resolutions 757, although shortly after
25 this those measures were to be strengthened by a further Security Council
2 "Clearly, we were aware we would face these difficulties
3 when deciding to provide assistance to Serbs who were at war. Now
4 conditions for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina have been created", and,
5 therefore, he goes on to suggest that the war should be stopped.
6 If you move through, if you keep moving through and maybe
7 move on to the next page, again he makes reference, "Serbia has lent a
8 great, great deal of assistance to the Serbs in Bosnia and owing to that
9 assistance they", that is the Bosnian Serbs, "have achieved most of what
10 they wanted". At this point he is indicating Serbia should begin to
11 take care of itself and, therefore, he is urging, he has been urging the
12 Bosnian Serbs (and this is in the address he gave at Pale) to accept
13 proposals for a settlement at that time, that is, that the settlement in
14 question was the one known as the Vance Owen plan. I think that is
15 probably enough for that.
16 Q. Thank you. Dr. Gow, apart from the matters that you have already
17 referred to, which you cite, as examples of Belgrade's continued
18 involvement in the Bosnian war after May 1992,
19 are there any other examples that you know of of such continued
21 A. There are. Belgrade on a number of occasions was noted to have had
22 forces deployed on the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In several
23 cases, these were not necessarily always large units, but there were cases
24 during 1993 and 94 where units of the VJ were involved in operations with
25 regard to Bosnia. Elements of the 63rd Airborne Division were involved --
1 Airborne Brigade -- were involved near Sarajevo. Elements of the Nis and
2 Uzice corps were involved in a number of locations in eastern and southern
3 Bosnia. There were reports of elements of the Novi Sad corps being
4 involved during 1992 and after in parts of eastern Bosnia, particularly in
5 the areas around Zvornik, Bijeljina, and activity continued into 1994
6 where there was evidence of joint air activity between
7 elements of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Serbia and Montenegro, the
9 Srpska and Republika Srpska Krajina.
10 Q. Would you look please, at the next document that you are shown?
11 (Handed). What is that document?
12 A. The document is a further extract from the Trifunovska "Yugoslavia
13 Through Documents" volume. This particular extract relates to a letter
14 from the President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina to the
15 President of the Security Council concerning a decision by
16 the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina to proclaim a state of war. The
17 date of that letter is 22 June 1992.
18 MR. NIEMANN: I tender that, your Honours.
19 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Any objection to Exhibit 63?
20 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No objection, your Honour.
21 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Exhibit 63 is admitted.
22 MR. NIEMANN (To the witness): In relation to this question of the
23 involvement of the Yugoslav Army, can you take us to the specific
24 reference for that?
25 A. First, I would emphasise the significance of this document is that
1 the presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina as wanting to make a formal
2 political and legal declaration of a state of war. If I can move to the
3 second page -----
4 JUDGE STEPHEN: Before you do, the state of war is not proclaimed with any
5 other particular specified country?
6 A. The proclamation of the state of war is made with reference -- in
7 making the proclamation of the state of war reference is made to Security
8 Council resolution 752 and, therefore, I think could be taken as by being
9 reference to that resolution is also with reference to the presence of the
10 forces of neighbouring countries on the territory of Bosnia and
12 Q. At that time, I am not quite clear of the status of the enemy, it
13 would be the new Federation of Serbia and Montenegro, or the remnants of
14 the old Yugoslavia?
15 A. In the case of Belgrade forces deployed in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it
16 would be forces of the newly declared Federal Republic of Yugoslavia,
17 Serbia and Montenegro. That was declared on 27th April 1992.
18 Q. That is the date I wanted, thank you.
19 MR. NIEMANN: On the second page, could you .....
20 A. On the second page in the letter, the President of Bosnia and
21 Herzegovina continues,
22 indicates, that the Yugoslav Air Force, in particular, he advised as being
23 involved in
24 bombing campaigns, bombing operations, at Gorazde and Visoko.
25 Q. Those two towns are in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
1 A. They are indeed.
2 Q. I think there is further reference further down the page, is there,
3 it is not the declaration of war but -----
4 A. He goes on to identify the action in the eyes of Bosnia and
5 Herzegovina as being an act of aggression and indicates that artillery and
6 airfields in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Serbia and Montenegro have been
7 used as part of this campaign.
