Tribunal Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia

Page 3060

 1                           Wednesday, 23 June 2010

 2                           [Open session]

 3                           [The accused entered court]

 4                           --- Upon commencing at 3.06 p.m.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good afternoon to everybody.  We have a delayed

 6     start because of another commitment of myself, and we will have an

 7     extended sitting tomorrow so that there is no loss of court time.

 8             The next witness should be brought in.

 9                           [The witness entered court]

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Good afternoon, sir.  Welcome to the Tribunal.

11     Would you please read aloud the affirmation on the card which is shown to

12     you now.

13             THE WITNESS:  Yes, Your Honour.  I solemnly declare that I will

14     speak the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth.

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  Please sit down.

16             Mr. Thayer for the Prosecution has, I assume, some questions for

17     you.

18             Mr. Thayer.

19             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.  Good afternoon to you and

20     Your Honours.

21             Good afternoon, General Tolimir, my learned colleagues.  Good

22     afternoon, everyone.

23                           WITNESS:  LOUIS FORTIN

24                           Examination by Mr. Thayer:

25        Q.   Good afternoon, sir.

Page 3061

 1        A.   Good afternoon.

 2        Q.   Would you please state and spell your name for the record.

 3        A.   Okay.  My name is Louis Fortin, L-o-u-i-s F-o-r-t-i-n,

 4     Lieutenant-Colonel in the Canadian army.

 5        Q.   Colonel, do you recall testifying over the course of two days in

 6     this courtroom back in November of 2007?

 7        A.   I certainly do.

 8        Q.   And did you have an opportunity to read all of your testimony in

 9     that case, the Popovic case, recently?

10        A.   Yes, I did.

11        Q.   Can you attest, sir, before this Trial Chamber that the

12     transcripts which you read fairly and accurately reflect what you said

13     here during that trial?

14        A.   Yes, it does.

15        Q.   And can you further attest, sir, that were you asked the same

16     questions today that you were asked back in November of 2007, that your

17     answers would be the same?

18        A.   Of course.  I would make sure to do my best that they are.

19             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, the Prosecution would tender P586 and

20     P587, Colonel Fortin's Popovic testimony, the latter exhibit being the

21     public version, the former under seal.

22             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received.

23             MR. THAYER:  At this time, Mr. President, I would like to read a

24     summary of Colonel Fortin's testimony in the Popovic case.  At the time

25     he --

Page 3062

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Before you do that, I should indicate for the

 2     record these are the P numbers 586 under seal and P587.  Sorry for

 3     interrupting you.

 4             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please continue.

 6             MR. THAYER:  At the time he testified in the Popovic case,

 7     Colonel Fortin had served for 31 years in the Canadian Forces in various

 8     staff, instructor, and command positions.  In May 1995 he held the rank

 9     of major and began a year-long tour of duty in Bosnia, serving as the

10     military assistant to General Herve Gobillard, the commander of Sector

11     Sarajevo which was headquartered in the PTT building in Sarajevo.

12             Colonel Fortin accompanied General Gobillard to meetings with

13     political and military personnel of the various factions or with other UN

14     personnel.  He took notes, shared advice with Gobillard, and discussed

15     the situation with him regularly.  He was also a link to the headquarters

16     staff and would pass information he gathered from meetings he attended

17     and in turn pass on situation reports from the staff to Gobillard.  The

18     fact that Colonel Fortin speaks French and English made it easier to work

19     with Gobillard and the largely French Sector Sarajevo headquarters staff,

20     as well as with the mostly English-speaking staff of the superior command

21     at UNPROFOR BiH command headquarters, also located in Sarajevo.

22             Colonel Fortin maintained a list of politicians and senior

23     military personnel from the warring factions.  The two or three names

24     which came to his mind quickest from the VRS high command were

25     Generals Mladic, Tolimir, and Dragomir Milosevic, in addition to

Page 3063

 1     Generals Miletic, Gvero, and Krstic.  Sector Sarajevo corresponded to the

 2     corps level in the VRS.  BiH command, Colonel Fortin's then-superior

 3     command, normally interacted with the senior officers such as Mladic,

 4     Tolimir, Miletic, and Gvero.

 5             Between approximately 8 July and 11 July 1995, General Gobillard

 6     was acting BiH commander in General Rupert Smith's absence.

 7     Consequently, Colonel Fortin spent most of his time during this period

 8     with Gobillard at BiH command headquarters instead of the Sector Sarajevo

 9     headquarters.  Key officers present during this period at BiH command

10     included General Nicolai and Lieutenant-Colonel Jim Baxter.

11             Colonel Fortin and these officers spent most of their time during

12     this period determining what was happening on the ground in Srebrenica.

13     Information was passing from Dutch peacekeepers in Srebrenica to their

14     command and up to the BiH command in Sarajevo.  They also received

15     reports from British personnel in the enclave who were reporting directly

16     to BiH command, as well as reports from the Bosnian government.

17             Generals Nicolai and Gobillard also had telephone conversations

18     with Generals Tolimir and Gvero during this time.  The Dutch peacekeepers

19     and British personnel in the enclave were telling UNPROFOR to do

20     something because they were attacked by the VRS, whereas Tolimir and

21     Gvero were telling them that they were not attacking; that the Bosnians

22     were attacking; that the VRS was not attacking UNPROFOR or the civilians;

23     that the Bosnians were using stolen UN APCs; and that they would confirm

24     what was happening on the ground and call UNPROFOR back 30 minutes later.

25     These were delaying tactics which created confusion and slowed the

Page 3064

 1     decision to authorise close air support and in the meantime allowed the

 2     VRS to keep attacking and advance further, making the use of close air

 3     support even more difficult.  It was clear to Colonel Fortin that they

 4     were just trying to delay so that they could complete the plan.

 5             Colonel Fortin testified about his notes of a conversation

 6     between Generals Gvero and Gobillard on 11 July at 1810 hours as well as

 7     an intercept of that conversation.  By this time UNPROFOR had suspended

 8     close air support because the VRS had threatened to kill some captured

 9     Dutch soldiers if close air support continued.  The Serbs also threatened

10     to shell the UN Potocari compound with all the civilians and peacekeepers

11     in it if close air support continued.

12             Colonel Fortin was also shown numerous passages from a journal he

13     compiled upon his return from his tour, which was made up of his

14     contemporaneous handwritten notes interspersed with cut and pasted

15     reports he had written at the time, in 1995.

16             He also testified about reports concerning problems with

17     Ukrainian peacekeepers, including that those in Zepa were selling their

18     fuel to the Serbs.

19             Around 26 July 1995, General Gobillard sent Colonel Fortin to

20     Zepa to be his eyes and ears.  UNPROFOR already had information that

21     suggested that thousands of Bosnian males had disappeared and been

22     killed.  The VRS stopped the witness at a check-point in Rogatica for 18

23     hours.  By the time he arrived there, the transportations had already

24     begun.

25             When he finally passed from Rogatica to check-point 2 on the top

Page 3065

 1     of the hill, he saw trucks taking the Bosnian civilians up out of Zepa

 2     village and described the scene as he watched mothers and their children

 3     being forcibly removed from their homes.  He described a meeting on

 4     27 July in which Mr. Torlak and two Muslim representatives met with

 5     General Mladic, who was trying to get them to sign an agreement and made

 6     veiled threats.  General Smith then arrived and told the Muslims not to

 7     sign because Mladic's agreement contained guarantees which could not be

 8     met and aspects, such as conditions of prisoner exchange, which needed to

 9     be agreed at a much higher level.

10             Finally, Colonel Fortin spent the night of 27 July in the

11     Ukrainian compound down in the Zepa village and described a meeting he

12     had in the afternoon of 28 July 1995 at check-point 2 between

13     Generals Tolimir and Gobillard, who had travelled to Zepa that day,

14     meaning General Gobillard had travelled to Zepa that day.  Gobillard

15     confronted Tolimir about several issues, including approximately 36

16     Muslim men who had been removed from the last two convoys in the evening

17     of 27 July; the link between the fate of the Zepa men and the ongoing

18     negotiations at the Sarajevo airport for a global POW exchange agreement;

19     and the report that Avdo Palic was dead.

20             Mr. President, at this time the Prosecution would tender Exhibits

21     P580 to P595 from the Prosecution's exhibit list, and that includes

22     everything on the list, including the two transcripts which have already

23     been admitted, with the exception of the last item on the Prosecution's

24     list which has not been previously shown to Colonel Fortin and I intend

25     to show him that document shortly.  But prior to that, I would tender

Page 3066

 1     these exhibits which were either admitted through Colonel Fortin's

 2     Popovic testimony or were shown to the witness during his testimony but

 3     admitted through other witnesses in Popovic, were shown to the witness

 4     but not tendered in Popovic.  I think that's about all the categories

 5     we've got, Mr. President, but they're all being offered as exhibits.

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you, Mr. Thayer.  The Chamber appreciates

 7     this distinction between the different categories of documents.  They all

 8     will be received, P585 under seal.

 9             MR. THAYER:  Thank you, Mr. President.

10        Q.   Colonel, I just have a few additional questions for you today.

11     Can you tell the Trial Chamber how many years in the service you have.

12        A.   I'm now just about at 34 years of service.

13        Q.   And can you tell the Trial Chamber in open session generally what

14     you were doing for the military presently.  If we need to go into private

15     to do so, we can certainly do that, but if there's a way to just give the

16     Trial Chamber some idea of what you're up to, that would be helpful.

17        A.   I'm currently Canada's defence attache to western Africa.  I'm a

18     resident in Abidjan, Cote d'Ivoire, but I'm also co-accredited to

19     Senegal, Sierra Leone, Mali, Ghana, Nigeria, and Cameroon, so I travel

20     within a subregion to effect my duties.

21        Q.   Okay, sir.  You are the first live UNPROFOR officer that has

22     appeared so far in this trial, I think, with the exception of perhaps a

23     DutchBat soldier who testified.  So it may be helpful for you to provide

24     just a little bit of the structure of UNPROFOR as it existed in July of

25     1995.  We threw out some places and terms and commands during the

Page 3067

 1     summary, Sector Sarajevo, BiH command.  If you could just briefly take us

 2     through from top to bottom in July 1995 the various echelons of command

 3     within UNPROFOR, starting with the one based in Zagreb?

 4        A.   Okay.  I would like to point out first that at that time in July

 5     1995, or shortly before, United Nations headquarters decided to change

 6     the names of the various missions.  So the old terminology, BH command,

 7     was still being used as opposed to the new name, which was headquarters

 8     UNPROFOR, United Nations Protection Force.  But the structure was HQ UNPF

 9     in Zagreb where resided the force commander, and he was responsible for

10     the whole UN theatre of operations, which included two missions, a

11     mission in Croatia, which was still ongoing - and I don't remember the

12     exact name of that mission; and a mission in Bosnia which was

13     headquarters -- headquartered in Sarajevo, and that mission's name was

14     UNPROFOR.

15             UNPROFOR was divided in three sectors, Sector South, Sector

16     North-West, and Sector Sarajevo.  Sector Sarajevo, where I worked, was

17     under the command of a French general officer who had troops from France,

18     three battalions, but also a battalion each from Ukraine, Russia, and

19     Egypt, and he was responsible for Sarajevo itself, including the airport;

20     a portion of the Igman mountains, which are west of the city; and the

21     enclaves or pockets of Zepa and Gorazde.  So that basically was the

22     structure of the mission at the time.

23        Q.   Okay.  Thank you, Colonel.

24             Now, going back to the UNPF in Zagreb, I take it that's -- that

25     was the highest echelon of command.  And who was the commander that was

Page 3068

 1     based in Zagreb, what was his name, sir?

 2        A.   The commander was a French general officer by the name of

 3     Janvier, General Janvier.  So in that structure General Rupert Smith, who

 4     commanded UNPROFOR, which is the Bosnia mission, reported to Janvier; and

 5     General Gobillard, who commanded the Sarajevo sector of UNPROFOR,

 6     reported to Smith.

 7        Q.   And when we refer to BiH command or UNPROFOR command, we're

 8     speaking about Rupert Smith's echelon, the command that was located in

 9     the residency; is that correct?

10        A.   That's correct.

11        Q.   And your command was located in the PTT building in Sarajevo; is

12     that correct?

13        A.   That's correct.

14        Q.   Just give us some idea of the distance between the two?

15        A.   Well, the residency HQ UNPROFOR was centre east of the city and

16     Sector Sarajevo was closer to the airport in the west, I estimate about 4

17     or 5 kilometres in between.

18        Q.   And during your service as General Gobillard's military

19     assistant, Colonel, how often would you shuttle between those two

20     headquarters in the course of your duties?

21        A.   Well, initially -- that is, I got there on May 15th, 1995, and

22     shortly thereafter military action picked up, became quite intense.  It

23     never -- it never really slowed down until September.  So whenever I was

24     in Sarajevo, I used to go almost every night to headquarters UNPROFOR in

25     addition to the trips that I took accompanying my boss during the day

Page 3069

 1     because we often visited General Smith where the two generals exchanged

 2     together.  So I spent quite a bit of my time at headquarters UNPROFOR.

 3        Q.   Okay.  And let's fill in some names and positions as well.  You

 4     were General Gobillard's military assistant.  Who was your counterpart

 5     with General Smith, who was his military assistant?

