1 THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL CASE NO. IT-94-1-T
2 FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
3 IN THE TRIAL CHAMBER
4 Thursday, 30th May 1996
5 (10.00 a.m.)
6 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr. Keegan, would you like to continue, please?
7 MR. KEEGAN: Thank you, your Honour. Can you please bring Mr. Mujadzic
8 in? Just before we start, it is my understanding that there is some
9 confusion on the order of the next few witnesses and I would like to
10 straighten that out so that all parties are clear. On the prior
11 notice we had, we indicated that Mr. Doko would be proceeding next.
12 However, because of the backlog and some of the delay that we had in
13 the proceedings, it was required for us to send him back to Bosnia so
14 he could participate in the elections that were scheduled in Mostar;
15 it was required for him to be there. So he is not, in fact, in the
16 country at this moment. We are bringing him back now.
17 So, as currently planned, the next witness would be the
18 witness P who was No. 12 on the original list, to be followed by
19 witness No. 15, Selak, because, as we had indicated, the witness 14 or
20 10 was gone and that is why we had moved Mr. Doko up originally.
21 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: What about 13? Witness P is 12.
22 MR. KEEGAN: Right. Witness 13, because of his commitments, will follow
23 -- the schedule was going to be P, Selak, Kranj.
24 JUDGE STEPHEN: What number is he?
25 MR. KEEGAN: 15 is Selak, Kranj is 17, then Doko 16 because of the time to
1 bring him back here and then Mr. Vulliamy who is No. 13.
2 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: So we have 12, 15, 17, 16 and 13, that is the
3 current order?
4 MR. KEEGAN: Correct.
5 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: This is witness 14?
6 MR. KEEGAN: Right.
7 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: The first three in this new order are here and will
8 be ready to go.
9 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Of course, witness P we will hear in closed session
10 pursuant to the motion of the Prosecutor, unopposed, I believe, by the
12 MR. KEEGAN: Correct.
13 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Very good. Would you continue, if there is nothing
14 else preliminary?
15 MR. KEEGAN: Thank you.
16 DR. MIRSAD MUJADZIC, recalled
17 Examined by MR. KEEGAN, continued.
18 Q. Dr. Mujadzic, when we left yesterday afternoon you had described a
19 series, listed a series, of events or meetings which occurred in the
20 first part of 1992, that you indicated caused some great concern to
21 you for what was about to occur. We began with at least the first of
22 those issues which was the meeting with Stojan Zupljanin, the head of
23 the Security Services in Banja Luka. You indicated that one of the
24 next significant issues was the proclamation of the Serb Republic in
25 Bosnia-Herzegovina and the consequent proclamation of a Serb Assembly
1 in opstina Prijedor. Can you describe the significance of those
2 events, please?
3 A. Following the proclamation of the Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina
4 -- I think this was at the beginning of 1992, I do not know the exact
5 date -- came the proclamation of the Serb municipality of Prijedor
6 which was published in the media. Milomir Stakic, who had legally
7 performed the duty of Vice President of the Municipal Assembly, was
9 in the proclamation of the Serb municipality the President of the Serb
10 municipality of Prijedor, and it was also announced that the Serb
11 municipality of Prijedor would be joined to the Serb Republic of
12 Bosnia-Herzegovina; and I know for sure that the names of members of
13 the municipal government were also published, the municipal government
14 of the Serb municipality of Prijedor. I am afraid I do not remember
15 all those names.
16 Q. After the initial announcement of the establishment of this Serb
17 municipality of Prijedor,
18 did Dr. Stakic and the others still continue to perform their
19 functions within the legitimate Municipal Assembly, the elected
20 Municipal Assembly, of Prijedor for a period of time?
21 A. Dr. Stakic himself for a time did continue to come to work after
22 the proclamation performing the duties of Vice President of the
23 legitimate Municipal Assembly, as well as the elected members of the
24 legitimate municipal government. Then perhaps just before the
25 outbreak of the war, Milomir Stakic ceased coming to work in the
1 building of the Municipal Assembly of Prijedor.
2 Q. You mentioned as one of the significant events the takeover of the
3 television transmitter which broadcast the signals to the Prijedor
4 area. What was the significance of that takeover?
5 A. It was a transmitter for the television of Bosnia-Herzegovina, on
6 Mount Kozara at the
7 point Lisina, just overlooking the city of Prijedor, and its function
8 was to transmit the TV signal for the territory of the entire Sana
9 River valley, therefore, the municipality of
10 Prijedor and several other surrounding municipalities.
11 At first, only the second TV channel was changed on this
12 transmitter; whereas the first channel continued to transmit the first
13 programme of the television of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The second
14 channel transmitted the programme of television Belgrade.
15 Q. How would you describe the type of programming that was being
16 received from the Belgrade channel?
17 A. I mentioned earlier on that Belgrade television had anyway been fully
18 in the service of Milosevic's greater Serbia and propaganda, and this
19 second channel continued to publicise Milosevic's propaganda on the
20 idea of a greater Serbia.
21 Q. At some point was the only channel of Bosnia-Herzegovina television
22 also cut off?
23 A. For a certain time the first channel continued to function and then,
24 I do not know the exact date, but maybe about a month later after the
25 transmitter was taken over, was the channel of Bosnia-Herzegovina
1 television cut off, so that the first channel, also first and second
2 channel, transmitted only the programmes of television Serbia.
3 Q. The next on your list of significant events was the beginning of the
4 war in Bosnia-Herzegovina particularly in the areas of Bijeljina and
5 Brcko. What significance did those events have on the population in
6 the opstina Prijedor?
7 A. People saw horrific pictures from Bijeljina where criminals and
8 extremists belonging to paramilitary formations under the leadership
9 of Arkan, under the command of Arkan, had killed tens and hundreds of
10 non-Serb inhabitants in Bijeljina, and immediately afterwards Biljana
11 Plavsic, who went on a visit to Bijeljina, shook hands, kissed and
12 congratulated Arkan. That was a horrifying picture which shocked and
13 frightened the non-Serb population in Prijedor.
14 Q. At the time that Biljana Plavsic went to Bijeljina, congratulated
15 Arkan, what was her position? What position did she hold in the
17 A. Up to then she held the position of member of the presidency of
18 Bosnia-Herzegovina, but I think by then she was at the same time or
19 maybe only a member or maybe Vice President
20 of the newly proclaimed Serb Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
21 Q. The next series of events you mentioned were the return of forces
22 from the Croatian war and their redeployment in the Prijedor opstina.
23 If I could have Exhibit 136 returned to the witness, please, and
24 placed on the elmo? While we are waiting for that to be displayed on
25 the elmo, Dr. Mujadzic, if you could briefly explain what forces were
1 being returned from Croatia?
2 A. After a cease-fire was established in Croatia, from the Croatian
3 battle front at Lipik and Pakrac, two brigades returned to the region
4 of Prijedor. They were the 5th Kozara Brigade, commanded by Colonel
5 Pero Colic, and the 43rd Brigade where the commander was Colonel Arsic
6 and his deputy was Major Radmilo Zeljaja.
7 Q. What type of heavy weaponry did those brigades have with them?
8 A. They had all heavy weaponry including tanks, cannon, guns and a large
9 number of mortar.
10 Q. Can you point out using the opstina map there, Exhibit 136, where
11 those forces and weapons were deployed in the opstina?
12 A. As far as I know, a part of the heavy weaponry was deployed in the
13 region of Crna Dolina, or Black Valley, and Velika Palaciste, a part
14 in the region of Lamovita, and a considerable portion of tanks and
15 other heavy weaponry in the region of Omarska. In the region of the
16 village of Miljakovci on Topica Brdo, Topica Hill, there were a number
17 of mortars, and some smaller forces were deployed, I think, here in
18 Niska Glava, I am not sure whether there was any heavy weaponry in
19 Niska Glava.
20 Q. After the return of these forces from the Croatian fronts, you
21 indicated that the next significant events were a series of meetings
22 with Colonel Arsic and his deputy, Radmilo Zeljaja. Can you explain
23 what the nature of these meetings were?
24 A. I am sorry, the translation was that the meeting was with Zeljaja and
25 Karadzic, was that the question?
1 Q. No, Arsic and Zeljaja.
2 A. There were several such meetings. Some meetings started before the
3 return of these brigades and they were meetings held through the
4 Municipal Council for National
5 Defence, and some meetings occurred after the return of these
6 brigades. So if you could specify whether you want me to speak about
7 the meetings before the arrival of these brigades or the meetings
8 after the arrival of these brigades?
9 Q. Let us start first with, obviously, the meetings before the return of
10 the Brigade. Who
11 called or asked for that meeting?
12 A. In formal, legal terms, the meeting was convened by the President of
13 the Municipal
14 Council for National Defence, who ex-officio was the President of the
15 municipality, Muhamed Cehajic. However, he called the meeting upon
16 the insistence of Colonel Arsic, and Arsic also asked that this
17 meeting, which is normally attended in addition to the President of
18 the municipality by function of their duties, the Prime Minister, the
19 Chief of Police, the Commander of the communal headquarters of
20 Territorial Defence units, the Municipal Secretary for National
21 Defence, and the Vice President of the Executive Board who was also
22 Commander of the headquarters of Civil Defence.
23 Therefore, in addition to these regular members of the
24 council, also invited to this meeting was I myself, as the President
25 of the SDA, Simo Miskovic in his capacity of President of SDS, the
1 President of HDZ, and I think also the President of the Social
2 Democratic Party. He attended the first or the second meeting. Later
3 on he was not invited. The main speaker at the meeting were Arsic and
5 MR. KEEGAN: If could I have this next exhibit, Exhibit 140, handed to the
7 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: When was this meeting, Dr. Mujadzic -- a date, as
8 best as you can recall?
9 A. I cannot remember the exact dates of those meetings. What I am sure
10 of is that this was quite a bit before the return of these brigades.
11 I think it was about a month or maybe more before the return of these
12 brigades from the war front in Croatia.
13 MR. KEEGAN: If that photograph could be displayed on the elmo; the
14 resolution was not very good on the computer. (To the witness): Dr.
15 Mujadzic, do you recognise the man in the middle in that photograph?
16 A. The photograph is not very clear. This is Colonel Arsic, Colonel
18 MR. KEEGAN: Your Honour, I would tender Exhibit 140.
19 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: I am sorry?
20 MR. KEEGAN: 140.
21 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Any objection to 140?
22 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No, your Honour.
23 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Exhibit 140 will be admitted.
24 JUDGE STEPHEN: Can I ask a question? What uniform is the first of those
25 people in that photograph wearing?
1 A. I do not know what kind of uniform. This is the first time I see
2 this sign, this insignia.
3 This was probably a photograph taken at a later stage after the time
4 of our meetings. At that time Mico Kovacevic wore civilian clothes
5 and the person you are asking about is Mico Kovacevic, President of
6 the Executive Council of the Prijedor municipality, in other words,
7 the President of the government of Prijedor.
8 MR. KEEGAN: If I might be of some assistance, your Honour, this
9 photograph is a still taken off a video which will be introduced
10 later. You will see he is actually just wearing a
11 T-shirt which, in fact, says "US Marines" on it which he has sewn a
12 patch on, so it is not a uniform at all.
13 (To the witness): This meeting, which you are about to describe, did take
14 place before the takeover on 30th April 1992? The meeting which we
15 are talking about that you were
16 about to describe did take place before 30th April 1992; is that
18 A. I have understood the question, but I do not have a translation into
19 Bosnian. I am sorry. No, it is all right. I can hear you now. I can
20 hear now.
21 Q. To answer Judge McDonald's question, if I may repeat, in any event
22 this meeting that you are about to describe did take place before 30th
23 April 1992?
24 A. Yes, certainly much before April 30th.
25 Q. What was the purpose of this meeting which Colonel Arsic asked for?
1 A. At the time both brigades, Serb brigades, were on the front in
2 Croatia. In the neighbouring municipality of Bosanska Dubica an
3 incident occurred. Several Croatian soldiers,
4 members of the National Guards known as "Zenga", apparently charged
5 into some Serb villages and provoked certain incidents. After that,
6 the surrounding Serb villages and the Serb population in Prijedor
7 insisted that some form of protection be provided for them.
8 At this meeting, Arsic proposed the mobilization of Territorial
9 Defence of Prijedor, and
10 that the most important buildings be protected in the Prijedor
12 Q. Concurrent with this mobilization was there a recommendation for the
13 distribution of arms for the TO?
14 A. Yes, after a number of these meetings, finally Arsic agreed that the
15 weapons of Territorial Defence which were stored in the warehouses of
16 the Yugoslav People's Army be distributed among the local communities,
17 neighbourhood communities, and that a part of the municipal detachment
18 of the Territorial Defence of the municipality of Prijedor be
19 mobilized. In each neighbourhood community 23 pieces were to be
20 distributed, and
21 I think for this detachment of the Prijedor municipality about 200
22 people were to be mobilized -- I am not quite sure of the figure --
23 for the city, for the town of Prijedor itself.
24 Q. This decision or agreement for 23 pieces of arms to be distributed to
25 each Mjesna Zajednica, was that based on the negotiations between the
1 authorities of the legitimate government of the opstina and the
2 military authorities?
3 A. I would not exactly call them "negotiations"; it was more like
4 Arsic's decision. We tried to ask for a larger number of weapons and,
5 in addition to ordinary rifles, that other weapons be distributed as
6 is normal for the mobilization of Territorial Defence, such as mortars
7 and light guns, but he did not allow it, so that the weapons were
8 limited to the 23 rifles.
9 Q. Did you observe that some of the predominantly Muslim local communes
10 were, in fact, distributed some of these weapons in accordance with
11 this decision?
12 A. I was not able to check that physically to see whether all these
13 weapons were issued.
14 What I am sure about is that in several local communes there were some
15 complaints that some of these weapons were not in working order, that
16 the number of pieces to be issued did not correspond to the number
17 allowed, and in some local communes where there were Serbs and Muslims
18 such as, for instance, Orlovci, the Muslims were not issued the
19 weapons due them. They were only issued to the Serbs.
20 Q. Did you observe in some of the Mjesna Zajednicas that were
21 predominantly Muslim that, in fact, some checkpoints were established
22 where there were members of the TO with weapons?
23 A. At the time the Territorial Defence operated absolutely in line with
24 the Territorial Defence plans. The Commander of the staff of the
25 Territorial Defence was Rade Javoric, a Serb, but he was not an SDS
1 candidate. All the checkpoints established in the territory of the
2 Prijedor municipality and in local communes were not points at which
3 any checks were made. At the time these were merely sentry posts
4 whose duty, whose responsibility, was the protection of some buildings
5 and to look after the security of the citizens.
6 Q. What type of weapons did you note that those sentries who were in the
7 Muslim communities had?
8 A. Those were old models, old Russian automatic weapons and old rifles
9 M49, that is, made
10 in 1949, and there were some semi-automatic rifles, M60 something. I
11 cannot recall the model exactly. In other words, those were mostly
12 quite old weapons that were mostly obsolete at the time.