8 Q. Thank you.
9 A. Finally, I just point out that he goes on to say beyond that in his
10 request, in view of that fact, Bosnia and Herzegovina regarding itself as
11 subject to an act of aggression by the Republic of Serbia, the Republic of
12 Montenegro and the Yugoslav Army as well as the internal elements of the
13 Serbian Democratic Party.
14 Q. What is that a reference to, the terrorists of the Serbian democratic
16 A. Those are the local Serbian forces of the, Serbian irregular forces
17 of the Serbian Democratic Party, the SDS, led by Radovan Karadzic.
18 Q. Perhaps that Exhibit might be exhibited? Would you now look at the
19 document I show you? (Handed) What is that a map of?
20 A. This is a map of the area around Gorazde in south-eastern Bosnia and
21 Herzegovina and it is
22 a map which indicates certain movements of military forces in March and
23 April 1994.
24 Q. Who prepared the map, do you know?
25 A. The map was prepared by the Office of the Prosecutor at my direction.
1 MR. NIEMANN: I tender that, your Honour.
2 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Any objection?
3 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No objection, your Honour.
4 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: 64 will be admitted.
5 MR. NIEMANN: Dr. Gow, would you look at that map and can you explain for
6 us the significance of the markings that appear there?
7 A. The outer set of markings, the broken line I am running along now,
8 indicates roughly the
9 area around Gorazde declared as a safe area under the auspices of the
10 United Nations
11 and, for the most part, under Bosnian/Muslim control. The red line
12 indicates the front line
13 to which Bosnian, Serbian and other forces moved in the course of April
15 The green lines indicate the lines of attack taken, taken
16 in order to carry out
17 that attack. There should be a marking, maybe this is the marking here,
18 yes -- no, there
19 should be a marking somewhere here which indicates the border between
20 Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina as well. If I could add -- if I
21 could see with my own eyes first of
22 all, I might be able to identify it because it does not seem to come
23 through very clearly. It still does not come through very clearly.
24 I will just have to indicate that the border, for the
25 purposes of what I have to say, the presence of the border between
1 Montenegro and Bosnia and Herzegovina which is somewhere there, although I
2 stand to be corrected by an accurate border being indicated, the
3 significance of this is that in the operations of Gorazde in April 1994
4 elements of special units from the Nis corps of the Vojska Jugoslavije and
5 units of the Uzice corps were reported to have been involved.
6 The those reports of involvement also are supplemented by
7 a deduction from the line of attack, which is that Serbia and Montenegro
8 has to have been giving assistance
9 in order for this attack to have taken place because the gathering point
10 at Cajnice in northern Montenegro is on the point of the -- access to the
11 gathering point is only via the road across the border. Forces gathering
12 there could not have come from anywhere else but Montenegro.
13 Q. Thank you. Would you look at the next document that I show you? In
14 connection with that particular -----
15 A. If I may, and I reserve a lack of certainty on this, I think I have
16 identified the problem in the preparation of map, and that the border is
17 here and runs across there and that this is the route which forces to have
18 come to Cajnice for the attack would have to have taken from the Republic
19 of Montenegro which lies just off the edge of this map now.
20 Q. In relation to the attack on Gorazde, what is the document that I
21 have now shown you?
22 A. The document is a paper headed, titled "The truth about Gorazde"
23 dated May 4, 1994. It is on headed paper from the Task Force on Terrorism
24 and Unconventional Warfare of the House Republican Research Committee of
25 the US House of Representatives.
1 Q. Do you consider that to be a reliable source?
2 A. I considered it to be a reliable source for the purposes of this
3 evidence, yes.
4 MR. NIEMANN: I tender that, your Honour.
5 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Any objection?
6 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No objection, your Honour.
7 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Exhibit 65 will be admitted.
8 MR. NIEMANN: In particular, I think, if you could place page 9, you might
9 have a look at it first. Perhaps you might refer to the section?
10 A. In particular, I would draw your attention to the paragraph I am now
11 indicating in which the report identifies, the report concerned with the
12 attack on Gorazde, identifies components of the Uzice corps.
13 Q. What does that mean?
14 A. The Uzice corps is based at Ujzice in south western Serbia and
15 special forces from the Nis area, that is, Nis is again within the 3rd
16 military district of the Vojska Jugoslavije in southern Serbia. Maybe I
17 would be permitted to explain something about the character of
18 this document?