 6        A.   He was Lieutenant-Colonel Jim Baxter, who was a British officer.

 7        Q.   And did General Smith have a Chief of Staff who served directly

 8     under him?

 9        A.   Yes, his Chief of Staff was General Nicolai, a Dutch army

10     officer.

11        Q.   And did General Nicolai himself also have somebody who was his

12     deputy or immediate subordinate?

13        A.   Yes, of course.  He was responsible for the staff of that

14     headquarters, and his main staff officer was -- the man in charge of

15     operations at that time was a Canadian lieutenant-colonel name --

16     initially was Colonel MacDonald, but he was shortly after replaced by

17     Colonel Rick Hatton.

18        Q.   And do you also recall interacting with a Colonel Coiffet?

19        A.   Yes, Colonel Coiffet, I don't remember his exact position, but he

20     was a French officer.  I believe he was -- he had an established position

21     within the headquarters, headquarters UNPROFOR, but he was also acting as

22     a liaison with headquarters of Sector Sarajevo, which was mostly staffed

23     by French officer and commanded by a French general.

24        Q.   Okay.  Just a couple of additional questions on the structure.

25     When you were speaking about the command to which you were attached,

Page 3070

 1     Sector Sarajevo, you described that it had several elements, and I

 2     believe you referred to a Ukrainian contingent that was serving as part

 3     of Sector Sarajevo or underneath Sector Sarajevo.  Can you tell the

 4     Trial Chamber what responsibilities the Ukrainian contingent had.

 5        A.   The Ukrainian contingent was a battalion of about 600 people from

 6     memory.  It had headquarters in Sarajevo at Tito barracks, which was

 7     somewhere in between the two headquarters I was talking about earlier,

 8     and in one of its three companies was located at Tito barracks and they

 9     had anti-sniping task.  They had a few spots in the city assigned to

10     cover sniping coming from the Serb side from those locations.  The other

11     two companies were located one in Zepa manning check-points and

12     observation posts around the enclave, and last company, the third one,

13     was doing the same thing in Gorazde, which was the southern-most of the

14     three eastern enclaves.

15        Q.   The Trial Chamber has heard a lot about the Dutch contingent.

16     You have referred to General Nicolai, for example.  And certainly the

17     Trial Chamber's heard about the Dutch Battalion peacekeepers who were

18     located in the Srebrenica enclave.  Under which direct command did the

19     Dutch peacekeepers in the Srebrenica enclave fall, Colonel?

20        A.   Actually, the -- it was a Dutch Company and the unit it belonged

21     to, the battalion it belonged to, was in Sector North-West, which -- that

22     sector had the responsibility of the Srebrenica enclave.

23        Q.   Now, just a couple of other definitional questions.  You referred

24     in your Popovic testimony here -- there to some General Staff positions

25     by abbreviations, G1, G2, I think at one time your position after leaving

Page 3071

 1     your tour was at J9.  If you could explain to the Trial Chamber just

 2     briefly, what does G1, G2, G3, G4, for example, connote?

 3        A.   Actually, this is a system which we referred to as the

 4     continental staff system, I believe we owe it to the Germans, to classify

 5     the various functions within the headquarters by a -- the notation such

 6     as G for General Staff or J for joint staff at higher levels.  So G1, 2,

 7     3, 4, 5 at the headquarters level.  Everybody in NATO was using the same

 8     terminology.  J1 or G1 was personnel, so people working in that branch

 9     were looking after personnel matters.  G2 was intelligence.  G3

10     operations.  G4 logistics.  And G5 was civil/military co-operation and

11     looking after activities that were for the benefit of the populations in

12     the areas we were responsible for.

13        Q.   And because we may be seeing this in other documents or from

14     other witnesses later, sir, at lower-level commands were the designations

15     the same in terms of the G or was there another letter which would

16     correspond to those respective positions?

17        A.   Well, not every army was using the system at the lower level.

18     For example, in the Canadian Army at battalion level we were using the

19     old British system, which is -- instead of having a G1, we could them the

20     adjutant, the unit adjutant.  He was responsible for personnel issues.

21     In the American army they were using the S system, S1, 2, 3, 4, 5, which

22     basically correspond to the same functions.

23        Q.   Okay.  Thank you for that, Colonel.

24             In your Popovic testimony you referred to General Tolimir and I

25     believe some other VRS officers as belonging to the army level of command

Page 3072

 1     as opposed to, for example, the corps level of command.  When you use

 2     that term, "army level," can you specify what you were referring to in

 3     your testimony.

 4        A.   It's the top level of command within the VRS, as simple as that.

 5        Q.   And have you heard that referred to as the Main Staff?

 6        A.   Well, yes.  We would use that term as well.

 7        Q.   On a separate issue, Colonel, you testified about a conversation

 8     for which you were present between a representative of the Muslim

 9     community in Zepa on or about the 15th of July, 1995, a man whose name

10     you recalled as either Horlak or Torlak.  Do you recall testifying about

11     hearing a particular conversation concerning that individual or involving

12     that individual, sir?

13        A.   Yes, and I have to specify, I was present for the conversation

14     but I was not in Zepa.  The conversation was through the Ukrainian radio.

15     They had link between their company headquarters and Zepa, and their

16     detachment at the sector headquarters in Sarajevo where Ukrainian

17     officers in the operation zone were manning a radio that was compatible

18     with the system that they had deployed in Zepa.  So those -- that

19     equipment was used for -- by Mr. Torlak to talk back.

20        Q.   Okay.  Let's just talk about that for a couple more moments.  You

21     had occasion to go down into the village of Zepa, as you testified; is

22     that correct?

23        A.   Yes, but it was later -- you mentioned this conversation on the

24     15th of July.  I went there on the 26th and I think I only went down to

25     the village on the evening of the 27th.

Page 3073

 1        Q.   And when you went down there that approximately two weeks later

 2     after that conversation, did you yourself have an opportunity to observe

 3     the communications equipment that Mr. Torlak was using to communicate to

 4     Sarajevo which you overheard in the operations room in Sarajevo?

 5        A.   Yes.  In fact, when we were there -- when I arrived, the

 6     Ukrainians were using still that equipment to report back to sector

 7     headquarters in Sarajevo; and the deputy sector commander from Ukraine,

 8     Colonel Verhoglyad met me when I arrived there and gave me a tour of the

 9     facilities.  So I was able to see their communication equipment which was

10     in fact in a radio van, a military vehicle which housed communication

11     equipment in the back.

12        Q.   And can you just describe what that equipment was just briefly.

13        A.   Well, it was I would say, older HF-type radios.  HF is a type of

14     frequency, it's short wave, not quite like the amateur radio systems that

15     many of us know about, but still shorter waves allow to talk through

16     longer distances.  So they were able to talk back to sector headquarters

17     with that equipment.

18        Q.   And just physically, can you describe where this Ukrainian

19     company command post was located in the Zepa village, just describe for

20     the Trial Chamber how it was situated?

21        A.   I believe it was a school and there were two buildings

22     perpendicular to one another, rectangular buildings, and in the space in

23     between there was that communication van as well as one of their armoured

24     personnel carriers, it was a BTR-70 that was providing protection for

25     that communication equipment.

Page 3074

 1        Q.   And what's the terrain like right in that area, the village of

 2     Zepa?

 3        A.   Well, it's surrounded by a very steep -- not hills, but it's kind

 4     of a -- in French we say "une cuvette" or a bowl with very steep sides

 5     and that's where the village was located, down a -- to access the village

 6     from the top, there was a single-lane road, one -- a dirt road attached

 7     to the -- basically to the flank of that cliff, and only one vehicle

 8     could go up and down at a time.  And if I remember correctly, that road

 9     was slightly longer than a kilometre.

10        Q.   And based upon your experience serving in Sector Sarajevo, how

11     frequently would that Ukrainian company based down in that -- the bottom

12     of that "cuvette" communicate via that radio with its command in

13     Sarajevo?

14        A.   Well, there was a procedure in place of course with all subunits

15     of every level reporting regularly to the next level up.  So in the case

16     of the company, the Ukrainian company, reporting back to sector

17     headquarters, it was at a minimum on a daily basis.  But it could have

18     been more.  I don't remember for sure.

19        Q.   And just help us out with one thing, Colonel.  You mention the

20     name of the Ukrainian officer Verugad or something to that effect.  If

21     you could spell it for the record so we have it clearly in the

22     transcript, please.

23        A.   Okay, if I remember it's pronounced Verhoglyad, but it's spelled

24     V-e-r-h-o-g-l-y-a-d.  Yeah, that looks right.

25        Q.   Okay, Colonel, I want to show you a document that you didn't see

Page 3075

 1     during the Popovic case.

 2             MR. THAYER:  If we could have P00596 on e-court, please.

 3        Q.   And you'll shortly see a document popping up on your computer

 4     screen.

 5             We have here an UNPROFOR inter-office memorandum.  Its date is 13

 6     July 1995.  The subject is report of a meeting held in Lukavica between

 7     Lieutenant-Colonel Indjic and MA, military assistant, to DSCU and UKRBAT

 8     LO - 13 July afternoon.

 9             Two questions:  One, do you recognise what this is?  And two, if

10     you do, can you define for us or explain some of these acronyms here in

11     the subject line?

12        A.   All right.  This is something that I wrote based on information

13     given to me by someone else, and I was writing to my boss,

14     General Gobillard, and a number of officers under his command to inform

15     them of that information.  The officer who attended the meeting were

16     Lieutenant-Colonel Indjic is the Serb liaison officer of the 1st Corps,

17     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps, which was the Serb military outfit that

18     surrounded Sarajevo, so he was a regular contact,

19     Lieutenant-Colonel Indjic.

20             The next one, the MA to DSCU is the military assistant to the

21     deputy sector commander Ukrain, so Colonel Verhoglyad's military

22     assistant, his name was Captain Andre Schumak.  And the UKRBAT LO is the

23     Ukrainian Battalion liaison officer that they had stationed or going

24     regularly to meet with Colonel Indjic who attended that meeting with the

25     same man.

Page 3076

 1        Q.   Okay.  And what or where is Lukavica?

 2        A.   Well, Lukavica is just to the south-west of Sarajevo, not very

 3     far from PTT building where we were located, but it's on the Serb side

 4     and it was a former military barrack of the Yugoslav Army that the Serbs

 5     were using, the VRS was using.

 6             MR. THAYER:  Now, if we could turn to the second page in English,

 7     please, and this is going to be the third page in B/C/S.

 8        Q.   I'd like to focus your attention on paragraphs 7, 8, and 9.  If

 9     you would, sir, just take a moment or two to read those three paragraphs.

10     And when you've done so I would ask you just to explain to the

11     Trial Chamber where this information was coming from exactly and how it

12     was arriving to you, through whom it arrived to get to you, and from

13     where.  And let's start with paragraph 7.  Can you tell us in that

14     paragraph who was the source of this information and what does this

15     reflect?  We can all read what it says, but if you could just tell us

16     where this information is coming from.

17        A.   Well, the information is coming from Indjic, the VRS liaison

18     officer at Lukavica.  The one that the two Ukrainian officers went to

19     meet.

20        Q.   And this information in paragraph 7 is being relayed to you

21     through the officer Schumak; is that right?

22        A.   Yes, that's correct.  One of the two Ukrainian officers who

23     attended.

24        Q.   Now, we see a heading between these two paragraphs referring to

25     the commanding officer of the Ukrainian Battalion joining the meeting.

Page 3077

 1     Can you just explain what's happening here, please, and where this

 2     information is coming from.

 3        A.   In fact, when Captain Schumak was reporting this to me during the

 4     course of doing that, that report, the CO of the Ukrainian Battalion

 5     showed up.  The CO, commanding officer, of the battalion is located in

 6     Sarajevo at Tito barracks as I mentioned earlier, but he also had contact

 7     with his company in Zepa.  So he got the information from them and he

 8     came to relay it to probably Colonel Verhoglyad, but we were there so he

 9     passed it on to me and Captain Schumak who were in the process of

10     drafting that report.

11        Q.   So if we look at paragraph 8 here, Colonel, where it says:

12             "The commanding officer of the Rogatica Brigade accompanied by

13     General Tolimir and the local Bosnian authorities met at Ukrainian

14     check-point 2 at 1200 hours today ..."

15             What is the or who is the first source of that information?

16        A.   Probably the Ukrainian at check-point 2 who passed it on to

17     the -- their commanding officer, who then passed it on to me.

18        Q.   And mechanically, sir, can you tell the Trial Chamber what means

19     this information or by what means this information was being communicated

20     from the Ukrainian Company in Zepa up to Sarajevo?

21        A.   The same type of radio that I mentioned earlier, HF,

22     high-frequency, radio that the Ukrainians were using regularly.

23        Q.   And, sir, is that any kind of special equipment, by the way, that

24     HF equipment, is that newfangled in any way?

25        A.   I don't think so.  I think it was standard issue in the Ukrainian

Page 3078

 1     army.  It looked very old, but it was working.  We were not using that

 2     kind of equipment any longer.  It's something we had gotten rid of a few

 3     years prior at least in my army.  We were using shorter range but more, I

 4     should say, efficient equipment.

 5             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, the Prosecution would tender P00596

 6     at this time.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It will be received, and I take the opportunity

 8     to say that the documents P584, 588, and 589 don't have a B/C/S

 9     translation.  They will be marked pending translation.