13 Q. At some point did you become aware that weapons were being
14 distributed to the Serbian population in the opstina on a large scale?
15 A. After that, after this distribution of weapons, that is, when the
16 Territorial Defence units were mobilized on a regular basis, we
17 noticed that the number of armed members in Serb local communes was
18 much larger than it should have been. Then on various occasions we
19 saw how from the trucks, from military trucks, of the JNA weapons were
20 distributed in Serb local communes after that issue. Then, by pure
21 chance, we discovered training grounds where exercises, where drills,
22 shooting exercises, were performed within the Kozara mountain from the
23 village of Brezicani towards Kozara. The Serb paramilitary formations
24 were undergoing training there.
25 Q. Did you confront Colonel Arsic with this information?
1 A. After I received this information, I asked to see him. I warned him
2 about those facts and he said that that was not true, and that those
3 were some rumours which were unverified and untrue. Then I told him
4 that we had evidence and, if he wanted to, I could show him
5 photographs showing weapons distributed from the trucks of the
6 Yugoslav People's Army. When I told him that, he was surprised and
7 somewhat at a loss and then he said: "Right, we shall examine the
9 Q. You mentioned that you also had some meetings with the Deputy
10 Commander, Radmilo Zeljaja; what were the nature of those discussions?
11 A. Those meetings, I think, were held after April 6th, that is, after
12 the commencement of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In an earlier
13 discussion, he mentioned that he had very close ties to Sarajevo and
14 that he had wonderful memories, reminiscences, of Sarajevo, during
15 his army service he was in Sarajevo and that he was very fond of that
17 On 6th April, Bosnia-Herzegovina was recognised and I told
18 him: "Zeljaja, listen to me. Bosnia-Herzegovina is a recognised
19 state. It will, undoubtedly, have its own army. It would be proper
20 for you to state your loyalty to the state of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and
21 to take a hand in the formation of the new army of the state of
22 Bosnia-Herzegovina". Thereupon, he expressed some doubts about the
23 survival of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and he said: "Oh, come on, Bosnia has
24 been recognised but nothing will come out of it".
25 I indicated that that was not quite the case, that the
1 European Community and the United States of America were supporting
2 that recognition and they were backing us. I suggested that if he
3 pledged his loyalty, we could offer him a good position in the new --
4 in the future army, a flat in Sarajevo and a reward, a generous
5 pecuniary reward, if he agreed to discuss this matter. He again
6 voiced doubts and said that hardly anything could come out of it, and
7 I told him: "Well, if you do not want to stay here, then we can help
8 you. If you would care to tell us what other officers in these
9 brigades or any other individuals whom you know and who would pledge
10 their loyalty to Bosnia-Herzegovina, we would reward you generously in
11 money and would help you to go wherever you want".
12 He looked very confused, very unsure of himself. He was, he
13 seemed to waiver, very hesitant, seemed to be thinking about it, and
14 then said: "Right, but let us not talk about this now; we can meet
15 elsewhere." Two or three days later we met again in
16 El Dorado which is a pub below the flat, in the building below his
17 flat, in the building
18 where he lived. But that other meeting did not last more than 15
19 minutes. We had a cup
20 of coffee together, and he said that he was pressed for time, that he
21 could not stay, and that there were very many activities he had to
22 pursue. Then I tried to provoke him. I said: "What do you mean, has
23 SDS offered you more?" and he said: "No, I am an officer of the
24 Yugoslav People's Army and I have no contact with the SDS", and then
25 we parted our ways and I did not have any further contacts with him
1 after that meeting.
2 Q. You mentioned that you also had meetings with Simo Miskovic. What
3 were the substance of those meetings?
4 A. There were quite a number of such meetings in the course of 1992,
5 after the proclamation of the Serb municipality of Prijedor, we asked
6 for explanations of what was behind that, what was the purpose of it,
7 what was the Serb opstina Prijedor, and how did they think of pulling
8 it through, how could two municipalities function in one and the same
10 He used to reply: "Do not worry, it will all be easy, it will
11 be sorted out in no time", and he never wanted to say what the true
12 intentions were. Then there was his characteristic appearance on
13 Radio Prijedor when the editor of Radio Prijedor, Muharem Nezirovic,
14 invited him and me on 28th April to take part in a programme, to take
15 together part in a radio programme. The closing sentences of his
16 address were that he wanted us to live in peace. I am paraphrasing,
17 of course, but the gist of his message was that SDS, that they will
18 not be the cause of war, of a conflict, in the municipality of
19 Prijedor. I said that neither did we have any intentions of provoking
20 a war, a conflict, in Prijedor and we wanted peaceful life to
21 continue, to go on, in Prijedor. Evidently, only a day later his
22 message did not tally with their true intentions.
23 Q. What kind of meetings did you have on 29th April, the next day?
24 A. 29th April was marked by several meetings and several events. In the
25 early hours of the morning, I was called from Sanski Most by
1 representatives of the SDA in Sanski Most, and asked me to come to
2 Sanski Most and attend a meeting which would also be attended by
3 General Talic, the then Commander of the Banja Luka corps, and Colonel
4 Hasetic. I accepted this invitation because at the time I also acting
5 as the President of the regional SDA board of Banja Luka which had a
6 co-ordinating role.
7 Q. What had occurred in Sanski Most that required this meeting with
8 General Talic?
9 A. As soon as we entered Sanski Most, we were met by soldiers at a post
10 and I told them that I was going to that meeting and they let us
11 through. The town was swarming with army and at first I did not
12 realise what was going on. We entered on the town hall building and
13 General Talic and Colonel Hasetic were already there, and the
14 Commander of the Sanski Most police representing SDA explained to me
15 in a few words what it was all about. That evening, Serb policemen
16 attacked non-Serb policemen, Croats, Muslims and others, and evicted
17 them from the station, so they moved into the building of the
18 municipal hall in Sanski Most. He said that immediately afterwards
19 the army came down into the town.
20 I approached General Talic and asked him for his explanation,
21 why had the
22 army taken control over the town? He said that it was in order to
23 forestall conflict
24 between, as he put it, conflicting parties and this was only
25 temporary. I then requested that the army withdraws because he was
1 not competent, it was not his mandate to do that, and the problem had
2 to be solved by political means, but he refused that possibility.
3 After that there was a meeting with Rasula, the mayor, and the
4 President of
5 SDA and another representative of SDA. And both the mayor and SDA
6 President in Sanski Most urged me to attend the meeting. However,
7 Rasula and SDS representative emphatically rejected that possibility
8 saying that there were no representatives of Banja Luka SDS board and,
9 therefore, refused to admit me to that meeting. After that, I left
10 Sanski Most.
11 Q. What was your next meeting that day, on 29th?
12 A. To the return to Sanski -- after the return from Sanski Most, I was
13 met in Prijedor and I was told that there would be a meeting with a
14 policeman and other employees of the police station in Prijedor, and
15 the meeting was to take place in the police station building. Hasan
16 Talundzic, the chief of the police, was present at the meeting as well
17 as several Serb superiors from the police, Muhamed Cehajic, the Mayor
18 of the Prijedor opstina and I was at the meeting.
19 Q. What was the point of the meeting?
20 A. Serb policemen were demanding to take a final decision whether the
21 Prijedor police station would become part of the Banja Luka police
22 under Stojan Zupljanin, or if it would be attached to the republic
23 Ministry of the Interior in Sarajevo, as insisted upon by non-Serb
25 Q. And what ----
1 A. Yes, please?
2 Q. Was there a resolution at that meeting?
3 A. There was no final, definitive conclusion. I simply asked that no
4 decision be taken at the time and to wait for the final understanding
5 about the organisation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and that after that
6 understanding to be reached at the level of the Republic, final
7 decisions should be made and that until that time the police station
8 in Prijedor should remain as it was, that is, under the Republican
9 Ministry of the Interior, but at the same time to
10 maintain co-operation with the State Security centre in Banja Luka.
11 Towards the end of the meeting, a policeman said that they did
12 not want to follow the orders from Sarajevo. It was a Serb policeman,
13 a policeman of Serb ethnic origin. He was the man employed in
14 communications department, and he said that a document had just
15 arrived saying that the police should attack the army and that he did
16 not want that. I said that I did not know what it was all about and
17 that was the end of the meeting.
18 Q. Did you later have a meeting with Colonel Arsic about that telegram?
19 A. After that meeting I went home to my flat, and some time, a little
20 before 5 o'clock, Colonel Arsic called me by telephone and asked me to
21 meet him in the barracks. In view of the situation as a whole, I said
22 that it would be better to meet some other -- at some other place. He
23 said: "Well, Simo Miskovic is already here with me, SDS President, so
25 you please be so kind and come too because there is an urgent matter
1 which we have to discuss and about which I can tell you nothing over
2 the telephone".
3 Q. Did you go to the barracks?
4 A. Yes, I did go to the barracks and as soon as I entered the barracks
5 he was sitting at a table and he showed me a document and said: "Do
6 you know what this is?" I looked at it. It was a telex and I read a
7 couple of sentences and said that I had not received any telexes from
8 Sarajevo, and I did not know what it was all about and that that was
9 the first time I saw anything like that. He said that this telegram
10 was the order, that it was an order for the police and the army that
11 the barracks of the JNA should be surrounded and all important access
12 roads which the army could use to get out should have blockades put
13 up. I said I knew nothing about that and that it must have been a
15 Q. During the course of that meeting, did it become clear or known to
16 Colonel Arsic and the others that the government of Bosnia-Herzegovina
17 had denied sending that telex and declared that it was a fake and that
18 they had no such intentions?
19 A. Immediately after that the presidency of Bosnia-Herzegovina denied
20 the contents of the document, saying that this order did not come from
21 them and that it was a mistake. However, Arsic then turned to me and,
22 allegedly, he said the same thing to Simo
23 Miskovic. He said: "If either of you launches an attack against the
24 barracks, I shall use all the means at my disposal, all the armaments
25 I have, to fire at those who attack the army".
1 I responded that it never occurred to us to attack the army or anyone.
2 After that he said: "Right, in that case I suggest we go and have
3 some dinner".
4 Q. Did you all go and have dinner?
5 A. Yes, we did. As a matter of fact, even during those previous
6 meetings he thought, I believe, that we ought to have been happy
7 because he had been mobilized in the Territorial Defence, and that
8 Simo Miskovic and I should invite him and Zeljaja to a dinner. I
9 said: "Right, all right, never mind, let us have this dinner" and he
10 remembered that and said: "Well, now how about your keeping your
11 promise and taking us to dinner?" and so we went to the restaurant
12 Europa in Prijedor and, apart from my myself, there was also
13 Hilmija Hopovac, Simo Miskovic, Zeljaja, Arsic and Zoran Karlica were
15 Q. Who is Zoran Karlica?
16 A. Well, I did not know him at that time -- that was the first time I
17 had seen him -- and I did not know anything about him. All I know
18 about him is something I learnt later from other people. But then at
19 that dinner, we stayed until 11 o'clock, and we talked at random about
20 all sorts of things that had nothing to do with events which were
21 underway, about general matters. I think we never even tackled a
22 political question at all.
23 Q. The next morning, the morning of 30th April 1992, did you receive a
24 phone call early in
25 the morning?
1 A. Yes, on April 30th, early in the morning at 6 o'clock, I was called
2 by Sistek Sahic,
3 Secretary of the Municipal Committee of SDA, and he said to me: "Do
4 you know what is new, Mirsad?" I said: "What?" "Prijedor was
5 occupied last night". After that I went out to see what had happened.
6 Q. What did you see in the town of Prijedor?
7 A. The whole town was swarming with military; the main communication
8 lines leading out of town were blocked with checkpoints; all the more
9 important buildings, Prijedor radio, the bank, the post office, the
10 town hall, the police station, they were all under military guard and
11 the whole picture reminded me of the films about military "putchs"
12 that occurred in Latin America or Africa. It was like a classical
13 coup d'etat.
14 Q. Did it also remind you of what you had seen in Sanski Most the day
15 before with the military check points and guards?
16 A. Yes, the scenario was almost identical.
17 Q. Were there any notices posted in the town?
18 A. Yes, there were several notices. The whole of Prijedor was covered
19 with posters and the text on these posters in Prijedor was very
20 frequently, at every half hour or one hour, I am not sure what, read
21 over the radio waves. The first proclamation and the poster explained
22 why the military putch had taken place, and it was stated that SDA had
23 usurped all power in Prijedor, that people from SDA had started to
24 steal in enterprises, that they had started to demolish the system,
25 that they were no better than thieves and criminals, and that the
1 Serbian Democratic Party was forced to take this step, that the Muslim
2 people and the other non-Serbs should have no fear about this event,
3 that it was simply a question of removing a few criminals, whereas
4 within six months on the outside new elections would
5 be organised at which Muslims and Croats would have a chance to elect
6 their new representatives.
7 Q. Did these notifications indicate that the SDS was stating that it had
8 responsibility for the takeover and was now controlling the municipal
10 A. Yes, of course. It was clearly stated that full control had been
11 taken over by the SDS in Prijedor.
12 Q. Were there subsequent notifications on the formation of a Krizni
14 A. Yes, in the course of the same day another proclamation was issued on
15 the Krizni Stab. It was stated that this Crisis Headquarters had been
16 formed in Prijedor which would be in charge of all activities in
17 Prijedor until some other changes occurred. The President of that
18 Crisis Headquarters was Milomir Stakic, and I think that its members
19 were Srdjo Srdic, Simo Miskovic Simo Drljaca.
20 Q. Did they include come Colonel Arsic and Slobodan Kurusovic?
21 A. For Slobodan Kuruzovic, I am sure that he was a member of this Stab.
22 I am not sure whether Arsic was formerly a member. But the
23 information I obtained later was that Slobodan Kuruzovic who took
24 over control of the Territorial Defence and who later assumed
25 responsibility for the entire putch in Prijedor, I learnt that he had
1 regularly reported to Arsic on all events taking place and that it was
2 there that he received further instructions.
3 Q. What happened to all of the non-Serb members of the opstina
4 municipality government as of 30th April?
5 A. On April 30th, all officials, Muslims and Croats, representatives of
6 SDA and HDZ, were removed from their posts, but not only
7 representatives of these two parties but many other reputed citizens,
8 Muslims and Croats, who had no connection with SDA, who were
9 honourable and decent people, loyal citizens of the state of
10 Bosnia-Herzegovina, such as Nedzad Seric, the President of the Court
11 of Prijedor, Habib Bajrahtarevic, the Director of the social
12 accounting service, SDK, for the control of payments, deputy bank
14 Lika Muhamed, and many other distinguished non-Serbs holding positions
15 that had any significance in all the institutions.