19 Q. Yes.
20 A. It is significant that the bulk of the document is more concerned
21 with identifying in what it describes about the truth about Gorazde in
22 describing the activities of Bosnian government army and Muslim units in
23 the area around Gorazde. It was compiled, obviously, by people who were
24 well informed, but who did not necessarily, I think, know where Nis and
25 Uzice were.
1 It is my judgment that it was prepared in that context to
2 persuade people in Congress in the US, possibly and probably -- I stress
3 this is speculation and only interpretation from the material that is
4 there -- that in the complex situation such as the war in Bosnia and
5 Herzegovina that the bulk of responsibility for the events of Gorazde lay
6 with the Bosnian government army.
7 The inclusion of the references to Nis and Uzice, I
8 think, I would probably interpret as being based on reliable information,
9 but on a failure to understand where Nis and Uzice are.
10 Q. Thank you. Perhaps that document might be returned? Dr. Gow, dealing
11 with the pattern of the spring 1992 attacks in Bosnia, do you, in your
12 opinion, consider that the spring offensive was a planned operation by the
14 A. The operations in the spring of 1992 were planned and co-ordinated
15 actions involving elements of the JNA, local Serbian Territorial Defence
16 units and paramilitary groups.
17 Q. In relation to that, would you look now, please, at the document that
18 you are shown?
19 (Handed) Would you look at those pages that are now given to you? What
20 are they?
21 While you are dealing with that, could you just refer, please, to the
22 number that appears
23 on the top of each one when you describe each one? When you describe each
24 one, can
25 you tell us in reference to the number that appears in the top -- you see
1 2/15, 2/16 and so forth?
2 A. Map 2/15 indicates certain Yugoslav Army air bases in Bosnia and
3 Herzegovina. Map 2/16
4 is a map indicating selected infrastructure resources in parts of the
5 former Yugoslavia. Map 2/17 is a selected indication of industry in Bosnia
6 and Herzegovina. Finally, map 2/18 is a map showing certain towns in
7 Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the complete layout of the local
8 government, local government areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
9 Q. Those local government areas are sometimes referred to as Opstinas?
10 A. Those are the Opstina in Bosnia and Herzegovina, yes.
11 MR. NIEMANN: I tender those, your Honour.
12 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Any objection to Exhibit 66?
13 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No objection, your Honour.
14 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Exhibit 66 will be admitted.
15 MR. NIEMANN (To the witness): Dr. Gow, looking at these maps, can you
16 demonstrate for us by reference to them the nature of the spring attacks?
17 When you are referring to them progressively, would you make reference to
18 the number that appears at the top so it can be indicated for the record
19 which number you are referring to at any given time?
20 A. Dealing with map 2/15 at the moment, indicating the air bases in
21 Bosnia and Herzegovina, broadly speaking, the areas which were involved in
22 the initial campaign also included, or attempted to include, these air
23 bases. The air base at Tuzla was not occupied by the JNA and its
24 associates at that time. The JNA destroyed the facilities at the air base
25 at Bihac. As it pulled out, it left -- it continued to use the air bases
1 around Banja Luka and after the division of the JNA ostensibly in May
2 1992, air force units were left to operate from Banja Luka with the VRS.
3 The airport at Sarajevo was controlled by the Serbs
4 throughout the conflict until the point in 1992 where, with their
5 agreement, the United Nations formally took control of running it, and
6 French units of the UNPROFOR from the summer of 1992 onwards formally
7 controlled the airport, although only with Serbian agreement.
8 This map of selected infrastructure through parts of
9 Yugoslavia again indicates a set of oil pipelines and gas pipelines and so
10 forth which run broadly along the axes of the war in Croatia and the war
11 in Bosnia running down through parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It may
12 well be that part of the activity of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina was
13 to secure control of areas in which these facilities and so forth were
14 present as well as of the main communications axes. That map was 2/16.
15 Map 2/17 indicating industry in Bosnia and Herzegovina;
16 again you will see the broad area of which the Serbian forces took control
17 is also, broadly, the area in which particular assets can be identified.
18 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: I cannot determine on the map, are they diagrams of
19 the industry, is that it?