10             MR. THAYER:  Yes.  Thank you, Mr. President.

11        Q.   Just a couple more questions for you, Colonel.  In your statement

12     to the OTP many years ago, you discussed a meeting that you also

13     testified about in the Popovic case that was held on 27 July 1995 between

14     three civilian representatives from Zepa, in which Mladic was trying to

15     get these men to sign an agreement.  Do you remember that testimony,

16     first of all, Colonel?

17        A.   Yes, I do.

18        Q.   And you said at page 24 of that witness statement that

19     General Smith told these individuals that they shouldn't sign because

20     they were being fooled by Mladic, and you further added in the statement

21     that they must have been afraid for their lives.  Can you just tell the

22     Trial Chamber, sir, based on your observations, your experience, why you

23     made that statement, they must have been afraid for their lives.

24        A.   Well, General Smith was not -- was not there initially when the

25     meeting started.  In fact, we had arrived, Colonel Soubirou who I

Page 3079

 1     accompanied who was to be in charge of all the UN troops because we had

 2     deployed more troops to Zepa to make sure that something like what

 3     happened -- had happened in Srebrenica not long before, that we could

 4     prevent it from happening in Zepa.  And so we met there with

 5     Lieutenant-Colonel Germain who was a French legion officer.  And at that

 6     time we heard that a meeting was going to occur between a Serb officer

 7     and three civilian leaders of the Bosniak in Zepa.

 8             So we got to where that meeting was supposed to be held and we

 9     said we wanted to attend.  The man in charge who we didn't see at the

10     time said, "Well, the Canadian can come with an interpreter."  So I took

11     a legionaire originally from Slovenia who could speak the language and I

12     went to the table.  And Mladic was sitting there.  We waited for a while

13     until at least two of the three Bosniaks arrived, and then the meeting

14     started.  Mladic wanted them to sign an agreement to basically leave the

15     pocket, allow the military -- the few Bosniak military in there to

16     disarm.  And he was not too - how should I say? - not too subtle about

17     what would happen to them if they did not sign.  Shortly after General

18     Smith arrived and he came -- he came directly to that meeting and

19     intervened, and that's when he saw what General Mladic was attempting to

20     get their agreement on.

21             In there it required many guarantees by UNPROFOR, guarantees that

22     UNPROFOR could not give.  So he told those Bosniaks not to sign the

23     agreement because if they were hoping for UNPROFOR to provide the

24     guarantees that were stated in that agreement, Smith was telling them:

25     We cannot provide those guarantees.  So you're basically handing over

Page 3080

 1     your fate to the Serb general.

 2             But they signed it anyway because I guess it was better than

 3     their current stalemate and their current stalemate was they were

 4     encircled by the VRS, and the only end for them was to be killed.

 5        Q.   What I want to show you last, Colonel, are some handwritten notes

 6     that you took on the 28th of July, 1995.

 7             MR. THAYER:  If we could take a look at P00582, please.

 8        Q.   And with the usher's assistance I'd like to hand up to you a copy

 9     that I pulled out from our evidence vault.  I noticed as I was preparing

10     for today that one of the pages was scanned improperly in our evidence

11     unit and is therefore illegible both in our databases and unfortunately

12     in e-court.  So I've provided legible copies to the Defence and we have

13     copies for the Trial Chamber.  So I just want to make sure that we have a

14     proper reading and understanding of this document from a legible copy?

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Did the Defence receive a copy as well?

16             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I did furnish copies to the Defence.

17             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.

18             MR. THAYER:

19        Q.   Now, do you see what's on the screen and is it the same as what

20     you've got in your hand, sir?

21        A.   Yes, it is.

22        Q.   And just for the record, what are you looking at?

23        A.   I'm looking at a report that I wrote following the meeting

24     between General Gobillard and General Tolimir at the Ukrainian

25     check-point 2 in Zepa.  The Ukrainian check-point 2 is basically the end

Page 3081

 1     of the road on top of the hill where there was a large parking area and a

 2     Ukrainian check-point.  So on the 28th of July.

 3        Q.   Now, if we could go to the third page in the English version and

 4     the corresponding page in the B/C/S is page 2.  And let's focus on

 5     paragraph 2 and pretty much the second half of the paragraph, if we could

 6     blow that up a little bit beginning where it says:

 7             "As for the Bosnian military ..."

 8             As about halfway, maybe two-thirds of the way down the page.

 9             Could I, Colonel, just ask you to read into the record this

10     section that begins with:  "As for the Bosnian military ..."

11        A.    "As for the Bosnian military, it seems that they are ready and

12     willing to drop their weapons and surrender provided they obtain firm

13     guarantees for their safety from UNPROFOR.  It was pointed out that

14     UNPROFOR cannot provide these guarantees unless there is a prisoner of

15     war exchange agreement at the airport.  Tolimir offered the UN the

16     opportunity to send vehicles to the hills to gather Bosnian civilian and

17     military personnel."

18        Q.   Okay.  Now, let's just stick with this passage first.  Do you

19     recall, sir, what the source of this information in this sentence "as for

20     the Bosnian military, it seems that they are ready and willing to drop

21     their weapons and surrender provided they obtain firm guarantees for

22     their safety from UNPROFOR ..." where this information came from.  Is

23     this something that's being reported to you from General Tolimir, is this

24     something you're observing yourself, or are you receiving this

25     information from another source?

Page 3082

 1        A.   I'm not sure where it's coming from.  It may have been reported

 2     by General Tolimir, but it may also have come from General Gobillard who

 3     had driven to Zepa that day and I had just linked with him.  I had been

 4     in Zepa already for a couple of days.  And so he had access -- he had

 5     discussions about what had happened in Srebrenica and what was going on

 6     in Zepa.  It may have come from him, but I'm not sure really.

 7        Q.   Okay.  And the next sentence where it says:

 8             "It was pointed out that UNPROFOR cannot provide these guarantees

 9     unless there is a POW exchange agreement at the airport ..."

10             Who's doing the pointing out here, sir?

11        A.   It was General Gobillard.

12        Q.   And now if we could go to the next page and this is the page

13     where I think the e-court is illegible at the top.

14             Can you just read into the record from the legible version what

15     this top sentence says here that follows on what you finished reading

16     from the prior page.

17        A.    "UNPROFOR officers concluded privately that this was not a good

18     idea as long as there was not a global agreement," which the good idea

19     was basically sending UN troops through the hills to gather whatever

20     Bosniaks remain there and offer them a guarantee of personal security or

21     safety.

22        Q.   And can you explain then what this means here, where you've

23     written "UNPROFOR officers concluded privately that this was not a good

24     idea as long as there was not a global agreement," can you just explain

25     that for the Trial Chamber, please.

Page 3083

 1        A.   Well, we were not about to help the VRS capture men between 18

 2     and 55 and hand them over without having some firm guarantees of what

 3     would happen to them later on.  So if there was a global prisoner of war

 4     exchange agreement, we could bring the Red Cross, we could provide

 5     security for these people until the proper exchange was made.  If there

 6     was no such agreement, the risk was that at the time we didn't have

 7     enough troops to be able to do that right away -- and so the risk was we

 8     hand over these people to the VRS and they do to them like what they did

 9     to the people of Srebrenica a couple of weeks before.

10        Q.   And do you recall whether at the time that this was going on,

11     Colonel, the issue of the Serbs' failure to account for what happened to

12     the missing men from Srebrenica contributed to the inability to come to a

13     global agreement?

14        A.   I must read that question.

15        Q.   It's a terrible question.  Let me ask it again, Colonel.

16             Were you aware at the time whether or not the Serbs' inability to

17     account for or explain what happened to the men from Srebrenica prevented

18     the two parties from being able to come together to a global POW exchange

19     agreement?  Did you ever become aware of whether that became an obstacle

20     to that agreement, the inability to account for those men from Srebrenica

21     during those negotiations?

22        A.   Well, it is probably a likely explanation, but not a complete --

23     it does not explain everything.  I believe that for the Serbs to move in

24     and reduce those enclaves two and a half years after the start of the war

25     was because they were beyond that now.  They wanted to get rid of those

Page 3084

 1     problems, problems that they were not able to solve initially when they

 2     launched their operation towards Bosnia to capture the country because of

 3     resistance in those areas.  Now they had decided that they had enough and

 4     they wanted to get rid of those enclaves.  Of course, the UN interfered

 5     so it didn't go as planned.  So I think that that's -- would be the main

 6     reason.  They were beyond negotiating.  They wanted to get rid of those

 7     enclaves.

 8        Q.   Okay.  Thank you, Colonel.

 9             MR. THAYER:  I have no further questions at this time.

10             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you, Mr. Thayer.

11             Mr. Tolimir, you indicated you would need eight hours for

12     cross-examination.  If it is possible, we would appreciate if you could

13     finish your cross-examination by the end of hearing tomorrow, taking into

14     account that we -- I don't want to put any time pressure on you because

15     you indicated you have lots of documents to show to the witness, but

16     please proceed and start your cross-examination.

17                           [Defence counsel confer]

18             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.  Peace in

19     this house and may God help all those present, including the witness.

20     And I would like these proceedings to be completed not as I will but

21     according to God's will.

22             I do have one question.  We announced ten hours that we would

23     need for this witness, not eight.  This is one thing.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  You are perfectly right.  I made a mistake.

25             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I will do my best.  When I run out

Page 3085

 1     of questions, I'm not going to stretch out the time like -- in the way

 2     that I haven't been doing up to now.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  That's absolutely correct.  Please proceed and

 4     put questions to the witness.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 6                           Cross-examination by Mr. Tolimir:

 7        Q.   [Interpretation] Mr. Fortin, I would like to wish you a good

 8     afternoon and wish you a pleasant stay in The Hague.

 9        A.   Thank you.

10        Q.   During the examination-in-chief you said that you came to Bosnia

11     in May 1995.  You told this to Mr. Thayer.  Can you please tell us how

12     long you spent in Bosnia and were you always on the same duty, just like

13     it says in your statement?  Thank you.

14        A.   I spent a year in Bosnia.  I arrived in May 1995 and I left in

15     May 1996; and, yes, I stayed in the same job, military assistant to the

16     sector commander.  However, when there was a transfer of authority to

17     NATO, the sector became a brigade as part of a division.  So most of the

18     responsibilities we had at sector level towards the factions were taken

19     over by this new higher level, which is the division level.  But in my

20     case, I remained military assistant to the French general in Sarajevo.

21        Q.   Thank you.  I wanted you to say that for the transcript.  So up

22     until the time the NATO forces came, you were the military assistant to

23     the sector commander and that was General Gobillard; is that correct?

24        A.   That was General Gobillard until mid-August; he was then replaced

25     by General Bachelet, another French officer.

Page 3086

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please explain for the transcript when the

 2     duty was transferred and when you moved from UNPROFOR to your duties in

 3     NATO.  Thank you.

 4        A.   Well, the transfer of authority to NATO occurred on the 20th of

 5     December, 1995.

 6        Q.   [Microphone not activated]

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please switch on your microphone, Mr. Tolimir.

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 9             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   And at that time from your duty as military assistant to the

11     sector commander, you became the military assistant to the commander of

12     the NATO brigade; is that correct?

13        A.   That's correct -- one of the NATO brigades because of course

14     there were many more troops coming in at that time.

15        Q.   Thank you.  During the examination-in-chief you said that the

16     seat of the UNPROFOR command in 1995 was located in Zagreb.  I would like

17     to ask you this now:  Do you know when did this command HQ move to

18     Zagreb, the UNPROFOR HQ?

19        A.   Actually, before events in Bosnia the mission in Croatia, the UN

20     mission in Croatia, was called UNPROFOR.  Eventually with the new mission

21     in Bosnia, the mission headquarters in Zagreb was renamed headquarters UN

22     PF, United Nations Protection Force.  And the mission in Bosnia took the

23     name UNPROFOR, with its headquarters commanded by General Smith.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please tell us whether you know that the UN

25     mission first was located in Belgrade and then in Sarajevo, and only

Page 3087

 1     after that in Zagreb?  Thank you.

 2        A.   I'm sorry, that's probably before my time and I'm not aware of

 3     the -- what happened in the two or three years before I got there.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  I would like to ask you if you know that in 1991 the

 5     UN mission for the former Yugoslavia was first located in Belgrade.  Are

 6     you aware of that or not?  Thank you.

 7        A.   I may have heard that, but no I was not aware of when exactly,

 8     what was the name of the mission.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  This was an observer mission headed by General Walker

10     who was a Prosecution witness in trials in this Tribunal.  Are you aware

11     that that mission was transferred from Belgrade to Sarajevo while the war

12     was going on in Croatia?  Thank you.

13        A.   No, I'm sorry, I was not aware of that.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that the mission was transferred to

15     Zagreb immediately after the signing of the agreement in Croatia and that

16     Bosnia was declared a risk -- high-risk zone?  Thank you.

17        A.   When was that agreement signed that you referred to?

18        Q.   Thank you.  This is an agreement that was signed between the

19     Republic of the Serbian Krajina, if you recall - do you recall? - and

20     Zagreb.  Do you recall that agreement?  And the UN mission that was

21     implementing that agreement.  Thank you.