16 Q. Between the takeover on 30th April and 23rd May 1992, did you have
17 some conversations with Srdjo Srdic about what was occurring in the
19 A. On that same day it was possible to hear on the Radio Prijedor waves
20 Colonel Arsic saying that, allegedly, he had nothing to do with the
21 described event. But I looked up Srdjo Srdic because he is a man who
22 was most superficial among the members of the SDS, and I thought it
23 would be easiest to learn from him what the intentions of SDS were. I
24 telephoned him at home but his wife said he was out, and she gave me a
25 number where I could probably find him. Judging by the telephone
1 number, I realised that this was not within the city limits of
2 Prijedor and that he must have been somewhere outside Prijedor because
3 I think the number started with a "3" and Prijedor, I think, starts
4 with a "2".
5 I dialled this number and, indeed, Srdjo replied and I asked
6 him: "Srdjo, what is happening? What have you done?" There was a
7 pause and then he answered: "I and my people are ready for war, are
8 you? Have you prepared yourself?" I answered: "For heaven's sake,
9 Srdjo, what war? What are you talking about? Why should we go to
10 war?" and he replied "You know very well what I am talking about and
11 if you do not know you will learn soon enough", and he broke off. He
12 hung up.
13 Q. Did the SDA have meetings subsequent to this takeover to determine
14 what action to take?
15 A. On April 30th and on May 1st, I toured the whole territory of the
16 municipality of Prijedor. On 30th April, Brdo and Ljubija, and on May
17 1st, Kozarac and other communities. I consulted with the local leaders
18 and people and we came to the conclusion that an emergency meeting was
19 necessary at which we would review the whole situation and decide what
20 should be done, because the Serbs had actually taken over control only
21 of the downtown part of the city and the regions in which the Serbs
22 were a majority, whereas all the regions with a Muslim and Croat
23 majority were under the control of Territorial Defence units.
24 Q. Did -----
25 A. Yes?
1 Q. Did members of the SDA also have meetings with delegations from the
2 SDS and the military?
3 A. At the first meeting held between 3rd and 4th May, soon after this,
4 therefore, we discussed what should be done next, and it was decided
5 that it would be a good idea to send a message to the people, since
6 Slobodan Kuruzovic at the time insisted that the Territorial Defence
7 hand over its weapons.
8 Q. Was the decision to allow each municipality or each Mjesna Zajednica
9 to make their own decision on that topic?
10 A. At this meeting we did not wish to take a definite decision, but we
11 wanted to hear the voice of the people, and we instructed that rallies
12 of citizens be convened in all the local communities and that the
13 question should be posed at those meetings, whether the Territorial
14 Defence should hand over their weapons or not.
15 Our recommendation was that the weapons should not be given
16 up. That was our recommendation, and I underline this. We did not
17 insist on this among the citizens. The citizens accepted this
18 recommendation, but they themselves also decided not to hand
19 in the weapons. At the next meeting, a large meeting in the municipal
20 council at which representatives of all the local communities were
21 present, held two or three days later between May 6th and 7th, a
22 current within the party insisted on negotiations with representatives
23 of the Serbian Democratic Party and the army believing that these
24 negotiations could achieve something.
25 I belonged to the group of people who believed that those
1 negotiations could achieve nothing, and that they have a clearly
2 outlined plan of what they would do and that nothing would come of
3 those talks, but we had nothing against those who felt that something
4 could be achieved to go ahead and negotiate.
5 Thus, a delegation was formed consisting, I think, of
6 Semenovic, Mujcic,
7 Terzic, Medunjanin, I think Islam Bahonjic as well -- I am not sure --
8 and they negotiated with SDS and with Arsic and Zeljaja until around
9 May 16th when at the last meeting Zeljaja came and said: "There are
10 no more negotiations from today on. We are the army of the Republic
11 of Srpska. This is the Republic of Srpska. Pass on the message to
12 your Muslims that the Territorial Defence must immediately hand over
13 all their weapons,
14 that all your conscripts must respond to mobilization of the Republic
15 of Srpska and all citizens must express allegiance to the state of the
16 Republic of Srpska." At a meeting on May 17th I was informed of this
17 by Music and Terzic who had attended that meeting.
18 Q. On 23rd May was there an incident at a checkpoint in Hambarine or
19 near Hambarine?
20 A. Yes, I was visiting in my parents' house and I heard some shots. I
21 went out to see what was happening and about 300 metres in the
22 direction of Hambarine on a bus stop, Polje, where a checkpoint of the
23 Territorial Defence had been formed, a group of people had gathered.
24 I went up to see what it was about and I saw a white Lada automobile
25 -- it is Fiat, a large Italian Fiat, a luxury vehicle, a limousine --
1 two dead people and four wounded.
2 I learnt that two of them were Croats, and they were lightly
3 wounded, and they said that the four people from SDS had kidnapped
4 them, they had forced them into the car and that they had nothing to
5 do with them. These four, two of whom were dead and two seriously
6 injured, bared the insignia of White Eagles and Chetnik insignia. The
7 White Eagles are extremist formations set up by Vojislav Seselj, a
8 Serb extremist. A member of the Territorial Defence was also injured,
9 and he briefly tried to reconstruct the event for my benefit.
10 They had stopped and before they managed to do anything at
11 all, to check them out, one of them came out of the car and opened
12 fire on members of the Territorial Defence. They lay down on the
13 floor and at that moment one of them opened fire from an automatic
14 rifle in the direction of the group of people I have just mentioned,
15 and immediately after that a deserted house about one kilometre away
16 in the field caught fire, and about 10 minutes later a military
17 transporter appeared on the spot painted in police colours, so it
18 appeared to be a transporter of the civilian Police Force.
19 He insisted that Aziz Aliskovic surrender and all other
20 members who were on that checkpoint should surrender, I told him that
21 we cannot do that, and that it would be a good idea to form a
22 commission to investigate the whole case. I immediately insisted that
23 the wounded be transported to the hospital which they refused. They
24 moved away 300 metres in the direction of Prijedor, and with a light
25 gun, something between a gun and a machine gun, they fired at the
1 checkpoint but there was no-one there so that nobody was hurt
2 additionally then.
3 MR. KEEGAN: Might that be a good time to take a break before we move on
4 to something?
5 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: We will stand in recess for 20 minutes.
6 (11.30 a.m.)
7 (Adjourned for a short time)
8 (11.50 a.m.)
9 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr. Keegan, would you proceed, please?
10 MR. KEEGAN: Thank you, your Honour. (To the witness): Dr. Mujadzic, you
11 indicated that when you arrived at the checkpoint you were told what
12 had occurred there by the individuals who had been wounded at the
13 scene. Did they relate this story to you while
14 you were attempting to treat their wounds?
15 MR. KAY: Can I just mention one matter? I do not think the witness did
16 say he was given the account by the individuals who had been wounded.
17 I think he was explaining that one person gave him an account. It
18 may be my misunderstanding, but perhaps it is a matter
19 that should be clarified as it is an important piece of evidence.
20 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr. Keegan, I really do not recall whether the
21 witness stated that he was told by the individuals who had actually
22 been wounded what had happened or whether he heard from other
24 MR. KEEGAN: I think we could scroll back through the transcript, but I do
25 not think it is necessary to do that. I believe that is what he said
1 but I will simply rephrase the question.
2 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: You can ask that question again, who told him and
3 then we will see what he says.
4 MR. KEEGAN: Exactly. (To the witness): Dr. Mujadzic, you have related
5 the story of what had occurred at the checkpoint; by whom were you
6 told what had happened?
7 A. Earlier on, I said that I talked with two of the six wounded
8 individuals who were in the car, but that later on a TO member
9 reconstructed the event for me; so that I draw my information both
10 from the wounded individuals in the car and a TO member who also was
11 wounded. So I received this information from two sides. That was
12 what I have said.
13 Q. My following question when we began was were they describing these
14 events to you while you were treating or attempting to treat their
15 wounds as a physician?
16 A. I examined all the present wounded; of the six wounded, two were
17 dead. Obviously, one had received a shot in the head and another one,
18 I think, was hit in the head and I believe
19 in the abdomen. He also gave no signs of life. The other two had
20 chest wounds and did
21 not bleed much. As a matter of fact, they did not bleed at all or,
22 when I say they did not bleed, I mean that there was no, an open blood
23 vessel which would bleed considerably.
24 At that moment, while extending the first aid, the only thing
25 I could try to do was to stop the bleeding because I had no other
1 aids, no other implements with me.
2 The next two were only lightly injured and their wounds presented no
3 life hazard. Their
4 life was not in danger -- the two in the car, I mean. A member of the
5 Territorial Defence had his right leg injured and his right thigh, but
6 his wounds were neither bleeding particularly profusely and his life
7 was not in danger either, so that he was only bandaged.
8 The thing that one had to do at that moment was to transfer
9 all the wounded to the hospital and I insisted on that, and tried to
10 have it done as quickly as possible because no other adequate help
11 apart from what I did could not be extended to them on the spot.
12 Q. Subsequent to this incident at the checkpoint, was there a
13 declaration made by the Krizni Stab in Prijedor?
14 A. That same evening on the hills above the village of Hambarine,
15 Rakovcani, five or six
16 shells were fired from the decks of Prijedor, and then the next day a
17 proclamation was broadcast on the Radio Prijedor to immediately
18 surrender all weapons in Hambarine and surrounding villages, and that
19 Aziz Aliskovic's group was also to surrender, it was at that
20 checkpoint, and if they failed to do so, then the Krizni Stab would
21 order to open fire from all available means, the settlement of
23 The Krizni Stab Crisis Committee said that the villages of
24 Hambarine should respond and thus avoid to suffer any further
25 consequences because of a group of extremists, as they put it. Now,
1 this document issued by the Crisis Committee was signed by Milomir
2 Stakic, so this was the Crisis Committee order signed by Milomir
4 Q. What was the decision of the authorities in Hambarine with regards to
5 turning over the weapons and the individuals from the checkpoint?
6 A. The local authorities decided not to turn over the weapons and men as
7 requested by the Crisis Committee and the deadline was 12 o'clock on
8 24th May. As it was not done, at 12.20 the shelling of the whole hill
9 began from artillery weapons from all directions, and it lasted until
10 about 3 o'clock in the afternoon and then a lull took place, break.
11 Q. The translation of your last answer, when you said the shelling of
12 Brdo began, was translated as "the whole hill" meaning a single hill.
13 Were you referring to a particular hill
14 in Hambarine being shelled or the Brdo region, as you described it
16 A. At that time during the shelling I was in Aladin Sijacic's house in
17 Celak -- in Carakovo,
18 and the shells were falling both on Carakovo and Hambarine, and I
19 think that Rakovcani
20 and all the other villages in Brdo region were shelled, but I think
21 that the principal target was the village of Hambarine.
22 Q. After the lull that you described at about 3 o'clock in the
23 afternoon, what occurred next?
24 A. After that lull from the direction of Tukovi where that same evening
25 to the part which
1 was inhabited by Serbs two tanks had arrived, so two tanks moved out
2 from there and they were followed by the infantry, and after
3 intermittent fire which did not last long and response by the
4 Territorial Defence on Brdo (which, I may add, had no anti-tank
6 or any mines, all they had were rifles which were issued them when
7 Arsic was distributing those weapons), sometime around 5 or 6 o'clock
8 p.m. those tanks climbed up the hill, that is, up the Brdo above
9 Hambarine and took that position. One tank, later on one tank turned
10 right and moved towards other villages and it fired at houses and
11 buildings, aiming at everything around it.
12 Q. Based on this attack by the infantry and the tanks, did the municipal
13 leaders in the Brdo call a meeting which included yourself to
14 determine whether to turn over those weapons?
15 A. That same evening, that is, around perhaps 7.00 or 8 o'clock, very
16 quickly almost all the weapons from the whole Brdo were collected, put
17 on tractors and turned over, except in Carakovo and Zecovi where I
19 The next day, May 25th, individuals, representatives from
20 Carakovo and Zecovi came to me and asked me what to do. Everybody knew
21 by that time that Biscani, Rakovcani, Hambarine, that is, the
22 right-hand side of the Brdo region had already turned over their
23 weapons. I told them that they should take that decision themselves,
24 that I would not want to be the cause or influence their decision in
25 any manner because I did not want to be responsible for anyone's life
1 or anyone's risk because the propaganda which the SDS had launched in
2 Prijedor, on the Radio Prijedor, and media has been trying to reduce
3 it only so the problem within the SDA, SDA and myself, and that if
4 people rejected me personally and SDA and other SDA leaders and they
5 called us criminals, thieves, extremists, fundamentalists and
6 what-not, then that everything would be all right, that nobody would
7 lose anything. Simo Miskovic said so himself on Radio Prijedor
8 immediately after the coup. I told those people: "Well, if you think
9 that is better, then
10 turn over your weapons and in that case I will go to the woods".
11 Indeed, they did so
12 during that day, and then with a small group of people I went to the
13 adjacent woods.
14 Q. How long did you stay in the forest in the area of opstina Prijedor?
15 A. After that other forests were shelled for days, I think for some
16 twenty days that forest was shelled by Chetnik formations, and during
17 the day on several occasions, several times, at different time
18 intervals, and because of that we dug out a hole on a hill and spent
19 all the time in that hole. From time to time, the brother of one of
20 the individuals who was with
21 me brought us some food every three or four days. We knew that there
22 were several more groups in the forest but, because of the shelling
23 which occurred at different time intervals, we could not move about
24 too much.
25 We asked that one of the individuals tried to establish
1 contact or communication with one of those people by some roundabout
2 way. However, he ran into Chetnik control, checkpoint. They caught
3 him and we learned later that they tortured him, trying to find
4 out our whereabouts. He did not tell them and they killed him with
5 battery and the rest.
6 After that, the elder brother came to see us in the forest
7 because their mother knew where we were too, and for some 10 days more
8 he also brought us food and then he told us that a special unit was
9 being prepared, a unit to come from Nis, in order to scour the
10 forest, that they would be bringing dogs along and all the special
11 devices and that we could not stay there any longer, that it would be
12 bad for our security and the security of the citizens because they
13 would be able to conclude that they had been feeding us. We
14 decided then to move on our way. That was on June 27th. That is
15 about a month since the beginning of the attack.
16 Q. You indicated that -----
17 JUDGE STEPHEN: Can I ask you to locate this forest?
18 MR. KEEGAN: Can you describe first in what portion of the opstina
19 Prijedor was the forest that you were hiding?
20 A. Well, if there is a map somewhere? I was a scout as a boy so that I
21 know the topography. I can explain it and indicate all those sites as
22 well as the road that we covered afterwards, all these sites that we
23 went by and how we moved.