20 A. The symbols represent different aspects of industry. This little
21 symbol here represents metallurgy, for example, and this represents
22 chemical industry.
23 The final map, 2/18, is simply for reference to the
24 particular Opstina throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina, should it be of use
25 to the court, in seeing where particular situations might have occurred
1 and where they relate to the territories which claimed as part of the
2 Serbian autonomous provinces and so forth.
3 MR. NIEMANN: Thank you.
4 A. I can confirm that the final map was 2/18.
5 Q. Dr. Gow, would you look at this document that is shown to you?
6 (Handed) What is that document?
7 A. The document is Annex III(A) on special forces of the final report of
8 the United Nations Commission of Experts established pursuant to Security
9 Council resolution 780, 1992. The date on the document which has the
10 reference S/1994/674/ Annex III(A) is 27 May 1994.
11 MR. NIEMANN: I tender that, your Honour.
12 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Any objection?
13 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No objection, your Honour.
14 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Exhibit 67 will be admitted.
15 MR. NIEMANN (To the witness): Dr. Gow, what support do you seek to obtain
16 from this document in terms of your evidence?
17 A. The document indicates ways in which paramilitary groups and the JNA
18 operated in parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina as part of the campaign being
19 undertaken in the spring of 1992.
20 Q. Is there a specific reference to that on page 166?
21 A. I just point out, first of all, that the report, as well as
22 indicating the elements of the Serbian campaign with which my evidence is
23 primarily concerned, also indicates the activity of
24 some Croatian and Muslim paramilitary groups within Bosnia and
25 Herzegovina, but that the bulk of the sections to which I made reference
1 first of all deal with what is described as Zvornik County, that is
2 Zvornik Opstina, and indicates the presence, first of all, of forces loyal
3 to Vojislav Seselj.
4 If I might take the opportunity to indicate with
5 reference to evidence given this morning, when we saw the individual
6 evidence of Seselj talking about involvement in Bosnia, I took the liberty
7 on checking on this and he was speaking specifically with reference to the
8 town of Zvornik in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The document goes on to detail the
9 presence, not only of Seselj paramilitary forces, but also of those of the
10 Serbian volunteer guard of Arkan.
11 Q. Yes, perhaps that might be returned? Would you look at this
12 document that is shown to you? What is this document?
13 A. This is Annex IV to the same document to which I just made reference,
14 that is, the Security Council document S/1994/674, Annex IV, dated 22nd
15 May 1994; again part of the final report of the United Nations Commission
16 of Experts. The Annex is titled "The Policy of Ethnic Cleansing".
17 MR. NIEMANN: I tender that, your Honour.
18 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Any objection?
19 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No objection, your Honour.
20 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Exhibit 68 will be admitted.
21 MR. NIEMANN (To the witness): Dr. Gow, what part of this document do you
22 seek to rely on for the purposes of your testimony?
23 A. If I can go through, first of all, again beginning with the reference
24 to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Zvornik, elements of the
25 JNA are identified from the 1st military
1 district and from the 2nd military district being involved in the area in
2 preparations, moving out and taking positions around Zvornik in the period
3 before the onset of major armed hostilities and before the formal
4 recognition of the independence of Bosnia and Herzegovina; and then moving
5 through to identify particular units which were involved in
6 the early phases of the armed conflict.
7 The document also goes on to identify the presence of
8 some of the paramilitary groups to which we have already made reference in
9 the course of my giving testimony. Specifically here we can see reference
10 to paramilitary units with the exception
11 of those controlled by Arkan which were judged to be identified as being
12 under the
13 authority of JNA officers. We can move further through the document, you
14 will see `various references to the paramilitary groups and to their use
15 of JNA uniforms and equipment.
16 Q. Thank you. Might that be returned? Dr. Gow, I would now ask you to
17 watch a very short video sequence and then after watching it I will ask
18 you some questions in relation to it. Your Honours, I am referring to 69
19 in the exhibit list.
20 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Is there any objection to 69?
21 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No, your Honour.
22 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Exhibit 69 will be admitted.
23 (The video was played)
24 Dr. Gow, are you aware of who prepared this? Firstly,
25 tell me what it is.