22        A.   No, I'm not aware of that agreement.  It was outside of my

23     territory and we had pretty much enough to keep us busy in Sarajevo.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Are you aware that the federal government of

25     Yugoslavia, before Yugoslavia broke apart in 1991, gave 300 vehicles to

Page 3088

 1     the UN mission from the federal government and they then went to Bosnia

 2     because they wanted the HQ to be in Bosnia?

 3        A.   No, I was not aware.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Are you aware that Bosnia was an oasis of peace for

 5     the United Nations while the conflict was raging in Croatia?  Thank you.

 6        A.   Yes, I was aware.  And not knowing the full details, I was aware

 7     that Bosnia was a fairly safe for a while, and the reason I'm aware is a

 8     Canadian General, General Lewis MacKenzie who was the Chief of Staff of

 9     that UN mission at that time went to Sarajevo when things started to go

10     sour, but I couldn't recall the exact dates, but I'm aware of that, yes.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Are you able to tell us if on the basis of what the

12     Canadian officers who were in that mission said, that Bosnia was declared

13     a war zone overnight from a peaceful oasis once the conflict was finished

14     in Croatia?  Thank you.

15        A.   Well, I don't know about overnight.  All I know from the Canadian

16     perspective - and I was in Canada when this was happening - was that a

17     Canadian unit who was part of the mission in Croatia drove all the way to

18     Sarajevo because problems were starting to happen there and they needed a

19     unit -- military forces to protect the airport.  So that's how I know

20     about this.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know -- have you heard from the Canadian

22     observers that the UNPROFOR observer mission forces in Bosnia used 300

23     Mercedes of the federal government of Yugoslavia while the war was raging

24     in Croatia and that they didn't really need any combat vehicles in order

25     to be able to implement their mission?  Thank you.

Page 3089

 1        A.   I was not aware.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  As a military expert and analyst, are you able to say

 3     why the UN forces and UN personnel immediately switched to the NATO

 4     contingent when the authority was transferred to that force?  Thank you.

 5        A.   I'm not sure what you mean.  Could you please rephrase that

 6     question.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  You were a military assistant at the UN -- UNPROFOR

 8     HQ in Zagreb until the authority was transferred; is that right?  Thank

 9     you.

10        A.   Yes, I was a military assistant in Sarajevo, not Zagreb, and I

11     was there when the transfer of authority occurred.

12        Q.   Thank you.  And since you said earlier that the transfer of

13     authority took place in December after the signing of the Dayton Accords

14     in 1995, did you immediately become an assistant but now in the NATO

15     forces brigade?  Thank you.

16        A.   In my case, yes, I did.  And I see what you were asking earlier.

17     For those countries member of NATO who were already providing troops to

18     the UN, if their government agreed it was fairly simple to basically

19     change hat from a blue hat to a green hat and remain with the new

20     mission, new mission which also had new modes of operations and more

21     means and a new mandate.

22        Q.   Thank you.  And was it easy to make this change practically in

23     the course of one night and one day?  Thank you.

24        A.   Well, changing the hat was much faster than one night and one

25     day, but changing the mandate was a bit longer than that.  And the

Page 3090

 1     preparations occurred in the months before -- I mean, it did not start

 2     happening on the 20th of December.  It started before with all sorts of

 3     planning.  I remember the ARC commander, the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps

 4     who would command the NATO operation came to visit a couple of months

 5     before to start devising plans with his staff and to determine how that

 6     would happen.  So we started before of course.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  You mentioned the commander of the Rapid Reaction

 8     Force.  Was that the French General Soubirou?  Thank you.

 9        A.   No, sir.  You are confusing the Rapid Reaction Force that the

10     French and British were putting together in late June 1995 and the Allied

11     Rapid Reaction Corps, NATO organisation, that eventually came and took

12     command of the new UN mandated mission but executed by NATO troops in

13     December 1995.

14        Q.   Thank you for correcting me.  But before July 1995 was the

15     commander of the Rapid Reaction Force in fact serving at the UNPROFOR

16     headquarters in Sarajevo?  Thank you.

17        A.   The Rapid Reaction Force that the French and British put together

18     before NATO got in the picture was in fact commanded by a former Sarajevo

19     Sector commander, who had returned to France, rejoined his army, and now

20     was coming back in this new capacity.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us whether the Rapid Reaction Force

22     operated under the UN mandate in June 1995 when the commander returned

23     from France to Bosnia?  Thank you.

24        A.   I'm not sure about that honestly.  That force was created by the

25     French and the British.  It would have had to be included eventually in

Page 3091

 1     the UN mandate, but how that came about was quite a bit above my pay

 2     grade.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Since you mentioned the IFOR commander,

 4     General Layton Smith, do you know what post he occupied before coming to

 5     Bosnia?  Thank you.

 6        A.   I'm not sure.  I think you're talking of the American admiral but

 7     I'm not sure what job he held.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Did he become the IFOR commander and before that he

 9     commanded the south wing of NATO?  Thank you.

10        A.   Possible.  I don't know.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that in all the observer missions the

12     observers were intelligence officers in the -- and they did their job in

13     the countries of the former Yugoslavia where there was war going on?

14     Thank you.

15        A.   What you can say that the nature of their job was gathering

16     information, but I know for a fact that not very many, if any, were

17     trained intelligence officers.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Were you in Bosnia or in NATO forces while the

19     Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was bombed and during the war in Kosovo?

20     Thank you.

21        A.   I was back in Canada at that time.

22        Q.   Thank you.  And have you ever served in Macedonia or in Albania?

23     Thank you.

24        A.   No, sir, I have not.

25        Q.   Thank you.  And do you know what mission General Walker, the

Page 3092

 1     American General Walker, had in Kosovo?  Thank you.

 2        A.   No, I do not, sir.

 3        Q.   Do you know anything about the observer missions in the territory

 4     of Serbia, the UN observer missions?  Thank you.

 5        A.   While I was deployed in Bosnia and Sarajevo from May 1995 to May

 6     1996, as far as I know all the UN observers were deployed within

 7     Bosnia-Herzegovina.  I'm not aware of observers elsewhere or at other

 8     times.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  You have told us about the UNPROFOR headquarters in

10     Zagreb.  Did it have several sectors and who was stationed in

11     Sector North in Croatia?  Thank you.

12        A.   With the UNPF headquarters in Zagreb was commanding two theatres,

13     basically Croatia and Bosnia, and I'm not aware of the forces that were

14     in the northern sector.  I'm aware of the Canadian contribution to that

15     mission, which was in the south.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Did you ever hear of Vukovar and Western Slavonia?

17     Thank you.

18        A.   I heard the names and I could probably find them fairly quickly

19     on a map, but it was outside of my area.  And believe me, we had quite

20     enough work to keep us busy in Sarajevo without concerning ourselves --

21     well, I'm speaking for myself, but without concerning myself with what

22     was going on elsewhere.  Had it been an adjacent sector to

23     Sector Sarajevo, perhaps I would have paid more attention because it was

24     geographical adjacent but it was not the case.  So I'm not aware of the

25     situation in those sectors.

Page 3093

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Well, I asked you this because I wanted to see

 2     whether you know all the UNPROFOR commanders from the period while you

 3     were -- or rather, when the UNPROFOR headquarters was moved to Zagreb.

 4     Because are you aware of the fact that UNPROFOR was also stationed in

 5     Western Slavonia and in Vukovar?  Thank you.

 6        A.   Well, I know that there were UN troops there, but they were not

 7     under UNPROFOR at that time.  They had renamed the mission, so there was

 8     a different mission in Croatia that was looking after those UN troops.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  And do you know that all the staff -- all the

10     personnel who were observers in Sector North under the command of

11     General Walker, who was also in Sector North, had been transferred from

12     Vukovar to Kosovo?  Thank you.

13        A.   No, I didn't know about that.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Do you know that all the UNPROFOR and NATO operations

15     followed after military missions that had been deployed in the territory?

16     Thank you.

17        A.   I'm not sure I understand what you're asking, sir.  If you could

18     rephrase, please.

19        Q.   Well, for instance, the combat operations in Kosovo were preceded

20     by the military mission by General Walker, and you probably know about

21     Racak.  He claimed that a crime had been committed there, and in the end

22     it turned out that there had been no crime.  Thank you.

23        A.   Well, Kosovo happened later, after I had returned to Canada and

24     occupied other functions.  All I know about General Walker is he,

25     probably the same, commanded the Allied Reaction Corps that was deployed

Page 3094

 1     to Bosnia in December 1995.  What he did after, I don't know.

 2             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, is that perhaps a convenient time

 3     for our first break?

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you, Mr. President.

 5             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Thank you, Witness, for giving me very fair answers.

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We must have our first break now for technical

 8     reasons.  We will have a shorter break because of the sitting time today,

 9     and we will resume ten minutes before 5.00.

10                           --- Recess taken at 4.32 p.m.

11                           --- On resuming at 4.54 p.m.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. Tolimir, please proceed.

13             THE ACCUSED:  [Microphone not activated]

14             [Interpretation] Could we please see in the e-court Exhibit P582.

15     This is the memorandum that we just had up on the screen, and can we show

16     it both in the English and in the Serbian versions.  Thank you.

17             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   And while we're waiting, can I please ask you to tell us if you

19     know that in all the areas where there was war in the former Yugoslavia,

20     first you had the observer missions, then you had the UNPROFOR forces,

21     then you had the rapid force -- reaction force, and then NATO forces.

22     Thank you.

23        A.   I'm not sure if it happened in all the missions, but yes that was

24     generally the deployment that occurred in Bosnia and probably in Kosovo

25     as well.

Page 3095

 1        Q.   Thank you.  We are looking at this memorandum of yours.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please show page 2 of the

 3     document.  Thank you.  Can we look at page 2.  Thank you.

 4             Could we zoom in on page 2, please.  Thank you.

 5             [Microphone not activated]

 6             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Microphone, please.

 7             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 8             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 9        Q.   In answer to Mr. Thayer's question - this is transcript page 17,

10     lines 18 to -- actually, lines 11 to 19, you said how General Smith said

11     that the UNPROFOR could not extend the guarantees to the agreement

12     offered by Mladic, which he wanted the representatives of Zepa to sign

13     with him.  Can you please tell us whether that was so.  Thank you.

14        A.   I can certainly give you a partial answer.  For a more complete

15     answer, you would have to ask General Smith because he was commander of

16     all the forces.  But from my understanding, one, we did not have all the

17     troops to be able to observe all Serbian or VRS activity while they were

18     collecting these people in the Zepa enclave because it was a fairly large

19     area; and two, we were not willing to let the VRS hold, especially the

20     men of military age, knowing that many men of the same age taken in

21     Srebrenica had been killed and not held as prisoners of war; and finally,

22     there was no all-encompassing agreement to have an exchange of prisoners

23     of war between Serbian and Bosniaks when this was all over.  And I think

24     this was General Smith's main point, but for a more complete answer you

25     would have to ask him.

Page 3096

 1        Q.   Thank you.  And was this on the 25th of July?  This is what you

 2     said on page 20, lines 11 to 18, that General Smith what I said he said

 3     just now.  Thank you.

 4        A.   I'm not sure of the exact date.  I would have to look at the

 5     document to confirm, but it --

 6        Q.   Thank you.  We can see the memorandum in front of us, your

 7     memorandum.  Can you remember when it was written and when you were in

 8     Zepa when Smith was in Zepa, if you look at the memorandum?  Thank you.

 9        A.   I think it was -- I wrote this late on the 28th of July, as I

10     was -- as I returned to Sarajevo with General Gobillard at that time.

11     But General Smith was there the day before.

12        Q.   Thank you.  So you were not there when General Smith was there.

13     You're giving us hearsay evidence here; is that correct or not?

14        A.   No, no.  No.  In fact, when General Smith first arrived, I was in

15     a meeting with General Mladic and the two or three Bosniak

16     representatives of Zepa.  And then General Smith arrived and I talked to

17     him along with other people at that time.  The next day is when I wrote

18     this, after General Gobillard had arrived.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us the date for the record.  Thank you.

20        A.   Well, I think from memory that the meeting of -- with

21     General Mladic was on the 27th, and that's when General Smith arrived.

22     And the next day, the 28th, is when I linked up with General Gobillard;

23     and after his meeting with you, I wrote this.

24        Q.   Thank you.  And can you tell us, please, when the evacuation

25     actually started because you tell us that you could see them take their

Page 3097

 1     things out of the houses.  Could you tell us who was doing that and when

 2     that happened.

 3        A.   When I went down to Zepa, I believe it was the evening of the

 4     27th, is when I saw that.  But the evacuation had started a few days

 5     before.  The questions being discussed there were the people that were

 6     left, and estimates varied about how many people were left and who those

 7     people were.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

 9             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, just perhaps to save some re-direct

10     time because I may not have any to get Mr. Fortin home, if we could just

11     clarify for the record when the General and Colonel Fortin are referring

12     to "see them take their things out of the houses," what are we talking

13     about?  Just to clarify who we're talking about, taking what out of whose

14     houses.

15             THE WITNESS:  Well, when I went down to the village, I saw Serb

16     soldiers taking fridge, cows, mattresses from Bosniak houses -- Bosniak

17     people who had been evacuated or were in the process of being evacuated,

18     loading that stuff into trucks for themselves.

19             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Please carry on, Mr. Tolimir.