24 Q. If Exhibit -----
25 A. If I could be shown a map, I can then explain it very precisely.
1 MR. KEEGAN: If the Exhibit could be shown to the witness, please?
2 A. I think this will be all right, yes. I think -- yes, this is fine.
3 So this is the village of Hambarine. This is this road from Prijedor
4 to Ljubija, and on the top of it were the units
5 of the Chetnik formations, they climbed up there on 24th May, and cut
6 off this part here where there are four villages, Biscani,
7 Rizvanovici, Rakovcani and Hambarine. This is where the village,
8 Carakovo -- if you can move it down, please -- Carakovo and the
9 village of Zecovi. These are all the two next Muslim villages. So
10 these four villages were immediately on 24th May turned over their
11 weapons and Carakovo and Zecovi did it the next day.
12 We then retreated. I was here in Carakovo and then we
13 retreated in the forest. This is the forest which the people there
14 called Kurevo forest. It is part of the so-called Mejdanski chain.
15 We were here, I should say, behind the village of Brdari, near the
16 village of Brdari. Here in the thick of the forest we dug a hole.
17 This is where we spent all this time until June 27th.
18 Q. You indicated that you left the forest or that area after news that a
19 special unit from Nis was being prepared to come into the forest to
20 find you. Where is Nis?
21 A. Nis is in Serbia.
22 Q. The shellings which occurred of the Brdo region on 24th, were those
23 shellings coming
24 from the tank and artillery positions which you indicated earlier had
25 been set up around Prijedor from units of the 43rd and 5th Kozara
2 A. I do not know exactly where each of the brigades was, what were their
3 positions, whether
4 it was Niska Glava or Crna Dolina, Velika Palaciste or Topica Brdo,
5 whether it was the 43rd Brigade or the 5th Brigade. But what I am
6 positive about is that those were the formations and the weaponry of
7 these two brigades, but I do not know which brigade occupied which
9 What is certain also is that it was from the direction of
10 Topica Brdo,
11 Miljakovac, Crna Dolina, from Brezicani, shells also hit Brdo. The
12 Serb propaganda on Radio Prijedor announced, publicised posse against
13 me and other SDA people in their propaganda. They said that in the
14 area of this forest that there was I in person and 700, as they put
15 it, 700 green berets, that is, 700 armed men, and that that was why
16 the special unit from Nis had to come, which was not true at least to
17 my knowledge.
18 Q. You mentioned before that the 43rd was under the command of Colonel
19 Arsic and you had had several meetings with him. Do you know where
20 Colonel Arsic was from, his nationality?
21 A. Colonel Arsic is a Serb by ethnic origin, but a Serb from Serbia, so
22 he is a Serbian Serb, as we say it, a genuine Serb, and he had a
23 specific accent and that is why I knew that he was from Serbia proper.
24 Q. In what part of Serbia was that accent that he had, from what part?
25 A. I believe that it is the central Serbian area which is called
2 Q. After you left the forest that you have described on the map on 27th
3 June, where did you head to?
4 A. If there is another map showing a wider area, then I could indicate
5 exactly the road we covered, but briefly I can say that we entered the
6 territory of Sanski Most municipality, Stari Majdan, then we moved on
7 to the village of Gorice, if there is a map? I do not think this map
8 shows it.
9 Q. It would be Exhibit 78, but I do not think it is necessary at this
10 time. If you could simply describe after you -----
11 A. Right, if this is not necessary, so I can briefly describe it, from
12 Stari Majdan, which is in
13 the Sanski Most municipality, moved across Fajtovac, which is also in
14 Sanski Most
15 opstina to Gorice, to Naskucani and Vakuf. This is all in opstina
16 Sanski Most. From there we moved on to the Grmec Mountain. In the
17 early hours of the morning, we passed between the villages Gornji and
18 Donji Majkic, climbed up the Grmec Mountain and then over the mountain
19 to the canyon of the Una River; then we climbed down the canyon and we
20 had lots of problems and difficulties because Chetniks had noticed
21 us. They were firing at us. Unfortunately, we lost a man there, but
22 we did manage to swim across the
23 Una and reach the free territory of the Bihac region.
24 Q. You arrived in Bihac in July of '92. What did you do while you were
25 in Bihac?
1 A. In Bihac, I immediately went to the hospital and began to work there
2 as a surgeon and mostly exercised my profession there, that is, in the
3 surgical department. In my free time,
4 I continued my work as a Republican Member of Parliament and engaged
5 in some other political activities.
6 Q. How long did you stay in Bihac and work in the hospital?
7 A. I stayed in Bihac, that is, we arrived in Bihac on July 13th and I
8 stayed there until the beginning of October in 1992. Then I flew over
9 the Serb territory in a small plane to
10 Zagreb and then immediately proceeded to Travnik, to central Bosnia,
11 where I stayed until the end of 1992, and there I also worked in the
12 Travnik hospital again as a surgeon.
13 Then I returned to Bihac by that same aircraft, the small
14 plane -- they were such small planes which flew to Bihac -- and then
15 the no fly decision was taken and, owing to these circumstances, I
16 stayed in Bihac until the end of November 1993, and then I was
17 transferred by a UN helicopter back to Travnik where I stayed until
18 May 1994.
19 Q. From there did you move on to Sarajevo?
20 A. In Travnik I also worked as a surgeon in the hospital and from there
21 in May '94 I moved to Sarajevo where I continued to work as a surgeon.
22 MR. KEEGAN: I have nothing further, your Honour.
23 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Is there any cross-examination?
24 MR. KAY: Thank you, your Honour.
25 Cross-examined by Mr. Kay.
1 Q. Mr. Mujadzic, you have told us that you were closely involved in the
2 politics in the
3 Prijedor region and became President of the SDA in Prijedor. What
4 date did you become President of the SDA?
5 A. August 17th 1990. That was the first founding assembly when my
6 nomination was accepted, but the real elections within the party were
7 held next year, I think, in October '91 when I was really elected
8 because the first time was by acclamation, but this was full elections
9 and I was again elected President of the party.
10 Q. Thank you. Before 1990 had you been involved in politics in
12 A. Before 1990 I did not belong to any political organisation.
13 Q. So you joined the SDA in 1990; would that be right?
14 A. Yes, that is right.
15 Q. And at that stage the SDA was just emerging as a political party. Do
16 you understand what I mean when I say that?
17 A. Yes, that is right.
18 Q. Can you tell us at all about perhaps the numbers of members that the
19 SDA had in Prijedor in 1990?
20 A. It is difficult to answer this question. I cannot tell you exactly.
21 I think there were a few thousand.
22 Q. You had candidates for the elections and a number of those candidates
23 identified themselves with your party, the SDA?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. And the organisation of the SDA in Prijedor presumably had a central
1 office in the town itself?
2 A. At the beginning we did not have premises because we were a newly
3 formed organisation. So that in the private home of one of our
4 members for a time we used his own home as temporary premises. Then
5 after the elections we acquired premises in a building, official, real
7 Q. So was it in 1991 that the SDA started to become more organised as a
8 political party in Prijedor?
9 A. I think that the level of organisation of SDA in '91 was better than
10 in 1990.
11 Q. Yes, and when you were acclaimed President in 1990 you were President
12 of the SDA in opstina Prijedor or just Prijedor town?
13 A. We did not have that type of organisation within the municipal board
14 of SDA. There were 30 local organisations on a lower level than the
15 municipal level, and there were 30 Presidents of these local
16 committees. Each President of the local committee was an ex-officio
17 member of the Municipal Committee, and in addition there was an
18 Executive Board which numbered 15 members. All together the Executive
19 Board and the President of the local committees formed the Municipal
20 Committee as the highest body within the party which took all the
22 Q. It was that that you were President of?
23 A. Yes, I was President of both the Executive Board and the Municipal
24 Committee because it was so proscribed by statute, that is part of the
25 general statute of the SDA party as a whole.
1 Q. So your committee of which you were President would have had
2 districts or towns and villages in opstina Prijedor where there were
3 local members who had a CDA
4 representative, an SDA representative for your committee in Prijedor?
5 A. I think that the expression "towns and villages" is not the most
6 appropriate. It is better to say "smaller settlements" because on
7 the territory of the opstina Prijedor there were, according to certain
8 standards, the only town really was the town of Prijedor. The rest
9 were smaller settlements and villages.
10 Q. Thank you. I understand what you are saying and it is these smaller
11 villagers and settlements who also had SDA delegates of which you were
12 the overall President?
13 A. Yes, that is so.
14 Q. The villages and settlements who supported an SDA candidate, were
15 they organised locally? Did they have their smaller committees within
16 their local settlement to discuss things together?
17 A. Each of those 30 local committees, in each of those settlements there
18 was a local
19 committee which had between five and seven members. For larger
20 settlements we agreed that the number could go up to 11 upon the
21 request of some of the local committees, and the local committees were
22 elected at assembly meetings of members of the local committees.
23 Therefore, each of those settlements had their assembly consisting of
24 members of the party living in that settlement and they elected their
1 and the President of that committee was a member of the Municipal
2 Committee of Prijedor opstina.
3 Q. The number of 30 that you had as delegates for the main committee,
4 was that because there were 30 villages or settlements or because that
5 was a standard number that the SDA required?
6 A. The number of organisations of committee members did not fully
7 coincide with the number of settlements. I will give an example,
8 because that was what the settlements
9 themselves asked for. The reason was very simple. The settlements
10 wanted to have more or less equal influence in proportion to the
11 number of inhabitants living in this region, so that large settlements
12 would be divided up into several local committees because our aim was
13 that the number of members in local committees should be roughly
14 equal. So that is how Kozarac, for instance, had 10 or 11, I cannot
15 remember exactly, I would have to list them. Kozarac as a settlement
16 had more than 10 local committees.
17 Q. I understand what you are saying. All these committees were subject
18 to the control, if you like, of the SDA in Prijedor; would that be
20 A. Yes, there was a two-way relationship within the organisation of the
21 party, but we did not have a firm hierarchical system; this was a
22 rather loose system. The Presidents of local committees would come
23 from their settlements with certain positions which would then be
24 co-ordinated at the opstina level and where a common policy and joint
25 decisions were
1 taken at the level of the whole opstina.
2 Q. So within that organisation I suppose you had a wide variation of
3 opinion between the different villages and settlements or the
4 delegates that they sent as to the strategy that the SDA should adopt
5 in dealing with the party of the SDS?
6 A. Well, as I said, ours was a party that had a rather liberal attitude,
7 so that within the party there was a high degree of democracy and
8 freedom. We did not have any firm hierarchical relations of
9 subrogation or any party constraints, and virtually all things having
10 to do with Prijedor were decided on the basis of the positions coming
11 from the local communities. It is also true that the range of those
12 positions regarding certain issues was very broad, but on some other
13 issues there was no difference of opinion regarding certain global
14 strategic issues. All agreed, for example, that Bosnia-Herzegovina
15 should be an integral state, that we should have good relations with
16 the Serbs and the Croats, equally good relations with one and the
17 other. Therefore, there was a certain spectrum of views and questions
18 on which there was no division of views. Everybody thought it was
19 only normal, whereas on other questions obviously there were
21 Q. So you, as President of the SDA, would not insist that all the
22 delegates spoke with the
23 same voice; is that what you are saying?
24 A. As I mentioned, as an organisation we were quite, quite liberal in
25 our internal
1 relationships. I must point out that we had a general platform which
2 is contained in the SDA programme and that very rarely did we have
3 special instructions even from our headquarters. So it would be more
4 correct to say that initiatives and the focus of political action came
5 from the grass root level, from the local communities rather than from
6 members of the top leadership, me personally or somebody from the
7 headquarters. I personally in line with the positions and setup of
8 the party and the way people thought, my personal attitude was that
9 all those present should express their views on all questions of any
10 importance, and my only task in fact as the President was to try and
11 find the best common position that would be acceptable to all, and
12 that is how decisions were mostly taken.
13 Q. So you did not exercise much control over the grass roots of the SDA;
14 would that be right?
15 A. Yes, one might put it that way.
16 Q. Did membership of the SDA as you moved from 1990 to 1991 to 1992
17 continue to grow in the opstina Prijedor region?
18 A. I think that the majority of SDA members who joined the party did so
19 in the period prior to the elections. After the elections the number
20 of people joining the party was somewhat smaller, and I would say that
21 we had a normal fluctuation; some people even dropped out and also
22 there were others who joined. I would not say that in the course of
23 '91 and later there was a significant increase in numbers. There was
24 no quantitative noticeable increase in membership. Perhaps one might
25 say that in view of the social structure later on in the course of '91
1 there were more members from the urban region. The number of members
2 from the city increased in relation to the number of those from the
5 Q. I suspect like many political parties you probably had more
6 supporters than members of the party; would that be right?
7 A. Before I became President of the party I was never a leader. I never
8 had any executive position. This was the first time for me to head an
9 organisation, after all, I was only 27 then, but I understood, I
10 grasped a rule and that is that on most questions I at least never
11 managed to achieve greater consensus than among 60 to 70 per cent of
12 those present. No matter how hard I tried to increase agreement on
13 some questions to a maximum and to avoid any conflict within the
14 party, the maximum I managed to achieve was about 60 to 70 per cent
15 agreement on most questions. There was always 30 or 40 per cent of
16 people who were against. I only exclude some global issues over which
17 we all agreed, otherwise we could not be members of the party if we
18 did not agree on some questions that were part of the party programme.
19 Q. Thank you, but what my question was aimed at was whether in fact
20 there were more supporters of your party than were actually signed up
21 as members. Do you understand the question?
22 A. I think you are right, there were more supporters than members of the
23 party, but I think that too is customary in all parties. In Europe
24 there are always more people who vote for the programme of a
25 particular party or a party than are the number of members of that
2 Q. In relation to the finances of the party, the SDA in opstina
3 Prijedor, how were you funded? Where did your money come from?
4 A. I personally drove my own car all the time. I never collected any
5 per diems. What we consumed while working we paid for ourselves.
6 Only at the beginning of 1992 did we get from our party headquarters a
7 vehicle which the party headquarters purchased for us, as it did for
8 all other Regional Committees. So a car was purchased for the Regional
9 Committee of Banja Luka and there was the car that I was given as
10 President of the Regional Committee and not as President of the
11 Municipal Committee, because at the
12 same time I held the function of President of the Regional Committee.
13 We did not receive any other funds from our headquarters,
14 ever. All the funds that we had were from one operation to another.
15 When we had a large rally we would give voluntary contributions. We
16 had the support of some of our supporters, sympathisers, private
17 businessmen, owners of private companies who would from time to time
18 make voluntary contributions for the benefit of the party, and that is
19 all we had. So this was just for particular activities, otherwise it
20 was all self-financing. We did not receive any other money from our
21 headquarters in Sarajevo or from anywhere else, ever.
22 Q. Did you have a subscription that was paid by the local members of
23 the party?