1 A. This is the opening sequence from a special edition of the programme
2 entitled "The Cook Report" and it is produced by Central Television in
3 Birmingham, in the United Kingdom.
4 Q. Did you have any involvement in the preparation of this series?
5 A. I had some involvement acting as a consultant.
6 Q. Thank you. Could part No. 1 of the series be played, please, part
7 No. 1 of Exhibit 69.
8 (Part No. 1 of Exhibit 69 was played)
9 Dr. Gow, I think it is obvious from the clip that that
10 was Arkan that was shown there?
11 A. It was.
12 Q. Can you tell us are you aware of the time frame that that related to?
13 A. I cannot give a specific time frame for the period in which that
14 recording was made.
15 Q. Do you know to what area or what theatre of the war it related to?
16 A. Because it was made as a video made by Arkan himself, I do not think
17 we can be clear whether he was referring to part of the war in Croatia or
18 part of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
19 Q. Dr. Gow, what political measures were taken by the Serbs concurrent
20 with the military activities?
21 A. As well as the types of military, paramilitary operation to which I
22 have made reference, the Serbian forces had also been engaged in a series
23 of political preparations for taking
24 control in areas of Bosnia and Herzegovina further to the declarations of
25 the Serbian autonomous provinces. In particular, certainly from the end
1 of 1991 onwards, the Serbian Democratic Party in conjunction with security
2 service centres was preparing to take
3 control in certain areas and making the provision for shadow secret
4 governments which
5 would take up their role in office at a designated point.
6 Q. I would now ask you to look at the document I show you. (Handed) What
7 is this document?
8 A. The document is a document of the Serbian Democratic Party of Bosnia
9 and Herzegovina, its principal committee or chief committee. It is marked
10 "Strictly confidential". This is example or copy No., I think, 96. It is
11 dated 19th December 1991. It is on a document on the organisation and
12 activity of the organs of the Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina and
13 emergency circumstances.
14 Q. Do you know where this document was obtained from?
15 A. I believe the document was obtained by the Office of the Prosecutor
16 from the government of Bosnia and Herzegovina. I use it in evidence on
17 the basis that I understand it has been assessed by qualified experts from
18 governments which are members of the United Nations.
19 Q. Therefore, do you consider it to be a reliable source?
20 A. On the basis of those assessments, I would consider it to be
22 MR. NIEMANN: I tender that, your Honour.
23 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Any objection?
24 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No, your Honour.
25 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Exhibit 70 will be admitted.
1 MR. NIEMANN (To the witness): In relation to the testimony you have just
2 given, do you find
3 that this document provides some support for your evidence?
4 A. I believe it does; the document indicates preparations for the
5 creation of these para governmental structures through the establishment
6 of what are called crisis headquarters.
7 Q. Can you show us that, please, by placing it on the overhead projector
8 specifically to the .....
9 A. The document indicates tasks and measures to be carried out and
10 divides those by those people involved in the planning for the creation of
11 these governmental forms and identifies
12 two categories for the planning; one is in areas in which the Serbian
13 people form the majority, described as option (A), and one for areas in
14 which Serbian people are not in the majority, described as option (B).
15 If I could move on? The remainder of the document deals
16 with the two options and takes them through stages. Some of the elements,
17 key elements, of the preparation to which I will draw your attention,
18 apart from identifying appropriate candidates for certain particular
19 tasks, also involve ensuring contact, preparations for taking over control
20 of security service centres and also involvement, contacts with public
21 security service centres in certain areas, the principal one I believe
22 was in Banja Luka, although there was one in the principal towns in each
23 of the other four autonomous regions.
24 Also, part of this preparation was ensuring preparations
25 with regard to active and reserve members of the police forces, the
1 Territorial and Defence Force and Civil Defence units so that they would
2 be in a position to have adequate numbers in place at whatever time it
3 would be appropriate.
4 Finally, for this part of it I think I can indicate the
5 intention throughout to co-operate with units of the JNA. In particular, I
6 draw your attention to the point here, which the instruction is to begin
7 equipping war-time units with personnel, military resources and livestock
8 reserves according to JNA designations.
9 Q. Dr. Gow, what is the date of this document?
10 A. I think I already gave the date which was 19th December 1991.
11 Q. Thank you. Dr. Gow, was this activity by the Bosnian Serbs and the
12 activity by the JNA brought about as a consequence of provocation, be it
13 fabricated or genuine, in Bosnia and Herzegovina?