20             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

21        Q.   And could you please state for the record what date that was and

22     what date the agreement was signed.

23        A.   Well --

24        Q.   Did the Muslims leave before this agreement was signed or what

25     happened?  Thank you.

Page 3098

 1        A.   I believe that -- like I said earlier, when I went down was the

 2     evening of the 27th of July, that's when I saw those things.  And the

 3     meeting I attended was prior to leaving check-point 2 and going down to

 4     the village, meeting where Mladic was trying to obtain the agreement of

 5     the Bosniak representative, which he eventually got.  But I was not

 6     present when he eventually got it, but I believe it's the same day.  The

 7     evacuation of the population had started happening before.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  We will be able to see it from other witnesses'

 9     statements and we will also look at the full text of the agreement on the

10     disarming and evacuation, so we don't want to waste any time.  But please

11     tell me when you were the second time with Gobillard on the 28th there,

12     were the Rapid Reaction Forces deployed at the check-point, the first

13     check-point, at the road at Boksanica, where the meeting between Mladic

14     and the Muslims was held?

15        A.   No.  The Rapid Reaction Force was not deployed to Zepa.  There

16     was a original Ukrainian Company and some Russian and French troops were

17     sent, but not troops of the Rapid Reaction Force.  And I make the

18     distinction because the Rapid Reaction Force had all the heavy military

19     hardware, whereas the UN troops who were deployed, they simply had their

20     own rifle.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Had the Rapid Reaction Force been already deployed in

22     Bosnia by that time?  Thank you.

23        A.   Some elements.  I don't remember the exact date of when they were

24     complete on the ground, but some elements had been deployed as early as

25     late June.  But this did not happen overnight.  It took quite some time

Page 3099

 1     to deploy all of the elements, but they were deploying in areas like

 2     Sarajevo and none were sent to the eastern enclaves.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  And do you know that the Muslim leadership in

 4     Sarajevo asked from UNPROFOR that the Rapid Reaction Force be deployed in

 5     Zepa and that they told the Muslims in Zepa to refuse signing the

 6     agreement because they had promises that the Rapid Reaction Force would

 7     be deployed there?  Are you aware of that?  Thank you.

 8        A.   Well, I became aware that the Muslim government was making all

 9     kinds of demands, but I don't think they were ever promised that the

10     Rapid Reaction Force would be deployed there.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Since the agreement was signed on the 24th of July --

12     [Microphone not activated]

13             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Well, since the agreement was signed on the 24th of July - we

16     have it here after all - and its implementation was delayed, was this in

17     any way related to the arrival of the Rapid Reaction Force demanded by

18     the Muslims?  Could there be any link there?  Thank you.

19        A.   I don't see why because UNPROFOR was not a party to the

20     agreement.

21        Q.   Thank you.  And could you tell us whether the Rapid Reaction

22     Force was an integral part of UNPROFOR and what kind of mandate it had,

23     if you know?  Thank you.

24        A.   It was not quite an integral part of UNPROFOR.  It was given

25     eventually, but I'm not sure when, under command of commander UNPROFOR,

Page 3100

 1     but it had a separate command structure.  I'm not sure who else they

 2     reported to, so I'm not very familiar with the chain of command of the

 3     Rapid Reaction Force.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  I think that's enough.  There's no need for us to

 5     burden the Trial Chamber any longer about this issue, why the

 6     implementation of the agreement was delayed by four days.

 7             Now, Mr. Thayer asked you here about Tolimir's role when he

 8     offered the possibility that the vehicles be sent into the mountains to

 9     pick up Muslim civilians and military personnel.  Now, was this conveyed

10     to you or is it something that you heard?  Thank you.

11        A.   I was there when you had the discussion with General Gobillard.

12        Q.   Thank you.  And can you tell us what I offered to Gobillard,

13     because in the sentence quoted by the Prosecutor it has not been

14     specified and after all I'm on trial here for some of the statements that

15     I allegedly made.  So could you please tell the Trial Chamber what is it

16     that I offered General Gobillard.  Thank you.

17        A.   Well, I think it's in the memorandum.  From memory, you were

18     offering the UN to go and pick up those remaining people in the enclave,

19     which was the best way for UNPROFOR to ensure the security of those

20     people.  As I mentioned earlier, we didn't have the means to do that,

21     considering that it was a wide area, it was a very hilly area, the

22     Bosniaks' military remnants which were those concerning you mostly had

23     been hiding in that area for a long time, and that would have been an

24     endeavour with no end.  We didn't have the means to do that.

25        Q.   Thank you.  So those were soldiers of the Zepa Brigade who

Page 3101

 1     refused to be disarmed in accordance with the agreement or are we talking

 2     about civilians here?  Thank you.

 3        A.   Well, we thought at the time that there were elements of both

 4     remaining in Zepa, some civilians and some members of the Zepa Brigade

 5     which were not ready to give up.  You didn't think so.  You thought that

 6     only military from the Zepa Brigade remained in the enclave.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Now I would like you to look at paragraph 6 of your

 8     memorandum where Tolimir is mentioned again and to explain to us -- well,

 9     to give us some additional explanations.  I will ask you questions after

10     you've read the document.

11             Thank you.  Now that you've read it my question to you would be:

12     Did this happen on the 28th in the conversation between myself and

13     General Gobillard?  Thank you.

14        A.   Yes.

15        Q.   And on the 28th did General Gobillard ask me if Avdo Palic had

16     been killed?  Thank you.

17        A.   Yeah, that's what it says.  If he knew if it was true that he had

18     been killed.

19        Q.   Thank you.  And do you know by any chance when Avdo Palic was

20     killed?  Thank you.

21        A.   No, I don't.

22        Q.   Thank you.  Well, the Trial Chamber will definitely be able to

23     determine that, and if you know he had not been killed at the time and I

24     said what I knew at the time.  It was probably part of the propaganda

25     because by that time -- at that time he was not dead yet.

Page 3102

 1             Now I would like us to look at the witness's statement.

 2             THE ACCUSED:  [Microphone not activated]

 3             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The witness statement provided to

 5     the Prosecution on the 19th, 20th, 21st, and 22nd of November, 1997.

 6     Thank you.

 7             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 8        Q.   And while we're waiting for the statement to come up on our

 9     screens, can you please tell us whether you gave this statement in the

10     course of a trial on the 19th, 20th, 21st, and 22nd of November, 1997,

11     when you came here to testify at a trial?

12        A.   No.  A court lawyer came to Canada to take that statement from

13     me.

14        Q.   Thank you.

15             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] So could we please look at 1D206,

16     that's the number of the statement, because we will now be focusing on

17     it.  Thank you.

18             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

19        Q.   You see the front page in English, and I can see it in my mother

20     tongue.  Is this the statement that you gave and that you signed?  Thank

21     you.

22        A.   Yeah, it's that first page.

23        Q.   Thank you.

24             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we please look at page 2 of

25     this statement.  Thank you.

Page 3103

 1             [Microphone not activated]

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 3             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] I would like the witness to look at

 4     paragraph 4 of this statement in the English language.  Thank you.

 5             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Now, is it correct that I asked you whether you had

 7     transferred from UNPROFOR forces to the multi-national division of IFOR,

 8     NATO, immediately and that this was true both for you and for your

 9     superior commander, General Zeller, is that correct because this is what

10     you state in your statement.  So could you please confirm for the record.

11        A.   Yes, that is correct.

12        Q.   Thank you.  Now I would like us to look at page 3 of the

13     statement in Serbian and I assume it's the same in English, but let us

14     have a look and then we'll check.  Thank you.

15             Now, in the first paragraph of this page it says that you did all

16     operative work in this UNPROFOR unit and later on in the IFOR unit as the

17     military assistant.  Is that correct or not?  Thank you.

18        A.   Yes, it basically says that I kept the same job.

19        Q.   Thank you.  In paragraph 2 the Rapid Reaction Forces are referred

20     to.  Thank you.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  What is your question, Mr. Tolimir?

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             My question was whether the Rapid Reaction Forces command was in

24     Kiseljak, as it is written here in this paragraph, number 4 in the

25     witness's statement.  Thank you.

Page 3104

 1             THE WITNESS:  Well, as you can see, that's what it says,

 2     headquarters in Kiseljak.

 3             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 4        Q.   Thank you.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we look at page 3 of the

 6     statement now, please, and can we look at the last paragraph on that

 7     page.  Thank you.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think it's on the screen.

 9             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

10        Q.   You can see the last sentence.  It says that:

11             "Sector Sarajevo was headquartered in the PTT building.  This is

12     the post office, telephone, and telegraph building.  When I talk of my

13     duties initially in May 1995, the sector commander was

14     General Herve Gobillard.  He was posted back to France" -- page 4,

15     please, can we look at page 4, "on the 12th of August, 1995.

16             Thank you.  This is on page 4.  I hope you're able to follow.

17             "He was replaced by General Jean-Rene Bachelet on the 9th of

18     August, 1995.  General Bachelet was replaced in early December 1995 by

19     General Louis Zeller, who I mentioned above.  General Zeller arrived on

20     December 11.  All the sector commanders I served under were French.  The

21     nature of my job as military assistant only changed under General Zeller,

22     as the mandate of the multi-national forces serving in the former

23     Yugoslavia had changed completely with the transfer of authority.

24     Otherwise, my duties and responsibilities remained the same, but with

25     Bachelet there were more occasions when we were doing things that the UN

Page 3105

 1     and he wanted to let the world see.  For instance, when we were opening

 2     the highway into Sarajevo, we had a press conference on the scene.  I

 3     would translate for Bachelet on those occasions."

 4             My question is:  Can you please tell me whether all these French

 5     commanders from UNPROFOR later remained in the IFOR forces on the same

 6     posts and on the same duties.  Thank you.

 7        A.   In fact, General Gobillard returned home to France after one year

 8     in Sarajevo as commander of Sector Sarajevo in August 1995.

 9     General Bachelet also returned to France after a shorter period.  He was

10     there from August to early December, but he returned to France to assume

11     other duties.  General Zeller, who was in charge as of early December and

12     therefore was in charge during the transfer of authority on the 20th of

13     December remained as commander of the Sarajevo Brigade.  But as I alluded

14     to earlier, when Mr. Thayer was questioning me, for us at sector level,

15     we now became brigade -- a NATO brigade and that changed the nature of

16     our responsibilities because it was a new level of command that was

17     created.

18             Above us, the new level was the division, divisional level, which

19     is higher than brigade.  The divisional level assumed all the duties that

20     the sector was performing during the UNPROFOR mandate.  So the

21     division -- the new divisional level was assuming those duties within the

22     NATO deployment.  So the brigade lost a lot of -- we were not responsible

23     any longer for contacts with the corps, for example, either Bosniak or

24     Serb, VRS, corps.  We lost that responsibility to the division.  So

25     that's what I'm saying in there.

Page 3106

 1        Q.   Thank you.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Can we now show page 5 of the

 3     statement to the witness, please, paragraph 4 and can we zoom in on that

 4     text, please, thank you.  Thank you.  Thank you.

 5             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 6        Q.   We can see this paragraph now, paragraph 4, which says:

 7             "There were three French Battalions in Sarajevo.  French

 8     Battalion 2 was at the airport.  Their duties were to protect the

 9     airport, run Bosnian convoys across the airport, and later run a two-way

10     crossing for Bosnian and Serb populations."

11             Thank you.  End of quote.  My question is:  Was this true during

12     the UNPROFOR mandate in Bosnia and are you able to tell us what Bosnian

13     convoys did you run across the airport?  Thank you.

14        A.   Okay.  Bosnian convoys across the airport occurred before I

15     arrived.  As I was saying earlier, when I landed on May 15th, it was the

16     second or third day of the Bosniak offensive to break out of Sarajevo and

17     the airport was closed because there was firing on both sides and there

18     were no more convoys.  My understanding is that those convoys were to

19     bring in food to the population of Sarajevo based on prior agreements

20     between the two factions.  Of course that agreement went out the door

21     when the fighting resumed on May 12th, 13th, or 14th, 1995, so those are

22     the convoys I'm talking about.

23        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us what UNPROFOR did in order to stop

24     the fighting by the Muslims in their attacks on Ilidza on the 12th, 13th,

25     and 14th of May?  Thank you.

Page 3107

 1        A.   I'm not aware of any intervention that I was a part of, but I

 2     know that the sector headquarters staff were in -- having meetings with

 3     the Bosniak corps in Sarajevo and probably sending protest letters.  But

 4     I was brand new so I didn't know everything that was going on at that

 5     time.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Are you able to explain to the Trial Chamber whether

 7     Sarajevo was a protected area when you got there in May and was it able

 8     to carry out offensive actions against the Army of Republika Srpska?

 9     Thank you.

10        A.   Yes, it was supposed to be protected area, but no side, yours or

11     theirs, was respecting the prior agreements.  Agreements concerning

12     weapon collection points, for example, were not respected.  So it was not

13     much of a protected area for that reason.

14        Q.   Thank you.  And does that justify the Muslims' attack on Serbs in

15     that period when you just arrived?

16        A.   Well, we have to look at the bigger situation, and the bigger

17     situation is the VRS tried to capture the whole of Bosnia initially.