24 A. There were several attempts to organise regular subscription fees in
25 the course of 1991, and I know that certain forms came from our
1 headquarters in Sarajevo for the collection of
2 such subscriptions. However, that never worked properly because the
3 idea was that all collected subscription fees should be sent to
4 Sarajevo and then a part of those fees would be given to us. So that
5 in some settlements some subscription fees were collected, but I think
6 that may be only two or three settlements paid in these subscriptions
7 on the account of the Municipal Committee. But these were symbolic
8 sums of money and most
9 or a part of the local committees that did collect those fees retained
10 the money at their
11 level, whereas most local committees did not even collect membership
12 fees. So that we
13 did not have a properly regulated system of subscription. I forgot to
14 mention that, according to the laws of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the opstina
15 government, according to the number of representatives in the
16 Municipal Assembly, would allot certain sums to all municipal parties.
17 Even those sums were of a symbolic nature. So that we were very, we
18 had very scarce resources and so we mostly financed ourselves.
19 Q. Did you have fund raising abroad? Did people contribute to the SDA
20 funds in Prijedor
21 who were living abroad, for instance, in Germany?
22 A. Yes. I went on a tour to Germany once only and this was upon
23 instructions from the party headquarters, and six people collected
24 2,500 German marks and since they came from the region of Brdo they
25 asked me to take that sum to the people in the region of Brdo. Since
1 at Brdo there were six or seven local committees, I informed the
2 people there and told
3 them that this sum had been collected and that they should do what
4 they wanted with it, and I gave the money to the Secretary, no, I am
5 sorry, he was not the Secretary, he was President of one of the local
6 committees. That was the only contribution that I had anything to do
7 with as far as money is concerned.
8 I remember exactly who are the people who contributed those
9 funds originally coming from Brdo, but I do not exclude the
10 possibility, because there were a number of settlements which behaved
11 quite freely and we exerted no pressure on them from the Municipal
12 Committee, so that I do not exclude there were similar such fund
13 raising activities in the region of Kozarac, that some funds arrived
14 from people abroad coming from Kozarac, though what I am sure of is
15 that these were not significant sums.
16 Q. Not all these funds that came from abroad then passed through your
18 A. We had an account, our own legal account, and we had people working
19 with that account and all the funds that were addressed to the
20 Municipal Committee were deposited on that account. Just a moment
21 please, I am saying that a symbolic amount, I will repeat, came every
22 two or three months from the Municipal Government which was financing
23 all parties in proportion to the number of delegates in the assembly,
24 and from time to time there were some voluntary contributions by
25 private entrepreneurs, but this was for a particular activity, for a
1 concrete undertaking when we organised something.
2 Q. The local communes could receive money from abroad to support the SDA
3 in their local village or settlement, and because that was not given
4 to the municipality that did not have to go to your main account; is
5 that right?
6 A. Yes, that is quite correct. When anyone from a particular village or
7 settlement, people
8 from Kozarac, if they wanted to support a particular activity because
9 there was quite a lot of activity, there was an idea, for instance, to
10 renew the old tower in Kozarac dating back to the old city, there was
11 an idea to lay an asphalt road, and there were also some activities to
12 improve the water supply system, the telephone network, and citizens
13 would assist such activities, but this did not go through the SDA
14 organisation but rather through the local communes; that is the State
15 level organisation which were like the local authorities. They were
16 non-party, they were local authorities, whereas some other larger
17 activities in relation to the party, I cannot remember anything of
18 significance for which larger sums were collected.
19 Q. Did you have a special form that was a receipt that recorded
20 donations to the SDA party that you signed in your own name?
21 A. I think there was a kind of receipt, a form. It is possible that
22 there were such forms
23 because when we received a voluntary contribution we gave out
24 receipts. I cannot remember whether we had some special forms or
25 perhaps they were the usual forms, but for every voluntary
1 contribution we did give receipts to every citizen. If he gave the
2 smaller sum he was given a receipt. Anyway, this is according to the
3 law, this is
5 Q. Were there SDA groups in, for instance, Germany who on a local level
6 in Germany organised collections and fund raising for your party in
8 A. Would you please repeat the translation because I did not fully pay
9 attention to the
10 question in English? So could you please repeat it?
11 Q. Were there SDA organisations abroad, for instance in Germany, where
12 the party was organised as the SDA of a particular town, in Germany,
13 say Westfalen, where in that place the SDA members of that town would
14 collect money for you, the SDA in Prijedor?
15 A. Not only in Germany but throughout Western Europe before the war
16 associations of citizens were formed. They were not political
17 organisations, but they were associations of citizens under the
18 sponsorship of SDA, the Party of Democratic Action. They are not
19 acting politically over there but only in the cultural area because
20 the laws of the host country do not allow it. So that is one
21 distinction. Secondly, all those organisations abroad are
22 organisations at the level of the whole of Bosnia-Herzegovina. For
23 example, in Germany in Munich, in Munich there is an SDA organisation
24 for Munich rallying
25 members temporarily living in Munich and coming from all over
2 from Zvornik, Sarajevo, Prijedor, Banja Luka, all over
3 Bosnia-Herzegovina. So abroad there is no SDA organisation for
4 Prijedor that could collect funds just for Prijedor. Certain fund
5 raising abroad was done but these were mostly individual, campaigns by
6 individuals. For example, an individual would invite a friend or
7 several friends from Prijedor or other place and say, "Let's collect
8 some funds to help the people down there", and that is the
9 kind of activity that was engaged in but no larger fund raising
10 activity as far as I know.
11 MR. KAY: Your Honour, that is a convenient moment.
12 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Very good. We will stand in recess until 2.30.
13 (1.04 p.m.)
14 (1.04 p.m.) PRIVATE
15 (Luncheon adjournment)
16 (2.30 p.m.)
17 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr. Kay, you may proceed.
18 MR. KAY: Mr. Mujadzic, Hambarine and the incident that you told the court
19 about earlier this morning ---
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. -- it was put to you that the date was 23rd May, but I think we are,
22 in fact, talking about 22nd May; is that right?
23 A. The incident at Hambarine?
24 Q. Yes.
25 A. I still think that was on 23rd.
1 Q. Very well. Was your brother in the village at the same time when
2 this incident happened?
3 A. You mean in the settlement, in that settlement, where the incident
4 happened? Yes, he was there.
5 Q. That would be Emir Mujadzic; is that right?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Was your cousin also there?
8 A. Which cousin?
9 Q. Mehmed Avdic, was he also there?
10 A. I do not have a cousin called that.
11 Q. You do not have a cousin by that name?
12 A. In our language, a cousin is a brother's son. My brother's son is
13 called Emir and he is four years old. Could you please specify what
14 you mean?
15 Q. In our language, a cousin would mean the son of your father or your
16 mother's brother or sister.
17 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: In my language, it could be both first cousin,
18 second cousin.
19 THE WITNESS: I do not really know anybody called that, Mehmed Avdic.
20 Q. "Avdic" spelt A-V-D-I-C?
21 A. Perhaps you mean Esad Avdic, and he is my uncle. His son is called
22 Alan Avdic, and that is the only relative called "Avdic" that I have.
23 Q. Was either your uncle or his son present at Hambarine during that day
24 when there was shooting?
25 A. Which uncle, could you please specify, because I have several uncles.
1 Do you mean the one that I mentioned, Esad Avdic?
2 Q. The one you mentioned, Esad Avdic, or his son also with the name
3 Avdic, A-V-D-I-C, were either of them also present when the shooting
4 took place in Hambarine?
5 A. Esad Avdic was not there and his son Alan, I think, was 12 or 13
6 years old at the time, so he was a boy and he could have nothing to do
7 with it. Esad Avdic lives about one kilometre and a half from that
8 place and he was not even a member of the SDA or participated in any
9 activities regarding the Territorial Defence, so that I am quite
10 positive that he was not there and -----
11 Q. Was it only members of the SDA who could participate in the
12 Territorial Defence then?
13 A. I did not hear the interpretation. I do have some technical
14 problems. Could you repeat it, please?
15 Q. You do not have to be a member of the SDA to be a member of the
16 Territorial Defence, do you?
17 A. It is a tendentious question. I do not know how you thought of it.
18 I have just mentioned that Esad Avdic was neither a Territorial
19 Defence member nor an SDA member, nor did he participate in any other
20 activities which could be related to the event. I do not know how you
21 establish that link, and why did you think that there was some causal
22 relationship between the SDA and the membership in the Territorial
24 Q. Let me make one thing clear. It is not for me to answer questions
25 but to ask you questions. I am asking you about what took place in
1 Hambarine when there was shooting at a roadblock. You happened to have
2 been in Hambarine on this particular day; is that right?
3 A. More specifically, it is a settlement called Polje and it is Sarajevo
4 Street which belongs in Tukovi.
5 Q. Perhaps if we could have Exhibit 79 so that we can look at where this
6 roadblock was?
7 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr. Kay, you do not have an answer yet to your
8 question. Do you want to go back to that?
9 MR. KAY: I am taking matters, I will move on and perhaps get back to it.
10 I am grateful to your Honour. There we have Prijedor. Can the map
11 be moved to show Hambarine in the middle of the screen? Thank you
12 very much, Mr. Bos. We see there Hambarine. Can you point to us as
13 to where this roadblock was, where the shooting had occurred. That is
15 A. This here is Hambarine.
16 Q. Can you point to the roadblock?
17 A. Just a moment, please, I shall. The exact site is right here.
18 Q. Thank you. Could you point to where you were at the time of the
19 shooting, if it is shown on the map?
20 A. It was somewhere here, some 3 or 400 metres towards Prijedor and that
21 is Sarajevo Street which is part of Tukovi or, rather, this is the
22 boundary area towards Hambarine and towards the settlement of Tukovi.
23 Q. How long had that roadblock been in place in Hambarine?
24 A. Just a moment, I will try to remember. Not more, I think, than some
25 10 to 15 days, not more than that but, at any rate, after the coup in
1 Prijedor, that is, when the Serb Democratic Party carried out a coup
2 in Prijedor on 29th April, it set up checkpoints at the entrances and
3 exits from the town of Prijedor, and here there was one of these
4 checkpoints across the bridge, on the other side of the bridge here.
5 In this place here was the first checkpoint set up by the Territorial
6 Defence which was set up after the coup, not less than seven days
7 after the coup and, in any event, after April 30th.
8 Q. Were there other checkpoints that were situated on the roads into
10 A. If you are moving away from, if you are going from Prijedor, then one
11 checkpoint was here at the junction in Tukovi, but this was the
12 checkpoint set up by Serb paramilitary formations, and I believe that
13 another one was here also belonging to the Serb paramilitary
14 formations, and the first TO checkpoint was only here almost at the
15 entrance into Hambarine.
16 Q. The TO, you said, had manned that checkpoint at Hambarine where this
17 incident took place. Would it be right to say that the members of
18 that TO group were Muslims?
19 A. They were simply members of the Territorial Defence. Nobody asks a
20 member of the Territorial Defence if he is a Muslim or not. It is a
21 private, personal matter whether he will declare that his faith is
22 Muslim or some other. It is the right of every individual, of every
23 human being.
24 Q. Perhaps you will try to assist us then because I would like to know
25 the answer, if you can give it, whether the people manning that check
1 point, as far as you knew, were Muslims?
2 A. Yes, all members were Muslims, but all inhabitants of that local
3 commune from which TO members came are also Muslims, and there was no
4 possibility to have any other ethnic group here, since this was a
5 local commune, a place inhabited only by Muslims. In other places, in
6 mixed environments, there were TO members manning those various
8 who were not Muslims.
9 Q. The Muslims who were at that checkpoint, did they have weapons with
11 A. Yes, they were Territorial Defence members and they were armed, of
13 Q. How many weapons did they have with them?
14 A. I do not know exactly. I could not say.
15 Q. But you arrived there after the shooting and you told us that you
16 made enquiries and you spoke to people. How many weapons did you see?
17 A. I am a physician and the first thing that interested me was the state
18 of health of the wounded, and that was my primary concern. It was a
19 secondary matter how many weapons there were. I saw several rifles,
20 four or five rifles, and automatic rifles, but I was also told that
21 all four of those who were in the car of the White Eagles, members of
22 the Chetnik paramilitary formation, that they were all armed with
23 automatic rifles.
24 Q. You have told us you are a physician and you were concerned with the
25 health of the people there. Forgive me for saying this, you appear to
1 remember details about the people within the car who were Serbs or
2 Croat, but you are unable to help with details of people outside on
3 the checkpoint. Perhaps if you could focus your memory a little and
4 tell us, upon reflection, as to how many weapons you saw in the
5 possession of people who had manned the checkpoint?
6 A. Just a moment, I will try to remember all the details. I am not sure,
7 but I believe there were no more than four or five rifles -- it could
8 not be more than that -- four or five rifles were in the possession of
9 TO members.
10 Q. Who was the leader of the TO group at the checkpoint? What was his
12 A. Aziz Aliskovic.
13 Q. How many men did Aliskovic have with him on this checkpoint?
14 A. I cannot remember exactly because I did not set up those checkpoints,
15 nor did I take part in their organisation -- it was beyond my
16 jurisdiction -- but I think that there could not have been more than
17 seven or eight people. As far as I can remember, I think that it
18 could not have been more than seven or eight people. I do not
19 remember exactly.
20 Q. Were they dressed in military uniform?
21 A. Those were uniforms which they had been issued by the Territorial
22 Defence of Prijedor during the legal mobilization, that is, from
23 military depots of the Yugoslav People's Army. They were the
24 conventional JNA uniforms in grey, olive green colour.
25 Q. Did they have insignia on the uniforms to identify them in any way?
1 A. No.
2 Q. They did not have any badge showing the lilies as insignia of
4 A. I think that nobody had those at this checkpoint.
5 Q. When you say you attended the checkpoint after the shooting, how long
6 did it take you to get there? What time had passed?
7 A. Well, I have already said that the house that I was in was some 3 to
8 400 metres away, not more than that, but I do not know exactly. It
9 took me a couple of minutes because I literally ran out of the house
10 when I heard the shots.
11 Q. Was your brother already there or did he go to the checkpoint with
13 A. My brother was not there, and I do not recall that he was at that
14 checkpoint at all. I mean, literally on that; he had come later to
15 the checkpoint.
16 Q. You saw him later on, you are saying, at the checkpoint rather than
17 when you arrived?
18 A. No, I said that I never saw him. I do not remember that he ever came
19 to that checkpoint.
20 Q. You saw him, though, did you not, that evening in Hambarine? You saw
21 him there?
22 A. No, I did not see him that evening at all.
23 Q. When you arrived at the checkpoint had you ever been to that
24 checkpoint before?
25 A. I used to pass by it several times on my way to Hambarine or Ljubija,
1 because when one goes from my parents' house where I was headed, and
2 if one wants to go to Hambarine, Ljubija or Brdo, one needs to pass
3 through the checkpoint and then enter Hambarine.