14 A. As you put the question, I would have to answer it on two levels.
15 Certainly, on a broad level, there was a process of action and reaction in
16 Bosnia and Herzegovina. I believe that members of the Serbian communities
17 in Bosnia and Herzegovina, as per some of the documents and declarations
18 we have seen, would regard the declaration of sovereignty and the
19 declaration of independence as being a provocative act.
20 On another level, with regard to operational questions
21 and activities in specific areas, it is clear that as part of a pattern
22 of activities in a number of places such as Bijeljina, such as Zvornik,
23 there was what appears to be an act of provocation within the town which
24 provided the justification for action by the JNA which had artillery
25 placed usually outside the town and by paramilitary forces which would
1 enter the town, again according to the pattern I identified in testimony
2 yesterday with regard to Croatia, that is, the JNA providing the heavier
3 weaponry but not having the manpower and resources to go into built up
4 areas and, therefore, relying on the volunteer forces.
5 Q. Dr. Gow, I would ask you now to watch the video sequence being part 2
6 of Exhibit 69,
8 (Part 2 of Exhibit 69 was played)
9 Could we stop that there for a moment, please? Is there
10 not normally sound attached to this one?
11 A. I do not believe there should be any sound attached, but if I could
12 ask for it to be replayed for my benefit, I am afraid I was remiss and
13 forgot to change monitors and so I was waiting for it to begin.
14 Q. Could we take it back and start again?
15 A. Thank you very much.
16 Q. Who is this that is being shown on the screen now?
17 A. That was Arkan.
18 Q. Does he appear again there?
19 A. He does.
20 Q. Who are the people that are in that circle?
21 A. If we could go back, as you go through I will identify one person in
23 Q. Perhaps if it was played again, you might indicate to us the people
24 there; could it be replayed again, please?
25 JUDGE STEPHEN: Would you like to tell us what you would hope to get out
1 of this? To me it means nothing at all.
2 MR. NIEMANN: Yes, your Honour. I might ask the witness to tell us the
3 significance of it as it is being played. Can you tell us the
4 significance of it and who it is that is appearing?
5 A. This is again an extract from The Cook Report special. Here we see
6 Arkan in his headquarters. The crest on the wall is that of his Serbian
7 volunteer guard. So, if we can continue, please, thank you.
8 As we move into the second sequence, the second sequence
9 that we now see -- if you could let it run just a little further, please?
10 Q. Could it go a little further, please?
11 A. You see Arkan himself there clearly identified on the left-hand side.
12 Here, if you can stop at that point, this sequence is filmed in the town
13 of Bijeljina in north eastern Bosnia at the
14 time on April 2nd, I think it was, 1992, the day on which Arkan's forces
15 had entered the town of Bijeljina as identified on documents I provided
16 earlier. Arkan is here seen kissing
17 a woman. That woman is Biljana Plavsic who at that time was one of the
18 two Serbian representatives to the collective presidency of Bosnia and
20 Immediately after this, Mrs. Plavsic and her
21 corepresentative, Nikola Koljevic, were to resign and both of them are now
22 acting or have been since then were acting as deputy presidents of the
23 Serbian Republic in Bosnia and Herzegovina, after that the Republika
24 Srpska, and Arkan again. Mrs. Plasvsic, I should point out, on this
1 is greeting and congratulating Arkan on the successful operation in
3 Q. To address His Honour's question, you refer to this to demonstrate a
4 sense of co-operation between Arkan and the Republic of Srpska?
5 A. I do it to demonstrate, first of all, in response to one of the
6 questions that was put earlier in the day, the presence of Arkan and his
7 paramilitary forces on the territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina and,
8 secondly, to indicate the co-operation that there was with senior
9 political figures who would become part of the Republika Srpska
11 Q. Thank you. Dr. Gow, what tactics were employed against the non-Serbs
12 by the JNA during the course of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
13 A. The forces either of the JNA or operating with the JNA in Bosnia and
14 Herzegovina carried out a series of actions associated with political
15 activities. The violent part of those activities involved a significant
16 degree of terror widely reported in a number of areas in Bosnia and
18 Q. I would ask you to look at the map that I now show you. (Handed).
19 What is that a map of?
20 A. It is a map of reported sites of camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Do
21 you want to me to -----
22 Q. Who prepared the map?
23 A. The map was prepared by the Office of the Prosecutor at my direction
24 on information derived from United Nations documentation. I believe the
25 map is selective rather than exclusive. For example, it does not include
1 any reference to camps that might have been organised by either Croat or,
2 I believe, reference to camps that might have been organised
3 by either Croat or Muslims.