18     They were not able to capture Sarajevo and the three eastern enclaves, so

19     they were surrounding these areas, choking them, and people were

20     starving.  So is it justified that the Bosniaks were trying to break out

21     so that they could obtain resupply based on their own wishes as opposed

22     to the VRS deciding what goes in and what not?  That's debatable I think.

23        Q.   Thank you.  And was this opinion shared by UNPROFOR unit

24     commands, just like the one that you stated for us today in this

25     courtroom?  Thank you.

Page 3108

 1        A.   What I have just stated is Fortin's opinion, my own opinion.

 2        Q.   Thank you.

 3             Can we look at page 7 of your statement now, please, lines 1, 2,

 4     and 3.  Thank you.

 5             We can see that it's the first paragraph.  You say:

 6             "What I did write was an ultimatum that we sent to return the

 7     weapons that were compiled or we would bomb them.  We did not bomb them

 8     and they were not returned."

 9             THE INTERPRETER:  Interpreter's note:  We could not find the

10     place in the statement in the original text.

11             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   I'm repeating my question.  Did this happen at the time when the

13     Muslims were conducting attacks on Serbian positions?  Was that the

14     period when you were collecting the weapons?  Thank you.

15        A.   I will read the text first.

16             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Perhaps it's on a different page.

17             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, if I may, just so we have a clear

18     record later on in case this particular document isn't tendered or for

19     any other reason.  I believe that the portion that General Tolimir's

20     referring to is on page 7, it's the last sentence of the second full

21     paragraph on 0055-5111:

22             "For instance, around May 20th, 1995, when the Bosnian Serbs

23     started using weapons around the WCPs, we wrote letters.  One that I

24     wrote was an ultimatum that we gave them to return weapons to the WCPs or

25     that we would bomb.  They did not, and we bombed."

Page 3109

 1             I think that's slightly different as was appeared in the

 2     transcript a few moments ago.  I just wanted to clarify that.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you very much.  I would like to have that

 4     on the screen.  It should be perhaps on the next page.  Are we on page 7?

 5             THE WITNESS:  I have it here.  It's below the bold title

 6     "Records," the second paragraph --

 7             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

 8             THE WITNESS:  -- last few sentences.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes.

10             Now your question, Mr. Tolimir.

11             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

12             My question was in his statement did the witness write:

13             "The one that I wrote was an ultimatum that we gave to them to

14     return weapons to the weapons collection points or that we would bomb.

15     They did not and we bombed."

16             Thank you.  I wanted the witness to read that so that I could put

17     a question to him.

18             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  He did and now you should put a question.

19     [Overlapping speakers]  repetition.

20             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

21             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

22        Q.   Did you state this in your statement, since Mr. Thayer said that

23     there was a difference in the statement.  Does the same thing -- does

24     your statement say the same thing in English?  Thank you.

25        A.   Well, I'm not sure if there's a -- if there's a translation

Page 3110

 1     problem, but I understand what I wrote on the English side, and that's

 2     correct.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  Did you write an ultimatum to the Serbs, that they

 4     should return weapons to the weapons collection points, and if not they

 5     would be bombed; and since they did not return the weapons, they were

 6     bombed?  Thank you.

 7        A.   That's correct.  I wrote the statement and the results are as

 8     laid out in the text.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  Does that mean that the Serbs were bombed because

10     they took their weapons in self-defence, but the Muslims were not even

11     though they attacked them?  Thank you.

12        A.   Well, the problem here is the type of weapons.  Weapons

13     collection points were created to store heavy weapons.  Heavy weapons

14     means heavy mortars, not 82-millimetre or less but bigger; artillery;

15     tanks and other vehicles of the sort.  The Bosniaks have very little of

16     that type of equipment.  There was a Bosniak weapon collection point in

17     Sarajevo, but they didn't have all the heavy equipment because that heavy

18     equipment was seized by the VRS, it was the former Yugoslav Army

19     equipment.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you.  Can you tell us if UNPROFOR tolerated

21     infantry attacks from the Muslims against the Serbs and punished the

22     Serbs for each violation of the agreement on the collection of heavy

23     weaponry at certain check-points that were under UNPROFOR control?  Thank

24     you.

25        A.   Well, I'm not sure I would put it that way, but the UN was sent

Page 3111

 1     to intervene to protect population in those enclaves, Sarajevo included,

 2     that could not be taken militarily initially in the war by the VRS.  So

 3     that's the whole point of the UN deployment, was to protect those

 4     populations.  And since the VRS was encircling the city and strangling

 5     it, preventing food from coming in, yes, the Bosniaks were attempting to

 6     break out while the UN was attempting to negotiate more food and UN

 7     convoys coming in.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Can you please tell this Trial Chamber that is

 9     presiding in this case whether these weapons were in the hands of the

10     Serbs when you sent the ultimatum and were these weapons always weapons

11     that belonged to the Serbs other than they had to be at these

12     check-points that under -- that were under your supervision?  Did they

13     take something that was already theirs?  Thank you.

14        A.   Well, those are former Yugoslav Army weapons taken by the VRS

15     early in the war.  And, yes, following an agreement with UNPROFOR

16     they - the Serbs - had agreed to put those weapons in weapons collection

17     points.  Again, I remind that those are heavy weapons, artillery, tanks,

18     and things like that; and those are the weapons that were taken from the

19     weapon collection points, breaking the agreement, and used to fire on

20     Sarajevo, a starving city at that time.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Does it say in the agreement that the weapons can be

22     used in self-defence?  Thank you.

23        A.   I don't recall, sir, the exact details of the agreement.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Could you please look at the sentence that's one

25     sentence below this one that you've just read.  It's -- you say:

Page 3112

 1             "I believe General Smith was doing the same things at his level.

 2     We always discussed sending an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs with him,

 3     of course, prior to doing so."

 4             Thank you.  So did you say that in your statement?

 5        A.   Yes, that's what we normally did.  Like I said earlier, we were

 6     operating at the corps level.  General Smith was operating at army Main

 7     Staff level.  Usually we agreed on something before we proceeded.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  And can you say if an ultimatum issued by you, your

 9     command, or General Smith was ever -- if any such ultimatums threatening

10     bombing was ever sent to Muslims?  Thank you.

11        A.   I don't recall, sir.

12        Q.   Thank you.  And then you go on to say in your statement when you

13     speak about sniping in that chapter, can you tell us whether Muslims had

14     snipers in Sarajevo, yes or no?  Thank you.

15        A.   I don't know if they had snipers in the same -- in the same way,

16     because from -- however, as I say, I was fired at by the Muslims as well

17     as the Serbs, but they were not snipers.  They were firing from the

18     window of a basement right near the street where I was driving by.  But I

19     don't think they had snipers in the same way that sniping was coming from

20     Serb hill Grbavica, for example.

21        Q.   Thank you.  Is it something that you think or are you sure about

22     that?  Thank you.

23        A.   No, I'm not sure, sir.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Now, could you please look at the fifth passage in

25     your statement where General Crouch is mentioned.  You say he came in

Page 3113

 1     before he took up his post in IFOR.  Why did he come to Sarajevo, in what

 2     capacity, when UNPROFOR was deployed there?

 3        A.   Like I said earlier, the deployment of NATO troops -- or planning

 4     for the deployment of NATO troops started before the actual date of

 5     transfer of authority.  And as soon as the Dayton Accords was signed, we

 6     started receiving reconnaissance missions from NATO units who would --

 7     who were designated to start preparing for deployment.  And I believe

 8     General Crouch was a senior member of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps,

 9     and he was coming in such a reconnaissance to look at the terrain, to

10     look at the situation, to look at where they could put additional troops

11     that were coming in.

12        Q.   Thank you.  And can you tell us whether that corps had a mandate

13     within UNPROFOR or NATO?  Thank you.

14        A.   No, that corps took command as IFOR as of December 20th, so it

15     had no mandate under UNPROFOR.  All it had was following the Dayton

16     Accords reconnaissance started by these people to see where they would

17     bring their people and be ready to take command on the 20th of December.

18        Q.   Thank you.  You say here in line 8, paragraph 5:

19             "I was there with General Bachelet," that's your commanding

20     officer, "and General Crouch, even before Crouch took up duties as part

21     of IFOR."

22             Now, my question is:  Can you tell us the time-period so that we

23     can have it on the record because you're talking about Dayton Peace

24     Accords and it did happen before that.  Thank you.

25        A.   Yes, I don't see that text on the e-court, but what I'm saying is

Page 3114

 1     that you are a trained military officer, you know how to conduct -- bring

 2     in reinforcements or conduct relief in place.  These things don't happen

 3     overnight, especially talking about thousands of troops with heavy

 4     equipment.  So as soon as there was an accord that NATO would take-over

 5     the UN mission, these things, preparations, started happening and that's

 6     one example of that.  Even before that, officers from

 7     UNPROFOR-contributing nations could come and visit their troops and look

 8     at the terrain and see in what conditions their soldiers were operating.

 9     So these kinds of visits were not out of the ordinary.  But in this

10     particular case, it was planning for the upcoming NATO deployment.

11        Q.   Thank you.  You said that you were unable to find it in the

12     English text.  Could you please look at line 3 here in the English

13     version, there's mention here of General Crouch.  So please look at it

14     because I would like to ask you some additional questions in this regard.

15     Thank you.

16        A.   Yes.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us whether you remember if it was in

18     December or before December?  Thank you.

19        A.   I don't remember exactly when, but it was close to December

20     because we had access to Grbavica, where we could not go before.  And

21     this is on -- Grbavica is a portion of the city that was held by the

22     Serbs, and we could even go and visit the underground system that had

23     been developed for people to move covertly from one firing position to

24     the next.  And I mention that because from a military -- from a soldier's

25     point of view, it was well done.

Page 3115

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Now, in order to determine the time-frame, was that

 2     after the first and the second air-strikes on the Republika Srpska army

 3     positions in Sector Sarajevo?

 4        A.   It was well after.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Now, can you tell us the reconnaissance mission and

 6     the deployment of those large units with heavy weapons before the Dayton

 7     Peace Agreement, could it have affected the outcome of the Dayton

 8     negotiations and, in fact, the Dayton Peace Agreement itself?  Thank you.

 9        A.   It did not occur -- deployment did not occur before the Dayton

10     Agreement.

11        Q.   Thank you.  And Crouch's reconnaissance mission, did it take

12     place before the Dayton Agreement?  Thank you?

13        A.   That's what I'm saying.  There were visits by staff officers from

14     the UN-contributing nations before that, but planning visits for the

15     deployment did not occur before Dayton, but Dayton was signed before the

16     transfer of authority date.  So there was some time in between to do

17     those reconnaissance and planning.

18        Q.   Thank you.  Can you tell us if you know that whether

19     General Crouch was deployed in Albania and Macedonia during the war in

20     Kosovo, yes or no?  Thank you.

21        A.   No idea, sir.  I would not even recognise the man.

22        Q.   Thank you.  And can you tell us what post he held in Bosnia after

23     the Dayton Peace Agreement.  Thank you?

24        A.   I don't know either, sir.  I believe he [Realtime transcript read

25     in error "I"] was part of the Allied Rapid Reaction Corps, the designated

Page 3116

 1     NATO land unit that was deploying, but I don't know any more precisely.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Could he have been the chief of the American delta

 3     teams, since he went there to observe the anti-sniping fighting

 4     against -- in Sarajevo that was conducted by the French Battalion, as you

 5     say here in line 3 of paragraph 5 here?

 6        A.   Well, like I said I don't remember much about the man, but I

 7     don't think so.  Delta teams are not commanded by generals, they're

 8     commanded by captains and majors.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

10             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, just a correction for the record at

11     page 56, line 14 for us, I know Your Honours may have a different line

12     cite, it's the answer that begins with "I wouldn't know, the next

13     sentence starts with "I was part of the Allied Reaction Corps

14     NATO-designated land unit that was deploying, but I don't know any more

15     precisely."

16             I'm not sure that that reflects the witness's answer properly, if

17     we could just get a clarification for that.  That was an answer to a

18     question about this General Crouch.

19             THE WITNESS:  That would be "he was part."

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.  That clarifies the situation.

21             Mr. Tolimir, I think this is perhaps a convenient time for the

22     second break.  It will be a shorter one as well, and we will resume at

23     quarter past 6.00.  Thank you very much.  We adjourn.

24                           --- Recess taken at 5.54 p.m.

25                           --- On resuming at 6.16 p.m.

Page 3117

 1             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Yes, Mr. Tolimir, please carry on.

 2             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

 3             Now I would like the witness to be shown page 9 of this

 4     statement, the one that we see here.  The chapter is "Major Events."

 5     Thank you.

 6             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

 7        Q.   Now, please look at paragraph 4 here.  You say:

 8             "I arrived in Sarajevo during the course of the second or third

 9     day of the Bosnian offensive to try and break out of the city."

10             Do you see that in the English language?

11        A.   Not yet, no.

12             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  It is on page 10, the second paragraph, in

13     English.

14             THE WITNESS:  Okay.  I see it.

15             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

16        Q.   Thank you.  So let me repeat.

17             "I arrived in Sarajevo during the course of the second or third

18     day of the Bosnian offensive to try and break out of the city.  Most of

19     the shelling during those few days was in the southern part of the city

20     and at Debelo Brdo.  The sector had two observation posts which were

21     right in the middle of this offensive and being pounded by mortars,

22     artillery, and rifle grenades from both sides.  After some time, the

23     Bosnian side moved their offensive to another location, Nedzarici.  For a

24     period of about two weeks, from late May until early June, they were

25     attacking every morning to try and break out towards Ilidza.  They were

Page 3118

 1     never able to do so."