4 Q. What was the purpose of that checkpoint?
5 A. Security reasons.
6 Q. Was it to stop people going into Hambarine?
7 A. No. Simultaneously with this checkpoint -- if I could be shown the
8 map? Just a moment, I should like to show where another checkpoint
9 was. Could I please see the map? So the checkpoint towards
10 Hambarine, the first after Prijedor was here, and I have said that I
11 was up here and then facing Hambarine and moving towards Hambarine,
12 and immediately beyond Hambarine and going down here there was another
13 checkpoint, but manned by SDS. There are some Serb houses here, and
14 all people passed freely through this checkpoint.
15 There were controls for security reasons only in the sense --
16 in view of the possible attack of Serb extremists, such as those White
17 Eagles, these extremist Chetnik formations or some other extremist
18 Chetnik, and I believe the fear was quite justified, as the situation
19 in Prijedor later on demonstrated.
20 Q. So the answer is that the checkpoint was to control whoever entered
21 the village of Hambarine?
22 A. I cannot say exactly. I do not think they controlled everyone, and
23 this is not the entrance, it is simply on the way to some other
24 places. Hambarine is a transit point, so to speak, because one has to
25 go through Hambarine to reach some other settlements. There are up
1 here are several other Serb villages, such as Niska Glava, Ljeskare
2 and some more, Donji Volar is another Serb village, Niska Glava. So
3 that citizens of Serbo-Croat origin and all the others, therefore,
4 passed freely through this checkpoint.
5 Q. Thank you very much, but what is the point of putting nine men in
6 military uniform at a checkpoint on a road with four or five rifles if
7 it is not to control who passes that checkpoint?
8 A. I did not say that there was no control of those passing by. I just
9 said that everyone was not necessarily checked, every single person
10 who passed.
11 Q. Let us look at some details then of what actually took place, you
12 say, on 23rd May. At what time did this shooting occur?
13 A. In the afternoon between 7.20 and 7.30 in the afternoon, evening.
14 Q. Were you just visiting your parents for social reasons?
15 A. No, on 30th when the putch occurred and, as I said, I toured all the
16 inhabited places on that day and on May 1st when I wanted to move
17 towards Prijedor, on May 2nd I was told by some people that if I come
18 to Prijedor the Chetnik extremists would arrest me and probably
19 execute me. That is why from May 2nd, for reasons of safety, I had
20 not entered Prijedor again, and all meetings that occurred after that
21 were held in Hambarine for safety reasons. Therefore, I was in my
22 parents' house for safety reasons because, obviously, in Prijedor I
23 was no longer safe because the word I received was that the Serb
24 extremists would arrest me and very probably execute me.
25 Q. When you heard the shots you decided to see what had happened rather
1 than leave the area; is that right?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. When you arrived at the checkpoint what kind of car did you see?
4 A. I think it was an old Lada or we call it PZ, Fiat PZ127, a white old
6 Q. And two people were dead?
7 A. I think that in the car itself there was no one. They were all
8 outside the vehicle.
9 Q. You say outside the vehicle, can you describe then where the bodies
11 A. I think they were right next to the car, perhaps one or two or maybe
12 three metres from the car, one two or three. I cannot remember
13 exactly the distance between the car and the bodies. After all, four
14 years have gone by since.
15 Q. Where exactly was the car, can you tell us how it was positioned?
16 A. The car was right up at the checkpoint because from the moment it was
17 stopped it did not make any more movement.
18 Q. So the car was stopped in the road at the checkpoint?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. The car had not crashed?
21 A. No, as far as I remember, no. I cannot be sure of that.
22 Q. When you say the car was stopped at the checkpoint, was there a
23 barrier across the road?
24 A. I think there was no barrier. The car simply stopped because people
25 from the checkpoint had stopped it by waving probably with something.
1 Q. The two dead bodies, where were they exactly? Can you remember where
2 they were when you arrived?
3 A. I think they were right next to the car. I have already said, maybe
4 one two or three metres away from the car.
5 Q. Front or back of the car?
6 A. I cannot remember.
7 Q. How many people had travelled in the car altogether? Were you able
8 to account for the number of people within the car?
9 A. Six.
10 Q. Two others from the car had been wounded?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Where were they when you arrived?
13 A. I think that one of them -- I cannot remember exactly, but I know
14 that some of the wounded were standing there and they had been
15 disarmed. They were standing next to the car. I cannot remember
16 exactly. They were there next to the car, I think, somewhere around
17 the checkpoint.
18 Q. So the two who had been wounded, had been disarmed, their weapons
19 taken away from them?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Were they Serbs?
22 A. Four were Serbs wearing uniforms with insignia of White Eagles, the
23 insignia of the extremist Seselj Chetnik organisation, and I think
24 that two of them who were driving the car were of Croatian
25 nationality, and I think they were in civilian clothes, and they told
1 me that they had nothing to do with this and that these four men had
2 forced them to drive that car, to take the men and to drive them.
3 Q. The two who were dead were also Serbs?
4 A. The two who were dead were Serbs but the two Croats were also
5 wounded. All six of them were hit because, as far as I was told by
6 those present, one of the TO members fired without actually taking aim
7 and he hit all of them.
8 Q. With one shot he hit all of them?
9 A. No, no, with a machine gunfire.
10 Q. So ---
11 A. A burst of fire, automatic weapons.
12 Q. -- without taking aim he managed to kill two and wound two others?
13 A. There were six people in the car and he fired in their direction.
14 Two out of those six died and the other four were wounded, two more
15 seriously and two less seriously.
16 Q. So everyone who had been in the car had injuries caused by shooting?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. The result of the injuries to the TO checkpoint was one person
20 A. Yes, one TO member was injured, wounded.
21 Q. What happened to the wounded people? You say that they were two
22 Croats and two Serbs. What happened to them? Where did they go after
23 you had arrived at the checkpoint?
24 A. As telephone lines were totally cut with the town of Prijedor, it was
25 not possible to ask for an ambulance to come to pick up the wounded.
1 There was a special system -- I am not very well versed in technical
2 equipment-- some kind of mini radio system, so that it was possible,
3 somebody proposed that using this system we could report to the centre
4 in Prijedor for information; and I immediately to Rizvanovici to try
5 and call the information centre and let them know what had happened,
6 and to ask somebody from the hospital, the emergency service, to come
7 immediately and care for the wounded.
8 Q. Were the four people who were wounded who had been in the car taken
9 to hospital?
10 A. I do not know, I cannot say because, as I said, immediately after
11 this event the police car, the armoured transporter, that immediately
12 arrived on the spot, and which I asked to take in these people and
13 they refused, they moved away 300 to 400 metres, maybe more, 500 or
14 600, I cannot say exactly, and they fired at the checkpoint.
15 After that, it was already dusk, and tanks arrived in Tukovi
16 and certain units. Everything was blocked in Tukovi along the next
17 kilometre towards Prijedor with military formations of the SDS. After
18 trying to report to Prijedor what had happened, I learnt later that
19 someone afterwards came from Prijedor with a car and drove those
20 people away -- at least that is what I was told.
21 Q. Let us look at when the police vehicle arrives after the shooting,
22 and asks that the leader of the TO group, Aliskovic, should surrender.
23 A. I did not see the people speaking from the transporter. They did not
24 even come out of the transporter. They spoke through the opening,
25 issuing orders and they demanded that Aziz and all the other people
1 should surrender. I just told them that a commission should be formed
2 to investigate the case rather than arresting people just like that.
3 Q. What do you mean "arresting people just like that"? There were two
4 people dead, four people injured and the police had arrived. Why
5 should you say that there should be a commission to investigate what
6 had happened? The people of the TO at that roadblock had done the
8 A. Yes, but you forget that this was no lawful police, that these were
9 ordinary criminal elements, and that the legal Chief of Police had
10 been dismissed by the coup.
11 Q. You wanted a commission to investigate it to avoid those people of
12 the TO at the roadblock being arrested?
13 A. I do not know who should arrest whom because, if we viewed things
14 from the legal aspect, then the people who came with the police should
15 have been arrested, because they were the ones who had caused the
16 incident and had overthrown the legal state system.
17 Q. You did not think, as the President of a political party in the area
18 with a responsibility, that where killings had taken place in that way
19 there should be investigation by the police?
20 A. Yes, certainly, but by legal bodies, legal police forces and these
21 people who came there were not that; and I was responding as a deputy
22 and member of the Republican Parliament of the Council of Citizens,
23 the highest legislative body of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina.
24 Q. You did not know who those policemen were that were in that vehicle,
25 did you?
1 A. What I knew for sure was that they were not representatives of the
2 legal authorities of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Anyway, they did not show
3 any documents, they did not even come out of the vehicle but, by the
4 insignia on the vehicle, it was clear that these were extremist SDS
6 Q. That is what you say, but you were quite happy for this shooting and
7 these killings to take place and for any due process of law to be
8 avoided, were you not, Mr. Mujadzic?
9 A. I think that your question is tendentious. I do not know how you
10 concluded that I wanted that shooting to take place because I happened
11 to hear about it quite by chance. That is my first point and,
12 secondly, it is quite certain that the people from the car were the
13 first to fire at TO members without any warning, and that the response
14 of one of the TO members was in self-defence, as he was falling to the
15 ground while the people were shooting at them from the car.
16 Q. How on earth can you say that when you were not there, you did not
17 see who fired the first shots, you come to the scene and there are two
18 Serbs dead, four others from the car wounded, and you say they are
19 extremists who started it, and you have one person slightly injured
20 from the TO; you have been impartial about this, have you not, Mr.
22 A. I think that I described the whole case absolutely impartially
23 because you forget that two out of these six people were Croats who
24 had nothing to do with the four Serb extremists, members of the White
25 Eagles, the most extremist Chetnik organisation, who confirmed that
1 that is how it happened; and, anyway, one of those present, Serbs,
2 also confirmed this and all the other eyewitnesses who saw this event,
3 that without any warning one of the members of the White Eagles had
4 started shooting at TO members, so I do not see why I am partial.
5 MR. KAY: Thank you very much.
6 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Additional questions, Mr. Keegan?
7 MR. KEEGAN: Yes, thank you, your Honour.
8 Re-examined by MR. KEEGAN
9 Q. Dr. Mujadzic, beginning on 27th June when you were hiding in that
10 hole in the woods for a month being shelled on a daily basis, did any
11 of these police authorities attempt to intervene and assist your
13 MR. KAY: Excuse me, I am not sure how that follows from cross-examination
14 as a matter arising, or whether it is an opportunity for a speech from
15 my learned friend.
16 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: If that is an objection ---
17 MR. KAY: Yes.
18 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: -- I will overrule the objection.
19 MR. KEEGAN: You can answer the question.
20 A. May I answer the question?
21 Q. Yes.
22 A. There was a price on my head and Stojan Zupljanin personally declared
23 that negotiations in Bihac in the presence of Zijed Kadic that they
24 would catch me at all cost and that there was no way I could escape.
25 The Serb propaganda reported on a daily basis whether I had been
1 captured and whether anyone had seen me and, according to information
2 I received, a price was offered to anybody who would report about my
3 whereabouts or who would capture me.
4 Finally, when they did not manage to find me and capture me,
5 they published that they had torn me asunder between two vehicles and
6 then Abdulah Konjici, President of the Council of Citizens, addressed
7 a letter of protest because of such a brutal act and, indeed, all
8 people in Sarajevo believed that that was what had happened. However,
9 thank God, that was just Serb/Chetnik propaganda.
10 MR. KEEGAN: Nothing further, your Honour.
11 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Additional questions, Mr. Kay?
12 MR. KAY: No, thank you, your Honour.
13 JUDGE STEPHEN: I have, I think, three questions to ask you. The first
14 question relates to the incident that you described when the tanks
15 arrived and there was, you say, concern on the part of citizens as to
16 what the meaning of this event was. Can you tell me, was that at a
17 time when fighting was going on in Croatia?
18 A. I think that by then the war in Croatia had started, had got well
19 underway, and the media in Zagreb and Belgrade presented the war in
20 Croatia in totally different ways. From the Zagreb media, we learned
21 of terrible crimes and bloodshed.
22 Q. I am only concerned with the question whether when the tanks arrived
23 that was a time when there was fighting in Croatia and I think you
24 have answered that "yes"?
25 A. Yes.
1 Q. Then the second question I wanted to ask you was about Dr. Karadzic's
2 position when he made the statement in the Republic's Assembly that
3 horrified delegates. What was the position he was then holding?
4 A. He was then President of the Serbian Democratic Party of
6 Q. And, accordingly, a member of the Assembly, is that so?
7 A. No. No, in the parliament of Bosnia-Herzegovina with the permission
8 of the parliament, someone who is not a member of the parliament may
9 speak, so that Karadzic was speaking only in the capacity of President
10 of the Party. He was not a member of parliament.
11 Q. Thank you. The third question is this reference to "lilies". I have
12 read in a number of exhibits that some forces wore lilies as a badge
13 and you were asked about lilies in cross-examination. Can you tell us
14 something about this badge and who wore it?
15 A. This was still early on and those badges were worn by some TO members
16 who, by chance, managed to find or draw that sign; not all members of
17 TO because there were very few such signs around.
18 Q. Subsequently, did it become a recognised badge of any particular
19 force in Bosnia?
20 A. Yes, of the army of Bosnia-Herzegovina, but if you are thinking of
21 the very beginning whether there was any other organisation which had
22 that sign.
23 Q. But later then it became the official insignia of the army of
25 A. Yes, yes, quite correct.
1 JUDGE STEPHEN: Thank you.
2 JUDGE VOHRAH: Mr. Mujadzic, when you took refuge in the forest were you
3 and your companions armed?
4 A. Yes, with personal arms. I had a pistol that was normally
5 registered, a Magnum 357 -- I had a permit a licence for it -- and the
6 people who were with me also had pistols.
7 JUDGE VOHRAH: Thank you.
8 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Dr. Mujadzic, you indicated on April 30th -- I
9 believe that was the date -- that military came into Prijedor. What
10 military was that?
11 A. You are probably thinking of the forces that carried out the putch
12 and which I saw early on April 30th in front of the most important
13 buildings, at the entrances of places. Those were forces of the 5th
14 Kozara Brigade, paramilitary formations of the Serbian Democratic
15 Party. Then there were also some special forces, special units, from
16 Banja Luka, and Banja Luka special police forces and some people of
17 whom I do not know which units they belong to, they were from Klujc,
18 Dubica, from other municipalities outside Prijedor.
19 Q. The 5th Kozara Brigade, is that from Serbia, from Bosnia-Herzegovina,
20 from Croatia, or was it part of the Territorial Defence?
21 A. The 5th Kozara Brigade is a brigade of which Colic Pero was in
22 command and which had fought in Croatia on the front of Lipik and
23 Pakrac and which, together with the 43rd Brigade, returned to
24 Prijedor. It was part of the Banja Luka corps brigade, belonging to
25 the Banja Luka corps of the Yugoslav People's Army.