4 MR. NIEMANN: I tender that, your Honours.
5 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Any objection?
6 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No objection, your Honour.
7 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Exhibit 71 will be admitted.
8 MR. NIEMANN (To the witness): Might that Exhibit 71 be placed on the
9 overhead projector?
10 I think you have already answered part of this. This map relates to camps
11 that were
13 A. It does indeed. If I might explain, that as the crisis, as the
14 combined JNA, post JNA and paramilitary armed forces were active with the
15 associated political programmes, in a number of areas a process of
16 separation of the population began. There were widespread reports of
17 extensive use of violence in a number of areas, allegations of atrocities
18 and, in a number of cases, many number of cases, there was a process by
19 which if people were not killed they were then administratively processed,
20 separated into military, potentially military age males and others. They
21 were in many cases given the opportunity to leave through administrative
22 processes on the basis of paying for exit visas and for transportation,
23 and on the basis of signing over property and other assets to the
24 authorities of the newly designated Republika Srpska which, I might add,
25 from day one had all its official documentation in place, including all
1 the rubber stamps and letter headed paper.
2 As part of this process, a number of camps were
3 established, conventionally referred to as "concentration camps", a term
4 which causes some concern, I think for the most part relates specifically
5 to the literal sense of the word in which people are concentrated in one
6 area for security purposes, otherwise detention centres. These were
7 created in a number of areas, as you can see, throughout Bosnia and
9 Q. Thank you. Dr. Gow, would you go to page 71 of Exhibit 30 being the
10 book by General Kadijevic?
11 JUDGE VOHRAH: Dr. Gow, could you look at the map again, please?
12 A. I would be happy to, yes.
13 Q. I see Omarska appears there, Trnopolje appears there, where is the
14 Keraterm camp?
15 A. Keraterm?
16 Q. Keraterm.
17 A. I believe Keraterm, as far as I am able to establish, is somewhere
18 there, but I am not sure exactly.
19 JUDGE VOHRAH: Thank you.
20 MR. NIEMANN: If your Honour pleases, we will be calling evidence of the
21 precise location of Keraterm during the course of the evidence.
22 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: It is not on this map.
23 MR. WLADIMIROFF: Your Honour, I may ask the witness to mark it on the map
24 where he located Keraterm.
25 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr. Niemann, any objection?
1 MR. NIEMANN: I do object to it on the basis, your Honour, that the
2 witness has already -- as long as it is indicated on the basis that the
3 witness has some uncertainty about it.
4 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Does he? Let me ask you this. This is Exhibit 71.
5 This is listed and it was admitted as a map of location of reported Serb
6 camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Does this purport to show all of the
7 detention camps operated by Serbs in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
8 A. No, I believe when I began talking about the map I clearly indicated
9 I regarded it as selected identification of camps. It was by no means
10 intended to convey any sense of being exhaustive, and I believe I made
11 that clear when I began.
12 Q. You did; you said it did not include camps operated by groups other
13 than Serbs -- at least, that was my understanding. I thought you said
15 A. I did indeed -- I did say, for example, that it did not include
16 reference to any of the camps that might have been operated by Croats and
17 Muslims, but it still made it selective and I would not necessarily regard
18 it as being comprehensive in terms of camps operated on the
19 part of the Serbian political and military bodies either.
20 I would also stress with regard to the request that was
21 made I did indicate uncertainty. As far as I understand it, Keraterm
22 (from the little that I know about Keraterm specifically) was a ceramics
23 factory and where the exact location of this place is,
24 I am afraid I would have considerable uncertainty.
25 Q. So you do not know where Keraterm is?
1 A. I would not -- I do not know where it is. I have an approximate
2 idea, I thought.
3 MR. NIEMANN: Dr. Gow, perhaps that Exhibit might be given to the
4 Registrar? Returning to page 71 of Exhibit 30, the English translation:
5 Dr. Gow, do you wish to draw our attention to something that appears on
6 that page in relation to your testimony?