 2             Did I quote you properly here and did this Muslim attack in fact

 3     take about 15 days, as you say here?

 4        A.   That's correct.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  Now we move on to the next paragraph which reads as

 6     follows:

 7             "In response to the Bosnian attack, the Bosnian Serbs started to

 8     fire their weapons which had been gathered in the weapons collection

 9     points.  The sector issued an ultimatum to the Bosnian Serbs to stop

10     firing and to return their weapons to the points by noon on May 25th,

11     1995, or risk air-strikes.  They failed to do so and there was an

12     air-strike on May the 25th.  That evening, however, the Bosnian Serbs

13     continued to fire from three firing positions -- or rather weapons

14     collection points.  And as a consequence, a second air-strike took place

15     during the morning of May 26th, 1995.  Before the end of the morning, the

16     sector and BH command were already receiving reports that UNMOs had been

17     taken hostage in Pale."

18             Thank you.  Did I read your statement correctly?

19        A.   Yes, sir.

20        Q.   Thank you.  On the basis of reading out those two passages, my

21     question is the following:  Were Bosnian Serbs punished because they had

22     taken the weapons, heavy weapons, out of the collection points in

23     self-defence?  Thank you.

24        A.   Yes, they were punished because they took the heavy -- heavy

25     weapons out of the collection points, type of heavy weapons that the

Page 3119

 1     other side did not have.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  So Muslims were allowed to attack Serb positions

 3     every morning during the 15 days and those positions were then defended

 4     using those heavy weapons?  Thank you.

 5        A.   And your question?

 6        Q.   So did UNPROFOR allow the Muslims to attack during the 15 days

 7     Serbs every morning with impunity and then punished the Serbs the moment

 8     they started defending themselves?  Thank you.

 9        A.   Well, as you know, the UN was deployed to keep things under

10     control, prevent any attack, if possible, while negotiations at higher

11     level tried to reach a solution.  The Bosniaks, however, as I said

12     earlier were home in Sarajevo in a city that had been surrounded for

13     years and a city was starving because food was not coming in as much as

14     was necessary.  I should point out that initially - and perhaps my

15     figures are off - but the point here, initially Sarajevo had about

16     350.000 people.  At that point there were 420.000 people and not enough

17     food going in.

18             Additionally, the Bosniaks were intertwined with their own

19     population, which was not the case of the surrounding VRS.  So we could

20     not bomb the Bosniaks, as is being alluded to here.  And of course

21     whenever the Bosniaks did that, they broke the peace, they broke the calm

22     situation which we were there to prevent but we could not prevent it.  We

23     didn't have the means to be able to stop everything and we could not --

24     certainly not prevent it with air-strikes because that would have meant

25     bombarding civilian populations in Sarajevo.

Page 3120

 1        Q.   Thank you.  Now, did Muslims have a circle around the Sarajevo

 2     Serb positions at Igman and other positions that dominated Serb

 3     positions?  Thank you.

 4        A.   Well, I don't think any of the positions the Bosniaks held around

 5     Sarajevo were dominating, but I'm willing to admit that there were a few

 6     spots where it was.  But as I said, they had very few heavy weapons.  And

 7     Igman, perhaps looking at the map, it's higher but it's quite a distance

 8     to be able to bring any effective fire; it's too far.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  You covered Sarajevo very well with your points, as

10     you've told us.  And now at page 10, could we please move to page 10 in

11     the Serbian version.  You speak about the so-called hostage crisis.  You

12     know what I want to ask you about so I don't have to read out all the

13     paragraphs.  You speak about how after the air-strikes Serbs took

14     UNPROFOR soldiers hostage.  That's what you say in paragraphs 1 through 6

15     on page 10, and this extends in fact all the way down to the end of this

16     page, where you speak about 364 UNPROFOR staff who were taken hostage or

17     detained in some other way; am I right?

18        A.   Yes, that's correct.  I don't see the -- all the information, but

19     the beginning is on the page that I have.

20        Q.   Thank you.  Unfortunately, I don't speak English so I can't

21     assist you, but that's what it says here.  It's the whole of page 10 in

22     the Serbian language is devoted to the hostage crisis that occurred after

23     the government seat at Pale and the factory were bombed.  You speak about

24     three French combat vehicles that were moved out and you speak about the

25     Ukrainians who had been captured the day before were taken towards Pale

Page 3121

 1     by bus, and then you say that the soldiers were chained to locations that

 2     were possible air-strike targets.  Is that what it says in your

 3     statement?

 4        A.   Okay, it's coming up now.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Thayer.

 6             MR. THAYER:  Mr. President, I was just going to suggest moving to

 7     page 11, which we have now done, to help the witness.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

 9             THE WITNESS:  But yes, what you're reading is correct.  This is

10     what -- part of my statement.

11             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

12        Q.   Thank you.  And I have not told you yet that in your statement

13     you also speak about the -- when UNPROFOR moved from -- was transferred

14     from the -- when the Vrbanja bridge was transferred from UNPROFOR hands

15     to Bosnian Serb hands and back; is that correct?

16        A.   Well, yes, but "transferred back" was -- fighting occurred

17     between UNPROFOR and the VRS in that case.

18        Q.   Yes, that's correct.  And you say that there were casualties on

19     both sides in the fighting; is that correct?

20        A.   That's correct, and I could add that there was probably

21     casualties on the Bosniak side as well because we -- when we -- French

22     troops re-took the OP at Vrbanja bridge, they were in sight of Bosniak

23     positions as well.  And we did not trust that the Bosniaks would remain

24     quiet in that counter-attack.  So they received some fire as well from

25     the French troops attacking to re-take that bridge or that observation

Page 3122

 1     post that was taken by the VRS.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Did you have approval from the UNPROFOR HQ in Zagreb

 3     to use force to re-take Vrbanja Most, bridge?

 4        A.   I'm not sure if they were informed before the fact.

 5        Q.   Thank you.  In your statement you then say that you were always

 6     warned by Zagreb not to deal with such crises by force, not to use

 7     weapons?

 8        A.   Well, you have to point out where I say this, but as a general

 9     rule proportionality was a UN principle.  If you're fired on, you respond

10     with a weapon of similar type.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Who opened fire first, was it UNPROFOR at the

12     positions of the Army of Republika Srpska or did the army fire at

13     UNPROFOR first?  Thank you.

14        A.   Well, we're talking about two incidents here.  The VRS took the

15     observation post from the French.  I'm not sure if there was much

16     fighting at that time because the post was taken at night by a Serbian

17     soldier dressed in French uniforms.  They had kept those uniforms when

18     they had captured I don't know how many French soldiers, but more than a

19     hundred.  And some Serb soldiers spoke French, so they approached at

20     night and they took the post and captured the soldiers, soldiers who

21     would later be put on display near the bridge with an officer pointing

22     his gun at the head of a man saying stop air-strikes or we kill this man.

23     So that's the first incident.  The next day UNPROFOR French troops

24     re-took the bridge and of course over -- during the night the Serbs had

25     reinforced their position with troops.  So force was used right from the

Page 3123

 1     start to re-take that position.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  So this was after the 26th and the 25th when you

 3     carried out the first and the second air-strike.  Do you know what was

 4     the target of the bombing on those occasions?  Thank you.

 5        A.   No, I didn't know what the targets were.  Perhaps I knew then,

 6     but I don't recall.

 7        Q.   Thank you.  Can I remind you, do you recall that a barracks in

 8     Pale, a factory in Pale, and the government building of the Government of

 9     Republika Srpska was also bombed in Pale at that occasion, do you

10     remember that?  Thank you.

11        A.   No, I don't remember.  I cannot confirm that either way.

12        Q.   Very well.  Thank you.  Do you remember if the Serbs killed any

13     French soldiers when they took the Vrbanja bridge?  Thank you.

14        A.   When they initially took the bridge at night, I don't think they

15     killed any French soldiers.  In the subsequent French attack, there were

16     two French soldiers killed and 17 wounded I think.

17        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you.  So in the first attack the Serbs didn't

18     kill anyone, they just captured some people; is that correct?

19        A.   As far as I remember, yes, that's correct.  They captured the

20     observation post and the people, the French soldiers, it contained.

21        Q.   Thank you.  And when the French UNPROFOR took that check-point

22     under its control with weapons, then there was some shooting and some

23     people were killed; is that correct?

24        A.   That's correct.

25        Q.   Thank you.  Did you try to return the observation post through

Page 3124

 1     negotiations, and in that way, through negotiations, prevent the killing

 2     of any French or Serb soldiers?  Thank you.

 3        A.   That may have been, but I don't know.  That was a decision by the

 4     French commander and I was not privy to everything but -- so I don't know

 5     if there was an attempt to negotiate before.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  Did the UNPROFOR also keep a certain number of

 7     soldiers as prisoners, the soldiers who had originally captured that

 8     check-point.  Thank you.

 9        A.   Yes, that's correct.  I think there were --

10        Q.   Thank you.  Thank you.  Did you treat them as prisoners of war?

11     Thank you.

12        A.   I really don't know about the procedure exactly that followed.

13     They were taken by the French and they were not exactly prisoners of war

14     because this is -- was a UN mission.  So it became a French thing, which

15     I don't know the details.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Did the Serbs capture a number of the French and were

17     they considered prisoners of war and did they have specific status too?

18     Thank you.

19        A.   Well, yes.  As I said earlier, when the Serbs initially took the

20     observation point -- the observation post at the bridge, they also took

21     the French people.  I think there were 11 of them.  How they were

22     designated, what type of prisoner, I don't know.  I know, however, that

23     some of these soldiers were taken to the bridge and was shown on Serb TV.

24     They were threatened with a handgun, showing us and the world that if

25     NATO did not stop its bombing on the Serbs, that the French soldier would

Page 3125

 1     be killed.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  Were these soldiers exchanged, those 11 and the four

 3     who had been captured by the Serbs on the Vrbanja bridge?  Thank you.

 4        A.   I know that eventually yes, but the four Serb soldiers were

 5     returned and the 11 French soldiers I think eventually returned the same

 6     way that other UN hostages were returned, through Belgrade.  But I'm not

 7     sure in this specific case.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  In the fifth paragraph on page 11 in the Serbian, and

 9     that is probably on page 12 in the English, you say how you met Indjic

10     and Lugonja in order to exchange the French hostages they had and to

11     return to you the hostages that you had.  Is that correct?

12        A.   I don't -- pardon me.  I don't see it now.

13        Q.   Well, I'm going to read it to you -- well, I don't know English.

14     I'm reading the first, second, third, fourth, fifth paragraph, 11th page

15     in the Serbian, where you say:

16             "People were actually freed that night, but towards Belgrade, by

17     the time the prisoners had made the route from Belgrade to Zagreb, Split,

18     and Sarajevo, it was already June 5th.  They had to walk down Mount

19     Igman.  There were trucks waiting for them at the bottom of Igman.  From

20     there, the men were tracked through Butmir to the airport.  The general

21     and I as well as a large number of other people were waiting for them."

22             You waiting for those soldiers.  Was that a result of those --

23     was that a result of that meeting you had with Colonel Meille -- actually

24     that Colonel Meille had with Lugonja and Indjic.  Thank you.

25        A.   Okay, sir, they just brought up the page.  Let me have a look.

Page 3126

 1             I'm not sure if they are the same hostages, the Vrbanja bridge

 2     hostages that we are talking about here, because there was in total close

 3     to 400 UN hostages at one point, and we're talking about 120 of them

 4     returning that way -- that particular night.  Did that include the people

 5     from Vrbanja bridge, I have no idea, sir.

 6        Q.   Thank you.  And you are actually saying that this was after the

 7     meeting with Indjic and Lugonja.  In one part of the statement, if you

 8     recall, you say that Indjic was not able to make the decision.  Do you

 9     remember that?  Thank you.

10        A.   Well, I don't remember that but I believe that, yes, Indjic was

11     not able to make that kind of decision.  That would have to be made at a

12     higher level because he was a lieutenant-colonel liaison officer for the

13     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps to UNPROFOR.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Your liaison officers, were they able to make

15     decisions that were opposite from the decisions made by your commanders?

16     Thank you.

17        A.   They'd better not if they want to keep their job.

18        Q.   Thank you.  I asked you this in order to be fair to Indjic

19     because he was just a liaison officer, not a commanding officer or

20     someone who can decide on any matter.  Thank you.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  And now your question, Mr. Tolimir.

22             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

23             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

24        Q.   Was Indjic a liaison officer who would convey what was ordered to

25     him by his commander in Sector Sarajevo in the same way that you had

Page 3127

 1     liaison officers in your sector, or was he somebody who had the power to

 2     make decisions?  Thank you.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think the witness answered this question

 4     already on the last lines of page 66.

 5             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  If he replied, I thank

 6     him.  I didn't hear that answer.  I didn't register it, so that is why I

 7     repeated the question.  Thank you.