1 Q. You indicated that Colonel Arsic was a Serbian from Serbia. What
2 army was he in, a Colonel of what military unit, if you know?
3 A. The Yugoslav People's Army.
4 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr. Keegan, any additional questions?
5 MR. KEEGAN: No, your Honour.
6 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr. Kay?
7 MR. KAY: No, thank you, your Honour.
8 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Fine. Have you any objection to Dr. Mujadzic being
9 permanently excused?
10 MR. KAY: No, your Honour.
11 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: OK. You may be permanently excused. Thank you, Dr.
13 for coming.
14 THE WITNESS: Thank you.
15 (The witness withdrew)
16 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr. Keegan, will you call your next witness, Mr.
17 Tieger, or both of you -- Mr. Tieger?
18 MR. TIEGER: The next witness will testify in closed session.
19 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Then we will go into closed session.
20 (Hearing in closed session–released by Trial Chamber II on 13 October 1996)
21 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr. Tieger, are you ready to proceed?
22 MR. TIEGER: I am, your Honour. I think it WILL take a little time
23 because of the movement of the previous witness. It has to be
24 completed before they move this witness?
25 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: How much time?
1 MR. TIEGER: I do not think it is any appreciable time. It is a slight
2 delay, but I do not think we need to recess.
3 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr. Wladimiroff, with respect to the motion that the
4 Trial Chamber suggested the Prosecution file regarding the alibi
5 notice, the Prosecution will file their motion by a week from
6 yesterday and you should file your response within 14 days, 14
7 calendar days, of receipt of that motion.
8 MR. WLADIMIROFF: That is fine.
9 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Very good. Thank you.
10 JUDGE STEPHEN: While we are waiting, I wonder, are there spare copies of
11 Exhibit 79, that is, the coloured map? It would be very useful. I
12 know I have already got one in chambers. It would be very handy to
13 have one and I think each of us might benefit from having one on the
15 MR. NIEMANN: I think we can try to do that, your Honour.
16 JUDGE STEPHEN: There is no hurry about it, but if we could?
17 MR. NIEMANN: Yes, your Honour.
18 JUDGE STEPHEN: Thank you.
19 MR. NIEMANN: Yes, your Honour.
20 (The witness was called into court)
21 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Sir, would you please take that oath?
22 THE WITNESS [In translation]: Of course. I solemnly declare that I will
23 speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth.
24 (The witness P was sworn)
25 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Fine. You may be seated. Thank you, Mr. Tieger,
1 you may proceed.
2 Examined by MR. TIEGER
3 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, your Honour. (To the witness): Sir, during the
4 course of your testimony in these proceedings pursuant to a court
5 order, we will be referring to you as "P" and, just for confirmation
6 purposes, if I may, the court has asked the court personnel to make
7 certain that there is no outside feed and no broadcasting, televising
8 recording going outside this courtroom.
9 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes, we have asked that it be verified and it has
10 been done, has it not? So there is no recording of this, of the
11 testimony that you will give. That recording will not go out to the
12 public. It will be retained in our records. The transcript of this
13 proceeding will likewise be retained until counsel for the Prosecution
14 can review it to make sure that the transcript in no way indicates
15 your identity. Counsel for the Defence will likewise be given the
16 opportunity to review the transcript, but that will then not be
17 released until it is determined that that does not reveal your
18 identity. You may proceed, Mr. Tieger.
19 MR. WLADIMIROFF: May I raise another question, your Honour?
20 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Yes.
21 MR. WLADIMIROFF: So far we have mentioned this witness as witness P and
22 we will do that, but should it not be appropriate to have this witness
23 read (redacted)real name and ask (redacted)whether (redacted).name is
24 correct so we have no confusion about our identities?
25 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: I do not have it.
1 MR. TIEGER: I think Judge Stephen's suggestion is a perfect way to deal
2 with it and if we could show Professor Wladimiroff?
3 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: I do not know the name, but you are saying read to
5 MR. WLADIMIROFF: Yes.
6 MR. TIEGER: Correct.
7 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: But not read (redacted) name out?
8 THE WITNESS: Yes, that is my name.
9 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: OK, very good.
10 MR. TIEGER: Miss Sutherland will show Mr. Wladimiroff the name to be
11 shown to the witness.
12 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr. P, you should verify that that is your name. We
13 do not know that and do not want to know your name.
14 THE WITNESS: Yes.
15 MR. WLADIMIROFF: Thank you.
16 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Go ahead, Mr. Tieger, you may proceed.
17 MR. TIEGER: Thank you, your Honour. (To the witness): (redacted), I know
18 you expected before you arrived today to be in a remote witness room and
19 under the hot lights of that room, and I assume that is why you are
20 dressed informally. I wanted to mention that. (redacted), can you tell the
21 court where you were born, please?
22 A. (redacted)
23 Q. That is in Bosnia-Herzegovina?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Did you grow up in the (redacted) area?
1 A. (redacted).
2 Q. (redacted)
3 A. (redacted)
4 Q. (redacted)
5 A. (redacted)
6 Q. (redacted)
7 A. (redacted).
8 Q. (redacted)
9 A. (redacted)
10 Q. (redacted)
11 A. (redacted)
12 Q. (redacted)
13 A. (redacted)
14 Q. (redacted)
15 A. (redacted)
20 Q. (redacted)
21 A. (redacted)
22 Q. (redacted)
24 A. (redacted)
13 page 1593 redacted
13 page 1594 redacted
13 page 1595 redacted
13 page 1596 redacted
19 Q. As a preliminary matter, let me ask you what the ethnic composition
20 of the Banja Luka area was, first of all, of Banja Luka itself?
21 A. The town of Banja Luka had a population of about 140,000; of them, as
22 regards the ethnic composition, there were about, roughly the same
23 number of Muslims and Croats, that is, there were slightly more
24 Muslims in Banja Luka because some of the Croats lived in villages
25 outside the town but within the municipality. The Serbs were the most
1 numerous group both in the town and the municipality. About 200,000
2 was the population of the municipality of Banja Luka, according to the
3 census of '91, 1st April '91. There were slightly -- 54 per cent of
4 the Serbs, about 15 per cent of the Croats and about 15 per cent were
5 Muslims, close to 15 per cent, and there were about 18 per cent of
6 others, I think. So that was the ethnic structure of the municipality
7 which was published and on record.
8 As for the ethnic structure of the town itself, these were not
9 possible to find because they were never filed, they were never put on
10 record nor announced. According to the 1991 census, or '81, that is,
11 10 days (sic) earlier because censuses were taken every 10 years,
12 there were 51.5 per cent of the Serbs in Banja Luka in '81, somewhere
13 around 50 per cent of Croats and Muslims respectively and others.
14 So the results of 1981, the results of the census of 1981 were
15 throughout Bosnia-Herzegovina taken as one of the criteria, as one of
16 the keys, for the elections in 1990, and served as a criterion for the
17 enforcement of some laws such as, for instance, law on municipal
18 affairs, law elections law, the law on the interior affairs.
19 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Before we recess for afternoon recess, I want to
20 refer the counsel and Mr. Tadic to the contents of the order that was
21 entered with respect to protective measures for P. Mr. Tadic, would
22 you please put on your earphones? Can you hear, Mr. Tadic?
23 THE ACCUSED TADIC: Yes, I can hear you.
24 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: In a language you understand?
25 THE ACCUSED TADIC: I can hear you independently whether I do have my
1 earphones on or not because the sound is very good.
24 (4.05 p.m.)
25 (Adjourned for a short time)
1 (4.25 p.m.)
2 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Mr. Keegan?
3 MR. KEEGAN: Your Honour, if I might, just before Mr. Tieger recommences,
4 with regard to the request for maps? The specific map which Judge
5 Stephen asked for may take some time. It will have to be re-produced
6 so we will do that at the earliest opportunity. But, in the short
7 run, with the agreement of the Defence, we do have these maps for each
8 of the Judges. It will give you a better picture generally for
9 geographical locations of various towns, so if I might have those
11 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: What Exhibit is that or is that just a gift?
12 MR. KEEGAN: These are not going to be an exhibit. They are simply for
13 your use at the Bench.
14 MR. WLADIMIROFF: We have the same.
15 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Is there any objection?
16 MR. WLADIMIROFF: Absolutely none.
17 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: OK, fine. Mr. Tieger, would you like to continue,
19 MR. TIEGER:Yes, your Honour, thank you. (To the witness): (redacted), just
20 before the brief recess, I had asked you about the ethnic composition
21 in Banja Luka. What was the ethnic composition of the opstinas
22 surrounding Banja Luka? Were they primarily Serb, primarily Muslim,
24 A. Around Banja Luka there were several adjacent municipalities where
25 the Serbs constituted the majorities, such as Celinac, Laktasi
1 bordering on the municipality of Banja Luka; then the municipality of
2 Srbac which also had a Serb majority; then in the association of
3 municipalities of Banja Luka, there was the municipality of Skender
4 Vakuf where the Serbs were the majority, but there was a considerable
5 share of the Muslims; and Kotor Varos where the Muslims and Croats
6 exceeded the number of Serbs, Serbs were about a third; then Prnjavor,
7 the municipality with a Serb majority. That was the association of
8 municipalities, Banja Luka, prior to 1990.
9 In the territory of Bosanska Krajina we had another
10 association of municipalities, that was the one with seat in Prijedor
11 and Jajce which incorporated several municipalities from Bosanska
12 Krajina and one from the territory of central Bosnia. When I say
13 "Bosanska Krajina", I do not mean the part in the maps, that is, in
14 the north west part of Bosnia-Herzegovina which has always stood to
15 mean or was known as Bihac Krajina or Krajina only because this was a
16 separate association of municipalities which incorporated Bihac,
17 Carzin, Velika Kladusa with a Muslim majority there, Bosanski
18 Petrovac, Drvar and Grahovo where these majority belonged to the Serb
19 part of the population.
20 Q. (redacted),
22 A. (redacted)
3 Q. One more quick geographic question, how far is Banja Luka from
4 opstina Prijedor?
5 A. Well, the distances, the distance between the towns of Banja Luka and
6 Prijedor is about 50 kilometres.
7 Q. Now I would like to ask you some questions about the political system
8 you referred to earlier in former Yugoslavia which existed before the
9 time of the democratic elections. (redacted)
11 A. Yes, politically speaking, Yugoslavia had a mono-party political
12 system. It was a Republic speaking of the state order. The Republics
13 had their Assemblies and there were Municipal Assemblies with the
14 people, with their members directly elected and indirectly elected
15 were members of the Federal Parliament. Then, following World War II
16 in 1945, when the socialist Yugoslavia was recognised as a state,
17 there was only one political party which was a political party at the
18 time, and that was the Communist Party of Yugoslavia.
19 The Communist Party of Yugoslavia at its 5th or 6th Congress,
20 I believe, in 1958 changed its name to the League of Communists of
21 Yugoslavia and, by the same token, in a certain way it changed its
22 attitude to the power. The Communist Party of Yugoslavia was not the
23 governing party in Yugoslavia, and that relationship between the
24 Communist Party, that is, the League of Communists after 1958 and that
25 remained until 1990.
1 At that time Yugoslavia had one socio-political organisation
2 called the Socialist Alliance of Working People, and as an umbrella --
3 it served as umbrella for all other socio-political organisations and
4 associations of citizens. In that model socio-political organisations
5 were the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, the Federation of Trade
6 Unions and the Union of the Socialist Youth.
7 Associations of citizens were various and they were
8 established under Republican laws on the association of citizens, and
9 these could be sports clubs, amateurist societies, any kind of
10 associations which, by their statute or acts of their foundation, were
11 not against, were not counter the existing political system. That was
12 the legal situation.
13 In terms of their real state of affairs, until 1990, was as
14 follows. The League of Communists of Yugoslavia decided on all
15 matters which in any way whatsoever were relevant in the former
16 Yugoslavia from a political to economic to cultural to any other.
17 This was done through the final acts of party congresses, and these
18 final acts which embraced, which covered, the whole life in the former
19 Yugoslavia were in the representative bodies, that is, in elected
20 bodies beginning from the Federal Assembly to the Republic Assemblies
21 to the municipal halls. They were enforced by them, completely.
22 There were no deviations from these documents. Any modification of
23 those Congress stance meant the deviation from what was called "party
24 line" and entailed party responsibility.
25 I need to mention that this party responsibility, even though
1 nobody could be convicted for it by the party nor end up in jail, was,
2 nevertheless, very strict. The loss of the status of a member of the
3 League of Communists usually meant the loss of one's job, loss of any
4 higher office or any executive office, any executive post, including
5 sports societies or sports clubs.
6 In that model the former Yugoslavia in that party system or,
7 rather, in that system of power, did not know the model of political
8 degradation. There was only the model of liquidation, political and
9 often times physical as well.
10 Q. By "political degradation" do you mean demotions within the party
11 which were merely handled in a political way as opposed to physical
13 A. No, I did not mean only that. I use the term "political
14 degradation", and by this I meant normal displacements from a
15 political or party post, that is, resignation in case of some dissent
16 with a document, with a party line, conclusions, and to keep one's
17 professional function or some other job; likewise, to be given a
18 chance to succeed once again or, that is, to re-enter the political
20 In the former Yugoslavia, in the League of Communists that was
21 impossible. Political fall meant a fall absolutely. Very high
22 ranking officials managed to remain in the shadow, that is, outside
23 the political life, but those were people who had distinguished
24 themselves in World War II and which that political system simply did
25 not dare liquidate politically completely.
1 As for the decisions in the League of Communists, how they
2 were taken, the League of Communists had a decision-making model which
3 was known as the democratic model or system of democratic centralism,
4 and which meant that the decisions of the party top ranks, regardless
5 of the level, municipal, republic or the Yugoslav, had to be enforced,
6 that is, adopted without objection and often without any possibility,
7 any chance, of discussing a particular view.
8 In this manner, a system was established whereby the highest
9 echelons of the party made decisions on behalf of the co-political
10 party, that is, the whole socio-political organisation, and formally
11 they provided, they ensured, the voting at the lowest ranking units of
12 organisation which were the basic organisations of the League of
14 The League of Communists had yet another thing,
15 organisationally speaking, by which it could be distinguished from a
16 political party, and that was the division into republic organisations
17 of the League of Communists, so that every republic had its own League
18 of Communists as an autonomous organisation, by and large autonomous,
19 and then these republic organisations were associated at Yugoslavia's
20 level in the League of Communists of Yugoslavia. (redacted)
23 Q. Did participants in this long-standing system, former Communist
24 members, become active in the new parties in Bosnia-Herzegovina in
1 A. Yes, the political parties established in 1990 and then filed in the
2 register of political parties which was instituted for the first time
3 in 1990 where former members of the League of Communists came
4 together. Almost all former members of the League of Communists
5 became members of the newly formed political parties, not one only,
6 all the political parties, some of them, a smaller number of them,
7 remained outside the political life. This presence of the former
8 members of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia largely determined
9 the nature and rules of conduct of the new political parties founded
10 in 1990.