7 A. I would draw your attention to the section here in this main
8 paragraph and would, in particular, draw your attention to the view of
9 General Kadijevic and the command of the JNA, a decision which was made in
10 conjunction with representatives of the Republic of Serbia to the SFRY
11 presidency, that in the process of the dissolution of the SFRY that, as a
12 priority at the political level, in addition to any military operations,
13 they had to mount a counter offensive which would confront the destroyers
14 of the old Yugoslavia, that is, those who would become independent, with a
15 new Yugoslavia composed of those peoples who wanted to live together in it
16 and who would not allow the disintegration of such a Yugoslavia.
17 This, I think, is significant in placing the evidence I
18 have been giving over the
19 past couple of days in an overall context. The General is clearly
20 identifying the political project to create new territorial entities. The
21 reference to peoples would be loyal to it maybe, in the General's
22 interpretation, might include non-Serbs but, from other parts of his text
23 and certainly from what happened in practice, was primarily designed to
24 include Serbian peoples and to be for those Serbian peoples; and that this
25 was a project which extended through parts of the territory of Croatia and
1 parts of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that that was the
2 context in which all the other things which we have been discussing has to
3 be considered.
4 Q. Dr. Gow, you said in the course of your evidence that the JNA left
5 air force units in Bosnia.
6 In addition to the aircrafts themselves, were air crews left in Bosnia as
8 A. Yes, some air crew were left in Bosnia and some air crew and aircraft
9 were left in the Republic of Serbian Krajina. However, it might be
10 significant to point out, for example, that in February 1994 the shadow of
11 the JNA, the three elements of the air force all acted together in an
12 operation against targets in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The pilots were
13 supplied from the Vojska Yugoslavia air base at Podgorica in Montenegro.
14 They were transferred to Udvina air base in the Serbian Krajina area, and
15 from there they flew operations on behalf of the Bosnian Serbs against
16 targets in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
17 This indicates, I think, the degree to which reference to
18 the political project and political military project I have just described
19 throughout the period there was a significant degree of co-ordination and
20 in one sense, although the JNA in one sense had bequeathed what would
21 formally be three armies, to a large extent, they could still act and
22 would still act as one.
23 Q. Did the military aircraft that was left behind in Bosnia include
24 fixed wing aircraft as well as helicopter aircraft.
25 A. It did yes.
1 MR. NIEMANN: I have no further questions.
2 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Do you have anything more of Arkan to play or have
3 you decided not to play that, the interview?
4 MR. NIEMANN: There is one thing.
5 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: It is in evidence; it is up to you.
6 MR. NIEMANN: We have played all of the tapes that I would wish to play,
7 your Honour, but there is one thing I just needed to attend to. I could
8 not attend to it yesterday because the exhibits were not here, but could
9 Exhibit 10(A) be shown to the witness, please?
10 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Exhibit 16?
11 MR. NIEMANN: 10A, your Honour, I am sorry. It is a map. (Handed). (To
12 the witness): Dr. Gow, could you place that on the overhead projector so
13 we can just see? I think you said earlier in your evidence in answer to
14 one of her Honour's questions that you may have made a mistake when you
15 made those notations on that map; is that right?
16 A. That is indeed correct. As I was speaking to her Honour, the judge,
17 it flashed into my mind
18 that I had written these two things down the wrong way round. So I would
19 just wish to correct the markings on the map, that where it says "after
20 1878" it should be "to 1878" and vice-versa.
21 Q. So you want to change the "to" and the "after"?
22 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Do you have any objection or do you want another
23 exhibit to come in as a correction, Mr. Wladimiroff?
24 MR. WLADIMIROFF: Let me just confer for a second. We have no problem
1 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: OK. The witness then may correct the exhibit, I
2 guess, and mark it according to your understanding now.
3 MR. NIEMANN: Perhaps it could be shown to us again with the corrections
4 that you have made? Thank you, your Honour.
5 JUDGE STEPHEN: I have two, I think, short questions. I do not know if
6 the witness is going to be here tomorrow morning, whether I can ask them
7 then or now?
8 MR. NIEMANN: He will be here for cross-examination tomorrow, your Honour.
9 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: As I indicated yesterday, we will be adjourning
10 early today. So we
11 will adjourn until 10 a.m. tomorrow morning.
12 (The hearing was adjourned)