 8             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  He said that would have to be made at a higher

 9     level because he was a lieutenant-colonel liaison officer for the

10     Sarajevo-Romanija Corps to UNPROFOR.

11             Please carry on.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.  That is a fair answer.

13     Thank you.

14             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

15        Q.   Are you able to tell us whether you had civilian affairs officers

16     from the International Red Cross or any other organisation that went

17     together with the military in any kind of task that they were carrying

18     out?  Thank you.

19        A.   Well, anything that concerned prisoners we would certainly

20     involve the International Committee of the Red Cross, and I believe they

21     were involved concerning the four Serb prisoners taken at Vrbanja bridge.

22     And I believe they were also involved by UN prisoners coming back to us

23     from Belgrade.

24        Q.   Thank you.  Do you think or were you sure that the prisoners held

25     by UNPROFOR were reported to the International Red Cross?  Thank you.

Page 3128

 1        A.   I am sure that they were involved.

 2        Q.   Thank you.  We're going to move to another topic now.  You're

 3     talking about the road via Mount Igman that led to Sarajevo airport

 4     through which the Muslims and UNPROFOR received their supplies.  Did I

 5     interpret this part of your statement correctly, and I think it's not

 6     necessary then for me to read from your statement.  Thank you.

 7        A.   Yes, that's right.

 8        Q.   Thank you.  Did the Muslims prevent you from carrying out

 9     transport during the day, from using that road via Mount Igman that led

10     to Sarajevo, did the Muslims prevent you from using that road during

11     day-time?  Thank you.

12        A.   No, they did add difficulties at times.  Sometimes we could use

13     it freely; other times it was just too many people using that road and it

14     was a very low capacity -- basically initially a mountain road made for

15     mules, not for heavy trucks.  But the alternative was to use the

16     traditional road, the sierra road, which the Serbs would not allow us to

17     use or would not grant proper freedom of movement to use.  So that put

18     the UN in a dilemma of using a road where we had more freedom of movement

19     but with little capacity and with the ensuing consequences that the Serb

20     thought that we were collaborating with the Bosniak on Igman, where in

21     fact we were trying to feed ourselves and feed the city by bringing UNHCR

22     convoys.

23        Q.   Thank you.  And was this crisis something that occurred during

24     the hostage crisis and after the bombing, this crisis that put an end to

25     the use of the Kiseljak road?  Thank you.

Page 3129

 1        A.   I believe so.  It was shortly after that it was getting more

 2     difficult to bring food and other resources for the UN into the city.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  I would now like to read something to you and you can

 4     just listen carefully if you cannot find it.  This is on page 14, first,

 5     second, third, fourth paragraph, I'm going to read from the beginning.  I

 6     think in your copy it's probably on page 15.

 7             "Later on Colonel Meille briefed the general as to what he had

 8     been told by the 1st Corps where the points agreed upon during the

 9     meeting between Nicolai and Muratovic.  That movement on the Igman road

10     at night was reserved for the Bosnians and during the day for UNPROFOR,

11     that Bosnians were to have total freedom of movement in the demilitarised

12     zone and that the upkeep of the Igman road was the responsibility of

13     Sector Sarajevo.  Of course these points had been discussed but were not

14     resolved in the manner reported by the 1st Corps."

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  We see it now on the screen in the English

16     version, paragraph 4.

17             MR. TOLIMIR: [Interpretation]

18        Q.   Based on what I have read to you and what you see in this

19     paragraph, 4, can I put a question to you now?  And the question is:  Did

20     the Muslims stop you from moving along the Igman road by day, the road

21     that passed through the DMZ, which the Serbs then restored once they

22     allowed the UN to take Igman?

23        A.   I'm not sure I understand, but if you refer to the paragraph that

24     you just read it says there that of course these points had been

25     discussed but were not resolved in the manner report by the 1st Corps.

Page 3130

 1     Although we felt we had little option but to use Igman road at the time

 2     because we were prevented by the Serbs from using better roads.  The

 3     Bosniaks were not making it easy for us either.

 4        Q.   Thank you.  Now I would like you to look at the fourth paragraph

 5     in English, line 4, where it says that the Bosnians were to have total

 6     freedom of movement in the DMZ and that the upkeep of the Igman road was

 7     the responsibility of Sector Sarajevo."

 8             Is that what you stated?  Thank you.

 9        A.   Well, yes.  And that's exactly the point I made.  The Bosnians

10     reported to us that that was the agreement between Muratovic and

11     General Nicolai, but it was not the agreement between Muratovic and

12     Nicolai.  And as I said, they were not making it easy for us either, and

13     Mr. Muratovic liked to put us in a bad situation like this.

14        Q.   Thank you.  Now, my question based on what you say, based on what

15     I read, is the following:  Did the Muslims prohibit you from moving

16     through the demilitarised zone at Igman?  Thank you.

17        A.   No, they did not, but they did not make it easy to move through.

18     There were agreements, for example, that we use it by day.  But by day we

19     were being fired on by the Serbs at the bottom of the hill and they were

20     using it by night.  But as you probably know better than me, the top of

21     Mount Igman is not paved with multi-lane highways.  They're all very

22     low-capacity roads and it very quickly turned into traffic jams

23     everywhere along the road between Tarcin and the actual hill to come down

24     in the valley near the airport.

25        Q.   Thank you.  So were you prohibited from using that road through

Page 3131

 1     the demilitarised zone at night, yes or no?  Thank you.

 2        A.   We had agreed to put most of our traffic through during the day.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  I will have to read out the paragraph 5 just below

 4     paragraph 4.  So I'm reading line 4 where you say:

 5             "Following the meeting, Meille learned that a UNHCR convoy which

 6     had come down the Igman route that night had been detained at the airport

 7     and that the DMZ was closed by the Bosnians.  At the time we were

 8     attempting to resupply both Sarajevo and ourselves and trying to obtain

 9     more routes from the Serbs."

10             Is this what you stated?  Thank you.

11        A.   Yes, and I might add the next sentence:

12             "Meanwhile, the Serbs perceived our use of the Igman route as

13     co-operating with their enemy.  A lot of the obstruction the Bosnians

14     created only served to reinforce that perception and make our task

15     difficult."

16             I said that a little earlier, and I also said that generally we

17     had more freedom of movement there than anywhere else, but the Bosniaks

18     were not always making it easy for us.

19        Q.   Thank you.  And on the basis of what I've just read out to you,

20     does it not follow that the Bosnians closed down the DMZ?  Is this what

21     you stated?  Thank you.

22        A.   They did not closing down.  In fact, you read the statement

23     yourself from Colonel Meille that he's trying to make the point to them

24     that we have complete access to the DMZ.  But in the reality, it was not

25     happening -- or it was not always happening as we would like.

Page 3132

 1        Q.   Why did they then force you to move by day while they used it by

 2     night?  Thank you.

 3        A.   That's what I said.  That was the agreement.  As Colonel Meille

 4     pointed out in discussions with the Bosniaks, we have -- we want and we

 5     should have complete freedom of movement over Igman, but we can negotiate

 6     with the 1st Corps the traffic flow.  And generally we took the road by

 7     day, they by night -- they did by night, but not always.  Because we

 8     wanted to maintain freedom of movement, so using that road as much as we

 9     wanted to.

10        Q.   Thank you.  Now, was the DMZ handed over to you as UNPROFOR once

11     the Republika Srpska army withdrew from those positions on Mount Igman

12     and was it the situation then that the Muslims exerted greater control of

13     the road than UNPROFOR?  Thank you.

14        A.   Well, I wouldn't say they exerted greater control, but it was the

15     only route in and out, both for UNPROFOR and for the Bosniaks.  And it

16     was the only route in and out - the airport was not functioning at that

17     time - to bring any food in, including food for UNPROFOR because at that

18     time we didn't have much to eat either.

19        Q.   Thank you.  If that road was used only by humanitarian convoys

20     with food, why then would Muslims prohibit you from using that road to

21     supply the population in Sarajevo?  Did they use it for military

22     purposes?  Thank you.

23        A.   Yes, they did.  And I said it was a very low-capacity road so

24     everything was competing for very little capacity.  All of those issues,

25     Bosniak military issues, UNPROFOR resupply, and mainly the largest

Page 3133

 1     quantities of anything that was brought in was food for the population,

 2     UNHCR convoys.

 3        Q.   Thank you.  And did -- were Muslims ever punished because they

 4     had taken control over the roads and the demilitarised zone on

 5     Mount Igman?  Thank you.

 6        A.   There were a lot of discussions, a lot of unhappiness - I shall

 7     put it that way - on the part of UNPROFOR.  But punishing the Muslims,

 8     with air-strikes is probably what you're alluding to, would have meant

 9     punishing ourselves as well because we were basically occupying the same

10     ground, whether in the city or on the very low-capacity road over Igman.

11        Q.   Thank you.  Now, did you punish only the Serbs with air-strikes

12     when we're talking about the warring sides in the former Socialist

13     Federative Republic of Yugoslavia or Bosnia and Herzegovina?  Thank you.

14        A.   As far as I recall, sir, yes we punished only the Serbs,

15     considered as the aggressor in this war.

16        Q.   Thank you.  Did UNPROFOR consider the Serbs as aggressors in this

17     war?  Thank you.

18        A.   That's what I am saying.

19        Q.   Thank you.  Can you be an aggressor in Canada, in your own home?

20     Did those Serbs come from somewhere else, from some other state, or were

21     they born there, in the territory where the war was going on?  Thank you.

22        A.   Well, if I take all the weapons of my army and encircle a city

23     and starve it, I certainly am the aggressor even if I'm born in that

24     country.

25        Q.   Thank you.  And do you know that in Sarajevo there were heavy

Page 3134

 1     weapons, howitzers, and tanks in all -- that were left behind by the JNA

 2     in all the barracks, Jusuf Dzonlic, Marsal Tito, and in all the barracks,

 3     wherever there were heavy weapons in Sarajevo they were left behind?

 4     Thank you.

 5        A.   I saw those things you mentioned on a road outside near Stup and

 6     they had been destroyed very early in the war, and the bodies were still

 7     there two years later along with non-functioning tanks with big holes in

 8     them.

 9        Q.   Thank you.  And where were the howitzers and the cannons that

10     they kept, the ones that were in the barracks because the JNA as it

11     withdrew did not take those weapons with it?  Thank you.

12        A.   Well, as I say, I believe a lot of it was destroyed in the

13     initial fighting.  When the Serbs were trying to Sarajevo, the Bosniaks

14     defended with those weapons that remained there.  Whatever was left, was

15     not -- there were not very many heavy weapons, like I said.  All I

16     personally saw were small calibre mortars, 82-millimetre, RPGs, and

17     rifles and machine-guns, 14.5 machine-guns and that type of weapons.  I

18     didn't see any artillery, although there might have been, and certainly

19     no tanks.

20        Q.   Thank you.  And do you know that by the 15th of May until the JNA

21     was still in Bosnia, that the Bosnian Presidency invited all the Muslims

22     to leave the JNA ranks?  Thank you.

23        A.   No, sir, I didn't know about that.

24             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir, we are running out of time.  We have

25     reached the 7.00 limit.  We must break now and continue tomorrow morning.

Page 3135

 1     Before we do that, just for the record some very small corrections.  The

 2     document P515 was only marked for identification pending translation.  We

 3     have discovered that this was a mistake.  We have a translation so that

 4     this is admitted as P515.

 5                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 6             On line 13 it should read -- yes, thank you.

 7             And the Prosecution has indicated that they don't want to attach

 8     translations for the notebooks we have seen.  We have seen six of them

 9     admitted pending translation and only marked for identification.  As it

10     is not necessary to have translations, these will be received as P438,

11     P439, P440, tendered with the Witness PW-033 and P508, P515 [sic], and

12     P516 tendered with Witness PW-035.  That's a clarification for the

13     record.

14                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

15             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Another correction, please, on line 21 it should

16     read P514 instead of P515.  I think now we have it.

17             Sir, thank you for your attendance today.  We have to continue

18     tomorrow --

19             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Mr. President.

20             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Mr. Tolimir.

21             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] The Defence would like this

22     statement, D96 [as interpreted] to be admitted into evidence.

23             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Could you please repeat the number.  It is not

24     recorded correctly.

25             It is P206 -- D --

Page 3136

 1             THE ACCUSED:  [Microphone not activated]

 2             THE INTERPRETER:  Microphone, please.

 3             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think it is --

 4             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] P596, P596.

 5             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  This will be received, but I think we had another

 6     number already.

 7                           [Trial Chamber and Registrar confer]

 8             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Correction, it's 206.  Thank you.

 9             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  That's correct.  It is D206.

10             THE REGISTRAR:  1D206 will be Exhibit D50.

11             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

12             THE ACCUSED: [Interpretation] Thank you.

13             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  I think we have now everything correctly on the

14     record.

15             Again, sir, we will continue with your examination tomorrow

16     morning at 9.00, and we will have an extended sitting because we had a

17     shorter sitting today.  And we will adjourn tomorrow at 2.30.  I would

18     like to remind you that it is not allowed to have discussion with either

19     party on the content of your evidence.

20             THE WITNESS:  Understood, sir.  I will be here tomorrow.

21             JUDGE FLUEGGE:  Thank you.

22             We adjourn and resume tomorrow at 9.00.

23                           --- Whereupon the hearing adjourned at 7.06 p.m.,

24                           to be reconvened on Thursday, the 24th day of

25                           June, 2010, at 9.00 a.m.