11 All those members of the League of Communists did not change
12 their habits, their rules of behaviour, their view of life, of
13 politics, of a political party, kept in full; and in new political
14 parties in almost all statutes there were provisions regulating what
15 was called "party discipline", so that the heaviest, the worst, rules
16 of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia were almost in toto taken
17 over by new political parties.
18 The main problem of the new political parties were people,
19 practically speaking, who had not changed at all. They merely changed
20 their standard. Rather than the standard of the league -- of the flag
21 of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, they now had a standard of
22 their political party or their nation and kept it above their heads.
23 Q. Under the communist system in former Yugoslavia, (redacted), how
24 was political advancement achieved? What was it dependent upon?
25 A. Advancement in the former Yugoslavia was possible in two areas, in
1 your profession, in your career and in politics, and in both cases one
2 could advance in two ways only. Due to exceptional qualities,
3 especially if you were not a member of the League of Communists, there
4 were some people who were like that, but they were few, or thanks to
5 loyalty or, rather, I always called it a completely servile attitude,
6 servility towards the leadership of the party, guaranteed advancement
7 and progress in your career, both in politics and at work.
8 No-one could be appointed a manager or a director if he was
9 not a member of the League of Communists until somewhere in the 80s.
10 Two or three years after Tito's death this became a bit more liberal,
11 so that it was possible for somebody who was extremely capable to
12 become a general manager without being a member of the League of
13 Communists. But the League of Communists was an organisation that
14 rallied or, rather, all judges, prosecutors, policemen, civil
15 servants, the management of enterprises, all of these had to be
16 members of the League of Communists. No-one would, could be elected a
17 judge if he was not a member of the League of Communists; there were
18 no such people.
19 Q. Can you give us any examples of how someone within this system,
20 aspects of which became transplanted to the post election environment,
21 would advance through the system if that is what he sought?
22 A. Yes, there are many such examples. There are many examples of the
23 most hardcore, almost orthodox, members of the League of Communists
24 after switching over to political parties became the most orthodox
25 Serbs, Croats or Muslims. A very good example of such a person is the
1 President of the Crisis Headquarters of Krajina who was well-known as
2 a hardcore communist, who was very strict in his demands for respect
3 of the rules of the League of Communists and after joining the SDS he
4 became one of the most orthodox Serbs.
5 The period that this transformation took was simply the time
6 needed to change his party membership card. Some prominent leaders of
7 SDS in Banja Luka never even withdrew from the League of Communists.
8 The President of the Municipal Committee of SDS for Banja Luka in the
9 spring of 1991 was still formally a member of the League of
10 Communists, and he was in the records of members of the League of
11 Communists and he still held the position of Secretary of the basic
12 League of Communists organisation attached to the Faculty of Medicine.
13 Q. Under that system, what was the relationship between the expression
14 of one's commitment to the party standard and the likelihood of
16 A. In the League of Communists?
17 Q. Yes.
18 A. The League of Communists had a very strange system of so-called
19 personnel policy. This was known as personnel policy, but it, in
20 fact, meant a network of Caders who were appointed to leading posts.
21 One had to be a very loyal member of the League of Communists to fight
22 against the church, against religion, to be against all ideologies
23 which were incompatible with the League of Communists and, because of
24 the way in which it was organised as a socio-political organisation
25 within or under the umbrella of the socialist alliance, the personnel
1 policy was usually decided at parties, at homes, in restaurants. It
2 was not important whether you were a capable individual or hard
3 working individual, somebody with knowledge; it was important to be
4 loyal to the party leadership. That was the precondition for
5 advancement in your career.
6 Q. Was that aspect of the former system also transplanted to any of the
7 parties in the post election environment?
8 A. It was totally transplanted, totally. What is more, after the
9 takeover of power or, rather, after the elections and the distribution
10 of departments among the ruling coalition partners, changes began in
11 the leaderships, in the economy, in public services, in the state
12 administration. The same model from the League of Communists was
13 fully applied. The more loyal, the louder, the more extreme a member,
14 the greater the chances for advancement, for a better career, for
15 acquiring a good post in business or in politics.
16 Q. Did the elections of 1990 provide an opportunity for people who had
17 not previously distinguished themselves in politics or professions to
18 advance with their parties by the expression of such loyalty?
19 A. Yes, if they were members of the parties in power, and in
20 Bosnia-Herzegovina it was the ruling coalition between SDS, HDZ and
21 SDA. Progress for members of other political parties, with the
22 exception of Tuzla, was not possible.
23 Q. Was likelihood of such advancement related to the strength of one's
24 apparent commitment to the party ideals?
25 A. Yes, that was a precondition of advancement, total commitment to the
1 political ideas, current political aims and expression of very firm
2 party positions. In that way, by such behaviour, it was possible to
3 advance in your working career, to achieve a managerial post or a
4 better paid post, and also to obtain political positions which meant a
5 political post in one's own party or in the political system, a member
6 of an Assembly, a working body of the Assembly which meant quite
7 considerable social power, power in society.
8 Q. Focusing your attention on the approximate time of the 1990
9 elections, had any nationalist movements surfaced in former Yugoslavia
10 by the time the elections were held?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Was there a Serbian nationalist movement at that time?
13 A. Yes, there was such an atmosphere, one might say a movement which
14 several years before the election escalated very strongly.
15 Q. Did Serbian nationalism embrace the concept of an expanded and
16 unified Serbian state?
17 A. Yes, in essence, at the basis of that nationalist movement, and I
18 must say that the Croatian nationalist movement was also very
19 powerful, there was the idea of a greater Serbia. The idea of a
20 greater Serbia is not a new one, nor was it discovered by politicians
21 who appeared on the political scene just before the 1990 elections,
22 that is, in 1989/1989. They simply very successfully implemented that
23 idea. The idea of a greater Serbia emerged roughly some 150 years
24 ago. It gained considerable momentum in the period between the two
25 wars, and it was always present in the Socialist Federal Republic of
2 The protagonists of the idea of a greater Serbia were mainly
3 focused in two institutions, that is, the Serbian Academy of Arts and
4 Sciences (or SANU in short) in Belgrade, and the Association of
5 Writers of Serbia with its headquarters in Francuska Street 7, known
6 as "Francuska 7". One of the major protagonists of that idea was Vasa
7 Cubrilovic in the period between the two world wars in the 30s, and
8 until his death as a member of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and in
9 the Association of Writers of Serbia, there were a number of important
10 protagonists, one of the most well known being to Dobrica Cosic.
11 Q. Let me ask you first about Vasa Cubrilovic. First of all, can you
12 tell us very quickly about his background and why he was a significant
13 figure for Serbs?
14 A. Vasa Cubrilovic was a very well known personality. He was thought to
15 be a Serb national hero. He was a member of the young Bosnian group.
16 He was born in Bosanska Gradiska. He was a member of that
17 organisation, an organisation which carried out the assassination of
18 Prince Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914 and which was the immediate cause
19 of the outbreak of the First World War and the conflict between Serbia
20 and Austria.
21 After release from prison, after the collapse of the
22 Austro-Hungarian Empire, he graduated at the Faculty of Philosophy
23 and, as a charismatic figure of that period, as a national hero, he
24 was untouchable in many respects. He was the creator of a programme
25 in 1937, I think it was, or 36, which was called the Emigration of the
1 Arnauti, or the Schipetars, where he described the ways and means of
2 expelling the Albanian population known officially as the "Schipetars"
3 from the territory of Serbia.
4 Those same services were offered by him to Tito's Yugoslavia
5 after the Second World War. However, the Communist Party of
6 Yugoslavia or, rather, the events in the Socialist Federal Republic of
7 Yugoslavia applied this programme of his only to Germans, that is,
8 citizens of German ethnicity in the former Yugoslavia. All German
9 citizens, or almost all of them, were expelled from former Yugoslavia.
10 All those who belonged to the German army, or to any political party
11 related to them, their property was confiscated and their return to
12 Yugoslavia prohibited.
13 Regarding ethnic minorities in the former Yugoslavia, that is,
14 the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, Tito never accepted
15 Cubrilovic's concept.
16 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, may I have this document marked as Exhibit 142
17 for identification, please? (Document handed). (redacted),did you recently
18 have an opportunity to review some of the work of Vasa Cubrilovic
19 along with other Serbian nationalists, such as Stevan Moljevic or
20 Militim Nedic?
21 A. Yes, I have.
22 Q. Did you extract portions of those works and are they contained in the
23 document now before you?
24 A. Yes.
25 MR. TIEGER: I would tender this document, your Honour.
1 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Is there any objection to Exhibit 142?
2 MR. WLADIMIROFF: No, your Honour.
3 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: It will be admitted. Exhibit 142 is admitted.
4MR. TIEGER (To the witness):(redacted), you mentioned that Vasa Cubrilovic was
5 an -- I am sorry, a small technical problem. I will start again. (redacted)
6 I believe you mentioned that Vasa Cubrilovic was an advocate of
7 achieving a greater Serbia. In particular, did he discuss the
8 scattering and displacement of minority groups as a method for
9 obtaining greater Serbia?
10 A. Yes, that was the way in which, in his view, greater Serbia should be
11 achieved as a state, not a state that would have a territory with a
12 multi-ethnic composition of citizens, but a one nation state. In his
13 promemoria on the resettlement of Arnauti from 1937, Cubrilovic
14 provided detailed instructions how the authorities should behave in
15 order to achieve this concept.
16 Q. Can I stop you for a moment and ask that the English translation of
17 the extracts from that document be placed on the elmo, in particular,
18 paragraphs 2 and 3 of the first page? In paragraphs 2 and 3, does
19 Cubrilovic describe some of the methods he recommends for adoption by
20 the authorities to achieve the expulsion or scattering of the
22 A. Yes, he says that another means is coercion by the state apparatus,
23 that that apparatus should make life of Albanians among Serbs
24 intolerable, using strict laws, increasing fines -- according to this
25 terminology, it meant a monetary fine -- for any offences of any kind
1 as well as criminal offences, imprisonment and all kinds of possible
2 police measures, imposing all kinds of compulsory labour, or kuluk.
3 "Kuluk" in the legislation of the kingdom of Yugoslavia meant
4 compulsory labour as one of the forms of punishment.
5 Economic measures were not neglected either. It was felt that
6 deeds on ownership should be treated null and void in the book of
7 Registry of land; that insistence should be placed on payment of
8 debts, on the collection of taxes; that concessions should be
9 cancelled or permits for the work of craftsmen and owners of private
10 shops, that people working in the private sector should be fired or
11 those working in communal services, especially in the health service,
12 to be more concrete, the traditional walls that encircle Albanian
13 family homes have to be pulled down.
14 It should be noted here that Albanian homes in Kosovo and the
15 many Muslim homes in typically Muslim settlements were surrounded by
16 high walls on the front towards the street, so that nobody could see
17 what was happening in the courtyard and to ensure privacy for the
18 people living in that home. At that time, Kosovo, there were enlarged
19 families living in one home known as cooperatives or enlarged
20 families, and violation of privacy was considered to be a great insult
21 and a heavy blow to the traditions and the feelings of those families.
22 It was considered to be very painful.
23 Counting on the religious feelings of people, he recommended
24 persecution of clergy and desecration of cemeteries. He then also
25 suggested that Serbian colonies should be given weapons. One of the
1 measures which the Kingdom of Yugoslavia used against the Albanians in
2 Kosovo was a colonization of Serbs, a settlement of Serbs, to take
3 over the property of Albanians who had been expelled, so that if an
4 Albanian property was expelled -- an Albanian family was expelled,
5 then a Serb family would be brought to settle there and in this way
6 attempts were made to change the ethnic composition of the province,
7 and these settlers should have been given weapons, according to
9 As always, Chetniks and paramilitary groups would have to be
10 the armed force to be used against those who were an obstacle to the
11 creation of a homogenous greater Serbia. In his opinion, when the
12 right moment comes, it would be sufficient to allow a tide of
13 Montenegrin mountain people to provoke a mass conflict provided that
14 the conflict is prepared with the help of trusted people.
15 I must explain what "Montenegrin highlanders" implies.
16 Montenegro was one of the republics of the Former Yugoslavia and, as
17 an independent state, its state continuity was never interrupted until
18 1919. The Turkish Empire which had occupied this part of Europe never
19 managed to conquer Montenegro. These were people living in the hills
20 and mountains who always were autonomous and independent and were
21 constantly at war. For centuries, those people slept with their
22 rifles in their hands. These people -- such people who were
23 accustomed to waging war and for whom waging war was not just a
24 profession but also a matter of pride -- were to be used to resolve
25 the problem of Albanians in Kosovo.
1 Q. When you refer to the successful implementation in the 1990s of some
2 of the ideas advanced by historical proponents of Serbian nationalism
3 and greater Serbia, did you have in mind any of the ideas of Vasa
5 A. Yes, of course, I did. The Crisis Committee of Banja Luka in 1992
6 followed these rules to the letter. All these decisions meant the
7 implementation, the operationalisation, of the rules written down
8 here. So that in the autonomous region of Krajina, this concept, that
9 is, the attitude of the authorities towards ethnic minorities or
10 non-Serb, was implemented and, in particular, one thing was
11 particularly taken care of, and it is rather important in this aide
12 memoir, and it is this last paragraph which says then: "In devising
13 the policy of implementation of this aid memoire, the principal role
14 should be played by the Academy of Sciences and the University", and
15 this was so also in the operationalisation of the idea of greater
16 Serbia. The protagonists were the Serbian Academy of Sciences,
17 Universities and the Association of Writers.
18 Q. I note in the document that the name "Stevan Moljevic" also appears.
19 Can you tell us briefly who he was?
20 A. Steven Moljevic, Steven Moljevic comes from Banja Luka. He is a
21 Banja Luka lawyer and a member of the independent Democratic Party of
22 Stetozar Pribicevic before World War II in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia,
23 and an important partisan of the greater Serbian idea, especially in
24 its elementary form found in Grasanin's project.
25 However, Stevan Moljevic also marked the boundaries, western
1 boundaries, of greater Serbia, and what other territories that have
2 never been part of Serbia and even in Serbia which, historically, when
3 Serbia was the largest and that was under Csar Dusan were not in
5 MR. TIEGER: Your Honour, may I ask the for the assistance of Exhibit 2?
6 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Are you moving into another area at this point
7 because we will adjourn early today, a few minutes early. The other
8 Trial Chamber needs this courtroom and so we are working around the
9 clock almost, so if now is a good time?
10 MR. TIEGER: It is fine, your Honour, sure.
11 THE PRESIDING JUDGE: Then we will adjourn until tomorrow at 10 o'clock.
12 (The hearing adjourned until the following day)